IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 18-1339

Filed September 26, 2018

IN THE INTEREST OF L.H.,

Minor Child,

D.M., Mother,

Appellant,

T.H., Father,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Craig M. 

Dreismeier, District Associate Judge.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to a child. 

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Amanda J. Heims of Amanda J. Heims, PC, Council Bluffs, for appellant 

mother.

Kyle J. McGinn of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, PLC, Council Bluffs, for 

appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Roberta J. Megel of State Public Defender Office, Council Bluffs, guardian 

ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to a child, 

born in 2016. The mother contends (A) the State failed to prove the grounds for 

termination cited by the district court, (B) the termination hearing should have been 

postponed, and (C) the district court should have declined to terminate her parental 

rights based on the closeness of the parent-child bond. The father contends 

(A) the State failed to prove the grounds for termination cited by the district court 

and (B) termination was not in the child’s best interests given the closeness of the 

parent-child bond.

I. Mother

A. Grounds for Termination

The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights under three 

statutory grounds. We may affirm if we find clear and convincing evidence to 

support any of the grounds. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2017) requires proof (1) the child is three 

years of age or younger, (2) the child was adjudicated in need of assistance, 

(3) “the child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents 

for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive 

months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days,” and (4) the 

child cannot be returned to the parents’ custody. Our de novo review of the record 

reveals the following facts.

The mother has a fourteen-year history of methamphetamine abuse and a 

seventeen-year history of marijuana abuse. The child was born with marijuana in 

his system. He was removed from the mother’s care shortly after the birth. 
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The mother progressed with reunification services, and the child was 

returned to her custody. In July 2017, just two months after the return, the child 

was removed again when the department of human services discovered the 

parents were using methamphetamine while caring for him. The child was 

adjudicated in need of assistance.

Preliminarily, the mother maintains the six-consecutive-month removal 

period was not satisfied because she had unsupervised visits with the child in 

December 2017. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(3). She cites no authority for 

the proposition that unsupervised visits would disrupt the removal time frame. Be 

that as it may, section 232.116(1)(h)(2) was satisfied. The subsection contains 

two alternatives: (1) removal for at least six of the last twelve months or (2) removal 

for the last six consecutive months with a home trial period of less than thirty days. 

See In re E.M., No. 17-1398, 2017 WL 6026721, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 22, 

2017). Under the first alternative, the child was removed in July 2017, and the 

termination hearing took place in June 2017. The child was out of the home for at 

least six of the twelve months up to and including the month of the termination 

hearing. Under the second alternative, the child was out of the home for at least 

six consecutive months. There was no trial home placement in December 2017 or 

at any time following the July 2017 removal. 

We turn to the fourth element—whether the child could be returned to the 

mother’s custody. The mother was in prison at the time of the termination hearing,

and her tentative discharge date was in 2021. When asked whether it was true 

the child could not be returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing, 

she responded, “That is true.” She went on to state, “I’m just asking that [the 
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department] not terminate my rights, allow [the child] to stay with [the foster parent] 

until I can, maybe, possibly be paroled, and to just extend this for, maybe, another 

six-month period due to the fact that I’m not able to be there right now.” Her 

request implicates the next two issues rather than the cannot-be-returned element. 

The State proved the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody 

B. Continuance

The mother contends the district court should have postponed the 

termination hearing to allow her to pursue reunification services in prison. Our 

review of a ruling on a motion for a continuance is for an abuse of discretion. In re 

R.B., 832 N.W.2d 375, 378 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013).

The mother admitted the prison lacked a substance abuse treatment 

program. But even if one were available, the mother’s history with treatment did 

not bode well. Before her incarceration, the department offered treatment and 

other reunification services for approximately two years. Three drug patches 

applied just before she went to prison were positive for methamphetamine, a patch 

requested of her in late 2017 was refused, and the mother failed to appear for 

application of a patch in the week preceding the refusal. Given this history, we 

conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to 

continue the termination hearing.

C. Bond with Child

The mother contends the district court should have declined to terminate 

her parental rights due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa 

Code § 232.116(3)(c). The department case manager acknowledged the mother 

was “bonded with” the child. But, as the district court pointed out, the child spent 
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the lion’s share of his young life out of her care and there was little likelihood the 

mother would be in a position to resume his care in the imminent future. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude the termination was warranted.

II. Father

A. Grounds for Termination

The department terminated the father’s parental rights to the child on the 

same statutory grounds as the mother. Again, we focus on Iowa Code section 

232.116(1)(h).

The father also had a long-term addiction to methamphetamine. Although 

he tested negative for several months, he refused to appear for six consecutive 

drug tests preceding the termination hearing. Because his failure to maintain 

sobriety while caring for the child was the impetus for the child’s removal, we agree 

with the district court that his refusal to undergo drug testing could be viewed as a 

return to drug use, which foreclosed a return of the child to his custody.

B. Closeness of Parent-Child Bond

Like the mother, the father points to the parent-child bond as reason to 

reverse the termination decision. The bond was not sufficient to overcome the 

significant health and safety risks to the child. As the department case manager 

stated, 

A reunification period had happened with a case closure that 

resulted in a new case opening with the exact same concerns not 

even two months later. There’s a concern that we could not reunify 

today. There’s no estimate that we could reunify in the near future. 

[The child] deserves permanency. He deserves a stable life, and the 

indicators from the past roughly 22 months of his life just show that 

he’s not going to be able to achieve a safe, stable permanency with 

his parents in the foreseeable future and that we have nothing to 

indicate that’s coming soon. 
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We affirm the termination of the parents’ rights to the child.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.