NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19-3654

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

 

v.

DEQUAN FORDE,

Appellant

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On Appeal from District Court of the Virgin Islands 

(D. C. No. 1-18-cr-00004-001)

District Court Judge: Honorable Wilma A. Lewis

Argued December 8, 2021

Before: McKEE, RESTREPO, SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: June 1, 2022)

Matthew A. Campbell, Esq. [ARGUED]

Kia D. Sears, Esq.

Office of Federal Public Defender

1336 Beltjen Road

Suite 202, Tunick Building

St. Thomas, VI 00802

Counsel for Appellant

Daniel H. Huston, Esq.

Office of United States Attorney

1108 King Street

Suite 201

Christiansted, VI 00820

1 ______________
2

Gretchen C.F. Shappert, Esq.

Adam Sleeper, Esq. [ARGUED]

Office of United States Attorney

5500 Veterans Drive

United States Courthouse, Suite 260

St. Thomas, VI 00802 

Counsel for Appellee

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OPINION*

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McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Dequan Forde appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

marijuana seized during a warrantless search of his checked luggage as he arrived in the 

Virgin Islands from the United States mainland. He also challenges the denial of his 

motion to suppress statements he made to Customs and Border Protection officers while 

at the baggage claim and in secondary inspection. We will affirm the district court’s 

denial of Forde’s motion to suppress the marijuana, his statements at baggage claim, and 

his spontaneous statement in secondary inspection. However, for reasons set forth below, 

we will reverse the court’s denial of Forde’s motion to suppress statements he made in 

response to questioning while in secondary inspection.

I.1

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court, and under I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 

1 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district 

court’s “denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual 
3

Forde argues that CBP’s warrantless search of his luggage at the internal customs 

border was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officers uncovered 

marijuana in Forde’s luggage during a routine x-ray examination of bags from a flight 

arriving from the mainland. They then returned it to the baggage belt so that they could 

intercept whoever retrieved it. While “[s]earches conducted absent a warrant are per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” there are certain exceptions.

2

In United 

States v. Baxter, decided after Forde’s motion was denied, we clarified that the border 

exception to the Fourth Amendment applies to the Virgin Islands’ customs border,

regardless of the direction of crossing.3 The officers’ warrantless inspection of Forde’s 

luggage was consistent with the border exception to the Fourth Amendment.

findings,” and we exercise plenary review over questions of law. United States v. Perez, 

280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).

2 United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014). 

3 United States v. Baxter, 951 F.3d 128, 134–35 (3d Cir. 2020). Baxter concerned a 

package mailed from the mainland United States to the Virgin Islands rather than 

checked baggage on a commercial flight from the mainland United States to the Virgin 

Islands. Looking to the statutory and regulatory landscape, searches of mailed packages 

may be different than searches of passenger’s luggage. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 145.2(b) 

(treatment of mail between the mainland and the Virgin Islands); 19 C.F.R. § 122.144(a) 

(treatment of passengers travelling from the Virgin Islands to the mainland); 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1467 (same); and 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (treatment of passengers travelling between the 

United States and a foreign country), with 19 C.F.R. § 122.143(a) (treatment of 

passengers travelling from the mainland to the Virgin Islands). But Forde concedes that 

Baxter controls the outcome of this case. See Appellant Br. 12 (“Mr. Forde recognizes 

that United States v. Baxter presently forecloses relief on this claim. Nevertheless, he 

wishes to preserve the claim for further review.” (citation omitted)); Oral Arg. at 0:58. 

We thus assume, without deciding, that Baxter controls the outcome here. The district 

court applied the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement. Given our application 

of Baxter, we need not address the court’s conclusion. Rather, we will affirm the denial 

of Forde’s motion to suppress on alternative grounds. See United States v. MacEwan, 445 

F.3d 237, 245 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006).
4

Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s denial of Forde’s motion to suppress this 

physical evidence.

II.

Forde also argues that the court erred in admitting statements he made in response 

to CBP questioning without being given Miranda warnings. “[T]he Fifth Amendment 

prohibits a prosecutor from using ‘statements . . . stemming from custodial 

interrogation’” in the absence of Miranda warnings.4 A defendant is in custody when a 

reasonable person would not feel at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.5 This 

standard is objective, based on the circumstances of the interrogation rather than the

subjective views of the officers or suspect.

6

The district court concluded that Miranda did not apply because the questioning, 

both at baggage claim and in secondary inspection, occurred in the context of a border 

search. However, the border exception does not apply when questions “cease to have a 

bearing on the grounds for admissibility and instead only further a potential criminal 

prosecution.”7 Here, admissibility was resolved before Forde was questioned at the

4 Renda v. King, 347 F.3d 550, 557 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).

5 United States v. Ludwikowski, 944 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2019).

6 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994). 

7 United States v. Kiam, 432 F.3d 524, 530 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a standard based on 

whether questions were routine or non-routine, since “courts have gone to great pains to 

label almost all questioning ‘routine’”). Kiam assumes that the official has a genuine 

interest in and authority to ascertain the admissibility of people and their effects. Id. at 

529–30 (“A person seeking entry into the United States does not have a right to remain 

silent. . . . [He] must convince a border inspector of his . . . admissibility to the country 

by affirmative evidence. . . . [And] the border inspector is accordingly entitled to ask 

questions and require answers.”). As with Baxter, it is not obvious that Forde was 

required to affirmatively prove his admissibility to the officials. Cf. 19 C.F.R. § 122.143 
5

baggage claim because it was CBP officers’ “intention to arrest” whoever claimed the 

checked luggage.8

However, the CBP officers never communicated their intent to arrest the owner of 

the luggage to Forde. There was no show of authority that would cause a reasonable 

person to believe that s/he was not free to leave.9 Because Forde was not deprived of his 

freedom of action in any significant way, he was not in custody, and Miranda did not 

apply.10 Thus, we will affirm the district court’s denial of Forde’s motion to suppress his 

statements at the baggage claim, but we do so on alternate grounds.11

Nevertheless, the district court erred in declining to suppress Forde’s responsive

statements in secondary inspection. It is undisputed that Forde was in custody during his 

detention and questioning by CBP officers during that secondary inspection. The inquiry 

there was not focused on determining the admissibility of Forde’s luggage. The officers 

knew it contained contraband that would not be admitted into the Virgin Islands. Rather, 

that inquiry was the epitome of a custodial interrogation aimed at confirming Forde’s 

association with the contraband and, thus, his guilt. Accordingly, the border exception to 

Miranda did not apply and Forde’s statements pertaining to the suitcase during that 

(treatment of passenger flights from the mainland to the Virgin Islands to be similar to 

flights within the United States). It is thus not obvious that Kiam is the proper lens 

through which to analyze the facts of this case. But Forde again concedes that it is, and 

we thus assume Kiam applies.

8 App. 212.

9 See United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1999) (requiring a showing that 

the authorities did or said something in a manner conveying to the suspect they cannot 

leave to establish custody without any formal arrest).

10 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.

11 See United States v. Belle, 593 F.2d 487, 499 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirming the district 

court’s refusal to suppress a post-arrest statement on different grounds).
6

investigation should have been suppressed as they were clearly obtained in violation of 

the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, we will reverse the district court’s order denying 

suppression of these statements.

III.

Lastly, Forde argues that his utterance “that’s weed” in secondary inspection 

should be suppressed because it was both involuntary and fruit of his illegal questioning 

during the secondary inspection.12 When CBP officers opened his suitcase and exposed 

the laundry bag containing marijuana, Forde blurted out, “that’s weed.”13 That statement 

was spontaneous and not made in response to CBP’s questioning.14 Moreover, Forde has 

not offered anything that would support a conclusion that his statement was anything 

other than the product of a free and rational will. The district court did not err in refusing 

to suppress that statement. 

IV.

In summation, for the reasons stated above, we will affirm the district court’s 

denial of Forde’s motion to suppress the physical evidence, the statements he made to 

CBP officers at the baggage claim and the spontaneous statement (“that’s weed”)15 that 

he made while in secondary inspection. We will reverse the district court’s denial of 

12 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding evidence stemming 

from Fourth Amendment violations must be excluded from trial as fruit of the poisonous 

tree).

13 App. 52.

14 See United States v. Calisto, 838 F.2d 711, 717 (3d Cir. 1988).

15 Calisto, 838 F.2d at 717.
7

Forde’s motion to suppress the responsive statements he made during secondary 

inspection that were made in the absence of the required Miranda warnings. 

Inasmuch as some of the evidence that forms the basis of Forde’s conviction 

should not have been admitted, we will vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.16

16 On remand, the district court will exercise its discretion in ruling upon any motion to 

withdraw the guilty plea based upon our partial reversal of the denial of the defendant’s 

motion to suppress. The court’s discretion will be guided by the usual factors for ruling 

upon such a motion when it is made after sentencing.