UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-7004

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL DEAN WOODS,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,

Chief District Judge. (5:12-hc-02091-D)

Submitted: February 26, 2014 Decided: March 26, 2014

Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, Research and 

Writing Specialist, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. 

Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Rudolf A. Renfer, Jr., 

Matthew L. Fesak, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Michael Dean Woods appeals the district court’s order 

committing him as a sexually dangerous person under the Adam 

Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the “Act”), 18 

U.S.C. § 4248 (2012). We affirm.

Pursuant to the Act, “[i]f, after [a] hearing, the 

[district] court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

person is a sexually dangerous person, the court shall commit 

the person to the custody of the Attorney General.” Id.

§ 4248(d). A “sexually dangerous person” is one “who has 

engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or 

child molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others.” 18 

U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2012). An individual is considered 

“sexually dangerous to others” if “the person suffers from a 

serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of 

which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from 

sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” 18 

U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2012).

On appeal, we review a district court’s factual 

findings under § 4248 for clear error and its legal conclusions 

de novo. United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th Cir. 

2012). Accordingly, “[i]f the district court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 

entirety, [we] may not reverse it . . . .” Id. (internal 
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quotation marks omitted). However, “we may set aside a district 

court’s factual findings if the court failed to properly take 

into account substantial evidence to the contrary or its factual 

findings are against the clear weight of the evidence considered 

as a whole.” United States v. Springer, 715 F.3d 535, 545 (4th 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 

Here, Woods argues that the district court clearly 

erred in crediting the testimony of Dr. Amy Phenix, a 

psychologist who diagnosed Woods as suffering from Pedophilia 

and Antisocial Personality Disorder and determined that, as a 

result, Woods would have serious difficulty refraining from 

sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. 

Woods notes that Dr. Phenix did not meet with him personally

before coming to these conclusions and suggests that she may 

have violated her ethical obligations by failing to explain in 

her written report to the court what limits, if any, the lack of 

an in-person interview placed on her evaluation. Woods claims

that the district court clearly erred in ignoring such

circumstances when crediting Dr. Phenix’s conclusions over those 

of Dr. Richard Wollert and Dr. Joseph Plaud, who both personally 

spoke with Woods before finding that he does not suffer from 

Pedophilia and poses no serious risk of committing an act of 

sexual violence or child molestation. For the reasons that 

follow, we disagree.
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First, we find no support for Woods’ suggestion that 

Dr. Phenix’s failure to interview him rendered her evaluation

unethical or inherently less reliable.* The ethical standards of 

the American Psychological Association (“APA”) that Woods’

identifies do not suggest as much, nor did the testimony during 

Woods’ § 4248 hearing. Dr. Phenix explained that, although she 

would have liked to have spoken with Woods personally, the 

substantial record evidence adequately supported her diagnosis 

and conclusions. Two other psychologists who evaluated Woods 

agreed. In fact, Dr. Plaud explained that, although his 

questioning of Woods was generally helpful, he relied primarily 

on the record evidence to inform his evaluation. 

Moreover, Woods has not identified pertinent 

information that Dr. Phenix may have neglected by not speaking 

with him personally. To the contrary, Dr. Phenix explained that 

her conclusions were not altered by her review of Dr. Wollert’s 

report, which transcribed the germane portions of his interview 

with Woods. Accordingly, we cannot say that Dr. Phenix’s 

inability to interview Woods amounted to substantial evidence 

contradicting the reliability of her evaluation.

 * We note that Woods declined Dr. Phenix’s request for an 

interview.
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Our conclusion is not altered by Woods’ suggestion 

that Dr. Phenix may have transgressed the letter of APA ethical 

rules by neglecting to explain in her written report to the 

court what limits, if any, her inability to question Woods 

placed on the quality of her evaluation. Without more, Dr. 

Phenix’s admittedly inadvertent mistake when drafting her report 

does not, as Woods would have it, necessarily imply 

unreliability in her final diagnosis or assessment of Woods’

risk of future sexual dangerousness. Dr. Phenix rectified her 

omission during Woods’ § 4248 hearing, and, absent evidence to 

the contrary, the district court was entitled to credit Dr. 

Phenix’s assertion that she could effectively evaluate Woods 

based on the information available to her. See United States v. 

Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that we are

“especially reluctant” to second guess district courts’ 

evaluation of expert credibility and assessment of conflicting 

expert opinions).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

AFFIRMED