U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

91–730 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 108–316

THE MIDDLE EAST ROAD MAP: OVERCOMING

OBSTACLES TO PEACE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 15, 2003

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Etkes, Mr. Dror, director of Peace Now’s Settlements Watch Project, Jerusalem, Israel ......................................................................................................... 22

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26

Ganor, Mr. Boaz, Ph.D., executive director, International Policy Institute

on Counter-Terrorism, Herzlia, Jerusalem ........................................................ 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Melchior, Rabbi Michael, Member of the Israeli Knesset and former Deputy

Foreign Minister, Jerusalem, Israel ................................................................... 15

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18

Ross, Hon. Dennis, director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC ................................... 3

Submitted testimony of Ambassador Ross is an article that appeared

in the Fall edition of The National Interest ............................................... 8

(III)

(1)

THE MIDDLE EAST ROAD MAP: OVERCOMING

OBSTACLES TO PEACE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 15, 2003

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN

AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:57 p.m. in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Lincoln Chafee

(chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senators Chafee, Lugar, Coleman, Boxer, and Corzine.

Senator CHAFEE. The hearing of the Near Eastern and South

Asian Affairs Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee

will come to order. I thought what we might do is begin with opening statements of Senators and then receive testimony from the

panel under a 10-minute time limit, and finally take some questions. We have lots of questions.

To begin with, of course, welcome to our witnesses. Some of you

traveled a long distance and we appreciate that very much. If we

have to break for votes, I apologize. We will try and keep that disruption to a minimum.

My perspective is influenced by having just returned from a trip

to Iraq and Afghanistan. Our delegation also stopped in Turkey

and Jordan. In these and other meetings I have had in my position

as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, we have been

asked over and over again, ‘‘where is the U.S. initiative on the

Road Map,’’ which is so crucial to making progress on this most intractable of dilemmas.

That is a question I have difficulty answering: What are we

doing as Americans? I think hearing from this panel is very important, at a hearing titled ‘‘Obstacles to Peace.’’ There always are

going to be obstacles—we knew that when we went to Aqaba—and

we want to be able to surmount those obstacles. With the events

of this morning, we are seeing a different trend: Americans are

now being attacked for the first time. This is a trend that I think

we have to address.

The most recent effort at studying the region is a report entitled ‘‘Changing Minds and Winning the Peace, the New Strategic Direction for U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World.’’ This study showed that people in the Arab and Muslim world generally like Americans, but they have some grave differences with

our policies. I think that is what we are all here to discuss this

afternoon.

2

Now we will turn to the ranking member Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for holding

this important hearing on the Middle East Road Map. I think we

both were a little disappointed that the administration is not testifying today at this session, but I think it is important to note they

did testify before us in a closed session, and I found that extremely

helpful. Ambassador Burns said he would be willing to work with

us to address us in an open session, and I look forward to that in

the near future.

Little did we know that this would be the day that we woke up

to the news that there was a tragic attack on Americans today, as

our chairman said, the first such attack aimed directly at Americans, Americans who were going to interview Palestinian students

who applied for Fulbright scholarships. I mean, that is a sick, a

sick day for all of us.

We need optimism. Mr. Chairman, you are an optimist and I am

an optimist, and we make a good pair I think across party aisles

here. But it is hard to come by. We were told by Mr. Wolfowitz,

in answer to a question you asked him, that the Iraqi war was

going to help solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I was skeptical

of that. I see these as very different situations. We certainly do not

see it happening.

We were told that Abu Mazen would change things and, sad to

say, he is gone from the picture, I think because he really wanted

to change things.

We need a real heroic effort and we all have to work together

across party lines to have that heroic effort for peace. Former

President Bill Clinton, I think everyone would say regardless of the

outcome of his efforts, put forth an incredible amount of energy,

and I think the Honorable Dennis Ross was an integral part of

that. While he was not successful in negotiating a final agreement

for peace, his efforts in and of themselves gave hope to good people

on both sides.

I remember the sense of despair that I felt when Yasser Arafat

went away after being offered essentially 90 percent of what he

wanted. I thought that was a signal of a real bad turn of events.

To the last days of the last administration, President Clinton

tried to bring lasting peace to the Middle East. We all know when

President Bush took office he was concentrating on other things,

and he had a hands-off approach to the intifada, and I believe he

disengaged with the Middle East and then came back and engaged,

but important time was lost.

I was glad when the President spelled out in a speech in July

a Road Map to peace. He called for a Palestinian leadership that

is not only free from terrorism, but willing to dismantle the terrorist organizations that oppose peace. I think that was a very

clear and important message. That speech did lead to the unveiling

of the Middle East Road Map to peace.

Again, unfortunately for the first time Americans were a target

on that road and I for one have not taken it all in yet as to what

it means, and I am hopeful that some of you can step back a little

bit. Maybe there is a way we can move forward from it.

So I look forward to hearing from the panel of witnesses today.

Clearly, I have very strong opinions about Yasser Arafat’s lack of

3

real engagement in dismantling the terrorist organizations. I hope

I could be proven wrong. We want to know who did this to our people today. We want those people brought to justice, and clearly we

need a vision to get back on some kind of a road.

I thank you very much.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator Boxer.

Chairman Lugar.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator CHAFEE. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman, because I do

want to hear from the witnesses. We need a path to peace. The

President laid out a Road Map. I have been strongly supportive of

his vision for peace, but it has proven very difficult. And optimism—we need optimism, but it is really hard, really difficult. As

the Senator from California notes today, it makes it even more difficult, more personal, with Americans being targeted, being attacked.

Yet we have to figure this out. Jews and Palestinians have to figure out how to live side by side, protecting the security of Israeli,

having a Palestinian state, but one in which there is an end to terrorism, in which there is transparency and democracy. I just hope

that we stay the course, but in the end I would like to get a better

sense that we can get there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you. I will just welcome the witnesses,

and I appreciate very much your holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. This accelerating element of violence that we have seen

capped only today by this attack on Americans I think alarms everyone, is something that I think challenges a lot of the assumptions of the actions that have taken place, at least with regard to

our major venture into Iraq, in my view.

I have a single question: How do we find that path to hope? How

do we move away from this accelerating sense of chaos and anarchy? I welcome hearing the thoughts on this because, no matter

how vigorously we seem to defend the actions that we take, the actions that follow do not seem to justify it. I believe in self-defense,

so I am looking for, as I think all of us are, what is this path that

we need to be looking for.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Senator.

Let us start with the Honorable Dennis Ross. Mr. Ross is the director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy here in Washington.

STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER

DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE

FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. ROSS. Thank you. I have a statement that I am going to submit for the record, but let me encapsulate what I think the essence

of what you are all looking for is. It is sobering for me to be here

today because the road where the attack took place today is a road

that I was on no less than 200 times. In the past when I would

take that road in there, it was not very clear——

4

Senator BOXER. Is your mike on?

Mr. ROSS. Is it now? You want to hear me also.

Senator BOXER. I want to hear what you said in the beginning.

Mr. ROSS. I was saying that the road where the attack took place

is a road that I have been on at least 200 times. In the past when

I would go into Gaza and I would have security and I would have

Palestinian security, the one thing that was very clear: There

would never be such an attack because Hamas or Islamic Jihad or

whoever is responsible for this would have understood that the consequences for doing it would have been so disastrous from their

standpoint they would not even have contemplated it.

They knew from the Palestinian side, which by the way is ultimately the way you are going to solve the terrorism problem, that

they would face an incredible onslaught from the Palestinian security forces if they carried out such an act. Now, obviously that imagery does not exist today for them. This was not a random act.

It took intelligence, it took planning, it took organization. And the

kinds of groups—even though no one has taken credit for it yet either Hamas or perhaps Hezbollah helping groups like Hamas are

the only groups with this kind of capability.

We had a moment in the spring to change the situation not to

make peace. Three years ago we were talking about making peace.

You have to understand where we are today. We are talking about

ending a war. The intifada started as an uprising and it got transformed into a war, and that is what we have had for the last 3

years.

When Abu Mazen became the Palestinian Prime Minister, you

had a moment. We were not able to capitalize on that moment. I

was in favor of the President going to Aqaba, but to make the most

of Aqaba the administration needed before the summit was to work

out the details on the ground of what the cooperation between the

two sides was going to be. That was not done.

The Road Map represented a set of guidelines. It did not represent a blueprint, because nobody had the same understanding of

what its 52 paragraphs represented. This was a concept that was

negotiated by the U.S., the EU, the Russians and the U.N. None

of these four parties had responsibility for carrying out even one

of its steps. The parties who had to carry it out were the Israelis

and the Palestinians and they were asked for their comments, they

were told it was not negotiable.

If you did not work out with the two sides how they understood

each of the obligations, if you did not work out what were the

standards of performance so everybody understood in the same way

what was expected of them, you were not in fact going to see the

Road Map materialize. Now that moment has been lost. Abu Mazen

is gone, and now we will see whether or not there can be a new

Palestinian Prime Minister.

To answer what I think you are most interested in he3aring—

namely, what can be done now—let me suggest that I think that

there are six options before us right now not to make peace, but

to end the war. That is not the issue right now. First things first.

We have to reestablish the possibility of the peace process before

we can be talking about what peace is going to be.

5

The six options are basically what I call: first, the muddle down

option. Not muddle through; muddle down. Muddle down means

you continue the way you are going now. You operate on an assumption that the two sides will reach a level of exhaustion where

they will be so exhausted, in such pain, that they will find a way

to work out of the current predicament.

I say ‘‘muddle down’’ because the situation will continue to get

worse. The reason I am not an enthusiast for this option is because

one of the things I think we have to learn from the past is that

both sides, in fact, have an enormous capacity to suffer. So if we

think that they just have to suffer a little bit more and it is going

to be OK, I am afraid that is not the case. Moreover, I am afraid

that the hole will be dug so deep that by the time some new opportunity arises we are going to find that it is too hard to climb out

of the hole that has been dug. So the muddle down option is an

option that some people may believe in, but I think it is not one

that can work.

The second option: It is basically assuming that Abu Ala, the person Arafat has appointed in the emergency cabinet to be the emergency Prime Minister, who is himself saying that at this point he

may not serve more than another 25 days; this option assumes that

Abu Ala will in fact stay as Prime Minister and he will seek in fact

to work things out by coopting Yasser Arafat. To coopt Yasser

Arafat he has to deliver something to Yasser Arafat; he can only

do so if he coopts Ariel Sharon. In reality Abu Ala cannot deliver

anything to Yasser Arafat unless he can deliver something to Ariel

Sharon.

What is it that he delivers to Yasser Arafat? Well, he probably

delivers a couple of things. First right now, in the aftermath of

what happened today, Arafat is likely to be afraid. He is likely to

believe that the possibility of the administration being less concerned about whether the Israelis expel him or not is a possibility

that perhaps he ought to be taking very seriously. He is likely to

be concerned that maybe the U.S. right now will give a yellow light

to the Israelis about expulsion, and that will concern him, No. 1.

No. 2, what he really wants more than anything else is a twoway ticket. Sharon has offered him a one-way ticket. He wants a

ticket out and he wants to be able to return to the West Bank of

Gaza. Is Ariel Sharon prepared to offer him anything like that? Not

likely. That is why I say that Abu Ala is going to have to coopt

Ariel Sharon as well.

The only way that Ariel Sharon will be coopted is if he believes

that in fact Abu Ala will deliver on security, and that means that

Abu Ala is given a carte blanche to organize the security forces and

to take on Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades.

Now, Ariel Sharon might well do that, particularly because he

does not have many other options. I would not bet the farm on it,

but I will tell you, if the next 6 months look to him like the last

2 months have looked, he might well look for a deal with Abu Ala.

If the Israeli options were so good right now, I am not sure they

would have attacked the terrorist training camp in Syria.

The reality is they do not have wonderful options right now. Expelling Arafat is not a great option from Sharon’s standpoint, but

6

it reflects a mood in Israel and his own mood. Going into Gaza the

way they have gone into the West Bank is an option, but it is very

expensive, and it does not deal with what is in fact the threat that

took place in Haifa on October 4. Accelerating the fence may be an

option, but it is not a near-term option that is going to produce.

And doing more against the Palestinians on the West Bank militarily is something that in fact is difficult to do at this point. The

Israelis have almost a complete siege on the territories. It is not

just that you cannot as a Palestinian move from the territories into

Israel, you cannot move around within the West Bank itself. The

siege is there for a reason. All the checkpoints are there because

if you lift checkpoints the number of terrorist attacks in Israel will

go up, not down. So it is not like the Israelis can do a lot of other

things.

If in fact a deal with Abu Ala is possible, if that means the Palestinians are policing themselves and not permitting Hamas and

Islamic Jihad to operate and organize attacks like we have seen

today, then that may not be such a bad option from Ariel Sharon’s

standpoint. So this option two of coopting Arafat and coopting

Sharon means a deal between the Israelis and this Palestinian Authority, with this Prime Minister, assuming he stays.

Obviously, he is going to have to be satisfied that he can work

out something with Arafat, and his own negotiations with Arafat

right now are not going so easily and that is one of the reasons he

has threatened not to stay.

A third option: A greater intervention by the United States to

create a reason for the Israelis to pause in what are their daily attacks against Hamas operatives and Islamic Jihad operatives and

leaders. The Palestinian Authority will not go after these groups

while the Israelis are doing so. At the same time, our intervention

must create a justification for the Palestinian Authority to act

against Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Now, that kind of intervention by us would require us to do our

part with the Israelis, and the Arabs to assume a real responsibility with the Palestinians. The President would need to go to a

collective of Arab leaders and say to them: You now have to make

it clear that what Hamas and Islamic Jihad are doing is a threat

to the Palestinian cause, a threat to Palestinian interests, certain

to undermine the possibility of ever achieving a Palestinian state.

You have to publicly condemn these groups, you have to embrace

the Palestinian Authority as it confronts these groups, and also

deal with Yasser Arafat so he does not block Abu Ala and the security forces, from taking on Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Now, that would take a big move by this administration and it

would take a revolution among Arab leadership, who to date have

never condemned Hamas and Islamic Jihad by name.

Option four would be the expulsion of Arafat. But Arafat is an

icon to the Palestinians. He put the Palestinians on the map. He

is the one who gave them standing and recognition. You do not

beat something with nothing. If you want to expel Arafat, what you

have to do is show that there is a solution and that the reason the

solution is not possible is because he blocks it, he is the obstacle.

You believe it and I believe it. Almost all Israelis believe it. But

Palestinians do not necessarily believe it, and what they have to

7

see is that there is a solution out there, something that looks like

the Clinton parameters, which would have created a state in 100

percent of Gaza and 95 to 97 percent of the West Bank and would

have made the Arab part of East Jerusalem the capital of that

state, or something that would make it clear that this Israeli Government is prepared to embrace statehood on the Palestinian side,

not surrounded, not fragmented, which means that many settlements will have to be evacuated, and Israelis are prepared to pursue that kind of a vision once it is clear that Arafat is gone and

there is a Palestinian leadership that truly rejects terror.

A fifth option would be the option of trusteeship. There are some

who argue for trusteeship on the grounds that the Palestinians are

never going to be responsible, are simply too dysfunctional to be

able to build a state on their own, so basically the international

community, led by us, has to come in, we have to go ahead and

build the institutions for them, we have to assume the responsibility for security, taking on Hamas, Islamic Jihad, so that over

time the Palestinians will be able to build a state.

There are a lot of reasons I think trusteeship cannot work. I do

not think that the administration will be too keen to engage in nation-building in Palestine given its other obligations in nationbuilding right now. But even beyond that, Arafat’s most pernicious

legacy for the Palestinians is a legacy of having created a concept

of victim hood, not as a reality but as a strategy. Being a victim

of strategy creates a sense of entitlement, a sense that you never

are responsible, you are never accountable. No failure is ever yours.

Someone is always responsible, not you. Somebody else has to do,

not you. Somebody else has to deliver, not you.

Trusteeship will reinforce a psychology that is inconsistent with

peacemaking because it will tell Palestinians once again: Somebody

else is out there to do it for you. That is not a great option.

The last option is what I call the default option. This is not one

that I normally would be in favor of because basically it reflects the

failure of diplomacy, not its triumph. But if you do not have option

two, which is basically an Abu Ala-Sharon cooptation option, if you

do not have option three, which is basically having the Arabs come

in and assume a responsibility to put the Palestinian house in

order and make it easier for Palestinians to confront those in their

midst who reject peace and use terror—and we will not do our part

with the Israelis in terms of affecting settlement activity—you will

not have diplomacy as an option and you will not have a partner.

If you do not have diplomacy you will not have security. And if that

is the case you are going to have the fence or the barrier or the

wall.

Now, the critical thing here is to build it in a way that makes

it possible still to have a political solution. That requires using

three criteria to govern how you approach the fence. One is security, building it in a topographical way that makes it difficult to infiltrate into Israel. Two is demographics because you are trying to

preserve Israel as a Jewish state and that means you cannot be

building this in a way that absorbs Palestinians into the state. And

three is preserving a political solution, which means the Israelis

have to get out of the Palestinians’ lives so that they are not controlling Palestinian lives, so you reduce the pool of anger and alienVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
8

1 In early 2001, The Toronto Star reported that 42 Israelis, as opposed to some 350 Palestinians, had been killed in the first four months of the Al-Aqsa intifada (‘‘Global Effort is Necessary

to Stop Pain in Mideast’’, February 11, 2001). According to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 841

Israelis have been killed in the period beginning on September 29, 2000, the start of the

intifada, to August 2003. 2 0n July 17, 2003, The Financial Times reported that 50 percent of the Palestinian population

is currently unemployed, while 60 percent lives below the poverty line (Christopher Patten, ‘‘A

Road Map Paid for in Euros’’, The Financial Times, July 17, 2003). In his speech on May 26,

2003, Prime Minister Sharon mentioned the dependence of over half the Palestinian population

on foreign aid as a key determinant for ending the occupation. Speaking before the Knesset,

the Israeli premier asked, ‘‘Today, 1.8 million Palestinians live thanks to support from international organizations. Do you want to take responsibility for them yourselves?’’ (Chris McGreal,

‘‘Peace hopes lie heavy on new force’’, The Guardian, June 3, 2003).

ation, but also so that Palestinians still have an incentive to negotiate.

I am not in favor of building the fence on the Green Line except

where demographics dictate that. The Palestinians have to know

that this fence, part of which they will not like, can be there 1 year,

2 years, or 50 years. It is up to them to make the choice to assume

responsibility, and what that means in practical terms is we would

pursue parallel unilateralism: working with the Israelis to build

the fence on those three criteria, working with the Palestinians so

that they would assume their responsibilities wherever the Israelis

withdraw.

The red light is on, so I will stop.

[The following submitted testimony of Mr. Ross is an article that

appeared in the Fall edition of The National Interest:]

SUBMITTED TESTIMONY OF AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER DIS- TINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, WASH- INGTON, DC

TAKING STOCK

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND THE ROADMAP TO PEACE

When the Bush Administration assumed office in January of 2001, it shifted direction in a number of foreign policy areas. Nowhere was the shift in direction and

priority more pronounced than in the approach to Arab-Israeli diplomacy. It was not

only that the President would not be engaged; it was also that there would be no

American envoy to the peace process. Indeed, in the first months of the administration, the very words ‘‘peace process’’ were banned from the public and private lexi- con.

The policy was one of disengagement. A number of assumptions seemed to guide

the new approach: the Clinton Administration erred in wanting peace more than the

parties, with the President having been far too involved; Yasir Arafat was indulged

too much; the new Ariel Sharon-led government in Israel would now rule out being

able to achieve much; and U.S. interests in the region were threatened far more by

Iraq. Dealing with that problem—as opposed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—was

more likely to transform the landscape of the area.

Whatever one thinks about the wisdom of America’s intensive, high-level engagement in the 1990s, disengagement from peacemaking efforts was clearly not the answer. In the first years of the Bush Administration, with very limited American diplomacy between Israelis and Palestinians, the intifada was transformed into a war

with a vast escalation in the suffering on both sides. For Israelis and Palestinians

alike, the price they paid for having no peace process was very high.

To put this in perspective, the number of Israelis killed in the first four months

of the intifada (until the end of the Clinton Administration) was 42. By June 2003,

over 800 Israelis had been killed. Palestinian fatalities went from 350 to nearly

2,500.1 The wounded amount to ten to twenty times the numbers killed. The economies on both sides have also paid a severe price. While the Israeli economy is in

crisis—having declined in absolute terms every year for the last three years—the

Palestinian economy has been devastated. More than 60 percent of Palestinians are

presently living below the poverty level, and 1.8 million in the West Bank and Gaza

are now dependent on subsistence from the UN and other international agencies.2

9

3While the Clinton parameters presented to the two sides in December 2000 would have provided for an independent Palestinian state, the parameters represented ideas to resolve the differences between the two sides, were never stated as formal policy, and were withdrawn at the

end of the administration. 4Published on April 30, 2003, the roadmap called for a comprehensive solution to the ArabIsraeli conflict based on two states, Israel and Palestine. Linked to this resolution, the roadmap

specifies, ‘‘the settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that

began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for

peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah—endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit—calling

for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement.’’ During his speech on June 24, 2002, President Bush outlined a similar

principle, defining the parameters of a two-state solution to mean ‘‘that the Israeli occupation

that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based

on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.’’

But there has been another casualty as well: The psyches of both sides have been

deeply wounded. Both Israeli and Palestinian publics have come to doubt whether

they have a partner in peace on the other side. The problem is less a loss of confidence and more a loss of faith. And that cannot be restored overnight.

The Beginnings of Change

Under pressure from Arab leaders, especially Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi

Arabia, the Bush Administration decided to re-engage in Middle Eastern diplomacy

in August 2001. The President sent a private letter to the Crown Prince, establishing for the first time that U.S. policy would be to support a two-state solution

to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.3 In addition, the Saudis and others were told that

the President would have a brief meeting with Yasir Arafat on the margins of the

United Nations General Assembly meetings in New York.

None of this was announced, and September 11 interrupted the advent of a new

diplomacy. Given the administration’s understandable preoccupation with the war

in Afghanistan, a new effort on Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy was put on the

backburner. Notwithstanding limited efforts to produce a ceasefire later in fall and

early winter 2001-02, the administration’s reluctance to engage itself seriously remained the guiding principle of its approach. The hesitancy was reinforced by perceptions that Arafat was doing little to stop terror, had frustrated General Anthony

Zinni’s effort to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, and had lied to the administration

about trying to smuggle Iranian arms into the territories. Following the IDF’s sweep

of West Bank cities and an unproductive trip to the region by Secretary Powell in

April 2002, the administration again came under increased pressure to do something.

The result was President Bush’s speech of June 24, outlining his vision for peacemaking. He publicly called for a two-state solution to the conflict. However, by emphasizing a performance-based approach to peace, he effectively told the Palestinians that if they wanted a state they would have to earn it. They must reform themselves, build credible institutions, end corruption, fight terror and create an alternative leadership untainted by terror. If the Palestinians did all this, Israel needed

to accept statehood and ‘‘end the occupation that began in 1967.’’ 4

While long on exhortation and short on plans, the President’s speech did create

a new basis for the international community to address the issue. Palestinian reform became the focal point for activity, with emphasis put on creating transparency

and accountability in the Palestinian Authority (PA). But translating this new emphasis into a new reality on the ground was bound to be difficult. There was nothing

immediately practical in terms of what had been proposed. Reform as an objective

was very important, but it was unlikely to be achievable unless the Israelis would

relax their grip on the territories so reformers could move, meet and plan. For its

part, the Israeli government might be a supporter of Palestinian reform—particularly if it meant sidelining Arafat—but it was not inclined to relax its grip on the

territories if the result of doing so would be new terror attacks in Israel.

The stalemate remained. Finding a mechanism to act on the President’s vision is

what gave birth to the concept of a roadmap.

Tactical Objective, Strategic Consequence

Ironically, it was Arab leaders who initially raised the concept of a roadmap, notwithstanding their concern that the President’s speech demanded too much from

Palestinians and too little from Israelis. Desperate for the United States to intervene, they embraced the President’s ultimate vision but called for a plan—a roadmap—to get there.

Here again, the administration did not rush to develop a roadmap. Arab leaders

and Europeans were pleading for one to act on the President’s words. Both argued

10

that the U.S. position in the Middle East was being threatened by the administration’s reluctance to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian war and its apparent eagerness to

go to war with Saddam Hussein. Faced with the uncertainty of who to deal with

on the Palestinian side and with the tactical need to gain support for its Iraq policy—or at least the prospect of acquiescence in it—the administration agreed to

work with the EU, the UN and Russia in forging a roadmap to carry out the President’s vision. While the United States would not let these other countries determine

its response to Iraq, it would let them shape the conduct of U.S. diplomacy between

the Israelis and Palestinians—an unprecedented step in the U.S. approach to ArabIsraeli issues. Few things better indicate that the real objective here had less to do

with Middle East peace and much more to do with the Bush Administration’s Iraq

policy. Arabs, Europeans and others would find it easier to tolerate what the United

States was doing in Iraq if the administration could point to its making a serious

effort on Israeli-Palestinian peace—or so the thinking went.

This tactical objective led to a reversal of the traditional approach to Arab-Israeli

diplomacy. Rather than working out understandings with the parties, the administration engaged in a negotiation with the members of the Quartet (the United

States, EU, UN and Russia). Consequently, the roadmap reflected agreement with

parties that had no responsibility for carrying out even one of the steps for which

they were calling. Conversely, the parties that would have to implement these steps

were presented the roadmap after the Quartet had already agreed to it. They were

each offered the opportunity to make comments but not to engage in a negotiation

about its content or how it might actually be implemented. Perhaps the need to

avoid negotiating with Yasir Arafat—as well as the desire to have an international

consensus that would be difficult to reject—influenced the administration’s approach.

By definition, however, the roadmap could never be brought to life if it were based

only on the understandings of outsiders. Indeed, it could only materialize with clear

and unambiguous understandings between the ‘‘insiders’’ on what each side would

actually do, when they would do it, where they would do it and how they would do

it. Not surprisingly, the roadmap, once unveiled, could not actually be launched

without an agreed trigger. Though President Bush publicly announced the roadmap

in March, before the beginning of the war in Iraq, it took active diplomacy in June,

after the Aqaba summit to produce an agreement on initial steps that each side

might take.

The Impact of the War in Iraq

Defeating Saddam was never going to yield peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The conflict between two national movements with competing historic claims

to the same territory was not created by Saddam Hussein and was not going to be

resolved by his demise. But the war and the fall of Saddam’s regime did have an

impact on U.S. diplomacy and on the Israelis and Palestinians. For his part, President Bush—as part of the effort to build support for the war—made promises to a

number of leaders, including Arab leaders, that he would make a serious effort on

Israeli-Palestinian peace after dealing with Saddam Hussein. The more he repeated

this privately, the more he became sincerely wedded to doing it, and the roadmap,

whatever the initial motives the administration had for it, suddenly became the

President’s avowed policy.

As for the Israelis and the Palestinians, neither wanted to say no to President

Bush, who glowed in the aftermath of Saddam’s defeat. Prime Minister Sharon—

knowing that most Israelis believed that the United States had removed a strategic

threat to Israel—was not about to reject an initiative by the triumphant President.

Similarly, neither Arafat nor Palestinian reformist leaders had any interest in denying a U.S. initiative under these circumstances. On the contrary, Palestinians

sought the intervention of the world’s only superpower to transform the situation

on the ground.

There is a big difference, however, between avoiding saying no, on the one hand,

and actually saying yes to the specifics of what the United States might be asking,

on the other. Not rejecting the U.S. initiative was consistent with wanting to stop

the war. Saying yes might mean moving toward the difficult decisions involved in

peacemaking. Such a positive response requires a different mindset—one which

must demonstrate a willingness to confront constituencies that resist compromise

and think not only in terms of their own political needs but their counterpart’s as

well. While Saddam’s defeat did not necessarily create these impulses on either side,

it did suggest that change was possible and that the moment should be seized at

least to produce relief for both sides.

In this sense, the President’s initiative came at a moment when both Israelis and

Palestinians were ready to stop the day-to-day struggle that was imposing such pain

11

5 A survey conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research from June 19-

22 found that 73 percent of Palestinians favored a hudna, a one-year voluntary cessation of violence against Israelis. Moreover, 80 percent of respondents favored a joint Israeli-Palestinian

ceasefire of unlimited duration. 6 A poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research from May 15-

18, 2000 found that 91 percent of Palestinians supported ‘‘fundamental reforms’’ in the Palestinian Authority. Equally noteworthy, respondents favored a number of specific actions by a

wide majority—including 85 percent supporting unification of security services, 95 percent supporting the dismissal of ministers accused of mismanagement or corruption, 83 percent supporting holding elections and 92 percent supporting the adoption of a basic law or constitution.

on each of them. On this point, they basically agreed. Their ‘‘agreement’’ did not extend to the content of peace negotiations or even to the content of the roadmap. But

it did reflect important developments within each society.

New Realities

Among Palestinians, the attitude toward the violence had begun to change in the

period preceding the war in Iraq. Though a majority of Palestinians favored violence

from the beginning of the intifada—especially as a way to inflict pain on Israelis

who were inflicting pain on them—this sentiment began to change in early 2003.

In February, polls indicated that a slim majority now opposed the violence. By June,

that slim majority became a more decisive one, with 73 percent of the Palestinians

in the territories favoring an end to it.5 Palestinians were longing for a return to

a more normal life—one in which the Israeli siege could be lifted and movement of

people and goods could be restored. No end to the violence would mean no lifting

of the checkpoints.

Under duress, Yasir Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) as the firstever prime minister of the Palestinian Authority. The administration skillfully used

the Palestinian desire for American intervention to increase the pressure on Arafat

to make the appointment, saying it could only unveil the roadmap when there was

a credible prime minister. Arafat may have made the appointment only because of

international pressure, but it was Palestinian reformers who first raised the idea

of a prime minister. Indeed, Palestinian pressure on Arafat for reform pre-dated

President Bush’s June 24 speech, emerging when no one predicted it. Following the

Israeli operation ‘‘Defensive Shield’’ of March-May 2002, in which the IDF entered

every Palestinian city in the West Bank except Jericho and destroyed extensive

parts of the old cities of Jenin and Nablus as they sought to root out terrorist cells,

most observers expected the Palestinians to be driven by their anger at Israel. No

doubt there was anger, but the overwhelming sentiment in the territories after Defensive Shield was the desire for reform. Reconstruction was what Palestinians

wanted: they did not want to reconstruct the ‘‘rot’’ that had been Yasir Arafat’s government.6

Palestinians were not prepared to embrace efforts to unseat their icon Yasir

Arafat, but they wanted him to share power. The emergence of Abu Mazen as prime

minister represented what reformers had sought, even if his cabinet, being the product of difficult negotiations with Arafat, was not exactly what they had in mind. No

one on the Palestinian side had more consistently opposed violence than Abu

Mazen. At one point, he publicly challenged those, including Arafat, who argued for

the intifada, saying that it yielded the opposite of their stated goals: it extended

Israeli occupation, tightened the Israeli control of East Jerusalem and strengthened

Prime Minister Sharon. To Abu Mazen, the continued violence was producing a disaster for Palestinians and threatening the cause itself.

The new Palestinian Prime Minister was not alone in this assessment. Critical

support for stopping the violence came from Tanzim leaders. The Tanzim are the

Fatah activists who control much of the grassroots organization, especially in the

cities of the West Bank. Though Marwan Barghouti is certainly the most prominent

Tanzim leader, the Tanzim tends to be more of a horizontal than a vertical organization. Their leaders produced the first intifada from 1987-90 and have played an

important role in the second one. As several of their leaders explained to me in

June, they initially believed that this intifada would prove to the Israelis that force

would not work on the Palestinians. Instead, it was now clear that force could work

against either side. Worse, as the intifada continued, their agenda of a two-state

solution, produced through negotiations, was being supplanted by the Hamas agenda of ongoing struggle. Lest there be a break in the situation, they were now concerned that the ability to produce a two-state solution could be lost.

The push for a ceasefire came strongly from the Tanzim and certainly also reflected the mood of the Palestinian public. In these circumstances, Hamas was not

about to oppose a ceasefire, believing that it could use the respite to rebuild, and

12

7Following the failed IDF attack against Hamas leader Abdelaziz Al-Rantissi, a poll published

in the Israeli daily Yediot Abronot found that 67 percent of Israelis opposed the recommencement of targeted killings. Within that group, 58 percent backed a temporary suspension of

strikes against militant leaders in order to afford Abbas an opportunity to curb the activities

of extremist groups. Only 9 percent of Israelis objected to the policy of targeted killings irrespective of circumstances (‘‘Poll: Israelis Oppose Military Strikes’’, Associated Press, June 13, 2003). 8This issue was going to press as Prime Minister Abbas resigned on September 6, but the

prescriptions for Abbas contained herein apply equally to his successor. 9The first phase is designed to produce Palestinian reform and Israeli security, with the Palestinians cracking down on the infrastructure of terror in their areas and the Israelis withdrawing their forces to where they were in September 2000. The second phase involves the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders, creating at least juridical equality between

Israelis and Palestinians as they negotiate on the existential questions of borders, Jerusalem

and refugees. The third phase is supposed to resolve those basic questions.

that sooner or later the Israelis would create a pretext for going back to the struggle.

In Israel, there was also a readiness to transform the situation. Certainly, the

Israeli public was ready for it, with two-thirds opposing the resumption of targeted

killings by the IDF.7 But coupled with the desire to see the violence end was a feeling that the Palestinians, having imposed the recent violence on Israel, must show

they were serious about stopping it.

With the emergence of Abu Mazen as prime minister, the Israeli public and Prime

Minister Sharon saw an opportunity. With President Bush’s initiative, he saw a

need, but the ongoing economic crisis in Israel also motivated him. Sharon came to

believe that Israel’s economy could not recover unless the war with the Palestinians

stopped—and for the first time he publicly began to say so. His call to his constituency to understand that Israel must give up the occupation and be ready to ‘‘divide

the land’’ was justified in terms of the occupation not being good for Israelis, for

Palestinians or for ‘‘Israel’s economy.’’

Exhaustion on both sides certainly helps to explain why there may now be a moment to end the war and resume a peace process. Can a peace process now be successful? Is the roadmap the vehicle for producing success?

The Problems Ahead 8

The roadmap is not a detailed plan. Having been forged with outside parties, it

lacks the clarity and definition to be anything other than a set of guidelines. Its

basic concept makes sense: establish mutual obligations and phases designed to restore an environment in which the two sides can, in time, once again tackle the core

issues of the conflict.9

Truth be told, the roadmap tries to create a pathway that restores the core bargain of Oslo: The Israelis get security. The Palestinians get their freedom. Both

sides assume responsibilities to fulfill their side of that bargain. This is a fair sounding proposition in theory, but devilishly difficult to translate into reality.

The two sides were not involved in developing the roadmap, so it should come as

no surprise that they would each try to redefine it. The Israelis have been public

about their concerns and created 14 conditions—primarily related to security and

sequence—that the current administration has promised to ‘‘take into account.’’ The

Palestinians have publicly accepted the roadmap without qualification; nonetheless,

they are trying to redefine it in its application. For example, the hudna, or truce

declared as an agreement among Palestinian factions, is not a part of the roadmap.

There is supposed to be an immediate, unconditional ceasefire, with the commencement of arrests and the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure. But Abu Mazen explained that he needed to build his capabilities before taking on the main Palestinian obligations in the first phase of the roadmap. He is betting that, with calm,

the Israelis will take steps both within and outside of the roadmap that will allow

him to show he is delivering. By showing that his way works, that life for Palestinians improves, he will build his authority and his leverage on groups like Hamas.

The irony is not lost on the Israelis: a roadmap that was to pressure the Palestinians to produce first on security issues before Israel had to take difficult steps is

one that in practice pressures the Israelis to perform prior to Abu Mazen fulfilling

his side of the bargain. Indeed, this irony even extends to items not in the roadmap—neither Palestinian prisoners nor the ‘‘fence’’ are addressed in the roadmap,

but releasing prisoners and halting construction of the security fence in the West

Bank have become part of the new list of Palestinian needs. Israel, recognizing its

stake in Abu Mazen’s success, released some prisoners, lifted some checkpoints and

even planned additional withdrawals. But the Israelis were never likely to withdraw

extensively prior to seeing more of a Palestinian effort to constrain terrorist groups

and their capabilities in additional areas of the West Bank. Moreover, Sharon was

13

unlikely to carry out the tough steps that the roadmap calls for in the first phase— freezing all settlement activity and dismantling all unauthorized settler outposts established since March 2001—before seeing Abu Mazen take the tough decision to

dismantle terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank and Gaza.

Even should Abu Mazen begin to build his authority; it will not be easy to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. Old habits die hard, and Palestinians abhor the

idea of civil conflict (fitna). Moreover, there is another paradox: the longer the

hudna goes on, the more Palestinians will likely say, ‘‘why rock the boat? Why invite civil war?’’ For the Palestinians, and the Arab world generally, Palestinian obligations in the roadmap have come to be understood as doing the hudna and nothing

more. Somehow, everything else is up to the Israelis.

Naturally, Yasir Arafat adds to Abu Mazen’s challenges in this regard. While

claiming that he accepts the roadmap, Arafat opposes the disarming of the groups— especially the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—and criticized Abu Mazen for not getting

more from the Israelis for the ceasefire. Recall that the roadmap calls for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire. This was not something to be negotiated but adopted.

For Arafat, however, highlighting Abu Mazen’s failings are essential to demonstrating his own indispensability. He needs Abu Mazen to fail to prove that he

(Arafat) is not the problem. In this regard, Arafat’s own iconic status, as well as

his control of half of the security apparatus, makes him a formidable obstacle to implementing the roadmap.

Does this mean the roadmap cannot succeed? No, but it is important to remember

that, at this stage, the parties are not even talking about the core issues of the conflict. To succeed, even on the initial challenges of the first phase, very intensive U.S.

efforts will be required.

Lessons from the Past

Israeli and Palestinian expectations about the roadmap continue to be different.

The United States cannot afford for each to believe that the other will take certain

steps when it cannot or will not. If Abu Mazen cannot deliver soon in certain areas,

we must work out what he will do, when he will do it and what he needs from the

Israelis to do it. For example, even more than releases of prisoners, Abu Mazen urgently needs to show that checkpoints are being lifted and, at least in some areas

of the West Bank, the transit of people and goods is being restored. What do the

Israelis require to withdraw from certain cities and the areas around them? What

kind of responsibilities must they see the Palestinian security forces assuming to

enable them to do this? If there are acts of terror, what would it take for the Israelis

to refrain from carrying out targeted killings? The administration’s role now must

be to pose, and help resolve, such questions.

On the basic issue of dealing with the terrorist infrastructure—which will soon

confront Abu Mazen in a moment of truth—the United States needs to take several

steps. First, it will need to publicize what is expected of both sides. Abu Mazen will

need a public posture from the United States on the Palestinian obligations under

the roadmap to explain why certain actions are necessary, especially if the Palestinians are to see performance from the Israelis. (Sharon will need this no less than

Abu Mazen.) Second, the United States should conduct three-way security discussions with the Israelis and the Palestinians and reach an understanding on which

steps would be most feasible for dealing with the terrorist infrastructure. While the

Palestinians have every reason to emphasize the daunting nature of this challenge,

the history of confronting Hamas should not be ignored. In the past, when there

were confrontations with the PA, it was Hamas that always retreated, and it was

not only because of relative strengths but also because they, too, shied away from

civil war. Third, Abu Mazen and Muhammad Dahlan, the Palestinian minister of

security, need capabilities—especially vehicles, command and control support and

communications equipment—which the United States has promised but not yet provided. This should be a high priority, and, if we have a problem furnishing it quickly, the Bush Administration should go to its European or Arab partners to fill the

gap. (In 1994, the United States provided vehicles from excess stocks in Europe, and

Secretary of State Warren Christopher literally arrived with a C–130 carrying vehicles for the Palestinian police.)

This raises the larger question of assistance. The Israelis are not the only ones

who can take steps to demonstrate that Abu Mazen is delivering. Knowing its stake

in showing that Abu Mazen is making a difference for Palestinians, the administration should have focused on generating a rapid infusion of material assistance. It

should have used the G-8 for this purpose; it should now organize a donor conference with very specific targeted projects in mind. Everywhere the Israelis pull

out, there should be highly visible projects to aid in the reconstruction immediately.

Abu Mazen must be seen not only affecting Israeli behavior, but also producing tanVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
14

gible assistance from the international community quickly. This, of course, also requires Abu Mazen to identify critical projects with Palestinian managers ready to

take charge of them with their international counterparts.

Politically, the administration will also have to give meaning to its readiness to

monitor the implementation of the roadmap. John Wolf, the head of a U.S. monitoring team, cannot perform that role adequately unless clear standards of performance are established. The roadmap created the illusion of specificity. It contains 52

paragraphs, with extensive obligations enumerated for each side. Monitoring of its

implementation ought to be straightforward, but it is not because each side interprets each obligation differently. The Israelis interpret the Palestinian obligations— making arrests, collecting illegal weaponry and dismantling terrorist capabilities

and infrastructure—far more expansively than the Palestinians. In turn, the Palestinians interpret the Israeli responsibilities—improving the humanitarian situation, stopping the confiscation of property, dismantling unauthorized settler outposts

and freezing all settlement activity, including natural growth—far more expansively

than the Israelis. Presently, there is no definition of what would constitute performance by either side. Whose interpretation are we monitoring? What constitutes fulfillment of obligations?

One of the most important failings of the Oslo process was its lack of accountability. Absent this, neither side felt it necessary to fulfill its obligations. This is a

critical lesson from the past, and President Bush has been right to say that the

United States will hold each side accountable. But there will be no way to do so

until very clear standards of what constitutes progress on every obligation.

If the United States imposes its own criteria without discussing the matter both

bilaterally, and multilaterally, it runs the risk of creating standards that cannot be

met. The Bush Administration must strike a balance between what is feasible and

also meaningful—without getting into long, drawn out negotiations with each side

and the other members of the Quartet. But the administration will have to resolve

the issue of standards, preferably sooner rather than later, all while recognizing

that it may make one or both sides unhappy in the process.

This sounds like a daunting task, and indeed it is. Unfortunately, no peace process can be had on the cheap. Maybe, the United States can sustain a period of calm

for longer than three months because both sides want a tactical respite. But at this

point the administration has not yet re-established a peace process. Obligations are

being avoided more than they are being implemented. If the ceasefire is to last, if

the current moment is to be translated into something more than only a ceasefire,

then the United States is going to have to do what it takes to create accountability—a goal to which the administration has not yet come close.

Two other lessons from the past must be integrated into the administration’s approach. Israeli and Palestinian leaders must condition their publics for peace, and

Arab leaders must assume real responsibilities. Oslo was plagued by the absence

of any serious or systematic effort to get both publics ready for compromise. On the

Israeli side, under Barak there was at least some conditioning, even if it was largely

done through press leaks. Somehow, at any rate, the far-reaching concessions that

Barak contemplated came as no surprise to his public. Palestinians, on the other

hand, were never told they would have to compromise on the core issues. On the

contrary, Arafat repeatedly emphasized to the Palestinians that they would get everything, never suggesting they might have to compromise.

At this point, Ariel Sharon has begun speaking about painful compromises and

the division of the land. He has accepted Palestinian statehood. But this is a state

without borders, powers or a capital. No one should expect Sharon to offer his fundamental concessions in advance of a negotiating process, but at some point the

Israeli public needs to hear that Israeli withdrawals will form a part of a negotiating process; that Israel must give up control of Palestinians; that no viable independent Palestinian state can be surrounded by Israel; and that a viable Palestinian

state must have territorial contiguity, not an illusory contiguity that would come by

connecting different parts of the West Bank by tunnels and bridges.

For his part, Abu Mazen needs to build his authority before he can begin to condition Palestinian attitudes towards compromise on existential questions of self-definition and identity. But sooner or later this will be necessary. It will not be easy,

given a history in which any compromise on the core issues has been treated like

a betrayal. It certainly will not be easy as long as Yasir Arafat retains a leading

role: he will accuse Palestinian leaders of selling out if they even hint at accepting

less than total capitulation on borders, the status of Jerusalem and refugees. That,

of course, is exactly what peace requires; curbing expectations and surrendering

mythologies.

This is why Arab leaders must assume responsibilities in the process. Ariel Sharon cannot prepare his public to make hard choices if the Palestinians are avoiding

15

making any of their own. There will never be a Palestinian state unless the Palestinian leadership is willing to confront those who remain determined to use the territories to attack Israelis. So long as the terrorist infrastructure is intact, how can

a Palestinian state—even one with provisional borders—be recognized? To confront

groups like Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, Abu Mazen

and the Palestinian leadership will need Arab public backing. They will need the

umbrella of legitimacy that Arab states can provide.

Arab backing is also a prerequisite for neutralizing Arafat and for justifying the

idea of making hard compromises. This Arab willingness must consist not simply

in pressuring Arafat, but also in it publicly criticizing his efforts to subvert Abu

Mazen’s policies. Few steps are more likely to temper Arafat’s behavior than the

possibility that the Arabs question him publicly on his stewardship of the Palestinian cause. Arafat has always directly identified himself with the cause, and Arab

leaders have tacitly accepted that formulation.

Similarly, an Arab willingness to broach the idea of compromise to the Palestinians could make it far more palatable for Palestinians to do so. Supporting the need

for internal confrontation when necessary, neutralizing Arafat and being prepared

to reaffirm the necessity of compromise on the part of the Palestinians as well as

the Israelis would represent a sea-change for the Arab world and give a genuine

peace process a chance to succeed. A sea-change, indeed, for Arab leaders have always found it useful to pledge their hearts and souls to the Palestinian cause—provided, of course, that it cost them nothing.

Surely, no single cause in the Arab Middle East is more evocative than the Palestinian one. No one wants to be on the wrong side of this issue. No single Arab leader

wants to be accused by Arafat of asking the Palestinians to surrender their national

rights, and this is the real reason no one criticized Arafat for turning down the Clinton ideas in December 2000, even as President Mubarak, Crown Prince Abdullah

of Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah of Jordan, President Ben Ali of Tunisia and King

Mohammad of Morocco all conveyed to President Clinton the sentiment that the

ideas were historic.

Arab leaders must assume their proper role, or there will be no success in the

near term, when Abu Mazen must confront Hamas and company, or in the long

term, on the core issues, without Arab leaders assuming their part. Their own insecurity and sense of vulnerability may again intrude on their assuming responsibilities. The key will be how they evaluate the impact of a continuing war between

Israelis and Palestinians on their polities and their rules. Will it foment anger towards them on their streets? Or will it remain an issue that generates anger and

hostility that can be more easily deflected onto the United States?

One thing is certain: No peace process will succeed without the Arabs. If they decide that their stability depends on ending the conflict, they may finally do their

part. In such a circumstance, the United States will have to do its part, which includes making sure that no one is let off the hook.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, sir.

Now we will go to Rabbi Michael Melchior. He is a Member of

the Knesset and a former Deputy Foreign Minister. Welcome,

Rabbi.

STATEMENT OF RABBI MICHAEL MELCHIOR, MEMBER OF THE

ISRAELI KNESSET AND FORMER DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

Rabbi MELCHIOR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Also,

with your permission, I would like to submit my full statement for

the record and just begin my remarks first of all with expressing

of course my deep condolences for the terrible loss and the tragedy,

the crime, which we saw with the killing of the three Americans

in Gaza.

I would like to congratulate you for conducting this hearing and

thanking you for inviting me to participate. There are few reasons

for optimism in our part of the world and I think that maybe this

careful research and study by a committee like yours will increase

your involvement, commitment, and care about ending the violence

in the Middle East.

16

I would like to say that one of the things which is important before we go ahead is to try to see what went wrong in all the previous attempts. We often do not do that. I myself was a Cabinet

Minister in Barak’s government and later Deputy Foreign Minister,

as you mentioned. I was part of many of the attempts which have

been, which Dennis Ross played a very central role in. I think that

it is important to reach the conclusion that there were important

elements which were lacking the whole way through in all the different attempts we made.

I think one of the things we have to reach and accept is that the

post-cold war conflicts are different in essence than what has been

during the last century. I would say even in many ways that we

are back to the pre-World War I conflicts in that the most dangerous wars which we see now in the world in general are the wars

which are based on, say, civilizational aspects. They cannot be

solved in the same political, economic, and territorial solutions

which were in the last century.

One of the best examples, of course, of this is Yugoslavia, where

Europe thought that it could pour in economic aid, it could hold

Yugoslavia together, and what it got was ethnic cleansing. I think

that we have to realize that also in the Middle East a much more

central place than what has been attributed up until now in the

process is on the issues of ethnicity, religion, culture, much more

than what we consider on economy and so on.

The danger, what the fundamentalists are afraid of, is that an

American-sponsored peace will introduce a cheap, Westernized secular value and destroy a traditional society. It is not a coincidence

that the intifada, which we now see did not come—it came at the

peak of the peace process. It came not in order to end occupation,

because if they wanted to end occupation they could have done it;

we know that. It is an intifada el Aqsa, el Aqsa of course being the

mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.

It is based on a religious concept. Therefore I think it is important to understand that what the Hamas and the Islamic Jihad

and the Al Aqsa Martyrs which we are talking about, what they

want to achieve is to defend their faith. They have built a myth

that we are in the Middle East only to get rid of Islam and to blow

up the mosques. That is much more important to them than for the

Palestinian, I think justified, request and demand to have their

rights fulfilled.

Now, the problem is that we continuously are empowering the

most extreme and totalitarian religious factions in the conflict. We

are doing it in the press, we are doing it by listening to them. They

are deciding the paradigms of the issue.

I would like to suggest to you today that we, instead of doing

that, empower a coalition of moderate forces which are in the opposing cultures in the Middle East. I think that the good news I

could tell you about is that I have been involved in many different

efforts of this kind. One of them resulted in quite a famous summit

meeting of all the religious leaders of the Middle East in Alexandria, Egypt last year, and in consequent meetings we have involved

cultural personalities, educationalists, and so on.

We need to make that coalition in order to agree that the religious leaders of the Arab world who believe that sanctity of human

17

life is a supreme value of Islam—these people have to be empowered and not always the al-Qaedas and the Hezbollahs and the

Hamas people. It can be a religious war and that is what it is turning into. If it is a religious war we will never be able to solve it.

If it is my god against your god, you cannot compromise. If it is

my civilization against your civilization, a clash of civilizations, we

will never get there.

But if we, as we have seen, can find the kind of leaders who are

willing to agree that maybe we have different religions and different identities—and do not forget, religion is the central identity

of the peoples of the Middle East both on our side and on the other

side. If we can come to an agreement that maybe our god and his

messengers have different messages, but both of our gods and their

prophets will not accept us killing each other, then a partnership

can begin, a totally different partnership than we have had up

until now.

We have to take the cultural clash, the clash of civilizations, and

turn it into an intra-civilizational fight. We of Israel, the Jews, we

have to fight the extreme elements also amongst ourselves, which

led to the Baruch Goldstein tragedy, to the assassination of our

Prime Minister, to what many of our extremists are doing today

when they know very well which buttons to press on the other side

in order for there not to be progress.

The other side of course has to do and empower—I think that the

Nobel Peace Prize which was declared just this week was an important step of empowering forces, intra-civilizational forces, and I

think that we should applaud that. We need to hear the voice of

the coalition in schools, synagogues, mosques, media, because if we

only broadcast the theory of radicals, the totalitarians, then they

have a built-in advantage because in public exposure it is always

more interesting. Political leaders alone cannot stop the bloodshed.

If it is not creative, we will not be able to proceed.

Now, however, I want to become practical also. Besides from

doing this, I want to become very practical. The first thing is that

we have to come to an agreement—maybe this is a followup of

what Ambassador Dennis Ross said—that we cannot come with an

overall peace solution now at this stage. We should not even attempt it, because every time we attempt it and we fail the despair,

the frustration and the lack of hope is opening then again for the

extremist elements to be much more dominant.

Therefore, I think that what we should do is what we are doing

all kinds of other places in the world: We are trying to control and

manage conflicts and we are not trying to solve them. Look at Cyprus, look at Kosovo, look even at Kashmir, although there it is not

always successful. We are not trying to solve those conflicts now.

We hope to do it in the future. We are trying to manage them.

Those are the new kinds of conflicts, which are mainly dominated

by religious and ethnic opposing sides.

Therefore what I think we should do now is to dominate—is to

control the conflict until we can get to a stage, maybe some time

in the future, but not with dates which will press us and then they

will not be followed and then the frustration would come again.

I would like to make just four short observations about what we

need to do immediately. One is to centralize the Palestinian AuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
18

thority, to centralize the military forces and so on. You cannot have

a state with 20 different armies. It does not exist anywhere in the

world. It will not exist with us, and the Palestinian leadership if

it wants a state and it needs a state has to do that, No. 1.

No. 2, we have to understand that today to demand of them a

Western-style democracy is not achievable at this stage and we

should not put in a precondition that will not get anywhere. If we

had demanded that of our neighbors, we would never have had

peace with Egypt, we would never have had peace with Jordan. We

have to be able to accept this, although of course democracy should

be the final goal and aim and we should do everything for that to

happen.

No. 3, we have to understand it is not enough to fight terrorism

or put up a wall. We have to at the same time give other options

which are political options.

No. 4, we need today a Palestinian state. It cannot wait until the

end of some road or in 5 years or in 10 years. I want to say very

clearly, if there are not two states there will be only one state and

that state will not be a Jewish and a democratic state. Therefore,

we as Israelis need—it is not something which is a gesture to a

Palestinian wish. We need it now.

If it cannot be done—and there my conclusion is the same as

Ambassador Ross’s. If it cannot be done under an agreement, which

is of course to be preferred in every way and sense, we have to do

it unilaterally and we have to do it fast. Then of course we will

have to move to our side of the fence, if we say it in that way. The

settlements which are on the other side, it is not going to be easy

to do it, but we will have to do it. You cannot build a fence which

is security and then continue to pour more and more people into

the other side of the fence.

So just to sum up in 1 minute because the red light is on, I will

say we need to empower a rational, moderate coalition of religious,

educational, cultural leaders. It is not a fringe thing. It is not something you pay lip service to. This is the essence of the conflict.

No. 2, we need a workable, realistic plan which will allow us and

the Palestinians to live with our differences, but to control the violence and stabilize our situation until we can get to the biblical

dreams of the peace, an absolute prophetic peace. We will work for

it, but if we do not end the bloodshed today it will deny us also

the dream of having an overall peace, which of course has to be the

target.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Rabbi Melchior follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RABBI MICHAEL MELCHIOR, MEMBER OF THE ISRAELI

KNESSET AND FORMER DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by congratulating you for conducting this hearing, and thanking you

for inviting me to participate. In the part of the world where I live, there have been

all too few reasons for optimism of late. The continued concern and commitment of

the government of the United States to help the sides reach an agreement, is one

of those few. We pray that as a result of careful research and study conducted by

committees such as this, your government’s concern and involvement will increase

and be even more effective, so that we can together arrive at a plan to end the violence which plagues us in the Middle East.

19

The last decade has, indeed, seen numerous attempts to solve the Middle East

conflict. From the outset I personally was a strong supporter of the Oslo Accords,

and as a minister in Ehud Barak’s cabinet I was closely involved in the Camp David

negotiations and their aftermath. In spite of all the hope generated by Oslo, in spite

of all the international support it and later efforts received, none brought the desired result. It seems that every time a peace effort is to bring us a step forward

towards resolving the conflict, we would be driven two steps back by yet another

terrorist attack. All the peace efforts—some of the most serious of which, of course,

were sponsored by your government—were well intentioned and the products of fine

minds. Yet I think that before we embark on yet another new peace initiative, we

would be wise to examine the previous efforts to see if perhaps there was an important element missing in them all.

In the tradition of solutions that ended many of the conflicts of the twentieth century, recent peace initiatives aimed at an overall political solution to the Middle

East conflict. I would like to suggest, however, that there is a difference between

ours (as well as some of the other troubling conflicts of the twenty-first century) and

those of the last one hundred years. In an interesting way, I submit, post-Cold War

conflicts contain an element more similar to pre-World War conflicts, than to those

of the 1900’s. The most dangerous wars of the twentieth century—the wars you and I grew up

with—were wars of conflicting territorial, economic, or nationalistic interests. Today’s conflicts may have territorial aspects as well, but—like those of more than one

hundred years ago—they are seen as mostly cultural, ethnic, and religious. They are

not wars fought between countries; they are wars between civilizations.

Recent peace-making efforts have been unsuccessful, I submit, because they offer

only twentieth-century style political/economic/territorial solutions to what are no

longer just political, economic, or territorial conflicts. The Europeans thought they

could hold Yugoslavia together by pouring in economic aid and by suggesting clever

political solutions. What they got was ethnic cleansing. Today’s efforts to solve our

conflict must be different. Though we think otherwise, extremist elements in the

Middle East wish to turn the Arab-Israel conflict of today into one aspect of the new

century’s overall clash between the Western Judeo-Christian civilization, and Islam.

It is not hard to realize why they do so. Jews and Moslems see their religions as

a major element in determining their identity. If fundamentalists persist in portraying an American-sponsored peace as an invasion of cheap Western, secular values, then peace initiatives become threats to the traditional lifestyles and religious

values that zealots would die to preserve.

Totalitarian Moslems see Israel as an outpost and vanguard of Western, secular

society. Making peace with Israel, recognizing its legitimacy, is a threat to the integrity of Moslem civilization in its heartland, the Middle East. No territorial compromise with ‘‘the small Satan’’ [the U.S.A. is ‘‘the big Satan’’] is possible, and no

suggestions for political or economic resolution to the conflict can be sufficient.

Extremists among the Palestinians have demonstrated this repeatedly. We must

remember that the present ‘‘Intifada’’ began in the immediate wake of the Camp

David negotiations where the Palestinians were offered a much more than just ‘‘generous’’ offer of territory and economic benefits. The violence today is not—as the Palestinians would have the West believe—about Israel’s ‘‘occupation’’ of Palestinian

territory. Mr. Arafat was offered an end to ‘‘occupation’’, and he turned it down!

Rather than embracing political, territorial, and economic solutions offered, the Palestinians began the current wave of violence, calling it ‘‘Intifadat el Aksa’’. [El Aksa

is a mosque on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.] They have denied historical fact,

and replaced it with a myth. They now claim that there never was a Jewish Temple

in Jerusalem. Our sincere concern for what is in fact Judaism’s holiest site, is depicted as a fabrication to hide Israel’s secret aim of attacking the mosques now

there. Palestinian terrorists seek—and receive—support from Moslems all over the

world, glorifying the blood they shed as part of this century’s historic and holy fight

to defend Moslem civilization from an attack by Western civilization’s puppet in the

Middle East, Israel.

The Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and el Aksa Martyrs who terrorize Israel as part of

‘‘Intifadat el Aksa’’ are not out to end Israel’s occupation of parts of the Gaza strip

or the West Bank. They are out to defend Islam from the threat of the West. Offering to satisfy the territorial or national aspirations of the Palestinians will not satisfy them. They are not Palestinian nationalists fighting a twentieth-century kind

of war. They represent maximalist, totalitarian elements in Islam that cannot tolerate any foreign impingement on Moslem territory. They see themselves as Moslems defending the faith, more than Palestinians fighting for their rights.

If we accept their paradigm, that the Arab-Israel conflict is in fact a clash of civilizations (modern Western society versus traditional Islam) rather than a conflict of

20

national interests (Palestinians versus Israelis), we will be guilty of empowering the

most extreme, totalitarian religious factions involved in the conflict, and condemn

ourselves to ever-escalating violence led by zealots. I would like to suggest an alternative. I would suggest that world leaders instead empower a coalition of civilizations of moderate forces from within opposing cultures. I hope that the world’s political leadership will seek out Moslem and Jewish religious leaders, who—while not

compromising their faith—still recognize the need to suspend implementation of

fundamental beliefs, in favor of achieving peaceful co-existence with a neighboring

civilization. Once found, these moderate religious leaders must be joined in a crosscultural coalition to counter the extremists in each camp. This, ladies and gentlemen, is the only way to avoid a violent clash of West versus East, of Christians and

Jews versus Moslems. And—unlikely as it may sometimes seem—it is viable.

Though the totalitarian radical elements of Islam gain headlines today, I can assure

you from the work I have done in recent years, that there are religious leaders in

the Arab world who teach that the sanctity of human life is a supreme value of

Islam. Extremists in my own religious camp pervert Jewish teachings to justify dastardly acts like that of Baruch Goldstein and the assassination of Prime Minister

Rabin, and manipulate holy texts to prevent progress towards peace. But rabbis in

Israel know that our true Torah is a Torah of peace, and our holy texts in fact teach

us the need to live in peace with our neighbors.

An imam and a rabbi may disagree over many things. One’s God and His Messengers may not be like the other’s. But if both agree that neither of their gods and

prophets wants us to kill each other, then a partnership can begin. I have met many

prominent Moslem, Jewish, and Christian leaders in the Middle East who are ready

to join such a coalition. In January of 2002, in Alexandria, Egypt, religious leaders

of the highest stature (including the Archbishop of Canterbury, the dean of the el

Azhar seminary in Cairo, and the Chief Rabbi of Israel) met and laid the foundation

for a coalition of rational, moderate religious leaders. Subsequent contacts and meetings, with top religious leaders of Sunni Islam in the Palestinian Authority and all

over the Moslem world, demonstrate that the coalition is not only needed, but practically feasible.

The true ‘‘culture clash’’ will actually be an intra-civilizational fight to change

public opinion in the two societies, a clash between the totalitarian extremists (both

Moslem and Jewish) on the one side, and the rational moderates (both Moslem and

Jewish) on the other. The political leaders of today must do much more than pay

lip-service in support of the religious moderates. It must be a top priority for the

enlightened world to empower them. We should all applaud the Nobel Peace Prize

committee for taking a first step in this direction. The governments of the world

must summon all the creativity and resources at their disposal to enable a coalition

of moderate religious leaders to change the way their constituents perceive adherents of competing civilizations. The voice of this coalition must be heard

overpoweringly in local media, in schools, synagogues and mosques. The media prefer to broadcast fiery radicals, and extremists have a built-in advantage in the competition for public exposure. Moderate religious leaders must be given whatever

tools they need to redress this imbalance, and educate their peoples towards realistic moderation, rather than romantic martyrdom. Otherwise, the extremist religious elements will continue to dominate public opinion and fan the flames of violence.

My call to empower a moderate religious coalition, I know, runs counter to conventional wisdom. But the peacemakers of today must not repeat the mistake of

their predecessors, and ignore religious issues. It was a mistake to believe that if

political issues could first be solved, religious issues would somehow work themselves out later. Religion is the core of the cultural identity of both Arabs and Jews.

It must be given a top priority in any agreement between them. Religious and cultural leaders, therefore, are needed at the outset and in the forefront to address our

problems in the twenty-first century. Political leaders alone cannot stop the bloodshed.

What are the realistic goals of those who would end the violence in today’s world?

Let me begin by stating clearly: an immediate resolution of the differences between

civilizations is not a realistic goal. The differences among civilizations—especially

when religion is an important element—are so profound that we cannot expect them

to be resolved in the near future.

That does not mean, however, that the situation is hopeless. Though we cannot

resolve our differences, we may still learn to live with them. We may not be able

to end the tension between us, but we can keep it from running out of control. Previous attempts to bring an overall peace to the Middle East were admirable and

honorable. They offered solutions to what were perceived as the basic problems dividing Israel and its neighbors. But they failed. The differences between us and the

21

Arabs are deeper and of a different nature than yesterday’s peacemakers realized.

In addition, the rash of terrorist attacks on our population centers has changed public opinion in Israel. Sadly I report to you, that many even of our moderate citizens

doubt the intentions of the Palestinians, and consider an overall peace agreement

unrealistic. Controlling the violence is the most Israelis think can be achieved in

the foreseeable future.

The Biblical vision of world peace, when the wolf dwells happily with the lamb,

remains a dream for the End of Days. We can, however—sadly perhaps—lower our

sights and aim not for a full resolution of the conflict, but for control and stabilization of the situation. An end to violence, a partial peace, a ‘‘piece of peace’’ if you

will, is achievable, and our best alternative until, some day, the dream of an overall

peace will become real.

Ours, of course, is not the only conflict of this century where ethnic, cultural, and

religious differences exacerbate the tension. There are those who see the tensions

in Kosovo, Cyprus and Kashmir as clashes of civilizations, no less. There, world

leadership has—wisely, I think—proposed practical methods to control violence and

stabilize the situation, rather than trying to reach an overall resolution to the vast

differences between the cultures in conflict. Though those practical proposals have

not yet proven uniformly successful, the world recognizes they are the best means

to address the situation. I find it curious that only in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,

does the world repeatedly press for an overall resolution of the problem. The ‘‘piece

of peace’’ approach has not failed elsewhere. I suggest we give it a try in our part

of the world as well.

What are the elements necessary for us to have our ‘‘piece of peace’’? I would like

to share with you four observations that I think will help us bring violence under

control and learn to live with our differences.

Firstly, if the Palestinian leadership wants a state of its own, it must realize that

no state can exist with uncontrolled armed militias in its midst. It must take immediate steps to centralize authority and control the terrorist organizations many of

which, by the way, threaten its own legitimacy as well. (Totalitarian extremists

have no tolerance for less-extreme elements in their own society, either.) It will not

be easy to disarm Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, but the Palestinian leadership has

no choice but to face up to the challenge.

Secondly, we cannot insist on Palestine becoming a Western-style democracy as

a pre-condition for ending the violence. Demanding that the Palestinians become a

democracy makes good sense, for we know that democracies don’t make war on each

other. But, if we were to insist on making agreements with democracies only, we

would not have peace today with any of our neighbors. We’ll be happy when the

Palestinians show more of an inclination towards forming a true democracy, but we

don’t have to suspend our efforts to stabilize the current situation, while we wait

for them to do so.

Thirdly, though we must do all in our power to combat terror, we must realize

that stopping today’s terrorists is not our only goal. It is in Israel’s best interest

that the Palestinians have a viable, prosperous state. The humanitarian catastrophe

visited on the Palestinian people by the current conflict pains us as moral human

beings, as well as—on a practical level—provides a breeding-ground for future suicide bombers.

And finally, we must physically separate ourselves from the Palestinians. We

shall have to divide into two states: one Jewish and one Palestinian. As Zionists,

we know that Israel must be a Jewish democracy where human rights are safeguarded. Given the demography of the region, if there will be only one state between

the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, it will not be Jewish, and/or it will

not be a democracy. We would like to negotiate with the Palestinians to bring about

this separation, but given the problems with the present Palestinian leadership, imminent success for such negotiations seems unlikely. Until we can negotiate agreed

borders, we may be forced to pull out of the Gaza Strip and much of the West Bank

unilaterally, and establish a secure division between us and the Palestinians. I wish

to emphasize that we consider an agreed-upon border to be preferable (and would

likely be better geographically for the Palestinians), but Israel has the right to secure borders, and will in the meantime assert that right unilaterally, if necessary.

This will be no easy matter for us in Israel. Many well-intentioned idealistic settlers

will have to be uprooted from the homes they built and have lived in for thirty

years. In addition, a unilateral withdrawal risks being seen as rewarding the terrorists, who will undoubtedly claim that it was their violence that drove the Jews out

of occupied territory. I submit, however, that true victory for terrorism is the continuation of the uncontrollable violence of today. If we take these admittedly painful

steps to bring the situation under control and to manage it on our terms rather than

22

theirs—we will have sent a message to the terrorists that their days have become

numbered, that their cause eventually will be lost.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is today despair among Palestinians and Israelis.

After every terrorist act, with every funeral, even those who once thought there was

a chance for peace find it harder to believe that there are partners left on the other

side. Unsuccessful peace initiatives by powerful and well-meaning friends, only

deepen the despair.

Totalitarian factions would turn our national differences into an insoluble clash

of civilizations. We ask our friends to help us empower a rational, moderate coalition of religious and cultural leaders from both sides, who will provide an alternative to those totalitarian extremists who now dominate public opinion and make

real peace impossible.

Our friends who would help us achieve peace must appreciate that full peace may

not be as immediately attainable as we had all hoped. Rather, we ask that they help

us develop a workable, realistic plan that would allow us and the Palestinians to

live with our differences, control the violence, and stabilize our situation.

Ladies and gentlemen, we Jews end all our prayers with a blessing and wish for

peace for our people. When we depart, as it were, from our sanctuary of prayer, we

bow and take three steps backwards. The late Chief Rabbi of the British Empire,

Rabbi Emmanuel Jacobovits, pointed out how proper it is that before asking the Almighty to make peace for us, we step back and thus make room for others. If we

are so full of ourselves that we cannot make room for others, there can never be

peace among us. And there is no greater blessing for Israel than peace. Let us pray

that the leaders of the world have the wisdom to encourage all of today’s combatants in all of today’s conflicts, to allow room for broad cultural, religious, and ethnic

spaces, wide enough to accommodate others and their hopes for peace, as well. And

if the Peace of our Biblical prophets must remain a dream for tomorrow, let us have

the wisdom to end the bloodshed today, that would deny us even that, our cherished

dream.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Rabbi, very much.

Now we will go to Mr. Dror Etkes, who is the coordinator of the

Settlements Watch Project for Peace Now and has also come here

from Jerusalem. Welcome, Mr. Etkes.

STATEMENT OF MR. DROR ETKES, DIRECTOR OF PEACE

NOW’S SETTLEMENTS WATCH PROJECT, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

Mr. ETKES. Thank you, Chairman Chafee, Ranking Member

Boxer, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee: Shalom.

My name is Dror Etkes. I am the director of the Israeli Peace

Now movement’s Settlements Watch Project. First I want to express my grief and outrage over the attack this morning against

America officials in the Gaza Strip.

It is a great honor and a tremendous privilege for me to appear

before you today on behalf of Peace Now to discuss the settlements

movement and its relationship to the Israeli-Palestinian peace

process. As an Israeli who is deeply committed to his country and

works every day to preserve its future as a Jewish and democratic

state, I deeply appreciate the subcommittee for taking such an interest in my homeland in our search for peace. I also appreciate the

high level of support that the Congress has provided to Israel since

its birth.

Before I discuss the settlements, I want to say a brief word about

the organization that I represent and mention that my written testimony contains many more details about the points I will make in

the opening comments this afternoon.

Peace Now was established in 1978 when 348 reserve officers

and combat soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces issued an open

letter urging Israel to reach a peace agreement with Egypt. What

23

was true then is still true today: We are a Zionist organization

with roots in the military and security establishment that believes

peace is essential for ensuring Israel’s long-term security.

Peace Now established Settlements Watch because we have always thought that settlements in the occupied territories threaten

our existence as a Jewish democratic state, weaken the security of

Israel, drain our economic resources, and serve to maintain Israeli

rule over another people, thereby preventing Israel from reaching

peace with the Palestinians. The settlements today pose an existentialist threat to the future of Israel. The West Bank and Gaza are

not empty. Beside the settlers, there are now about 3.5 million Palestinians and, given demographic trends, those Palestinians combined with Israeli Arabs who live inside the Green Line will guarantee that Jews will soon be a minority and Arabs will be the majority in the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean

Sea.

When that day comes, Israel will cease to be a Jewish democracy

state. We will no longer be a Jewish country because Israeli Jews

will be outnumbered by our Arab neighbors. As a result, we will

be forced to become a binational state lacking any prospect for stability. Or we will choose to forego all acceptable norms of democracy in order to maintain Jewish minority supremacy over an Arab

majority. Both of these options should frighten all friends of Israel.

Settlements weaken our security because each settler, each settlement, and each bypass road requires protection from the Israeli

military. In the West Bank the Israeli line of defense is roughly ten

times longer than the Green Line because of the need to protect the

settlements and their supporting infrastructure.

A recent extensive study by, Ha’aretz found that Israel spent a

little under half a billion dollars a year to maintain about 10,000

troops in the occupied territories prior to the intifada. Ha’aretz also

found that our Defense Ministry is spending roughly double that

amount today, more like $1 billion, because of the ongoing violence.

Beyond stretching Israel’s defense capabilities, the settlements

movement costs Israeli taxpayers at least $556 million in extra

non-military spending each year, according to Ha’aretz.

Finally, Peace Now is concerned about settlements because they

work to ensure that the Israeli and Palestinian populations are

woven together throughout the territories and to make it impossible to separate the two societies into two viable independent

states.

Now let me turn to the question of the role the settlements play

in the peace process at the present time. It is important to keep

in mind that, despite the fact that settlements are a significant obstacle to peace, there is no moral equivalency between settlements

and terrorist attacks, nor are settlements the only cause of tension

between Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, settlements

have a lot to do with what Israel has failed to deliver through negotiations with the Palestinians that are based on the concept of

exchanging land for peace.

Here are the basic facts. There are approximately 230,000 settlers today living in 145 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza

considered official under Israeli law. In addition, over 120 settlement outposts have been established since 1996 without proper

24

Israeli authorization. Settlement construction covers only a tiny

fraction of the occupied territories, but Israel has expropriated approximately 50 percent of the West Bank land through various

methods. Contrary to popular belief, settlement expansion actually

continued during the Oslo years, between the years 1993 and 2000,

with the settler population nearly doubling. In addition, thousands

more settlement housing units were built.

The ultimate fate of official settlements is left as an issue for

Israel and the Palestinians to resolve in a final peace agreement.

But the Road Map details specific steps that Israel must take in

the first phase of the process in order to prevent settlements from

becoming an even worse dilemma. These steps should be taken by

Israel whether or not this particular plan is successful.

Israel is required to immediately dismantle settlement outposts

erected since March 2001. These outposts were established without

authorization for a specific reason, to complete the chain of Israeli

settlements along the areas to remain under complete Israeli control according to the Oslo Accords, just about 60 percent of the

West Bank, and to connect them with the other settlements deep

in the West Bank in order to form more solid blocks of communities.

It was Ariel Sharon, then Foreign Minister, who in October 1998

called upon the settlers to grab the hilltops in order to establish

new settlements to prevent the land from being turned over to the

Palestinians. During this period, roughly 50 new settlement outposts were established. This process reached a peak during the

first Sharon government, during which approximately 75 new outposts were built.

At this point, over 120 settlement outposts have been established

since 1996. Few have been truly evacuated and the settlers continue to push to build new ones and strengthen older outposts

every single day.

Israel is also required to freeze all settlement activity, including

natural growth of settlements. Successive Israeli governments have

used the excuse of natural growth as a loophole through which

more settlements, housing, and bypass roads have been built and

more settlers brought to the occupied territories.

It is true that some settlers move there for ideological or religious reasons, but they are a distinct minority. The vast majority

of the settlers, 77 percent of them according to the polling results,

moved to the occupied territories for quality of life reasons. Basically, Israeli governments have offered extensive economic incentives that make it significantly cheaper for Israelis to live in the

West Bank and Gaza than inside the Green Line. A real freeze on

all settlement activity would require an end to these subsidies, but

in general they continue.

Peace Now hired an independent Israeli accounting analyst to examine government spending on West Bank and Gaza settlements

in 2001. He found that in 2001 Israel spent at least $440 million

in what can be considered surplus spending on the settlements

movement, not counting military and some civilian spending. Israel

received $838 million in its annual economic grant from the United

States in 2001. This means that Israel spends the equivalent of

over half of the amount on settlements that year, excluding secuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
25

rity expenses. As I mentioned earlier, the more extensive Ha’aretz

study found that Israel now spends at least $556 million a year

extra on settlements activity, not including military expenditures.

Let me now turn to the controversy that surrounds the security

fence that Israel is building in the West Bank. There is nothing inherently wrong with Israel erecting a security barrier between us

and the West Bank. In fact, the whole idea of such a fence, which

Peace Now supports, comes from the Labor Party and other concerned Israeli organizations. They pointed out in the early days of

intifada that it is crazy for Israel to allow its border along the West

Bank to remain wide open to terrorist infiltration. After all, a fence

that runs along the 1967 border near Gaza has never been penetrated by a single Palestinian terrorist.

However, the security barrier that Prime Minister Sharon is

building in the West Bank strays far from the original plan of

erecting a fence along the Green Line. Prime Minister Sharon

strongly opposed the initial concept of a fence because he knows

that it has political implications. Building it along the Green Line

would imply that settlements left on the other side would be likely

candidates for dismantlement once final borders were established

with the Palestinians. As a result, the settlers and their supporters

began to clamor to have as many settlements as possible on the

Israeli side of a fence.

It is only the prospect of using the fence to reinforce Israeli settlements and Israel’s hold on about 50 percent of the West Bank

that has gained the Prime Minister’s support. Ironically, Prime

Minister Sharon’s proposed fence route would bring hundreds of

thousands of Palestinians who live near the settlements inside

Israel’s line of defense. These Palestinians will be angry for being

cutoff from their farm lands, relatives, and social services in the

process.

Pushing the fence deeper into the West Bank also will greatly increase the cost to Israel of building the barrier, with the segment

enclosing the settlement of Ariel adding about $224 million to the

price if it is completed.

Finally, a longer fence will place additional strain on the military, which will need to guard and defend the barrier along much

more difficult terrain than if the fence ran along the Green Line.

Peace Now encourages the Senate to support Israel’s right to

build a security fence, but we also strongly urge you to support

President Bush’s objection to the specific route of the fence being

proposed to accommodate settlements.

Last, it is important to point out that the positions that the

Peace Now take on settlements are much more reflective of public

opinion in Israel and the American Jewish community than those

of the Sharon government. Independent surveys in Israel consistently show solid majorities in support of withdrawing settlements

if a peace treaty is reached. Polls commissioned by Peace Now’s

U.S. sister organization, Americans for Peace Now, also show

strong American Jewish support for a settlement freeze and an end

to Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Peace Now also recently commissioned an independent firm to

survey settlers themselves about the peace process. We found that

83 percent of the settlers would agree to leave the West Bank and

26

Gaza in exchange for compensation. In fact, 29 percent of them

would leave the settlements today if they could. Only one, up to

two, percent would use all means to resist evacuation. In other

words, should the time come when Israel has to make some tough

decisions on settlements the vast majority of the settlers will not

necessarily stand in the way.

Let me conclude by stressing that Israel’s failure to meet its obligations regarding settlements is not an excuse for the Palestinian

Authority’s failure to meet its obligation to combat terrorism and

undertake numerous reform efforts. Both sides must take steps in

parallel to make this particular peace plan succeed. At the same

time, I would suggest to you that, whether or not the Road Map

is implemented, supporting the current Israeli government’s policy

on settlements and the fence is not in Israel’s best interests. The

continuation of settlement growth will spell an end to the Zionist

dream regardless of whether terrorism is crushed today or not for

the years to come.

Please, help us to meet this challenge. One way that you could

help is to consider a proposal made by Americans for Peace Now

about what to do with money that may be deducted from the loan

guarantee package that Congress has generously provided to

Israel. This money is to be deducted because of Israeli spending on

the settlements. Instead of having Israel lose these guarantees, this

portion of the guarantee should be placed in a set-aside account to

help fund housing construction inside the Green Line for settlers

who want to return to Israel. No account like this exists today.

Helping establish one would send a constructive message about settlements. It would also demonstrate compassion for settlers who do

not have the money to move back home.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this distinguished panel. I would be happy to answer any questions you may

have about settlements. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Etkes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DROR ETKES, DIRECTOR OF PEACE NOW’S

SETTLEMENTS WATCH PROJECT, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

Chairman Chafee, Ranking Member Boxer, and other distinguished members of

this subcommittee:

Shalom.

My name is Dror Etkes, and I am the Director of the Israeli Peace Now movement’s Settlements Watch Project. It is a great honor and a tremendous privilege

for me to appear before you today on behalf of Peace Now to discuss the settlement

movement and its relationship to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which regrettably has stalled because of the violence and failure of both sides to implement

their basic obligations.

As an Israeli who is deeply committed to his country and works every day to preserve its future as a Jewish, democratic state, I deeply appreciate this subcommittee

for taking such an interest in my homeland and our search for peace with our neighbors.

I also appreciate the high level of support that Congress has provided to Israel

since its inception. Your consistent backing has been, and will continue to be, essential to the well-being of my country.

BACKGROUND OF PEACE NOW AND SETTLEMENTS WATCH

Before I discuss the settlements, I want to say a brief word about the organization

that I represent.

Peace Now was started in 1978 when 348 reserve officers and combat soldiers of

the Israel Defense Forces issued an open letter to then-Prime Minister Menachem

27

Begin urging him to reach a peace agreement with Egypt. From this beginning,

Peace Now was born and quickly became the largest grassroots movement in the

history of Israel.

What was true then is still true today: we are a Zionist organization with roots

in the military and security establishment that believes peace is essential for ensuring Israel’s long-term security.

Over the years, Peace Now has organized large demonstrations—involving hundreds of thousands of Israelis—on behalf of peace, as well as established a series

of projects to do research and analysis about issues that are related to the peace

process. One of these projects is called Settlements Watch, which I currently direct.

Settlements Watch was established because Peace Now has always thought that

settlements in the occupied territories threaten our existence as a Jewish, democratic state, weaken the security of Israel, drain our economic resources, undermine

our society’s moral fiber, and serve to perpetuate Israeli rule over another people

in a way that prevents Israel from reaching peace with the Palestinians.

The settlements today pose an existential threat to the future of Israel.

Let me be very clear: it is in Israel’s own best interests to separate itself from

settlements and the occupied territories that the settlers would have us bind to the

state.

The former head of Israeli military intelligence, Yehosephat Harkabi, summed up

the problem like this in a lecture to an American audience during the Cold War.

He said, ‘‘You Americans have the most powerful army in the world. No one can

challenge you. But if you had 120 million Russians living in America—all completely

loyal to the Soviet Union—your great army would be of no use and you would not

be safe. That is our situation. The simple fact is that we must either have a Palestinian state in our neighborhood or we will become a Palestinian state.’’ Our circumstances have not improved since Harkabi spoke those words. The West

Bank and Gaza are not empty—besides the settlers, they are now home to about

3.5 million Palestinians. And given demographic trends, those Palestinians, combined with Israeli Arabs who live inside the Green Line, will guarantee that Jews

will soon be a minority in the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.

When that day comes, Israel will cease to be a Jewish, democratic state. We will

no longer be a Jewish country because Israeli Jews will be outnumbered by our

Arab neighbors, and therefore we will be forced to become a bi-national state, with

the prospects for a civil and stable bi-national state being virtually impossible. Or

we will choose to forego all acceptable norms of democracy in order to maintain Jewish minority supremacy over an Arab majority.

Both of these options should frighten all friends of Israel in the Senate and elsewhere in the United States. But we will rapidly be forced to choose between these

options unless firm measures are taken immediately to free us, our allies, and our

neighbors from the stranglehold of the settlements.

Settlements weaken our security because each settler, each settlement, and each

bypass road connecting Israel to the settlements requires protection from the Israeli

military. Our soldiers are required to put their lives on the line every day to defend

Israeli communities deliberately placed in the midst of Palestinian population centers in order to break up Palestinian territorial contiguity. In the West Bank, the

Israeli line of defense is roughly ten times longer than the Green Line because of

the need to protect the settlements and their supporting infrastructure.

A recent extensive study by a leading Israeli newspaper, Ha’aretz, found that

Israel spent a little under a half billion dollars a year to maintain about 10,000

troops in the occupied territories prior to the Intifada. Ha’aretz also found that our

Defense Ministry is spending roughly double that amount, more like $1 billion,

these days because of the ongoing violence. These are troops and money that could

be committed to defending our border.

Beyond stretching Israel’s defense capabilities, the settlement movement costs

Israeli taxpayers at least $556 million in extra non-military spending each year, according to the Ha’aretz study.

Total spending on settlements has amounted to over $10 billion since 1967.

Settlements also harm Israeli interests by undermining the political authority of

moderate Palestinian leaders, the sort of leaders who are interested in stopping terror. For these leaders to be able to advance their political agenda, they need to

prove to their constituents that a non-violent path of negotiations can lead to a future Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They are battling every day for

the hearts and minds of the Palestinian street. Settlement construction delivers a

message layered in concrete and steel that Israel is not interested in negotiations.

Finally, Peace Now is concerned about settlements because they work to ensure

that Israeli and Palestinian populations are woven together throughout the terriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
28

tories and make it impossible to separate the two societies into two viable, independent states.

This is not an accident. This is the result of deliberate planning by the settlement

movement and its supporters in different Israeli governments over the years, especially our current Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon.

SETTLEMENTS AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Now let me turn to the question of the role that settlements play in the peace

process at the present time.

It is important to keep in mind that despite the fact that settlements are a significant obstacle to peace, there is no moral equivalency between settlements and terrorist attacks. There is obviously a difference between building a red-roofed home

in the West Bank and sending a suicide bomber to take the lives of innocent

Israelis. I would echo the sentiments of both Amnesty International and Human

Rights Watch in emphasizing that terrorist attacks against civilians—including settlers—are war crimes and crimes against humanity.

I also recognize that settlements are not the only cause of tension between

Israelis and Palestinians.

At the same time, in a process that is supposed to see Israelis and Palestinians

exchanging land for peace, settlements have a lot to do with what Israel is supposed

to deliver through negotiations to the Palestinians, but has largely not provided.

Here are the basic facts: according to Israeli government sources, there are approximately 230,000 settlers today living in 145 settlements in the West Bank and

Gaza considered official under Israeli law and over 120 settlement outposts established since 1996 without proper Israeli authorization (although not all of these outposts are still in existence since around 20 of them—mostly uninhabited—have been

dismantled). Roughly 7,000 settlers live in the Gaza Strip in 17 settlements, with

the rest of the settler population living in West Bank communities.

Although settlement construction covers only a tiny fraction of the occupied territories, Israel has expropriated approximately 50% of West Bank land, which has

been taken over as ‘‘state land,’’ seized for ‘‘military purposes,’’ declared to be ‘‘abandoned property,’’ or expropriated for ‘‘public use.’’ Further, settlements and the territory they control are often placed near Palestinian communities to deny them the

opportunity to expand or among Palestinian population centers to break up their

contiguity.

Contrary to popular belief, settlement expansion actually continued during the

years of the Oslo peace process, with the settler population nearly doubling and

thousands more settlement housing units being built. This escalation of settlement

growth strengthened the popularity of Palestinian rejectionists and undermined the

standing of moderate Palestinian leaders who backed the Oslo Accords.

President Bush’s peace initiative explicitly recognizes settlements as an immediate problem and obligates Israel to deal with them.

Although the ultimate fate of official settlements is left as an issue for Israel and

the Palestinians to resolve in a final peace agreement, the Road Map lays out specific steps that Israel must take at the beginning of the process in order to prevent

settlements from becoming an even worse dilemma.

These steps should be taken by Israel whether or not this particular plan is successful.

OUTPOSTS

In the first phase of the Road Map, Israel is required to immediately dismantle

settlement outposts erected since March 2001.

Not after the Palestinians have succeeded in fulfilling all of their security obligations, but immediately.

And not just those outposts that Israel considers unauthorized or illegal, but all

those built since a specific date, which coincides with when Ariel Sharon first became Prime Minister.

Settlements Watch has been instrumental in raising the profile of the settlement

outpost issue. We drive throughout the occupied territories and use aircraft overflights to document the establishment of these outposts and to track their growth.

We consider outposts to be those settlements built without pre-authorization from

the state, located a significant distance from official settlements, and provided with

basic infrastructure for existing as independent communities.

These outposts are established for a specific reason: to complete the chain of

Israeli settlements along the areas that remained under complete Israeli control according to the Oslo Accords and to connect them with the isolated settlements in

the heart of the West Bank in order to form more solid blocks of communities. This

29

has been done with the awareness, and often the assistance, of the Israeli military

and numerous Israeli governments.

The outpost phenomenon is not new. This is the way that various settlements

were started as early as the late 1960s. However, during the years of the Netanyahu

government, settlers received support from right-wing Israeli politicians to use this

method. It was Ariel Sharon, then Foreign Minister, who returned from the Wye

negotiations in October 1998 and called upon the settlers to grab the mountain tops

and establish new settlements to prevent the land from being turned over to the

Palestinians. During Netanyahu’s term, roughly 50 new settlement outposts were

established. This process reached a peak during the first Sharon government, during which approximately 75 new outposts were built (although a few have been dismantled).

Prime Minister Sharon has occasionally gone through the motions of pretending

to dismantle outposts, but this is a charade.

The method for supposedly dismantling an outpost takes a familiar pattern: the

government selects the right political time to engage in a limited battle of wills with

a small and isolated outpost. The settlers—particularly the rowdy ‘‘hilltop youth’’—

respond with resistance to Israeli soldiers and police, who are often subject to violence and other abuse during the process. The cameras film it all, and it looks good

on TV. But when the reporters go away, the settlers put up new outposts either in

the same location, some place close by, or in a very remote area that is hard for

journalists to reach.

At this point, over 120 settlement outposts have been established since 1996, few

have been truly evacuated, and the settlers continue to push to build new ones and

solidify older outposts every day.

SETTLEMENT FREEZE

The second step that Israel is required to take under the first phase of the Road

Map is to freeze all settlements activity (including natural growth of settlements).

As I mentioned earlier, settlements and the settler population have continued to

expand over the years of the peace process, thereby creating facts on the ground

that make negotiating their future more difficult. Successive Israeli governments

have used the excuse of ‘‘natural growth’’ as a loophole through which more settlement housing and bypass roads have been built and more settlers brought to the

occupied territories.

But, in fact, there is no such thing as ‘‘natural growth’’ when you discuss settlements.

‘‘Natural growth’’ would imply that some version of Adam Smith’s ‘‘Invisible

Hand’’ is guiding Israelis to the West Bank and Gaza. While it is true that some

settlers move there for ideological or religious reasons, they are a distinct minority.

The vast majority of settlers—77% of them, according to an independent survey

commissioned by Peace Now—move to the occupied territories for ‘‘quality of life’’

reasons. Basically, Israeli governments have offered extensive economic incentives

that make it significantly cheaper for Israelis to live in the West Bank and Gaza

than inside the Green Line. This allows settlers to maintain a better lifestyle than

they otherwise could afford.

A freeze on all settlements activity would require an end to these subsidies, but

by and large, Israel continues to underwrite inducements for settlement growth.

Peace Now hired an independent Israeli accounting analyst to examine government spending on the West Bank and Gaza settlements in 2001. The analyst, Dror

Zaban, was formally with the Budget Department of the Israeli Finance Ministry

and Assistant to the Director General of the Finance Ministry.

He found that in 2001, using the prevailing exchange rate of 4.1 shekels to the

dollar, Israel spent at least $553.6 million on settlements in the West Bank and

Gaza, of which at least $440.5 million can be considered ‘‘surplus’’ spending, that

is, expenditures dedicated to settlers and settlements that would not have otherwise

been spent on these individuals and their communities as part of normal budget allocations available to Israelis inside the Green Line.

Mr. Zaban did not examine military spending to protect settlements, nor was he

able to determine expenditures for some civilian categories, such as education.

While these numbers may not sound impressive to members of the Senate who

are used to dealing with much larger figures, by way of comparison, Israel received

$838.2 million as its annual economic grant from the U.S. in 2001, meaning that

Israel spent the equivalent of over half of that amount on settlements that year,

excluding security expenses.

30

The more recent study of Israeli government spending on settlements conducted

by Ha’aretz, which I mentioned earlier, was even more extensive because its reporters were able to determine spending in areas that Peace Now was unable to.

As I said, Ha’aretz found that Israel spends at least $556 million extra per year

on settlement activity, not including military expenditures. This spending translates

into annual surplus costs of over $2,222 per settler. The main budget items include

$156 million in transfers to local settlement authorities, an estimated $111 million

from the Housing Ministry this year, and $89 million for roads. The cost of income

tax benefits provided to settlers was about $29 million, although these benefits were

canceled this past summer. Other items include surplus millions for electricity,

water, industry, education, and health care, among other things.

Far from meeting its obligation to freeze settlement growth, the Sharon government has recently launched a huge new housing incentive program for the settlements and an expansion of investment in tourism in the occupied territories.

Peace Now believes that our government should freeze settlement growth and

transfer the full $556 million in surplus spending on settlements to the general welfare of Israelis living inside the Green Line.

SECURITY FENCE

A great deal of attention has been paid over the past few months on the security

fence that Israel is building in the West Bank. Although the fence is not mentioned

in the Road Map, it has nonetheless become a bone of contention between the Sharon government and the Bush Administration.

Let me say that there is nothing inherently wrong with Israel’s erecting a security

barrier between us and the West Bank. In fact, the whole idea of such a fence,

which Peace Now supports, came from the Labor Party and other progressive Israeli

organizations that pointed out in the early days of the Intifada that it is crazy for

Israel to allow its border along the West Bank to remain wide open to terrorist infiltration.

Too many Israelis have paid a heavy price because nothing stood in the way of

terrorists slipping into their communities. Israel has a right and an obligation to

defend its borders, and it is not the first country in the world to use a fence as one

way to enhance its security. While we believe that Israel must hold out a viable option for a negotiated peace with the Palestinians, we should not hesitate to protect

our border until such a peace is possible.

However, the security barrier that Prime Minister Sharon is building in the West

Bank strays far from the original plan of erecting a fence along the Green Line.

Sharon strongly opposed the initial concept of the fence because he knows that it

has political implications. Building it along the Green Line would imply that the

settlements left on the other side would be likely candidates for dismantlement once

final borders were established with the Palestinians. As a result, the settlers and

their supporters began to clamor to have as many settlements as possible on the

Israeli side of the fence, and it is only the prospect of using the fence to reinforce

Israeli settlements and Israel’s hold on about 50% of the West Bank that has drawn

the Prime Minister’s support.

Therefore, President Bush is right to object to the route of the fence that Sharon

is proposing. As currently planned, this fence would clearly violate another Israeli

obligation—not to take actions that undermine trust, including confiscation and/or

demolition of Palestinian homes and property. Routing the fence so that it cuts off

Palestinians from around half of their territory is certainly a confiscation of property, and it precludes a negotiated settlement, thereby undermining President

Bush’s vision of ending the occupation of 1967. Official Israeli sources say that 85%

of the land confiscated for the fence in just its first stage of construction was expropriated from Palestinians.

It should be noted that one reason Israelis are enthusiastic about a West Bank

fence is the success of the barrier that surrounds Gaza, through which not a single

Palestinian terrorist has penetrated. However, the Gaza fence is built along the

1967 border, and this should be the precedent for a fence between Israel and the

West Bank.

Further, the proposed fence route will bring tens of thousands of Palestinians who

live near the settlements inside Israel’s line of defense, Palestinians who will be angered from being cut off from their farm lands, relatives, and social services in the

process. Prime Minister Sharon rabidly opposes any sort of Palestinian right of return (which would add tens of thousands of Palestinians to Israel), yet his fence

would amount to a de facto annexation of approximately half a million Palestinians

to our state.

31

Pushing the fence deeper into the West Bank also will greatly increase the cost

to Israel of building the barrier, with the segment enclosing the settlement of Ariel

adding about $224 million to the price, if it is completed.

Finally, a longer fence will place an additional strain on the military, which will

need to patrol and defend the barrier.

Here’s what Israeli analyst Amir Rappaport wrote in the newspaper Ma’ariv on

August 12th about the security problems with the route being advocated by the

Sharon government:

‘‘It would... oblige the IDF to allocate substantially larger numbers of

troops to defend it for two reasons. Not only is the fence along the Green

Line shorter, it is also located in more favorable terrain than the route that

runs deep in Samaria, which is hillier terrain and more difficult to secure.

Quite a few security officials believe that it would have made far more

sense to plan from the outset to have the fence run more or less along the

Green Line and to encompass, as needed, settlements in the territories

within separate, internal fences (in any event, nearly all the settlements

presently are fenced in). There are, therefore, good grounds to the argument

that the fence was planned with a view to political interests in an attempt

to keep on the Israeli side as much territory as possible, and less with a

view to security interests.’’

Peace Now encourages the Senate to support Israel’s right to build a security

fence, while also supporting President Bush’s objections to the specific route of the

fence being proposed in order to accommodate settlements. Please use all your influence to ensure that the fence is built along the Green Line.

PUBLIC OPINION

Lastly, it is important to point out that the positions that Peace Now takes on

settlements are much more reflective of public opinion in Israel and the American

Jewish community than those of the Sharon government. In fact, even the majority

of the settlers are reasonably moderate on some of these issues.

Let me explain.

Since the outbreak of the Intifada, Israeli public opinion polls have reflected increasing support for evacuation of outposts and other settlements, especially in the

context of a peace treaty.

The Steinmetz Institute of Tel Aviv University has conducted a monthly survey

of Israeli views on the peace process for the past decade. According to these polls,

60-70% of Israelis consistently say that they would support the withdrawal and dismantlement of part or all of the settlements if a peace treaty were signed today.

These figures have been reflected in other surveys, as well. Further, a recent

Ha’aretz poll found that 40% of the public is prepared to evacuate at least some settlements unilaterally, even without a treaty. That same Ha’aretz poll found that

55% of Israelis feel that settlements are more of an economic burden than a security

asset, while 55% also believe that the benefits given to settlers should be abolished

or reduced.

Surveys of American Jewish opinion conducted by Peace Now’s U.S. sister organization, Americans for Peace Now, have found similar attitudes among your constituents. In a poll conducted this past July, Americans for Peace Now found that close

to 71% of American Jews either strongly or somewhat support a settlement expansion freeze, and 58% of American Jews either support or somewhat support Israel

ending its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Further, 59% of American Jews

would support a final status agreement between Israel and Palestinians roughly

along the lines of where the parties ended our last formal negotiations in Taba, a

plan that includes evacuating most settlements from the West Bank and Gaza.

I mentioned earlier that most of the settlers moved to the occupied territories for

non-ideological reasons. This fact is reflected in the results of two extensive surveys

that Peace Now commissioned an independent polling firm to undertake over the

past year in which questions were put to settlers themselves about the peace process. The results may surprise some people because it turns out that the settlers are

more moderate than many have been lead to believe.

For example, in our June 2003 survey, we found that 90% of settlers would not

violate the law in response to a decision to withdraw from the territories, only 1-

2% of settlers would actually use all means to oppose evacuation, and 83% of settlers would agree to leave the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for compensation.

In fact, 29% of them would leave the settlements today if it were possible.

On political issues, 71% of settlers think that a peace agreement should be

reached with the Palestinians, 66% of them think unauthorized settlement outposts

32

should be removed, and 57% of settlers see the sometimes violent ‘‘hilltop youth’’

as extremist and dangerous.

In other words, should the time come when Israel has to make some tough decisions on settlements, the vast majority of settlers will not necessarily stand in the

way.

CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by reemphasizing how much I, as an Israeli, and Peace Now, as

a Zionist organization, appreciate the support that Congress provides Israel year

after year. Without your efforts, we would be in a much more difficult security and

economic situation than we are today. Please continue to help us combat terrorism

and other regional threats.

I also want to stress that Israel’s failure to meet its obligations regarding settlements in no way excuses the Palestinian Authority’s failure to meet its obligations

to combat terrorism and undertake numerous reform efforts. As the Road Map indicates, both sides are supposed to take steps in parallel to make this particular peace

plan succeed.

At the same time, I would suggest to you that—whether or not the Road Map is

implemented—indulging the current Israeli government’s refusal to deal with settlements and its drive to build a security barrier through the West Bank in order to

complicate any Israeli departure from the occupied territories is not in Israel’s best

interests. And here, too, we need your help.

Allowing Israel to deepen our occupation of the West Bank and Gaza through settlements and the fence is the same as condemning us to surrender our future as

a Jewish, democratic state.

The continuation of settlement growth will spell an end to the Zionist dream, regardless of whether terrorism is crushed today or not for years to come.

This is the most serious threat that we face today. Please help us with your words

and deeds to meet this challenge.

One way that you could help is to consider a proposal made by Americans for

Peace Now earlier this year about what to do with money that may be deducted

from the loan guarantees package that Congress has generously and wisely provided

to Israel, money that is to be deducted because of Israeli spending on settlements.

Instead of having Israel lose these guarantees, Americans for Peace Now has suggested that this portion of the guarantees be placed in a set aside account to help

fund housing construction inside the Green Line for settlers who want to return to

Israel. No account like this exists today. Helping establish one would send a constructive message about settlements and demonstrate compassion for settlers who

do not have the money to move back home.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this distinguished panel, and

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have about settlements.

Thank you.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you very much for your testimony.

We will go to Dr. Boaz Ganor, who has also made the long trip

from Israel. Welcome, Dr. Ganor.

STATEMENT OF MR. BOAZ GANOR, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, HERZLIA, ISRAEL

Dr. GANOR. Thank you, Senator. I am not going to make any political or ideological statements; I came as a counterterrorism expert to share with you my views about the obstacles facing any

peace plan in our region.

Since October 2000 Israel is facing a war of attrition. This war

of attrition combines terrorist and guerrilla attacks, more than

2000 attacks in 3 years. Over 800 Israelis have died, and more

than 4,000 were wounded. There have been over 100 suicide attacks. As a matter of fact, we had more casualties in Israel from

terrorism in the last 3 years than from the establishment of Israel

in 1948.

33

I choose to share with you this data in my opening statement because I do believe that the cessation of terrorism is the crucial element of any peace plan in our region. The whole rationale of the

Oslo process from the Israeli perspective was aimed just to achieve

one goal: security. This is living a reasonable life in our region.

But the Israeli public feels that we were double-crossed by

Yasser Arafat. Yasser Arafat used a double policy; while he was

condemning in English the terrorist attacks he was personally preserving the capability to launch terrorist attacks whenever convenient and whenever he believes that it serves the national interest

of the Palestinians.

In order to understand how this policy works, let me go back to

the equation of terrorism. Terrorism in my view is a combination

of two factors: motivation and operational capability. Only when a

group of people have both motivation to attack and operational capability, then a terrorist attack or a terrorist campaign occurs.

From this we can conclude what counterterrorism is all about.

Counterterrorism aims to either lower the motivation or lower

down the operational capability; the best thing, of course, is to

lower both factors at the same time. Unfortunately, in many cases

the two are mutually contradictory. When you deal offensively with

the operational capability of the terrorist organization, thus lowering it, you immediately raise the motivation to retaliate.

I would like to argue that since 1994, the beginning of the Oslo

Accords, when Arafat wanted to stop terrorist attacks—and there

were some times that he wanted to do so—he dealt only with the

motivation, not with the operational capability of the terrorist organizations. I call this the ‘‘threat and persuasion policy’’ of Yasser

Arafat.

This policy was based on two issues on which Arafat and Hamas

and Palestinian Islamic Jihad saw eye to eye. The first issue is

what I call the short-term Palestinian national interests. What are

these interests? To reduce Israel to the 1967 borders, creation of

a Palestinian state with a capital in Jerusalem, and what they call

the right of return for the Palestinian refugees to live in Israel in

the 1967 borders. On this short-term Palestinian national interest,

Hamas and Arafat saw eye to eye.

The other issue on which Hamas saw eye to eye with Arafat was

that in any case, the worst case scenario from their point of view

is the deterioration of the situation in the Palestinian arena into

a ‘‘fitana’’—a civil war. Whatever happens, let there not be a civil

war.

Having these goals and these beliefs, Arafat never dealt with the

operational capability of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Occasionally, for a photo opportunity he would attack an explosives laboratory or arrested some people in a revolving door policy. When

he was criticized for doing no more than this, he took the position

of the underdog, saying: I am investing 100 percent of efforts; I

cannot guarantee 100 percent success.’’ Well, of course nobody can

measure effort and therefore there was no accountability for what

he was doing.

The American policy in the last 3 years, in my view was based

on the recommendations of the Mitchell committee. The Mitchell

committee understood the problem, understood the need to change

34

the equation of terrorism, and the double policy of Yasser Arafat.

Therefore, they suggested progress in the peace process in stages,

with a prior condition being first of all the cessation of terrorism

activity and then dismantling Hamas and Palestinian Islamic

Jihad.

The Road Map, coming from the initiative of the European Quartet, had another view. They thought that the progress should be reciprocal steps from both sides with no preconditions. The amendments that the Americans insisted be put in, which is again the

cessation of terrorism and dismantling Hamas, complicated things

for Arafat.

But he had a solution—a solution that he used time and again

in the past. This is the hudna or temporary cease-fire, which frees

him from the need to deal with operational capabilities. Thus he

need only deal with the motivation of the terrorists for a temporary

time.

Well, the hudna had no chance. It had no chance because there

were four actors that were engaged in this hudna directly or indirectly and all of them had different views and different goals in

reaching this hudna. Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad

wanted the hudna only in order not to be regarded by the Palestinian public as the ones who prevent Palestinian national interests from being fulfilled. The other thing that Hamas did not want

to see is a deterioration of the situation into a fitana—a civil war.

The Palestinian Authority defined the hudna as a great opportunity again to prevent a fitana, but more than everything else to

show the rest of the world that they are fulfilling their obligation

to stop terrorist activity by dismantling the terrorist organizations

without doing that, of course.

Israel indirectly and unofficially accepted the hudna, because

Israel thought that this would give a window of time for Abu

Mazen, the new Prime Minister, to deal with the infrastructure of

Hamas.

The United States indirectly accepted the hudna for the same

reason that Israel did. But if you ask me, I think that at the end

of this hudna, the American policy started to shift toward the point

of view of the Palestinians—that dismantling Hamas is very important, but that this can be delayed to a later time.

Well, the hudna did not give us what we expected to achieve

from it because the terrorist organizations did not fulfill their obligations. During the hudna—almost 2 months of ‘‘temporary ceasefire,’’ we had 178 attacks. We had four people killed in these attacks and 16 wounded, and this does not include the August 19 attack on the bus in Jerusalem that killed 20 people and injured 112.

The Road Map did not have a chance. It did not have a chance

because the Palestinians did not have any intention of fulfilling

their obligation to dismantle Hamas. Abu Mazen was appointed for

his mission for only one reason: To pave the way for Yasser Arafat

to return to center stage in our region. Abu Mazen had no sovereignty of his own—no power of his own. If he had any sovereignty or power, it came from the sovereignty and power that he

gained from his patron, Yasser Arafat.

Even if he really wanted to dismantle Hamas—and I believe that

maybe he personally did want this—he would never have been alVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
35

lowed to do so by Yasser Arafat. If Arafat were to give him the

power to do this, he would immediately show the rest of the world

that he had deceived them for more than a decade in saying that

he could not do it, whereas Abu Mazen could do it in no time.

What are the conclusions from this? As long as Arafat plays a

key role in our region, no peace plan is going to be fulfilled. There

will never evolve a new Palestinian leadership as long as Arafat

rules, because this new, moderate leadership, would face two fronts

at the same time: Hamas on one hand and Arafat on the other

hand. No leadership will be ready and willing to fulfill the precondition of dismantling Hamas and risking a civil war as long as

Arafat is there.

It seems to me that there are no shortcuts. A society that would

like to achieve a homeland, to end a revolution, must fight extremists. It is what we had to do before the creation of Israel. Now it

is the Palestinians’ obligation to do so. And why is it necessary to

do so? Because Hamas will never recognize the right of Israel to

exist; because Hamas will never stop fighting Israel; and because

Hamas will never voluntarily and willingly dismantle itself.

The Palestinian’s have to choose between two choices: hudna or

fitana. Hudna means to go on dealing with only the motivation and

deceiving the world. Fitana may bring us a chance for another

peace plan in our region.

To summarize, I would say that no peace plan can succeed without the cessation of terrorism. This would be impossible without

dismantling the terrorist organization. This would be impossible

without a fitana, civil war, and a fitana would be impossible as

long as Arafat plays a key role in our region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Ganor follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BOAZ GANOR, PH.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

INTERNATIONAL POLICY INSTITUTE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, HERZLIA, ISRAEL

At the end of the Camp David discussions, Yasser Arafat, who was offered a Palestinian state alongside—but not instead of—Israel, declared the Oslo Peace Process

a dead end. Israel soon found itself in a position where it faced terror attacks unprecedented in scope and character. Within three years, there were thousands of

terror and guerrilla attacks, more than a hundred suicide attacks and many more

terror attacks that were foiled. The annual number of casualties caused by terror

attacks hit the highest point since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

This terror offensive has forced Israel unwillingly to move from ‘‘conflict resolution’’

to ‘‘conflict management’’ using all the counter-terrorism means at its disposal

Israel has identified the Palestinian Authority and its Chairman, Yasser Arafat,

as being responsible for this terror activity, by instigating, financing, inciting, assisting and even actively perpetrating terror attacks (as opposed to terror attacks carried out during 1994-2000, when the perpetrators were mainly Hamas and Islamic

Jihad activists and Arafat was ‘‘only’’ accused of turning a blind eye). Since September 2000, over 50% of the most serious terror attacks have been carried out by

members of Arafat’s own organization, Fatah).

Some experts tend to analyze and evaluate the prospects of peace initiatives in

the middle-east without recognizing terrorism as a crucial factor.

This was also the official policy of late Rabin’s government in 1994-1995 using the

slogan—‘‘we will pursue peace as if there is no terrorism and fight terrorism as if

there is no peace process’’. This Israeli strategy offered no incentive to the Palestinians to refrain from terrorist attacks and the Palestinian Authority to pressure

these organizations to hold their fire. As a consequence it became evident to the Palestinians that terrorist activity does serve their interests or at the very least doesn’t

endanger them. This false conviction that ‘‘terrorism pays’’ stood in full contradiction to any peace initiative in the Middle East. Moreover, after three years of an

36

on going war of attrition against Israel, the Israeli public, like the American public

does after 9/11 attacks, believes in zero tolerance attitude towards terrorism.

Anyone who cares for peace in the Middle East has to acknowledge the importance of a complete secession of terrorism as a crucial prerequisite to any future effort to reach a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

What is the phenomenon of terrorism? Terrorism is a combination of two factors—

motivation and operational capability—the motivation of a terrorist organization to

perpetrate attacks, and it’s operational capability of doing so at a given time. Based

on the terrorism equation one may conclude the Counter-Terrorism counter equation—either lower the motivation to use terrorism as a tool for achieving political

goals or diminish the terrorists’ operational capabilities to do so. (It is better of

course to try and accomplish both simultaneously but unfortunately they are often

contradicting as the offensive designated to limit operational capabilities usually

feed motivation to retaliate).

Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Yasser Arafat has

adopted a policy whereby he refrains from disrupting the military infrastructure of

the Palestinian radical groups—Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in

the areas under his control. Thus, he was free to preserve the constant threat of

terrorism as a bargaining chip to be used against Israel, acting to prevent attacks

when it served what he saw as the Palestinian national interest. But whenever such

prevention was necessary it was always accomplished through a policy of ‘‘persuasion and threats’’—never through direct military action.

Whenever the PA came out to prevent terror attacks against Israel it has maneuvered to limit the terrorist organization’s motivation to do so at a given time frame

but systematically refrained from dismantling their operational capabilities—preserving them for later use when it better suited PA’s political agenda.

What made Arafat’s threat and persuasion policy effective was the fact that the

Palestinian authority and the fundamentalist terror organizations—Hamas and PIJ,

shared from day one of establishing the P.A. what was agreed upon as ‘‘the short

term Palestinian national interests’’. These interests were the removal of Israeli

forces from the West bank and Gaza strip, the establishment of a Palestinian state

with Jerusalem as it’s capital, and the ostensible ‘‘right of return’’ of 1948 Palestinian refugees to live in Israel within its 1967 borders.

Both sides also shared an understanding that ‘‘civil war’’ among themselves

(‘‘Fitana’’ in Arabic) is to be avoided at all costs as it would only serve Israel’s interest.

When Arafat wanted to temporarily stop terrorist attacks against Israel, or ‘‘lower

the flames’’, he managed to convince the leadership of the terror organizations that

attacks at that specific point in time would be counterproductive and harm the Palestinian national interests. He usually added a warning that if these organizations

would disregard his request, he would be obligated to act thereby risking civil war.

At such times, Arafat, who controlled the Palestinian media, would work to ensure that the popular environment was not conducive to terrorist activity. However,

during the seven years that the Palestinian Authority has existed, Arafat never lifted a finger to curtail the ability of the terrorist organizations to carry out attacks.

He never took real steps to disrupt the militants’ command centers, shut down their

bomb factories, or prosecute the leaders of the organizations’ military wings. What

actions he did take were always carried out ‘‘for the cameras,’’ and were rescinded

or overturned as soon as the eyes of the world were elsewhere. Nor did Arafat ever

do anything about gathering up the thousands of illegal weapons in the hands of

militants, including those of his own Fatah organization—contrary to the terms of

numerous agreements signed with Israel. Nor was anything done to prevent radical

organizations from engaging in fund-raising or recruitment activities. On the contrary, the terrorist organizations have been allowed by Arafat to take root and grow

in the soil of the Palestinian Authority. The PA turned a blind eye to the activity

of Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and other groups in the autonomous zone, allowing

them to act freely, to organize for terror attacks, and to possess many and varied

weapons.

Not only has Arafat, and the PA under his control not fought to control those who

oppose the agreements, but they have actively encouraged such militancy. This is

clear from the incitement in PA text books, in the television commercials (on the

official PA channels) encouraging Palestinian children to die as martyrs; it is clear

in the attempts—both open and clandestine—to smuggle into Palestinian territories

weapons against all their obligations in the treaties with Israel. And it is clear from

Arafat’s undermining of the authority of any Palestinian leader who attempts to

rein in Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, much less Fatah’s own Martyrs of al-Aqsa

Brigades.

37

Whenever Aaraft’s policy was criticized he immediately assumed the ‘‘underdog’’

position, claiming he was doing whatever was possible but was ‘‘too weak to guarantee success’’.

After every terror attack involving massive Israeli casualties, Arafat would reiterate that he was doing everything in his power to prevent the attacks, in his

words—‘‘100% effort’’, but that no one can guarantee 100% success in thwarting terrorism.

He would usually back his statement with a one time exposure of an explosive

laboratory or a casual arrest of a terrorist, orchestrated to get maximum international media coverage and create a PR spin.

The lack of any qualitative criteria for measuring it’s efforts at combating terror

absolved the Palestinian Authority of all responsibility for terrorist attacks, allowing

the PA to fall back on impotence.

Eventually, when Israel made it clear that this deceiving policy cannot last, a new

excuse was invented. According to this new argument, Arafat should be held responsible only for terrorist attacks carried out from areas under Palestinian control

(Area A) and not for those launched from areas under Israeli security control (Areas

B and C). Immediately Arafat issued orders to the Palestinian radical groups not

to ‘‘embarrass the Palestinian Authority,’’ by ensuring that the perpetrators of every

attack set out on their mission from outside of the Autonomy. All of this, of course,

completely ignores the fact that everything that went into the attack—the planning,

the bomb making, the intelligence gathering the recruiting and training—all this

took place inside Palestinian autonomous areas.

The old underdog position assumed by Arafat time and again is still being used

by the PA to excuse their permanent unwillingness and impotence in dealing with

the terrorist infrastructures in Gaza and the West Bank. This Palestinian policy

was never a matter of weakness on the part of the PA—it was not that they feared

a confrontation with the fundamentalists. Rather, it was part of a calculated policy,

whereby the threat of violence was held in check, to be used to put pressure on

Israel at the appropriate time during the negotiations.

Some experts still mistakably hold that Arafat is not in control of the Palestinian

masses, and is thus not in a position to stop the Intifada. But Arafat was in the

past and is still today in full control of the main apparatuses that can dismantle

terrorism.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE

The first and the most important pillar of counter-terrorism is intelligence. The

gathering of intelligence plays a key role in the ongoing war on terror. Intelligence

is meant to provide essential data on the terror organization: it’s hierarchy, leaders

and main activists, exposing their infrastructure, locating the terror cells, learning

about their terror attacks planning etc. The Palestinian intelligence agencies had

and still have the best intelligence—better then any Israeli, American or other intelligence agency—on the ongoing activity of the Palestinian terrorist organizations in

Gaza, the West Bank and abroad. This gives the Palestinian Authority a huge advantage in any counter-terrorism activity.

Before the Oslo agreements, (1994), control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip gave

the Israeli intelligence agencies uninhibited access to the ‘‘street’’ and made possible

the gathering of vital information for the war on terror and the frustration of attacks before the killers even ventured from their nest. Needless to say, the withdrawal of the IDF from these areas did not encourage the residents to continue

turning over information to Israeli intelligence authorities. The bitter end of those

suspected of collaboration with Israel brutally illustrated the fate that awaits collaborators—or whoever is suspected as such—once the IDF departed and Arafat and

his people took over. This gap in intelligence was supposed to have been bridged

by intelligence cooperation with the PA. But even at the pick of cooperation between

the PA and Israel, the Palestinians were reluctant to give Israel any information

that was gathered by their own sources in order to prevent terror attacks.

The intelligence cooperation channel was mainly used for passing Israeli intelligence data, which naturally is gathered from classified sources, to the PA security

forces for the purpose of interdicting attacks.

In many cases the Palestinians chose to ignore the information and did not use

it to prevent terror attacks. In other cases they opted to warn the terrorists instead.

Sometimes they would put up a show arrest apprehending the terrorists and let

them go free after a short while through the infamous ‘‘revolving door’’ policy.

Whatever the case their only genuine effort was immediately directed at exposing

and eliminating the Israeli intelligence sources who provided the information. In effect, an extremely dangerous paradox was formed. Intelligence data from classified

38

sources was passed to the PA security forces for the purpose of interdicting attacks.

Yet at the same time, the PA was doing its best to eliminate Israeli intelligence

sources defined by them as ‘‘collaborators’’. Of course, anyone suspected of cooperating with Israel has his fate determined well before seeing a judge.

CONTROL OF THE MEDIA

By controlling the media, Arafat controls the standards of popularity. From the

outset it was the official messages disseminated through the radio, television and

the official PA preachers, that set the standards for popularity in the Palestinian

street.

At the heart of Arafat’s dilemma is the need to continue to mobilize his society

in an atmosphere in which no real achievements can be presented. The ultimate victims of Palestinian terrorist attacks have been the Palestinians themselves. The

Palestinian Authority never implemented plans to develop a self-sufficient economy.

The income of most Palestinians has always been based on the employment of Palestinians in Israel. Since the outbreak of hostilities, Israel, fearful of terrorist attacks has now virtually closed its borders to Palestinian laborers. At the same time,

tourism, a mainstay of both the Palestinian and the Israeli economies, has dropped

to a trickle.

Thus, Arafat is forced to continue to justify a war that, while saving him the need

to address domestic concerns, has brought the Palestinians nothing but grief.

CONTROL OVER TERRORIST GROUPS

Arafat also has considerable influence, even over the ‘‘opposition’’ Islamist groups.

These organizations, while not directly controlled by Arafat, were still dependent on

his keeping their military capabilities intact. Had he chosen to disarm and outlaw

the PIJ and Hamas, the Islamists would have been largely marginalized.

Arafat’s own terrorist groups compete with the Islamic groups in number of attacks against Israeli targets. The Fatah groups enjoy the overwhelming support of

Arafat’s constituency, and he has invested a great deal in keeping them armed and

active, even when his civilian infrastructure languishes for lack of funds.

Over the past three years, since the outbreak of Palestinian hostilities, Arafat

consistently preached ‘‘Jihad’’ (Holy war) against Israel. However, at first it was

mostly the Islamist groups, Hamas and PIJ that carried out the mass-casualty attacks inside Israel. The Fatah-Tanzim, which lacked the resources for carrying out

the kind of ‘‘professional’’ bombings typical of Hamas, confined itself to shooting attacks on Israelis on the roads in the disputed territories.

All of this began to change towards the end of 2000, when Arafat ordered his security services to release the majority of the imprisoned Hamas and Islamic Jihad

militants—many of them convicted terrorists who had been jailed under the terms

of the Oslo agreements with Israel. Hamas was invited to join the Palestinian

Authority’s governing body, and while the invitation was not accepted, a new level

of cooperation between Fatah and Hamas began to take shape. The first joint attacks against Israeli civilians were not long in coming.

To date, the Fatah-Tanzim and the Martyrs of al-Aqsa—yet another Fatah offshoot—have taken responsibility for more than 300 terror attacks in which Israeli

civilians were killed.

Since September 2000 the Arafat‘s Fatah-linked groups have carried out more

than 1,500 attacks and attempted attacks, including car bombings, shootings,

kidnappings, and knifings.

As Arafat could have—and still can—prevent the terror attacks against Israel, so

he can, put a stop to the current round of violence in the Territories. After all, he

has at his disposal all the means necessary to do so. Among these is the complete

control of the Palestinian media, which, right up until the time these lines were

written, continues to broadcast blatant incitement against Israel. And then there is

the security and intelligence apparatus, deeply rooted in Palestinian society, the

heads of which miss no opportunity to express their loyalty to Arafat, and whose

personnel receive their monthly salary from Arafat’s Palestinian Authority. Add to

this a vast law enforcement force, numbering in the tens of thousands, and one has

ample means to control the violence in the Palestinian street.

The violence and terrorist activity known as the ‘‘al-Aqsa Intifada’’ was a direct

result of Arafat’s evaluation that violence and terrorism pay—that in the end, ‘‘the

Palestinian national interests’’ will be better served by violence than by negotiations. By instigating a war of terrorist attrition as an extension of his overall political effort, Arafat meant to force Israel into further concessions—more than what

was offered to him at Camp-David (The creation of a Palestinian state on 95% of

the West Bank and Gaza strip including the control on the strategic territory of JorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
39

dan valley. In exchange for the highly Jewish populated territory in the West Bank

that Israel wanted to keep, Israel was ready to swap Israeli territory bordering

Gaza Strip. Israel was also willing to divide it’s capital—Jerusalem to accommodate

a parallel capital for the Palestinians).

To the other parties utter disbelief those far reaching concessions of historic magnitude were suddenly deemed insufficient and Arafat, apparently sensing blood,

have decided to push for more assuming that an additional dose of terror and orchestrated violence will do the trick.

He was probably right as the pattern worked time and again. Few weeks after

Arafat provoked the resumption of violent activity, Israeli negotiators (in the Taba

Talks) expressed sudden flexibility on the Israeli sacred Casus Beli issue of Palestinian claim of return of the 1948 Palestinian refugees into Israel proper—a horrifying gamble on Israel’s sheer existence, later rectified by the Israeli electorate

through a democratic process.

It’s difficult to unlearn the lessons of years all at once, and Israel is now paying

dearly for past mistakes. The Israeli government and most of the Israeli public are

not willing nor able to adopt a policy of turning a blind eye to the Palestinian terrorist activity by promoting peace ‘‘as if there is no terrorism’’. This is probably also

clear to Arafat. Therefore his strategy in promoting the current terrorist activity is

not anymore to obtain further voluntary concessions from Israel, but to try to manipulate the international community to force a solution probably assuming that

such a compromise, will hold more for the Palestinians than what was offered at

the negotiating table.

In other words, from Arafat’s viewpoint, terrorism and violence will once more pay

off, regardless of how many Palestinian or Israeli lives are lost along the way. In

fact, the higher the casualties, the greater the urgency of an imposed solution.

Based on the American administration policy in the Middle East, the Mitchell

committee understood the need to break the deadly patterns of the PA policy, and

demanded full cessation of Palestinian terror activity, and total dismantling of the

terrorist organization operational capabilities and infrastructures to be considered

an overriding pre condition to any further diplomatic and political discussions concerning future arrangements and solutions of the conflict.

In contradiction to the Mitchell committee recommendations, The Road-Map that

was structured by the European ‘‘Quartet’’ and inspired by a Saudi initiative, was

based on a simultaneous, reciprocal steps by Israel and the Palestinians, with no

preliminary demand from the Palestinians to dismantle the terrorist organizations.

This was Arafat’s victory and therefore he embraced the Road-Map plan.

The amendment that has been later introduced by the American administration

demanding the cessation of Palestinian terrorist activity and dismantling Hamas as

preliminary steps, complicated Arafat’s vision.

Nevertheless he hoped that the American policy will be changed after he will

reach a temporary cease-fire (‘‘Hudna’’) with the Palestinian Islamic-radical terrorist

organizations. This was not the first time that such Hudna was discussed between

Palestinian factions in order to promote Palestinian national interests.

But there was no real expectancy to this Hudna since the four players—the PA,

Hamas and PIJ, Israel and the USA adopted this Hudna directly or indirectly for

different reasons and with different expectations.

Hamas understood that the PA and maybe the Palestinian public will regard terrorist activity at this specific timing as endangering Palestinian national interests

and they wanted to prevent deterioration to a possible civil war.

The PA for its part adopted the Hudna in an attempt to diminish the motivation

of the Islamists to execute terrorist attacks and so to avoid failing to meet it’s obligations to dismantle the terrorist organization. They argue that in any case they

do not have sufficient military capabilities to dismantle Hamas and PIJ right now

so it should be postponed for later times. Meanwhile Israel should be forced to fulfill

its obligations by the Road-Map.

Israel adopted the Hudna indirectly in order to buy time for Abu-Mazen’s new administration to reorganize and start fulfilling their obligation to dismantle the Palestinian terrorist organizations.

The USA was indirectly accepting the Hudna having the same point of view as

Israel but as the time passed, some statements of the American administration implied that there is a beginning of a shift in the American position towards the Palestinians by softening the demand for immediate dismantling of the terror organizations.

As expected the Hudna did not last long. The terrorist organizations did not keep

their obligation to abstain from terrorist attacks. The volume of the attacks did drop

at first but there was no cessation of terrorism and definitely no pressure on its infrastructure.

40

A few days after the Hudna agreement was concluded, Israel suffered from cold

weapon terrorist attacks, then a kidnap of a taxi driver, up to suicide attacks that

culminated in the horrific suicide attack on a Jerusalem bus on August 19th and

the killing of more then 20 Israelis and wounding 112 others.

There was no hope for the Road-Map plan or any other peace initiative in the

Middle East since the PA headed by Arafat did not have the slightest intention to

fulfill their obligation to dismantle the terrorist organizations infrastructures.

The new Abu-Mazen’s government that was created as he pointed out, to pave the

way for Arafat’s return to the international arena, had no chance to fulfill it’s obligations even if they wanted to. Abu Mazen did not have any sovereignty or power

of it’s own in the Palestinian constituency. Any capabilities he had were those relayed to him courtesy of Arafat.

Under such circumstances even if a surrogate nominee for PM will be genuinely

motivated to dismantle Hamas and PIJ, Arafat would never empower him to do so

and will withhold the authority and support needed for this assignment.

Arafat cannot afford anyone to dismantle the terrorist organizations, as by so

doing he would publicly admit a decade long deception of the entire international

community.

As long as Arafat is present in the West Bank and Gaza strip, no other Palestinian leader will emerge that is capable of simultaneously withstanding two

fronts—the Islamic radical terrorist organizations and Arafat himself.

Even pragmatic Palestinian leaders who understand that tackling the Islamic radical organizations is in their own best interest, would not dare to declare Fitna

(Civil War) against the terrorist organizations.

Since Hamas and PIJ will never recognize the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish

state, will spare no effort to bring about its destruction and will never volunteer to

dismantle themselves, there is no real prospect for a viable peace initiative in the

Middle East as long as the Palestinians will choose Hudna over Fitna and as long

as Arafat is in control there.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Dr. Ganor, very much, and let me

thank the entire panel for their insightful testimony.

I think we will go to about 7 minutes each because I know my

colleagues also have questions. I will direct my questions to the entire panel, so please be considerate so that everybody is able to get

a shot in within the 7 minutes. It might be a difficult question, because I am making the assumptions that you know the difference

between the legislative branch and the executive branch.

I will start with Ambassador Ross because you probably know

more about our American system: What can we do in Congress? Do

you have any advice for us here as Members of Congress as we look

at the challenges ahead?

Mr. ROSS. I would say that the most important thing is to recognize that what Boaz was just saying is absolutely right. This is not

an ideological argument about violence. The fact of the matter is

we have history now that shows that terror will undo any peace

process. As soon as the Israelis would withdraw to any extent, if

there is terror they are going to go right back. So there has to be

on the Palestinian side an understanding that there is going to be

a moment of truth.

I think from the congressional standpoint it ought to be clear

that you are prepared to support those on the Palestinian Authority or those Palestinian groups that are prepared to create grassroots movements, that are prepared to make it clear that they will

discredit the very idea of terror; you will support those Palestinians

that are prepared to live in peace with Israel.

In fact, there are some who are for the first time creating a kind

of grassroots approach. Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon—Sari

Nusseibeh is the president of al-Quds University, Ami Ayalon is

the former head of Shin Bet in Israel—they have agreed on six

41

principles for what should constitute peace between the two sides,

representing important concessions that each would make.

I think embracing these kinds of groups, even if not embracing

the precise outcomes they suggest is important, especially because

the idea that Palestinians will reject the concept of terror has to

be supported in Congress, not only in terms of your rhetoric, but

also the groups you are prepared to support.

I would also say that, if it comes time for supporting the costs

of the fence, that the fence should reflect certain criteria. I do not

agree, as I said, that the fence should be built along the Green

Line except where demographics dictate it, and there are places

where it does. The fence should be built in a way that ensures

Israeli security, topography makes sense to cut back on infiltration,

but it has to take into account demographics.

The point about Israel remaining a Jewish state, a democratic

state, is right. You cannot build a fence on the eastern side of the

West Bank. You build it on the western side.

I would view deductions on loan guarantees being related to settlements, which is what originally it was designed to do, not related to the fence. The fence is about security, but then again make

clear to the Israelis that building a fence that creates an encirclement of Palestinians is not a pathway toward Israeli security or

creating a possibility for the future.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Ambassador.

Rabbi Melchior, I know you would like to advocate for more support for the Alexandria Group, but I will let you speak for yourself.

Rabbi MELCHIOR. That, it speaks for itself. I would like really to

say that to create the coalition of civilizations has to be essential

to our purpose, I would say not only for our part of the Middle

East; I think this is something which is true for world peace in

general. We have to fight terror, I totally agree also with Boaz on

that. I said in my opening statement, we cannot go ahead, we cannot get anywhere. Every time we get one step ahead, we are blown

back two steps by a new terror act.

It has to be a demand so clearly on the Palestinian Authority.

I just want to remind you that actually Abu Mazen put forward a

100-day program where he actually said how he could dismantle.

The Hamas and Jihad are not that big organizations when it comes

to their terrorist infrastructure that it cannot be done if there is

the will to do it. It is difficult. It is very, very difficult. It is necessary. We did it when the state of Israel was created. We had

somewhat similar problems.

But at the same time, if we do not build, if we do not empower,

not only by funds, but empower the coalition of civilizations and all

the things which have to—you cannot have that measure of hatred

inside your room every day from 120 television stations, so much

hatred, so much anti-Semitism. It cannot come—when we were on

our way to Camp David, I remember I was sitting with Barak on

the plane, it is a long plane trip, discussing the prospects. I said:

How is Arafat going to go back and say that he made eternal peace

with the devil, because that is how we are described.

We need to deal in both societies with creating this coalition of

civilizations so that we do not turn into something which can never

be solved. I think that is the best answer to the terrorists, together

42

with what has to be done. We have to understand that the prospect

of having a Palestinian state as soon as possible is a necessity for

Israel.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Rabbi.

Mr. Etkes.

Mr. ETKES. I think that supporting President Bush’s initiative

based on his June 24 speech, a vision which involved two independent viable states living one next to the other, accepting the

Green Line as the international border between them, which happens to be also the demographic line between the two groups, this

is the main thing which the Senate can contribute in helping us

to more stability.

Contribution—or support of this vision as far as I understand it

contains three main factors: first of all, support of President Bush’s

objection to the route of the fence. The fence which is constructed

right now around Ariel is 25, 26 kilometers deep in the West Bank.

It will include hundreds of thousands of Palestinians within the

boundaries of the fence.

Second is, as I suggested before, to support a constructive message being sent to the Israeli people: Yes, we are on your side, we

want to help Israel to go through this very hard time, and we are

doing it by allocating money to constructive objectives.

I think the third thing which could be done is tightening the inspection over two parties’ actual deeds on the ground in terms of

what are the Palestinians doing dealing with the infrastructure of

terror, the capabilities of terror organizations to carry out actions

against Israel, and, for the other hand, dealing with the Israeli settlements which their construction continuously sends a very, very

destructive, negative message to the Palestinians that Israel is not

willing by any circumstances to leave the West Bank.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you once again.

We have got a few seconds left, I believe. Dr. Ganor.

Dr. GANOR. Thank you. First of all, I think that the Congress can

support the example that we, and the whole world, get from the

Americans that there is no appeasement of terrorism. That is the

first thing to do.

The second thing, I believe that there is a real need to deal with

the motivation of the terrorists. As I said, counterterrorism must

deal with both the motivation and the operational capabilities. But

dealing with the motivation definitely does not mean appeasing the

terrorists or giving them concessions that they seek. Rather, I am

talking about humanitarian effort, education, and so on and so

forth.

In that regard, I definitely support Rabbi Melchior’s idea of

bridging gaps between civilizations, between religions. Just to give

you an impression of how everything comes from the same arena

of Islamic radicalism. The suicide attacker that committed the attack in Tel Aviv about half a year ago had the traditional last picture made of himself. Usually the suicide attacker takes a last picture before committing an attack. I was amazed to see the background that he chose for this picture, because in most cases they

take Islamic symbols—Koran, al-Aqsa Mosque, or something like

that. He chose the view of Mount Hebron. This in my view shows

43

that they come from the same state of mind, the state of mind of

Islamic radicalism.

I agree with Melchior in saying that this is not a clash of civilizations. Thank God, it is not Islam against the rest of the world. It

is Islamic radicalism against the rest of the world, including moderate Islam. And I do believe there is a need for Christians, Jews,

and moderate Moslems to join hands in fighting the phenomenon

of Islamic radicalism.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, sir.

Senator Boxer.

Senator BOXER. Thanks. First let me just say, Mr. Chairman, I

think this panel has been extraordinary. I thank all of you. I know

it was hard for you to get here. I think this has been an extremely

intelligent discussion and with various views being heard. I think

it is healthy, I think it is good.

I just, as someone who is a total optimist in my life—that is why

I do what I do—I am getting to a point here where I see these vicious circles and I am very worried about it. When I heard Dennis

Ross put out as one of his ideas a fence, I know how hard that is

to get to that place. But I have to say as I look out at this circumstance, in most tough negotiations you have a lot of grey areas.

For example, one grey area, which settlements should be inside,

which settlements could be outside, and people could discuss it and

have arguments about it.

But I go to where Dr. Ganor comes from, which is I do not think

you make a move until you solve the terrorism issue. I do not see

how you can. I mean, I think to myself, what if I went home to my

constituents—and I just get the chills saying this because this particular article has stuck with me and a vision of the people involved stuck with me. How could I go home to a community—and

Jon Corzine had to do this after 9–11. How do I go home to a community and face a family who lost their father and the daughter?

They were sitting at a cafe talking about his advice to her before

her wedding day. How do I go home and explain that I am going

to go back to a peace table in a situation like that?

Now, that is an excruciating thing for anyone to do who is first

and foremost entrusted with the responsibility to make life safe for

people, so they can go to a supermarket, so they can ride on a bus,

so they can travel somewhere.

So I really start where Dr. Ganor starts from, and frankly it is

not an impossible place to start because it is black and white. I do

not know anyone, Yasser Arafat included, who ever said: Oh, terrorism, that is something we support. At least that is what they

say. Let us start there. We have got to have progress in this, and

I think it starts with newspaper reports that talk about resistance

as opposed to terrorism. Killing innocent people is terrorism. That

is how I feel. And I think we need to use our words and choose our

words carefully in all of this.

So I have two questions and I will stop. One is, we get so focused

on the parties themselves, which we have to do because in the end

that is where it is at. Nothing President Bush can do or President

Clinton could do is going to bring the parties together. But the

Arab countries, what is their story? Why do they not understand

44

that their future could be so much brighter if this conflict was resolved?

So I would like to ask whoever would like to answer: How do you

feel about the fact that we know Syria, from everything we can see,

is involved in supporting some of these organizations? And, as Dennis Ross has written in his article in The National Interest, that

the Arab countries never even said to Arafat, you know, shape up

here and help Abu Mazen.

So that is a piece of the puzzle, those are two pieces of the puzzle, that I think are key, Mr. Chairman, the Arab countries and

what they are and are not doing and this terrorism piece.

So that is one question about the Arab countries and the second

question is to Dennis. Without doing anything that would be inappropriate, because I do not want to say if you were there what

would you say, because you are not there and you have to be careful, what are the options of the Bush administration in the way

they would respond to the death of three Americans riding along

that road that you rode on 200 times, a road that was known for

taking the embassy officials? And by the way, one injured, so it was

three killed and one injured. Those are my two questions.

Dr. Ganor.

Dr. GANOR. Thank you.

As I said, I see the problem as Islamic radicalism against the

rest of the world, including moderate Islam. The problem is that

the moderate Arab countries, and moderate Muslims, are reluctant

to acknowledge their responsibility to deal with this phenomenon.

I was in the United States when the horrific attack of 9–11 occurred. On the same day I was interviewed on public radio and I

was asked: ‘‘Who do you think is responsible for this attack?’’ I

said: I think it is bin Laden. I said: bin Laden represents Islamic

radicalism, but definitely not Islam as a culture, as a religion. One

of the listeners called the studio and went on the air to say: ‘‘I am

a Muslim, and I am an Arab, and I am an American citizen,’’ and

he praised me for differing between Islam and Islamic radicalism.

He said: ‘‘If it is true and these are Muslims that have done that,

I think we should capture them, I think we should try them, I

think we should hang them; I wish I could do it myself.’’

My answer to him was: It is very important for you to say this

on this horrific day, that the American people will know that there

are Muslims and Arabs like you; but you know what, my friend,

it is much more important for you to say it in Arabic on Al-Jazeera

than in English.

Senator BOXER. OK, so just cutting through because my time is

running out and I know Senator Corzine has been waiting, you are

basically saying that within these Arab countries they have to—it

is internal politics, they are fearful to speak out or they are reluctant to for internal political reasons.

Does anyone disagree with that assessment?

Mr. ROSS. No, but let me put it in a slightly different way. I do

agree with that assessment. The fundamental problem in terms of

the Arab leaders is that they are more fearful of condemning

Hamas and Islamic Jihad and taking on their own radical Islamists

because of their own lack of legitimacy than they are of the conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 13:26 Feb 26, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 91730 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1
45

sequences of a deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian war. When that

equation changes, then they will do something.

Senator BOXER. Which leads to the last question: What are the

options of the Bush administration, given this for the first time

ever direct attack?

Mr. ROSS. The Bush administration I think basically has two options that they can employ at this point. They are both related to

the diplomatic side. We do not have a military option. The Israelis

have the military option, we do not there. One is to finally go to

the Arab leaders and say, enough already; you can no longer glorify

these attacks and portray them as acts of resistance; these are acts

of terror, pure and simple. And as long as you portray them as resistance, you legitimize them. Enough already. 9–11 should have

created that understanding. In Saudi Arabia, May 12 of this year

should have created that understanding.

We should be much more public about this. We should make it

very clear if our Arab friends want us to help transform the situation on the ground between Israelis and Palestinians then they

have to step up to their responsibility. Absent that, we cannot succeed here and we cannot succeed in the war on terror either, because as long as these kinds of acts are not discredited for what

they are you are still going to have many people who are prepared

to engage in them.

The other option would be to try to broker something with Abu

Ala and Sharon. That would be the other thing, but to do it more

decisively. Right now our posture is, the Bush administration’s posture, is we are not going to deal with Abu Ala until he proves that

he can deliver. Now, that is also Sharon’s position.

But as I said, if Abu Ala shows that he might be prepared to do

something, he is also going to want to know what it is he is going

to get when he does it. So I would say we have to at least consider

that as a possibility.

Senator BOXER. Thank you. I think my time has expired.

Rabbi MELCHIOR. Just three very short comments on this. No. 1,

I totally agree on the issue of defining terror as terror. You should

just know that in these days there is a gathering of all the Islamic

states in Malaysia, 57 states, which is not doing that, not defining

terror as terror; and the opposite is true.

The necessity for pressuring now and using also this terrible

tragedy for pressuring I think is a one-time—the Bush administration has to understand—I do not want to give too much advice. I

come from another country. They have to either decide if they want

to be really involved or not, and really involved is very, very difficult, but it is necessary. We will not get anywhere without it.

The third comment is just to your first comment, if I can say

this. The true victory of terrorism is also a continuation of what is

going on today and the status quo. There are a lot of things

which—this vacuum here is playing into their hands. Therefore, if

we do not come up with political solutions—now, it may be unilateral because of the mess. I think it was not only the fence that

Dennis Ross was promoting, but unilateral withdrawal as part of

the fence. That is a different thing. That is a unilateral, very important step that was the same as my conclusion if nothing else

46

could be done. Of course, it would be much, much better to do it

with an understanding or even an agreement.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Senator Corzine.

Senator CORZINE. Thank you.

Gentlemen, we have 140,000 troops on the ground in Iraq. We are about to vote on roughly $90 billion of additional involvement.

We claim we have some element of international support and seem

to be building some initiatives on that score with regard to the

United Nations. In this tragic—and it really is, both for the Palestinian people and certainly for the Israelis and some small involvement for the U.S. here now today. Why is there not more of, not

just the Arab nations, although certainly an appropriate involvement, why has there not been a greater willingness to see the

international community to take overt and strong actions?

I think I have spoken with some of you on other points in other

times about monitors and NATO and other kinds of involvement

that the international community has been willing to marshall to

resolve the kind of issues that plague continually this arena. Why

is that not one of these options, I ask Dennis or any of the other

panelists, as opposed to fences, since this is in some way linked to

the war on terrorism, some would argue more directly than others?

I do not understand why we are not able to marshall the same

international sense of outrage. I certainly believe that we need to

do that at a moral level. But it may take more than morality. I

would love to hear your comments on it.

Senator CHAFEE. Why do we not start with Mr. Etkes this time.

Mr. ETKES. Thank you, Senator, for your question. I think that

the key to understand the lack of involvement of other international bodies in this conflict is hiding in the same place where

we have to look to seek for the answer why there is not strong opposition within the Palestinian and Israeli societies to what is

going on, what actually is happening, what actually is being led

to—despair. This word ‘‘despair,’’ this feeling, is an epidemic, something which people from abroad feel, and it is something which I

as an Israeli person who is representing here the Israeli society,

who cares first of all about my own people and my own country,

feel very strongly that my government should do something against

it.

When I am saying something against it, fighting terrorism is undoubtedly No. 1, the No. 1 objective which each one of us has to

support. But fighting terrorism without offering something, without

offering a political horizon, another option, to the hundreds of thousands, to the millions who support, passively or sometimes more

actively, terrorism, this is where the despair hides.

This problem we have to try to overcome by offering—I am talking right now about my own government first of all—by offering

another alternative. Offering another alternative is first of all accepting the right, that Palestinians have the right to establish their

own state in the West Bank, and that there is no way that we as

a Jewish democratic state can go on and rule those areas.

Thank you.

Rabbi MELCHIOR. Mr. Chairman, I will just say one sentence or

comment. I think the main problem is that from different places in

47

the world they look different ways at the conflict. While our war

against terror is seen in America as a war against terror, in Europe it is seen as a war against the Palestinian aspiration to their

own freedom and self-determination and so on. It is a total different war which is described in Europe than what is described in

the United States. That is one of the problems of doing something

together in this.

Therefore, I think a hearing like this and going into the depths

of what the source really is and how at the same time we need— it is difficult—first of all to lower our eyes a little about what the

prospects are of where we can get to, to try to, first of all, to manage to defeat the terror, to manage the conflict, to put in necessary

elements, like we said here, maybe unilateral elements, to do that

first. If we do not reach those conclusions and we come again with

these overall solutions, then we are not going to get anywhere, we

do not get to the first station of a Road Map, because the terror

continues.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you.

Dr. GANOR. If you ask President Bush, he would say he is

against terrorism. If you would ask Blair, he is against terrorism.

Schroder is against terrorism; Chirac is against terrorism, you

name it. If you ask President Assad, he is against terrorism. If you

would ask bin Laden, I can guarantee that he is against terrorism

as well.

The problem is of course defining terrorism. I will not get into

this, as I’ve already written a lot about that. But the problem is

also where the interest of counterterrorism is in the hierarchy of

the overall interest of each particular state. When the French people say that they are against terrorism, I believe them. However,

above all, to them it is important to guard their economical, political and diplomatic ties with states that sponsor terrorism, and so

on and so forth.

The problem is that the rest of the world—not the Americans but

the rest of the world—do not recognize how dangerous international Islamic radical terrorism today is. Because what we are

facing now is different; we are moving from modern terrorism to,

God forbid, post-modern terrorism, and I refer to bioterrorist attacks, chemical, nuclear, radiological terrorism, and so on and so

forth. This is just around the corner. I cannot say if it will be

months or years.

When it comes, the French, for example, will have to understand

that they cannot appease the terrorists; they cannot cut a deal with

the terrorists, because a bioterrorist attack in London in no time

will come to Paris.

Senator CHAFEE. Ambassador Ross.

Mr. ROSS. Let me make a couple of comments. I want to pick up

one thought on what Boaz said. It goes back to what I was saying

before. You are not going to win the war on terror unless you also

are competing in the area of ideas. Our military power is essential

for confronting those who are going to use terror against us. No

substitute for that; indispensable. But the power of our ideas and

the power of our example is essential for creating an environment

where you discredit terror on the one hand and you do not have

a ready pool of people constantly being recruits to take the place

48

of those who you have killed in the war on terror on the other.

These are two aspects of the same requirement.

On your specific question, Senator, I think if you look at the Europeans—I want to pick up on what Rabbi Melchior was saying,

but I am going to put it slightly differently. Go back to basic assumptions, first principles. We in this country understand that the

fundamental problem for Israel and the Arab world is the acceptance of Israel’s right to be there, its moral legitimacy. The Europeans tend not to focus on the Arab or Palestinian acceptance of

Israel. They tend to focus on the Palestinians as the victims and

as the Israelis who are therefore in a position to do something

about the victims.

So we start with very different premises. They are almost never

concerned about Israeli security. I can tell you from all my experience they will say: Yes, yes, we have to deal with Israeli security,

and then they want to dispense with anything that is related to it.

What we have to do is in a sense, if you want to get to the point

where you could have monitors, you either have to have an agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, there was such an

agreement on having our forces on the ground, or the Palestinians

have to be prepared to assume a responsibility.

I come back to this notion: There is a moment of truth that the

Palestinians are going to have to face. It is inescapable. They will

not have a state if they allow independent armies to exist within

that state who can use that territory as a platform from which to

go and kill Israelis. They have to face up to that and realize this

is part of their salvation when they take it on.

The Arabs can create a climate that supports them as they do

it. That is what they have not done. That is one thing we could be

doing.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you once again, gentlemen. If there are

no further questions, Senator Corzine or Senator Boxer, I would

like to thank you once again for traveling long distances. If any of

you would like to submit full statements for the record, you are certainly welcome to do that, and safe travels.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

Æ