IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

_______________________________________ 

PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC., : 

3601 South Broad Street : CIVIL ACTION NO. 

Philadelphia, PA 19148 : 2:04-CV-2322 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY, : 

400 Field Drive : 

Lake Forest, IL 60045 : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

_______________________________________

O R D E R

 AND NOW, this day of , 2004, upon 

consideration of Defendant, Trustmark Insurance Company’s Motion to Compel 

Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings, and Plaintiff, Philadelphia Flyers, Inc.’s 

response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that said Motion is 

DENIED with prejudice. 

 

 _______________________________________ 

 J. 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 1 of 16

PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC. v. TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY Doc. 5

Dockets.Justia.com
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

_______________________________________ 

PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC., : 

3601 South Broad Street : CIVIL ACTION NO. 

Philadelphia, PA 19148 : 2:04-CV-2322 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY, : 

400 Field Drive : 

Lake Forest, IL 60045 : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

_______________________________________

PLAINTIFF, PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC.’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 

DEFENDANT, TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY’S MOTION 

TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO STAY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS

 Plaintiff, Philadelphia Flyers, Inc., by and through its undersigned 

counsel, hereby seeks an Order denying Defendant, Trustmark Insurance 

Company’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Legal Proceedings, for the 

reasons set forth in accompanying Memorandum of Law, which is attached 

hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

By: _________________________________ 

 Peter J. Deeb, Esquire 

 Atty. I.D. No. 42281 

 FREY, PETRAKIS, DEEB, BLUM, 

BRIGGS & MITTS, P.C. 

 1601 Market Street, 26th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

 (215) 563-0500 

 Attorney for Plaintiff, 

 Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. 

Dated: June 18, 2004 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 2 of 16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

_______________________________________ 

PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC., : 

3601 South Broad Street : CIVIL ACTION NO. 

Philadelphia, PA 19148 : 2:04-CV-2322 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : 

 v. : 

 : 

TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY, : 

400 Field Drive : 

Lake Forest, IL 60045 : 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

_______________________________________

PLAINTIFF, PHILADELPHIA FLYERS, INC.’S MEMORANDUM OF LAW

IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT, TRUSTMARK INSURANCE COMPANY’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. (“The Flyers”), by and through its 

undersigned counsel, hereby seeks an Order denying Defendant, Trustmark 

Insurance Company’s (“Trustmark”) Motion to compel arbitration and to stay 

these legal proceedings. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This dispute arises out of Trustmark’s failure to honor a disability 

insurance agreement, entered into between Trustmark, as the insurer, and the 

National Hockey League Trust (“NHL”), as the policyholder. (A true and correct 

copy of the policy at issue is attached hereto, incorporated herein and marked 

as Exhibit A). The Flyers are a major league professional ice hockey team, 

playing in the City of Philadelphia as a member of the National Hockey League. 

After the policy was negotiated and entered into between Trustmark and the 

NHL, a certificate of insurance unilaterally drafted by Trustmark was provided 

to The Flyers. (A true and correct copy of said certificate of insurance is 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 3 of 16
attached hereto, incorporated herein and marked as Exhibit B). While the 

negotiated insurance policy itself did not contain an arbitration clause, the 

certificate of insurance contains the following pre-printed form arbitration 

clause. 

Arbitration: Any dispute arising from this contract between the 

Policyholder, the NHL or any club on one hand, and BWD or Us on 

the other shall be submitted to binding arbitration. The 

Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 

Association shall apply, except with respect to selection of the 

arbitration panel and location. 

Each party to the arbitration shall select one arbitrator. A third 

independent arbitrator shall be selected by the first two 

arbitrators. Arbitration shall be held in a location agreed to by the 

parties. If no location can be agreed upon, arbitration shall be 

held in a location agreed to by the parties. If no location can be 

agreed upon, arbitration shall be held at the then current main 

corporate office of the American Arbitration Assocation. If the 

American Arbitration Association is not in existence or its offices 

unavailable, arbitration shall be conducted in Our home office. 

The costs of arbitration shall be borne equally by all of the parties 

hereto. 

(See Exhibit B). 

Trustmark seeks to bind The Flyers to this arbitration clause. The Flyers 

request that this Court deny Trustmark’s Motion to compel arbitration, because 

The Flyers did not enter into any agreement to arbitrate with Trustmark and 

because the arbitration clause is itself unconscionable. 

The Flyers were listed as a beneficiary under this Trustmark-NHL 

disability policy. (See Exhibit B). However, The Flyers were not given an 

opportunity to participate in the negotiation of the Trustmark-NHL policy or any 

of its terms or conditions. (A true and correct Affidavit of Lewis R. Bostic on 

behalf of The Flyers is attached hereto, incorporated herein and marked as 

Exhibit C; see Exhibit C at ¶ 5). Nor were The Flyers free to obtain their own 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 4 of 16
disability insurance coverage elsewhere. (See Exhibit C, ¶ 6). Instead, The 

Flyers were required to take part in the coverage and to pay for this coverage, 

notwithstanding that The Flyers were non-signatories to the insurance 

agreement negotiated and entered into between Trustmark and the NHL alone. 

(See Exhibit C, ¶ 4). 

The Trustmark-NHL policy generally provides for the reimbursement of 

an insured player’s salary during a period of disability that results in the 

player’s inability to play professional ice hockey. (See Exhibits A-B). The 

Flyers’ Rick Tocchet (“Tocchet”) was one such hockey player entitled to 

insurance coverage under this Trustmark-NHL disability policy. (See Exhibit 

B). In the fall of 2001, Tocchet suffered serious injuries to his left knee and 

back, rendering him disabled and incapable of playing professional ice hockey. 

(See Exhibit C, ¶ 9). 

In light of these injuries, The Flyers made a claim under the TrustmarkNHL disability policy. (See Exhibit C, ¶ 10). However, Trustmark wrongfully, 

and without a good faith basis, refused to reimburse The Flyers for 12 games 

missed by Tocchet between January 17, 2002 and February 12, 2002. This 

resulted in approximately $257,560.92 in damages to The Flyers. 

Consequently, The Flyers filed suit in the Commerce Court of the 

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for: (I) breach of contract; (II) breach of 

contract/third party beneficiary; and (III) bad faith under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371. 

Trustmark thereafter removed this matter to this Court for reasons of diversity. 

The Flyers did not oppose removal. Then, on June 4, 2004, Trustmark filed a 

Motion to compel arbitration and to bring these legal proceedings to a halt. The 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 5 of 16
Flyers herein oppose Trustmark’s Motion and respectfully request that these 

legal proceedings be permitted to rightfully proceed to conclusion in this Court. 

II. ARGUMENT

Inasmuch as this litigation has been removed to this Court, Trustmark’s 

Motion is now controlled by the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et

seq. However, our courts have held that the FAA, the Pennsylvania Uniform 

Arbitration Act (“PUAA”; see 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7304), and the case law that has 

developed under each Act, are “functionally equivalent” with regard to the 

authority of a district court to review a purported agreement to arbitrate. See

Painewebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 510 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) 

(comparing the FAA with the PUAA, and referring to these Acts 

interchangeably); Lytle v. Citifinancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 656 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (finding “no appreciable difference” between Pennsylvania law and 

the FAA). Consequently, an examination of both federal and Pennsylvania state 

law on this issue follows. 

“[T]he existence of an arbitration provision and a liberal policy favoring 

arbitration does not require the rubber stamping of all disputes subject to 

arbitration.” McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267, 1271 (Pa. Super. 

2004). The issue of whether a particular dispute falls within a contractual 

arbitration provision is a matter of law for the Court to decide. See 

Painewebber, 921 F.2d at 511. In order to determine whether a claim is subject 

to arbitration, this Court must decide the following questions: 

(1) whether a valid agreement exists between the parties; and 

(2) whether the dispute falls within the scope of the agreement. 

Id. 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 6 of 16
With regard to the first question, our courts have uniformly held that “no 

party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has entered into an agreement 

to do so.” Id. (citing AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers of 

America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986) (arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 

cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not 

agreed to so submit). “This axiom recognizes the fact that arbitrations derive 

their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties agreed in advance to 

submit such grievances to arbitration.” AT&T, 475 U.S. at 648. Thus, 

instantly, The Flyers should not be forced to arbitrate because they did not 

enter into any agreement to do so. Rather, Trustmark simply placed such a 

pre-printed clause into the certificate of insurance after the policy had been 

negotiated and entered into between Trustmark and the NHL alone. 

Moreover, the Federal Arbitration Act itself provides that an arbitration 

provision may be challenged using traditional contract defenses such as duress, 

illegality, fraud or unconscionability. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (an agreement in writing 

to submit to arbitration...shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract). 

This Court must look to the relevant state law of contracts in evaluating 

whether the parties entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate. See Alexander 

v. Anthony International, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2003). 

“In analyzing the contract, we must take care to note the surrounding 

circumstances, the situation of the parties when the contract was made, and 

the objects they apparently had in view and the nature of the subject matter.” 

McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1272. The Court’s role is greater than simply determining 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 7 of 16
whether a contract containing an arbitration provision has been signed. Id. A 

contract term is unconscionable if: 

(1) there was no meaningful choice on the part of the party regarding 

acceptance of the provisions; and 

(2) the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter. 

Id. at 1273. (arbitration clause unconscionable where contract was one of 

adhesion and cost of arbitration was prohibitive); Lytle, 810 A.2d at 658 (case 

remanded where one-sided arbitration clause contained within adhesion 

contract created a presumption of unconscionability; costs of arbitration as 

contrasted to court proceedings to be examined on remand in determining 

whether arbitration clause is unconscionable); Carll v. The Terminix 

International Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 2002) (arbitration clause 

containing limitation of damages language unconscionable); Zak v. Prudential 

Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 713 A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. 1998) (arbitration 

clause making award binding only if award was less than $15,000 found to be 

one-sided and unconscionable). See also Elcom Technologies v. Amer. Dynasty 

Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 2001 WL 1843378 at *11 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding 

certain portions of an arbitration clause to be unconscionable where it required 

application of Delaware law even though the parties had no connection to that 

state, and it prohibited the arbitrators from considering certain well-established 

pro-insured rules of policy construction such as contra proferentum and the 

doctrine of reasonable expectations). 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 8 of 16
The first prong of the two-part unconscionability test can be met by 

showing that the contract is a classic adhesion contract; i.e., a form contract 

prepared by one party, to be signed by another party in a weaker position, who 

has little choice about the terms. See McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273; Lytle, 810 

A.2d at 658. See also Elcom, 2001 WL 1843378 at *12, offering this alternative 

definition of an adhesion contract: 

The term [contract of adhesion] refers to a standardized contract 

prepared entirely by one party to the transaction for the 

acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity in 

bargaining power between the draftsman and the second party, 

must be accepted or rejected by the second party on a ‘take it or 

leave it’ basis, without opportunity for bargaining and under such 

conditions that the ‘adherer’ cannot obtain the desired product or 

service save by acquiescing in the form agreement. 

Id.

Although contracts of adhesion are usually found in consumer cases, 

“even when some level of sophistication may be assumed from the business 

setting of a transaction, this alone is not determinative.” Elcom, 2001 WL 

1843378 at *11. “A demonstration of sophistication in insurance matters in 

particular is required when an insurance policy is otherwise shown to be a 

contract of adhesion.” Id. (finding insurance policy to be a contract of adhesion 

where it was merely a standard, pre-printed contract, involving no negotiation). 

Given this background and case law, the Court ought to have little 

difficulty concluding that the insurance agreement at issue was a contract of 

adhesion in which The Flyers lacked any meaningful choice. The arbitration 

clause was a pre-printed “take it or leave it” provision drafted by the insurer, 

Trustmark, with no input from The Flyers. (See Exhibit C, ¶¶ 4-7). It was 

subject to no negotiation by The Flyers. (See Exhibit C, ¶¶ 4-7). The 

arbitration clause at issue was merely sent to The Flyers after the policy had 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 9 of 16
been negotiated by and entered into solely between Trustmark and the NHL. 

(See Exhibit C, ¶ 7). The Flyers were required to pay for the policy as a member 

of the NHL and had no power or opportunity to bargain any terms connected 

thereto. (See Exhibit C, ¶¶ 4-5). The Flyers were not authorized to participate 

in the negotiation of this disability policy or any of its terms. (See Exhibit C, ¶ 

5). Nor were The Flyers allowed to obtain their own disability insurance 

coverage elsewhere. (See Exhibit C, ¶ 6). Thus, the arbitration clause was a 

classic contract of adhesion, whereby The Flyers lacked any opportunity to 

bargain, and first prong of unconscionability is satisfied. 

 With regard to the second prong of the two-part unconscionability test, 

the arbitration clause at issue unreasonably favors Trustmark in a number of 

ways. First, the costs of proceeding with this matter in arbitration are 

oppressive, when compared to the costs of litigating this matter in the courts. 

Our courts have determined that an arbitration clause may be deemed 

unconscionable if the costs associated with the arbitration are so high, that it 

would effectively deny the claimant “access to justice.” See McNulty, 843 A.2d 

at 1274; Lytle, 810 A.2d at 666-68. “Goals favoring arbitration of civil disputes 

must not be used to work oppression.” Lytle, 870 A.2d at 668. “When the goals 

given in support of contract clauses like this are used as a sword to strike down 

access to justice instead of as a shield against prohibitive costs, we must defer 

to the overriding principle of justice.” Id. at 668. Evidence on the issue of the 

costs of arbitration, as contrasted to court proceedings (e.g., average daily rate 

of compensation for an arbitrator, filing fees, administrative fees, deposits, etc.), 

is highly relevant because “having to advance such substantial sums [to 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 10 of 16
proceed in arbitration versus in court] will deter many litigants from 

proceeding.” Id. at 667. 

 In the case at bar, court costs amount to the $399.50 filing fee (already 

paid to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas prior to removal) and legal fees. 

In contrast, in order to bring this case to arbitration, the following costs would 

be incurred in addition to legal fees: $325.00 case set-up fee; $4,250.00 initial 

filing fee; and $1,750.00 case service fee. See American Arbitration Association, 

Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures at adr.org. In 

addition, the arbitrators would have to be compensated at the rate of $7,302.00 

per day ($2,434.00 being the average cost of a AAA arbitrator in Philadelphia, 

multiplied by 3 arbitrators needed). See mediation panel resumes, referencing 

fees payable at mediatorindex.com. Furthermore, the arbitrators’ compensation 

rate does not include additional charges for arbitrators’ administrative time, 

conference calls, pre- and post-arbitration study time, preparation for 

arbitration, travel time and expenses, or settlement negotiations, all of which 

are billed at an average rate of $303.00 per hour. These rates also do not 

include cancellation fees ranging from $600.00 to $2,000.00 in the event of 

settlement. Finally, there are the additional costs for a stenographer and the 

rental of the arbitration hearing room. These are all fees which The Flyers 

would not have to incur at all if the case were to proceed in this Court. Clearly, 

spending such a great deal of money in arbitration, in addition to legal fees, to 

risk getting back only $257,560.92, or nothing at all, is cost-prohibitive and 

designed to deter claimants with legitimate disputes, such as The Flyers, from 

proceeding at all. 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 11 of 16
 In addition, arbitration unreasonably favors Trustmark because, if this 

case goes to arbitration, The Flyers will be prevented from taking depositions 

and other discovery vital to its case. Precluding The Flyers from taking 

discovery, as provided for under the Federal Rules, substantially benefits 

Trustmark because The Flyers have the burden of proof. Further, Trustmark 

already has the advantage of having received all of the The Flyers’ 

documentation and other evidence, which The Flyers were required to produce 

at the time when The Flyers filed their claim for under the disability policy. 

Thus, unlike The Flyers, Trustmark has no urgent need to conduct discovery. 

Additionally, enforcing the arbitration clause against The Flyers in this 

situation unreasonably favors Trustmark because it encroaches upon The 

Flyers’ constitutionally guaranteed rights to a jury trial, since there was never a 

knowing or voluntary waiver of The Flyers’ day in court before a jury. See U.S 

CONST. amend. VII; PA CONST. Art. I, § 6. See also Nealy v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 695 A.2d 790, 793 (Pa. Super. 1997), stating that requiring 

arbitration of bad faith claims in particular would rob claimants of their 

opportunity to exercise their Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. 

As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, arbitration is not the 

equivalent of a trial by jury. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 

U.S. 198 (1956), disagreeing with the conclusion that arbitration is merely 

another form of trial, and stating as follows: 

[A]rbitration, whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially 

affects the cause of action...The change from a court of law to an 

arbitration panel may make a radical difference in [the] ultimate 

result. Arbitration carries with it no right to trial by jury that is 

guaranteed...by the Seventh Amendment...Arbitrators do not have 

the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give 

their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 12 of 16
not as complete as it is a court trial; and judicial review of an 

award is more limited than judicial review of a trial... 

Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202-03. 

 Furthermore, enforcing the arbitration clause against The Flyers 

unreasonably favors Trustmark and prejudices The Flyers because it remains to 

be conclusively resolved by our Courts as to whether a Pennsylvania statutory 

bad faith claim, which The Flyers have made a part of their Complaint, may 

subject to arbitration, or instead must be decided by a court. See Nealy v. State 

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 695 A.2d 790 (Pa. Super. 1997) (statutory bad faith 

claim cannot be decided by arbitration panel, but must be decided by court 

pursuant to statute), allocator denied, Nealy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

717 A.2d 1028 (Pa. 1998). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371, providing that “the 

court” acts as the finder and imposes any interest, punitive damages, and 

attorneys’ fees and costs, if necessary. Cf. Elcom, 2001 WL 1843378 

(bifurcating the bad faith claim from the remaining claims); Brayman 

Construction Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., 319 F.3d 622 (3d Cir. 2003) 

(holding that all claims, including the bad faith claim, were subject to 

arbitration where parties voluntarily entered into agreement to arbitrate). 

Instantly, even bifurcating the bad faith claim from the remaining claims would 

double The Flyers’ costs, which are already oppressive going through arbitration 

alone. Thus, the main purpose of arbitration (i.e., to lower costs, resolve suits 

quicker and more easily) would be entirely frustrated. 

 Finally, the arbitration clause at issue contains a cost-splitting provision, 

which would require The Flyers to pay half of the costs of any arbitration. This 

clause is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and unreasonably favors 

Trustmark because it attempts to circumvent the Pennsylvania bad faith 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 13 of 16
statute. The Pennsylvania bad faith statute was intended to protect insureds 

from bad faith denials of coverage by insurers such as Trustmark. General Acc. 

Ins. Co. v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 682 A.2d 819, 822 (Pa. Super. 1996). As 

such, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 provides for the assessment of costs and attorneys’ 

fees against the insurer and in favor of a prevailing plaintiff. See Section 

8371(3). Thus, pursuant to Section 8371(3) and contrary to the arbitration 

clause, Trustmark ought to be completely responsible for all costs and 

attorneys’ fees if and when The Flyers prevail in their claims against Trustmark. 

See Giordano v. Pep Boys—Manny, Moe & Jack, Inc., 2001 WL 484360 (E.D. 

Pa. 2001) (cost-sharing provision in arbitration clause found to unconscionable 

and unenforceable; matter submitted to arbitration, though court required 

defendant to bear all costs of arbitration over and above filing fees for which 

plaintiff would be responsible if he were filing his claim in federal court). 

III. CONCLUSION 

In light of the above considerations, the arbitration clause contained in 

the NHL-Trustmark policy ought not be applied to compel arbitration of The 

Flyers’ causes of action against Trustmark. Consequently, The Flyers 

respectfully request that this Honorable Court deny the Motion to Compel 

Arbitration and to Stay Legal Proceedings filed by Trustmark in connection with 

this litigation. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 

By: _________________________________ 

 Peter J. Deeb, Esquire 

 Atty. I.D. No. 42281 

 FREY, PETRAKIS, DEEB, BLUM, 

BRIGGS & MITTS, P.C. 

 1601 Market Street, 26th Floor 

 Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 14 of 16
 (215) 563-0500 

 Attorney for Plaintiff, 

 Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. 

Dated: June 18, 2004 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 15 of 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I, Peter J. Deeb, Esquire, hereby certify that I served a true and correct 

copy of the foregoing Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration 

and to Stay Legal Proceedings, by first class mail, postage prepaid on June 18, 

2004, as follows: 

Stephen C. Baker, Esq. 

Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP 

One Logan Square 

18th and Cherry Streets 

Philadelphia, PA 19103-6446 

 ___________________________________________ 

 Peter J. Deeb, Esquire 

Attorney for Plaintiff, 

 Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. 

Case 2:04-cv-02322-JP Document 5 Filed 06/18/2004 Page 16 of 16