“As the one

year milestone

approaches,

thousands of

American

soldiers remain

in Bosnia, the

costs of the

mission have

more than

doubled, and its prospects for success have

not brightened....

“Operations like Bosnia are slowly

diminishing the ability of our armed forces

to meet the national military strategy.

Important modernization and readiness

programs are being mortgaged to pay for

these indefinite ‘contingency’ missions....

“One year into this operation, it is

legitimate to ask whether the benefits of

U.S. participation have outweighed the

costs, and whether the American presence

in Bosnia has helped to create the

conditions for a just and lasting peace.

U.S. Troops in Bosnia: Caught in the Quagmire?

From the Chairman...

Volume 1, Issue 1 January 1997

I

t is now more than one year since U.S.

forces deployed to Bosnia as part of a

multinational peace implementation

force (IFOR). To date, the military

aspects of the Dayton peace agreement

have been completed, although violations

continue to occur. These military aspects

include the separation of the warring

parties, the destruction or cantonment of

heavy weapons, and the

transfer of

territories

according to

the provisions agreed

upon in Dayton. What

remains to be

accomplished

— and what

is generally

recognized

as the more difficult goal — is the civilian

and humanitarian rebuilding of Bosnia.

spite of the Dayton accord’s requirement

that they leave.

Nationwide municipal elections

have been twice postponed because of

massive voter registration fraud and

irregularities and the threat of a Bosnian

Serb boycott. The results of the presidential election in September — seen by

some as an

important

step toward

reunifying

the country

— indicated

the continued strength

of nationalist candidates in the

Muslim,

Croat, and

Serb communities. Current Bosnian President Alia

Izetbegovic, the top vote-getter, will head

Bosnia’s collective presidency for

another two years. Momcilo Krajisnik,

a nationalist Serb, and Kresimir Zubak,

a Croat nationalist, will also serve on

Bosnia’s rotating presidential body.

These three victors each received

strong majority support within their

respective ethnic communities, and they

embody the ethnic divisions that brought

the country to war in the first place. This

has led some observers to conclude that

the divisions between Bosnia’s ethnic

groups remain sharp and to doubt the

future viability of Bosnia as a multiethnic unitary state. In fact, the Serb

member of Bosnia’s rotating presidency

refused to attend his own inaugural and

swear allegiance to a unified Bosnia.

Bosnia—One Year Later

“While the large-scale fighting has ceased,

the bitter divisions that gave rise to the

conflict in the first place have intensified

and are likely to remain for years. Human

rights violations continue on all sides....

In reality, the Dayton accords have served

to ratify the ethnic partition of the

country....

“In short, one year after Dayton, NATO is

no closer to ensuring lasting peace in

Bosnia and the United States is no closer

to developing a credible exit strategy that

will lead to the withdrawal of U.S. ground

troops from that troubled land.”

The Current Political Situation

Increasing difficulties in

implementing the civilian aspects of the

Dayton accord are raising questions

about the long-term political and

economic stability of this war-ravaged

country. Human rights violations

continue on all sides. Refugees are being

prevented from returning to their homes.

In the last few months, hundreds of

Muslim homes have been destroyed by

Serbs. Attacks on civilians by partisans

remain commonplace. Political

differences between Muslims and Croats

have called into question the continued

viability of the Bosnian Federation. War

criminals remain at large and Islamic

mujahedeen remain in the country, in

Background Brief

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues

, Chairman
2 National Security Report

The Clinton Administration

originally pledged to Congress that U.S.

participation in the IFOR mission would

last no longer than one year. President

Clinton, in his address to the American

people last December, stated that “the

military mission can be accomplished in

about one year.” He reiterated this belief

in a letter to House National Security

Committee Chairman Floyd Spence on

June 26, 1996. In April 1996, Under

Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff testified

before the House International Relations

Committee that “our policy...is to have

all U.S. forces out on or about the 14th

of December.”

Earlier this year, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman General Shalikashvili

expressed his conviction that “America

will not participate with military forces

in Bosnia after the conclusion of this year.

I cannot imagine circumstances changing

in such a way that we would remain in

Bosnia.” However, increasing levels of

violence and the potential for greater

political instability have now led the

Clinton Administration to decide that an

extended U.S. military ground presence

in Bosnia is required to guarantee stable

conditions for the lagging civilian and

humanitarian reconstruction effort.

Secretary of Defense William Perry has

called the Administration’s prior

assurances that the U.S. deployment

would be limited to one year “an error in

judgment.” As he noted, “The conditions

for peace still do not exist in Bosnia.”

Currently, a “covering force” of

7,500 U.S. troops has been deployed to

Bosnia to replace troops that are rotating

out after their one-year tour is up and to

assist in their withdrawal. These troops

are likely to comprise the bulk of the

8,500 U.S. troops that President Clinton

has declared will participate in a smaller

31,000-troop multinational follow-on

peacekeeping presence in Bosnia. This

follow-on “stabilization force,” or

“SFOR,” will continue its mission until

at least June 1998, with assessments of

progress occurring at six-month intervals.

The U.S. contingent of the SFOR may

be reduced to 5,500, and the total SFOR

to 13,500, after one year. Nevertheless,

the Administration has refused

to set June 1998 as

a firm deadline

for withdrawal,

implying that

there is sill no

credible exit strategy to extricate

U.S. forces from

this war-ravaged

country.

The prospect

of a follow-on

military peacekeeping force for

Bosnia was discussed at a September 1996 NATO

ministerial meeting in Norway. The

decision to participate in Bosnia with

U.S. ground forces for another eighteen

months was made after a NATO study

of several post-IFOR options, timed for

States did the same. To some observers,

the decision to keep U.S. troops engaged

in Bosnia appears more like the United

States being led by the NATO alliance

than leading it.

completion after the U.S. presidential

election. The options of continuing the

current IFOR mission as currently

structured or completely withdrawing

were rejected by NATO ambassadors at

a meeting in Brussels earlier this month.

Some form of continued ground presence

was seen as indispensable to the

consolidation of peace in Bosnia.

However, the Europeans again made it

clear that they would not participate with

forces on the ground unless the United

U.S. Troop Deployments

The Prospect of “Mission Creep”

“I’m absolutely convinced

that America will not

participate with military

forces in Bosnia after the

conclusion of this year. I

cannot imagine circumstances changing in such a

way that we would remain

in Bosnia.”

— Statement by Joint

Chiefs of Staff General

John M. Shalikashvili,

Washington Post, 4/3/96

Concern over extension of the U.S.

military presence in Bosnia has been

accompanied by confusion over the

military mission and the prospect of

“mission creep.” Administration

statements explicitly excluded using

IFOR for civilian and humanitarian

missions. In particular, General

Shalikashvili ruled out the use of U.S.

troops to seek out and arrest suspected

war criminals, declaring that this “would,

in fact, represent mission creep.... It is

not IFOR’s task.” However, Secretary

of State Christopher stated in June that

“our troops will conduct more visible and

proactive patrols throughout the

country.... [which will] put war criminals

at greater risk of apprehension.”

The role of U.S. troops in providing

assistance to war crimes investigators,

including providing security for grave

site investigators, has also been

controversial. Then-IFOR commander

Admiral Leighton Smith declared in

January that “NATO is not going to

provide specific security... for teams

investigating these grave sites.” Several

weeks later, Secretary Perry stated that

“we’ll provide the security that allows

them to do that.... I don’t consider that

mission creep.”
National Security Report 3

Analysis

More recently, reports have

indicated that IFOR troops have been

engaging in civilian-oriented activities,

carrying out constabulary functions,

searching for illegal weapons, and

As political difficulties mount inBosnia and the expectation of a

prompt American military exit

evaporates, the costs of maintaining an

armed U.S. presence on the ground will

invariably escalate, adding to the

debate over the temporary nature of

“contingency” missions. From a strict

monetary perspective, the costs of the

Bosnia operation have increased

substantially. The Administration’s

original estimate of $1.5 billion through

the end of 1996 grew to $2.8 billion in

April and has now reached more than

$3.2 billion. Deputy Secretary of

Defense John White conceded to the

House National Security Committee in

September that “our initial estimates,

as we know, were low....” The

Administration has indicated to

Congress that a supplemental funding

request of over 2 billion is needed for

the current SFOR operation , as the

defense budget had projected an end

to operations in Bosnia as of the first

quarter of the fiscal year.

In addition, there are concerns that

the Bosnia operation has also

compromised the ability of U.S. armed

forces to meet the requirements of U.S.

national security strategy. Despite a

reduced U.S. presence in Bosnia, the

requirement to rotate troops during the

course of the 18-month mission, plus the

ongoing presence in Macedonia, will tie

expanded U.S. presence in Bosnia will

increase the strain on American

soldiers and their families as it draws

from limited defense resources

available to support them.

Overall, the record of success of

the Dayton peace agreement is

decidedly mixed. Compliance by the

parties has been neither uniform nor

universal. The incidence of violence

among the factions has disturbingly

increased. There is little to suggest that

the Bosnian people are ready to let go

of their destructive hatreds. As

Assistant Secretary of State John

Kornblum stated , “...we have failed

to change the hearts and minds of the

people there.”

It remains to be seen whether

keeping Americans on the ground in

Bosnia for a longer period of time will,

in fact, accomplish this goal. Without

a change in attitude among all the

parties to the conflict, a true and lasting

peace in Bosnia is unlikely to be

realized anytime soon.

assisting in the reconstruction of

Bosnia’s infrastructure. IFOR has

reportedly had greater success in this

regard than the civilian aid organizations

that have been tasked with these

responsibilities. The civilian rebuilding

effort has been hindered by bureaucratic

stonewalling and latent distrust among

the parties, along with a shortfall in

financial resources.

According to the Administration,

the new SFOR will operate under

guidelines similar to IFOR. It will have

a precise mission and well-defined rules

of engagement. However, the strict

military tasks outlined by the Dayton

agreement have been completed.

Because the focus of SFOR will be on

ensuring the conditions for an effective

rebuilding and rehabilitation of Bosnia’s

civilian infrastructure, the prospects for

mission creep loom large. In particular,

the SFOR missions to keep civil order,

ensure freedom of movement, support

the war crimes tribunal and provide

security to the municipal elections –

whenever they do take place – all carry

potential for mission creep.

 “The conditions for peace

still do not exist in Bosnia.”

— Statement by Secretary

of Defense William Perry,

Washington Post, 11/16/96

The “Arm and Train” Program

Conclusion

The first deliveries of arms and

equipment to the Muslim-dominated

Bosnian Federation under the “arm- andtrain” program have taken place,

including the shipment of U.S.-built

M60A3 tanks and M16A2 rifles.

However, the program has not acquired

the broad-based support or financial

backing that was originally hoped for. In

particular, America’s European allies

have expressed uneasiness about arming

the Bosnian Federation. That uneasiness

has been reinforced by the instability

within Bosnia and the prospect of

renewed conflict. Training of

Federation forces within Bosnia under

the arm-and-train program is also

underway, and is being carried out by a

private U.S. firm, Military Professional

Resources, Inc. In spite of the

Presidential certification that all foreign

forces have left Bosnia — a necessary

precondition for the initiation of the armand-train program — published reports

continue to suggest the presence of

foreign forces, particularly Iranianbacked Islamic mujahedeen, at various

training camps located throughout the

country.

down virtually the entire U.S. Army

garrison in Europe, as well as important

stateside units necessary for contingency

deployments. In addition, it is likely that

U.S. Air Force and Marine units will

continue to fly air cover over Bosnia.

Some also believe the Administration has

sacrificed necessary procurement,

research and development, and training

programs by reallocating defense

resources in support of an indefinite

contingency mission of questionable

national security relevance. The

As the United States transitions to a

reduced, but longer-term military

presence in Bosnia, significant questions

remain over mission scope, duration,

rules of engagement, exit strategy, and

long-term political stability in Bosnia.

These questions will likely feature

prominently in the oversight activities of

the 105th Congress.
4 National Security Report

Update

This is the first issue of the National Security Report which is also archived on the world wide web site of the House National Security

Committee at: http://www.house.gov/nsc/pubs.htm. Additional background information may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372),

David Trachtenberg (x60532), or Will Marsh (x56045) on the committee staff.

 In Bosnia...

 In the Pacific...

 In the United States...

Secretary of Defense William J. Perry

will officially turn over control to exSenator William S. Cohen (R-ME) at the

end of this month if Cohen is confirmed

by the Senate. One of Perry’s concerns

upon leaving office is the tension in

Russia over NATO expansion: “I see

some hard times ahead of us between

now and July,” when alliance

representatives are scheduled to meet to

admit new members.

•

Perry’s departure, Cohen’s pending

arrival and internal Pentagon delays have

slowed the effort to craft a new U.S.

military strategy to replace the current

“Bottom-Up Review.” A review by the

Joint Staff was slowed, as was the naming

of an independent “National Defense

Panel” mandated by Congress in the FY

1997 Defense Authorization Act. The

panel was to be named by December 1,

1996. And the formal strategic review,

called the Quadrennial Defense Review,

is slated to be complete by May 15, but

observers doubt that the deadline, also

mandated by Congress, will be met. The

cumulative effect of the dealys is to

ensure that the upcoming defense budget

will be a “placeholder” budget, and that

the real debate about U.S. defense

strategy and force structure will be

postponed until 1998.

•

A recent report released by the Pentagon

states that Information Warfare in the

future is a possible “electronic Pearl

Harbor.” Also stated in the report was

that “there is a need for extraordinary

action” and that currently, there “are

ingredients in a recipe for a national

security distaster.” Also stated was that

the United States military owns

approximately 2.1 million computers and

possesses around 10,000 local area

networks, all of which could be crippled

by information warfare.

 In Russia...

Russian President Boris Yeltsin returns

to the hospital on January 8, after showing

early symptoms of pneumonia. He is to

be hospitalized for a few days.

•

Moscow has agreed in principle to accept

a cache of weapons-grade uranium from

Georgia. Previously, Russian government

officials had raised bureaucratic,

technical, and financial issues obstructing

the transfer to a safer facility in Russia.

Georgia has offered the material for sale

to foreign governments, claiming this

would not violate the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, to which Georgia is

a signatory.

•

Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov,

in a December 21 television interview

says “I think the Cold War is not yet over.”

Declaring “NATO enlargement to the east

is unacceptable to Russia...There exist

two countries with powerful nuclear

potentials capable of destroying the globe

and turning each other into dust. Is there

a 100 percent guarantee that a possible

conflict can be avoided?”

The inaugural session of Bosnia’s

newly-formed joint government is held,

three months after it was to have

originally convened. President Alija

Izetbegovic, the Muslim member of

Bosnia’s revolving tripartite presidency

says, “We will request the return of

people to their homes, freedom of

movement, hunting of war criminals, and

freedom of media.”

•

The Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), who is

responsible for overseeing and

conducting elections in the region, calls

upon Serbian President Milosevic to

recognize the opposition electoral

victories in 14 Serbian cities, including

the capital, Belgrade.

•

Croatian President Tudjman attacks

efforts by the United States to foster

democracy in Croatia. He refers to

private U.S. groups seeking democratic

reform in Croatia as “foreign enemies.”

He also criticizes the U.S. Ambassador

and the Voice of America for supporting

the efforts of a new opposition

publication.

 •

Military officials and diplomats report

that Yugoslavia has exceeded its

requirement for reducing arms under the

terms of an arms control agreement

signed last June. However, officials

report that the Bosnian Serbs are not in

compliance with the agreement and are

seeking to keep stockpiles well in excess

of what the agreement allows.

•

Bosnia’s governing Muslim party

confirms that it received $500,000 from

Iran last spring. However, the Party for

Democratic Action denies that a report

by the CIA concludes that funds were

used in support of President

Izetbegovic’s election campaign.

Japan and the U.S. are expected to hold

top-level defense talks in the U.S. from

late April to early May to mull closer

defense cooperation in regional crises.

The ministerial meeting is timed to come

after the expected conclusion in April of

talks on the review of bilateral defense

guidelines. The U.S. and Japan want to

strengthen the bilateral security alliance.

•

China’s President Jiang Zemin says that

the PRC intends to commission its first

aircraft carrier by the year 2000. If

successful, Beijing will have

accomplished its goal of deploying an

aircraft carrier five years ahead of its

originally planned date.