Page 1 GAO-01-979R Military Readiness

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

July 26, 2001

The Honorable Robert Stump

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable John M. McHugh

Chairman, Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Subject: Military Readiness: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s Manning Initiative

In the recent past, Congress, the Department of Defense, and we have expressed concerns

about the readiness of U.S. forces to perform combat missions. To ensure Army units’

readiness to fulfill their missions, the Army Chief of Staff created an initiative in October 1999

to staff all active units at 100 percent with personnel at authorized grades and skills over

fiscal years 2000-2003. In October 2000 you requested that we examine a number of issues

associated with the readiness of Army divisions, including the manning initiative. After

interim briefings with your staff, you requested that we provide our initial observations on (1)

the extent to which the Army has achieved the manning initiative goals to date for enlisted

personnel, (2) the impact the initiative has had on Army units, and (3) the effect of

management decisions on the Army’s ability to achieve the initiative’s goals. We will issue a

report later this year on the other readiness-related issues that you requested we review.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

As of May 2001, the Army had achieved its manning initiative goals for enlisted personnel to

varying degrees, as shown in table 1.
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Table 1: Army’s Progress in Meeting Manning Initiative Goals (as of May 2001)

Fiscal year Goal Progress

2000 Staff 10 combat divisions and 2 combat

armored cavalry regiments at 100 percent

of the number of enlisted personnel

authorized in the aggregatea

Achieved goal

2001

(second

quarter)

Staff 10 combat divisions and 2 combat

armored cavalry regiments at 100 percent

of authorized enlisted personnel by the

skills and grades needed

Nearly achieved goal

2001 Staff nondivisional,b early deploying

combat support units at 100 percent of

authorized enlisted personnel by skill and

grade levels

Made progress but will not fully

achieve goal until the end of

fiscal year 2002

a The term “aggregate” refers to the total number of soldiers at any skill or grade level. b For this report nondivisional units are all units other than the 10 combat divisions and 2

combat armored cavalry regiments. The early deploying units include aviation, engineering,

military police, chemical decontamination, and transportation units that would deploy within

the first 30 to 35 days to support the combat units during a major theater war.

Source: GAO analysis of Army Chief of Staff manning initiative.

The initiative has had a positive impact on the Army’s combat divisions but has created some

negative effects, at least in the short term, on many nondivisional units. On the positive side,

some combat divisions that in the past were routinely staffed at less than authorized levels

are now staffed in the aggregate at 100 percent. Also, division commanders said that training

has improved and that with more soldiers in their occupational specialties, the units perform

their missions more effectively. Readiness reports submitted by the divisions from October

1998 to June 2001 confirm that the initiative has improved “personnel readiness”; that is, the

units have the required number of soldiers at grade and skill levels to accomplish their

mission. On the negative side, because of the effort to staff the combat divisions and

armored regiments at 100 percent, the staffing levels of some nondivisional units, including

early deploying combat support units, decreased; Army officials said that over 40 percent of

these units have reported lower states of readiness since the beginning of the initiative.

According to Army officials, some management decisions have affected and may continue to

affect the Army’s ability to achieve the goals for the manning initiative. First, the Army has

chosen to budget for less than its authorized number of soldiers. Second, in some cases, the

Army has allowed new recruits or soldiers who reenlist to move into occupational specialties

other than those it needed to fill. Finally, the Army has allowed the number of soldiers

unavailable for assignment to units, such as those who are in training, between assignments,

or awaiting discharge, to increase to levels higher than in the past. According to Army

officials, whether the Army will fully achieve and sustain its manning initiative goals will

depend on its future management decisions on funding, recruiting, and retention.

BACKGROUND

The manning initiative, which the Army Chief of Staff created on October 12, 1999, includes a

plan to ensure that all Army units have 100 percent of their authorized staff, by grade and
Page 3 GAO-01-979R Military Readiness

skill levels,1 by fiscal year 2003 and that those staffing levels are maintained. The manning

initiative has three elements: (1) distributing soldiers by the grades and skills needed to staff

the force, (2) recruiting soldiers to sustain the force, and (3) ensuring that the force structure

matches congressionally authorized staff levels. Only the distribution element has

measurable goals (see table 2). The intent of the initiative is to ensure that at all units have

the personnel necessary to perform their assigned missions and to address staffing

imbalances that had developed in past years. Such imbalances developed partly because

priority for staffing was given to those divisions that would be called upon first to deploy to a

major theater war, and divisions that were to deploy later2

 in a war were staffed at less than

authorized levels.

Table 2: Implementation Schedule for the Army Chief of Staff’s Manning Initiative Goals

Fiscal year Goal Units

2000 100 percent authorized

enlisted personnel in

the aggregate

10 active divisions

2 armored cavalry regiments

2001

(second

quarter)

100 percent authorized

enlisted personnel by

skill and grade level

10 active divisions

2 armored cavalry regiment

2001 100 percent authorized

enlisted personnel by

skill and grade level

Nondivisional combat support

units—early deploying units

2002 100 percent authorized

enlisted personnel by

skill and grade level

Nondivisional combat support units--

all remaining units

2003 100 percent authorized

enlisted personnel by

skill and grade level

Institutional units, including support

activities such as training, doctrine

development, base operations,

supply, and maintenance units

Source: U. S. Army.

The Chief of Staff provided additional parameters for the initiative. For example, to ensure

that adequate readiness is maintained, units are not to have less than 70 percent of their

authorized staff. He also described recruiting as his number one task and emphasized the

importance of retention.

 1

 Skill is related to a soldier’s occupational specialty such as infantryman. Skills are grouped by grade

levels as follows: skill level 1, E1-E4 (lowest graded enlisted personnel); skill level 2, E5-E6 (mid-level

noncommissioned officers); and skill level 3, E7-E9 (senior noncommissioned officers).

2

 For purposes of this report, the later deploying combat divisions are the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th

Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry divisions. Later deploying combat divisions are those divisions

expected to deploy in the event of a second simultaneous or nearly simultaneous major theater war or

as reinforcements for a theater war that is larger than expected.
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ARMY HAS ACHIEVED MANNING INITIATIVE

GOALS TO VARYING DEGREES

In fiscal year 2000, the Army achieved the manning initiative goal for enlisted personnel3 as

planned. That is, since May 2000, the reported aggregate staff levels for the 10 active

divisions and 2 armored cavalry regiments have been at or nearly 100 percent and were at 100

percent as of June 2001. The Army anticipates that it will be able to maintain 100 percent

enlisted staffing for these units. Figure 1 shows the staffing levels for these units since

December 1999 through June 2001.

Figure 1: Aggregate Enlisted Staffing Levels for Army Divisions and Armored Cavalry

Regiments (Dec. 1999 – June 2001)

Source: U.S. Army.

For its fiscal year 2001 goals, the Army nearly achieved one goal and made progress on the

other (see figs. 2 and 3). The Army almost staffed the 10 Army divisions and 2 armored

cavalry regiments by grade and skill level. Specifically, the Army achieved 93 percent of its

required staffing, by grade and skill levels, in its divisions and armored regiments. Army

officials projected that they could maintain that level of staffing until the end of fiscal year

2001 but also said that a 94-percent match might be the best the Army could achieve because

positions such as cooks and fuel handlers have traditionally been difficult to fill at certain

grade and skill levels. According to Army officials, changes in requirements for certain

occupations, such as those requiring a higher level of technical skill, prevent the Army from

attaining 100 percent of its goals by grade and skill levels.

For the second fiscal year 2001 goal, the Army will not staff all of its nondivisional, early

deploying combat support units in the aggregate or by grade and skill levels at 100 percent.

 3

The Army dropped a goal initially established for officers shortly after the initiative was implemented.

According to Army officials, the Army dropped officers from the initiative because it considered the

shortages of officers not as critical as shortages of enlisted personnel and because the Army measures

personnel readiness primarily in terms of its enlisted force. The Army plans to address officer

shortages through other means.

95 95

97

98

99

100 100

99 99

100

92

93

94

95

96

97

98

99

100

Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. Ma JuneJuly Aug.Sept.

Fiscal Year 2000

Percent

100 100 100

99

100 100 100 100 100

Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June

Fiscal Year 2001
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According to Army officials, these units could not be staffed as intended by the initiative

because doing so would reduce staffing for the remaining combat support and institutional

units and create readiness problems. Thus, the Army plans to staff 238 of its 386 early

deploying units at 100 percent of their authorized staff by the end of fiscal year 2001 and staff

the remaining 148 units in fiscal year 2002. As of May 2001, the Army had achieved 96

percent of its staffing goal for the 238 units in the aggregate; it also achieved 88 percent of its

goal to staff these units by skill and grade levels. The Army staffed the remaining 148 early

deploying units at 97 percent in the aggregate and 83 percent by skill and grade levels.

According to Army officials, by the end of fiscal year 2002, these units are expected to be

filled at 100 percent. Figure 2 shows the percentage of staffing in the aggregate and by grade

and skill level for nondivisional, early deploying combat support units for fiscal years 2001

and 2002.

Figure 2: Staffing Levels for Nondivisional, Early Deploying Combat Support Units for Fiscal

Years 2001 and 2002 Goals

Note: October 01 are the Army’s projected figures.

Source: U.S. Army.

IMPACT OF INITIATIVE ON UNITS HAS

BEEN BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

The impact of the manning initiative has been positive for divisions, but staff levels in

nondivisional units were initially reduced. In 1998, we testified that five divisions had about

93 percent of their authorized staff, a number of shortages of personnel in the grade and

skills required, and unfilled squads.4

 As of June 2001, however, these units are staffed at 100

percent in the aggregate and have fewer shortages by grade and skill levels. According to

reported data and interviews with Army commanders, personnel readiness, that is, having the

 4

Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army Divisions

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, Mar. 20, 1998).

92

85

96

88

100

93

96

84

97

83

91

84

0

20

40

60

80

100

Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01

Aggregate

Grade and Skill Level

Fiscal Year 2001 Goal

(238 Units)

Fiscal Year 2001 Goal

(148 Units)

Percent
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required mix of soldiers at grade and skill levels to accomplish their mission, had improved

for these units as a result of the manning initiative. Also, division commanders believe the

initiative has improved their ability to train and has placed more soldiers in their

occupational specialties, allowing the units to perform their missions more effectively.

As stated earlier, nondivisional combat support units are currently manned at less than their

authorized levels, and according to Army officials over 40 percent of these units have

reported lower states of readiness since the beginning of the initiative. As previously

discussed, Army officials decided to staff some nondivisional, early deploying combat

support units in fiscal year 2001. The goals for the remaining nondivisional combat support

units and institutional units will not be in effect until fiscal years 2002 and 2003. As of May

2001, these units were staffed at 97 percent in the aggregate and 86 percent by grade and skill

levels, and the institutional units were staffed at 97 percent in the aggregate and 82 percent

by grade and skill levels (see fig. 3). The Army projected that enlisted staffing in the

aggregate and grade and skill levels would decrease from the May 2001 level by October 2001.

Figure 3: Enlisted Staffing Levels for Remaining Nondivisional Units in Fiscal Year 2001

Note: October 01 are the Army’s projected figures.

Source: U.S. Army.

MANAGEMENT DECISIONS HAVE EFFECTED

ARMY’S ABILITY TO ACHIEVE INITIATIVE GOALS

According to Army officials, some decisions have affected and may continue to affect the

Army’s ability to achieve the goals of the manning initiative. For example:

• Since the late 1990s the Army has chosen not to budget for its authorized number of

soldiers and used the funds to meet other needs. In fiscal year 2001, for instance, the

Army budgeted for only 477,600 soldiers, even though Congress authorized 480,000

soldiers. The Army has moved funds from the military personnel account because it

92

85

97

86 91

84

100

81

97

82

91

76

0

20

40

60

80

100

Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01 Oct. 00 'May 01 Oct. 01

Aggregate

Grade and Skill Level

Remaining Nondivisional Combat

Support Units

Institutional Units

Percent
Page 7 GAO-01-979R Military Readiness

could not fill its force to the authorized level through recruitment and could use the

money elsewhere.

• To fill its force to the authorized level, the Army has, in some cases, allowed new recruits

or soldiers who reenlist to move into occupational specialties other than those that it

needed to fill. While the Army may maintain the aggregate level at 100 percent through

this practice, it has left units without the right mix of grades and skills.

• The Army has allowed the number of soldiers that are unavailable for assignment to units,

which include new recruits, soldiers attending training at Army schools, soldiers between

assignments, and soldiers awaiting discharge, to increase to levels higher than in the past.

Although the Army has estimated since the late 1990s that it would have only 63,000

soldiers in this category, the number has consistently averaged about 67,000. This leaves

about 4,000 fewer soldiers available for assignment.

According to Army officials, whether the Army will fully achieve and sustain its manning

initiative goals will depend on its future management decisions on funding, recruiting, and

retention practices.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft copy of this report to officials with the Office of the Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff

(Personnel). We met with Army Personnel officials to discuss the draft and they provided

technical comments which were incorporated where appropriate.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

To assess the extent to which the Army has achieved the manning initiative goals to date, the

impact the initiative has had and will have on units, and the affect of management decisions

on the Army’s ability to achieve the initiative’s goals, we interviewed Army officials from the

Department of Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, the Army Personnel Command,

the Army Forces Command, and U.S. Army Forces Europe; and commanders and staff from

the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division, 25th Infantry Division, 4th

Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry Division; commanders and staff from the 13th Corps Support

Group and the 937th Engineer Support Group. We also obtained and examined relevant Army

manning initiative policy documents and goals and compared them to the Army’s reported

implementation of the manning initiative. Additionally, we reviewed reported Army

readiness data to identify any changes in readiness trends since the manning initiative began.

We conducted our review between April and July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards. We are continuing our review of the readiness of the Army’s

later deploying units. This report represents the preliminary results of our work related only

to the manning initiative.

- - - -

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the

Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director of the Office of Management and

Budget. We will send copies to other interested parties upon request.
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Please contact me on (757) 552-8111 if you or your staff have any questions about this report.

Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in enclosure I.

Neal P. Curtin, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosure
Enclosure I

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GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

William Solis (202) 512-8365

Claudia Dickey (202) 512-6399

Staff Acknowledgments

In addition to those named above, Donna Rogers, Nancy Ragsdale, Nadine Furr,

Melissa McDowell, Connie Sawyer, Lauren Johnson and James Lewis made key

contributions to this report.

(350101)