Opinion filed November 6, 2014

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals ___________

No. 11-14-00222-CV

___________

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

ESTHER ABELL DENTON, DECEASED

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Midland County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. P14779

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant, Douglas A. Denton, filed a pro se notice of appeal in which he 

indicated that he wished to appeal various rulings and orders of the trial court with 

respect to the administration of his mother’s estate. As listed in his notice of 

appeal, Appellant attempts to appeal from the following rulings and orders of the 

trial court: the order granting the administrator’s motion to quash a deposition and 

motion for protective order; the verbal ruling denying Appellant’s motion for 

continuance; the verbal ruling to not accept Appellant’s evidence of incomplete 

administration; the order granting the administrator’s application to appoint a 

receiver for the Esther Denton Trust for Douglas A. Denton; the overruling, by 
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operation of law, of Appellant’s motion for new trial with respect to the order 

appointing a receiver; and the overruling, by operation of law, of Appellant’s 

motion for new trial with respect to the order quashing a deposition and granting a 

protective order. Upon receiving and filing the record in this case, the clerk of this 

court notified Appellant by letter that the various orders and rulings mentioned in 

the notice of appeal did not appear to be final, appealable orders and that the 

appeal from the order appointing a receiver did not appear to be timely filed. We 

requested that Appellant provide a response showing grounds to continue this 

appeal, and we notified Appellant that the appeal may be dismissed. Appellant has 

filed an appropriate response; however, we must dismiss this appeal. 

Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from 

final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 

(Tex. 2007); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001); see TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014 (West Supp. 2014) (authorizing appeals 

from certain interlocutory orders). We recognize that an appeal from an 

interlocutory order that appoints a receiver is expressly authorized by statute. CIV.

PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(a)(1). However, to perfect an interlocutory appeal, which 

is an accelerated appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within twenty days after 

the order was signed. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b), 28.1(a), (b). Filing a motion for 

new trial or a request for findings of fact does not extend the time to perfect an 

accelerated appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1(b). Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed 

eighty-five days after the trial court signed the order granting the administrator’s 

application to appoint a receiver for the Trust. Thus, Appellant did not timely 

perfect an interlocutory appeal from that appealable interlocutory order. In his 

response, Appellant correctly states that his notice of appeal “was filed timely for 

appeal of a final order, but was not timely filed for appeal of an interlocutory 

order.” 
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We also recognize that probate proceedings may have multiple judgments 

that are final for purposes of appeal. De Ayala v. Mackie, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578 

(Tex. 2006); see TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 32.001 (West 2014). An appeal from a 

probate order may be authorized by “an express statute, such as the one for the 

complete heirship judgment, declaring the phase of the probate proceedings to be 

final and appealable.” De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578 (quoting Crowson v. 

Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995)); see EST. § 202.202 (heirship); see 

also id. §§ 351.053, 355.057, 355.058, 355.158(d), 356.556 (other express 

declarations of finality). If not expressly authorized as final or appealable by 

statute, a probate order is immediately appealable when it disposes of all parties or 

issues in a particular phase of the proceedings. De Ayala, 193 S.W.3d at 578. 

Otherwise, the probate order is interlocutory and is not a final judgment. Id. 

The rulings and orders listed in Appellant’s notice of appeal are 

interlocutory because they do not dispose of all of the issues in a particular phase 

of the underlying proceeding and because no statute declares them to be final,

appealable probate orders. See id. This court has no jurisdiction with respect to 

Appellant’s untimely appeal from the interlocutory order appointing a receiver. 

See Gibson v. Cuellar, 440 S.W.3d 150, 153–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2013, no pet.); Fortenberry v. Cavanaugh, No. 03-07-00310-CV, 2008 WL 

4997568, at *23–24 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 26, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

Nor do we have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from (1) the order granting the

motion to quash and motion for protective order, (2) the denial of the motion for 

continuance, (3) the refusal to accept evidence, or (4) the overruling by operation 

of law of the motions for new trial that relate to the above orders; these are 

interlocutory and are not being appealed in conjunction with a final, appealable 

order or judgment. 
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Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 42.3. 

PER CURIAM

November 6, 2014

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.