Report to the Honorable Peter A.

DeFazio, House of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

June 2001 DEFENSE

ACQUISITION

Comanche Program

Objectives Need to Be

Revised to More

Achievable Levels

GAO-01-450
Page i GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 4

The Comanche Program Continues to Experience Cost Increases,

Schedule Delays, and Performance Shortfalls 6

The Army Plans to Begin Comanche Production Despite Numerous

Uncertainties 15

Conclusion 17

Recommendations for Executive Action 17

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 17

Scope and Methodology 18

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense 20

Appendix II GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 22

Tables

Table 1: Timeline of Comanche’s Acquisition History and Schedule. 5

Table 2: Comparison of Total Acquisition Cost By Category 6

Figures

Figure 1: Comparison of Comanche Pre-Production Aircraft

Deliveries 9

Figure 2: Comanche Concurrent Flight Testing and Production 10

Contents
Page 1 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

June 7, 2001

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. DeFazio:

Since 1983, the Army has been working to build its next-generation

helicopter, the Comanche, with the intention of significantly expanding the

Army’s capability to conduct attack and reconnaissance operations in all

battlefield environments, day or night and during adverse weather

conditions. With a projected total acquisition cost of about $48 billion,

Comanche is the Army’s largest aviation acquisition program. In June 2000,

the Comanche program awarded a six-year engineering and manufacturing

development contract to Boeing-Sikorsky. The program office plans to

begin low-rate initial production in June 2005 and full-rate production in

December 2006. Current Army plans call for the acquisition of 1,213

Comanches through fiscal year 2026. Success in meeting the Comanche’s

performance requirements largely depends on the Army’s ability to meet

the helicopter’s weight requirements and to develop and integrate

advanced technologies such as the critical mission equipment package,

integrated satellite communication capabilities, and on-board capability to

detect and isolate equipment problems.

Since its inception, the Army has restructured the Comanche program five

times, significantly delayed the development schedule, and reduced

planned quantities. In August 1999,1

 we reported that the program faced

significant risks related to cost overruns, scheduling delays, and degraded

performance. The Army faced these risks primarily because it decided to

(1) begin engineering and manufacturing development before key

technologies had matured, (2) compress the flight-test schedule, which

increases concurrency between developmental and operational testing,

and (3) begin initial production before completing operational testing. We

also reported that by proceeding to the next development phase with high

levels of uncertainty, the program’s actions were not in accordance with

best practices followed by successful commercial firms.

 1 Defense Acquisition: Comanche Program Cost, Schedule, and Performance Status

(GAO/NSIAD-99-149, August 24, 1999).

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

In response to the findings of our 1999 report, you requested that we (1)

evaluate changes in the Comanche’s status with regard to cost, schedule,

and performance and (2) assess whether the Army will have the

knowledge it needs on the helicopter’s performance and costs to proceed

with its current production plans.

The Comanche program continues to face significant cost, scheduling, and

performance risks.

• First, since our last review, the program’s total development and

production cost estimate has increased by almost $4.8 billion—from

$43.3 billion to $48.1 billion. Development cost increased $75

million—from about $8.178 to $8.253 billion and production cost

increased by about $4.8 billion. However, areas of high technical risks

and unfunded requirements could further increase the program’s costs.

The program office does not plan to update its April 2000 current

estimate to reflect these increases until January 2003.

• Second, the Comanche’s December 2006 full rate production decision

date has not changed even though the risks of not meeting this date

have increased. In particular, the development and testing schedule has

become more compressed with many critical development and test

events coming close together or concurrently in the late stages of

development. This, in turn, has left the Army with very little time to

correct deficiencies found during testing. Failure to do so during

development could result in costly retrofits and repairs to aircraft

already produced. These costs could be substantial because the Army

is planning to buy a significant number of pre-production and low-rateinitial production aircraft before design and testing are completed. The

Army plans to use what it considers production-representative aircraft

produced during development for operational flight-testing. As these

aircraft are being tested, the Army plans to produce 84 low-rate initial

production aircraft to equip the helicopter’s first operational units.

• Third, the Army continues to face the risk that critical performance

requirements may not be met—at least for the helicopters it will

initially produce. Specifically, the program is at risk of not (1)

achieving the rate of vertical climb requirement; (2) completing

development and integration of its mission equipment package, which

is needed to support a range of important functions including early

warning, target acquisition, piloting, navigation, and communications;

(3) completing development of the system for detecting equipment

problems; and (4) achieving the “beyond-line-of-sight” communications

Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

capability needed to perform its mission. The Department of Defense

(DOD) recently provided $84 million in additional development funding

to help reduce some of these high-risk areas.

Additionally, we found that the Army is not likely to have the knowledge it

should have to begin production when scheduled. The Army currently

plans to begin low-rate initial production of the Comanche in June 2005.

Before entering this stage, our work has shown that successful

commercial firms already know that (1) technologies match customer

requirements; that is, they can fit onto a product and function as expected,

(2) the product’s design meets performance requirements, and (3) the

product can be produced within cost, schedule, and quality targets. It is

unlikely that the Army will have this level of knowledge about Comanche

by the June 2005 scheduled low-rate initial production decision date.

Specifically, the Army does not plan to freeze Comanche’s design

configuration until January 2006, or six months after the low-rate initial

production decision point. In addition, the Army is not likely to know

whether certain technologies being developed—such as those used for the

mission equipment package—will work on the helicopter and function as

expected and whether the helicopter can be produced within current cost

estimates. That level of knowledge will not be obtained until much later

when the results of operational flight-testing are available and the

contractor has more experience and data on producing the fully developed

Comanche helicopter.

In light of the current status and the significant challenges ahead, the

potential for undesirable outcomes for the Comanche program are high—

higher than expected costs, longer than expected schedules, and uncertain

performance. DOD and Army officials acknowledge that the current

program cost and schedule objectives are not achievable and should be

changed to reflect more realistic objectives. Yet they believe that the

planned January 2003 review for the Comanche program is the appropriate

time to address the changes. Such a delay in revising the program’s cost

and schedule estimate limits the visibility and knowledge that Army and

DOD management as well as the Congress needs to (1) provide program

oversight and direction; (2) make effective cost, schedule, and

performance trade-off decisions; and (3) assess affordability and annual

funding requirements. To improve management oversight and direction

and achieve more favorable program outcomes, this report recommends

that the Secretary of the Army reassess the program’s cost, schedule, and

performance objectives, and revise those objectives to more achievable

levels prior to submitting its next fiscal year budget.
Page 4 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

In commenting on this report, DOD partially concurred with our

recommendation. DOD stated that it agreed with some of the report’s

concerns and recognizes there are some risks in the currently planned

Comanche engineering and manufacturing development program. DOD

stated that it is currently examining whether any of Comanche's

requirements should be deferred, in order to reduce the risk of not

meeting cost and schedule objectives. DOD disagreed with a reference to

our previous Comanche report stating that current program risks were

caused by, among other things, the program being allowed to enter

engineering and manufacturing development prior to maturation of key

technologies. DOD maintains that the Comanche program successfully

demonstrated its exit criteria prior to entering engineering and

manufacturing development. However, the exit criteria did not require

that the technologies used in Comanche be at or above specific levels of

demonstrated readiness. As we noted in our 1999 report, the Army's own

assessments clearly indicated that several key areas of technology were

not at those levels called for in commercial best practices guidelines.2

The Comanche helicopter program began in 1983 to provide a family of

high technology, low-cost aircraft that would replace the Army’s light

helicopter fleet, which includes the AH-1 Cobra, OH-58 Kiowa, OH-6

Cayuse, and the UH-1 Iroquois (Huey). The Army subsequently decided to

develop only a single Comanche aircraft capable of conducting either

armed reconnaissance or attack missions. The Army intends for the

Comanche to be part of its future or “objective” force.3

The Comanche is designed to have improved speed, agility, aircrew

visibility, reliability, availability, and maintainability over current

reconnaissance and attack helicopters. The helicopter is also designed for

low observability (stealth) and is expected to be capable of deploying over

long ranges without refueling. Lastly, the Comanche is being designed to

provide enemy information to force commanders at all levels.

 2 Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon

System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).

3

 On October 12, 1999, the Chief of Staff of the Army announced plans to radically

transform the Army. The transformation strategy is designed to ensure that the Army can

respond to a broad range of operations—from peacekeeping, to regional conflicts, to major

theater wars. This strategy centers on developing a new combat force that is expected to

be lighter, but just as powerful and survivable as today’s heavy force. The new force is

planned around a common unit design and a family of combat vehicles that can be

transported on an Air Force C-130-type of transport aircraft. The Comanche will be the

Army’s objective force reconnaissance aircraft.

Background
Page 5 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Critical to achieving the Comanche’s desired capabilities is the successful

development and integration of advanced technologies, especially for the

mission equipment package. The mission equipment package includes an

integrated communication system, piloting system, target acquisition

system, navigation system, helmet-mounted display, survivability and early

warning equipment, mission computer, and weapon management system.

The Comanche program started in 1983 and is currently projected to

continue through fiscal year 2028. A timeline of the Comanche’s

acquisition history and schedule is provided below.

Table 1: Timeline of Comanche’s Acquisition History and Schedule.

Dates Program Phase Highlights

1983 to

April 2000

Demonstration and ValidationaProgram restructured 5 times.

Last restructuring extended development of the Comanche from 1996 to

2006 and reduced planned quantities from 2,096 to 1,292. Subsequently,

quantities were reduced to 1,213.

Army decreased the number of developmental aircraft planned, accelerated

the development of the fire control radar by 5 years, and extended the

production schedule.

April 2000 to Dec.

2006

Engineering and

Manufacturing Development

In June 2000, a 6-year engineering and manufacturing development contract

was awarded to Boeing-Sikorsky.

First pre-production aircraft were originally scheduled to be delivered in April

2002. Subsequently, that delivery has been delayed until January 2004.

Developmental flight-testing is scheduled to start in mid-2004 and continue

through December 2006.

Program reviews are scheduled for January 2003 and January 2005.

June 2005 to Oct.

2007

Low-Rate Initial Production Low-rate initial production of 84 aircraft scheduled to begin in June 2005.

Initial operational test and evaluation of pre-production aircraft is scheduled

for June 2006 through October 2006.

Initial Operational Capability is scheduled for December 2006 (also using

aircraft built in engineering and manufacturing development).

Delivery of the first low-rate production helicopter is planned for October

2007.

Dec. 2006 to

Fiscal Year 2028

Full-Rate Production Full-rate production decision is scheduled for December 2006.

Last production is planned for 2026, with the last unit to be equipped

occurring in 2028.

a

Now known as the program definition and risk reduction phase.
Page 6 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Since our August 1999 review, the Comanche program’s estimated cost has

increased significantly—from $43.3 billion to $48.1 billion—and costs are

expected to increase further. In addition, the Comanche continues to

experience scheduling delays and performance risks. These problems are

due to a range of factors, such as understated acquisition program cost

estimates; ambitious flight test schedules with substantial concurrency in

test events; delays in another DOD program which had been counted on to

develop a critical component of the aircraft; inadequate facilities to fully

test and integrate system hardware and software; and considerable growth

in aircraft weight. The Army has not updated the Comanche’s cost or

schedule estimates since April 2000 and does not plan such an update until

its in-progress program review in January 2003.

The Comanche program’s latest cost estimate, in April 2000, shows

estimated costs have increased by almost $4.8 billion—from $43.3 billion

to $48.1 billion—since our last report. Table 2 identifies where the cost

estimate has changed.

Table 2: Comparison of Total Acquisition Cost By Category

(then year dollars in millions)

Research,

Development,

Test &

Evaluation Procurement

Military

Construction Total

Current Program

Costs Estimate

$8,253.84 $39,358.2 $522.3 $48,134.3

Prior Program Costs

Estimate

$8,178.5 $34,581 $589.8 $43,339.3

Cost Estimate

Increases

$ 75.3 $ 4,777 -$67.5 $ 4,795

The $75.3 million increase in research, development, testing, and

evaluation resulted from added testing for the Comanche program. During

the Milestone II5

 decision process, the Defense Acquisition Executive

directed that the Comanche testing program be expanded by adding more

 4

 The total research, development, testing, and evaluation cost estimate includes about $4.2

billion spent in previous years.

5

 A milestone decision point is when a recommendation is made and approval sought

regarding starting or continuing an acquisition program.

The Comanche

Program Continues to

Experience Cost

Increases, Schedule

Delays, and

Performance

Shortfalls

Cost Estimate Increases
Page 7 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

testing to fully demonstrate the aircraft’s reliability before completion of

its engineering and manufacturing development phase.

The $4.777 billion increase in estimated production cost was to address

DOD concerns about the long-term affordability and stability of the

Comanche program. Specifically, DOD directed the Army to add 10

percent to Comanche’s production unit cost estimate in order to ensure

that annual planned procurement funding would be sufficient to cover

planned procurement quantities. To reduce the annual funding increase

resulting from this directive, the Army reduced Comanche’s peak annual

production rate from 72 aircraft per year to 62 per year, which extended

the planned delivery schedule by 3 years.

The $67.5 million reduction in estimated military construction costs

reflects changes in anticipated needs for operating and maintenance

facilities.

In January 2001, DOD added about $504 million in funding to the

Comanche program over the next few years. About $84 million of the

additional funds are earmarked for research, development, test, and

evaluation, and the remaining $420 million for production. These

additional funds have not yet been reflected in the program’s official cost

estimates. The program office plans to use the additional development

funding to at least partially address what had been unfunded requirements

in three areas considered to be high risk: (1) developing and integrating

the mission equipment package; (2) developing the technology to detect

and isolate equipment problems (automatic fault isolation); and (3)

developing and integrating satellite communication capabilities. The

section on performance discusses these areas in more detail.

The Comanche’s most recent cost estimate was made in April 2000, when

DOD approved the program for entry into the engineering and

manufacturing development phase. At that time, DOD’s Cost Analysis

Improvement Group estimated that the Comanche program would need an

additional $180 million for its engineering and manufacturing development

phase. However, the higher costs estimated by the Cost Analysis Group

were not included in the cost estimate when the program office

established a new baseline6

 for the Comanche program in April 2000. The

 6

 A baseline is a detailed estimate of acquisition and ownership costs normally required for

high level decisions. This estimate is performed early in the program and serves as the base

point for all subsequent tracking and auditing purposes.

Additional Funds Recently

Provided by DOD

Additional Cost Growth

Likely
Page 8 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Comanche program is scheduled for an in-progress program review in

January 2003 to review, among other things, its cost estimate. DOD

believes that this January 2003 review, along with other major program

reviews and oversight processes will permit successful management of

program risks. The Deputy Program Manager acknowledged that the

Army’s cost estimate for the Comanche may need to be revised at this

point.

The Comanche program office also maintains a list of unfunded

requirements. The additional funds recently added to the program have

reduced these funding requirements, but the revised list still has unfunded

requirements in the amount of $68 million. The program office

acknowledges that, unless additional funds are obtained, some yet-to-bedetermined program performance requirements could be impacted.

We have reported that when development work and low-rate initial

production are done concurrently, significant schedule delays that cause

cost increases and other problems are not uncommon in early production.

Also, production processes are often not able to consistently yield output

of high quality when full-rate production begins.7

 DOD’s guidance also

states that programs in which development work and low-rate initial

production are done concurrently typically have a higher risk of

production items having to be retrofitted to make them work properly and

of system design not being thoroughly tested. We have also reported that

the discovery of problems in testing conducted late in development is a

fairly common occurrence on DOD programs, as is the attendant “late

cycle churn”, that is, the unanticipated effort that must be invested to

overcome such problems.8

 Further, these problems could be exacerbated

if the program plans to produce a significant number of systems during the

low-rate initial production period, before design and testing are

completed.

In August 1999, we reported that the Army would experience a 19-month

delay in testing because the first pre-production aircraft for testing were

expected to be delivered 19 months later than planned. We noted that, by

retaining the December 2006 initial operating capability date, the delay in

 7 Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon System

Decisions (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137, April 26, 2000).

8 Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System

Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-00-199, July 31, 2000).

Highly Compressed and

Concurrent Schedule May

Lead To Additional

Schedule Slippage and

Higher Costs
Page 9 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

acquiring test aircraft would compress the majority of Comanche’s flighttest schedule into the last 3 years of development. The compressed flighttest schedule would, in turn, shorten the available time for completing all

test events and taking necessary corrective actions before the full-rate

production decision.

Since our last report, the first pre-production aircraft to be used for

development testing is now scheduled for delivery in January 2004, adding

an additional 3-month delay to the 19-month delay we reported in August

1999. As shown in figure 1 below, the delivery of pre-production

Comanche aircraft has been delayed and, because the Army has retained

the December 2006 full-rate production decision, the time available for

testing, assessing, and correcting problems has been reduced.

Figure 1: Comparison of Comanche Pre-Production Aircraft Deliveries

Many critical test events are now scheduled late in the development

stages—during the low-rate initial production phase of the program—and,

as shown in figure 2, many developmental and operational test events are

scheduled to be conducted concurrently.
Page 10 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Figure 2: Comanche Concurrent Flight Testing and Production

The combination of compressing the development schedule and

undertaking developmental and operational testing activities concurrently

leaves the Army with little room to accommodate any delays that may

result from assessing, correcting, and retesting problems found during

testing. In Comanche’s case, several critical subsystems—to be included in

the mission equipment package—may not be available until the

development flight-testing is well underway. These subsystems are very

complex, state-of-the-art systems that have not been demonstrated on a

helicopter platform like Comanche. As testing proceeds, any problems

found will need to be analyzed, fixed, and retested. However, with the

ambitious test schedule, there may not be time available between test

events to correct problems and prepare properly for the next event.

Further, the Army’s schedule for developing and testing software for the

Comanche may not be completed prior to the full-rate production

decision. The contractor is experiencing a shortage of software engineers

available to work on the Comanche contract. In addition, only about 1.4

million of the projected 1.9 million lines of computer code for the
Page 11 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Comanche’s mission equipment package will be completed by the time the

package is to be tested on the initial pre-production aircraft. Additional

segments of computer code for the mission equipment package will be

introduced as developmental testing is underway. At this point, it is

uncertain if all of the computer code for the full mission equipment

package will be completed by the time the Army is scheduled to make a

full-rate production decision for Comanche in late 2006.

Finally, the Army plans to use pre-production aircraft that it considers

production-representative for operational flight-testing. Before this testing

is complete, the Army plans to begin producing a total of 84 low-rate initial

production aircraft. These aircraft are to be used to equip Army helicopter

units and to ramp-up production. To produce that many aircraft during

low-rate initial production, the Army will have to ramp-up its production

capabilities rapidly and at a time when the aircraft design is still evolving

as new subsystems are introduced and test results are evaluated.

Specifically, the Army does not plan to freeze Comanche’s design

configuration until January 2006, or six months after the low-rate initial

production decision point. Making design changes and retrofits to a large

number of aircraft already produced could be costly.

In our last report, we noted that the Army was making modifications to the

Comanche that would adversely impact some of the Comanche’s planned

performance capabilities; for example, some modifications have added

weight and drag to the aircraft. While their exact impacts are still

unknown, these changes increase the risk that the Comanche’s planned

performance goals may not be achieved. The Comanche continues to have

several areas of high technical risk that jeopardize the achievement of

several critical performance requirements.

Performance Degradation

Is Still A Risk
Page 12 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

The Comanche’s ability to climb at a rate of 500 feet per minute is a key

performance requirement for the aircraft.9

 Since we last reported on the

Comanche program, the aircraft’s projected empty weight 10 has increased

by 653 pounds—from 8,822 pounds to 9,475 pounds. At the current

projected design weight of 9,475 pounds, the Comanche program office

has acknowledged that the helicopter cannot achieve the required vertical

rate of climb of 500 feet per minute without increasing the horsepower of

the current engine. Consequently, the program office has assessed its

achievement of the weight requirement as high risk.

The Army offered its prime contractor for Comanche’s development,

Boeing-Sirkosky, an award fee of $1.4 million to reduce its projected

weight to 9,250 pounds. However, the contractor did not achieve the first

iteration of weight reduction in December 2000. The program office is

considering increasing the incentive fee to $5 million for the contractor to

reduce the projected weight to 9,300 pounds in December 2001.

The program office believes that it can achieve its vertical rate of climb,

even with the increase in Comanche’s weight, by increasing the

horsepower of Comanche’s T-801 engine from its current horsepower

rating of 1131 to 1201. The program office estimates that the increase in

the engine’s power can be obtained at a cost of about $13 million, and this

approach will be less costly than other weight reduction efforts. However,

an increase in engine performance could adversely affect the expected life

of the engine since it will have to perform about 47 degrees hotter than is

normally required. According to the program office, this increased

performance may not have an appreciable impact on the engine’s life.

As noted earlier in this report, the successful development and integration

of the mission equipment package is critical to meeting Comanche’s

performance requirements. This package includes an integrated

communications system, piloting system, target acquisition system,

navigation system, helmet-mounted display, survivability and early

 9

 A key performance requirement is a capability or characteristic that DOD believes is so

central to the Comanche’s performance that failing to meet its threshold can be cause for

the concept or system selection to be reevaluated or the program to be reassessed or

terminated. Other key performance parameters include (1) night target acquisition range,

(2) radar cross signature, (3) infrared engine exhaust signature, and (4) digitally

communications with joint and combined armed forces.

10 Comanche’s empty weight is the weight of the aircraft and it component parts. It does not

include the pilot’s weight, gear, fuel, radar kits, or expendable munitions.

Weight Growth Could

Adversely Impact Vertical

Rate of Climb

Scheduled Integration of

Critical Mission Equipment

Package Still High Risk
Page 13 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

warning equipment, mission computer, and weapons management system.

The program office has assessed the achievement of this portion of its

development effort as high risk.11

In order to reduce this risk, the Army had planned to develop a mobile

integration laboratory, called a hotbench, which simulates Comanche’s

hardware, to integrate and test mission equipment package software

before installing the software on the flight test aircraft. However, due to a

shortage of development funds, the Army had listed the hotbench as an

unfunded requirement. DOD recently provided additional funding to the

Comanche program, which the program office plans to use to fully fund

the hotbench. Despite the additional funding for the hotbench, the

program office continues to acknowledge that integration of Comanche’s

mission equipment package as an area of high technical risk.

A critical Comanche requirement is an on-board fault detection system

that can rapidly and accurately provide information about equipment

problems. With an on-board fault isolation system, the Army would be able

to promptly identify and correct potential problems in advance, according

to the Comanche’s operational requirements document. Additionally,

without the system, the time and cost of maintaining the aircraft will likely

increase. According to the Army, this system needs to be 75 to 95 percent

accurate—75 percent for mechanical and electrical equipment and 95

percent for avionics and electronics equipment. The Comanche program

office has concluded that this requirement will be difficult to achieve

within the current cost, weight, and packaging constraints, and does not

expect to achieve a mature fault detection and fault isolation capability

until 2 years after initial fielding.12 According to the program office, this

system depends, in part, on a database built on flight data and equipment

failure experience; therefore, the system becomes better with additional

flight hours. The program office anticipates that after 2 years of flight

testing, the system should meet the full level of predictability required.

Although some of the recently provided development funding will be used

by the Army in this area, the Comanche program has identified an

 11 Comanche system integration involves the integration of its weapon systems and

battlefield information into a total weapon system that is expected to provide maximum

effectiveness with minimum crew workload.

12 This approach would entail using previously obtained developmental diagnostic analyses

and models to support the initial operational testing and evaluation test events. Afterward,

the Army plans to define system changes that are needed to obtain required system

performance.

Fully Capable On-Board

Fault Isolation

Requirement May Not Be

Achieved Until 2 Years

After Initial Fielding
Page 14 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

additional $20 million unfunded requirement for the fault isolation

capability.

In some battle situations, the Army plans to use Comanche as a deep

reconnaissance aircraft to provide critical information and situational

awareness to joint forces. Satellite communication technology is

necessary for the helicopter to be able to achieve the “beyond-line-ofsight” capability needed to carry out this function, according to the

Comanche operational requirement document. To meet this need, the

Army was planning to rely on satellite communication technology being

developed and miniaturized as part of the Joint Strike Fighter program,

which is being developed jointly by the Air Force, Navy, and Marines.

However, in May 2000, Congress provided that the Joint Strike Fighter

program could not enter into the engineering and manufacturing

development phase until the Secretary of Defense certified the

technological maturity of its critical technologies.13 This has delayed the

Joint Strike Fighter program’s schedule for beginning its engineering and

manufacturing development phase.

When assessing the risk of its dependency on the Joint Strike Fighter’s

program, the Comanche program office concluded that the helicopters in

low-rate initial production would not have the beyond-line-of-sight

communication capability if the Joint Strike Fighter program was delayed.

The program office now believes that it must develop its own satellite

communication capability. However, the development schedule remains

high-risk for the timely inclusion of this capability on the initially fielded

Comanche helicopters. The Army has estimated that it will require about

$58 million to develop this capability and plans to fully fund this effort

with additional funds recently provided by DOD.

 13 Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, section 212, PL

106-239, October 12, 2000.

Critical Comanche

Beyond-Line-of-Sight

Communications

Requirements May Not Be

Achievable
Page 15 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Our work on best practices has found that product development in

successful commercial firms is a clearly defined undertaking for which

firms insist on having in hand the technology that meets customers’ needs

before starting. The firms demand—and receive—specific knowledge

about a new product before production begins. And, they do not go

forward unless a strong business case on which the program was

originally justified continues to hold true. Such a knowledge-based

process is essential to commercial firms getting better cost, schedule, and

performance outcomes. It enables decision-makers to be reasonably

certain about critical facets of the product under development when they

need it.

At the point of going into production, successful firms will already know

that (1) technologies match customer requirements, that is, they can fit

onto a product and function as expected, (2) the product’s design meets

performance requirements, and (3) the product can be produced within

cost, schedule, and quality targets. The Comanche program does not yet

have this knowledge and is not likely to have this knowledge when it plans

to begin low-rate initial production in June 2005.

First, the Army does not yet know and it will not know until well after its

low-rate initial production decision whether certain technologies being

developed will fit on the helicopter and function as expected. Our report14

on incorporating new technologies into programs indicated that

demonstrating a high level of maturity before new technologies are

incorporated into product development programs puts those programs

into a better position to succeed. Further, technologies that were included

in a product development before they were mature later contributed to

cost increases and schedule delays to those products. While the Comanche

program has made progress in the technology readiness level of its critical

components, integration of those components into subsystems, such as

the mission equipment package, and the helicopter as a whole remains

high-risk. In addition, the integration, development, and configuration of

key satellite communication technology for inclusion in the integrated

communication, navigation, and identification avionics has also been

assessed as high risk. Finally, some of the technologies have not been

developed to meet Comanche’s specific configuration requirements. For

instance, the Comanche’s second generation forward-looking infrared

 14 Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon

System Outcomes (GAO/NSIAD-99-162, July 30, 1999).

The Army Plans to

Begin Comanche

Production Despite

Numerous

Uncertainties
Page 16 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

sensor has been tested and proven on the Black Hawk helicopter by the

Army’s night vision laboratory but not on the Comanche itself. Such

testing needs to be done to ensure that the system can work together with

other unique systems being developed for the Comanche, including the

piloting, target acquisition, and navigation systems, which work as one

unit. Comanche’s contractor has maintained that its mission equipment

package technology is challenging because some key components have

not been developed and configured in the required manner for the

helicopter’s intended mission.

Second, as discussed earlier, the Army does not yet know and may not

know until well after the start of low-rate initial production, whether

performance requirements can be met—including vertical rate of climb,

on-board fault isolation, and beyond-line-of-sight communication

requirements. The Army plans to conduct a limited user test before it

begins low-rate initial production but it is a rudimentary test and not a

complete operational test that fully demonstrates the aircraft’s

capabilities. By compressing many key events late in the development

schedule and conducting developmental and operational testing activities

concurrently, the Army is running the risk of not fully demonstrating many

of its critical capabilities before its planned full-rate production decision.

Under current plans, for example, the Army will not complete a full

demonstration of its integrated mission equipment package until

December 2006—over a full year after its low-rate initial production

decision and within the same month that the Army plans to make its

decision on Comanche full-rate production.

Third, as noted earlier, it is still uncertain whether the Comanche can be

developed within cost and scheduling estimates. Although additional costs

have been identified for the Comanche since it was last restructured, the

full development cost will not be known until critical technology is fully

developed, integrated, and tested. This will not occur until well after a lowrate initial production decision has been made in June 2005. The program

office believes that it will know the cost of the initial production aircraft,

which will have been negotiated prior to the low-rate initial production

decision. However, at that time, the program office and the contractor will

have limited experience and data relative to producing the fully developed

Comanche helicopter. Until more experience and data is available, there is

not a high level of confidence in the Army’s production cost estimate.

Further, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the

results of the Comanche milestone II test data indicated that it is highly

unlikely that the Army can deliver the expected system performance
Page 17 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

within the current budget and schedule. The Director's assessment

revealed that, without an operational assessment of an integrated system,

it is difficult to predict with any degree of confidence whether (1) the

individual subsystems can be successfully integrated, (2) the subsystems

will function properly in an operational environment, or (3) the

subsystems, in concert, will provide the anticipated benefits in operational

performance.

In 1999, we reported that the Army started the Comanche’s program

development too early in terms of technology readiness, which is contrary

to best commercial practices. Further, in approving the program for

engineering and manufacturing development, the Army accelerated the

development of some components, reduced the number of test aircraft,

and compressed the test schedule. Two years later, the program is

confronted with rising development costs, a compressed development

schedule, and several major areas of high technical risk. The Army plans

to proceed to low-rate initial production in June 2005 and full-rate

production in December 2006, both of which could be well in advance of

attaining sufficient knowledge of the helicopter’s technical maturity,

demonstrated performance capabilities, and production costs. With such a

scenario, the potential for adverse program outcomes is high—higher than

expected costs, longer than expected schedules, and uncertain

performance. DOD and Army officials acknowledge that the current

program cost and schedule objectives are not achievable and should be

changed to reflect more realistic objectives, but they believe that the

planned January 2003 review for the Comanche program is the appropriate

time to address such changes. Such a delay in revising the program’s cost

and schedule estimate limits the visibility and knowledge that Army and

DOD management as well as the Congress needs to (1) provide program

oversight and direction; (2) make effective cost, schedule, and

performance trade-off decisions; and (3) assess affordability and annual

funding requirements.

To improve management oversight and direction and achieve more

favorable program outcomes, this report recommends that the Secretary

of the Army reassess the program’s cost, schedule, and performance

objectives, and revise those objectives to more achievable levels prior to

submitting its next fiscal year budget.

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our

recommendation. DOD noted that it agrees with some of our concerns

and recognizes there are risks in the currently planned Comanche

engineering and manufacturing development program. DOD noted that

Conclusion

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Page 18 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

these risks were understood during the Comanche milestone II review. At

that time, the Defense Acquisition Executive directed that the program

proceed as planned, but that interim decision reviews be conducted in

January 2003 and June 2005 to review program status. DOD stated that

these reviews, along with other major program review and oversight

processes, will permit successful management of program risks.

Nevertheless, DOD stated that it is currently examining whether any of

Comanche's requirements should be deferred, in order to reduce the risk

of not meeting cost and schedule objectives. DOD's examination of

Comanche's requirements is consistent with our recommendation. We

continue to believe that DOD should report on the results of this

examination and any revisions to the program’s objectives to the defense

committees of the Congress with its next budget request.

DOD disagreed with a reference to our previous Comanche report stating

that current program risks are caused by, among other things, the program

being allowed to enter engineering and manufacturing development prior

to maturation of key technologies. DOD maintains that the Comanche

program successfully demonstrated its exit criteria prior to entering

engineering and manufacturing development. However, the Comanche

program’s demonstration of its exit criteria was not sufficient as a basis to

move forward in the acquisition process. For example, the exit criteria did

not require that the technologies used in Comanche be at or above specific

levels of demonstrated readiness. As we previously reported, the Army's

own assessments clearly indicated that several key areas of technology

were not at those levels called for in commercial best practices guidelines.

DOD's comments are reprinted in appendix I. Other comments provided

by DOD were incorporated in the report as appropriate.

To evaluate changes in the Comanche’s status with regard to cost,

schedule, and performance and assess whether the Army has the certainty

it needs to proceed with beginning production, we examined and

compared program schedules, pertinent cost documents, and acquisition

strategies, and discussed potential changes and causative factors with

cognizant Comanche program officials. We analyzed flight-test plans,

schedules, and reports and discussed significant issues with program

officials. We reviewed program documents related to risk and analyzed

program risks and development problems by comparing them with various

test schedules and plans. To assess performance capabilities before

beginning with production, we analyzed required and projected

performance and compared it with the Comanche’s operational

requirements. We relied on previous GAO best practices work to examine

Comanche’s technological readiness levels for key program technologies.

Scope and

Methodology
Page 19 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Our analyses focused on the impact of Comanche’s cost, schedule, and

performance on the Army’s ability to field a Comanche helicopter that

would meet its requirements and incorporate technological upgrades in its

helicopter fleet.

In performing our work, we obtained pertinent program documents and

interviewed officials from the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the

Army, Washington, D.C.; the Program Executive Office-Aviation and

Comanche Program Office, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Rucker, Alabama; the Comanche

Joint Project Office, Huntsville, Alabama; and the Aviation Test and

Evaluation Command, Alexandria, Virginia. We conducted our review from

September 2000 through March 2001 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we will not distribute this report until 5 days from its

date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Honorable

Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Thomas White,

Secretary of the Army; Director, Office of Management and Budget; and

other interested congressional committees and parties. We will also make

copies available to others upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on (202)

512-4530. GAO contacts and major contributors to this report are listed in

appendix II.

Sincerely,

James F. Wiggins

Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 20 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense
Appendix I: Comments From the Department

of Defense

Page 21 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition
Appendix II: GAO Contacts and

Acknowledgments

Page 22 GAO-01-450 Defense Acquisition

James F. Wiggins (202) 512-4841

William Graveline (256) 650-1414

In addition to those named above, Leon S. Gill, Wendy Smythe, Gary

Middleton, and Cristina Chaplain made key contributions to this report.

Appendix II: GAO Contacts and

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

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