Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on

Crime, Committee on the Judiciary, House

of Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

July 2001 DEA'S MOBILE

ENFORCEMENT

TEAMS

Steps Taken to Enhance

Program Management,

But More Can Be Done

GAO-01-482
Page i GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Letter 1

Executive Summary 2

Purpose 2

Background 3

Results in Brief 3

Principal Findings 4

Recommendations for Executive Action 9

Agency Comments and GAO’s Evaluation 9

Chapter 1 Introduction 12

Drug-Related Violent Crime 12

DEA’s Role in Drug Law Enforcement 12

MET Program 14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 17

Chapter 2 Program Management Enhanced, but No Assurance

METs Are Assisting Only Incapable Local Agencies 20

DEA Headquarters Has Taken Steps to Improve Its Management of

the MET Program 21

METs Generally Followed Some Program Requirements;

Compliance With Other Requirements and Guidelines Is Unclear 25

MET Deployments Generally Concluded When Objectives Were

Achieved 35

Conclusions 38

Recommendation for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 39

Chapter 3 MET Deployments Typically Investigated StreetLevel Drug Dealers and Used Various Investigative

Techniques 44

MET Deployments Focused Primarily on Street-Level Drug Dealers 44

MET Deployments Involved Mostly Local and Regional Drug Cases 48

Drug Buys and Informants Used More Than Most Other

Investigative Techniques 50

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Chapter 4 DEA Measures of MET Program Results Have

Problems and Limitations 51

DEA Uses a Variety of Performance Measures 51

DEA Reports Results for Some MET Performance Measures 56

Performance Measures Have Problems and Limitations 57

Conclusions 61

Recommendations for Executive Action 62

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 62

Appendix I Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995

Through 2000 67

Appendix II GAO Methodology for Selecting and Reviewing

Completed DEA MET Deployment Files 75

Appendix III Summary Examples of MET Assessments of Local

Law Enforcement Agencies’ Capabilities 77

Appendix IV Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated,

Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 80

Appendix V MET Program Arrests and Seizures Data,

Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 81

Appendix VI Summary Examples of DEA-Reported Successful

MET Deployments 82

Appendix VII Examples of Postdeployment Information Reported

for Four Areas 84
Page iii GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Justice 87

Appendix IX GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 96

Tables

Table 1: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Year 1995 Through

First 6 Months of Fiscal Year 2001 16

Table 2: MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000 17

Table 3: Median Duration of MET Deployments Started in Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000 and Completed by September 30,

200038

Table 4: File Review Strata for Completed MET Deployments 75

Figures

Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events Relating to MET Management 21

Figure 2: MET Predeployment Assessment Process 28

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of MET Deployments Completed

as of June 30, 1999, Following Certain Required

Procedures for Assessing Drug and Violence Problems 29

Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as

of June 30, 1999, with Targets and Primary Targets

Arrested 37

Figure 5: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as

of June 30, 1999, Investigating Different Types of

Suspected Drug Violators 45

Figure 6: Level of Drug Dealing Investigated During MET

Deployments at Six DEA Field Divisions 46

Figure 7: Selected Aspects of MET Deployment Operations at Six

DEA Field Divisions 47

Figure 8: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated During Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000 49

Figure 9: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as

of June 30, 1999, Using Various Investigative Methods and

Techniques 50

Figure 10: MET Program Performance Measures 52
Page iv GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Abbreviations

ASAC Assistant Special Agent in Charge

DCI data collection instrument

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ Department of Justice

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

MET Mobile Enforcement Team

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

RET Regional Enforcement Team

SAC Special Agent in Charge

SOD Special Operations Division

VCTF Violent Crimes Task Force
Page 1 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

July 26, 2001

The Honorable Lamar Smith

Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime

Committee on the Judiciary

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to a request from your Subcommittee, this report discusses

the results of our review of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA)

Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) Program. Specifically, the report

discusses (1) DEA’s management and implementation of the program; (2)

the types of individuals and groups investigated, geographic scope of

investigations, and investigative techniques used during MET operations;

and (3) the performance measures used by DEA to assess the program’s

results. We include recommendations to help improve program

management and performance measurement.

We are sending copies of this report to the Ranking Minority Member of

the Subcommittee, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug

Enforcement Administration, the Director of the Office of Management

and Budget, and interested congressional committees. We will also

provide copies to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please

contact Daniel C. Harris or me at (202) 512-8777. Key contributors to this

report are listed in appendix IX.

Sincerely yours,

Laurie E. Ekstrand

Director, Justice Issues

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548
Executive Summary

Page 2 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Since its creation in 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

has focused its efforts primarily on investigating major organizations

involved in interstate and international drug trafficking. DEA has also

supported state and local law enforcement efforts directed at lower levels

of drug trafficking. In this regard, DEA established the Mobile

Enforcement Team (MET) Program in February 1995 to help state and

local law enforcement agencies combat drug trafficking and related

violent crime in local communities, particularly such crimes committed by

violent gangs.

Because the MET Program had been in operation for almost 5 years, the

former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary

Committee, requested that GAO review the management and performance

of DEA’s MET Program. In response to this request, GAO agreed to

determine the following.

1. How DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program, including

(a) how DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations; (b)

whether DEA field divisions have complied with pertinent program

requirements and guidelines; and (c) whether the MET operations

concluded when their objectives were achieved.

2. What types of individuals and groups are investigated during MET

operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the

principal investigative techniques used.

3. How DEA measures the MET Program’s results and whether DEA’s

performance measures have any limitations.

To address our objectives, we reviewed DEA headquarters files for a

representative, national sample of 83 completed MET deployments (i.e.,

operations) selected from a population of 197 deployments1

 conducted

from the program’s inception in 1995 through June 1999. We also

interviewed officials at DEA headquarters, six DEA field divisions, 13 U.S.

Attorneys’ Offices, 12 District Attorneys’ Offices, and 25 local law

enforcement agencies. In addition, we collected MET Program resource,

management, workload, results, and performance measures information at

DEA headquarters.

 1

For GAO’s review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files, GAO considered the deployment

of both DEA’s Atlanta and Houston Field Division METs to Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996,

to August 12, 1996, as one deployment. DEA counts this as two deployments.

Executive Summary

Purpose
Executive Summary

Page 3 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA established the MET Program to help overcome two drug

enforcement challenges facing many state and local agencies: (1) state and

local police agencies did not have sufficient resources to effectively

enforce the drug laws, and (2) local law enforcement personnel were

known to local drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and

penetration of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.

Under the program, DEA may deploy a team of special agents (referred to

as a MET) to a community from one of its field divisions after receiving a

written request from a police chief, sheriff, or other local law enforcement

official. Because DEA’s resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed

only when it is determined that the problem is beyond the immediate

capabilities of the requesting agency. DEA’s decision to deploy a MET is to

be made only after consulting with the law enforcement agency that made

the request and a thorough on-site assessment substantiating (1) the

reported drug and related violence problem and (2) the requesting law

enforcement agency’s inability to address the problem. DEA headquarters

approves or disapproves each MET deployment based on a field division’s

written request for authorization and funding. When deployed, the MET is

to work cooperatively with the requesting local law enforcement agency to

investigate the targeted individuals, gangs, and organizations responsible

for the drug-related violent crime.

DEA headquarters staff manages the MET Program. The primary

responsibility of the headquarters staff is to develop, disseminate, and

continually monitor the METs’ compliance with program policy,

requirements, and guidelines.

Since the MET Program was established in 1995, and particularly since a

1998 DEA headquarters evaluation led to criticism of the program by the

former DEA Administrator, DEA has enhanced its management of the

MET Program and provided for greater headquarters oversight and

monitoring. For example, DEA increased the number of headquarters staff

managing the program and monitoring the field division METs’ compliance

with program requirements and guidelines.

In implementing the program and carrying out deployments, the field

division METs generally complied with some of the pertinent requirements

and guidelines that GAO reviewed. However, because some DEA

headquarters files did not contain adequate documentation, GAO could

not determine whether the METs consistently and adequately assessed the

requesting local law enforcement agencies’ abilities to address, on their

Background

Results in Brief
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

own, the drug and related violence problems for which DEA’s MET

assistance was requested. Unless the METs adequately assess each

requesting law enforcement agency’s capabilities, and then document and

report their assessments to headquarters, DEA has no assurance that the

METs are helping only those agencies with a legitimate need for

assistance. GAO is making recommendations to help improve this

situation.

DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/organizations

in the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed and that

deployments will generally continue until the targeted individuals are

arrested and/or the targeted drug gangs/organizations have been disrupted

or dismantled. The MET deployments GAO reviewed generally concluded

when their objectives were achieved.

Consistent with the nature and objectives of the MET Program, MET

investigations focused primarily on street-level drug dealers and were

mostly local and regional in scope. In addition, the investigative

techniques of purchasing illegal drugs (referred to as drug buys) and using

informants were employed more frequently than most other techniques to

investigate suspected drug violators. MET investigations sometimes led to

other investigations of higher-level drug traffickers and their

organizations.

DEA collects data for a variety of performance measures to assess the

results of individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program. It

reports internally and externally on program results for some of the

performance measures. However, the measures have problems and

limitations related primarily to the inconsistency in data collection. GAO is

making recommendations to help improve this situation.

DEA has enhanced its management of MET operations and provided for

greater headquarters oversight and monitoring. However, because of

insufficient documentation in DEA headquarters files, GAO could not

determine whether the field division METs consistently and adequately

complied with the program requirement that they assess each requesting

local law enforcement agency’s ability to address the drug and related

violence problem for which DEA’s assistance was requested.

Principal Findings

DEA Has Enhanced MET

Program Management but

Lacks Assurance That METs

Are Assisting Only Agencies

Incapable of Addressing

Problems
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA has enhanced its management and monitoring of the MET Program

since it was established in 1995. DEA headquarters developed a handbook

containing program requirements and guidelines, modified the

requirements and guidelines to improve the program, increased the

number of staff managing the program and monitoring the METs’

compliance with the requirements and guidelines, and took other actions

to more actively oversee and monitor the program. Most of these changes

took place after a June 1998 DEA headquarters evaluation of the MET

Program led to criticism of the program by the former DEA Administrator.

Consequently, DEA concluded that additional oversight and monitoring

was necessary to ensure that the METs were operating in accordance with

program requirements and guidelines.

GAO’s review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files disclosed that

the METs generally followed some of the program requirements and

guidelines GAO selected for review. However, some deployment files did

not contain sufficient evidence that other requirements and guidelines

were followed.

Two key MET Program requirements are that each DEA field division

Special Agent in Charge, after receiving a request to deploy a MET to a

community, and before deploying, must assess (1) the scope of the drug

and related violence problem and (2) the capability of the requesting law

enforcement agency to address the problem. Because DEA’s resources are

limited, a MET is to be deployed only when it is determined that the

problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of the requesting agency.

The DEA headquarters files GAO reviewed generally had documentation

showing that the METs assessed the drug and related violence problems

for which DEA’s assistance was requested. However, 30 percent2

 of the

deployment files did not have documentation showing that the METs

consistently and adequately assessed whether the requesting law

enforcement agencies were capable of addressing their drug and related

violence problems. In addition, many of the deployment files having

documentation did not contain specific evidence that the identified drug

and violence problem was beyond the immediate capabilities of the

requesting agency or explain how this conclusion was reached as the

result of a MET assessment.

 2

The sampling error for all estimates in this report based on GAO’s review of DEA headquarters’

MET deployment files is not greater than 10 percentage points at the 95-percent confidence level

unless otherwise noted. Appendix II contains a thorough explanation of GAO’s probability

sample of MET deployment files.

Steps Taken to Enhance MET

Program Management and

Monitoring

Compliance With Some MET

Program Requirements and

Guidelines Is Unclear
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA headquarters has not clearly required the METs to document their

assessments of the requesting agencies’ capabilities, including the

rationale and basis used to determine that agencies are incapable of

handling their drug and violence problems. Further, DEA’s MET Program

handbook, which establishes program requirements and guidelines, does

not discuss how such assessments should be made and does not identify

specific factors that the METs should consider in making this

determination, such as the amount of money the agency has available to

buy illegal drugs from dealers, availability of technical equipment, and

extent of the agency’s drug law enforcement expertise. The Comptroller

General’s internal control standards3

 require that all transactions and other

significant events be clearly documented, and that the documentation be

readily available for examination. Appropriate documentation is an

internal control activity to help ensure that management’s directives are

carried out. Without such documentation, DEA has no assurance that the

METs are helping only those agencies with a legitimate need for

assistance.

DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/organizations

in the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed and that

deployments will generally continue until the targeted individuals are

arrested and/or the targeted drug gangs/organizations have been disrupted

or dismantled. GAO estimates that 62 percent of the 197 DEA headquarters

files, or about 122 files, contained documents indicating one or more

reasons that deployments were concluded. Of these 122 files, an estimated

80 percent indicated that at least one reason was that the deployment

objectives had been achieved or essentially achieved. The files also

contained the following other reasons relating to the achievement of the

deployment objectives: an estimated 96 percent of the 122 files included

the reason that targeted individuals had been arrested; an estimated 40

percent of the files included the reason that targeted gangs/organizations

had been disrupted; and an estimated 21 percent of the files included the

reason that targeted gangs/organizations had been dismantled.

 3

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1).

MET Deployments Generally

Conclude When Objectives Are

Achieved
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

MET deployments investigated a wide range of suspected drug violators.

However, consistent with the nature and objectives of the program, the

primary focus of the investigations was street-level drug dealers (an

estimated 87 percent of the 197 deployments). Other categories of

suspected violators investigated included drug organizations in an

estimated 65 percent of the deployments, violent individuals in an

estimated 64 percent of the deployments, wholesale-level drug suppliers in

an estimated 62 percent of the deployments, gangs in an estimated 33

percent of the deployments, and international drug trafficking

organizations in an estimated 8 percent of the deployments.

According to DEA data, about 76 percent of the MET investigations

initiated through fiscal year 2000 were local or regional in scope, involving

suspected drug violators operating in the geographic areas of the DEA

offices that conducted the investigations; an estimated 18 percent involved

drug traffickers operating on a broader scale within the United States; and

an estimated 6 percent involved traffickers operating internationally. A

variety of different methods and techniques were used during MET

deployments to investigate suspected drug violators, with drug buys and

informants used more frequently than most other investigative techniques

(i.e., in an estimated 92 and 90 percent, respectively, of the 197

deployments in GAO’s review).

GAO’s file review and interviews with officials in six of DEA’s field

divisions indicated that MET investigations sometimes led to other DEA

spin-off investigations of higher-level drug traffickers and their

organizations. For example, GAO estimates that 14 percent of the 197

deployment files contained documentation indicating that the

deployments led to a spin-off investigation.

DEA uses various quantitative and qualitative performance measures to

assess the results of individual MET deployments and how well the overall

MET Program is achieving its goal of helping local law enforcement

agencies to disrupt or dismantle drug trafficking gangs or organizations

responsible for drug-related crime and violence. Some of the MET

Program performance measures are intended to measure program output

(activity), while others are intended to measure outcome (results). Two

principal performance measures are the disruption or dismantlement of

targeted drug trafficking gangs or organizations and the arrest of

individuals identified as the primary targets of the MET deployments.

Other performance measures are differences in the number of certain

violent crimes (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated assault) occurring in

MET Deployments Typically

Involved Investigations of

Street-Level Drug Dealers

and Employed Various

Investigative Techniques

DEA’s Measures of MET

Program Results Have

Problems and Limitations
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

the geographic areas where the deployments take place, the total number

of arrests, the amount of drugs seized, the amount of assets seized, and the

analysis and opinions of local law enforcement agencies regarding four

outcome-oriented areas (i.e., reduction in drug sales, stability of the target

area, community reaction and involvement, and overall assessment of the

deployment).

DEA periodically summarizes and reports the results related to some of

the MET performance measures. This information is provided to DEA top

management and the Attorney General; some MET results information has

been provided to Congress, in support of DEA’s annual budgets and

performance plans, and to the public. For example, DEA reported that the

MET deployments resulted in 11,283 arrests and the seizure of about 6,000

pounds of drugs (i.e., cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana)

and about $16.9 million in assets (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars) from

fiscal years 1995 to 2000.

However, DEA lacks standard data collection methods for some of the

MET Program performance measures. For example, DEA has no written

guidance and specific criteria for determining whether a gang or

organization has been disrupted or dismantled, and DEA has no assurance

that the METs are consistently considering the same factors. Without

standard data collection methods, some performance measures may not

provide information needed by DEA to determine how well the MET

Program is achieving its goal.

In addition, DEA does not compile information to compare the number of

primary individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted for investigation at

the beginning of and during deployments to the number arrested,

disrupted, and dismantled at the conclusion of deployments. Without such

a comparison, DEA cannot accurately determine the progress of the MET

Program.

Moreover, the qualitative information collected during post-deployment

reviews for the four outcome-oriented areas that are used as performance

measures (i.e., reduction in drug activity, stability of the target area,

community reaction and involvement, and overall assessment of the

deployment) is not as useful as it could be for assessing results because it

is not collected and reported in a standardized, structured way.
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

To help ensure that DEA’s MET resources are used only in those instances

where the requesting local law enforcement agencies are incapable of

addressing drug-related violence problems in their communities, GAO

recommends that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to

(1) provide clear guidance for METs to use in assessing local law

enforcement agencies’ capabilities; and (2) ensure that the DEA field

divisions document such assessments and provide them to DEA

headquarters before MET deployments are approved.

With regard to DEA's MET Program performance measures, GAO

recommends that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to

(1) establish and ensure the use of standardized data collection methods

for obtaining information on the performance measures DEA uses to

assess the results of the individual MET deployments and the overall MET

Program; (2) compile data and compare the number of primary

individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the beginning of and

during deployments to the number arrested, disrupted, and dismantled; (3)

collect and report consistent violent crime statistics that cover

comparable crime types and time periods and relate to (a) the specific

geographic areas where the MET deployments were focused and (b) to the

extent feasible and practical, pertinent adjacent and comparable areas;

and (4) use more structured data collection methods, such as a survey

instrument, to collect qualitative data on the four outcome-oriented areas

included in the post-deployment reviews that can be used to assess the

results of the individual MET deployments and be aggregated to evaluate

the overall MET Program.

GAO provided a draft of this report to the Attorney General for comment.

DOJ’s written comments and our responses can be found at the end of

chapters 2 and 4 and are reprinted in appendix VIII. In its written

comments, DOJ agreed with certain aspects of GAO’s recommendations

and disagreed with other aspects. GAO is retaining all of its

recommendations.

With regard to GAO’s first recommendation that DEA provide clear

guidance for METs to use in assessing local law enforcement agencies’

capabilities, DOJ stated it will ask DEA to revise the MET Program

handbook to address GAO’s concern that it does not discuss how such

assessments should be made and identify specific factors for METs to

address. Nevertheless, DOJ stated that DEA has provided much guidance

in a number of ways. However, GAO does not believe those ways cited by

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DOJ provided clear, sufficient guidance for METs' use in assessing

capabilities.

Regarding GAO’s second recommendation concerning agency capability

assessments, DOJ stated that it would ask DEA to ensure that detailed

field assessments are documented for DEA headquarters before

committing to MET deployments. DOJ noted that DEA suggests that a field

division's notice that an assessment has been made and approved by field

management is the key documentation needed by headquarters. GAO

states, however, that without better documentation, as required by the

Comptroller General's Internal Control Standards, DEA headquarters

management has no assurance that MET resources are being used to help

only those agencies with a legitimate need for DEA’s assistance. DOJ also

suggested that GAO could have made some methodological changes

relating to its findings on the documentation issue, but GAO cites various

reasons why such changes would not have been feasible or resulted in

different findings.

DOJ disagreed with GAO’s first performance measurement

recommendation. DOJ stated that DEA's MET Program now uses

standardized data collection methods, specifically citing the collection of

disruption and dismantlement information and violent crime statistics for

each deployment. However, GAO emphasizes that there is no assurance

that this information is collected in a standardized way because of the lack

of guidance for applying the definitions for disruption and dismantlement

and the problems associated with collecting consistent violent crime

statistics at the local level.

DOJ disagreed with GAO’s second performance measurement

recommendation that DEA compile and compare the number of primary

individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the beginning of and

during MET deployments to the number arrested, disrupted, and

dismantled. DOJ stated that because MET investigations may evolve and

change focus (with regard to targets), it is very difficult to measure the

success of a deployment strictly by comparing the number of primary

targets at the onset of a deployment against the number of arrests at the

conclusion. GAO recognizes that targets can change during a deployment.

However, without comparative information, taking into account

appropriate target changes, DEA cannot determine to what extent the

MET Program is achieving its goal of disrupting and dismantling targeted

drug trafficking gangs and organizations.
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DOJ disagreed with the first part of GAO’s third performance

measurement recommendation concerning the collection and reporting of

consistent violent crime statistics. DOJ stated that as long as the pre- and

postdeployment crime data are based on consistent geographic areas, even

though the areas may be larger than the MET deployment areas, DEA will

continue to use the best available data. However, GAO believes that

violent crime statistics should, as often as feasible, relate to the specific

geographic areas where the METs were focused rather than broader

geographic areas. When not feasible, GAO believes DEA should ensure

that only consistent violent crime data for specific MET deployment

geographic areas, time periods, and crime types are aggregated and

reported for MET Program performance measurement purposes. With

regard to the second part of the recommendation, DOJ stated it would ask

DEA to collect and report violent crime statistics for pertinent adjacent

and comparable areas whenever feasible and practical.

DOJ agreed with GAO's final performance measurement recommendation

regarding the use of more structured data collection methods to collect

qualitative data from local law enforcement agencies on the outcomeoriented areas included in the MET postdeployment reviews. DOJ noted

that given the difficulty in aggregating the results of the deployments to

evaluate the overall MET Program, DEA will appraise creating a more

structured data collection instrument that can be used to gather data from

a diversity of communities.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 12 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Since its creation in 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

has focused its efforts primarily on investigating major organizations

involved in interstate and international drug trafficking. DEA has also

supported state and local law enforcement efforts directed at lower levels

of drug trafficking. In 1994, the DEA Administrator undertook a review of

DEA’s policies and strategies to ensure that DEA was appropriately

responding to the nation’s drug trafficking problem and related violent

crime. One of the results of this review was the creation of the Mobile

Enforcement Team (MET) Program in 1995, to help state and local law

enforcement agencies combat violent, street-level drug gangs, and other

drug-related violent crime in local communities.

The demand for and supply of illegal drugs persists at very high levels and

adversely affects American society in terms of social, economic, and

health costs. In addition, many violent crimes committed are drug related,

according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).1 There

are no overall quantitative data on drug-related violent crime and the

relationship between drug abuse or trafficking and violent crime.

However, ONDCP has identified several qualitative indicators linking drug

abuse or trafficking and other crimes, including violent crimes.

According to ONDCP, many crimes such as murder, assault, and robbery

are committed under the influence of drugs or may be motivated by a need

to obtain money for drugs. Also, competition and disputes among drug

traffickers and dealers can cause violence, as can the location of drug

markets in disadvantaged areas where legal and social controls against

violence tend to be less effective. DEA reported that gangs responsible for

distributing drugs in local communities often commit violent crimes

associated with their drug activities.

The mission of DEA, which is a component of the Department of Justice

(DOJ), is to (1) enforce U.S. controlled substance laws and regulations and

bring drug traffickers to justice and (2) recommend and support

nonenforcement programs aimed at reducing the availability of illegal

drugs in domestic and international markets. DEA is the lead agency

responsible for federal drug law enforcement and for coordinating and

pursuing drug investigations in foreign countries.

 1

See ONDCP’s Fact Sheet: Drug-Related Crime (March 2000, NCJ-181056).

Chapter 1: Introduction

Drug-Related Violent

Crime

DEA’s Role in Drug

Law Enforcement
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 13 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA’s primary responsibilities for drug law enforcement include:

• investigating major drug traffickers operating at interstate and

international levels;

• coordinating and cooperating with federal, state, local, and foreign law

enforcement agencies on mutual drug enforcement efforts, including

interstate and international investigations;

• managing a national drug intelligence system in cooperation with other

federal, state, local, and foreign agencies to collect, analyze, and

disseminate strategic, investigative, and tactical intelligence information;

• seizing and forfeiting drug traffickers’ assets;

• providing leadership for, coordinating, and cooperating with federal, state,

and local law enforcement agencies and foreign governments on programs

designed to reduce the availability of illegal drugs on the U.S. market by

developing drug enforcement institutions, enhancing drug enforcement

agencies’ capabilities, and developing and promoting nonenforcement

methods, such as crop eradication; and

• coordinating all programs associated with drug law enforcement

counterparts in foreign countries under the policy guidance of the

Secretary of State and U.S. Ambassadors.

To carry out its mission and responsibilities, DEA, along with its

headquarters office, had 21 domestic field divisions throughout the United

States and its territories, including Puerto Rico, as of October 2000.

Subordinate to these divisions, each of which was headed by a Special

Agent in Charge (SAC), were a total of 34 district offices, 117 resident

offices, and 49 posts of duty, with at least 1 office in every state. Overseas,

DEA had 78 offices in 56 foreign countries. This included 57 country

offices, each headed by a country attaché, and 21 resident offices

reporting to the country offices. In addition, DEA manages a multiagency

intelligence center in El Paso, TX; conducts training at the Justice Training

Center in Quantico, VA; and maintains seven drug analytical laboratories

in various regions of the country and a special drug testing facility in

McLean, VA.

DEA’s total budget authority for fiscal year 2001 was $1.4 billion. There

were 9,209 DEA employee positions authorized for fiscal year 2001. Of

these, 4,601 were special agent positions, 693 were intelligence specialist

positions, and 3,915 were other positions.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 14 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA established the MET Program in February 1995 to help state and local

law enforcement agencies combat violent crime and drug trafficking in

their communities, particularly crime committed by violent gangs.

According to DEA officials, federal assistance through the MET Program

was designed to help overcome two drug enforcement challenges facing

many state and local agencies: (1) they did not have sufficient resources to

effectively enforce the drug laws; and (2) their officers were known to

local drug users and sellers, making undercover drug buys and penetration

of local distribution rings difficult and dangerous.

The MET Program’s goal is to provide resources to assist local law

enforcement agencies in identifying, targeting, investigating, and

disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking gangs/organizations that are

responsible for drug-related violence in local communities. Under the

program, DEA is to deploy a MET, which is typically comprised of 8 to 12

DEA special agents, to a community only after (1) receiving a written

request from a police chief, sheriff, or other local law enforcement official;

(2) assessing the scope of the drug and related violence problem in the

community; (3) confirming a link between violent crime and identified

drug traffickers, gangs, and organizations; and (4) assessing and

confirming the requester’s need for assistance. METs are based in DEA’s

field divisions throughout the country.

During a deployment, the MET is to work with the local law enforcement

officials to investigate and arrest the targeted violent drug offenders. The

MET generally collects intelligence, initiates investigations, participates in

undercover operations, makes arrests, seizes assets, and provides support

to local or federal prosecutors. Evidence gathered in the course of a MET

investigation may also be used to prosecute the same individuals for

related crimes, including murder, assault, or other acts of violence.

The MET Program is consistent with the Attorney General’s Anti-Violent

Crime Initiative, which was started in 1994 to establish partnerships

among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to address major

violent crime problems, including gangs. The program is also consistent

with DOJ’s Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2000-2005. One of the plan’s goals

is to keep America safe by enforcing federal criminal laws, and one of this

goal’s objectives is to reduce the threat, incidence, and prevalence of

violent crime, especially as it stems from organized criminal enterprises

and drug and gang-related violence. Another of the goal’s objectives is to

reduce the threat and trafficking of illegal drugs by identifying, disrupting,

and dismantling drug trafficking organizations that are international or

multijurisdictional, or have an identified local impact.

MET Program
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 15 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The MET Program is also consistent with ONDCP’s National Drug Control

Strategy.2

 One of the goals of the National Strategy is to increase the safety

of America’s citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and

violence, and one of this goal’s supporting objectives is to strengthen law

enforcement—including federal, state, and local drug task forces—to

combat drug-related violence, disrupt criminal organizations, and arrest

and prosecute the leaders of illegal drug syndicates.

Finally, the MET Program is consistent with DEA’s Strategic Plan: Fiscal

Years 2000-2005, which is derived from the goals and objectives delineated

in both the National Drug Control Strategy and DOJ’s Strategic Plan.

DEA’s overall strategic goal is to identify, target, investigate, disrupt, and

dismantle the international, national, state, and local drug trafficking

organizations having the most significant impact on America. The METs

are specifically identified as a critical success factor in achieving DEA’s

Local Impact strategic objective of reducing drug-related crime in

American communities, including such crime caused by violent gangs, by

providing specialized expertise as required by the local situation.

Table 1 shows the number of active METs, the number of special agents

authorized for those METs, and MET costs reported by DEA from the

inception of the program through the first 6 months of fiscal year 2001.

 2

The most recent National Drug Control Strategy was submitted to Congress in February 1999.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 16 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Table 1: Selected MET Program Data, Fiscal Year 1995 Through First 6 Months of Fiscal

Year 2001

Program data 1995a

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001a

METs 19 19 23 24 24 25b 25b

DEA special

agentsc

120d120d250 250 250 262b262b

Operating costs

(millions)e

$1.0 $2.5 $3.2 $4.4 $6.5 $6.4 $3.1

Operating costs in

constant 2001

dollars (millions)e

$1.1 $2.7 $3.5 $4.7 $6.8 $6.6 $3.1

Payroll

costs(millions)f

$3.4 $12.9 $21.4 $23.1 $23.2 $9.7

Payroll costs in

constant 2001

dollars (millions)f

 $3.7 $13.8 $22.7 $24.0 $23.8 $9.7

a

The data for fiscal year 1995 are for the 6-month period ending September 30, 1995. The data for fiscal

year 2001 are as of March 31, 2001.

b

In fiscal years 2000 and 2001, a second MET in the New York Field Division was staffed with 10 special

agents that were not included in the total number of positions authorized for the MET Program. The New

York Special Agent in Charge redirected resources to create this MET. Table 1 does not include these 10

special agents.

c

The number of special agent positions were authorized as of the end of each fiscal year, except for fiscal

year 2001 positions, which were as of March 31, 2001.

d

DEA’s approved reprogramming authorized 120 special agent positions for the MET Program for fiscal

years 1995 and 1996. DEA program managers reported that 167 special agents were assigned to METs

during these 2 years.

e

MET Program operating costs include deployment expenses such as travel, rent, purchase of evidence,

and purchase of information. According to DEA, the costs are actual for fiscal years 1995 through 2000 and

obligations for the first 6 months of fiscal year 2001.

f

The MET payroll costs are for special agents and support personnel. However, DEA could not account for

all of these payroll costs. According to DEA officials, the costs are actual, as recorded in DEA’s payroll

system, for fiscal years 1996 through 2000, but not all of the MET payroll costs were recorded because of

timekeeping problems, especially in fiscal years before 1998. The costs for the first 6 months of fiscal year

2001 are obligations.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

At the time of our review, DEA had 25 METs in 20 of its 21 domestic field

divisions.3

 Table 2 shows the number of MET deployments requested,

initiated, completed, and active from the program’s inception in fiscal year

1995 through fiscal year 2000.

 3

DEA’s Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, New Orleans, and New York field divisions each had two

METs. The Caribbean Field Division did not have a MET.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 17 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Table 2: MET Deployments, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Deployment 1995-96a1997 1998 1999 2000 Totalb

Requested 112 67 79 70 56 384

Initiated 79 46 55 55 52 287

Completedc79 46 55 55 35 270

Actived 0 0 0 0 17 17

a

Fiscal years 1995-96 data are for the 18-month period ending September 30, 1996.

b

Totals are as of September 30, 2000.

c

Completed deployments are categorized according to the fiscal year they started.

d

Active deployments were initiated but not completed as of September 30, 2000.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix I contains a list of MET deployments completed through fiscal

year 2000 by DEA field division, including the location and time period for

each deployment.

Because the MET Program had been in operation for almost 5 years, the

former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime, House Judiciary

Committee, requested that we review the management and performance of

DEA’s MET Program. In response to this request, we agreed to determine

the following.

1. How DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program, including

(a) how DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations; (b)

whether DEA field divisions have complied with pertinent program

requirements and guidelines; and (c) whether the MET operations

concluded when their objectives were achieved.

2. What types of individuals and groups are investigated during MET

operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the

principal investigative techniques used.

3. How DEA measures the MET Program’s results and whether the

performance measures DEA uses have any limitations.

We did our review at DEA headquarters and at 6 of the 20 domestic field

divisions having MET teams. We did not independently verify the accuracy

and reliability of the funding and other statistical data we collected from

DEA and used in this report because they were used primarily for

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 18 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

background and descriptive purposes and generally were not directly

related to our findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

The six DEA field divisions we visited were in Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA;

Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Phoenix, AZ; and Washington, D.C. These

offices were judgmentally selected based on, and to assure diversity

among, the following factors: geographic location, the year the field

divisions began conducting MET deployments, the length of the field

divisions’ deployments, and whether rural or urban communities were

involved in the field divisions’ deployments. We also obtained information

from officials representing 13 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, 12 District

Attorneys’ Offices, and 25 local law enforcement agencies in the

geographic regions of the 6 DEA field divisions we visited. These agency

representatives had either been involved with or had knowledge of the

MET deployments conducted in their local areas.

To determine how DEA has managed and implemented the MET Program,

including (a) how DEA headquarters has monitored field MET operations,

(b) whether DEA field divisions have complied with pertinent program

requirements and guidelines, and (c) whether the MET operations

concluded when their objectives were achieved, we interviewed DEA

headquarters officials, collected program management, resource, and

workload information, and analyzed pertinent DEA documents, including

the MET Program handbook containing program policies, requirements,

and guidelines.4

 We also reviewed DEA headquarters files for a

representative, national sample of 83 completed MET deployments

selected from a population of 197 deployments conducted from the

program’s inception in 1995 through June 1999. (Our methodology for

selecting and reviewing MET deployment files is discussed in app. II.) In

addition, using structured interviews, we interviewed (1) DEA officials in

the six selected field divisions we visited; and (2) U.S. Attorney, District

Attorney, and local law enforcement officials in the geographic regions of

the six DEA field divisions.

To determine what types of individuals and groups are investigated during

MET operations, the geographic scope of the MET investigations, and the

 4

Based on our review of DEA documents, including the MET Program handbook, and

discussions with DEA officials, we identified what we considered important program

requirements and guidelines. We then consulted with the Chief of DEA’s Mobile Enforcement

Section, which oversees the MET Program, to determine whether the particular items were

either requirements or guidelines and when they became effective.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 19 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

principal investigative techniques used, we reviewed the files for our

random sample of 83 completed MET deployments. We also obtained and

analyzed case initiation data from DEA headquarters for fiscal years 1995

through 2000. In addition, we interviewed DEA headquarters officials,

DEA officials in the six field divisions, and local law enforcement officials

in the geographic regions of the six divisions.

To determine how DEA measures the MET Program’s results and whether

the performance measures DEA uses have any limitations, we reviewed

the files for our random sample of 83 completed MET deployments;

obtained and analyzed DEA headquarters summary program results

information for each fiscal year from 1995 to 2000; and interviewed DEA

headquarters officials, DEA officials in the 6 selected field divisions, and

local law enforcement officials in the geographic regions of the 6 divisions.

We also obtained and analyzed DEA’s Annual Performance Plans for fiscal

years 2000 and 2001, as well as other DEA headquarters information on

MET Program performance measures. We used the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) as our basic criteria along

with Office of Management and Budget (OMB), DOJ, and GAO guidance

on the act, including OMB Circular A-11 and GAO guides for assessing

agency annual performance plans and strategic plans.

We performed our work from December 1999 to January 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In

May 2001, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the

Attorney General. On June 14, 2001, we received written comments from

the Acting Assistant Attorney General for Administration. The comments

are discussed at the end of chapters 2 and 4 and reprinted in appendix VIII.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 20 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA has enhanced its headquarters management and monitoring of the

MET Program since it was established in 1995, particularly since a 1998

DEA headquarters’ evaluation led to criticism of the program by the

former DEA Administrator. DEA headquarters developed and modified

requirements and guidelines for the program and increased the number of

headquarters staff assigned to manage and oversee MET operations.

Based on our examination of evidence contained in DEA headquarters

deployment files, the field division METs generally followed some of the

program requirements and guidelines we selected for review. However,

compliance with other program requirements and guidelines was unclear

because the files did not contain sufficient evidence to make that

determination.

A key program requirement is that the METs assess the requesting local

law enforcement agency’s ability to address the drug and related violence

problem for which DEA’s MET assistance was requested. According to

DEA, because its resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed only when

it is determined that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of

the requesting agency. However, insufficient documentation in many of

the headquarters deployment files made it impossible for us to determine

how consistently and adequately DEA’s 24 METs nationwide1

 carried out

this requirement. DEA headquarters has not clearly required that METs

document and report their assessments of agencies’ capabilities. It also

has not provided clear, sufficient guidance for independently assessing an

agency’s capabilities and determining that they are inadequate to address

the identified drug and related violence problem for which MET assistance

was requested. Unless the METs adequately assess each requesting law

enforcement agency’s capabilities, and then document and report their

assessments to headquarters, DEA has no assurance that the METs are

helping only those agencies that have a legitimate need for assistance and,

thus, that DEA’s MET resources are being used appropriately.

In addition, we found that the MET deployments generally concluded

when their objectives were achieved—e.g., targeted individuals were

arrested or targeted gangs/organizations were disrupted or dismantled—

and at the same time have been shorter in duration, on average, each year

over the last few years.

 1

Although there were 25 METs at the time we completed our work in December 2000, there were

24 METs as of June 30, 1999, the cutoff date for our review of completed deployments.

Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 21 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As the MET Program has evolved, DEA headquarters has taken a number

of actions to improve its management of the program, including increasing

the number of staff carrying out this function and becoming more

assertive in its oversight. The primary responsibility of the headquarters

staff is to develop, disseminate, and continually monitor compliance with

MET Program policy, requirements, and guidelines. Figure 1 provides a

chronological summary of the key steps DEA has taken to improve its

management of the MET program.

Figure 1: Chronology of Key Events Relating to MET Management

Source: Developed by GAO based on DEA information.

DEA Headquarters

Has Taken Steps to

Improve Its

Management of the

MET Program

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

February

May

April/May

February

June

August

June

October

December

July

May

First headquarters MET Program Staff Coordinator, responsible for

overseeing and monitoring the MET Program nationwide, was assigned

to the State and Local Programs Section in DEA's Office of Domestic

Operations

MET Program handbook containing policies, requirements, and guidelines

for initiating and implementing MET deployments was first published and

distributed to field divisions

First MET conference held for field division managers

Additional headquarters Staff Coordinator assigned

First Program Analyst assigned to MET to assist management and the

staff coordinators in overseeing and monitoring the MET Program by,

among other things, preparing reports and providing analytical support

Second MET conference held

Following a June 1998 DEA headquarters evaluation, DEA headquarters

assumed a more active oversight role of METs

Additional Program Analyst assigned

MET Program handbook revised

February Third MET conference held

Mobile Enforcement Section established as a separate headquarters

unit in the Office of Domestic Operations with a Section Chief to oversee

and monitor program implementation by the field divisions consistent

with established policies and requirements

Two additional Staff Coordinators and one additional Program Analyst

assigned later to the Section

Fourth MET conference held
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 22 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

At the time of our review, the Mobile Enforcement Section2 had a Section

Chief, 4 Staff Coordinators, 3 Program Analysts, a secretary, 2

administrative assistants, and a budget technician for a total of 12 staff.

According to the Section Chief, the additional staff has enhanced

management of the MET Program by allowing the Staff Coordinators to

focus on fewer METs and devote more time to each one.3

Since DEA headquarters controls funds allocated for METs, before each

deployment the responsible field division must submit a written request to

the Mobile Enforcement Section for authorization and funding. This

request is to include the results of the MET’s predeployment assessment of

the situation in the requesting community. After receiving the request,

DEA headquarters authorizes or disapproves the deployment based on the

documented predeployment assessment results. According to the MET

Program handbook, the request is to include a discussion of the drug and

related violence problem, a summary of the deployment’s investigative

strategies and objectives, an estimate of the deployment’s duration, and an

estimate of the resources needed.

If any required information is not provided or is unclear in the request, a

headquarters section Staff Coordinator is to contact the MET supervisor to

obtain or clarify the information. The deployment should not be

authorized and funded until all predeployment requirements have been

met. For example, before a New York MET request for the authorization

and funding of a deployment to Watertown, NY, was approved, a Staff

Coordinator requested that additional information be provided, including

information regarding violence attributed to the deployment targets, crime

statistics, and a short statement explaining why Watertown needed a MET

deployment.

 2

In May 2001, DEA changed the name of this section to the Tactical Enforcement Section.

Because our work for this review was completed before this change, our report refers to the

Mobile Enforcement Section.

3

In addition to managing the MET Program, the Mobile Enforcement Section has carried out

similar responsibilities for DEA’s Regional Enforcement Team (RET) Program since the program

was established in fiscal year 1999. Under the RET Program, DEA deploys mobile teams of

special agents to target organized crime syndicates that have established command and control

centers, warehouses, and drug transshipment points in small communities throughout the

United States. As of September 2000, DEA had established three RET offices—Des Moines, IA;

Charlotte, NC; and Las Vegas, NV. Three of the four Staff Coordinators were responsible for

monitoring and coordinating with one RET in addition to six or seven METs.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 23 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Headquarters is to provide a written deployment authorization that

includes approval of a specified length of time, and the amount of

operational funding and staffing to conduct the deployment. If it is later

determined that a deployment cannot be completed in the amount of time

approved and funded by headquarters, the MET can request an extension

of time and additional funds. There is no required timeframe for

completing a MET deployment. While headquarters guidance suggests that

deployments should generally last from 2 to 4 months,4 it is expected that

deployments will generally continue until the targeted drug organization is

disrupted or dismantled.

In addition to the requests for authorization and funding of deployments,

each MET is to provide the Mobile Enforcement Section with various

other documents. These include (1) deployment request letters received

from local law enforcement agencies; (2) biweekly activity reports

discussing the investigative progress of deployments; (3) monthly reports

containing statistics such as the number of arrests, amount of drugs

seized, amount of assets seized, and number of deployments requested and

pending; (4) a summary of each deployment after completion; (5) an

assessment of each deployment’s impact immediately after completion;

and (6) an assessment of each deployment’s impact 6 months after

completion. A file for each deployment containing these and other

documents is maintained at the headquarters section.

MET operations are managed on a day-to-day basis at the field division

level by the Special Agent in Charge (SAC), Assistant Special Agent in

Charge (ASAC), and MET group supervisor. In carrying out program

oversight responsibilities, Mobile Enforcement Section Staff Coordinators

are to monitor all field MET activities, from the receipt of a deployment

request to the completion of the postdeployment review, to ensure that the

METs are operating in accordance with program policies, requirements,

and guidelines.

When problems are identified, Staff Coordinators are to take needed

corrective actions in collaboration with field division MET supervisors. In

our review of headquarters MET deployment files, we noted that some

 4

In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review, DEA issued a revised

MET Program handbook. The new handbook does not suggest a length of time that deployments

should last.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 24 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

identified problems and related actions were noted in the pertinent files.5

If warranted, Staff Coordinators are to provide on-scene consultation to

MET supervisors to resolve problems. If the problem persists, discussion

is to take place between headquarters management (e.g., the Mobile

Enforcement Section Chief or a higher level manager) and the field

division ASAC or SAC.

The Mobile Enforcement Section is to inform DEA top management of the

progress of MET deployments and other program activities through

briefings and periodic reports. The section also is to (1) evaluate the

success of each deployment using violent crime statistics and other factors

(as we discuss in chapter 4); (2) evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of

each MET by examining factors such as the number of deployment

requests received, the age of pending requests, how deployments are

conducted, and the amount of oversight and correction needed; and (3)

track all MET obligations using an automated data base program.

In addition, since 1996, DEA headquarters has organized and conducted

conferences for field division MET supervisors and the ASACs to whom

they report. As shown in figure 1, four such conferences have been held

since the MET Program began. According to DEA, the goal of these

conferences has been to (1) establish the future objectives and direction of

the MET Program, (2) enhance the operational effectiveness and efficiency

of the METs, and (3) communicate to the conference attendees the

support that the program receives from top DEA management, DOJ, and

Congress. DEA headquarters managers have used these conferences to

reiterate and clarify reporting requirements and respond to questions.

Conferences have also featured guest speakers who have discussed

successful MET deployments in their communities and other topics of

interest. The conferences also provide MET supervisors with an

opportunity to meet one another and share information based on their

deployments, such as lessons learned, innovative investigative techniques,

and successful approaches to implementing deployments.

Since a June 1998 DEA headquarters evaluation of the MET Program,

which included an analysis of each field division MET, DEA headquarters

has assumed a more active role in overseeing the program and each

 5

We did not attempt to determine whether all such problems and related actions were

documented in the files.

DEA Headquarters Has

Assumed a More Active

Oversight Role
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 25 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

deployment. Based on this evaluation, the former DEA Administrator

expressed concern and criticism regarding headquarters leadership and

oversight of the MET Program. In response to the DEA Administrator,

DEA concluded that additional oversight and monitoring was necessary to

ensure that METs were operating in accordance with program

requirements and guidelines. DEA also concluded that MET deployment

problems needed to be quickly identified and addressed to avoid wasted

time and resources.

In addition to the biweekly activity reports and monthly statistical reports,

which were already being submitted to the headquarters section and

considered to be primary oversight mechanisms, the Mobile Enforcement

Section Chief said he now meets with headquarters managers on a daily

basis to apprise them of noteworthy MET deployment activity. In addition,

he said the Mobile Enforcement Section prepares a monthly MET activity

report for the DEA Administrator describing the progress of each ongoing

deployment. Also, the biweekly activity report was revised to improve

monitoring and help ensure that the METs continually direct their

investigative resources and activities toward individuals and organizations

identified and targeted in each deployment.

Our review of DEA headquarters deployment files disclosed that in

implementing the MET Program, the field division METs generally

followed some of the requirements and guidelines we reviewed that were

contained in the MET Program handbook. However, some deployment

files did not contain evidence that other requirements and guidelines that

we reviewed were being followed. Most significantly, it was not clear

whether the METs were adequately assessing each requesting law

enforcement agency’s capabilities as required before deciding whether to

approve a deployment request.

Two key MET Program requirements are that each DEA field division SAC,

after receiving a request to deploy a MET to a community and before

deploying, must assess (1) the scope of the drug and related violence

problem and (2) the capability of the requesting law enforcement agency

to address the problem. Particular attention is to be given to determining

the violent crime rate in the requesting community and establishing a link

between the targeted narcotics group(s) and violence. The decision to

METs Generally

Followed Some

Program

Requirements;

Compliance With

Other Requirements

and Guidelines Is

Unclear

METs Are Required to

Assess Local Drug and

Related Violence Problems

and Local Law Enforcement

Agencies’ Capabilities to

Address the Problems
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 26 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

deploy a MET is to be made only after careful consultation with the law

enforcement official who made the request and a thorough on-site

assessment substantiating the need for a deployment. According to DEA,

because its resources are limited, a MET is to be deployed only when it is

determined that the problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of the

requesting agency.

MET supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in six DEA field divisions told

us that their MET special agents almost always visit the requesting law

enforcement agency and discuss the drug and related violence problem

and the agency’s capabilities and limitations with requesting agency

officials. The officials said MET agents also (1) visit the specific problem

area, (2) identify the potential deployment targets already known by the

requesting agency, and (3) obtain information about the area (e.g., crime

statistics) and the potential targets (e.g., criminal histories) as part of their

assessment of the need for a MET deployment.

Officials we interviewed representing 24 of the 25 local law enforcement

agencies included in our review6

 said DEA assessed the drug and related

violent crime problems in their communities prior to initiating a

deployment. Officials at 19 of these 25 agencies also said DEA assessed

whether their agency was capable of handling the problem; officials at 2 of

the agencies said DEA did not assess their capabilities; and officials at 4 of

the agencies did not know whether such assessments had been made. The

MET supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in five of the six DEA field

divisions said requests for deployments had previously been denied

because it was determined there was not a high level of violent crime or

there was no established link between drugs and violence.7

 None of the

officials we spoke with said a request for a deployment was denied

because it was determined that the requesting agency was capable of

addressing the identified drug and violence problem.

 6

As discussed in chapter 1, we obtained information from officials representing 25 local law

enforcement agencies in the geographic regions of the 6 DEA field divisions we visited. These

agency representatives had either been involved with or had knowledge of MET deployments

that DEA carried out at the request of their agencies. The 25 local law enforcement agencies all

carried out police operations and did not include the 13 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and 12 District

Attorneys’ Offices also included in our review.

7

The DEA officials in one field division did not know if any requests for deployments had been

denied.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 27 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

In conducting its predeployment assessment, after the MET visits the

requesting law enforcement agency, it is required to review the

information collected and prepare a thorough and complete written

summary of its assessment of the violent drug situation in that community,

including a description of the link between drugs and violence. The

written summary is also to (1) identify the individuals and organization(s)

to be targeted, (2) outline the investigative methods to be used, (3) state

the deployment objective(s) to be accomplished, and (4) estimate the

duration of the deployment and the resources required. The summary

must also include violent crime statistics for, at a minimum, murder,

robbery, and aggravated assault, which are supposed to be derived from

the area most impacted by the individuals or organization(s) to be targeted

and cover the 6-month period prior to the deployment. In addition, the

summary must explain the requesting law enforcement agency’s reason for

requesting MET assistance. After concurrence by the DEA field division

SAC, the written summary of the predeployment assessment is to be

forwarded to DEA headquarters in the form of a request for the

authorization and funding for the deployment.

Figure 2 summarizes the key steps in the MET predeployment assessment

process.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 28 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 2: MET Predeployment Assessment Process

Source: Developed by GAO based on DEA information.

Consistent with the remarks of officials in 6 DEA field divisions and of 25

law enforcement representatives we interviewed, our review of a

probability sample of DEA headquarters files for 197 MET deployments

completed as of June 30, 1999, revealed that the METs generally adhered

to the key requirement that they assess the drug and related violence

problems for which DEA’s assistance was requested. Figure 3 shows the

estimated percentages of the files that contained documentation indicating

that the METs carried out certain required procedures relating to

predeployment assessments of drug and related violence problems.8

 8

The sampling error for all estimates in this report based on our review of DEA headquarters

MET deployment files is not greater than 10 percentage points at the 95-percent confidence level

unless otherwise noted. Appendix II contains a thorough explanation of our probability sample

of MET deployment files.

METs Generally Assessed

Drug and Violence Problems

As Required

MET assesses the drug

and related violence

problem (e.g.,

determines violent crime

rate, establishes a link

between drugs and

violence, identifies

individuals and gangs

involved, and visits

problem area)

MET visits the

requesting agency to

conduct a

predeployment 

assessment

DEA field

division

MET

MET assesses the

capability of the

requesting agency to

address the drug and

related violence

problem

MET reviews and

analyzes information

collected; prepares

summary of 

predeployment

assessment

Field division sends

request for MET

deployment

authorization and

funding (including

predeployment

assessment

summary) to DEA

headquarters

DEA headquarters

notifies the field

division of approval

or disapproval

If approved, MET

deploys to

authorized location

DEA receives letter

from local law

enforcement agency

requesting MET

assistance

Local law

enforcement

agency

DEA

headquarters
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 29 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 3: Estimated Percentages of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30, 1999, Following Certain Required

Procedures for Assessing Drug and Violence Problems

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

Due to insufficient documentation in the files we reviewed, it is unclear

whether the METs consistently and adequately assessed the requesting

law enforcement agencies’ capabilities to address drug and related

violence problems. The lack of sufficient documentation could be the

result of DEA headquarters (1) not clearly requiring that the assessments

be documented and (2) not providing clear, sufficient guidance to the

METs on how to make these assessments.

We estimate that 30 percent of the headquarters files for the 197

deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, had no documentation

indicating that the METs assessed the capability of requesting law

enforcement agencies to address their own drug and related violence

problems. Even for the six field divisions we visited, where the officials

told us they always assess the requesting agency’s capabilities, we

Unclear Whether METs

Consistently and Adequately

Assessed Local Agencies’

Capabilities

Insufficient Documentation

Relating to the Assessment of

Requesting Agencies’ Capabilities

95

92

85

89

0 20 40 60 80 100

Estimated percentages

METs consulted with the requesting local law

enforcement agency

METs assessed the scope of the drug and

related violence problem

METs established a link between drugs

and violence

METs identified one or more individuals, gangs,

or organizations as a target of the deployment

Predeployment assessment procedures
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 30 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

estimate that 34 percent of the headquarters files did not contain this

documentation.9

For the estimated 70 percent of the headquarters deployment files that did

contain this documentation, the documents generally indicated, as

justification for the deployments, that the agencies had a limited number

of personnel (often providing the number of officers in the police

department and in the drug unit) or limited funds. However, many of these

documents did not provide specific evidence or an explanation of how,

based on its predeployment assessment, the MET concluded that the

identified drug and violence problem was beyond the immediate

capabilities of the requesting agency.

Appendix III contains four examples from our random sample of

deployments that illustrate how METs, in their requests for authorization

and funding, summarized the results of their predeployment assessments

of requesting agencies’ capabilities and the diversity of evidence and

support provided. Although all four requests were approved by DEA

headquarters, as noted in our analysis of each example, the first two do

not provide specific evidence or explain why the requesting agencies were

incapable of addressing their drug and related violence problems. To

illustrate, in the first example, the MET’s request for authorization and

funding to deploy stated that the requesting local police department had

357 persons, including 12 narcotics officers, and that the department was

seeking DEA’s assistance in targeting mid- and upperlevel organizations in

select violent neighborhoods. However, the MET request did not explain

why or cite specific evidence that the identified drug and violence problem

was beyond the police department’s immediate capabilities, i.e., why the

12 narcotics officers and perhaps other officers could not successfully

target and investigate the drug trafficking organizations of concern

without MET assistance.

The third example in appendix III cites a specific reason why the local law

enforcement agency cannot successfully address the drug and violence

problems identified, but does not put the reason into context by explaining

why a particular investigative technique must be used to address the

problems. The fourth example cites several specific reasons why two local

law enforcement agencies cannot successfully address the drug and

 9

The sampling error for this estimate based on our review of DEA headquarters MET deployment

files is 14 percentage points at the 95-percent confidence level.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 31 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

violence problems identified. In the example, the request for deployment

authorization and funding cites the requesting sheriff department’s lack of

manpower, insufficient money to make drug purchases, and inability to

recruit informants. It explains that the local police department is also

incapable of successfully addressing the problems because its drug

enforcement activities have been limited to investigating juveniles and it

did not have sufficient funds to buy drugs and pay informants. In addition,

the request cites prior unsuccessful sheriff and police department efforts

against the identified drug trafficking organization.

DEA headquarters requires METs to document and report their

assessments of drug and related violence problems in their requests for

authorization and funding. However, it has not clearly required the METs

to similarly document and report their assessments of the requesting

agencies’ capabilities, including the METs’ rationale and basis for

concluding that the requesting agencies are incapable of addressing the

drug and violence problems for which DEA’s assistance was requested.

The MET Program handbook, in discussing the information the METs are

to include in their predeployment assessment summaries requesting

authorization and funding of deployments, does not require that

information relating to the requesting agency’s capabilities be included.

At the February 1999 and May 2000 MET conferences, DEA headquarters

provided each MET supervisor with information explaining the elements

that are required for the predeployment assessment summaries requesting

authorization and funding of deployments. One document provided at the

conferences indicated that the METs’ deployment requests are to explain

the requesting agency’s “reason for requesting” a MET deployment, citing

such possible reasons as limited manpower, limited expertise, and the

need for federal prosecution. Another document indicated that the METs’

deployment requests are to explain the requesting agency’s “need for” a

deployment, citing such possible reasons as limited budget for drug

purchases, officers known to traffickers, limited expertise, and limited

technical equipment. However, neither of these documents indicated that

the METs should explain how they determined that the requesting agency

was incapable of addressing its identified drug and related violence

problem without DEA’s assistance.

The Comptroller General’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal

Government (GAO/AIMD-00-21. 3.1) requires that all transactions and

other significant events be clearly documented, and that the

documentation be readily available for examination. The documentation

should appear in management directives, administrative policies, or

No Clear Requirement That

Assessments of Requesting

Agencies’ Capabilities Be

Documented
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 32 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All

documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.

The documentation of transactions or other significant events should be

complete and accurate and should facilitate tracing the transaction or

event and related information. Appropriate documentation is an internal

control activity to help ensure that management’s directives are carried

out.

While DEA headquarters has provided the METs with guidance for

assessing drug and related violence problems, including specific factors to

address, it has not developed and provided the METs with clear, sufficient

guidance for determining whether a requesting agency is capable of

addressing its identified drug and related violence problem without DEA’s

assistance. The MET Program handbook does not discuss how such

assessments should be made and does not identify specific factors for the

METs to address in making their assessments. The absence of such

guidance may have contributed to the lack of sufficient information at

DEA headquarters regarding MET assessments of agencies’ capabilities.

DEA headquarters provided a predeployment assessment checklist

developed by DEA’s Miami field division to each MET supervisor at the

February 1999 and May 2000 MET conferences. While the checklist

identifies some factors to address in assessing the drug and related

violence problem, it contains limited guidance for assessing agencies’

capabilities. The items on the checklist pertaining to an agency’s

capabilities are (1) total number of sworn officers, (2) number of narcotics

officers, (3) availability of K-9 assistance,10 (4) ongoing/prior investigations

of targeted individuals or organizations, and (5) reason(s) MET assistance

was requested.

As previously mentioned, other documents provided at MET conferences

indicate that deployment requests are to explain the requesting agency’s

“reason for requesting” a deployment or “need for” a deployment. These

documents cite other reasons an agency may need assistance that are not

included on the checklist provided to MET supervisors, such as officers

known to traffickers, limited budget for drug purchases, limited expertise,

limited equipment, and the need for federal prosecution. These

documents, however, do not discuss or provide guidance on how to carry

out an assessment and determine whether an agency is capable of

 10K-9 assistance is the use of one or more dogs for the detection of illegal drugs.

Unclear Guidance for Determining

Whether Agencies Are Capable of

Addressing Drug and Violence

Problems
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 33 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

addressing its identified drug and violence problem without DEA’s

assistance.

In discussing the MET predeployment assessment requirements, the Chief

of the Mobile Enforcement Section acknowledged that DEA headquarters

has not specified how the assessments should be conducted. He said

headquarters relies on field division managers to determine how to

conduct the required assessments. Thus, according to the Section Chief,

the length, approach, methodology, and scope of predeployment

assessments, including assessments of each requesting agency’s ability to

address the specific drug and violence problem DEA was asked to

address, could vary among the various field divisions.

In our visits to six DEA field divisions, we asked how the METs conducted

their assessments of requesting agencies’ capabilities. The MET

supervisors and ASACs told us they considered the availability of funds

and whether local narcotics officers were known or recognizable in the

community. Officials in five of the field divisions said they also considered

the requesting agencies’ number of personnel; officials in four of the field

divisions said they also considered the officers’ level of expertise; and

officials in four of the field divisions said they also considered the

agencies’ technical capability (i.e., equipment). The DEA officials said that

MET personnel collected information and made determinations regarding

these factors by talking to officials representing the requesting law

enforcement agencies.

The MET Program handbook cites various other matters that are to be

discussed with the requesting law enforcement agency prior to initiating a

MET deployment. We reviewed a probability sample of DEA headquarters

files for 197 deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, to determine

whether the METs complied with some of these requirements. Our review

found that the files did not always contain evidence of compliance. The

requirements and guidelines we reviewed and our corresponding findings

are summarized below.

• The requesting agency must commit to assigning a specific number of

personnel for the duration of the deployment. DEA officials in the six field

divisions we visited said they always obtain this commitment. We estimate

that 32 percent of the 197 deployment files contained documentation

indicating that the METs obtained such a commitment before initiating the

deployments.

Compliance With Other MET

Program Requirements and

Guidelines Is Unclear
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 34 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

• The MET should work with the requesting agency to make certain that the

deployment is coordinated with other federal, state, or local law

enforcement agencies or task forces operating within the same jurisdiction

to prevent any overlap of ongoing investigations. DEA officials in five of

the field divisions we visited said they always coordinate with other law

enforcement organizations, and officials in one division said they

sometimes coordinate. We estimate that 54 percent of the 197 deployment

files had documentation indicating that the METs carried out such

coordination.

• Prior to each deployment, the MET should obtain the commitment of

federal or local prosecutors to fully support the deployment to ensure the

most effective prosecutions. Only four deployments in the probability

sample of files we reviewed started after December 1998, when the MET

handbook first required that a prosecutor’s commitment be obtained to

support each deployment. Consequently, we could not reach a conclusion

regarding compliance with this requirement. However, we noted that an

estimated 53 percent of the 197 deployment files had documentation

discussing MET coordination with either, or both, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices

and District Attorneys’ Offices. Of those files, the documents in 60 percent

mentioned that the MET had obtained a commitment from prosecutors

regarding potential prosecutions. DEA officials in the six field divisions we

visited said the MET always coordinates with prosecutors, either federal

or state, prior to deployments. Officials in five of the six divisions also said

the MET always obtains a federal or state prosecutor’s commitment of

support, while the officials in one division said they usually, but not

always, obtain such a commitment.

• Within 1 month after each deployment is concluded, an “immediate”

postdeployment review is to be completed evaluating the deployment’s

impact in the requesting jurisdiction from the time the deployment started.

Since April 1997, METs have also been required to prepare a

postdeployment review discussing the deployment’s impact 6 months after

its completion. This review is to include violent crime statistics, supplied

by the requesting law enforcement agency, covering the periods 6 months

before and 6 months after the deployment. Based on our review of DEA

headquarters files for deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, we

estimate that 30 percent of the 197 files contained an immediate

postdeployment review, and 81 percent of the files contained a 6-month

postdeployment review. For those files containing a 6-month

postdeployment review, 89 percent of the reviews included violent crime

statistics.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 35 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA expects the METs to focus on specific, targeted gangs/organizations

in the geographic areas in which the METs are deployed. DEA further

expects that deployments will generally continue until the targeted

individuals are arrested and/or the targeted drug gangs/organizations have

been disrupted or dismantled. The deployments included in our review

were generally concluded when these objectives were achieved—e.g.,

targeted individuals were arrested or targeted gangs/organizations were

disrupted or dismantled. We also noted that while there is no required

standard timeframe for completing a deployment, the deployments have

been shorter in duration, on average, each year over the last few years.

We reviewed a probability sample of DEA headquarters files for the 197

deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, to determine the reasons the

deployments were concluded. We estimate that 62 percent of the files, or

about 122 files,11 contained documents indicating one or more reasons for

concluding the deployment. Of these 122 files, we found that an estimated

80 percent indicated that at least one reason was that the deployment

objectives had been achieved or essentially achieved. The files also

contained the following other reasons relating to the achievement of the

deployment objectives: an estimated 96 percent of the 122 files included as

a reason for terminating the deployment that targeted individuals12 had

been arrested; an estimated 40 percent of the files included the reason that

targeted gangs/organizations had been disrupted; and an estimated 21

percent of the files included the reason that targeted gangs/organizations

had been dismantled.

The MET supervisors and ASACs we interviewed in the six DEA field

divisions we visited said that generally the key reason for concluding a

deployment was that the MET and the involved local law enforcement

agency collected sufficient evidence to make arrests and seek prosecution.

Some of the officials pointed out that not all of the primary targets may

have been arrested; for example, some targets may have fled, and their

whereabouts may be unknown. However, officials in four of the divisions

said that generally the objectives are achieved when a deployment is

concluded.

 11Because of sampling error, the range for this estimate extends from 104 files to 140 files at the

95-percent confidence level.

12The targeted individuals arrested include those identified and targeted during DEA’s

predeployment assessment and targets added during the deployment.

MET Deployments

Generally Concluded

When Objectives

Were Achieved
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 36 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Our review of the DEA headquarters deployment files also found that

targeted individuals were usually arrested when the MET deployments

concluded. Figure 4 shows the estimated percentage of the 197

deployment files that contained documentation indicating that, in most

instances, all or some of the targets and primary targets had been

arrested.13

 13Documents in the DEA headquarters deployment files referred to “targets” and “primary

targets”. The Mobile Enforcement Section Chief told us that there is no official definition for

these terms; however, he noted that a primary target is generally the head, or in the upper

echelon, of an organization.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 37 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 4: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30, 1999, with Targets and Primary Targets

Arrested

Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

Although the MET Program handbook states there is no required

timeframe for completing a deployment, it suggests that deployments

should generally last 2 to 4 months.14 Our analysis of DEA data on the

timeframes for the 269 deployments completed as of September 30, 2000,

showed that the overall median duration was 130 days (or slightly over 4

months) and that the median duration has decreased each year over the

 14In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review, DEA issued a revised

MET Program handbook. The new handbook does not suggest a length of time that deployments

should last.

Some

Unclear

All

None

75%

12%

11%

All

Unclear

None

No primary

targets

identified

49%

23%

22%

4%

3%

2% Some

Targets Arrested Primary Targets Arrested
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 38 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

last few years. Table 3 shows the median duration for the completed

deployments categorized by the fiscal year in which they started.15,16

Table 3: Median Duration of MET Deployments Started in Fiscal Years 1995 Through

2000 and Completed by September 30, 2000

Deployments completed

through fiscal year 2000a 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Number completed 26 52 46 55 55 35

Median duration in days 78 181 148 130 123 122

a

The deployments are categorized according to the fiscal year they started. The table does not include 17

deployments started in fiscal year 2000 and not completed by September 30, 2000. The duration of these 17

deployments may change the median duration for fiscal year 2000.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Nine percent of the 269 deployments in table 3 were completed within 60

days and 44 percent were completed within 120 days. The median duration

for the deployments decreased about 33 percent from fiscal year 1996 to

fiscal year 2000.

DEA has enhanced its management of MET operations. However, because

of insufficient documentation in DEA headquarters deployment files, we

could not determine whether the METs consistently and adequately

complied with the requirement that they assess each requesting local law

enforcement agency’s ability to address the drug and related violence

problem for which DEA’s assistance was requested. DEA headquarters has

not clearly required the METs to document and report their assessments

of agencies’ capabilities. Also, DEA headquarters has not developed clear

guidance for the METs to assess whether each requesting agency is

capable of handling the identified drug and violence problem for which

 15We report the median durations because the distribution of durations is skewed by some

unusually long deployments, making the median a better indicator of the central tendency of

durations. We calculated the durations by subtracting the starting dates from the ending dates,

using figures provided by DEA and verified for those cases in our file review sample.

Deployments may be considered completed even though DEA special agents may carry out

certain postdeployment activities, such as testifying in court, and even though further

indictments and arrests may be obtained at a later date.

16Appendix I of this report contains a list of all MET deployments completed through September

30, 2000, and includes the starting and ending dates of each. For our calculation of the overall

median duration of these deployments, we considered the deployment of both DEA’s Atlanta and

Houston Field Division METs to Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996, to August 12, 1996, as one

deployment. DEA counts this as two deployments.

Conclusions
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 39 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA’s assistance was requested and comprehensively identifying specific

factors to be addressed in making such assessments. Absent such

guidance, and internal controls requiring that such assessments be

documented and forwarded to DEA headquarters for consideration before

MET deployments are authorized and funded, DEA cannot be sure that

METs are only being deployed to those requesting law enforcement

agencies that have a legitimate need for assistance. As a result, the MET

Program may not be making the most effective use of its limited resources.

To help ensure that DEA’s MET resources are used only in those instances

where the requesting local law enforcement agencies are incapable of

addressing drug-related violence problems in their communities, we

recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to (1)

provide clear guidance for METs to use in assessing local law enforcement

agencies’ capabilities; and (2) ensure that the DEA field divisions

document such assessments and provide them to DEA headquarters

before MET deployments are approved.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ essentially agreed

with the two recommendations contained in this chapter. However, it had

some comments on the related findings.

With regard to our recommendation relating to guidance for METs to use

in assessing whether local law enforcement agencies are capable of

addressing drug and related violence problems without DEA’s assistance,

DOJ stated it will ask DEA to revise the MET Program handbook to

address our concern that the handbook does not discuss how such

assessments should be made and does not identify specific factors for the

METs to address. In agreeing with the recommendation, however, DOJ

referred to our finding that DEA does not currently provide clear guidance

for assessing a local law enforcement agency's capabilities as "largely

interpretive in nature." DOJ said that while DEA has provided much

guidance on what to look for in assessing agencies’ capabilities, GAO

would like to see more detail and the guidance published in the MET

Program handbook.

We acknowledge that DEA headquarters has provided the field division

METs with some guidance for assessing local law enforcement agencies’

capabilities. In fact, our report states on page 32 that a predeployment

assessment checklist and other documents provided to MET supervisors

at MET conferences cite various reasons why a local agency may need

Recommendation for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 40 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

assistance. However, neither these documents nor the MET handbook

discusses or provides clear, sufficient guidance to the METs on how to

carry out an assessment and determine whether an agency is capable of

addressing its identified drug and violence problem without DEA’s

assistance. They do not provide specific guidance on how to assess the

situation by (1) establishing what the requesting agency’s capabilities are;

(2) determining what enforcement methods, techniques, resources, and

capabilities are needed to resolve the specific, identified problem that

DEA has been asked to help address; and (3) determining if there are one

or more valid reasons why the requesting agency cannot resolve the

problem without a MET deployment.

DOJ discussed three ways it believes DEA has provided guidance for

assessing an agency’s capabilities. However, as discussed below, we do

not believe the three ways cited by DOJ provided clear, sufficient guidance

for field division METs to use in conducting their assessments.

First, DOJ stated that it is established policy that DEA will assign MET

resources to address a documented threat only when the local police are

not capable of doing so themselves. DOJ cites two possible reasons for

judging a local law enforcement agency as incapable of addressing the

threat without DEA’s assistance and notes that there are other reasons. In

our opinion, the fact that it is established DEA policy that MET resources

be assigned only when the local police are judged incapable of addressing

the identified problem for any of a number of reasons is not the same as

providing guidance on how to implement the policy and on reasons or

factors to be considered in assessing capabilities.

Second, DOJ stated that annual MET conferences provide MET managers

with an opportunity to exchange views on best practices and enable DEA

headquarters to clarify management issues related to MET deployments.

While we agree that the conferences are good forums for exchanging MET

experiences and best practices and clarifying issues, our review of detailed

summaries of the conferences provided by DEA shows that the topic of

assessing agencies’ capabilities apparently was not an agenda item at the

conferences and was not addressed.

Third, DOJ stated that DEA field division managers are primarily

responsible for assessing local agencies’ capabilities, and the uniqueness

of many situations makes the development of standard protocols difficult.

In our opinion, the fact that DEA field division managers are primarily

responsible for conducting agency capability assessments, which may

address many unique situations, does not constitute guidance on how to
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 41 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

carry out such assessments. On the contrary, the fact that there are 25

different METs in 20 DEA field divisions making capability assessments

emphasizes the importance of and need for guidance, that is, established

general principles, standards, or criteria to which the field divisions can

refer.

With regard to our recommendation relating to the documentation of

agency capability assessments, DOJ stated that it accepts our

recommendation and will ask DEA to ensure that detailed field office

assessments be documented for DEA headquarters before committing

funds to MET deployments. DOJ noted that the crucial point is to

determine the best use of federal resources in addressing drug and

violence problems around the country. DOJ stated that it planned to ask

DEA to review this matter, especially as it relates to the MET Program, in

the coming months. In our opinion, having clearer, more detailed guidance

for assessing local law enforcement agencies' capabilities in the MET

Program handbook together with more adequate documentation and

explanations of the basis for field assessments and decisions would

provide DEA headquarters officials with a sounder basis for making

resource decisions related to the deployment of METs across the United

States.

Although DOJ accepted our recommendation, it stated that it was based

largely on the finding that headquarters program files, in 30 percent of the

MET deployments reviewed, did not contain documentation indicating

that the field divisions had assessed the capabilities of local law

enforcement agencies. While this is true, it is also important to emphasize

that, as discussed on page 30, many of the other 70 percent of the files that

contain documentation did not provide specific evidence or an

explanation of how the METs, based on their predeployment assessments,

concluded that the local law enforcement agencies were incapable of

addressing the identified drug-related violence problems in their

communities.

DOJ also suggested that we could have made three changes in our

methodology to probe the documentation issue and determine more

definitively whether DEA erred in deploying METs to areas where local

law enforcement agencies could have addressed the drug and violence

threat by themselves.

First, DOJ suggested that since DEA relies on its field managers and SACs

to determine local agencies’ capabilities, we could have reviewed DEA

field division files to find and examine more detailed documentation on
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 42 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

this issue. The objectives of our review focused mainly on DEA

headquarters’ overall management and oversight of the MET Program

carried out by field division METs and not on determining specifically

whether DEA erred in deploying METs to areas where local law

enforcement agencies could have addressed the drug and violence threat

by themselves. In developing our methodology, we considered reviewing

DEA’s field office MET deployment files. However, the head of DEA’s

Mobile Enforcement Section17 informed us that the section maintains all

key documents pertinent to each deployment for management purposes.

Also, a significant constraint was that travel to a number of different

locations around the country, as compared with reviewing all files in a

central location, would have been costly and time-consuming. In addition,

the preliminary work we carried out at two field division offices indicated

that these field divisions generally did not have more detailed

documentation related to their actions to comply with MET Program

requirements and guidelines, including the required MET predeployment

assessments, than DEA headquarters.

DOJ also stated that DEA suggests that a field division’s notice to

headquarters that an assessment has been made and the field division SAC

concurs with the assessment is the key documentation needed at

headquarters for the capability assessment requirement. However, as

discussed on pages 31-32, the Comptroller General’s internal control

standards require that the documentation of significant events, which we

believe the assessments of local law enforcement agencies’ capabilities

are, should be complete and accurate and facilitate tracing the transaction

or event and related information. Appropriate documentation can help

ensure that management’s directives are carried out. Therefore, in our

opinion, without better documentation than we found during our review,

DEA headquarters management has no assurance that the field division

METs are helping only those agencies with a legitimate need for DEA’s

assistance and that the MET Program is making the most effective use of

limited DEA resources.

Second, DOJ stated that we could have sampled and compared

deployment files before and after the Mobile Enforcement Section was

created (in July 1999) to determine whether increased headquarters

 17In May 2001, DEA changed the name of this section to the Tactical Enforcement Section.

Because our work for this review was completed before this change, our report refers to the

Mobile Enforcement Section.
Chapter 2: Program Management Enhanced, but

No Assurance METs Are Assisting Only

Incapable Local Agencies

Page 43 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

oversight has led to an increase in detailed documentation of MET

deployment decisions. DOJ noted that our review of MET deployment files

pertained mostly to deployments initiated before DEA expanded its

headquarters oversight of the MET program in 1998, after the DEA

Administrator reviewed an internal evaluation. In our opinion, changing

the sample would not have changed the results because neither the May

1995 nor December 1998 MET Program handbooks containing policies,

requirements, and guidelines for initiating and implementing deployments

require that information relating to the requesting agencies’ capabilities be

documented or included in the predeployment assessment summaries

requesting authorization and funding of deployments. Thus, there is no

reason to believe that increased headquarters oversight to ensure that

METs operate in accordance with program requirements and guidelines

would have led to an increase in detailed documentation regarding

assessments of agencies’ capabilities.

Third, DOJ stated that in addition to approved MET deployments files, our

evaluation could have reviewed MET requests that were denied at the field

or headquarters level to help determine whether proper management

decisions were being made regarding the legitimacy of MET deployments.

We considered doing that when we were designing our review and

developing our methodology. However, our preliminary work at the time

indicated that DEA did not formally track denials. The head of DEA’s

Mobile Enforcement Section told us when we were developing our

methodology that headquarters did not routinely collect and maintain

complete information on denied MET deployment requests, including the

number of denials and the reasons for the denials. Also, our preliminary

work at two field division offices indicated that they did not have

documentation containing the reasons for all denied requests. In addition,

as discussed on page 26, while officials in five of the six field divisions we

visited during our review cited reasons that deployment requests had been

denied, none told us a request was denied because it was determined that

the requesting agency was capable of addressing the identified drug and

violence problem.
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 44 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Consistent with the MET Program’s nature and objectives as discussed in

chapter 1, the MET deployments we reviewed focused primarily on streetlevel drug dealers and involved mostly local and regional investigations. In

addition, to investigate suspected drug violators, the techniques of

purchasing illegal drugs (referred to as drug buys) and using informants

were employed more frequently than most other investigative techniques.

MET investigations also sometimes led to other investigations of higherlevel drug traffickers and their organizations.

Our review showed that investigations done as part of MET deployments

focused primarily on individuals suspected of street-level drug dealing,

with considerable attention also directed at drug trafficking organizations,

violent individuals involved in drug activities, and wholesale-level drug

suppliers. A wide range of different types of suspected drug violators were

investigated during MET deployments, including those in the categories of

gangs, drug transporters, drug importers, money launderers, drug

manufacturers, and national and international trafficking organizations.

Figure 5 shows, based on our review of a probability sample of DEA

headquarters files for 197 MET deployments completed as of June 30,

1999, the estimated percentage of deployments in which different types of

suspected drug violators were investigated.

Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

MET Deployments

Focused Primarily on

Street-Level Drug

Dealers
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 45 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 5: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30, 1999,

Investigating Different Types of Suspected Drug Violators

Note: The types of drug violators overlap. For example, a drug organization could include a gang, national

drug trafficking organization, international drug trafficking organization, as well as other types of

organizations not listed here such as a local or regional trafficking group.

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six DEA field divisions

we visited about the extent to which their deployments were directed at

various types of drug violators. Figure 6 summarizes their responses,

which indicate that the deployments among the six divisions focused

primarily on street-level drug dealers. This is consistent with the results of

our file review shown in figure 5 above.

87

65 64 62

44

33

13 11 9 8 8

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Estimated percentage of deployments

Street-level drug

 dealers

Drug organizations

Violent individuals

Wholesale-level drug

 suppliers

Drug transporters

Gangs

Drug importers

National drug trafficking

 organizations

Money launderers

Drug manufacturers

 International drug

trafficking organizations

Type of drug violator
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 46 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 6: Level of Drug Dealing Investigated During MET Deployments at Six DEA Field

Divisions

Source: GAO structured interviews of DEA field division officials.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six field divisions

whether their MET deployments had ever led to other investigations

(referred to as spin-off investigations) of higher-level drug traffickers. In

addition, we asked about certain aspects of their deployments that provide

indications that the deployments involved or led to investigations of

higher-level traffickers. Specifically, we asked whether (1) DEA’s Special

Operations Division (SOD)1

 was ever involved in any of the deployments,

(2) any of the deployments had ever been part of a major operation or

multijurisdictional drug enforcement effort coordinated by SOD or some

other organization or agency, and (3) the divisions’ deployments ever

 1

SOD implements an investigative approach and initiatives to support domestic and foreign

investigations of major drug traffickers and trafficking organizations. This approach focuses on

intercepting the communications of major drug trafficking organizations to target the leaders

and dismantle their operations.
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 47 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

involved investigative efforts in locations other than the area of the

deployment. The officials’ responses are summarized in figure 7.

Figure 7: Selected Aspects of MET Deployment Operations at Six DEA Field Divisions

Source: GAO structured interviews of DEA field division officials.

As figure 7 shows, officials in five of the six divisions said that

deployments have led to some spin-off investigations of higher-level drug

traffickers and involved investigative efforts in other locations. In our

review of DEA headquarters files for the 197 MET deployments completed

as of June 30, 1999, we found that an estimated 14 percent of the files

contained documentation indicating that the deployment led to a spin-off

investigation. Our file review also showed that an estimated 30 percent of

the files contained documentation indicating that the deployment involved

investigative efforts in other locations.

We asked DEA headquarters for quantitative data on the extent that MET

deployments have led to investigations of higher-level drug traffickers. In

response to our request, a DEA headquarters official said this information

was not systematically maintained in an automated data base and would

be extremely difficult to track. However, according to DEA, it is not

uncommon for MET deployments to lead to more complex, long-term

investigations, such as Title III (wiretap and other electronic surveillance)

investigations. When this occurs, the deployment-related investigation is
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 48 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

usually transferred to another DEA enforcement group for additional

investigation.

DEA categorizes each investigation, also called a case, as either local,

regional, domestic, foreign, or international, according to the geographic

scope covered.2

 As shown in figure 8, the MET deployments conducted in

fiscal years 1995 through 2000 involved mostly local and regional

investigations of suspected drug violators operating in the geographic

areas covered by the DEA offices conducting the investigations. Local

cases were the single largest category, making up about 50 percent of the

total during that period, followed by regional cases, which made up about

26 percent. About 18 percent of the MET cases involved drug traffickers

operating on a broader scale within the United States, including on a

national basis, and about 6 percent involved traffickers operating

internationally.

 2

As defined by DEA, a local case involves a domestic target who operates principally within a

local geographic area less extensive than a regional case; a regional case involves a domestic

target who is criminally active throughout the geographic region of the DEA office conducting

the investigation; a domestic case is an investigation of a target who is active principally within

the jurisdiction of the United States; a foreign case involves a target active principally outside

the jurisdiction of the United States; and an international case involves a target whose criminal

activities are both domestic and foreign.

MET Deployments

Involved Mostly Local

and Regional Drug

Cases
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 49 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 8: Geographic Scope of MET Cases Initiated During Fiscal Years 1995

Through 2000

a

Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period.

Note: No foreign cases were initiated.

Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding. In addition, figure 8 does not include (1) one

case initiated in fiscal year 1995 that DEA categorized as “other” in the geographic scope data it provided us

and (2) one case initiated in fiscal year 2000 that was not categorized according to its geographic scope.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Estimated percentage of deployments

Local/regional

Domestic

International

Fiscal years

a

75

15

8

69

23

8

74

23

3

75

16

9

86

9

5

93

5
Chapter 3: MET Deployments Typically

Investigated Street-Level Drug Dealers and Used

Various Investigative Techniques

Page 50 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

While the MET deployments we reviewed employed a variety of different

methods and techniques to investigate suspected drug violators, drug buys

and informants were used more frequently than most other investigative

techniques. Undercover operations, search warrants, and physical

surveillance were also frequently used. Figure 9 shows the estimated

percentage of the deployments that employed various investigative

methods and techniques based on our review of a probability sample of

DEA headquarters files for 197 deployments completed as of June 30,

1999.

Figure 9: Estimated Percentage of MET Deployments Completed as of June 30, 1999,

Using Various Investigative Methods and Techniques

Source: GAO review of DEA headquarters MET deployment files.

We asked the MET supervisors and ASACs in the six DEA field divisions

we visited about the types of investigative methods and techniques used

during deployments. Their responses were consistent with the results of

our file review.

Drug Buys and

Informants Used

More Than Most

Other Investigative

Techniques

92 90

85

76 75

53

9

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Estimated percentage of deployments

Drug buys

Confidential sources

 (i.e., informants)

Undercover operations

Search warrants

Wiretaps

Technical surveillance

(other than wiretaps)

Physical surveillance

Investigative method/technique
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 51 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The MET Program’s goal— to provide resources to assist local law

enforcement agencies in identifying, targeting, investigating, and

disrupting or dismantling drug trafficking gangs/organizations that are

responsible for drug-related violence in local communities—-is consistent

with DEA’s overall strategic goal and Local Impact strategic objective as

discussed in chapter one. DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Section collects data

for a variety of performance measures or indicators1

 to assess the results

of individual MET deployments as well as the overall MET Program. These

performance measures, which are a mix of quantitative and qualitative

data, are intended to measure program output2

 (activity) and outcome3

(results). DEA uses some of the performance measures to report internally

and externally on program results. However, the measures have problems

and limitations related primarily to the inconsistency in data collection

which could impair their value in assessing the extent to which the MET

Program is achieving its goal and contributing to DEA’s overall strategic

goals and objectives.

In an effort to assess the level of success in achieving the MET Program’s

goal, the Mobile Enforcement Section collects data for specified

performance measures from the individual METs. Figure 10 provides

basic information on these performance measures.

 1

A performance measure, as defined by ONDCP for purposes of the National Drug Control

Strategy, means data, variables, and events used to track progress toward performance targets

or the desired end state to be achieved. The term is largely interchangeable with performance

indicators, which as defined by OMB for purposes of the GPRA, means a particular value or

characteristic used to measure output or outcome and is associated with performance goals.

2

Outputs, as defined by DOJ for purposes of the GPRA, are the products and services produced

by a program or process and delivered to customers, whether internal or external. Outputs are

important for measuring internal work performance, but they do not in themselves indicate the

extent to which progress has occurred toward the program’s mission or what impact a program

has had on a particular goal or objective.

3

Outcomes, as defined by DOJ for purposes of the GPRA, means an event, occurrence, or

condition that indicates progress toward achievement of the mission of the program. Outcomes

can be measured in terms of the extent to which they are achieved, or they can reflect the quality

of service delivery or customer satisfaction. Intermediate outcomes are expected to lead to the

desired ends but are not in themselves ends. In many programs, a progression or sequence of

outcomes usually occurs. End outcomes are the derived end or ultimate results that the agency

hopes to achieve through its program activities. These results are directly related to the agency’s

mission.

Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

DEA Uses a Variety of

Performance

Measures
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 52 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Figure 10: MET Program Performance Measures

Source: GAO analysis.

Qualitative 

Quantitative 

Output

Outcome

Performance Measures

Disruption or dismantlement of targeted drug 

trafficking gang(s) or organization(s) (determined 

at the completion of the deployment)

Primary target(s) arrested

Number of arrests 
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 53 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 54 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 55 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

a

The Management Initiative Tracking System report, which the DEA Administrator submits quarterly to the

Attorney General, contains information on several major initiatives of interest to the Attorney General,

including the MET Program.

b

In some instances, the 6-month pre- and 6-month postdeployment violent crime statistics are included

under these headings in the 6-month postdeployment reviews without any additional information.

METs collect, and the Mobile 

Enforcement Section compiles, data 

based on drugs and assets seized

METs collect from requesting local 

law enforcement agencies, and the 

Mobile Enforcement Section 

compiles selected violent crime 

statistics

METs primarily obtain analysis and 

opinions of requesting local law 

enforcement agencies 

Significance of results difficult to 

interpret, e.g., (universe of available 

illegal drugs unknown)

No standardized collection methods, 

including

 geographic area of statistics may not

 match deployment area and

 variances in local law enforcement

 agencies' data collection capabilities

Difficulty in determining the specific 

MET contribution

Data reported without appropriate 

qualifiers

Subjective

No standardized collection methods

Difficulty in determining the specific 

MET contribution

METs report in the biweekly reports, 

monthly statistical analysis of deployment 

reports, and summary/completion of 

deployment teletype

Mobile Enforcement Section reports 

overall data in the monthly statistical 

report and on each ongoing and 

completed deployment to DEA's 

Administrator in the monthly activity report

DEA reports to (1) the Attorney General 

in its quarterly Management Initiative 

Tracking System report, (2) Congress in 

support of its annual budgets and 

performance plans, and (3) the public

METs report in the immediate and 6-

month postdeployment reviews

DEA reports to (1) the Attorney General in 

its quarterly Management Initiative 

Tracking System report, (2) Congress in 

support of its annual budgets and 

performance plans, and (3) the public

METs report in the immediate and 6-

month postdeployment reviews

How data are collected How data are reported Measurement issues
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 56 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As the figure shows, the performance measures include quantitative data,

such as the number of arrests or quantity of drugs seized, and qualitative

data, such as the stability of the deployment target area following a MET

deployment. While most of the quantitative measures are output oriented,

all of the qualitative measures are outcome oriented. Both output and

outcome measures are helpful for assessing overall program performance,

although outcome measures are generally stronger indicators of whether a

program is achieving its goals and objectives.

The Mobile Enforcement Section periodically summarizes and reports the

results of the MET Program. As indicated in Figure 10, the results

information relating to some of the performance measures is provided to

DEA top management and the Attorney General. DEA also reports some

MET results to Congress, in support of its annual budgets and

performance plans, and to the public. Program results reported externally

by DEA are summarized below.

• As shown in appendix V, DEA reported to the Attorney General, as well as

Congress and the public, that the MET deployments resulted in 11,283

arrests and the seizure of about 6,000 pounds of drugs (i.e., cocaine,

methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana) and about $16.9 million in

assets (in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars) from fiscal years 1995 through

2000.

• DEA reported to the Attorney General and the public that as of September

30, 2000, the MET Program’s aggregate effect on violent crime nationwide

was a 16-percent reduction in murders, a 14-percent reduction in

robberies, and a 15-percent reduction in assaults.

In addition to the results related to the above performance measures, DEA

reports to the Attorney General the number of recently completed

deployments and includes examples of successful MET deployments.

Examples of the MET’s positive effect on local communities are also

included in DEA’s annual performance plans. Appendix VI contains

summaries of examples of MET deployments that DEA has reported

internally and externally as being successful.

DEA Reports Results

for Some MET

Performance

Measures
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 57 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As figure 10 shows and as discussed below, the various performance

measures on which DEA collects data and reports internally and

externally have problems and limitations.

According to DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Section Chief, and consistent

with the goal of the MET Program, disruption or dismantlement of the

targeted drug trafficking gangs or organizations is a principal performance

measure. Recently, the section began to systematically collect data on the

total number of targeted drug trafficking gangs/organizations that were

disrupted or dismantled for each completed deployment and report this

information to DEA top management.4

With regard to data collection, although METs are to use the definitions

for disruption and dismantlement that were developed by DOJ,5

 no written

guidance or specific criteria has been provided for applying the definitions

and determining if and when a targeted drug trafficking gang/organization

has actually been disrupted or dismantled. The Mobile Enforcement

Section Chief said that, in making this determination, DEA field divisions

consider various factors, with the key determining factor being whether

the hierarchy of the organization (usually the primary targets) was

arrested and is no longer capable of running the organization. The absence

of written guidance or specific criteria could lead to inconsistent

judgements and determinations among the field divisions and, thus, the

collection of inconsistent information.

In addition, the Mobile Enforcement Section does not compile information

to measure the MET Program’s actual performance against its intended

performance. Specifically, while drug trafficking gangs and organizations

are to be identified and targeted by the METs at the beginning of and

 4

In May 2001, subsequent to the completion of our work for this review, DEA issued a revised

MET Program handbook. The new handbook requires that a summary of each completed

deployment include a statement regarding the total number of drug trafficking organizations that

were either disrupted or dismantled.

5

Disruption occurs when the normal effective operation of an identified gang/organization is

significantly impacted so that it is temporarily unable to conduct criminal operations for a

significant period of time. Dismantlement occurs when the identified gang/organization is

deprived of vital content or force and is no longer capable of operating as a coordinated criminal

enterprise.

Performance

Measures Have

Problems and

Limitations

Disruption or

Dismantlement of Drug

Trafficking

Gangs/Organizations
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 58 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

during deployments, the Section does not compile either this information

or information on the number of targeted gangs and organizations

determined to be disrupted and dismantled at the end of the deployments

to make a comparison.6

 Without such a comparison, it would be difficult to

monitor and evaluate the overall progress of the MET Program in

achieving its goal of disrupting and dismantling the targeted drug

trafficking gangs and organizations.

According to the Mobile Enforcement Section Chief, another principal

performance measure is whether the primary individuals targeted by the

MET deployments were arrested.7 However, similar to the

disruption/dismantlement measure, the Mobile Enforcement Section does

not compile information to measure the MET Program’s actual

performance against its intended performance. While it is consistent with

the MET Program goal to compile and report the number of primary

targets arrested, the significance of such information as a measure of

success is difficult to interpret without comparing it to the total number of

primary individuals targeted initially and during a deployment.8

 Moreover,

it would be difficult to monitor and evaluate the MET Program’s overall

progress in achieving its objective of apprehending such individuals. For

instance, if four of five primary targets were arrested the deployment may

have done well in achieving its goals. However, if 4 of 10 primary targets

were arrested, the success of the deployment might be viewed quite

differently. Furthermore, as discussed below, the use of arrest data as a

performance measure has other limitations.

Another performance measure used by the Mobile Enforcement Section is

the total number of arrests, which includes the primary targets arrested

discussed above, made during the MET deployments. Arrest data alone are

difficult to interpret in terms of their significance. In this regard, DEA

stated in its fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan that there is

currently no analytical process in place to determine the value of a

 6

A MET deployment can target more than one drug trafficking gang/organization and can add or

delete targets based on their investigations.

7

Depending on the circumstances, a primary target could include an organization leader, a

member, or a street-level dealer.

8

A MET deployment can target more than one individual and can add or delete individual targets

based on its investigation.

Primary Targets Arrested

Number of Arrests
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 59 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

specific arrest. For example, the current process does not distinguish the

arrest of a street-level dealer from an organization leader. Moreover, the

use of total arrest data as a performance measure can be misleading

without information on the extent to which arrests lead to prosecutions

and convictions.

The Mobile Enforcement Section also uses the amount of drugs and assets

seized during MET deployments as a performance measure. However, as

with the arrest data, these results are difficult to interpret in terms of their

significance. While the amount of drugs and assets seized may be

important output-oriented measures for MET deployments, they do not

measure the extent to which the deployments may have reduced the

availability of drugs and the assets of drug dealers in the target areas. In

this regard, DEA’s fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan states that the

actual impact of drug seizure amounts cannot be determined because the

universe of available illegal drugs cannot be measured. It further states

that there is no way to ascertain if seized drugs have been replaced by

lesser, equal, or greater quantities.

A quantitative outcome measure that DEA uses to determine the results of

MET deployments is the difference between violent crime statistics 6

months before and 6 months after each deployment. This measure is

directly linked as an outcome to the MET Program’s goal of reducing the

level of drug trafficking and related violence. The statistical data for this

measure are to be collected and provided to DEA by the requesting local

law enforcement agencies in the deployment target areas.

The Mobile Enforcement Section has instructed the METs to obtain

statistics on specific violent crimes (i.e., murder, robbery, and aggravated

assault) in the targeted geographic areas for 6 months before and after

each deployment. However, our review of DEA’s deployment files showed

that the statistics obtained from local law enforcement agencies by some

METs varied in that they included additional types of crimes, different

geographic areas than where the deployments were focused, and different

time periods. In explaining the data variances among METs, DEA

indicated that it must deal with the fact that local law enforcement

agencies vary in their capabilities to collect and provide this data. For

example, some have automated systems while other may keep statistics on

index cards.

Amount of Drug and Asset

Seizures

Pre-Versus Postdeployment

Violent Crime Statistics
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 60 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Notwithstanding, these inconsistencies in the collection of violent crime

statistics among the METs raise concerns about the validity and usefulness

of the data depending on how they are used and reported. For example,

reporting violent crime statistics for an entire city rather than the specific

geographic area where the MET deployment took place could distort

program results. Indeed, reporting for a geographic area substantially

larger than the area of the MET deployment could result in

underestimating MET results, depending on the circumstances.

To illustrate, as reported in one of the 6-month postdeployment reviews

included in our sample of deployment files, the Chicago MET assisted a

local police department in containing the spreading gang and drug activity

in three targeted areas within the city where the MET deployed. The

review provided violent crime statistics for both the city and the three

targeted areas. The citywide statistics showed that robberies and

homicides increased 8 and 23 percent, respectively. On the other hand,

robberies and homicides in the three targeted areas of the deployment

decreased 59 and 100 percent, respectively. Thus, if the review had only

provided the citywide statistics, the MET results would have been

understated.

Despite these inconsistencies, DEA periodically reports internally and

externally on the MET Program’s effect on violent crime without

appropriate qualifiers. For example, DEA's September 30, 2000,

Management Initiative Tracking Report to the Attorney General did not

indicate that the violent crime data included geographic areas other than

where METs were deployed. Also, such reporting does not consider the

effect of other factors on the crime rate, such as the local economy and

anti-crime social programs.

Further, recognizing DEA’s dependency on local law enforcement

agencies and the associated problems, the usefulness of pre- and

postdeployment violent crime statistics as a measure of MET performance

could be enhanced if similar statistics were collected for adjacent areas or

other areas with demographic characteristics and past crime statistics

similar to the geographic areas covered by the MET deployments. Such

statistics could allow changes in violent crime rates to be considered in

relation to any general trends (such as recent overall drops in violent

crime rates) in adjacent or comparable areas that were not the focus of a

MET deployment.
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 61 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

In addition to the above performance measures, the MET Program

handbook requires the METs to conduct two postdeployment reviews—

one immediately after completion and another 6 months later—- to assess

the effectiveness of each MET deployment. The handbook requires that

each review address five areas: (1) reduction in drug sales and/or reduced

visible drug sales; (2) stability of the target area, including any noticeable

reduction in violent crime; (3) community reaction and involvement; (4)

an overall assessment of the deployment; and (5) media coverage. While

the MET handbook requires that the postdeployment reviews include

information on media coverage, the Mobile Enforcement Section Chief

stated that media coverage is not used as a performance measure for the

MET Program.

With regard to the other four outcome-oriented areas, the Mobile

Enforcement Section has not prescribed standardized data collection

methods for obtaining and reporting information. Rather, as stated in the

handbook, the METs are to rely primarily on, and report the opinions and

analyses of, the cognizant local law enforcement agencies. While opinions

and perceptions can be part of a valid qualitative measurement program,

without standardized guidance as to specific criteria or factors to consider

in developing these judgements, interpretation of the results can be

problematic. Also, without a standard, structured method, such as a survey

instrument, for collecting such qualitative information, the results are

inconsistent and not comparable. For example, with regard to reduction in

drug sales, one MET reported that crack cocaine arrests had increased

substantially following the MET deployment; but, the MET did not relate

or link this information to any change in drug sales. In contrast, another

MET reported that the availability of certain illegal drugs in a deployment

area had decreased significantly and that drug traffickers were attempting

to conceal their illegal activities. The MET noted that the local police had

received fewer calls concerning complaints about narcotic or violent drugrelated activity. Appendix VII contains these and other examples of how

METs reported information in postdeployment reviews.

DEA’s current measures for determining the results of MET deployments

and the overall MET Program have several problems and limitations. For

example, as a result of the lack of standard data collection methods and

written guidance, DEA has no assurance that all METs are consistently

using the same criteria or factors for determining whether they have

disrupted or dismantled their targeted gangs and organizations. Also, DEA

cannot measure actual against intended performance because it does not

compile data to compare the number of primary individuals, gangs, and

Postdeployment Information

on Specific Areas

Conclusions
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 62 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

organizations targeted at the beginning of and during deployments to the

number actually arrested, disrupted, and dismantled. In addition, DEA’s

attempts to measure the effect of MET deployments by comparing pre-and

postdeployment violent crime statistics has been affected by (1) variances

in the data provided to DEA, including some agencies providing data for a

larger area than that targeted by the MET deployment; and (2) the lack of

violent crime statistics for adjacent and other areas with similar

demographic characteristics, to be used for purposes of comparison.

Moreover, because the postdeployment information used to assess MET

effectiveness is not collected and reported in a standardized, structured

way, its usefulness is limited. As a result of these various problems and

limitations, DEA management has no way of accurately assessing the

effect of individual METs or the effectiveness of the MET Program as a

whole.

We recommend that the Attorney General direct the DEA Administrator to

(1) establish and ensure the use of standardized data collection methods

for obtaining information on the performance measures DEA uses to

assess the results of the individual MET deployments and the overall MET

Program; (2) compile data and compare the number of primary

individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the beginning of and

during deployments to the number arrested, disrupted, and dismantled; (3)

collect and report consistent violent crime statistics that cover

comparable crime types and time periods and relate to (a) the specific

geographic areas where the MET deployments were focused and (b) to the

extent feasible and practical, pertinent adjacent and comparable areas;

and (4) use more structured data collection methods, such as a survey

instrument, to collect qualitative data on the four outcome-oriented areas

included in the postdeployment reviews that can be used to assess the

results of individual MET deployments and be aggregated to evaluate the

overall MET Program.

In its written comments on a draft of this report, DOJ indicated agreement

with certain aspects of our recommendations in this chapter and

disagreement with other aspects.

DOJ disagreed with our recommendation on standardized data collection

methods. DOJ stated that DEA’s MET Program now utilizes such methods

for obtaining information on performance measures used to assess the

results of individual MET deployments and the overall MET Program. DOJ

specifically cited the collection of disruption and dismantlement

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 63 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

information and violent crime statistics. While DEA recently began

collecting this information for each deployment, there is no assurance that

METs are collecting it in a standard way. Therefore, we are retaining our

recommendation.

With regard to the collection of disruption and dismantlement information,

DOJ stated that the criteria used in determining the disruption or

dismantlement of MET targeted drug trafficking gangs or organizations are

the DOJ definitions for disruption or dismantlement. We believe the

development and use of definitions for disruption and dismantlement is a

good first step. However, these definitions are broad and, as indicated on

page 57, no written guidance or specific criteria have been provided to

assist the DEA field divisions in applying the definitions and determining if

and when a targeted drug trafficking organization has actually been

disrupted or dismantled. Without such guidance or criteria, there is little

assurance that judgments and determinations relating to disruption and

dismantlement are being made in as standard and consistent a manner as

possible. In this regard, DEA's 2001 and 2002 annual performance plans

indicate that DEA staff are developing criteria to determine whether or not

enforcement activities meet the threshold of either disruption or

dismantlement as defined by DOJ.

With regard to the collection of violent crime statistics, DOJ noted that the

MET guidelines require, at a minimum, that the (pre- and postdeployment)

assessment(s) include violent crime statistics for murder, robbery, and

aggravated assault, which (according to the requesting agency) are derived

from the area most impacted by the targeted organizations. DOJ further

noted that, as indicated in our report, DEA instructed the METs to obtain

statistics on these crimes (in the targeted geographic areas for the 6

months before and after each MET deployment). However, as discussed

below, the METs are not collecting and reporting consistent violent crime

statistics. Thus, while DEA has promulgated standard guidelines, the field

divisions are not consistently following them.

DOJ disagreed with our recommendation regarding compiling data on the

number of primary individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the

beginning of and during deployments and comparing them with the

number arrested, disrupted, and dismantled. DOJ stated that a MET

investigation may evolve, or redirect its focus several times, making it very

difficult to measure the success of a deployment strictly by comparing the

number of primary individuals, gangs, and organizations targeted at the

onset of a deployment against the number of arrests at the conclusion. We

recognize that targets identified at the onset of a deployment can change
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 64 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

during the deployment. We are not suggesting that DEA measure the

success of the METs only by comparing the number of primary targets

identified at the onset of a deployment against the number of arrests,

disruptions, and dismantlements at the conclusion. That is why our

recommendation states that DEA should compile data on the number of

primary targets identified during, as well as at the beginning of,

deployments and compare them with the number actually arrested,

disrupted, and dismantled. Further, we recognize that changes in targets

complicate the comparison, although DEA has a basis for tracking changes

in targets in that, as DOJ notes, DEA requires that field divisions inform

DEA headquarters of target changes in their biweekly activity reports.

Nevertheless, without comparative information, taking into account

appropriate target changes, DEA cannot measure actual against intended

performance and determine to what extent the MET Program is achieving

its goal of disrupting and dismantling targeted drug trafficking gangs and

organizations. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation on this

matter.

In commenting on this recommendation, DOJ also noted that some

assessment of a MET’s success is subjective and can only be measured on

a case-by-case basis when the quality of life in the community is studied.

DOJ further stated that it is extremely important to recognize that the

number of arrests at the conclusion of a deployment does not adequately

measure, by itself, the success of the deployment. We agree with these two

statements. In fact, on pages 58-59, we discuss the limitations of arrest

data as a measure of the success of a deployment. Moreover, our report

indicates that DEA uses a variety of qualitative and quantitative

performance measures to assess the individual MET deployments as well

as the overall MET Program, and we agree with this approach.

DOJ disagreed with the first part of our recommendation regarding the

collection and reporting of consistent violent crime statistics. DOJ stated

that as long as the pre- and postdeployment crime data are based on

consistent geographic areas, DEA will continue to use the best available

data, ensuring that the data collection areas are the same within each

deployment. DOJ acknowledged that in many cases, a local law

enforcement agency provides crime data for a geographic area that is

larger than DEA’s MET deployment area. Due to differences in the data

collection systems used by local law enforcement agencies, DEA often

takes the best available data rather than the exact data for the specific

deployment area. DOJ believes that it is unreasonable to expect local law

enforcement agencies to manually count statistics in order to satisfy

DEA’s data collection standards for the MET Program.
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 65 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

While we agree that local law enforcement agencies should not be

expected to expend an unreasonable amount of time and resources

obtaining data for DEA, it is not clear how much effort would be involved

in some cases. All things being equal, we continue to believe that the data

should, as often as feasible, relate to the specific geographic areas where

the METs were focused because, as discussed on page 60, the

inconsistencies in the collection of violent crime statistics raise concern

about the validity and usefulness of the data as a measure of MET

deployment results. Therefore, we are retaining our recommendation.

To the extent it is not already doing so, DEA needs to make sure it is

making a reasonable, concerted effort to obtain the required data. For

example, DEA could emphasize in its promotion of the MET program, and

in its initial contact with local law enforcement agencies requesting MET

deployments, the need to have pre- and postdeployment violent crime

statistics for the specific targeted area of the MET deployments as well as

for the specified time period and crime types. To the extent that DEA is

unsuccessful in obtaining violent crime statistics for the specific

deployment area, it needs to ensure that only data for the specific

geographic areas where the METs were focused, specified time periods,

and specified crime types are aggregated and reported for purposes of

measuring the performance of the overall MET Program.

DOJ agreed with the second part of our recommendation regarding violent

crime statistics, stating that it would ask DEA to collect and report

pertinent adjacent and comparable statistics whenever feasible and

practical. However, it noted that collecting both adjacent and comparable

statistics would be difficult in many areas where METs are deployed. We

recognize that DEA may not be able to obtain these data for all

deployments, but we believe that, to the extent feasible, DEA should make

a concerted effort to collect these statistics for all of its MET deployments.

Finally, DOJ agreed with our recommendation regarding the use of more

structured data collection methods to collect qualitative data from local

law enforcement agencies on the four outcome-oriented areas included in

the MET postdeployment reviews. DOJ stated that the current system of

capturing qualitative data from police departments allows DEA to grasp

the sentiment and reaction of the departments and is within the

parameters of the MET guidelines (namely, obtaining the analysis or

opinions of police department officials as to the impact or success of the

deployments). However, DOJ noted that given the difficulty in aggregating

the results of the deployments to evaluate the overall MET Program, DEA
Chapter 4: DEA Measures of MET Program

Results Have Problems and Limitations

Page 66 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

will appraise creating a more structured data collection instrument that

will still be able to gather data from a diversity of communities.
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 67 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Atlanta Columbus, GA 6/15/95 10/1/95 108

Bowden, GA 6/15/95 10/15/95 122

Monroe, NC 10/3/95 1/5/96 94

Chattanooga, TN 10/15/95 12/30/95 76

Atlanta, GA (lead) 1/16/96 8/12/96 209

Spartanburg, SC 9/9/96 12/20/96 102

Greenville, SC 9/9/96 2/5/97 149

Marietta, GA 1/6/97 6/1/97 146

Macon, GA 7/7/97 12/3/97 149

Kinston, NC 7/8/97 12/30/97 175

Glynn County, GA 3/16/98 8/11/98 148

Durham, NC 9/14/98 1/27/99 135

Griffin, GA 3/23/99 7/14/99 113

Dalton, GA 3/23/99 7/27/99 126

Clarksville, TN 8/23/99 2/11/00 172

Dillon, SC 3/27/00 7/21/00 116

Boston Worcester, MA (#1) 5/15/95 8/7/95 84

Lynn, MA 5/15/95 11/1/96 536

Revere, MA 12/15/95 3/28/97 469

Boston, MA (#1) 4/1/96 3/12/97 345

Worcester, MA (#2) 5/22/96 1/7/97 230

Boston, MA (#2) 8/16/96 3/28/97 224

Webster, MA 5/14/97 9/23/97 132

Pawtucket, RI 11/15/97 8/13/98 271

Springfield, MA 6/30/98 1/19/99 203

Lawrence, MA 9/25/98 5/1/99 218

Everett, MA 3/3/99 10/15/99 226

Fitchburg, MA 5/17/99 12/31/99 228

Southbridge, MA 1/4/00 4/14/00 101

Bridgeport, CT 4/25/00 6/23/00 59

Chicago Fort Wayne, IN 7/1/95 9/1/95 62

Racine, WI 2/1/96 7/29/96 179

Kankakee, IL 6/15/96 1/9/97 208

North Chicago, IL 10/1/96 4/16/97 197

Milwaukee, WI 4/21/97 10/4/97 166

Minneapolis, MN 9/2/97 11/20/97 79

Aurora, IL 1/2/98 8/19/98 229

Beloit, WI 9/21/98 12/2/98 72

Chicago Heights, IL 1/19/99 6/30/99 162

Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 68 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Chicago (cont.) Indianapolis, IN 8/2/99 11/19/99 109

Bloomington, IL 1/18/00 4/13/00 86

Chicago, IL 6/5/00 9/22/00 109

Dallas Arlington, TX 5/10/95 7/6/95 57

Wichita Falls, TX 8/28/95 11/16/95 80

Tyler, TX 12/5/95 6/21/96 199

Ft Worth, TX 3/6/96 10/26/96 234

Athens, TX 4/1/96 8/22/96 143

Greenville, TX 11/1/96 3/6/97 125

Paris, TX 11/1/96 4/15/97 165

Terrell, TX 5/5/97 11/18/97 197

Mt. Pleasant, TX 6/23/97 12/17/97 177

Henderson, TX 10/27/97 5/12/98 197

Corsicana, TX 1/15/98 9/22/98 250

Fort Worth, TX 5/27/98 9/14/99 475

Brownwood, TX 10/26/98 3/25/99 150

Sherman, TX 4/20/99 11/16/99 210

Texarkana, TX 1/24/00 7/28/00 186

Denver Denver, CO (#1) 4/1/95 7/1/95 91

Lakewood, CO 11/1/95 5/21/96 202

Albuquerque, NM 11/1/95 12/1/96 396

Durango, CO 12/1/95 9/25/96 299

Denver, CO (#2) 2/16/96 6/15/96 120

Clayton, NM 7/1/96 9/1/96 62

Salt Lake City, UT 7/22/96 11/14/96 115

Denver, CO (#3) 11/27/96 12/29/97 397

Edgewater, CO 12/13/96 2/28/97 77

Park County (Cody), WY 7/13/97 9/16/97 65

Denver, CO (#4) 10/1/97 4/1/98 182

Avon, CO 3/1/98 6/15/98 106

Eagle/Garfield Counties,

CO

3/1/98 9/15/98 198

Pueblo, CO 8/10/98 11/2/98 84

La Plata County, CO 2/1/99 7/14/99 163

Longmont, CO 7/12/99 12/30/99 171

Midvale, UT 4/10/00 6/7/00 58

Detroit Pontiac, MI 4/12/95 5/10/95 28

Ypsilanti, MI 7/17/95 10/2/95 77

Lincoln Park/Melvindale,

MI

11/14/95 8/23/96 283

Toledo, OH 7/29/96 12/31/96 155
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 69 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Inkster, MI 2/10/97 6/30/97 140

E Cleveland, OH 7/28/97 10/26/97 90

Detroit (cont.) Louisville, KY 7/30/97 9/27/97 59

Muskegon, MI 8/20/97 10/14/97 55

Jefferson County, OH 2/8/98 5/20/98 101

Benton Harbor, MI 6/15/98 9/22/98 99

Village of Lincoln Heights,

OH

10/1/98 1/21/99 112

Warren, OH 2/1/99 5/5/99 93

Youngstown, OH 2/1/99 5/5/99 93

Mount Clemens, MI 7/6/99 11/3/99 120

Flint, MI 1/26/00 6/15/00 141

El Paso El Paso County, TX 11/17/97 3/27/98 130

Odessa, TX 4/26/98 7/21/98 86

El Reno, OK 9/10/98 11/27/98 78

Midland, TX 1/19/99 6/29/99 161

Portales, NM 8/24/99 11/30/99 98

Las Vegas, NM 1/18/00 5/30/00 133

Houston Galveston, TX 5/15/95 12/1/95 200

Atlanta, GA (assist) 1/16/96 8/12/96 209

Orange County, TX 6/10/96 11/21/97 529

Port Arthur, TX 6/10/96 11/21/97 529

East Harris County, TX 9/4/97 3/27/99 569

Freeport, TX 6/2/98 3/31/99 302

Kingsville, TX 3/1/99 10/7/99 220

Corpus Christi, TX 5/14/99 9/2/99 111

Victoria, TX 11/15/99 4/6/00 143

Tomball, TX 5/1/00 9/14/00 136

Los Angeles San Luis Obispo, CA (#1) 5/22/95 7/31/95 70

Oxnard/Ventura, CA 9/9/95 11/19/95 71

Gardena, CA 11/20/95 1/12/96 53

Century, Los Angeles, CA 2/21/96 7/29/96 159

Rampart, Los Angeles,

CA

4/13/96 7/29/96 107

Antelope Valley, CA 9/10/96 12/13/96 94

El Monte, CA 2/18/97 4/18/97 59

Santa Maria, CA 5/5/97 7/3/97 59

“Quad Cities” (4 cities),

L.A. Metro Area, CA

8/4/97 10/3/97 60

Coachella Valley, CA 10/20/97 12/23/97 64

Wilshire, Los Angeles,

CA

1/17/98 5/22/98 125
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 70 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Reno, NV 6/29/98 8/29/98 61

Pico Rivera, CA 10/19/98 2/5/99 109

Devonshire (North Hills),

CA

10/26/98 2/26/99 123

Hawthorne, CA 3/15/99 7/16/99 123

San Luis Obispo, CA (#2) 4/19/99 7/19/99 91

Los Angeles (cont.) Carson City, NV 8/29/99 11/23/99 86

Ontario, CA 9/1/99 11/23/99 83

Hawaii County, HI 2/23/00 5/7/00 74

Inglewood, CA 3/6/00 8/6/00 153

Miami Fort Pierce/St Lucie, FL 7/18/95 8/28/95 41

Collier County, FL 11/25/95 3/10/97 471

Opa Locka, FL 2/5/96 1/22/98 717

Homestead, FL 3/24/97 8/1/97 130

Hendry County, FL 5/28/97 11/12/97 168

Sarasota, FL 8/18/97 1/5/98 140

South Miami, FL 3/1/98 5/19/98 79

Florida City, FL 3/6/98 9/6/98 184

Hardee County, FL 3/8/98 11/13/98 250

North Miami Beach, FL 9/1/98 12/3/98 93

Riviera Beach, FL 10/5/98 3/10/99 156

Franklin County, FL 1/19/99 5/12/99 113

Fort Lauderdale, FL 4/26/99 12/31/99 249

Key West, FL 6/21/99 12/9/99 171

Fernandina Beach, FL 9/20/99 2/23/00 156

Delray/Boca Raton, FL 2/22/00 7/12/00 141

Fort Pierce, FL 4/17/00 5/7/00 20

Highland County, FL 6/12/00 8/25/00 74

New Orleans Selma, AL 5/12/95 7/29/95 78

Pritchard, AL 7/20/95 3/1/96 225

Jackson, MS (#1) 1/18/96 12/6/96 323

Alexandria, LA (#1) 8/1/96 7/10/97 343

Alabaster, AL 1/6/97 9/10/97 247

Pine Bluff, AR 1/13/97 7/15/97 183

Donaldsonville, LA 6/16/97 2/10/98 239

Hancock County, MS 10/14/97 3/18/98 155

Enterprise, AL 12/1/97 5/20/98 170

Concordia Parish, LA 4/13/98 9/2/98 142

Gadsden, AL 5/1/98 11/4/98 187

Slidell, LA 9/9/98 4/21/99 224

Hammond, LA 10/1/98 4/7/99 188
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 71 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

New Orleans, LA 10/5/98 12/31/98 87

Anniston, AL 1/4/99 9/8/99 247

Jackson, MS (#2) 3/15/99 7/2/99 109

Brent /Fairfield, AL 6/14/99 12/3/99 172

Greenville, MS 8/9/99 11/4/99 87

Alexandria, LA (#2) 2/1/00 4/7/00 66

New Orleans (cont.) Hattiesburg, MS 2/1/00 6/2/00 122

Green /Tuscaloosa

Counties, AL

6/12/00 8/25/00 74

New York Niagara Falls, NY 6/21/95 11/2/95 134

Southampton, NY 8/22/95 10/14/95 53

Albany, NY 10/26/95 8/1/96 280

Schenectady, NY 6/15/96 9/30/97 472

Troy, NY 11/21/96 9/1/97 284

Amsterdam, NY 10/21/97 4/20/98 181

Utica, NY 5/29/98 9/22/98 116

Monticello, NY 7/1/98 10/26/98 117

Watertown, NY 11/15/98 2/25/99 102

Poughkeepsie, NY 11/24/98 8/27/99 276

Kingston, NY 4/6/99 9/13/99 160

Mount Vernon, NY 10/29/99 6/7/00 222

Newburgh, NY 11/1/99 5/12/00 193

Liberty, NY 5/22/00 9/25/00 126

Newark Asbury Park, NJ 9/27/95 5/21/96 237

Camden, NJ 11/29/95 5/21/96 174

Paterson, NJ 3/11/96 2/28/97 354

Newark, NJ 2/13/97 9/10/97 209

Atlantic City, NJ 7/14/97 7/31/97 17

Lakewood, NJ 8/18/97 12/9/97 113

Elizabeth, NJ 2/2/98 7/30/98 178

Passaic, NJ 9/1/98 1/17/99 138

Plainfield, NJ 2/24/99 9/24/99 212

Pleasantville, NJ 10/4/99 2/15/00 134

Trenton, NJ 3/28/00 6/28/00 92

Philadelphia Bristol, PA 6/8/95 10/4/95 118

Chester City, PA 5/21/96 9/1/96 103

Clairton, PA 6/3/96 11/26/96 176

Easton, PA 9/3/96 5/8/97 247

Norristown, PA 6/24/97 6/18/98 359

Wilmington, DE 2/9/98 5/13/98 93

Philadelphia, PA 6/5/98 11/1/98 149
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 72 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Reading, PA 12/21/98 5/27/99 157

Allentown, PA 6/14/99 10/8/99 116

York, PA 10/18/99 2/25/00 130

Pottstown, PA 4/26/00 8/25/00 121

Phoenix Eloy/Pinal, AZ 11/12/95 7/29/96 260

Bullhead City, AZ 2/1/96 7/29/96 179

Prescott, AZ 8/14/96 11/26/96 104

Phoenix (cont.) Lake Havasu, AZ 11/19/96 5/20/97 182

Sierra Vista, AZ 6/18/97 2/13/98 240

Apache County, AZ 3/10/98 7/9/98 121

Coconino County, AZ 7/28/98 3/16/99 231

Navajo County, AZ 4/1/99 7/30/99 120

Payson, AZ 10/18/99 4/20/00 185

San Diego Oceanside, CA 8/4/95 10/15/95 72

El Cajon, CA 4/10/96 10/10/96 183

Chula Vista, CA 6/3/96 10/26/96 145

National City, CA 10/1/96 9/10/97 344

Vista, CA 6/2/97 3/5/98 276

San Diego (Logan

Heights), CA

4/1/98 12/4/98 247

San Diego (Mid-City), CA 4/1/98 12/4/98 247

La Mesa , CA 1/4/99 3/3/99 58

Escondido, CA 4/26/99 2/18/00 298

San Marcos, CA 3/6/00 8/17/00 164

San Francisco Richmond, CA 10/16/95 1/8/96 84

Vallejo, CA 3/1/96 6/21/96 112

Seaside/Marina, CA 7/29/96 11/14/96 108

Merced, CA 1/21/97 4/3/97 72

Modesto, CA 4/28/97 8/27/97 121

Oakland, CA 10/27/97 2/27/98 123

W. Contra Costa County,

CA

5/14/98 8/29/98 107

Eastern Kern County, CA 9/29/98 2/4/99 128

Yuba County, CA 3/8/99 7/2/99 116

San Jose, CA 8/23/99 12/10/99 109

Stanislaus County, CA 1/17/00 5/5/00 109

Oakland, CA 5/15/00 7/15/00 61

Woodland, CA 7/17/00 9/8/00 53

Seattle Puyallup/Tacoma, WA 7/7/95 10/1/95 86

Woodburn, OR 4/1/96 6/20/96 80

Lewiston, ID 7/8/96 9/24/96 78
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 73 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

DEA field division Location of deployment Beginning date Ending date Duration (in days)

Madras, OR 11/10/96 1/31/97 82

Klamath Falls, OR 3/1/97 6/30/97 121

Washington County, OR 7/27/97 8/23/97 27

Keizer, OR 11/9/97 1/30/98 82

Portland, OR 3/15/98 6/3/98 80

Everett, WA 6/22/98 1/8/99 200

Chehalis, WA 2/1/99 6/2/99 121

Thurston /Yelm, WA 6/7/99 9/28/99 113

Seattle, WA 6/23/99 1/16/00 207

Seattle (cont.) Lakewood, WA 2/28/00 6/30/00 123

St Louis Sikeston, MO 7/5/95 8/5/95 31

Fountain Park, MO 10/16/95 12/15/95 60

East St Louis, IL 3/4/96 9/27/96 207

Alton, IL 11/1/96 4/11/97 161

Lexington, NE 3/31/97 5/2/97 32

St. Charles County, MO 11/3/97 1/30/98 88

Audrain County, MO 3/2/98 5/29/98 88

Yankton Sioux

Reservation, SD

7/6/98 7/23/98 17

Crystal City, MO 8/17/98 10/23/98 67

Berkley, MO 12/8/98 3/26/99 108

Hannibal, MO 4/6/99 5/20/99 44

Madison, IL 7/6/99 2/25/00 234

Fort Dodge, IA 4/17/00 6/28/00 72

Washington, DC Manassas City, VA 5/1/95 6/9/95 39

Chincoteague, VA 6/26/95 8/10/95 45

Fredericksburg, VA 9/12/95 10/6/95 24

Richmond, VA 11/29/95 10/11/96 317

Washington, DC 10/21/96 4/3/97 164

Baltimore, MD 4/28/97 9/26/97 151

Annapolis, MD 11/3/97 3/3/98 120

Petersburg, VA 4/27/98 8/14/98 109

Hampton, VA 10/5/98 6/30/99 268

Charles Town, WV 5/3/99 8/20/99 109

Hagerstown, MD 10/13/99 3/23/00 162

Prince William County,

VA

5/1/00 8/31/00 122

Note: An asterisk (*) marks each of the 197 MET deployments completed as of June 30, 1999. We reviewed

DEA headquarters files for a representative, national sample of these deployments.

a

The Atlanta, GA, deployment was led by DEA’s Atlanta Field Division MET, and the Houston Field Division

MET assisted. DEA counts this as two deployments. For our review of DEA’s MET deployment files, we

considered the deployment of the two METs as one deployment.
Appendix I: Completed MET Deployments, Fiscal

Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 74 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.
Appendix II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and

Reviewing Completed DEA MET Deployment

Files

Page 75 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

As discussed in chapter 1, to address several of our objectives, we

reviewed a probability sample of DEA headquarters files1

 for 83 randomly

selected MET deployments.2

 We obtained from DEA a listing of all 197

MET deployments completed by June 30, 1999.3

 Because we needed to

review DEA’s 6-month postdeployment reports, we used June 30, 1999, as

our cutoff date. To recognize the potential effect of program policy and

procedural changes on the implementation of deployments, we divided the

197 deployments into 4 strata depending on whether they started before

January 1, 1997, or later, and whether they lasted up to or more than 6

months.4

 We then randomly selected a total of 83 deployments from the 4

separate strata, to assure coverage of deployments of varying length and

age. Table 4 provides details of the strata samples and populations.

Table 4: File Review Strata for Completed MET Deployments

Initiation date/duration of deployment Population size Sample size

Prior to Jan. 1997/6 months or less 55 15

Prior to Jan. 1997/longer than 6 months 34 17

Jan. 1997 or later/6 months or less 82 31

Jan. 1997 or later/longer than 6 months 26 20

Total 197 83

Source: GAO.

Our probability sample allows us to make estimates to the population of

all 197 deployments. Because we used random sampling, the results

 1

We reviewed DEA headquarters files rather than field division files because the head of DEA’s

Mobile Enforcement Section, a headquarters unit which oversees the MET Program, advised us

that the section maintains all key documents pertinent to each deployment for management

purposes.

2

A probability sample is drawn using statistical, random selection methods that assure that each

member of the population has a known, positive probability of being selected. This approach

allows us to make inferences about the entire population.

3

For our file review, we considered the deployment of both DEA’s Atlanta and Houston Field

Division METs to Atlanta, GA, from January 16, 1996, to August 12, 1996, as one deployment.

DEA counts this as two deployments.

4

We consulted with the head of DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Section regarding the appropriate

date for stratifying MET deployments to recognize significant policy and procedural changes that

could have affected how deployments were implemented over time. He advised us that January

1, 1997, was an appropriate date. Regarding the length of deployments, we used 6 months to

distinguish between short and long. While MET Program guidelines state that deployments

generally should last 2 to 4 months, DEA advised us that the average length of a deployment at

the time was 163 days.

Appendix II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and

Reviewing Completed DEA MET Deployment

Files
Appendix II: GAO Methodology for Selecting and

Reviewing Completed DEA MET Deployment

Files

Page 76 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

obtained are subject to some uncertainty or sampling error. The sampling

error can be expressed in terms of confidence levels and ranges. The

confidence level indicates the degree of confidence that can be placed in

the estimates derived from the sample. The range is a pair of values

derived from the sample data, an upper and lower limit, between which

the actual population values might be found. Our samples were designed

so that the sampling error around the estimates of percentages would not

be greater than 10 percentage points at the 95-percent confidence level.

Thus, if all cases in our population had been examined, the chances are 95

out of 100 that the results obtained would be included in the range formed

by adding or subtracting no more than 10 percentage points from the

sample estimates. In this report, all sampling errors fall within this range,

unless otherwise noted.

In addition to the reported sampling errors, the practical difficulties of

conducting any file review may introduce other types of errors, commonly

referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, differences in how two

reviewers interpret a question, or in the ways in which two DEA officials

provided documentation, can introduce unwanted variability into the

results. We took steps to minimize such nonsampling errors. We developed

our data collection instrument (DCI) in consultation with DEA officials,

and we conducted collective training and pretesting with our reviewers.

During the review process, a second reviewer was involved in assuring

consistency and accuracy for all key questions on the DCI. When

reviewers did not find required documentation in the deployment files, we

provided DEA the opportunity to obtain the documents from its filing

system and provide them for our review; and we considered these

documents as part of the files. We verified all data entry of the DCIs as

well as all the programming used in the analyses.
Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET

Assessments of Local Law Enforcement

Agencies’ Capabilities

Page 77 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following four examples are from DEA headquarters files for the 197

MET deployments completed as of June 30, 1999 that were included in our

review. The examples show how four METs, in their requests for

authorization and funding, summarized the results of their predeployment

assessments of requesting local law enforcement agencies’ capabilities and

the diversity of evidence and support provided. Our analysis is included at

the end of each example.

“The [name deleted] Police Department is 357 persons strong, with a

dozen officers assigned to narcotics to date. The [name deleted] Police

Department has addressed the drug epidemic at a street level but would

now like to target mid and upper level organizations in select violent

neighborhoods . . . . [name deleted] Police Department would like MET to

assist them in targeting some of these areas of friction where rival drug

dealers and street gangs continue an open air drug market, and where

gunfire and homicides permeate surrounding streets and area residents.”

Based on our analysis, this example does not cite specific evidence that

the identified drug and violence problem is beyond the police

department’s immediate capabilities. There is no explanation of why the

12 police officers assigned to narcotics cannot, without MET assistance,

successfully target and investigate the drug trafficking organizations that

are of concern. The request for authorization and funding does not cite

possible reasons such as an insufficient amount of money available to buy

drugs, a lack of needed technical equipment, officers’ lack of necessary

investigative or foreign language skills, or the officers being incapable

because they are known by the drug traffickers.

“The [name #1 deleted] Department consists of eighty-four sworn officers.

[name #1 deleted] has a four-man Special Investigations Unit that

investigates vice related crimes including drug complaints. [name #1

deleted] has members of the department assigned to the [name #2 deleted]

Violent Crimes Task Force, [name #3 deleted] Law Enforcement Task

Force and [name #4 deleted] Task Force. The [name #3 deleted] Law

Enforcement Task Force consists of approximately eight local

municipality police departments and the [name #3 deleted] Sheriff’s

Department. This task force directs its efforts to high profile criminal

activity including drug distribution investigations. The [name #2 deleted]

. . . operates a Violent Crimes Task Force (VCTF). This task force consists

of ten to twelve local police officers. The VCTF investigates violent crimes

Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET

Assessments of Local Law Enforcement

Agencies’ Capabilities

Example 1

Analysis

Example 2
Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET

Assessments of Local Law Enforcement

Agencies’ Capabilities

Page 78 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

in [name #3 deleted] and [name #5 deleted] counties of northeast [name #6

deleted]. The [name #5 deleted] Sheriff’s Department has a drug

investigation unit that works independently of any local law enforcement

task forces. There is no local area task force that concentrates its efforts

solely on drug trafficking investigations.”

In this example, it is not clear why the police department’s four-man unit

and the various task forces in the area cannot resolve the drug and

violence problem DEA was asked to address. As in the first example, the

request for authorization and funding does not explain specifically why the

problem is beyond the immediate capabilities of the local law enforcement

resources. Possible limiting factors, such as a lack of money available to

buy drugs and the unavailability of needed technical equipment, are not

addressed.

“The [name #1 deleted] police force has 130 full time police officers with

four officers assigned to work narcotics full time. In addition to the full

time narcotics officers there is a drug task force comprised of [name #2

deleted] state troopers and officers from neighboring communities to

include one officer from [name #1 deleted]. The [name #1 deleted] narcotic

officers and the drug task force officers are well known to the owners of

these bars, making it difficult and dangerous for undercover operations.”

This example does cite a specific reason as to why the local police

department and drug task force officers are not considered capable of

resolving the identified drug and violence problems, i. e., that there is a

high risk that the narcotics officers would be recognized if they were to

conduct undercover operations. However, the example does not put the

reason into context by explaining why the investigative technique of

undercover operations must be carried out to successfully address the

drug and violent crime problems, and it does not discuss the viability of,

and the police department’s and task force’s capabilities relating to, other

techniques and approaches.

“The [name #1 deleted] County Sheriff’s Department has approximately

170 officers with 18 assigned to their narcotics division. The drug unit is

further divided into small enforcement groups assigned to cover particular

areas within county jurisdiction. The Sheriff’s Department has identified

the communities of [name #2 deleted], East [name #3 deleted], and [name

Analysis

Example 3

Analysis

Example 4
Appendix III: Summary Examples of MET

Assessments of Local Law Enforcement

Agencies’ Capabilities

Page 79 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

#4 deleted] as the most active and difficult areas for the department to

police . . . in large part due to relentless daily crack cocaine distribution

activity and related violent crime conducted openly on the streets . . . . The

Sheriff’s department has deemed drug law enforcement in [name #2

deleted] to be virtually impossible citing a lack of manpower, a small

budget to purchase evidence, and an inability to recruit reliable

confidential informants to work in the area. Drug trafficking in [name #2

deleted] continues with minimal police presence, resulting in increased

community concern over the apparent lawlessness that exists. . . . The

[name #5 deleted] crack cocaine and cocaine distribution organization

operates within the East [name #3 deleted] and the [name #4 deleted]

areas of [name #1 deleted] County. Continuous sheriff department

enforcement efforts against [name #5 deleted] have met with negative

results due to similar manpower problems and the inability to infiltrate

this organization . . . . The [name #3 deleted] Police Department consists of

70 officers with two detectives assigned to a drug unit to cover

approximately 13 square miles. Due to the small size of the drug unit and

department budgetary constraints, narcotics enforcement has been limited

to investigation of juveniles and juvenile gang activity . . . . The [name #3

deleted] Police Department has also been unsuccessful infiltrating the

[name #6 deleted] group due to a lack of undercover police personnel not

already known to [name #3 deleted] drug distributors. The [name #3

deleted] Police Department also does not have the funds necessary to

purchase evidence and secure informants to effectively investigate the

activities of this organization. Virtually all narcotic enforcement has been

limited to assistance provided by outside law enforcement agencies . . .”

This example cites several specific reasons why local law enforcement

agencies cannot successfully address the drug and violence problems

identified. For example, the request for deployment authorization and

funding points out the sheriff department’s lack of manpower, insufficient

money to buy drugs, and inability to recruit informants in the area. The

request also cites the negative results of previous sheriff department

enforcement efforts against the identified crack cocaine and cocaine

trafficking organization. In addition, the request explains that the local

police department is also incapable of successfully addressing the

identified problem: its narcotics enforcement activities have been limited

to investigating juveniles; it was unable to infiltrate the identified

trafficking organization; and it did not have sufficient funds to buy drugs

and pay informants.

Analysis
Appendix IV: Geographic Scope of MET Cases

Initiated, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 80 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Scope of case # % # % #% #% #%

Local 8

7

54.4 69 48.6 35 62.5 25 58.1 289 49.6

Regional 3

2

20.0 38 26.8 13 23.2 15 34.9 154 26.4

Domestic 3

6

22.5 23 16.2 5 8.9 2 4.7 104 17.8

Foreign 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0

International 5 3.1 12 8.5 3 5.4 0 0.0 34 5.8

Other/unknown 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 2.3 2 0.3

Total 1

6

0

100.0 142 100.1 56 100.0 43 100.0 583 99.9

a

Fiscal year 1995 data are for a 6-month period ending September 30, 1995.

Note: Percentages may not total 100 percent due to rounding.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix IV: Geographic Scope of MET Cases

Initiated, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000
Appendix V: MET Program Arrests and Seizures

Data, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000

Page 81 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Selected data 1995-96a1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

Deployments completed 79 46 55 55 35 270

Arrests 2,577 2,157 2,250 1,965 2,334 11,283

Cocaine seized (pounds) 95 747 342 333 195 1,712

Methamphetamine seized

(pounds)

68 115 199 86 135 603

Heroin seized (pounds) 3 29 18 17 36 103

Marijuana seized (pounds) 159 953 646 998 672 3,428

Assets seized (millions)b$3.8 $2.7 $3.9 $3.1 $3.4 $16.9

a

Fiscal year 1995-96 data are for the 18-month period ending September 30, 1996.

b

The amounts of assets seized each fiscal year are in constant fiscal year 2001 dollars.

Source: Developed by GAO from DEA data.

Appendix V: MET Program Arrests and Seizures

Data, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 2000
Appendix VI: Summary Examples of

DEA-Reported Successful MET Deployments

Page 82 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following are summaries of examples of successful MET deployments

reported internally and externally by DEA.

• In its fiscal year 2001 congressional budget submission, DEA reported that

from July 1998 until March 1999, the Phoenix Field Office MET worked

closely with the Northern Arizona Street Crimes Task Force in targeting

two drug trafficking organizations. One organization was responsible for

supplying street-level dealers with multiple-pound quantities of

methamphetamine. The other, a polydrug trafficking group, had a

reputation for extreme violence; some of its members had criminal

histories, which included armed robberies, home invasions, assault, sex

crimes, and child abuse. Using confidential sources, the MET was able to

successfully infiltrate these organizations and severely disrupt their

operations. The 9-month deployment resulted in the seizure of 7

operational and 3 dismantled methamphetamine labs, 44 grams of heroin,

22 pounds of marijuana, 500 dosage units of LSD, 40 weapons, 18 motor

vehicles, and $16,292 in U.S. currency. In addition, the MET secured 86

arrests, including the arrest of 2 primary targets.

• In its fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan, DEA reported that in June

1998, the New York MET initiated a deployment at the request of the Utica

Chief of Police who indicated that Utica was experiencing a surge in drugrelated criminal activity attributable to turf battles between competing

drug organizations, drug-related robberies, and retaliation shootings. The

MET, in conjunction with the Utica Police Department, identified two

significant drug trafficking organizations operating in the Utica area.

Utilizing cooperating sources and undercover operations, MET and Utica

agents successfully infiltrated the targeted organizations. This cooperative

investigative strategy led to the indictment of 25 defendants by a federal

grand jury. The indictments included the primary deployment targets and

their identified source of supply. On September 22, 1998, the New York

MET--working in conjunction with their local, state and federal

counterparts--conducted a round-up which concluded its 3-month

deployment. Nineteen of the 25 indicted subjects were arrested and the

targeted organizations were dismantled.

• In its September 1999 quarterly Management Initiative Tracking Report,

DEA reported that from April 1999 until July 1999, the Los Angeles MET

deployed to a county that was experiencing an epidemic of violent

criminal conduct perpetrated by gang members. The Los Angeles MET

infiltrated the methamphetamine trafficking activities of the deployment

targets by utilizing: (1) observation posts in areas of high pedestrian traffic

where gangs sell narcotics in the open; (2) undercover operations in an

Appendix VI: Summary Examples of

DEA-Reported Successful MET Deployments
Appendix VI: Summary Examples of

DEA-Reported Successful MET Deployments

Page 83 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

attempt to eliminate sources of supply; and (3) search warrants to

eliminate locations where narcotics were being produced and stored.

During the course of this 3-month deployment, the following seizures were

made: 144.38 grams of powder cocaine; 2,268.5 grams of

methamphetamine; 3.55 grams of heroin; 3,907.57 grams of marijuana;

1,330 marijuana plants; 35 weapons; and $23,014 in U.S. currency. Arrests

took place throughout the investigation, and there was a limited round-up

operation. A total of 51 suspects, including the 3 primary targets of the

investigation, were arrested.
Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment

Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 84 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following are examples from DEA headquarters files for the 197 MET

deployments completed as of June 30, 1999, that were included in our

review. The examples show the inconsistencies in the type and amount of

data reported by the METs, in their 6-month postdeployment reviews, from

requesting local law enforcement agencies. Our analysis is included at the

beginning of each review area.

Based on our analysis, the first two examples do not relate or link the

provided information to any change in drug sales and/or reduced visible

drug sales. In contrast, the third example provides information indicating

that there was a reduction in visible sales.

“Sgt. [name #1 deleted] ([name #2 deleted] Police Department) stated that

crack cocaine arrests have increased substantially for the six-month

period following termination of the MET deployment. This is attributable

to the success of the MET deployment. Patrol officers assigned to the

designated area are taking a more aggressive posture in the enforcement

of state narcotics laws. This aggressive position is most evident in the

statistics regarding unlawful possession of a controlled substance.”

“The reputation for the [name deleted] as being a principal in the

distribution of methamphetamine and cocaine has been eliminated.”

“According to the [name deleted] Police Department, the availability of

cocaine, methamphetamine and other controlled substances has

decreased significantly. During the MET deployment, drug sales were

conducted with little fear of police intervention. [Name deleted] Police

Department officials report that traffickers now attempt to conceal their

illegal activity and have been hampered by increasing police pressure.

Open narcotic activity in the area has been almost completely eliminated.

Patrol Officers in this community no longer respond to as many drug

related incident calls as in the past. The department receives fewer calls

concerning complaints about narcotic or violent drug related activity.”

Based on our analysis, the first example does not relate or link the

provided information to the stability of the targeted area and any

noticeable difference in violent crime. The second example while

containing a statement that there has been a difference in violent crime,

does not provide any supporting information. In contrast, the third

example provides supporting information that there was a noticeable

difference in violent crime.

Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment

Information Reported for Four Areas

Reduction in Drug Sales

or Reduced Visible Drug

Sales

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Stability of Targeted

Area or Noticeable

Difference in Violent

Crime
Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment

Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 85 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

“It should be noted that during the MET deployment to [name deleted]

there was a homicide committed in the community. As a result of

undercover purchases which were made by DEA agents, homicide

detectives were able to bring in suspects and uncooperative witnesses for

questioning based on arrest warrants obtained from MET undercover

operations.”

“Chief [name deleted] reported that there has been a decrease in street

crime associated with drug trafficking in the target area since the

deployment.”

“Information provided by the [name deleted] PD narcotics unit disclosed

that there has been a reduction in narcotics activity within the targeted

area. There has also been a reduction in threats against citizens and

violent related calls. A review of the statistical data provided by the [name

deleted] PD crime analysis unit revealed the following:” [pre- and

postdeployment violent crime statistics provided].

Based on our analysis, the first two examples do not cite any information

pertaining to community reaction and involvement. In contrast, example 3

provides information about community involvement while example 4

provides information about community reactions.

“Since the arrests of members of the [name #1 deleted] and [name #2

deleted] organizations, activity typically attributed to those organizations

(i.e.: narcotics trafficking, assaults and citizen harassment) have been

greatly reduced. According to the [name #3 deleted] PD detectives, life in

the city of [name #3 deleted] is of better quality. Patrol officers who

worked the downtown [name #3 deleted] area appreciated the efforts of

MET 2.”

“Since the arrest of the high level organizations members, activity typically

attributed to the group (i.e., narcotics trafficking, assaults and citizen

harassment) have been greatly reduced. Suspected narcotics traffickers

believe that their distribution areas continue to be surveilled by MET-2.

According to a confidential source, the crack cocaine in the targeted area

is either fake or of very poor quality. The source confirmed reports by the

[name deleted] PD officers that narcotics activity is “almost non-existent”.”

“Chief [name #1 deleted] advised that since the deployment the [name #2

deleted] PD has joined a program with local churches to attempt to reduce

crime and revitalize crime laden areas. Chief [name #1 deleted] stated that

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3

Community Reaction

and Involvement

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3
Appendix VII: Examples of Postdeployment

Information Reported for Four Areas

Page 86 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

the police department has also become involved in the “Weed and Seed”

Program.”

“Community reaction was positive, mostly stemming from local

newspaper stories. There was no attempt made by the police department

to gauge local reaction or to establish any new programs as a result of the

MET operation.”

Based on our analysis, the first example provides some statistics and the

opinion of a police official as to the state of the community after the MET.

However, there is no supporting trend analysis of the statistics or evidence

of a cause/effect relationship between the MET deployment and the trends

in violent crime. Moreover, the official's statement does not demonstrate

how the community is noticeably difference and how the MET contributed

to making the difference. The last two examples are statements of opinion

without any supporting evidence and analysis.

“Listed below are the statistics furnished by the [name #1 deleted] Police

Department’s Crime Analysis Section. . . . . Sgt. [name #2 deleted] stated

that there is a noticeable difference in the community and that very few of

the violent drug dealers are on the streets of [name #1 deleted].”

“It is apparent that MET-2’s deployment was not only successful but

greatly appreciated by the [name #1 deleted] Police Department. [Name #1

deleted] PD Chief [name #2 deleted} has expressed his appreciation in

writing to DEA Administrator [name #3 deleted].”

“The [name deleted] deployment was not only successful, but was also

greatly appreciated by the [name deleted] PD.”

Example 4

Agency Assessment

Example 1

Example 2

Example 3
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 87 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 88 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 24.

Now on p. 14.

Now on p. 32.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 89 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 74.

Now on p. 74.

Now on pp. 5-6.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 90 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 26.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 91 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Now on p. 59.

Now on p. 57.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 92 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 93 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

See comment 1.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 94 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department

of Justice

Page 95 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

The following is GAO's comment on DOJ's letter of June 14, 2001.

1. For clarification purposes, we revised the introductory portion of our

third recommendation in Chapter 4 as follows: "(3) collect and report

consistent violent crime statistics that cover comparable crime types

and time periods and relate to (a) the specific geographic areas ... and

(b)...." (See pp. 9 and 62 of this report.)

GAO Comment
Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 96 GAO-01-482 DEA’s Mobile Enforcement Teams

Laurie E. Ekstrand (202) 512-8777

Daniel C. Harris (202) 512-8777

In addition to the persons named above, the following persons made key

contributions to this report: Ronald G. Viereck, Katrina R. Moss, Lemuel N.

Jackson, Roosevelt R. Burns, Lawrence T. Kinch, Barry J. Seltser, Michael

P. Dino, Michael H. Little, Katherine M. Raheb, Jena Y. Sinkfield, and Ann

H. Finley.

Appendix IX: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts

Acknowledgments

(186774)
The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are

$2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the

Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also

accepted.

Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are

discounted 25 percent.

Orders by mail:

U.S. General Accounting Office

P.O. Box 37050

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by visiting:

Room 1100

700 4th St., NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW)

Washington, DC 20013

Orders by phone:

(202) 512-6000

fax: (202) 512-6061

TDD (202) 512-2537

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To

receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days,

please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will

provide information on how to obtain these lists.

Orders by Internet

For information on how to access GAO reports on the Internet, send an email message with “info” in the body to:

Info@www.gao.gov

or visit GAO’s World Wide Web home page at:

http://www.gao.gov

Contact one:

• Web site: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

• E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

• 1-800-424-5454 (automated answering system)

Ordering Information

To Report Fraud, Waste,

and Abuse in Federal

Programs