ORDER OF THE COURT (Eighth Chamber)

14 June 2016 ([\*](#Footnote*))

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court — EU trade mark — Word mark LUCEA LED — Opposition by the proprietor of the word mark LUCEO — Rejection of the opposition — Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union — Article 56 — Rules of Procedure — Article 186 — Application for legal aid — Suspensive effect on the time limit for bringing an appeal — Appeal manifestly inadmissible)

In Case C‐43/16 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 21 January 2016,

**Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd,** established in Borehamwood (United Kingdom), represented by C. Röhl, Rechtsanwalt,

applicant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

**European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO),**

defendant at first instance,

**Maquet SAS,** established in Ardon (France),

intervener at first instance,

THE COURT (Eighth Chamber),

composed of D. Šváby, President of the Chamber, J. Malenovský and M. Vilaras (Rapporteur), Judges,

Advocate General: M. Bobek,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 181 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court,

makes the following

**Order**

1        By its appeal, Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd asks the Court to set aside the judgment of the General Court of the European Union
of 25 June 2015 in *Copernicus-Trademarks* v *OHIM — Maquet (LUCEA LED)* (T‐186/12, ‘the judgment under appeal’, EU:T:2015:436), by which that Court dismissed its action seeking the annulment of
the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 13 February 2012
(Case R 67/2011-4) concerning an application for registration of the word sign ‘LUCEA LED’ as an EU trade mark.

**On the appeal**

2        Pursuant to Article 181 of its Rules of Procedure, where the appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible or manifestly
unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate General,
decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal or cross-appeal in whole or in part.

3        On 22 April 2016, the Advocate General took the following position:

‘1      In my view, the present appeal should be rejected as manifestly inadmissible because Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd (the appellant)
failed to bring it within the prescribed time limit.

2      The General Court gave its judgment in Case T‐186/12, *Copernicus-Trademarks* v *OHIM* on 25 June 2015. The judgment was notified to the appellant on 26 June 2015. Upon notification, the appellant had 2 months
and 10 days within which to lodge an appeal at the Court of Justice (Article 56, Statute of the Court of Justice of the European
Union and Article 51, Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice: “Rules of Procedure”).

3      The appellant filed an application for legal aid with the Court of Justice on 3 September 2015. That application had the effect
of suspending the time limit within which the appellant had to lodge its appeal until the date of service of the order making
a decision on that application (Article 186, Rules of Procedure).

4      The Court of Justice granted the appellant’s application for legal aid with an order made on 10 November 2015. That order
was served on the appellant on 11 November 2015.

5      The appellant eventually lodged its appeal on 21 January 2016. It follows from the text of the Rules of Procedure that an
application for legal aid merely *suspends* the time limit for lodging an appeal (Article 186, Rules of Procedure; see *a contrario* the rule in Article 55(7), Rules of Procedure). Therefore the time limit for bringing an appeal before the Court of Justice
does not start to run anew from the date of service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid. The service
of that order simply resumes the course of the initial time limit which, in this case, started to run upon the appellant’s
notification of the judgment under appeal (see also by analogy the interpretation by the General Court of similar provisions
in its Rules of Procedure (order of 6 September 2010 in *Kerelov* v *Commission*, T‐60/08 P, EU:T:2010:350, paragraph 18).

6      It follows that upon service of the order making a decision on the application for legal aid on 11 November 2015, the appellant
had two days left within which it had to lodge its appeal. As the appellant brought its appeal on 21 January 2016, it was
clearly brought too late.

7      The appeal must therefore be rejected as manifestly inadmissible.’

4        On the same grounds as those adopted by the Advocate General, the appeal must be dismissed.

**Costs**

5        Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure, applicable to the procedure on appeal pursuant to Article 184(1) of those rules,
a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings. Since the present order was adopted before
the appeal was served on the respondent and therefore before the latter could have incurred costs, the appellant must be ordered
to bear its own costs.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby orders:

1.      **The appeal is dismissed.**

2.      **Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd shall bear its own costs.**

[Signatures]

---

[\*](#Footref*) Language of the case: English.