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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

____________________________________

:

JAMES MARIO PRIDGEN, : 

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. : NO. 00-4561

:

SHANNON :

and :

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE :

COUNTY OF LANCASTER :

and :

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE :

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA : 

Respondents. :

____________________________________:

DuBois, J. March 21, 2013

M E M O R A N D U M

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, James Mario Pridgen, is currently serving a life sentence in Pennsylvania for 

his state conviction on a first-degree murder charge. Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s 

60(b) Motion Alleging that the Federal Courts Misapplied the Federal Statute of Limitations Set 

Out in § 2244(d). Petitioner argues that his original Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant 

to § 2254 was entitled to equitable tolling and that it was therefore properly filed within the 

applicable statute of limitations. The Court denies the Motion for the reasons set forth below.

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case have been previously set forth in the opinions of this Court. See 

e.g., Pridgen v. Shannon, 2002 WL 31122131 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2002). Accordingly, the Court 

recounts only those facts necessary to resolve the issues presently before the Court.
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Following his conviction and sentencing for first-degree murder, petitioner filed his first 

application for post-conviction relief under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541, et seq. on May 23, 1996. That PCRA petition was denied by 

the Court of Common Pleas, the denial was affirmed by the Superior Court, and on January 12, 

1999 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the petition for allowance of appeal. 

While the PCRA appeal was pending in state court, on September 12, 1997, petitioner 

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. By Order 

dated December 10, 1997, this Court approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of 

United States Magistrate Judge Charles Smith and dismissed the Petition without prejudice, on 

the ground that petitioner had failed to exhaust his state court remedies. 

Petitioner then filed a second PCRA petition on February 22, 1999, which was dismissed

by the state trial court as being barred by the applicable one-year state statute of limitations. 

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Superior Court, which affirmed the dismissal of the 

petition as untimely, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on June 

20, 2000. 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this 

Court on July 24, 2000. That Petition was later withdrawn at petitioner’s request. He filed a 

new Petition on September 8, 2000, which was considered by the Court. By Report and 

Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Charles Smith recommended that the § 2254 Petition be 

dismissed as untimely. That recommendation was based on section § 2244(d) of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 which provides a one-year 

statute of limitations period following direct review in the state courts within which a state 

prisoner may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244. § 2244(d)(2) provides 
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that “the time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted 

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added). 

Magistrate Judge Smith concluded that because the second PCRA petition was dismissed 

as untimely by the state courts, it was not “properly filed,” and thus could not act to toll the oneyear time limit applicable under AEDPA. Petitioner thus had approximately eleven months from 

the final disposition of his first and only properly filed PCRA petition to file a petition for federal 

habeas relief, that is until December 13, 1999. Petitioner failed to do so; he did not file a petition

for habeas relief until July 24, 2000, over seven months after the deadline passed, rendering the 

habeas Petition untimely. See Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding the July 

24, 2000 submission date as untimely). By Order dated December 13, 2000, this Court 

approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Smith, and denied 

and dismissed the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as time-barred under AEDPA.

In the instant 60(b) motion, petitioner seeks relief from that twelve-year old order of the 

Court. Petitioner alleges that the statute of limitations under AEDPA should have been equitably 

tolled during the pendency of his second PCRA petition. He states that Third Circuit precedent 

led him to believe that he was required to exhaust state remedies, and that as a consequence, the 

statute of limitations would be tolled during his proceedings in state court. Petitioner thus claims 

that the one (1) year limitations period should have been equitably tolled and that his habeas 

Petition was timely filed.
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III. DISCUSSION

The Court rejects petitioner’s arguments on two grounds: (1) the instant motion was not 

filed within a “reasonable time” as required under Rule 60(b), and (2) petitioner has not shown 

extraordinary circumstances required for relief from the Court’s Order of December 13, 2000. 

A. Reasonable Time

Petitioner does not specify precisely the provision of Rule 60(b) under which he seeks 

relief. As none of the specific grounds of relief in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) are relevant to petitioner’s 

Motion, the Court construes the Motion as seeking relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the catch-all 

provision which allows a court to consider “any other reason that justifies relief.” Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) states that any “motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a 

reasonable time . . . . ”

“What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the circumstances of each case . . . 

[Further,] relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is extraordinary because it can be given for ‘any other 

reason justifying relief’ and is not subject to an explicit time limit. Therefore, a claimant must 

establish exceptional circumstances justifying the delay for filing under Rule 60(b)(6).” In re 

Diet Drugs Prod. Liab. Litig., 383 F. App’x 242, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2010). 

Petitioner seeks relief from Court’s Order dated December 13, 2000, now over twelve 

years old. In his Motion, petitioner provides no circumstances justifying the delay.1 Having 

failed to allege any circumstances justifying the twelve-year delay in seeking relief, the Court 

denies petitioner’s Rule 60(b) Motion as untimely filed. See also Zahl v. Harper, 403 F. App’x 

729, 733-34 (3rd Cir. 2010) (holding that “eight years is without a doubt not a reasonable time to 

 1 The Court notes that petitioner has made previous 60(b) motions, though none contained the instant arguments.
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wait before seeking to reopen a judgment, including under the catch-all subparagraph (6) [of 

Rule 60(b)]”).

B. Extraordinary Circumstances

The Court further concludes that even if petitioner’s Motion is timely filed, it is meritless. 

Generally, equitable tolling is proper only where petitioner shows “(1) that he has been pursuing 

his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and 

prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010). Further, “a movant 

seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6) [is required to] show extraordinary circumstances justifying 

the reopening of a final judgment . . . Such circumstances will rarely occur in the habeas 

context.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005).

Petitioner’s primary argument is that the Third Circuit decision Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 

F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1998), instructed him to exhaust his state remedies, and informed him that his 

AEDPA filing period would be tolled during the pendency of his state proceedings. He argues 

that Lovasz functioned as the “extraordinary circumstance” that prevented him from timely filing 

his federal habeas claim, such that he was entitled to equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of 

limitations. (Mot. at 5.)

The Court rejects petitioner’s argument. The Lovasz opinion states explicitly that the 

AEDPA filing period may only be tolled where a petitioner “properly filed [an] application” for 

state post-conviction relief, meaning “one submitted according to the state’s procedural 

requirements, such as the rules governing the time and place of filing.” Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 

F.3d 146, 148 (3d Cir. 1998). The Lovasz court noted that “[a] Pennsylvania PCRA petitioner, 

for example, must file a motion with the clerk of the court in which he was convicted and 

sentenced . . . generally within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” Id. at 149. 
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At no point was petitioner ever prevented, by Lovasz or otherwise, from timely asserting 

his federal rights. Far from requiring petitioner to fully exhaust untimely state remedies, Lovasz

held that the failure to follow state procedural requirements would bar tolling of the AEDPA 

statute of limitations. Petitioner’s second PCRA petition was not “properly filed” and thus it did 

not toll the AEDPA statute of limitations. Further, any “misunderstanding of the exhaustion 

requirement is insufficient to excuse [petitioner’s] failure to comply with the statute of 

limitations.” Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, petitioner has 

failed to show any extraordinary circumstance required to warrant applying equitable tolling.2

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Court denies petitioner’s 60(b) Motion.3 An appropriate 

order follows.

 2 The Court notes that in ruling on an earlier 60(b) motion asserting that the second PCRA petition was properly

filed, the Third Circuit held that “[n]o extraordinary circumstances are presented here that would warrant the District

Court revisiting its prior decision that the habeas petition was untimely filed.” Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 

728 (3d Cir. 2004). 3 Because the Court rejects petitioner’s arguments under Rule 60(b), it is not necessary to address petitioner’s 

arguments under the law of the case doctrine.