1This sentence was first appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth

v. Medina, 3885 Philadelphia 1993 at 1-3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 1995) (hereinafter “Medina

I”). 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSE MEDINA, :

Petitioner, :

: CIVIL ACTION

v. : No. 04-CV-128

:

:

DAVID DIGUGLIELMO, et al., :

 Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Anita B. Brody, J. June 2, 2005

Jose Medina (“Medina”) petitions this court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, Medina’s petition is granted.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 12, 1992, after a jury trial before the Honorable Juanita Kidd Stout in the

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Medina was found guilty of first degree murder, robbery

and possession of instruments of crime in connection with the October 18, 1991 death of William

Bogan (“Bogan”) and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.1

 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that Bogan was stabbed in the heart near

Mutter and Gurney Streets in Philadelphia. (Tr. 11/6/92 at 189-90, 206.) The stab wound was

ultimately caused by a knife with a six-inch, single-edged blade. (Id. at 207.) Although this

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2The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of the police officers who arrived on

the scene and who arrested Medina, the testimony of a medical examiner, and the testimony of

people who knew Bogan. However, Hector Toro, Marcos Toro, and Maria Caraballo were the

only witnesses who testified to seeing Bogan and Medina before Bogan was killed.

2

wound was fatal, Bogan was able to run for about two blocks before collapsing in the street. (Tr.

11/6/92 at 150, 189, 212-13.) When the police found Bogan in the intersection of Hope and

Gurney Streets, he was already dead. (Tr. 11/6/92 at 172-73.)

On the night that Bogan was killed, Philadelphia police stopped Medina at approximately

9:30 pm at Mutter and Cambria Streets. (Tr. 11/6/92 at 166-67.) A police officer stopped and

frisked Medina because Medina, dressed in a white sweatshirt, matched the description in a radio

report about a male in a white sweatshirt carrying a knife. (Id. at 176.) The officer found no

weapons on Medina and let him go. (Id. at 166-67.) Several minutes later, after discovering the

body of Bogan, the police found Medina in a local bar and arrested him. (Id. at 172-74.) No

blood was found on Medina’s white sweatshirt. (Id. at 181.) No knife was ever recovered. 

Medina I at 19.

At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Hector Toro (“Hector”), Maria

Caraballo (“Caraballo”), and Michael “Marcos” Toro (“Marcos”).

2

 Hector was 10 years old on

the date of the incident. (Tr. 11/5/92 at 39-81.) Hector testified that he and his brother, Marcos,

saw Medina (a.k.a. “Harry”) at a neighborhood store (the “Chinese store”) at approximately 8:30

or 9:00 pm on October 18, 1991. (Id. at 43-46.) Hector testified that Medina had a knife and that

Medina stated that he was going to kill someone. (Id.) Hector testified that after Medina left the

store, Hector and Marcos also left the store and returned to their grandmother’s house on Mutter

Street. (Id. at 46-47.) While Hector’s testimony was unclear as to his exact activities after he

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returned to his grandmother’s house, his testimony indicated that, at some point, Hector left his

grandmother’s house, went to the corner of Mutter and Gurney Streets, and saw Bogan’s body in

the street. (Id.) Hector did not witness Bogan being stabbed. (Id. at 47-48.)

Maria Caraballo (“Caraballo”), a neighbor of the Toro brothers, also testified at trial. (Tr.

11/6/92 at 146-64.) Caraballo was sitting on the front steps of her house on the evening of the

murder. (Id. at 147-50.) At approximately 9:15 or 9:30 pm, she saw Bogan run past her house

while holding his chest. (Id. at 150.) Caraballo tried to follow Bogan to offer assistance but

could not find him. (Id. at 151.) As she returned to her house, she saw Medina looking

underneath a car parked across the street. (Id. at 152-53.) Although Caraballo saw Bogan

running by her house, she did not see him being stabbed. (Id. at 156.)

Marcos, who was 11 years old at the time of the incident and 12 years old at the time of

trial, was the only trial witness who testified about the substantive homicidal act itself. (Tr.

11/5/92 at 83, 97, 105); Medina I at 3, 8-11. At the beginning of Marcos’s testimony, when

asked, “Do you know the difference between telling the truth and telling a lie,” Marcos answered,

“No.” (Tr. 11/5/92 at 83.) Marcos then proceeded to testify that he saw Medina stab Bogan. (Id.

at 97.) However, upon cross-examination, Marcos confirmed his preliminary hearing testimony

that he did not actually see Medina stab Bogan and that he only assumed Medina stabbed Bogan

because of what his brother Hector had told him and because he had seen Medina with a knife

earlier in the day. (Id. at 110-11.) At no point did Medina’s trial counsel object to Marcos

Toro’s competency to testify.

Because it is central to Medina’s claims, I will take the time to review in detail Marcos’s

preliminary hearing and trial testimonies. At the preliminary hearing held on November 26,

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1991, Marcos testified that, while looking out of his window, he saw Medina stab Bogan:

[By the prosecution, Ms. Ponterio]

Q. Tell the Judge what you saw when you looked out your

window?

A. The dude [Bogan] with his hands on his heart.

. . .

Q. And where did you see him first?

A. I don’t know.

Q. Okay. What did you see him doing, the white dude [Bogan]?

A. I didn’t see that part.

Q. Okay. Tell us the part that you saw? Did you see Harry

[Medina] when you were looking out your window?

Mr. Silverstein [defense counsel]: Objection. Leading nature.

The Court: Overruled.

By Ms. Ponterio:

Q. You can answer?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And what was Harry doing?

A. Chasing after him.

Q. Okay. You are saying chasing after the white dude?

A. A-huh.

Q. Okay. Did Harry catch up to the white dude?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what I mean by catch up?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What did you see Harry do with the white dude?

A. Stabbed him. 

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 8-10.) However, on cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Marcos

testified that he did not actually see Medina stab Bogan:

[By defense counsel]

Q. Now, you said you looked out the window and you saw this

white gentleman [Bogan] holding his heart; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see anything happen before that?

A. No.

Q. You didn’t see anything happen before that?

A. (Witness shakes head)

. . .

Q. Did you see Harry [Medina] when this white fellow was

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running down the street holding his heart?

A. No.

Q. You did not see Harry?

A. No.

. . .

Q. In fact, you didn’t see Harry stab the guy, did you?

A. My brother did.

Q. Your brother did. And you are only telling us what your brother

told you; is that right?

A. A-huh.

Q. And you didn’t eyewitness Harry do anything; right? Am I

correct? You have to say yes or no?

A. Yes.

Q. And you only assumed that because you saw a knife at the

restaurant; is that right?

A. A-huh.

Q. So everything you said about Harry stabbing the white dude is

either something that your brother told you or you made up because

you figured he did it because he had a knife; right?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 21-23.)

Medina’s trial began on November 5, 1992, approximately one year after the preliminary

hearing. Marcos’s trial testimony started with the prosecutor’s examination of Marcos’s

understanding of the duty to speak the truth: 

Q. [By the prosecution, Ms. Sweeney] Do you know what it means

to tell the truth?

A. [By Marcos] Yes.

Q. What does it mean?

A. (No response.)

Q. Let me ask it the other way. Do you know what it means to tell a

lie?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the difference between telling the truth and telling

a lie?

A. No.

Q. You just told the jury and the judge when you put your hand on

the Bible you were going to tell the truth?

A. Truth.

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Q. What does the truth mean?

THE COURT: First of all, let’s sit up straight and take our hand

down. What happens to you if you tell a lie?

(No response.)

THE COURT: What happens to you? Take your hand down and

look at me. Tell me what will happen to you if you tell a lie?

(No response.)

 . . . 

THE COURT: Tell me what will happen to you if you tell a lie?

What would the teacher – what would your mother do to you?

What would your father do to you? What would happen to you?

BY MS SWEENEY [the prosecution]:

Q. Marcos, you have to give an answer if you know the answer.

What would happen to you if you tell a lie? Do you get rewarded?

A. No.

Q. Do you get a prize for telling a lie?

A. No.

Q. Do you get in trouble for telling a lie?

A. Yes.

Q. What about when you tell the truth? If you tell the truth? If you

tell the truth, is that a good thing to do?

A. No.

THE COURT: It is not good to tell the truth?

A. Yes.

MS. SWEENEY: Sit back. Nobody is going to hurt you. Sit back. 

If you want some water, if you want a Kleenex or if you say, “Boy I

need a break,” you just let us know. All right?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. We want you to tell the truth about what you may have seen and

heard about a year ago involving the white dude [Bogan]. Do you

know what I am talking about?

A. No.

MR. DALY [defense counsel]: I object to the leading nature of the

question.

THE COURT: Overruled. You don’t know what she is talking

about?

WITNESS: No.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 83-86.)

Marcos testified on direct examination that he saw Bogan stab Medina. However,

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Marcos’s description of Medina’s and Bogan’s actions contradicted itself:

BY MS. SWEENEY [prosecution]:

Q. Marcos, after you went home to your house, what did you see

happen which is why you came to court today?

A. (Pause.) Because he stabbed somebody.

Q. Who stabbed somebody?

A. Harry [Medina].

. . .

Q. Where did Harry stab the white man [Bogan]? By that, I mean

where on the white man did the defendant Harry stab?

A. Chest.

Q. Show me where. Point to it?

A. (Witness indicates.)

Q. Indicating right there. Did you see the white man fall down?

A. Yes.

Q. Where?

A. Gurney.

THE COURT: We want to see you handsome face. Sit up.

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. After you saw him, meaning the white man, fall down on

Gurney Street, did you see anybody do anything?

A. No.

Q. What happened after the white man fell down on Gurney Street?

A. (Pause.)

Q. Did you see anyone at all go over to the white man after he fell

down?

A. No.

THE COURT: Keep your head up, and put your rope down.

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. Did you see Harry again after he stabbed the white man?

A. No.

. . . 

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. I will back you up just for a minute. Before Harry stabbed the

white guy, did anyone say anything?

A. No.

. . . 

Q. Marcos, when you saw, before you saw Harry stab the white

dude, did you hear either Harry or the white dude say anything?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you hear?

A. The white man said, “I will pay you tomorrow. I will pay you

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tomorrow,["] and then.

Q. Did Harry say anything?

A. No.

Q. After you saw the white dude fall down on Gurney Street, did

you see Harry again at all?

A. No.

Q. Did you see anyone go over towards where the white dude fell

and go through his pockets?

MR. DALY [defense counsel]: Objection. Leading nature of the

question.

THE COURT: I sustain the objection.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. What did you see anyone do in terms of after the white man fell

on the ground?

A. They were digging in his pockets.

Q. Who was?

A. Harry.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 97-100, 105-06.) Thus, Marcos testified that he both did and did not see Medina

after he stabbed Bogan, that he both did and did not hear Bogan say something before Medina

stabbed Bogan, and that he both did and did not see someone go over to Bogan after he fell

down.

On cross-examination, Marcos contradicted his answers from direct examination and

confirmed his preliminary hearing testimony that he did not actually see Medina stab Bogan: 

BY MR DALY [defense counsel]:

Q. Do you remember this question: “In fact, you didn’t see Harry

[Medina] stab the guy [Bogan]. Did you?” Do you remember that

question?

A. Yes.

Q. Your answer: “My brother did.” Do you remember that answer?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember this question: “Your brother did and you

were only telling us what your brother told you. Is that right?” And

your answer: “Yes.” The answer is “Huh-huh.”

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember that question and that answer?

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A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember this question: “And you didn’t eyewitness

Harry do anything. Right? Am I correct? You have to say yes or

no.” And your answer: “Yes.”

A. Yes.

Q. Question: “And you only assumed that because you saw the

knife at the restaurant. Is that right?”

A. Yes.

Q. And you answered: “Uh-uh.” And then to this question: “So

everything you said about Harry stabbing the white dude is either

something that your brother told you or you made up because you

figured he did it because he had a knife. Right?”

A. Yes.

THE COURT: Do you remember that question?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. DALY:

Q. And do you remember the answer “Yes”?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were under oath at that time. Were you not?

A. No.

Q. Didn’t you raise you hand and put your hand on the Bible before

you testified?

A. Yes.

. . . 

Q. When the defense attorney [at the preliminary hearing] asked

you that question, remember we went over here, when he asked

you, “You only assumed that because you saw the knife in the

restaurant is that right?”

A. Yes.

Q. And when he asked you the question, “Everything you said

about Harry stabbing the white dude is either something that your

brother told you or you made up because you figured he did it

because he had a knife. Right?”

A. Yes.

Q. When he asked you that question, you were telling the truth. 

Weren’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. And it is not your intention, never was, to tell a lie. Was it?

A. No.

Q. And you believed at the time you were talking to the police that

you were helping them?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes?

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A. Yes.

A. And what you told the defense attorney at the time was the

truth. Wasn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. You thought from seeing the knife earlier that Harry must have

down [sic] it?

A. Yes.

A. As you told the defense attorney, in fact, you didn’t see it. Did

you?

A. Yes.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 110-11, 125-26.) Thus, Marcos repeatedly confirmed the truth of his preliminary

hearing testimony that he did not see Medina stab Bogan.

On redirect examination, the prosecution asked Marcos to confirm portions of his

preliminary hearing testimony indicating that he did see Medina stab Bogan: 

Q. And then the next question, “And did Harry do anything to the

white dude?” And you said, “No, he only stabbed him once.” Do

you remember that?

A. Yes.

Q. Then the next question: “He only stabbed him once. Now did

you see this with your own eyes?” And do you remember her

asking that and you saying yes. Do you remember saying that?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that the truth?

A. Yes.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 134.) 

However, upon re-cross by defense counsel, Marcos once again confirmed the truth of his

preliminary hearing testimony that he did not see Medina stab Bogan: 

Q. When I asked you the question, so everything you said about

Harry stabbing the white dude is either something that your brother

told you or you made up because you figured he did it because he

had a knife – right – 

A. Yes.

Q. – they [Medina’s family] weren’t in the room to scare you then. 

Were they?

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3Medina was represented by different counsel at each stage of his case. Attorney Robert

Silverstein represented Medina at the preliminary hearing, attorney Daly represented Medina at

trial, attorney Patrick Egan represented Medina on his first direct appeal, attorney Barnaby

Wittels represented Medina on his second direct appeal, attorney Sondra Rodrigues represented

Medina on his PCRA petition, and attorney Dan Rendine represented Medina on his PCRA

appeal. 

11

A. No.

Q. And you were telling the truth to me. Weren’t you?

A. Yes.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 136.)

Finally, Marcos’s testimony ended with a second redirect examination as follows:

Q. Did you make this up?

A. No.

Q. Did you see this stabbing?

A. Yes.

Q. Who stabbed the white dude?

A. Harry.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 136-37.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 12, 1992, a jury found Medina guilty of first degree murder, robbery and

possession of instruments of crime. Medina I at 1. The prosecutor sought the death penalty. 

After the jury deadlocked during the penalty stage, Judge Stout sentenced Medina to life

imprisonment. (7/27/94 Post-trial opinion of J. Stout at 1.) At trial, Medina was represented by

Ed Daly, Esq. (“Daly”).3

Medina filed a direct appeal claiming (1) the trial court erred in permitting the testimony

of two-pre-teenage boys, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a pre-trial

determination of the boys’ competency to testify and for failing to object to their competency

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during trial, and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Medina I at 1. The

Pennsylvania Superior Court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Id.

at 19. It also found that there was “at least arguable merit to appellant’s contention that his trial

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the competency of the juvenile, Michael [Marcos]

Toro.” Id. at 20. After a detailed review of Marcos’s trial testimony, the court described his

testimony thus: 

It is apparent from this [testimony] that whether the juvenile

witness observed appellant [Medina] stab the victim depended on

the identity of the questioner, with whom the young witness

invariably sought to agree.

. . . 

The testimony of Michael [Marcos] Toro varied from one extreme

to the other, depending upon the party asking him questions. 

During the three times that he was questioned by the

Commonwealth, he testified that he had seen appellant [Medina]

stab Bogan. However, he contradicted this testimony during both

cross and re-cross examination. On those occasions, he said he had

not seen appellant stab the victim. The discrepancy resulted not

only from defense counsel’s impeachment of Michael with his

preliminary hearing testimony, but also from Michael’s testimony

at trial. Michael asserted that at the preliminary hearing he

truthfully had denied that he had seen the stabbing. He in essence

provided two distinct accounts of what he actually had seen on the

night of the stabbing.

Id. at 15, 19.

The Superior Court then found that the matter of Marcos Toro’s competency was not

resolved at trial:

Michael’s age necessitated an inquiry into his competency as a

witness. That inquiry, focused as it was on his consciousness of the

duty to speak the truth, failed to resolve the matter. His reluctance

to answer questions had frustrated the trial court and the

Commonwealth’s efforts. Despite that result, the trial court

permitted him to testify. During his testimony, he consistently

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answered questions as he believed his examiner desired. His

inclination to please his questioner created a highly contradictory

record, where he both saw and did not see the stabbing. From the

portions quoted in the trial transcript, Michael had acted in a

similar fashion at the preliminary hearing. Nevertheless,

appellant’s trial counsel failed to object to his competency at trial. 

We cannot determine from the record whether a reasonable basis

existed for this approach by appellant’s trial counsel. With

Michael as the only eyewitness to the stabbing, and the prejudice

from his testimony being self-evident, the issue is significant.

Id. at 21-22. On this basis, the Pennsylvania Superior Court vacated Medina’s sentence and

remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing regarding counsel’s failure to challenge the

competency of Marcos Toro, the only eyewitness to the stabbing. Id. at 22-24. 

Judge Stout presided over the ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) hearing on

November 22, 1995. Medina was represented by new counsel, Patrick Egan, Esq. At the

evidentiary hearing, Daly, Medina’s trial counsel, explained why he did not object to Marcos

Toro’s competency and what his strategy was at trial. Daly testified that he believed Marcos was

competent based solely on the transcript of the preliminary hearing (as Daly was not Medina’s

counsel at the time of the preliminary hearing) and on Marcos’s demeanor during trial:

Well, I looked at the preliminary hearing notes, and based on the

statements and the conflicts in the statements that I saw there – in

other words, I ran down the criteria that one considers in looking at

the competency of a witness. . . . Well, the individual, did he

perceive something; yes, he saw something that was there; did he

recall it; he could recall it; did he have the necessary

communicative skills; yes, he did; was there any question, did it

appear that he understood the oath that he was taking; yes, he

appeared to understand the oath. . . . [I]t appeared, from the

preliminary hearing notes, that he was competent, and it appeared,

when I watched him on the stand, and I watched the demeanor and

I listened to him, that he had the communicative skills, that he had

the recollections, that he had, in fact, seen something.

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Judge Davis is now a federal district court judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

5Despite Medina’s instructions, attorney Egan failed to file an appeal. Commonwealth v.

Medina, CP 91-12-1080 at 2 (First Judicial Dist. of Pa., Ct. of Common Pleas, Feb. 8, 2000)

(Lazarus, J.). Medina filed his own notice of appeal on October 30, 1997, but the notice was

never docketed by the clerk of court. (Id.) On June 8, 1998, Medina filed a Petition for Writ of

Mandamus in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. (Id.) The petition was forwarded to the Court of

Common Pleas where it was docketed as a Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Attorney

14

(Tr. 11/22/95 at 18, 24.) 

When asked about his strategy at trial, Daly testified: 

Well, I decided that the individual appeared to me to be competent,

and based on the strategy that I wished to use, that is the fact that

Michael Toro, in his preliminary hearing notes, seemed to flip-flop,

I wanted to have him on the stand to see whether or not he would

do the same, which I believed that he, based on the notes of

testimony, that he would, and he flip-flopped in front of the jury at

that time. . . . During the trial, the strategy appeared to work,

because Michael Toro, in fact, when the prosecution, that is

yourself, asked Michael Toro a question, he went with the

prosecution. However, when I went up and cross-examined him,

he went for the defense, that is, he didn’t see what he supposedly

saw.

(Tr. 11/22/95 at 18-19.)

Judge Stout did not make a ruling as to Medina’s claim at the time of the evidentiary

hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel. At a subsequent hearing on March 18, 1996, Judge

Stout stated that she prepared a written opinion finding no ineffective assistance of counsel. (Tr.

3/16/96 at 2.) However, there is no such opinion by Judge Stout in the state court record, and the

court did not enter an order on that day. After Judge Stout’s death, the Honorable Legrome

Davis of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas4

 issued an order on October 10, 1997 denying

Medina’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

Medina filed a second direct appeal5 claiming once again that trial counsel was ineffective

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Barnaby Wittels was appointed to represent Medina at that time. (Id.) On October 18, 1999,

upon agreement by the Commonwealth, Judge Lazarus reinstated Medina’s appellate rights. (Id.)

15

for failing to challenge the competency of the Toro brothers. On February 16, 2001, the Superior

Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective. Commonwealth v.

Medina, 3132 EDA 1999 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2001) (hereinafter “Medina II”). The court

found that “[c]ounsel’s strategy, while arguably the wrong one in hindsight, was not lacking in a

reasonable basis designed to further appellant’s interest.” Id. at 3. 

On or about December 11, 2001, Medina filed a pro se petition pursuant to

Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9551. In the

amended petition filed by appointed counsel Sondra Rodrigues, Esq., Medina presented three

claims: (1) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve the issue of trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to present medical evidence establishing that Medina was

physically incapable of the activities described at trial; (2) appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to properly preserve the claim that the prosecutor made improper remarks at trial; and (3)

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve an argument that the trial court

rendered trial counsel ineffective by admonishing him in front of the jury. (Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R

Ex. A at 5.) The PCRA trial court denied Medina’s petition on September 27, 2002. 

Commonwealth v. Medina, 3224 EDA 2002 at 4-5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sep. 17, 2003) (hereinafter

“Medina III”). 

Medina appealed the denial of his PCRA petition and was appointed new counsel, Dan

Rendine, Esq. On September 17, 2003, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the trial

court’s denial. Medina III at 11. The court found that Medina had waived his second and third

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claims because Medina failed to “properly layer” his allegations of IAC. Id. at 7. Pennsylvania

law at that time required Medina to raise IAC claims on the first occasion at which he was

represented by new counsel, otherwise the issue was considered waived. Id. at 6. To avoid a

waiver, a PCRA petitioner had to “layer” his allegations of ineffectiveness to include all prior

counsel and state his allegations with specificity. Id. The Superior Court found that Medina’s

arguments in support of his second and third claims failed to clearly specify which of the two

appellate attorneys, Egan or Wittels, Medina was referring to when he made his allegations of

ineffectiveness. Id. at 7. As for Medina’s first PCRA claim regarding his medical evidence, the

court found this claim to be meritless because Medina failed to show how his medical records

from five months before the night of the murder were relevant to his physical condition on the

night of the murder. Id. at 8-10. Medina filed a petition for allowance of appeal on September

30, 2003, which was denied on December 16, 2003. Commonwealth v. Medina, 468 EAL 2003.

On January 13, 2004, Medina filed, pro se, the instant petition for habeas corpus relief. 

Medina raises six claims in his petition. Medina’s first three claims all allege ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the competency of the Toro brothers. Medina’s

fourth claim alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to introduce medical

evidence establishing that Medina was incapable of acting in the manner described at trial. 

Medina’s fifth claim alleges that the trial court rendered his trial counsel ineffective by

admonishing counsel in front of the jury and that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to

raise this issue. Finally, Medina’s sixth claim contends that the prosecution made improper

remarks in its closing argument by vouching for the Commonwealth’s witnesses and that

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 16 of 46
6The distinction among Medina’s first three claims is unclear from his pro se habeas

petition. Medina’s appointed counsel first characterized Medina’s petition as containing five

claims in the Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Medina’s Habeas Petition: (1)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the competency of the Toro brothers,

(2) violation of Medina’s federal due process rights when the trial court failed to conduct a sua

sponte inquiry into the competency of the Toro brothers; (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel

for failing to introduce medical records; (4) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object

to improper prosecutorial remarks; and (5) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in

relation to the trial court’s admonishments of trial counsel in front of the jury. (Supp. Mem. Law

Supp. Habeas Pet. at 1 n.1.) However, Judge Hart characterized Medina’s pro se habeas petition

as containing six claims, the first three of which are essentially one claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the Toro brothers’ competency to testify. 

(Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 4.) The parties did not object to this characterization

of Medina’s claims in their objections, and Medina actually adopted this characterization of his

claims in his objections to the R&R. (Pet.’s Obj. at 3-4.) 

This characterization of Medina’s petition disregards his pro se claim that the trial court

violated his due process rights when it failed to conduct a sua sponte inquiry into the competency

of the Toro brothers. However, in light of my granting habeas relief on the basis of Medina’s

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to Marcos Toro’s competency,

it is not necessary to discuss whether the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing

sua sponte. Therefore, I will address petitioner’s claims as they are characterized in the R&R and

in the parties’ objections. 

17

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue.6

I appointed counsel on April 22, 2004. After supplemental briefing, Magistrate Judge

Jacob P. Hart issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on January 13, 2005, which

recommended granting habeas relief on the basis of Medina’s claim that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to the competency of Marcos Toro. (R&R at 6-22.) Judge Hart

also found that Medina’s fourth claim, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce

medical records, was without merit (R&R at 22) and that Medina’s fifth and sixth claims were

procedurally defaulted (R&R at 5-6). 

Both parties filed objections to the R&R. Medina objected to Judge Hart’s finding that

Medina’s sixth claim, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to improper

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 17 of 46
7Federal habeas relief is also available if the state court’s decision was based on an

“unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). This clause is not at issue in the instant case because

Medina does not contend that the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Rather, Medina only argues that the state court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

18

prosecutorial remarks, was procedurally defaulted. (Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R.) Respondents objected

to Judge Hart’s conclusion that Medina’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the

competency of Marcos Toro. (Resp’ts’ Obj. to R&R.) Neither party objected to Judge Hart’s

findings on Medina’s fourth and fifth claims.

Oral argument was held on April 29, 2005, and both parties filed post-argument briefs. 

For the reasons set forth below, I will affirm the conclusion reached in Judge Hart’s R&R and

grant Medina’s petition for habeas relief.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This petition is governed by the revisions to the federal habeas statute enacted in the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996),

effective April 24, 1996 (“AEDPA”). Pursuant to AEDPA, 

when a federal court reviews a state court’s ruling on federal law,

or its application of federal law to a particular set of facts, the state

court’s decision must stand unless it is “contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).7

A state court decision is “contrary” to clearly established Supreme Court precedent “if the

state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 18 of 46
8Although Medina’s pro se habeas petition included Hector Toro in this claim, Medina’s

counseled supplemental brief only addressed the testimony of Marcos Toro. The R&R found no

basis to question Hector’s competency to testify (R&R at 6), and Medina did not object to Judge

Hart’s finding as to Hector’s competency. Therefore, I will adopt Judge Hart’s finding as to the

competency of Hector Toro and focus solely on the testimony of Marcos Toro in this claim.

19

or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court

and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405-06 (2000), quoted in Lam, 304 F.3d at 263. Under the “unreasonable application”

clause, habeas relief should be granted “when the state court ‘correctly identifies the governing

legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular [] case.’” Id. (quoting Williams,

529 U.S. at 407-08). Furthermore, with respect to this clause, habeas relief will only be

warranted if the “state court’s application of clearly established federal law was objectively

unreasonable,” not merely “incorrect.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-410, quoted in Lam, 304 F.3d

at 263. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Object to Marcos Toro’s Competency

Medina claims that his trial counsel, Daly, was ineffective for failing to object to the

competency of Marcos Toro as a witness.8 To merit habeas relief, Medina must show that the

Pennsylvania state court’s decision denying his claim was an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The clearly established federal law that

governs Medina’s ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim is found in Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prove IAC under Strickland, a petitioner must show that

(1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced petitioner’s

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 19 of 46
9Medina II concluded that the performance of Medina’s trial counsel, Daly, was not

deficient and, therefore, never reached the prejudice prong of Strickland. Because Medina II

never reached the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, nor did any other state court, my

review of the prejudice prong of Strickland is a de novo review rather than a deferential review

under the “unreasonable application” clause of AEDPA. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.

20

defense. 466 U.S. at 687. To find that the state court’s application of Strickland was

“unreasonable,” the state court’s decision must have been more than simply incorrect or

erroneous. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). The state court’s application of

Strickland must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Id. 

The state court decision under review is the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s second direct

appeal decision in Medina’s case, Medina II. I will first analyze whether Medina II’s application

of the first prong of Strickland was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law and then address the prejudice prong of Strickland under the standard of de novo

review.9

1. Medina II’s application of the first prong of Strickland

In determining whether Medina II’s denial of Medina’s IAC claim constituted an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the first step is to set forth the

applicable federal law, that is, the first prong of Strickland; then analyze Daly’s performance

under the Strickland standard; lastly review whether the state court’s application of Strickland to

Daly’s performance was an unreasonable application of the Strickland standard. I conclude that

Medina II constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

To establish deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland, a petitioner must

demonstrate that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” 

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 20 of 46
10In Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 106 (3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit decided that the

state court’s “decision, based on a single factor to the exclusion of other relevant factors,

involved an unreasonable application of Strickland.” The Third Circuit noted that cases have

often emphasized the necessity of assessing an ineffectiveness claim in light of all the

circumstances. Id. at 106-07 (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533; Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S.

470, 478 (2000); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 (1986); Lewis v. Johnson, 359

F.3d 646, 659 (3d Cir. 2004); Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 257 (3d Cir. 2004); Duncan v.

Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1101 (3d Cir.

1996); Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992).

11While “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to

plausible options are virtually unchallengeable, . . . counsel has a duty to make reasonable

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations

unnecessary.” 466 U.S. at 690-91; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521. In Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, in

which the United States Supreme Court addressed an IAC claim, trial counsel justified their

limited investigation into petitioner’s background “as reflecting a tactical judgment not to present

mitigating evidence at sentencing and to pursue an alternative strategy instead.” Id. at 521. The

Court rejected trial counsel’s proffered strategy. The Supreme Court found that the state court

unreasonably applied Strickland because it failed to examine whether counsel’s decision was

based on a reasonable investigation, including whether the scope of that investigation was

reasonable. Id. at 527-29. 

Although Wiggins and Strickland were both decided in the context of counsel’s failure to

adequately investigate facts relevant to mitigation in death penalty cases, the Supreme Court

clearly contemplates counsel’s duty to investigate the applicable law as well as the relevant facts. 

Only strategic decisions “made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible

options” are virtually unchallengeable. 466 U.S. at 690-91; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521. Wiggins

shows that a court cannot accept as sound trial strategy just any proffered justification by trial

counsel. Rather, a court must consider if counsel’s strategy was based on a reasonable

investigation into relevant facts and law. A knowledge of the applicable law is a necessary first

21

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521. The proper measure of attorney

performance “remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. The

reasonableness of counsel’s conduct must be determined on the facts of the particular case,

viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct and “in light of all the circumstances.”10

 Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689-90. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential” and

“strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options

are virtually unchallengeable.”11 Id. at 690. 

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 21 of 46
step into determining what relevant facts might be. 

12While certain holdings in Everett are no longer binding, see Priester v. Vaughn, 382

F.3d 394, 397-98 (3d Cir. 2004), Everett’s ineffective assistance of counsel analysis is still valid.

13In Everett, the Third Circuit reviewed applicable Pennsylvania law on accomplice

liability for first-degree murder because such a review was necessary in determining whether

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to jury instructions on accomplice liability. 290 F.3d

at 510-11 In Jacobs, the Third Circuit looked to Pennsylvania law on a diminished capacity

defense in order to determine whether counsel was ineffective for failing to raise such a defense. 

395 F.3d at102. 

14Pennsylvania courts have alternatively articulated this same standard as a three-prong

test requiring “(1) such capacity to communicate, including as it does both an ability to

22

The reasonableness of counsel’s conduct must be analyzed in light of the applicable law

at the time of trial. Everett v. Beard, 290 F.3d 500, 509 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Of course, the state of

the law is central to an evaluation of counsel’s performance at trial. A reasonably competent

attorney patently is required to know the state of the applicable law. . .”).12 Medina’s IAC claim

involves Daly’s failure to object to the testimony of Marcos Toro based on his competency. 

Witness competency is a question governed entirely by state law. In this case, as in Everett, the

analysis of the federal constitutional claim, that of ineffective assistance of counsel, obviously

involves an analysis of the state law.13 The reasonableness of Daly’s failure to object to Marcos

Toro’s testimony must be assessed in light of Pennsylvania state law on witness competency. 

Under Pennsylvania law, a witness is competent to testify if the witness: 

“(1) has the capacity to observe or perceive the occurrence with a

substantial degree of accuracy; (2) has the ability to remember the

event which was observed or perceived; (3) has the ability to

understand questions and to communicate intelligent answers about

the occurrence; and (4) has a consciousness of the duty to speak the

truth.”

Commonwealth v. Mazzoccoli, 380 A.2d 786, 787 (Pa. 1977).14 While adult witnesses are

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 22 of 46
understand questions and to frame and express intelligent answers, (2) mental capacity to observe

the occurrence itself and the capacity to remember what it is that she is called to testify about and

(3) a consciousness of the duty to speak the truth. . . .” Rosche v. McCoy, 155 A.2d 307, 310

(Pa. 1959).

23

assumed to be competent, when the witness is under 14 years of age, “there must be a searching

judicial inquiry as to mental capacity.” Commonwealth v. Fultz, 462 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 1983). This is because:

The capacity of young children to testify has always been a concern

as their immaturity can impact their ability to meet the minimal

legal requirements of competency. Common experience informs

us that children are, by their very essence, fanciful creatures who

have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality; who when asked

a question want to give the “right” answer, the answer that pleases

the interrogator; who are subject to repeat ideas placed in their

heads by others; and who have limited capacity for accurate

memory.

Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39-40 (Pa. 2003). The determination of competency

is vested in the discretion of the trial court and is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 

Mazzoccoli, 380 A.2d at 787. 

At the time of Medina’s trial, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already set forth an

example of an incompetent child witness. In Mazzaccoli, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held

that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a 15-year-old competent to testify. 380 A.2d

786. When the 15-year-old witness in Mazzaccoli was asked “And do you know whether it is

right or wrong to tell a lie? Do you?” the witness answered, “No.” Id. at 788. Additionally,

when the witness was asked “Is it right or wrong to tell a lie?” the witness answered, “Right.” Id.

The court concluded from this testimony that the witness “did not demonstrate a consciousness

of the duty to tell the truth.” Id. The Mazzaccoli court also found that the witness did not have

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 23 of 46
15 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that “while the Superior Court sometimes

referred to counsel’s ‘alternatives,’ the two strategies examined were not ‘alternatives’ at all. 

24

the ability to understand questions and communicate intelligent answers: 

Most [of the witness’s] answers were simply yes or no responses to

leading questions. The entire transcript reveals that most of the

time [the witness’s] answers could be manipulated by the question. 

Further, this entire testimony is fraught with inconsistencies and

contradiction.

Id. The Mazzaccoli court concluded, “Under these circumstances, we believe that the trial court

abused its discretion in allowing [the witness] to testify.” Id. 

At the time of Medina’s trial, applicable state law also held that an objectively reasonable

attorney would not merely rely on cross-examining a key witness when the attorney could also

make an arguably meritorious competency challenge. In Commonwealth v. Mangini, 425 A.2d

734 (Pa. 1981), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s finding that trial

counsel was reasonable in attempting to discredit a witness on cross-examination rather than

challenging the witness’s competency. The “key prosecution witness” in Mangini was a

paranoid-schizophrenic. The state Supreme Court, quoting extensively from the lower court

decision, noted that “even if counsel’s tactic was deliberate, it was ineffective to effectuate his

client’s interest”:

Initially, it must be noted that an objection to the

competency of the witness would at least have been of arguable

merit under prior competency cases of the Supreme Court. 

Counsel could have raised this objection, or requested a

competency hearing, without prejudice to his ability to pursue his

other alternative, i.e. attempting to discredit the witness on cross. 

This was not a case where counsel had two alternatives that

were mutually exclusive. In such a case, counsel must necessarily

choose one or the other alternative. This case presents, instead, the

situation where counsel has two alternatives,[15] both of which are

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 24 of 46
Rather, they were distinct and independent tactics.” 425 A.2d at 737 n.4.

25

available to him. Counsel could have attempted to (first)

disqualify the witness. . . . If he succeeded in this attempt, there

would be no need to pursue the less certain method of discrediting

the witness on cross. If he failed in the attempt, he still could fall

back on cross-examination. . . . There is no reasonable basis under

these circumstances[] for[] deliberately eschewing one weapon (out

of two available) when both can be used.

425 A.2d at 737 (internal citations omitted). In Commonwealth v. Fultz, 462 A.2d 1340, 1345-

46 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), the Pennsylvania Superior Court later applied Mangini to a case in

which defense counsel failed to challenge the competency of a child witness and, after quoting

extensively from Mangini, found that defense counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to

request a competency hearing or for failing to place on the record an objection to the minor’s

competency. 

In light of the applicable law on the competency of juvenile witnesses and the specific

facts in Medina’s case, all of which are relevant to assessing the reasonableness of Daly’s actions

“under the prevailing professional norms” and “in light of all the circumstances” as required by

Strickland, Daly’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Several

individual circumstances in Medina’s case would have caused a reasonably competent attorney to

object to the competency of Marcos Toro, a juvenile who was the prosecution’s sole eyewitness. 

The sum of these circumstances makes it overwhelmingly apparent that Daly fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness in failing to do so. 

First of all, Marcos’s age alone should have prompted Daly to request a competency

hearing. Marcos was 12 years old at the time of trial. (Tr. 11/5/92 at 83.) For any witness under

the age of 14, there must be a “searching judicial inquiry as to mental competency.” Fultz, 462

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 25 of 46
16Marcos testified that when he first saw Bogan, Bogan was holding his heart, suggesting

that Bogan had already been stabbed:

Direct

26

A.2d at 1343. As the state Superior Court noted on Medina’s first direct appeal, the inquiry at

trial “failed to resolve this matter.” Medina I at 21. Because Marcos was under the age of 14 and

because the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry as to Marcos’s mental competency,

as required by Pennsylvania law, Daly should have objected to Marcos’s testimony or requested a

full competency hearing.

Second, Daly should have requested a competency hearing on the basis of Marcos’s

preliminary hearing testimony, which contained sufficient contradictions and inconsistencies that

it called into question Marcos’s competency. The most significant contradiction in Marcos’s

testimony was whether he actually witnessed Medina stab Bogan. At certain points in the

preliminary hearing, Marcos indicated that he was merely relating what his brother told him had

happened or what he guessed had happened. On direct examination during the preliminary

hearing, Marcos testified:

Q: What did you see Harry [Medina] do with the white dude

[Bogan]?

A: Stabbed him.

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 9.) But on cross-examination, Marcos testified:

Q: In fact, you didn’t see Harry stab the guy, did you?

A: My brother did.

Q: Your brother did. And you are only telling us what your brother

told you; is that right?

A: A-huh

(Id. at 23.) Marcos’s preliminary hearing testimony was also inconsistent as to whether he saw

Bogan before or after Bogan was stabbed;16 when Marcos first saw Medina in the presence of

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 26 of 46
Q: Tell the Judge what you saw when you looked out your

window?

A: The dude [Bogan] with his hand on his heart.

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 8.) Marcos then testified during cross-examination that he did not see anything

before he saw Bogan through the window. Given that Bogan died of single stab wound to the

heart, this was tantamount to Marcos testifying that he did not see the stabbing:

Cross

Q: Now, you said you looked out the window and you saw this

white gentleman [Bogan] holding his heart; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you see anything before that?

A: No.

(Id. at 20) (emphasis added). 

17On direct examination, Marcos testified that when he looked out his window, he saw

Medina with Bogan:

Direct

Q: Did you see Harry [Medina] when you were looking out your

window?

MR. SILVERSTEIN: Objection, leading nature.

THE COURT: Overruled

[By Prosecutor]

Q: You can answer?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And what was Harry doing?

A: Chasing him.

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 9) (emphasis added). However, on cross and redirect, Marcos testified that he

did NOT see Medina with Bogan when he looked out the window: 

Cross:

Q: Did you see Harry when this white fellow was running down the

street holding his heart?

A: No.

Q: You did not see Harry?

A: No.

(Id. at 21) (emphasis added).

Redirect

Q: When you looked out your window, did you see the white dude

at that time?

A: Yes.

Q: And did you see Harry at that time?

A: No.

27

Bogan;17 and whether Marcos’s brother, Hector, was with Marcos when he saw Bogan.18 The

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 27 of 46
Q: Okay. Did you see Harry after that?

A: No.

(Id. at 28) (emphasis added).

18Within the space of three questions, Marcos changed his answer to a straightforward

question:

Re-cross:

Q: Was your brother looking out the window with you?

A: No.

Q: When you saw Harry [Medina] stab the white gentleman

[Bogan]?

A: No.

Q: Was he?

A: Yes.

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 33.)

28

Pennsylvania Superior Court in Medina’s first direct appeal, Medina I, noted that Marcos’s

preliminary hearing testimony was contradictory. Medina I at 21 (“[Marcos’s] inclination to

please his questioner created a highly contradictory record, where he both saw and did not see the

stabbing. From the portions quoted in the trial transcript, [Marcos] had acted in a similar fashion

at the preliminary hearing.”). Daly himself characterized Marcos’s preliminary hearing

testimony as “flip-flopping.” (Tr. 11/22/95 at 18-19.) It is apparent from the face of the

preliminary hearing transcript that Marcos’s testimony was full of contradictions and

inconsistencies. These contradictions went directly to Marcos’s ability to perceive the events in

question, his ability to remember the events, and his ability to understand questions and

communicate answers intelligently, three of the four factors that Pennsylvania courts must

consider in assessing the competency of a juvenile witness. Mazzoccoli, 380 A.2d at 787. A

reasonably competent attorney would have requested a competency hearing after reading the

transcript of Marcos’s preliminary hearing testimony.

Daly had yet a third indication that Marcos’s competency was highly questionable. Like

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 28 of 46
19This section of Marcos’s trial testimony cannot be considered a competency hearing

because the trial court did not inquire as to all four requirements of witness competency. First of

all, the trial court did not test Marcos’s ability to perceive or remember events accurately or his

ability to understand questions and communicate answers intelligently. More importantly, the

state superior court in its first direct appeal decision found that this exchange failed to resolve the

issue of Marcos’s competency. Medina I at 21 (“Michael’s [Marcos’s] age necessitated an

inquiry into his competency as a witness. That inquiry, focused as it was on his consciousness of

the duty to speak the truth, failed to resolve the matter.”).

29

the 15-year-old witness in Mazzaccoli, 12-year-old Marcos Toro failed to demonstrate a

consciousness of the duty to speak the truth, one of the requirements of competency. At trial,

Marcos testified as follows: 

Q. [By the prosecution] Do you know what it means to tell the

truth?

A. [By Marcos Toro] Yes.

Q. What does it mean?

A. (No response.)

Q. Let me ask it the other way. Do you know what it means to

tell a lie?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the difference between telling the truth and

telling a lie?

A. No.

Q. You just told the jury and the judge when you put your hand on

the Bible you were going to tell the truth?

A. Truth.

Q. What does the truth mean?

THE COURT: First of all, let’s sit up straight and take our hand

down. What happens to you if you tell a lie?

(No response.)

THE COURT: What happens to you? Take your hand down and

look at me. Tell me what will happen to you if you tell a lie?

(No response.)

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 83-84) (emphasis added).19 This exchange blatantly called into question Marcos’s

consciousness of the duty to speak the truth. Having failed to make an objection to Marcos’s

competency before Marcos began to testify, Daly should have made such an objection upon

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 29 of 46
20Out of the thirty-three answers Marcos gave during his re-direct examination, thirty-one

of those answers consisted of only “yes” or “no.” (Tr. 11/5/92 at 127-34.)

21Perhaps one of the more obvious examples of Marcos’s inclination to please came

during the prosecutor’s redirect examination at trial when the prosecutor admonished Marcos for

answering her question without even listening to it:

Q. [BY PROSECUTION] And after, you talked about the white

dude being stabbed in the heart, and falling on the Street, by Hope

Street. Did you tell the police that night?

A. Yes.

Q. Wait. You didn’t even hear my question. . . .

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 128) (emphasis added). 

22For example, during direct examination, Marcos testified that he did not see anyone

approach Bogan after Bogan collapsed on the street:

Q. [BY PROSECUTION] After you saw him, meaning the white

man [Bogan], fall down on Gurney Street, did you see anybody do

anything?

A. No.

Q. What happened after the white man fell down on Gurney Street?

A. (Pause.)

Q. Did you see anyone at all go over to the white man after he fell

down?

A. No.

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 98-99) (emphasis added). However, Marcos contradicted himself when he

testified, also during direct examination, that he saw Medina go over to Bogan after Bogan

collapsed on the street:

30

hearing this exchange at trial.

Furthermore, like his testimony at the preliminary hearing, Marcos’s trial testimony as to

what he saw was so contradictory that it called into question his ability to perceive the events,

remember the events, and to understand questions and communicate intelligent answers about

those events. Like the witness in Mazzaccoli, most of Marcos’s answers were “yes” or “no”

responses to leading questions,20 his answers could be manipulated by the question and usually

matched the answer desired by his questioner,21 and his answers were inconsistent and

contradictory.22 See generally supra section I (containing excerpts of Marcos’s direct, cross,

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 30 of 46
Q. After you saw the white dude fall down on Gurney Street, did

you see Harry [Medina] again at all?

A. No.

Q. Did you see anyone go over towards where the white dude fell

and go through his pockets?

MR. DALY: Objection. Leading nature of the question.

THE COURT: I sustain the objection.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MS. SWEENEY:

Q. What did you see anyone do in terms of after the white man fell

on the ground?

A. They were digging in his pockets.

Q. Who was?

A. Harry.

(Id. at 105-06) (emphasis added).

31

redirect, re-cross and final redirect examinations). The most significant contradiction in

Marcos’s testimony involved whether or not he actually saw Medina stab Bogan. Marcos first

indicated, indirectly, that he saw Medina stab Bogan:

BY MS. SWEENEY [prosecution]:

Q. Marcos, after you went home to your house, what did you see

happen which is why you came to court today?

A. (Pause.) Because he stabbed somebody.

Q. Who stabbed somebody?

A. Harry [Medina].

(Tr. 11/5/92 at 97.) However, on cross, Marcos indicated that he did not see Medina stab Bogan:

Q. When the defense attorney [at the preliminary hearing] asked

you that question, remember we went over here, when he asked

you, “You only assumed that because you saw the knife in the

restaurant is that right?”

A. Yes.

Q. And when he asked you the question, “Everything you said

about Harry stabbing the white dude is either something that your

brother told you or you made up because you figured he did it

because he had a knife. Right?”

A. Yes.

Q. When he asked you that question, you were telling the truth. 

Weren’t you?

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 31 of 46
23Respondents argue that the contradictions in Marcos’s preliminary hearing testimony

were not caused by Marcos’s incompetency but by Marcos’s fear of Medina’s family members,

who were sitting in the audience at the preliminary hearing. (Resp. to Pet’r’s Post-Argument

Letter at 2.) Respondents then speculate that “it is not beyond the realm of possibility” that

Medina’s family engaged in witness intimidation in the time between Marcos’s preliminary

hearing testimony and his trial testimony. (Resp. to Pet’r’s Post-Argument Letter at 10.) There

are no evidentiary findings or affidavits on the record, either inside or outside of the courtroom,

to support this speculation. Contrary to respondents’ intimations in their briefs (Resp’ts’ Obj. to

R&R at 5-6; Resp. to Pet’r’s Post-Argument Letter at 10 n.3), which cite to an entirely unrelated

article in the New York Times on witness intimidation by Boston street gangs, there is no

evidence that Medina’s family members intimidated or even approached Marcos in the time

between the preliminary hearing and the trial. Regardless of the cause for the contradictory

nature of Marcos’s testimony, the combined circumstances of his age, the fact that his testimony

at both the preliminary hearing and trial contradicted itself, and his ambiguous understanding of

the difference between the truth and a lie all would have caused a reasonably competent attorney

to object to Marcos’s competency. 

32

A. Yes.

(Id. at 125.) The Superior Court in Medina I described Marcos’s testimony thus:

During his testimony, he consistently answered questions as he

believed his examiner desired. His inclination to please his

questioner created a highly contradictory record, where he both

saw and did not see the stabbing. 

Medina I at 21. This trial testimony, on top of Marcos’s age, his contradictory preliminary

hearing testimony, and his ambiguous knowledge of the difference between a truth and a lie,

should have prompted any reasonably competent attorney to object to Marcos’s competency as a

witness.23

Daly testified at the evidentiary hearing after the Medina I remand that his strategy with

regards to Marcos was to discredit Marcos through cross-examination rather than making a

competency objection. (Tr. 11/22/95 at 18-19.) Daly’s strategy was objectively unreasonable

because it represented a false choice. This was not a case where two potential strategies were

mutually exclusive. Daly could have first attempted to eliminate Marcos’s testimony altogether

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 32 of 46
24Respondents speculate that Daly might have chosen not to object to Marcos’s

competency because a finding of competency by the trial court in front of the jury would have

bolstered Marcos’s credibility to the jury. (Suppl. Resp. to Pet. at 6.) There were enough factors

before trial, however, such as Marcos’s age and his contradictory preliminary hearing testimony,

to prompt a reasonably competent attorney to request a pre-trial competency hearing. Such a pretrial hearing would not have been before a jury and could not have prejudiced Daly’s crossexamination at trial. If Daly had objected to Marcos’s competency during Marcos’s trial

testimony, Daly could have requested that the trial court hold a hearing on his objection outside

of the presence of the jury. If the trial court refused and if the trial court overruled the

competency objection, Daly could have requested that the trial court instruct the jury as to the

difference between competency and credibility. See, generally, Commonwealth v. Washington,

722 A.2d 643, 646 (Pa. 1998) (noting that some jurisdictions require such instructions if

competency examinations are held within the presence of the jury). All of these options would

have had a reasonable probability of success. In Washington, decided after Medina’s trial, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the rule concretely that all hearings on the competency of

juvenile witnesses must be held outside of the presence of the jury. 722 A.2d at 647. 

33

by objecting to Marcos’s competency. As set forth above, such an objection had, at the very

least, arguable merit. If the competency objection failed, Daly could have then pursued his

chosen strategy of discrediting Marcos’s testimony through cross-examination. Any crossexamination would not have been prejudiced by a prior competency objection.24 There is no

reasonable basis under these circumstances for deliberately eschewing one weapon, out of two

available, when both can be used. 

Daly’s strategy was also objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms as

established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mangini, 425 A.2d 734. As mentioned

earlier, the Mangini court held that trial counsel was ineffective for attempting to discredit a “key

prosecution” witness on cross-examination rather than challenging the witness’s competency

when such a challenge would have been of arguable merit under prior competency cases of the

court. Id. at 737. Also, the state Superior Court later applied Mangini to a case in which defense

counsel failed to challenge the competency of a child witness. Fultz, 462 A.2d 1340. After

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34

quoting extensively from Mangini, the Fultz court found that defense counsel had no reasonable

basis for failing to request a competency hearing or for failing to place on the record an objection

to the minor’s competency. Fultz, 462 A.2d at 1345-46. Mangini can be directly applied to

Medina’s case. As in Mangini, Marcos was a key prosecution witness. As in Mangini, a

competency challenge as to Marcos would have been of arguable merit. As in Mangini, Daly

could have requested a competency hearing or raised an objection to Marcos’s testimony without

prejudicing his ability to discredit Marcos through cross-examination. Given that Daly’s strategy

represented a false choice and given that Daly’s decision was deficient under the professional

standards set by the state Supreme Court in Mangini, Daly’s performance plainly fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. 

In summary, the first prong of Strickland requires that Daly’s performance be measured

under an “objective standard of reasonableness.” 466 U.S. at 688. That reasonableness is

determined under “prevailing professional norms” and “in light of all the circumstances.” Id. at

688-690. Determining whether counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable necessitates

viewing counsel’s actions in light of applicable state law since reasonably competent counsel is

patently required to know the state of the applicable law. Everett, 290 F.3d at 509. In light of the

applicable state law on the competency of juvenile witnesses, Marcos’s age, his equivocal

answers as to whether he knew the difference between a truth and a lie, and his contradictory

testimony during both the preliminary hearing and at trial all would have prompted reasonably

competent counsel to object to Marcos’s competency as a witness. Daly’s decision to discredit

Marcos through cross examination rather than to try to disqualify his testimony altogether

through a competency challenge, when he could have pursued both options, was objectively

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 34 of 46
25Pennsylvania’s IAC analysis consists of a three-pronged test: (1) whether the underlying

claim is of arguable merit; (2) whether “an objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate the

[defendant’s] interest existed for counsel’s actions or inactions;” and (3) whether defendant was

prejudiced by the alleged error by counsel. Medina I at 23-24. Although the Medina II court

articulated its finding in terms of the second prong of Pennsylvania’s IAC test, the Third Circuit

has noted that Pennsylvania’s IAC test and the Strickland standard are the same. Rompilla v.

Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2004); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000). In

particular, the second prong of the Pennsylvania test, whether an objectively reasonable basis

designed to effectuate the defendant’s interest existed for counsel’s actions or inactions, is

“substantially indistinguishable” from the first prong of Strickland. Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 248.

35

unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms as set by state Supreme Court law. In

light of all these circumstances, Daly’s failure to object to Marcos’s competency fell below

Strickland’s objective standard of reasonableness. 

The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Medina II concluded that Daly’s performance was

not deficient and, therefore, denied Medina’s IAC claim.25 In concluding that Daly’s strategy had

a reasonable basis, Medina II focused solely on Daly’s own testimony and his rationale. Medina

II at 2-3. The Medina II court considered Daly’s belief that Marcos was competent and Daly’s

strategy of cross examination. Id. at 2. The Medina II court noted that “As the transcript from

the evidentiary hearing established, counsel fully explained his strategy in going forward with

cross-examination of the witness, rather than challenging his competency.” Id. at 2. Medina II

concluded that Daly’s decision, “while arguably the wrong one in hindsight, was not lacking in a

reasonable basis designed to further appellant’s interest.” Id. at 3. 

By focusing solely on Daly’s testimony explaining his action, Medina II’s application of

Strickland was objectively unreasonable. Medina II failed to take into consideration prevailing

professional norms, as embodied in Mangini and Fultz, in assessing the reasonableness of Daly’s

strategy; the court failed to consider if Daly’s strategy was based on a reasonable investigation or

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36

knowledge of the applicable law governing the competency of juvenile witnesses; and the court

failed to assess Daly’s actions in light of all the circumstances, including Marcos’s age, his

contradictory preliminary hearing and trial testimony, and his ambiguous understanding of the

difference between the truth and a lie. All of these are necessary considerations in assessing

whether Daly’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under the first

prong of Strickland. Given how egregious Daly’s failure to object was in light of all the

circumstances of Medina’s case, Medina II’s conclusion that Daly’s performance was not

deficient was not merely an incorrect application of Strickland, it was an objectively

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

2. Prejudice 

Because the state courts never reached the prejudice prong of Strickland, my review of

this prong is de novo. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534. To establish prejudice under Strickland, there

must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694) (internal quotations omitted). A “reasonable probability” is less demanding than a

“preponderance of the evidence” standard. See Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 105 (“[Petitioner] need not

show that counsel’s deficient performance more likely than not altered the outcome in the case –

rather, he must show only a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. This

standard is not a stringent one.”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94; Jermyn v. Horn, 266

F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001); Baker v. Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 154 (3d Cir. 1999)). 

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 36 of 46
37

There is a reasonable probability that had Daly objected to Marcos’s competency, Marcos

would have been found incompetent to testify and, without the testimony of the sole eyewitness,

the jury would not have convicted Medina. For the reasons stated in section IV.A.1., supra, there

is at least a reasonable probability that Marcos would have been found incompetent. Marcos’s

answers regarding his consciousness of the duty to speak the truth were equivocal. (Tr. 11/5/92

at 83-84.) Marcos’s contradictory testimony both at the preliminary hearing and at trial called

into question his ability to perceive the events, remember them accurately, and understand

questions and communicate intelligent answers. See supra section IV.A.1. Because Marcos was

under the age of 14, the trial court was obligated to conduct a searching inquiry into his mental

capacity. Fultz, 462 A.2d at 1343. There is a reasonable probability that had Daly actually

objected to Marcos’s competency and requested a competency hearing, the trial court would have

found Marcos incompetent. For the trial court to do otherwise could well have been an abuse of

discretion, as in Mazzaccoli.

Respondents argue that in order to show prejudice, Medina must “demonstrate that, had

counsel raised this objection, the trial court would have sustained the objection.” (Resp’ts’ Obj.

to R&R at 8.) Respondents go on to argue that Judge Stout’s post-trial ruling that the evidence

was sufficient to sustain the verdict indicated that she believed Marcos was competent to testify.

(Resp’ts’ Obj. to R&R at 8-9.) Therefore, she would not have sustained an objection to his

competency. (Id.) Respondents’ argument is flawed for at least two reasons. First, in order to

show prejudice under Strickland, a petitioner only has to show a “reasonable probability,” a

standard that is less than a preponderance of the evidence, that the outcome would have been

different. As the Third Circuit has stated, “This standard is not a stringent one.” Jacobs, 395

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 37 of 46
26In post-oral argument briefs, respondents argue that the preliminary hearing court made

a finding as to Marcos’s competency in the following exchange which took place at the end of

Marcos’s re-direct at the preliminary hearing: 

Q. [BY PROSECUTION] Now, is what you are telling the Judge

the truth?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know the difference between the truth and a lie?

THE COURT. I am satisfied he is precocious. He is a very bright

young boy.

(Tr. 11/26/91 at 31; Resp. to Pet’r’s Post-Argument Letter at 4.) Respondents’ try to stretch this

exchange into something it is not. The preliminary hearing court does not state that it finds

Marcos Toro to be competent, nor was there an objection on which the court was ruling. This

brief exchange certainly does not constitute a “searching judicial inquiry as to mental capacity”

as required by Pennsylvania law on juvenile witnesses. Fultz, 462 A.2d at 1343. There are also

no indications of any findings as to Marcos Toro’s ability to perceive and remember events or his

ability to understand questions and answer intelligently. For these reasons, this brief exchange in

the preliminary hearing cannot be considered a finding of competency by the court.

38

F.3d at 105. Medina does not need to show that the trial court definitively would have sustained

a competency objection. Medina need only show by a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome that a competency objection would have been sustained. Given the

indications in Marcos’s testimony that he was not competent to testify, there is, at the very least,

a reasonable probability that a competency objection was meritorious.

Second, respondents’ assumption about how the trial court would have ruled is flawed

because Daly never actually raised an objection to Marcos’s competency and the trial court was

never called upon to pass judgment on Marcos’s competency one way or another.26 A ruling on

the sufficiency of the evidence takes into consideration all evidence actually presented to the

jury, whether or not it was correctly presented. Commonwealth v. Baker, 353 A.2d 454, 456 (Pa.

1976) (“. . . in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence all evidence actually received at trial is

considered whether the rulings thereon were right or wrong”). Under Pennsylvania case law, in

making her post-trial ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, Judge Stout was not to consider

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 38 of 46
39

the competency of the evidence. Rather, she was to view “all the evidence admitted at trial . . . in

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 485 A.2d 1102,

1103 (Pa. 1984). Additionally, “in viewing the evidence, [the reviewing court] remain[s]

mindful that credibility determinations were a matter solely for the fact finder. . . .” 

Commonwealth v. Murray, 597 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). Thus, one cannot infer

from Judge Stout’s post-trial ruling any opinion that she might have had about Marcos’s

competency to testify, or even his credibility. In applying the prejudice prong of Strickland,

instead of speculating about what Judge Stout might have believed about Marcos Toro, one must

instead examine the circumstances of Marcos’s testimony through the applicable law on the

competency of child witnesses at the time of Medina’s trial. As stated above, there is a

reasonable probability that a challenge to Marcos’s competency would have been meritorious. 

Thus, I must now examine whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial

would have been different if Marcos had been disqualified from testifying.

Without Marcos’s testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not

have convicted Medina. Marcos was the only witness at trial who testified to seeing the actual

stabbing. Medina I at 22. A review of the other evidence offered at trial shows that Marcos’s

testimony was the key to the prosecution’s case. Hector Toro testified that he saw Medina with

the knife in a neighborhood store, threatening to kill someone. (Tr. 11/5/92 at 43-46.) Hector

did not see the stabbing. (Id. at 47-48.) Maria Caraballo testified that she saw Bogan run past

her while holding his chest, but when she followed him she could not find him. (Tr. 11/6/92 at

150-51.) When she returned to her house, she saw Medina in front of her house, looking under a

car. (Id. at 152-53.) Caraballo also did not see the stabbing. (Id. at 156.) The knife used to stab

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 39 of 46
40

Bogan was never found. Medina I at 19. While the forensic pathologist testified that the stab

wound could have been caused by the type of “Rambo” knife that Hector said Medina possessed,

the stab wound also could have been caused by a butcher knife or any knife with a single edge

and a blade six inches in length. (Tr. 11/6/92 at 214.) Finally, Medina’s white sweatshirt had no

blood on it when he was stopped on the street shortly after the stabbing or when he was later

arrested at a nearby bar. (Id. at 180-81.)

It is clear from this review of the evidence presented at trial that Marcos’s testimony was

significant. Indeed, when remanding Medina’s case for an evidentiary hearing, the state Superior

Court found that Marcos’s testimony was key to the prosecution’s case: “With Michael [Marcos]

as the only eyewitness to the stabbing, and the prejudice from his testimony being self-evident,

the issue is significant.” Medina I at 22. Absent Marcos’s testimony, there is a reasonable

probability that the jury would have a reasonable doubt regarding Medina’s guilt. Thus, Medina

has satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland. 

Medina has shown both (1) that his trial counsel, Ed Daly, was objectively unreasonable

in failing to object to the competency of Marcos Toro and (2) that there was a reasonable

probability that, had Daly objected, Marcos would have been disqualified from testifying and the

jury would not have been able to find Medina guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Medina has

satisfied both the deficient performance and the prejudice prong of Strickland. The state court’s

conclusion that trial counsel was effective was an objectively unreasonable application of federal

law. Therefore, habeas relief is merited on the basis of this claim.

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27 To serve as an independent and adequate state rule barring federal review, a state rule

must be “firmly established and regularly followed.” Lee v. Kemma, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002). 

The Third Circuit has previously explained that a state procedural rule is “adequate” only if the

rule is “consistently or regularly applied.” Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 278 (3d. Cir. 2001). In

Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

“recognized that it has not been entirely clear in the past as to what is required of a PCRA

petitioner seeking to plead and prove a layered claim of ineffectiveness, and, accordingly,

indicated a general preference to remand to the PCRA court for further development . . . .” 

Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 812 (Pa. 2004) (discussing McGill). Given that

D’Amato and McGill advocate remanding a PCRA petition to the trial court to give petitioner a

chance to cure a failure to correctly layer an ineffectiveness claim, it is questionable just how

“firmly established and regularly followed” or “consistently or regularly applied” Pennsylvania’s

layering requirement was. See Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 278-79 (finding no procedural default where

state waiver rule was not consistently applied in death penalty cases). In Commonwealth v.

Grant, 813 A.2d 726, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned its requirement that

ineffectiveness claims must be raised at the earliest opportunity and adopted a new rule that

defendants should wait until collateral review to raise all ineffectiveness claims. Thus, after

Grant, there is no longer a need to layer ineffectiveness claims. The new rule does not apply to

this case because Medina’s direct appeal was concluded prior to the court’s announcement in

41

B. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel for Failing to Raise Improper Prosecutorial

Remarks

In the sixth claim of his habeas petition, Medina claims that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to preserve the issue of improper prosecutorial remarks made during

closing arguments. Judge Hart concluded that this claim was procedurally defaulted because

Medina III, in denying Medina’s PCRA appeal, found Medina had waived this claim by failing to

properly layer his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel against both of his appellate

lawyers. (R&R at 5.) Medina objects to Judge Hart’s conclusion. Medina argues that

Pennsylvania’s requirement that a petitioner layer his ineffective assistance of counsel claim does

not amount to an independent and adequate state rule barring federal review of Medina’s claim. 

(Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R at 9.) It is indeed questionable whether Pennsylvania’s layering

requirement constitutes an independent and adequate state rule barring federal review.27

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 41 of 46
Grant. See D’Amato, 856 A.2d at 812. 

28I must analyze this claim of improper prosecutorial remarks claim under the state

standard because the prosecutorial vouching that Medina alleges is not a violation of the federal

constitution. As stated by the Third Circuit, “This Court en banc has held that vouching that is

aimed at the witness’s credibility and is based on extra-record evidence is deemed nonconstitutional error.” United States v. Dispoz-O-Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 1999)

(citing United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995)). 

42

However, I deny Medina’s sixth claim without reaching a conclusion as to whether it is

procedurally defaulted because the underlying claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

for failing to raise a claim of improper prosecutorial remarks is without merit.

Medina argues that the following statements contained in the Commonwealth’s closing

arguments were improper:

. . . [U]se your common sense. At 9:30 at night, on a Friday night

on a nice evening . . . the only one with the guts to come forward

was a 12 year old boy. (Tr. 11/9/92 at 273) (emphasis added).

. . .

Nobody else wanted to come forward. Nobody else wanted to

say what they saw. (Id. at 274) (emphasis added).

. . . 

The defense tries to make you say a guilty person would have left

[the scene]. I say not necessarily, not in the kind of tight

neighborhood where people don’t come forward, where

nobody wants to say what they saw. (Id. at 279) (emphasis

added).

(Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R at 5.) Medina argues that these comments constituted improper

prosecutorial vouching and referred to evidence not in the record and that appellate counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise this claim on direct appeal. (Id. at 4, 10.)

On Medina’s direct appeal, a claim of improper prosecutorial remarks would have been

analyzed under Pennsylvania state law,28 which holds: 

[C]omments by a prosecutor do not constitute reversible error

Case 2:04-cv-00128-AB Document 43 Filed 06/02/05 Page 42 of 46
43

unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to

prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility

toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence

objectively and render a true verdict. . . . Prosecutorial misconduct

will not be found where comments were based on the evidence or

proper inferences therefrom or were only oratorical flair.

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d 492, 503 (Pa. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. D’Ambro,

456 A.2d 140, 144 (Pa. 1983); Commonwealth v. Marshall, 633 A.2d 1100, 1110 (Pa. 1993)). 

As Medina’s PCRA counsel acknowledged, the Pennsylvania standard for the granting of

a new trial due to prosecutorial misconduct is an extremely strict standard. (Pet’r’s Obj. to R&R

Ex. A at 10.) In this case, it is a standard that Medina cannot meet. Although Medina argues that

the prejudicial effects of the prosecutor’s comments “is undeniable given the scant evidence

against Mr. Medina other than Marcos Toro’s testimony and the contradictory nature of that

testimony itself” (id. at 6), Medina fails to show that those comments were more than simply

oratorical flair. These comments certainly are not egregious enough to lead to the “unavoidable

effect” of the jury forming “fixed bias and hostility” toward Medina. Medina is unable to show a

reasonable probability that the Pennsylvania Superior Court would have granted his claim of

improper prosecutorial remarks and remanded for a new trial.

Because Medina cannot show a reasonable probability that the state Superior Court would

have granted his claim of improper prosecutorial remarks, Medina’s claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel must fail. As stated above, to establish prejudice under

Strickland, there must be “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) (internal quotations omitted). The Third Circuit stated in United

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44

States v. Barnes, 324 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 2003), “an attorney’s performance cannot have

prejudiced a defendant if his alleged ineffectiveness was the failure to advance an unmeritorious

claim that could not have been successful had it been advanced.” As stated above, Medina fails

to show a reasonable probability that the state court would have found his claim of improper

prosecutorial remarks to be meritorious. Therefore, Medina fails to meet the prejudice prong of

Strickland and his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is denied.

C. Medina’s Remaining Claims

Two of Medina’s claims remain to be addressed. Medina’s fourth claim alleges

ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in relation to trial counsel’s failure to

introduce medical records establishing that he was incapable of committing the offense. Judge

Hart noted that the PCRA court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court concluded that counsel was

not ineffective because the medical records at issue were not relevant to the time when the victim

was stabbed:

Medina’s records show that on May 12, 1991, he sustained a

gunshot wound to the head that caused initial sensory and motor

deficits. The records also show that two weeks after the injury,

Medina required a walker for ambulation and was receiving

occupational and physical therapy to address his physical

symptoms. . . . We find Medina’s claim unavailing because he

makes no attempt to argue that the condition reflected in his

medical records as of May 1991 persisted five months later when

he stabbed the victim. The trial court properly recognized that

without such an offer of proof the relevance of the records is

questionable and does not establish that his claim of ineffective

assistance possesses arguable merit.

Medina III at 9-10; (R&R at 22). The R&R noted that because the records at issue do not

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45

comment on Medina’s condition at the time of the stabbing, Medina cannot establish that

introduction of the documents would have affected the outcome of trial. (R&R at 22.) 

Therefore, Judge Hart concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. 

(Id.) Neither party has objected to Judge Hart’s finding that Medina’s fourth claim is without

merit. Therefore, I adopt without comment the finding of the R&R as to this claim.

Medina’s fifth claim alleges that the trial court rendered his counsel ineffective by

admonishing trial counsel in front of the jury and that appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise this issue. Judge Hart found this claim to be procedurally defaulted. On Medina’s

PCRA appeal, the state Superior Court did not consider this claim on its merits. (R&R at 4-5.) 

Rather, the court found that Medina waived this claim by failing to properly layer his claim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to include specific allegations of ineffectiveness on the

part of both of his previous appellate attorneys. (Id.) Neither party has objected to Judge Hart’s

finding that Medina’s fifth claim is procedurally defaulted. Therefore, I adopt without comment

the finding of the R&R as to this claim.

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the state court’s denial of Medina’s claim of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the competency of Marcos Toro was an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Therefore, Medina’s petition is

granted on the basis of this claim.

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46

ORDER

AND NOW, this __2nd___ day of June 2005, it is ORDERED that the petition for writ

of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

It is FURTHER ORDERED that the execution of the writ is STAYED for 180 days to

permit the Commonwealth to retry the petitioner.

 S/Anita B. Brody

 _________________

 ANITA B. BRODY, J.

Copies via ECF on to: Copies MAILED on to:

O:\ABB\Medina-opinion.wpd

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