Volume 2, Issue 4 August 1998

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues,

Written and Produced by

From the Chairman...

Chairman, House National Security Committee

Unveiling the Ballistic Missile Threat:

The Ramifications of the Rumsfeld Report

The Rumsfeld Report:

A Wake-up Call for

All Americans

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Developing and deploying systems todefend against ballistic missiles has

been a highly controversial issue since

1983, when President Reagan first challenged the scientific community to develop

ways of rendering nuclear ballistic missiles

“impotent and obsolete.” Indeed, this challenge remains a formidable one, and the

task of destroying

ballistic missiles

after launch is often likened to “hitting a bullet with

a bullet.” However, the technology to intercept

and destroy ballistic missiles in

flight has improved dramatically since President Reagan’s

challenge, and recent advances in

interceptor and

sensor technology have increased confidence within the missile defense community that effective missile defenses are possible.

The Evolution of Ballistic

Missile Defense Policy

United States policy toward ballistic missile defense (BMD) has also evolved since

1983. Along with the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, the need to defend against

thousands of incoming Soviet nuclear warheads has diminished, greatly simplifying

the challenge of building an effective defensive system. As such, plans for a national missile defense (NMD) system have

been scaled back dramatically, and now

focus on defending against a limited strike

resulting from an accidental or unauthorized launch, or from the actions of a rogue

state.

Despite the diminished likelihood of a

massive Soviet first-strike nuclear attack,

strains in the post-Soviet command and

control system have increased concern

over the risk of an

accidental or unauthorized launch.

The former National Intelligence

Officer for Strategic Programs at

the Central Intelligence Agency,

David Osias, testified to Congress

that the command

and control system in Russia is

being buffeted by

“stresses and

risks it was not

designed to withstand,” and a recent CIA analysis

reportedly concluded last year that Russia’s

command and control systems “continue

to degrade.”

The uncertainties related to the command

and control of former Soviet nuclear forces

have led some in Congress to call for accelerated efforts to develop and deploy a

national missile defense system to protect

against the threat of accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile launch. In addition, concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles and technologies to rogue

regimes that may seek to target the United

States directly with longer-range missiles

has fueled recent Congressional efforts to

increase funding for NMD programs.

After listeningto the Rumsfeld Commission’s

classified briefing, I

believe it is safe to

say that the unanimous and bipartisan conclusions

reached by the Commission indicate that

the intelligence community and, therefore, policymakers may be seriously underestimating and miscalculating the

threat to all Americans posed by ballistic missiles.

Consistent with its mandate, the Commission assessed the ballistic missile

threat, and reported the most serious

national security warning the American

people have received since the end of

the Cold War. Indeed, the conclusions

reached by the Commission suggest that

the ballistic missile threat to the United

States is a serious one today, not some-

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where in the future, and is rapidly growing. In addition, the report contains an

especially disturbing conclusion that ballistic missile threats will likely manifest

themselves sooner than we think, leaving little time or ability for the Nation to

respond.

I am also struck by the Commission’s

finding that the ballistic missile threat to

the United States is, quote, “broader, more

mature, and evolving more rapidly that it

has been reported in estimates and reports by the intelligence community.”

Furthermore, as a longtime critic of this

and previous administration’s export

control policy, I am not surprised by the

Commission’s finding that the progresBackground

Brief

Background

Brief
2 National Security Report

Current Administration Policies

While there is general agreement that

the threat from shorter-range theater ballistic missiles is “here and now,” the Administration continues to consider the strategic ballistic missile threat to be years

away. As a result, research on a number

of defensive concepts involving advanced

BMD technologies has been reduced or

abandoned. Currently, the Administration

is placing emphasis on ground-based interceptor systems with significantly less

potential coverage and capability than

other systems. Furthermore, the Administration has indicated that U.S. policy

shall be to maintain the “integrity and viability” of the 1972 U.S-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limits

the United States to one ground-based

anti-ballistic missile site.

Consequently, the current NMD program budget does not support the deployment of a national missile defense system.

Under the Administration’s “3-plus-3” program, the United States would research

and develop over three years the technologies that would be sufficiently robust

to support a decision to deploy a limited

NMD system. This stage of the program

is expected to be completed in fiscal year

2000. Actual deployment of a system, if such a decision were made,

would require an

additional three

years. However,

because of the

Administration’s

contention that

there are no nearterm ballistic missile threats to the

United States,

there are no plans

at present to deploy a national missile defense system, and funding for the

procurement of long lead items necessary

for deployment is absent from the

Administration’s five year defense program.

Since 1995, the Congress has called on the

Administration to give greater priority to national missile defense. Deployment of national

missile defenses was a key element in the Republican Congress’ 1995 “Contract With

America,” and members of the House and

Senate have repeatedly urged the Administration to commit to deployment of a NMD

system. For the past several years, Congressional actions have significantly increased the

level of funding for NMD. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996

also contained a provision specifically

calling for the deployment of a national missile defense system by

2003. This provision

was a key reason

President Clinton

vetoed the bill, stating that such a commitment was “unwarranted” and

“cannot be accommodated within the

terms of the existing

ABM Treaty.” He

also argued that the intelligence community

“does not foresee in the coming decade” any

long-range missile threat to the United States.

Is There a Threat?

The President’s assertion of the lack of a

near-term threat was based in part on a CIAproduced National Intelligence Estimate

(NIE) released in November 1995. According to Richard Cooper, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the NIE concluded “that in the next 15 years no country other than the major declared nuclear

powers will develop a ballistic missile that

could threaten the contiguous 48 states or

Canada.” Supporters of the NIE cited this

key conclusion as a reason not to move

quickly toward deployment of a NMD system. However, critics pointed out that the

estimate improperly ignored the ballistic

missile threat to Alaska and Hawaii; focused on countries’ intentions rather than

on their missile capabilities; discounted the

risk of accidental or unauthorized launch

from Russia; did not address the existing

threat from China’s ICBM force; emphasized indigenous development of longrange missile capabilities rather than alternative means of acquisition; and failed to

address the prospect that shorter-range

ballistic missiles launched from platforms

or territories closer to the United States

could pose a threat to U.S. territory.

In the wake of the President’s veto of the

FY 1996 National Defense Authorization

Act, and debate over the validity and possible politicization of the NIE, House National Security Committee Chairman Spence

requested the General Accounting Office

(GAO) review the intelligence estimate. In

its August 1996 assessment, the GAO con-

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Despite the technical challenges inherent in developing systems to counter ballistic

missiles, like the Scud missile pictured above, recent advances in interceptor and

sensor technology have increased confidence within the missile defense community

that effective missile defenses are both possible and feasible.

“Ballistic missiles are

attractive, and they’re

attractive for several

reasons. There are no

defenses against them.

They tend to arrive at

their targets.”

— Former Secretary of Defense,

Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony

before the National Security

Committee on July 16, 1998
National Security Report 3

Policy Paul D. Wolfowitz, former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Strategic Command

General George Lee Butler, and former Air

Force Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch.

Some six months after first meeting, the

commissioners released their findings and

conclusions in testimony to the House National Security

Committee on

July 16, 1998.

Of particular

note, the commissioners were

unanimous in

concluding that

ballistic missiles

armed with

nuclear or biological weapons

“pose a growing

threat to the

United States, its

deployed forces

and its friends

and allies.” They noted that the threat to

the United States posed by countries seeking ballistic missile capabilities “is broader,

more mature and evolving more rapidly than

has been reported in estimates and reports

by the intelligence community.” In fact,

just one week after the Rumsfeld Commission publicly released their report concluding that Iran’s Shahab-3 medium range ballistic missile “may be flight tested at any

time and deployed soon thereafter,” Iran

performed the first flight test of the missile.

Until recently, the intelligence community

had predicted this milestone would not occur for another 12 to 18 months.

Furthermore, the commission expressed concern that “under some plausible scenarios... the U.S. might well

have little or no warning” before being

confronted with the operational deployment of ballistic missiles. Consequently,

they called on the intelligence community to review and, as appropriate, revise

its “analyses, practices and policies that

depend on expectations of extended

warning.”

Although the Rumsfeld Commission

differed from published intelligence estimates, much of this difference can be attributed to the commission’s use of a

more comprehensive methodology for assessing the threat. This methodology

From the Chairman...

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sive relaxation of U.S. export controls

has made the United States, “a major,

albeit unintentional contributor” to the

proliferation problem.

The Commission members have performed an invaluable service by speaking forcefully and with one voice about

the seriousness of the ballistic missile

threats facing America. I continue to

believe that the American people have

been lulled into a false sense of security

since the end of the Cold War and hope

that the Commission’s report will serve

as a wakeup call for all Americans, who

must realize that the world remains a

dangerous place.

acknowledged the reality that other countries today can obtain outside technical

assistance for their ballistic missile programs with relative ease. As the commission noted, “Foreign assistance is not

a wild card. It is a fact. It is pervasive.”

In addition, the commission recognized

the fact that other nations are increasingly able to conceal key elements of their

missile programs.

Also of concern, the report revealed

the roles of Russia and China in proliferating critical technologies to other nations and noted that it is “unlikely” that

this proliferation will decline. With respect to other countries possessing

shorter-range missile infrastructures, the

report concluded that, with external assistance, they could develop and flighttest a long-range missile “within about

five years” of a decision to do so, a period of time in which “the U.S. might not

be aware that such a decision had been

made.” Commenting on the intelligence

community’s unwillingness to predict the

Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, General Butler testified before the House National Security

Committee on July 16, 1998, “If you don’t

want to believe it, there is no body of evidence which cannot be ignored.”

Finally, the commission called the United

States “a major, albeit unintentional contributor” to the the proliferation of ballistic

missiles and weapons of mass destruction

as a result of, “the illegal acquisition of U.S.

designs and equipment and... the relaxation

of U.S. export control policies.”

cluded that the NIE “overstated” the certainty of its conclusions, contained “analytical shortcomings,” and “did not explicitly identify its critical assumptions.”

To further investigate this issue, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201) directed the Director

of Central Intelligence to conduct a

review of the assumptions and

conclusions of the

November 1995

NIE by appointing

a panel of outside

experts. The panel,

chaired by former

Director of Central

Intelligence Robert

Gates, reported

that the November

1995 NIE was “politically naïve,” and that its failure to include Alaska and Hawaii was “foolish from

every possible perspective.” The panel

concluded that the NIE was done “in

haste,” leading to a number of “presentational and analytical problems.”

Enter the Rumsfeld Commission

In light of this review, Chairman Spence

included a provision in the FY 1997 National Defense Authorization Act to establish an independent “Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the

United States”. The commission was patterned after the “Team B” exercise in the

1970s, which successfully reviewed and critiqued the intelligence community’s judgment regarding the strategic goals and objectives of the Soviet Union. This commission, however, was directed to “assess the

nature and magnitude of the existing and

emerging ballistic missile threat to the

United States.”

Once appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence (in consultation with House

and Senate leadership of both political parties), the commission included many notable experts of the defense and intelligence

communities including former Secretary of

Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former Director

of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey;

former Under Secretary of Defense for

“Ballistic missiles don’t

have to go through

customs. They don’t get

pulled over by the police.

They don’t defect...”

— Former Science Advisor to

the President and Director of

the White House Office of

Science and Technology Policy,

William R. Graham, in testimony

before the National Security

Committee on July 16, 1998
4 National Security Report

The National Security Report is archived on the House National Security Committee website at: http://www.house.gov/nsc/. Additional background

information may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372), David Trachtenberg (x60532), or Michelle Spencer (x53036) on the committee staff.

In General

“Concerted efforts by a number of overtly

or potentially hostile nations to acquire

ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear

payloads pose a growing threat to the

United States, its deployed forces,

and its friends and allies. These

newer, developing threats in North

Korea, Iran, and Iraq are in addition

to those still posed by the existing

ballistic missile arsenals of Russia

and China... The newer ballistic

missile-equipped nations’

capabilities will not match those of

U.S. systems for accuracy or

reliability. However, they would be

able to inflict major destruction on

the U.S. within about five years of

a decision to acquire such a

capability (10 years in the case of

Iraq). During several of those years, the

U.S. might not be aware that such a decision

had been made.”

“The threat to the U.S. posed by these

emerging capabilities is broader, more

mature, and evolving more rapidly than has

been reported in estimates and reports by

the Intelligence Community.”

“The warning times the U.S. can expect of

new, threatening ballistic missile

deployments are being reduced. Under

some plausible scenarios — including rebasing or transfer of operational missiles,

sea- and air-launch options, shortened

development programs that might include

testing in a third country, or some

combination of these — the U.S. might well

have little or no warning before operational

deployment.”

“We unanimously recommend that U.S.

analyses, practices, and policies that

depend on expectations of extended

warning of deployment be reviewed and,

as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality

of an environment in which there may be

little or no warning.”

On the Russian Threat

“Russia continues to pose a ballistic missile

threat to the United States, although of a

different character than in the past... Still,

Russian ballistic missile forces continue to

be modernized and improved, although the

pace of modernization has been slowed from

planned schedules by economic

constraints. The Russian ballistic missile

early warning system and nuclear command

and control system have also been affected

by aging and delays in planned

modernization. In the context of a crisis

growing out of civil strife, present early

warning and command and control

weaknesses could pose a risk of

unauthorized or inadvertent launch of

missiles against the United States.”

“Russia poses a threat to the U.S. as a major

exporter of enabling technologies,

including ballistic missile technologies, to

countries hostile to the United States. In

particular, Russian assistance has greatly

accelerated Iran’s ballistic missile program.”

On the Chinese Threat

“China is modernizing its long-range

missiles and nuclear weapons in ways that

will make it a more threatening power in the

event of a crisis. China’s 1996 missile firings

in the Taiwan Strait, aimed at intimidating

Taiwan in the lead-up to its presidential

election, provoked a sharp confrontation

with the United States. For example, during

this crisis a pointed question was posed

by Lt. Gen. Xiong Guang Kai, a frequent

spokesman for Chinese policy, about U.S.

willingness to trade Los Angeles for Taipei.

This comment seemed designed

to link China’s ballistic missile

capabilities with its regional

priorities.”

“China also poses a threat to the

U.S. as a significant proliferator

of ballistic missiles, weapons of

mass destruction and enabling

technologies. It has carried out

extensive transfers to Iran’s solidfueled ballistic missile program. It

has supplied Pakistan with a

design for a nuclear weapons and

additional nuclear weapons

assistance. It has even transferred

complete ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia

(the 3100-km-range CSS-2) and Pakistan

(the 350-km-range M-11).”

In Summary

“The behavior thus far of Russia and China

makes it appear unlikely... that either

government will soon effectively reduce

its country’s sizable transfer of critical

technologies, experts, or expertise to the

emerging missile powers.”

“Ballistic missiles armed with WMD

payloads pose a strategic threat to the

United States. This is not a distant threat.

Characterizing foreign assistance as a wild

card is both incorrect and misleading.

Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling

and often the preferred path to ballistic

missile and WMD capability.”

KEY CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE

BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES

In a unanimous report to Congress, the commission convincingly described the ballistic

missile threat facing the U.S. today. The following are a few of their key conclusions.

— A complete copy of the Commission’s

unclassified Executive Summary is

available on the website of the House

National Security Committee at:

 http://www.house.gov/nsc

The Rumsfeld Commission The Rumsfeld Commission