1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

HAROLD C. WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al.,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 04-05396

PAPPERT, J. April 8, 2016

MEMORANDUM

The factual background to this case is extensive and is recited in detail in the Court’s 

separate opinion on the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See Wilson v. City of 

Philadelphia, No. 04-05396 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2016) (ECF No. 245). The Court recites here those 

facts most pertinent to the present motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Harold C. 

Wilson (“Wilson”). 

On October 4, 1989, a Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas jury found Wilson 

guilty of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of possessing an instrument of crime. 

(Joint Appendix (“JA”) 1091–1101.)1 Wilson filed post-trial motions asserting, among other 

things, that his equal protection rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) were 

violated when the prosecutor in his case discriminated in jury selection. (JA 5785–5926.) The 

trial court heard Wilson’s motions on October 3, 1991, and ultimately denied them in December 

1993. (JA 5786.) Wilson appealed his case directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which 

affirmed the trial court’s decision in February 1996. (Id.)

 

1 Given the extensive record in this case, the parties have submitted a Joint Appendix. The pages in the Joint 

Appendix are labeled with a prefix of “JA.” The Court maintains this numbering scheme when citing to the record.

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 1 of 8
2

In March 1997, the videotape of a lecture given by Wilson’s prosecutor, Jack McMahon 

(“McMahon”), became public. McMahon had given his presentation at some point after the 

1986 Batson decision but before Wilson’s 1989 trial. The contents of the tape are discussed in 

greater detail in the Court’s opinion deciding the Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In 

short, McMahon explained to other Assistant District Attorneys (“ADAs”) in the Philadelphia 

District Attorney’s Office (“DAO”) his strategies on jury selection, some of which were 

impermissible under Batson.

After learning of the video, Wilson filed for post-conviction relief and renewed his 

Batson claim. (JA 5785–5926.) The Common Pleas Court held an evidentiary hearing and 

eventually set aside Wilson’s convictions and granted him a new trial “because of the 

Commonwealth’s violation of [] Batson.” (JA 1208, 4253–99.) Wilson was retried and 

ultimately acquitted of all charges. (JA 1458.) He thereafter filed this lawsuit.

Wilson’s claims against the DAO2allege: (1) a violation of his equal protection rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) a 42 U.S.C. Section 19833 Monell claim contending 

that the DAO had a policy or custom of racial discrimination in jury selection which caused 

Wilson’s constitutional injury. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56–67, ECF No. 89.)4 Wilson’s 

summary judgment motion against the DAO seeks to apply offensive collateral estoppel to bar 

relitigation of his Batson claim because it was already litigated in the PCRA hearing where the 

 

2 Wilson also sued the City of Philadelphia and former officers of the Philadelphia Police Department (“the 

City Defendants”). (See generally Second Am. Compl.) Wilson’s claims against the City Defendants are not 

relevant to the Court’s analysis of Wilson’s motion for summary judgment infra.

 

3

Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

4 Wilson concedes that he erroneously labeled his second amended complaint as the “Third Amended 

Complaint.” (See ECF No. 104 at 1.) Thus, the Court refers to the operative complaint as the Second Amended 

Complaint (“Second Am. Compl.”).

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 2 of 8
3

DAO had a full and fair opportunity to defend itself. For the reasons below, the Court grants 

Wilson’s motion.

I.

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if, viewing 

the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Smathers v. Multi-Tool, Inc./Multi-Plastics, Inc. Emp. Health & 

Welfare Plan, 298 F.3d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 2002); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A genuine issue of 

material fact exists when “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence in 

support of the non-moving party will not suffice; there must be evidence by which a jury could 

reasonably find for the non-moving party. Id. at 252. 

In reviewing the record, a court “must view the facts in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and draw all inferences in that party’s favor.” Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, 579 

F.3d 285, 286 (3d Cir. 2009). The court may not, however, make credibility determinations or 

weigh the evidence in considering motions for summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson 

Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); see also Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 

655, 665 (3d Cir. 2002).

II.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, compels a later court to honor the earlier decision 

of a matter that was actually litigated. See Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 

1997). The doctrine relieves parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, facilitates 

judicial consistency, conserves judicial resources and encourages reliance on adjudication. See 

Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 47, 51 (Pa. 2005); see also Schaffer v. 

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 3 of 8
4

Smith, 673 A.2d 872, 875 (Pa. 1996). The movant bears the burden of showing that collateral 

estoppel applies. See Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 50 (3d Cir. 1981).

Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738, federal courts must “give 

the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the 

courts of the State from which the judgments emerged.” Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 

U.S. 222, 246 (1998) (quoting Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982)). 

Congress directs federal courts to “look principally to state law in deciding what effect to give 

state-court judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006). Under Pennsylvania law, 

relitigation of an issue is barred by collateral estoppel if: (1) the issue decided in the prior case is 

identical to the one presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) 

the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case; 

(4) the party or person privy to the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding; and (5) the determination in the prior 

proceeding was essential to the judgment.5 See Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d at 50–51.; see also Office 

of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 644 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Pa. 1994).

First, the issue in Wilson’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) hearing and this case 

must be “sufficiently similar.” Commonwealth v. Holder, 805 A.2d 499, 502 (Pa. 2002). The 

similarity of the issue “is established by showing that the same general legal rules govern both 

 

5

 The DAO’s brief is largely unresponsive to Wilson’s analysis of the Kiesewetter factors. (See generally 

Def.’s Resp. to Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Resp.”), ECF No. 222.) At oral argument, the DAO conceded that 

collateral estoppel should apply under the five Kiesewetter factors:

The Court: If we apply the five factors, can you make any argument that taking fairness aside, if 

we just apply the five factors, do you have any argument that collateral estoppel should not apply?

Mr. Scalera: Under the five factors we [the DAO] haven’t contested it.

(Oral Arg. 59:11–17, ECF No. 244.) Instead, the DAO argues that fairness considerations should preclude collateral 

estoppel’s applicability. See infra Part IV.

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 4 of 8
5

cases and that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as measured by those rules.” Suppan 

v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted). To defeat such a 

finding, “the difference in the applicable legal standards must be substantial.” Di Loreto v. 

Costigan, 600 F. Supp. 2d 671, 689 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (quoting Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 

F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 1995)).

The Common Pleas Court held a PCRA hearing on Wilson’s Batson claim. (JA 4254–

99.) The court stated he was “entitled to a new trial because of the Commonwealth’s violation of 

[] Batson.” (JA 1208, 4253.) Similarly, in this case Wilson must prove an underlying Batson

violation as an initial element of his Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 

(1978) claim against the DAO. (Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 9, ECF No. 212-1.) The 

PCRA court’s determination that Wilson’s Batson rights were violated is sufficiently similar to a 

determination that Wilson’s Batson rights were violated within the context of his Monell claim as 

to fulfill the first Kiesewetter factor.

Second, there must be a final judgment on the merits. See Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d at 50–

51. A judgment is “final” for purposes of collateral estoppel “unless or until it is reversed on 

appeal.” Shaffer, 673 A.2d at 874. A decision is “on the merits” when it “resolves the claim on 

the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Thomas v. Horn, 570 

F.3d 105, 115 (3d Cir. 2009). The state court order vacating Wilson’s conviction and granting 

him a new trial was “final” as the Commonwealth chose not to appeal. (Joint Statement of Facts 

¶ 28, ECF No. 211-1.) The order was “on the merits” because the PCRA court found that Wilson 

was entitled to a new trial as a result of the Commonwealth’s violation of Batson. (JA 1208–09, 

4253.)

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 5 of 8
6

Third, the DAO must be in privity “with a party in the prior case.” Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d 

at 50–51. The DAO concedes that it was “an arm of the Commonwealth in all aspects of 

Wilson’s prosecution.” (Def.’s Resp. at 2–4.) The third Kiesewetter factor is met.

Fourth, the Commonwealth, as the party in privity with the DAO, must have had a full 

and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d at 50–51. 

The requirement that a party have a “full and fair opportunity to litigate” mandates that “state 

proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” See Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 

461, 481 (1982); see also Rider v. Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982, 991 (3d Cir. 1988). The mandate 

“does not require that the issue must have been thoroughly litigated.” Lynch v. City of 

Philadelphia, No. 08-4780, 2009 WL 1424489, at *2 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2009) (citations omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The Commonwealth exchanged discovery, filed briefs, presented McMahon’s testimony, 

and engaged in oral argument to support its contention that Batson was not violated during 

Wilson’s first criminal trial. (JA 488–595, 1177–1217, 4254–4457.) The Commonwealth had an 

opportunity to appeal the PCRA court’s ruling granting Wilson a new trial, but chose not to do 

so. (Joint Statement of Facts ¶ 28.) The Commonwealth, therefore, had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate the Batson claim.

Fifth and finally, the determination in the prior proceeding must have been essential to 

the judgment. See Kiesewetter, 889 A.2d at 50–51. “This necessity requirement is justified by 

concerns that the first court may not have taken sufficient care in determining an issue that did 

not affect the result and that appellate review may not be available to ensure the quality of the 

initial decision.” Prusky v. ReliaStar Life Ins. Co., 532 F.2d 252, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations 

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 6 of 8
7

and internal quotation marks omitted). As the PCRA court’s finding that Wilson’s Batson rights 

were violated was the basis for his new trial, it was necessarily essential to the judgment. (JA 

1208–09, 4253.)

III.

While the DAO concedes that Wilson fulfills the five Kiesewetter factors, it argues that 

collateral estoppel should not apply for fairness reasons. See supra note 1. “A finding of 

fairness to the defendant is [] a necessary premise to the application of offensive collateral 

estoppel.” Raytech, 54 F.3d at 195. The Supreme Court of the United States grants district 

courts “broad discretion” to determine when a plaintiff “who has met the requisites for the 

application of collateral estoppel may employ that doctrine offensively.” Raytech, 54 F.3d at 195 

(citation omitted). The DAO advances three fairness arguments, all of which the Court finds 

unpersuasive.

First, the DAO argues that “there is a vast gulf between the consequences of losing a 

PCRA petition and losing a civil suit where damages in excess of ten million dollars are 

claimed.” (Def.’s Resp. at 4.)6 The DAO relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Parklane

Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) to support this proposition. In Parklane, the 

Court referenced a hypothetical scenario in which offensive collateral estoppel would be unfair: 

“If a defendant in the first action is sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little 

incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable.” Parklane, 439 

U.S. at 330. Wilson’s first trial was not a civil case for nominal damages; it was a criminal trial 

with the highest possible stakes for Wilson: the deprivation of his liberty and even the loss of his 

life by execution. The stakes were high for the Commonwealth as well; namely the conviction of 

 

6 At oral argument, Wilson’s counsel conceded that the Monell claim against the DAO cannot form the basis 

for a damage award that takes into account Wilson’s incarceration. (Oral Arg. 116:16–18.)

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 7 of 8
8

someone they believed murdered three individuals. This case is clearly distinguishable from 

Parklane.

Second, the DAO contends that “giving binding effect to the PCRA court’s conclusion 

would incentivize [DAOs] across the Commonwealth to litigate to the hilt every issue that could 

conceivably form the basis for civil liability down the road.” (Def.’s Resp. at 4.) This cannot be 

the case. If the DAO believed it had a chance to win an appeal of the PCRA court’s ruling, it 

presumably would have pursued one. The DAO instead made a strategic decision to accept the 

PCRA court’s finding and retry Wilson. The DAO must live with the consequences of that 

choice.

Third, the DAO argues that “Wilson raised a Batson challenge before three state courts 

and lost twice: his claim was rejected both by the trial court that conducted the challenged voir 

dire and by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” (Def.’s Resp. at 5.) The two prior decisions, 

however, preceded the release of the McMahon tape. The PCRA court, with the benefit of the 

McMahon tape, determined that Wilson’s Batson rights were violated. 

Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of Wilson’s underlying Batson claim. An appropriate 

order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert 

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.

Case 2:04-cv-05396-GJP Document 247 Filed 04/08/16 Page 8 of 8