IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERMONT COX, :

 :

Petitioner, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 00-5188

 :

v. :

 :

MARTIN HORN, CONNOR BLAINE, :

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE :

COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, and THE :

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE :

OF PENNSYLVANIA, :

 :

Respondents. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Smith, J. August 28, 2018

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States held that 

error by post-conviction counsel can constitute cause to overcome the procedural default of 

substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. The petitioner here, convicted of firstdegree murder in 1993, moved for relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) on 

the heels of Martinez in 2012. He argued that Martinez permitted the district court to consider 

the merits of ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims the court previously deemed 

procedurally defaulted during the court’s initial consideration of his section 2254 habeas corpus 

petition in 2004. While the district court denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, the Third Circuit 

vacated and remanded, holding that while Martinez alone cannot entitle a petitioner to 60(b)(6) 

relief, the combination of Martinez and additional factors, not considered by the district court,

could.

Roughly concurrent with the petitioner’s Martinez motion, the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania reexamined ballistics evidence from his 1993 trial. Although the ballistics 
2

evidence at trial was inconclusive as to whether the two bullets recovered from the murder 

victim originated from the same gun, the new ballistics report in 2013 concluded that they did 

not. The petitioner therefore filed a second Rule 60(b)(6) motion, arguing that the new ballistics 

report is an extraordinary circumstance permitting relief from the court’s previous denial of 

habeas relief.

Currently before the court are the petitioner’s two Rule 60(b)(6) motions—the first on 

remand from the Third Circuit, and the second based on the ballistics evidence. Following a stay 

of federal habeas proceedings to allow the petitioner to exhaust state remedies, the parties filed 

supplemental memoranda on the motions. As explained below, the court finds that it lacks 

jurisdiction over the petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) ballistics motion because that motion is a second 

or successive petition lacking appellate authorization. Additionally, even if the motion was not 

an unauthorized second or successive petition, it is untimely and lacks merit because the new 

ballistics report is consistent with the petitioner’s own admission that he fired two shots, belying 

his defense of accident. As for his motion based on Martinez, although the petitioner’s murder 

conviction in this case served as an aggravating factor towards a death sentence in a subsequent 

murder case, and although the petitioner has diligently pursued his defaulted ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claims, those claims are neither meritorious nor substantial, as required 

by Martinez. Accordingly, the court will deny the petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(6) motions.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In recounting the 25-year procedural history of this case, the court borrows liberally from 

the Third Circuit’s relatively recent procedural recitation, beginning with the 1993 trial of the 

petitioner, Jermont Cox (“Cox”).

On October 28, 1993, following a bench trial before the Hon. Carolyn 

Engel Temin of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Cox was 
3

convicted of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy, and possession of an 

instrument of crime in connection with the July 19, 1992 shooting death of 

Lawrence Davis, and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In a statement he gave to the police at the time of his arrest, Cox confessed 

to shooting Davis, but said that the shooting had been accidental. He and a friend, 

Larry Lee, he said, had gone to a drug house operated by Lee. While they were 

outside drinking, Lee got into a dispute with Davis that escalated into a physical 

altercation. At some point, Lee handed Cox a gun that was already cocked. Cox 

shot twice, hitting Davis, and then handed the gun back to Lee. According to Cox, 

he later told family members that the shooting had been an accident.1

To prove at trial that Cox had the requisite intent for first-degree murder, 

the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Kimberly Little, an eyewitness. 

Little testified that Cox and Lee worked for a drug organization that was run out 

of an apartment in her building: Cox was a “lookout” and Lee supplied the 

operation’s drugs. On the night of Davis’ death, Little saw from her window an 

argument erupt between Davis and Lee. According to Little, Cox then exited a 

local bar with a six-pack of beer, approached the two men, placed the six-pack on 

the hood of Lee’s nearby car, retrieved a gun from the car, walked to within four 

feet of Davis, and shot him three times. Cox stopped to drink a beer, and he and 

Lee left in Lee’s car.

The Commonwealth’s other witnesses were Kimberly Little’s sister, Mary 

Little; the medical examiner; and a ballistics expert. Mary Little confirmed that 

Cox and Lee were neighborhood drug dealers and that she saw them drive off 

together after the shooting. The medical examiner asserted that Davis had four 

wounds caused by at least three bullets,2 and the ballistics expert explained that it 

was unlikely the shooting was accidental given the number of shots fired.

3

 1 The relevant portions of Cox’s statement are as follows:

When I got to where Larry was, he handed me the gun. He took it from his waist and 

handed it to me. It was silver, .357 or .38, a pretty big gun. I was really not sure which.

When I got the gun, it was already cocked. That’s when I fired two shots. When I fired 

the shots, I was [approximately two feet from the victim].

After the two shots, I saw that he was hit and I [sic] fell to the ground. Larry then took 

the gun and we left.

Trial Tr. Oct. 27, 1993, at 104. After being asked whether he ever talked to Larry Lee about the shooting, Cox 

replied, “He just said[,] ‘What’s done is done. The police aren’t going to look on it as an accident.’” Id. at 106–07. 

Finally, Cox stated that he had told his uncle and mother about the murder, explaining to them that “Larry had a 

scuffle[,] and I shot someone accidentally.” Id. at 107.

Testifying at his suppression hearing, Cox referred to the shooting as “accidental,” and appears to offer 

contradicting information about the location of the murder weapon at the time of the shooting: “In this statement it 

says this weapon was handed to me by a male which [sic] was fighting the deceased. That makes it seem a little bit 

worse than what it is.” Id. at 44, 48. 2 The medical examiner also opined that “all the shots are coming from the right side and are pretty much horizontal 

and proceeding leftward.” Trial Tr. Oct. 28, 1993, at 94.

3 Specifically, the ballistics expert’s testimony as to an accidental shooting is as follows:

[C]ertainly firearms can be accidentally fired, and I’m talking about not the firearm being the 

cause, but an accidental or unintentional trigger pull. There can be malfunctions in the firearm.

With three shots being fired, it kind of like multiplies that possibility unlikely [sic]. One 

shot, especially without having the firearm, we can’t tell whether it was defective, I have no 

firearm submitted, I don’t know if it was accidentally discharged by the shooter, but once you 
4

Trial counsel filed post-verdict motions on Cox’s behalf. Cox also filed a 

motion pro se alleging trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and requesting the 

appointment of new counsel. In February of 1994, Judge Temin held a hearing on 

the post-verdict motions. At the hearing, Cox testified in support of his pro se 

motion and outlined trial counsel’s alleged failings: trial counsel (1) failed to 

present testimony from various character witnesses; (2) failed to find a witness, 

identified by Cox, who would have testified that “guys from the neighborhood” 

forced Kimberly Little to give a false statement to the police; (3) failed to review 

paperwork that Cox provided him; and (4) dissuaded Cox from taking the stand in 

his own defense. In response, trial counsel stated that he found himself in “a very 

untenable position” and asked that he be permitted to withdraw. Judge Temin 

denied the request as well as the pro se motion, finding Cox’s claims of 

ineffectiveness to lack merit. She later denied the counseled post-verdict motions.

Cox, still represented by trial counsel, appealed his conviction, 

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of evidence relating 

to uncharged drug activity. In June of 1995, the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

affirmed the judgment of sentence. Cox then filed a pro se petition for allocatur in 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, raising claims of trial counsel’s ineffective 

assistance at the trial and on appeal. New counsel was appointed for Cox and 

submitted a supplemental allocatur petition. The Supreme Court denied allocatur 

in April of 1996. . . .4

The following month, Cox filed a pro se petition under Pennsylvania’s 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 9541–9546. 

The attorney who had represented Cox in his petition to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court was again appointed to represent Cox in his collateral review 

proceeding under PCRA. Counsel filed an amended PCRA petition asserting 

 

have two shots, and then three shots, especially if it’s a revolver, you have to pull a double action 

trigger and/or cock the hammer every time you are going to fire that particular shot.

Trial Tr. Oct. 28, 1993, at 57–58. The ballistics expert also explained that he could not determine whether the two 

bullets recovered from Davis’s body originated from the same firearm:

There are insufficient microscopic characteristics to permit a positive identification between the 

two bullet specimens, one bullet specimen being mutilated and gouged, the other projectile being 

constructed of the copper alloy jacket. There were [sic] a lack of markings to identify them as 

both being fired from the same firearm.

Id. at 55. Lastly, the ballistics expert opined that the two recovered .38 special caliber bullets likely originated from 

a revolver:

The vast majority of firearms in that caliber are revolvers. However, there are semiautomatic 

pistols also in that caliber. Due to the lack of no fired cartridge cases submitted to our unit, that 

would be an indicator that it is a revolver, but it doesn’t rule it out, that it’s not a semiautomatic.

Id. at 54, 56. 4 The Third Circuit noted that by this time, 

Cox had also been convicted of the 1992 first-degree murders of Roosevelt Watson and Terence 

Stewart, both of whom he aided Lee in killing. Cox was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 

murder of Watson and death for the murder of Stewart. His conviction for murdering Davis was 

found to be an aggravating factor in support of his capital sentence. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 

983 A.2d 666, 673–75 (2009).

Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 117 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Cox II”) (citation altered).
5

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. . . .5 Judge Temin, sitting as the 

PCRA court, held a hearing at which PCRA counsel chose to proceed on only one 

of the multiple claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness: failure to impeach the 

Littles with their criminal records and motive to curry favor with the 

Commonwealth to gain leniency in their own cases.

On August 28, 1998, Judge Temin denied postconviction relief, finding 

that Cox had not been prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to impeach Kimberly 

and Mary Little with their criminal records because evidence aside from their 

testimony established his guilt. The Superior Court affirmed in July of 1999 and 

the Supreme Court denied allocatur in December of that year. Cox filed a second 

PCRA petition pro se, alleging ineffective assistance claims against trial and 

PCRA counsel. Judge Temin dismissed the petition as untimely, and the Superior 

Court affirmed after Cox failed to file a brief.

In October of 2000, Cox, now represented by the Federal Defender, filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court. The petition raised 

eight grounds for relief: (1) six claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 

(2) one violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and (3) a claim of 

cumulative error. In July of 2003, a magistrate judge issued a report and 

recommendation (“R & R”) in which he determined that the ineffective assistance 

claims abandoned by PCRA counsel before the PCRA court, as well as the Brady 

and cumulative error claims, were procedurally defaulted. He reviewed the 

remaining claim of ineffective assistance—trial counsel’s failure to impeach the 

Littles with their criminal records—and concluded that the Superior Court’s 

decision rejecting that claim was neither “contrary to” nor an “unreasonable 

application” of established federal law. [See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).] Cox filed 

objections to the R & R, arguing that PCRA counsel’s unilateral decision to 

abandon claims constituted cause to overcome the procedural default bar. In 

August of 2004, the District Court rejected Cox’s objections, adopted the R & R, 

and dismissed the habeas petition. . . . We affirmed on appeal. Cox v. Horn, 174 

F. App’x 84 (3d Cir. 2006) [(“Cox I”)].

Six years later, on June 20, 2012, Cox filed a motion pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) seeking relief from the District Court’s order of 

dismissal due to the intervening change in procedural law occasioned by the 

March 20, 2012 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Martinez v. 

Ryan. The Court held in Martinez that, under certain circumstances, error by postconviction counsel can constitute cause to overcome the procedural default of 

claims alleging trial counsel’s ineffective assistance. Cox argued that it was only 

due to PCRA counsel’s ineffective assistance at the initial PCRA proceeding that 

 5 The Third Circuit noted that Cox’s counseled PCRA petition raised the following ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel claims:

The counseled PCRA petition claimed that trial counsel had provided constitutionally deficient 

representation when he failed to impeach the Little sisters with (1) the fact that they had charges 

pending against them when they first gave statements to the police, were eventually convicted of 

lesser charges, and were on probation at the time of trial; (2) their alleged familial relationship to 

the murder victim, Davis; and (3) a prior inconsistent statement by Kimberly Little. Trial counsel 

was also allegedly deficient for failing to present evidence of Cox’s lawful employment.

Cox II, 757 F.3d at 117 n.2.
6

his claims of ineffectiveness against trial counsel had been abandoned and were 

now procedurally defaulted.

On May 23, 2013, the District Court denied Cox’s motion, finding that 

“Martinez’s change of law, without more,” was not cause for relief. In a separate 

July 2, 2013 order, the District Court issued a certificate of appealability on the 

“legal question” of “whether the change in law resulting from Martinez 

constitutes extraordinary circumstances that would warrant relief” under Rule 

60(b)(6).

Cox II, 757 F.3d at 116–18 (internal citations to appellate record omitted and case citations 

altered). On appeal, the Cox II court held that Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires “much more” “than 

the concededly important change of law wrought by Martinez.” Id. at 115 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). However, in reaffirming a “flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) 

motions,” the court vacated the district court’s May 23, 2013 order and remanded for a 

determination of whether, with supplemental briefing, the petitioner could demonstrate “much 

more” than just Martinez. Id. at 115, 122, 126.

Before filing his June 20, 2012 Rule 60(b)(6) motion, Cox also moved for discovery of 

ballistics evidence and examination records in the federal habeas proceedings associated with the 

Watson and Stewart murders. See Civil Action No. 00-5289, Doc. No. 32; Civil Action No. 10-

2673, Doc. No. 12. The Honorable Anita B. Brody granted Cox’s discovery motion on February 

7, 2012, which apparently spurred the Commonwealth to reexamine the ballistics evidence in the 

Davis murder. See Civil Action No. 00-5289, Doc. No. 40; Civil Action No. 10-2673, Doc. No. 

17. The officers conducting the reexamination, dated April 23, 2013, concluded that the two 

bullets recovered from Davis’s body, “when compared against each other, were NOT fired from 

the same firearm.” Suppl. Mem. Supp. Pet’r’s Mot. Relief Final J. Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b)(6) (“Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem.”), Ex. A at 3, Doc. No. 95-1. The officers noted that their 

examination and the previous examination were not in complete agreement. See id. Arguing 

that the ballistics reexamination undermines the district court’s and Third Circuit’s rationale in 
7

denying habeas relief, Cox filed another Rule 60(b)(6) motion on August 5, 2013. See Pet’r’s 

Mot. Relief Final J. Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) at 1, Doc. No. 82.

Then-Chief Judge Petrese B. Tucker reassigned the instant case from Judge Brody’s 

calendar to the undersigned’s calendar on June 10, 2014. See Doc. No. 83. At the request of 

counsel, the court stayed each of Cox’s three federal habeas cases due to pending PCRA 

petitions in state court challenging the three murder convictions on the basis of the new ballistics 

evidence. See Order at 1–2, Doc. No. 90; see also Civil Action No. 00-5289, Doc. No. 64, Civil 

Action No. 10-2673, Doc. No. 43. After exhausting state court remedies, Cox filed a counseled 

supplemental memorandum in support of his August 5, 2013 Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Doc. Nos. 

91, 95. The respondents filed a response to the motion on November 27, 2017. Doc. No. 105. 

Finally, Cox filed a counseled reply on February 9, 2018. Doc. No. 110. Cox’s June 20, 2012

Rule 60(b)(6) motion, on remand from the Third Circuit, and August 5, 2013 Rule 60(b)(6) 

motion are now ripe for review.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standards Of Review

1. Rule 60(b)(6)

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may file a 

motion seeking relief from “a final judgment, order, or proceeding” for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have 

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 

misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an 

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is 

no longer equitable; or

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
8

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). “A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time—and 

for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the 

date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). 

A Rule 60(b)(6) movant must show “extraordinary circumstances where, without such 

relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox II, 757 F.3d at 115 (quoting 

Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). Courts in this circuit employ

a flexible, multifactor approach to Rule 60(b)(6) motions, including those built 

upon a post-judgment change in the law, that takes into account all the particulars 

of a movant’s case. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 274 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (noting, in the context of a 60(b)(6) analysis, the propriety of 

“explicit[ly]” considering “equitable factors” in addition to a change in law); 

Lasky v. Cont’l Prods. Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing multiple 

factors a district court may consider in assessing a motion under 60(b)(6)). The 

fundamental point of 60(b) is that it provides “a grand reservoir of equitable 

power to do justice in a particular case.” Hall v. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 772 

F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).

2. The Relationship Between Rule 60(b) Motions and Second or Successive Habeas 

Corpus Applications

“When a motion is filed in a habeas case under a Rule 60(b) . . . label, the district court 

must initially determine whether the motion is actually a ‘second or successive’ habeas petition 

within the meaning of [28 U.S.C.] § 2244(b).” Davenport v. Brooks, Civil Action No. 06-5070, 

2014 WL 1413943, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2014). Pursuant to section 2244(b),

[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under [28 

U.S.C. §2254] that was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed 

unless . . .

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or

(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been 

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
9

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of 

the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable 

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). “Before a second or successive application . . . is filed in the district 

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the 

district court to consider the application.” § 2244(b)(3)(A). Failure to seek appellate 

authorization before filing a successive petition acts as a jurisdictional bar. See Blystone v. Horn, 

664 F.3d 397, 412 (3d Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner’s failure to seek such authorization from the 

appropriate appellate court before filing a second or successive habeas petition ‘acts as a 

jurisdictional bar.’” (quoting United States v. Key, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000))).

If a petitioner in a section 2254 habeas proceeding files a motion containing a “claim,”

even if he labels it as a Rule 60(b) motion for relief, the motion is in substance a second or 

successive habeas corpus application. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531 (2005)

(concluding that Rule 60(b) motions containing “claims,” “is in substance a successive habeas 

petition”). Accordingly, the motion is subject to section 2244(b)’s aforementioned requirements, 

including appellate authorization. Id. A “claim” under section 2244(b), is “an asserted federal 

basis for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction.” Id. at 530. A Rule 60(b) motion 

does not assert a claim when it “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of a 

claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Id. at 

532. Examples of non-merits rulings include those denying habeas relief for failure to exhaust, 

procedural default, or a statute-of-limitations bar. Id. at 532 n.4. However, a Rule 60(b) motion 

asserts a claim

if it attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits, . . .

since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas relief on the merits is 
10

effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the 

substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.

Id. at 532 (emphasis in original).

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

With regard to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must satisfy the 

two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, the 

petitioner must show that counsel’s representation was deficient because it was not “within the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 688. That is, the petitioner 

must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below an “objective standard of 

reasonableness” based on the facts and circumstances present at the time of counsel’s allegedly 

deficient conduct. Id. In attempting to satisfy this burden, a petitioner has to overcome the 

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 689.

As for the second element of the Strickland test, a petitioner must demonstrate prejudice. 

Id. at 687. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. at 694.

B. Analysis

In vacating the May 23, 2013 order denying Cox’s June 20, 2012 Rule 60(b)(6) motion

and remanding to this court, the Cox II court offered instructions for further review of Cox’s 

motion. 757 F.3d at 124. First, as discussed above, the court held that “the jurisprudential 

change rendered by Martinez, without more, does not entitle a habeas petitioner to Rule 60(b)(6) 
11

relief.” Id. Second, because the Martinez exception to procedural default requires a 

“substantial” underlying ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”) claim, the court may 

assess the merits of Cox’s procedurally defaulted IATC claims. Id. at 124–25. Third, in the 

habeas context, Rule 60(b)(6) relief must be “rare,” the principle of comity weighs against 

disturbing a state’s criminal judgment via a Rule 60(b) motion, and “[c]onsiderations of repose 

and finality become stronger the longer a decision has been settled.” Id. at 125 (citations 

omitted). Fourth, “[a] movant’s diligence in pursuing review of his [IATC] claims is also an 

important factor.” Id. at 126. Finally, the fact that Cox’s conviction in the Davis murder case

served as an aggravating factor for his receiving a death sentence in the Stewart murder case is 

“significant.” Id.

Cox presents another factor that he argues weighs towards a finding of “extraordinary 

circumstances” that was not before the Third Circuit when that court issued the aforementioned 

guidance: the new ballistics report. Before considering the Third Circuit’s instructed factors, the 

court first analyzes the importance of the new ballistics report as it is a prerequisite to a complete 

discussion of the Cox II factors.

1. The New Ballistics Report as an Extraordinary Circumstance

Rather than providing a substantive ground for habeas relief, Cox argues that the new 

ballistics report is an extraordinary circumstance undermining the prosecution’s evidence, 

thereby permitting a merits consideration of his defaulted IATC claims. Pet’r’s Reply Supp. 

Mot. Relief Final J. Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (“Pet’r’s Reply”) at 3, Doc. No. 110. The 

court cannot agree because (1) his motion, to the extent it is based on the new ballistics report, is 

a second or successive habeas corpus petition requiring appellate authorization; (2) his motion, 

again to the extent it is based on the new ballistics report, is untimely whether construed under 
12

Rules 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6); and (3) regardless of non-merits defects, the report does not 

undermine Cox’s conviction.

a. Second or Successive Petition

Cox’s Rule 60(b) motion requesting relief based on the new ballistics report is a second 

or successive habeas petition because the report attacks the merits of his conviction, not the 

court’s prior refusal to consider procedurally defaulted IATC claims. 

As an initial matter, courts have repeatedly held that new evidence presented in a Rule 

60(b) motion, such as the new ballistics report, constitutes a “claim” under Gonzalez. See

Blystone, 664 F.3d at 413 (“[A] motion that seeks to present newly discovered evidence in 

support of a claim previously denied presents a claim.” (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532)); 

United States v. Jones, Crim. Action No. 06-367, 2015 WL 525184, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2015)

(“A Rule 60(b) motion that brings a new claim for relief or new evidence in support of a claim is 

in substance a successive habeas petition and should be treated accordingly.” (citing Gonzalez, 

545 U.S. at 531)).

Cox’s own mismatched reasons for raising the ballistics report further demonstrate that 

presentation of the report constitutes a claim under Gonzalez. On the one hand, he rejects the 

idea that the new ballistics report raises a new claim, and reaffirms that he only raises 

procedurally defaulted IATC claims in his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Pet’r’s Reply at 2–3. On the 

other hand, he calls the ballistics report “an extraordinary circumstance that calls into question 

the accuracy and reliability of the prosecution’s evidence against [him].” Id. at 3 (citing Cox I

for its reliance on “ballistics evidence presented at trial to conclude that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance”). Thus, according to Cox, for the report to 

have any bearing on this court’s determination as to whether extraordinary circumstances exist, 
13

thereby permitting consideration of the procedurally defaulted IATC claims, the court must first 

determine whether the report does indeed “call[] into question the accuracy and reliability of the 

prosecution’s evidence.” 

Unfortunately, determining the accuracy and reliability of the prosecution’s evidence is a 

fundamentally merits-based analysis and goes beyond the purview of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, as 

delineated by Gonzalez. Cox fails to demonstrate how the new ballistics report, unlike his 

Martinez claim, has any bearing on the order from which he seeks relief, at least to the extent 

that the order denied habeas relief on procedural default grounds. Cox does not wield the new 

ballistics report to attack “some defect in the integrity” of that order’s conclusion that all but one 

of his IATC claims were procedurally defaulted. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532. Instead, by his own 

admission, the new ballistics report demonstrates flaws in trial evidence, and therefore amounts 

to a claim under Gonzalez—i.e. “an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s judgment 

of conviction.” Id. at 530. In other words, he “seek[s] to challenge the underlying criminal 

proceedings and not this Court’s decision denying habeas relief. In this regard, the motion . . . is 

properly construed as a second or successive habeas petition.” Box v. Petsock, Civ. Action No. 

3:86-CV-1704, 2014 WL 4093248, at *15 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2014) (holding that petitioner’s 

allegations of fraud perpetrated on state courts and claims of new evidence, including alleged 

“sham” arrest warrant, constituted second or successive petition, even though joined to Rule 

60(b) motion for relief based on Martinez as an extraordinary circumstance).

Cox’s citation to Cox I only supports the conclusion that his Rule 60(b) motion, to the 

extent it presents the new ballistics report, is a second or successive petition. He cites that case

to demonstrate that the new report undermines the Third Circuit’s reliance on purportedly 

outdated ballistics evidence in its analysis of the one IATC claim considered on its merits. But 
14

the ostensible purpose of Cox’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is not to relitigate the merits of his one 

IATC claim that was not procedurally defaulted. Rather, he seeks a merits-based consideration 

of IATC claims previously rejected for a non-merits reason: procedural default. If Cox were to 

use the new ballistics report to challenge his one IATC claim that was not procedurally 

defaulted, that would constitute an attack of “the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on 

the merits.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532 (emphasis in original). Such a challenge would amount 

to a second or successive petition.

Finally, the court does not interpret Cox II as an invitation for Cox to present new 

evidence, new IATC claims, or any other arguments irrelevant to the propriety of reopening his 

procedurally defaulted claims—the narrow basis under which the Third Circuit remanded to this 

court for review. Rule 60(b)(6)’s requirement that the movant demonstrate “extraordinary 

circumstances” in the habeas context does not unlock for the court’s consideration any of a 

petitioner’s conceivable disagreements with his conviction or collateral proceedings. In short, 

Cox’s Rule 60(b) attacks must be tailored to the order from which he seeks relief, and he has not 

explained how the new ballistics report demonstrates that this court erred in declining to review 

his procedurally defaulted IATC claims. Therefore, his Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief based on 

the new ballistics report is a second or successive petition, and because he did not first seek 

authorization from the Third Circuit, this court lacks jurisdiction over that claim.6

 6 Cox also urges the court to consider additional IATC claims separate from those raised in his federal habeas 

petition as extraordinary circumstances that support Martinez relief: trial counsel’s failure to retain a ballistics 

expert, call witnesses whose statements to police implicated others in the crime, and cross-examine the Little sisters 

on inconsistencies in their testimony. For the same reasons that Cox’s presentation of the new ballistics report 

constitutes a second or successive petition, these purported extraordinary circumstances are also second or 

successive claims.
15

b. Timeliness of the New Ballistics Report

Gonzalez concerns aside, Cox’s motion for relief based on the new ballistics report is also 

untimely, whether the court construes his motion as requesting relief under Rule 60(b)(2) or 

60(b)(6).7

 The court analyzes timeliness under each rule in turn.

i. Rule 60(b)(2)

Rule 60(b)(2) permits relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding based on “newly

discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to 

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2). Under this Rule, “the 

phrase newly discovered evidence refers to evidence of facts in existence at the time of trial of 

which the aggrieved party was excusably ignorant.” United States v. 27.93 Acres of Land, More 

or Less, Situate in Cumberland Cty., Com. of Pa. Tract No. 364-07, 924 F.2d 506, 516 (3d Cir. 

1991) (internal brackets omitted). Relief under Rule 60(b)(2) and Rule 60(b)(6) is mutually 

exclusive; that is, if relief is available under Rule 60(b)(2), it is unavailable under Rule 60(b)(6). 

See S.E.C. v. Fin. Warfare Club, Inc., 425 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing 

Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988)). Accordingly, “Rule 

60(b)(6) cannot be used as a means by which the [one-year] time limitations of 60(b)(1–3) may 

be circumvented.” Salley v. Dragovich, 594 F. App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in Financial Warfare Club, Inc., the Third Circuit 

foreclosed Rule 60(b)(6) relief because the appellant presented newly discovered evidence that 

the appellee committed fraud, making Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) relief available. See 425 F. App’x at 

87. This was so even though the appellant did not specifically file his motion for relief under 

Rules 60(b)(2) or (3). See id. at 86–87.

 7 Cox’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is only untimely to the extent it requests relief based on the new ballistics report. As 

the Cox II court noted, his Rule 60(b)(6) motion is timely to the extent it requests relief pursuant to Martinez and 

consideration of his procedurally defaulted IATC claims. Cox II, 757 F.3d at 116.
16

The Financial Warfare Club, Inc. logic and application of precedent applies similarly to 

this case. By Cox’s own telling, the new ballistics report presents factual evidence that existed at 

the time of trial in 1993 that he could not discover with reasonable diligence, and for which he 

was excusably ignorant, because the respondents always maintained exclusive control of 

ballistics evidence:

[T]he delay in bringing this motion is the result of Respondent’s exclusive 

possession of the ballistics evidence at issue. Respondent has always maintained 

complete control of the disputed ballistics evidence. Respondent only re-analyzed 

the evidence and produced a new and materially different report after Respondent 

was ordered to allow Petitioner access to the ballistics evidence. The grand 

reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case under [R]ule 60(b) 

counsels against now punishing Mr. Cox for a delay that was of the Respondent’s 

making.

Pet’r’s Reply at 4 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the new ballistics report 

constitutes newly discovered evidence, Rule 60(b)(2) relief is available, subject to Rule 

60(c)(1)’s one-year deadline. Judge Brody denied Cox’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on 

August 11, 2004, and Cox did not file his motion for relief based on the new ballistics evidence 

until August 5, 2013, far past the one-year deadline. Therefore, Cox’s motion for relief, to the 

extent the new ballistics report is the basis for that relief, is untimely.

ii. Rule 60(b)(6)

Even if the court could consider Cox’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6), the result is no 

different because his lack of diligence in seeking ballistics evidence belies his filing the motion 

within a reasonable time. A Rule 60(b)(6) motion “must be made within a reasonable time,” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), and, here, Cox did not move for Rule 60(b)(6) relief “within a 

reasonable time” because he did not diligently seek ballistics evidence, contrary to his assertion 

above. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered this very issue in 2016 upon review of 

Cox’s PCRA petition based on the new ballistics report. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 
17

221, 231 (Pa. 2016). Although that PCRA petition was based on the Watson and Stewart 

murders, the Court’s analysis is relevant to the Davis murder as well:

[T]here is no question that Cox knew that more testing could be performed on the 

ballistics evidence at the time of trial [for the Watson and Stewart murders] in 

1995. It was not until six years later, in 2001, that Cox first attempted to obtain 

the ballistics evidence through his first PCRA petition . . . . By raising this claim 

in his first PCRA petition, Cox has effectively conceded that the testing could 

have been done at the time of trial. Moreover, Cox admitted to committing the 

Davis murder, and so Cox always knew that more than one firearm was used in 

the perpetration of that crime. Nevertheless, Cox has never explained why he did 

not seek independent ballistics testing at the time of trial or on direct appeal.

Importantly, our review of the record reveals that Cox has never alleged that he 

asked trial counsel to seek independent ballistics testing or that his counsel 

refused such a request. Were that the situation, there could be a basis upon which 

to conclude that he attempted to act diligently, but that his efforts were thwarted 

by trial counsel. However, this is simply not the case here. Cox acknowledges that 

the testing could have been done at the time of trial, but offers no explanation as 

to why he did not seek such testing at that time. Instead, he took no action to 

obtain the additional testing for six years. . . . It is this lengthy, unexplained delay 

that defeats the possibility of a conclusion that Cox acted with reasonable effort to 

obtain ballistics testing. . . . Cox’s failure to act, and failure to explain his lack of 

action, precludes a finding of due diligence.

Id. (citation omitted). The Court also clarified in a footnote that

[t]here is no allegation here that a newly developed technology or newly 

discovered source led to the new fact. Cox makes no claim that Officers Walker 

and Cruz[, the examiners for the new ballistics report,] employed new testing 

methods or techniques, nor does he claim that they tested anything beyond what 

Officer O’Hara[, the examiner for the old ballistics report,] tested in connection 

with his report. This further weakens any attempt to claim that the fact was not 

ascertainable prior to the issuance of the second ballistics report.

Id. at 231 n.15. None of the relevant factors that the Court discussed is materially different in 

this case. Moreover, the Court’s reasoning applies even more forcefully here because the Davis 

murder trial occurred two years before the Watson and Stewart murder trial. Therefore, eight 

years, rather than six years, separate Cox’s trial in this case and his first attempt to obtain 

ballistics evidence in any of the three cases.
18

Cox’s argument that the Commonwealth has always been in sole possession of the 

ballistics evidence is only superficially persuasive. As the Court discussed, Cox was admittedly 

present for Davis’s murder, and therefore, assuming the accuracy of the new ballistics report’s 

conclusion, he has always known that the bullets recovered from Davis originated from two (or 

more) guns. Despite that knowledge, there is no evidence he insisted that his trial or PCRA 

counsel pursue a theory based on multiple firearms, which surely would have involved seeking 

another ballistics analysis. Without such diligence, the court refuses to find that he filed his Rule 

60(b)(6) motion based on the new ballistics report within a reasonable time.

d. Whether the New Ballistics Report’s Conclusion is Extraordinary

Even disregarding Gonzalez, timeliness, and diligence concerns, the new ballistics report 

does not undermine the reliability of Cox’s conviction because he admitted to firing two shoots

that were almost certainly not accidental. Therefore, the report is not an extraordinary 

circumstance.

Most importantly, while the new ballistics report, if accurate, undermines the conclusion 

that Cox was the only shooter, it does not undermine the conclusion that he nevertheless shot 

intentionally. Regardless of whether the bullets recovered from Davis originated from one or 

two guns, Cox admitted to firing two shots in his statement. Because at least three bullets struck 

Davis, the new ballistics report is still consistent with Cox firing two shots with at least one other

shot originating from a different shooter. Concededly, Cox firing only two shots is more 

suggestive of an accident than firing three or more shots. But only marginally so: The ballistics 

expert testified that two shots were sufficient to all but negate the possibility of an accident. 

Specifically, the ballistics expert at trial testified that two or more shots required the shooter to 

cock the hammer and/or pull a double action trigger for each shot. The ballistics expert also 
19

testified that these actions between each shot were especially necessary given the likelihood that 

the bullets recovered from Davis originated from a revolver. Thus, even if Cox only fired twice, 

instead of three or more times, he still would have had to undertake the intentional action of 

preparing the gun for the second shot. The combination of these three pieces of evidence—

Cox’s admission, evidence that at least three bullets struck Davis, and the ballistics testimony—

demonstrate the extreme unlikelihood that Cox accidentally shot Davis.

According to Cox, as a result of the new ballistics report, his “partially-inculpatory 

statement is called into doubt and the portion of his statement explaining that the shooting was 

accidental is supported.” Pet’r’s Reply at 9. The court disagrees for several reasons, each 

contributing to the court’s conclusion that the new ballistics report is not an extraordinary 

circumstance. First, the new ballistics report does not impeach the medical examiner’s testimony 

that Davis had four wounds caused by at least three bullets. Therefore, assuming arguendo that 

the conclusion of the new ballistics report is correct, the report is consistent with Cox’s 

admission that he fired two shots, and that there was at least one shot from a different firearm. 

Second, he never explains why he should not be held responsible for his own admission, given 

that the new report is consistent with two (or more) shots originating from his own firearm.

8

 

Third, it is unclear whether Cox even argued the shooting was an accident in his admission. In 

recollecting the moment of the shooting, the only indication of an accident is his reference to Lee 

handing him a cocked gun, after which he twice states that he fired two shots. But as explained, 

even if Lee handed him a cocked gun, Cox would have still had to cock the gun for the second 

 8 Before trial, Cox moved to suppress his statement based on a purported unawareness that he could face the death 

penalty for confessing—not, for example, involuntariness or coercion. In denying the motion, the trial judge, 

finding that the statement was not involuntary, explained, “I find there’s absolutely no evidence nor has the 

defendant presented any argument on the issue of psychological coercion.” Trial Tr. Oct. 27, 1993, at 63.
20

shot. Outside of that moment, Cox only states that he told his family he shot someone 

accidentally and quotes Lee stating that the police would not look at the shooting as an accident. 

Fourth, to the extent the new ballistics report demonstrates that Cox’s statement omitted a 

complete description of Davis’s death, Cox alone is responsible for that omission, further 

undermining his attempt to paint the shooting as an accident. Cox was present at the time of 

Davis’s shooting, and the medical examiner testified that all bullets entered from the same 

approximate angle. Cox would therefore know if somebody else fired shots. Nevertheless, he 

never suggested the involvement of a second shooter. Assuming the accuracy of the new report, 

the court is unwilling to find credible Cox’s claims of accident thereby rewarding him for hiding 

the full truth of the shooting. And finally, Cox ignores the fact that the first ballistics report was 

merely inconclusive as to whether the bullets recovered from Davis originated from the same 

firearm. Thus, Cox’s conviction was not necessarily premised upon him firing all shots, belying 

his argument that the new report is a game-changer that materially strengthens his assertion that 

he shot accidentally.

Cox is correct that the new report offers a different interpretation of the proceedings and 

evidence at trial, as well as collateral proceedings. For example, the court agrees with Cox that 

the report “places both the prosecution and defense theories in a different light.” Pet’r’s Suppl. 

Mem.” at 10, 13 (citing Trial Tr. Oct. 28, 1993, at 116 (reciting trial counsel’s statement during 

closing that “I don’t know that we could say firing a gun three times . . . would be consistent 

with an accident”), 124 (reciting prosecutor’s closing statement that trial “[c]ounsel has 

conceded . . . there is one shooter and that shooter is the defendant, and that defendant is 

responsible for all the bullets that entered the body of the deceased”)). Additionally, both the 

2003 R & R and Cox I do not appear to contemplate the possibility of a second firearm or 
21

shooter in determining that trial counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice Cox. For 

example, Magistrate Judge Jacob Hart wrote in the 2003 R & R, “Since Dr. Lieberman

concluded that the wounds were caused by at least three bullets, even if the weapon was cocked 

when Cox got it, he would have had to cock the weapon two other times to fire three shots.” R 

& R at 19, Doc. No. 31. Likewise, the Cox I court explained:

According to Cox, the Superior Court disregarded the importance of Kimberly 

Little’s testimony to the prosecution’s case and gave too much weight to other, 

wholly circumstantial, evidence presented at trial. However, even without 

Kimberly Little’s testimony, the verdict was supported by circumstantial evidence. 

For example, Cox admitted to police that he shot the victim from a distance of two

feet, and the victim sustained three gun shot wounds to vital parts of the body, 

specifically the neck and chest. In addition, the ballistics expert explained that the 

likelihood of an accidental shooting was diminished by the number of shots fired. It 

is true that the ballistics expert testified that he could not exclude the possibility of 

an accidental shooting without examining the weapon; nonetheless, the expert’s 

testimony about the likelihood of an accidental shooting weighs against Cox’s 

claim that he shot the victim accidentally.

174 F. App’x at 88. And finally, the report’s conclusion contradicts Kimberly Little’s 

eyewitness testimony which omits any reference to a second shooter or firearm.

Even if the new ballistics report offers this new interpretation of trial and collateral 

proceedings, it does not necessarily follow that the outcome of those proceedings is faulty. First, 

closing statements suggesting that Cox fired three shots and fired them alone are immaterial 

because, as explained above, the admitted two shots sufficiently established intent, and the 

presence of a second shooter is irrelevant to that intent. And again, these arguments ignore the 

fact that the first ballistics report was only inconclusive as to whether both bullets originated 

from the same gun. Second, although Judge Hart relied on Cox having to cock the gun two other 

times to establish that trial counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice Cox, just one cock 

of the gun demonstrates the same point with near equal force, as explained by the ballistics 

expert. The same goes for the Cox I reasoning: One fewer shot than that presumed by the court 
22

still demonstrates Cox’s intent because he still had to cock the gun for the second shot to which 

he confessed. Lastly, although the new ballistics report’s conclusion contradicts Kimberly 

Little’s account of the shooting, her testimony is unnecessary to maintain confidence in the 

outcome of Cox’s trial, as the Third Circuit determined, even assuming Cox fired only two shots 

rather than three or more.

In all, even overlooking Cox’s improper presentation of the new ballistics report in a 

Rule 60(b)(6) motion and the untimeliness of the motion, the report is not an extraordinary 

circumstance because (1) the existing evidence—Cox’s admission that he shot twice, medical 

testimony that at least three bullets struck Davis, and ballistics testimony that shooting twice all 

but forecloses an accident—sufficiently justifies his conviction; (2) Cox fails to explain why he 

is not responsible for his own inculpatory statement that he shot twice, how his original 

statement demonstrates he thought the shooting was an accident, why he has kept silent about the 

possibility of a second shooter despite his presence during the shooting, and why the new report 

materially changes the integrity of the trial when the ballistics evidence at trial was merely 

inconclusive as to the number of firearms; and (3) although Cox is correct that the new report 

undercuts presuppositions during and after trial that he was responsible for all shots, the new 

report nevertheless does not undercut the outcomes of trial and collateral proceedings.

2. Merit and Substantiality of the Procedurally Defaulted IATC Claims

Because the Martinez exception to procedural default requires a “substantial” underlying 

IATC claim, the Cox II court permitted an assessment of the merits of Cox’s defaulted IATC 

claims on remand. The defaulted IATC claims are four-fold: (1) failure to introduce evidence 

that the Little sisters were related to Davis; (2) failure to impeach Kimberly Little with prior 

inconsistent statements; (3) failure to refute the Commonwealth’s assertion that Cox worked as a 
23

drug lookout; and (4) failure to present an adequate defense to first-degree murder and properly 

advise Cox of his right to testify. See R & R at 3, 9–13; Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 14. The court 

discusses the merit of each in turn and finds that Cox fails to prove any of his IATC claims.

a. Failure to Introduce Evidence that the Little Sisters were Related to Davis

Cox argues that trial counsel possessed a statement from Mary Little’s husband, Keith 

Harris (“Harris”), indicating that Harris was Davis’s cousin by marriage, thereby making the 

Little sisters cousins of Davis; however, trial counsel failed to question the biases of the Littles 

based on that familial relationship. Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 19. The court disagrees that trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient or that the alleged deficiency prejudices Cox.

Under the first part of the Strickland test, trial counsel’s performance was not deficient 

because Harris’s statement is ambiguous as to the familial relationship between Davis and the 

Littles. Harris stated he was related to Davis as a “cousin by marriage.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem., 

Ex. B at 2, Doc. No. 95-2. As the respondents argue, while the Littles may be cousins of Davis, 

Davis may also have been married to Harris’s cousin. Resp. Suppl. Mem. Supp. Pet’r’s Mot. 

Relief Final J. Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (“Resp’t’s Resp.”) at 28, Doc. No. 105. Cox 

fails to respond with any evidence of a relevant familial relationship, and without clarity on that 

question, trial counsel’s performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Nor would any deficiency be prejudicial, under the second part of the Strickland test. As 

the Third Circuit explained in Cox I, sufficient evidence outside of the Little sisters’ testimony 

existed to convict Cox, and as explained above, even if considering the new ballistics report is 

proper, the report does not materially alter the Cox I reasoning. Therefore, there is not a 

reasonable probability that trial counsel’s failure to elicit testimony from the Littles on a possible 

familial relationship to Davis prejudiced Cox.
24

b. Failure to Impeach Kimberly Little with Prior Inconsistent Statements

Cox alleges that trial counsel failed to highlight two prior inconsistent statements of 

Kimberly Little. First, Cox argues that a passage in Harris’s statement demonstrates that 

Kimberly Little did not see the shooting, contrary to her testimony that she witnessed the 

shooting from her apartment window. Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 18; Pet’r’s Reply at 14. The 

complete relevant portion of Harris’s statement is as follows:

Q. Did anyone else tell you that they had seen the shooting?

A. Kim said that she was ac[]ross the street and after she heard the shots she went 

to the corner and seen them . . . pulling off.”

Q. Anyone else?

A. That was it.

Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem., Ex. B at 3–4. According to Cox, 

[t]he key part of this statement . . . is that Ms. Little did not see the incident. 

Instead, she only heard the shots. Moreover, Mr. Harris stated that he was in the 

apartment building, where both he and Ms. Little lived, when the shooting 

happened. There is a reasonable inference that Mr. Harris would not have said his

sister-in-law was “across the street” if she was inside the apartment building that 

they both lived in. By calling Mr. Harris as a witness, counsel could have proved 

that Kimberly Little was not where she claimed to be when the shooting occurred 

and did not see Petitioner shoot anyone.

Pet’r’s Reply at 14 (emphasis in original).

Cox’s argument takes advantage of two ambiguities in Harris’s statement. First, while 

Harris’s answer responds to the question of whether anyone else told him that they had “seen the 

shooting,” suggesting that Kimberly Little saw the shooting, he also says that she had “seen 

them” “after she heard the shots,” suggesting that the first time that she saw the perpetrators was 

after the shooting. Second, although Harris and Kimberly Little lived in the same building, and 

Kimberly Little testified that she viewed the shooting from her building, he said she was “across 

the street” at the time of the shooting, which could either mean she was across the street from 

Harris, an inconsistency, or across the street from the shooting, a consistency.
25

While neither interpretation of Harris’s statement strikes the court as more likely than the 

other, effective counsel would have nonetheless further investigated Harris’s meaning. 

However, Cox does not allege a failure to investigate; rather, from this sole ambiguous 

statement, he faults trial counsel for failing to use the statement to impeach Kimberly Little at 

trial. Without more evidence of deficiency—for example, that trial counsel failed to use the 

statement either after neglecting to investigate or after an investigation affirmed Cox’s 

interpretation of Harris’s statement—the court cannot find that trial counsel’s failure to impeach 

Kimberly Little with Harris’s statement was objectively unsound trial strategy.

The second inconsistency Cox alleges is as follows: Kimberly Little told police that she 

had known Cox for a week, and yet she testified that he was a lookout for a drug operation that 

was open every day except Sunday. Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 18. Additionally, trial counsel failed 

to question Little about the source of her drug operation information. Neither alleged failure 

demonstrates that trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. Kimberly Little’s familiarity with the weekly schedule of a local drug operation 

is consistent with only knowing one of the drug operation’s participants for one week. 

Additionally, questioning Little about the source of her information may have only elicited 

further unfavorable testimony about Cox’s involvement. Therefore, Cox cannot overcome the 

strong presumption that trial counsel’s omissions during his cross-examination of Kimberly 

Little were sound trial strategy. Trial counsel’s performance was not deficient on either alleged 

prior inconsistent statement.

As for the prejudice prong of Strickland, because Cox argues in this IATC claim that trial 

counsel missed an opportunity to impeach Kimberly Little, the same analysis from the first claim 
26

applies: Kimberly Little’s testimony was unnecessary to support Cox’s conviction, and therefore, 

the failure to impeach her did not prejudice him.

c. Failure to Refute the Commonwealth’s Assertion that Cox Worked as a Drug Lookout

In his third defaulted IATC claim, Cox argues that trial counsel failed to conduct an 

adequate investigation and interview and produce exculpatory witnesses to defend him from the 

accusation that he worked as a drug lookout. For example, trial counsel had an available witness 

willing to testify about Cox’s lawful employment. Under the first prong of Strickland, evidence 

of Cox’s lawful employment is of marginal probative value because lawful and unlawful 

employment are not mutually exclusive. That probative value is small enough that it was not 

objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to decline to elicit testimony of lawful employment. It 

is true that trial counsel “wasn’t really . . . anticipating” that the Commonwealth would produce

testimony from Kimberly Little as to Cox’s drug work. Trial Tr. Oct. 28, 1993, at 5. However,

Cox fails to offer any specifics, other than evidence of lawful employment, as to what trial 

counsel should have done differently at trial to contradict Kimberly Little’s testimony of Cox’s 

work as a drug lookout. Therefore, Cox has failed to demonstrate that trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient on this issue.

Turning to the prejudice prong of Strickland, evidence that Cox worked as a drug lookout 

was unnecessary for the reasons discussed in the above analysis of the new ballistics evidence. 

Regardless of his alleged work as a drug lookout, Cox confessed to shooting Davis twice, the 

ballistics examiner testified as to the extreme unlikelihood that two shots could be accidental, 

and the medical examiner testified that Davis died from at least three gunshot wounds. 

Therefore, trial counsel’s failure to refute the assertion that Cox worked as a drug lookout did not 

prejudice him.
27

d. Failure to Present an Adequate Defense to First-Degree Murder and Properly Advise Cox

of His Right to Testify

On the final procedurally defaulted IATC claim, Cox argues that trial counsel failed to 

(1) present any evidence that he shot accidentally and (2) properly advise him of his right to 

testify. As to the first alleged deficiency, trial counsel proceeded at trial under a theory that Cox 

had “buckshot fever,”9 and Cox repeatedly criticizes this decision in his submissions. See, e.g., 

Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 2, 16 (referring to theory as “ill-conceived” and “irrational”). The court 

sees this IATC claim differently: Trial counsel pursued the buckshot fever theory because Cox’s 

inculpatory admission that he shot twice left him without winning options. While admittedly 

lacking in plausibility, the buckshot fever theory provided a tidy explanation for how Cox could 

have fired two or more shots without the intent to kill. Once again, Cox does not specify which 

theory trial counsel should have instead pursued, which arguably further demonstrates the 

difficulty of framing two or more shots as an accident. 

Worse, and turning to the second alleged deficiency, Cox’s only support for the argument 

that trial counsel failed to properly advise him of his right to testify is a misleadingly 

decontextualized quote from trial counsel during a PCRA hearing. Cox argues:

At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that “there were many factors that led 

me to believe [the statement] could have been coerced.” NT 2/04/98 at 5. Given 

counsel’s admission that he did not believe the statement, he was ineffective for 

failing to advise Mr. Cox of his right to testify . . . .

Pet’r’s Reply at 17 (alteration in original). In fact, trial counsel’s fully contextualized quote from 

the PCRA hearing is as follows:

Q. Would you agree that Mr. Cox’s statement, in your view, did not make out 

first degree murder?

 9 As described by trial counsel, buckshot fever is “a collective term describing various individual incidents of 

strange and relatively unexplainable behavior . . . in hunters, shooting into the ground, shooting more shots than they 

ever realized, having an empty weapon, [and] thinking they only shot once . . . [.]” Trial Tr. Oct. 28, 1993, at 65.
28

A. That’s correct. I knew the Commonwealth would be using his statement, 

and I did not attempt to suppress it. First of all, it was not suppressible in the 

sense that there were many factors that led me to believe it could have been 

coerced, but having the statement in, knowing full well that the statement was 

going to be brought into evidence, my strategy was to attempt to use the good 

points of that statement to greatest advantage.

Hr’g Tr., Feb. 4, 1998, at 6. In other words, trial counsel’s testimony was the opposite of that 

suggested by Cox, which deflates any argument that trial counsel should have encouraged him to 

testify to combat a coerced statement. Therefore, Cox has failed to prove that trial counsel’s 

first-degree murder defense and right-to-testify advisement were deficient. 

On this claim, the court declines to consider the prejudice prong of Strickland because 

Cox fails to offer alternatives to trial counsel’s strategy that would permit the court to 

contemplate the consequences of those alternatives. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (“[T]here is 

no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to . . . address both components of 

the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).

e. Cumulative Effect and Consequence of Unsuccessful Claims under Martinez

Because Cox has failed to demonstrate that any of his claims are meritorious, the 

aggregate of his claims do not amount to a more favorable outcome. Additionally, to round out 

the application of Cox’s case to the Martinez rule, the fact that his defaulted IATC claims are not 

meritorious, let alone “substantial,” PCRA counsel was not deficient for abandoning those

claims; nor did the abandonment prejudice Cox. Because Martinez served as the foundation of 

Cox’s argument for relief, the rejection of his defaulted IATC claims is sufficient to dispose of 

his Rule 60(b)(6) motion. Nevertheless, the court completes its analysis by discussing the 

remaining Cox II considerations and any additional factors that Cox presents.
29

3. Rarity of Rule 60(b)(6) Relief and Principles of Comity and Finality

The rarity of Rule 60(b)(6) relief, comity, and finality all weigh against finding that 

extraordinary circumstances exist here, such that without relief, Cox would suffer an extreme 

and unexpected hardship. Given the lack of merit of his defaulted IATC claims and the fact that 

Martinez alone does not constitute extraordinary circumstances, granting Cox’s motion would 

conflict with mandatory authority requiring only rare grants of Rule 60(b)(6) relief. Principles of 

comity and finality also weigh against granting relief because the state court convicted Cox 25 

years ago, and, as the Cox II court indicated, the district court initially dismissed his federal 

habeas petition in 2004, 14 years ago and eight years before Martinez. Therefore, considerations 

of repose and finality, which strengthen over time, weigh against granting Cox relief.

4. Cox’s Diligence in Pursuing His Defaulted IATC Claims

Unlike the previous discussion of Cox’s diligence in pursuing ballistics evidence, the 

focus here is on Cox’s diligence in pursuing review of his defaulted IATC claims. Cox 

summarizes his long-running pursuit of the defaulted IATC claims as follows:

[Cox] initially raised these claims in a pro se Allocatur Petition filed on June 30, 

1995. After allocatur was denied, Petitioner raised the claims in a pro se PCRA 

petition. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Cox did not consent to waive the claims 

that his post-conviction counsel abandoned. In fact, he submitted a second pro se

PCRA petition to raise these claims after the first PCRA petition was denied. In 

sum, Mr. Cox tried unsuccessfully to present the claims in a pro se petition for 

allowance of appeal in his direct appeal, in a counseled PCRA petition, and in a 

pro se PCRA petition.

Pet’r’s Suppl. Mem. at 23. The respondents appear to concede that Cox has diligently pursued 

his procedurally defaulted IATC claims. See Resp’t’s Resp. at 32 (listing defaulted claims and 

acknowledging that “petitioner was diligent in pursuing these claims”). The court agrees that 

Cox has diligently pursued his defaulted IATC claims, and his diligence would weigh towards 

granting relief if the underlying claims had substantial merit.
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5. Cox’s Conviction Serving as an Aggravating Factor Towards His Death Sentence

More than any other consideration, the fact that Cox’s conviction in the Davis murder 

case contributed towards his death sentence in the Stewart murder case weighs towards finding 

that extraordinary circumstances exist to permit Martinez relief. While the Cox II court thought 

the capital aspect of this case is “significant,” the court refrained from circumscribing the extent 

to which this court should weigh Cox’s death sentence. See Cox II, 757 F.3d at 124, 126 

(remanding for a determination of “how, if at all, the capital aspect of this case . . . figure[s] into 

[a] 60(b)(6) analysis”). In this court’s judgment, if a defaulted IATC claim is both meritorious 

and substantial, and PCRA counsel was ineffective in abandoning that claim, as required by 

Martinez, a death sentence may very well tip the balance of equitable factors towards granting 

relief. This is because limiting Rule 60(b)(6) Martinez relief to cases implicating the death 

penalty ensures that such relief will be, as required by that Rule, rare and based on extraordinary 

circumstances, given that the penalty is “the most severe sanction available to society.” Saffle v. 

Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990). But this is not that case. It is this court’s “duty to search for 

constitutional error with painstaking care . . . in a capital case,” but the court has found none

rooted in Cox’s Martinez claim. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987).

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, Cox filed two Rule 60(b)(6) motions for this court’s consideration, which 

collectively request relief based on the new rule of law articulated by Martinez. Consideration of 

the new ballistics report, which concluded that the two bullets recovered from Davis originated 

from different firearms, at this stage is improper. Cox’s presentation of the new ballistics report 

constitutes a claim, requiring appellate authorization of his second or successive petition. His 

presentation of the report is also untimely under either Rule 60(b)(2) or 60(b)(6). Out of an 
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abundance of caution, the court nevertheless considered in the alternative the merits of the 

ballistics evidence. In short, the new ballistics report does not materially undermine Cox’s 

conviction because he admitted to shooting Davis twice, and, according to unimpeached 

ballistics testimony from trial, the possibility that Cox fired twice accidentally is remote. 

Whether considered with or without the aid of the new ballistics report, none of Cox’s 

procedurally defaulted IATC claims have merit on either element of the Strickland test. And 

although Cox’s diligence and his death sentence weigh towards granting relief, such relief must 

be rooted in substantially meritorious, procedurally defaulted IATC claims. Accordingly, the 

court denies Cox’s two Rule 60(b)(6) motions.

A separate order follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Edward G. Smith 

EDWARD G. SMITH, J.