INDO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND 

NUCLEAR COOPERATION: 

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. 

SECURITY INTERESTS 

Jerome M. Conley 

INSS Occasional Paper 31 

Proliferation Series 

February 2000 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, 

or the U.S. Government. This paper is approved for public release by the 

Naval Postgraduate School; distribution is unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Acknowledgements x 

Introduction 1 

The Cold War Years: 1947-1991 7 

 Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation 8 

 The Indo-American Rift 9 

 Indian Strategic Culture 10 

New Dynamics and Continuities: The Post-Cold War Era 11 

 India's Post-Cold War Identity 11 

 Indo-American Relations in the Post-Cold War Era 13 

 Russia's Post-Cold War View of India 14 

 Strained Indo-Russian Relations 17 

 India's Military Needs and Russia's Supplier- 

 Dependency 20 

 The Role of Russian Interest Groups 23 

 11 May 1998: Pokhran II 25 

 Post-Cold War Trends: A Balance Sheet 26 

Conclusion: Implications for U.S. Security Interests 27 

 Indian Strategic Culture and Future Nuclear 

 Expansion 28 

Russia's Support of Indian Expansion 33 

Area Denial and the Indian Threat 35 

 Policy Options for the United States 36 

Endnotes 40 
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FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). This paper is derived from United States 

Marine Corps Major (select) Jerome M. Conley's Naval Postgraduate 

School thesis. It presents a detailed analysis of the Indian rationale 

behind their nuclear tests of 1998. As Major Conley concludes, "While 

some observers cite the inability of the United States to prevent India’s 

overt testing in May 1998 as a failure in American efforts, the analysis in 

this thesis of India’s strategic culture suggests that India’s decision to test 

was driven primarily by domestic politics, and was therefore beyond the 

reach of American nonproliferation efforts." He then goes on to develop 

specific policy recommendations for the United States to engage the new 

nuclear powers of South Asia to shape their future nuclear development, 

to facilitate transparency and confidence-building measures, to educate 

the regions powers on the full costs of their recent decisions, and to 

supplant Russian influence. In short, he calls for active U.S. engagement 

and shaping of the nuclear future of the region. 

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI); the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (incorporating the sponsorship of the 

Defense Special Weapons Agency and the On-Site Inspection Agency); 

the Army Environmental Policy Institute; the Plans Directorate of the 
viii

United States Space Command; the Air Force long-range plans 

directorate (XPXP); and the Nonproliferation Center of the Central 

Intelligence Agency. The mission of the Institute is “to promote national 

security research for the Department of Defense within the military 

academic community, and to support the Air Force national security 

education program.” Its research focuses on the areas of greatest interest 

to our organizational sponsors: arms control, proliferation, regional 

studies, Air Force policy, information warfare, environmental security, 

and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS is in its eighth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We 

appreciate your continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This paper analyzes the history of Indo-Russian military and nuclear 

cooperation. The “special” Moscow-New Delhi relationship during the 

Cold War, it concludes, was based upon Indian needs, American 

ambivalence, and Soviet opportunism. In the post-Cold War era this 

relationship has persisted due to continued American ambivalence, shortterm Indian military needs, and Russian economic needs. This bond, 

therefore, may be fractured by an eventual improvement in Indian 

military self-reliance or a deepening in Indo-American military 

cooperation. India’s strategic culture, rooted in Indian history, 

geography and political culture, has created an Indian strategic mindset 

impervious to American nonproliferation efforts. The paper finds, 

moreover, that there are no short-term “silver bullets” to cure the current 

Indo-American rift, which flows from causes in addition to India’s 

nuclear weapons tests in 1998. While short-term measures can be taken 

to improve the bilateral relationship, the historical rift that has emerged 

between the two states cannot be easily mended. The United States, 

therefore, must strive to ensure that Indian nuclear expansion is 

conducted in a controlled, safe and limited manner. 
x

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

I would like to thank David Yost, Sumit Ganguly, Mikhail Tsypkin, 

Peter Lavoy, Gaurav Kampani, Michael Barletta, Robert Meagher, and 

George Perkovich for their expertise and assistance at various stages of 

this project. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely mine and do 

not necessarily reflect the views held by these individuals. Any factual 

errors also rest with me. I would also like to thank my wife for her 

patience and support throughout the numerous deployments and the 

hours of research. 
INDO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NUCLEAR 

COOPERATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. 

SECURITY INTERESTS 

INTRODUCTION 

It is a strategic goal of the United States, rooted in the 

strategic self-interest of the United States, to see a 

secure India; a more economically vibrant India; and, 

of course, a better relationship between India and the 

United States. The nuclear issue is a complicating 

factor but not necessarily a contradictory one (and I 

insist on that distinction). 

 -U.S. Deputy Secretary of 

State Strobe Talbott1

 

 On 17 August 1999, India’s National Security Advisory Board 

(NSAB) released a draft copy of its long awaited nuclear doctrine.2

 

Arriving fifteen months after the May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests,3

the draft document refueled the debate within the United States over the 

future course of American policy towards India. But while the U.S. 

State Department was warning, “We think it would be unwise [for 

India] to move in the direction of developing a nuclear deterrent” due 

to the potential “action-reaction cycle” for a South Asian arms race,4

the Russian response was diametric. Rather than aligning Russia’s 

reaction with that of the other global powers, Grigory Karasin, the 

Russian Deputy Minister in charge of relations with India, stated, “We 

shall carefully study this draft and in due time clearly state our 

opinion.”5

 More telling is the fact that as the Clinton Administration 

pushed for a continuation of sanctions against India,6

 Russia was 

negotiating with India for the sale of TU-22 BM strike-bombers.7

 This 

contrast in American and Russian approaches to Indian “security 

needs,” and the legacy created by these polar approaches, typifies Indo-
2

Russian and Indo-American relationships over the last five decades and 

is the focus of this paper. 

 Moreover, this paper is based in the proposition that the 

history of Indian procurement of Soviet/Russian military hardware 

provides a framework for understanding Indian strategic culture and its 

influence on past, present and future development of military and 

nuclear forces. Intertwined in the history of Indo-Russian military 

cooperation, one can also find the roots of the Indo-American 

diplomatic divide that continues to separate the world’s two largest 

democracies. This divide, and the numerous factors that may prevent it 

from being completely bridged, is also discussed in this paper. 

 Finally, this paper examines the implications of the fact that 

India does not pose a direct military threat to the United States 

homeland. Any possibility for future strife between these two states, 

while remote, would most likely emerge from an area denial scenario in 

which the United States attempted to project military power into the 

Asian subcontinent or its surrounding waters. In this aspect, any 

possibility for military conflict between India and the United States 

would be, from an Indian perspective, the product of American 

aggression and Indian defense. 

When the draft nuclear doctrine was released in August 1999, 

American policy goals in South Asia consisted of five short-term 

“steps” and one long-term goal. The short-term steps entailed: the 

signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); 

a cessation of the production of fissile material by both states; a 

limitation on the development and deployment of ballistic missiles and 

nuclear capable aircraft; tightening the export controls in both India and 

Pakistan for nuclear technology; and the expansion of Confidence 

Building Measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan. The long-
3

term objective of American policy in South Asia was “universal 

adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”8

 To promote these 

“steps” and the end-state goal, the United States utilized a broad 

application of economic sanctions. American policy in South Asia 

during the fifteen months following Pokhran II can therefore be viewed 

as strictly nuclear-centric. Choosing a dialogue based on 

nonproliferation, the United States was certain to meet with eventual 

failure. As a proud nation and emerging power, India would not allow 

a foreign power, especially the United States, to dictate “internal” 

decisions, particularly with regard to national security and international 

status. 

 Contrary to America’s nuclear-focused approach to India, 

Russia adopted a more balanced approach to India in the period 

following Pokhran II. While the reaction of Russia’s political 

leadership to India’s proliferation was mixed, the signing of a ten-year 

treaty of military and technological cooperation in December 1998 sent 

a clear signal that Russia would neither condemn India nor would it 

support American nonproliferation efforts in South Asia. Claiming that 

it would continue to honor the historically “special” relationship, 

Russia would solidify the Indo-Russian military bond during this 

period. 

The crux of the “Indian problem” for American policy makers, 

therefore, is twofold. The first issue is the need to realize that India is 

not a problem. India is not a rogue state. Having based its post-Cold 

War policy objectives in India on the issue of nonproliferation, the 

United States allowed no flexibility in the Indo-American dialogue. 

While the Indian decision to overtly weaponize its nuclear program 

may have been a slap in the face of American preferences, the catalysts 

for the tests ran much deeper than simple anti-American sentiments. 
4

There is a need, therefore, for American policy-makers to understand 

the role of Indian strategic culture as the medium through which Indian 

military and nuclear procurement decisions are made. An underlying 

theme of this paper, therefore, is to draw out the essence of India’s 

strategic culture and to demonstrate how Russia has historically catered 

to this aspect of Indian thought while America has remained 

impervious to its influence. 

As defined by Ken Booth, strategic culture is the product of a 

nation’s “history, geography and political culture,” and it helps to 

“shape behavior on such issues as the use of force in international 

politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and 

strategic doctrine.”9

 As shown below, the value of this definition when 

applied to an analysis of India’s nuclear weapons program is that it 

embraces three core theoretical models normally attributed to nuclear 

proliferation: the “security,” “domestic politics” and “norms” models.10 

From an American policy perspective, an understanding of 

Indian nuclear proliferation must embrace a broad spectrum of 

proliferation incentives and the reality that “security,” “domestic 

politics,” and perceived international “norms” have all been 

instrumental at various times during the evolution of India’s nuclear 

weapons program. As the status of India in the international arena has 

changed, Indian perceptions of international “norms” have also 

changed. Changes in India’s domestic politics have sharply changed 

the role and influence of nuclear weapons as a symbol of national selfesteem and power. Furthermore, changes in the military and nuclear 

capabilities of Pakistan and China have reduced the geographic security 

of India and have provided nuclear proponents a rhetorical foundation, 

if not a fully credible military-technical foundation, for pursuing 

nuclear security. While the confines of this paper do not allow a 
5

detailed discussion of Indian strategic culture,11 critical junctures in 

Indian history, geographic security and political culture that influenced 

the evolution of India’s nuclear program are highlighted below. 

The second aspect of the American approach to the “Indian 

problem” is a failure to understand the dynamics of the “special” IndoRussian relationship. The continued references by Indian and Russian 

officials to the unique quality of their bipolar relations imply a certain 

resilience and common perspective in Indian and Russian strategic, 

diplomatic and economic interests. This paper argues, however, that 

the Indo-Russian relationship is not “special” when placed in a vacuum, 

devoid of outside influences. While India and Russia have had, and 

will continue to have, common interests that are necessary for the 

development of a resilient bond, said commonality has not been in and 

of itself sufficient to solidify their relationship. The glue in the IndoSoviet/Russian “special” relationship, therefore, has been and continues 

to be American ambivalence towards India and Indian military needs. 

If American ambivalence dissipates and India’s military-industrial 

complex achieves a high-level of self-reliance, the Indo-Russian bond 

will fragment. 

 India’s Cold War military procurement decisions are 

summarized briefly here. Central to this period was an Indian desire 

for diplomatic independence and military self-reliance. Indeed, the 

Cold War Indo-Soviet relationship was created by Indian needs, Soviet 

opportunism, and American ambivalence. While not intended as a 

critique of American Cold War policies in South Asia, the pivotal 

decisions made by the United States in South Asia had significant 

short-term consequences on Indian military procurement, and a legacy 

of mistrust and suspicion was created towards the United States. This 
6

legacy continues to influence Indo-American and Indo-Russian 

relations today. 

 The paper focuses in detail on the period from the end of the 

Cold War up through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period is defined 

by a shift in Indo-Russian relations as Russian economic needs became 

a dominating factor for continued military cooperation with India. 

While an Indian attempt to severe the umbilical cord to the Russian 

military- industrial complex would fall short, India would take 

advantage of Russian cooperation to expand its military base. 

Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on 

nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of IndoAmerican relations. This period represents an opportunity lost for 

American security interests in South Asia as Russian influence was 

allowed to remain and American influence was not properly developed. 

 Finally, the paper examines Indo-Russian and Indo-American 

relations in the post-Pokhran II era. The legacy of the Cold War will 

continue to influence bilateral interactions. Additionally, the ability of 

the United States to influence Indian nuclear expansion will be limited. 

With Russian assistance, India will pursue a nuclear triad and develop 

its “minimal” nuclear deterrent. The primary option available to the 

United States, therefore, will be to endeavor to ensure that Indian 

nuclear expansion is conducted in a controlled, safe, and limited 

manner, and to promote an improvement and redefining of the IndoAmerican dialogue. The future policy options of the United States will 

be weighed against Indian economic, political, and military needs, 

American strategic interests, and Russian influence. While no “silver 

bullet” for Indo-American bilateral bliss is evident, the need and the 

means to improve a teetering strategic situation are elucidated. This 
7

paper concludes that India does matter to future American security 

interests, and that future American policy must be scripted accordingly. 

THE COLD WAR YEARS: 1947-1991 

The real reason why there is now an increasingly 

open conflict between Western and Indian policy and 

attitudes on so many issues is, quite simply, almost 

tautologically, that the West and India are running an 

increasing risk of pursuing policies which cut 

severely across each other’s interests. The Russians 

have done no more than act as a catalyst....The real 

symbol of what has happened is not the welcoming 

millions who cheered Messrs. Bulganin and 

Khruschchev in Calcutta, but the grim sharpness of 

the reaction which met Mr. Dulles’s description of 

Goa as a “Province of Portugal.”12 

–The Round Table, 1956 

This section only briefly summarizes Indo-Soviet and IndoAmerican diplomatic, economic, and military relations during the Cold 

War years from 1947 to 1991. ∗

 This summary can only highlight an 

historical pattern in the Indo-Soviet relationship that supported India’s 

quest for regional security and independent global stature, and an 

oscillating Soviet vision of India based upon India’s changing geostrategic and diplomatic significance. As a result, far from being an 

enduring and close “special relationship,”13 the historical foundations 

of the Indo-Soviet relationship reveal an opportunistic relationship in 

which “India’s needs are a match for Soviet capabilities, and Soviet 

needs are a match for India’s strengths.”14 Moreover, the strength of 

the Indo-Soviet relationship depended upon the short-term impact of 

 

∗

 The full Naval Postgraduate School thesis includes an extensive 

discussion of the Cold-War history of Indian security development and 

India's relations with Russia and the United States. That section of the 

thesis was reduced to only a brief summary for length management in 

this occasional paper. 
8

Indo-American interactions. Additionally, major South Asian policy 

decisions made by the United States during the Cold War show that the 

cementing of the “special” Indo-Soviet relationship was a product of 

American inattention as much as Soviet perseverance. 

The pattern of Indian military procurement during the period 

1947 to 1990 highlights three central themes of this study. The first is 

the fragile nature of the Indo-Soviet “special” relationship. The second 

theme is the emergence and growth of the Indo-American divide. The 

final theme is the evolution of India’s strategic culture and its role in 

procurement decisions. A summary of these three topics is provided 

below. 

Indo-Soviet Military Cooperation 

The history of Indo-Soviet military cooperation can be summarized as a 

relationship determined by Indian needs, Soviet opportunism, and 

Western ambivalence. When India commenced the rapid 

modernization of its armed forces following the 1962 Sino-Indian 

conflict, its initial objective was to continue and expand upon its 

historical Western supply-line. After failing to secure arms transfer 

agreements with the West, India turned to the Soviet Union out of “dire 

necessity.” For India, the agreement was a commercial one based on 

economics. Soviet military contracts usually had favorable financial 

terms and included provisions for production licensing. But in the 

long-run, these deals became a burden as India failed to secure a 

reliable supply of spare parts and also experienced a drop in operational 

readiness due to a void in indigenous maintenance capabilities. 

When India made a concerted effort in the 1980s to diversify 

its procurement portfolio, it found itself returning to the Soviet Union 

to satisfy its short-term military needs. With a long-term goal of selfreliance in military procurement, India would continue to use Soviet 
9

arms as a stepping stone between the bygone era of the British Raj and 

future Indian procurement autonomy. While Soviet arms would be 

used to offset American influence in South Asia, they did not pose a 

direct military threat to American forces during this period. 

The Indo-American Rift 

Central to the discussion of Indo-American relations during the Cold 

War is the fact that India did not play a vital role in American geostrategic thinking during this period. The ideological significance of 

India as the world’s largest democracy was negated by India’s 

unwillingness to align itself with the West in the pivotal East-West 

struggle. From the American perspective, a lack of Indian support 

versus the “communist threat” equated to Indian hostility. India’s quest 

for diplomatic independence and self-reliance did not fit into the 

American paradigm for a bipolar world. 

From the Indian perspective, the confrontational American 

style threatened a return to colonial methods and subservience. In 

Indian eyes, America’s willingness to engage Pakistan and China, and 

thereby impair India’s regional security, illuminated American 

hegemonic aspirations and American indifference towards less 

developed countries. The unwillingness of the United States to provide 

arms to a fellow democracy when needed seemed hypocritical and 

incredible. The essence of the Indo-American “problem” was quite 

clear. Both states were acting in the same manner and securing their 

own national needs, with little regard for what other states might desire. 

The United States believed that as a superpower it had the right to take 

a superior position. India felt that as the world’s largest democracy, 

and a victim of centuries of repression, it had the right to demand 

equality. With both states proceeding forward and neither willing to 

give way to the other, a collision was imminent. 
10

Indian Strategic Culture 

History, geography, and political culture all played crucial roles in the 

development of India’s conventional forces and nuclear capabilities 

during the Cold War. India’s sudden emancipation in 1947 after 

centuries of subservience created “a fierce determination to preserve 

Indian independence no matter what the cost—an attitude often 

bordering on paranoia.”15 Any attempt by outside powers, whether 

Soviet or Western, to exert influence upon India was often met with 

open defiance. While the Soviet Union, especially under Khrushchev, 

would be more understanding of India’s “paranoia” and would treat 

India with respect, the United States often presented India with 

demands, even when providing food aid. Furthermore, the United 

States would exacerbate India’s geographic isolation by providing arms 

and technical data to both Pakistan and China, thus adding fuel to 

Indian militarism. 

Finally, India’s political and bureaucratic leaders were crucial 

in determining the course that India would take in weapons 

development and procurement. Nehru neglected the country’s military 

forces until it was too late to recover. Shastri provided the green signal 

to Bhabha, who manipulated the emerging Chinese threat skillfully. 

When Sarabhai replaced Bhabha in crucial posts within India’s atomic 

energy program, pursuit of the nuclear option was neglected. Indira 

Gandhi preferred cooperation with the Soviet Union during her first 

premiership (1966-1977), then became more pro-Western during her 

second term (1980-1984). Desai understood the limitations of a singletrack procurement source and set the course for diversified 

procurement. While all these individuals had the will to shape and 

direct India’s weapons programs, their hands were often tied by 

financial, technical and diplomatic constraints. When these bonds 
11

began to loosen in the post-Cold War era, the influence and role of 

India’s political culture would become even more decisive. 

NEW DYNAMICS AND CONTINUITIES: THE POST-COLD 

WAR ERA 

India is becoming a harder, more selfish and 

pragmatic entity. No longer encumbered by leaders 

besotted by larger-than-life images of themselves on 

the international stage, the new India is inclined to 

look at the world in terms of its own interests.16

The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan in 1989 and the end of 

the Cold War brought about a drastic change in India’s geo-strategic 

and diplomatic importance. At the same time, India experienced 

internal economic turmoil and an increase in domestic instability due to 

numerous insurgency movements. These factors contributed to a sharp 

decrease in Indian military expenditures and arms importation. 

Furthermore, a rigid American approach to India, centered on 

nonproliferation concerns, would permeate all aspects of IndoAmerican relations and prevent a broadening of these relations. 

Finally, the foundations of the Indo-Soviet/Russian military 

relationship would shift from Indian needs and Soviet opportunism to 

Russian economic needs and Indian military needs and opportunism. 

This section encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War up 

through the Pokhran tests of 1998. This period represents a lost 

opportunity for American security interests in South Asia as Russian 

influence was allowed to remain while Indian suspicions of American 

intentions were continually validated. 

INDIA’S POST-COLD WAR IDENTITY 

Having defined its identity and prestige in international politics as the 

leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, India’s raison d’être and identity 

in international relations became uncertain with the collapse of the 
12

Soviet Union in 1991. “The pursuit of autonomy without power was 

premised, first, on a balanced stalemate between the Atlantic and 

Soviet blocs....”17 The removal of the “Soviet bloc” from the 

“stalemate” effectively ended the stalemate and, consequently, the 

rationale for the non-aligned movement. Indians also came to realize 

that the absence of a bilateral competition between the two 

superpowers meant that India’s geo-strategic role as a “counter-weight” 

no longer existed. “When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union 

collapsed, India found that few people outside the region cared much 

about the country. India neither had economic influence nor risked 

becoming a major source of instability—the two most important criteria 

for earning foreign attention.”18 Furthermore, the rise of secessionist 

movements throughout India, South Asia and Central Asia shifted 

Indian defense concerns back to the issue of internal stability. Finally, 

after three decades of protectionist economic policies, India was forced 

to abandon its Soviet-supported “fortress mentality” and turn to the 

World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for economic 

rejuvenation.19

Aiding the collapse of the Indian “fortress” was a realization 

among Indian elites that other Asian countries were experiencing rapid 

economic growth via the global market.20 It was during this transition 

period of the early 1990s that India emerged from centuries of 

subservience to (or, during the Cold War, dependence on) external 

powers to begin defining a global role for itself that was solely 

egocentric and not centered on India’s reliance on other states. On the 

strategic level, to rephrase Ashley Tellis’ Cold War depiction of India, 

the post-Cold War era became a time of transition as India evolved 

from being a consumer of security to being a producer of its own 

security.21
13

INDO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR 

ERA 

In the early 1990s, economic reforms in India and the end of the EastWest competition of the Cold War provided an opportunity for 

improved Indo-American relations. Many observers hoped that the 

continued growth in Indo-American trade relations would provide a 

“cornerstone” for improved relations.22 As a result of India’s 

Economic Reform Programme, foreign investment in India had risen 

sharply, with the United States taking the lead as India’s largest foreign 

investor.23 Additionally, the United States became a major source of 

technology for India.24

Against this backdrop of opportunity, however, the legacy of 

the Cold War Indo-American rift persisted. During the 1990-91 Gulf 

War, India had silently allowed American cargo aircraft transiting from 

the Philippines to the Gulf States to refuel at several airports. When an 

Indian press photographer happened upon an American aircraft in 

Bombay that was delayed due to maintenance problems, the story 

exploded into the Indian press.25 Domestic politics elevated the 

refueling operations into a breech of India’s nonalignment policies, and 

the new Indian Prime Minister, Chandra Shekhar, was forced to halt the 

operations. 

Following the Gulf War, however, Indo-American military 

cooperation improved as the two nations conducted a joint naval 

exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military cooperation in 1995.26 

Additionally, the United States continued to provide technical support 

to India’s Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program and also authorized 

the transfer of 315 Texas Instruments Paveway bomb-guidance kits to 

the Indian Air Force.27 Despite these efforts, Indo-American relations 

continued to flounder. 
14

During the first term of the Clinton Administration, the United 

States adopted foreign policy goals in South Asia based upon human 

rights issues, the desire to resolve tensions in Kashmir, and the need to 

“cap, roll-back and eliminate” nuclear weapons in the region.28 As the 

Clinton Administration continued into its second term, there appeared 

to be no attempt to readdress Indo-American relations. “One third of 

the Clinton Administration saw India in terms of arms control, one 

third saw it as an economic opportunity and one third saw it as a 

possible strategic partner. There was no policy review, no attempt to 

bring all this together.”29 Additionally, in 1995, the U.S. Congress 

passed the Brown Amendment, which lifted most of the sanctions 

dictated by the Pressler Amendment and allowed the sale of $658 

million worth of military equipment to Pakistan.30 Finally, the United 

States chose not to impose sanctions on China for the transfer to 

Pakistan of M-11 missiles and parts and 5,000 ring magnets for 

Pakistan’s unsafeguarded centrifuges.31 From the Indian perspective, 

in the early post-Cold War years, the United States continued to show a 

preference towards Pakistan and China while simultaneously infringing 

upon Indian sovereignty. 

RUSSIA’S POST-COLD WAR VIEW OF INDIA 

Unable to stabilize its own domestic environment, Russia’s leadership, 

specifically President Boris Yeltsin, emphasized a need for the “‘deideologization’ of its foreign policy.”32 This “de-ideologization” policy 

resulted in Russia adopting a “wait and see” policy towards India. 33 

“The main thing was that Moscow wanted its policy towards India to 

be pragmatic and flexible.”34 Perhaps the greatest source of Russian 

neutrality towards India during the transition period of the early 1990s 

was a Russian political leadership that was “dominated by ‘Westerners’ 

and the ‘Atlanticists.’”35 Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin both 
15

appeared to rest their hopes for a rejuvenation of the Russian economy 

on some variant of the Marshall Plan.36 Both men failed to understand 

that a Marshall Plan scenario—at least in the variation pursued in West 

Germany—required not only defeat but also an occupation of the 

targeted state to ensure that the required infrastructure and “rule of law” 

were in place. As is well documented, the tremendous amount of 

corruption and disorganization within Russia’s bureaucracy curtailed 

the potential effectiveness of Western financial assistance. 

The foreign policy struggle between the “Westerners” and 

“Asia first” groups in the new Russian state placed Indo-Russian 

relations in a precarious position. Two schools of thought concerning 

India existed within Russia in the early 1990s. The first school was 

composed of academics, members of the Duma and the defense 

industry who believed that Russia should maintain its “special” 

relationship with India.37 A strong India, they argued, could help fight 

the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that was sweeping across the 

Central Asian region between Russia and India. Additionally, this 

group believed that a strong India could offset the hegemonic status of 

the United States. If Russia promoted areas of regional strength 

throughout the globe, this school believed, the United States’ ability to 

rest upon its post-Cold War laurels would be short-lived.38 Finally, 

India was the top importer of Soviet armaments during the final years 

of the Cold War, and many experts in Russia believed that this income 

source was crucial in Russia’s transition to a free-market economy.39 

The second Russian school of thought concerning future 

relations with India was headed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 

Kozyrev. This group believed that Pakistani relations were more 

valuable in fulfilling Russia’s immediate foreign policy and security 

concerns. The southern periphery of Russia was a hotbed for Islamic 
16

fundamentalism and Pakistan held the necessary credentials to be an 

effective middleman for Russia. This view obviously countered the 

pro-India school that believed the solution to the growing Islamic threat 

was a strong Indian counter-balance. Finally, the Russian Foreign 

Ministry considered Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey as having a higher 

priority than India due to their geographic proximity to Russia.40 

As the transition from Soviet to Russian rule took place, the 

anti-India school of thought dominated Russian foreign policy-making. 

This domination resulted in a major shift in Soviet/Russian policy 

towards South Asia. “In November 1991, when the Soviet Union was 

breathing its last, in a dramatic change of policy, Moscow suddenly 

supported the Pakistan-sponsored UN Resolution calling for the 

establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia to the great 

consternation of New Delhi.”41 A nuclear-free zone would mean that 

both India and Pakistan would discontinue their nuclear programs and 

become “equals” as non-nuclear states. The signal sent by the 

collapsing Soviet regime, with many of its leaders taking positions in 

the new Russian government, was that it sided with the West and 

Pakistan against India’s ambitions for regional leadership and security. 

A second impetus for Soviet/Russian support of the Pakistanisponsored resolution may have been the strong desire to put closure to 

the war in Afghanistan. To accomplish this, the Soviet/Russian 

leadership wanted to “secure the release of their prisoners of war who 

were in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions.”42 In 

January 1992, one month after a delegation of Afghan Mujahideen 

traveled to Russia, Moscow severed all “military supplies, ordnance 

and fuel for military transport” that were sustaining the Najib 

government’s war effort against the Mujihadeen. This decision 

effectively negated the airpower advantage that the Najib government 
17

had held over the Mujihadeen and tilted the conflict back in favor of the 

insurgents. New Delhi felt a certain sense of betrayal because of the 

reversal in Soviet policy since the Indian government had worked with 

the Soviet Union in supporting the nationalist and secular Najib 

government.43 

STRAINED INDO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 

It was in this atmosphere of uncertain Russian foreign policy objectives 

that the post-Cold War relations between Russia and India were further 

strained by two events. The first of these destabilizing events centered 

around a contract dispute between the Russian space directorate 

“Glavkosmos” and the government of India for the purchase of 

cryogenic engines and the related technology. The contract, signed on 

18 January 1991, stemmed from India’s desire to gain knowledge of the 

liquid oxygen propulsion system of Russian cryogenic engines in order 

to advance India’s geo-synchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) 

program. If produced indigenously and without Russian assistance, the 

project was forecast to require fifteen years until it would be 

operational.44 For Glavkosmos, the $350 million deal would provide 

crucial funds during a period of tremendous reductions in Russian 

defense expenditures.45 

Over the next two years, the United States protested the 

proposed transfer of missiles and technology to India on the grounds 

that the sale would violate the April 1987 Missile Technology Control 

Regime (MTCR). The growing threat of missile proliferation became 

well known to the United States following the Iraqi Scud missile 

attacks during the Gulf War46 and the testing of India’s Agni IRBM 

missile in 1989. However, the ability of the United States to coherently 

protest the sale was hampered by the changing of governments in 

Moscow as the Soviet Union collapsed and as the U.S. Executive 
18

Branch changed administrations from President Bush to President 

Clinton.47 

From the Indian and Russian perspectives, the cryogenic 

engine deal was legal under the MTCR on the grounds that the treaty 

did not block the support of “peaceful space ventures.”48 Furthermore, 

India asserted that U.S. attempts to block the sale were financially 

motivated since General Dynamics and the French space-booster 

manufacturer Arianespace had both been outbid by Glavkosmos.49

The new Russian government under Boris Yeltsin promised 

India’s leadership that it would not give in to U.S. diplomatic pressure. 

This promise was compromised, however, after the United States 

applied sanctions in May 1992,50 and threatened further economic 

measures. On 16 July 1993, Boris Yeltsin agreed to suspend the 

transaction and to alter the nature of the transfer to the sale of only the 

cryogenic engines and not the technology.51 In exchange, Glavkosmos 

was given bidding rights on over $950 million worth of future U.S. 

space projects.52

While the ability of India to indigenously produce GSLVs and 

ICBMs was delayed by several years due to the cancellation of the 

original cryogenic engine deal, the main concern in New Delhi was that 

the Yeltsin government had given in to Western pressure. “The 

conclusion they drew was that Russia’s overriding need for American 

economic aid would make it susceptible to American pressure. In 

Indian eyes, Russia is unreliable, and it has also lost its international 

stature.”53 As Indo-Russian relations appeared to weaken under 

Western pressure, direct bilateral interactions between the two states 

also revealed tensions. 

During the same time frame as the cryogenic engine fiasco, 

the “rupee versus ruble” debate flared up in Indo-Russian relations. As 
19

the Cold War concluded, India had an amassed debt of $12-16 billion 

owed to the Soviet Union for arms purchases. While India proved 

willing to pay off its debt, a dispute emerged between the two states 

over the nature of the currency and the exchange rate that would be 

used. As noted earlier, the Soviet Union had been willing to accept 

rupee-for-arms arrangements since the initial Soviet intent in the 

military cooperation was to use India as a strategic counter-balance, not 

a financial pool. Since there was not a huge demand for Indian imports 

in the Soviet Union, almost half of the rupee-based debt remained in 

Indian banks uncollected.54 When the new and financially strapped 

Russian state took over the old Soviet trade books, the vast Indian debt 

became an issue of concern. “Goodwill alone cannot forge mutually 

advantageous economic ties. Trade between Russia and India almost 

collapsed in 1991-92 because of arguments over the rupee-ruble 

exchange rate and the amount India owed Russia as the successor state 

to the USSR.”55 After much domestic squabbling in each country, a 

resolution was reached in January 1993 that called for India to repay 

Russia $1 billion a year in Indian goods until 2005, after which the 

remaining thirty-seven percent of the debt would be repaid, interest 

free, over forty-five years.56

Although a repayment schedule was established, controversy 

over distribution of the “Rupee Fund” continued. Russia had originally 

agreed to establish a three-year import schedule with India which 

would allow Indian exporters to forecast the amount of products needed 

in advance. In September 1994, the Russian government reversed this 

decision out of fear that long-term financial commitments would be too 

constricting. The new plan offered by Moscow provided a 180-day 

export forecast to Indian producers.57 
20

To further stimulate investor interest in India’s currency, the 

Russian government began to auction off vast sums of the Indian 

currency to Russian importers at discounted rates. The average 

discount of fifteen percent during the auctions led to rampant 

corruption and manipulation of the rupee fund, especially among 

Russia’s banking oligarchy.58 Meanwhile, the Indian government 

continued to petition Russia to accelerate the repayment schedule while 

it simultaneously maintained its protectionist import-export policies.59 

By 1993, the level of bilateral trade between India and Russia had 

dropped to one-fifth of the 1990 level of $5.5 billion.60 

India was finally revived in the Russian strategic focus in 

January 1996, when Yevgeny Primakov replaced the pro-Western 

Andrei Kozyrev as Russia’s Foreign Minister.61 The result was an 

immediate swing in Russia’s foreign policy focus that included 

considerations for both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. A clear 

signal was sent by Moscow to New Delhi, and the rest of the world, 

one year later when an agreement was reached to build two Russian 

light-water nuclear reactors (LWR) in India in defiance of a Nuclear 

Suppliers Group ban.62 “The two countries signed an accord paving the 

way for the construction of two 1,000 MW light water nuclear reactors 

at Kudankalam in Tamil Nadu. Hence it seems that Russia would not 

succumb to external pressure this time.”63 Diplomatically, Russia 

appeared to no longer look strictly westwards. 

INDIA’S MILITARY NEEDS AND RUSSIA’S SUPPLIERDEPENDENCY 

The primary short-term military concern for India in the early 1990s 

was its limited supply of spare parts and supplies for its Sovietproduced armaments.64 After three decades of reliance on Sovietproduced hardware, India was in a position in 1991 in which seventy 
21

percent of Army armaments, eighty percent of Air Force armaments, 

and eight-five percent of Navy armaments were of Soviet origin.65 

Lacking the indigenous capability to produce spare parts and supplies 

for these systems, India’s military faced an immediate crisis. The 

break-up of the Soviet Union had caused a fracture in the Soviet-Indian 

military supply-line as the administrative control and actual locations of 

the Soviet defense industries were situated throughout the newly 

independent states. “As Air Vice-Marshall S. Krishnaswamy noted 

with some understatement, there was a ‘hiccup’ in supply relations 

during 1991-92.”66 Over-reliance on Soviet military hardware had 

allowed India to postpone developing a self-reliant indigenous defense 

industry. More to the point, “the dependence on Russian weapons over 

30 years was a serious strategic defect.”67

In response to its economic crisis in 1990-91 and the 

temporary loss of its primary foreign arms supplier, India imposed a 

reduction in defense expenditures and a sharp reduction in arms 

importation (see Figures 1 and 2 below). After having been the top 

importer of conventional weapons in the world during the period from 

1988 to 1992,68 India was ranked as the twenty-third largest importer of 

conventional arms by 1996.69 Meanwhile, Russia’s share of the global 

arms market dropped from thirty-two percent in 1989 to eight percent 

in 1994.70 The inability of Russia to continue the Soviet flow of 

military hardware, coupled with the sharp reduction in Indian military 

expenditures, weakened the primary bond that had united India and the 

Soviet Union during the Cold War (see Figure 3). 
22

Figure 1: Indian Military Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 

1988-96 

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

%

198819891990199119921993199419951996

Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI 

Yearbook 1998 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 230. 

Figure 2: Indian Arms Imports in Constant 1996 U.S. dollars 

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

Source: Data obtained from, World Military Expenditures and Arms 

Transfers, 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament 

Agency, 1998), Table II. Available online: 

<http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/wmeat97/wmeat97.pdf>. 
23

Figure 3: Percentage of Indian Arms Imported from the Soviet 

Union/Russia 

 

Source: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI 

Yearbook 1996 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 482. Table 

11.8. 

THE ROLE OF RUSSIAN INTEREST GROUPS 

Until the communist collapse, the Indo-Soviet 

relationship prospered because of the need for a 

balance against the West, and shared security and 

geopolitical concerns. The new Indo-Russian 

relationship will have to be based primarily on 

business interests, and colored only marginally by 

geopolitics and security.71 

By the mid-1990s, however, the recovery of the Indian 

economy and the financial needs of Russia’s military-industrial 

complex quickly mended the temporary “hiccup” in Indo-Russian 

military cooperation. In 1995, the sale of Russian arms on the 

international market increased by sixty percent over the previous year’s 

total as the state shifted from “an ideological to a market-driven 

approach to selling its military hardware.”72 Along with this shift in 

Russian arms sales practices came the decisive influence of Russian 

85 76 77 69

0

20

40

60

80

100

% of Total 

Imports 

1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95
24

interest groups.73 During the Cold War, decisions to sell Soviet 

weaponry abroad had been made by the Politburo. But in the post-Cold 

War era, the choice of where and when to sell Russian arms rested with 

the power-brokers of the Russian military-industrial complex.74 As 

Vitaly Kataev, the General Director of Russia’s Center of Military 

Industrial Complex, remarked, “Economics dictate the routes of 

trade.”75

The likelihood of Russian interest groups dictating future 

military cooperation with India appears high. India buys more 

hardware from the Russian defense industry than Russia’s own military 

forces.76 Estimates show that about eight hundred Russian defense 

production facilities are kept in operation by Indian defense contracts.77 

Russian exports to China and India amount to about forty-one percent 

of the total revenue brought in by Russia’s defense industry.78 The 

signing of a ten-year Indo-Russian agreement on military-technical 

cooperation, worth $15 billion, in the aftermath of the Pokhran II tests 

is an example of this trend.79 “In this sense it can be assumed that at 

the very least up to 2010, when aging begins of the most advanced 

Russian models already existing (SU-30MK and SU-35/37, T-90S tank, 

Mi-28 and Ka-50/52 attack helicopters), Russia can count on 

preserving a stable Indian demand for relatively large lots of arms and 

for their manufacturing technology.”80 

Outside the paradigm of arms sales, several trends are 

emerging that may promote strong Indo-Russia cooperation. The first 

is a common security interest as both countries have strong concerns 

about the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the potential Chinese 

threat, and the prospect of U.S. world hegemony.81 “In private 

discussions Russian and Indian diplomats willingly open the cards: 

both Moscow and New Delhi see a threat in the excessive strengthening 
25

of China and the Islamic extremists.”82 Furthermore, by promoting the 

rise of Indian power, Russia may be able to offset the “heat of NATO’s 

eastward extension.”83 There also remains a school of thought that 

Russia may be able to learn from India some lessons for sustaining a 

multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic democratic state. Finally, both states face 

an increasing criminal threat centered around narcotics and illegal arms 

smuggling.84 

11 MAY 1998: POKHRAN II 

The current disharmony, therefore, between India and 

the rest of the globe is that India has moved from 

being totally moralistic to being a little more realistic, 

while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all 

its nuclear conclusions entirely realistically. With a 

surplus of nuclear weapons and the technology for 

fourth-generation weapons, the other nuclear powers 

are now beginning to move towards a moralistic 

position. Here is the cradle of lack of understanding 

about the Indian stand. 

-Jaswant Singh85

A decisive turn was made along the historical path of India’s 

nuclear program when the Rajastan desert was rocked by three nuclear 

explosions on 11 May 1998. This decision to overtly weaponize after 

twenty-four years of “restraint” has been the subject of much scrutiny 

in nonproliferation studies. The reasons normally highlighted as 

possible catalysts include: technological considerations, in that India 

needed to update the limited test data acquired in the 1974 test to allow 

supercomputer simulations for designing future warheads; security 

concerns, in that the recent testing of Pakistan’s IRBM Ghauri missile 

and increasing Sino-Pakistani military cooperation reduced India’s geostrategic buffer zone; normative factors; in that nuclear weapons 

remain a symbol of international power;86 and domestic politics, in that 

the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had recently become the major party 
26

in the ruling Indian coalition after an election campaign which included 

an open promise to make India a nuclear power.87 Of these four 

rationales for India’s 1998 tests, the normative and domestic politics 

motivations appear most salient when subjected to close scrutiny.88

POST-COLD WAR TRENDS: A BALANCE SHEET 

In the post-Cold War era, several definitive trends have emerged that 

do not bode well for American security interests in South Asia. India 

and the United States have allowed Cold War differences to persist 

untreated. These differences have consequently festered into a “weversus-they” dialogue that promotes conflict rather than cooperation. 

While the decision to conduct the Pokhran II tests was motivated only 

partially by sentiments against American unilateralism, the effect has 

been a widening gap in Indo-American ties. 

Furthermore, the revival of Indo-Russian military ties, driven 

by economic factors, has placed the United States in a quandary in 

which the Indo-Russian connection can only be severed by counteroffers of third-party arms89 or the slow but eventual emergence of 

Indian self-sufficiency. These options are long-term in nature and 

cannot offset India’s short-term dependence on its Soviet-era military 

systems. Moreover, the likelihood of the United States authorizing the 

sale of high-technology arms to India after years of nonproliferationcentric diplomacy is minimal. 

Finally, the most recent developments in Indian strategic 

culture have rejuvenated India’s quest for global status and equity. The 

rise of the BJP has resulted in a new approach to international nuclear 

politics in New Delhi. India has played its nuclear card in the hope of 

receiving international power status. Having based Indian nationalism 

on the image of nuclear strength, it is unlikely that India will 

unilaterally rollback its program. 
27

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY 

INTERESTS 

Civilization clash is not so much over Jesus Christ, 

Confucius, or the Prophet Mohammed as it is over 

the unequal distribution of world power, wealth and 

influence, and the perceived lack of respect accorded 

to small states and peoples by larger ones. Culture is 

the vehicle for expression of conflict, not its cause.90

Although it has become fashionable to argue that 

economic strength, not military might, is now the 

international currency of power, neither the patterns 

of post-cold war military expenditure and arms 

development nor the primacy of muscle and force in 

international relations supports that thesis...India has 

learned the hard way that a unilateral desire for peace 

cannot bring about peace. A country can enjoy peace 

only if it can defend peace.91

 The above statements highlight the crucial contradiction that 

currently exists between Western nonproliferation goals in South Asia 

and Indian nuclear aspirations. While foreign and domestic critics of 

India’s nuclear program have argued that the direct costs and 

opportunity costs associated with developing a nuclear deterrent are too 

high for an economically strapped nation such as India to undertake,92

the statement by Brahma Chellaney, one of the creators of India’s new 

draft nuclear doctrine, asserts that economic concerns are secondary to 

the strategic and normative advantages afforded to India by the 

acquisition of nuclear arms. These polar views result in a “chicken or 

the egg scenario” in which one side argues that economic strength and 

stability are a prerequisite to modern global power and the other side 

argues that modern global power, symbolized by nuclear strength, 

provides security and can open the door to future economic growth. In 

this scenario, the resilience of the Indian view is amplified by a 

strategic culture that exudes suspicion towards Western motives as well 

as a deep drive towards decision-making free from external pressures. 
28

 This section explores three crucial topics surrounding the 

current nonproliferation standoff between the United States and India. 

The first is an analysis of the most likely path that India will pursue in 

the development of its nuclear deterrent. Enmeshed in this discussion 

is the role of Russia, and other foreign suppliers, in assisting the 

creation of a “credible” Indian nuclear triad. The second topic 

discusses the extent to which India’s nuclear program is a direct threat 

to American security interests. This discussion includes both the global 

implications for American nonproliferation efforts and the hypothetical 

existence of a direct military threat to American power projection in the 

Indian Ocean. Finally, the third topic explores future policy options for 

the United States in India specifically, and South Asia in general. 

INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FUTURE NUCLEAR 

EXPANSION 

In the preceding discussion of the parallels between India’s strategic 

culture and the development of its nuclear weapons program, the key 

aspect of the “green signals” of 1948, 1964, 1974 and 1998 is that they 

all symbolize an Indian stair-stepping approach to the creation of a 

nuclear arsenal.∗

 From the Indian perspective, which is crucial to 

understand in a nonproliferation framework, the Indian nuclear 

weapons program has demonstrated fifty-one years of “restraint.”93 

This Indian perspective is well encapsulated by a policy paper 

delivered by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee two weeks after the 

Pokhran III tests. 

Our nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and 

openness. Restraint, however, has to arise from 

strength. It cannot be based upon indecision or 

doubt. Restraint is valid only when doubts are 

 

∗

 The 1948, 1964, and 1974 "green signals" are fully developed in the 

Naval Postgraduate School thesis. 
29

removed. The series of tests undertaken by India 

have led to the removal of doubts.94 

The argument about a “restrained” Indian nuclear weapons 

program is not meant to discount the motives of many members of the 

Indian “bomb-lobby.” As mentioned above, strategic concerns, 

domestic politics, and international norms have all played crucial roles 

in the growth of the Indian bomb program. Homi Bhabha utilized the 

strategic fears created by the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 to obtain 

authorization to develop the nuclear option.95 Despite these strategic 

“fears,” Prime Minister Shastri authorized the pursuit of the nuclear 

option, but did not authorize the actual building of a weapon. While 

this may seem to be a simple case of semantics, from the viewpoint of 

Indian strategic culture and nonproliferation analysis, a nuclear option

and a nuclear weapon are two diametric concepts. One represents 

strength and the other represents restrained strength. It was quite 

fitting, therefore, that when “India...moved from being totally 

moralistic to being a little more realistic”96 and conducted the Pokhran 

II tests, the operation would be codenamed “Operation Shakti” 

(Strength). The most recent step up the ladder of Indian nuclear 

restraint was the release of India’s draft “minimal deterrent doctrine.” 

If one were to project the next rung up the ladder, the signing of a 

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) or a Comprehensive Test Ban 

Treaty (CTBT) would still allow India to develop its arsenal while 

restraining the size of the arsenal. As India views most arms control 

treaties as discriminatory in nature, these treaty options would only 

come to fruition if the original P-5 states also became signatories and 

ratified the treaties. 

Before projecting what step, or series of steps, India might 

take next in the development of its nuclear arsenal, it is necessary to 
30

evaluate the strength of current strategic, normative and political 

incentives for further proliferation. As the above discussion 

highlighted, domestic politics have always been a necessary catalyst for 

any major progression in India’s program. The obvious difficulty with 

basing a projection on proliferation on the domestic politics of another 

country is that politics can be very difficult to predict and, from a 

policy standpoint, the ability to influence domestic politics within 

another country may be nearly nonexistent. 

Despite this obstacle, certain trends in Indian politics can be 

tracked, especially in light of recent Indian national elections.97 Since 

the initial euphoria that swept India following the Pokhran tests of 

1998,98 domestic politics have returned to the normal subjects of 

infrastructure improvements, overpopulation, insurgencies, illiteracy, 

and poverty. Unable to deliver in these key areas, the BJP lost a 

significant segment of its voter base early in 1999 and subsequently lost 

cohesion within the ruling coalition with a resulting fall from political 

power. While serving as a caretaker and awaiting elections in the fall, 

Prime Minister Vajpayee returned the nation’s focus to the same issue 

that was central to his election victory in 1998, nationalism based on 

Indian military strength. In the three months leading up to the fall 1999 

elections, three events signaled that the BJP would indeed continue to 

use the nuclear issue as a tool in domestic politics. 

The first was the BJP’s use of the fighting in Kargil between 

Indian armed forces and Islamic insurgents and Pakistani armed forces. 

The BJP successfully packaged the military operation as a “victory” for 

India.99 Adding to Indian nationalism was the outrage caused by the 

torture and execution of captured Indian pilots and soldiers.100 Kargil 

also fueled the nuclear issue in India due to BJP claims that the fighting 

in Kashmir validated the decision to go nuclear in 1998 since the 
31

overall threat of nuclear retaliation prevented Pakistan from escalating 

the conflict. This last view has been sharply contested by critics who 

hold that the Kargil crisis would not have even started without Pakistan 

having been afforded strategic parity with India after testing its own 

nuclear weapons in response to the Indian nuclear tests.101 

The second recent signal of a BJP-driven resurgence of 

nuclear politics came in August 1999 during several Independence Day 

speeches in which Prime Minister Vajpayee and other BJP leaders 

declared that India would induct its new Agni II IRBM missile into the 

operational inventory.102 Coming one month before the 

commencement of national elections, this declaration that India would 

pursue the deployment of a missile that has been specifically advertised 

as a deterrent asset against China103 has again shown the willingness of 

the BJP to utilize the “Chinese threat” as a tool in domestic politics. 

The final example of the BJP’s willingness to utilize India’s 

nuclear weapons for the garnering of votes can be seen in the decision 

to release the draft of India’s nuclear doctrine. Despite the fact that the 

draft had been approved for release for over two months, the BJP-led 

government did not publish the document until weeks before the 

commencement of national elections.104 What this incident and the 

Kargil and Agni II examples have demonstrated is that the BJP, unable 

to resolve the true domestic concerns of poverty, overpopulation and 

infrastructure bottlenecks, has continued to show a willingness to 

engage in nuclear gestures to secure its political power base. 

While domestic politics may be pushing India’s nuclear 

program towards expansion, the primary obstacles to the growth of 

India’s nuclear program are financial and technological. The greatest 

criticism of the draft nuclear doctrine is that it does not specify the 

actual size of India’s “minimal deterrent.” The absence of size 
32

projections and deployment timelines has led to greater ambiguity over 

how much India’s nuclear deterrent will cost.105 What seems to be a 

common opinion is that the decision to pursue a nuclear triad is not, 

from an economic viewpoint, “minimal.” 

One study projects a nuclear arsenal of 328 warheads with a 

nuclear triad and the required command and control structure costing 

$14.2 billion over thirty years. The study goes on to highlight an 

opportunity cost of over $48 billion due to “sanctions, lost business, 

trade and investment,”106 bringing the total cost of the arsenal to 

approximately $62 billion over a thirty year period (in 1998 prices). 

This equates to 2.38 percent of India’s GDP annually.107 Not included 

in this estimate, however, are the vast costs associated with training 

personnel and deploying and maintaining equipment. According to one 

study, “building bombs consumed just seven percent of the total cost of 

the U.S. nuclear weapons program.”108

The lost opportunity costs associated with India’s nuclear 

weapons program are particularly difficult to predict, but also crucial to 

understand, in light of India’s domestic needs. Dr. Peter Lavoy, who is 

currently the Director of Counterproliferation Policy in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, cites one study that concludes that “a single 

Agni missile costs as much as the annual operation of 13,000 health 

care centers.”109 Additionally, numerous studies have shown that 

crucial foreign investments have dropped in India due to loss of 

confidence in India’s economic future.110 While the BJP remains 

adamant that sanctions and the costs associated with building a credible 

deterrent are only short-term in nature, one can argue otherwise. 

India’s ability to develop a credible nuclear deterrent also 

centers on its ability to produce, procure, and maintain the delivery 

vehicles and warheads associated with a “minimal deterrent.” At the 
33

time of its tests in May 1998, India was believed to have twenty to 

thirty nuclear warheads in its arsenal.111 If Indian designs require five 

kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium per bomb, and India has an onhand store of approximately 400 kilograms and a production capacity 

of 20 kilograms (four bombs) of weapons-grade plutonium a year,112

India can reach a level of just under 200 warheads by 2020. 

The greatest obstacle to the deployment of a nuclear triad by 

India, however, lies in the issue of delivery vehicles. While continuing 

to emphasize the need to develop self-reliance in the procurement of its 

military hardware, India has been unable to surmount many of the 

technological, bureaucratic, and financial obstacles to self-sufficiency. 

RUSSIA’S SUPPORT OF INDIAN EXPANSION 

While India continues to invest in the development of its indigenous 

aviation, naval, and tank programs, notably the Light Combat Aircraft 

(LCA) and Arjun tank, it has been forced to continue to rely upon 

imports to meet its requirements for modernization of its conventional 

forces and the development of a nuclear triad. For strike aircraft, India 

is acquiring forty SU-30MKIs aircraft, plus IL-78 refuelers and IL-76 

airborne early warning aircraft for strike support.113 Additionally the 

purchase of four Russian TU-22Ms strike aircraft and 16 to 18 French 

2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft "soft wired for carrying nuclear 

missiles” is also being negotiated.114 To compensate for the high cost 

associated with the direct purchase of these systems, Russia has even 

offered to “lease” IL-76s and Tu-22s to India.115

The most controversial area, however, where India is reported 

to be receiving military assistance is in the development of its 

“indigenous” nuclear-powered submarine and submarine-launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM). India’s Advanced Technological Vessel 

(ATV) program dates back to 1988 when India leased a Soviet Charlie-
34

I Class SSN for three years.116 The knowledge shared and relationships 

established with the Soviet Navy during this period are reported to 

continue today as India struggles with the design of its propulsion plant 

and the installation of the reactor in the submarine hull.117 Additional 

reports indicate that the hull design and reactor design of the two 

unfinished ATVs are based on the new Russian Project 885 

Severodvinsk Class and its 190MW pressurized water reactor.118 

Additionally, the former “apprentices” of the Indian Navy during the 

three-year period of the submarine lease “have taken key posts in 

Indian design offices developing nuclear submarines.”119 Finally, an 

entire Indian submarine crew is reported to have spent at least six 

months during 1999 “on an official mission” in the closed northern 

Russian city of Severodvinsk.120 

The U.S. Department of State reported during 1998 that 

Russia was helping India develop the “Sagarika,” a submarinelaunched ballistic missile.121 The Sagarika has caused Indian scientists 

difficulty, especially with its guidance systems, and many foreign 

observers state that the system is a “far cry” from being operational.122 

Again, Russian scientists are reported to be supporting this 

“indigenous” project.123 

While the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes 

is in violation of numerous international treaties, it is difficult to 

determine whether “Russian support” of the ATV and Sagarika projects 

is state-sponsored or a product of individual scientists left unemployed 

and unaccounted for after the collapse of the Soviet Union. “No one 

knows where all the weapons scientists have gone.”124 However, if one 

considers the role of Russian interest groups in influencing Russian 

policy decisions, it is worth noting that the Rubin design bureau of St. 
35

Petersburg, one of Russia’s two major submarine design bureaus, 

designed and developed the Severodvinsk-class submarine. 

AREA DENIAL AND THE INDIAN “THREAT” 

The current inability of the United States to exert successful unilateral 

diplomatic or economic pressure on India highlights a pattern of 

waning U.S. prestige and diplomatic power toward India since the end 

of the Cold War.125 Because America is unable to achieve its ends 

through economic and diplomatic means alone, some Indian observers 

have speculated, the United States may decide to utilize “the military 

option” to influence India during future regional crises. Reviving 

Indian images of the show of force by the U.S.S. Enterprise in 1971, 

this U.S. military “influence” would most likely be naval in nature and 

would entail power projection. From the viewpoint of Indian analysts, 

the United States is already preparing for this inevitability by 

conducting war-game simulations of such a scenario.126

To counter American intervention, India’s military 

establishment has advocated the procurement of “sea-denial assets,” 

such as the ATV project.127 “The Indian Navy would need to possess 

the ability to raise the costs of American military and naval intervention 

against India.... The development of even limited ‘sea denial’ 

capabilities against US military forces at sea could assist an attempt to 

deter an attack of this nature in the first place.”128 Since it is unlikely 

that the Indian government would attempt to engage the United States 

in a full-blown war, India’s strategy would center on making the cost of 

any U.S. intervention too high. As an internal Indian Navy study, dated 

one week after the Pokhran II tests, states: “Should it be possible for 

the target nation to be able to retaliate to cause significant losses, 

casualties or embarrassment, the strategy of intervention is not 

normally resorted to.”129 While the possibility of a direct military 
36

confrontation between India and the United States may seem remote, 

this possibility has evidently been considered in New Delhi. 

POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 

In 1998, both India and Pakistan tested nuclear 

weapons. Neither country has real-time surveillance 

capability; reliable command, control and 

communications; or early warning systems. This 

vulnerability could lead to a launch on warning 

posture, further aggravating the subcontinent’s 

already serious instability. Moreover, this rivalry 

increases the possibility of Chinese and Russian 

involvement and more explicit missile and nuclear 

assistance.130 

-The Deutsch Report, 1999 

The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 

awoke the world to the reality that the spread of 

nuclear weapons had reached a dangerous new phase. 

Two regional powers with unresolved antagonisms 

had made their nuclear ambitions overt. The tests 

reflected the failure of global non-proliferation norms 

to prevail over regional security imperatives, and 

increased fears that regional conflicts could turn into 

real nuclear wars.131

-The Tokyo Forum, 1999 

Having reviewed the historical motivations for nuclear 

proliferation in India and the current prospects for India to continue to 

expand its nuclear weapons capabilities, policy options for the United 

States must be discussed. Pokhran II has taught the United States 

several lessons concerning its nonproliferation policies that can be 

applied in South Asia and, to some extent, globally. While some 

observers cite the inability of the United States to prevent India’s overt 

testing in May 1998 as a failure in American efforts, the analysis in this 

thesis of India’s strategic culture suggests that India’s decision to test 

was driven primarily by domestic politics, and was therefore beyond 

the reach of American nonproliferation efforts. 
37

The ability of the United States to rollback and eliminate 

India’s nuclear arsenal hinges on the willingness of the other P-5 states 

to pursue this objective,132 and this is unlikely in the foreseeable future. 

As early as 1965, a National Security Council report to President 

Johnson noted that “lessened emphasis by the United States and the 

Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and agreements on broader arms 

control measures must be recognized as important components on the 

overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.”133 The statement by 

Brahma Chellaney, quoted in the beginning of this chapter, expresses 

the Indian belief that nuclear weapons remain a symbol of global 

power. If the United States and the other members of the P-5 opt to 

retain nuclear weapons, Indians argue, they cannot realistically expect 

India to abandon its arsenal; and they should therefore abandon such 

foreign policy goals. 

Additional South Asian foreign policy objectives of the United 

States that require review are the goals of obtaining accession to the 

CTBT and the projected FMCT by India and Pakistan and a bilateral 

no-first-use agreement. Until the United States Senate ratifies the 

CTBT, or another treaty regime with significant testing restrictions, 

India’s leadership will continue to view its stance on the treaty as 

“vindicated.”134 Pakistan in turn has linked its accession to the CTBT 

with India’s; and Islamabad also appears unlikely to adhere to the 

projected FMCT due to a perception of strategic inferiority, in view of 

India’s superior air force and air defense systems.135 Moreover, the 

likelihood of securing a Pakistani promise for no-first-use of nuclear 

weapons is minimal as this strategic inferiority feeds Pakistan’s sense 

of vulnerability. 

American foreign policy in South Asia should recognize that 

India and Pakistan will expand their nuclear arsenals. It is incumbent 
38

upon the United States to ensure that said expansion is conducted in a 

limited and safe manner. The concerns highlighted above by the 

Deutsch Report and the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 

and Disarmament are real. While both India and Pakistan claim that 

their nuclear arsenals are stable and safe due to their limited size, 

factors other than “size” can trigger nuclear release.136 Included in 

these factors are the lacunae of “real-time surveillance capability; 

reliable command, control and communications; or early warning 

systems.”137

According to some interpretations of the NPT, the United 

States cannot provide India and Pakistan with nuclear-related command 

and control systems.138 However, transparency can be created with the 

sharing of American-provided intelligence and monitoring data with 

both states.139 The possibility of a border conflict escalating into a 

nuclear exchange should be weighed against the limited real-time 

intelligence capabilities of both states. During the Kargil crisis of 

1999, a recurring complaint was that India’s satellites and airborne 

reconnaissance assets did not provide adequate early-warning and 

imagery quality.140 A Pakistani P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft was 

shot down during the waning days of the conflict while it performed a 

reconnaissance mission.141 Lacking the technical capability for 

transparency during regional conflicts, India and Pakistan may fall 

victim to misperceptions.142 

The benefit of American-provided technical transparency is it 

would take the orchestration of confidence-building measures out of the 

hands of India and Pakistan and direct it equitably to both states. 

While this may appear to be a case of American intervention in the 

internal matters of the subcontinent, India and Pakistan both proved 

willing to accept American-supplied intelligence as a de-escalatory 
39

mechanism during the 1990 Kashmir crisis.143 Left to their own 

devices, India and Pakistan have not historically taken confidencebuilding measures seriously enough. Providing the rhetoric but not the 

action, neither state’s leadership has viewed CBMs for what they are: 

potentially useful instruments of national security, at least in some 

circumstances.144 

Additionally, the United States should actively educate India 

and Pakistan about the vast hidden costs associated with deploying and 

maintaining a nuclear triad.145 While such information may not sway 

deployment decisions, a foundation of nuclear knowledge can influence 

the deployment levels selected. 

 Another area of potential U.S. engagement in India concerns 

its vulnerable and crucial domestic economy and infrastructure 

projects. Measures to encourage U.S. investment in India will not only 

improve diplomatic ties between the countries, but will also greatly 

reduce anti-American sentiment among the Indian populace.146 

Additionally, the arena of joint oil exploration projects holds 

promise:147 “By the early part of the next century, India would become 

the third largest consumer of petroleum products in the world, after the 

People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia.”148 In 1996-97, India 

imported approximately fifty percent of its crude oil demand, and by 

2010, this import-to-domestic-demand percentage is expected to 

increase to seventy-three percent.149 

Finally, the United States must address the role of Russia in 

South Asia. While there is no reason to recreate the Cold War 

competition, the willingness of Russia to undermine U.S. 

nonproliferation and security policies in South Asia raises serious 

questions. The difficulty arises, however, when American policy must 

cater to and “buy-out” Russian interest groups. While the United States 
40

may have been successful in such an endeavor with the cryogenic 

engine deal, the recent failure to block the sale of two light-water 

reactors to India shows the limits of American diplomatic and financial 

weight. The United States does, however, continue to hold 

considerable influence in the World Bank and the IMF and can affect 

investor confidence in Russia through these institutions. 

The history of Indo-Russian military cooperation provides a 

foundation for understanding the current rift in Indo-American relations 

and the ability and willingness of India to defy American 

nonproliferation goals. Moreover, Indian strategic culture highlights 

the likely course of military and nuclear expansion in India and how 

said course may cross the path of American forces and interests. While 

India is not a rogue state, future policy and doctrinal decisions by its 

leadership could result in the first bilateral nuclear exchange in history 

(with Pakistan or China) or lead to direct conflict with the United 

States. It is imperative that future American policy be designed to 

avoid such events. 

ENDNOTES 

 

1

 Strobe Talbott, address at the India International Center, New Delhi, 

India, 30 January 1999. Available online: 

<http://www.state.gov/www/policy_Remarks/1999/990130_ 

talbott_india.html> [25 July 1999]. 

2

 “India Spells Out Draft N-doctrine.” The Hindustan Times (18 

August 1999). Available online:<http:www.hindustantimes.com> [19 

August 1999]. “India Reserves Right To Retaliatory N-strikes.” The 

Times of India (18 August 1999). Available online: 

<http://www.timesofindia.com > [19 August 1999]. 

3

 Pokhran II is the name normally attributed to the testing of three 

nuclear weapons by India on 11 May 1998 at the Pokhran test range in 

India’s Rajasthan desert. Pokhran I was the execution of a single 

Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) by India on 14 May 1974. The 

Pokhran III tests followed Pokhran II by two days and encompassed the 
41

 

testing of two additional nuclear weapons. In the months leading up to 

the execution of Pokhran II, the overall series of tests were code named 

“Operation Shakti.” The word Shakti translates into “strength” or 

“power.” 

4

 Barry Bearak, “An Indian Call for a Nuclear Arsenal.” The New York 

Times (22 August 1999): A16. 

5

 Vladimit Radyuhin, “Russia Refuses to Join India Bashing.” The 

Hindu (22 August 1999). Available online: 

<http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1999/08/22/stories/ 

03220001.htm> [22 August 1999]. 

6

 “N-doctrine Invites G-8 Wrath, Sanctions to Stay.” The Times of India

(20 August 1999). Available online: 

<http://www.timesofindia.com/200899/20home1.htm> [20 August 

1999]. 

7

 “Russia May Sell Four Bombers To India,” The Economic Times 

Online (28 August 1999). 

8

 Strobe Talbott, “U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report” 

(speech delivered at The Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C., 12 

November 1998). Available online: 

<http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/19981112a.htm> [25 July 

1999]. 

9

 Ken Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed,” in Carl G. 

Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan, 

1990), 121. 

10 The security model claims that “states build nuclear weapons to 

increase national security against foreign threats, especially nuclear 

threats.” The domestic politics model “envisions nuclear weapons as 

political tools used to advance parochial domestic and bureaucratic 

interests.” The norms model highlights the acquisition or restraint from 

acquisition of nuclear weapons as a “symbol of a state’s modernity and 

identity.” See Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear 

Weapons?” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996/97), 55. 

11 For a discussion of India’s strategic culture, see George Tanham, 

“Indian Strategic Culture,” The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 1 
42

 

(Winter 1992), and Jerry Conley, “Indian Strategic Culture: A Past, 

Present and Future Analysis,” unpublished paper, The Naval 

Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (19 March 1999). 

12 “Tovarishchi Errant,” The Round Table, no. 182 (March 1956): 117. 

13 The term “special relationship” has often used by Indian and Russian 

officials to describe the Indo-Soviet/Russian bond. The implication of 

this term is that the bilateral ties go beyond Indian and Russian selfserving interests and serve a greater good. This chapter will argue 

otherwise. 

14 Peter Zwick, Soviet Foreign Relations: Process and Policy

(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1990), 317. 

15 Ashley J. Tellis, India: Assessing Strategy and Military Capabilities 

in the Year 2000 (Santa Monica, CA.: The Rand Corporation, 1996), 

12. 

16 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role. Adelphi Paper 293 

(London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 66. 

17 Gopal Krishna, “India and the International Order—Retreat From 

Idealism,” in, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, ed., The Expansion of 

International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 283. 

18 James Manor and Gerald Segal, “Taking India Seriously,” Survival

40, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 63. 

19 Bhabani Sen Gupta, “India in the Twenty-First Century,” 

International Affairs 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 301-02. 

20 James Manor and Gerald Segal, 63. 

21Ashley J. Tellis, 2. 

22 M. J. Vinod, “India-United States Relations in a Changing World: 

Challenges and Opportunites,” Strategic Analysis 20, no. 3 (July 1997): 

442. 
43

 

23P.R. Rajeswari, “From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics: Indo-US 

Experience,” Strategic Analysis 21, no. 8 (November 1997). Available 

online: <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov-4.html>. 

24Ibid., page 6 of 11. 

25 Dennis Kux, 440. 

26 John F. Burns, “U.S.-India Pact on Military Cooperation,” The New 

York Times (13 January 1995): A12. 

27 Eric Arnett, “Nuclear Stability and Arms Sales to India: Implications 

for U.S. Policy,” Arms Control Today 27, no. 5 (August 1997): 9. 

28 “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” Dispatch 6, no. 13 (27 March 

1995). Published by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the U.S. 

Department of State. P. M. Kamath, “Indo-US Relations During the 

Clinton Administration: Upward Trends and Uphill Tasks Ahead,” 

Strategic Analysis 21, no. 11 (February 1998): 1604. 

29 Ainslie Embree and Stephen P. Cohen cited in Barbara Crossette, 

“From Guru to Rogue: American Re-examines India,” The New York 

Times (17 May 1998): A4. 

30 Virginia Foran, “The Case for Indo-US High-Technology 

Cooperation,” Survival 40, no. 2 (Summer, 1998): 84. 

31 Virginia Foran, 84. 

32Anita Inder Singh, “A New Indo-Russian Connection,” International 

Affairs 71, no. 1 (January 1995): 70. 

33Ibid. 

34Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” page 4 of 18. 

35Ibid., page 1 of 18. 

36Ibid. 

37 The crucial role of Russian interest groups is discussed below. 
44

 

38Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” page 2-3 of 

18. 

39 Ibid. Yuri Maslyukov, “Russia’s Future Lies With The Defense 

Industry,” Military Parade (July-August 1998). 

40 Shubha Singh, “There Has Been An Improvement in Indo-Russian 

Bilateral Trade in The Past Year,” The Pioneer (24 December 1998): 9. 

FBIS Document ID: FTS19981224000277. Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in 

Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” page 2 of 18. 

41 Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma,” Strategic 

Analysis 22, no. 5 (August 1998): 721. Available online: 

<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-4.html>. 

42Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” page 3 of 18. 

43Ibid., 3-4 of 18. 

44Alexander A. Pikayeo, et al., Russia, the US and the Missile 

Technology Control Regime, Adelphi Paper 317, International Institute 

for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 21. 

45Ibid., 22. 

46Ibid., 12. 

47Ibid., 26-35. 

48Anita Inder Singh, 73. 

49Alexander A. Pikayev, et al. 22-23. 

50 The authority for the United States to apply sanctions was vested in 

the 1991 Missile Technology Control Act (MTCA). See Eric Arnett, 

“Military Technology: The Case of India,” in Armaments, 

Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New 

York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 358. 

51 Despite this pledge not to transfer technology, fifteen Indian 

scientists continued to train at Glavkosmos through 1994. See Eric 

Arnett, “Military Technology: The Case of India,” 359. Moreover, by 
45

 

the time that Yeltsin “corrected” the cryogenic contract with India, 85% 

of all the technological documents had already been transferred to 

India. See Gennadiy Khromov, “A View of India’s Policy on Missile 

and Nuclear Nonproliferation,” Yadernyy Kontrol 41, no. 5 (Sep-Oct 

1998). Translated by FBIS. Document ID: FTS19990127001680. 

52Alexander A. Pikayev, 55. 

53Anita Inder Singh, 74. 

54Ibid., 75. 

55Anita Inder Singh. 

56Ibid., 76. “Interfax Financial Report For 26 November 1998,” 

Moscow Interfax (26 November 1998). Available from FBIS. 

Document ID: FTS19981126001140. “India, Russia To Sign Seven 

Accords,” The Hindu (20 December 1998). 

57Anita Inder Singh, 76 

58Arun Mohanty, “Russia Allots Rs 28,000 Core in Rupee Funds for 

Indian Imports,” The Times of India (23 March 1999). 

59Ibid. 

60 Sujata Rao, “India, Russia Repair Trade Ties,” The Moscow Times

(12 February 1997). 

61Alexander Golz, “Primakov’s Realpolitik,” The Moscow Times (11 

April 1996). Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” 

page 13 of 18. 

62 Dmitry Zaks, “Moscow Courts Eastern Giants,” The Moscow Times

(26 March 1997). The Nuclear Suppliers Group ban forbids all 

nuclear-related sales to states that do not subject all of their nuclear 

facilities to full IAEA safeguards. See “Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet,” 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (19 August 1998). 

Available online: <http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/factsheet2.htm>. 

63R. Adam Moody, “The Indian-Russian Light Water Reactor Deal,” 

The Nonproliferation Review (Fall 1997): 112. Nirmala Joshi, 
46

 

“Towards Strategic Partnership,” The Pioneer (10 September 1998): 

10. FBIS Document Number: FBIS-NES-98-253. Russia was most 

likely motivated also by a desire to “secure resources to pay the salaries 

of MINATOM employees, maintain work at the nuclear design bureaus 

and production facilities, and provide fresh momentum to the 

development of the domestic nuclear industry in general.” Igor 

Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, 249-50. 

64Anita Inder Singh, 74. 

65Yuriy Golotyuk, “Russia and India are experiencing a ‘MilitaryTechnical Renaissance,’” Segodnya (27 March 1996): 2. Translated by 

FBIS. Document Number: FBIS-UMA-9-080-S. 

66As quoted in Eric Arnett, ed., Military Capacity and the Risk of War: 

China, India, Pakistan and Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press for 

SIPRI, 1997), 294. 

67Yuriy Golotyuk, 2. 

68 Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: SIPRI 

Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996): 344. 

69 World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1997 

(Washington, D.C.: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1998), 

100. 

70 Deepa M. Ollapally, “India and the New ‘Asian’ Balance of Power,” 

Strategic Analysis 22, no. 4 (July 1998): 516. 

71 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role. Adelphi Paper 293 

(London: Oxford University Press, 1995), 62. 

72 Anton Zhigulsky, “Russia’s Arms Sales Rose 60% in 1995,” The 

Moscow Times (05 January 1996). 

73 A detailed analysis of the influence of Russian interest groups has 

been conducted by Stephen De Spiegeleire of the Rand Corporation. 

These papers can be accessed at: 

<http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/sdspieg. Of particular 

relevance to this study are the findings that rank Russia’s military-
47

 

industrial complex as the second most influential interest group in 

Russia after the gas-oil industry. 

74 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Profits Driving Arms Trade,” The Moscow 

Times (16 January 1997). Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, 

239. 

75 Vitaly Kataev, MIIS lecture, 13 October 1999. 

76 Yevgenia Borisova, “St. Pete Shipyard Turns to State for Loan 

Bailout,” The Moscow Times (02 February 1999). 

77 Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, 246. 

78 Ibid., 244. 

79 “India to Buy Russian Arms Worth $15 billion in 10 Years.” The 

Indian Express (12 November 1998): 12. 

80Konstantin Makiyenko, “Prospects for Russian Presence in South 

Asian Arms and Military Market,” Yadernyy Kontrol 38, no. 2 (MarchApril 1998): 64-73. Translated by FBIS. Document Number: FBISSOV-98-167. 

81Aleksandr Shumilin, “Russia Will Help India Become A Power,” 

Kommersant-Daily (10 October 1997): 5. As cited in The Current 

Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 44, no. 41 (12 November 1997): 20. 

82Jyotsna Bakshi, “Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma,” Strategic 

Analysis 22, no. 5 (August 1998): 721. Available online: 

<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-4.html>. 

83Jyotsna Bakshi, “India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” page 15 of 18. 

84Lowell Bezanis, “An Enlarged Golden Crescent,” Transitions 2, no. 

19 (20 September 1996). Aleksandr Shumilin; and Jyotsna Bakshi, 

“India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking,” p. 12 of 18. 

85Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 

5 (September/October 1998): 47. The term “shakti” can be translated 

to “strength,” “force,” or “power.” It is quite revealing that the code 
48

 

name assigned to India’s nuclear tests in May, 1998, was Operation 

Shakti. 

86Russia had increased its reliance on nuclear deterrence to compensate 

for crumbling conventional forces. Additionally, Gen. Sundarji, the 

former Indian army chief of staff, pointed at the recent defeat of Iraq in 

the Gulf War and stated that the true lesson of the war was that one 

should not fight the United States unless one possessed nuclear 

weapons. See Mario E. Carranza, “An Impossible Game: Stable 

Nuclear Deterrence After the Indian And Pakistani Tests,” The 

Nonproliferation Review (Spring-Summer 1999): 14. 

87 “The nuclearization of India has been an article of faith for the BJP.” 

Manoj Joshi, “Nuclear Shock Wave,” India Today (25 May 1998). 

Available on-line: http://www. indiatoday.com/itoday/25051998/cover.html. 

88 While it has been reported that India retrieved no data from the 1974 

PNE due to the destruction of all the test gear in the shaft, the sudden 

decision to acquire new data after twenty-four years is not in and of 

itself sufficient to explain the test. Concerning a “strategic” incentive, 

Pakistan’s testing of a Ghauri missile does not address why the BJP 

initially gave authorization to test in 1996, but was removed from 

power within thirteen days. Additionally, the fact that the Defense 

Minister was not informed of the impending Pokhran II tests until two 

days prior, while the service chiefs were not informed until one day 

prior, suggests that the May 1998 tests were conducted outside of a 

civil-military strategic dialogue. See Manoj Joshi, 2. The “strategic” 

argument should also be examined closely in light of the fact that the 

decision to test was made prior to India performing a much-heralded 

Strategic Defense Review. See George Perkovich, “India Errs,” 

Newsday (15 May 1998): A57. 

89 India has in fact turned to France and other states to purchase aircraft 

and military hardware. These acquisitions, however, will only partially 

offset the dominance of Russian arms sales. See, Rahul Bedi: "India 

Seeks Mirage 2000 Nuclear Squadron," The Asian Age (29 Aug 99), 

Atul Aneja, “Arms Purchases Being Finalised,” The Hindu (04 

September 1999). 

90 Graham Fuller, “The Next Ideology,” Foreign Policy, no. 98 (Spring 

1995): 153-54, cited in, Satish Kumar, “The Post-Cold War 
49

 

International Perspective: An Indian Perspective,” Strategic Analysis

21, no. 6 (September 1997). Available online: <http://www.idsaindia.org/an-sep-2.html>. 

91 Brahma Chellaney, “The Defence of India,” The Hindustan Times

(20 October 1999). Available Online: 

http://www.hindustantimes.com>. 

92 See Peter R. Lavoy, “The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia.” 

U.S. Information Agency (September 1999). Available online: 

<http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0999/ ijpe/pj29lavo.htm>, and M. 

V. Ramana, “A Recipe For Disaster,” The Hindu (09 September 1999). 

Available online: <http://www.indiaserver.com/thehindu/1999/09/09/ 

stories/05092523.htm>. 

93 While a non-Indian perspective could highlight economic and 

technological restraints in the early decades of the Indian program and 

U.S.-imposed restraints placed on planned tests in 1982-83 and 1995, 

the key aspect of this discussion is that from the Indian perspective, 

India has shown moral restraint in its nuclear weapons program for 

over half a century. 

94 “Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy.” Paper laid on the table of the 

Lok Sabha on 27 May 1998 by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. 

95 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and Causes of Nuclear 

Proliferation,” Security Studies 2, no. 3&4 (Spring/Summer 1993): 

201-202. 

96 Jaswant Singh, 47. 

97 These elections were especially crucial as the BJP is trying to reform 

the coalition government that lost its majority votes and power in 

March 1999. 

98 A poll taken two weeks after the Pokhran II test showed an 87% 

approval of the testing and an 86% approval for weaponizing. See, 

“Solid Support,” India Today (25 May 1998). Available online:<http://www.india-today.com/itoday/25051998/poll.html>. 

99 An opinion poll taken at the beginning of August 1999 showed that 

81% of those polled believed that Kargil was a “decisive victory for 
50

 

India.” “BJP on Track for Landslide Victory,” Economic Times Online

(14 August 1999). Available on-line: 

<http://www.economictimes.com>. 

100 “Indian pilot 'killed in cold blood.'” BBC On-line (30 May 1999). 

Available on-line: http://news.bbc.co.uk. Timothy D. Hoyt, “Conflict 

in Kargil,” Southern Asian Internet Forum (12 June 1999). 

101 W. P. Singh Sidhu, “Nuclearization of South Asia: The Kargil 

Experience,” Presented at the Eighth International Castiglioncello 

Conference. “Nuke Weaponisation Limited Our Options in Kargil: 

Cong,” The Hindustan Times Online (26 August 1999). Available 

online: http://www.hindustantimes.com. P.R. Chari, “Kargil and BJP’s 

Nuclear Agenda,” Nuclear & Disarmament Issues, Institute for Peace 

and Conflict Studies. Article No.202(11 June 1999). Available Online: 

http//:www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/202-ndi-chari.htm. Stephen P. 

Cohen, “India’s Strategic Misstep,” Nuclear & Disarmament Issues, 

Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. Article No. 110 (08 June 

1998). Available online: http//:www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/110-ndicohen.htm. 

102 “BJP, Allies Hope to Gain From the Kargil Victory,” The Economic 

Times Online (16 August 1999). Available online: 

http://www.economictimes.com. 

103 “Agni Described as 'Effective' Weapon Against PRC Missiles,” The 

Pioneer in English (12 Apr 99), 1. “Agni-II 'ready' to carry Nwarhead,” The Hindustan Times Online (15 April 1999). Available 

online: http://wwww.hindustantimes.com. 

104 “BJP plays nuclear politics on poll eve,” Asian Age Online (18 

August 1999). Available online: http://www.asianage.com. 

“Opposition Sees a Design in Release of N-doctrine,” The Economic 

Times Online (18 August 1999). Available online: 

htto://www.economictimes.com. 

105 Ninad D. Sheth, “Flaws Dog Nuclear Doctrine Draft,” The 

Hindustan Times Online (18 August 1999). Available online: 

http://www.hindustantimes.com. “Deterrence and Debate,” The Times 

of India (18 August 1999). Available online: 

http://www.timesofindia.com. 
51

 

106 Bharat Karnad, “Going Thermonuclear: Why, With What Forces, At 

What Cost.” Journal of the United Service Institution of India 128, no. 

533 (July-September 1998): 310-336. Karnard projects a force of 4 

SSBNs, 70 SU-30MKIs and 25 ICBMs, 40 IRBMs, 25 tactical missiles, 

and 48 SLBMs. 

107 Ibid. In India’s 1999 military budget, 2.5 percent of its GDP was 

designated for its conventional armed forces, which, by most accounts, 

were already severely under-funded. See Sudha Passi, “Give Defence 

More Funds, say Experts.” Economic Times Online (03 August 1999). 

Available online: http://www.economictimes.com. “Defence Budget as 

Effective Regional CBM?” The Hindustan Times Online (1 March 

1999). Available online: http://hindustantimes.com. Mahendra Ved, 

“In Real terms, Defence Gets Less.” The Times of India (28 February 

1999). Available online: http://www.timesofindia.com. 

108 Peter R. Lavoy, “The Costs of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia.” 

U.S. Information Agency (September 1999). Available online: 

http://www.usia.gov/journals/itps/0999/ ijpe/pj29lavo.htm. 

109 Ibid. 

110 Sharif Rangnekar, “US Investors Shun India, but S. Korea Keeps the 

Faith.” The Economic Times Online (15 September 1999). Available 

online: http://www.economictimes.com. Subhash Mohanti, “India 

Promises but Delivers Little: UK-based Agency.” The Economic Times 

Online (4 September 1999). Available online: 

http:www.economictimes.com). Peter R. Lavoy, “The Costs of Nuclear 

Weapons in South Asia.” 

111 David Albright, “The Shots Heard Round the World.” The Bulletin 

of the Atomic Scientists 4, no. 4 (July/August 1998). Available on-line: 

<http://www.bullatomsci.org/ issues/ 98/a98albright.html>. 

112 Ibid., page 8 of 9. 

113 Thomas W. Zarzecki, “Arming China or Arming India: Future 

Russian Dilemmas.” Comparative Strategy 18 (August 1999): 262-265. 

114 “Russia May Sell Four Bombers To India.” Agence France Presse

(27 August 1999). Rahul Bedi, “Delhi Plans Purchase of French Mirage 

2000, Other Arms.” The Asian Age (29 Aug 99): 1-2. 
52

 

115 “Russia Offers Leasing of Military Hardware to India,” The 

Hindustan Times (07 October 1999). 

116 Dmitry Litovkin, “Indian Nuclear Submarine Fleet Development 

Program: Russian Participation,” Yaderny Kontrol, no. 10 (Spring 

1999): 48. 

117 Mark Gorwitz, “The Indian Strategic Nuclear Submarine Project: 

An Open Literature Analysis.” (December 1996). Available online: 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/ sub/ssn/part01.htm 

118 Sergey Golotyuk, “Nuclear Cooperation Between Moscow and 

Delhi: No One is Any The Wiser.” Moscow Russkiy Telegraph (1 July 

1998): 1. Available on FBIS: Document ID: FTS19980701001186. 

Igor Kudrik, “Russia Helps India Build Nuclear Submarine.” Available 

from Bellona: <http://www.bellona.no/e/russia/nfl/news/990324.htm>. 

119 Dmitry Litovkin, 48. 

120 Sergey Golotyuk, 1. 

121 Steven Lee Myers, “Russia is Helping India Extend Range of 

Missiles, U.S. Aides Say,” The New York Times (27 April 1998): A1. 

Some news reports have also referred to this system as a submarinelaunched cruise missile. Its range is reported to be 250-350 km. 

122 Dmitry Litovkin, 46. 

123 Srinjoy Chowdhury, “Work on Indian Missile Program Reported.” 

The Telegraph (14 Apr 98); 6. “US misses target, say Congressmen 

on Ghauri.” The Hindu (May 6,1998). N.C. Menon, “Subtleties of 

Sagarika.” The Hindu (11 May 1998). 

124 David Hoffman, “Idled Russian Arms Experts Find Takers For 

Their Nuclear Know-How,” International Herald Tribune (29 

December 1998): 7. 

125 Chintamani Mahapatra, “Pokhran II and After: Dark Clouds Over 

Indo-US Relations,” Strategic Analysis vol. 22, no. 5 (August 1998). 

Available online: <http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-3.html> [6 

January 1999]. 
53

 

126 W. P. Singh Sindu, 20-21. 

127 Eric Arnett, “Military Technology: The Case of India,” 362, 

footnote 105. Vice Admiral S. P. Govil (Retd), “Indian Navy - Its 

Shape and Size,” Indian Defense Review, 1997. 

128 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “US Naval Policy in the Indian Ocean,”

Strategic Analysis vol. 22, no. 9 (December 1998). Available online: 

<http://www.idsa-india.org/an-dec8-4.html> [6 January 1999]. 

129 Cited in Ibid. Emphasis added. 

130 Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. “The 

Deutsch Report.” (14 July 1999), 15. 

131 “Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the 21st Century,” The 

Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 

Disarmament (25 July 1999): 10. 

132 George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global 

Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 455-56. 

133 “A Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear 

Proliferation,” Secret (21 January 1965): 5. Digital National Security 

Archives, Non-Proliferation Collection. Item Number: NP01104. 

134 “Senate Debate on CTBT Vindicates India’s Stand,” The Hindustan 

Times (15 October 1999). 

135 This sense of inferiority has only been escalated by the recent 

negotiations between India and Russia for the sale of Tu-22 strikebombers and S-300V air defense systems. See Aroosa Alam, “India to 

Acquire Capability to Counter Pakistani Missiles,” Pakistan Observer

(29 June 1999): 1. 

136 Neil Joeck, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia. Adelphi 

Paper 312 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). 

137 Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. “The 

Deutsch Report.” (14 July 1999), 15. 
54

 

138 An AP report in December 1998 stated that the United States did in 

fact provide a tour of an American command and control facility to a 

visiting Indian delegation. See “US Helps India Manage Nukes,” (17 

December 1998). 

139 India and Pakistan, however, would have to gain confidence in the 

reliability of American-supplied data, and the U.S. government may 

prove reluctant to compromise intelligence collection capabilities. 

Conversation with George Perkovich, 18 November 1999. Any sharing 

of American satellite imagery should also be weighed against the recent 

case of Iraq taking shared American imagery acquired during the IranIraq War and using it to analyze and counter the ability of the United 

States to detect Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. See Richard Kokoski, 

Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 1995), 221-22. 

140 Chandan Nandy, “Kargil Panel Quizzes Ex-RAW Chief,” The 

Telegraph (28 OCT 99). “ISRO Plans Satellite with Surveillance 

Capability,” The Economic Times Online (02 August 1999). 

141 Indrani Bagchi, “India Guns Down Pak Aircraft Near Kutch 

Border,” The Economic Times Online (11 August 1999). 

142 Mario E. Carranza, 18. 

143 Sumit Ganguly, NPS presentation. 

144 The process of injecting American-proposed CBMs into the 

subcontinent, albeit delicate, can be performed if the United States 

addresses Indian sensitivities by conferring with New Delhi first at 

each stage of the process. Additionally, Pakistani compliance must not 

be secured via the habitual American method (a promise of arms sales) 

as this would cause a loss of Indian support. Conversation with George 

Perkovich, 18 November 1999. 

145Lavoy, 205. 

146 One of the high points of American popularity in India during the 

Cold War was during the shipments of grain relief in the 1960s. 

147 Russia is already conducting joint oil exploration ventures with 

India. See Madhumita Chakraborty, “India’s ONGC to Explore Oil In 
55

 

Caspian Sea,” Delhi Financial Express (4 January 1999); and Atul 

Aneja, “India, Russia to Tap Oil In Iraq,” The Hindu (23 December 

1998). 

148 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “An Energy Security Policy for India: The 

Case of Oil and Natural Gas,” Strategic Analysis 21, no. 11 (February 

1998): 1675. This representation of the situation appears to omit U.S. 

consumption of petroleum products. 

149 Ibid., 1676. 
56