IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 


FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 


HAROLD C. WILSON CIVIL ACTION 


Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., 

Defendants. NO. 04-5396 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

L. FELIPE RESTREPO FEBRUARY 22, 2012 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Before the Court is the Motion ofDefendant, R. Seth Williams,1 to Dismiss Plaintiff's 

Third Amended Complaint, Pursuant to Rule l2(b)(6) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.2 

The motion requests dismissal of all claims against Mr. Williams on the following bases: (I) the 

claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (2) Mr. Williams is not a proper party in this 

matter because of his lack of personal involvement; and (3) plaintiff's state law claims against 

Mr. Williams should be dismissed because he is immune from liability under Pennsylvania law. 

See Def's Br. 7-10. In his Response to defendant's motion, plaintiff argues that: (I) Mr. 

Williams is a proper party to this civil action in his official capacity; (2) plaintiff s claims are not 

time-barred; and (3) plaintiff is not pursuing claims against Mr. Williams for a violation of state 

law. See PI.'s Resp. 2-6. For the reasons which follow, defendant's motion is denied. 

lMr. Williams is the Philadelphia District Attorney. 

2Plaintiff acknowledges that he "erroneously labeled his most recent Complaint, 'Third 

Amended Complaint,' when it is only the second time he has amended his Complaint." See PI.'8 

Resp. Opp. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (hereinafter cited as "Pl.'s Resp.") 1 n.l. 

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Discussion 

In support of his motion to dismiss, Mr. Williams argues that plaintiff alleges liability for 

events that occurred at the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office "in 1989 during Plaintiffs first 

trial," but that Mr. Williams "was barely a law student in 1989." See Def.'5 Br. 8. Therefore, 

contending "that there must be an element ofpersonal involvement on the part of the defendant 

through particular participation, knowledge, or acquiescence," defendant's motion requests that 

"the claim against him in his official capacity must be dismissed." Id. 

"Claims against individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the 

government entity itself." Wise v. Augustine, 1997 WL 534695, *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 1997); see 

Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985) ("a judgment against a public servant 'in his 

official capacity' imposes liability on the entity that he represents"); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 

U.S. 159, 166 (1985) ("an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as 

a suit against the entity"). "A claim of an unconstitutional custom or policy is necessary for 

[p ]Iaintiffs to hold the individual district attorneys liable in their official capacities." See Wise, 

1997 WL 534695, at *3. In particular, "[t]o hold a local government unit, such as a district 

attorney's office, liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a 

constitutionally protected right, and that (2) an official policy or custom caused that deprivation." 

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Monell y. D~'t of80c. 5mB. ofCity ofN.Y .. 436 U.S. 658, 690 

(1978)). 

Here, as Mr. Williams acknowledges, Def.'s Br. 8, plaintiff brings this action against 

him only "in his official capacity" as District Attorney, see PI.' s Third Am Compl. ~ 11, and 

alleges plaintiff was deprived of his constitutionally protected rights as a result of "a 

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longstanding pattern and practice of invidious discrimination in the [District Attorney's] Office," 

id. '1133 (alleging that Mr. Williams is being "sued in his official capacity"); see id. '11'1134-37, 59­

62; see also Def.'s Br. 8 (acknowledging that plaintiff alleges claims against Mr. Williams in his 

official capacity in alleging liability for a custom and practice that occurred at the Philadelphia 

District Attorney's Office). Accordingly, to the extent that defendant's motion requests that 

plaintiff s claims against Mr. Williams should be dismissed on the ground that it lacks "an 

element of personal involvement," ~Def.'s Br. 8, defendant's motion is denied. 

Mr. Williams further argues that plaintiff's claims against him should be dismissed due to 

the statute of limitations. See Def.' s Br. 7. He contends that since plaintiff did not specifically 

include Mr. Williams in the Complaint filed within the statute of limitations that the claims 

against him in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint should be dismissed as time-barred. rd. at 

7-8. 

As explained, claims against Mr. Williams in his official capacity are equivalent to 

"claims against the government entity itself." See Wise. 1997 WL 534695, at +3; see Brandon, 

469 U.S. at 471-72; Graham. 473 U.S. at 166. As plaintiff points out in his brief, the City and 

the District Attorney were named as defendants "at the time of the original Complaint and 

because the allegations at issue here were lodged in that Complaint (as well as in the more 

recently filed Amended Complaint), there is no bar to pursuing" plaintiffs claims against Mr. 

Williams, see PI. 's Resp. 3-4. In addition, Rule 25(d) ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

provides: 

An action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an 

official capacity dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office 

while the action is pending. The officer's successor is automatically 

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substituted as a party. Later proceedings should be in the substituted 

party's name, but any misnomer not affecting the parties' substantial 

rights must be disregarded. The court may order substitution at any 

time, but the absence ofsuch an order does not affect the substitution. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 2S(d); see also Estate of Smith y. Hamilton County Dep't of Job and Family 

Servs., 2007 WL 2572184, ·5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31,2007) (naming the District Attorney to the 

lawsuit after the statute oflimitations expired was not time-barred in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

25(d)'s provision that "the omission to enter the substitution [of the District Attorney] will not 

affect the Plaintiffs ability to do so"). Accordingly, Mr. Williams' request to dismiss plaintiff's 

claims against him as time-barred and for lack of Mr. Williams' personal involvement is denied. 

Finally, Mr. Williams requests that plaintiffs state law claims against him should be 

dismissed. See Defo's Br. 8. In response, plaintiff represents that he is not pursuing any state law 

claims against Mr. Williams, and he is not requesting that the Court exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction in that regard. See PI.'s Resp. 6. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss is 

granted insofar as it requests that any and all state law claims against Mr. Williams be dismissed. 

An implementing Order follows. 

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