Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Paulsen, Richard A., 1956-

The role of US nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era / by Richard A. Paulsen.

p. 207.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States-Defenses. 2. Nuclear weapons-United States. 3. World polltics-1989- 1. Title.

UA23.P373 1994 94-25605

355.02'17'0973-dc20 CIP

ISBN 1-58566-055-8

First Printing September 1994

Second Printing July 1998

Third Printing September 2000

Fourth Printing September 2001

Disclaimer

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school environment and in the

interest of academic freedom and the advancement of national defense-related concepts. The

views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or

position of the Department of Defense, or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for

public release .

Ll.
Contents

Chapter

Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii

1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR

POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Truman Era-Containment . . . . . . . . 1

The Eisenhower Years-Massive Retaliation . . 4

The 1960s-Flexible Response . . . . . . . . . 9

The 1970s-Sufficient Deterrence and

Countervailing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The 1980s-Peace through Strength . . . . . . 15

Strategic Modernization . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Emphasis to Denuclearize . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Changing Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe . . 21

The 1990s-Peace through Disarmament . . . . 22

ANew Defense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

The Impact of Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . 24

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks . . . . . . . . 25

The Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact . . . . 27

Unilateral Initiatives-Round One . . . . . . 28

The Downfall of Communism and the

Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Unilateral Initiatives-Round 2 . . . . . . . . 33

Washington Summit and Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty II . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

An Economical Approach to Arms Control . . 37

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2 US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR . . 43

National Security Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Strategic Nuclear Forces . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces . . . . . . . . . 46

1.1.E
Chapter Page

Missile Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

National Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Strategic Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . 55

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles . . . . . 56

The Future of the Triad . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

3 CURRENT THINKING ON THE FUTURE ROLE

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

An Assessment of Current Thinking . . . . . . . 61

Seven Questions regarding Future US

Nuclear Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Are Nuclear Weapons Still Necessary? . . . . . . 63

Nuclear Weapons Should Be Eliminated . . . . 64

Nuclear Weapons Should Not Be Eliminated . . 67

Chemical/Biological Weapons and

Conventional Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Arguments against Nuclear Use in

These Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

Arguments for Deterring Chemical and

Biological Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Arguments for Deterring Conventional

Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . 75

Maintain Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . 76

Nuclear Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Countervalue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Counterforce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Multilateral Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

How Many Nuclear Weapons? . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Multilateral Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

iv
Chapter Page

Nuclear Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

Crisis Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92

4 THETHREAT-WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

US Approach to Proliferation . . . . . . . . . 98

Proliferation Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

Nuclear Threats and Considerations . . . . . . 105

Current Nuclear Countries . . . . . . . . . . 106

Current Nuclear-Capable and Undeclared

Nuclear Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Developing Nuclear Countries . . . . . . . . 112

Chemical and Biological . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Ballistic Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Future Potential Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . 123

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

5 US NUCLEAR FORCES FOR THE POST-COLD

WAR ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

PostCold War Environment . . . . . . . . . . 135

Possible US Responses to Proliferation . . . . . 138

Carrots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Sticks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

The Role of US Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . 149

A Declining Role? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Warfighting and Deterrence . . . . . . . . 151

US Defense Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Arms Control and Acquisition Policy . . . . . 155

A Hedge against Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . 156

Unilateral Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

An Analysis of Nuclear Force Capabilities . . . . 158

Quick Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Positive Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Crisis Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Decisive Firepower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

High Probability of Kill . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Minimizing Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . 167

Precision Accuracy/Wide Variety of Yields . . 167

u
Chapter Page

Flexible Employment Options . . . . . . . . 168

Demonstration of Capability . . . . . . . . . 169

Show of Force/Visible Generation . . . . . . 169

Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Hedge against Uncertainty . . . . . . . . . . 170

Bottom Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172

6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . 175

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

Illustrations

Table

1 Bush's and Gorbachev's Tactical Nuclear

Weapon Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2 Bush's and Gorbachev's Strategic Nuclear

Weapon Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

3 Bush's and Gorbachev's Proposals . . . . . . . . 31

4 Bush's 28 January 1992 Initiatives . . . . . . . . 33

5 Bush's 28 January 1992 Proposals . . . . . . . . 34

6 Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Initiatives . . . . . . . 34

7 Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Proposals . . . . . . . 35

8 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II . . . . . . . . 36

9 National Objectives Involving Military Forces . . . 44

10 Possible Future Weapons of Mass Destruction

Threatening US National Security . . . . . . . . . 124

UL
Foreword

The decade of the 1990s opened with a declining Soviet

threat that ushered in an astonishing round of unilateral and

bilateral nuclear arms reductions . While the dissolution of the

Soviet Union has greatly reduced the possibility of global

nuclear war, it has also increased third world instability,

conflict, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction .

While the threat of chemical and nuclear weapons never

materialized in Desert Storm, the next regional confrontation

may not afford the United States such latitude.

Maj Rick Paulsen's study analyzes the role of United States

nuclear weapons in this new, multipolar environment. He

begins with a historical look at the role nuclear weapons have

played in US defense policy since 1945. He reviews current

unclassified guidance and the spectrum of public opinion on

where the United States should be going with its nuclear

weapons programs . He then surveys the potential threat of

weapons of mass destruction. Major Paulsen concludes his

study by suggesting nuclear force capabilities that would

provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the

post-cold war era. His recommendations address a broad

range of issues that focus on developing a coherent nuclear

strategy.

About the

Author

Maj Richard A. Paulsen completed this study as the last

Strategic Air Command (SAC)-sponsored research fellow and

one of the first two Air Combat Command (ACC)-sponsored

research fellows at the Airpower Research Institute (ARI), Air

University College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and

Education (AUCADRE) at Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB),

Alabama. Major Paulsen is a 1978 graduate of the United

States Naval Academy, with a bachelor of science degree in

electrical engineering. After graduation, he served as an

electronics project engineer for five months at the Naval

Ordnance Station at Indian Head, Maryland, while waiting to

attend nuclear power training. Major Paulsen attended the

Navy Nuclear Power School at Orlando, Florida, the Navy

Nuclear Propulsion Prototype Plant at Windsor Locks,

Connecticut, and the Officer Basic Submarine School at

Groton, Connecticut. He reported to the USS Lafayette (SSBN

616) Poseidon missile submarine blue crew in January 1980 .

While on Lafayette, he completed three 70-day deterrent

patrols and took the ship through a two-year refueling

overhaul. During the course of his tour, Major Paulsen held

the positions of electrical division officer, reactor control

division officer, main propulsion assistant, communications

officer, and reactor refueling officer. He received his gold

dolphins on 23 March 1981 and passed the Naval Reactors

Engineer's Exam prior to departing for the Air Force . Major

Paulsen received an interservice transfer to the Air Force on 31

LX
October 1983 and reported to the Air Force Weapons

Laboratory at Kirtland AFB, New Mexico, for his first Air Force

assignment. He served as the electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

effects section chief and, later, as the technology branch chief

in the nuclear technology office during his tour. In 1987 he

was assigned to the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) at

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, where he earned a master of

science degree in operations research. After AFIT, Major

Paulsen was assigned to the Force Analysis Division at SAC

headquarters at Offutt AFB, Nebraska . In 1992 the

commander of SAC selected him as a research fellow at ARI

and as a student to concurrently attend Air Command and

Staff College. He became an ACC-sponsored research fellow

during the Air Force reorganization in June 1992 . Major

Paulsen is currently assigned to the Joint Staff, Force

Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) as a

strategic analyst . He and his wife, Barb, were married in 1978

and have a daughter, Donna, and two sons, David and Daniel.

x
Preface

I arrived at SAC in January 1989 and was assigned to the

Force Analysis Division, commonly referred to as "the vault."

One of my key responsibilities was to support commander in

chief Strategic Air Command (CINCSAC) with force structure

analysis and, in particular, to provide the analysis for his

yearly testimony before Congress. At that time, we vigorously

provided analytical support to validate strategic force

modernization requirements-132 B-2s, advanced cruise

missile (ACM), short-range attack missile (SRAM) II, Peacekeeper Rail Garrison, small intercontinental ballistic missile

(SICBM), and Trident submarines equipped with the D-5

missile . Then, unexpectedly, the threat disappeared-the

Warsaw Pact disbanded, the Berlin Wall fell, and the Soviet

Union disintegrated . President Bush canceled SRAM II,

Peacekeeper Rail Garrison, and SICBM. He also reduced the

B-2 buy to 20, the ACM buy to 640, and the Trident buy to 18 .

Additionally, the D-5 upgrade for the Pacific-based Tridents

was postponed indefinitely .

It quickly became apparent that the Soviets were no longer

being viewed as the threat. During the cold war, we validated

force structure requirements based on the ability to

sufficiently damage the Soviet targets delineated in our

projected out-year target base . Without a specifically defined

threat for the post-cold war era, force structure modernization

was almost baseless.

Other factors became obvious to me. US theater nuclear

policy had remained vague throughout Desert Shield and

Desert Storm. Some individuals had espoused that the United

States would maintain the "high moral ground" and not

retaliate "in kind" even if Saddam Hussein attacked with

chemical or nuclear weapons . After the Gulf War, it became

evident that national attention was centering on the

effectiveness of precision-guided conventional weapons as a

possible replacement for nuclear weapons . The threat of

weapons of mass destruction focused national attention

around the need for better defenses against ballistic missile

threats, nonproliferation efforts, and further arms control

treaties . Concurrently, nobody seemed to question projected

xi
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II levels . Further,

radical arms control measures were tossed around--even in

SAC headquarters . Suggestions such as actually demating

warheads from ballistic missiles and keeping all submarines

in port were posed as possible future postures.

I initially proposed my research to look at START lI levels

and beyond, focusing on the question, "How low can we go?"

As I witnessed President George Bush's unilateral initiatives

and the Washington Summit agreement, I realized that

nuclear weapons levels over the next decade already had been

decided . I began to ask myself, "On what are these tremendous

force reductions based?" and "Does the United States have a

plan for when nonproliferation efforts fail?" These questions

led me to my research topic, "What is the role of US nuclear

weapons in the post-cold war era?" One thing is for sure: there

are a multitude of opinions being expressed.

I began my research with an examination of the role of

nuclear weapons from a historical context. I then surveyed

current unclassified national guidance regarding nuclear

weapons. Following this, I examined the literature for what

various proposals were being offered in the public sector as

the future for US nuclear weapons. Due to the tremendous

magnitude of literature on nuclear weapons, policy, strategy,

and arms control, I chose to limit my coverage to a sampling

of proposals that have been made over the last few years. I

then looked at possible threats the United States may face

over the next couple of decades. I limited this discussion to

weapons of mass destruction, since these threats are most

likely to draw a US nuclear response . Finally, I proposed

some overall nuclear force characteristics that would provide

the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold

war era by maintaining the capability to respond across the

full spectrum of conflict .

While the scope of this research is quite broad, I hope that

many individuals will find it both useful as a starting point

for performing more in-depth research on this subject and

as a point of departure for discussing US nuclear force

requirements for the post--cold war era. I could expand each

chapter alone into a book. My only regret is that attending Air

Command and Staff College did not afford me as much time as

I would have liked.

X1.1.
I wish to thank many people for their help: Maj Mike Zenk

for telling me about the ARI program and encouraging me to

apply for the fellowship ; Brig Gen Robert Linhardt for his

initial vote of confidence as SAC/XP by recommending me for

the program; Maj Gen James Hurley (ACC/XP) for taking me

under his wing when SAC disappeared ; Capt Bill Spindler for

providing me with a great amount of historical background

information; Lt Col Chuck Fletcher (AF/XOXI) for providing

arms control expertise and feedback on my working draft; Col

Steve Cheavens (ACC/XOON) and his shop for their valuable

comments and suggestions; and Lt Col Bob Sberna

(ACC/XPXT) for providing a good scrub of my final draft.

Special thanks go to my reading group chairman, Dr Karl

Magyar, and my editor, Dr Richard Bailey, for their valuable

assistance in completing this document.

Finally, above all, I would like to thank my wife, Barb, for

her loving support throughout this difficult year. She endured

many lonely nights while I pounded away on the computer. I

would also like to thank my daughter, Donna, and sons, David

and Daniel. Although it was hard for them to understand why

their dad spent so much time on the computer, they helped

me to keep things in perspective and provided me with lots of

support.

RICHARD A. PAULSEN, MAJ, USAF

Research Fellow

Airpower Research Institute

xiii

Introduction

The nuclear arms race did an about-face in 1991 and

became a disarmament race. The Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START) treaty, signed in July 1991, marked the first

time the United States and Soviet Union committed

themselves to reducing the size of their strategic nuclear

arsenals. The announcement of President Bush's initiatives in

September 1991 marked an unprecedented step in nuclear

disarmament-unilateral warhead reductions coupled with

changes to the strategic nuclear alert posture and cancellation

of some strategic modernization programs. These initiatives

achieved their desired result when President Mikhail

Gorbachev reciprocated in October 1991 with his own set of

unilateral initiatives. Not to be outdone, President Bush

quickly followed with a second set of initiatives in January

1992 . By this time the Soviet Union had become the former

Soviet Union and its new president, Boris N. Yeltsin, had also

proposed a second set of unilateral initiatives . The Washington

Summit agreement in June 1992 established the framework

for the START II agreement signed in January 1993. This new

agreement promises to reduce the number of US and

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) strategic offensive

nuclear weapons to approximately one-third of what they

would have been under the START agreement.'

Amidst the fast snowballing of nuclear disarmament

proposals rang the question, How low can we go? While most

leaders seemed comfortable with the 3,000-3,500 level stated

in the START II agreement, others suggest a much lower

number. But before the United States can decide on how many

nuclear weapons it needs, a more fundamental question must

be answered : What is the role of US nuclear weapons in the

post-cold war era? Until the United States establishes the

mission of its nuclear arsenal, it cannot determine the number

of weapons and delivery systems required and how the

systems should be based and postured.

There are five main elements of nuclear policy-declaratory

policy, acquisition policy, deployment policy, employment policy,

and arms control policy. 2 Declaratory policy encompasses that

which is known by the public from announcements through
the president or his staff. Acquisition policy includes plans for

obtaining new capabilities and replacing aging weapons to

ensure that the military can accomplish national security

objectives . Deployment policy involves the way that nuclear

forces are postured to support declaratory policy. Employment

policy involves plans for the actual use of nuclear forces . Arms

control policy comprises existing treaties and US negotiating

positions regarding the reduction or elimination of various

nuclear weapons and their delivery systems .

Amazingly, tremendous changes have been made to every

nuclear policy except one-declaratory policy. Many strategists

contend that nuclear weapons no longer serve any purpose

other than to deter the minuscule possibility of a nuclear

attack from the CIS. Yet such a view may be too rooted in the

traditional bipolar world standoff between two superpowers .

The collapse of the Soviet Union has transformed the bipolar

into a multipolar world in which ethnic and regional conflicts

have reemerged to produce a much less stable world . Without

the Soviet guarantee, numerous third world countries are

scrambling for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic

missile systems to deliver them.

While the United States has devoted major attention to the

problem of proliferation, efforts to date have dealt with export

controls. Unfortunately, these nonproliferation efforts will not

solve the proliferation problem. Third world countries that

want weapons of mass destruction will find ways to get them.

Therefore, US nuclear policy must focus on how to achieve US

national security objectives in future scenarios where third

world weapons of mass destruction pose a threat.

For example, how would US national command authorities

have responded in Desert Storm if one or more Scud missiles

had been nuclear tipped? What about chemical or biological

weapons? Would not an Iraqi attack on Israel with a nuclear or

chemical warhead have elicited a different response from

coalition forces? Would the United States have considered

tactical nuclear weapons if Saddam Hussein had mounted an

offensive during the early days of Desert Shield and overrun

allied forces inflicting heavy casualties? Americans asked

questions during the Gulf War, and they are not outside the

realm of distinct possibilities for scenarios that the United

States could face in the future.

XUI.
Numerous other questions need serious contemplation. If

nuclear weapons are to provide a deterrent against the use of

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as stated in US

national military strategy, does the United States really intend

to use them if deterrence fails? If there is no plan to use them,

are they truly a deterrent? Will the United States have a

credible deterrent to third world advances after destroying/

dismantling all ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons, as

announced by President Bush in his 27 September 1991

speech, or will the remaining US weapons have such large

yields that the United States would never really employ them

(self-deterrence)?

This book examines US nuclear policy in light of the US

victory in Desert Storm and since the cessation of the cold

war; identifies changes in US nuclear capability in light of

START, the president's unilateral initiatives, and the

Washington Summit agreement; explores potential future

scenarios in which the United States could be faced with an

enemy employing weapons of mass destruction; and evaluates

the ability of US nuclear forces to meet anticipated national

security objectives in light of these changes.

To provide a foundation from which to evaluate change in

nuclear policy, chapter 1 provides a historical overview of the

role of nuclear weapons and examines key events that have

had a dramatic impact on bringing the 40-year cold war to an

end and creating a changing perception on the need for and

role of nuclear weapons. Chapter 2 examines current and

ongoing changes in US nuclear policy since the Soviet threat

declined, the success of conventional weapons in Desert

Storm, and the flurry of arms control agreements and

initiatives . Chapter 3 examines current public thinking on

the future role of nuclear weapons and the potential impact

of this thinking on US policy. Chapter 4 addresses possible

future threats and threat scenarios, with particular focus on

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the third

world. Chapter 5 evaluates the ability of planned US nuclear

forces to meet national security objectives in light of the

possible threats and scenarios identified in chapter 4. Finally,

chapter 6 summarizes the findings and makes recommendations for future research.

XUI.I.
Notes

1 . For the sake of clarity, I have used the term Soviet Union when

speaking of the time frame prior to the 1991 dissolution and CIS for the time

period since then.

2 . The terms policy and strategy are used interchangeably by policymakers and writers. Some writers prefer strategy . For example, see Col

Dennis M. Drew and Dr Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction

to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air

University Press, August 1988), 128 . Some authors choose to use the term

policy. For example, see Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence,

Adelphi papers no . 185 (Great Britain : Netherwood Dalton & Co. Ltd.,

Summer 1983), 37. Due to the tremendous number of quotes and references

in chapter 1, I chose not to apply any strict definition to these terms; however,

in my own usage, policy is used to denote more general national-level

guidance, whereas strategy refers to more specific plans to apply a policy .

Additionally, it should be noted that the term doctrine is also used

interchangeably with these terms at times.

xviii
Chapter 1

Historical Overview of

US Nuclear Policy

The history of nuclear weapons development, strategy, and

policy is both vast and complex and would take many volumes

to cover sufficiently. US nuclear policy and strategy have been

in a state of evolution since 1945, reacting to changes in both

US and Soviet nuclear capabilities . This chapter summarizes

each administration's nuclear policies and highlights some of

the major events that have affected changes to those policies .

Particular emphasis is given to events that have had a

dramatic, effect in bringing an end to the cold war and

beginning the nuclear disarmament process .

The Truman Era-Containment

On 16 July 1945 the Manhattan Project reached its fruition,

and the nuclear age was born at the Trinity test site in New

Mexico. Three weeks later, the Enola Gay dropped Little Boy

on Hiroshima, providing the world with a dreadful picture of

the horror of nuclear war. Three days later, Fat Man was

unleashed on Nagasaki and Japan capitulated.

From 1945 to 1949 the United States was the world's sole

nuclear power . President Harry S Truman saw nuclear

;weapons as strictly weapons of terror rather than serving

`military purposes. He sought to keep nuclear weapons from

'military control while also attempting to place nuclear,

'weapons under United Nations (UN) international control

'through the (Bernard) Baruch plan. Although the UN plan

failed, he was, successful in placing nuclear weapons under

'US civilian control through the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 . 1

Between 1946 and 1949, US war plans focused on the

!destruction of population, government control centers, and,

industrial complexes, which meant targeting Soviet cities. 2

1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

The first US war plan, PINCHER (1946), called for an attack on 20

Soviet cities with 50 A-bombs. A subsequent plan, FLEETWOOD

(1948), called for attacks on 70 Soviet cities with 133 bombs over a

period of 30 days. Moscow was targeted with eight bombs and

Leningrad with seven. 3

The year 1947 marked the start of nuclear war plans based on

prepared target lists, although urban-industrial targets

continued to be the highest priority. That year also marked the

date of the famous Truman Doctrine, which emphasized the

policy of containment of communism. It was not until 1948,

however, during the Berlin crisis, that a nuclear policy

statement was issued at the presidential level. This policy,

National Security Council (NSC)-30, was signed on 16

September 1948 and directed that the military plan for and be

ready to use nuclear weapons in war; however, the decision to

use nuclear weapons rested with the president. NSC-30 did

not specify under what conditions nuclear weapons would be

used, what targets would be struck, or how nuclear weapons

were tied to national objectives . The NSC provided more

guidance regarding US objectives later that year in NSC-20/4 .

It stated that the goal during an attack would be to "reduce or

eliminate Soviet control inside and outside the Soviet Union,"

but it did not see unconditional surrender or occupancy of the

Soviet Union as necessary. 4

Three events in 1949 had a significant impact on the

direction of the United States nuclear program. First, on 4

April, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) treaty, committing the United States to

the defense of Western Europe. Second, a committee headed

by Air Force Gen H. R. Harmon produced a report in May

which concluded that the present US arsenal would not be

sufficient to "bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of

Communism, or critically weaken the power of Soviet

leadership to dominate the people." Further, it stated that the

Soviet's ability to "overrun Western Europe and the Middle

East 'would not be seriously impaired' ." 5 Third, the Soviets

successfully exploded an atomic weapon in August and gained

the capability to challenge US nuclear superiority.

These factors were influential in President Truman's

decision to approve increases in nuclear production capability

2
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

three times during his last three years in offices This

expansion of nuclear production facilities provided the basis

for the tremendous increase in US stockpile size over the next

decade . Additionally, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

reports that the Soviets were working on a thermonuclear

bomb influenced Truman to sign an executive order

authorizing the development of a hydrogen bomb on 30

January 1950 . 7 He issued a statement of rationale the

following day.

It is my responsibility as commander in chief of the armed forces to

see to it that our country is able to defend itself against any possible

aggressor . Accordingly, I have directed the AEC to continue its work on

all forms of atomic weapons, including the so-called hydrogen or Super

bomb.$

On 1 November 1952 the United States successfully entered

the thermonuclear age. Ivy Mike was detonated at Eniwetok

atoll, achieving a yield of 10 .4 megatons.

The Mike test was as important a milestone for the development of US

thermonuclear weapons as the original Trinity test in 1945 had been

for the development of fission weapons. The new hydrogen bomb was

as great a leap in explosive power over the atomic bomb as the atomic

bomb had been over conventional explosives: the Mike shot was 500

times as powerful as the Fat Man prototype detonated in New Mexico

during Operation Trinity in 1945. 9

Nuclear targeting strategy also shifted. With the Soviets

capable of delivering nuclear attacks on the United States, the

first priority became the destruction of Soviet nuclear delivery

capability . Second priority was a retardation attack against

Soviet capability to invade Western Europe. And third was

attacks against "liquid fuel, electric power, and atomic energy

industries."lo

The presence of Soviet nuclear weapons also created

concerns over the most efficient use of atomic weapons .

Planners saw the value of striking the first blow; however,

NSC-68, written in April 1950, "rejected on strategic and moral

grounds, the idea of preventative war, that is, a war

deliberately launched by the United States before the Soviet

Union could become stronger."" It did see the value in

maintaining the right to launch a preemptive attack.

3
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The military advantages of landing the first blow become increasingly

important with modern weapons, and this is a fact which requires us

to be on the alert in order to strike with our full weight as soon as we are

attacked, and, if possible, before the Soviet blow is actually delivered . 12

The Eisenhower Years-Massive Retaliation

"Where Harry Truman viewed the atomic bomb as an

instrument of terror and a weapon of last resort, [President]

Dwight Eisenhower viewed it as an integral part of American

defense, and, in effect, a weapon of first resort." During his

first year in office, Eisenhower began transferring nuclear

weapons to the military "to decrease the vulnerability of the

stockpile through dispersal and to increase operational

readiness." He continued to do so throughout his term, to

such an extent that "by 1961, less than 10 percent of the

stockpile remained in civilian control ." 13

Both the Korean War and the Soviets' successful detonation

of a hydrogen bomb in August 1953 were factors in shaping a

new nuclear policy. "President Eisenhower and Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles, convinced that their threat to use

atomic weapons in Korea had ended the stalemate there,

believed future conventional wars could be deterred by the

threat of rapid escalation." 14 Eisenhower's nuclear strategy of

massive retaliation was delineated in NSC-162 /2, which was

signed on 30 October 1953 . The policy emphasized "a strong

military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting

massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power." 15 The

strategy of massive retaliation was delineated publicly in

Secretary of State Dulles's address to the Council on Foreign

Relations in January 1954 . He stated, "The way to deter

aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to

respond vigorously at places and with means of its own

choosing," and the means of response "was to depend

primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly." 1 s

Massive retaliation was also adopted as NATO's first nuclear

strategy, MC 14/2, which was signed in December 1954 . 17

This strategy was seen as a cheaper means of security as

opposed to maintaining large standing armies in Europe to

oppose Soviet expansionism.

4
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

Aside from massive retaliation, Eisenhower launched the

United States into a massive tactical nuclear weapons

program. NSC-162/2 stated :

In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear

weapons to be as available for use as other munitions. This statement

. . . was seen by the JCS as an assurance that they could confidently

plan for the use of nuclear weapons in both limited and general

conflicts. i s

The nuclear weapons complexes that were expanded under

Truman provided the basis for the United States stockpile to

grow from approximately 1,000 warheads in 1953 to

approximately 18,000 by 1960. 19 Improvement in nuclear

weapon pit designs and fusion technology greatly increased

the yields of nuclear weapons from approximately 20 kilotons

to several hundred kilotons and finally the megaton range.

These improved designs reduced the weight of nuclear

weapons substantially, making them employable on tactical

aircraft, missiles, depth-charges, torpedoes, artillery shells,

and land mines. 2° The United States successfully entered the

age of battlefield nuclear weapons on 25 May 1953. A 280

millimeter (mm) artillery round was fired at the Nevada

Proving Grounds, achieving a yield of 15 kilotons, or the

equivalent of Little Boy. 21

In March 1954 NSC-5410/ 1 was published, replacing

NSC-20/4 . It stated that the objective of the United States in

general war was to "achieve a victory which will insure the

survival of the United States." This statement created further

discussion of preventive war, but the NSC continued to reject

this option while retaining the option of preemption . In fact,

President Eisenhower told his Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that

in the case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, tactical

weapons would be employed to delay their advance while

Strategic Air Command (SAC) conducted a blunting attack. 22

As the Soviets continued to expand their nuclear capability

both in weapons and bombers, the effectiveness of the United

States' ability to preempt an attack came under close scutiny.

Eisenhower directed the development and deployment of

several defensive systems including early-warning radar

systems, interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air missiles (SAM),

and the sound surveillance system (SOSUS) for the detection

5
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

of submarines . Additionally, alternate national and joint

command posts were built for military and government

leadership to provide the capability to relocate during a

nuclear attack. 23

The JCS were not all in agreement with Eisenhower's

strategy of massive retaliation . Army Chiefs of Staff Matthew

B . Ridgeway and Maxwell Taylor both argued against it from

their tenure of 1953 through 1960. Both were convinced of the

need to focus on conventional responses, particularly in the

realm of limited conflicts . Taylor argued that massive

retaliation offered "only two choices" and a flexible response

strategy "would recognize that it is just as necessary to deter

or win a limited war as to deter general war ." He was

concerned that using tactical nuclear weapons in a limited war

would cause escalation . 24

Nonetheless, Eisenhower continued to hang on to his

strategy of massive retaliation. NSC-5602/1, signed on 15

March 1956, stated that nuclear weapons "will be used in

general war and in military operations short of general war as

authorized by the President ." It also stated, "Such

authorization could be given in advance ." 25

The Soviets' launching of Sputnik on 4 October 1957

propelled nuclear strategy into the space age. Ballistic missiles

offered the ability to deliver nuclear weapons in a matter of

minutes as opposed to hours . Ballistic missiles could not be

intercepted like bombers, and thus defending the United

States would not be possible. Eisenhower faced several critical

decisions regarding the future of US nuclear forces .

These included how to deal with bomber force vulnerability, what types

and numbers of ballistic missile systems should be authorized, how

forces should be based and targeted, and whether they were intended

primarily for preemptive or retaliatory strikes. 26

SAC responded to the need for immediate retaliatory strike

by devising the ground alert concept. After conducting several

tests, Gen Thomas Power directed that one-third of SAC's

aircraft be placed on ground alert. This was accomplished in

1957, and a reorganization occurred in 1958 to support the

concept. Although ballistic missile testing had been ongoing

since the end of World War 11, the first US intercontinental

ballistic missile (ICBM) did not reach even a limited capability

6
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

until 1958. Atlas-D did not really become fully operational

until 1960 . 27

Submarine-based missiles offered the promise of

invulnerability to surprise attack. A Supplemental New

Construction Program, signed on 11 February 1958, ordered

the construction of three submarines that would carry the

Polaris sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) . The George

Washington, the first US nuclear-powered ballistic missile

submarine, was launched on 9 June 1959 ; it successfully fired

a Polaris missile while submerged on 20 July 1960. 28 The

strategic triad was officially born in November 1960, when the

George Washington departed for its first deterrent patro1. 29

Arguments between the Navy and the Air Force over nuclear

missions and strategies were waged during the late 1950s. The

Air Force felt threatened by the proposal of nuclear missile

submarines. Adm Arleigh Burke proposed a concept of "finite

deterrence" as an alternative to an escalating arms race . He

observed that Soviet ICBMs made the blunting mission

impossible and land forces vulnerable to surprise attack.

Further, he stated that not only would hardening and defenses

be expensive, but also that such measures would cause the

Soviets to produce more powerful weapons in response. Finite

deterrence rested on having a secure striking force. He argued

that this would provide "time to think in periods of tension" by

eliminating "the constant pressure to strike first in order to

avoid being disarmed ." It also provided the ability of selective

and gradual response, the ability to "apply political coercion,"

and a stable nuclear state in which "neither side would be

under pressure to expand its nuclear arsenal.

"30

The Air Force responded with the argument that the United

States must continue to have the capability to destroy Soviet

nuclear delivery capability. It argued that finite deterrence did

not offer sufficient forces to deter limited acts of aggression or

attacks on US allies; nor would it be able to protect the United

States from surprise attack or provide the capability to

preempt in the case of gradual escalation. Gen Thomas D. White,

Air Force chief of staff, stated that "US policy must encompass

the requirement for forces adequate to permit the United

States to have initiative under all circumstances of war." 31

7
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Nuclear planning had been identified as a problem for two

reasons . First, each unified or specified commander with

nuclear forces prepared his own target list-supposedly

unique to his own theater. However, there was overlap with

regard to which targets each commander in chief (CINC)

considered important to the defense of his theater. 32 Even

though CINCs began meeting as early as 1955 to review one

another's plans, as many as 300 out of 2,400 targets were

duplicated in 1959. JCS chairman Nathan F. Twining sought

to alleviate this problem by proposing a single integrated

operational plan.

Second, the development of ICBMs and SLBMs was going to

further exacerbate these problems. Gen Thomas S. Power

recommended that SAC should have control of Polaris

submarines to ensure coordination of planning. The Air Force

proposed the formation of a strategic command in April 1959

in which the commander of SAC would be a specified

commander . Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates did not

concur with the ideas of a strategic command, but he was

convinced of the need to integrate nuclear planning .

Eisenhower approved Gate's proposal to establish a joint

strategic target planning staff (JSTPS), which would be under

SAC but manned with officers from all services . 33

The JSTPS was tasked with developing the national strategic

target list (NSTL) and the single integrated operational plan

(SIOP) . The NSTL listed possible targets that might be struck ;

the SIOP was the actual war plan that assigned weapons to

targets. The first plan, SIOP-62, was completed in December

1960 . It contained only a single plan, which was a massive

response in which all nuclear forces would be launched with

no reserve forces held back. It primarily targeted

Soviet, Chinese, and satellite cities-whether by virtue of their value as

urban-industrial targets or because of the location of numerous

military and government control centers, as well as airfields and other

military bases and facilities, within or on the outskirts of these cities .34

US strategic nuclear forces in 1960 were comprised of nine

Atlas ICBMs, two Polaris submarines, 1,250 B-47s, and 450

B-52 bombers . The Soviets had 60-70 Bear, 100-120 Bison,

and 1,000 Badger aircraft, and 35 SS-7/8 ICBMs . 35

8
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

The 1960s-Flexible Response

When John F. Kennedy began his administration, he viewed

the doctrine of massive retaliation as too inflexible . He ordered

a revision of SIOP-62 to provide a variety of options . His staff

drew up a set of planning guidelines to aid in this process :

" China and the satellite countries were separated from the

USSR for targeting purposes.

" Soviet strategic forces were separated from Soviet cities on

US target lists.

" Strategic reserves were held by the United States in

accordance with the concept of intrawar deterrence .

" US command and control systems were to. be protected to

allow "controlled response."

" Soviet command and control was to be preserved, at least

in the initial stages of any nuclear exchange . 36

Using these guidelines, five options and several suboptions

were provided to allow for a spectrum of responses. These

options differentiated between Soviet nuclear forces, Soviet

conventional forces not collocated with cities, Soviet forces near

cities, Soviet command and control centers, and urbanindustrial targets. SIOP-63 went into effect on 1 August 1962. 37

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara publicly acknowledged

the pursuit of a "no-cities" counterforce strategy in January

1962 . Testifying before the House Appropriations Committee,

he stated that the "mission of the strategic retaliatory forces is

to deter war by their capability to destroy the enemy's

war-making capabilities ." He further revealed that US plans

included the capability to either target or spare cities . Other

statements made by McNamara indicate that he saw

retaliatory forces as useful in a damage limitation role by

destroying any reserve Soviet nuclear weapons before they

could be launched. He also saw the value of reserve forces in

terminating hostilities on terms acceptable to the United

States and as a deterrent against Soviet strikes on US cities. 38

The no-cities counterforce strategy was made possible by

the launching of US reconnaissance satellites in 1960 and

1961 . These satellites provided comprehensive mapping of the

Soviet Union, showing the location of strategic and other

9
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

military forces. They also laid to rest the missile gap theory in

which the Soviet Union was thought to have a superior

number of ICBMs. 39 That these satellites provided Kennedy

with a clear picture of the superiority of US strategic forces

was certainly a factor in his conducting the United States

response to the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 and

threatening "full retaliatory response" against the Soviet Union

in the event of missile launch from Cuba. 4 o

Shortly after describing the no-cities counterforce strategy

in an Ann Arbor commencement address, McNamara began to

publicly retreat from this strategy for at least four reasons .

First, counterforce strategy was being publicly criticized due to

its first-strike implication. Second, Soviets discounted the

credibility of a controlled counterforce war. Third, allies

disagreed with a no-cities approach. Fourth, the services were

using counterforce as a rationale for significant force

development. Between 1964 and 1966, declaratory policy

"included both Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation"

as basic US strategic objectives. Although public discussion

focused on these two policies, employment policy did not. The

options and flexibility in the revised SIOP were never

substantially changed. In fact, President Lyndon B. Johnson

did not make any changes to strategic policy during his years

in office. 41

McNamara stated in the fiscal year (FY) 1966 defense

budget:

The strategic objective of our general nuclear war forces are (1) to deter

a deliberate attack upon the United States and its allies by

maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable

damage on an attacker, even were that attacker to strike first; [and] (2)

in the event such a war should nonetheless occur, to limit damage to

our populations and industrial capacities. 42

He went on to define the first objective as "assured destruction"

and the second as "damage limitation ." While he did not

specifically define how much capability constituted assurance,

he suggested that "the destruction of, say, one-quarter to

one-third of its population and about two-thirds of its

industrial capacity . . . would certainly represent intolerable

punishment to any industrialized nation and thus should

serve as an effective deterrent." 43

1 0
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

Between 1965 and 1966, McNamara began emphasizing

assured destruction more than damage limitation, and by

1967 all focus was on assured destruction. 44 In January 1969

he wrote, "Achieving a significant damage limitation capability

against the Soviet Union does not appear to be feasible with

current technology. "45

Assured destruction eventually became known as mutual

assured destruction (MAD) . MAD was never an official US

policy. MAD doctrine asserts that strategic stability could be

attained if both sides adopted a policy of assured destruction.

The Soviets never accepted MAD, and thus it was only a

theory.

Although assured destruction was being stressed within the

United States, flexible response was adopted as NATO's

doctrine in 1967. Flexible response sought to deter aggression

through both nuclear and conventional forces at any level of

aggression. The first use of nuclear weapons was left as an

ambiguous option in response to superior numbers of Soviet

and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.

The 1970s-Sufficient Deterrence and

Countervailing Strategy

Like John F. Kennedy before him, Richard M. Nixon entered

office with the desire to change the previous administration's

nuclear policies . The Nixon administration identified three

problem areas to fix. First, the extended deterrence policy for

Europe lacked credibility, particularly from the United States

declared strategy of assured destruction. Second, the United

States lacked response options below that of major counterforce

attacks, which were not useful in terms of limited options or

an escalating war in Europe . Third, the Soviets had surpassed

the United States in numbers of launchers and were building

an antiballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow. 46

The Soviets had deployed 1,300 single-warhead ICBMs by

1970 (as compared to 1,054 on the United States' side) and

were continuing to build more. Although the United States had

a larger number of deployed SLBMs (656 launchers on 41

Polaris submarines, compared to 280 launchers on 40 Soviet

11
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

submarines), the Soviets were embarking on a massive

submarine construction program. 47 Thus, the threat of the

Soviets gaining strategic superiority was real . Nixon addressed

these issues through continued force modernization, arms

control, and new nuclear guidance .

Modernization efforts included the deployment of multiple

independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV) on ICBMs and

SLBMs. The first flight of 10, three-warhead Minuteman III

missiles was deployed in June 1970. Over time, 550 of the

1,000 Minuteman missiles were converted to Minuteman HIS.

The conversion was completed in January 1975 . 48 The first

submarine to receive the 10-warhead Poseidon missile was the

James Madison, which deployed in March 1971 . A total of 31

Lafayette-class submarines were converted to Poseidon

missiles. This conversion was completed in 1977 . 49

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I agreement,

signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972 by President Nixon and Gen

Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, was a five-year interim agreement

that froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers

on both sides at then-current levels . 5° The ABM treaty, signed

the same day, limited both sides to two limited ABM sites . 51

SALT I basically failed in that, while it capped the number of

launchers, it permitted both parties to deploy MIRVs within

those launchers and it did not address strategic bombers.

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242 was

signed on 17 January 1974 and became known as the (James)

Schlesinger doctrine. It had two major thrusts. The first was

"to provide more credible deterrence and escalation control

through the development of a wider array of planned limited

nuclear options." While Schlesinger acknowledged that some

"limited" response options existed in the SIOP, he believed that

they were too large for the enemy to "ascertain whether the

purpose of the strategic strike was limited or not" and that

they would be "virtually indistinguishable from an attack on

cities ." The new directive provided the president "the option of

limiting strikes down to a few weapons." This approach

boosted the credibility of NATO's threat of nuclear first use in

the event of conventional defense failure. 52

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242

provided for escalation. control by directing that plans be made

12
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

to allow the national command authorities (NCA) "the ability to

execute their options in a deliberate and controlled fashion

throughout the progress of a strategic nuclear exchange." It

directed the development of "limited employment options,"

target "withholds" (such as population) that could be used for

intrawar deterrence or bargaining, and the ability to control

"the timing and pace of an attack execution, in order to

provide the enemy opportunities to consider his actions ." 53

The second major thrust redirected the assured destruction

strategy. NSDM-242 directed a counterrecovery strategy that

required the destruction of 70 percent of Soviet industry. Not

only was this mission the top priority for the next six years,

but it significantly altered the SIOP from an emphasis on

counterforce to that of counterindustrial. 54

Another important aspect of NSDM-242 was that it

"authorized the secretary of defense to promulgate the Nuclear

Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP)." The NUWEP "set out

the lanning assumptions, attack options, targeting objectives,

damage levels needed to satisfy the political guidance."

,- SDM-242 and NUWEP-1 were used by the JSTPS in

developing SIOP-5, which went into effect 1 January 1976 .

Subsequent to this version, the JCS began publishing Annex C

to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), translating the

NUWEP into more specific requirements for the JSTPS. 55

SIOP-5 contained four general categories of options: major

attack options (MAO), selected attack options (SAO), limited

nuclear options (LNO), and regional nuclear options (RNO).

Targets were grouped into four categories : nuclear forces,

conventional forces, military and political leadership, and

economic and industrial facilities . SIOP-5 also provided for a

strategic reserve force. 56

The next changes to nuclear policy occurred when President

Jimmy Carter took office in 1977. Carter entered office with

the determination to reduce the United States nuclear arsenal

and push for a strategy of minimum deterrence. He surprised

the JCS by suggesting that 200 warheads deployed on

submarines would be sufficient to deter a Soviet attack. Yet.

Carter was the first president to "study seriously what his role

in fighting a nuclear war would be like ." 57 His study soon led

to a different opinion.

13
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

President Carter issued Presidential Decision (PD)-18 in

August 1977 after a detailed review of military posture and

strategy. PD-18 "reaffirmed the continued use of NSDM-242

and NUWEP-1" while directing that three studies be conducted

concerning strategic matters . 58 The most significant study was

the Nuclear Targeting Policy Review (NTPR), which resulted in

PD-59, signed in July 1980. PD-59 outlined a strategy that

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called "countervailing

strategy." The basis for a countervailing strategy was "to take

into account the specific values of the Soviet leadership, and

specific operations for which the Soviet military prepares, in

an effort to deny the perceived war aims of the Soviet

government." In the words of Harold Brown, it is "aimed at

what the Soviets think is important to them, not just what we

might think would be important to us." Furthermore, he

defined the capabilities needed to do this .

We must have forces, contingency plans, and command and control

capabilities that will convince the Soviet leadership that no war and no

course of aggression by them that led to use of nuclear weapons-on

any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict-could lead to victory,

however they may define victory. Firmly convincing them of that

fundamental truth is the surest restraint against their being tempted

to aggression. 59

Specifically, with regard to targeting strategy, PD-59

emphasized counterleadership and countermilitary targeting

while deemphasizing counterindustrial .so PD-59 authorized

the secretary of defense to release a new NUVVEP, which was

called NUWEP-80. NUWEP-80 downgraded the requirement

for 70 percent damage on Soviet industry and emphasized the

targeting of war-supporting industry as opposed to economic

recovery facilities.s l PD-59 also mandated that the United

States "develop the capability to fight a protracted nuclear

conflict, one that lasted months instead of days ." This charge

put a significant requirement on US strategic and command

and control systems to survive a nuclear first strike and be

capable of retaliation not only immediately but after a

significant delay in response. 62

Carter and Brezhnev signed SALT II in Vienna on 18 June

1979 and designed it as a "long-term comprehensive treaty" to

"replace the Interim Agreement." The agreement, much like

14
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

SALT I, capped strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) .

SALT II attempted to make up for the shortfalls of SALT I by

capturing strategic bombers as well as ballistic missile

launchers and limiting the number of MIRVed ballistic

missiles. 63 SALT II, much like SALT I, merely capped the

number of strategic delivery systems at then-current levels

and did nothing to reduce nuclear force levels . Carter

submitted the treaty for Senate ratification, but after the

Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, he withdrew it

from consideration and made Soviet withdrawal a condition for

its resubmission.

Intermediate-range nuclear forces also were a concern for

the Carter administration . NATO adopted a "dual-track" policy

in 1979 in response to the tremendous Soviet buildup of

theater nuclear weapons. These weapons were seen as a threat

to the NATO strategy of flexible response. Of primary concern

was the SS-20 ballistic missile, which had a range of 3,000

miles and carried three warheads. The dual-track policy called

for the deployment of land-based, intermediate-range Pershing

II ballistic missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles in NATO

while simultaneously engaging the Soviets to come to

negotiating terms on limiting the number of SS-20s . 64

The 1980s-Peace through Strength

Carter was severely defeated in 1980 by Ronald Reagan,

who was both a critic of SALT II and a proponent for a strong

national defense . In October 1981 President Reagan issued

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-13), which

replaced PD-59 . NSDD-13 required the capability to prevail "in

a protracted nuclear war of up to 180 days." In July 1982

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger issued NUWEP-82,

which replaced NUWEP-80 . These documents were used to

develop SIOP-6, which put "emphasis on targeting Soviet

leadership and relocatable targets ." 65

While SIOP-6 contained the same basic categories of targets

and options as SIOP-5, each option carried a wide range of

suboptions including "withholds ." Withholds included

"population centers, national command and control centers,

15
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

particular countries targeted in the SIOP, and `allied and

neutral territory' ." Withholds were designed for escalation

control, allowing for possible negotiations with Soviet

leadership during the course of a conflict. 66

Although SALT II was never ratified, President Reagan

announced his intentions to comply with the treaty if the

Soviets did so .

As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions

which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal

restraint . With good will and dedication on both sides, I pray that we

will achieve a safer world. 67

At the same time, Reagan announced the upcoming Strategic

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations, which were to

address the shortfalls in SALT II by working toward nuclear

arms reductions. START negotiations commenced on 29 June

1982 and took nine years to complete. While SALT II did contain

several bans on new developments and modifications, it

provided plenty of room for the United States and the Soviet

Union to develop and deploy new systems . 68 Both nations took

full advantage of the leeway. By the late 1980s, they had

together amassed more than 50,000 nuclear weapons-enough

to annihilate the world several times over. Approximately

one-half of these warheads were deployed on strategic systems.

Strategic Modernization

The Soviets ran a massive, two-stage, "catch-up-to-theAmericans" nuclear program in the 1960s and the 1970s

under Gen Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, although the program

was not intentionally designed that way. The 1960s were

characterized by a period of quantity increases, whereas the

1970s were a period of quality increases .

These massive 1960s ICBM and SLBM development programs, largely

centered on the SS-9 and SS-11 ICBMs and the SS-N-6/YANKEE

SLBM/SSBN weapons systems, provided the foundation from which

subsequent strategic nuclear modernization programs were to grow.

The 1970s modernizations . . . were largely technical in nature. 69

By 1981 "more than half of the 1,398 Soviet ICBM launchers

[had] been rebuilt to house the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19

ICBMs in vastly more survivable, hardened silos ." These new

16
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

ICBMs were MIRVed and had a significant upgrade in

accuracy to hold US ICBMs at risk. The Soviets had 950 SLBM

launchers by this time. They were deploying Delta-class fleet

ballistic missile (FBM) submarines with the SS-N-8 and

MIRVed SS-N-18 SLBMs, and they were testing the SS-NX-20

missile to deploy on their 71jphoon-class SSBN, which was in

development. The Soviets also had deployed 156 Bear and

Bison long-range bombers and 70 Backfires.'°

US strategic programs over this same period had not been

so vigorous . Reagan's agenda to correct this deficiency was no

secret. His famous "Star Wars" speech on 23 March 1983

launched the nation on a strategic modernization program

that would continue toward the end of the decade. He focused

on the issue of deterrence :

"Deterrence" means simply this: making sure any adversary who

thinks about attacking the United States, or our allies, or our vital

interests, concludes that the risks to him outweigh any potential gains.

Once he understands that, he won't attack. We maintain the peace

through our strength ; weakness only invites aggression. 7l

He went on to say that "this strategy of deterrence has not

changed. . . . But what it takes to maintain deterrence has

changed." Citing statistics and using photographs, he

compared and contrasted the Soviet nuclear buildup over the

past 20 years to that of the United States and built a solid case

for modernization before the American public .

The United States introduced its last new intercontinental ballistic

missile, the Minute Man III, in 1969, and we're now dismantling our

even older Titan missiles . . . . Since 1969 the Soviet Union has built

five new classes of ICBMs and upgraded these eight times. . . . Over

the same period, the Soviet Union built four new classes of

submarine-launched ballistic missiles and over 60 new missile

submarines . We built two new types of submarine missiles and

actually withdrew 10 submarines from strategic missions. The Soviet

Union built over 200 new Backfire bombers, and their brand new

Blackjack bomber is now under development. We haven't built a new

long-range bomber since our B-52s were deployed about a quarter of a

century ago, and we've already retired several hundred of those

because of old age.72

Reagan's modernization programs included the B-1 bomber;

the B-2 bomber; conversion of the B-52H bomber fleet to carry

air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) ; the advanced cruise

17
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

missile (ACM), a stealth replacement for ALCM; the shortrange attack missile (SRAM) II, a replacement for SRAM A; the

Peacekeeper missile ; Rail Garrison, a rail deployment for

Peacekeeper; the small ICBM (SICBM) program; the hard mobile

launcher (HML), a mobile basing scheme for SICBM; the

Trident submarine; the Trident I missile, which was deployed

on the first eight Trident submarines; and the Trident II missile,

which will be deployed on the remaining 10 submarines .

Reagan continued to support the NATO dual-track policy as

well. When the Soviets broke off negotiations on limiting

intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), the United States

responded with deployments of missiles beginning in

December 1983. The US plan included 108 Pershing Its for

West Germany, with an additional 464 Tomahawks to be

dispersed among the United Kingdom (UK), Netherlands, Italy,

Belgium, and West Germany. 73

Amidst the continued arsenal buildup, Soviet leadership

changed hands four times. Brezhnev's death in November

1982 brought a period of uncertainty to US onlookers as his

next two successors, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin

Chernenko, also died during a span of only 28 months.

Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko as general secretary

of the Soviet Communist party on 11 March 1985 . Until

Gorbachev took office, arms control negotiations with the

Soviets had stalled.

In January 1985, Secretary George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister

Andre Gromyko agreed to separate but parallel negotiations on INF,

strategic arms (START), and defense and space issues as part of a new

bilateral forum called the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) . . . . Formal

talks resumed in March 1985 in all three areas. 74

Emphasis to Denuclearize

Almost immediately on taking office, Gorbachev began to

announce economic, political, and military changes in accord

with his now famous glasnost and perestroika policies. One of

his most striking proposals was a plan to do away with

nuclear weapons.

On 15 January 1986 Gorbachev unfolded a three-stage plan

that called for "the complete elimination of nuclear weapons

throughout the world" by the end of the 20th century. Stage

18
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

one, encompassing a period of five-to-eight years, called for the

cessation of both nuclear testing and the transfer of missiles to

other countries, the "complete elimination of medium-range

missiles" from Europe, the reduction of strategic arsenals by

one half, and the destruction of delivery vehicles above the

capability to deliver 6,000 warheads. Stage two, to commence

by 1990, called for a freeze on all new weapons production, a

returning of all foreign-based weapons to sovereign soil, an

elimination of all tactical nuclear weapons as defined by a

range of less than 1,000 kilometers, and an agreement on the

prohibition of developing space-strike weapons or nonnuclear

weapons with destructive power approaching that of nuclear

weapons. Stage three, to begin by 1995, called for the

complete "elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons" by

the end of 1999. 75

Many individuals cite the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant

accident as a key contributor to sustaining the Soviet drive to

denuclearize . Occurring slightly more than three months after

the three-step proposal, Chernobyl brought to the forefront a

small picture of the dangers of nuclear war. Gorbachev used

the accident to support his proposal.

The accident of Chernobyl showed again what an abyss will open if

nuclear war befalls humankind. For inherent in the nuclear arsenals

stockpiled are thousands upon thousands of disasters far more

horrible than the one at Chernobyl . . . more than 40 years ago the first

atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, as a result

of which hundreds of thousands of people perished. . . . The nuclear

age forcefully demands a new approach to international relations . . .

for the sake of putting an end to the disastrous arms race. 7s

Such a proposal provided hope in the West for a changing

relationship with the Soviet Union, but beyond the rhetoric,

there was no cessation or even a decrease in Soviet nuclear

system production. Since the Soviets' actions did not match

their declared intentions, the proposal remained dormant for

another five years. On 27 May 1986 President Reagan cited

three instances where the Soviets had violated US trust by

breaching the SALT II and ABM treaties .

I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet noncompliance with their

existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national

security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the

integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be

19
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about

compliance. . . . The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The

Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its

ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification . The

Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of

the Soviet strategic force buildup. 77

He went on to announce that the United States was no longer

bound by the agreement but would temper its US response to

the Soviet breaches.

Given the situation, I have determined that in the future the United

States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on

the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces

and not on standards contained in the SALT structure. . . . Assuming

no significant change in the threat we face as we implement the

strategic modernization program, the United States will not deploy

more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic

missile warheads than does the Soviet Union. 78

Another shift in nuclear strategy occurred in 1987 . The

counterrecovery mission was eliminated, and targeting the

Soviet leadership was emphasized more strongly. Gen Larry

Welch, Air Force chief of staff, stated that "literally thousands

of industrial targets have been dropped from the SIOP."'9

Additionally, NUWEP-87 required a "prompt counterleadership option." This was in response to the discovery of a

tremendous network of underground hardened leadership

bunkers around Moscow. Observers estimated "more than

1,500 hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key

Party and government personnel throughout the USSR."

Arguments over the ability of Peacekeeper and Trident II

missiles to destroy these "deeply buried" targets precipitated

the development of earth-penetrating warheads that would

burrow far into the ground before detonating. 80

A major breakthrough in nuclear weapons negotiations

occurred on 8 December 1987 with the signing of the

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the first treaty

to require the reduction in any nuclear weapons, albeit tactical.

The treaty requir[ed] destruction of the sides' ground-aunched ballistic

and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers,

their launchers and associated support equipment within 3 years after

the treaty enter[ed] into force . 81

20
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

This treaty was a preliminary sign of the changing climate in

Europe.

Changing Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe

On 7 December 1988 Gorbachev detailed a significant

change to Soviet policy in Europe before the United Nations.

Some of his most striking comments involved his

announcement of a unilateral reduction of 500,000 men from

the Soviet armed forces and a reduction of 50,000 men and

5,000 tanks from countries in the Warsaw Pact. 82 The toll

taken by the massive arms race was beginning to appear

through the iron curtain.

The priority allocation of resources to build large standing military

forces created an additional burden on a Soviet economy already

suffering from the effects of central economic planning on incentives

and efficiency. The result has been a faltering industrial base, uneven

technological development, an agricultural system incapable of

adequately feeding its people, citizen disillusionment, growing health

and environmental problems, and the waning of socialism's appeal to

the third world.83

But Soviet strategic modernization continued . Testifying

before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Strategic

Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Gen John T. Chain,

commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, stated:

In the political arena, I applaud the present Soviet leadership's efforts

at Glasnost and Perestroika and am encouraged by the warming of

US-USSR relations . But, I recall the 1970s when we were enthralled

with the promise of detente and were blind to the Soviet's massive

strategic buildup. Therefore, I urge that we not forget the past and

base our decisions on their observed actions rather than rhetoric. 84

Further, he tied the necessity for continued strategic modernization to the pending START agreement:

Modernization of offensive forces is essential in a START environment

which places no limitations on air defenses, antisubmarine warfare,

hardening, burying or dispersal of assets, and conventional forces.

Rather than negating the need for modernization, START would

underscore the need to complete and sustain strategic modernization . 85

Over the next year, Warsaw Pact countries began to

denounce communism and to move towards free elections . The

fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was one of the most

21
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

visible signs of the upheaval occurring within the Warsaw

Pact . By mid-1990 East Germany, Poland, Hungary,

Czechoslovakia, and Romania had held free elections. By

August the threat of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe

had diminished to the point that President George Bush

announced the need for a new defense strategy.

The 1990s-Peace through Disarmament

President Bush's speech to the Aspen Institute on 2 August

1990 formed the foundation for the reshaping of US armed

forces . In his speech he noted a diminished Soviet threat.

We're entering a new era: the defense strategy and military structure

needed for peace can-and must-be different. The threat of a Soviet

invasion of Western Europe launched with little or no warning is today

more remote than any other point in the postwar period . 86

A New Defense Strategy

President Bush noted that not only had the Soviet threat

diminished, but regional contingencies would shape US

military needs for the future .

Our task is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing

strategic circumstances. In a world less driven by an immediate threat

to Europe and the danger of global war-in a world where the size of

our forces will increasingly be shaped by the needs of regional

contingencies and peacetime presence-we know that our forces can

be smaller.e 7

He went on to say that "our security needs can be met by an

active force 25 percent smaller than today's." He defined the

ceiling as "no more than the forces we need to guard our

enduring interests," which he further defined as "forces to

exercise forward presence in key areas" and forces "to respond

effectively to crisis." The key to this strategy is to retain "the

national capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed."88

Bush stressed the need for 75 B-2s, 18 Tridents, and the

development and completion of both the small ICBM and

Peacekeeper Rail Garrison. This trend reflected a reduction

from the previously planned 132 B-2s and 21 Tridents .

Strategic programs that were not mentioned by Bush but were

22
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

still in the budget included the ACM, SRAM 11, and D-5

missiles . The president also stressed the need for the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI) more than ever. In the area of meeting

the overall challenge, he stressed the need for active and

inventive research, forces capable of rapid response, and

readiness, which incorporates reconstitution as well as crisis

response .

Bush's cautious approach to reducing planned strategic

forces was due largely to the Soviets' continuance of

modernization programs despite their proposal to eliminate

nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and their tremendous

economic problems. In the words of Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney,

The intentions of that regime are changing. But intentions are not

enough to support dramatic changes in our own level of preparedness.

We must see fundamental and enduring changes in both the

capabilities and character of Soviet military power. 89

Paul Wolfowitz, under secretary of defense for policy, indicated

that continued Soviet modernization, coupled with

congressional indecision over authorizing US modernization

programs, placed the United States at a continued

disadvantage.

The Soviet Union continues to modernize its strategic nuclear forces at

a robust pace. This includes continued construction of modern SSBNs,

three types of bombers, and three types of ICBMs, two in mobile

variants. While we debate Peacekeeper rail garrison development, the

Soviets continue with deployment of the train-mobile SS-24 missile,

with its 10 warheads. While we debate research on the small ICBM,

the Soviets are deploying hundreds of SS-25 road-mobile missiles. Last

year alone, the Soviet Union produced 140 new ICBMs, where we

produced 12 Peacekeepers, all spares . While we debate initial

production of the B-2, the Soviets continue to build Blackjack,

Backfire, and Bear-H bombers. Last year, the Soviets built 45

bombers; we produced one B-2 . 90

The single-warhead SS-25 road-mobile system and the

MIRVed SS-24 rail-based system were of major concern to the

United States, since they were survivable when deployed

across the countryside . The Soviets also began to replace

SS-19s with a silo-based version of the SS-24 and upgraded

the SS-18 to provide a hard-target-kill weapon. In addition,

23
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

they introduced the Delta IV SSBN with the SS-N-23 missile

and deployed six Typhoon SSBNs .

The Impact of Desert Storm

As if on cue, Saddam Hussein played the perfect straight

man for Bush's prediction of a necessary US regional

contingency emphasis, rolling into Kuwait the same day of the

president's Aspen speech . Unfortunately, for Hussein, the

lessening threat in Europe freed up US troops for Desert

Shield . US experiences in Desert Storm further molded the

new defense strategy.

Desert Storm produced at least four major impacts on the

perception of both the continued need for US nuclear weapons

and the need to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of

irrational actors. First, the tremendous success of high-tech

conventional weapons convinced many people that highly

accurate conventional weapons can accomplish almost any

feat a nuclear weapon can. In fact, media coverage of these

new capabilities gave the impression that destroying targets

was as easy as playing a computer game .

Second, the quick victory against the fourth largest army in

the world reinforced optimism among the American people of

the superiority of the United States fighting machine. On the

tail of the highly successful Grenada and Panama campaigns,

the perception seemed to be that US conventional forces could

achieve victory anywhere in the world.

Third, Cable News Network (CNN) television coverage of

Scud missile attacks brought the stark reality of a third world

chemical/biological threat to every home in America and many

other homes around the globe. Rumors of Iraq's potential

nuclear capability were on everyone's mind as well. The Iraqis'

tremendous progress toward building a nuclear device,

uncovered during the postwar inspections, further heightened

world concern. The world and, in particular, Washington

responded to these concerns over weapons of mass destruction

with an increased focus on stepping up nonproliferation efforts

and an increasing emphasis on developing ballistic missile

defenses.

Fourth, Desert Storm set a precedent of multilateral

participation. In future conflicts the United States will rely

24
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

more heavily on the United Nations to sanction required action

and build coalition forces to respond . Gorbachev had stressed

the importance of the UN in bringing about necessary

international cooperation in his 1988 UN speech.

The United Nations embodies, as it were, the interests of different

states. It is the only organization which can channel their effortsbilateral, regional, and comprehensive-in one and the same direction.

. . . What is needed here is a united effort, the consideration of the

interests of all groups of countries. This can only be ensured by such

an organization as the United Nations. 91

President Bush, who pioneered the effort to get as many nations

as possible involved in Desert Storm, was quick to emphasize

the success of the multinational effort and used it as a basis

for declaring the changing world security environment to be a

"new world order."

After the liberation of Kuwait, world attention was quickly

refocused on Europe . Although 20 nations signed the

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty on 19 November

1990, the Soviets' reclassification of some of their forces to

escape capture under the treaty created an impasse to US

treaty ratification . Bush bullied Gorbachev by postponing an

upcoming summit meeting and making the summit

conditional on settling the CFE dispute and finalizing START.

Quoting anonymous US officials, the Washington Post reported

that "settlement of the conventional arms disputes must come

before agreement on another treaty, START, limiting nuclear

forces. And until START is completed, the White House has

said Bush will not hold another summit with Gorbachev. " 92

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

After resolving these disputes, President Bush and Soviet

President Gorbachev signed the historic START treaty on 31

July 1991 . The signing of this treaty marked a key milestone

in thawing the strategic stalemate between the United States

and the Soviet Union. The agreement took nine years to

negotiate and was the first treaty between two superpowers to

delineate reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) .

Interestingly, although the START document runs 280

pages, it lists briefly on page one the only rationale .

25
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for

all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of

strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this

treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and

strengthen international peace and security, [and]

recognizing that the interests of the parties and the interests of

international security require the strengthening of strategic stability. 93

Four key points can be gleaned from this brief statement.

First, no one can win nuclear wars ; hence, they should be

avoided at all cost . Second, reducing the size of strategic

offensive arsenals will help to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Third, reducing the size of the arsenals will foster international

peace and security. Fourth, by implication, reducing the size

of the arsenals will enhance strategic stability .

Once ratified by the Senate and entered into force, START

provides a seven-year drawdown period . The START II treaty,

discussed later, is basically overlaid on the START schedule

and utilizes START protocol and verification procedures .

Although the unilateral initiatives announced by Bush on 27

September 1991, the reciprocal initiatives announced by

Gorbachev on 5 October 1991, the additional initiatives

announced by the president in his State of the Union Message

on 28 January 1992, Boris Yeltsin's counter-proposals on 29

January 1992, and the Washington Summit Agreement signed

by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin on 17 June 1992 worked to

arrive at much lower warhead levels, the importance of START

should not be overlooked . President Bush called START "a

fundamental milestone in reducing the risk of nuclear warstabilizing the balance of strategic forces at lower levels,

providing for significant reductions in the most threatening

weapons, and encouraging a shift toward strategic systems

better suited for retaliation than for a first strike ." 94

Under START, the number of "fast-fliers" ballistic missile

warheads are reduced to no more than a total of 4,900 on each

side, of which no more than 1,100 may be deployed on mobile

ICBMs . The treaty limits the Commonwealth of Independent

States (CIS) to no more than 1,540 heavy ICBM warheads

(SS-18s) . It limits total "accountable" warheads to 6,000

warheads on no more than 1,600 SNDVs. (The treaty defines an

26
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

SNDV as a single ballistic launcher, whether land- or sea-based,

or a long-range bomber.) The 1,600 limit will result in a

reduction of approximately 30 percent of total pre-START SNDVs.

Long-range bombers are counted at a discounted number,

since bombers are deemed to be a more "stabilizing" strategic

system. Penetrating bombers count only one warhead toward

the 6,000 limit regardless of the number of bombs and SRAMs

carried. The treaty also allows the United States to deploy up

to 150 cruise missile carriers, loaded with up to 20 cruise

missiles, but only counting 10 toward the overall 6,000

warhead limit. Beyond 150, the cruise missiles would be

counted "as-equipped." The Soviets have similar rules. They

are allowed 180 carriers counted at eight yet loaded at 16, and

beyond that as-equipped . The net effect of the bomber

counting rules is that rather than deploying merely 6,000

warheads, the United States would have approximately 9,500

strategic nuclear warheads, while the CIS would have

approximately 7,500 . This net effect is due to the United

States advantage in long-range bombers . Overall, START

provides a net reduction of approximately 35 percent in

pre-START strategic nuclear warheads.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) were of concern and

were discussed during the talks . However, they were not

captured under START. The two parties made a side

agreement to limit the number of SLCMs to 880.

Beyond reducing the risk of nuclear war, President Bush

delineated another advantage that START provides to national

security: "Deterrence will indeed be enhanced as a result of

the START Treaty and US modernization efforts can go forward

with greater knowledge and predictability about future Soviet

forces. " 95

The Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact occurred officially on

1 July 1991, when the presidents of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,

Romania, and Poland, the prime minister of Hungary, and the

vice president of the Soviet Union signed an agreement to

dissolve both their military and political alliances . Albania

withdrew from the pact back in 1968, and East Germany

withdrew in September 1990, before the reunification of

07
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Germany. 96 The major impact for strategic planners was a

reduction of approximately 1,000 targets that US nuclear

weapons had to hold at risk. 97 The loss of these buffer states

also reduced NATO's concern for a Soviet overrun of Western

Europe and decreased the need for maintaining a large arsenal

of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

Unilateral Initiatives-Round One

On 27 September 1991 President Bush declared :

The prospect of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe, launched with

little or no warning, is no longer a realistic threat. The Warsaw Pact

has crumbled. In the Soviet Union, the advocates of democracy

triumphed over a coup that would have restored the old system of

repression . The reformers are now starting to fashion their own

futures, moving even faster toward democracy's horizon. 98

He commented that the Soviets were questioning the need for

a large nuclear arsenal.

The Soviet nuclear stockpile now seems less an instrument of national

security and more of a burden. As a result, we now have an

unparalleled opportunity to change the nuclear posture of both the

United States and the Soviet Union.99

He also suggested an approach to increased strategic stability .

If we and the Soviet leaders take the right steps, some on our own,

some on their own, some together, we can dramatically shrink the

arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons . We can move to more

effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more

on defensive measures land] on our strategic relationship . We can

enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war. loo

In an unprecedented move, President Bush went on to announce

a "series of sweeping initiatives affecting every aspect of our

nuclear forces on land, on ships, and on aircraft ."i° 1 His

announcement cut through the rhetoric of arms control

negotiations that had plagued negotiators for decades. He did

in one night what negotiators had not been able to accomplish

since the start of SALT I negotiations in November of 1969 .

Perhaps even more amazing was the speed of the response

from Mikhail Gorbachev on 5 October 1991, matching most of

President Bush's initiatives and announcing strategic offensive

cuts below the START level.

28
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

We will make more radical cuts in our strategic offensive weapons than

the treaty on strategic offensive weapons envisages . As a result, in

seven years, we will have 5,000 nuclear warheads instead of [the]

6,000 envisaged by the treaty . toe

He further upped the ante and proposed "that after the ratification of the treaty, the United States and Soviet Union begin

negotiations of further radical cuts in strategic offensive

weapons, approximately 50 percent." He concluded by stating

that these steps were "approaching the goal proclaimed in

1986-a nuclear-free, safer, and more stable world."lo 3 Tables

1 through 3 provide a summary of the Bush and Gorbachev

initiatives.

Table 1

Bush's and Gorbachev's Tactical Nuclear Weapon Initiatives

Bush Initiative Gorbachev Initiative

27 September 1991 5 October 1991

- Eliminates worldwide inventory of ground- - Will :

launched, short-range (theater) nuclear

weapons (bring home and destroy)

- - Nuclear artillery shells - - Destroy all nuclear artillery ammunition

-- Short-range ballistic missile warheads -- Destroy all nuclear warheads for

-- Requests Soviets to do the same plus tactical missiles

destroy nuclear warheads for air -- Remove nuclear weapons from antidefense missiles and land mines aircraft missiles (will destroy some

and store some)

-- Eliminate all nuclear mines

- Withdraws all tactical nuclear weapons - Will remove all tactical nuclear weapons

from surface ships, attack submarines, from surface ships, multipurpose suband land-based naval aircraft marines, and ground-based naval aviation

-- Tomahawk cruise missiles from ships -- Will destroy some and store some

and submarines -- Proposes destroying all on basis of

- - Nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers reciprocity

-- Dismantle and destroy many; store

the rest in a cenral area

-- Requests Soviets to do the same

- Retains air-delivered nuclear capability - Proposes removal of all nuclear bombs

in Europe and missiles from front (tactical) aviation

and storing them

Source: "Bush Announces U.S . Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms," Reuter transcript of presidential

address on national television, 27 September 1991, in Congressional Quarterly 49, no. 40 (5 October 1991) :

2898-99; and Mikhail Gorbachev, 'The U.S.S .R .'s Disarmament Measures," delivered to the nation, Moscow,

USSR, 5 October 1991, in Vital Speeches 58, no. 2 (1 November 1991) : 37.

29
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Table 2

Bush's and Gorbachev's Strategic Nuclear Weapon Initiatives

Bush Initiative Gorbachev Initiative

27 September 1991 5 October 1991

- Calls for prompt ratification of START - Earliest possible ratification of START

- Stand down bombers from alert - Heavy bombers will be removed from alert

and their warheads stored

-- Calls for Soviets to confine mobile

missiles to garrisons - ICBM missiles on rail cars will be returned

to storage

- Stands down all ICBMs scheduled for

deactivation under START(Minuteman II) - Removes from day-to-day alert 503

ICBMs including 134 MIRVed

-- Accelerate destruction after START

ratification -- Early elimination not discussed

-- Ask Soviets to do the same

- Teminates development programs : - Takes the following measures:

-- Mobile Peacekeeper (Peacekeeper -- Scraps plans to make newlaunchers

rail garrison) for ICBMs on rail cars and modernize

-- Mobile portions of SICBM program them

-- Asks Soviets to terminate any ICBM -- Stops work on mobile, small-size

program on systems with more than ICBM

one warhead and limit ICBM --- Number of MIRVed mobile

modernization to one type of single missiles will not increase

missile system - - Stops work on new, modified short-

- Cancels SRAM II range missile for bombers

-- Will remove three nuclear submarines

with 48 launchers from active service

- Streamlines command and control: - Puts all strategic nuclear weapons under

-- Consolidates under USSTRATCOM single control and includes strategic

defense into a single armed service

Source : "Bush Announces U.S . Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms," Reuter transcript of presidential

address on national television, 27 September 1991, in Congressional Quarterly 49, no. 40 (5 October 1991):

2898-99; and Mikhail Gorbachev, "The U.S .S .R .'s Disarmament Measures," delivered to the nation, Moscow,

USSR, 5 October 1991, in Vital Speeches 58, no . 2 (1 November 1991) : 37.

30
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

Table 3

Bush's and Gorbachev's Proposals

Bush Initiative Gorbachev Initiative

27 September 1991 5 October 1991

- Seeks an early agreement to eliminate - No response

multiple warheads in ICBMs

-- Use procedures already established

in START

- Limits deployment of nonnuclear defenses - Proposes to study possibility of creating

against limited ballistic missile strike joint systems to avert nuclear missile

attack with ground- and space-based

- Soon will propose additional initiatives on elements

BM early warning

- Explores cooperation in three areas: - Ready to being detailed dialogue on:

-- Safe & environmentally responsible -- Development of safe and ecologically

storage, transportation, dismantling clean technologies to store and

and destruction of nuclear weapons transport nuclear warheads

-- Enhancing physical security and -- Methods to utilize nuclear explosive

safety devices

-- Improving command and control to -- Increased nuclear safety

provide more protection against

unauthorized or accidental use

- Announces a cut in strategic offensive

nuclear weapons to 5,000 rather than

6,000 and proposed to begin negotiations

toward a 50% reduction

- Declares one-year moratorium on nuclear

weapons tests

- Proposes reaching an agreement on

controlled cessation of production of

fissionable material for nuclear weapons

- Calls for ajoint statement to keep from

making afirst nuclear strike

Source: 'Bush Announces U.S. Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms," Reuter transcript of presidential

address on national television, 27 September 1991, in Congressional Quarterly 49, no . 40 (5 October 1991) :

2898-99; and Mikhail Gorbachev, 'The U.S.S.R .'s Disarmament Measures," delivered to the nation, Moscow,

USSR, 5 October 1991, in Vital Speeches 58, no. 2 (1 November 1991) : 37.

31
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

At the time of his speech, President Bush attached two

caveats to his unilateral initiatives-the B-2 and the Strategic

Defense Initiative (SDI)-stating, "The United States must

maintain modern nuclear forces, including the strategic triad,

and thus ensure the credibility of our deterrent." 104

The Downfall of Communism and the Soviet Union

In August 1991 Soviet hard-liners plotted a coup against

Gorbachev. Although unsuccessful, the coup attempt caused

considerable concern about who was in control of the Soviet

Union's nuclear arsenal . Gorbachev disbanded the

Communist party on 29 August. For the next three months,

the world looked on with concern as Boris Yeltsin gradually

displaced Gorbachev and pondered the possibilities of civil war

among the republics.

The CIS was officially formed on 8 December 1991, when

Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine declared the Soviet Union to be

dissolved . By 21 December eight other republics had joined in

the declaration. Of the four nuclear republics, the Ukraine and

Byelorussia both indicated a desire to become "nuclear-free."

This scenario left Kazakhstan as the only other republic

(outside of Russia), indicating the possibility of holding on to

its strategic nuclear weapons . Gorbachev completed the

political transition, resigning as USSR president on 25

December 1991 .

Two main concerns occupied the attention of most western

observers during this transition period: first, the control of

nuclear weapons and nuclear materials still present in many

of the republics, particularly tactical nuclear weapons that

may not be as accountable as strategic nuclear weapons; and

second, the potential "brain drain" caused by the possibility of

Russian nuclear scientists being hired by third world

countries . Concern over the "loose nukes" was fourfold: (1) the

potential for nonnuclear republics to obtain nuclear weapons;

(2) the possibility of nuclear republics refusing to become

nuclear-free ; (3) the potential that the CIS may not be willing

to adhere to the START treaty ; and, perhaps the biggest

concern, (4) the danger of nuclear weapons and nuclear

materials being sold surreptitiously to third world countries.

32
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

The United States responded to these concerns in at least

three ways . First, Congress authorized $400 million to help

the CIS dismantle its nuclear weapons in the Soviet Nuclear

Threat Reduction Act. Second, President Bush offered to share

technology for better safety and security of nuclear weapons .

Third, the president announced a second round of unilateral

cuts in nuclear weapons with the hope that the CIS would do

the same.

Unilateral Initiatives-Round 2

In response to Gorbachev's reciprocal measures to the 27

September initiatives, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and

the move towards democracy, Bush announced further

unilateral initiatives in his State of the Union Address on 28

January 1992:

Two years ago, I began planning cuts in military spending that reflected

the changes of the new era. But now, with imperial communism gone,

that process can be accelerated. . . . These are actions we are taking on

our ownbecause they are the right thing to do.

105

These initiatives are summarized in table 4.

Additionally, he announced proposals for further reductions.

These are summarized in table 5 . He concluded this portion of

his speech by reminding the American public that "the world

is still a dangerous place." He cautioned against making any

further cuts in the military.

33

Table 4

Bush's 28 January 1992 Initiatives

- Shuts down further production of the B-2 after 20 planes

- Cancels the Small ICBM program

- Ceases production of new warheads for sea-based ballistic missiles

- Stops new production of Peacekeeper

- Ceases purchase of any more ACMs

Source : George Bush, State of the Union Address delivered to Congress on 28 January 1992, in

Washington Post, 29 January 1992, 14.
We must not go back to the days of "the hollow army." We cannot

repeat the mistakes made twice in this century, when armistice was

followed by recklessness, and defense was purged as if the world were

permanently safe. 106

In response to President Bush's proposal, Yeltsin went on

the air and announced his own set of initiatives . These

initiatives are summarized in table 6. The news coverage made

it impossible to tell how much of the announced strategic

initiatives would have happened under the START treaty or

what part of the tactical initiatives overlapped with

Gorbachev's 5 October proposals. Yeltsin also announced

some proposals for further reductions . These are listed in table 7.

THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Table 5

Bush's 28 January 1992 Proposals

- If Yeltsin will eliminate all ICBM MIRVs, the United States will

-- Eliminate Peacekeeper

-- Reduce all land-based ICBMs to one warhead

- - Reduce number of SLBM warheads approximately one-third

- - Convert a substantial portion of US strategic bombers to primarily conventional use

Source: George Bush, State of the Union Address delivered to Congress on 28 January 1992, in

Washington Post, 29 January 1992, 14.

Table 6

Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Initiatives

- Take 600 sea- and land-based nuclear missiles off alert (1,250 warheads)

- Eliminate or prepare to eliminate 130 silos

- Terminate Bear-H and Blackjack production

- Terminate air-launched and sea-launched cruise missile production

- Destroy six submarine launch systems

- Reduce SSBN alert patrols by 50%

- Cease production of land-based tactical missiles

- Eliminate one-third of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons

- Eliminate one-half of nuclear warheads for antiaircraft missiles

- Cut weapon purchases by 50% and defense budget by 10%

Source: R. Jeffery Smith, "Bush, Yeltsin Add Momentum to Reduction of Atomic Arsenals," Washington

Post, 30 January 1992, 18.

34
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

Table 7

Yeltsin's 29 January 1992 Proposals

A limit of :

- 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons (total)

Mutually eliminate:

- All sea-based cruise missiles

- SSBN alert patrols

No longer:

- Target each other

Source: R. Jeffery Smith, "Bush, Yeltsin Add Momentum to Reduction of Atomic Arsenals," Washington

Post, 30 January 1992, 18 .

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney did not consider Yeltsin's

proposals to be in the best interest of the United States. He

favored implementing START and the US-proposed additional

cuts before any additional reductions .

Before new negotiations could begin, it was necessary to

obtain the consensus of the four nuclear CIS republics with

regard to honoring the START treaty, which was a formal

agreement between the United States and the former Soviet

Union. The biggest roadblock had been Kazakhstan's desire to

retain its 104 SS-18 missiles. This roadblock was breached on

19 May, when the president of Kazakhstan met with President

Bush and agreed to eliminate the weapons during the START

drawdown period. By signing the START protocol on 23 May

1992, the four nuclear republics open the doors for the

Washington summit.

Washington Summit and Strategic Arms

Reduction Treaty 11

At the Washington summit on 17 June 1992, President

Bush and President Yeltsin agreed to "substantial further

reductions in strategic offensive arms . . . and Will promptly

conclude a Treaty." 107 Bush and Yeltsin signed the treaty,

START II, in Moscow on 3 January 1993. Table 8 lists the

major provisions of the treaty.

35
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Table 8

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II

Within the seven-year period following entry into force of the START Treaty, reduce

strategic forces to no more than:

- between 3,800 and 4,250 actual warheads

- 1,200 MIRVed ICBM warheads

- 650 heavy ICBM warheads

- 2,160 SLBM warheads

By the year 2003:

- reduce total warheads to no more than 3,000-3,500 actual

- reduce SLBM warheads to no more than 1,700-1,750

- eliminate MIRVed ICBMs

New counting rules:

- bomber warheads will count "as-equipped"

- up to 100 noncruise missile heavy bombers may be reoriented to conventional roles

and not count against overall total

Source: Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 18 June 1992, in

U.S. Department of State Dispatch 3. no 25 (22 June 1992): 492-93.

Even though START II made a quantum leap forward in

nuclear arms reductions, several issues have yet to be

addressed . START II, like START, did not address tactical

nuclear weapons, SLCMs, the stockpile of nuclear warheads in

storage, or nuclear testing . And although unilateral

statements were previously issued regarding tactical nuclear

weapons on both sides, verbal policy does not carry the same

weight as a signed treaty.

Absent from the unilateral initiatives and START II is any

detailed rationale for the reductions already agreed upon.

According to President Bush, START II builds upon START

by further reducing strategic offensive arms in . . . a way that further

increases the stability of the strategic nuclear balance. It bans the

most destabilizing type of nuclear weapons system-land-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently

targetable nuclear warheads. At the same time, the START II treaty

permits the United States to maintain a stabilizing sea-based force.

108

In a statement released by the White House press secretary,

an additional emphasis is placed on the fact that the United

36
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

States views CIS heavy ICBMs as the most destabilizing

weapons, and that START II "fully achieves a longstanding

goal to eliminate completely heavy ICBMs . " 109 President Yeltsin

stated that the START II reductions are directed at the

categories of arms which are of the greatest concern to the parties and

the world. For the United States, these are submarine-launched

ballistic missiles and heavy bombers; for Russia, land-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles-ICBMs. This reduces the level of

danger, military mistrust, and suspicion.' io

Yet, no one has explained why all MIRVed ICBMs will be

banned, even though SSBNs will retain MIRVed missiles .

Additionally, a big difference between START and START II is

the significant change in bomber-counting rules . For reasons

of stability, bombers were incentivized under START, yet

bomber weapons are counted the same as ballistic missile

warheads under START II . No agency provided a public

rationale for this change .

An Economical Approach to Arms Control

In many instances, the initiatives over the past year have

taken a "least-cost" approach. President Yeltsin, speaking of

START II, stated, "We have made our calculations, and they

show that the proposed reductions would cost us much less

than the mere maintenance of nuclear weapons systems in a

safe condition." He also cited cost savings for verification,

inspections, and physical destruction-the latter point being

that the United States has offered to help the Russians in the

destruction of their arsenal.''' President Bush, as well,

referred to the "cost-effective" manner in which START II

allows reductions to be made. This includes the downloading

of missiles on existing systems and the reorienting of nuclear

bombers to a conventional-only role .

112

It appears that, at least for the moment, the United States

and CIS have reached a plateau in the denuclearization

proposal process. Gorbachev's proposal of a nuclear-free world

is a topic of "real-possibility" conversation, much more now

than in 1986, when he first proposed it. Yet, the unrest caused

by economic disaster and political tensions within the CIS

could explode in another coup and jeopardize arms control

progress to date . Additionally, third world countries continue

37
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

to seek weapons of mass destruction. Even if the United States

is able to reduce to START II levels while saving money, and

"in a fashion that is fully consistent with US national

security," one still wonders if the force structure meets the

requirements for the role of nuclear weapons in the post-cold

war era.

113 Chapter 2 examines how the events of the past

decade have affected US national security and national

military strategy and how the United States plans to deal with

the uncertain future.

Notes

1. David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons

and American Strategy, 1945-1960," International Security 7, no. 4 (Spring

1983) : 11-12; and Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and

National Security (Princeton, N .J. : Princeton University Press, 1989), 14.

2 . Rosenberg, 15.

3 . Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic

Modernization Program," Journal ofStrategic Studies 6, no. 2 (June 1983): 126.

4. Rosenberg, 12-14.

5. Harmon Report, as quoted in Sagan, 18.

6. Rosenberg, 23.

7. Larry H. Addington, The Patterns ofWar Since the Eighteenth Century

(Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1984), 253 .

8. Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York:

Crown Publishers, Inc., 1988), 47.

9. Ibid., 60.

10. Rosenberg, 17.

11 . Sagan, 19-20.

12. NSC-68, as quoted in Sagan, 20.

13. Rosenberg, 27-28 .

14. Sagan, 23.

15. Rosenberg, 28 .

16. Speech of John Foster Dulles, as quoted in Russell F. Weigley, The

American Way of War. A History of United States Military Strategy andPolicy

(Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1973), 403-4.

17 . Bruce George, ed ., Jane's NATO Handbook: 1990-91 (United

Kingdom: Jane's Information Group, 1990), 3.

18. Rosenberg, 31 .

19. Ibid., 23.

20. For a detailed history of US nuclear weapons development, see Hansen.

21 . Hansen, 172 .

22. Rosenberg, 33-34.

23. Ibid ., 32.

24. Weigley, 417-22.

25. NSC-5602/1, as quoted in Rosenberg, 40.

26. Ibid., 42.

38
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

27. Norman Polmar and Timothy Laur, eds., Strategic Air Command:

People, Aircraft, and Missiles, 2d ed . (Baltimore, Md. : Nautical and Aviation

Publishing Company of America, 1990), 49-50, 55, 299 .

28. Richard Humble, Submarines: An Illustrated History (Belgium:

Basinghall Books Limited, 1981), 141 .

29. Rosenberg, 64.

30. Ibid., 54-55.

31. Ibid., 56-57.

32. Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in

Strategic Nuclear Targeting, ed. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson (Ithaca

and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 59.

33. Rosenberg, 4-5, 58-62.

34. Ball, 62.

35. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Free

World: The Military Balance 1960 (London: ISS, 1960), 3, 7.

36. Ibid., 62-63.

37. Desmond Bail and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SIOP: Taking WarFighting to Dangerous Extremes," International Security 11,/ no. 4 (Spring 1990):

67. '

38. Ball, 64.

39. Ibid., 65.

40. Sagan, 31 .

41 . Ball, 67-68, 70.

42. Ibid. ,

43 . Ibid., 69.

44. Ibid.

45. Sagan, 73.

46. Ibid., 39-41

47. The Soviets had 220 SS-7/8, 240 SS-9, 800 SS-11, and 40 SS-13

missiles . The United States had 54 Titan, 500 Minuteman I, and 500

Minuteman II missiles. Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance

1970-1971 (London: ISS, 1970), 1-2, 6, 9, 105-6 .

48. Polmar and Laur, 121, 140.

49 . R. T. Pretty, ed., Jane's Weapons Systems 1979-1980 (London:

MacDonald and Jane's Pub., Inc., 1979), 19-20.

50. This consisted of 1,054 land-based ICBM launchers and 656

sea-based SLBM launchers for the United States and 1,618 ICBM launchers

and 740 SLBM launchers for the Soviets . US SLBM launchers were

"permitted to reach a ceiling of 710 launchers on 44 submarines" by

dismantling "54 older ICBM launchers ." Likewise, the Soviets could

dismantle older ICBM systems and increase the number of their SLBM

launchers to 950. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Text and

Histories of the Negotiations 7reaties (Washington, D.C . : US Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency, 1990), 167-68.

51 . The treaty permitted each side to deploy one ABM site to protect its

capital and one to protect an ICBM site. Each site is limited to 100 missiles

and 100 launchers, and the sites must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart.

See Arms Control, 155.

52 . Sagan, 42-43 .

39
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

53. Ball, 73 .

54. Sagan, 44-45.

55. Ball, 74.

56. Ball and Toth, 67.

57. Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," The Atlantic

Monthly 250, no. 5 (November 1982): 84, 95.

58. Ball, 76.

59. Sagan, 49 .

60. Ibid., 50-53.

61 . Ball, 79.

62 . Richelson, 129 .

63. The agreement limited "the number of strategic nuclear delivery

vehicles-ICBM and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and air-to-surface

ballistic missiles (ASBMs)"-to 2,400 on both sides, which were to be

reduced to 2,250 by the end of 1981 . The treaty sublimit for MIRVed

ballistic missiles was 1,200, of which 820 could be land-based ICBMs . The

total number of MIRVed ballistic missile launchers plus heavy bombers

equipped to carry long-range cruise missiles could not exceed 1,320. Arms

Control, 261-64.

64. Jane's NATO Handbook, 4.

65. Ball and Toth, 68.

66. Ball, 79-82 .

67. Statement of the president, 31 May 1982, in Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents 18, no. 22 (7 June 1982) : 730.

68. SALT II banned the following: construction of additional fixed ICBM

launchers; increases in the number of fixed heavy ICBM launchers; heavy

mobile ICBM launchers; launchers of heavy SLBMs and ASBMs

flight-testing or deployment of new types of ICBMs, with an exception of one

new type of light ICBM for each side (the new system was limited to no more

than 10 warheads) ; increasing the number of warheads on existing types of

ICBMs (it also limited the number of warheads on SLBMs to 14, ASBMs to

10, and cruise missiles to 20 per existing heavy bomber); conversion of light

ICBM launchers to launchers of heavy ICBMs ; Soviet SS-16 ICBM,

rapid-reload ICBM systems; long-range ballistic missiles on surface ships;

and ballistic and cruise missile launchers on the seabeds. See Arms Control,

264-65.

69 . Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1981 (Washington, D.C. :

Government Printing Office, 1981), 53-54.

70 . Ibid ., 54.

71 . Statement of the president, 23 March 1983, in Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents 19, no. 12 (28 March 1983): 443.

72. Ibid., 443-44.

73. Jane's NATO Handbook, 4.

74. Arms Control, 346.

75 . Mikhail Gorbachev, statement before the Communist Party Central

Committee, Moscow, USSR, 15 January 1986, in Soviet Military Review 5

(May 1986) : 12-13. .

40
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF US NUCLEAR POLICY

76. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The Chernobyl Accident," delivered as a

television address, Moscow, USSR, 15 May 1986, in Vital Speeches 52, no. 17

(15 June 1986): 517.

77. Statement of the president, 27 May 1986, in Weekly Compilation of

Presidential Documents 22, no. 22 (2 June 1986) : 707.

78. Ibid ., 709.

79. Sagan, 53.

80. Ball and Toth, 74-76.

81 . Arms Control, 345.

82 . Mikhail Gorbachev, "U.S.S.R. Arms Reductions," delivered before the

United Nations, New York City, 7 December 1988, in Vital Speeches 55, no. 8

(1 February 1989): 235.

83. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change

1989 (Washington, D .C. : Government Printing Office, 1989), 9 .

84. Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic

Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Committee of Armed Services, 101st Cong.,

1st sess., 1989, pt. 6:71 .

85. Ibid., 6:72.

86. George Bush, "United States Defenses: Reshaping Our Forces,"

delivered to Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., 2 August 1990, in Vital Speeches

56, no. 22 (1 September 1990) : 677.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid.

89. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1990 (Washington, D.C. :

Government Printing Office, 1990), 5.

90. Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1991 : Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990, pt. 2:313.

91 . Gorbachev, "Arms Reductions," 232.

92. Ann Devroy and R. Jeffrey Smith, "Bush Urges Gorbachev to Drop

Arms Treaty Claims," Washington Post, 26 March 1991, 6.

93. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, START Treaty

Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics on the Reduction and Limitation ofStrategic Offensive Arms, United

States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., signed in

Moscow on 31 July 1991, 1.

94. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, August 1991), 15.

95. Ibid., 25.

96. "Death Knell Rings for Warsaw Pact," New York Times, 2 July 1992, 7.

97. Robert C. Toth, "U.S. Scratches Nuclear Targets in Soviet Bloc," Los

Angeles Times, 19 April 1991, 1 .

98. "Bush Announces U.S. Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms,"

Reuter transcript of presidential address on national television, 27 September

1991, in Congressional Quarterly 49, no. 40 (5 October 1991): 2898.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101 . Ibid.

4 1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

102. Mikhail Gorbachev, "The U.S .S.R.'s Disarmament Measures,"

delivered to the nation, Moscow, USSR, 5 October 1991, in Vital Speeches

58, no. 2 (1 November 1991) : 37.

103. Ibid.

104. "Bush Announces U.S. Elimination of Short-Range Nuclear Arms,"

2899.

105. George Bush, State of the Union Address delivered to Congress on

28 January 1992, in Washington Post, 29 January 1992, 14.

106. Ibid .

107. Statement released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary,

18 June 1992, in U.S. Department ofState Dispatch 3, no. 25 (22 June 1992): 492.

108. Letter to the US Senate, 15 January 1993, Office of the Press

Secretary, 1 January 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 4

(25 January 1993): 53.

109 . Fact Sheet released by the White House, Office of the Press

Secretary, 1 January 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 1 (4

January 1993): 5-6.

110. Opening remarks at a news conference on the signing of the

START II Treaty, Moscow, Russia, 3 January 1993, Office of the Press

Secretary, 1 January 1993, in U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no . 2

(11 January 1993) : 20.

111 . Ibid.

112. U.S. Department of State Dispatch 4, no . 4 (25 January 1993) : 54.

113. Ibid.

42
Chapter 2

US Nuclear Policy after the Cold Wax

The last chapter examined some of the major events and

decisions that have had and will continue to have a major

effect on the postcold war role of nuclear weapons. This

chapter focuses on how those events and decisions have

affected US nuclear policy. The primary unclassified source for

current US nuclear policy is the National Security Strategy of

the United States. I

National Security Strategy

US national security interests and objectives have not

changed significantly since the beginning of the cold war. The

1991 National Security Strategy presents four main interests

"that even in a new era are enduring":

The survival of the United States as a free independent nation, with its

fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure.

A healthy and growing US economy to ensure opportunity for

individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home

and abroad.

Healthy, cooperative, and politically vigorous relations with allies and

friendly nations.

A stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom,

human rights, and democratic institutions flourish. 2

National security objectives are broad goals that flow from

national interests . Accomplishment of national security

objectives requires the use of political, economic, and military

power. The majority of objectives supporting the first and

fourth national security interests involve the use or potential

use of military forces. These objectives are listed in table 9.

Each objective either involves or could involve nuclear

weapons.

43
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

President Bush's 2 August 1990 Aspen speech provided the

foundation for the new national defense strategy. The National

Security Strategy provides further amplification of this

strategy. It states that "specific challenges facing our military

in the 1990s and beyond will be different from those that have

dominated our thinking for the past 40 years." The new

defense strategy accounts for the decreased threat of global

war and, in particular, the low probability of an invasion of

Europe and seeks to offset the "competing fiscal demands"

against a "still dangerous world." This new strategy deliberately

reduces forces to "no more than the forces we need to defend our

interests and meet our global responsibilities ." It identifies four

key needs that will shape future US military forces: strategic

deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force

reconstitution . 3

Table 9

National Objectives Involving Military Forces

The United States seeks, whenever possible in concert with its allies, to :

deter any aggression that could threaten the security of the United States and its

allies and-should deterrence fail-repel or defeat military attack and end conflict on

terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies;

effectively counter threats to the security of the United States and its citizens and

interests short of armed conflict, including the threat of international terrorism;

improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements,

modernizing our strategic deterrent, developing systems capable of defending

against limited ballistic-missile strikes, and enhancing appropriate conventional

capabilities;

promote democratic change in the Soviet Union, while maintaining firm policies that

discourage any temptation to quest for military advantage ;

foster restraint in global military spending and discourage military adventurism ;

prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile

countries or groups, especially the spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear

weapons, and associated high-technology means of delivery;

maintain stable regional military balances to deter those powers that might seek

regional dominance;

aid in combating threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion,

insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking .

Source: President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C . : The

White House, August 1991), 3-4.

44
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

The National Security Strategy discusses six areas that have

a bearing on the future role of nuclear weapons . Strategic

nuclear forces, nonstrategic nuclear forces, and missile

defenses comprise elements of the national strategy of

deterrence. Arms control and nonproliferation efforts are part

of the US political agenda to pursue strategic stability . Finally,

maintaining a technological edge is a key strategy to reducing

the size of defense forces successfully.

Strategic Nuclear Forces

"Even in a new era, deterring nuclear attack remains the

number one defense priority of the United States ." The

strategic triad has been the cornerstone of US nuclear

deterrent posture for more than 30 years . The 1991 National

Security Strategy continues to reaffirm the validity of the

strategic triad and to advocate continued strategic

modernization: 'The modernization of our Triad of land-based

missiles, strategic bombers, and submarine-launched missiles

will be vital to the effectiveness of our deterrent in the next

century."4

After the National Security Strategy was published, all

modernization programs were severely curtailed by President

Bush through his unilateral initiatives (discussed in chapter 1) .

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated President Bush's

position on strategic modernization just prior to leaving office .

In signing the START I and START II treaties, the President has

determined that, with the full implementation of these agreements, the

residual US arsenal can, with appropriate modernization, provide the

effective and flexible nuclear deterrent that will be required for the

foreseeable future. Efforts to extend the service life of the existing

Minuteman III ICBM force, along with the previously authorized

introduction of the B-2 stealth bomber in the mid-1990s and

completion of the 18-ship Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine force

in 1997, are the extent of the modernization efforts currently planned. 5

Survivable command and control, nuclear weapon safety,

security and testing, and safe and environmentally sound

nuclear weapons production capability continue as important

national security issues . President Bush announced a change

to US nuclear testing policy in July 1992. He stated that the

United States will continue its policy of performing nuclear

45
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

tests; but will restrict the purposes of those tests to safety and

reliability purposes . Congress subsequently placed further

restrictions on US testing. It decreed:

A nine-month moratorium on US testing beginning in October 1992,

ceilings of 15 tests from July 1993 through September 1996 and of five

tests for any single year, and a ban on tests beginning in October 1996

unless another state tests after that date. It further restricted the

purpose of tests to weapons safety, but allowed one test per year for

reliability unless Congress specifically disapproved of the tests

While the strategic triad was well suited for deterring the

Soviet threat, the new era presents several additional

concerns.

while we have traditionally focused on deterring a unitary, rational

actor applying a relatively knowable calculus of potential costs and

gains, our thinking must now encompass potential instabilities within

states as well as the potential threat from states or leaders who might

perceive they have little to lose in employing weapons of mass

destruction.

Yet, the National Security Strategy does not propose a solution

to such potential scenarios; it merely continues to tie US

conventional capability to strategic weapons through the

linkage of nonstrategic nuclear weapons .$

Nonstrategic Nuclear Forces

Nonstrategic nuclear weapons will continue to play a role in

US National Security Strategy for the foreseeable future . They

act to highlight US resolve and to "link conventional defense to

the broader strategic nuclear guarantee of the United States ."

Additionally, nonstrategic nuclear weapons have "contributed

to the deterrence of conventional attack." This has been

particularly true in NATO.

Non-strategic nuclear weapons remain integral to our strategy of

deterrence. They make NATO's resolve unmistakably clear and prevent

war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which a nuclear

response to military action might be discounted. 9

The National Security Strategy also cites nonstrategic nuclear

weapons as part of the US nonproliferation strategy. That

these weapons are a link to the strategic guarantee has

"helped remove incentives that otherwise might have

accelerated nuclear proliferation." Additionally, US possession

46
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTERTIM COLD WAR

of nonstrategic nuclear weapons has helped deter enemy use

of nonstrategic nuclear weapons . t o

President Bush's 27 September 1991 initiative made some

major changes to nonstrategic nuclear forces . The

announcement that all ground-launched nuclear weapons

were to be brought home and destroyed removed the Army

from any future nuclear role. The decision to remove all

nonstrategic nuclear weapons from naval vessels limited the

Navy's peacetime nuclear role to strategic deterrence only. The

Air Force will retain the only peacetime nonstrategic nuclear

mission, via an air-delivered capability in Europe.

Missile Defenses

President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech on 23 March 1983

launched the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program,

which "was intended to shift deterrence to a safer, more stable

basis" by limiting Soviet capability to launch a successful

ballistic missile attack on the United States . Although the

threat of an attack from the former Soviet Union has greatly

diminished, the "threat posed by global ballistic-missile

proliferation and by an accidental launch resulting from

political turmoil has grown considerably ." 11 Desert Storm

provided a heightened awareness to the American public of the

potential dangers of ballistic missile attacks, both to troops on

the battlefield and to undefended cities. The Soviet coup

attempt in August 1991 heightened US concerns over the

possibilities of unauthorized launches .

In light of the decreasing defense budget and the receding

threat of a Soviet nuclear strike, the SDI program has been

scaled back to the global protection against limited strikes

(GPALS) program . GPALS provides protection against an

unauthorized or inadvertent nuclear launch and helps to

"enhance strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear

war" by improving survivability, "remov[ing] incentives for a

nuclear first strike" and "implement[ing] an appropriate

relationship between offenses and defenses." 12 It is envisioned

that GPALS would protect against "launches of up to 200

warheads." 13

GPALS also may "provide incentives against further

proliferation of ballistic missiles" in two ways . First, by

47
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

decreasing the potential for missiles to "cause certain and

immediate damage," governments may be less likely to "go to

such great lengths to acquire them." Second, the offering of US

defensive assistance may "provide an incentive for countries not

to seek ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction." 14

Subsequent to the 1991 National Security Strategy, Presidents

Gorbachev and Yeltsin both proposed the development of joint

systems to avert nuclear ballistic missile attacks . Later,

Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed ajoint statement on 17 June

1992, committing both nations to explore the role of and develop

a concept for a global positioning system (GPS) .

Aries Control

The National Security Strategy stipulates that "arms control

is an important component of a balanced strategy to

ameliorate the deadly consequences of global tensions as well

as to reduce their fundamental causes." The United States

seeks to "enhance the security of the United States and its

allies while strengthening international stability by" :

" Reducing military capabilities that could provide incentives to

initiate attack;

" Enhancing predictability in the size and structure of forces in order

to reduce the fear of aggressive intent;

[and]

" Ensuring confidence in compliance, through effective verification . 15

The tremendous success in arms control treaties from INF to

START II was discussed in chapter 1 . Beyond the success of

treaties, President Bush stated that the arms control process

has changed significantly .

Instead of merely damping competition, arms control now plays a

major role in creating the framework for cooperation. . . . In some

areas, particularly with the independent states of the former Soviet

Union, we can now afford to take unilateral steps, often based on

anticipated reciprocity. In others, we continue to require formal

agreements, but those can be arrived at far more quickly than before. 16

Another breakthrough in arms control occurred on 13 January

1993, when the United States became an original signatory to the

Chemical Weapons Convention. "The convention prohibits the

48
US NUCLEAR POLICY A=RTHE COLD WAR

development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention,

and transfer of chemical weapons" and "the use of chemical

weapons against any other state-regardless of whether the

country is a signatory to the convention." Additionally, it seeks

to eliminate chemical weapons within 10 years . 17

This step has significant ramifications for the United States .

Some nations may not sign or abide by the treaty. Having

already forsworn biological weapons, the United States now

will not respond in kind to either chemical or biological attack.

The implications of this policy are discussed in chapter 5.

Proliferation

The National Security Strategy identifies "stopping the global

proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as

well as the missiles to deliver them" as the most urgent issue

in arms control. 18 President Bush proposed a "three-tiered

strategy: to strengthen existing arrangements ; to expand the

membership of multilateral regimes directed against

proliferation, and to pursue new initiatives ." 19 The thrust of

this program strengthens efforts to stop proliferation via

supply-side economics-controlling export of critical

technologies, weapons, and components that can be used as

building blocks for the development of weapons of mass

destruction.

President Bush released a nonproliferation initiative on 13

July 1992 . The initiative is aimed at "integrat[ing] new and

existing policies in an overall framework to guide US

nonproliferation policy in the years ahead ."ZO In seeking

compliance and enforcement of international norms,

supporting inspections, helping weapons destruction, and

enforcing export controls, the United States will continue to

work through numerous groups and agencies. The Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group

(NSG), and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all seek

to control nuclear proliferation . The Missile Technology

Control Regime (MTCR) is aimed at combating missile

proliferation . The Australia Group, Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC), Biological Weapons Review Conference

(RevCon) and Enhanced Proliferation Controls Initiative (EPCI)

deal with the control of chemical and biological weapons.

49
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Additionally, although not mentioned in the initiative, the

Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export

Control puts export controls on critical technologies. 21

Technology

The National Security Strategy emphasizes the importance of

maintaining a technological edge as the size of military forces

and the defense budget are reduced. High-technology weapons

provide the capability to "overcome numerical disparities and

to reduce the risk to American lives," offer a "hedge against the

unknown," and give the president flexibility in response

options. 22 While the Gulf War validated the capabilities and

value of high-technology weapons, and although there has

been much widespread discussion that such technology can

begin to replace nuclear weapons, no mention of any such

policy appears in the US national security strategy.

National Military Strategy

The National Military Strategy of the United States

"implements the new, regionally focused defense strategy

described in the President's National Security Strategy of the

United States and builds upon the Annual Report to the

President and Congress provided by the Secretary of Defense."

As such it is the responsibility of the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff to advise "in providing strategic direction for the

Armed Forces." 23 Since the national military strategy builds on

the national security strategy, a thorough analysis would be

redundant to what already has been covered. However, four

issues within the document hold special meaning to the

discussion within this analysis .

First, deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States and

its allies has been the primary role of US nuclear weapons for

many years. While the National Security Strategy also includes

deterrence of conventional attack, particularly with regards to

the NATO flexible response strategy, it does not mention the

role of nuclear weapons in deterring chemical or biological

attacks . The National Military Strategy, however, states

50
US NUCLEARPOLICY AFTERTHE COLD WAR

specifically that the role of nuclear weapons includes chemical

and biological weapons deterrence .

The purpose of nuclear forces is to deter the use of weapons of mass

destruction and to serve as a hedge against the emergence of an

overwhelming conventional threat. 24

As mentioned earlier, with the signing of the Chemical

Weapons Convention, the US policy on chemical use is no

longer "no first use" but "no use." The significance of a lack of

declaratory policy from the president will be discussed in the

remaining chapters .

Second, while traditionally nuclear deterrence has been

defined in terms of nuclear systems and warning systems, and

while the value of defenses in providing a deterrent capability

has been discussed since SDI was initiated, the National

Military Strategy adds GPALS as one of the prerequisites for

deterrence.

A credible deterrent requires [emphasis added] a reliable warning

system, modern nuclear forces, the capability and flexibility to support

a spectrum of response options and a defensive system for global

protection against limited strikes . 25

The role of defense and its impact on the future role of nuclear

weapons also will be discussed in the remaining chapters.

Third, the National Military Strategy identifies the adaptive

planning process as the key to meeting regional challenges

with a smaller force structure . This process provides options to

US national leadership with a "diverse spectrum" of

"preplanned options" to confront "any opponent's leadership

with uncertainty and risk should it contemplate aggression of

any kind to include the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons. "26 This necessitates detailed planning and flexible

forces to respond to a full spectrum of possible scenarios.

Detailed target planning is done to enhance responsiveness and provide

options . Specific target selection and the alert status of the force are

functions ofthe world situation at any particular point in time.27

Fourth, the JCS document set forth the base force concept

to meet "our enduring defense needs" while "maintain[ing] an

acceptable level of risk. "z8 The base force strategic forces are

composed of 18 Trident submarines, 50 Peacekeeper and 500

Minuteman III missiles, and unspecified numbers of B-1,

51
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

B-52, and B-2 aircraft. When the chairman of the JCS first

released his base force concept, it had included 75 B-2s, 95

B-52Hs, and 97 B-1 Bs . 29 These numbers disappeared with the

onset of the unilateral initiatives and Washington Summit

agreement. President Bush lowered the ceiling for B-2s to 20

during his 28 January 1992 State of the Union Address.

START II allows up to 100 formerly heavy bombers to be used

as conventional bombers. Secretary of Defense Cheney stated :

The B-1 Bs will be reoriented to a conventional role [from a nuclear

role] and will not be counted under START [II] . Under the START 11

Treaty, the US-planned nuclear long-range bomber force will consist of

B-2s equipped with gravity bombs and B-52H standoff cruise missile

carriers, armed with a mix ofALCM-Bs and ACMs. 3o

This concession provides the United States with options for its

heavy bombers, many of which could not be maintained under

the START II limits with the as-equipped counting rules for

bombers. Regardless of the actual force structure, the National

Military Strategy continues to affirm the policy of deterrence

based on the strategic triad .

The Strategic Triad

Gen John T. Chain, Jr., then commander of the Strategic Air

Command, iterated the link between deterrence and force

structure in his testimony before the Senate Appropriations

Committee on 3 May 1990:

Since World War II, deterrence, based upon highly capable nuclear

forces, has been the cornerstone of our nation's military strategy. To

support this strategy, we have fielded forces that have convinced the

Soviets they could not launch a successful attack against the US or its

allies . The Soviet Union is, and will remain, a nuclear superpower.

Therefore, a Triad of US strategic offensive forces will remain essential

to deterrence .31

Secretary of the Air Force Donald B . Rice and Air Force Chief

of Staff Gen Merrill A. McPeak presented the fiscal year (FY)

1992 Air Force Posture Statement to the House Armed

Services Committee on 26 February 1991 . In it, they stated the

rationale for the continued validity of the strategic triad :

The TRIAD concept remains fundamental. Each leg of the TRIAD

possesses unique and complementary characteristics which

52
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

synergistically provide a retaliatory capability that no adversary could

hope to successfully overcome. 32

The triad concept was well suited for the cold war. It

provided insured survivability of nuclear forces for the

worst-case scenario-a surprise bolt-out-of-the-blue attack.

The triad also addressed concerns about the possibility of

technological breakthroughs or system failures that could

render a leg of the triad inoperative . The triad approach

ensured that at least one leg was available to hedge against

such attack or failure . While these concerns are not as

paramount in the post-cold war era, the triad concept is still

valid to hedge against future uncertainties .

Bombers

The penetrating bomber was the first strategic nuclear

delivery platform. After the advent of the ballistic missile, it

continued to perform a vital strategic mission as a member of

the triad . Still, some individuals criticized it as being an

antiquated system that was no longer needed, while others

suggested its role as merely a hedge against the failure of one

of the other legs of the triad. These arguments were faulty for

two reasons. First, as the size of the target base began to grow,

the number of Soviet targets exceeded the number of ballistic

missile warheads, requiring bomber weapons to cover the

target base. Second, bomber-delivered weapons were more

accurate than ballistic missile warheads and thus were

necessary to ensure that an adequate level of damage was

achieved on many targets . This second point became touted as

an extremely important mission for the bomber-the bomber

could perform damage assessment and release a second

weapon against a target that had been missed or insufficiently

damaged by a ballistic missile.

In response to the penetrating bomber threat, the Soviets

built a large network of air defenses . The B-52's inability to

penetrate these defenses provided the argument for

modernizing the bomber fleet (through the B-1 B and the

cruise missile programs) . The Soviets continued to modernize

their surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, which fueled the

argument for further US modernization . The advanced cruise

53
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

missile (ACM) and the B-2 bomber employed stealth

technology, a capability that reduces the ability of Soviet

radars to "see" an incoming system . The short-range attack

missile (SRAM) 11, an improved standoff weapon, was planned

as well, allowing bombers to launch weapons longer distances

from their targets.

In the midst of arms control talks that focused on bringing a

halt to the upward spiral of the nuclear arms race, stability

and flexibility became important issues for the strategic triad.

The bomber provided these capabilities far beyond that which

the ballistic missile legs could provide.

In the nuclear arena, the bomber enhances the stability of the nuclear

balance. Its high survivability promises any aggressor that an attack

will be met with devastating retaliation, while its relatively slow speed

compared to ballistic missiles means that the bomber does not pose a

first-strike threat. Because it can be generated, dispersed, launched

under positive control and then recalled or redirected, the bomber also

provides our nation's leaders with a highly flexible means of sending a

variety of unmistakable messages to an adversary-messages that can

help defuse and stabilize crises. 33

While some politicians argued for a purely cruise missile

force to save the cost of providing defensive upgrades to the

B-1 B and procuring the B-2, the Air Force used the continued

buildup of Soviet defenses to discredit this concept.

Moving to a pure missile force would eliminate the advantages

provided by penetrating bombers and introduce new vulnerabilities.

Using long-range radars, airborne radar platforms, tankers, and

fighters, Soviet air defenses could focus on detecting, tracking, and

engaging nonstealthy cruise missile carriers before they could launch

their missiles.3 4

The Air Force continued to advocate a balanced mix of

penetrating bombers and cruise missile carriers to provide

flexibility and complicate the Soviet defensive effort.

Cruise missiles have proven to be a valuable compliment to the

penetrating bomber force: they extend the lives of older bombers no

longer capable of penetrating effectively, add mass to the bomber

attack by saturating defenses, and are excellent weapons against fixed

targets. The manned penetrating bomber is an extremely efficient,

flexible, and effective system . The key to the penetrating bomber's

warfighting versatility and efficient weapons delivery is the presence of

a crew in the cockpit capable of reacting to situations and making

decisions . 35

54
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTERTHE COLD WAR

The collapse of the Soviet Union called into question the

validity of these arguments . In the face of intense

congressional debate over the B-2, the Air Force drew

attention to the fact that bombers are reusable platforms that

also can perform conventional missions . This campaign was

met with increased public criticism that the Air Force was

trying hard to justify the B-2 by inventing a new mission for

it . 36 The capping of the B-2 purchase at 20 and the ACM buy

at 640 and the cancellation of the SRAM II program made it

obvious that with the decreased Soviet threat the Department

of Defense (DOD) could not provide adequate support for

continued capital investment in heavy bombers for nuclear

deterrence .

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

The intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) leg has always

been touted as the most economical leg of the triad .

ICBMs make unique contributions to the TRIAD. They are valued for

their promptness, reliability, accuracy, low operating cost,

connectivity, and availability-while their near 100% alert rate allows

the other two legs of the TRIAD to operate at more economical

tempos. 37

There are two problems with the ICBM fleet : age and

survivability . Retiring Minuteman (MM) II missiles in

conjunction with arms reductions was a cost-effective

approach to the aging problem. Minuteman Ills are facing an

aging problem as well . In response to the president's

cancellation of the small ICBM (SICBM), Dick Cheney stated

that it "will require us to take steps to maintain the

Minuteman III force. Eventually those missiles will have to be

refueled ; they'll need new guidance systems ." 38

Current plans include "replacement of aging components in

the guidance computer and associated electrical systems and

refurbishment of the second- and third-stage rocket motors."

Replacement of the guidance system and refurbishment of the

first-stage motor also are being considered. The goal is to extend

the life of the Minuteman III fleet beyond the year 2010 . 39

The SICBM and the Peacekeeper rail garrison (PKRG) were

proposed solutions to the survivability problem.

55
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Soviet advancements in ICBM accuracy and increased MIRVing led to

increasing concern over the survivability of our silo-based ICBM force

and the potential for crisis instability . Adding mobility was deemed to

be the best method of addressing these problems, which in turn led to

the development of the Peacekeeper Rail Garrison program, where

Peacekeeper missiles would be mounted on trains, and the Small

ICBM (SICBM) program, where single warhead missiles would be

mounted on Hard Mobile Launchers (HMLs). 4o

In the face of a reduced Soviet threat and leaner defense

budgets, President Bush canceled both SICBM and PKRG

programs as part of his unilateral initiatives. He made this

decision without seeking equal concessions from the Soviets .

The START I agreement allows each side to deploy up to 1,100

mobile land-based warheads. The START II treaty bans

MIRVed ICBMs and places no further limits on mobile

systems. Thus, the Russians will retain an advantage with

survivable mobile ICBMs, while the United States will be left

with 500 silo-based missiles.

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

The nuclear-powered fleet ballistic-missile submarine

(SSBN), part of "the Silent Service," has provided an extremely

survivable strategic deterrent for more than 30 years .

Operating on nuclear power, it can patrol independently

underwater for months at a time, limited only by the need for

food replenishment and crew rest . Unlike the silo-based ICBM,

the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is survivable ;

that is, it does not need to be launched upon warning of

incoming ballistic warheads . Therefore, it also provides a

survivable strategic reserve force .

The SLBM has historically been inferior to the ICBM on

three counts: less certain communication links with the

national command authorities (NCA), a more limited missile

range, and less accuracy, which translates to a lack of

hard-target-kill capability . The advent of the Trident

submarine with the Trident II missile system and the D-5

warhead has eliminated the latter two arguments . More

survivable communication links also have been part of

modernization programs .

An aging fleet and cost considerations have forced the

retirement of the older Poseidon submarines, curtailed the

56
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTERTHE COLD WAR

Trident buy to 18, and postponed indefinitely the Trident II

missile upgrade for the Pacific-based boats . The closure of

Rocky Flats initially was responsible for limiting the number of

D-5 warheads to a few hundred . President Bush's announced

cancellation of further D-5 production made the situation

permanent.

The Soviets traditionally have feared the SSBN as a

formidable threat, whereas the United States has been

concerned about the SS-18. During his State of the Union

Address in January 1992, President Bush proposed to lower

the number of SLBM warheads by about one-third in exchange

for a ban on MIRVed ICBMs. The United States and Russia

reached a compromise in the Washington Summit, where each

side decided to eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by the year 2003 in

exchange for a lowering of the number of SLBM warheads by

approximately one-half.

The Future of the Triad

In response to the changes announced by President Bush in

his 1992 State of the Union Address, Secretary of Defense

Cheney stated that the United States "will continue to rely on

its strategic nuclear deterrent capability," which will be "a

modified version of the traditional Triad" and will give "less

emphasis to land-based ICBMs aQd ready bombers." 41

Referring to the possibility of facing weapons of mass

destruction in future conflicts, Cheney stated:

We may need to fight earlier than we had to this time. If the use of

weapons of mass destruction is threatened, we may need to win even

more quickly and decisively, and we would want to retain the

advantages necessary to keep our own losses as low as possible. 42

He mentioned the development of new systems and the

importance of maintaining the capability to preempt if

necessary.

We may require advanced systems to deal with the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, either to destroy them before they are

used, to defend against them, or to win decisively to discourage others

from contemplating their use.43

While the president, secretary of defense, and chairman of

the JCS have discussed their plans for nuclear weapons and

57
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

forces for the next decade in a fair amount of detail, they have

not been as forthcoming with changes to nuclear strategy for

the post-cold war era. As discussed in the introduction,

nuclear policy consists of several parts . These parts--arms

control, acquisition, and deployment policy-have been well

publicized throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations .

While US defense strategy has shifted to regional threats and

collective security, nuclear declaratory policy has not been

altered significantly since the announcement of NATO's

flexible response strategy and Carter's countervailing strategy.

While the details of current employment policy are classified,

Secretary of Defense Cheney stated, "US nuclear targeting

policy and plans have changed and will continue to change in

response to developments in the former Soviet Union. "44

The post-cold war era has brought with it a flurry of

opinions on the future role of nuclear weapons and what is

necessary for continued deterrence . The next chapter

examines the scope of public opinion, which is a significant

force acting on public officials and a potential major player in

determining future nuclear requirements.

Notes

1 . Just prior to leaving office, President Bush released the 1993

national security strategy. This new document was significantly shorter

than its 1991 predecessor and did not make any declared changes to US

nuclear policy. Thus, I chose to use the more detailed information available

in the 1991 version .

2 . President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, August 1991), 3-4.

3. Ibid., 25.

4. Ibid.

5. Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and

Congress (Washington, D.C . : Government Printing Office, 1993), 69.

6. Ibid., 15-16.

7. 1991 National Security Strategy, 26.

8 . The 1993 version of the National Security Strategy did not discuss

nonstrategic nuclear forces . Chapter 5 discusses possible reasons for and

ramifications of this omission.

9. 1991 National Security Strategy, 26.

10. Ibid.

11 . Ibid., 27.

12. Ibid., 15.

13. Report of the Secretary ofDefense, 72.

14. 1991 National Security Strategy, 27.

58
US NUCLEAR POLICY AFTERTHE COLD WAR

15. Ibid., 14.

16. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, January 1993), 17.

17 . Based on a statement released by the US Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Washington, D.C., 5 January 1993, in U.S.

Department of State Dispatch 4, no. 3 (18 January 1993): 27.

18. The 1993 version of the National Security Strategy uses the term

"limit" as opposed to "stop" (proliferation) . The significance and possible

ramifications of this change are discussed in chapter 5.

19 . 1991 National Security Strategy, 15.

20. "Nonproliferation Initiative," US Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, Washington, D.C., Office of Public Affairs, 13 July 1992, 1 .

21 . Ibid., 3 ; "Existing Nonproliferation Efforts," US Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., Office of Public Affairs, 13 July 1992,

1-2.

22. 1991 National Security Strategy, 30.

23. Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1992), 1 ; [preface], np.

24. Ibid., 13.

25. Ibid., 6.

26. Ibid., 12.

27. Ibid., 13.

28. Ibid., 18.

29. House of Representatives, Department of Defense Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1992: Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, pt. 8:15-16.

30. Report of the Secretary ofDefense, 70.

31 . Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1991 : Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1990, pt. 2:327.

32. Donald B. Rice and Merrill A. McPeak, "FY92 Air Force Posture

Statement" presented to the House of Representatives Armed Services

Committee, 26 February 1991, in Air Force Update, Secretary of the Air

Force, Office of Public Affairs, 26 February 1991, 4.

33 . Ibid., 5.

34 . Ibid., 5-6.

35. Ibid., 5 .

36. See Senate, Department ofDefense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1992:

Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 102d

Cong., 1st sess., 7 May 1991, pt. 3:965-99 and 5:440-64. Many of the

questions directed to General Butler concern this issue and, in particular,

the submitted questions.

37. "FY92 Air Force Posture Statement," 6.

38. News briefing and question and answer session with Secretary of

Defense Dick Cheney, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen Colin Powell,

and Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Atwood, Pentagon, 31 January 1992,

in Defense Issues 7, 31 January 1992, no. 3, 3 .

39. Report of the Secretary ofDefense, 70.

40. "FY92 Air Force Posture Statement," 7.

59
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

41 . Prepared statement of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to the

Senate Armed Services Committee, 31 January 1992, in Defense Issues 7,

31 January 1992, no. 4, 11 .

42. Ibid., 14.

43. Ibid., 15.

44. Report ofthe Secretary ofDefense, 4.

60
Chapter 3

Current Thinking on the

Future Role of Nuclear Weapons

The post-cold war era provides a unique opportunity for

accomplishing national security objectives with a smaller

defense force. The question that politicians and analysts are

grappling with is, To what level can the United States disarm

while maintaining a high degree of confidence in being able to

achieve national security objectives? The literature is full of

opinions on the matter. While a complete review of the

literature is not practical, this chapter captures a sampling of

the broad spectrum of varying opinions regarding the

requirements for US nuclear forces. Although many of these

opinions are not necessarily those held by current

policymakers, public opinion and media coverage have a

tremendous leverage in influencing policy decisions . An

opinion advocated in print today may turn into national policy

tomorrow. Future nuclear policy could be a conglomerate of

many of the opinions cited in this chapter.

An Assessment of Current Thinking

This chapter proposes a series of seven questions, the

answers to which will determine the future objective of US

nuclear forces, the numbers of weapons needed, and how they

should be postured. Public opinions from the literature are

presented as answers to these questions, providing a

systematic method for analyzing the various proposals.

Seven Questions regarding

Future US Nuclear Forces

First, are US nuclear weapons necessary to achieve national

security objectives in the post-cold war era? Second, (if so) is the

sole purpose of nuclear weapons to deter the use of another

country's nuclear weapons, or should nuclear weapons also

61
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

have a role in deterring the use of chemical and biological

weapons and conventional attack (as in the NATO flexible

response strategy)? Third, should the United States continue

to extend the umbrella of deterrence to allies, or should US

nuclear weapons serve solely to deter against attack on the

United States? Fourth, are tactical nuclear weapons necessary

for deterrence, or can strategic nuclear weapons accomplish

national security objectives? Fifth, what nuclear strategy will

best accomplish national security objectives? Sixth, how many

and what types of nuclear weapons does the United States

need to implement its nuclear strategy? Seventh, how should

the United States posture its nuclear forces to best achieve

national security objectives?

Terms

In examining a variety of documents, articles, and books

dealing with this subject, this writer found that some common

terms taken for granted as having a universally understood

meaning actually mean different things to different authors .

These terms include nuclear deterrence, extended deterrence,

and nuclear weapons reductions.

The term nuclear deterrence is used universally; it is often

shortened to deterrence. During the cold war the term was

used only in conjunction with the Soviet Union. In the wake of

the Gulf War, a series of articles dealing with the threat of

weapons of mass destruction, in particular from third world

countries, have used the term almost entirely in the multipolar

(as opposed to the bipolar) sense. While in the past, nuclear

deterrence has predominately implied the use of nuclear

weapons to deter someone else from using nuclear weapons,

such a narrow definition no longer suffices.

When one speaks of nuclear deterrence, does one refer to

the defender or the attacker? Is the defender using nuclear

weapons to deter nuclear attack (and perhaps chemical,

biological, and conventional attack as well)? Or is the defender

using nuclear weapons (and possibly such conventional

weapons as precision-guided munitions and GPALs) to deter a

potential attacker from using nuclear weapons? Until a new

set of definitions appears, authors should state which types of

weapons are being used to deter which types of attack.

62
FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Authors traditionally have used the term extended

deterrence to speak of the use of US nuclear weapons to deter

nuclear attack on US allies . The term has been broadened in

recent years to include using US nuclear weapons to deter

conventional attack on US allies. The NATO flexible response

strategy offers a case in point. Other authors have used

extended deterrence to include the use of nuclear weapons to

deter all weapons of mass destruction. As with nuclear

deterrence, writers should specify what type of deterrence a

country is extending, and to whom.

Many writers fail to distinguish between strategic and

tactical nuclear weapons . Their articles advocate a certain

level of nuclear reductions but fail to state whether they are

dealing with strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear

weapons, or both. For example, a conclusion to an article that

advocated a reduction below START levels might read, "And

thus we can safely reduce our total nuclear weapons to a level

of no more than 3,000 warheads." Never having mentioned

tactical weapons in the article, the author might mean only

strategic warheads or, literally, all nuclear warheads.

Additionally, in dealing with nuclear reductions, the vast

majority of authors show either ignorance or total disregard for

maintenance, repair, and testing. Writers frequently use the

term total to describe the resulting numbers of warheads after

applying proposed reductions. Almost always, the author is

really advocating total operational warheads. Authors rarely

mention that an additional percentage must be added to

operational warheads to account for maintenance, repair, and

testing. Depending on the particular system, this percentage

may be as much as 20 percent above the "total" number.

Are Nuclear Weapons Still Necessary?

Are US nuclear weapons necessary to achieve national

security objectives in the post-cold war era? Although

antinuclear protests occurred during the cold war, Americans

for the most part seemed to have accepted nuclear weapons as

a fact of life . Now that the Soviet threat has greatly

diminished, has the American perspective changed?

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Nuclear Weapons Should Be Eliminated

Some writers suggest that the post-cold war era will produce

a change in societal attitudes regarding the need for nuclear

weapons . Paul Warnke (former director of the Arms Control

and Disarmament Agency) states, "In 1992, it is hard to

imagine that the United States or its friends in Europe or

elsewhere could be the victims of nuclear or even large-scaled

conventional aggression."' This mentality has prevailed after

every major conflict in which the United States has

participated, leading to severe reductions in the size of US

armed forces in each instance .

William Arkin (director of nuclear information, Greenpeace

USA), Damian Durrant (research associate, Greenpeace USA),

and Hans Kristensen (research associate, Greenpeace

International) state that "undoubtedly society will go through a

period in which `minimum' deterrence is important, but once

nuclear weapons have relinquished their dominant position,

the continued investment in them will be questioned."2

David Yost (associate professor, Department of National

Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,

California) claims that nuclear deterrence is being delegitimized .

This delegitimization might be defined as (at least in some circles)

reduced confidence in the reality and safety of nuclear deterrence

arrangements and lessened certainty about the practical prudence,

strategic necessity, and/or moral legitimacy of posing nuclear threats

to adversaries . 3

He claims that these changes are not found "in the views of the

masses [but] . . . have instead been in the views articulated in

certain elite sectors of society." He also indicates that it would

be difficult to measure such changes, but a trend in which

public opinion is having more inroads into higher-level

policy-making seems to be forming. 4

Kosta Tsipis (physics professor at Massachusetts Institute of

Technology and director of MIT's program in science and

technology for international security) sees a possible evolution

away from dependence on nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence will become decreasingly relevant while a new set of

self-interests will impose self-discipline on the political leadership of

each nation. The United States and the Soviet Union may forego war in

the future, not just because nuclear deterrence will prevent them, but

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

probably because economic or common geopolitical interests will make

war irrelevant. 5

He cites the relationship between the United States and Great

Britain as an example.

Those who advocate the elimination of nuclear weapons

espouse one or more of four basic arguments . First, they

stress that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons

against civilians is morally wrong. Second, they argue that

since military bases and industrial complexes are often

collocated with civilian population centers, these targets

cannot be attacked without a tremendous loss of civilian life .

Third, they say that nuclear war cannot be controlled and that

it will inevitably end in massive carnage, possibly world

destruction. Fourth, now that the cold war is over, they argue

that nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose and should be

eliminated totally.

Those who favor the elimination of nuclear weapons almost

unanimously call for an immediate ban on nuclear weapon

testing, discontinuance of nuclear weapon fuel production,

and cessation of nuclear weapons development. The major

difference of opinion among those who call for the elimination

of nuclear weapons centers around how quickly total

elimination is possible.

Those who favor quick action cite two predominant reasons.

First, the present situation in which the Russians are on

amiable terms with the West may be a unique, short-lived

situation. The political climate within the CIS could change at

any moment and revert to hard-line communism. Thus, the

chance to eliminate nuclear weapons should be seized quickly.

Second, they assert that quick elimination of nuclear weapons

would reduce pressure on third world countries to acquire

nuclear weapons for themselves . This includes both

indigenous production and the potential to purchase loose

nukes from the CIS republics.

Other observers are more cautious, preferring a gradual

reduction over time while maintaining a deterrent posture to

discourage nuclear attack . These individuals favor the

continuance of such confidence-building measures as taking

some or all ICBMs, SSBNs, and bombers off alert status and

removing and then storing their warheads.s Such action would

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

be a sign of good faith that the United States is indeed serious

in moving toward the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons.

Other confidence-building measures include verifiable step

reductions . Mikhail Gorbachev's three-stage plan to eliminate

nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was one of the first such

proposals .' Randall Forsberg (director of the Institute for

Defense and Disarmament Studies in Cambridge,

Massachusetts) also advocates the elimination of nuclear

weapons in a three-step sequence but over a five- to 10-year

period . Step one involves a multilateral reduction to

approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons. Step two stipulates a

reduction to approximately 100 warheads. And step 3 provides

for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. 8

Two major obstacles exist to achieving a nuclear-free world.

The first is achieving world consensus on the total elimination

of nuclear weapons . The second is implementing a verification

plan to ensure that no cheating occurs . The eliminators

believe there is already overwhelming support for a

nuclear-free world. Proposals for verification range from

intrusive verifications to self-policing by members of each

nation. 1° Richard Barnet (a fellow at the Institute for Policy

Studies and one who also served in the US Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency) suggested that verification costs could

be shared mutually by a worldwide tax scheme." Theodore

Taylor (former weapons designer at Los Alamos National

Laboratory, former member of the Defense Nuclear Agency,

and currently president of Southern Tier Environmental

Protection Society in New York State) views verification as an

international effort that encourages "whistleblowers" and

"severely and directly punishes violators .

1112 Paul Nitze

(founder and diplomat-in-residence at the Paul H. Nitze School

of Advanced International Studies at the Johns Hopkins

University and adviser on arms control issues to every

president since Harry S Truman) provides an interesting

insight to the verification problem.

The global elimination of nuclear weapons, if this were ever to become

possible, would need to be accompanied by widespread deployments of

effective nonnuclear defenses . These defenses would provide

assurance that were some country to cheat . . . it would not be able to

achieve an exploitable military advantage. 13

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Idealistically speaking, perhaps it would be possible to

eliminate nuclear weapons, police against cheating, and

maintain GPALS just in case a missile gets by the verification

regime . But most observers are not so optimistic.

Nuclear Weapons Should Not Be Eliminated

While many authors agree that nuclear weapons will play a

less prominent role in the post-cold war era, they do not agree

that the logical end is total elimination. Patrick Garrity (staff

member for National Security Studies at Los Alamos National

Laboratory and former member of the Center for Strategic and

International Studies and professor at the Naval Postgraduate

School) writes that "nuclear weapons are depreciating in their

value as a currency in international relations, at least in terms

of relations among today's major powers." 14 Unlike Tsipis,

however, he does not see elimination as the logical conclusion

to depreciation.

The nuclear depreciation will manifest itself in certain obvious ways,

such as a substantial reduction in the size of American and Soviet

stockpiles . . . and significantly decreased rates of nuclear

modernization . . . issues associated with these weapons will no longer

dominate the political and military agendas of the great powers . . .

rather, they will be interested in using nuclear weapons as a hedge in

the event that international relations should deteriorate and as a

means of keeping the major power competitions at the political and

economic, not the military, level. 15

By deemphasizing nuclear weapons and focusing future

military forces around high-technology conventional weapons,

Garrity cautioned that an adversary may find employment of

nuclear weapons an effective strategy . He also voiced a

concern that technological breakthroughs coupled with

nuclear reductions could greatly upset the balance of power

and quickly bring nuclear weapons back into focus. 16

Those who see a continuing role for nuclear weapons share

a common view that nuclear weapon technology cannot be

disinvented and that nuclear weapons cannot be successfully

eliminated, if for no other reason than complete worldwide

verification is impossible . Rather than reducing the temptation

for third world countries to acquire nuclear weapons, a ban on

nuclear weapons may increase it . A few nuclear weapons in

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

the hands of a single country could provide tremendous

leverage, as demonstrated by the United States at the end of

World War II . Thus, the risks of cheating would outweigh the

disadvantages of getting caught in a nuclear-free world .

Referring to work performed back in 1963 under the Kennedy

administration, Paul Nitze states:

We prepared a Paper [sic] on the issues involved in a bilateral

agreement limiting strategic nuclear delivery vehicles between the

United States and the Soviet Union. The analysis suggested that the

total elimination of nuclear weapons was not the optimum solution.

This was because nuclear technology had become too widely known:

the risk of clandestine or third-country production of nuclear weapons

was too great. It seemed that a level of perhaps 500 strategic nuclear

weapons on each side would provide a more stable and predictable

future than none at all.

17

If the concern for technology proliferation was great in 1963, it

is much more so today.

Advocates for the elimination of nuclear weapons that raise

the morality issue seem predominately concerned with the

targeting of, or the collateral damage to, civilian populations.

But such has been the concern of many individuals since the

advent of total wars. More than one and one-half million

German and Japanese civilian casualties were inflicted by

conventional bombing in WWII ."' Modern wars require

tremendous logistics supplies. As such, support personnel and

civilians that comprise the logistics train from factory to the

battlefield are key targets . The issue of morality is truly one of

war and not just atomic weapons.

Most Americans probably will agree that nuclear weapons

are necessary to deter nuclear attack against the United

States, at least for the foreseeable future . Advocates for the

continued use of nuclear weapons disagree with one another

in at least three areas . First, they disagree over whether

nuclear weapons also should be used to deter chemical,

biological, and conventional attack. Second, while some

advocates see tactical nuclear weapons as having a continuing

role in the post-cold war era, others believe that they no longer

serve any useful purpose. Third, there is a lack of consensus

over whether the nuclear umbrella should be extended to US

allies and, if so, what guarantees the United States should

offer. The next three sections examine each of these areas.

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chemical/Biological Weapons

and Conventional Attack

Is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons to deter the use of

another country's nuclear weapons, or should nuclear

weapons also have a role in deterring the use of chemical and

biological weapons and conventional attack (as in the NATO

flexible response strategy)?

Arguments against Nuclear Use in These Roles

Carl Kaysen and George W. Rathjens (both members of the

Defense and Arms Control Program at MIT) and Robert S.

McNamara (US Secretary of Defense from 1961 to 1968)

suggest that nuclear weapons are "useful in the narrowest

deterrent role: to make sure that no other nuclear weapons

state is tempted to attack." 19 Similarly, a National Academy of

Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms

Control (CISAC) report concluded that

The principal objective of U.S. nuclear policy should be to strengthen

the emerging political consensus that nuclear weapons should serve

no purpose beyond the deterrence of, and possible response to,

nuclear attack . 20

Paul Nitze, who also holds this view, argues,

The United States cannot rely on its nuclear weapons to deter attacks

with chemical, biological, or conventional weapons. . . . The prospect

that a nuclear weapon would be used in response to such attacks is

too dubious for deterrence to be reliable . 21

Using nuclear weapons to deter chemical, biological, or

conventional attack implies at least a threatened nuclear

"first-use" policy. Reviewing several polls, David Yost states

that "there has been little public support for 'first-use' nuclear

employment concepts in the United States or Western Europe

since the mid-1950s." Citing a poll by Thomas Graham, Yost

states that 60 to 69 percent of Americans favor second-use of

nuclear weapons only in the instance of an attack on the US

homeland or on US troops abroad . 22

During Desert Shield, James Kitfield noted that "some

defense experts are even suggesting that the United States

apply the 'flexible response' doctrine of NATO to its showdown

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

with Iraq. That could mean countering any chemical weapon

attack with tactical nuclear weapons ." 23 President Bush did

publicly threaten Iraq with the "strongest possible response"

should Saddam unleash chemical or biological weapons . The

national command authorities were ambiguous about the use

of nuclear weapons, however, indicating that it was their

desire "to keep Saddam guessing," (according to an unnamed

administration official in a 4 February 1991 Tame article) . The

president confirmed this ambiguity at a televised news

conference on 5 February 1991 when he was asked about

possible US responses to a chemical attack. He stated, "I think

it is better never to say what you may be considering. "24 Other

administration sources stated, "It's very unlikely that the

United States would even respond in kind to a chemical

attack."25 The TYrne article also suggested that the United

States never really had any other intention but a conventional

response for two key reasons :

[One] The linchpin in Washington's strategy to limit the spread of atomic

weapons is a formal promise never to use them against a nonnucleararmed state. If the U.S. violates its own policy to nuke Iraq, which by

all indications does not yet have the bomb, other countries might rush

to develop atomic arms and possibly use them. . . . [Two] Advanced

nonnuclear weapons such as fuel-air bombs and cluster bombs can do

virtually as much damage to battlefield targets as nukes would. 26

McGeorge Bundy (chairman of the Carnegie Corporation's

Task Force on the Nuclear Threat and former special assistant

for national security affairs to President Kennedy) criticized

President Bush for using Desert Shield to reinforce publicly

the US policy of nonuse of nuclear weapons against

nonnuclear states announced by Secretary of State Cyrus

Vance under Carter in 1978 :

President Bush missed an excellent opportunity to make clear that in

reality, and as a matter of basic national policy, the United States

would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in this crisis. . . . He

would have greatly strengthened the worldwide cause of avoiding

nuclear war and won honor for leadership around the worldespecially at home . 27

Now that the massive Eastern bloc conventional threat to

Western Europe is basically gone, is the concept of deterring

conventional attack with nuclear weapons still valid today?

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Some analysts continue to say yes, but a larger and more

vocal majority is saying no. Newsweek conducted a poll during

Desert Storm that asked, "Do you favor or oppose the use of

tactical nuclear weapons against Iraq to quickly end any

hostilities and save the lives of U.S . forces?" An overwhelming

72 percent of those responding said they opposed such action. 28

Several authors cite the significant number of conventional

conflicts that occurred during the cold war as proof that

nuclear weapons cannot deter conventional conflict. Joseph

Rotblat (president of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and

World Affairs, London, England) states that "nuclear weapons

have certainly not prevented the outbreak of some 125 wars

since 1945, some directly involving the superpowers, which

have led to an estimated 40 million deaths ." 29

While the United States has maintained a general policy of

nuclear response in the face of such overwhelming

conventional opposition as an overrun of NATO forces in

Western Europe by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, many

Americans never have been comfortable with this position. Yet

even in the context of Western Europe, once the nuclear

threshold has been breached, there would be no guarantee of

stopping the conflict short of an escalation to all-out nuclear

war. Many authors have argued that using nuclear weapons to

thwart a conventional attack was an idle threat. They contend

that the United States would never risk the retaliation of

Soviet ICBMs on American cities for the sake of Western

Europe or American lives on foreign soil . The French initiated

their own nuclear program because of this very logic . In the

aftermath of Desert Storm, many observers believe that hightech conventional weapons can perform the same mission as

nuclear weapons without the stigma of crossing the nuclear

threshold.

Arguments for Deterring Chemical

and Biological Attack

Deterrence of chemical and biological weapons poses a real

problem for the United States . With the signing of the

Chemical Weapons Convention, the United States now has a

"no use" policy for both biological and chemical weapons.

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Thus, conventional and nuclear responses are the only

possible retaliatory options to a chemical or biological attack.

Gen Colin Powell (chairman, JCS) specifically defined the

role of nuclear weapons as deterring weapons of mass

destruction in the national military strategy. Although

President Bush never publicly threatened the use of nuclear

weapons in Desert Storm, the implication was there . While a

blanket US policy of nuclear response to a chemical or

biological attack could undermine the policy of nuclear nonuse

against nonnuclear countries and could also give the third

world a clear signal of the importance of obtaining nuclear

weapons, a blanket policy of no nuclear use could open the

door for chemical and biological use against the United States

or its allies.

Arguments for Deterring Conventional Attack

The National Security Strategy states that two of the

purposes of nonstrategic nuclear forces are to "contribute to

the deterrence of conventional attack" and "link conventional

defense to the broader strategic nuclear guarantee." 3o The

argument that nuclear weapons have not prevented

conventional wars is a hollow one. Some analysts would argue

that the presence of a strong US nuclear posture is what

prevented Soviet nuclear use, prevented an Eastern bloc

overrun of Western Europe, and mitigated the effects of third

world regional conflicts. Some historians credit Eisenhower's

threatened use of nuclear weapons as a key ingredient to the

final Korean armistice.

It is impossible to assess what would have happened over

the past 47 years without nuclear weapons . An estimated 55

million people died in WWII . 31 Forty million deaths in

conventional conflicts over the past 47 years certainly is better

than 55 million deaths in six years. The presence of nuclear

weapons may have prevented many more deaths than would

have occurred in their absence . Richard Barnet states:

As a practical matter, a nuclear weapons-free environment is probably

unattainable and certainly would not be stable in a world ruled by

force and bulging with conventional weapons. 32

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

In fact, some individuals advocating elimination of nuclear

weapons realize this fact and are calling for the disarmament

of all conventional armies down to defensive-sized, policekeeping forces. 33

NATO has never declared a "no first-use policy" but has

declared a "no first-use of violence" to prevent the Soviet Union

from thinking it could launch a conventional attack on

Western Europe "without risking nuclear retaliation. "34 In light

of the changes in Eastern Europe, would it be appropriate to

announce a "no first-use policy"? Until the recent changes in

Europe, most NATO members thought that such a decision

would provide an open invitation for a Soviet conventional

invasion of Western Europe . Walter Slocombe (member of

Caplin and Drysdale law firm in Washington, D.C .) says that

"hedging against the possibility of a Soviet relapse will be a

priority for US and European security policy for many years to

come ." 35 President Bush's tactical nuclear weapon initiatives

left an air-delivered capability in Europe as just such a hedge.

Extended Deterrence

Should the United States continue to extend the umbrella of

deterrence to allies, or should US nuclear weapons serve solely

to deter attacks on the United States? Paul Nitze states that

"U .S . nuclear weapons may continue to play a role in

reassuring friends and allies, underscoring the U.S .

commitment to their security." 36 He goes on to say that 'the

continuing role of extended deterrence depends on changes in

the security environment.

Many critics feel that extended deterrence is a hollow

threat-that the United States would not risk an attack on its

homeland to retaliate against a nuclear attack on one of its

allies. What then is the purpose of alliances? If the national

command authorities elect not to respond in such a case, they

must be prepared to bear the brunt of some potentially severe

ramifications. Certainly, it would call the US nuclear umbrella

into serious question and signal nonnuclear alliance countries

to go out and procure their own nuclear weapons for

self-preservation . Such nonaction would strike at the very

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

heart of US nonproliferation policies. Even more unsettling,

however, would be the perceived message by third world

aggressors-a nuclear weapon can be detonated against a US

ally without eliciting a nuclear response .

The issue of US nuclear response to chemical, biological,

and conventional attack on one or more of its allies is at best

gray. The United States has neither rescinded support of the

NATO flexible response doctrine nor abrogated its nonuse

against nonnuclear states . Keeping nuclear response options

would provide US national command authorities the greatest

amount of flexibility in dealing with future scenarios.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Are tactical nuclear weapons necessary for deterrence, or

are strategic nuclear weapons sufficient to accomplish

national security objectives? Tactical nuclear weapons coupled

with highly accurate strategic weapons have provided the

capability to employ nuclear weapons across the full spectrum

of conflicts . The NATO flexible response strategy reflected US

willingness to employ nuclear weapons in such a manner.

President Bush's unilateral initiative announced on 27

September 1991 places almost all tactical nuclear weapons in

CONUS storage facilities and requires the destruction of many

of them.

Some nuclear arms control analysts have advocated the

elimination of the artificial distinction between strategic and

tactical nuclear weapons. While some individuals think of

higher yield nuclear weapons as being strategic and lower

yield ones as being tactical, traditionally a nuclear weapon has

been termed strategic or tactical by its delivery platform and

method of employment. DOD has defined strategic nuclear

weapons as those deployed on delivery platforms that have

intercontinental ranges-ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range

bombers . Tactical nuclear weapons are employed in a

battlefield scenario.

Cruise missiles posed a problem for the START negotiatorsare they strategic or tactical? Analysts employed an artificial

range definition to solve the problem. They deemed those

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

missiles with ranges greater than 600 kilometers strategic and

countable under START, except for submarine-launched

cruise missiles (SLCMs), which were discussed in a side

agreement . The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Treaty solved some of the problems of intermediate-range

nuclear forces by requiring their destruction . Perhaps one day

the distinction between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons

will vanish. For now, however, most analysts still recognize a

difference.

Eliminate Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Advocates for the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons

see the maintenance of these systems as contributing to

heightened tensions between two states in a time of crisis.

That tactical nuclear weapons were added to the US arsenal to

bolster conventional defenses and that many tactical nuclear

weapons have relatively low yields increases the believability of

a nuclear response. Sergei Kortunov (an associate of the Arms

Limitation and Disarmament Directorate, ministry of foreign

affairs of the Soviet Union, under President Gorbachev)

advocates a mutual deterrence posture that is "maintained

exclusively by strategic forces at minimum possible levels

while all nonstrategic nuclear weapons should be

eliminated. "37

Other observers advocate the elimination of tactical nuclear

weapons based on their obsolescence. These individuals assert

that not only can precision, high-technology conventional

weapons accomplish the same mission as tactical nuclear

weapons but that they are a better deterrent to war because

conventional response is more believable. Beatrice Heuser (a

lecturer in the Department of War Studies at Kings College,

University of London) states that the employment of tactical

nuclear weapons is "currently being thrown into doubt by the

advent of new conventional weapons with capabilities

approaching those of nuclear arms." The advent of fuel-air

explosives, conventional high explosives, precision-guided,

earth-penetrating weapons, and conventional cruise missiles

are negating the need for nuclear weapons. 38 Patrick Garrity

and Sharon Weiner (a doctoral candidate in political science at

MIT) suggest:

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The clear U.S. conventional superiority as manifested in the Persian

Gulf War would seem to render moot the principal long-standing

military justification for nuclear weapons-that they were needed to

compensate for presumed Western conventional inferiority.3s

Maintain Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Removing nuclear weapons from Europe would reduce the

deterrence threshold, since the penalty for aggression would

not be so grave: aggressors might be willing to accept the same

potential military losses if they were not accompanied by the

side effects of nuclear weapons. During Mikhail Gorbachev's

visit to England in April 1989, Margaret Thatcher stated that

"both of our countries know from bitter experience that

conventional weapons do not deter war in Europe, whereas

nuclear weapons have done so for over forty years. "40

Although the tremendous changes in Europe merit the

removal of tactical nuclear weapons, announcing the

destruction of a significant number of tactical nuclear

weapons sends quite a different signal to the world . While

President Bush indicated a small air-dropped capability would

be retained, the overwhelming perception among other nations

may well be that the United States is not planning to use

nuclear weapons in any future conventional scenario.

If an aggressor perceives that the United States no longer

has the will to use nuclear weapons, the deterrent value of

those weapons becomes null and void . As mentioned in the

previous section, the United States added tactical nuclear

weapons to its arsenal to increase the believability of a nuclear

response. The concept of believability has been described as

the "usability paradox" :

For the sake of deterrence, nuclear forces must be "usable enough" to

convince the Soviet Union that a potent U.S. nuclear response would

actually be forthcoming in the event of a Soviet attack on the United

States or its vital interests . To prevent accidental war, however, U.S.

weapons must not be "so usable" that they are ever launched through

a mechanical error, used by unauthorized or insane military

commanders, or operated in such a provocative manner as to cause

the Soviet Union to mistakenly "preempt" what it falsely believes is an

imminent U.S. attack. 41

Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S . Howard II of Los Alamos

National Laboratory identify two potential problem scenarios

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

that US armed forces may face in future regional conflicts-US

contingency forces could be overrun by stronger conventional

forces and/or may be exposed to the use of nuclear, biological,

and chemical weapons . They also assert that US national

leadership will probably not respond to these scenarios with

nuclear weapons because US nuclear weapons have large

yields that will "self-deter" policymakers from using them in

regional conflicts . 42

These authors' principal thesis is that low-yield nuclear

weapons "could enhance U.S. security in possible future third

world conflicts by bridging the gap that exists between the

capabilities of conventional weapons . . . and the higher yield

nuclear weapons that dominate our current arsenal." They

assert that the mere existence of low-yield nuclear weapons

coupled with the resolve to use them may provide a viable

deterrent to a tyrant who doesn't believe US leadership would

actually use the current stockpile. 43

Dowler and Howard propose three categories of small-yield

nuclear weapons, each with a different purpose, to bridge the

gap between current conventional capabilities and the nuclear

arsenal : (1) "micronuke(s] with a yield on the order of 10 tons,"

which could be employed against command and control and

airfield facilities; (2) "mininuke[s] with a yield of about 100

tons," which could be utilized in a ballistic missile defense

role, particularly against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear,

biological, or chemical weapons ; and (3) "tinynukes . . . with a

yield of about 1,000 tons," which could prevent contingency

forces from being overrun before reinforcements arrive. 44

Dowler and Howard argue that smaller nuclear weapons

would be more credible because they would not violate the

principle of proportionality of response and would have

minimal collateral damage and fallout. Small nuclear weapons

would provide the capability that the United States lacked in

the Iraqi conflict-the ability to destroy deeply buried

command and control facilities and the ability to completely

destroy an incoming ballistic missile warhead . 45

Some military planners argue strongly for the development

of the small-yield nuclear weapons. Along with the current

downsizing of the military and the strategy of flexible

contingency forces and force reconstitution comes the real

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

danger of not having several months to build up, as was the

case in Desert Storm. During the cold war, the United States

placed tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to prevent the Soviet

Union from quickly overrunning prepositioned forces . The

same logic applies to US involvement in regional contingencies .

On the con side, the tremendous changes in the former

Soviet Union have rendered a current political climate that

makes it unlikely that policymakers will listen to any proposal

for the development of new nuclear weapons, particularly any

that would potentially lower the usability threshold . While the

small-yield nuclear weapons make good military sense and fit

well in the US national military strategy, the current political

climate calls for the destruction of nuclear weapons having

similar capabilities . The removal and destruction of

ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing 11 missiles from

Europe under the INF Treaty eradicated some viable platforms

that contained nuclear warheads with selectable yields on the

order of tinynukes. Additionally, the president's unilateral

initiatives included the removal and/or destruction of many

theater nuclear weapons that have selectable yields on the

order of the mini and tiny nuclear categories .

Thomas Ramos (special scientific advisor to the assistant

secretary of defense-atomic energy, under the Bush

administration) submits that it is necessary to modernize US

tactical nuclear weapons to achieve the national defense

strategy. He notes the lack of discussion of tactical nuclear

weapons when Dick Cheney and Colin Powell testified before

the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 1991 and

concludes that "what appears to be missing at present is a

comprehensive plan to incorporate theater nuclear weapons

into the National Defense Strategy ." He states that the

requirement for theater nuclear weapons is not only

scenario-dependent but,

the presence of nuclear weapons in forward deployed regions serves

the purpose of sending an unequivocal message to all adversaries and

allies about American intentions . The very presence of nuclear

weapons in forward-deployed areas can act as a deterrent against the

proliferation of nuclear weapons. 46

Thomas-Durell Young (associate research professor of national

security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US

78
FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Army War College) suggests that President Bush was

premature with his sweeping reductions of tactical nuclear

weapons on 27 September 1991 and that he has, in essence,

redefined "NATO's on-call substrategic nuclear capabilities"

without "a full review of future security requirements. "47 Young

believes that by reducing allied tactical nuclear capability to

gravity bombs, President Bush has essentially declared a

"minimum deterrence" strategy for NATO. Young further

argues that future threats to NATO warrant a wide range of

response options. 48 He also suggests an alternative view to the

idea that highly accurate conventional weapons are replacing

the need for tactical nuclear weapons :

The argument that sophisticated conventional munitions can provide

the alliance with a massive nonnuclear strike capability misses the

point. The issue now, as it has been in the past, is one of deterrence,

not warfighting. Even if one accepts the debatable proposition that

modern precision-guided conventional munitions can produce a

similar level of deterrence, financial exigencies in Europe will

substantially limit the acquisition of these types of munitions in the

years to come. Hence, as NATO has long recognized, nuclear forces are

a cheap way of achieving effective deterrence. 4s

Nuclear Strategy

What nuclear strategy will best accomplish national security

objectives? Writing with regard to President Bush's unilateral

initiatives, Charles Glasser (assistant professor in the Irving B.

Harris School of Public Policy Studies at the University of

Chicago) states :

The United States has now proposed the first basic changes in U.S.

strategic nuclear forces, but the strategy that these forces must

support, and how and why it differs from America's cold war strategy,

have yet to be articulated. 50

A new US nuclear policy was certainly not on the agenda

during the 1992 presidential campaigns and debates . Some

observers suggest that the reason may be that the United

States is still trying to define its role in world affairs . Robert J .

Art (a research associate of Harvard's Center for International

Affairs) asks,

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Now after its forty-five year battle with the Soviet Union, what should

the United States do with its power? . . . Exactly where on the

continuum between the two grand alternatives-unbridled

internationalism and constricted isolationalism-should the United

States draw the line?51

The selection of Bill Clinton for president suggests the desire of

Americans to turn inward after the lengthy cold war. Such US

security objectives as promoting democracy, advancing human

rights, and strengthening free market economies may take a

back seat to solving US economic problems . President

Clinton's proposals for additional military reductions indicate

a further scaling back of overseas involvement and US military

power projection.

Deterrence

The Clinton administration most assuredly will continue to

advocate the need for at least minimum levels of deterrence .

Traditionally, deterrence has been defined as holding at risk

what the enemy holds most dear. Even in the case of the

45-year-old cold war relationship with the Soviets, the United

States always held some concern about how to determine what

the Soviets considered most dear. The tremendous difference

between Eastern and Western thinking left considerable

doubt.

George Quester (professor of government and politics at the

University of Maryland) asserts that there has been a problem

with deterrence for decades and the changes in Eastern

Europe add to these problems . He identifies four concerns :

the problem of maintaining adequate retaliatory forces ; the problem of

maintaining command and control to prevent unauthorized nuclear

attacks; the problem of reconciling nuclear deterrence to Western

moral traditions; and the problem of extending nuclear deterrence to

prevent conventional attacks . 52

He asserts that

deterrence theory has always maintained that both sides must be able to

launch a formidable countervalue attack even after absorbing a

counterforce attack designed to prevent such retaliation. If either side was

able to neutralize the other's forces, nuclear deterrence would fail . 53

Such statements are only partially true. For years the US strategy

has been one of counterforce-even retaliatory counterforce .

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Secondly, deterrence lives in the eyes of the deteree . What

constitutes a formidable attack? And how does one determine

whether it can neutralize the other side's forces? It is all a

matter of perception. Deterrence is not a matter of absolute

truth but, rather, one of perceived vulnerability .

Americans have accepted President Bush's unilateral

initiatives and the START II agreement as being in their best

interest. That the disintegration of the Soviet Union provided a

potential opportunity for the United States to become not only

the sole superpower but finally to achieve nuclear superiority

over the Soviets, in both offensive and defensive capability,

never became an issue. With regard to US nuclear posture, a

position has been generally accepted, seemingly without

question, "that, over the long term, U.S . security will be

greater in a world of mutual vulnerability .

"54

Analysts and politicians are proposing nuclear strategies for

the post-cold war era that run the gamut from minimum

deterrence to counterforce targeting. Although a particular

nuclear strategy and the number of weapons required to

support it are closely linked, they are two distinctly different

issues. Many authors fail to present these as two separate

subjects, choosing to link nuclear strategy with a specified

number of nuclear weapons and discussing alternatives as a

combined entity. For these cases, this analysis has separated

strategy from number of weapons.

Countervalue

Nuclear strategy could be well on its way to its first complete

cycle . With a minimum number of atomic weapons, early US

war plans called for attacks on Soviet cities. Once the Soviets

acquired atomic weapons, US strategy shifted to targeting

Soviet nuclear delivery capability . Early ballistic missile

warheads were inaccurate and thus could threaten only

population centers. Eventually, highly accurate weapons

systems held opposing ICBM silos at risk, and counterforce

strategies were in vogue . With the tremendous nuclear

reductions under START II, some analysts are proposing

further reductions . Retention of warheads-in the vicinity of

100-are advocated by a few individuals. Such low numbers

require a countervalue strategy commonly referred to as

81
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

16 countercity," which amounts to holding civilian populatior

centers at risk.

Given the redirection under President Bush-that o:

focusing on regional conflicts, safety and security of nuclear

weapons, and development of GPALS to defend against

accidental, unauthorized, or third world use, Garrity anc

Weiner propose that nuclear weapons may be moving to the

periphery of US strategy:

If taken to its logical conclusion, this approach will rapidly lead the

United States to cease to regard nuclear weapons as the cornerstone of

its national security and to "segregate" any remaining nuclear forces

from its force structure and strategy. 55

This would lead to a "countercity targeting strategy" under a

policy of "existential deterrence" in which nuclear stockpiles

would be reduced to fewer than 2,000 warheads, while

modernization and testing programs would be terminated.

Alternately, they indicate that the United States may not make

such deep cuts, wishing to hedge against the possibility of

future uncertainties. 56

Charles Glaser outlines three alternatives to the current

state of mutual vulnerability between the United States and

the CIS :

Defense dominance-both countries are protected from annihilation by

highly effective strategic defenses; U.S. superiority-strategic defenses

and counterforce protect the United States, while it maintains its

ability to annihilate Russia; and nuclear disarmament-arms control

agreements, requiring near-total cuts in nuclear forces, protect both

countries . 57

Glaser states that most analyses focus on these three

conditions because analysts assume that these alternatives

would bring greater security to the United States. He argues

that the United States will be more secure in a state of

continued mutual vulnerability by employing a flexible

countervalue strategy. Kosta Tsipis agrees with this assertion

and states that US and Russian arsenals will maintain "the

symmetrical state of vulnerability that both undergirds and

makes necessary the new approaches of common security and

win-win negotiated resolution of conflict that the nuclear

nations-and their allies-are in the process of adopting

toward each other." 58

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Countervalue strategy suffers two main criticisms. First,

analysts have criticized the policy of targeting leadership,

since it undermines the objective of achieving a quick end to

war: obliterating leadership leaves no one to capitulate .

Second, a large portion of society sees the targeting of cities,

which amounts to the civilian population, as morally wrong .

Counterforce

Janne E. Nolan (a Brookings Institution senior fellow) allows

a vast difference in opinion between the military and most

politicians over the need for and employment of nuclear

weapons . Most politicians see "the need for `assured

retaliation,' in which each side maintains only enough nuclear

forces to ensure that some of its weapons would survive an

attack and enable the country to retaliate, " 59 whereas the

military has been driving the need for "counterstrategic"

capability.

Over time, military planners have come to dominate not only

operational decisions-which targets to hit with which weapons-but

also decisions about the numbers and types of nuclear weapons

"required" to fulfill national plans. War-fighting plans have a far

stronger influence over force requirements and arms control than does

political rhetoric about the basis of nuclear deterrence. As Paul

Warnke, the former director of the U.S. Arms Control and

Disarmament Agency, says, "The SIOP drives everything---force levels,

budgets, and arms control."so

Two complementary problems contribute to this dilemma--

military resistance and civilian disinterest. The development of

the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) by the joint

strategic target planning staff (JSTPS) at US Strategic

Command (formerly SAC) in Omaha, Nebraska, is a detailed

and lengthy process that few civilian officials have ever taken

the time to get involved with.s l And while the military has

traditionally resisted civilian involvement, such excuse is a

lame one. One would think that at least the president of the

United States would be familiar with the war plans, since he

would have fewer than 30 minutes to make a decision in the

event of a Soviet surprise attack. Yet, "other than Jimmy

Carter, every president since Franklin Roosevelt has expressed

only a passing interest in the subject. In 1988, a former chair

83
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that Ronald Reagan's

knowledge of the SIOP was practically nonexistent." 62

Michael J . Mazarr (senior fellow in international security

studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies)

performed a literature survey to summarize some of the "key

writings and fundamental ideas in circulation on the subject of

nuclear strategy and arms control." He identifies "two primary

cold war schools of thought on nuclear weapons-the warfighters

and the assured destruction proponents," whom he terms

"maximalists" and "minimalists ." The maximalists favor a

continuation of a cold war strategy comprised of "counterforce

targeting and extended deterrence." In contrast, the minimalists

contend that "U.S. nuclear weapons should be used for nothing

but deterring nuclear arsenals of other counties."63 Mazarr

points out the real danger of these two extremes :

Maximalism may go too far in integrating dozens of first-strike

scenarios into day-to-day U.S. planning: Minimalism may err on the

opposite side, fervently ruling out-and therefore failing to equip U.S.

nuclear forces and strategy for-roles they might be forced to serve. 64

Counter-force strategy has been declared by many politicians

and analysts to be a destabilizing strategy, since a country

being attacked must launch its weapons upon warning of an

inbound attack-or even prior to receiving warning-to avoid

the possible destruction of its weapons on the ground . Of

primary concern in this instance are MIRVed, silo-based

ICBMs, which are lucrative targets for a nuclear first-strike

and thus are too valuable an asset not to launch upon attack

warning. The banning of these systems under START II will

help with this stability problem; however, the retention of

silo-based ICBMs will continue to provide a destabilizing

strategic posture .

Mazarr suggests a third alternative-a counterpower

strategy that targets nonnuclear military forces . He states that

since counterpower strategy "does not threaten either side's

nuclear deterrent, it is not destabilizing like counterforce ; yet,

as specifically countermilitary, it avoids some of the moral and

credibility-related drawbacks of countervalue policies . "65

Paul Nitze favors a similar strategy-a counterforce strategy

against "conventional forces and installations ." He contends

that conventional targets are the most valuable targets, since

84
FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

an aggressor would need to eliminate them to "consolidate any

gains achieved in a nuclear strike."ss

While a counterpower strategy against conventional forces

provides a theoretically sound argument, there are at least

three problems associated with it. First, how does one side

convince the other that nuclear assets are not being targeted

along with conventional ones? Apart from stationing Russians

in US ICBM silos and aboard submarines, there would be no

way for Russians to verify ballistic missile aimpoints . Second,

it fails to address the complications involved in targeting

mobile conventional forces. Aside from a barrage attack, what

does one target? Troops? Tanks? Command and control?

Third, a counterconventional strategy was the rationale behind

the development of tactical nuclear weapons . One can argue

that a greater sense of strategic stability could be achieved by

banning ICBMs and SLBMs and by relying on air-delivered

nuclear weapons for a counterconventional strategy.

Multilateral Concerns

To date, most nuclear force analyses have focused on the

US-Soviet bilateral relationship. It's not clear whether anyone

has a good grasp on how to analyze nuclear weapons in a

multilateral sense, particularly when the traditional concept of

deterrence may be totally invalid for the post-cold war era.

Furthermore, the literature is practically void of any

discussion of the effects of US nuclear weapon reductions on

other countries' perceptions of US power and will. For example, a

focus on regional issues coupled with severe reduction in

nuclear weapons could well be perceived by the rest of the world

as isolationist in nature and certainly a weakening in US military

power and resolve. Hence, third world nations may be more apt

to acquire nuclear weapons for themselves and challenge US

resolve .

How Many Nuclear Weapons?

How many and what types of nuclear weapons does the

United States need to implement its nuclear strategy? Nuclear

strategy should dictate the number of nuclear warheads

85
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

needed; however, too often strategists apply reverse logic, as

seen in the following quote. Walter Slocombe asks:

Should nuclear weapons be reduced to a level of a few thousand

warheads (allowing for a deterrence doctrine based on the capability to

strike both military targets and cities), or can reductions be made to a

level of a few hundred (allowing for a deterrence doctrine based on

large-scale attacks on cities)?s7

The real danger of this bottom-up approach is that within

debate and discussion circles, an unsubstantiated number is

often better than no number at all. Once planners suggest a

number as a possibility, they tend to migrate toward that

number in the absence of any better number. For example,

about the time the United States and the CIS stood poised to

really sign START, discussions about a possible START II

sprang up in analytical circles around the United States. For

lack of any formal guidance or a better starting point,

observers assumed that all START limits would be cut in half.

Most analyses proceeded with these general assumptions. It is

no coincidence that a year later, the Washington Summit

agreement proposed levels approximately half those of START.

Mazarr suggests that most nuclear analysis can be lumped

into one of three camps. Maximalists propose nuclear forces

on the order of "one-third to one-half the size of those

maintained during the cold war. " 68 He states that "to support

their global targeting policies, counterforce doctrines, and

extended deterrence pledges, maximalists would be very

uncomfortable going below 3,000 or so warheads for the

foreseeable-and perhaps indefinite-future ." Mazarr suggests

that "minimalists tend to view the deterrent effect of even a few

dozen nuclear bombs as sufficient. " 69 The top end of the

minimalist position is probably in the category of a few

hundred. Mazarr suggests 1,000-2,000 as a good moderate

position and locks on to 1,000 as a good, round, sellable

number, but he offers no rationale for his estimate. 7° This

approach compromises on numbers, fails to consider strategy,

and ignores warhead yield altogether.

The following paragraphs summarize just a few of the

proposals that have been suggested for nuclear weapon levels.

A sampling is provided to illustrate the minimalist,

maximalist, and moderate positions espoused by Mazarr.

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Nitze does not concur with strategists who want to reduce

the US arsenal to a few hundred weapons. These low numbers

of warheads require a countercity targeting strategy which he

feels is morally unacceptable and therefore not a credible

deterrent. 71 Nitze favors a counterforce strategy and suggests

an arsenal size of from 3,000 to 5,000 warheads, "with further

cuts possible as conventional weapons gain additional

effectiveness or if other nuclear powers become more willing to

participate in arms reductions ." He sees little need for tactical

nuclear weapons beyond "a small force of air-delivered

weapons in the European stockpile. "72

CISAC proposed a reduction to an actual 3,000-4,000

strategic warheads, predicated on making the remaining forces

"more survivable ." The committee suggests reducing the

number of tactical nuclear weapons but does not provide any

numbers . It also indicates that over time, levels of 1,000-2,000

warheads could be reached-given appropriate agreements,

verification, and confidence-building measures . 73

No Daalder (director of research at the Center for International

Security Studies) wants to reduce the number of warheads to the

hundreds but only if the remaining weapons are survivable. He

states, "As long as remaining forces are invulnerable to

preemption and capable of riding out an attack, the actual

number can be in the hundreds, rather than the thousands.

"74

Daniel Ellsberg (senior research associate of the Center for

Psychological Studies in the Nuclear Age, Harvard Medical

School) advocates a minimum deterrent level based on

survivable warheads. Citing Herbert York, first director of

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, he states,

The number of survivable weapons needed to deter the kind of

adversary that can be deterred is far below the level of [the] 1,000

frequently mentioned . He suggested the number is "somewhere in the

range of one, 10, or 100," and "closer to one than it is 100." 75

Christopher Paine, a senior research associate, and Thomas

Cochran, a senior staff scientist at the Natural Resources

Defense Council, Washington, D.C ., favor a level of a few

hundred weapons but base their recommendation on verification

rather than on survivability. They assert that an "effective

verification system could make it possible for the nuclear powers

to slash their arsenals to a few hundred weapons each." 7s

87
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Multilateral Concerns

The discussion of large reductions also requires the

consideration of the other nuclear powers. At what point do

Great Britain, France, and China become players in the

reduction game? At some point alliances will play a role from

both perspectives. The United States has stated a policy to

work multilaterally yet retain the capability to act unilaterally.

A CIS proposal to reduce strategic warheads to 1,000, provided

that the sum of US, British, and French strategic warheads

also equals 1,000, would not be acceptable to the United

States . Likewise, a US proposal to bilaterally reduce to 1,000

strategic warheads, while not taking into account alliances,

would probably not be acceptable to the CIS.

Carl Kaysen, Robert S . McNamara, and George W. Rathjens

propose "minimal" deterrent forces that can destroy

approximately a dozen targets in a retaliatory attack. They

suggest that the United States and the CIS could unilaterally

reduce their arsenals to approximately 1,000 warheads as an

initial step to achieving these levels. They suggest that "at

some pointperhaps in the neighborhood of 1,000 US and

Soviet warheads-France, the United Kingdom, and China

would have to be drawn into the reduction process.""

Paul Warnke, an eliminationist, concurs that the United

States and the CIS can make unilateral reductions to "no more

than 1,000 nuclear warheads and no more than one to a

delivery vehicle" as a first step toward total elimination. 78

Gen John T. Chain does not favor deep reductions that

would place all nuclear powers on the same plane.

If the United States and the Soviet Union reduce strategic nuclear

forces drastically, then nations such as France, Great Britain, China,

and others become equals. The concept that a world of many

superpowers is less stable than a bipolar one is not new, and a less

stable world is certainly not in U.S. interests . 79

Paul Nitze concurs with this evaluation:

U.S. strategic forces should remain at least equal in size and

effectiveness to the strategic arsenal in the former Soviet Union. The

United States should also retain a strategic reserve that would be as

large as the strategic arsenals of all other nuclear nations combined to

prevent their domination in the aftermath of a U.S.-Russian or

comparable exchange.80

88
FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

Harold A. Feiveson, senior research policy scientist, and

Frank N. von Hipple, professor of public and international

affairs, Princeton University, suggest a way to reduce US and

CIS arsenals significantly without creating parity between all

nuclear states . They propose a "finite-deterrence" level of

about 2,000 highly survivable warheads . The 2,000 level is the

lowest they recommend without involving the other nuclear

states .$' They suggest that "France, Britain, and China should

be willing to limit their arsenals to 200-500 warheads each,"

given US and Soviet willingness to reduce to the 2,000 level. 82

Glaser agrees with this level of warheads and states, "An

assured destruction capability would require fewer than two

thousand weapons, and possibly fewer than one thousand.

This range depends on the yield of the weapons, their

survivability and penetrability, and whether the United states

is attacked by surprise or with warning." 83

So, depending on the particular strategy, analysts advocate

warhead levels between one and 4,000. In some cases, they find

it hard to determine whether these numbers refer strictly to

strategic warheads or to total operational warheads only. Some

authors specify survivable warheads, leaving the reader to

determine the total number of warheads needed based on

assumptions made about system capabilities and potential

scenarios .

Nuclear Posture

How should the United States posture its nuclear forces to

best achieve national security objectives? Achievement of

national military objectives short of war involves the ability to

clearly communicate US national will and resolve to defend its

vital security interests. US nuclear posture is a communication

of national resolve to use nuclear weapons if necessary.

Former Air Force chief of staff Larry Welch suggests four

major objectives for future US strategic nuclear forces:

" Ensure a deterrent force adequate to convince a rational adversary

that he has nothing to gain, and everything to lose, in initiating a

nuclear attack. The force must also be adequate to deal with potential

"third powers," armed with nuclear or other mass-destruction

weapons, whose behavior may be less rational .

89
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

" Increase stability by reducing the incentives for the first strike,

reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles

as a whole, and giving priority to highly survivable systems.

" Reduce the cost of strategic nuclear deterrent forces .

" Reduce incentives for destabilizing countermeasures. 84

During the SALT and START negotiations, much attention

and discussion revolved around the issue of stability . One of

the predominant concerns was crisis stability.

Crisis Stability

Crisis stability measures each side's resistance to use their

nuclear weapons out of fear that they may be annihilated

before they can be used . The major contributor to crisis

stability is weapon survivability-the ability to deploy a

weapon system in such a way that it could ride out a nuclear

attack and survive. This is the main reason ICBMs-and, in

particular, MIRVed ICBMs-are so destabilizing. With the

advent of greater accuracy, the only way to ensure

survivability is to launch them out under attack-a term quite

often referred to as use-or-lose. Submarines at sea and

deployed, mobile, land-based missiles are almost fully

survivable. The ability to flush aircraft from their bases before

incoming missiles could destroy them was the reason for

maintaining bombers on alert for so many years .

The Air Force considers the manned bomber to be the best

system to provide stability during times of crisis . In the words

of Gen John T. Chain,

During crisis situations with the Soviet Union, or any other possessor

of nuclear weapons, a premium is on U.S. forces that can provide our

national leadership with a variety of stabilizing response options to

help de-escalate the crisis . The manned bomber can be used as a

show-of-force to demonstrate resolve by increasing the number of

aircraft on alert, deploying them to dispersal bases, or putting them

airborne. This offers a rapid-response operational and employment

flexibility that is highly visible and unmatched by the other Triad

forces. 85

The majority of nuclear arms reduction talks have revolved

around achieving greater strategic stability with the

reductions. Planners have stressed the need for survivable

basing and deMIRVing land-based ICBMs to minimize the

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

benefit from a preemptive strike. They also have emphasized in

recent years ways to reduce "hard-target kill" capability .

Somewhere in the midst of the unilateral initiatives and the

Washington Summit agreement, someone subordinated the

issue of crisis stability budget concerns . The president

canceled both programs designed to provide survivability to

the US ICBM force-SICBM and Rail Garrison. He also took

bombers off alert-the same system that the START

negotiators agreed was the most stabilizing, so much so that

they instituted discount rules to incentivize its employment.

President Bush also placed ground and sea tactical nuclear

weapons in storage . Though not a likely scenario, if the

Russian republic were to launch a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack

on the United States today and the president elected not to

launch ICBMs on warning, the only survivable nuclear

weapons would be those deployed on submarines at sea.

By not posturing nuclear forces for survivability, one invites

a preemptive strike . Sergei Kortunov asserts that new arms

control negotiations should "emphasize removing incentives

for a nuclear first strike, reducing the concentration of

warheads on strategic weapons, and giving priority to highly

survivable systems ." 86

Paul Nitze states that the "restructuring of forces will be just as

important as the reductions." He suggests stabilizing measures to

include the elimination of land-based MIRVed weapons, reducing

missile throw weight, banning new technology development that

would threaten nuclear force survivability, and making remaining

forces as flexible as possible.$' As a means of stability, Paul

Warnke suggests that the United States "explore a ban on all

ballistic missiles" that "would in no way diminish the viability of

the U.S. deterrent, which can be adequately insured by the U.S.

bomber force alone."88

Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hipple want to achieve

survivability by mobile basing all ICBMs as single-warhead,

road-mobile SICBMs or SS-25s, continuing sea-basing on

SSBNs, and maintaining aircraft on alert. They suggest that

"to minimize dependence on strategic warning," the SSBNs

would be on at least a "50 percent at-sea rate," aircraft would

be on "at least a 50 percent runway alert rate," and mobile

ICBMs would "be kept dispersed in ones or twos ." 89

9 1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

This chapter has provided a broadbrush presentation of

many ideas that are on the table for the future direction of the

US nuclear arsenal. Since complete elimination of nuclear

weapons is not possible in the near future, the United States

requires a nuclear strategy for the post-cold war era. The

choice of strategy will dictate the number of nuclear weapons

necessary to support national security.

Many other considerations must be taken into account

when making future decisions. One factor is cost. Nuclear

weapons are relatively cheap, cheaper than some of their

high-tech conventional counterparts. Chemical and biological

weapons, commonly referred to as "the poor man's nukes,"

cost even less. While the United States rushes toward nuclear

disarmament and is readily embracing high-tech conventional

munitions, other countries do not have the budget or the

technology to pursue the conventional route . Nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons may be their only hope of

remaining competitive on the battlefield . The next chapter

discusses some of these potential threats.

Notes

1 . Paul C . Warnke, "Missionless Missiles," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992): 36.

2. William M. Arkin, Damian Durrant, and Hans Kristensen, "Nuclear

Weapons Headed for the Trash," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 47, no. 9

(December 1991) : 19.

3. David S. Yost, "Ibe Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?" Armed

Forces and Society 16, no. 4 (Summer 1990): 487.

4. Ibid., 490-92.

5. Kosta Tsipis, "Me Future of Nuclear Deterrence," in World Security:

Trends and Challenges at Century's End, Michael T. Klare and Daniel C .

Thomas, comp. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1991), 65.

6. See Jack Mendelsohn, "Enroll in Five Step Program," The Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992): 40. His understanding of submarine

capabilities and operations is a bit lacking, however. He proposes that

submarines could patrol out of range of targets. While this would have been

valid for Polaris- and Poseidon-class submarines, Trident missiles have the

capability to reach Russian targets from US ports. See Maj Gen Boris

Surikov, "USSR Breakup Makes Nuclear Reductions a Five-Way Deal,"

Armed Forces Journal International (March 1992): 38-39 . Surikov advocates

no-notice inspections to insure that cheating does not occur and that the

CIS and the United States should explore the possibility of a space-based

monitoring system.

7 . The details of this plan were discussed in chapter 1 .

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FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

8. Randall Forsberg, "Keep Peace by Pooling Armies," The Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992) : 41-42.

9. David Cortright, "From the Movement to the Moment," The Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992) : 15.

10. Joseph Rotblat, "Citizen Verification," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992): 19.

11 . Richard J. Barnet, "Twin Anachronisms: Nuclear Weapons and

Militarism," The Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992): 26.

12 . Theodore B . Taylor, "Just Unplug 'em," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992) : 28.

13. Adm Paul H. Nitze, The 1985 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, 28

March 1985, in Survival 27, no. 3 (May/June 1985) : 106.

14. Patrick J. Garrity, "The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in

International Politics: Possibilities, Limits, Uncertainties, Journal of Strategic

Studies 14, no. 4 (December 1991) : 463.

15. Ibid., 465.

16. Ibid., 500-501.

17. Nitze, 101 .

18. Some 300,000 German civilians were killed and 780,000 wounded

and 330,000 Japanese civilians were killed and an additional 476,000

wounded in Allied bombing attacks . The two atomic bombs accounted for

approximately 100,000 of those deaths and 100,000 of those injured . The

United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : reprinted by Air

University Press, October 1987), 6, 92, 100-101 .

19. Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear

Weapons After the Cold War," ForeignAffairs j`airs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991) : 102 .

20. "The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship," National

Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control

(CISAC) (Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1991), 3.

21 . Paul H. Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992) : 34.

22. Yost, 488.

23. James Kitfield, "The Perils of Proliferation," Government Executive 22,

no. 10 (October 1990): 34.

24 . Quoted in McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf,"

Foreign Affairs 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 84.

25. Kitfield, 34.

26. Lisa Beyer, "Military Options: Three Ethical Dilemmas," Tirne, 4

February 1991, 49.

27. Bundy, 87.

28. John Barry, "The Nuclear Option: Thinking the Unthinkable,"

Newsweek, 14 January 1991, 17.

29. Rotblat, 19.

30. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C . : The White House, August 1991), 26.

31 . Larry H. Addington, The Patterns ofWar Since the Eighteenth Century

(Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana University Press, 1984), 248.

32. Barnet, 27.

93
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

33. For a more in-depth look at these issues, see the series of articles in

The Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992).

34. Wolfgang Altenburg, "Defensive Alliance in a Nuclear World," Nato's

Sixteen Nations 34, no. 7 (December 1989): 20.

35 . Walter B. Slocombe, "Strategic Stability in a Restructured World,"

Survival 32, no. 4 (July/August 1990): 302.

36. Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," 34.

37. Sergei Kortunov, "Negotiating on Nuclear Weapons in Europe,"

Survival 33, no. 1 (January/February 1991) : 52.

38 . Beatrice Heuser, "What Nuclear Strategy For Post-Cold War

Europe?" Orbis 36, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 217.

39. Patrick J. Garrity and Sharon K. Weiner, "U.S. Defense Strategy After

the Cold War," The Washington Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992) : 67.

40. "Gorbachev Criticizes Lack of US Policy," Washington Post, 7 April

1989, 14, quoted in Garrity, "The Depreciation of Nuclear Weapons in

International Politics," 472.

41 . Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National

Security (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1989), 4-5.

42. Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II, "Countering the Threat

of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons,"

Strategic Review 19, no. 4 (Fall 1991) : 36.

43 . Ibid., 39.

44. Ibid., 36-38.

45. Some observers believe that the development of new tactical nuclear

weapons will have a destabilizing effect and give third world countries

reasons to develop their own nuclear weapons. See William M. Arkin and

Robert S. Norris, "Tinynukes for Mini Minds," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no . 3 (April 1992) : 24-25.

46. Thomas F. Ramos, "The Future of Theater Nuclear Forces," Strategic

Review 19, no. 4 (Fall 1991) : 43.

47. Thomas-Durell Young, "The Need for NATO-Europe's Substrategic

Nuclear Weapons," Orbis 36, no. 2 (Spring 1992) : 228.

48. Ibid., 229-31 .

49. Ibid., 231-32 .

50. Charles L. Glaser, "Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary: U.S. Planning

for the Post Soviet Era," International Security 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992) : 34.

51 . Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense," International Security 15, no. 4

(Spring 1991): 5.

52. George H. Quester, "The Future of Nuclear Deterrence," Survival 34,

no. 1 (Spring 1992): 74.

53. Ibid., 74.

54. Glaser, 35.

55. Garrity and Weiner, 67.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., 38.

58 . Tsipts, 65.

59 . Janne E. Nolan, "U.S. Strategy After the Cold War: Who Decides?"

Technology Review 94, no. 1 (January 1991): 54.

60. Ibid., 55-56.

94
FUTURE ROLE OF NUCLEARWEAPONS

61 . One should note that in recent years a greater involvement in the

targeting process by DOD civilians has occurred.

62 . Nolan, 56.

63. Michael J. Mazarr, "Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War," Washington

Quarterly 15, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 185.

64. Ibid., 190-91 .

65. Ibid., 194.

66. Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," 34.

67. Slocombe, 299.

68. Mazarr, 188 .

69. Ibid ., 195.

70. Ibid., 196.

71 . Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," 34.

72. Ibid ., 35.

73. "The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship," 3 .

74. No H. Daalder, "The Future of Arms Control," Survival 34, no. 1

(Spring 1992): 57.

75. Daniel Ellsberg, "Manhattan Project II," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 48, no. 4 (May 1992): 44.

76. Christopher Paine and Thomas B. Cochran, "So Little Time, So Many

Weapons, So Much To Do," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 48, no . 1

(January/ February 1992) : 15.

77. Kaysen, McNamara, and Rathjens, 107-8.

78. Warnke, 38.

79. Gen John T. Chain, "Peace Through Strength," Defense 90 (July/

August 1990): 23.

80. Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," 34.

81 . Harold A. Feiveson and Frank N. von Hipple, "Beyond START,"

International Security 15, no. 1 (Summer 1990): 156.

82. Ibid., 159-60.

83. Glaser, 76.

84. Larry D. Welch, "U.S. Strategic Forces After START," Global Affairs 6,

no. 3 (Summer 1991) : 37.

85 . John T. Chain, "The B-2 Bomber-A Technical Revolution," Nato's

Sixteen Nations 34, no. 7 (December 1989) : 21 .

86. Sergei Kortunov, "START II and Beyond," The Bulletin of Atomic

Scientists 46, no . 8 (October 1990): 21 .

87. Nitze, "Keep Nuclear Insurance," 35.

88. Warnke, 38.

89. Feiveson and von Hipple, 168.

95

Chapter 4

The Threat--Weapons of Mass Destruction

Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of

the Soviet Union, DOD has faced increasing difficulty in defining

a military threat to US national security on which to base

nuclear force structure requirements. The threat of a CIS

invasion of Europe or nuclear strike against the United States is,

at least for the time being, practically unthinkable. Until

recently, the Soviet threat formed the basis for US force

structure planning.' "The decline of the Soviet threat has

fundamentally changed the concept of threat analysis as a basis

for force structure planning." 2 According to Gen Cohn Powell,

"The real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the

uncertain. The threat is instability and being unprepared to

handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected. " 3

In the absence of a true threat, analysts must employ

hypothetical scenarios to evaluate nuclear and conventional

force needs and capabilities . The press severely criticized this

approach when the seven hypothetical defense planning

guidance scenarios were leaked in February 1992 . (The

criticizing press failed to propose an alternate methodology.)

Many analytical groups as well as individuals have provided

their own independent assessments of how to determine force

structure needs and how many nuclear weapons should be

retained. Chapter 3 examined a variety of these opinions

regarding the future need for US nuclear weapons. The majority

of these studies and articles have examined nuclear

requirements from a purely subjective "feel" rather than using

objective criteria. Such "analyses" recommend an arbitrary

number of nuclear weapons to meet US needs. This bottom-up

approach defines nuclear requirements in total deference to

national objectives and strategy . The danger of such an

approach, however, is that one opinion may have just as much

validity as another-without some objective evaluation criteria.

There is no wrong answer. This chapter examines present and

97
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

potential nuclear, chemical, and biological threats to US

national security interests. 4

Proliferation

Armed with a new defense strategy, the United States has

focused much attention on sizing its military forces to meet

the most likely threat-regional conflicts. The greatest threat

in a regional conflict is one that involves weapons of mass

destruction. President Bush stated, "In the postCold War era,

one of our most threatening national security challenges is the

spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to

deliver them ." 5

According to Dick Cheney, secretary of defense in the Bush

administration,

it is estimated that by the year 2000 at least 15 developing nations

may have the ability to build ballistic missiles-eight of which either

have or could be near acquiring nuclear weapons . Perhaps as many as

30 may have chemical weapons, and 10 could deploy biological

weapons. 6

US Approach to Proliferation

In the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States,

President Bush stated, "A new world order is not a fact; it is an

aspiration-and an opportunity . . . to build a new international

system in accordance with our own values and ideals"7

[emphasis added] . The key is the phrase, "our own values ."

President Bush merely affirmed what the rest of the world

already suspected-that the United States will use its

superpower status to direct a "new world order" in a direction

amenable to itself. In his 1992 State of the Union Address,

President Bush declared the United States "the one sole

°minent power" and "the leader of the world." He also stated

that "the world trusts us with power" and "trust[s] us to do

what is right. "$ These sweeping generalizations are not true for

all nations . A number of countries do not agree with US

foreign policy, particularly when it involves the use of political,

°conomic, or military power to leverage change. Several of

these countries already have or are attempting to acquire

98
THE THREAT

weapons of mass destruction . In the future, these countries

may threaten or actually use weapons of mass destruction in

protest of US foreign policy.

While declaring the United States to be the leader, President

Bush also stated, "We cannot be the world's policeman with

responsibility for solving all the world's security problems." In

light of the successful multinational involvement in Desert

Storm, President Bush suggested that the world is in a "period

of transition" and can seize the opportunity for the United

Nations to function in accordance with its designed purpose,

"with the world's leading nations orchestrating and sanctioning

collective action against aggression ."9 Multinational rule

requires both a consensus for action and a willingness for

nations to commit their own military forces against aggressors .

Historically, consensus has been a problem. The United

Nations Security Council has authorized the use of force only

twice in its history-the Korean War and Desert Storm. In both

instances, the United States provided the bulk of the

manpower and the equipment. Until other nations belly up to

the bar, the United States must maintain the capability to act

unilaterally in potential future conflicts.

National leadership is optimistic that nonproliferation efforts

will be successful in stemming the flow of weapons of mass

destruction to third world countries . Like the old adage, "an

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure," the Bush

administration devoted an intense amount of effort to export

controls designed to keep critical weapons and technologies

out of the hands of would-be aggressors. Chapter 2 listed a

number of the major nonproliferation efforts with which the

United States is involved . These controlling actions are

nothing more than the "haves" dictating policy to the

"have-nots ." Mariam Aftab (a research associate at the

Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad) asserts:

Thus what the "new world order" is advocating is not international

arms control but a sort of an "arms apartheid" whereby certain

countries will be allowed to build up military arsenals and others will

be forced to cut defence expenditure in the name of either international

or regional stability and/or development. t o

In some cases, third world countries are beginning to voice

objections to these conditions. For example, Mexico and other

99
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

third world countries have been vocal in demanding that a

comprehensive test ban be instituted prior to renewing the

1968 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) in 1995. Yet, both

Great Britain and the United States have been adamant

regarding the need for continued nuclear testing.

A halt to nuclear testing would not eliminate weapons or increase

security, but it would erode confidence in our deterrent [sic] and

severely restrict our ability to make improvements, especially in

nuclear safety."

But by taking such a position, the United States may be

sending the wrong message.

In putting itself at odds with influential third world countries on this

issue, the administration is telling them, in effect, that it considers the

maintenance and upgrading of its own nuclear forces to be more

important than preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. 12

The United States has, to date, relied on arms control

measures as the primary method in achieving regional

stability. Many third world countries view imposed arms

control as discriminatory. A. Z. Hilali (a faculty member in the

Department of International Relations at the University of

Peshawar) states,

In the third world itself the necessity for arms control is not seen as a

burning issue . These countries point to the enormous arms potentials

in the industrial countries and demand that they too should have to

take effective measures to promote the processes of arms control and

disarmament. 13

Attacking the problem of weapons of mass destruction

through arms control measures merely treats a symptom.

Geoffrey Kemp (a special assistant to the president during the

first Reagan administration and now a senior associate at the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) states :

If there is a lesson to be learned from the European experience on

conventional arms-control negotiations, it is that until there is a

movement toward the resolution of basic political and geographic

aspects of the problem, detailed blueprints for arms control will not

succeed. Europe at last is making progress on arms control because

the political environment has changed. 14

Further, Kemp states that third world countries view arms

control as unwanted internal meddling:

100
THE THREAT

Many of the regional states see arms-control initiatives as an attempt

to interfere with their national security needs at a time when the old

collective security umbrellas are being removed. Most regional states

believe that arms-control arrangements must either parallel or follow

progress on the resolution of regional conflicts, not precede it . 15

Aaron Karp (a guest scholar at the Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute) agrees that arms control alone does

not hold the answer. Although he deals specifically with ballistic

missile proliferation, his insights pertain to all weapons.

There is no simple solution to the missile proliferation problem. Like

other major challenges to international security, missile proliferation

cannot be taken care of through export controls, missile defenses, or

regional arms control. Long-term security can be ensured only by

reducing the motives behind missile proliferation. To reduce their

prestige value, the international community can erect a new norm

against ballistic missiles. But security motives can only be ameliorated

by addressing regional political disputes. 16

While US nonproliferation efforts may be effective in slowing

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they will not

be able to prevent it . The 16 March 1992 edition of U.S. News

& World Report states, "The West's attempt to prevent the

spread of nuclear weapons has failed, and a dangerous new

era of nuclear proliferation has begun." 17

Proliferation Rationale

To understand the proliferation problem, one must

understand the mind-set of third world leaders and, in

particular, their reasons for wanting weapons of mass

destruction and ballistic missile delivery systems .

Traditionally, the possession of nuclear weapons has equated

to having a strong voice in world affairs; all members of the UN

Security Council are nuclear powers . Third world countries see

the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a means toward

furthering their political objectives. They have learned well

from the United States and Soviet Union that policy is dictated

through power.

Many third world countries want to acquire weapons of

mass destruction to achieve regional supremacy . Regional

disputes are often deeply rooted in national, cultural, and

ethnic issues. An understanding of these issues is paramount

to solving the problem.

10 1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Some third world countries may be acquiring weapons of

mass destruction to counter US intervention in their affairs.

After the Gulf War, a spokesman for Iran declared, "No country

has the right to come here and make decisions about the

future of Islamic countries .

'118 Chemical and biological

weapons have been termed the "poor man's nuke," providing

third world countries with weapons of terror without the high

cost of technology needed to develop nuclear weapons .

However, Desert Storm may have made nuclear weapons a

worthwhile investment for third world nations.

Desert Storm introduced a new strategic weapon-the

precision-guided conventional munition . The high cost of this

technology is prohibitive for third world countries. The United

States showed the inability of the world's fourth largest army

to stand up to such technology in Desert Storm. Nuclear

weapons may become the most cost-effective means for poorer

nations to compete against expensive high-technology

weapons . One of the lessons learned from the Gulf War,

according to the Indian military chief of staff, was that one

should "never fight the United States without [having] nuclear

weapons." 19 Yossef Bodansky (contributing editor of Defense &

Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy) reported that the Gulf War

produced a "sudden intensification of the drive to acquire

nuclear weapons" by the North Korean, Iranian, Libyan,

Syrian, and Cuban alliance . 2o

As mentioned earlier, many third world countries see arms

control as discriminatory . Discriminatory arms control may

act to encourage proliferation. Evaluating the NPT, George W.

Rathjens and Marvin M. Miller (senior research scientist with

the Department of Nuclear Engineering and the Center for

International Studies at MIf state:

In its genesis and its implementation, it reflects policies of denial-and

worse yet, of discriminatory denial: it attempts to prevent nonweapons

states from acquiring nuclear weapons but permits the weapons states

to retain them, further develop them, and acquire more. 21

Further, they state:

Attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation by denying nations access to

nuclear technology or by destroying a nascent nuclear infrastructure

might delay the attainment of such capabilities . But military actions

are unlikely to eliminate motivations and may even reinforce them. The

102
THE THREAT

best hopes for reducing the impetus for vulnerable states to acquire

nuclear weapons lie in guaranteeing security. 22

Most countries desire weapons of mass destruction as a

means of security. The increasing availability of modern

conventional weaponry has contributed to the third world's

arms race. Yahya Sadowski (senior fellow in the Brookings

Foreign Policy Studies program) asserts that arms control

proposals may "soon be eclipsed by a new round of the

regional arms race . Arab states cannot afford to lag too far

behind their neighbors in arms acquisition.

"23 The reduction

in conventional forces required under the Conventional Forces

in Europe agreement will create a tremendous surplus of arms

that third world countries will stand in line to purchase. In the

absence of increased government restrictions, defense

industries will continue to compete for third world dollars.

Sadowski cites the United States as one of the major

contributors to the third world arms race:

Despite President Bush's assertion that "it would be tragic" if the Gulf

War were followed by a renewal of the arms race in the region, the

United States has emerged as the largest weapons proliferator in the

Middle East market. When queried about this development, American

officials replied with the formula that "there is absolutely no

contradiction between arms control and arms sales ." 24

Jennifer Scarlott (fellow of the World Policy Institute at the

New School for Social Research) states that the sale of

conventional weapons has a direct link to proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction:

By continuing to transfer large amounts of conventional weapons to

troubled regions, the United States and other arms suppliers are also

contributing to the spread of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles,

as heavily armed third world countries seek a qualitative edge in

rapidly escalating regional arms races. This trend is not only

dangerous in itself, but may increase pressure for nuclear

proliferation. 25

Ballistic Missiles. Ballistic missiles provide the delivery

capability to make weapons of mass destruction truly weapons

of terror. Janne E . Nolan suggests that there are several

reasons third world countries pursue ballistic missile

technology beyond its inherent characteristics of speed,

difficulty to defend against, and capability of carrying weapons

103
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

of mass destruction: "Emerging missile programs also reflect

countries' long-term aspirations for technology status . . .

[and] the means to prosecute local and regional ambitions

immune from the dictates of the superpowers ." Further, she

states, "For many developing states, the capability to produce

weapons indigenously has become the sine qua. non of national

sovereignty. 1126

In addition to these reasons, Andrew Hull, writing for Jane's

Intelligence Review, states, "Third World states, in part,

acquire missiles for the same pragmatic reason as more

industrialized states-deterrence ."27 He also cites several other

reasons that third world countries will acquire ballistic

missiles . Attacks on the enemy's population act to demoralize

the population and make them feel vulnerable to attacks that

cannot be defended . Ballistic missiles provide the capability for

seizing military initiative and tactical surprise . They also can

supplement aircraft strike and interdiction missions .

Additionally, they may be used as a political statement, an act

of retribution, or, even in the face of a tactical defeat, a sign to

the enemy "that he is not yet in control of the situation."28

Ballistic missiles can carry out attacks on the enemy even

when the enemy possesses air superiority. Although ballistic

missiles are not "a cost-effective means for delivering

conventional explosives," Steve Fetter (assistant professor in

the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland,

College Park) suggests that they can be cost effective at short

ranges when aircraft attrition rates are high. 29

Desert Storm taught the world a tremendous lesson about

the value of mobile missiles . In the words of Barry Schneider

and Larry Fink (weapons systems and political analysts for the

Hams Group, Reston, Virginia), "Mobile missiles can avoid

detection even when a superpower trains all its intelligencegathering capabilities on the task of finding and counting

them."30 Saddam launched Scud missiles almost with impunity.

Sometimes the presence of a missile's plume was the only way

for the United States to successfully locate a launcher.

Given these reasons for the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction and the means to deliver them, what possible

threats will the United States face in the post-cold war era?

Many unclassified sources deal with current capabilities of

104
THE THREAT

nations that possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic

missiles. Some of them are factual; some are speculative. When

it comes to predicting the future, the literature is even more

speculative. The following is a brief summary of some of these

threats and is by no means exhaustive.

Nuclear Threats and Considerations

George W. Rathjens and Marvin M. Miller state,

Almost 30 years ago, John Kennedy warned that the ability to produce

nuclear weapons could spread to 10 countries by 1970 and perhaps 15

or 20 by 1975 . "Horizontal" proliferation to this extent did not occur, in

part because the world was divided into two power blocs. With the

United States and the Soviet Union guaranteeing security within their

alliances, other member states, aside from Britain, France, and China,

felt little pressure to develop indigenous nuclear weapons programs. 31

This bilateral power balance has been significantly altered with

the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the

Soviet Union. Those countries that were allied with the former

Soviet Union no longer have an expressed nuclear guarantee,

particularly when ethnic or national rivalries may pit these

countries against one another or even Russia. These countries

may have a strong interest in acquiring nuclear weapons to

protect their own sovereignty. US allies, as well, may seek their

own nuclear weapons to maintain insurance against regional

powers who choose to acquire nuclear weapons . The previous

section outlined numerous reasons that third world countries,

who may not be allied with either the United States or the CIS,

may seek to acquire nuclear weapons.

Up until the START II treaty, nuclear reductions have

proceeded unilaterally and bilaterally between the United

States and the CIS. These reductions assume a huge gap

between the United States/CIS nuclear capability and that of

other nuclear countries . Most Americans seem to view the

START II limits on nuclear weapons as a sort of plateau, below

which the United States should not venture without involving

other nuclear nations . At lower nuclear weapon levels,

strategists are concerned about five different categories of

nations which will, or already have the potential to, affect the

balance of power: (1) countries that have developed and

105
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

declared nuclear weapons ; (2) countries that have built

nuclear weapons but not declared them; (3) countries that

have developed the capability to produce nuclear weapons but

have stopped short of actually producing them; (4) countries

that may soon develop the capability to produce nuclear

weapons, either through indigenous effort or by purchasing

technology and skilled labor; and (5) countries that may be

able to bypass the developmental stage and directly purchase

complete nuclear weapons.

Current Nuclear Countries

Currently five countries have declared their nuclear statusthe United States, CIS, France, Great Britain, and China. Of

these, the CIS clearly draws the most concern .

CIS. Unclassified estimates of the Soviet nuclear stockpile

range from 25,000 to 32,000 weapons . 32 The United States

was extremely concerned during the August 1991 Soviet coup

attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev about the safety and

security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The subsequent

breakup and unstable economic conditions within the CIS

further heightened US concerns about the possibility of

nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, and nuclear scientists

appearing on the underground market.

Barry Schneider, writing just prior to the Soviet breakup,

suggests five major concerns regarding Soviet nuclear

weapons: (1) the possibility of nuclear proliferation if the Soviet

Union splintered into several smaller nuclear countries; (2) the

possibility of nuclear weapons being sold or transferred to

other nations or terrorist groups; (3) the possibility of nuclear

weapons being used by republics and ethnic groups to achieve

their goals or prevent interference from the central

government; (4) the possibility that nuclear weapons may be

used in a "use-or-lose" scenario in which Red Army troops face

being overrun by superior numbers of local militia; and (5) the

possibility that a republic or ethnic group may seize nuclear

weapons to blackmail Moscow into not acting against their

desire to secede. 33 Many of these concerns are still valid for the

CIS . Schneider's first concern already has occurred-one

nuclear state became four nuclear states-Russia, Belorussia,

Ukraine, and Kazakhstan .

106
THE THREAT

Even though the four nuclear republics have agreed to

implement START and consolidate all strategic nuclear

weapons under Russia, these republics have a long way to go

before they achieve nuclear-free status. Much could happen

during the interim-anything from reneging on the START

agreement to nuclear civil war. In fact, as of March 1993,

Ukraine remained the only party that had not ratified START I,

refusing to do so without "security assurances from the United

States and Russia."m Currently the Ukraine has

176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (130 SS-19s and 24

SS-24s in silos) with 1,360 strategic nuclear warheads, Blackjack

strategic bombers, and a few thousand tactical nuclear warheads. That

is more than is presently possessed by Great Britain, France, China,

and Israel combined. Kazakhstan has 104 heavy missiles (SS-18s) with

1,040 strategic warheads, Bear-H strategic bombers, and a substantial

number of tactical warheads. This makes Kazakhstan the largest

nuclear power in Asia apart from Russia.35

Sergei Rogov (deputy director of the Institute for the Study of

USA and Canada, in Moscow) states that "with the passing of

the cold war, policymakers and pundits in the capitals of the

West have breathed a heavy sigh of relief'; however, those in

Moscow "see all too clearly the prospects for chaos ." 36 Writing

after the formation of the CIS, he suggests three possible

future paths for the CIS : (1) the formation of "a loose

confederation" with military and nuclear forces remaining

"under some form of central control" ; (2) the formation of "a

military and political alliance of independent states without a

central government but with unified military forces" ; and (3)

"chaotic disintegration, a fragmentation of Soviet military

power, and potential competition among new states ." He

contends that over the "long term," the probability of the last

option occurring is "60 percent," considering the "ethnic

conflict" and "competing territorial claims. "37

Observers have voiced serious concerns regarding the

security of tactical nuclear weapons, which may not be as

carefully guarded as strategic weapons. Observers have

estimated that as many as 5,000 tactical warheads are

dispersed among eight non-Russian republics . 38 Rodman D.

Griffin, writing for the CQ Researcher, states that there are

about 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons in the former Soviet

107
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

arsenal. These weapons are stored at some 200 depots . 39 This

situation presents a tremendous risk. There have been news

reports alleging that Soviet weapons already have been sold to

external agencies.

Corriere della Sera reported in January that investigators had found

documentary evidence about the sale of nuclear artillery shells from a

Soviet base in Irkutsk . . . . La Stampa charged that Soviet officers have

been selling tactical nuclear weapons to the mafia. 4o

Investigators are extremely concerned about the possible sale

of nuclear materials as well. They seized a small sample of

plutonium in northern Italy in October 1991 and 65 pounds of

uranium in Zurich, Switzerland, in November 1991 . They

charged that both samples were produced in the Soviet Union

and were bound for the Middle East. 41 "Germany alone is alleged

to have carried out over 100 arrests associated with efforts to

smuggle nuclear materials originating in the republics of the

former Soviet Union.

"42 Yossef Bodansky reported that:

By the end of 1991, Iran had all (or virtually all) the components to

make three operational weapons. . . . The weapons were assembled

from parts bought in the ex-Soviet Muslim republics. These weapons

can become operational as early as February to April 1992. 43

The article provides a believable and detailed account of the

interaction between specific individuals in Iran and

Kazakhstan that was purposed to achieve an "Islamic bomb."

Robert M. Gates, director of the Central Intelligence Agency

at the end of the Bush administration, attempted to defuse

such reports while testifying before a Senate committee .

We have seen a number of the press reports that Soviet nuclear

materials have already been offered on the black market. Thus far, we

have no independent corroboration that any of these stories are true,

and all that we have been able to check out have turned out to be

false. . . . We can expect to see many of these scams and hoaxes .44

Testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

on 24 February 1993, James Woolsey, new CIA director,

agreed with Gates.

So far, we have detected no transfers of weapons-grade material in

significant quantities. We have no credible reporting that nuclear weapons

have left CIS territory, and we do not believe that nuclear weapons design

information has been sold or transferred to foreign states. 45

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THE THREAT

Besides the potential loss of nuclear material and weapons,

the United States has been concerned about Soviet

nuclear-trained personnel selling their skills to third world

countries who are willing to pay much higher salaries than the

CIS can compete with . The 1991-1992 Strategic Survey states :

Of most immediate concern are the thousands of scientists and

engineers left with little work or pay after the collapse of the Soviet

Union. The USSR employed some 100,000 people in nuclear weapons

establishments . According to CIA Director Gates, approximately

1,000-2,000 have detailed knowledge of weapons design and

3,000-5,000 others were directly involved in related manufacturing

processes . . . . Ex-Soviet nuclear weapons experts . . . report

employment offers from Brazil, China, India, Iraq, and Libya, raising

fears of an international auction for their talents. 46

Reporting on the means by which Iran assembled its bombs,

Yossef Bodansky states that "Iran recruited, for the construction

of the weapons, some 50 experts and around 200 senior

technicians mostly from the Kurchatov (Semipalatinsk-21) nuclear

production plant in Kazakhstan." He continues that the experts

are paid the United States equivalent of $5,000 per month and

that Iran sought to hire senior nuclear scientists from the

Kurchatov Institute in Moscow for the United States equivalent

of $30,000 per month. Scientists in the CIS currently make

about $5 per month. 47 A December article in the Washington

71ales reported that as many as 60 scientists from the former

Soviet Union were being employed in India, Iraq, Iran, Brazil,

and Pakistan, earning as much as $75,000 per year. 48

The CIA also attempted to diffuse the brain-drain problem at

the 24 February testimony by distributing a January 1993

Russian foreign intelligence (FIS) report. While acknowledging

the existence of the problem, it stated:

A comparatively small percentage of the many hundreds of thousands

of specialists and scientists employed in the area of nuclear physics,

chemistry, biology, and even missile building are privy to the secrets of

designing, calculating, modeling, and assembling experimental and

combat copies of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] systems. 4s

The report went on to say that the FIS had no knowledge that

any of these specialists were working for third world countries .

One would hope that the CIA and FIS statements are

absolutely true, but can the United States bet its national

security interests on the inability of the CIA and the FIS to

109
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

confirm (at least publicly) the transfer of nuclear materials anc

scientists? And even if the CIA and the FIS reports are correct

what effect will they have on the Middle Eastern countries whc

believe that transfers have occurred?

China. China detonated a nuclear device successfully ir.

1964 but has not aggressively pursued the acquisition of

nuclear weapons . Observers estimate that China presently

possesses approximately 375 strategic nuclear weapons and

125 tactical warheads . 5 ° The launch capabilities of these

weapons and warheads are limited to eight ICBMs, 60 ICBMs,

and 12 SLBMs (one SSBN) . 51 Additionally, they probably have

some air-drop capability.

China has been a US concern with regard to proliferation. It

has been a major supplier of conventional arms to the third

world and has helped several countries establish nuclear

research programs. 52 China joined the NPT in March 1992, which

may help to alleviate US concerns over nuclear proliferation.

That China presently has a small nuclear arsenal may

comprise only half of the story. China could have a significant

amount of weapons-grade materials in storage for quick

assembly into weapons . Additionally, it may have a significant

production base for producing nuclear material .

At least three situations could cause China to consider

increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal. First, Kazakhstan

could decide to keep some number of nuclear weapons as

opposed to becoming nuclear-free, which would greatly affect

the balance of nuclear power within the region . Some

individuals have voiced considerable concern regarding the

possibility of Kazakhstan allying itself with other Moslem

states . Second, tensions may rise again between India and

Pakistan. Many analysts fear the potential of a nuclear arms

race between these two countries . Should an arms race occur,

China most likely would respond with weapons development

as well. Third, North Korea's potential for nuclear capability,

coupled with their development of longer range ballistic

missiles, also may be seen as a threat by China.

France. France, although an ally and a member of NATO,

has pursued a nuclear capability separate from NATO control

since its first successful nuclear test in 1960. It joined the NPT

in March of 1992 . France also has adhered to a testing

110
THE THREAT

moratorium since 8 April 1992 and has agreed to refrain from

further tests, conditional on US and Russian refraining as

well. 53 Currently, France has approximately 450 strategic

nuclear weapons and 125 tactical weapons . 54 Besides

nuclear-capable aircraft, France has six SSBNs (with a total of

96 launchers), 18 IRBMs, and 40 SRBM launchers. 55 In

considering further drawdowns, observers certainly cannot

consider French weapons additive in the sense of an alliance

with the United States.

Great Britain. Britain became a nuclear power in 1952 . It has

approximately 275 strategic nuclear weapons and 100 tactical

warheads. 56 Besides having nuclear-capable aircraft, Britain has

launcher capabilities strictly in the sea leg. These capabilities are

currently being upgraded, as the British are replacing four older

Resolution-class SSBNs with four Vanguard and Trident SSBNs.

Although Britain is part of NATO, the United States cannot

assume that Britain will always side with the United States in

the event of unilateral actions.

Current Nuclear-Capable and

Undeclared Nuclear Countries

Perhaps even more dangerous than declared nuclear

countries are those with undeclared nuclear weapons or those

with the capability to assemble nuclear weapons quickly.

Those countries are referred to as de facto nuclear countries . 57

While declared weapons and intentions provide a visible

deterrent, undeclared capabilities leave open the whole realm

of motives and possible actions . Three nations probably

possess nuclear weapons but have chosen not to declare

them-Israel, India, and Pakistan. South Africa recently

declared that it possessed six nuclear weapons, but it has

since dismantled them . 58

India and Pakistan. The possibility of an arms race between

India and Pakistan continues as a major concern to the United

States. Gates testified :

We have no reason to believe that either India or Pakistan maintains

assembled or deployed nuclear bombs. But such weapons could be

assembled quickly, and both countries have combat aircraft that could

be modified to deliver them in a crisis . 5s

111
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

India tested a nuclear device in 1974 and declared it a

peaceful demonstration . Analysts estimate that India may

have enough materials to assemble from 40 to 60 weapons

and may be working on developing thermonuclear capability.

Pakistan may have obtained the capability to build a nuclear

device in 1986. Analysts estimate Pakistan's capability ranges

from five to 10 ready-to-assemble warheads . 60 Neither country

holds a membership in the NPT.

Israel. As mentioned earlier, Israel has not declared its

nuclear capability. Scientists believe that Israel achieved nuclear

capability in the late 1960s . Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli

nuclear technician, released information regarding the Dimona

nuclear weapons facilities, where he was employed from 1977 to

1985 . Based on Vanunu's testimony, the London Sunday Times

reported that Israel may have as many as 200 nuclear weapons.

US officials stated that Israel's Dimona reactor could not have

produced enough plutonium to support that many weapons and

that Israel probably has only 50 to 60 weapons. 61

South Africa. South Africa has had the capability to

produce nuclear weapons since the early 1980s . Some

analysts believe that it has stockpiled as many as 15 to 25

nuclear weapons . 62 South Africa joined the NPT in 1991 and

agreed to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

safeguards. South African President F. W. de HIerk's statement

that all nuclear weapons have been dismantled seems to be

somewhat substantiated by the IAEA, which declared that

"115 inspections of South Africa's nuclear facilities revealed no

evidence of incomplete information on its nuclear program ." 63

However, dismantlement of the six declared weapons occurred

in 1990, prior to its joining the NPT.

Developing Nuclear Countries

As already mentioned, the United States became

preoccupied with the possible exodus of both nuclear

materials and Russian scientists after the disintegration of the

Soviet Union. The scientists could shave years off the time

required for a country's research and development efforts to

obtain a nuclear weapon. Additionally, many Americans are

concerned about the potential sale of CIS nuclear weapons

and material to third world countries. Third world countries

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THE THREAT

may bypass the indigenous development phase and simply

purchase complete nuclear weapons. Robert M. Gates stated

that "US or multinational forces deployed abroad could face an

increased threat of air-delivered nuclear weapons before the

end of the decade. "64

Of particular interest to the United States is the loose

alliance between North Korea, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Cuba.

They formed this alliance in the early 1980s. These countries

have provided a front "for the USSR in sponsoring terrorism

and revolutionary warfare in return for a strategic umbrella

vis-d.-vis the United States ." Two events have intensified efforts

within the alliance to acquire nuclear weapons-the collapse of

the Soviet Union and its nuclear umbrella over these countries

and the Gulf War with the UN-imposed nuclear sanctions

against Iraq. 65

North Korea. North Korea signed the NPT in 1985 but refused

to sign the IAEA safeguard agreement to allow inspection of its

nuclear facilities. The United States and South Korea took

several steps to apply pressure on the North Koreans. The

United States removed all nuclear weapons from South Korea in

1991 and granted North Korea the right to inspect these

facilities . South Koreans made a pledge to remain nuclear-free.

North Koreans responded by signing a joint declaration on 31

December 1991 in which it agreed to "ban possession or

development of nuclear weapons, and allow inspection of

suspected nuclear weapons-related sites ." 66 Both countries

agreed to form a Joint Nuclear Control Commission in March

1992 to oversee the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

67

North Korea has one operational reactor and another one

under construction . It is estimated that the operational reactor

can produce 14 pounds of plutonium annually and that the

second could produce from 36 to 100 pounds annually. North

Korea is also constructing a processing plant that could be

used to turn the plutonium into a nuclear bomb . North Korean

defectors have indicated the possibility of underground

nuclear facilities, thereby posing the potential of another Iraq.

Nuclear weapons deployed on Scud variants could threaten

not only South Korea but Japan as wells$ Japan stated that

"Tokyo would not go through with its plan to award North

Korea financial compensation related to the Japanese

113
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

occupation of Korea during World War II" if North Korea

completes the construction of its "plutonium separation

facility-even if operated under IAEA safeguards ." This

presents a double standard, since Japan maintains a

plutonium-processing capability that North Korea contends is

too large based on civilian needs alone.ss

Although North Korea allowed some preliminary IAEA

inspections beginning in 1991, it refused to allow inspectors to

visit two suspicious sites at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in

January 1993 and subsequently denied a request by the IAEA

in February to perform a special inspection of the sites.'°

North Korea's actions have added to US concern that the

North Koreans may be attempting to conceal a nuclear

weapons program and are stalling until they achieve some

minimal capability. James Woolsey testified that "North Korea

has already manufactured enough fissile materials for at least

one nuclear weapon."71

Iran . Iran signed the NPT in 1970 but nonetheless has been

actively pursuing nuclear weapons . Iran signed a cooperative

agreement with Pakistan in 1986 whereby Iranian nuclear

scientists would receive training in Pakistan for Iranian

financial support of Pakistan's nuclear program. Iran also

received Pakistani help on the construction of a reactor in

1989 . 72 Despite these activities, Woolsey testified that Iran

would take "at least eight to 10 years to produce its own

nuclear weapons"-but that time could be shortened with

outside assistance. 73 As discussed earlier, Iran may have

obtained nuclear materials from CIS sources. Tehran signed a

nuclear cooperative agreement with Cuba in September 1991

and is committed to providing Syria with a nuclear umbrella

once it obtains a nuclear weapon. 74

Libya. Libya became an NPT member in 1975. It has made

numerous attempts to purchase nuclear materials and elicit

help for its nuclear programs . Libya is reported to have made

several contacts in the CIS, but there have been no reports of

success. M. Qadhafi believes that the coalition would not have

attacked Iraq if Saddam had possessed nuclear weapons . 75

Libya provides a significant amount of services and finances

to the alliance. Bodansky states,

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THE THREAT

In the mid-1980s, Libya established a wide network of front-companies

and underground financing institutions which is being utilized for the

illegal acquisition of Western technologies and equipment and their

smuggling into radical states . 7s

North Korea has made extensive use of this network. In one

instance, a sample of US zirconium was obtained via a West

German company.

Syria. Syria, though having no nuclear program to speak of,

has been actively seeking to establish one . It has sent

individuals to France and other places for training, signed a

cooperative agreement with India in 1981, and is working with

China to purchase a research reactor. 77

Cuba. Cuba is in the process of building two nuclear power

plants . Cuba refuses to sign both the NPT and the Treaty of

Tlatelolco. 78 This latter treaty declares that Latin America and

the Caribbean are free of nuclear weapons . Cuba signed

nuclear cooperative agreements with North Korea in February

1990 and with Iran in September 1991 . 79

While Cuba does not have an advanced nuclear program, it

does have military expertise and hardware. Cuba maintains a

wing of nuclear-capable MiG-23BN Floggers in underground

shelters . The Soviets trained the Cuban pilots for low-level

nuclear delivery missions in the United States. 8°

Argentina and Brazil. Argentina and Brazil have had

nuclear research programs since the 1950s, although neither

nation possessed operational nuclear reactors until the 1970s.

Both countries achieved nuclear enrichment capabilities by

the late 1980s . 81 Neither country has signed the NPT, viewing

it as discriminatory and providing insufficient protection

against nuclear attacks. 82 Argentina and Brazil did sign a

mutual nuclear nonproliferation act in July 1991 . This act not

only declares that nuclear energy was designed for peaceful

purposes, but it also bans nuclear testing and allows for joint

monitoring of the two nations' nuclear facilities . The nuclear

inspections agreement virtually parallels IAEA safeguards.

Both Brazil and Argentina have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco,

but only Brazil has ratified it . 83

Taiwan. Taiwan has a nuclear power program but does not

have facilities to produce weapons-grade fuel . Although

Taiwan signed the NPT in 1970, it built a secret lab in 1987 to

115
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

extract plutonium. Taiwan disassembled the facility, under US

pressure, prior to its use. 84 However, any increase in perceived

threat from China could prompt Taiwan to develop nuclear

weapons .

Iraq. Patrick Glynn, a resident scholar at the American

Enterprise Institute, asks the question that many other

observers have pondered, "How did Iraq, a signatory of the

1968 Nonproliferation Treaty, manage to get so close to a

bomb while ostensibly remaining under the treaty's

`safeguards'?" 85 Iraq ratified the NPT in 1969 . Observers

estimate that Iraq would have achieved a nuclear capability

within six to 18 months of the Gulf War. US air attacks

destroyed the majority of Iraq's nuclear facilities . UN

Resolution 687 mandates that Iraq dismantle the remainder of

its nuclear facilities . The real question now focuses on how

long it will take for Iraq to reestablish those capabilities once

UN members pull out. In the words of Jaffar Dhia Jaffar, Iraq's

leading nuclear physicist, "You can bomb our buildings . You

can destroy our technology. But you cannot take it out of our

heads. We now have the capability." 86 Scientists believe Iraq

could regain its nuclear infrastructure within a few years . 87

Algeria. Algeria purchased a reactor from Argentina in

1985. Argentina required the 1 MW natural-uranium reactor to

be placed under IAEA inspection . It appears that this

purchase was a deception plan to cloak the purchase of a

larger reactor. 88 In 1991 the United States detected the

construction of a second larger reactor through cooperation

with China . Much secrecy surrounds this reactor, and the ring

of antiaircraft missiles around it adds to US suspicions despite

Algerian-announced peaceful intentions. 89 China claims that

the reactor contract with Algeria was signed in 1983, prior to

China's joining the NPT in 1984. 9 ° Scientists believe the

reactor in Algeria can produce 12 pounds of plutonium each

year. 91 Algeria agreed to IAEA inspections of the second reactor

in February 1992; however, their intentions are still unclear. 92

Others. Several countries have extensive ongoing nuclear

research programs. Others have stockpiled large quantities of

nuclear materials . Iraq proved that membership in the NPT

and IAEA inspections are no guarantee that a country is not

116
THE THREAT

developing nuclear weapons. Jennifer Scarlott states that the

NPT has

failed to prevent nations from acquiring the materials to abruptly opt

for nuclear weapons at a time of their choosing. Belgium, Germany,

Japan, and Switzerland are all stockpiling large quantities of

plutonium and bomb-grade uranium, as well as the means to turn

these materials into bombs. 93

While such countries may have no current need to build

nuclear weapons, regional instabilities and changes to the

current alliance structure could spawn several new nuclear

countries virtually overnight.

Chemical and Biological

In testimony before a Senate committee on 9 February 1989,

William H. Webster, former director of the CIA, stated:

Currently, we believe that as many as 20 countries may be developing

chemical weapons; and we expect this trend to continue despite

ongoing multilateral efforts to stop their proliferation. . . . We are

concerned that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been

breached. At least 10 countries are working to produce both previously

known and futuristic biological weapons.94

While the literature agrees fairly consistently that 10 countries

have engaged in biological weapons programs, it does not

agree on the number of countries working on chemical

weapons . James Kitfield, writing for Government Executive,

states that "23 [countries] now have confirmed or suspected

chemical warfare programs." 95 Many other authors suggest the

number comes closer to 30 . Denis Warner, writing for the

Asia-Paces Defense Reporter, contends that "no less than 38

countries are believed to have acquired chemical weapons, or

to be seeking to acquire them. " 96

This analysis does not focus on the exact number of

countries and capabilities . Whatever the real number may be,

it is apparent that chemical and biological weapons are on the

rise and pose a threat to regional security, particularly in the

Middle East. Harvey McGeorge, chemical and biological

warfare editor for Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy,

states that "at least half of these nations began the acquisition

process within the previous 15 years ." 97 Onlookers have at

117
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

least four particular areas of concern regarding chemical and

biological weapons proliferation among third world countries.

First, like the nuclear brain drain, Russian skills in

chemical and biological weapons are marketable in the third

world. On 15 January 1992 Robert M. Gates testified :

A few thousand have the knowledge and marketable skills to develop

and produce biological weapons. The most worrisome problem is

probably those individuals whose skills have no civilian counterpart,

such as nuclear weapons designers and engineers specializing in

weaponizing CW and BW agents. They were treated well under the

Soviet system and will find it hard to get comparable positions now. 98

Second, chemical and biological weapons are much easier to

produce than nuclear weapons and have proved to be quite

effective . David Goldberg, a chemical weapons analyst for the

Army, states that "it was not until World War I that chemical

science and military technology had advanced so that

chemical agent use could produce significant results ." The

Germans and Allies employed a total of 124,000 tons of

chemical agents, resulting in 1 .3 million casualties, of which

91,000 died. 99

Currently, the 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of

chemical and biological weapons in war. The ban has been

ineffective mainly because

the Protocol is, in effect, a no-first-use agreement, because many of the

parties signed with the reservation that the Protocol was not binding if

chemical agents were used by an enemy or its allies. Some

reservations also made the Protocol nonbinding in the case of

countries that are not a party to the Protocol. loo

The Geneva Protocol has not prevented the use of chemical

weapons in several conflicts. "There have been confirmed or

alleged chemical agent attacks in 19 different countries in

Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East since World War L,'lol The Soviets incorporated chemical warfare into their

military doctrine and employed chemical weapons during the

invasion of Afghanistan. "Evidence compiled by the United

States State Department in 1982 showed a minimum of 47

chemical attacks in Afghanistan, causing 3,042 deaths,

although Afghan sources believe the figure was much

higher."lot The use of chemical weapons was widespread

during the Iran-Iraq war. "Iran claims that in 242 attacks

118
THE THREAT

between January 1981-March 1988 it lost 44,000 soldiers to

CWs. . . . Between April 1987August 1988 Iraq's Kurds claimed

the Iraqi Army used CWs against their villages at least 200

times." 103 Additionally, use of chemical weapons by Vietnam,

Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Libya have been asserted by

opposing factions but thus far have not been proven.

104

No agency or country has proven that biological weapons

have been used in warfare . There have been numerous

unproven allegations since the start of WWII . More substantial

evidence exists for accidents that have occurred during

biological research.

105

The United States is working wholeheartedly toward a worldwide ban on chemical and biological weapons. Along with 129

other nations, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons

Convention in Paris on 13 January 1993, pledging to destroy

chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities .

The 22-nation Arab League boycotted the signing to put pressure

on Israel to sign the NPT. Despite the boycott, four Arab nations

signed the treaty. 106 By February a total of 136 nations had

signed the treaty, including four more Arab states. lo'

Will a chemical weapons ban work? Kathleen C. Bailey (vice

president of National Security Research in Fairfax, Virginia)

states that "a chemical weapons ban is essentially nonverifiable .

. . . Chemical weapons are technologically easy to produce,

inexpensive, effective in many scenarios, and difficult or

impossible to detect." She also asserts that verification would be

"extremely expensive." 1 °8 Before a congressional committee,

Webster offered the following testimony:

Because much of the equipment needed to produce chemical warfare

agents can also be used to produce legitimate industrial chemicals,

any pharmaceutical or pesticide plant can be converted to produce

these agents. A nation with even a modest chemical industry could use

its facilities for part-time production of chemical warfare agents. 109

Additionally, Geoffrey Kemp states:

Although nuclear weapons remain in a class by themselves, the use of

chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and the low-keyed response of

the international community have made them an attractive alternative

to nuclear weapons for technically deprived countries wishing to

develop military capabilities for both deterrence and war-fighting. 110

119
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Verification of biological weapons may be even harder. Dr

Barry J. Erlick, a biological weapons analyst for the Army, states

that "in November 1969, President Nixon unilaterally renounced

the United States offensive biological warfare program and, three

months later, renounced toxins as a method of warfare.""

Additionally, the "development, production, and stockpiling of

biological and toxin weapons is prohibited by the 1972

[Biological and Toxin Weapons] Convention. . . . However, it does

have a large loophole in that research is not banned, leaving a

thin line between offensive development and defensive

research." 112 Again, Webster testified :

The equipment to produce biological warfare agents is truly dual-use

in nature. With currently available technology, biological warfare

agents can be produced at such a rate that large stockpiles are no

longer necessary . There are no precursor chemicals or equipment that

can be used only for the production of biological warfare agents.

Actually, any nation with a modestly developed pharmaceutical

industry can produce biological agents if it chooses.

113

Third, if a ban is unobtainable, or unverifiable, can the use

of such weapons be deterred? Historians espouse that Hitler

was deterred from using chemical weapons in WWII due to the

vulnerability of German cities to reciprocal Allied air attacks.

Many historians have asked the question, "Why didn't Saddam

use chemical weapons in the Gulf War?" Some observers have

speculated that it was for the same reason-Iraqi cities were

totally vulnerable to coalition attacks . Others suggest the

ambiguity of President Bush's threats left open the possible

use of nuclear weapons in retaliation . Kathleen C . Bailey

suggests three other possible reasons : Saddam lost

communications with his troops due to effective US air strikes;

Saddam perceived a low utility in chemical attacks due to

coalition forces being equipped with gas masks ; or Soviet

advisers may have counseled/ pressured Saddam into not

using chemical weapons. 114 Whatever the real reason, a

deterrent equation cannot be extrapolated from the Gulf War.

Fourth, chemical and biological weapons pose a significant,

lethal threat. James Smith states that biological weapons

have limited battlefield utility though their effects can be short-lived

and indiscriminate. Strategically they do have some potential, but

contagious diseases or contaminated water supplies would pose

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THE THREAT

extreme problems for any conventional follow-on attack. . . . The

greatest threat biological weapons pose is as a terror weapon.

115

Chemical weapons are more suited for battlefield use than

biological weapons are, since military personnel can control

their effects and distribution to a greater degree. The utility of

employing chemical weapons against troops that are equipped

with protective gear would be limited . Other than casualties

from equipment failure or improper use, the main usefulness

gained in employing chemical weapons would be the effect in

slowing an army's rate of advance and the psychological effect

on troops operating in such an environment. So chemical

weapons, too, pose the greatest threat as weapons of terror.

To use biological and chemical weapons to terrorize another

nation's civilian population, a nation must have a relatively

long-range delivery capability. Artillery and battlefield rockets

are not sufficient to threaten population centers without

invading the country. And while aircraft certainly can deliver

these weapons, the most feared delivery method-which

makes them truly weapons of terror-is the ballistic missile.

Ballistic Missiles

As illustrated during the Gulf War, conventionally tipped

ballistic missiles are not much of a military threat, particularly

when they are as inaccurate as the Scud . Since they are not

reusable, ballistic missiles are an expensive means for

delivering conventional weapons. In contrast, aircraft can

carry significantly heavier payloads and are reusable. Most

third world ballistic missiles carry no more than 500 to 1,000

kg payloads . "The payload of a single F-16 is equal to that of

four Scud-13 missiles." 116 When weapons of mass destruction

are delivered by ballistic missiles, the inaccuracy and cost

issues become much less significant.

As it did for other technologies, the United States is

attacking the missile proliferation problem through supply

controls. 'The MTCR prohibits the sale of missiles that exceed

180 miles in range and 1,100 pounds in payload; it also

restricts transfers of the technologies to produce them, from

space launch vehicles to rocket engines ." 117 The case of Iraq

121
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

demonstrates that when given a basic missile, a nation can

use indigenous research and development to increase its

range . Like other dual-use technology, space launch programs

offer an inherent military ballistic missile capability. Of the

seven countries that have placed satellites into orbit, only

Japan has not manufactured ballistic missiles as well. Beside

India and Japan, which have launched satellites, eight other

third world countries have ongoing space programs. 118 "The

space organization GLAVKOSMOS has reorganized to market a

joint Russian-Kazakhstan space launch service, and Russia is

offering SS-25 boosters as space launchers ." 119 And not all

countries are agreeing to MTCR controls . According to

Reginald Bartholomew (under secretary for international

security affairs during the Bush administration), North Korea

is still "exporting complete MTCR-class missile systems ." 120

Denis Warner states that "23 different countries have

acquired ballistic missiles. . . . Seventeen of the 23 ballistic

missile countries are in the Third World, nine of them in the

Middle East." 121 An important issue is not merely the purchase

of missiles by third world countries, but their acquiring the

technology to build them indigenously. Appearing before the

Senate committee in 1989, Webster testified that "by the year

2000, at least 15 developing countries will be producing their

own ballistic missiles . . . . Many countries where these

missiles are being developed are in the Middle East." 122

Lora Lumpe (a research analyst at the Federation of

American Scientists, in Washington, D.C.), Lisbeth Gronlund

(an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at the Center for International

Security Studies, University of Maryland, College Park), and

David C. Wright (an analyst at the Union of Concerned

Scientists, Washington, D.C .) contend that of the countries

possessing ballistic missiles only China and Russia have the

range capability to target CONUS and, with the exception of

Saudi Arabia, Israel, Britain, and France, the other nations

have ballistic missiles with ranges of under 500 km.

Furthermore, they contend that with the exception of space

launch programs by Japan, India, and Brazil, no country will

develop a capability to reach CONUS by the year 2000.

123

However, Gates stated, "I think that we do anticipate that at

least some [third world ballistic missiles] will have the

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THE THREAT

capability of reaching the United States by the end of the

decade (2000] ." 124 While the capability of targeting CONUS

with ballistic missiles presents a serious challenge, the major

threat for the 1990s will continue to be regional stability.

Dr Martin S . Navias (a research associate in the

Department of War Studies, King's College, London)

suggests that countries in the Middle East may soon

upgrade their ballistic missile capability to be able to target

Europe .

125 While several countries employ the Scud B with a

range of approximately 300 km, the Iraqis modified the Scud

B to achieve a range of 600 km. Additionally, Saudi Arabia

acquired the CSS-2 from the Chinese with a range of 2,500

km, and Israel's Jericho 2 is believed to have a range of

1,500 km. 126 Egypt, Iraq, and Libya have all been actively

seeking longer range ballistic missiles. Egypt and Iraq were

working with Argentina to develop the 1,000 km Condor 2,

but that program was subsequently canceled-which was

touted as an MTCR success. 127 W. Seth Carus (Olin Fellow at

the Naval War College Foundation in Newport, Rhode Island)

states that with a 1,000-km range, Libya could reach targets

in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Israel. 128 India has

tested several ballistic missiles, including the Agni, which

has a 1,500-mile range and could deliver a nuclear weapon

to Beijing.

129

Future Potential Scenarios

While observers may find it difficult to determine what the

future may hold for US conflicts, they may categorize potential

threats and targets for not only discussion purposes but also

for analyzing shortfalls in US capabilities to meet the threat.

The following table captures the spectrum of potential

scenarios . The table can be summarized by a series of

questions:

l . What weapons of mass destruction are involved?

2 . What delivery capability does the enemy possess?

3 . Is the threat potential or actual?

4 . Who is being threatened by these weapons?

123
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Weapons of mass destruction have been a primary concern

throughout this paper. Table 10 shows these weapons as

possible choices for several potential threat scenarios . Since it

is impossible to capture the range of possible scenarios in a

table or a graph (column 1 alone would require a threedimensional graph to capture the possibilities simultaneously),

the table should be thought of in terms of a spectrum of

possibilities . Column one represents the weapon threat

spectrum . A nation may possess one weapon of mass

destruction of one type or may possess a significant number of

anv combination of the three tvnes.

Column two lists a variety of potential delivery means for

these weapons . When weapons of mass destruction are

discussed, authors almost unanimously assume a ballistic

missile threat. This certainly is not the only means of delivery,

but it is clearly the one of most concern for regional conflicts .

Although terrorism has not materialized to the fullest extent

possible, it could still become a real problem for the United

States . Whereas a surprise ballistic missile attack from the

Soviet Union was the most feared threat during the cold war,

the threat of a covert weapon of mass destruction delivered by

a terrorist looms as one of the most feared threats today. The

124

Table 10

Possible Future Weapons of Mass Destruction

Threatening US National Security

Types of Weapons Delivery Means Types of Threats Target

" Nuclear " Artillery " Presence " US territory

" Chemical " Airdrop " Threatened use " US military alliances

" Biological " Ballistic missile " Actual use " US regional interests in

the third world

" Covert

" Global peace/regional

" Cruise missile stability

" Rockets " Overseas US facilities

" Deployed US and allied

forces
THETHREAT

attack on the World Trade Center building (in New York) in

March 1993 heightened fears among Americans of the

possibility of terrorist attacks . Although the attack was

conducted with conventional high-explosives, weapons of

mass destruction can be small and thus portable, making

them easy to smuggle into a country.

Artillery weapons are easy to produce . Numerous artillerydelivered chemical weapons were employed in the conflict

between Iraq and Iran. President Gorbachev promised to

destroy all Soviet nuclear artillery shells in his 5 October 1991

speech; however, there is no guarantee that some nuclear

artillery shells will not be smuggled out of Russia before their

destruction can occur. Gates testified that the Russians have

the capability to dismantle approximately 1,500 warheads per

year. "At that rate it would take well over 10 years to dismantle

the 15,000 weapons they say they will destroy." 130

Such US high-tech weapons as cruise missiles will not be

easily manufactured in a third world country, but cruise

missile technology may be available from Russian scientists

for a price. Robert M. Gates testified :

We may also see leakage of highly sophisticated but less controlled

conventional military technologies and weapons from the former Soviet

republics. Technologies of concern include stealth, counterstealth,

thermal imaging, and electronic warfare. Weapons could include

fuel-air explosives, precision-guided munitions, and advanced

torpedoes.

131

The third column in the table represents a spectrum of

possible conditions that may confront US national command

authorities. A nation may simply acquire a particular weapon

of mass destruction with a crude delivery capability, which

may upset a regional balance of power. A state may threaten to

use a weapon of mass destruction to advance its cause or thwart

attempts from outside interference. And finally, a country may

actually use weapons of mass destruction in a conflict.

The fourth column lists possible targets for weapons of mass

destruction that are US security interests. The United States

mainland has been free from assault since the Civil War. Many

Americans take this apparently secure tranquillity for granted.

Currently, only Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and China can

reach the United States with a ballistic missile . The advent of

125
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

more countries acquiring ballistic missile and space assets

increases the vulnerability of the United States to outside

attack. Third world countries could target CONUS with their

shorter range ballistic missiles simply by launching them from

ships .

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, many world leaders

have voiced increasing concern about rising regional

instabilities formed by the lack of Soviet influence. In many

ways the bilateral standoff between the United States and the

Soviet Union produced a stabilizing influence on the world .

Without that balance, aggressive third world leaders may seize

opportunities to increase their regional dominance or settle old

territorial or ethnic disputes. US interests and allies will

continue to be threatened by regional conflicts. The United

States National Security Strategy fully recognizes this fact and

focuses attention on these potential problems.

Most future regional conflicts will not be of the same

magnitude as the Gulf War, yet the United States will continue

to face guerrilla insurgencies, terrorism, and civil wars in

many regional conflicts. Regional conflicts may involve two

countries but certainly may involve more than that.

The closure of some overseas bases and the reduction in

numbers of US personnel deployed on foreign soil will not

reduce the potential danger to US bases and personnel. If

anything, the continued anti-American sentiment, coupled

with a weaker overseas presence, may increase the potential

for attacks on bases and personnel.

In addition to the possibility of several conditions within

table 10 existing simultaneously (i .e., more than a single type

of weapon or delivery capability), other conditions may develop

over time . For example, a conflict may escalate from purely

conventional to use of chemical and/or biological agents as

the war drags on. In the face of sure defeat, a nation may

employ nuclear weapons as a last-ditch effort. Conversely, a

nation may be concerned about a preemptive strike by

high-tech conventional weapons and may choose to employ

weapons of mass destruction early in the conflict to respond to

what they consider a use-or-lose scenario . A nation may chose

to use weapons of mass destruction at the outset of hostilities

for their shock value alone.

126
THE THREAT

Table 10 fails to capture two additional factors . First,

leadership mental state--is the enemy leadership rational or

irrational? Classifying Saddam as an example of an irrational

leader, observers ask, "What will the United States do in future

conflicts when it faces undeterrable leaders?" Assuming a pure

difference between rational and irrational produces two cases

for table 10-one for the rational leader and one for the

irrational one . In reality, rationality is relative . The United

States has been guilty of overlaying the American mind-set on

its enemies in the past. Unfortunately, an action that is

irrational to US thinking can be perfectly reasonable to the

enemy leader.

Second, table 10 fails to capture the particular source, type,

and size of the conflict. Regional conflicts have numerous

possible dimensions . The details of how the conflict started, who

is involved, and the magnitude of the conflict will affect how the

United States chooses to respond. The following partial list of

types of activities (and to some degree, type, and size) could all

involve the release of weapons of mass destruction:

" Terrorist activity

" Guerrilla activity

" Coup attempt

" Civil war

" Bilateral conflict

" Regional conflict

US nuclear weapons may play an important role in

protecting US national security interests in several other

special case scenarios. The following is a sampling:

1 . The United States has announced its intention to develop

GPALS as a means of protection against a small number of

ballistic missiles-on the order of two hundred. The presence

of GPALS could motivate US leadership to develop a

"no-first-use" nuclear strategy. Having a limited number of

ballistic missile assets, the next obvious step would be for a

potential enemy to develop an effective countermeasure to

GPALS . An effective countermeasure coupled to a belief that

the United States would not launch on warning could lead an

enemy to launch a preemptive attack against the United

States. Such an imbalance would force the United States to

127
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

return to the nuclear alert posture of the cold war, where

deterrence consisted of survivable nuclear assets.

2 . While precision-guided munitions can destroy a host of

targets, conventional weapons cannot sufficiently destroy all

targets . A hardened target may require several conventional

weapons to ensure its destruction. Super hard targets, in all

probability, cannot be sufficiently damaged by conventional

weapons . The tremendous success of precision-guided

munitions in the Gulf War was largely due to the coalition's

total air superiority. Future conflicts may not afford that

luxury. Even in the Gulf, not all precision weapons hit their

targets . In some cases, a near miss may not be tolerable. For

example, in carrying out a preemptive strike against a

hardened nuclear silo or a ballistic missile shelter, a near miss

might evoke a nuclear response from the enemy.

3. Desert Storm taught another valuable lesson to future

US enemies-it takes a considerable length of time for US

transportation assets to build up sufficient forces within the

theater of operations . With the reduction in US overseas

presence and overall force strength, the United States will find

it even harder to respond to future scenarios-at least of the

magnitude of Desert Storm. Approximately 90 percent of the

cargo transported to and from Saudi Arabia went by sea. US

sealift occupies its lowest strength level since WWII. There was

no submarine threat during Desert Storm. Future conflicts

may not have as benign a sea threat as during Desert Storm.

Tactical nuclear weapons played an important role in NATO

doctrine when forces faced a potential Soviet/Warsaw Pact

overrun . The potential for US and allied forces to be

overwhelmed by superior strength and numbers may increase

as the United States continues its military drawdown. In the

future, deployed US/allied troops may face certain

conventional defeat against an enemy that has local air

superiority and/or an effective submarine capability against

US transport ships. In such instances, tactical nuclear

weapons may be the only US choice to prevent US/allied

troops from being overrun .

4 . Desert Storm was truly the first "space war." Satellites

provided data for navigating, targeting, weather forecasting,

missile warning, communicating, and intelligence gathering as

128
THE THREAT

never before. The presence of a similar capability by Saddam

would have greatly affected the coalition's ability to execute

Gen Norman Swarzkopfs "Hail Mary" play. And while the war

emphasized the importance of space assets to future wars, it

also provided a lesson about the need to remove an enemy's

ability to use space to his advantage. The Russians currently

have an antisatellite (ASAT) capability. Future enemies also

may develop ASATs . While the United States has many

ongoing research and development programs in the area of

directed energy and kinetic energy weapons, it may need to

rely on nuclear weapons to deter attacks against space assets

or to destroy enemy satellites .

5 . The heavy dependence of the industrial world on

electronics makes it extremely vulnerable to a nuclear

weapons effect known as electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . In

recent years, the United States military has concentrated large

amounts of money in hardening certain systems against EMP.

Still, many systems are not hardened against EMP, and the

actual susceptibility of hardened systems has never been

tested, only simulated, due to the banning of above-ground

nuclear tests.

A future enemy may seek to damage electronic systems and

shut down key communications systems by launching an EMP

attack by detonating several high-altitude nuclear bursts

above the United States . An enemy may calculate that the

United States would not respond with nuclear weapons, since

it is not being directly attacked . Such an attack could be the

front end of a nuclear attack, the precursor to a conventional

attack, or perhaps an action by a third world leader to "get

even" for some US intervention . US nuclear weapons may have

a role in deterring such actions.

Some of the scenarios presented here may seem far-fetched;

others may be all too real. The ability of the United States and/or

the United Nations to deter the use of weapons of mass

destruction in such scenarios or to terminate hostilities with

minimal damage from weapons of mass destruction is

certainly not clear-cut. The United States must plan a course

of action for future scenarios in which proliferation is a given.

While it is impossible to consider every permutation of each

possible scenario, the United States must possess sufficient

129
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

capability to deter any rational leader from using weapons of

mass destruction against the United States and its allies, and

its forces must be flexible enough to provide the national

command authorities with the widest range of responses to an

irrational leader who tests the resolve of US leadership. The

next chapter examines the capability of current US forces to

perform these two missions .

Notes

1 . Traditionally, nuclear force structure planning has been based on

damage estimation (DE) . DE is calculated by using probabilistic computer

models to determine the level of damage a particular force structure can be

expected to inflict on a predetermined target set. Force structures are

evaluated on their ability to achieve a certain level of DE against each of the

four classes of Soviet targets-nuclear, other military, war supporting

industry, and leadership.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States

(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1992), 3 .

3. Ibid., 4.

4. Although nuclear weapons may still play a role against an

overwhelming conventional threat, this analysis does not examine worldwide

conventional capabilities to speculate on possible regions where such a

condition might occur.

5. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D .C. : The White House, January 1993), 16.

6. Richard Cheney, "U.S. Defense Strategy for an Era of Uncertainty,"

Defense 92, 7.

7 . President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, August 1991), v.

8. George Bush, State of the Union Address delivered to Congress on 28

January 1992, in Washington Post, 29 January 1992, 14.

9. 1991 National Security Strategy, v, 2.

10 . Mariam Aftab, "The New World Order: A Critical Evaluation,"

Strategic Studies 14, no. 3 (Spring 1991): 54.

11 . 1991 National Security Strategy, 26.

12. Jennifer Scarlott, "Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War," World

Policy Journal 8, no. 4 (Fall 1991) : 697.

13. A. Z. Hilali, "Arms Control in the Third World," Strategic Studies 14,

no. 3 (Spring 1991) : 72. ,

14. Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of the

Cold War," Washington Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 47.

15 . Ibid., 45 .

16. Aaron Karp, "Controlling Ballistic Missile Proliferation," Survival 33,

no. 6 (November/December 1991) : 529.

17. Stephen Budiansky et al., "The Nuclear Epidemic," U.S. News &

World Report, 16 March 1992, 40.

130
THE THREAT

18. Yossef Bodansky, "Radical States and Nuclear Proliferation: Racing

to the Finish," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 19, no. 6 (Winter

1991-1992): 12 .

19 Douglas M. Johnston, "Defense Strategy in an Uncertain World,"

World & I (May 1992): 28.

20. Bodansky, 10.

21 George W. Rathjens and Marvin M. Miller, "Nuclear Proliferation After

the Cold War," Technology Review 94, no. 6 (August/ September 1991): 30.

22. Ibid., 27.

23. Yahya Sadowski, "Sandstorm with a Silver Lining? Prospects for Arms

Control in the Arab World," Brookings Review 10, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 11.

24. Ibid.

25. Scarlott, 702-3.

26. Janne E. Nolan, "The Politics of Proliferation," Issues in Science and

Technology 8, no. 1 (Fall 1991): 64.

27. Andrew Hull, -The Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third World Defense

Strategies," Jane's Intelligence Review 3, no. 10 (October 1991) : 465.

28. Ibid., 470.

29. Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction:

What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security 16, no. 1

(Summer 1991): 9-10. He notes that such rates would be a rare special

occurrence. His analysis, based on fairly rough data, shows that even at a

range of 500 km per sortie, aircraft attrition would have to exceed 35

percent before it would be more economical to employ ballistic missiles.

30. Barry Schneider and Larry Fink, "A Deadly Game of Hide-and-Nuke,"

Defense and Diplomacy 9, no. 7 (July/August 1991): 14.

31 . Rathjens and Miller, 25.

32 . Barry Schneider, "The First Nuclear Civil War," Defense and

Diplomacy 9, no . 7 (July/August 1991): 7.

33 . Ibid . . 8-9 .

34. Dunbar Lockwood, "Belarus Ratifies START I Pact; Ukraine Remains

Last Holdout," Arms Control Today 23, no. 2 (March 1993): 20.

35. Sergei Rogov, "International Security and the Collapse of the Soviet

Union," Washington Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992) : 19.

36. Ibid., 15.

37. Ibid., 16.

38. Don Oberdorfer, "Senators Back Aid to Soviets for Arms Cuts,"

Washington Post, 22 November 1991, A38, quoted in Serget Rogov,

"International Security and the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Washington

Quarterly 15, no. 2 (Spring 1992) : 19.

39. Rodman D. Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," CQ Researcher 2, no. 21

(5 June 1992) : 484.

40. Dunbar Lockwood, "U.S. Seeks to Avert Ex-Soviet Nuclear-Expert

'Brain Drain'," Arms Control Today 22, no. 1 (January/February 1992): 40.

41 . From statements of Romano Dolce, an assistant prosecutor in Como,

Italy, in Lockwood, "Brian Drain," 40.

42. William C. Potter, "Nuclear Exports From the Former Soviet Union:

What's New, What's True," Arms Control Today 23, no. 1 (January/February

1993) : 3.

13 1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

43. Yossef Bodansky, "Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons and Moves to

Provide Cover to Syria," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 20, no. 1

(February 1992) : special section, 1.

44. Senate, Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order. Hearings before

the Committee on GovernmentalAfairs, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 1992, 8-9.

45. Quoted in Dunbar Lockwood, "CIA Sheds New Light on Nuclear

Control in CIS," Arms Control Today 23, no. 2 (March 1993) : 21 .

46 . International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey

1991-1992 (London: Brassey's, 1992), 210.

47 . Bodansky, "Iran," 2.

48. Lockwood, "Brain Drain," 40.

49. Lockwood, "CIA," 25.

50 . Year 1992 estimate by the Arms Control Association, quoted in

Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," 484, 488.

51 . International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance

1990-1991 (London: Brassey's, 1990), 149.

52. See R. Bates Gill, "Curbing Beijing's Arms Sales," Orbis 36, no. 3

(Summer 1992): 379-96.

53. "France Extends Nuclear Testing Moratorium," Arms Control Today

23, no. 1 (January/February 1993) : 31 .

54. Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," 484, 488.

55. The Military Balance 1990-1991, 63.

56. Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," 484, 488.

57. See Peter A. Clausen, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s,"

in World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End, Michael T. Mare

and Daniel C . Thomas, comp . (St . Martin's Press, Inc. : New York, 1991),

144; Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers no. 263

(London: Brassey's, Winter 1991), 6.

58. Juan J. Walte, "South Africa Says It Built Nuclear Arms," USA

Today, 25 March 1993, A6.

59. Weapons Proliferation, 41 .

60. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Arms Control

Association, quoted in Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," 489.

61 . Leonard S. Spector, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," Orbis

36, no. 2 (Spring 1992) : 192-93.

62 . Griffin, "Nuclear Proliferation," 489.

63 . Walte, A6.

64. Weapons Proliferation, 7.

65. Bodansky, "Radical States," 10.

66. Richard Fisher, "Responding to the Looming North Korean Threat,"

Asian Study Center Backgrounder, no. 119, 29 January 1992, 1 .

67. "South-North Korea Nuclear Inspection Agreement," 18 March 1992,

in Foreign Policy Bulletin 2, no. 6 (May/June 1992): 43.

68. Fisher, 3-4.

69. David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "North Korea's Plutonium Puzzle,"

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 48, no. 9 (November 1992) : 38, 40.

70. Jon B. Wolfsthal, "IAEA Asks for Special Inspection of North Korean

Sites," Arms Control Today 23, no . 2 (March 1993): 20.

132
THE THREAT

71 . Jon B . Wolfsthal, "U.S., Russian Intelligence Agencies Offer

Proliferation Assessments," Arms Control Today 23, no . 2 (March 1993) : 25.

72. Bodansky, "Radical States," 11-12.

73. Wolfsthal, "Proliferation," 21 .

74. Bodansky, "Iran," 2, 4.

75. Bodansky, "Radical States," 10.

76. Ibid., 10-11 .

77. Spector, 189.

78. Dunn, 11.

79. Bodansky, "Radical States," 13.

80. Ibid.

81 . Ruth Stanley, "Co-operation and Control: The New Approach to

Nuclear Non-proliferation in Argentina and Brazil," Arms Control Today 13,

no. 2 (September 1992) : 196-99.

82 . Ibid., 194.

83 . Ibid., 192-93.

84. Griffin, Carnegie Endowment, 489.

85. Patrick Glynn, "Bombs Away," The NewRepublic, 28 October 1991, 14.

86. US News & World Report, 25 November 1991, 42, quoted in Griffin,

"Nuclear Proliferation," 489.

87 . Weapons Proliferation, 93.

88. Vipin Gupla, "Algeria's Nuclear Ambitions," International Defense

Review (April 1992) : 330-31 .

89. Spector, 190-91 .

90 . Gupla, 329.

91 . Budiansky et al., 43.

92. Gupla, 331 .

93. Scarlott, 690.

94 . Senate, Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons:

Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and its Permanent

Subcommittee on Investigations, 101st Cong., 1 st sess., 1991, 10.

95. James Kitfield, "The Perils of Proliferation," Government Executive

22, no. 10 (October 1990) : 34.

96 . Denis Warner, "Mounting Dangers in Nuclear and Chemical

Proliferation," Asia-Paces Defense Reporter 16, no. 12 (June 1990): 44.

97. Harvey J. McGeorge, "Growing Trend Toward Chemical and Biological

Weapons Capability," Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 19, no. 4

(April 1991) : 5.

98. Weapons Proliferation, 9.

99. Global Spread, 30.

100. Ibid.

101 . Ibid .

102. James Smith, "Chemical Weapons Proliferation," Jane's Soviet

Intelligence Review 3, no. 5 (May 1991): 195.

103 . Ibid., 197.

104. Ibid ., 196-98.

105. James Smith, "Biological Warfare Developments," Jane's Intelligence

Review 3, no. 11 (November 1991) : 483-86.

133
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

106. Lee Feinstein, "Chemical Weapons Convention Signed by 130 Countries

in Paris," Arms Control Today 23, no. 1 (January/February 1993): 20.

107. "Chemical Treaty Gains New Signatories," Arms Control Today 23,

no. 2 (March 1993) : 27.

108. Kathleen C. Bailey, "Problems With a Chemical Weapons Ban,"

Orbis 36, no . 2 (Spring 1992) : 239.

109. Global Spread, 13 .

110. Geoffrey Kemp, "Regional Security, Arms Control, and the End of

the Cold War," Washington Quarterly 13, no. 4 (Autumn 1990) : 39.

111 . Global Spread, 31 .

112. Smith, "Biological Warfare Developments," 484.

113. Global Spread, 11 .

114. Bailey, 248-49.

115. Smith, "Biological Warfare Developments," 486.

116. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and

Response (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 34-35.

117. Nolan, 64.

118. Carus, 24.

119. Weapons Proliferation, 8.

120 . Statement by Reginald Bartholomew, under secretary for

international security affairs, before the Subcommittee on Foreign

Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, 8 April 1992, in U.S.

Department of State Dispatch 3, no . 15 (13 April 1992), 300.

12 1 . Warner, 44.

122. Global Spread, 11 .

123. Lora Lumpe, Lisbeth Gronlund, and David C. Wright, "Third World

Missiles Fall Short," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 48, no. 2 (March 1992):

30-32.

124. Weapons Proliferation, 32 .

125. Dr Martin Navias, "Is There a Third World Ballistic Missile Threat to

Europe?" RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence

Studies 135, no. 4 (Winter 1990) : 13.

126. Hull, 465, 468.

127. Azriel Lorber, "Tactical Missiles: Anyone Can Play," The Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists 48, no. 2 (March 1992) : 40.

128 . Carus, 54-55.

129. Gary Milhollin, "India's Missiles-With a Little Help From Our

Friends," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (November 1989), 31, quoted in

Peter A. Clausen, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s," in World

Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End, Michael T. Klare and

Daniel C. Thomas, comp. (St . Martin's Press, Inc. : New York, 1991), 152.

130. Weapons Proliferation, 8.

131 . Ibid., 9.

134
Chapter 5

US Nuclear Forces for the

Post-Cold War Era

Thus far, this analysis has examined the role of US nuclear

weapons in a historical context, defined the current role of

nuclear weapons as detailed by the national security and

military strategies, described the wide range of opinions within

the literature regarding future roles for nuclear weapons, and

discussed potential threats with particular emphasis on

weapons of mass destruction. This chapter analyzes the ability

of US nuclear forces to meet national security objectives in

light of potential threats, projected nuclear reductions, and

curtailment of nuclear modernization and research and

development programs.

Post-Cold War Environment

The post-cold war era provides an opportunity for an eased

nuclear posture, nuclear arms reductions, military

downsizing, and perhaps a more stable security environment

through multinational cooperation in the areas of arms

control, nonproliferation, and security agreements . These

opportunities have become US policies and are basic to the

national security strategy yet are not an end in and of

themselves. They are merely tools to achieve the distant goal of

world peace, which is a condition upon which the four

enduring US national security objectives can flourish.

The START agreement, President Bush's and Gorbachev's

unilateral initiatives, and the START II agreement are steps to

reduce the size of US and CIS nuclear arsenals and presumably

to posture nuclear forces in a safer, more secure, and more

stable manner. The condition that must be avoided at all costs is

political myopia, which calls for military downsizing without

connectivity to national security objectives.

135
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Newspapers, periodicals, books, congressional hearings, and

television have become a national forum to answer the

question of How low can we go? Unfortunately, all too often,

the connectivity of forces and force structure to national

security objectives gets lost in the exuberance of achieving a

"peace dividend" in the absence of any real near-term threats .

Besides recommending arbitrary reductions in nuclear

weapons, many of these articles and studies make dangerous

generalizations . For example, the National Academy of

Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms

Control (CISAC) reported :

U.S. national security can be greatly increased if nuclear forces are

substantially reduced, drastically beyond those levels now foreseen in

START or that will result from the unilateral withdrawals and

reductions contemplated by the Soviet Union and NATO.'

Such a sweeping generalization leads the public to believe that

"less is better" and draws attention away from national

security to drastic reductions in the levels of nuclear weapons .

When this occurs, reducing the size of the United States and

CIS arsenals can become the end, rather than the means to

achieve the end.

To answer the How low can we go? question, a more basic

question must be answered: How does one identify the threat

(present and future), measure current military capabilities

against the threat, identify excesses and deficiencies in those

capabilities, and make decisions on what capabilities to

acquire or dispose of?

The post-cold war era has made the task of defensive

planning a difficult one to say the least. Planners must start

with national objectives, develop a suitable strategy to

accomplish those objectives in light of the current and

projected threat, and then define a force structure that will

support the strategy. Without a specifically defined threat,

force structure requirements become relative.

President Bush's unilateral initiatives are two perfect

examples of this problem. Other than stating that the risk of a

Russian attack on the United States is lower than during the

cold war, Bush made no connectivity between the proposed

nuclear weapons and delivery systems reductions and the

need for deterrence delineated in the United States national

136
US NUCLEAR FORCES

security and military strategy. Neither was any qualitative

rationale provided to the American people as to why 20 B-2s, 18

Tridents, 500 MM Ills, and an unspecified number of B-52Hs

adequately meet the requirement for deterrence under START II .

In the face of Clinton administration conventional force

reductions, nuclear weapons could return as an important

means of assurance . The United States may once again find

itself in the same position as it did after WWII when it

increasingly employed nuclear weapons to make up the

difference between US and Soviet conventional capabilities .

Russia, too, with many economic woes, may have to rely more

on the power of nuclear weapons as opposed to the large

conventional force structure it can no longer afford. Having

viewed with substantial concern the tremendous success of

US technology in the Gulf War, Russia may view nuclear

weapons as the only means of maintaining parity with US

high-technology weapons.

While some Americans advocate that nuclear weapons should

no longer be used to deter the use of chemical or biological

weapons or to hedge against an overwhelming conventional

attack, the significance of reducing the size of the United States

military coupled to such a policy change has not been explored.

Riding the crest of Desert Storm, many US military and civilian

analysts think future conflicts will be won quickly, with

minimum loss of life, through use of conventional high-tech

weapons . They view the United States as being the sole

remaining superpower, capable of gaining United Nations

support to legitimize coalition offensive action against would-be

aggressors. While the United States has always favored the

employment of technology to save American lives on the

battlefield, the tremendous success of high-tech conventional

weapons as perceived through the eyes of the public media may

be giving the American public a false sense of security.

What happens when nonproliferation efforts fail and the

adversary not only has weapons of mass destruction but

threatens to use them? Given the narrow margin of the

Senate's vote on going to war in the Gulf (52-47), how

successful would President Bush have been in obtaining the

Senate's endorsement of military action had Iraq possessed

nuclear weapons? Furthermore, how successful would the UN

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be in building a coalition? How many countries would readily

join a coalition against an aggressor that possesses the

capability of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological

weapons? And even if the aggressor cannot target members of

the coalition directly, how would a coalition respond to threats

against a third-party nation such as Saddam's attacks on

Israel in the Gulf War?

These issues present US policymakers with a real dilemma.

On one hand, the United States can seek to achieve

multinational action against aggression whenever possible, yet

retain a strong military posture to act unilaterally whenever

multinational consensus cannot be reached or US leaders

disagree with the consensus. On the other hand, the United

States can surrender some of its military strength and rely

entirely on multinational consensus to deal with future conflicts .

If history is any indicator, US security interests will continue to

be challenged by other countries regardless of the size of the

United States military. While a weaker military posture will make

it harder for the United States to respond to future threats,

maintaining a strong military posture will be declared hegemonic

by countries who disagree with US policies.

Possible US Responses to Proliferation

Proliferation can be stopped theoretically by either eliminating

the supply, eliminating the demand, or eliminating both.

Currently, US nonproliferation efforts focus predominately on

the suppliers. The United States has spearheaded efforts to

consolidate suppliers under the banner, "It's not in the world's

best interest for us to indiscriminately sell weapons and

technology." If suppliers agree not to sell technology or hardware

to buyers, nonproliferation will succeed-that is, until a

demander offers enough under-the-table money to offset the

supplier's reluctance. And even if suppliers cannot be bribed,

technology can be obtained through research and development

or espionage, and hardware can be stolen. Supply-side efforts

will inevitably fail.

By concentrating its efforts predominately on suppliers, the

United States has little recourse when supply controls fail . US

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actions to date have been little more than a "slap on the wrist"

comprised of "embarrassment" by the media and political

denouncements. In some instances, proliferation will be the

result of a corporation selling its wares without the consent of its

country's leadership. In these cases, little can be done other

than to demand that judicial action be taken against the

corporation . The damage, however, already will have been

done--the gaining nation will have the technology in its

possession.

What about demand control? Demand control involves the

proverbial carrot and stick approach.

Carrots

Carrots are an extension of political favor through alliances,

promises, and goodwill. By extending its nuclear umbrella

through alliances, the United States may dissuade nonnuclear

countries from pursuing nuclear weapons. It is not likely that

the United States will extend its nuclear umbrella for chemical

and biological threats as well. Although the promise of an

overwhelming US conventional response may satisfy some

third world leaders, others may want their own chemical and

biological weapons for deterrence and retaliation should

deterrence fail.

A potential drawback of alliances is that the American

public has been increasingly less tolerant of the perceived

useless spillage of American blood on foreign soil to enforce US

foreign policy. Fighting another country's war will not sit well

with many Americans. The post-cold war era may see an

increasing reluctance from Americans to get involved with

another country's regional disputes .

US promises complement the alliance approach. The United

States has promised not to use nuclear weapons against

nonnuclear states . In some ways this pledge is both a security

guarantee and an unspoken stick as well. Inherent in the

promise that the United States will not attack nonnuclear

states with nuclear weapons is the negative message, "If you

obtain nuclear weapons and go to war against the United

States, you are not exempt from nuclear attack."

Goodwill includes bestowing political prestige, economic

trade, and foreign assistance programs in exchange for

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militarily good behavior. The problem with assistance

programs is that they require tax dollars for support. Third

world countries may subtly bribe the United States by

continuing to up the ante for not pursuing weapons of mass

destruction programs. At some point the United States may be

forced to call someone's bluff.

Carrots will work only when a country is not fully convinced

that it desires weapons of mass destruction . What if a

country's desire for weapons of mass destruction is stronger

than its desire for carrots? What does the United States do in

the case of countries that it chooses not to ally with and

extend the nuclear umbrella to? In these cases the United

States must resort to the stick approach.

Sticks

The stick approach involves three progressive steps :

inspecting to ensure that technology and hardware are not

acquired; policing to remove any materials (short of actual

weapons) found to be in violation of treaties or policies ; and

acting to remove weapons should they be manufactured or

acquired . The latter two procedures may involve political,

economic, or military measures or any combination of the three.

A major problem of verification inspections is the

tremendous cost involved . US leadership faces critical choices

during these times of budget drawdowns . President Bush

stated that the United States does not wish to be the world's

policeman. An inspection program that requires the United

States to supply a large percentage of dollars and manpower

may not receive strong congressional support.

A second major problem with the stick approach is that,

except in the case of voluntary cooperation, it involves the

violation of a sovereign state's rights. To date, most arms

control measures, short of war, have involved the voluntary

cooperation of states. The nonproliferation efforts outlined in

chapter 2 conform to this approach . A state may voluntarily

elect to participate in opening its doors to surveillance and

intrusive inspection, but what about those who refuse? Does

the UN have the right to override state sovereignty to remove

technological capabilities or actual hardware that seem to

threaten? To date, such action has been endorsed only after a

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major war; for example, the Treaty of Versailles, which

stripped Germany of tanks, aircraft, artillery, and poison gas.

Iraq is the first instance of a UN-endorsed action against

weapons of mass destruction . UN Security Council Resolution

687 specifies the "supervised destruction of Iraqi nuclear,

chemical, and biological weapons," as well as missile

capabilities with "long-term monitoring of compliance ." 2

In the future, when a country is suspected of developing or

of actually possessing weapons of mass destruction, will the

UN sanction political, economic, and military action (if

required) to enforce inspections and/or removal? If the UN will

not assume such a responsibility, the world will certainly face

countries acting unilaterally, such as Israel's attacking the

Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981 .

The Gulf War provided the United States with an excuse to

attack Iraqi nuclear production sites. Some analysts have

estimated that Saddam was within a year of obtaining a nuclear

weapon . Had the Gulf War not occurred, would the United States

have performed a surgical strike to eliminate Iraq's nuclear

capability? The United States national security strategy avows

that the United States will continue to act unilaterally when it is

deemed a matter of US security interests.

The United States established a new precedent on 17

January 1993 . US Navy vessels launched 45 Tomahawk cruise

missiles at an Iraqi facility that produced electromagnetic

isotope separation components for Iraq's uranium enrichment

program. 3 While these actions were taken to enforce the UN's

right to inspect nuclear facilities, they mark the first time the

United States has attacked a nuclear facility during peacetime .

Such offensive military actions as the Israeli and US attacks

on Iraqi nuclear facilities without prior political dialogue will

erode the credibility of nonaggressive nonproliferation regimes .

Jennifer Scarlott asserts that "the United States finally

dropped all pretense of having a coherent nonproliferation

policy" by attacking Iraq's IAEA nuclear facilities during the

Gulf War. In essence she argues that the United States has set

itself up to assume a leading role in "the fight against

aggression and instability around the world." 4 The danger of

military action is that it may encourage further proliferation.

States may opt for nuclear weapons as security against such
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

raids . Additionally, the threat of strikes may force nuclear

weapons programs "further underground" to ensure their

survivability against military action. 5

US and UN experiences in Iraq bring to light two important

issues that illustrate a third major problem of the stick

approach-finding a country's assets, whether it be for

inspection or destruction purposes. First, the United States

had tremendous difficulty in finding and destroying mobile

Scud missiles . While processing facilities are relatively large

and stationary, weapons can be concealed virtually anywhere.

Second, although Iraq is a member of the NPT and was subject

to IAEA inspections, it was able to develop undetected nuclear

processing facilities and, by the estimates of some inspectors,

was perhaps within a year of developing a nuclear weapon.

A fourth major problem with the stick approach looms

quite large . Research and development and dual-use

technologies virtually permit a country to possess the pieces

necessary to build a weapon of mass destruction without

actually having a weapon. Peter A. Clausen, a director of

research for the Union of Concerned Scientists, illustrates this

problem in the case of nuclear technology. He states that there

is not "a clear boundary between nuclear and nonnuclear

status ." This gray area is due to the fact that building nuclear

weapons requires several technologies and subprocesses. A

country may possess the ingredients to assemble a bomb but

may choose not to actually perform the last step . Additionally,

actually testing a weapon, particularly a simple fission

weapon, is no longer necessary, thus adding to a country's

ability to conceal its capabilities. Clausen states that the "lack

of a clear boundary . . . is partly responsible for the

international community's inability to respond coherently to

the undeclared nuclear powers." 6

Clausen suggests three possible approaches to the problem

of proliferation by asking, "Should energies be directed at

reversing the process, holding the line against further moves

up the proliferation ladder, or smoothing the entry of de facto

weapon states into the nuclear club?'17

Eliminating the Threat . One of the most likely US

responses may be to persuade a country that has acquired

weapons of mass destruction to give up its capability. Such an

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action is called a rollback. Before resorting to the stick

approach, the United States may choose the alliance

approach, as discussed earlier. Thus, the United States could

offer security guarantees to the proliferator in exchange for its

relinquishment of weapons. Of course, such an option is not

without economic burden either. The United States would

most likely have to offer money and perhaps manpower to

disassemble and clean up the nuclear facilities.

On the other hand, the United States may not want to

extend its nuclear umbrella in exchange for a small

rudimentary nuclear capability . Furthermore, numerous

countries are seeking nuclear capability for which the United

States would not even think of extending any security

guarantees . Such countries require other rollback options.

Political denouncement and economic sanctions are often

exercised as a US expression of disapproval. The United States

may be successful in obtaining UN backing and multilateral

sanctions against a country. As history has shown, however,

political denouncement and economic sanctions do little to

achieve the ultimate goal. Armed conflict is almost always

required.

If the United States views the newly acquired capability as a

threat to regional security, it may consider offensive action to

remove the capability. This action may emanate from a UN

sanction and could involve multilateral forces. The danger of

this approach is that it is overt and would most likely be

countered by threats to use weapons of mass destruction

against attacking forces or neighboring countries that voted

for the action . The possible threat of weapons of mass

destruction certainly would hinder efforts to build coalition

forces and could hamper the sanctioning of action by

countries that are located within striking range.

Covert action or a preemptive strike most likely would

provide the best opportunity to remove the capability-with

the greatest success and with the least danger to the forces

involved. The major problem with surgical or preemptive

strikes is the possibility of retaliation . Libya's launching of two

Scud-13 missiles at the US installation on the island of

Lampedusa in retaliation for US raids on Tripoli in 1986 offers

a perfect example . Qadhafi stated that had he possessed

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missiles that could reach the United States, he would have

attacked New York with nuclear weapons. 8

W. Seth Carus states that "almost certainly, the fear of

Libyan attacks would cause many US allies to distance

themselves from the United States, especially if the missiles

were to be armed with chemical weapons.

999

Deterring the Threat. Deterrence is the most likely US

response to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. With

the renouncement of biological and chemical weapons, US

deterrence is limited to the threat of either conventional or

nuclear retaliation . The National Military Strategy states that

US nuclear weapons will continue to provide a deterrence

against attack from weapons of mass destruction . Yet, the

credibility of US nuclear response to a chemical or biological

attack increasingly is being called into question. The use of

conventional precision-guided munitions in lieu of nuclear

weapons has been widely discussed for responses to such

scenarios but has not been advocated as an official US

declaratory policy.

The ability of US nuclear weapons to deter the use of third

world nuclear weapons also is being called into question for at

least two reasons . First, many observers feel that the United

States would not use nuclear weapons against a third world

country. If a third world leader also holds this belief, he might

detonate a nuclear device against the United States or its allies

believing that the United States will not respond with nuclear

weapons . Lewis A. Dunn (assistant director of the United

States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1983 to

1987 and now an assistant vice president of Science

Applications International Corporation) suggests that while

"the design of a credible declaratory policy raises difficult

choices . . . there are good arguments for an 'assured nuclear

second use' declaratory policy."lo

The deterrent value of a declaratory policy needs to be

heavily weighed against the potential that the United States

could back itself into a corner. Having promised a nuclear

response, the president may decide in a particular situation

that it is not in the best interest of the United States to so

respond . For example, suppose Saddam had had one

confirmed nuclear device at the start of Desert Storm.

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Furthermore, suppose he had launched it on a Scud, but

because of the Scud's lack of accuracy, it caused minimal

damage. In this instance, the United States, believing that

Saddam had no more nuclear weapons, might have decided to

maintain "the high moral ground" and not respond "in kind,"

but rather to retaliate with overwhelming conventional force .

Refusing to respond in kind may send mixed messages. On

the positive side, it may strengthen the confidence of world

leaders in the US desire to maintain a high-nuclear threshold.

On the negative side, some leaders (potential nuclear

possessors would be of concern) may perceive it as a lack of

US resolve to respond with nuclear weapons, and they could

subject the United States to another test of that resolve.

Dunn argues that there are "moral considerations (`not

killing innocent civilians'), political arguments (`likely loss of

international support'), and geopolitics (`avoiding a further

weakening of the nuclear taboo') [that] would all argue against

nuclear rather than conventional retaliation."" The United

States has two difficult choices . First, if the United States were

to respond with a nuclear device, what size device should it

use? Second, what target would the United States use it

against? Even if the international community supported

nuclear retaliation to teach an aggressor a lesson or two, the

United States most assuredly would be criticized if it

responded with too large a weapon or killed "innocent

civilians ."

A second criticism of deterrence theory is that it may not be

valid for certain third world scenarios . The United States and

the Soviet Union had more than 40 years to work out the

relationship between nuclear weapons and deterrence .

Developing nuclear nations do not have the benefit of such a

mature relationship . Americans typically view third world

leaders as undeterrable ; that is, many third world leaders

would risk US nuclear response for a prestigious place in

history and the afterlife .

Defending against the Threat . Thus far, the only solutions

posed to the undeterrable leader problem are overwhelming

punishment of the enemy and GPALS. Overwhelming

punishment does not offset the potential large loss of lives at

the hands of weapons of mass destruction . GPALS, if

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developed and deployed with a high probability to intercept an

incoming missile, will help deter a ballistic missile attack as

well as provide a degree of security against such an attack.

GPALS also may alleviate the problem of attempting to find

mobile missiles before they are launched . But, as noted

earlier, GPALS offers only a potential solution to a limited

ballistic missile attack. It will not protect against chemical

artillery shells, nuclear bombs, or biological contamination

from terrorists.

GPALS poses another potential dilemma. No system can

offer complete protection. What if a country shoots a ballistic

missile at the United States and that missile is successfully

intercepted? What then? Will the United States shoot back to

teach that country a lesson? Or will it warn once, twice, or

perhaps three times before shooting back? Perhaps the NCA

would consider a conventional rather than a nuclear response.

Precision conventional munitions can be targeted against

nuclear sites, and even if some miss their targets, GPALS will

save the day. Or will it? Suppose GPALS has a 90 percent

intercept-and-kill probability and today happens to be your

unlucky day. How much of a chance will the NCA take on a

nuclear weapon detonating over a large US city?

Perhaps the most feared threat in America today is that

weapons of mass destruction will fall into the hands of

terrorists . A terrorist is not deterrable and is almost impossible

to defend against. A terrorist does not need a ballistic missile

to deliver a bomb--and even if state-sponsored, the terrorism

may not be traceable to a state for punitive action. The threat

alone of a chemical, biological, or nuclear bomb planted in a

major US city would be enough to cause injury and death from

the panic-stricken exodus it would create . An actual bomb

that was intercepted successfully by authorities would cause

tremendous panic and upheaval in this country. An actual

detonation would become a nightmare .

Beyond terrorism, Qadhafi stated that he would have

retaliated against the United States with nuclear weapons for

the raid on Tripoli. Is it implausible to think that North Korea

and Iran may supply Cuba with nuclear weapons, once they

obtain the capability, to be delivered by Cuban nuclear

capable aircraft to selected targets in Florida? And that a

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single nuclear bomb could be dropped on Orlando (Disney

World or Sea World) in retaliation for aggressive US action in

the Middle East?

To date, the United States has done little more than attempt

to hold the line against further proliferation. As discussed

earlier, this action may have delayed proliferation, but it will

not prevent it . The United States has neglected announcing

any long-term nonproliferation policy. How is the world to

perceive this ambivalence? If actions speak louder than words,

acquisition is okay as long as one doesn't get too aggressive (as

Saddam did) .

Acceptance

A third approach, which is rarely discussed in the literature,

is simply "live with it." Stephen Budiansky states :

America and its allies may be facing a painful choice: either use

military force to prevent North Korea and others from going nuclear, or

learn to live in a world in which nearly every nation that wants nuclear

weapons has them. 12

Such an approach assumes a state's right to sovereignty. In

the case where supply controls fail, the United States could

extend a "welcome-to-the-club" hand.

A key criticism of the acceptance approach is that the

probability of weapons of mass destruction actually being used

increases with the number of states possessing them. Robert

Art (Christian A. Herter professor of international relations at

Brandeis University and a research associate at Harvard's

Center for International Affairs), speaking specifically about

nuclear weapons, suggests five factors that would tend to

increase the probability of nuclear use:

First, new nuclear forces are not likely to be as secure from preemptive

attack as those of the mature nuclear states. Consequently . . . states

might be tempted to launch preemptive first strikes against an

adversary's nuclear forces . . . . Second, command and control

arrangements in new nuclear states are not as likely to be

state-of-the-art . Consequently, the chances for unauthorized or

accidental use will be greater. Third, many would-be third world

nuclear states do not have governments as stable as those of the

mature nuclear powers. Consequently, this increases the risk that

their nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of sub-national groups

waging civil war, or terrorist groups taking advantage of political

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chaos . Fourth, many third world would-be nuclear states are involved

in implacable confrontations in which reason and restraint have been

far less prevalent than they have in U.S.-Soviet relations. . . . Fifth, for

the case of nuclear terrorism, the argument is both simple and

terrifying : terrorists are not 'deterrable,' only suicidal. 13

Rather than expending large amounts of money to stop

proliferation, the United States could set up programs to help

countries learn to be responsible owners, sharing valuable

command and control information and providing training in

security and safety. A policy of acceptance may act to surface

undeclared weapons and see that modern safety and security

devices are installed, which, some would argue, produces a

more desirable end than the current risk involved with

undeclared weapons . Acceptance may be passive or active.

Passive Acceptance . Passive acceptance amounts to either

no public reaction from national leaders or political

denouncement with no further actions needed . The biggest

problem with passive acceptance is that it conveys a message

of either US apathy or US acceptance . Some nations have

criticized the United States for turning a blind eye to Israeli

and Pakistani nuclear programs. This lack of response delivers

a message of prejudice to the rest of the world-that the

United States is interested in preventing proliferation only in

the case of certain countries . Such impressions will only fuel

the fires of proliferation . Lack of US reaction also seriously

undermines the nonproliferation efforts that are currently in

place . Analysts contend that US willingness to turn a blind eye

to proliferation by Israel and Pakistan "has had a significant

ripple effect in eroding the credibility of the NPT regime." 14

Active Acceptance. The United States has much to gain by

maintaining a friendly relationship with new nuclear

countries. Acts of goodwill may offset a previously adversarial

relationship . US assistance in the area of training, security,

and command and control would make that country's

capability safer and more stable than it would be without US

assistance . Additionally, acceptance is a positive approach

which, coupled with other acts of political goodwill, could aid

in the establishment of new alliances and ensure that the

newly acquired weapons would not be used against the United

States .

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The Role of US Nuclear Weapons

Before one can analyze forces, one must establish what US

nuclear weapons will be required to do in the post-cold war era.

Without a coherently stated mission, it is impossible to trace a

clear and logical flow from the intended purpose of nuclear

weapons through the acquisition process to the deployment of a

force structure intended to meet that mission. Chapter 2 notes

the absence of any real change in national-level guidance

regarding the role that nuclear weapons should play in achieving

national objectives-despite the substantial size reduction in the

military, the major change in military posture from overseas

forward basing to stateside reactionary basing, the major

reductions in nuclear armament under President Bush's

unilateral initiatives and START II, and the significant change in

nuclear force posture under the unilateral initiatives.

Yet, the 1993 version of the National Security Strategy hints

that a changing role for US nuclear weapons may be on the

horizon. While the document continues to stress the value of

modern strategic nuclear forces for deterring nuclear attack, it

fails to even mention nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The 1991

National Security Strategy defined the role of nonstrategic

nuclear weapons as highlighting US resolve, linking

"conventional defense to the broader strategic nuclear

guarantee" and "ensuring that there are no circumstances in

which a nuclear response to military action might be

discounted." 15 Was this omission an oversight, or is the newer

National Security Strategy quietly suggesting that nonstrategic

nuclear weapons no longer have a role in the post-cold war era?

Or is the latter version purposefully blurring the distinction

between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons? And does the

omission of mentioning nuclear weapons as a means to deter

chemical and biological attack or as a response to an

overwhelming conventional attack denote a move away from

nuclear weapons in these roles?

A Declining Role?

Chapter 3 provided a sampling of opinions concerning the

future role of US nuclear weapons . On one end of the spectrum

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are those observers who advocate a nuclear-free world . On the

other end are those that continue to advocate an offensive

nuclear posture to guard against a resurgent Soviet threat. In

between are many realists who reject the notions of a possible

nuclear-free world one day and the reemergence of the Soviet

threat in the near future. These realists contend that nuclear

weapons should be used only to deter nuclear attack.

Several action officers in the Pentagon suggested that the

United States is indeed moving toward a position that nuclear

weapons are for deterrence only-that the United States will

not actually use nuclear weapons in war. Some of these

officers went on to say that had Saddam possessed and used

nuclear weapons in the Gulf War, the United States would

have maintained the "high moral ground" and retaliated with

overwhelming conventional forces . A white paper written by

AF/XOXI reinforces this belief. It states:

In the future, the United States may have the option of retaliating with

means other than nuclear weapons, even in response to attacks with

nuclear weapons, thus enhancing the prospects of controlling further

escalation. Retaliating with advanced conventional weapons, or

defending against an attack with ballistic missile defenses, will both be

more credible and will allow the United States to maintain the moral

high ground, at least in conflicts short of direct nuclear attacks on US

territory. i s

This position is potentially a dangerous one. While such a

position advocates the maintenance of a high "nuclear

threshold," it strikes at both the will of the United States to use

nuclear weapons and the credibility of US commitment to its

allies.US refusal to retaliate in kind against a nuclear attack

could well open the door for further testing of US resolve.

The 1992 National Military Strategy clearly articulates a

position toward the other end of the spectrum. It defines the

purpose of nuclear forces as "to deter the use of weapons of

mass destruction and to serve as a hedge against the

emergence of an overwhelming conventional threat." 17 With

the elimination of biological and chemical weapons, the United

States has left itself with only two options for responding to

weapons of mass destruction. While the United States will

most likely continue to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence

against weapons of mass destruction, what clearly is missing

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from both the national security and military strategy

documents is any declaration of US intention to actually use

nuclear weapons or a statement of conditions that may evoke

a US nuclear response .

Warfighting and Deterrence

By the end of the cold war, nuclear strategy had evolved

from massive retaliation to flexible response, in which the

United States possessed a wide range of nuclear forces which

provided the national command authorities with the ability to

respond to any level of conflict. As late as 1990, Gen John T.

Chain, commander of Strategic Air Command, spoke of the

need for nuclear weapons to "deter throughout the potential

range of deterrent scenarios-from normal day-to-day through

the brink of nuclear war-yet allow [for] effective warfighting

should deterrence fail and nuclear war ensue." 18 With the

passing of the cold war, public discussion of actually

employing nuclear weapons also has passed .

Chapter 3 discussed the "usability paradox." To deter the

use of nuclear weapons, countries must make nuclear

weapons usable but not so usable that someone could launch

them accidentally or without proper release authority.

Usability is only one-half of the deterrence equation. Leaders

also must display a willingness to employ nuclear weapons if

they are to be a credible deterrent. By taking nuclear bombers

off alert, placing tactical nuclear weapons in storage,

committing to a significant reduction in the number of nuclear

weapons, and canceling nuclear weapon modernization

programs, President Bush sent a cogent message to the world

of US intentions to move away from the heightened nuclear

posture under the cold war. At the same time, his actions

reduced the usability of nuclear weapons and indicated a

lessening of US willingness to actually employ them.

Decreasing both the number and posture of US nuclear

weapons in a manner commensurate with the decrease in the

Soviet/CIS threat was an appropriate action; however, the

United States must guard against lowering the deterrent value

of its nuclear forces . The way that the United States

maintains, advertises, modernizes, and postures its nuclear

weapons will affect their deterrent value directly. As stated by

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President Bush, the world is still a dangerous place . In the

estimation of some analysts, the world is more unstable than

it was during the cold war. Thus, nuclear weapons may play

an even more important role in the post-cold war era.

President Bush's unilateral initiatives emphasized nuclear

reductions while failing to stress US willingness to regenerate

nuclear forces. The National Military Strategy seems to clarify

this matter tactfully by stating, "The President's September

1991 nuclear force initiative was intended [emphasis added] to

enhance our security through arms reductions while

preserving the capability to regenerate forces if required." 19

Without a statement that US nuclear forces will be smaller,

yet flexible, and capable of responding to any threat that the

NCA deems worthy of a nuclear response, nuclear weapons

will begin to lose their deterrent value . Lowering deterrent

value affects not only US security but nonproliferation policies

and alliances as well . The United States may be

communicating an actual or perceived message to the world

that the United States no longer has the resolve to employ

nuclear weapons in a war-fighting sense. Such a perception

could encourage a hostile nation to challenge US resolve to

use nuclear weapons. If alliances perceive a decrease in US

will to employ nuclear weapons, they may be tempted to

procure their own nuclear weapons for protection.

So, despite the reduced defense budget, nuclear

modernization and careful force posturing may be the best

investments the United States can make to provide a believable

deterrent through usable nuclear forces . Nonproliferation

advocates may attack such a position as one that encourages

other countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction to

counter US capabilities, which will, in turn, spurn regional arms

races. But as discussed earlier, proliferation is a given. Third

world countries will seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction

for the numerous reasons detailed in chapter 4. The 1993

National Security Strategy acknowledges this fact and stresses a

nonproliferation policy that is aimed at limiting proliferation .

With such an approach, the United States must adopt a clear

nuclear policy to accomplish national security objectives while

planning options for US confrontations with proliferators.

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Unlike the cold war nuclear relationship with the Soviet

Union, the post-cold war environment promises uncertainty

and unpredictability. Flexibility holds the key to dealing with

this uncertainty. US nuclear strategy must be capable of

holding at risk that which is deemed valuable by other

nations-to one leader, it may be population; to another, it

may be military forces .

In the case of third world nations that are not deterrable in

the traditional sense-that is, they would have every intention

of employing weapons of mass destruction in a conflictthe

United States will need to rethink its war-fighting strategy.

When US strategists came to the realization that nuclear war

with the Soviet Union was not winnable, the United States

adopted a flexible response strategy with emphasis on

controlling escalation short of total annihilation . However, the

United States should not seek to apply this strategy to third

world countries that have a dissimilar view. The United States

may need to explore a dual strategy-a continued war-fighting

strategy to deter CIS aggression and a war-winning strategy

for "nondeterrable" third world countries. A war-winning

strategy would ensure that the United States retains sufficient

offensive capability to soundly defeat any third world aggressor

and sufficient defenses to protect the United States and its

allies from weapons of mass destruction. The United States

would achieve deterrence through a US nuclear "second use"

declaratory policy--namely, that any use of weapons of mass

destruction employed against the United States and its allies

will be met with swift nuclear retaliation from the United

States.

US Defense Strategy

Nuclear policy should clearly parallel the new US defense

strategy of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence,

crisis response, and reconstitution. Deterrence of nuclear

attack based on a highly capable triad has been the

cornerstone of US defense strategy for more than 30 years.

Even with the end of the cold war, the triad will continue as

the fundamental element of the United States strategic

deterrence equation . Nuclear weapons must maintain the

capability to deter across the full spectrum of possible

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

conflicts. GPALS has been added recently to the strategic

deterrent strategy to guard against the accidental or

unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile and to defend

against actual attack by a small number of ballistic missiles .

The forward basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe

provided a credible deterrent through the flexible response

strategy. Nuclear weapons deployed on ships and submarines

also provided a decided forward presence . President Bush's

initiative to bring these weapons back to CONUS was

warranted under the decreased threat from the former Soviet

Union. His move also provided a greater degree of security for

US tactical nuclear weapons. Forward basing is not necessary

to deliver nuclear weapons in a crisis . US long-range bombers

can deliver air-dropped nuclear weapons anywhere on the

globe in a matter of hours . These unilateral actions eliminated

the deterrent value provided by forward-based nuclear

weapons. The physical presence of these weapons, even if not

visible, provides a statement of the will of the United States' to

use them if necessary. Even if the United States will to use

nuclear weapons has not changed, CONUS basing will lower

the deterrent value of tactical nuclear weapons in the eyes of

an enemy.

Since nuclear weapons no longer will be forward-based, the

United States should be ready to deploy tactical nuclear

weapons to positions of forward basing in cases of heightened

tensions . The mere open redeployment of these weapons

would serve to highlight US resolve and provide a visible

deterrent against the use of weapons of mass destruction. On

the negative side, redeployment could be seen as an act of

aggression by other nations and could elicit such an

undesirable response as the early use of their weapons of

mass destruction in what they may consider as a use-or-lose

scenario that was precipitated by the presence of US nuclear

weapons.

In view of the crisis response strategy, nuclear weapons

must be rapidly deployed and flexibly targeted . Deterring the

use of weapons of mass destruction during peacetime may be

achievable with a minimal number of strategic nuclear

weapons on alert. Deterring weapons of mass destruction

during time of crisis and crisis-response actions requires a

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greater range of flexibility and visibility than that provided by

strategic missiles. Deterring weapons of mass destruction

during conventional war is the most challenging of all. A

nation must combine its offensive actions, political policies

and statements, and nuclear capability to convince the enemy

that it will meet any use of weapons of mass destruction with

immediate retaliation to cause unacceptable damage.

Reconstitution means that should the CIS refuse to comply

with START or START II or should another nuclear arms race

ensue, the United States is fully ready to respond . US

intelligence sources are vital to this strategy. Intelligence

estimates must provide enough warning time to allow for

adequate reconstitution .

Although the United States has a large number of nuclear

weapons in storage, US nuclear weapons production facilities

would be a key element should reconstitution be necessary.

President Bush announced US intentions to cease production of

weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. 2° While these materials

can be removed from older warheads and reused, the ability of

the United States to process plutonium pits for nuclear weapons

was obstructed when Rocky Flats was ordered closed in 1989

because of safety and environmental concerns. Due to its

relatively short half-life, tritium production would be required to

reconstitute stored warheads. US production of tritium also was

halted with the shutdown of the Savannah River nuclear plant in

1988. Considerable congressional and public debate has ensued

concerning the reopening of these plants, due to both

environmental concerns and the lack of perceived need with the

tremendous drawdown under START II . These debates have not

been resolved to date. 21

Arms Control and Acquisition Policy

During the cold war, the United States based the acquisition

of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems on the Soviet

threat. Now that the Soviets no longer provide the basis for

nuclear weapons requirements, how does the United States

identify necessary capabilities? Maintaining parity with the

CIS during the nuclear weapons drawdown serves as a

sufficient near-term measuring stick, but at some point the

United States also must consider the capabilities of other

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

nations. The National Security Strategy recognizes this issue

and asks, "How does the proliferation of advanced weaponry

affect our traditional problem of deterrence?" In addition, it

also asks, "How should we think about these new military

challenges and what capabilities and forces should we develop

to secure ourselves against them?"22 However, the document

does not provide answers to these questions.

The new national defense strategy must account for

developing third world capabilities in light of two distinct, yet

interrelated, policies. First, US arms control policy must

account for the effects of other countries and alliances. While

the United States and the CIS can comfortably reduce nuclear

and conventional forces bilaterally, both countries must

consider the capabilities of other nations at some point. These

capabilities should define a lower limit in disarmament levels.

Additionally, US arms control policy must consider defense

capabilities that are no longer needed in the context of a CIS

confrontation but might prove useful in the multilateral realm.

Second, US acquisition policy not only must consider ways to

replace aging systems and provide new and better technology,

but also must plan for new defensive capabilities needed to

deal with the complex realm of a multipolar environment. Most

importantly, these two policies must function together. The

United States cannot afford to destroy old capabilities in the

name of disarmament before new ones are ready.

A Hedge against Uncertainty

The National Security Strategy states, "It is our responsibility

as a government to hedge against the uncertainties of the

future." 23 Hedging requires an understanding of what future

role the United States will play in world affairs . It also requires

an evaluation of the spectrum of hostile scenarios in which the

United States might find itself engaged . The United States

intends to remain engaged in regional problems around the

world . President Bush stated, "America must possess forces

able to respond to threats in whatever corner of the globe they

may occur. 1124 The National Military Strategy states:

Into the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies, often in

concert with the United Nations, will be called upon to mediate

economic and social strife and to deter regional aggressors . As the only

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nation with the military capability to influence events globally, we

must remain capable of responding effectively if the United States is to

successfully promote the stability required for global progress and

prosperity. 25

To respond to uncertain future events effectively, the United

States must maintain forces that can provide US leadership

with the flexibility to respond to the full spectrum of possible

scenarios . (Chapter 4 outlined the spectrum of possible

scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons.)

Unilateral Capability

As stated by both the national security and military

strategies, the United States plans to act within the realm of

the multinational security environment. Thus, whenever

possible, the United States will act in conjunction with other

nations. However, when such action is not possible, the United

States will maintain the capability to act unilaterally.

This issue becomes extremely important when one considers

further nuclear reductions. In fact, further reductions should

require that other nuclear powers reduce the size of their

arsenals . Paul Nitze feels that the United States arsenal

should remain comparable in size and capability to that of the

CIS and should maintain a strategic reserve that is as large as

the sum of other strategic arsenals combined. This strategy is

necessary to hedge against any possible changes in the

current nuclear alliance structure and to prevent domination

by another nuclear power in the aftermath of a nuclear

exchange.

The START II agreement makes this outcome an

impossibility for at least two reasons. First, START II

maintains parity between the United States and the CIS. The

United States cannot maintain parity with the CIS and at the

same time keep additional strategic nuclear weapons to

account for current and developing nuclear countries. Second,

START II counts all bomber nuclear weapons. 26 This new rule

eliminated the United States advantage in maintaining a large

number of bomber weapons, which served as a hedge against

the failure of a ballistic-missile triad leg and provided a viable

strategic reserve. At lower numbers, the United States will find

it increasingly difficult to maintain a secure strategic reserve

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

equal to the sum of all other strategic weapons. For example,

the strategic arsenals of Great Britain, France, and China

would mean a strategic reserve of approximately 1,100

weapons . As other countries build or acquire ICBM capability,

they will cause this number to increase . The acquiring of

long-range bomber capability or SSBNs by other countries also

would affect this number.

Chapter 3 also pointed out that some blurring is occurring

in the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear

weapons. US tactical nuclear weapons could figure into the

equation of maintaining some sort of strategic reserve. The key

is not so much numbers of weapons as it is survivable

weapons. US tactical weapons are not currently survivable,

since they are being stored at nuclear weapons storage sites.

The only survivable weapons the United States currently has

postured are SLBM weapons, which are to be scaled back to

no more than 1,750 under START II . Future arms reductions

will most assuredly reduce this number, if not actually ban

MIRVed SLBMs.

The importance of these issues runs much deeper than a

purely analytical number count. The presence of massive

strategic arsenals by the United States and Soviet Union

allowed for some "bullying" to take place in the aggressive

actions of both countries. In the shadow of the massive US

and Soviet arsenals, the arsenals of China, Great Britain, and

France were insignificant as far as alliances were concerned.

As the numbers of nuclear weapons decrease, alliances will

become increasingly more important and may tip the scales of

nuclear balance . In a START II environment, if all nuclear

countries in the world were to ally with the CIS and protest

against US unilateral action, the United States would most

likely be dissuaded from continued action.

An Analysis of Nuclear Force Capabilities

Though the cold war has ended, the fact remains that the

best defense is still a good offense . No defensive system can

offer absolute protection against ballistic missile attack, and

ballistic missiles are by no means the only way to deliver

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weapons of mass destruction. Deterring weapons of mass

destruction in the post-cold war era requires nuclear forces

that can respond across the spectrum of possible scenarios.

The following list offers some nuclear force characteristics that

help to provide this capability:

" quick response

" positive control

" decisive firepower

" precision accuracy

" minimum collateral damage

" flexible employment options

" wide range of weapon yields

" high probability of kill

" demonstration of capability

" show of force

" crisis stability

" survivability

" visible generation

" hedge against uncertainty

These characteristics would provide a capable and visible

deterrent to any aggressor who contemplated the use of

weapons of mass destruction. These characteristics also would

provide US national command authorities with the qualities

that US forces will need to respond at any level of conflict.

These capabilities also would give the NCA the ability to

negotiate from a position of strength when the NCA wants to

roll back another nation's acquired capabilities, the precision

to remove a capability if negotiations fail, and a force to deter,

retaliate, and punish the enemy. In addition, such capabilities

would provide a good reason for nations to accept the United

States nuclear umbrella when it is extended . Finally, if a

nation acquires nuclear weapons and the United States

chooses to acknowledge that nation as a nuclear power, the

capabilities listed above would provide leverage to impose

safety and security measures on that nation's nuclear arsenal.

Quick Response

The strategy of crisis response and reconstitution, relying

heavily on the reserves, is a return to the minuteman philosophy

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

of the American Revolution. The United States is putting much

faith not only in its intelligence-gathering sources but also in

its leadership's ability to accept indicators and warnings and

take prompt action. The basis of this strategy centers around

the enemy's belief that the president would respond to a crisis

promptly.

US nuclear forces must be able to respond quickly to a

rapidly escalating regional conflict, especially in cases where

the NCA fears that a nation may use weapons of mass

destruction in a preemptive role or at the outset of the conflict.

Obviously, ICBMs provide the fastest response ; however, their

present yields may be too high for third world targets, and

their present guidance systems may not provide enough

accuracy for low-yield nuclear weapons . Some strategists have

proposed using ICBMs to deliver conventional warheads .

Although new guidance , systems and warheads (nuclear or

conventional) could be installed on a few ICBMs for such

missions, the use of ICBMs causes some additional concerns.

The United States would have to notify the CIS of its intentions

to launch nuclear-tipped ICBMs to avoid the CIS perception

that the attack was aimed at them . Additionally, use of

conventional warheads would require strict separation of

systems and tightly controlled verification procedures to

provide assurance that an announced conventional attack was

not a US deception for the delivery of nuclear weapons .

SLBMs provide the next fastest response, but they suffer

from the same drawbacks as the ICBMs . Additionally, they

would not be useful in their START II MIRVed configuration

unless the NCA chose to deliver several warheads to a

particular region . Of course, one or two missiles per

submarine could be reconfigured to perform a low-yield

nuclear or conventional attack.

To avoid broadcasting missile launch intentions, the B-2

bomber would provide the best platform for worldwide delivery,

surprise, and accuracy. In some instances, however, a bomber

may take too long to reach its intended target. US intelligence

agencies may fail to provide the NCA with enough tactical

warning to allow bombers to reach their targets in time . Since

President Bush did leave an air-delivered nuclear capability in

Europe, some quick-response tactical capability will remain.

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The majority of US tactical nuclear weapons have been stored

and will be unavailable for quick response. Deploying tactical

weapons requires a significant period of time. Aside frorr

transportation and handling, unless ships and aircrewe

maintain current nuclear certification, a much longer lead time

will be necessary to recertify personnel for nuclear weapons.

Positive Control

While it is desirable to have rapid response, it is imperative

also to maintain positive control over nuclear forces so that

nuclear weapons are not launched without proper release

authority. The United States command and control system has

provided a high degree of control through the history of the

United States nuclear weapons program. Perhaps one of the

biggest dangers faced from new nuclear powers is a lack of a

sophisticated system to control their nuclear weapons.

Crisis Stability

Crisis stability became a key focal point of arms control

discussions with the Soviet Union. The United States position

is that silo-based ICBMs are destabilizing, particularly highly

MIRVed ICBMs, since they are vulnerable to a preemptive

strike unless launched upon warning of an incoming nuclear

attack. Since missile flight time is approximately 30 minutes,

a leader does not have much time to make a decision. Such a

hair-trigger posture created fears throughout the cold war that

an erroneous warning of an imminent or actual nuclear attack

could cause a leader to launch his ICBMs and start World War

III . Additionally, the advent of the MIRVed ICBM made a

preemptive strike more tempting, since the attacker could

possibly destroy a large number of ICBM warheads on the

ground in exchange for a much smaller number of his own

warheads. Arms control talks focused on ways to counter the

destabilizing nature of such systems. START limits the total

allowed number of ballistic missile warheads to 4,900 . START

II limits the total number of MIRVed ICBM warheads to 1,200

initially and totally eliminates MIRVed ICBMs by the year

2003 . Additionally, START II limits the number of SLBM

warheads to 1,750 by the year 2003.

16 1
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

While these two arms control treaties have moved toward a

more stabilizing ballistic-missile posture, they have

succumbed to several decisions that have run counter to the

stability logic under arms control negotiations and the START

agreement. First, the START II treaty allows SLBMs to remain

MIRVed . While this posture may not seem destabilizing by

itself, it could prove to be destabilizing in the future. The

United States has always sought to maintain a relatively

balanced triad as a hedge against failure or a technological

breakthrough that would prevent a leg of the triad from

performing its mission . The United States START II posture is

extremely SLBM-heavy. With a total of only 18 submarines

carrying at least one-half of the United States strategic

arsenal, a future enemy can focus the majority of his research

and development on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) . Any

technological breakthrough in ASW that would render US

submarines easier to kill would be destabilizing, especially

since the remainder of US ballistic missiles will continue to be

silo-based and easily targeted.

Second, the START II treaty allows the CIS to deploy mobile

ICBMs at the START limit of 1,100. President Bush made the

decision to cancel both Peacekeeper Rail Garrison and SICBM

programs, so US ICBMs will remain in silos. The idea behind

Rail Garrison and SICBM was to provide survivability . Rail

Garrison was to be survivable on strategic warning; SICBM, on

tactical warning. For reasons already discussed, US ICBMs will

still be vulnerable to a preemptive strike and destabilizing to the

extent that the president must still launch ICBMs upon attack

warning or lose them on the ground should he decide to ride out

the attack. The CIS will be able to hold US ICBMs at risk while

the United States will not be able to target mobile CIS missiles. If

a breakthrough in ASW technology were to occur, US ballistic

missiles would be vulnerable to attack while the CIS could have

as many as 1,100 survivable ICBM warheads.

Third, bombers are the most stable component of the

nuclear system. A bomber may take several hours from the

time it is launched until it reaches its assigned target. This

time provides plenty of room for leadership to sort out a

situation without committing to an nonreversible act. Unlike

ICBMs, bombers can be launched on warning and yet recalled

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if the warning proves to be false. Additionally, a nation can use

bombers as a show of force and national resolve. A nation can

use this capability to stabilize and defuse a growing crisis

before it employs weapons of mass destruction. Bombers

provide the most visible means of nuclear force generation-a

tool that the NCA can use to send a powerful message.

To encourage the deployment of bombers, as opposed to

ballistic missiles, the authors of START developed discounted

rules for the way the United States and the CIS counted bomber

weapons (see chapter 1) . While many individuals criticized this

approach as a sort of "authorized cheating," the START

agreement sought to reduce the number of destabilizing ballistic

missile warheads in the United States and Soviet arsenals to

4,900 while allowing for the retention of as many bombers as

would fit under the 6,000 warhead and the 1,600 strategic

nuclear delivery vehicle limits . The combination of START limits

and bomber-counting rules puts a ceiling on the number of

actual warheads that could be deployed. Based on planned force

structure under the cold war, the United States actually would

have deployed between 9,000 and 10,000 warheads and would

still have been START compliant.

Under START II, this "cheating" was eliminated. The United

States and the CIS count all bombers as-equipped, and thus

all bomber weapons count toward the total warhead limit.

Under this restriction, bombers are no longer an attractive

delivery system. Currently, except for the ABM system around

Moscow, there are no defensive systems against ICBMs ;

however, long-range bombers are susceptible to being downed

by surface-to-air missiles (SAM) . And the Soviets built and

deployed a tremendous number of modern SAMS to defend

against bomber attacks. Thus, the probability of a bomber

weapon arriving at a target was less than that of a ballistic

missile warhead-until the promise of stealth technology

increased the chances of aircraft survivability. This probability

was a major selling point for the B-2-it could penetrate Soviet

air defenses undetected and deliver its weapons to the target.

Unfortunately, the B-2's price tag made it hard to justify,

particularly with the decreasing Soviet threat. And with the

counting rules under START II, it is even less attractive as a

nuclear delivery platform.

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Under START, approximately one-half of the United States

strategic arsenal would have been deployed on bombers .

Under START II, only 25 to 35 percent will be deployed on

bombers . Thus, START II has moved nuclear posture toward

ballistic missile basing, which is much less stable than aircraft

basing. By eliminating the discount rule for aircraft weapons,

the framers of START II have undermined START's incentive to

move toward a more stable aircraft-based posture .

Fourth, President Bush took the most stabilizing platforms

off alert on 27 September 1991-the bombers . From this

posture, few responses to a surprise attack remain. To prevent

destruction of two legs (bombers and ICBMs) of the triad, the

president would have to launch US ICBMs on warning-the

very factor that has been criticized as the most destabilizing

aspect of the triad. SSBNs at sea are survivable and could

delay their response.

Under START II, ICBMs will carry only 14 to 17 percent of

US strategic warheads. It would make more sense for the sake

of both survivability and crisis stability to have bombers on

alert and ICBMs not on alert. In this case, a nation could

launch bombers upon receiving warning of a nuclear attack,

thus providing guaranteed survivability to two legs of the triad,

and not require the president to launch missiles on warning.

Fifth, the stabilizing nature of deMIRVing ICBMs under

START II will be counterbalanced to some degree by the

centralized storage of nuclear weapons. Although the

probability of a CIS bolt-out-of-the-blue attack is extremely

remote, the placing of tactical nuclear weapons and MIRVed

RVs into storage has given the CIS an even bigger kill

advantage in attacking nuclear weapons storage sites. In the

current US posture, a surprise attack could eliminate US

ICBMs and bombers, SSBNs in port, and stored tactical

nuclear weapons with a relatively small number of warheads

(assuming the president did not launch ICBMs on warning) .

Never before has the United States presented itself as such an

attractive target for a bolt-out-of-the-blue attack.

Emphasis in the post-cold war era should move away from

ballistic missile technology toward a safer and more stabilizing

technology . This movement may mean banning ballistic

missiles and allowing nuclear weapons delivery by aircraft only.

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Decisive Firepower

While precision-guided munitions provided an extremely

effective air campaign against Iraq, one must remember that

the United States had complete air superiority throughout the

war. In future wars, the United States may face a different set

of circumstances . Countries learning a lesson from Desert

Storm may acquire better air defense capabilities. Nuclear

weapons provide a higher degree of confidence that a highly

defended target can be destroyed . Aside from the ABM system

around Moscow, no defense against an ICBM presently exists .

The United States developed SRAM, ALCM, and ACM to give

bombers a standoff capability against defended Soviet targets.

Leadership will face a dilemma with regard to employing

precision-guided conventional weapons against weapons of mass

destruction. On one hand, crossing the nuclear threshold will be

something a leader will attempt to avoid at all costs . On the

other hand, leaders must consider the ramifications of a near

miss by conventional weapons. A near miss in attacking a

nuclear ballistic missile site may mean a nuclear response

against the United States or its allies . Even a near miss of a

chemical or biological capability may be politically unacceptable

if it results in retaliatory attacks on undefended population

centers. Will US leadership chance such a risk?

Additionally, conventional precision-guided attacks on

reinforced structures do not leave much visible external damage.

A reconnaissance photograph may show merely a building with

a hole in the top of it . Apart from human intelligence sources, it

is impossible to ascertain the level of damage to the structure.

Furthermore, if a capability is disabled, it is impossible to

determine how long the capability will be down and how many

additional strikes will be necessary to keep the facility out of

commission for the duration of the conflict. Nuclear weapons

provide a dual role in this situation, providing both visual

confirmation of damage and confirmed downtime.

High Probability of Kill

As nuclear weapon delivery systems became increasingly

more accurate during the cold war, the United States and the

Soviet Union put a great amount of effort into hardening

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

critical facilities and weapon systems. In the aftermath of

Desert Storm, nations will certainly be researching means to

harden critical facilities against conventional precision

attacks . In such cases, nuclear precision weapons may be

necessary to hold these targets at risk.

As the United States and the CIS reduce the number of

nuclear weapons over the next decade, nuclear weapons will

become a scarcer resource . If leadership decides to strike a

target with nuclear weapons, it cannot afford to use several

nuclear weapons to ensure a single kill. Therefore, the United

States must develop specialty warheads for certain cases and

better delivery accuracy for others. For example, a deeply

buried command and control bunker that has been hardened

against nuclear blast may require an earth-penetrating

mechanism coupled with a nuclear weapon to provide a high

degree of confidence that it will be destroyed.

One of the most difficult issues to be tackled today is how to

seek out and destroy mobile missiles. Desert Storm proved

how difficult it is to find and destroy mobile systems. Even

with complete air superiority, the United States found it

difficult to locate and destroy large numbers of Scuds . In some

cases, the United States was able to locate a Scud launcher

only by the missile plume of a Scud being fired . This scenario

certainly provides an unacceptable solution when it comes to

weapons of mass destruction. While aircraft capability could

be designed to perform effective wide-area search missions,

the amount of loiter time necessary for such a mission would

be prohibitive in a hostile air environment.

The deployment of Soviet SS-24 rail-mobile and SS-25

road-mobile missile systems provided an insurmountable

problem for US targeteers. Even with an ICBM flight time of 30

minutes, these systems can move far enough from their

original location during an ICBM time of flight to survive the

ensuing nuclear blast. The ability to destroy such mobile

missiles promptly requires one of two capabilities. Either the

weapon system must receive external real-time

reconnaissance to update its final aim point, or the system

must have onboard sensors to detect the mobile target and

alter its course to the target.

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Minimizing Collateral Damage

The success of conventional precision-guided weapons in

the Gulf War brought with it a high expectation for minimizing

collateral damage to other structures and to civilians .

Employment of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war era also

must meet this requirement for any usage short of an outright

nuclear exchange. Ways to minimize both fallout and radiation

damage to nearby civilian populations and blast damage to

adjacent structures must be considered . In many cases,

collateral damage can be minimized through precision

accuracy and selectable yields .

Precision Accuracy/Wide Variety of Yields

Planners designed the current strategic nuclear force

structure to deter the Soviet Union and, should deterrence fail,

to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. With few exceptions,

planners designed the yields of strategic nuclear weapons to

offset any delivery , inaccuracy and ensure destruction of an

intended target. They designed tactical nuclear weapons for a

wide range of uses and for a wide range of yields. Some weapons

have selectable yields. President Bush's decision to destroy

ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons will significantly

reduce the range of yields available for employment, especially

those on the lower end of the spectrum.

Chapter 3 showed that the destruction of these lower yield

tactical weapons may deter US leadership from using the

remaining US stockpile. It is doubtful that many third world

leaders believe the United States would actually launch a

Minuteman III against them. The stockpile should provide a

wide range of yields, giving US decision makers the option to

employ nuclear weapons across the full spectrum of possible

conflicts . In some cases, a small-yield warhead coupled to a

precision system may be desired. In other cases, an area target

or hardened structure may dictate a much larger yield .

Selectable-yield warheads on a few ICBMs with rapid

retargeting capability would provide a strong deterrent against

third world weapons of mass destruction.

Selectable yields also provide another important ingredient

the ability to tailor a proportional US response. A US nuclear

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THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

response to an attack by weapons of mass destruction may be

open to world criticism; however, an overly disproportionate

nuclear attack may elicit much stronger disapproval from

numerous countries .

Flexible Employment Options

While the US nuclear arsenal during the cold war contained

a wide range of weapons, yields, and delivery options,

unilateral initiatives and START II will not provide the same

degree of flexibility. The much smaller force structure will lack

the wide variety of yields and delivery systems that were

present under the cold war, and the remaining systems will be

fewer in number. Yet, the post-cold war force structure must

perform an even broader mission than it did under the cold

war. Not only must it deter attacks from the CIS, but it must

deter the use of weapons of mass destruction by third world

nations . Additionally, it must be employable in a manner

conducive to a US victory (or at least to minimize damage to

the United States), and it must retain a sufficient reserve to

give the United States a position of strength from which to

negotiate after a nuclear exchange (taking into account

nuclear powers that were not involved in the exchange) .

Thus, the United States needs to design maximum flexibility

in its force structure . Selectable-yield weapons would provide

the NCA with a wide range of responses from a set number of

weapons. As discussed earlier, selectable-yield warheads

coupled with rapid retargeting on a few ICBMs would prove a

more believable deterrent for third world countries . Although

most tactical nuclear weapons have been placed in storage, a

number of ships and naval aircraft should maintain nuclear

certification to provide the NCA a seaborne tactical response .

As the cold war was drawing to a close, the Air Force

emphasized that long-range bombers perform twin missionsconventional and nuclear. General Butler, the last commander

of SAC, coined the phrase 'qNvin Triad," in which bombers

were the pivotal link between the nuclear triad and a

conventional triad composed of bombers, tankers, and

reconnaissance assets . Declaring B-1Bs as dedicated

conventional platforms under START II will greatly reduce this

touted flexibility . The remaining B-52s and newly acquired

168
US NUCLEAR FORCES

B-2s will continue to provide the NCA with a long-range

penetrating bomber and cruise missile capability.

Demonstration of Capability

Prior to the detonation of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima,

national leaders discussed the merits of demonstrating the

capability offshore as opposed to attacking a city. In the

future, the NCA may want to demonstrate resolve without

actually attacking a country-a "shot across the bow," if you

will . Such action may be enough to get a potential adversary's

attention and cause its leadership to terminate hostilities .

An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack may be useful against

an industrialized opponent as an alternative to conducting direct

air strikes. Drawbacks would include the inability to prevent

electronic burnout in neighboring countries, as well as possible

damage to satellites from a high-altitude burst.

Show of Force/Visible Generation

Show of force is an important part of US military doctrine,

be it forward deployment, conducting exercises and war

games, or deploying units from stateside. As discussed. earlier,

silo-based ICBMs do not offer a show of force or generation

capability. Sending SSBNs to sea provides a visible generation

but no show of force. Mobile ICBMs can provide a visible

generation when they are dispersed from a centralized basing

scheme, but they too provide no show of force . Of course,

ICBM and SSBN generation is observable only to nations with

space-monitoring assets.

Aircraft provide the most visible show of force and

generation for the strategic triad . The recalling of crews and

arming of aircraft is an observable generation . Placing aircraft

on airborne alert is a visible show of force.

In many cases, the redeployment of tactical nuclear

weapons on ships or to areas of forward deployment may be

the best show of force and statement of US resolve in times of

crisis . But since nuclear weapons are not visibly deployed, the

show of force would actually be an official announcement by

the president that nuclear weapons were being deployed .

169
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

Survivability

Generals Chain and Powell supported the START agreement

during the cold war, contingent on continued strategic

modernization. While some of those modernization programs

provided for the replacement of aging systems and accuracy

upgrades, many of the programs were designed to increase the

survivability of strategic systems. With the tremendous decrease

in numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems,

survivability may be even more imperative during the post-cold

war era. Stability is directly tied to survivability. Stability is a

condition in which the enemy sees no advantage in attacking

because he stands a high probability of losing more than he

hopes to gain. Survivable systems ensure this high probability .

President Bush's cancellation of both the Rail Garrison and

SICBM programs eliminated any hope the United States had to

provide mobility for its ICBM force. As discussed previously,

silo-based missiles are destabilizing, since they are in a

use-or-lose condition when under an attack. A mobile system is

inherently stable since it does not have to be launched on

warning of an incoming attack. Mobile missiles can be dispersed

around the countryside, allowing the leadership to sort out

available information and avoid the dreaded problem of

launching on false warning of attack.

As discussed previously, President Bush's decision to pull

nuclear bombers off alert was destabilizing. Any surprise

attack would have the capability to destroy the entire US

bomber force on the ground. The storage of tactical nuclear

weapons also invites surprise attack.

The net result is that the United States is in a rigid nuclear

posture, poorly positioned for the bolt-out-of-the-blue scenario .

Even with the small probability of such an attack, how much

farther does the United States have to lower its guard before a

surprise attack becomes tempting to an adversary?

Hedge against Uncertainty

The United States has sought to hedge against future

uncertainty by maintaining a technological edge through

extensive research and development and by deploying the

most modernized forces in the world . Beyond technology, the

170
US NUCLEAR FORCES

United States has sought to maintain redundancy in force

structure to guard against unforeseen circumstances. This

attempt was quite evident with the strategic triad. The ability

of three different legs, each capable of performing overlapping

missions, provided a hedge against catastrophic failure of one

of the legs, whether it be due to component failure,

communication failure, or enemy action. The triad can attack

from multiple directions with complex timing, making it

impossible for the enemy to defend against it.

The need for the triad was questioned continuously during

the cold war by those seeking to reduce defense spending, and

it will certainly continue to be attacked in the post-cold war

era. With a significantly reduced force structure, the need for

hedging against uncertainty, if anything, increases the need

for the triad. Any technological breakthrough that can track

submarines would put half of our START II strategic warheads

at risk. The ability to detect stealth technology would put the

B-2 and the ACM at risk. But the triad will continue to ensure

that a single technological breakthrough will not render the

entire strategic force incapable of performing its mission.

The United States and the CIS currently have an ABM treaty

and have agreed to work on GPALS technology together. As the

number of nuclear weapons decreases and ABM technology

increases, the possibility of arms instability becomes greater.

With superior numbers, it is possible eventually to overwhelm a

defensive system. With limited numbers, this would not be

possible. Should a "defense race" ensue, it is conceivable that

one country could acquire an effective defense before another.

This situation could be destabilizing in that the country with the

defensive capability could launch a nuclear attack against

another and shoot down any weapons that were launched in

retaliation . The country with the defensive capability could even

hold another country "hostage" without firing a single shot.

A serious concern during START negotiations was the ability

of the Soviets to break out of the treaty. System modifications

and on-site inspections were specifically intended to prevent

any cheating under the treaty. START II overlooks the need for

system modifications . Up to 100 noncruise-missile bombers

can be reoriented to a purely conventional role without any

physical modification. ICBMs can be deMIRVed without any

171
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

modification to prevent uploading . While this procedure

provides both sides with the capability to hedge against

cheating, the potential for breakout is greater than it would

have been under START.

Bottom Line

Deterrence against weapons of mass destruction rests in the

credibility and believability of US responsive action. This

requires that US nuclear forces be capable of responding to

any crisis at any level. It also requires that US leadership

provide the world with a clear statement of US resolve to

counter any weapons of mass destruction seen to be a threat

to the United States or its allies . Above all, the United States

cannot afford to allow nuclear weapons to lose their deterrent

value by the lack of coherent guidance and policy.

Notes

1 . The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship, National Academy

of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC)

(Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press, 1991), vii.

2. Statement by Richard A. Clarke, assistant secretary for politico-military

affairs, before the Subcommittee on Technology and National Security of the

Joint Economic Committee, Washington, D.C., 23 April 1991, in U.S.

Department ofState Dispatch 2, no. 18 (6 May 1991): 333.

3. "Allied Forces Bomb Iraq to Force Compliance with Demands," Arms

Control Today 23, no. 1 (January/February 1993): 30.

4. Jennifer Scarlott, "Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War," World

Policy Journal 8, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 704.

5 . Ibid ., 705-6.

6. Peter A. Clausen, "Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s and 1990s," in

World Security: ?rends and Challenges at Century's End, Michael T. Mare and

Daniel C. Thomas, comp. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1991), 160-61 .

7. Ibid.

8. Thomas G. Mahnken and Timothy D. Hoyt, '"The Spread of Missile

Technology to the Third World," Comparative Strategy no. 3 (1991) : 194,

cited in Andrew Hull, "The Role of Ballistic Missiles in Third World Defense

Strategies," Jane's Intelligence Review 3, no. 10 (October 1991) : 467.

9. W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and

Response (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 54.

10. Lewis A. Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Papers no.

263 (London: Brassey's, Winter 1991), 60.

11 . Ibid.

12. Stephen Budiansky et al., "The Nuclear Epidemic," U.S. News &

World Report, 16 March 1992, 40.

172
US NUCLEAR FORCES

13. Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense," International Security 15, no. 4

(Spring 1991) : 24-25.

14. Gerald C . Smith and Helana Cobban, "A Blind Eye to Proliferation,"

Foreign Affairs 68, no. 3 (Summer 1989) : 54.

15. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, August 1991), 26.

16. Draft of AF/XOXXI White Paper, "Nuclear Sufficiency in the 1990s and

Beyond: The New Strategic Equation," 2 July 1992, in Volume 10: Nuclear

Warfare (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air Command and Staff College, March 1993),

133-34.

17. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States

(Washington, D .C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), 13.

18. Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for

Fiscal Year 1991 : Hearings before the Subcommittee of the Committee on

Appropriations, 101st Cong., 2d sess ., 1990, pt. 2:327 .

19. National Military Strategy, 13.

20. President George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United

States (Washington, D.C. : The White House, January 1993), 16.

21 . For more information on issues see David Albright, Peter Gray, and Tom

Zamora, "Retire Rocky Flats," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 47, no. 9

(December 1991): 12-13; Holly Idelson, "Nuclear Weapons Complex Braces for

Overhaul," CQ 50, no. 17 (25 April 1992) : 1066-73; and Holly Idelson, "What's

left of the Nuclear Plants?" Air Force Magazine 75, no. 8 (August 1992): 68-71.

22. 1991 National Security Strategy, 1-2.

23. Ibid., 6.

24 . George Bush, "United States Defenses: Reshaping Our Forces,"

delivered to Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colo., 2 August 1990, in Vital Speeches

56, no. 22 (1 September 1990): 678.

25. National Military Strategy, 4.

26. START II does not limit bomber weapons in storage, but limits the

number that can actually be loaded on an aircraft . Theoretically, a bomber

could fly more than one mission by reloading.

173

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Recommendations

It is not apparent, either from the literature or from

statements made by US leaders, that any attempt to date has

been made to posture US nuclear forces for the post-cold war

era. Rather, three major factors appear to have driven the

unilateral initiatives and START II . First, the tremendous

political changes within the Soviet Union resulted in a move

toward democracy that provided an atmosphere conducive to

cooperation with the United States. US leadership seized this

unique opportunity with vigor and sought to accelerate the

disarmament process as a hedge against any further political

upheaval that would close this window of opportunity. Second,

the United States and Soviet Union concluded that nuclear

war would not be winnable and that moving from the

hair-triggered posture of the cold war to a more stable and

reduced nuclear posture provided advantage to all . The

consensus was that the number of nuclear weapons allowed

under START I could easily be cut in half. Third, the

tremendous economic difficulty within the Soviet Union,

brought about by years of mismanagement and large military

expenditures and coupled with the desire within the United

States to achieve a peace dividend from the termination of the

cold war, produced a cooperative spirit on both sides to disarm

in the most economic way possible. Thus, rules established

under START were modified in a spirit of trust and economy.

START I took nine years to negotiate and 14 months to

ratify. It allows for a seven-year draw-down period from its

entry into force . However, the tremendous political changes

within the Soviet Union put arms control on a fast track that

resulted in two sets of unilateral initiatives and START II--

within just 19 months of the START agreement. These actions

affected not only the total number of nuclear weapons on both

sides significantly, but also, nuclear posture, basing,

modernization, research and development, and stability. These

actions have been taken without any announced changes to

175
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEAR WEAPONS

declaratory US nuclear policy. Additionally, in some instances

the final force structure and posturing under these initiatives

and START II run totally contrary to the clear line of stability

logic established during 40 years of cold war and embedded in

the START I counting rules. In particular, President Bush

opted for a more destabilizing alert posture by leaving

silo-based ICBMs on alert while taking bombers off alert,

canceling two ICBM programs that would have provided

survivability to the ICBM force, and signing START II, which

offers no added incentives for either side to posture nuclear

weapons on bombers that inherently have more stability than

ballistic missiles. Additionally, President Bush's decision to

destroy ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons and place

the majority of remaining tactical nuclear weapons in US

stateside storage might reduce the deterrent value of tactical

nuclear weapons.

With regard to the fast-paced arms control initiatives, one

could easily ask, Where's the fire? Obviously, potential

instability within the Soviet Union raised US concerns over the

safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The coup

attempt in 1991 certainly added to these concerns. Yet, even

though START II is signed, it will take the Russians

approximately a decade to dismantle the warheads that they

indicated they will destroy.

Much could happen over the next 10 years . Further

instability within the CIS could hinder compliance with START

I and START II . The CIS republics of Kazakhstan, Belorussia,

and Ukraine could refuse to surrender all nuclear weapons to

Russia. Several third world countries could acquire weapons of

mass destruction and ballistic missile delivery capability. The

United States must rely on vigilance and careful planning to

meet any threat that arises because of these uncertainties . Its

challenge is how to anticipate and plan against a potential

future threat.

Nuclear requirements under the cold war were threat-driven,

based on the Soviets' target base. The NCA defined the role of

nuclear weapons as deterrence based on the ability to inflict

unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union should deterrence

fail. Without a threat, the two nations no longer have the

capability to determine future nuclear requirements. Nations

176
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

in a rush to disarm asked, How low can we go? This question

provoked public discussion, but the answer lies within the

response to a more fundamental question : What is the role of

US nuclear weapons in the post-cold war era? Presently,

Washington has offered no definitive response.

The role of nuclear weapons in the post-cold war era may

increase in scope as the United States reduces both the size of its

military and the number of forces forward-postured in overseas

locations. No longer must nuclear weapons deter a single,

well-understood opponent; now they must deter numerous

countries either singularly or together in alliances within a

complex, multipolar world. The concept of flexible response fits

well within this environment to provide both credible deterrence

and a wide spectrum of options to US leaders.

For the case of irrational, undeterrable third world leaders,

the United States should consider adopting a war-winning

strategy and possibly a declaratory second-use policy. Such a

policy would state that the United States will not tolerate the

use of weapons of mass destruction against it or its allies and

that the United States would meet any such attack with

nuclear retaliation.

Nuclear weapons may continue to play a vital role to hedge

against conventional overrun of US contingency forces . As it

draws down its defense forces, US capability to respond in

times of crisis will be smaller. Desert Shield demonstrated the

tremendous time required to mobilize US forces for a conflict.

Desert Shield was unique in that the United States utilized

troops and equipment from Europe that were being returned

to the United States because of the CFE treaty. Additionally,

the United States drew upon active duty personnel before

military reductions had a big impact and upon basing and

logistics support provided by Saudi Arabia's facilities . Future

conflicts will not afford the United States such unique

circumstances. Thus, the chances of US forces being overrun

in regional contingency wars will increase in the post-cold war

era. The ability of high-tech, conventional weapons to replace

nuclear weapons in these scenarios remains to be seen.

The United States has destroyed its stockpile of biological

weapons, and its signature on the 'Chemical Weapons

Convention agreement ensures that it will not use chemical

177
THE ROLE OF US NUCLEARWEAPONS

weapons even to retaliate for chemical attacks. Thus, the United

States has only two response options for chemical or biological

attacks-conventional or nuclear weapons. While the United

States is riding the "high moral ground" philosophy, confident of

the newly proven abilities of precision-guided conventional

munitions, no one has explored fully the ramifications of a US

policy of using conventional weapons to deter chemical and

biological weapons. In some instances, conventional weapons

may not suffice to deter the use of chemical and biological

weapons . Thus, nuclear weapons may continue as a

requirement to deter chemical and biological weapons in the

post-cold war era.

Since the Gulf War, the United States has focused its

concern on a push for tighter nonproliferation efforts and the

need for better defenses, namely global protection against

limited strikes (GPALS) . The 1993 National Security Strategy

passively admits that these efforts will not suffice, in that it

sets the United States' goal for limiting proliferation rather

than preventing it. This current focus overlooks a US strategy

when nonproliferation efforts fail. Such a strategy could range

the spectrum, from passively accepting proliferation when it

does occur to taking such active measures as surgical strikes

to remove a threatening weapon system.

For the United States to continue to use nuclear weapons to

provide a high level of deterrence in the post-cold war era, it

must state a clear policy of their purpose and intended

employment. Above all else, the United States should guard

against the devaluation of nuclear weapons through any

actual or perceived message that the United States would

never actually use them in war. It can avoid devaluation by

maintaining a nuclear stockpile that provides options for every

possible scenario across the spectrum of conflict.

Although the United States can use bombers to deliver

nuclear weapons against the third world, it should conduct

studies to determine whether a higher delivery accuracy

coupled with lower yields would provide a more usable system.

Additionally, the United States should explore fast response

capabilities . For the time being, SLBMs will remain MIRVed

and will not present a usable option for third world conflicts. A

few ICBMs with adjustable yields and fast retargeting

178
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

capability may provide a better deterrent; and certainly a more

usable system, for third world scenarios . Additional

capabilities may become necessary if countries place weapons

or command and control facilities in nuclear-hardened

underground shelters . Finally, the United States must ensure

that, in destroying its arsenal of ground-launched tactical

nuclear weapons, it retains capabilities for defending against

conventional overrun.

In the area of future arms control, the United States and the

CIS need to focus on the issue of stability . START II, while

banning MIRVed ICBMs, still allows for MIRVed SLBMs. It also

allows the CIS to continue to deploy mobile ICBMs, which the

United States cannot hold at risk, while the United States

continues to base ICBMs in targetable silos . In addition,

START II does nothing to move away from ballistic missile

basing and the ability of the United States and the CIS to

obliterate each other within 30 minutes. If anything, START III

should ban silo-based ICBMs, since they would not survive

nuclear attack apart from an ABM system. Furthermore, it

makes no sense to ban MIRVed ICBMs and allow MIRVed

SLBMs. The total elimination of ballistic missile systems on

alert would provide a much more stable nuclear environment

than that under START II . Maintaining a few aircraft on alert

would serve as a hedge against any nuclear attack.

Finally, any examination of a START III proposal must focus

on the effects of other nuclear countries and defenses .

Reducing the number of ballistic missiles could cause severe

instability if significant ABM systems are deployed . For

example, a country might acquire the capability to launch a

nuclear attack and shoot down any missiles fired in

retaliation. A focus on defensive systems could swing the

United States from the arms race to a "defenses" race.

179

Index

advanced cruise missile (ACM) : 17-18, 53-54

Afghanistan: 15, 118

Aftab, Mariam: 99

Air Force: 2, 20, 52-55, 89-90

arguments with Navy over nuclear missions and strategies,

7-8

on peacetime nonstrategic nuclear mission, 47

on conventional bombing missions, 88

on long-range bombers, 168

air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) : 17-18

Andropov, Yuri: 18

Annual Report to the President and Congress: 50

antiballistic missile (ABM) : 16

Arkin, William: 64

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 64, 66, 83, 144

Art, Robert J . : 79, 147

artillery weapons: 125

Asia.-Pacific Defense Reporter: 117

Aspen Institute : 22

Aspen speech: 22, 43

Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation: 10

Atlas-D: 7

Atomic Energy Act of 1946 : 1

atomic weapons: 3-4, 68, 70, 81

B-1 : 17, 52

B-1 B: 52, 54

B-2 : 22-23, 32, 45, 52, 54-55, 160, 163, 171

B-52: 8, 52-53

Backfire: 17, 23

Badger: 8

Bailey, Kathleen C. : 119-20

ballistic missiles: 37

capability to deliver nuclear weapons, 6

comparison to bombers, 6

invulnerability, 7

reaction of Soviet Union, 11-12

181
limitations imposed by SALT II, 14, 33-34, 36

deployment by Soviets, 16-17

introduction by United States, 17, 25

verification of Soviet system, 19-20

reduction imposed by INF Treaty, 20-21

limitations imposed by SALT, 28-29, 32

Barnet, Richard : 66, 72

Bartholomew, Reginald: 122

Baruch, Bernard: 1

Bear: 8, 17, 23, 107

Berlin crisis: 2

biological weapons: 50-52, 61-62, 69-72, 91-92, 98, 102,

117-21, 137-39, 141, 144, 177-78

Bison: 8, 17

Bodansky, Yossef

impact of Gulf War on nuclear weapons, 102

on Iran's making nuclear weapons, 109-10

on Libya's financing nuclear weapons purchases, 114-15

Brezhnev, Leonid I . : 12, 14, 16, 18, 22

Brown, Harold : 14

Bundy, McGeorge : 70

Burke, Arleigh: 7

Carter, Jimmy: 13-25, 58, 70, 83

Carus, W. Seth: 123

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) : 3

Chain, John T., Jr.

on Soviet modernization, 21

on deterrence and force structure, 52

opposition to sharp reductions, 88

reaction to manned bomber, 90

on the need for nuclear weapons, 151

support of START, 170

chemical weapons : 49-51, 71-72, 77, 98, 103, 117-21, 125,

137, 144, 150, 177-78

Chemical Weapons Convention : 48-49, 51, 71, 119, 177-78

Cheney, Dick: 23, 45, 52, 55, 57-58, 78, 98

Chernenko, Konstantin: 18

Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant: 19

China: 9, 88-89, 105--7, 110, 115-16, 122, 125-26, 158

182
CIS dismantle: 33

CISAC: 69, 87, 136

Clausen, Peter A. : 142

Clinton, Bill: 80, 137

cold war: 1, 34, 43, 53, 62-63, 65, 71, 78-80, 84, 86, 124, 128,

136, 151-53, 155, 158, 161, 163, 165, 168, 170-71, 175-76

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) : 26

Congress: 33, 46, 50

CONUS: 74, 122-23, 126, 154

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) : 25

Council on Foreign Relations : 4

Cuban Missile Crisis : 10

Daalder, Ivo : 87

de Klerk, F. W. : 112

Delta-class: 17

Department of Defense (DOD) : 55, 74, 97

Desert Shield: 24, 69-70, 177

Desert Storm: 24-25, 47, 71-72, 78, 99, 102, 104, 128, 137,

144, 166

deterring the threat: 144

Dowler, Thomas W. : 76-77

Dulles, John Foster: 4

Dunn, Lewis A. : 144-45

Durrant, Damian: 64

Eisenhower, Dwight: 4-6, 8, 72

Ellsberg, Daniel: 87

Enola Gay: 1

Erlick, Barry J. : 120

extended deterrence: 11, 62-63, 73-74, 84, 86

Fat Man: 1, 3

Feiveson, Harold A. : 89, 91

Fetter, Steve: 104

FLEETWOOD: 2

Forsberg, Randall: 66

Garrity, Patrick: 67, 75, 82

Gates, Robert M. : 108, 111, 113, 118, 122, 125

183
Gates, Thomas: 8

Geneva Protocol: 118

George Washington: 7

glasnost: 18, 21

Glasser, Charles: 79

global positioning system (GPS): 48

global protection against limited strikes (GPALS) program: 47

Glynn, Patrick: 116

Goldberg, David: 118

Gorbachev, Mikhail: 18-19, 21, 25-6, 28-29, 32-34, 37, 48,

66, 75-76, 106, 125, 135

Graham, Thomas : 69

Griffin, Rodman D. : 107-8

Gromyko, Andre: 18

Gulf War: 50, 62, 76, 102-3, 113, 116, 120-21, 126, 128,

137-38, 141, 150, 167, 178

hard mobile launcher (HML): 18

Harmon, H. R. : 2

Hilali, A. Z. : 100, 151

House Appropriations Committee: 9

Howard, Joseph S., 11 : 76-77

Hull, Andrew: 104

Hussein, Saddam: 24

hydrogen bomb: 3-4

intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) : 6-8, 17, 55-56

intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) : 18

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: 20, 75

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): 49, 112

Ivy, Mike: 3

Jaffar, Jaffar Dhia: 116

James Madison: 12

Jane's Intelligence Review: 156, 199, 208, 268

Johnson, Lyndon M. : 10

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) : 5

Joint Nuclear Control Commission: 113

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) : 13

joint strategic target planning staff (JSTPS): 8, 83

184
Karp, Aaron: 101

Kaysen, Carl: 69, 88

Kemp, Geoffrey: 100-01, 119

Kennedy, John F. : 9, 11, 68, 70, 105

Kitfield, James: 69, 117

Korean War: 4, 99

Kortunov, Sergei: 75, 91

Kristensen, Hans: 64

Kuwait: 24-25

Little Boy: 1, 5

London Sunday 71mes: 112

Los Alamos National Laboratory: 66-67, 76

Lumpe, Lora: 122

Manhattan Project: 1

Mazarr, Michael J . : 84, 86

MC 14/2 : 4

McNamara, Robert S. : 9-11, 69, 88

McPeak, Merrill A. : 52

Miller, Marvin M. : 102, 105

Minuteman 11 : 55

Minuteman 111 : 12, 45, 51, 55, 137, 167

Minuteman missiles: 12

Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) : 49

multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRY) : 12

mutual assured destruction (MAD) : 11

Nagasaki: 1

national command authorities (NCA) : 13, 56

National Security Council (NSC)-30: 2

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD-13) : 15

National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242:

12-13

National Security Strategy of the United States: 43-45, 48-50,

98, 149-50, 156

national strategic target list (NSTL) : 8

NATO : 2, 4, 11-12, 15, 18, 28, 46, 50, 58, 62-63, 69, 71,

73-74, 79, 110-11, 128, 136

Navias, Martin S. : 123

185
Newsweek: 71

Nitze, Paul: 66, 68-69, 73, 84, 87-88, 91, 157

Nixon administration : 11

Nixon, Richard M. : 11-12, 120

Nolan, Janne E. : 83, 103

NSC-162 /2 : 4,5

NSC-20/4: 2, 5

NSC-5410/ 1 : 5

NSC-5602/ 1 : 6

NSC-68: 3

Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) : 18

nuclear deterrence : 21, 51, 57, 62-64, 80, 83

nuclear disarmament process: 1

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) : 49, 100

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) : 49

nuclear war: 1, 2, 10, 13, 19, 26-27, 65, 70-71, 151, 153, 175

nuclear weapons: 1-6, 9, 11, 14-15, 20, 23-25, 28, 32, 36-37,

43, 45-47, 50-51, 58, 61-79, 81-87, 89-92, 97-98,

100-103, 105-17, 119-20, 126-30, 135-39, 142, 144-47,

149-61,164-72,175-79

Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NtJWEP) : 13

nuclear weapons reductions: 62

nuclear-free world : 29, 32, 66, 68, 150

NUWEP-87: 20

Paine, Christopher: 87

Peacekeeper: 18, 20, 22-23, 51, 55, 162

Peacekeeper Rail Garrison (PKRG) : 56

perestroika: 18, 21

Pershing II : 15, 78

PINCHER: 2

Polaris : 7-8, 11

post-cold war: 38, 43, 53, 58, 61--64, 67-68, 81, 85, 92, 98,

104, 135-39, 149, 152-53, 159, 167-68, 170-71, 175,

177-78

Powell, Colin: 72, 78, 97, 170

Power, Thomas S. : 6, 8

Presidential Decision (PD)-18: 14

Proliferation rationale : 101

186
Qadhafi, M. : 114, 143-44, 146

Quester, George: 80

Ramos, Thomas: 78

Rathjens, George W. : 69, 88, 102, 105

Rice, Donald B. : 52

Ridgeway, Matthew B . : 6

Rocky Flats: 57, 155

Rogov, Sergei: 107

Roosevelt, Franklin: 83-84

Rotblat, Joseph: 77

Russian foreign intelligence (FIS) : 109

Sadowski, Yahya: 103

SALT 11 : 14-16, 19

Scarlott, Jennifer: 103, 117, 141

Schlesinger doctrine: 12

Schlesinger, James: 12

Schneider, Barry: 104, 106

Scud missile: 24

sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) : 27

Senate Appropriations Committee: 52

Senate Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear

Deterrence: 21

short-range attack missile (SRAM) II : 18, 54

Shultz, George : 18

SIOP-6: 15

SIOP-62: 8-9

SIOP-63 : 9

Slocombe, Walter: 73, 86

small ICBM (SICBM): 55

Smith, James: 120-21

sound surveillance system (SOSUS) : 5-6

Soviet nuclear capabilities : 1

Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act: 33

Soviet Union: 2-3 . 9-11, 16-17, 19-20, 23, 25, 27-29, 32-35,

47-48, 52, 55, 62, 64, 68, 73, 75-76, 78, 80-81, 88, 90,

101, 105-6, 108-9, 112-13, 124, 126, 136, 145, 153-54,

158, 161, 165, 167, 175-76

187
space war: 128

Sputnik: 6

SS-24: 23, 166

SS-25: 20, 23, 122, 166

SS-N-23: 24

Star Wars: 17, 47

START 11 : 26, 35-38, 45, 48, 52, 56, 81, 84, 86, 105, 135,

137, 149, 155, 157-58, 160-64, 168, 171, 175-76, 179

START II agreement: 81, 135, 157

State of the Union Address: 33, 52, 57, 98

Strategic Air Command (SAC : 5, 21

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT') :12

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START): 16

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) : 23, 32, 47

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDV) : 15, 25-27

strategic superiority: 12

Strategic Survey: 109

strategy: 1, 3-4, 6, 9-11, 13-15, 17, 20, 22-24, 38, 43-46,

48-52, 62-63, 67, 69-70, 72, 74, 77-85, 87, 89, 92,

97-98, 126-27, 135-36, 141, 144, 149-57, 159-60,

177-78

Supplemental New Construction Program: 7

surface-to-air missiles (SAM): 5, 163

Taylor, Maxwell: 6

thermonuclear age: 3

third world countries: 32, 62, 65, 67, 99-105, 109-10, 112,

118, 122, 125-26, 140, 153, 168, 176

11ime: 70

Tomahawk: 15, 141

Treaty of Tlatelolco: 115

Treaty of Versailles : 141

triad concept: 52-53

Trident: 18, 20, 51, 57, 111

Trident I missile: 18

Trinity test site: 1

Truman Doctrine: 2

Truman, Harry S: 1-6, 66

Tsipis, Kosta: 64, 67, 82

Twining, Nathan F. : 8

188
Typhoon-class : 17

U.S. News & World Report 101

UN plan : 1

UN Security Council Resolution 687: 141

United Nations (UN) : 1

United Nations Security Council: 99

US approach to proliferation: 98

US defense strategy: 58, 153

US intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) : 6-7

US nuclear policy: 1, 43, 79, 176

Vance, Cyrus: 70

verification: 20, 26, 37, 48, 66-67, 87, 120, 140, 160

von Hipple, Frank N. : 89, 91

Warner, Denis: 117,122

Warnke, Paul: 64, 83, 88

Warsaw Pact: 11, 21-22, 27-28, 71, 97, 105, 128

Washington Post 25

Washington summit: 26, 35, 52, 57, 86, 91

Washington summit agreement: 26, 52, 86, 91

Washington 71imes: 109

Webster, William H. : 117,119-20,122

Weinberger, Caspar: 15

Welch, Larry: 20,89

Wolfowitz, Paul: 23

Woolsey, James: 108, 114

World War II : 6, 52, 68, 114

Wright, David C. : 122

York, Herbert: 87

Yost, David: 64, 69

Young, Thomas-Durell: 78-79

189

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