*The Hon. John Bailey Jones, United States District Judge for

the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

_____________

No. 95-2749EM

_____________

Donald C. Anton, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

*

Carol Pavilack Getty, U.S. *

Parole Commissioner; Carol *

Muller, a Hearing Examiner for *

the U.S. Parole Commission, * On Appeal from the United

North Central Region; Jeffrey * States District Court

S. Kostbar, Chief Analyst for * for the Eastern District

U.S. Parole Commission National * of Missouri.

Office; Jerome F. Lawrenz, *

Chief Probation Officer, U.S. *

Probation Office, Eastern *

District of Missouri; Kenneth *

S. Woddail, Senior Probation *

Officer, U.S. Probation Office, *

Eastern District of Missouri, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

 Submitted: January 10, 1996

 Filed: March 12, 1996

___________

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BOWMAN, Circuit Judge, and JONES,*

District Judge.

___________
 The Honorable Edward L. Filippine, United States District

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Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the

recommendation of the Honorable Catherine D. Perry, then a United

States Magistrate Judge, now a United States District Judge.

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RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge.

Donald Anton filed this action against a United States Parole

Commissioner and a number of parole and probation officers, claiming that

they violated his constitutional rights by causing his parole to be

delayed. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary

1

judgment and denied Anton's motion to add claims against three Bureau of

Prison employees. We affirm.

I.

On December 15, 1989, the United States Parole Commission informed

Donald Anton, who was then serving a six-year prison term for conspiracy

to commit mail fraud, extortion, and obstruction of justice, that his

presumptive parole date was September 24, 1991. The Parole Commission

conditioned Anton's tentative release date "upon [his] development of a

suitable release plan." 

In July of 1991, Anton suggested to Judy Holt, a probation officer,

that he would like to work for Vandalia Bus Lines upon his release. Holt

told Mickal Laird, an employee of the Bureau of Prisons who was Anton's

case manager, that Anton's plan was unacceptable because the owner of

Vandalia Bus Lines had a criminal record. Laird discussed Anton's release

plan with Carol Wilson Muller, a Hearing Examiner with the United States

Parole Commission, who agreed with Holt's conclusion and told Anton that

he could not work for Vandalia Bus Lines.

On August 25, Anton submitted a release plan indicating that he would

work for Robert Baine, Esq., as a part-time paralegal and would live with

his mother in St. Louis. Laird requested an
 Kostbar concedes that he was mistaken. At the time Kostbar 2

wrote to Anton, Anton was eligible for parole.

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investigation of Anton's release plan. Kenneth Woddail, a probation

officer, responded to Laird that Anton's plan was unacceptable because it

did not call for Anton to be housed in a Community Corrections Center

before his release. Laird notified Muller of Woddail's conclusion and

suggested that Anton's release be delayed for 90 days so that Anton could

be placed in a Community Corrections Center. 

On September 9, Parole Commissioner Carol Pavilack Getty, acting on

the recommendation of Muller, rescheduled Anton's release date to December

23, 1991, "with placement in a Community Corrections Center up to 120

days." Anton attempted to appeal Getty's decision, but Jeffrey Kostbar,

Chief Analyst for the Parole Commission's National Appeals Board, informed

Anton that Getty's decision was not appealable because the Commission did

not have the authority to release a prisoner prior to his paroleeligibility date. On December 23, Anton was released on parole to the

2

Dismas Community Corrections Center, from which he was discharged on March

30, 1992.

Anton filed this complaint under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,

403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Parole Commissioner Getty, Hearing Examiner

Muller, Chief Analyst Kostbar, and Probation Officers Lawrenz and Woddail.

He sought to amend his complaint by adding claims against Laird, Stan

Ahlin, and Cecil Turner, two of Laird's supervisors who worked for the

Bureau of Prisons, and Probation Officer Holt. The District Court granted

the original defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Anton leave

to amend his complaint. It held that Commissioner Getty, Kostbar, Muller,

and the probation officers were absolutely immune from suit. As for the

Bureau of Prison employees, the Court concluded that even if these

defendants were entitled only to qualified,
 Anton has submitted a motion urging us to sanction the

3

defendants for submitting a brief that mischaracterizes the facts.

We find the defendants' brief satisfactory and, therefore, deny

Anton's motion.

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rather than absolute, immunity, Anton had failed to state a claim against

them.3

II.

Generally, qualified immunity is "sufficient to protect government

officials in the exercise of their duties." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,

486-87 (1991). Judges and officials who have duties that are "functionally

comparable" to those of judges are, however, entitled to absolute immunity.

Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). This immunity, which protects

the independence of judges, administrative-law judges, and officials with

similar duties, shields not only these decisionmakers, but also other

individuals who perform discretionary tasks that play an "integral part[]"

in the decisionmaking process. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200

(1985) (quoting Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983)).

A.

We begin by applying these principles to Parole Commissioner Getty's

decision to delay Anton's parole. In Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828

(8th Cir. 1983), we held that "parole officials in deciding to grant, deny,

or revoke parole, perform functions comparable to those of judges," and

are, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 831. Commissioner

Getty's decision to delay Anton's parole was based on her conclusion that

Anton had not prepared an adequate release plan and, thus, had not met the

requirements for parole. It was no less judicial in character than are

decisions to deny parole. Accordingly, Commissioner Getty is
 Anton argues that Commissioner Getty lost her absolute

4

immunity because she violated Anton's constitutional rights. We

disagree. Although "an official acting outside her jurisdiction

loses her immunity, . . . [a] decision about whether or not to

grant parole is at the heart of a parole board member's

jurisdiction, whether that decision is based on lawful or unlawful

considerations." Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th

Cir. 1993). The same is true of a parole commissioner's decision

to delay a release date. Thus, even if we believed that

Commissioner Getty acted unconstitutionally (which we do not), she

would still be absolutely immune from suit.

 Our decision in Ray v. Pickett, 734 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1984), 5

is not to the contrary. In Ray, we held that two federal probation

officers who were accused of filing a false parole-violation report

were entitled only to qualified immunity. We noted that the

"effect of filing [a parole-violation] report is merely to trigger

an inquiry by another officer that may or may not lead to an

administrative proceeding." Id. at 373. These duties were

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entitled to absolute immunity.4

Hearing Examiner Muller and Probation Officers Lawrenz, Holt, and

Woddail are protected by absolute immunity, as well. Anton claims that

these defendants violated his constitutional rights by concluding that his

release plan was unacceptable and recommending that his parole be delayed.

These tasks are similar to the ones performed by probation officers when

they prepare a presentence report. In both cases, officials evaluate

facts, draw legal conclusions, and make recommendations which play a

significant part in a decisionmaking process. A number of our sister

circuits have held that because presentence reports are so closely

associated with the exercise of a judicial function, probation officers who

prepare these reports are entitled to absolute immunity. See Young v.

Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1837

(1995); Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per

curiam); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157-58 (9th Cir. 1986); Hughes v.

Chesser, 731 F.2d 1489, 1490 (11th Cir. 1984); Spaulding v. Nielsen, 599

F.2d 728, 729 (5th Cir. 1979). Because the conclusions and recommendations

of Muller, Holt, Lawrenz, and Woddail had a similar, close connection to

Commissioner Getty's decision to delay Anton's parole, these officers are

protected by absolute immunity.5
analogous to those "of a police officer in deciding whether there

is probable cause for an arrest. . .," id. at 374, and were,

therefore, too far removed from the decision to revoke Ray's parole

to merit absolute immunity.

In contrast, the duties of Holt, Muller, Lawrenz, and Woddail

were closely connected to Parole Commissioner Getty's decision to

delay Anton's parole. They did not merely take actions that might

have precipitated an inquiry which could have led to a decision by

Commissioner Getty. Instead, these defendants made recommendations

that were an important part of an ongoing evaluation of whether

Anton had met the requirements for parole. 

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Next, we consider whether Chief Analyst Kostbar, who determined that

Commissioner Getty's decision was not appealable because Anton's paroleeligibility date had not yet occurred, is entitled to absolute immunity.

In Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385 (9th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1040 (1988), the Ninth Circuit

confronted a similar question. Mullis filed suit against a bankruptcycourt clerk who failed to accept a bankruptcy petition because the petition

was not written in the correct form. The court held that the clerk was

entitled to absolute immunity because his refusal to accept the petition

was "an integral part of the judicial process." Id. at 1390. See also

Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Courts have granted

absolute immunity to court clerks where they were performing discretionary

acts of a judicial nature."). The same reasoning applies to Kostbar, who

performed a discretionary task which played an "integral part" in the

National Appeals Board's decisionmaking process. Indeed, Kostbar's

conclusion that Anton's appeal was not ripe is the sort of decision that

judges often make. Kostbar is, therefore, entitled to absolute immunity.
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B.

 

Finally, we turn to Anton's claims against Case Manager Mickal Laird,

and Stan Ahlin and Cecil Turner, two of Laird's supervisors. Anton asserts

that Laird, acting under the direction of Ahlin and Turner, violated the

Constitution by suggesting to Parole Officer Muller that Anton's parole be

delayed. Although we do not believe that Laird, Ahlin, and Turner are

entitled to absolute immunity, we agree with the District Court that Anton

has failed to state a claim against them.

After Probation Officer Woddail decided that Anton would have to be

housed in a Community Corrections Center, Laird told Muller that it would

take 90 days to place Anton in one of these facilities. Laird's

recommendation that Anton's parole be delayed was based on this time

estimate, not on an assessment of Anton's release plan. This purely

logistical calculation is not comparable to a judicial decision.

Therefore, Laird and his supervisors are not protected by absolute

immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 228 (1988) (absolute

immunity does not protect officials when they make "administrative," rather

than "judicial," decisions).

The proposed complaint, however, failed to state a claim against

these three defendants. In requesting that Anton's parole be delayed so

that Anton could be placed in a Community Corrections Center, Laird, Ahlin,

and Turner did not violate any constitutional rights. Their actions were

a lawful and quite reasonable response to Anton's failure to submit an

adequate release plan. See Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th

Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (dismissing a § 1983 claim brought against a

parole-board member who delayed the plaintiff's parole hearing because his

parole application "did not contain sufficient information about his

proposed home placement").
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III.

For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.