United States

Department of

Agriculture

Economic

Research 

Service

GFA-10

December 1998

Contact:

Shahla Shapouri

Stacey Rosen

Principal Contributors

Chris Bolling

M.S. Deepak

Michael Kurtzig

William Liefert

Birgit Meade

Stacey Rosen

David Schimmelpfennig

Shahla Shapouri

Meredith Soule

Michael Trueblood

Keith Wiebe

Technical Editor

Diane Decker

Production/Design

Wynnice Pointer-Napper

Victor Phillips, Jr.

Cover Photos

FAO

Tanzania

Approved by the World

Agricultural Outlook Board.

Summary released December

1, 1998. Summary and full

report may be accessed electronically via the ERS website

at http://www.econ.ag.gov.

FOOD SECURITY

ASSESSMENT

Situation and Outlook Series

Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Global Food Security: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

New Independent States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Special Articles:

Agricultural Productivity and Food Security 

in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

The Link Between Imports and Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Country Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77
Preface

This report continues the series of food assessments begun in the late 1970s. Global Food Assessments were done from 1990

to 1992, hence the GFA series. In 1993, the title was changed to Food Aid Needs Assessment, to more accurately reflect the

contents of the report, which focuses on selected developing countries with past or continuing food deficits. In 1997, the analysis was widened beyond the assessment of aggregate food availability to include more aspects of food security. The title was

therefore changed to Food Security Assessment.

Acknowledgments

Appreciation is extended to Kitty Smith, Director of Market and Trade Economics Division, for her support of the food security project and to Kelley White for valuable comments on the food security report. We would also like to thank John Dyck

and Gary Vocke for their help on the articles on Indonesia and North Korea and the reviewers, especially Mary Bohman, Fred

Surls, Cheryl Christensen, Ron Trostle, Dave Stallings, Carol Goodloe, and Gerard Rector for their comments. Special thanks

are extended to Diane Decker, Wynnice Pointer-Napper, and Victor Phillips for editorial and design assistance.

2 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of race, color, national origin, gender,

religion, age, disability, political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status. (Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs). Persons with disabilities who require alternative means for communication of program information (braille, large print, audiotape, etc.) should contact USDA’s Target

Center at (202) 720-2600 (voice and TDD). 

To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th and Independence Avenue, SW,

Washington, DC 20250-9410 or call (202) 720-5964 (voice or TDD). USDA is an equal opportunity provider and employer.
Food Gaps Continue To Widen for 

Low-Income Countries

Food production shortfalls continue to threaten the food security of low-income countries. The food security of these countries is evaluated by measuring the gaps between actual food

consumption (domestic production, plus commercial imports,

minus non-food use) and consumption targets, and projecting

the gaps through the next decade. The targets are: 1) maintaining per capita food consumption at 1995-97 levels, and 2)

meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements. In

addition, an attempt was made to estimate food consumption

by different income groups within each country.

In 1998 the food gap to maintain per capita consumption at

1995-97 levels in 66 low-income developing countries is

estimated at 11 million tons, up from 8.5 million estimated

for 1997. The gap to meet minimum nutritional requirements

is estimated to be substantially higher at 17.6 million tons,

compared with 15 million last year. Weather-related production shortfalls are expected to account for about 15-40 percent of these food gaps. The 66 countries in the study either

have been or may become food aid recipients. In the projections, however, the availability of food aid is excluded.

Therefore, depending upon future food aid availabilities,

some or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated.

Over the coming decade, the food gaps with respect to both

consumption targets are projected to widen. The gap to

maintain per capita consumption increases 80 percent to

19.8 million tons in 2008, while the nutritional gap expands

61 percent to 28.4 million. In 2008, food consumption is

projected to fall short of the nutritional requirement in 35

countries, while 47 countries are expected to face a decline

in per capita food consumption.

Unequal purchasing power within countries exacerbates

food insecurity in the 66 countries. Not surprisingly, people

in lower income groups have larger nutritional gaps than

their wealthier counterparts. Moreover, the ratio of food

consumption to nutritional requirements of the lowest

income quintile is much lower than the national average. In

Sub-Saharan Africa, food consumption by people in the

lowest income quintile is estimated to equal only 72 percent

of the minimal nutritional requirement in 1998. The corresponding figures for Latin America and the New

Independent States are 78 and 80 percent, respectively.

For the 66 countries as a whole, the “distribution gap” (the

amount of food required to bring consumption of each

income quintile up to the minimal nutritional requirement)

is expected to rise 36 percent over the next decade and

reach 38.4 million tons in 2008. The growth of this gap far

surpasses the growth in the number of people becoming

food insecure. In fact, the number of people failing to meet

nutritional requirements is projected to grow 6 percent to

1.14 billion by 2008. This implies that the nutritional problems related to income distribution will intensify more than

they will spread.

The two regions projected to face a deteriorating nutritional

situation over the next 10 years are Asia and Sub-Saharan

Africa. In Asia, however, the deterioration is negligible.

Moreover, the region’s consumption relative to nutritional

requirements starts at a higher level. Conversely, the deterioration is measurable in Sub-Saharan Africa and consumption starts at a lower base. In this region, only the highest of

the five income groups is projected to consume at a level

above the minimum nutritional requirement, compared with

the top three groups in Asia. Changes in the “distribution

gap” confirm the severity of food insecurity in Sub-Saharan

Africa. For other regions, this gap declines or increases negligibly by 2008. But for Sub-Saharan Africa the gap jumps

more than 50 percent.

Selected countries of Latin America and North Africa

depend heavily on food imports, which currently provide

around 40 percent of their consumption needs. Food imports

in both regions are projected to remain at this level or

increase slightly during the next decade. Financing this volume of food imports, however, could become difficult

unless the real prices of Latin America’s and North Africa’s

export commodities recover from their current lows.

Of the five New Independent States included in the study,

only Tajikistan and Azerbaijan are projected to be vulnerable to food insecurity in 1998. In the next decade, assuming

continued peace, Azerbaijan is projected to eliminate its

food gaps, but Tajikistan will continue to face substantial

food deficits.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 3

Summary
Food Insecurity Grows Despite Adequate

Global Food Supplies

Global food supplies continue to grow faster than population. According to FAO data, average world calorie consumption was about 2,745 per day in 1996, up nearly 9 percent from 1980. The Economic Research Service projects

this trend of rising per capita food supplies to continue

through the next decade. If the available food was divided

equally, each and every person would be able to consume

more than the minimum nutritional requirement (a target of

2,100 calories per day is used in this report). However, the

level and growth in food consumption vary among countries. While food consumption is growing in higher income

developing countries, many lower income countries remain

vulnerable to food insecurity. Among lower income countries, the nature of this problem differs both in magnitude

and in causes. In some countries, many of them in SubSaharan Africa, a lack of resources (physical and financial)

is the root cause of the food security problem and unequal

food distribution exacerbates the situation. In other countries, mostly in Latin America and Asia, food insecurity is

caused by the unequal distribution of food resulting from

wide disparities in income. The differences in the causes of

food insecurity influence the assessment of the amount of

food needed and strategies required to achieve food security.

This report focuses on 66 countries that have been or are

potential food aid recipients. The future food security of

these low-income developing countries is evaluated by projecting the gaps between food consumption (domestic production, plus commercial imports, minus non-food use) and

consumption targets through the next decade. The two consumption targets are: 1) maintaining per capita consumption

at 1995-97 levels (also referred to as status quo), and 2)

meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements

(see box “How Food Security Is Assessed”). In addition to

aggregate measures, an attempt was made to estimate food

consumption by different income groups within each country. The estimated nutritional gap only measures the gap

in calorie consumption and does not consider other factors such as poor utilization of food due to inadequate

consumption of micro nutrients and lack of health and

sanitary facilities.

The results indicate that food production shortfalls continue

to be a threat to the food security of countries facing foreign

exchange constraints that limit their ability to use food

imports to compensate for slow domestic production. The

food gap to maintain per capita consumption at the base level

(1995-97) in the 66 countries is estimated at 11 million tons

for 1998 (see table 1). The gap to meet minimum nutritional

requirements is estimated at 17.6 million tons. Weather

related production shortfalls account for about 15 to 40 percent of food gaps in 1998. The estimates are based on USDA

data as of October 1998. It should be emphasized that the

availability of food aid is excluded in these projections.

Therefore, depending upon the future availability of food aid,

a proportion or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated. For example, in 1997 roughly 5.5 million tons of food

aid were distributed globally. If the same amount of food aid

is provided in 1998, it would fill slightly more than 50 percent of the calculated gap to maintain per capita consumption and about 30 percent of the nutritional gap. 

The long term projections indicate growing food gaps with

respect to both consumption targets in the 66 countries. The

food gap to maintain per capita consumption increases 80

percent during 1998 to 2008, while the nutritional gap

increases 61 percent (see table 1 and figure 1). In 2008, in

35 countries, food consumption is projected to fall short of

nutritional requirements and 47 countries are expected to

face a decline in per capita consumption.

National level analysis, however, masks the impact of

unequal access to income on food security. People in lower

income quintiles have larger nutritional gaps than their

wealthier counterparts. The estimated results show the ratio

of food consumption to nutritional requirements of the lowest income quintile to be much lower than that of the

national average. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the lowest income

quintile is estimated to consume only 72 percent of its nutritional requirement in 1998, followed by 78 percent in Latin

America, and 80 percent in the New Independent States

(NIS) (see table 2). The amount of food required to bring

food consumption of each income quintile up to the nutritional requirement is the distribution gap. This gap is projected to rise from 28 million tons in 1998 to 38.4 million

tons by 2008, an increase of 36 percent.

4 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Global Food Security: Overview

A continuation of present trends in food supplies is projected to lead to deteriorating food security of many low-income countries. The unequal distribution of food within countries exacerbates

the situation. Significant increases in investment in agricultural sectors, along with adjustments

in trade and producer policies, will be imperative to improve food security in resource-poor

countries. [Shahla Shapouri and Stacey Rosen]
The growth of the distribution gap is not simply the result of

more people becoming food insecure. In fact, the number of

people failing to meet their nutritional requirement is projected to grow only 6 percent from 1998 to 1.14 billion by

2008. This means distribution-related nutritional problems

will intensify more than they will spread.

Sub-Saharan Africa Remains the Most

Vulnerable Region

Sub-Saharan Africa (37 countries) is projected to account

for about 60 percent of the food gap to maintain consumption and 79 percent of the total nutritional gap (of the 66

study countries) in 2008. Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa’s

population is projected to account for less than 26 percent of

the total of the study countries by 2008 (see figure 2). SubSaharan Africa’s food gap to maintain per capita food consumption is estimated at 6.7 million tons for 1998, while the

gap to meet the nutritional requirement is estimated at 13.9

million tons. These gaps are 2.5 times and 5 times higher

than the average regional food aid received during 1995-97.

The 1998 estimates of food gaps are highly influenced by

production variability, either weather-related or due to civil

strife. The projected long term food outlook for the region

shows a steady increase in the food gaps. Historically, SubSaharan Africa showed the smallest improvement in average

daily per capita calorie consumption. Unfortunately, the

growing share of food aid received by the region failed to

reverse this trend. Our projections of per capita food consumption for the next decade also indicate a continued

declining trend, unless more food aid is provided.

In addition to inadequate food availability, skewed distribution of purchasing power amplifies the nutritional problem

in the region as scarce food supplies have been distributed

unevenly among populations. The distribution gap for the

region is estimated at 18 million tons in 1998, increasing to

27 million by 2008. The number of people who cannot meet

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 5

Table 1--Food Availability and Food Gaps for 66 Countries

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate Population

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons --- Million

1988 352,316 47,695 39,417 9,420 486,758 2,061

1989 351,311 49,603 34,948 10,136 491,222 2,108

1990 365,395 53,633 33,525 10,638 506,901 2,155

1991 369,597 56,285 39,572 10,189 522,584 2,202

1992 377,815 57,466 42,216 8,224 540,416 2,249

1993 389,248 58,592 45,549 7,682 547,965 2,296

1994 393,952 59,485 53,843 5,381 576,459 2,344

1995 413,124 60,940 46,211 5,045 586,385 2,392

1996 405,209 60,572 56,957 3,841 586,832 2,442

1997 Food gap*

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 415,082 61,843 56,199 10,974 17,630 591,788 2,543

2002 458,835 67,002 62,696 13,236 21,407 650,614 2,802

2007 498,690 72,988 72,864 19,862 28,369 713,711 3,066

* SQ stands for status quo and describes the amount of grain equivalent needed to support 1995-97 levels of per capita consumption and NR stands for nutritional 

requirements and describes the amount needed to support minimum nutritional standards (see box "How Food Security Is Assessed.") 

1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Figure 1

Food Gaps in All 66 Countries, 1998-2008

Million tons

Nutritional gap

Gap to maintain consumption
their nutritional requirement is projected to increase 34 percent between 1998 and 2008, to 516 million. 

Low-income Asia and Latin America 

Face Consumption Declines and 

Distribution Problems

The nine countries in the Asian region studied here are projected to face declining per capita consumption levels that

produce an estimated gap of 3.8 million tons in 1998, with

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia making up the bulk

of the total. By 2008, these three countries plus Pakistan

will account for 94 percent of the total consumption deficit

of the 9 Asian countries in the study. In terms of meeting

nutritional requirements, Afghanistan and Bangladesh will

be the only countries in the region consuming below their

respective requirements in 1998. By 2008, the region’s

nutritional gap is projected to widen and Nepal will join the

other countries that face a deficit.

Low-income Asian countries have made significant gains in

increasing food consumption over the past three decades.

However, average calorie consumption remains low compared to the world average. Therefore, when the inequality

in purchasing power is taken into account, the estimated distribution gap in 2008 is projected at almost two times the

average nutritional gaps. Although the number of people

who cannot meet their nutritional requirement is projected

to decline 11 percent over the next decade, the region is still

projected to account for more than half of the undernourished people in the study countries.

Government policies could reduce the magnitude of the

problem. Countries such as India and Pakistan have

restricted food imports as part of their policy of food selfsufficiency, but have the capacity to increase their imports.

The import dependency of this region is less than that of the

other regions, averaging less than 3 percent during 1980-97.

Increasing food imports, for example, would reduce food

prices and increase purchasing power of the poor.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, food gaps are a growing problem and annual production variations tend to intensify the vulnerability of individual countries. El Niño

brought drought in Central America and heavy flooding in

Ecuador and Peru in 1997 and 1998. In the long term, five

of the eleven countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti,

Honduras, and Nicaragua) are projected to be unable to

maintain recent consumption levels or fulfill minimum

nutritional requirements. These five countries also have the

lowest average per capita calorie consumption in the region.

It should be noted that the impact of the recent hurricanes to

hit the region has not been considered in our quantitative

analysis and food insecurity is likely to be a more serious

problem than reflected in our results. In the study countries

of Latin America, food import dependencies are high, averaging about 40 percent in 1995-97 and are projected to

remain at this level during the projection period. This, while

not alarming, may not be sustainable over the long term. In

Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua, debt service payments continue to be burdensome, with the value of debt exceeding

the value of GNP in 1995.

In low-income Latin American countries, the distribution

gap is almost three times the average national nutritional

gap. The number of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirement is projected to decrease slightly between

1998 and 2008. If more disaggregated data were available,

the results would likely indicate the depth of the region’s

food insecurity to be even more severe.

North Africa and NIS Less at Risk

North Africa, despite the wide variation of incomes among

and within countries, has been successful in protecting food

consumption of low-income consumers. The two dominant

features of food production of the region are scarcity of

physical resources and highly variable output due to erratic

rainfall (except in Egypt, where irrigation is prevalent).

Imports currently make up about 39 percent of the region’s

consumption needs and the share is projected to rise slightly

to 45 percent by 2008. Financing this level of imports in

the next decade may be difficult. The region’s two largest

6 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 2--Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirement 

Region Year Income quintiles 

Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest

North Africa 1998 1.07 1.17 1.23 1.29 1.41

2008 1.11 1.17 1.22 1.27 1.38

Sub-S. Africa 1998 0.72 0.80 0.85 0.91 1.06

2008 0.70 0.78 0.83 0.89 1.03

Asia 1998 0.88 0.96 1.02 1.07 1.19

2008 0.89 0.96 1.00 1.06 1.19

Latin America 1998 0.78 0.92 1.00 1.08 1.23

2008 0.85 0.95 1.03 1.11 1.31

NIS 1/ 1998 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.01 1.10

2008 0.92 1.00 1.06 1.13 1.24

1/ Based on average regional income distribution.
food importers, Egypt and Algeria, are, to varying degrees,

dependent upon oil and gas revenues (directly through

exports and also indirectly for Egypt through worker remittances from neighboring OPEC countries). If real prices of

oil and gas gradually recover from their current low levels,

these countries should be able to cover their import needs.

However, continuation of current prices portends long run

financial difficulties.

Of the 5 NIS countries covered in this report, only Tajikistan

and Azerbaijan are vulnerable to food insecurity. In the next

decade, assuming continued peace, Azerbaijan is projected to

eliminate its food gaps, but Tajikistan will continue to face

substantial food deficits and low absolute food consumption

levels in comparison to the other NIS countries.

Food Aid Remains Vital to Many Countries

Food aid, although valuable to food-insecure countries, is

inadequate both in terms of availability and capacity to alter

the food security prospects of low-income countries. Food

aid shipments for 1997/98 are estimated at roughly 5.5 million tons, the same as the previous year. Food aid donations

have not been this small since the mid-1970s. If the food aid

continues at the 5.5-million-ton level, it will cover 28 percent of the needs to maintain per capita consumption and

only 19 percent of the nutritional gap by the year 2008.

As food aid donations have been declining, the type of food

aid being supplied has also changed. Early on, most food

aid was program food aid, which is non-targeted food assistance. This type of aid is provided on a bilateral basis to

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 7

25%

64%

5%1%5%

SS-Africa

Asia

Latin America

NIS

North Africa

Population in 2008

1998--Status Quo Gap 2008--Status Quo Gap

1998--Nutritional Gap 2008--Nutrition Gap

61%

34%

4% 1%

61%

29%

4% 1% 5%

79%

15%

2% 4%

79%

16%

3% 2%

Figure 2

Sub-Saharan Africa Has Only 25 Percent of the World's Population, But Accounts

for 80 Percent of the World Nutritional Gap
support recipient governments’ budgets or reduce balance of

payments deficits. More recently, donors have moved

toward relief and project aid, which is targeted to specific

groups of nutritionally vulnerable people. This approach is

clearly evident in the appropriations for the U.S. Public Law

(PL) 480 program. PL 480’s Title I program provides government-to-government sales of agricultural commodities to

developing countries under long term credit arrangements.

This program was cut roughly 25 percent between fiscal

years 1996 and 1998. Conversely, funding for Title II, the

program under which the United States delivers emergency

food and World Food Program shipments, has remained relatively stable.

Food Security of Lower Income Countries:

Opportunities and Obstacles

Based on the projected results, countries covered in this

report can be grouped into four different food security categories: 1) countries with severe food insecurity problems,

where average food consumption is projected to fall to less

than 75 percent of the minimum nutritional requirement by

2008; 2) countries that are moderately food insecure, where

projected average food consumption falls in the range of 75

to 99 percent of the nutritional requirement; 3) countries

that are projected, on average, to have adequate food, but

because of inequality in purchasing power, segments of their

population face food insecurity; and 4) countries where all

income groups are projected to have adequate food (table 3).

1) Twelve of the study countries fall in the most vulnerable

group, and all but two are in Sub-Saharan Africa. A common characteristic among these countries is that they have

been or are currently faced with internal or external political

problems. While the projections did not account for a worsening of their situation over time, projected population

growth alone will severely deteriorate their food security

situation because of their weak base period position.

The political problems of these countries reinforce long term

trends in poverty, food insecurity, and a breakdown of social

structure. Consequently, events such as drought, disease

(human or livestock), or floods can easily trigger acute food

shortages and famine. For these countries, political stability

and better policies are essential for improving food security.

2) The moderately food insecure group includes 27 countries. There is, however, a wide variation in severity of food

insecurity in these countries. Some are experiencing civil

unrest, while others have shown progress in their agricultural

performance and may be able to sustain the recent growth

momentum. For example, in Congo, civil unrest during the

last 2 years has displaced populations, adversely affecting

food production and hindering marketing activities. This factor, coupled with flooding from El Niño in early 1998 that

damaged houses, infrastructure, and crops, led to higher food

prices and food insecurity in many parts of the country. On

8 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

How Food Security Is Assessed

The commodity coverage in this report has been

expanded from the Food Security Assessment published

in 1997. In addition to grains and root crops, the commodity coverage now includes a new group called

“other.” The “other” category includes meat and dairy

products. The three commodity groups in total, account

for as much as 90 percent of all calories consumed in the

study countries. This report projects food consumption

and access in 66 lower income developing countries—37

in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in North Africa, 11 in Latin

America and the Caribbean, 9 in Asia, and 5 in the NIS

(see appendix 1 for a list of countries and appendix 2 for

a detailed description of the methodology). The projections are based on 1995-97 data. The period covered is

1998 (current), 2003 (5 years out), and 2008 (10 years

out). Projections of food gaps for the countries through

2008 are based on differences between consumption targets and estimates of food availability, which is domestic

supplies (production plus commercial imports) minus

nonfood use. The estimated gaps are used to evaluate

food security of the countries.

The food gaps are calculated using two consumption targets: 1) maintaining base per capita consumption or status

quo (SQ), which is the amount of food needed to support

1995-97 levels of per capita consumption, and 2) meeting

nutritional requirements (NR), which is the gap between

available food and food needed to support minimum per

capita nutritional standards (for definitions of terms used

see Methodology in appendix 2). Comparison of the two

measures either for countries, regions, or the aggregate,

indicates the two different aspects of food security: consumption stability and meeting the nutritional standard.

The aggregate food availability projections fail to take into

account food insecurity problems due to food distribution

difficulties within a country. Although lack of data is a

major problem, an attempt was made in this report to project food consumption by different income groups based on

income distribution data for each country. The concept of

the income-consumption relationship was used to allocate

the projected level of food availability among different

income groups. The estimated “distribution gap” measures

the food needed to bring food consumption of each income

quintile up to the nutritional requirement. Finally, based on

the projected population, the number of people who cannot

meet their nutritional requirements is projected.

The common terms used in the reports are: domestic

food supply, which is the sum of domestic production

and commercial imports; food availability, which is food

supply minus non-food use such as feed and waste;

import dependency, which is the ratio of food imports to

food supply, and food consumption which is equal to

food availability.
the other hand, Mozambique is reaping the benefits of sustained peace. Production has risen steadily for the last 6

years. Grain output in 1997 was estimated to be roughly 3

times higher than the average output of the late 1980s.

The common characteristic of this group, however, is the

large contribution of domestic food production to food consumption. The use of modern technologies in agricultural

production in general and food production in particular is

limited. As countries remain unsuccessful in adopting new

technologies to increase productivity, labor remains the principal input in production and large families will be the main

hope for survival. With slow growth in domestic food production, these countries use commercial imports to fill food

gaps. Historically, imports of these countries were supported

by external assistance; food aid helped reduce the financial

burden of food imports. With the decline in external assistance, a larger share of foreign exchange availability must

be allocated to food imports. However, any increase in

spending on food imports will crowd out spending on essential raw materials and spare parts, raising concern over the

long term economic health of these countries.

Roughly half of the Sub-Saharan countries fall in this moderately insecure group. To improve food security of this group,

a special article in this report, “Agricultural Productivity and

Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa,” argues that returns to

any single intervention in isolation are likely to be limited in

the absence of broad improvements in physical infrastructure, political stability, and the institutional environment.

Policy reforms directed at improving physical and institutional infrastructure not only increase use of inputs by lowering prices, but also improve output prices and thus directly

stimulate output. In addition, investment in education of the

rural labor force and agricultural research will improve the

future prospects for productivity growth.

3) In the third category of insecure countries, skewed

income distribution limits access of low-income groups to

sufficient amounts of food despite adequate aggregate food

supplies. Nearly 40 percent or 27 of the 66 study countries

have adequate supplies, but in 12 of them, skewed income

distribution limits purchasing power of the lowest income

groups, precluding adequate diets. In these countries,

improved agricultural performance can reduce income

inequality. Statistics show that most poor live in rural areas

with limited access to resources such as land or credit. In

these countries, food insecurity among the low-income

groups is expected to continue unless special attention is

focused on targeted programs that create employment and

increase productivity of the poor. Increasing investment to

improve market infrastructure will also help markets work

and increase returns to farming communities.

4) Fifteen of the study countries are projected to be “food

secure” because both on average and by individual income

group their consumption will be higher than the minimum

nutritional requirement.

In summary, the two regions projected to face a deteriorating nutritional situation are Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In

Asia, however, this deterioration is negligible. Moreover,

the region’s consumption relative to nutritional requirements

starts at a higher base level. In 1998, consumption as a share

of nutritional requirements is estimated at 106 percent for

the region, on average. Conversely, in Sub-Saharan Africa,

this deterioration is measurable and consumption has a

lower base value. In this region, only the highest income

group is projected to consume at a level exceeding the minimum nutritional requirement, compared with the top three

groups in Asia. The severity of the situation in Sub-Saharan

Africa is confirmed upon examining the changes in the distribution gap. For all the regions other than Sub-Saharan

Africa, this gap declines or increases negligibly during the

projection period. For Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the gap

jumps more than 50 percent over the next decade. This statistic alone is a strong indicator of the intensity of the

region’s food insecurity problem.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 9

Table 3--Food Insecurity in 2008: Unequal national food distribution is the principal factor behind food insecurity for 30 percent 

 of the population 

National food secure 1/ Moderately food insecure 2/ Highly food insecure 3/ 

N. Africa: Algeria

Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Cote dí Ivoire, Cameroon, Centr.Afr. Republic, Burundi, Eritrea, Rwanda, Somalia,

Guinea-Bisseau, Nigeria D.R. of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Angola, Cape Verde, Chad, Liberia,

Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Sierra Leone

Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,

Mozambique, Zambia,Zimbabwe,

Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali,

Mauritania, Senegal, Togo

Asia: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka Bangladesh, Nepal Afghanistan

Latin America: El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras,

Peru Nicaragua, Haiti

NIS: Azerbaijan Tajakistan

1/Adequate food but unequal distribution. 2/ Meet 75 percent or more of requirement. 3/ Meet less than 75 percent of requirement. 
North Africa is known for its highly variable grain production (four droughts in the last 8 years). However, the

region’s output this year is remarkably on trend. As a result,

there is no food gap in the region based upon recent per

capita consumption levels as countries will be able to purchase the balance of their grain imports. Given that current

consumption levels exceed nutritional requirements, there is

no nutrition-based food gap this year either. In the next

decade, a relatively small food gap (about 1 million tons) is

projected in the region (primarily in Egypt and to a lesser

extent Algeria) which is expected to have difficulty sustaining the high per capita grain consumption.

Despite the wide variation of incomes between and within

countries, North Africa has successfully protected the food

consumption of low-income consumers, in part due to policies that subsidize the prices of staple foods. Average per

capita incomes vary widely from $700 in Egypt to $1,800 in

Algeria. Income distribution is skewed in the region with

the lowest 20 percent income group sharing only 7.1 percent

of total income. Yet, except for the lowest quintile income

group in Algeria, it is estimated that the average consumer

in all income groups throughout the region currently meets

his or her nutritional requirements. This situation is projected to remain the same through 2008.

Financial import capacity will become increasingly critical

to the region’s food security—Food production in the

region is characterized by two dominant features: 1) a

scarcity of physical resources that limit output under current

technologies and which are inadequate to meet demand,

implying the necessity of imports even in good years; and 2)

a highly variable output pattern due to erratic rainfall

(except in Egypt, where irrigation is widespread). These factors underscore the critical nature of imports to meet

demand. Structurally, grain imports make up about 39 percent of the region’s consumption needs and are projected to

increase to 45 percent in 2008.

Financing these imports will be critical in the next decade.

The two largest grain importers, Egypt and Algeria (recently

both accounted for about three-fourths of the region’s

imports), are to varying degrees dependent upon oil and gas

revenues (directly through exports and also indirectly for

Egypt through worker remittances from neighboring OPEC

countries). If oil and gas real prices gradually recover from

their current glut-induced lows, these countries should be

able to cover their import needs. However, continuation of

the current low prices portends long run financial difficulties. All of the countries in the region have manageable debt

ratios, but may be vulnerable to a variety of political instability risks, ranging from terrorism in Algeria and Egypt to

unclear succession issues.

Egypt to develop food gap despite productivity gains—

Egypt is projected to have the largest food gap in the region

by 2008 (about 3 percent, or 819,000 tons) based upon

recent per capita food consumption levels. Egyptian food

consumption, which has been climbing since the early

1980s and is now estimated at 308 kilos per person, is well

above nutritional requirement levels and remains much

higher than in countries with comparable purchasing power.

Food subsidies, although reduced, continue for staples such

as bread. Policy reform and investment in agricultural

research have generated productivity gains since the early

1990s. Grain production has increased at an average annual

rate of 5.2 percent from 1980 to 1997, mostly from high

yield growth rates. The current average yield for all grains is

about 6 tons per hectare, among the highest in the world.

Egypt is projected to have lower production growth rates

due to a slower growth rate in yields.

Civil strife threatens food security in Algeria—Algeria is

the most import dependent country in the region. Grain

imports, for example, have averaged 73 percent of supplies

over the past 5 years. Projected food production growth at

just over 1 percent reflects the country’s generally difficult

growing conditions. To offset the slowing production

growth, imports will rise, making Algeria even more import

dependent. Algeria’s import capacity, although highly

dependent on energy revenues—which in 1995-97

accounted for 95 percent of its export earnings and 60 percent of its budgetary revenues—has an immediate problem

of civil strife that could cause economic collapse. Since

1992, civil strife has caused many international companies

to scale back their investments. This trend, if continued,

could have long term negative implications for the country’s

economic performance and thereby reduce import capacity,

making the country more vulnerable to food insecurity.

10 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

North Africa

There is no food gap in 1998, but a small gap may develop in the region by 2008. Financing a

growing share of imports will become more critical over time. Maintaining political stability will be

important to this end. [Mike Kurtzig]
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 11

Table 4--Food Availability and Food Gaps for North Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 19,908 1,034 16,844 1,993 33,576

1990 21,261 988 13,277 2,604 31,225

1991 26,890 1,162 13,219 1,345 33,859

1992 20,765 1,085 15,013 831 33,090

1993 19,082 1,053 16,731 418 33,799

1994 24,780 945 19,073 239 35,968

1995 19,937 1,318 19,656 249 41,230

1996 31,825 1,428 15,270 204 37,687

1997 22,771 1,452 18,036 169 34,567

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 27,204 1,275 19,206 0 0 42,208

2003 26,834 1,385 20,964 882 0 43,124

2008 28,595 1,501 23,841 1,000 0 47,615

2008 Food Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile

Lowest Highest

quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile

Algeria 0.97 1.04 1.08 1.13 1.22

Egypt 1.21 1.26 1.29 1.33 1.43

Morocco 1.00 1.06 1.11 1.16 1.27

Tunisia 1.26 1.34 1.40 1.46 1.58

North Africa: 

131 million people

Production in this highly 

erratic grain producing region 

is near the trend level this 

year. 

The region’s grain importdependency is increasing as 

land and water resources are 

limited and populations’ 

incomes are rising. However, 

the food aid share of imports 

has dropped sharply in the 

past decade. It may be 

difficult to sustain current 

consumption levels, which for 

most consumers are above 

nutritional levels. A proportionally small food gap is 

projected to develop by 2008. 

North Africa’s Grain Imports

0

5

10

15

20

25

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Com.imports,

 million tons

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Food aid,

million tons

Food aid

Commercial imports

0

20

40

60

80

100

Million tons

1980198319861989199219951998200120042007

Historical, Projected Grain Sources

Production Imports
Sub-Saharan Africa’s food gap to maintain per capita food

consumption is estimated at 6.7 million tons for 1998, while

the gap to meet the nutritional requirement is estimated at

13.9 million tons. These gaps are 2.5 times and 5 times

higher than the average food aid received during the base

year (1995-97). The large gap projected for 1998 stems

from poor crops in much of the region.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, variability in crop production is a

major source of instability in food consumption. The main

factors contributing to the region’s uneven production

include weather variability and civil strife. While deviations

in food production above the trend are of little concern, large

and frequent deviations below the trend are critical, especially for countries with a history of chronic food deficits.

Coefficients of variation (CV) in production among SubSaharan countries range up to 48 percent. For countries

where domestic production contributes to a large share of

food consumption, high production variability can cause

severe nutritional problems. For example, Somalia has one

of the highest production CVs of 40, and variability in production has widened its food gaps. In 1998, Somalia’s grain

production is estimated to decline roughly 50 percent from

1997— to a fraction of the pre-strife levels of the late 1980s.

Long-term outlook is grim—The projected long-term food

outlook for the region shows a steady increase in food gaps,

both to maintain per capita consumption and to meet nutritional requirements. Between 1980 and 1997, Sub-Saharan

Africa showed the smallest improvement of all the regions

in average daily per capita calorie consumption. In fact, if

Nigeria is excluded, the region’s per capita calorie consumption declined annually by 0.2 percent. Unfortunately, the

growing share of food aid received by the region failed to

reverse this trend. Our projections of per capita food consumption for the next decade also indicate a declining trend.

This translates into a sharp increase in food required to

maintain per capita consumption from 6.7 million tons in

1998 to 12.1 million in 2008. The nutritional gap is

expected to grow 60 percent during the same period.

What are the driving forces behind such a gloomy outlook?

The answers lie in the region’s historically poor policy environment, slow changes in policies, slow growth in investment, and high population growth. Because of these factors

growth in food production in 26 of the 37 countries failed to

keep up with population growth during 1980-97. The

assumptions for the projected food gaps are extrapolations

of the historical trends that shaped these countries’ food

markets (i.e., no dramatic increase in investment, changes in

policies, or improvements in market infrastructure are

assumed). Countries are also projected to continue to struggle with their financial difficulties, which will limit their

food imports. According to the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), 28 of the 41 countries in the region are categorized

as severely indebted. These “severely indebted” countries

have debt service valued at more than 80 percent of their

GNP and three times their export earnings.

Projected food production growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,

although varying by country, averages about 2.3 percent

from the base year (1995-97) to 2008. About 60 percent of

production growth is due to expansion of crop area, which is

less than the historical contribution of 80 percent. The lower

projected growth for area is driven by the growing scarcity

of good land in many countries.

Food import growth is not expected to compensate for the

region’s slow production growth. Annual growth in commercial imports is projected to follow the historical path of

1.9 percent. The main determinant of commercial import

growth is growth in export earnings and the net flow of capital. World food and non-food prices also influence food

imports. Growth in export earnings in all countries is projected to exceed historical levels, 2.1 percent annual real

growth compared with 0.8 percent during 1980-96. The

higher projected growth in export earnings reflects trade

policy adjustments and the expected growth in market

access due to liberalization of global markets for agricultural products. The net flows of capital are assumed constant

during the projection period. This assumption can significantly influence food imports of the countries. A country

such as Mozambique, which relies on external assistance for

two-thirds of its import bill, is likely to face significant

financial difficulties if its export growth does not compensate for the per capita decline in capital flows.

12 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Sub-Saharan Africa

Per capita food consumption is projected to decline during the next decade. This translates into

a near doubling of the food required to maintain per capita consumption between 1998 and

2008. The nutritional gap is expected to grow 60 percent during the same period. Income

inequality, in addition to widespread poverty, intensifies food insecurity in the region. The number of people in the region with inadequate access to food is projected to jump 34 percent during the next 10 years. [Shahla Shapouri and Stacey Rosen]
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 13

Table 5--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 50,421 29,232 4,385 3,351 92,548

1990 53,026 31,768 4,794 3,586 99,159

1991 59,185 35,289 5,308 4,756 108,576

1992 57,512 37,044 6,485 5,687 109,105

1993 61,386 38,092 7,719 3,485 116,712

1994 64,884 39,172 8,101 3,040 120,795

1995 65,025 39,413 7,518 2,091 122,159

1996 67,573 40,171 6,924 2,159 123,838

1997 65,804 40,154 9,368 1,857 125,883

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 66,141 41,200 8,636 6,651 13,883 122,892

2003 80,849 45,152 9,011 6,242 16,589 142,395

2008 90,661 49,864 9,750 12,092 22,369 158,369

2008 Food Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile

Lowest Highest

quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile

Congo, Dem.Rep. 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.88 1.00

Ethiopia 0.61 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.88

Kenya 0.60 0.67 0.71 0.75 0.88

Nigeria 0.95 1.09 1.19 1.29 1.47

Sudan 0.77 0.83 0.88 0.93 1.06

Sub-Saharan Africa

584 million people in 1998.

The gap between available 

food supplies and the 

amount of food needed to 

meet nutritional targets 

jumps 64 percent during 

1998-2008.

Twenty-six of the 37 

countries face gaps to 

maintain consumption and 

meet nutritional targets.

While Sub-Saharan Africa 

will have only 25 percent of

the population of the study 

countries, the region is 

projected to account for 80 

percent of the total nutritional 

gap.

All Food 

Supply vs Requirement

0

50

100

150

200

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

Supply Requirement

Grain Production in SS-Africa

56

58

60

62

64

66

68

70

72

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Million ha

0.88

0.90

0.92

0.94

0.96

0.98

1.00

Tons/ha

Area

Yields
Unequal purchasing power intensifies food security problems—The national estimates of food supplies discussed

above mask the enormous food insecurity problems of the

region that stem from inequality in food access. Second only

to the Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan Africa has the

highest income inequality in the world. This, in addition to

widespread poverty, intensifies the food insecurity of the

region. Of the 50 lowest income countries in the world, 34

are in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 1996, the average per capita

daily income for the region was less than $1.50. The very

low average purchasing power and the high inequality in

purchasing power are major threats to the food security of

the region.

The region’s ratio of actual food consumption to the nutritionally required level is estimated at 91 percent in 1998, on average. This ratio is projected to decline to 88 percent during the

next decade. When the inequality in purchasing power is

added to the picture, food consumption of 60 percent of the

population is projected to fall short of the nutritional target by

2008. The distribution gap, which is the quantity of food

required to cover the food gap of the different income groups,

is projected to be 20 percent higher than the average countrylevel food gap—27 million versus 22 million tons. When the

portion of the population that consumes less than the requirement is multiplied by the total population in each country, the

estimate of the number of people in Sub-Saharan with inadequate access to food jumps from 386 million in 1998 to 516

million in 2008, a 34-percent increase.

Closing the food gap: Can it be achieved in one decade?—

To determine the potential to close the food gaps, we examined two options: expanding domestic food production and

increasing imports. Domestic production in Sub-Saharan

Africa contributes to almost 90 percent of food consumption. The growth in domestic production required to close

nutritional gaps varies depending on which food gap is chosen. To close the region’s average nutritional gap, food production must grow 3.4 percent per year—about 1.1 percentage points higher than our baseline projection. If the goal is

to adopt a targeted program to increase consumption of

those income groups that consume less than the nutritional

requirement (or fill the distribution gap), the required production growth rate rises to 3.6 percent per year. While this

growth rate matches what was achieved historically in the

region, it far outstrips the growth that is expected under the

current model assumptions.

Closing the food gap solely by increasing imports will be

very difficult, given the region’s historical financial performance. The region’s commercial imports are projected to fall

relative to the size of the nutritional food gap throughout the

projection period with the share measuring 44 percent in

2008. To fill the average nutritional and distribution food

gaps, imports must grow 13 and 17 percent a year, considerably higher than the baseline projection rates of 1.9 percent.

Sub-Saharan Africa responds to the challenge of food insecurity by promoting agricultural production. For many

countries in this region, agricultural exports are the main

source of foreign exchange earnings (see the import article).

Increasing agricultural output also improves food access for

a majority of the poor population who live in rural areas.

Therefore, investment in the agricultural sector will not only

increase food production and foreign exchange earnings, it

will improve the purchasing power of the poor. The process,

however, will be long and require consistent policies and

credible institutional bodies for implementation.

14 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA
Regional per capita consumption grew 1 percent a year during 1980-89 and has been stagnant since then, although it

remains well above the minimum nutritional requirement in

1997.1 The Asian region is projected to fall short of 1995-97

base per capita consumption levels by 3.8 million tons in

1998, with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia making

up the bulk of the total. By 2008, these three countries plus

Pakistan account for 94 percent of the total consumption

deficit of 5.8 million tons. 

In terms of minimum nutritional standards, Afghanistan and

Bangladesh will be the only countries in the region consuming below their respective requirements in 1998, yielding a

regional nutritional shortfall of 2.7 million tons. By 2008,

the nutritional gap is projected to widen to 4.7 million tons,

with Nepal facing a deficit as well. Historically speaking,

Afghanistan’s per capita consumption was steadily above its

nutritional standard in the 1980s but fell below it during

1990-96. Bangladesh, on the other hand, experienced a very

volatile pattern throughout 1980-96, and its average per

capita consumption was barely nutritionally adequate.

Unequal purchasing power threatens food security—The

national-level food gaps described above do not account for

differences in consumption among the income groups in the

population. Adequate nutrition depends on purchasing power,

and it is often the case that the poorest segments of a country’s population are simply unable to afford complete diets.

In Asia, on average, the poorest income quintile receives

only 8 percent of the region’s income and the richest quintile

43 percent. Of the nine Asian countries studied in this report,

the Philippines show the highest degree of income inequality,

with income shares ranging from 6 percent for the poorest

quintile to 50 percent for the richest. At the other extreme,

Bangladesh has corresponding shares of 10 percent and 39

percent for the poorest and richest quintiles.

Allowing for consumption differences across income

groups, the distribution gap in 1998 is estimated at 8.4 million tons. The lowest quintile, including 45 percent of the

undernourished, will bear 68 percent of the total shortfall.

Indonesia and Vietnam are the only countries with no distribution gap, while Afghanistan will be the only country with

a gap across all income quintiles, assuming its current climate of political instability persists.

Overall, between 1998 and 2008 food security in Asia will

improve, and the food gap in the lowest income quintile will

shrink towards more equitable food consumption. In 1998,

food consumption of 612 million people, or 37 percent of

the region’s population, is estimated to fall short of nutritional requirements. A reduction of 70 million hungry people in Asia is projected between 1998 and 2008. The entire

population of Afghanistan and up to 80 percent of the population of Bangladesh and Nepal are threatened by inadequate nutrition. As such, these latter countries are considered at risk.

Measures for closing national food gaps—The import

share of total food supply is projected to rise marginally,

from 5 percent to 6 percent by 2008. The region’s aggregate

nutritional gap relative to projected commercial food

imports is about 16 percent in 1998 and is projected to rise

to 20 percent by 2008. This nutritional gap exceeds the

recent level of food aid received. Given the declining global

trend in food aid, it is clearly impractical to expect that food

aid will cut these gaps. For the food insecure countries,

therefore, the challenge is to either increase domestic production or raise imports on a commercial basis.

To close the nutritional gap in Afghanistan, domestic production has to grow 4.2 percent annually during the next

decade. However, our assumption is that food production

will grow a very modest 1.3 percent per year through 2008.

Achieving high and sustained growth in food production is

unlikely, given the continuing current political instability

and civil strife, with no quick resolution in sight.

Afghanistan’s imports accounted for 9 percent of its total

food supply during 1980-96, of which roughly 42 percent

came from food aid. Closing the food gap with commercial

imports alone is unlikely because the projected aggregate

nutritional gap is more than three times the projected volume of commercial imports in 1998 and almost nine times

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 15

Asia

During the coming decade, the food security situation in Asia is expected to worsen marginally.

However, nutritional prospects vary widely across countries and among population segments

within countries. To the extent that the lowest income group could become more food secure

while higher income groups face increasing food gaps, there appears to be some tendency

towards more equitable food consumption in Asia. [M. S. Deepak]

1Nine countries that traditionally depend on food aid define the Asian

region for purposes of this study: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India,

Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
commercial imports in 2008. These ratios become even

more pronounced if the income distribution of the population is acknowledged.

Bangladesh is the region’s second most threatened country.

Ninety percent of the food supply in Bangladesh is grown

domestically and 10 percent imported, both commercially

(66 percent) and as food aid. The aggregate food gap to

meet nutritional requirements is expected to be 1.7 million

tons in 1998 and 2 million tons in 2008.2 Given that food

aid received by the country decreased steadily during 1980-

96, it is difficult to foresee the two- or three-fold growth in

food aid required to meet these gaps. 

Domestic resources may be only partially adequate for the

purpose. The ratio of the aggregate food gap to domestic

production is about 8 percent during the projection period. A

significant increase in production may be difficult to attain,

given that grain production in the country was nearly stagnant during 1990-96 as improved yields were offset by a

gradual withdrawal of cultivated area. Commercial imports

need to grow 6 percent per year to close the nutritional gap

completely. This requirement contrasts with the historical

import trend of -1.3 percent during 1980-97.

Nepal shows an aggregate nutritional gap of 194,000 tons in

1998. However, in view of its highly skewed income distribution, this gap widens to 450,000 tons when the differences in

consumption levels across income groups are taken into

account. Nepal has traditionally been a nearly self-sufficient

country, and targeted food gaps are expected to be as much as

75 times its commercial imports in 1998 and 2008. As in the

case of Bangladesh, Nepal is unlikely to be able to close its

food gaps in the next decade. Grain production grew 3 percent per year during 1980-96 with area expansion contributing to 56 percent of the growth. With limits on further area

expansion, however, crop production is projected to grow

much slower in the coming decade, at 1.6 percent annually.

This growth rate is not sufficient to provide nutritional support for a population growth of 2.4 percent per year.

16 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Drought and Financial Crisis Overhang Indonesia’s Food Security

Although per capita food consumption in Indonesia has historically been above its nutritional requirement, a prolonged

drought and an ongoing financial crisis seriously threaten the country’s living standard. An unpublished IMF report estimates real per capita income to have declined 15 percent in 1997-98 and to remain at this level through 1999. In the food

sector, per capita grain consumption went down 10 percent during 1995-97. Net outflows of foreign capital have reduced

the country’s capital account balance, and the rupiah weakened considerably from 2,450 per U.S. dollar in July 1997 to

11,500 at the end of August 1998. Unfortunately for Indonesia, this currency depreciation made imports of intermediate

goods in its export industries more expensive and therefore did not provide the desired stimulus to its exports and foreign

exchange earnings.

To make matters worse, a severe drought has affected about 500,000 hectares of farmland in the Irian Jaya, Kalimantan,

and Sulawesi regions of Indonesia. Plantings of rice, the country’s staple crop, have been reduced; as of October 19,

1998, current-year production is forecast at 46 million tons, down from 51 million tons in 1996 and 49 million in 1997.

Panic hoarding and distribution problems due to social unrest, coupled with the exchange rate devaluation, have fueled

inflation, while the financial crisis is causing rampant unemployment. As a result, the purchasing power of the poor is

seriously curtailed. Despite these problems, consumption, on average, remains higher than the nutritional requirement.

Several measures are being adopted to ease Indonesia’s food shortages. For example, social safety net expenditures are

being stepped up, and the targeted supply of subsidized rice has been expanded from 71⁄2 million households to 17 million.

Value added taxes on rice and other essential commodities are being suspended, and private traders are being allowed to

freely import rice, wheat, sugar, and soybeans. Subsidies on wheat and sugar are being eliminated and those on soybeans

are being phased out, on the grounds that consumers are not really benefiting from them due to illegal exports and trader

markups. Quotas on the sale of livestock are being abolished; import duties on soybean meal, fishmeal, and corn have

been dismantled, and mechanisms are being developed to adjust administered food prices regularly.

Given the time required for the above measures to take effect, Indonesia’s ability to maintain its current food consumption

levels in the immediate future remains suspect. As such, substantial infusions of international food aid may be necessary

for a country that has, in recent years, relied on the commercial sector for 99 percent of its food imports. [M.S. Deepak]

2These figures do not include the impact of the widespread floods that ravaged the country in July and August.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 17

Table 6--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Asia

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 268,244 14,830 8,183 2,756 337,128

1990 263,007 14,353 7,354 2,522 336,884

1991 265,879 14,716 5,858 2,721 340,332

1992 277,086 15,551 10,017 1,859 349,893

1993 282,588 15,364 9,694 1,792 358,790

1994 286,400 15,413 10,233 1,877 360,180

1995 295,900 15,498 17,182 1,495 380,378

1996 299,897 16,069 13,759 1,328 390,878

1997 302,570 15,469 18,173 1,113 391,923

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 302,931 16,049 16,555 3,756 2,680 296,635

2003 331,774 16,971 19,370 5,336 3,683 321,628

2008 363,683 17,947 23,426 5,789 4,676 353,730

2008 Food Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile

Lowest Highest

quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile

Asia (average) 0.90 0.96 1.01 1.06 1.19

Afghanistan 0.50 0.57 0.63 0.69 0.85

Bangladesh 0.81 0.87 0.90 0.94 1.05

Nepal 0.78 0.84 0.89 0.94 1.09

Pakistan 0.88 0.94 0.98 1.03 1.13

Asia

1,669 million people

By 2008, Asia’s population-- 

64 percent of the world’s 

total--is projected to account 

for 16 percent of the 

nutritional food deficit.

Amid regional prosperity and 

growth, countries such as 

Bangladesh and Afghanistan 

remain food insecure. A 

growing number of countries 

may be unable to maintain 

their recent consumption 

levels.

Growing population, rapid 

urbanization, and industrialization continue to put 

pressure on the region’s 

fragile resource base.

Nutritional Gap in Asia

012345

2008

2003

1998

Million tons

Bangladesh

Other

Asia’s Grain Imports 

0

5

10

15

20

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Com.imports,

million tons

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

Food aid, 

million tons

Commercial imports

Food aid
18 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

North Korea Relies Heavily on Food Aid

North Korea has experienced years of economic stagnation followed by floods in 1995 and 1996 and a drought in 1997.

Decreasing capacity for commercial food imports and lack of agricultural inputs have made the country heavily reliant on

food aid to meet the nutritional needs of vulnerable groups. In June 1998, the Foreign Agriculture Organization estimated

a cereal shortfall of 522,000 tons beyond projected levels of commercial imports and food aid, for the crop year that

ended in October 1998. Reports by fact-finding missions from various groups have yielded widely different estimates of

the severity of North Korea’s food difficulties. This underscores the great uncertainty about agriculture and food caused

by the lack of key data.

Infrastructural constraints impair the efficient functioning of the economy. Transport of food aid and commercial goods is

hampered by the shortage of fuel and parts. After 5 years of insufficient imports and disappointing harvests, food stocks

are assumed to be very low. Even the government’s Public Distribution System reportedly ceased operations in some

areas at times, and its negligible buffer stocks preclude all but extremely limited food distribution. An increasing number

of North Korean households now depend on self-grown vegetables, wild plants and berries, and informal food contributions. Barter exchange, including across the border with China, is being used to secure food.

The agricultural sector suffers from lack of fertilizers, depreciated farm machinery, and energy shortages. For these reasons, even under an optimistic weather scenario, cereal production would be short of needs, especially given the limited

potential for expansion of cultivable area.

Double cropping of barley with rice or maize was introduced in North Korea in 1996. An estimated 70,000 hectares were

double-cropped in 1998, compared with only 38,000 in 1997. A United Nations initiative has called for donor assistance

of U.S. $99 million to extend double cropping to 200,000 hectares by the year 2000.

North Korea’s economic decline is linked to the loss of its protected trading arrangements with China and the former

COMECON, which were the main sources of imported raw materials and other inputs into the country’s manufacturing

sector. Manufacturing exports were exchanged both for commercial food imports and for purchases of yield-enhancing

agricultural inputs.

Like its neighbors, Japan and South Korea, North Korea cannot be self-sufficient in its food supply, and needs to find

ways to import food. Increased investment in income-generating light industry operations in North Korea by companies

based in South Korea and elsewhere offered promise. However, the current global financial turmoil has had a negative

effect on foreign companies’ ability to invest in and finance such enterprises.

Food assistance has come from donations by foreign governments in response to appeals by the World Food Program.

The U.S. government has announced donations of 500,000 tons in 1998 (chiefly wheat, rice, and corn) in support of the

WFP plans. Other food donations have come through non-governmental organizations. Considerable food has come from

China as a result of barter trade, governmental assistance, and commercial purchases. [M.S. Deepak]
Food security remains a problem in the region and annual

production variations tend to intensify the vulnerability of

the countries.3 El Niño brought drought to Haiti and the

Dominican Republic and heavy flooding in Ecuador and

Peru in 1997 and 1998. In fall 1998, hurricanes Georges and

Mitch destroyed lives, crops, and infrastructure. The result

has been a decline in food supplies and damaged distribution systems. It should be noted that the impact of the recent

hurricanes has not been considered in our quantitative

analysis and food insecurity is likely to be more severe than

reflected in our results. Average per capita food production

in this region is projected to decline in 1998 with 436,000

tons of food gap to maintain per capita consumption. The

nutritional gap in 1998 is projected at 368,000 tons.

Grain and root consumption in the eleven countries

increased, on average, 1.8 percent per year between 1980

and 1997, while population grew 2.2 percent per year. As a

result, per capita consumption failed to increase in several

countries. This trend is expected to continue into the next

decade and the food gap to maintain per capita consumption

is projected to almost double between 1998 and 2008. The

2008 projected gap to maintain consumption is 845,000

tons while the nutritional gap is 724,000 tons. Despite the

decline in per capita consumption, basic nutritional needs

are projected to be met in the majority of countries.

In the long term, five of the eleven countries are projected

to remain vulnerable to food insecurity. Bolivia, Guatemala,

Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua are all projected to be

unable to maintain recent consumption levels or fulfill minimum nutritional requirements. Per capita consumption will

decline, as much as -1.1 percent per year in Honduras.

Average per capita calorie consumption is lower in these

five countries than in other countries in the region.

Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,

Jamaica, and Peru will be able to increase per capita consumption steadily. In the latter set of countries, per capita

food projections range from an annual increase of 0.1 percent in El Salvador to 1.2 percent in Jamaica.

The distribution gap, the quantity of food required to cover

the food gap of the different income groups, is estimated at

1.8 million tons in 1998. This is five times the national nutritional gap. The key problem is inequality in purchasing

power. In Guatemala, the country with the most unequal

income distribution in the world after Brazil, the poorest 20

percent receive just 2.1 percent of the entire national income

while the richest 10 percent receive 46.6 percent. This means

that while the average per capita income was $1,470 in 1996,

the lowest income group’s income was only $154. Such large

income inequality inevitably leads to food insecurity of the

poor, despite nationally adequate food availability.

Consumption of the lowest income quintile is estimated to

average 22 percent less than the nutritional requirement,

whereas the richest 20 percent of the population is estimated

to consume 23 percent more than the recommended minimum in 1998. Overall, food consumption of almost half of

the population with the lowest incomes falls below the

nutritional requirement during the projection period.

How do these gaps compare with recent food aid levels?—

Between 1980 and 1998, food aid shipments represented

more than 12 percent of the region’s grain consumption.

There is, however, a declining trend in food aid allocated to

the region. This is due to declining or stagnant donor budgets and the shift of donations away from Latin America

and the Cari bbean towards other needy regions such as

Sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia. With food aid becoming increasingly rare in this region, food security must be

achieved through a country’s own resources, meaning that

gaps have to be filled by increasing either production or

commercial imports or both.

Improved production performance is projected—During

1980-1997, the region’s grain and root production grew at

an annual rate of 1.2 percent, considerably lower than the

population growth rate of 2.2 percent. Area planted

increased at 0.7 percent and yields grew only 0.5 percent

per year. The poor performance stemmed from the debt

crises of the early 1980s, which led to dramatic market liberalization policies. These policies, despite improving the

terms of trade of the agricultural sector through currency

devaluation, reduced investment in the sector because of the

fiscal austerity also imposed. The slow agricultural growth

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 19

Latin America and the Caribbean

Despite strong economic growth in the region, five countries are projected to face substantial

food insecurity over the next decade. Grain production is not expected to keep up with population growth and foreign exchange is projected to be insufficient to close the gap with commercial

imports. The destruction caused by hurricanes Georges and Mitch will increase hunger and

delay improvements. [Birgit Meade]

3The countries studied here are four Central American countries: El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; three Caribbean countries:

the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica; and four South American

countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. These countries have a

total population of 130 million, roughly one-third of all Latin America.
has increased poverty in rural areas which, in turn, has promoted migration to urban areas.

Despite the growing food gaps, the performance of the

region’s food sector is expected to improve in the next

decade. The policy adjustment has contributed to economic

growth in recent years in most countries, and thus there is

reason to assume that agricultural performance will improve

in the future. Growth in crop production is projected to

accelerate in the next decade, to about 1.7 percent per year.

Most of the projected growth stems from yield growth, with

area contributing to about 30 percent of the growth.

Fertilizer use has risen markedly in recent years and efforts

to improve inputs and cropping practices are expected to

lead to higher yield growth. The potential to expand production area varies by country. Haiti, Guatemala, and El

Salvador are the most densely populated countries, and

urban growth is competing for agricultural land. Peru, on

the other hand, has the highest potential to expand area of

production. In fact, it is estimated that in the highlands of

Peru, only 20 percent of potential land is cultivated.

Can the five food insecure countries close their food

gaps?—Domestic production still provides between 70 and

80 percent of domestic food consumption in Bolivia,

Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The annual growth in

grain yields in these countries ranged from 0.11 percent in

Nicaragua to 1.34 percent in Bolivia. Much higher growth is

required to satisfy food needs. In Nicaragua, fertilizer use

declined in the last 15 years. Increasing availability of

inputs should improve the production performance of these

countries. The main challenge is to keep a balance between

productivity growth and demand growth. To simply keep up

with population growth, food production must grow 2.4 to

2.8 percent per year in these countries. Closing food gaps

requires even higher growth rates. In Bolivia, for example,

annual grain production growth was 2.8 percent during

1980-97, but a higher growth of 3.2 percent is required to

close the nutritional gap.

Food imports can play an important role in improving food

security of the countries. Grain import dependency of the

region grew from 38 percent in the early 1980s to 44 percent in the mid-1990s, and is projected to remain at this

level during the next decade. The five food insecure countries face a wide range of required growth rates in food

imports to close their food gaps. Honduras requires the lowest import growth of 4 percent per year to close the nutritional gap in 10 years, while Nicaragua requires the highest

at 7 percent per year. It should be noted, however, that the

problem in these countries is not only an inadequate supply

of food, but access to food, particularly by the low-income

population. This means that an increase in productivity of

the agricultural sector, which employs most of the poor, is

expected to have a greater impact on the food security of the

population than increasing imports.

Haiti, the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, has to

increase its crop production 4.3 percent per year to close its

nutritional gap by 2008. This is 3 percentage points more

than the projected growth rate. Only 10 years ago, Haiti produced more than two-thirds of its grain consumption domestically, a share that fell to less than one-third in 1998, when

close to 70 percent of grain consumption was imported. To

close the nutritional food gap by 2008, Haiti would have to

increase imports at an annual rate of 5.6 percent, too high a

growth rate considering its present political and economic

situation. Aid from the international community will be crucial in preventing further cuts in consumption.

20 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Brazil and Poverty

In the midst of Brazil’s successes as a leading agricultural producer and exporter, Brazilians deal with extreme poverty. Brazil,

with more than 160 million people and the ninth largest economy in the world, is considered an upper middle-income country,

with an average annual per capita income of $4,900. But Brazil also has the most unequal income distribution in the world, where

the poorest 10 percent of the population live on an annual income averaging only $390 while the richest 10 percent have an

income of close to $25,000.

Poverty is prevalent both in urban and in rural areas. However, the urban problems are a spillover of problems in rural areas,

where employment is scarce. In rural areas, small farmers and the landless population are the most vulnerable group. Policies

designed to improve the conditions of the agricultural sector tend to ignore small farmers, as income tax breaks and farm credit

are policy tools with little impact on the rural poor. The landless population are even more vulnerable because many move to frontier or low quality land and are highly affected by weather variability.

In addition to low purchasing power in rural areas, the inadequate infrastructure is another major obstacle to food security in

Brazil. Without roads, food cannot be transported to where it is needed. The northeast portion of the country, for example, is considered less developed compared to the more prosperous central south. The northeast also does not grow enough food to support

its own needs and is subject to severe droughts.

The most recent drought began in the spring of 1998. About 9 million people were believed to be at risk of food shortages, and

about 5 million were facing critical food supply problems because of a decline in food production in the northeastern region. The

Brazilian government had implemented emergency relief operations, but these were hindered by transportation and distribution

problems endemic to Brazil. The central south, one of the richest agricultural regions of the world, harvested record crops this

year, but the high costs of transporting food made it too expensive to ship to food-deficient regions. [Chris Bolling]
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 21

Table 7--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 10,425 2,598 3,365 1,320 23,507

1990 9,947 2,493 4,005 1,423 23,954

1991 9,614 2,465 4,413 1,817 24,135

1992 10,423 2,369 5,609 1,335 25,199

1993 11,065 2,720 5,727 1,371 25,269

1994 10,161 2,811 7,559 1,002 26,156

1995 10,013 2,965 8,613 434 27,373

1996 9,941 2,949 9,297 294 28,269

1997 9,581 3,162 9,768 360 27,935

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 10,170 2,974 10,305 436 368 29,119

2003 10,909 3,121 11,653 642 485 31,973

2008 11,632 3,274 13,799 845 724 36,117

2008 Food Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile

Lowest Highest

quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile

Bolivia 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.96 1.10

Guatemala 0.70 0.83 0.91 1.00 1.22

Haiti 0.56 0.65 0.71 0.79 0.98

Honduras 0.71 0.80 0.86 0.93 1.11

Nicaragua 0.68 0.78 0.86 0.94 1.15

0

100

200

300

400

1,000 tons

1998 2003 2008

Nutritional Food Gap in Haiti and the 

Rest of Latin America

Rest of Latin America Haiti

Latin America and the 

Caribbean (129 million people)

El Niño sharply cut output in a 

number of countries. In 1997, 

Central America's crops 

suffered from drought while 

parts of South America 

suffered from drought and 

excessive rains.

In fall 1998, two hurricanes 

swept away chances of fast 

economic recovery in several 

countries, especially Honduras, 

Nicaragua, Haiti, and the 

Dominican Republic. 

A very unequal income 

distribution continues to 

threaten food security for lowincome households.

Urban and Rural Population, 1995

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Haiti

Guatemala

Honduras

Bolivia

Nicaragua

Dominican Republic

Peru

Colombia

Percent

urban rural
Of the five NIS countries covered in this report, only

Tajikistan and Azerbaijan will have food gaps this year. For

these two countries, the food gap in 1998 to maintain per

capita consumption at recent levels is relatively small (average of 6 percent of total requirements), but the nutrition-based

food gaps are relatively larger (16 percent for Azerbaijan, 32

percent for Tajikistan). In the next decade, assuming continued peace, Azerbaijan is projected to eliminate its food gaps

(even for the nutritional standard), but Tajikistan still will

have substantial food deficits and low absolute food consumption levels in comparison to other NIS countries. The

agricultural sectors of Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan

appear to be recovering from their earlier contractions. These

countries do not have any overall food gaps this year or in the

foreseeable future. However, food consumption will remain a

problem for some of the lowest income groups in these countries due to inadequate purchasing power.

As with other transition economies, the five NIS countries

have experienced rapid changes in their diets due to falling

real incomes resulting from general economic restructuring

and removal of subsidies. Meat production and consumption

have fallen sharply in most countries, leading to a rapid

decline in feed grain use (about 68 percent during 1990-98).

However, feed use has stabilized in the past couple years.

Food grain consumption has fallen to some degree, but is

also stabilizing in most of the countries as real incomes have

started to recover slightly. The region’s overall per capita

grain consumption (both food and feed use) has declined

from around 367 kg in 1990 to 242 kg in 1997, a 34-percent

drop. Most of the decline has been due to a sharp reduction

in imports, which before the transition period totaled 6.1 million tons annually and have recently averaged 2 million tons

(given the contraction in consumption, this represents a

change from about 61 percent of grain supplies to 31 percent). Production growth has been stagnant over the past

decade, first dropping sharply and then recovering in recent

years. Higher input costs have led to a decline in modern

input use, causing yields to decline 3.4 percent annually

since the transition period began. This has been offset by an

expansion in area sown of about 3.7 percent annually.

Tajikistan and Azerbaijan remain vulnerable—Although

Tajikistan has a small food gap this year based upon recent

per capita consumption levels (48,000 tons, which is about 5

percent of required food availability), it is the most vulnerable country of the five NIS countries in terms of overall

food security. Grain production has accelerated sharply in

the past couple of years as producers have switched area

from cotton to wheat, which has alleviated some food supply pressures. Recently, it has been estimated that about 85

percent of Tajikistan’s population lives in poverty. Currently,

even the average consumer in the highest income quintile

group in Tajikistan does not meet the nutritional requirement

of 216 kg per capita. The aggregate food gap to meet this

nutritional target is estimated to be 431,000 tons in 1998,

which represents 32 percent of the nutritionally required

food availability.

For the NIS countries, we assume in our projections that there

will be continued peace, reform- oriented policies, increased

use of new technology, and real growth in export earnings of

about 7 percent annually. Tajikistan’s food gap based upon

recent per capita consumption is projected to increase to

around 12 percent of total requirements over the next decade,

while the nutrition-based food gap is projected to reach about

37 percent. This scenario is relatively optimistic in that it

assumes that the internal peace accord signed in June 1997

will continue to hold (despite the government’s lack of follow-through thus far to appoint opposition leaders) and that

the country can reverse the negative growth rates in production and imports. The food gap to maintain recent per capita

consumption could be eliminated if production increased 3.2

percent annually. The base projection assumption is about

half this rate but significantly higher than the negative growth

rate experienced over the past decade. Alternatively, this gap

could be eliminated if imports grow 4.1 percent annually as

opposed to the base assumption of 2.5 percent. Meeting a

nutrition-based target would require production to increase to

about 5.1 percent annually or imports to increase by 6.2 percent annually, both of which appear overly optimistic.

Azerbaijan is the next most vulnerable country currently, but

is expected to be much less vulnerable in the future as its oil

production and pipelines are brought on line. Azerbaijan’s

1998 food gap to maintain recent per capita consumption is

estimated to be 83,000 tons, which is about 6 percent of the

required food supply. Meeting a nutrition-based target

would require about 268,000 tons or 16 percent of the food

supply. In addition, Azerbaijan has a very high ratio of inter22 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

New Independent States (NIS)

With the assumption of peace and implementation of reform-oriented policies, the NIS with the

exception of Tajikistan is projected to maintain base level consumption and meet nutritional

requirements in the long term. Tajikistan's nutritional food gap is projected to grow significantly

during the next decade due to slow production and import growth. [Michael Trueblood]
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 23

Table 8--Food Availability and Food Gaps for NIS

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 3,318 --- 6,639 --- ---

1990 4,070 --- 5,518 --- ---

1991 3,827 --- 4,726 --- ---

1992 3,811 236 2,448 479 5,298

1993 3,694 237 2,346 1,159 5,846

1994 3,023 251 583 1,524 4,866

1995 3,077 290 874 1,112 5,318

1996 3,888 323 961 1,061 5,713

1997 4,483 335 1,612 342 6,524

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 4,468 345 1,496 131 699 5,880

2003 4,332 373 1,698 135 650 6,035

2008 4,628 403 2,048 137 600 6,786

2008 Food Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile

Lowest Highest

quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile

Armenia 0.91 1.01 1.09 1.16 1.31

Azerbaijan 0.86 0.94 0.99 1.05 1.15

Georgia 1.11 1.22 1.29 1.36 1.50

Kyrgyzstan 1.18 1.28 1.35 1.42 1.55

Tajikistan 0.52 0.57 0.61 0.64 0.71

NIS

27 million people

Only Tajikistan and Azerbaijan

have food gaps in 1998. 

Azerbaijan is projected to 

eliminate its food gaps over 

time as the economy develops

its resources, but Tajikistan 

still will have large food gaps 

and widespread poverty. 

The other three NIS countries 

(Armenia, Georgia, and 

Kyrgyzstan) are starting to 

recover and do not show food 

gaps this year or in coming 

years. Resumption of 

hostilities in any of these 

countries could affect these 

projections.

Grains: Food Versus Feed Use

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Million tons

Food Feed

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Million tons

1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

Historical and Projected Grain Supplies

Production Imports
nally displaced persons relative to its population size due to

the conflict with Armenia over the disputed NagarnoKarabakh region. This large number of displaced persons

contributes to disguised unemployment and undernutrition.

In the long run, Azerbaijan is expected to grow its way out

of poverty. It already has acheived a relatively high degree

of land privatization (40-50 percent) that could help boost

production. Expected petroleum revenues will enhance commercial food import capacity. Assuming there is no resumption of hostilities with Armenia, Azerbaijan is projected to

eliminate its food gaps to maintain per capita consumption

levels as early as 1999, while the nutrition-based food gap is

projected to be gradually eliminated by 2006. Internal food

distribution will remain a challenge, however.

Other NIS countries are recovering—Armenia, Georgia,

and Kyrgyzstan have no food gaps this year and are not

expected to have any gaps in the foreseeable future.

Kyrgyzstan has experienced high economic growth recently,

and another good grain harvest. Armenia actually has been

able to increase its per capita meat supplies in recent years

partly by importing poulty meat, a pattern similar to other

transition economies, but unique among these NIS countries. Georgia has shown high real per capita GDP growth in

the past 2 years and is expected to sustain these high growth

rates in the next few years, in part due to pipeline construction and related employment activities. In the short run,

internal food distribution will remain a problem for average

consumers in the bottom income quintiles of Armenia and

Georgia, who consume below nutritional requirements.

Sensitivity of projections to peace assumption—The long

run forecasts presented above assume continued peace

throughout the region. However, the political situations in

several of the countries are fragile. To hypothetically examine the effect of resumed hostilities, we simulated a production shock of 20 percent below the baseline assumption 5

years out. This magnitude of shock is typical of other wartorn countries’ experiences in the past few decades. The

results suggest Azerbaijan and Tajikistan would be hit fairly

hard by these shocks. The food gap based on recent per

capita consumption levels would rise from 13 to 21 percent

in Tajikistan and from 0 to 12 percent in Azerbaijan. The

nutrition-based food gap would increase from 38 to 44 percent in Tajikistan and from 6 to 22 percent in Azerbaijan.

24 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Western Food Aid for Russia

The economic crisis in Russia has raised concerns about the country’s food security. The threat appears to involve not so

much supply-side problems but more so the demand side and distribution. The main threat to food security is that the crisis will increase unemployment and lower consumers’ real income such that some people might not be able to afford an

adequately healthy diet.

The Russian grain harvest in 1998 is forecast (as of November) at a very low 49 million tons, compared to an average

output of 71 million tons over the last 3 years. However, large grain stocks remain available from the bumper 1997 crop

of 85 million tons. Yet, even if supplies might be generally adequate to feed the country, problems exist concerning consumer purchasing power and distribution. Before the crisis hit in August, Russia already had a sizable share of its population living below the established poverty level. The crisis will increase poverty by raising unemployment. Also, the depreciation of the ruble, one of the main immediate consequences of the crisis, has ignited inflation. Prices will almost certainly rise more than money wages and salaries, thereby reducing consumers’ real income. A greater share of the population might therefore not be able to afford a minimally acceptable diet.

Another food security concern involves the reaction of Russia’s regions to the economic crisis. In an apparent effort to

protect their consumers from shortages, certain regions are restricting the outflow of foodstuffs. Another (related) cause of

restrictions is that regions are imposing price controls on food. To prevent food from moving to neighboring areas that

pay higher prices, controls on outflows are required. Widespread behavior of this type could prevent food-deficit regions,

particularly in the north and far east, from obtaining needed supplies even if they are willing to pay higher prices.

In November the United States announced a food aid package for Russia. It involves 3.1 million tons of commodities,

worth $625 million, and has three parts. First, under Food for Progress, Russia will be given 100,000 tons of foodstuffs,

to be targeted to needy social groups and food-deficit regions, with distribution to be handled by private charities. Second,

the United States will donate to Russia 1.5 million tons of wheat, to be sold in Russia with the proceeds intended to fund

social welfare programs. Third, the United States will sell under the PL 480 Title I program another 1.5 million tons of

products, involving mainly corn, rice, soybeans, soybean meal, wheat, beef, and pork. The European Union is also preparing an aid package for Russia, valued at around $475 million, involving about 1.5 million tons of grain and 250,000 tons

of meat. [William Liefert]
Introduction

Agriculture is the principal source of food, livelihood, and

foreign exchange earnings in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

(Badiane and Delgado, 1995). Over the next 10 years, the

region’s food needs are projected to grow rapidly, driven by

a population growth rate of 2.5 percent per year, the world’s

highest (World Bank, 1998). Although expansion of agricultural land has contributed much to increased agricultural

production in the past, continued area expansion is likely to

involve increasing economic and environmental costs

(Crosson and Anderson, 1995). Growth in agricultural productivity remains critical to SSA’s ability to meet food security and economic development objectives.

Yet evidence of agricultural performance in SSA is mixed at

best (table A-1). Total factor productivity in agriculture (see

“Definitions”) is estimated to have grown an average of 1.3

percent annually between 1961 and 1991 for Africa as a

whole (Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997). Land productivity in SSA

agriculture rose an average of 1.9 percent per year between

1980 and the mid-1990s, while increasing 3.4 percent and

2.0 percent annually in South Asia and Latin America and

the Caribbean, respectively (World Bank, 1998). Over the

same period crop production in SSA grew 2.7 percent per

year, and food production grew 2.4 percent per year. By

contrast, labor productivity fell an average of 1.0 percent

per year in SSA agriculture, while increasing 1.9 percent

and 2.5 percent per year respectively in South Asia and

Latin America and the Caribbean.

Complicating the differences in these indicators of agricultural productivity at the regional level are differences in the

level and rate of change in each indicator across subregions

and countries within SSA. Understanding these differences,

and the various factors that generate them, is critical to

determining how policy measures can best improve agricultural productivity.

Different Measures of Productivity Have

Different Implications for Food Security

Different measures of agricultural productivity are explained

in the “Definitions” box. In brief, each indicates the level of

agricultural output per unit of a particular input or set of

inputs. Distinguishing different measures of productivity is

important. Output per unit of land, or crop yield, is commonly used by agricultural scientists or by national policymakers to assess agricultural production for meeting

national food security needs. Output per agricultural worker,

on the other hand, may be a more important indicator of

rural standards of living and welfare (Block, 1995). As such,

labor productivity may be particularly important as an indication of the ability of agricultural workers to acquire sufficient food, regardless of whether they produce food themselves. Thus labor productivity is linked to food security at

the household level. By contrast, total factor productivity

(TFP) controls for changes in the levels of multiple inputs,

and is thus suited to assessing the impact of technical

change in agriculture.

It is also important to distinguish sources of change in the

productivity of a given input or set of inputs over time. The

productivity of a particular input, such as land, may change

for a variety of reasons. For example, agricultural output per

unit of land (i.e. land productivity) in a particular area might

increase due to adoption of improved seed varieties, expansion of irrigation, or increased fertilizer use. Increased labor

application on a fixed land area would also be expected to

increase land productivity (at least over a particular range).

However, the increase in output would be expected eventuEconomic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 25

Special Article

Agricultural Productivity and Food Security 

In Sub-Saharan Africa

Keith D. Wiebe, Meredith J. Soule, and David E. Schimmelpfennig1

Abstract: Patterns of agricultural productivity growth in Sub-Saharan Africa are mixed.

Most of the variation between countries in the region is due to differences in the application

of conventional inputs, especially labor, but further gains from increased labor application

are likely to be limited. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa still have considerable potential to raise productivity through increased use of other conventional inputs, such as fertilizer. Realizing such increases, however, will depend on additional investment in roads, education, research, and (in some areas) the cessation of armed conflict.

1Agricultural economists with the Resource Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA.
26 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA
ally to diminish as more and more labor is applied to a fixed

land area.2 If the percentage increase in output is less than

the percentage increase in labor, labor productivity could

well be falling while land productivity is increasing.

Distinguishing sources of change in the productivity of a

given input is important because it improves our understanding of how policy might generate additional increases

in returns to that input. We look next at levels and changes

in three measures of agricultural productivity, and then at

some of the factors that drive those changes.

Trends in Agricultural Productivity Are Mixed

Land productivity averaged US$68 per hectare of agricultural land for SSA as a whole in 1993, compared with $519

in South Asia and $116 in Latin America and the Caribbean

(table A-1). Values ranged from $5 to 10 per hectare in the

drier countries of Southern Africa and the Sahel to $200 per

hectare and more in the East African highland countries and

tropical West Africa. For SSA as a whole, land productivity

grew an average of 1.9 percent per year between 1980 and

1993, with slow to moderate growth in most countries. Land

productivity grew most rapidly in the Sahelian countries and

West Africa, and more slowly in Eastern and Southern

Africa (see also figure A-1).

Labor productivity averaged $392 per agricultural worker

for SSA as a whole in 1995, compared with $383 in South

Asia and $2,292 in Latin America and the Caribbean. Values

ranged from $100 to 200 per worker in many countries in

Eastern and Southern Africa and the Sahel to more than

$500 per worker in parts of West and Central Africa. Labor

productivity declined an average of 1.0 percent per year for

SSA as a whole between 1980 and 1995, with modest

growth in parts of Western and Southern Africa (see also

figure A-1).

As noted previously, low (or declining) labor productivity is

consistent with high (or growing) land productivity in the

context of a large (or expanding) agricultural labor force.

Such patterns are evident in the data on agricultural land per

worker presented in table A-1. The land/labor ratio is generally low in East Africa and high in Central and Southern

Africa and the Sahel. Within regions, low land/labor ratios

are generally associated with high land productivity (as in

Rwanda, Gambia, Benin, and Malawi), while high

land/labor ratios are generally associated high labor productivity (as in Gabon, Ivory Coast, and Namibia).

Land and labor productivity are both incomplete measures

of agricultural productivity, since they measure the productivity of only a single factor of production, and may well

move in opposite directions or conceal negative growth in

broader productivity measures. In an effort to address this

problem, economists estimate total factor productivity,

which measures changes in agricultural output relative to

changes in an aggregated index of multiple inputs. Table A1 reports estimates by Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) of total factor productivity levels for 1991 and rates of change for

1961-91.3 The TFP index is normalized to 1.0 for the most

efficient countries in 1961. For Africa as a whole, the TFP

index averaged 0.8 in 1991, up from 0.7 in 1961. This indicates that even though productivity has risen on average,

many SSA countries were still not as efficient in 1991 as the

most efficient countries were in 1961. TFP levels are mixed

in each region, with the highest estimates in parts of

Southern, Western, and Eastern Africa (particularly Uganda

and Burundi). Uganda and Burundi are also among the

countries with the highest rates of growth in TFP (see also

figure A-1).

Changes in TFP are, by definition, driven by changes in 

factors that are not incorporated in the index of inputs constructed to estimate TFP. For example, TFP growth could

reflect factors such as technical change or improvements 

in infrastructure or research. On the other hand, it could 

also reflect factors such as unmeasured depletion of soil or

other natural resources, with very different implications 

for sustainability and food security. Identifying these

sources of change is thus critical to designing appropriate

policy responses.

Productivity Is Affected by Many Factors

We are interested in differences in agricultural productivity

levels and growth rates across countries in SSA in order to

better understand those factors that are particularly influential in generating or impeding productivity growth. Five

recent studies have examined agricultural productivity in

Africa and other developing countries, and are summarized

in table A-2.

Frisvold and Ingram (1995) examine land productivity for

28 countries in four regions of SSA between 1973-75 and

1983-85. Land productivity was estimated to have grown at

an annual rate of 1.5-1.8 percent in most regions over the

period. Frisvold and Ingram found that increased application

of agricultural labor was the single most important factor in

explaining growth in land productivity, and concluded that

substantial increases in land productivity should not be

expected until land becomes relatively scarce, echoing

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 27

2The “almost universal” law of diminishing marginal product (Henderson

and Quandt, 1980, p. 68) describes the relationship between the level of

output of a particular commodity and the level of a particular input as the

latter changes while the level of other inputs remains fixed. The pattern

typically exhibited by this relationship is one in which, after a point, the

incremental increase in output generated by continuing increases in a single input begins to diminish (all other inputs being fixed). The law does

not apply if all inputs are increased proportionately.

3Several recent studies have presented Malmquist TFP indexes for various

sets of countries (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1997; Lusigi and Thirtle, 1997;

Trueblood and Coggins, 1997). We choose to present the results of Lusigi

and Thirtle, since theirs is the only study that focuses exclusively on Africa.
28 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA
Binswanger and Pingali (1988) and Boserup (1965). Growth

in the stock of conventional inputs (such as labor and

machinery; see “Definitions” box) accounted for more than

two-thirds of growth in land productivity, which in turn

accounted for the majority of growth in agricultural output.

Nonconventional inputs (such as land quality and historic

calorie availability) were significant in explaining land productivity variation across countries, but did not contribute

significantly to land productivity growth over time in most

regions. Although agricultural research is often aimed

specifically at improving yields, Frisvold and Ingram found

no significant relationship between agricultural research

expenditures and land productivity.

Labor productivity was examined in a study of 67 developing countries, including South Africa and 24 other SSA

countries, by Craig, Pardey, and Roseboom (1997). They

found that conventional inputs explain nearly three quarters

of the variation in labor productivity across countries.

Variables that adjust for quality differences in land and labor

(rainfall, share of land that is arable, share of land that is

irrigated, and life expectancy), and the amount of publicly

provided infrastructure (including roads and agricultural

research expenditures) are also significant in explaining

cross-sectional differences in labor productivity.

Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) estimated an average rate of TFP

growth of 1.3 percent per year for 47 African countries during 1961-91. They found that conventional inputs, land

quality, and research expenditures together explain almost

three-quarters of variation in production across the countries

studied. Like Frisvold and Ingram (1995), Lusigi and Thirtle

stress the contribution of population pressure to faster

growth, arguing that land abundance depresses farmer

incentives to increase land productivity by adopting yieldincreasing technologies.

Block (1995) finds rates of growth in agricultural TFP in 39

SSA countries increasing from -0.5 percent per year (for

1973-78) to 1.6 percent per year (for 1983-88). Block suggests that expenditures for agricultural research and

improved economic incentives (through improved macroeconomic policies) together explain two-thirds of measured

productivity growth in SSA during 1983-88. This finding

raises concerns about current reductions in public spending

on agricultural research in SSA.

Thirtle, Hadley, and Townsend (1995) decompose the low

but positive TFP growth rate they find for 1971-86 in most

of the 22 SSA countries they studied into technical progress

(from the time series for this panel of countries) and efficiency change (from the cross-section). Investments in infrastructure, extension, and the level of real protection on international agricultural markets are shown to be significant in

explaining efficiency change, while tractors, the labor/land

ratio, research and development (R&D), and secondary education are found to explain the variation in technical

progress. They find the labor/land ratio, or population density, to be the single most important explanatory variable,

again suggesting that productivity growth will accelerate in

land-abundant countries as population density increases.

While the precise effects of different factors on the various

measures of agricultural productivity vary from one study to

the next, one broad pattern is clear. The studies are nearly

unanimous in attributing most historic productivity growth

to increases in the use of conventional inputs, especially

labor. Policy reform, infrastructure, and agricultural research

also make important contributions to productivity, although

the estimated magnitude of these contributions is sensitive

to the precise ways in which these variables are measured

and analyzed.

Policy Reforms and Investment in

Infrastructure and Research Are Keys to

Productivity Growth

The studies reviewed here provide a guide to the factors that

have historically affected agricultural productivity in SSA.

Differences in the application of conventional inputs—espeEconomic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 29
cially labor—explain most of the historic variation in productivity between countries in SSA. Evidence of declining

labor productivity and the costs of continued expansion of

agricultural land, however, suggest that potential productivity gains yet to be realized from increased labor application

are limited. Nevertheless, it is apparent that many countries

in SSA still have considerable potential to raise productivity

through increased use of other conventional inputs, namely

fertilizer, machinery, and livestock. It has been argued that

barriers to increased use of these inputs include lack of

appropriate infrastructure and poor policy environments

(Byerlee and Heisey, 1997; Heisey and Mwangi, 1996;

Larson and Frisvold, 1996).

However, studies of historic productivity trends in SSA may

provide incomplete guidance for future productivity growth.

Analysis of a wider sample of countries with higher productivity may provide additional useful information on factors

that could improve productivity in the future. In a review of

such studies, Trueblood (1991) reports that the variables

found to consistently affect productivity over a wide selection of countries include education, infrastructure, and

research. For example, improved infrastructure may lead to

increased productivity through enhanced access to output

markets as well as through reduced costs for inputs such fertilizer and extension services. Investment in education and

research may provide complementary increases in the efficiency with which fertilizer and extension services are used.

Given the importance accorded to physical infrastructure

and education as nonconventional inputs in other multicountry studies of agricultural productivity (Craig, Pardey,

and Roseboom, 1997) as well, it is surprising that these

variables have not been included in the studies exclusive to

Africa. It may be that data on infrastructure are not available

for a large set of African countries. In an earlier study of

agricultural productivity, Antle (1983) concluded that infrastructure investments help improve agricultural productivity

in developing countries. In addition, a study of agricultural

productivity in the United States has shown that infrastructure investments made important contributions to agricultural productivity through the 1960s (Shane, Roe, and

Gopinath, 1998). Since that time, however, public and private R&D have become more important in spurring productivity growth in the United States. If a similar trend holds

for other countries, we would expect that, for countries

where the infrastructure is not yet well developed (as in

much of Africa), large increases in agricultural productivity

may be possible from investments in rural roads and utilities. It should also be noted that studies that include research

as an explanatory variable but leave out infrastructure and

other important nonconventional variables may be overstating the importance of research. It is for this reason that

Block (1995) stresses that his estimate of research explaining up to one-third of the growth in TFP is an upper limit.

A few studies have looked explicitly at policy reform as an

explanation for productivity growth. Block (1995) found

that countries that depreciated the real exchange rate—and

thus increased the prices paid to farmers for export crops—

tended to have higher growth rates of total factor productivity. Fulginiti and Perrin (1997) used nominal price protec30 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Definitions

Agricultural productivity is the amount of agricultural output per unit of input used in agricultural production.

Land productivity is the amount of agricultural output per unit of land used in agricultural production. Growth in land productivity reflects the growth in agricultural output not accounted for by (i.e. above and beyond) the growth in the amount of land used

in agricultural production.

Labor productivity is the amount of agricultural output per unit of labor input used in agricultural production. Growth in labor

productivity reflects the growth in agricultural output not accounted for by (i.e. above and beyond) the growth in the amount of

labor used in agricultural production.

Total factor productivity (TFP) is the ratio of agricultural output to an index of inputs used in agricultural production. The inputs

included in the denominator of the TFP index are typically the conventional inputs to agricultural production. The growth in

agricultural TFP thus reflects the growth in agricultural output not accounted for by (i.e. above and beyond) the growth of conventional inputs.

Agricultural output is the sum of outputs of the agricultural sector, aggregated in monetary terms, less the cost of intermediate inputs.

Conventional inputs to agricultural production include land, labor, machinery, livestock, and fertilizer.

Nonconventional inputs to agricultural production include physical and institutional infrastructure, education, agricultural

research and extension, and government programs and policies.
tion as a proxy for policy reform and concluded that countries that tax agriculture the most tend to have the most

negative rates of productivity change. Recent World Bank

findings suggest that countries with the most appropriate

policy environments have experienced the highest levels of

economic growth in SSA in recent years.

Other variables that deserve closer attention in studies of

agricultural productivity include changes in resource quality

over time and measures of political and institutional instability. Recent analysis indicates that changes in input quality

accounted for one tenth of productivity growth in U.S. agriculture between 1948 and 1994 (Ahearn et al., 1998).

Peterson’s (1987) useful land quality index, which controls

for irrigation, precipitation, and soil nitrogen, has been used

frequently in international agricultural empirical work, but

provides only one (constant) number per country that fails

to reflect possible changes in land quality over time. If a

portion of growth in agricultural productivity is actually due

to soil fertility depletion, but soil depletion is left as an

unmeasured explanatory variable (see box, “Data

Limitations...”), growth in productivity may be incorrectly

attributed to one of the variables that is measured and

included in the analysis. As for measures of political instability, Messer, Cohen, and D’Costa (1998) estimate that cessation of armed conflict would have added 2 to 5 percent

annually to Africa’s per capita food production since 1980.

Improved Food Security Will Require

Accelerated Productivity Growth

Almost three-quarters of the variation in agricultural productivity in SSA is explained by the use of conventional

inputs, and research suggests that there remains significant

scope to improve productivity in many countries through

increased use of fertilizer, machinery, and livestock.

Analysis elsewhere in this report projects that food production in SSA will grow an average of 2.3 percent per year

over the next decade through a combination of area expansion (1.3 percent per year) and yield increases (1 percent per

year). This report also projects that food production in SSA

would have to grow 3.3 - 4.5 percent annually to meet a

range of food security objectives over the next decade. If we

further incorporate the World Bank’s recommendation

(Cleaver and Schreiber, 1994) that agricultural area expansion in SSA be limited to 0.5 percent per year on sustainability grounds, the need for gains in agricultural productivity growth becomes even more urgent. How might such

gains be realized?

The studies reviewed indicate that continued growth of the

agricultural labor force of 2.5 percent per year (World Bank,

1998) can be expected to increase agricultural output about 1

percent per year. As land becomes increasingly scarce relative to labor, farmers will increasingly seek ways to augment

land through increased application of other inputs as well.

Fertilizer application rates have been declining in SSA by an

average of 1.3 percent per year since 1980 (World Bank,

1998). Reversing this trend and increasing fertilizer use by 5

percent per year could increase agricultural output by an

additional 0.5 percent per year. Proportionate increases in the

use of machinery and in research expenditures could be

expected to add similar increases to output. Expected

increases in output from improved infrastructure and price

policies are difficult to quantify, but such improvements are

also necessary to make possible the increases in productivity

from conventional inputs and research.

In sum, agriculture in SSA is characterized by multiple constraints on accelerated productivity growth. On the one

hand, this suggests that there are many means by which

such constraints could be alleviated. For example, productivity gains from increased use of conventional inputs, such

as fertilizer, could be supported through measures to

improve smallholders’ access to credit. On the other hand,

in the absence of broad improvements in physical infrastructure, political stability, and the institutional environment, the

returns to any single intervention in isolation are likely to be

limited as other constraints quickly become binding. Policy

reforms directed at improving physical and institutional

infrastructure may not only increase use of inputs by lowering prices, but may also improve farmgate prices of agricultural output and thus more directly stimulate output. In addition, education of the rural labor force as well as agricultural

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 31

Data Limitations and Concerns

Data on agricultural inputs and outputs are costly to collect. Sub-Saharan African countries have limited budgets devoted to data

collection, with the result that data on both conventional and nonconventional inputs are often unavailable or incomplete. Even for

conventional inputs, data are often limited to large-scale, commercial, and/or more capital-intensive agricultural production rather

than the smallholder sector that employs most of the region’s agricultural labor force and produces most of the region’s food.

These limitations are of concern because the more inputs that are unmeasured or incompletely measured, the fewer are the

inputs that can be included in analyses of agricultural productivity, and the poorer are the estimates of the productivity of those

inputs that are measured and analyzed. Lack of good estimates of the productivity of various inputs limits the ability of government and international agencies to establish policies that seek to achieve sustainable resource use, food security, and other objectives in the most cost-effective manner.
research will improve the future prospects for productivity

growth in SSA. Finally, the full benefits of research are

unlikely to be realized before these more basic constraints

are surmounted. Nevertheless continued investment in

research (along with attention to more basic sources of productivity growth) remains important due to potentially long

lags in application.

References

Ahearn, Mary, Jet Yee, Eldon Ball, and Richard Nehring

(1998). Agricultural Productivity in the United States.

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Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agricultural

Information Bulletin No. 740. January.

Antle, John M. (1983). “Infrastructure and Aggregate

Agricultural Productivity: International Evidence”

Economic Development and Cultural Change 31(3

April):609-619.

Badiane, Ousmane, and Christopher Delgado (1995). A

2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the Environment

in Sub-Saharan Africa. Food, Agriculture, and the

Environment Discussion Paper 4. Washington, DC: The

International Food Policy Research Institute.

Binswanger, H., and P. Pingali (1988). “Technological priorities for farming in Sub-Saharan Africa.” World Bank

Research Observer 3: 81-98.

Block, Steven A. (1995). “The Recovery of Agricultural

Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Food Policy

20(5):385-405.

Boserup, E. (1965). The Conditions of Agricultural Growth:

The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population

Pressure. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Byerlee, D. And P.W. Heisey (1996). “Past and Potential

Impacts of Maize Research in sub-Saharan Africa: a

Critical Assessment.” Food Policy 21(3):255-277.

Cleaver, Kevin M., and Gotz A. Schreiber (1994). Reversing

the Spiral: The Population, Agriculture, and Environment

Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: The

World Bank.

Craig, Barbara J., Philip G. Pardey, and Johannes Roseboom

(1997). “International Productivity Patterns: Accounting

for Input Quality, Infrastructure, and Research.”

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

79(November):1064-1076.

Crosson, Pierre, and Jock R. Anderson (1995). Achieving a

Sustainable Agricultural System in Sub-Saharan Africa.

World Bank, Building Blocks for Africa 2025 Paper No.

2. March.

Frisvold, George, and Kevin Ingram (1995). “Sources of

Agricultural Productivity Growth and Stagnation in SubSaharan Africa” Agricultural Economics, 13:51-61.

Fulginiti, Libyan E. and Richard K. Perrin (1997). “LDC

Agriculture: Nonparametric Malmquist Productivity

Indexes.” Journal of Development Economics 53:373-

390.

Heisey, P.W. and W. Mwangi (1996). Fertilizer Use and

Maize Production in Sub-Saharan Africa. CIMMYT

Economics Working Paper 96-01. Mexico, D.F.:

International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center

(CIMMYT).

Henderson, James M., and Richard E. Quandt (1980).

Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach (3rd

edition). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Larson, Bruce A. and George B. Frisvold (1996).

“Fertilizers to Support Agricultural Development in SubSaharan Africa: What is Needed and Why.” Food Policy

21:509-525.

Lusigi, Angela, and Colin Thirtle (1997). “Total Factor

Productivity and the Effects of R&D in African

Agriculture”, Journal of International Development 9(4):

529-538.

Messer, Ellen, Marc J. Cohen, and Jashinta D’Costa (1998).

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and Hunger.” 2020 Brief 50. Washington, DC: The

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Peterson, Willis (1987). International Land Quality Indexes,

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Paper P87-10, University of Minnesota.

Shane, Matthew, Terry Roe, and Munisamy Gopinath

(1998). U.S. Agricultural Growth and Productivity: An

Economywide Perspective. Market and Trade Economics

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Induced Innovation in Sub-Saharan African Agriculture:

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32 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA
Introduction

To achieve food security—with respect to aggregate quantities, not household access—countries have two options:

accelerate domestic agricultural production or increase

imports. The first option is certainly a possibility for many

of the low-income countries that have performed below

their potential due to inappropriate producer policies, prolonged civil strife, or very low adoption of new technologies. However, agricultural sectors in many countries have

been performing well, or have maximized their potential and

yet they continue to face—or are projected to have— food

gaps. For these countries, as well as those where potential

for agricultural growth is quite limited, commercial imports

could play a major role in their future food security position.

For low-income countries, food aid has been a supplement

to commercial imports. However, food aid imports are at the

discretion of donor countries and the recipient countries

have little say in allocation decisions. At one time, food aid

contributed a significant share of food supplies in some of

the low-income, food deficit countries. However, donations

peaked in the early 1990’s and have fallen considerably

since then. The prospects of food aid rebounding to historical levels are not promising given budgetary policies in

many donor countries. This means that commercial imports

will be the key to increasing food supplies in countries

where production growth is unlikely.

As defined in the model used in this report, the principal

determinants of commercial food imports are foreign

exchange availability and food prices. The ability to finance

commercial imports varies considerably across low-income

countries. The performance of the export sector is crucial to

providing the foreign exchange to enhance commercial

import capacity. In addition to financing imports, exports

have a direct effect on the domestic economy and also support debt service payments which are critical to maintaining

a country’s creditworthiness. World commodity prices also

influence commercial import capacity. A decline in food

prices raises the capacity to import. On the other hand, a

decline in prices of goods exported by developing countries

reduces import capacity.

This article reviews the trends in import dependency, the

contribution of food aid to food supplies, and factors affecting commercial import capacity in the countries in four

regions of this study: North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa,

Asia, and Latin America. The NIS region has been omitted

from the historical discussion because of lack of data. The

Food Security model is used to determine the impact of

changes in major variables (such as export earnings and

world prices) on food security in these regions.

Import Dependency

Between 1980 and 1997, North Africa was the most import

dependent region in this study with commercial imports

contributing 39 percent of the food supply, on average (figure B-1). Latin America was close behind with a share of

34.3 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia relied on imports

to a much lesser degree with dependency ratios of 6.3 and

less than 3 percent. While imports accounted for a very

small share of food supplies in Asia, commercial imports in

this region were rising the fastest of all the regions at nearly

8 percent per year. Latin America’s commercial import

growth was also strong. Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa,

however, was weak—less than 2 percent per year—reflecting the region’s poor financial situation.

Examining the projection period (1998-2008), the strongest

import growth is projected to occur in Latin America, 3.4

percent per year, and Asia, 3.1 percent. The jump in Latin

America will lead to the highest import dependency of all

regions, averaging 45 percent during the decade. Asia’s

import dependency will nearly double from historical levels,

but remain low at 5.3 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa’s import

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 33

Special Article

The Link Between Imports and Food Security

Stacey Rosen1

Abstract: In many low-income food deficit countries agricultural sectors have performed at

full capacity. For these countries, as well as those where potential for agricultural growth is

quite limited, commercial imports could play a major role in their future food security position. The objective of this article is to review the trends in import dependency, the contribution of food aid to food supplies, and factors affecting commercial import capacity in the

countries of North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

1Agricultural economist with the Market and Trade Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA.
growth is projected to remain even with historical levels

leading to an import dependency of nearly 16 percent. 

Role of Food Aid

For many countries in the study, food aid has played a critical

role in boosting food supplies. However, this role has diminished along with the declining trend in global donations. In

the early 1990s, cereal food aid averaged roughly 14 million

tons per year, but fell steadily thereafter to 5.5 million in

1997/98. FAO’s forecast for 1998/99 is for aid to increase to

roughly 8 million tons, still well below historical levels. For

North Africa and Asia, food aid trends have followed similar

paths. In both regions, the food aid share of food imports fell

from around 20 percent in the early 1980s to roughly 2 percent in more recent years. In Latin America, the food aid

share peaked at nearly 40 percent in the mid-1980s, but has

since fallen to less than 5 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa is the

only region where food aid has consistently played a major

role in augmenting food supplies. While the share of imports

has fluctuated widely during 1980-97—ranging from 22 to 57

percent—it has averaged nearly 40 percent. This average is

much higher than any of the other regions, with Latin

America next in line with an average of 23 percent.

Factors Influencing Import Capacity

In the model used in this report, commercial imports are

assumed to be a function of domestic production, world

commodity prices, and foreign exchange availability.

Foreign exchange availability is defined here as the sum of

export earnings and net flow of credit. Net credit flow is

assumed constant in the model, which means among all the

variables, export earnings and commodity prices are the key

determinants of commercial imports. In the following sections, export earnings performance and international commodity price trends are reviewed.

Export Performance

Historical export earnings growth has varied widely across the

regions and countries in this study. Data were reviewed for 61

low-income countries (the same set of countries covered in the

report with the exception of the NIS countries because of the

lack of data). To compare changes in trends in export earnings

during the historical period, growth was calculated for two different time periods—1980-90 and 1990-96 for four regions:

Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, Latin America, and Asia

(table B-1). Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region that experienced a slowdown in earnings growth between the two time

periods: from 3 percent per year to 1.6 percent. Growth in the

other regions accelerated. Latin America saw the biggest

jump—from roughly 1 percent in the early period to 5.4 percent in the more recent period. Asia’s export earnings growth

was the strongest of all the regions in both time periods and

measured nearly 11 percent per year in the 1990s.

The differences in export performances of regions and countries stem from a variety of internal and external factors. Most

developing countries are price takers in the international market, but their export volume response to these prices is not

uniform and is influenced by internal policies and the flexibility of their production system. For example, Sub-Saharan

Africa’s regulatory policies have influenced trade patterns.

The region’s transportation policies have been structured in

such a way that exports of higher valued processed goods are

discouraged. This was one factor that contributed to the

region’s continued dependence on primary products.

Export volume: Evidence of policy successes and failures is

clear upon review of the trends in export volume in each

region. The historical period was divided into two periods,

1980-90 and 1990-96, to compare changes in growth rates

over time (these time periods were chosen due to availability

of data). Both North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a slowdown in their export volume growth rates in

between the two time periods. North Africa, however, started

from a higher base rate. Export volumes in this region fell

from an annual growth rate of 5 percent during 1980-90 to

4.4 percent in 1990-96. In Sub-Saharan Africa, growth in the

early period measured less than 2 percent per year and fell to

less than 0.4 percent in the more recent period. In other

words, the region has experienced virtually no growth, on

average, in export volume in the 1990s. In fact, half the coun34 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

North Africa

Sub-Saharan

Asia

Latin

America

NIS

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1980 1996 2008

Figure B-1

Import Dependency

Percent
tries in this region saw their export volumes decline during

this time. In Latin America, growth in export volume

strengthened from less than 1 percent per year in the early

period to 3 percent in the more recent period. This change

was driven by significant improvement by Ecuador, El

Salvador, Honduras, and Peru. Asia had the greatest export

volume growth of all the regions, averaging 7.4 percent annually through the 1980s and exceeding 11 percent in the 1990s.

There is a general consensus that such disparities in performance stem from micro- and macroeconomic policies of the

countries. Studies have shown that trade and exchange rate

policies in poor performing countries have often taxed

exports in favor of import-substitute products. The evidence

also indicates that these policies have been more widespread

with respect to agricultural products. A 1988 study by the

World Bank measured the effects of policy intervention on

agricultural commodities in several developing countries.

The policy interventions for selected commodities were

decomposed into direct (sector specific) and indirect (economywide) interventions. The results showed that the negative

indirect effects of intervention policies were much stronger

than the negative direct effects. In fact, in Ghana and

Zambia, the positive direct effects were eroded by strong

negative indirect (economywide) effects.

Recognizing these costs, agencies attached conditionality to

their multilateral and major bilateral lending to developing

countries in an attempt to persuade the countries to amend

their policies. The response of developing countries, in general, was positive. Many countries, including many in SubSaharan Africa, adopted flexible exchange rate policies to

reduce the bias against export sectors. Currency depreciation, which lowers export prices, is expected to increase

export volumes and export shares.

An FAO study that quantified the relationship between

exchange rates and exports has also provided some insights.

The results of the study showed that while exchange rate

adjustments are necessary, they are not sufficient conditions

to revitalize exports. A World Bank study concluded that

uneven policy reforms across sectors and countries in SubSaharan Africa can explain the weakness of the export sectors. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the trade sector continues to be

the main source of government revenue and according to

available reports, trade policy distortions continue.

Export prices: In addition to export volume, export prices

are the other principal determinants of trends in export earnings. Declining prices can mitigate growth in export volumes. Likewise, rising prices can compensate for a decline

in export volumes. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, slow

growth in export volumes has been exacerbated by weak

prices for the commodities the region exports. This region

exports principally primary products, prices of which peaked

around 1980, fell considerably through the 1980s and have,

in most cases, not fully recovered. Moreover, the World

Bank is projecting these prices to decline more than 2 percent per year through the next decade. One reason is that

demand for these primary products is not particularly strong.

Several countries in the region rely heavily on metals and

minerals for much of their export earnings. Real prices of

these products are equal to roughly 75 percent of their 1990

price—which was considerably lower than the 1980 price.

Real prices are projected to remain flat through 2005. Many

countries in the other regions included in this study have

moved away from exports of primary products toward manufactured goods, prices of which have increased 3 percent

annually since 1980.

It has been argued that export diversification can improve

export earnings. A simple comparison of trends in exports

and commodity composition in different regions demonstrates the likely linkages between these two factors. SubSaharan Africa experienced the lowest export growth of all

the regions in this study and also had the largest share of

agricultural exports. The bulk of these exports were beverages, sugar, and tobacco.

As in Sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural commodities account

for a large share of export earnings in Latin America.

However, Latin America has a larger and growing share of

exports in manufactured goods, reaching 40 percent in 1996.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, this share remained below 10 percent throughout the historical period. The obvious benefits

of these products is that demand for them is growing faster

than for primary agricultural commodities. Moreover, unlike

agricultural commodities, they are not vulnerable to the

vagaries of weather.

In North Africa, fuel exports continue to play an important

role in total export earnings, but their share fell considerably

during the historical period. During the same time period,

earnings growth in the region has accelerated. Some of this

growth can be attributed to a sharp increase in the share of

exports coming from manufactured goods, reaching 41 percent in 1990.

A similar, but even more dramatic, path is evident in the

Asian countries. The agricultural share of total exports was

cut in half during the historical period while that of manufactured goods more than doubled. These changes were a

major factor behind the region’s strong export growth.

International Food Prices

In addition to exports, food prices play a significant role in

determining import capacity. As import prices fall, capacity

to import rises and vice versa. Grain prices, in real terms,

fell nearly a half between 1980 and 1990. Other than price

spikes in 1995 and 1996, prices have remained fairly steady

in the 1990s. Exporters responded to the 1996 price hike

with a sharp increase in output. This ability to respond to

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 35
price hikes reflects the excess capacity in major exporting

countries and supports the opinion that sustained periods of

higher prices are unlikely.

These price trends indicate that the low-income, food-deficit

countries are in a much better position now than in the early

1980s. However, even a one-time price spike can adversely

affect a country. Between 1994 and 1996, grain prices

jumped more than 30 percent in real terms. Although the

volume of grain imports of low-income, food-deficit countries increased nominally between 1994 and 1996, the grain

import bill rose 50 percent. Given the financial constraints

facing most of these countries, this volatility adversely

affects short-term economic growth.

Modeling Food Imports and Gaps Under

Alternative Scenarios

The Food Security model was used to determine the impact

of changes in the growth path of export earnings and a onetime shock to food prices on imports and food security in

these regions (table B-2). In the baseline, combined commercial imports by the 66 countries are projected to total

nearly 73 million tons in 2008. The nutritional food gap is

projected at 28.4 million tons, nearly 80 percent of which

will be accounted for by Sub-Saharan Africa.

In the first scenario, a highly optimistic export growth path

of 10 percent per year, in real terms, was used for each year

of the projection period (1998-2008). This growth rates

translates into a doubling of export earnings, on average, for

the 66 countries over the next 10 years. In the baseline scenario, annual real export growth ranges from 2 to 6 percent.2

The accelerated export growth assumption is projected to

result in a 46 percent jump in commercial imports, on average, for all the regions relative to the base scenario.

Reviewing the results by region, gains in commercial

imports are projected to be the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa

and the lowest in the NIS region. This is due to the differences in export growth rates in the baseline projections. The

highest export growth was projected for NIS countries, while

the lowest was for Sub-Saharan Africa. As for the implications for food security resulting from a boost in export earnings, the nutritional gap is projected to decline 16 percent, on

average, relative to the base scenario. Latin America is projected to see the greatest decline in the gap, while the smallest change is projected for Asia. These impacts are consistent

with the import dependency of these regions. In Latin

America, imports account for a large share of food availability. Therefore, when imports are cut, the implications for

food security will be significant. Conversely, in Asia, import

dependency is quite low (generally below 5 percent). As a

result, when imports are cut, the implications for food security are marginal. While the accelerated export growth is projected to improve the food security situation across all

regions, the problem is not eradicated.

In the second scenario, the impact of a one-time shock—a 20-

percent increase in grain prices—as was experienced in 1996,

was examined. In the baseline scenario, the assumption was a

2-percent annual price decline. In accordance with expectations, the higher prices are projected to result in a decline in

commercial imports—8.2 percent, on average, for all countries. The regional responses were fairly consistent with the

overall results. The reduction in commercial imports is projected to result in a deterioration in food security and this is

reflected in the 4.2 percent rise in the nutritional gap relative

to the base scenario. The situation is projected to deteriorate

the greatest in Latin America where the gap increases more

than 40 percent. On the other hand, the price hike is projected

to have a negligible effect on the food security situation in

Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, these results can be explained by

the degree of import dependency in these regions.

In the third scenario, the accelerated growth rath of the first

scenario is combined with the one-time price shock of the

second scenario. In this scenario, the negative effects of the

one-time shock completely erode the positive effects of

higher export growth. Commercial imports are projected to

decline more than 8 percent relative to the higher export

growth scenario. Moreover, the nutritional gap is projected

to be 4.6 percent larger. However, the food security implications are projected to be better under this scenario than in

the base scenario. Even when the price shock is added to the

high export growth assumption, the food gaps are projected

to be smaller than those under the base scenario. There is no

surprise in this finding, but it illustrates the point that if

countries can maintain a high export growth path, their food

security situation can improve despite periodic price shocks.

In sum, the analysis clearly shows that improved export performance will enhance the food security of the countries,

but it cannot eradicate the problem. In many cases, the

export growth needed to boost the import capacity to the

level necessary to close the food gaps is simply unrealistic.

For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, commercial food

imports must grow nearly 13 percent annually to close the

average nutritional gap by 2008. The parameters used in the

model assume that the response of food imports to changes

in foreign exchange availability is not one-to-one (i.e.,

inelastic response in the range of 0.6 to 0.8, depending on

country—estimates based on cross-country data). This

means that, everything being equal, to achieve a 1-percent

growth in food imports, foreign exchange availability must

grow 1.3 to 1.7 percent. If the net flow of capital stays constant or even declines as has been the case in many of these

countries, exports will remain the sole source of import

financing. This means that much higher export earnings will

be required to attain the necessary foreign exchange availability. Clearly, achieving dramatically higher growth in

36 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

2Projected annual growth in real export earnings is 2.1 percent for SubSaharan Africa, 3.7 percent for North Africa, 4.1 percent for Asia, 5.1 percent for Latin America, and 6.1 percent for NIS.
export earnings is unlikely. This also means that eradicating

food insecurity in the poor countries is a complicated task

and requires a comprehensive strategy to increase export

earnings as well as domestic production. 

Conclusion

If the future growth path of exports follows the historical

trends in these study countries, export earnings will remain

far short of financing the required imports. Assuming an

accelerated export growth path of 10 percent through the

next decade will reduce, but not eliminate the food gaps.

Periodic price hikes also remain a hinderence to financing

imports and a threat to food security. 

Domestic policies of the countries, however, can improve

this outlook. In most countries, export markets continue to

be distorted by a wide range of domestic policies and border

measures that reduce opportunities for export diversification

and growth. Improving trends in food security, however,

requires a simultaneous effort to improve both export and

domestic production performance. This is particularly

important for most of the food-insecure countries, because

agriculture continues to be the main source of income for

the rural population, where most of the food insecure live.

Moreover, agricultural products contribute to a large share

of export earnings in many countries.

Research has shown that international trade is one of the

most important factors affecting food security. Overall,

food-deficit countries must continue their current policies of

liberalizing trade and the agricultural sector and implement

structural adjustments that improve the performance of the

agricultural sector. Improving export performance will

enhance the financial condition and creditworthiness of

these countries and thereby attract foreign investment. For

the low-income countries, increasing export earnings will

increase the capacity for importing not only food, but capital

goods as well that are essential for long term growth.

References

Derosa, Dean A. “Increasing Export Diversification in

Commodity Exporting Countries,” International

Monetary Fund Staff Papers, Vol. 39, No. 3, Sept., 1992.

Diakosavvas, D. and C. Kirkpatrick. The Effects of Trade

and Exchange Rate Policies on Production Incentives in

Agriculture. UN Food and Agriculture Organization,

Rome 1990. 

Krueger, A.O., M. Schiff, and A. Valdes. Measuring the

impact of sector-specific and economy-wide policies on

agricultural incentives in developing countries. The

World Bank Economic Review, 1988.

Shapouri, Shahla and S. Rosen. “Export Performance in

Africa,” 1989. Staff Report No. AGES 89-16. Economic

Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

World Bank. Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and

the Road Ahead, 1994.

World Bank. Exports of Developing Countries: How

Direction Affects Performance, ed. by Oli Havrylyshyn,

The World Bank: Washington, DC, 1987.

World Bank. Global Economic Prospects and the

Developing Countries. The World Bank: Washington DC,

various issues.

Yeats, Alexander J., with A. Amjadi, U. Reincke, and F. NG,

“Did Domestic Policies Marginalize Africa in

International Trade?” January, 1997. Washington, DC:

World Bank. 

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 37
38 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 1--Algeria (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,993 255 7,764 11 9,462

1990 1,619 206 4,741 26 6,843

1991 3,730 275 4,190 19 7,674

1992 3,348 295 4,688 15 7,868

1993 1,563 272 5,482 18 7,515

1994 1,094 183 6,939 24 8,738

1995 2,193 306 5,719 17 10,846

1996 3,603 294 3,578 0 8,488

1997 1,023 281 4,469 0 5,217

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,078 278 5,092 0 0 9,197

2003 2,290 306 5,501 134 0 9,917

2008 2,433 336 6,140 182 0 10,925

Food import dependency 

is projected to increase 

considerably over time, from 

43 percent in the base period 

to 56 percent in 2008. 

Financing these imports will 

depend critically upon gas and

oil revenues and political 

stability.

Historical and Projected

Grain Supply Sources

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2004

Million tons

Production Imports

Statistical table 2--Egypt (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 9,890 459 6,832 1,211 14,208

1990 11,787 460 6,076 2,003 15,050

1991 12,016 508 6,440 1,026 15,637

1992 12,329 460 6,545 482 15,441

1993 13,205 466 6,717 230 16,012

1994 13,510 398 8,886 180 17,712

1995 14,578 721 7,658 215 18,947

1996 15,323 731 7,551 202 17,842

1997 16,546 754 9,886 167 21,331

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 16,690 633 9,052 0 0 20,876

2003 16,751 677 9,785 748 0 21,149

2008 17,746 723 11,011 819 0 22,951

Grain production has grown 

substantially since 1980. 

Food aid imports have dropped 

sharply for the same period, 

due to higher production and 

improved financial capacity. 

However, Egypt is projected to 

develop a small food gap by 

2008 due to the difficulty of 

sustaining high consumption 

levels.

Food Aid Imports

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1985198719891991199319951997

Million tons
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 39

Statistical table 3--Morocco (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 7,404 275 1,130 227 7,868

1990 6,254 268 1,390 204 7,070

1991 8,636 325 1,758 203 7,826

1992 2,933 276 2,860 234 6,975

1993 2,753 265 3,531 124 8,000

1994 9,530 312 1,673 13 7,519

1995 1,800 232 3,602 0 7,943

1996 10,037 337 2,905 2 8,647

1997 4,101 343 2,310 2 6,174

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 6,785 303 3,084 0 0 9,266

2003 5,789 335 3,484 0 0 8,678

2008 6,255 369 4,151 0 0 9,881

Morocco compensates for 

frequent production shortfalls 

with commercial imports. 

Although growth in food output

is projected to be slow--2.1 

percent annually--relatively 

strong import growth of nearly 

3 percent per year is projected 

to preclude food gaps.

Grain Production Trend

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1980198319861989199219951998

Million tons

Statistical table 4--Tunisia (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 621 44 1,119 543 2,038

1990 1,601 54 1,070 371 2,261

1991 2,508 55 831 96 2,722

1992 2,155 54 920 100 2,807

1993 1,561 49 1,001 46 2,271

1994 646 52 1,576 22 1,999

1995 1,366 58 2,678 18 3,494

1996 2,862 67 1,236 0 2,710

1997 1,101 75 1,371 0 1,844

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,651 61 1,979 0 0 2,869

2003 2,004 67 2,194 0 0 3,381

2008 2,161 73 2,539 0 0 3,858

Tunisia’s agricultural sector 

is characterized by high 

production variability--

averaging roughly 50 percent 

since 1980. Production and 

import growth are projected to 

be more than adequate to 

maintain base consumption 

levels and meet nutritional 

requirements. 

Grain Production Trend

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1980198319861989199219951998

Million tons
40 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 5--Cameroon (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 880 616 425 0 2,317

1990 826 755 381 10 2,408

1991 950 747 253 13 2,431

1992 868 755 434 1 2,576

1993 878 784 307 2 2,506

1994 892 778 417 2 2,650

1995 1,140 749 314 4 2,714

1996 1,240 926 118 4 2,841

1997 1,090 830 249 2 2,660

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,015 867 255 204 0 2,696

2003 1,281 936 268 232 0 3,093

2008 1,387 1,009 290 462 187 3,344

Food production would need 

to grow at twice the projected 

rate to maintain consumption 

at base levels. Domestic 

supplies, however, are 

sufficient to meet nutritional 

requirements through most of 

the projection period.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. SQ req.

Statistical table 6--Central African Republic (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 125 235 22 4 571

1990 123 258 32 4 594

1991 129 270 22 3 600

1992 93 281 25 5 580

1993 93 279 24 6 582

1994 85 271 43 1 602

1995 105 281 28 0 608

1996 110 298 14 0 623

1997 100 315 39 0 640

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 95 288 29 27 112 616

2003 105 302 29 68 163 646

2008 109 316 29 120 225 674

Production growth of less 

than 1 percent per year 

coupled with little import 

capacity are projected to lead 

to a deteriorating food supply 

situation. In 2008, average 

consumption levels are 

projected to equal only 75 

percent of nutritional 

requirements.

Grain Imports and

 Food Gaps

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commercial imports SQ gap
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 41

Statistical table 7--Congo, Democratic Republic (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,038 6,345 236 109 8,541

1990 1,011 6,590 318 86 8,922

1991 1,229 6,826 164 129 9,292

1992 1,408 6,968 238 27 9,694

1993 1,567 6,668 246 31 9,678

1994 1,545 6,745 223 86 9,698

1995 1,452 6,679 333 35 9,729

1996 1,465 6,648 290 8 9,622

1997 1,370 6,648 244 7 9,421

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,445 6,931 301 196 327 9,948

2003 1,695 7,596 279 710 860 10,939

2008 1,839 8,314 267 1,639 1,814 11,911

Food production growth of 

less than 2 percent per year 

and declining commercial 

imports are projected to 

generate rapidly expanding 

food gaps. Production would 

need to increase 3.3 percent 

per year to close these gaps 

by 2008.

Food Gaps as Share of 

Total Availability

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1998 2003 2008

Percent

SQ gap Nutritional gap

Statistical table 8--Burundi (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 268 375 11 3 985

1990 360 380 19 3 1,176

1991 385 389 33 1 1,220

1992 258 399 18 6 1,097

1993 249 389 0 28 1,063

1994 185 339 34 78 1,016

1995 225 356 40 5 1,018

1996 220 366 37 3 1,041

1997 255 373 37 0 1,173

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 230 362 40 51 343 1,041

2003 243 392 39 135 468 1,112

2008 288 424 39 177 553 1,232

The food gap to meet 

nutritional requirements is 

projected to rise from 33 to 45 

percent of food availability 

between 1998 and 2008. 

Production would need to 

expand nearly 5 percent per 

year to close this gap--much 

higher than the projected rate 

of less than 2 percent. 

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0

400

800

1,200

1,600

2,000

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

SQ req.
42 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 9--Eritrea (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 122 23 0 0 144

1990 72 23 0 100 94

1991 72 23 0 253 94

1992 198 23 0 39 220

1993 73 23 0 235 293

1994 298 23 192 63 679

1995 153 23 29 62 349

1996 132 23 39 72 359

1997 150 23 235 54 571

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 130 24 112 96 407 360

2003 161 26 115 126 486 402

2008 175 28 122 158 561 432

Eritrea is one of the most 

food insecure countries in 

the world. Consumption in 2008 

is projected to equal only 45 

percent of nutritional requirements. The nutritional food gap 

is projected to exceed 

aggregate food availability 

throughout the projection period. 

Consumption by Income 

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent

Statistical table 10--Ethiopia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 5,001 707 0 678 5,871

1990 5,052 734 0 808 6,068

1991 4,876 748 0 1,046 6,160

1992 5,342 746 487 543 6,567

1993 5,363 746 0 942 8,302

1994 5,960 767 336 687 9,573

1995 7,075 773 248 403 10,200

1996 6,775 780 86 354 9,685

1997 7,800 780 0 394 11,138

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 8,385 797 63 0 3,040 11,061

2003 9,346 882 64 182 4,051 12,429

2008 10,764 975 68 400 4,895 14,257

While reliance on external 

sources to maintain per capita 

consumption will be negligible 

during the projection period, 

the nutritional situation is 

projected to worsen. Projected production growth of 

3.1 percent per year falls well 

short of the 4.7 percent 

required to close the 

nutritional gap. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

20

25

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 43

Statistical table 11--Kenya (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 3,399 513 71 89 5,219

1990 2,723 485 296 65 5,341

1991 3,033 480 136 186 5,361

1992 3,085 500 359 288 5,330

1993 2,220 525 312 236 4,445

1994 3,554 520 1,004 111 5,853

1995 3,227 571 284 56 5,738

1996 2,778 578 393 32 5,010

1997 2,930 570 1,771 75 6,628

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,930 576 907 171 1,046 5,640

2003 3,300 633 994 298 1,285 6,257

2008 3,670 695 1,119 467 1,586 6,964

Although food production 

growth is projected to outstrip 

historical rates and import 

growth is among the strongest 

in the region, food gaps are 

projected to rise. By 2008, 

consumption in even the 

highest income group is 

projected to fall short--albeit 

marginally--of the nutritional 

target.

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

400

800

1,200

1,600

2,000

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 12--Rwanda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 262 552 13 10 1,416

1990 269 629 15 15 1,440

1991 254 739 19 11 1,438

1992 267 673 0 90 1,435

1993 188 598 46 90 1,350

1994 149 499 0 272 1,156

1995 154 480 0 244 1,186

1996 159 584 72 218 1,436

1997 214 587 2 232 1,656

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 184 524 0 498 295 1,101

2003 258 575 0 791 531 1,260

2008 309 631 0 867 579 1,402

Food production is projected 

to remain below pre-strife 

levels in the near term, 

resulting in significant food 

gaps. Output growth would 

need to double from projected 

rates to close the gaps. 

Consumption in each income 

group is projected to fall below 

nutritional targets in 2008.

Food Gaps as a Share of

Total Availability

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1998 2003 2008

Percent

SQ gap Nutritional gap
44 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 13--Somalia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 513 16 103 95 1,289

1990 477 16 97 100 1,189

1991 257 16 77 132 1,044

1992 202 14 38 312 1,102

1993 162 14 125 75 1,042

1994 228 12 115 13 1,199

1995 293 14 81 12 1,219

1996 313 14 94 12 1,210

1997 320 15 211 5 1,369

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 254 14 144 129 1,005 1,262

2003 327 15 144 299 1,345 1,360

2008 349 16 149 502 1,720 1,431

Per capita consumption is 

projected to fall more than 2 

percent per year through 

2008 as output rises less 

than 1 percent a year and 

commercial imports rise 

negligibly. In 2008, 

consumption in the highest 

income group is projected at 

only 55 percent of the 

nutritional target.

Consumption by 

Income Quintile in 

2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent

Statistical table14--Sudan (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 2,467 45 182 360 4,726

1990 2,119 36 120 513 4,274

1991 4,488 50 488 711 6,101

1992 5,307 51 334 286 5,932

1993 3,087 48 427 293 5,562

1994 5,152 50 811 134 6,485

1995 3,307 50 450 64 5,283

1996 5,207 50 383 40 6,632

1997 4,682 50 447 46 6,331

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 4,097 51 463 486 707 5,572

2003 5,112 53 459 100 347 6,663

2008 5,540 56 469 342 617 7,175

If the growth in food production followed historical trends 

of 3.5 percent per year, both 

food gaps would fall to zero. 

However, growth in output--

particularly grains--is projected to slow considerably, 

reflecting a slowdown in area 

expansion. 

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 45

Statistical table 15--Tanzania (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 4,470 1,628 24 28 6,325

1990 3,565 1,966 43 34 5,686

1991 3,540 1,736 111 18 5,887

1992 3,390 1,648 154 36 5,598

1993 3,700 1,593 150 47 5,647

1994 3,305 1,681 228 108 5,549

1995 4,355 1,451 194 25 5,815

1996 4,455 1,419 233 22 6,186

1997 3,140 1,416 62 5 4,777

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 3,805 1,531 177 419 935 5,750

2003 4,869 1,653 174 50 634 6,945

2008 5,384 1,783 179 400 1,068 7,608

Although food production is 

projected to grow at slightly 

higher rates than those of the 

historical period, food gaps 

persist. To close the 

nutritional food gap, output 

would need to rise nearly 3 

percent per year, compared 

with the projected rate of 

roughly 2.2 percent. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

10

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 16--Uganda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,535 1,906 0 49 4,596

1990 1,520 1,858 0 74 4,583

1991 1,460 1,834 0 30 4,560

1992 1,666 1,765 0 40 4,603

1993 1,794 1,886 36 46 4,897

1994 1,900 1,593 0 60 4,792

1995 2,020 1,688 10 41 5,087

1996 1,750 1,431 35 20 4,681

1997 1,550 1,630 57 21 4,643

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,740 1,607 37 198 0 4,911

2003 2,267 1,786 39 58 0 5,819

2008 2,558 1,982 42 307 0 6,508

Uganda is one of a few 

countries in the region 

projected to have adequate 

food supplies to meet 

minimum nutritional targets 

through 2008. At the national 

level, consumption is projected to equal 105 percent of 

the nutritional target in 2008.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. SQ req.
46 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 17--Angola (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 287 618 101 139 1,740

1990 227 617 210 124 1,761

1991 346 633 162 142 1,843

1992 452 714 200 116 2,083

1993 317 707 103 222 1,877

1994 261 887 173 229 2,148

1995 302 897 185 224 2,278

1996 473 934 276 228 2,597

1997 488 875 295 154 2,550

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 523 955 268 173 304 2,430

2003 473 1,025 294 523 675 2,528

2008 512 1,100 336 789 965 2,742

Domestic supplies are not 

projected to grow fast enough 

to preclude significant 

increases in food gaps. The 

nutritional food gap will more 

than triple during the 

projection period and equal 

35 percent of aggregate food 

availability in 2008. 

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 18--Lesotho (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 189 13 138 34 303

1990 214 13 167 36 419

1991 148 14 195 37 402

1992 75 16 173 45 306

1993 151 17 187 32 369

1994 243 20 172 15 367

1995 106 23 318 28 491

1996 233 23 287 30 553

1997 183 26 96 32 305

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 145 23 263 51 109 412

2003 192 24 273 60 125 464

2008 207 26 295 94 168 498

High production variability 

characterizes the agricultural 

sector. Commercial imports 

have compensated for many 

production shortfalls. Slow 

growth in output and imports 

are projected to lead to a 1-

percent annual decline in per 

capita consumption through 

2008. 

Grain Production

and Imports

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1,000 tons

Grain production Commercial imports
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 47

Statistical table 19--Madagascar (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,645 919 76 51 2,762

1990 1,700 926 99 38 2,803

1991 1,553 932 28 54 2,660

1992 1,715 916 73 59 2,871

1993 1,812 952 77 34 2,963

1994 1,670 972 123 20 2,885

1995 1,780 955 131 21 3,005

1996 1,830 964 117 28 3,079

1997 1,880 965 69 18 3,095

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,880 996 114 125 386 3,098

2003 2,047 1,080 116 399 703 3,361

2008 2,217 1,170 121 729 1,083 3,636

The nutritional gap as a share

of aggregate food availability 

is projected to rise from 12 to 

30 percent between 1998 and

2008. Production must rise 

3.6 percent per year to close 

the nutritional gap; this is 

more than 2 times the 

projected growth rate.

Food Gaps

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

SQ gap Nutritional gap

Statistical table 20--Malawi (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,531 108 0 347 2,026

1990 1,373 108 90 65 1,887

1991 1,629 116 0 285 2,165

1992 670 105 0 605 1,606

1993 2,016 128 493 67 2,459

1994 1,093 118 196 284 2,247

1995 1,628 124 198 105 2,106

1996 1,833 131 91 222 2,353

1997 1,395 138 76 99 1,887

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,545 126 133 312 446 1,964

2003 1,973 138 137 174 327 2,424

2008 2,180 151 147 280 454 2,667

Despite a projected 

improvement in Malawi’s 

overall nutritional situation 

during the next decade, 

consumption in each income 

group will remain below the 

nutritional target. Production 

is projected to grow at higher 

rates than the historical period

due solely to gains in yields. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
48 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 21--Mozambique (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 568 1,356 0 560 2,561

1990 706 1,674 0 523 2,946

1991 544 1,355 0 664 2,613

1992 278 1,193 123 929 2,512

1993 715 1,292 297 356 2,859

1994 756 1,238 214 304 2,750

1995 1,080 1,322 276 251 3,095

1996 1,313 1,727 170 302 3,697

1997 1,453 1,943 155 109 3,884

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,553 1,453 208 78 681 3,378

2003 1,676 1,558 206 278 957 3,616

2008 1,984 1,669 210 355 1,124 4,053

Grain output continues the 

post-war upward trend. 

Despite these gains, food 

gaps are projected to grow. 

Average per capita consumption in 2008 is projected at 

only 78 percent of the 

nutritional target; for the 

lowest income group, the 

number falls to 55 percent.

Crop Production 

and Food Aid

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1,000 tons

Grain prod. Root prod.

Food aid

Statistical table 22--Swaziland (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 115 3 81 7 255

1990 85 2 84 4 234

1991 158 2 89 5 309

1992 59 2 57 40 222

1993 78 2 71 10 219

1994 104 2 100 1 269

1995 81 2 84 12 245

1996 140 2 90 6 308

1997 85 2 71 6 201

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 85 2 95 19 0 256

2003 114 2 107 9 0 306

2008 119 2 127 15 0 341

With food production projected

to grow at two times the 

historical rate, output and 

commercial imports will be 

adequate to meet nutritional 

targets and nearly sufficient 

to maintain per capita 

consumption levels. On 

average, consumption is 

projected at 126 percent of the

nutritional target.

Consumption by Income

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

50

100

150

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 49

Statistical table 23--Zambia (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,797 198 125 6 2,034

1990 1,195 214 38 110 1,911

1991 1,309 219 1 56 1,795

1992 597 220 8 715 1,568

1993 1,759 222 342 11 2,062

1994 1,195 218 54 12 1,435

1995 929 213 78 74 1,380

1996 1,563 218 80 58 1,792

1997 1,162 221 118 4 1,468

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 842 221 108 471 964 1,122

2003 1,498 240 110 17 575 1,787

2008 1,727 259 116 14 647 2,030

A weather-induced production 

shortfall will leave a huge 

nutritional gap for 1998. Output 

is projected to grow at roughly 

two times the historical rate, 

but it will not be sufficient to 

close food gaps. By 2008, 

consumption in each income 

group is projected to fall short 

of the nutritional requirement.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 24--Zimbabwe (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 2,487 43 115 17 2,493

1990 2,758 45 95 54 2,598

1991 2,139 47 16 41 2,653

1992 675 52 0 896 995

1993 2,249 57 337 16 2,112

1994 2,622 58 61 5 2,412

1995 1,225 64 148 4 2,205

1996 2,900 65 138 0 2,548

1997 2,320 68 288 1 2,616

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,955 64 212 265 788 2,123

2003 2,325 67 219 168 749 2,482

2008 2,566 70 231 216 860 2,722

Production would need to 

grow nearly 3 percent per 

year to eliminate Zimbabwe’s 

nutritional food gap. This is 

more than 1 percentage point 

above the projected rate. In 

2008, consumption is projected to average only 76 

percent of nutritional 

requirements.

Consumption by Income

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

20

40

60

80

100

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent
50 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 25--Benin (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 557 719 82 13 1,260

1990 522 717 146 9 1,300

1991 524 802 138 7 1,382

1992 602 782 161 19 1,461

1993 635 843 106 26 1,524

1994 635 868 74 15 1,497

1995 746 946 87 18 1,670

1996 651 1,018 88 9 1,646

1997 595 945 112 32 1,556

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 645 992 107 76 0 1,615

2003 819 1,097 118 63 0 1,886

2008 925 1,210 136 152 0 2,107

While production growth is 

projected to slow considerably from the strong historical 

growth of more than 5 percent 

per year, output will be 

sufficient to meet nutritional 

requirements. Consumption 

in each income group is 

projected to exceed the 

minimum nutritional 

requirement in 2008.

Crop Production 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1,000 tons

Root prod (in grain equiv.)

Grain production

Statistical table 26--Burkina Faso (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,901 28 95 51 2,002

1990 1,547 20 0 124 1,692

1991 2,220 21 167 42 2,430

1992 2,438 25 127 31 2,536

1993 2,515 22 115 27 2,603

1994 2,453 19 104 19 2,499

1995 2,265 23 84 37 2,326

1996 2,425 23 101 26 2,508

1997 2,385 23 118 16 2,492

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,465 21 109 65 91 2,462

2003 2,903 22 112 17 48 2,888

2008 3,205 23 119 157 192 3,182

A continuation of historical 

production growth--6.1 

percent per year--would 

certainly eliminate projected 

food gaps. However, output 

growth is projected to slow to 

2.3 percent annually as gains 

in yields and area will be 

minimal.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 51

Statistical table 27--Cape Verde (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 7 5 0 72 116

1990 10 5 0 76 120

1991 4 3 0 76 115

1992 10 2 88 45 188

1993 12 5 13 58 135

1994 9 3 24 64 146

1995 10 2 27 50 137

1996 10 2 9 46 115

1997 10 2 51 61 172

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 10 3 32 56 0 94

2003 12 3 33 70 3 98

2008 13 3 36 83 9 103

A relatively large long-run 

food gap is projected based 

primarily upon limited commercial import capacity, the 

principal source of food 

supplies. This country is 

highly dependent upon food 

aid to maintain per capita 

consumption.

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

20

40

60

80

100

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commercial imports SQ gap

Statistical table 28--Chad (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 716 210 0 36 1,082

1990 536 240 0 33 934

1991 794 233 0 67 1,204

1992 836 183 51 0 1,167

1993 671 187 58 17 1,045

1994 846 186 33 15 1,182

1995 779 215 24 11 1,165

1996 786 207 17 28 1,179

1997 796 209 63 26 1,245

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 796 208 37 67 313 1,156

2003 977 227 39 15 294 1,373

2008 1,094 246 41 32 345 1,526

Production would need to 

grow 3.3 percent per year to 

close the nutritional food gap. 

This is nearly 1 percentage 

point higher than the 

projected growth rate. 

Consumption in each income 

group is projected to fall short 

of the minimum nutritional 

requirements in 2008.

Consumption by Income

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

20

40

60

80

100

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent
52 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 29--Cote d’lvoire (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,012 1,449 543 26 3,383

1990 972 1,486 495 59 3,349

1991 1,031 1,579 572 36 3,559

1992 962 1,619 492 41 3,468

1993 1,009 1,629 597 45 3,568

1994 1,042 1,669 433 56 3,425

1995 1,092 1,244 678 30 3,403

1996 1,160 1,270 502 47 3,373

1997 1,140 1,270 463 52 3,318

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,120 1,423 614 56 0 3,505

2003 1,398 1,553 681 0 0 4,011

2008 1,580 1,695 782 0 0 4,484

Growth in production and 

import capacity is projected to 

be sufficient to meet nutritional

requirements through 2008. 

For the country as a whole, 

consumption is projected to 

average 114 percent of the 

nutritional target in 2008.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

1.0

2.0

3.0

4.0

5.0

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 30--Gambia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 121 2 36 13 243

1990 100 2 77 14 267

1991 108 2 80 10 283

1992 87 2 78 6 267

1993 93 2 66 11 266

1994 101 2 85 2 274

1995 101 2 92 4 285

1996 101 2 95 4 297

1997 83 2 97 7 269

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 94 2 107 0 0 302

2003 108 2 125 0 0 347

2008 118 2 152 0 0 403

In the long run, per capita 

consumption will be supported

above base levels as 

production and commercial 

imports will provide adequate 

food supplies. Morevover, 

consumption in even the 

lowest income group is 

projected to exceed the 

minimum nutritional 

requirement in 2008.

Consumption by Income

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

50

100

150

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 53

Statistical table 31--Ghana (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,255 1,553 171 73 3,356

1990 813 1,184 244 76 2,773

1991 1,375 1,690 197 215 3,736

1992 1,198 1,799 323 75 3,866

1993 1,582 1,969 252 126 4,303

1994 1,498 2,382 401 101 4,679

1995 1,737 2,724 318 36 5,054

1996 1,673 2,936 183 40 5,071

1997 1,655 2,819 383 84 5,350

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,575 2,851 326 251 0 5,084

2003 2,206 3,385 333 0 0 6,286

2008 2,452 4,419 355 0 0 7,707

Per capita consumption is 

projected to be maintained at 

base levels in the long term. 

Ghana’s food security 

situation is projected to 

improve during the next 

decade as the ratio of 

consumption to nutritional 

requirements is projected to 

rise from 119 to 138 percent 

between 1998 and 2008.

Consumption by Income

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

50

100

150

200

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent

Statistical table 32--Guinea (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 412 175 237 25 1,125

1990 475 198 241 12 1,209

1991 581 232 236 30 1,382

1992 672 255 284 30 1,594

1993 744 277 243 46 1,691

1994 819 284 331 29 1,815

1995 600 298 375 5 1,648

1996 640 312 272 7 1,623

1997 690 331 372 3 1,841

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 600 307 376 11 0 1,688

2003 771 334 392 0 0 1,937

2008 864 363 423 53 0 2,133

Despite declining per capita 

grain production and imports, 

Guinea’s nutritional situation 

is projected to improve during 

the next deacde. The ratio of 

consumption to nutritional 

requirements is projected to 

reach 109 percent in 2008. 

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
54 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 33--Guinea-Bissau (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 154 24 30 21 270

1990 152 23 38 9 266

1991 172 21 42 21 301

1992 125 22 72 9 282

1993 134 22 60 9 271

1994 154 22 64 2 292

1995 152 22 60 2 287

1996 150 20 60 6 285

1997 145 20 80 5 298

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 145 22 72 11 0 291

2003 178 23 73 5 0 328

2008 198 24 75 11 0 357

While food supplies are 

sufficient, on average, to meet 

nutritional targets, falling per 

capita production and imports 

may lead to a small food gap 

to maintain consumption at 

the base level. Consumption 

in only the lowest income 

group is projected to fall short 

of the nutritional target.

All Food Availability 

 Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statisitcal table 34--Liberia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 168 214 35 118 553

1990 126 173 2 69 381

1991 120 135 31 143 447

1992 61 141 0 142 376

1993 39 127 1 138 344

1994 30 131 0 119 323

1995 35 127 26 104 340

1996 60 116 0 117 313

1997 60 116 86 130 432

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 60 128 33 186 323 261

2003 63 137 30 323 504 270

2008 72 146 29 393 601 288

Liberia’s declining per capita 

consumption trend is projected to continue through 

2008. In the highest income 

group, consumption may 

reach only 40 percent of the 

nutritional target in 2008. If 

peace continues, output will 

rise faster than projected and 

food gaps would fall 

considerably.

Per Capita Food 

Consumption

0

50

100

150

200

250

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Kg of grain equiv.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 55

Statistical table 35--Mali (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,760 5 68 57 1,966

1990 1,807 7 29 47 1,987

1991 2,245 8 184 51 2,661

1992 1,714 6 63 35 2,052

1993 1,965 9 53 29 2,184

1994 2,234 7 22 16 2,458

1995 2,050 8 83 11 2,329

1996 1,875 10 73 5 2,153

1997 2,200 8 97 25 2,514

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,050 8 92 125 249 2,308

2003 2,609 9 96 0 63 2,900

2008 2,974 10 105 0 115 3,304

Food production growth of 

nearly 3 percent per year will 

be sufficient to maintain per 

capita consumption at base 

levels and nearly sufficient to 

eliminate nutritional food gaps 

in the long term. However, 

consumption in only the 

highest income group is 

projected to exceed the 

nutritional target in 2008.

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commerical imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 36--Mauritania (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 152 2 107 89 514

1990 85 2 62 116 434

1991 96 2 274 50 590

1992 103 1 163 45 477

1993 158 1 187 63 581

1994 204 1 172 22 576

1995 210 1 175 25 603

1996 195 1 240 27 650

1997 148 1 344 24 661

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 168 1 280 29 0 653

2003 226 1 288 44 0 729

2008 239 1 306 98 0 774

A small long-run food gap 

to maintain per capita 

consumption is projected 

as per capita grain production 

and imports decline. However, 

the overall nutritional situation 

is projected to remain 

favorable as the ratio of 

consumption to nutritional 

requirements is projected at 

108 percent in 2008.

Grain Production

 and Imports

0

100

200

300

400

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1,000 tons

Grain production Commercial imports
56 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 37--Niger (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,797 106 29 46 2,040

1990 1,596 108 22 91 1,864

1991 2,290 110 88 45 2,591

1992 2,227 111 95 28 2,425

1993 2,119 112 91 31 2,221

1994 2,190 114 92 39 2,624

1995 2,153 114 70 27 2,235

1996 2,296 114 93 6 2,672

1997 2,195 114 248 13 2,726

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,320 117 146 69 491 2,548

2003 2,659 124 144 185 680 2,891

2008 2,933 133 148 415 993 3,177

Yields are projected to 

increase marginally through 

2008, staying among the 

lowest in the world and 

holding output growth to 2.2 

percent per year. To 

eliminate food gaps, output 

would need to grow 3.3-3.9 

percent. As a result, the 

nutritional situation is 

projected to deteriorate.

Food Gaps as a Share of

Total Availability

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1998 2003 2008

Percent

SQ gap Nutritional gap

Statistical table 38--Nigeria (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 9,800 8,147 515 0 15,407

1990 16,345 9,831 422 0 23,247

1991 17,531 12,885 750 1 26,423

1992 18,248 14,684 976 0 29,198

1993 19,278 15,544 1,572 0 32,543

1994 19,897 16,269 922 0 32,270

1995 20,810 16,436 995 0 33,846

1996 18,885 16,387 1,170 0 32,155

1997 19,270 16,230 1,373 1 32,582

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 19,520 17,180 1,300 1,441 0 32,871

2003 24,628 18,677 1,380 502 0 38,904

2008 27,884 20,283 1,522 1,776 0 43,259

Nigeria’s food gap to maintain 

consumption, although large 

relative to other countries in 

the region, is small relative to 

overall food availability--4 

percent in 2008. Therefore, if 

production grows marginally 

faster than projected levels of 

2.3 percent, the gap would fall 

to zero.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

10

20

30

40

50

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 57

Statistical table 39--Senegal (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,015 26 503 71 1,675

1990 912 29 669 47 1,784

1991 900 14 552 65 1,633

1992 817 20 524 71 1,568

1993 1,029 19 558 38 1,759

1994 900 31 564 18 1,744

1995 1,005 24 693 9 1,681

1996 917 22 729 11 1,909

1997 930 23 736 8 1,866

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 840 27 801 125 181 1,814

2003 1,073 28 826 138 202 2,074

2008 1,163 28 876 289 362 2,222

Production growth would 

need to double from the 

projected rate of 1.5 percent 

per year to eliminate food 

gaps. By 2008, consumption 

in only the highest income 

group is projected to exceed 

the minimum nutritional 

requirement. 

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 40--Sierra Leone (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 345 48 93 43 550

1990 264 50 135 20 493

1991 268 50 115 66 517

1992 315 48 114 29 470

1993 321 44 116 29 511

1994 270 104 238 30 654

1995 193 93 234 46 618

1996 260 118 177 117 715

1997 275 117 139 100 540

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 235 110 198 115 324 562

2003 258 115 197 183 421 588

2008 274 120 203 244 508 614

Civil strife continues to 

hinder agricultural activities. 

Declining per capita production and imports are 

projected to cause the nutritional situation to worsen. 

The ratio of consumption to 

nutritional requirements is 

projected to fall from 63 to 55 

percent between 1998 and 

2008.

Food Gaps

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

SQ gap Nutritional gap
58 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 41--Togo (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 550 301 117 11 831

1990 389 365 109 16 726

1991 427 327 88 14 694

1992 492 302 155 4 812

1993 611 351 55 11 874

1994 405 289 48 8 571

1995 450 420 68 4 783

1996 600 429 71 4 920

1997 660 447 86 7 1,006

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 660 390 79 0 17 936

2003 702 433 79 21 92 995

2008 789 480 83 56 137 1,102

If annual production growth 

followed the historical trend of 

3.1 percent, both food gaps 

would be eliminated. However, 

a slowdown in area expansion 

is projected to hold output 

growth to 2.4 percent per year. 

As a result, consumption in 

2008 is projected to equal only 

89 percent of the nutritional 

target.

Grain Imports and

Food Gaps

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

Commerical imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 42--Afghanistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 3,218 78 90 173 4,005

1990 2,980 86 248 41 3,748

1991 2,830 86 82 56 3,406

1992 2,830 86 45 108 3,462

1993 2,930 88 144 71 3,575

1994 3,510 88 0 151 4,062

1995 3,470 90 73 127 4,258

1996 3,600 90 0 194 4,272

1997 3,610 90 640 150 4,944

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 3,700 92 242 522 833 4,432

2003 3,809 99 245 1,377 1,751 4,576

2008 4,066 107 255 1,840 2,262 4,881

In the absence of food aid, 

per capita consumption is 

projected to decline through 

the next decade due to slow 

production and import growth. 

The ratio of consumption to 

nutritional requirements is 

projected to fall from 84 to 68 

percent, on average, between 

1998 and 2008. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

SQ req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 59

Statistical table 43--Bangladesh (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 18,797 401 1,001 1,216 22,474

1990 18,903 387 89 1,452 22,206

1991 19,301 422 157 1,469 22,477

1992 19,452 454 777 719 22,898

1993 19,264 446 325 745 22,398

1994 18,011 457 0 858 20,493

1995 18,979 467 1,752 825 23,643

1996 20,299 472 1,003 743 24,568

1997 20,133 476 482 618 23,617

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 20,399 477 1,194 729 1,654 23,636

2003 22,254 509 1,331 743 1,750 25,803

2008 24,031 543 1,553 911 2,008 27,995

If production growth continued 

along the historical path of 1.9 

percent per year, the food gap 

to maintain consumption 

would be eliminated and the 

nutritional food gap would be 

negligible. However, output 

growth is projected to fall to 

1.6 percent per year due to 

slower gains in yields. 

Per Capita 

Consumption

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Kg of grain equiv.

Statistical table 44--India (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 162,484 5,262 458 456 203,864

1990 156,694 5,268 88 217 202,550

1991 155,744 5,497 0 187 204,776

1992 165,337 5,862 1,262 351 210,557

1993 168,530 5,487 67 336 214,676

1994 170,844 6,186 0 271 216,157

1995 174,870 6,276 0 313 224,548

1996 177,758 6,434 425 257 233,604

1997 183,511 6,142 1,830 208 236,477

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 182,200 6,514 758 447 0 233,479

2003 201,532 7,045 902 0 0 255,627

2008 218,788 7,615 1,133 0 0 277,986

Despite a projected slowdown 

in production growth relative to 

the historical trend, food 

supplies will be more than 

adequate to prevent food gaps 

in the long term. Imports are 

projected to rise at a strong 

rate of more than 4 percent per 

year through 2008.

Change in Agriculture’s 

Value Added 

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Percent
60 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 45--Indonesia (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 34,366 6,132 2,129 39 46,360

1990 34,042 5,686 1,810 46 45,546

1991 36,750 5,713 2,760 59 47,351

1992 36,968 5,977 3,155 41 49,472

1993 35,715 6,218 3,075 52 49,294

1994 38,433 5,693 5,154 15 49,976

1995 39,215 5,755 8,388 12 55,840

1996 38,034 6,205 6,965 18 55,537

1997 36,600 5,893 7,278 0 52,900

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 39,000 5,972 6,888 1,292 0 54,816

2003 40,863 6,131 8,385 1,539 0 58,610

2008 42,798 6,290 10,229 771 0 62,941

Although food production is 

projected to grow a slow 1 

percent annually, food 

supplies are projected to be 

adequate to meet nutritional 

requirements through 2008. 

Consumption is projected to 

exceed the nutritional target in 

every income group in 2008.

GNP Growth 

0

2

4

6

8

10

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Percent

Statistical table 46--Nepal (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 4,541 178 11 8 4,641

1990 4,674 185 20 1 4,764

1991 4,437 199 4 8 4,538

1992 4,003 198 41 18 4,155

1993 4,075 199 15 44 4,255

1994 4,427 211 49 26 4,646

1995 4,445 223 19 43 4,645

1996 4,735 237 58 33 4,944

1997 4,785 259 8 6 4,944

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 4,585 230 31 339 194 4,681

2003 5,224 245 33 346 182 5,327

2008 5,667 260 37 590 406 5,778

Food production is projected 

to grow at half the rate of the 

historical period due to a 

considerable slowing of area 

expansion. Consumption is 

projected to exceed the 

minimum nutritional 

requirement in only the top 

income group in 2008.

Nepal’s Food Sources

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

1,000 tons

Grain imports Food aid
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 61

Statistical table 47--Pakistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 19,407 218 1,678 499 24,572

1990 19,445 261 1,673 380 25,998

1991 19,390 248 603 373 24,423

1992 20,458 279 1,813 236 25,838

1993 21,915 301 2,831 67 28,736

1994 20,537 331 1,817 103 28,046

1995 22,788 343 2,679 18 30,377

1996 22,989 336 1,971 15 30,201

1997 22,934 313 3,025 8 30,988

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 24,750 348 2,801 0 0 32,263

2003 26,858 375 3,122 918 0 35,185

2008 29,973 405 3,666 1,470 0 39,447

While the projected growth in 

food production of 2.3 percent 

per year is sufficient to meet 

nutritional requirements 

through 2008, it is not enough 

to prevent in per capita 

consumption from slipping 

below base levels. 

Per Capita 

Consumption

185

190

195

200

205

210

215

220

225

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

kg of grain equiv.

Statistical table 48--Philippines (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 10,197 902 1,763 59 13,070

1990 11,527 913 2,625 109 14,324

1991 10,426 902 1,642 48 13,937

1992 11,000 901 1,956 53 13,551

1993 11,480 924 2,140 52 14,678

1994 11,343 907 2,380 44 15,092

1995 11,587 925 2,786 17 14,650

1996 11,480 912 2,398 11 15,554

1997 10,000 912 3,441 40 15,584

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 11,350 929 3,207 0 0 15,980

2003 11,947 964 3,755 322 0 17,156

2008 12,613 1,000 4,684 91 0 18,904

Projections for strong import 

growth of nearly 4 percent per 

year through 2008 compensate for weak growth in 

food production. Yield gains 

are projected to slow 

markedly relative to the 

historical period, lowering 

annual output growth to 1.3 

percent.

Grain Production

5.4

5.6

5.8

6.0

6.2

6.4

6.6

6.8

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Million ha

1.50

1.55

1.60

1.65

1.70

1.75

1.80

Tons/ha

Area Yields
62 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 49--Sri Lanka (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,625 188 928 231 4,029

1990 1,678 173 700 201 3,753

1991 1,691 162 421 439 3,847

1992 1,649 140 813 249 3,962

1993 1,748 141 803 338 4,084

1994 1,905 140 590 346 4,228

1995 1,679 138 1,022 120 4,235

1996 1,502 143 513 57 3,426

1997 1,697 143 1,114 83 4,341

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,615 142 961 50 0 3,925

2003 1,687 146 1,012 90 0 4,097

2008 1,734 151 1,106 116 0 4,307

Food production stagnated 

during the historical period. 

While output is projected to 

grow only 0.7 pecent per year 

during the projection period it 

will be sufficient to meet 

minimum nutritional 

requirements. However, 

without food aid, per capita 

consumption is projected to 

fall from base levels.

Grain Production

and Imports

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

1,000 tons

Grain production Commercial imports

Statistical table 50--Vietnam (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 13,609 1,472 123 75 14,114

1990 13,064 1,394 99 75 13,995

1991 15,310 1,488 190 80 15,578

1992 15,389 1,654 156 84 15,998

1993 16,931 1,561 293 87 17,094

1994 17,390 1,400 242 64 17,482

1995 18,867 1,281 464 21 18,183

1996 19,500 1,240 425 0 18,773

1997 19,300 1,240 355 0 18,129

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 19,500 1,344 475 376 0 18,478

2003 21,736 1,456 585 0 0 20,705

2008 23,504 1,576 764 0 0 22,587

High growth rates in irrigated 

area and fertilizer use raised 

grain yields more than 3 

percent per year during the 

historical period. Although the

growth in food output is 

projected to slow relative to 

the historical period, the 

nutritional situation is 

projected to improve.

Grain Production

6.7

6.8

6.9

7.0

7.1

7.2

7.3

7.4

7.5

7.6

7.7

7.8

1992 1994 1996

Million ha

2

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

Tons/ha

Area Yields
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 63

Statistical table 51--Bolivia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 703 312 178 96 1,419

1990 692 288 0 235 1,406

1991 760 309 143 238 1,570

1992 780 291 130 243 1,575

1993 1,055 318 89 205 1,695

1994 875 268 155 176 1,531

1995 825 272 274 67 1,576

1996 965 295 160 75 1,593

1997 1,090 338 204 130 1,923

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,015 287 232 78 66 1,628

2003 1,115 305 249 147 134 1,760

2008 1,228 325 278 188 173 1,923

Food Aid Share 

of Consumption

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Percent

Bolivia experienced it’s 11th 

year of economic growth 

and low inflation in 1997. 

Nevertheless, food insecurity 

is far from being eliminated. 

The adverse weather conditions caused by El Niño 

slowed progress. One million 

out of 8 million people are 

estimated to have been 

affected by either drought or 

flooding.

Statistical table 52--Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 3,164 1,117 771 7 7,783

1990 3,093 1,150 952 1 8,229

1991 2,816 1,053 791 8 7,675

1992 2,688 1,037 1,590 17 8,502

1993 2,806 1,250 1,694 31 8,229

1994 2,811 1,257 2,373 15 8,600

1995 2,394 1,236 2,572 0 8,910

1996 2,159 1,176 3,272 0 9,881

1997 1,754 1,279 2,986 0 8,493

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,119 1,254 3,296 0 0 9,739

2003 2,253 1,314 3,780 0 0 10,768

2008 2,373 1,376 4,528 0 0 12,265

El Niño is to blame for last 

year's drastic decline in corn 

output. Grain production has 

declined 30 percent during the 

last 10 years, which is mainly 

due to a sharp decrease in 

sorghum production. A decline 

in average crop yield and 

harvested area has reduced 

sorghum output to less than 

one-sixth of its 1989/90 high.

Grain Production

and Imports

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Million tons

Production Imports
64 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 53--Dominican Republic (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 357 80 622 9 1,603

1990 323 73 682 6 1,608

1991 343 76 731 14 1,506

1992 390 84 785 7 1,508

1993 350 57 972 7 1,749

1994 329 63 924 3 1,678

1995 316 85 1,018 1 1,758

1996 360 78 975 0 1,660

1997 306 78 1,040 2 1,572

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 340 77 1,116 0 0 1,916

2003 335 79 1,261 0 0 2,121

2008 344 82 1,485 0 0 2,493

Like most countries in Central 

America, the Dominican 

Republic had just started to 

recover from the 1997 drought 

when hurricane Georges 

destroyed lives, infrastructure, 

and crops. An estimated 90 

percent of food and export 

crops were affected to a 

varying extent.

Food Production

and Imports

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1988 1998 2008

Million tons

Grain and Roots prod. Imports

Statistical table 54--Ecuador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 747 111 432 38 2,438

1990 865 116 365 98 2,422

1991 956 104 416 45 2,576

1992 1,028 128 346 14 2,528

1993 1,104 113 271 12 2,433

1994 1,050 137 321 32 2,631

1995 1,009 123 377 1 2,487

1996 767 120 433 8 2,586

1997 786 128 622 17 2,824

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 966 124 539 0 0 2,902

2003 1,005 129 665 0 0 3,267

2008 1,055 135 861 0 0 3,774

Ecuador’s economy has been 

greatly affected by El Niño in 

1998. Crop production 

declined considerably and 

transportation has been 

rendered difficult due to flood 

damage to roads and bridges. 

This natural shock adds to 

financial problems such as 

high inflation of close to 40 

percent and a large fiscal 

deficit.

Grain Production

in Ecuador

0

200

400

600

800

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1,000 ha

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

Tons/ha

Grain area Yield
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 65

Statistical table 55--El Salvador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 772 10 0 249 1,123

1990 795 10 72 84 1,124

1991 699 11 368 86 1,388

1992 953 15 141 131 1,290

1993 858 14 212 79 1,239

1994 690 32 467 7 1,366

1995 873 27 415 13 1,353

1996 841 26 402 0 1,217

1997 860 26 412 0 1,379

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 830 29 462 28 0 1,354

2003 922 31 534 14 0 1,515

2008 960 33 655 0 0 1,693

Exports of goods and services 

have become a driving force of 

economic growth. El Salvador 

has successfully increased its 

share of non-traditional 

exports. However, traditional 

exports such as coffee and 

sugar still earn the bulk of 

foreign exchange. Hurricane 

Mitch destroyed most of the 

corn and other grain crops.

Per Capita Food 

Consumption Declines

0

50

100

150

200

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

Kg grain equiv.

Statistical table 56--Guatemala (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,342 13 35 163 1,771

1990 1,398 16 185 171 1,961

1991 1,355 14 176 252 2,060

1992 1,454 16 280 109 2,087

1993 1,400 17 275 151 2,067

1994 1,343 17 430 144 2,171

1995 1,423 17 462 30 2,153

1996 1,436 17 611 25 2,132

1997 1,258 17 739 40 2,164

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,255 18 785 152 111 2,235

2003 1,584 20 907 37 0 2,700

2008 1,760 22 1,106 0 0 3,121

Since the conclusion of 

Guatemala’s 36-year internal 

conflict with the signing of the 

Peace Accords in late 1996, 

the outlook for agricultural 

expansion and general 

economic growth is favorable. 

In 1997 and 1998, however, 

losses due to El Niño 

prevented increases in crop 

production.

Food Aid Share 

of Consumption

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Percent
66 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 57--Haiti (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 350 223 43 195 1,099

1990 350 224 254 42 1,221

1991 330 225 218 55 1,188

1992 320 231 268 75 1,278

1993 340 223 217 114 1,244

1994 330 224 159 117 1,197

1995 345 224 328 81 1,413

1996 345 224 312 86 1,409

1997 355 224 326 104 1,476

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 355 228 344 98 190 1,360

2003 372 242 344 194 295 1,404

2008 395 257 354 285 395 1,470

Just as Haiti appeared to 

recover from the 1997 drought, 

hurricane Georges caused 

flooding and mudslides that 

destroyed crops such as 

sorghum, millet, and roots. 

Many banana plantations--

important for earning foreign 

exchange--were also 

devastated. Foreign aid will be 

crucial to feed the population.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

1998 2003 2008

1,000 tons

All food avail. SQ req.

Nutritional req.

Statistical table 58--Honduras (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 619 7 31 134 953

1990 684 8 88 84 948

1991 693 7 100 160 977

1992 710 8 73 64 950

1993 690 8 66 149 1,012

1994 617 7 250 73 1,069

1995 780 7 233 42 1,079

1996 679 8 190 58 1,154

1997 730 8 369 32 1,339

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 735 8 287 74 0 1,169

2003 847 8 298 141 20 1,275

2008 929 9 319 220 84 1,370

The recent devastation of 

much of Honduras by hurricane 

Mitch erased the basis for our 

food gap projections. Besides 

killing thousands of people, the 

storm may have destroyed as 

much as 70 percent of 

Honduras’ key crops--including 

bananas, rice, beans, and corn. 

The country’s infrastructure has 

been crippled. It will take years 

to recover.

Honduras’ Volatile 

GNP Growth

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Percent
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 67

Statistical table 59--Jamaica (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 4 58 200 165 551

1990 2 68 172 163 524

1991 3 72 131 323 655

1992 4 84 251 201 636

1993 5 92 298 157 687

1994 5 97 303 53 556

1995 5 102 383 49 602

1996 5 108 312 0 515

1997 5 108 450 0 644

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 5 106 422 0 0 634

2003 5 112 468 0 0 705

2008 5 118 533 0 0 805

A prolonged drought attributed

to El Niño reduced Jamaica's 

domestic crops by one-third in 

the third quarter of 1997. 

Consumption of roots and 

tubers such as yams and 

potatoes decreased as a 

result while rice, imported and 

sold at more affordable prices,

will be in higher demand. 

Jamaica’s Food

Sources

0

100

200

300

400

500

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997

1,000 tons

Grain imports Food aid

Statistical table 60--Nicaragua (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 430 20 84 57 746

1990 357 20 33 141 745

1991 409 20 1 145 750

1992 427 20 61 97 761

1993 485 21 85 55 780

1994 290 21 156 34 763

1995 409 21 155 43 853

1996 557 21 184 43 1,014

1997 494 21 174 35 908

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 545 22 186 6 0 975

2003 529 23 212 109 36 1,001

2008 551 24 257 152 71 1,092

Nicaragua, the second poorest 

country in the Western 

Hemisphere, suffered a severe

setback when hurricane Mitch 

devasted much of its northwestern parts. Huge crop 

losses and destruction of 

homes, roads, and bridges are 

sure to threaten food security. 

The country may take years to 

recover.

Nicaragua’s External

Public Debt

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

Billion U.S.$
68 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 61--Peru (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,937 647 971 209 4,023

1990 1,388 521 1,202 398 3,766

1991 1,250 575 1,339 492 3,790

1992 1,669 455 1,684 377 4,084

1993 1,972 607 1,549 410 4,134

1994 1,821 686 2,021 348 4,595

1995 1,634 850 2,396 108 5,190

1996 1,827 877 2,447 0 5,108

1997 1,943 935 2,446 0 5,213

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 2,005 821 2,636 0 0 5,209

2003 1,943 856 2,935 0 0 5,457

2008 2,033 893 3,423 0 0 6,112

Peru’s economy has resumed 

its fast growth and is expected 

to continue increasing its 

commercial import capacity at 

a fast pace. The El Niño 

phenomenon and the Asian 

crisis are expected to slow 

growth in the short run and 

increase the current account 

deficit.

Peru’s Exports 

and Imports

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Billion U.S.$

Exports Imports

Statistical table 62--Armenia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 169 --- 1,114 --- ---

1990 246 --- 758 --- ---

1991 295 --- 741 --- ---

1992 302 62 360 117 624

1993 313 72 189 277 716

1994 238 77 64 366 712

1995 263 87 106 279 875

1996 293 82 159 200 772

1997 293 89 255 101 776

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 418 87 263 0 0 805

2003 360 93 292 0 0 798

2008 385 100 350 0 0 906

A good wheat harvest 

ensures that there will be no 

food gap this year. Grain 

production is projected to 

meet consumption needs 

over the next decade. 

Grain Sources

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

198919901991199219931994199519961997

Million tons

Production Imports Food aid
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 69

Statistical table 63--Azerbaijan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 822 --- 1,500 --- ---

1990 1,349 --- 950 --- ---

1991 1,327 --- 940 --- ---

1992 1,269 30 298 6 1,196

1993 1,084 29 653 58 1,351

1994 1,004 29 204 424 1,450

1995 1,075 30 63 180 1,130

1996 1,084 41 324 187 1,543

1997 1,144 42 452 33 1,678

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,124 45 315 83 268 1,370

2003 1,282 49 368 0 95 1,603

2008 1,368 52 458 0 0 1,806

Azerbaijan may have a small 

food deficit in 1998, but by 

2008 the country’s oil exports 

should allow it to eliminate its 

food gaps at a national level. 

However, the lowest income 

groups still will not have the 

necessary incomes to meet 

nutritional requirements.

Grain Imports

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

19891991199319951997

Million tons

Statistical table 64--Georgia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 464 --- 1,600 --- ---

1990 658 --- 1,400 --- ---

1991 567 --- 970 --- ---

1992 493 41 340 194 1,086

1993 412 49 69 585 964

1994 482 58 152 569 1,185

1995 522 69 398 281 1,354

1996 532 70 113 381 1,057

1997 822 74 538 92 1,570

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 802 78 571 0 0 1,371

2003 658 82 652 0 0 1,337

2008 688 86 788 0 0 1,543

An above average harvest 

means that food supplies will 

be adequate in 1998. Recent 

high real economic growth is 

projected to continue and 

should safeguard against any 

future food gaps.

Sources of Grain

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1989 1993 1998 2003 2008

Million tons

Production Imports Food aid
70 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 65--Kyrgyzstan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 1,593 --- 1,075 --- ---

1990 1,535 --- 1,080 --- ---

1991 1,369 --- 880 --- ---

1992 1,510 70 1,017 91 1,844

1993 1,600 59 694 156 1,686

1994 1,059 60 45 61 937

1995 983 83 0 165 1,111

1996 1,468 108 0 154 1,286

1997 1,713 107 96 19 1,571

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 1,613 107 15 0 0 1,431

2003 1,552 118 18 0 0 1,385

2008 1,675 130 22 0 0 1,516

Another good harvest means 

that Kyrgyzstan should be 

able to export a small 

surplus for the second year 

in a row.

Trends in Grain Production

and Consumption

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

198719891991199319951997

Million tons

Production Consumption

Statistical table 66--Tajikistan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

of all food

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) (grain equiv.)

---1,000 tons ---

1989 270 --- 1,350 --- ---

1990 282 --- 1,330 --- ---

1991 269 --- 1,195 --- ---

1992 237 32 433 71 548

1993 285 28 740 82 1,130

1994 240 27 118 104 583

1995 234 21 308 206 848

1996 511 22 364 139 1,055

1997 511 22 271 97 928

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1998 511 28 333 48 431 903

2003 480 31 368 135 555 911

2008 513 35 430 137 600 1,014

The switching of some area 

from cotton to wheat has 

boosted food supplies in the 

short run. However, 

widespread poverty will 

remain a problem for the 

foreseeable future leading to 

chronically low food 

consumption for nearly all 

income groups.

Sources of Grain

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Million tons

Produciton Imports Food aid
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 71

Appendix 1--Country list

Country Country

Asia East Africa

Afghanistan Burundi

Bangladesh Eritrea

India Ethiopia

Indonesia Kenya

Nepal Rwanda

Pakistan Somalia

Philippines Sudan

Sri Lanka Tanzania

Vietnam Uganda

Latin America Southern Africa

Bolivia Angola

Colombia Lesotho

Dominican Rep. Madagascar

Ecuador Malawi

El Salvador Mozambique

Guatemala Swaziland

Haiti Zambia

Honduras Zimbabwe

Jamaica

Nicaragua

Peru

Former Soviet Union West Africa

Armenia Benin

Azerbaijan Burkina Faso

Georgia Cape Verde

Kyrgyzstan Chad

Tajikistan Cote d’Ivoire

Gambia

Ghana

North Africa Guinea

Algeria Guinea-Bissau

Egypt Liberia

Morocco Mali

Tunisia Mauritania

Niger 

Central Africa Nigeria

Cameroon Senegal

Central Afr. Rep. Sierra Leone

Zaire Togo
The Food Security Assessment model used in this report was

developed at the USDA-ERS for use in projecting food consumption and access, and food gaps (previously called food

needs) in 66 low-income countries through 2008. The reference to food includes grains, root crops, and—for the first

time—a category called “other,” which includes livestock

and dairy products. All of these commodities are expressed

in grain equivalent and, in total, account for as much as 98

percent of all calories consumed in the study countries.

Food security of a country is evaluated based on the gap

between projected domestic food consumption (produced

domestically plus imported commercially minus nonfood

use) and a consumption requirement. Although food aid is

expected to be available during the projection period, it is

not included in the projection of food consumption. It

should be noted that while projection results will provide a

baseline for the food security situation of the countries, they

depend on assumptions and specifications of the model.

Since the model is based on historical data, it implicitly

assumes that the historical trend in key variables will continue in the future.

Food gaps are projected using two consumption criteria:

1) Status quo target, where the objective is to maintain average per capita consumption of the recent past. The most recent

3-year average (1995-97) is used for the per capita consumption target in order to eliminate short-term fluctuations. 

2) Nutrition-based target, where the objective is to maintain

the minimum daily caloric intake standards recommended

by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The

caloric requirements (based on total share of grains, root

crops, and “other”) used in this assessment are those necessary to sustain life with minimum food-gathering activities.

They are comparable to the activity level for a refugee—

they do not allow for play, work, or any activity other than

food gathering.

The status quo measure embodies a “safety-net” criterion by

providing food consumption stability at recently achieved

levels. The nutrition-based target assists in comparisons of

relative well-being. Comparing the two consumption measures either for countries or regions provides an indicator of

the need depending on whether the objectives are to achieve

consumption stability and/or to meet a nutritional standard.

Large nutrition-based needs relative to status quo needs, for

example, mean additional food must be provided if

improved nutrition levels are the main objective. In cases

where nutrition-based requirements are below status quo

consumption needs, food availability could decline without

risking nutritional adequacy, on average. Both methods,

however, fail to address inequalities of food distribution

within a country. 

Structural framework for projecting food 

consumption in the aggregate and by 

income group

Projection of Food Availability—The simulation framework used for projecting aggregate food availability is

based on partial equilibrium recursive models of 66 lower

income countries. The country models are synthetic, meaning that the parameters that are used are either cross country estimates or are estimated by other studies. Each country model includes three commodity groups, grains, root

crops and “other.” The production side of the grain and root

crops are divided into yield and area response. Crop area is

a function of 1-year lag return (real price times yield),

while yield responds to input use. Commercial imports are

assumed to be a function of domestic price, world commodity price, and foreign exchange availability. Foreign

exchange availability is a key determinant of commercial

food imports and is the sum of the value of export earnings

and net flow of credit. Foreign exchange availability is

assumed to be equal to foreign exchange use, meaning that

foreign exchange reserve is assumed constant during the

projection period. Countries are assumed to be price takers

in the international market, meaning that world prices are

exogenous in the model. However, producer prices are

linked to the international market. The projections of consumption for the “other” commodities is simply based on a

trend that follows the projected growth in supply of the

food crops (grains plus root crops). Although this is a very

simplistic approach, it represents an improvement from the

previous assessments where the contribution to the diet of

commodities such as meat and dairy products was overlooked. The plan is to enhance this aspect of the model in

the future.

For the commodity group grains and root crops (c), food

consumption (FC) is defined as domestic supply (DS) minus

nonfood use (NF). n is country index and t is time index.

FCcnt = DScnt - NFcnt (1)

Nonfood use is the sum of seed use (SD), feed use (FD),

exports (EX), and other uses (OU). 

NFcnt = SDcnt + FDcnt + EXcnt + OUcnt (2)

Domestic supply of a commodity group is the sum of

domestic production (PR) plus commercial imports (CI) and

changes in stocks (CSTK).

DScnt = PRcnt + CIcnt + CSTKcnt (3)

72 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA

Appendix 2--Food Security Model: Definition and Methodology
Production is generally determined by the area and yield

response functions:

PRcnt = ARcnt * YLcnt (4) 

YLcnt = f (LBcnt ,FRcnt ,CUcnt , Kcnt ,Tcnt ) (5)

RPYcnt = YLcnt * DPcnt (6)

RNPYcnt = NYLcnt * NDPcnt (7)

ARcnt = f ( ARcnt-1 , RPYcnt-1 , RNPYcnt-1 , Zcnt ) (8)

where AR is area, YL is yield, LB is rural labor, FR is fertilizer use, CU is capital use, K is indicator of capital use, T is

the indicator of technology change, DP is real domestic

price, RPY is yield times real price, NDP is real domestic

substitute price, NYL is yield of substitute commodity,

RNPY is yield of substitute commodity times substitute

price, and Z is exogenous policies.

The commercial import demand function is defined as:

CIcnt = f (WPRct , NWPRct , FEXnt , PRcnt , Mnt ) (9)

where WPR is real world food price, NWPR is real world

substitute price, FEX is real foreign exchange availability,

and M is import restriction policies.

The real domestic price is defined as:

DPcnt = f (DPcnt-1 , DScnt , NDScnt , GDnt , EXRnt) (10)

where NDS is supply of substitute commodity, GD is real

income, and EXR is real exchange rate.

Projections of food consumption by income group—

Inadequate economic access is the most important cause of

chronic undernutrition among developing countries and is

related to the level of income. Estimates of food gaps at the

aggregate or national level fail to take into account the distribution of food consumption among different income

groups. Lack of consumption distribution data for the countries is the key factor preventing estimation of food consumption by income group. An attempt was made to fill this

information gap by using an indirect method of projecting

calorie consumption by different income groups based on

income distribution data.1 It should be noted that this

approach ignores the consumption substitution of different

food groups by income class. The procedure uses the concept of the income/consumption relationship and allocates

the total projected amount of available food among different

income groups in each country (income distributions are

assumed constant during the projection period).

Assuming a declining consumption and income relationship

(semi log functional form):

C = a + b ln Y (11)

C = Co /P (12)

P = P1 +........+ Pi (13)

Y = Yo /P (14)

i = 1 to 5 .

where C and Y are known average per capita food consumption (all commodities in grain equivalent) and per capita

income (all quintiles), Co is total food consumption, P is the

total population, i is income quintile, a is the intercept, b is

the consumption income propensity, and b/C is consumption

income elasticity (point estimate elasticity is calculated for

individual countries). To estimate per capita consumption by

income group, the parameter of b was estimated based on

cross-country (66 low-income countries) data for per capita

calorie consumption and income. The parameter a is estimated for each country based on the known data for average

per capita calorie consumption and per capita income. 

Historical Data

Historical supply and use data for 1980-97 for most variables are from a USDA database. Data for grain production

in 1998 for most countries are based on a USDA database as

of October 1998. Food aid data are from the UN’s Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), and financial data are from

the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Historical

nonfood-use data, including seed, waste, processing use, and

other use, are estimated from the FAO Food Balance series.

The base year data used for projections are the average for

1995-97, except export earnings that are 1994-96.

Endogenous variables:

Production, area, yield, commercial import, domestic 

producer price, and food consumption.

Exogenous variables:

Population—data are medium UN population projections. 

World prices—data are USDA/baseline projections.

Stocks—USDA data, assumed constant during the 

projection period. 

Seed use—USDA data, projections are based on area 

projections using constant base seed/area ratio.

Food exports—USDA data, projections are either 

based on the population growth rate or extrapolation 

of historical trends.

Inputs—fertilizer and capital projections are, in general, 

an extrapolation of historical growth data from FAO.

Agricultural labor—projections are based on UN 

population projections, accounting for urbanization 

growth.

Food aid—historical data from FAO, no food aid

assumed during the projection period.

Gross domestic product—World Bank data.

Merchandise and service imports and exports—

World Bank data.

Net foreign credit—is assumed constant during the 

projection period.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 73

1The method is similar to that used by Shlomo Reutlinger and Marcelo

Selowsky in “Malnutrition and Poverty,” World Bank, 1978.
Value of exports—projections are based on World Bank 

data. (Global Economic Prospects and the Developing 

Countries, various issues), IMF data (World Economic

Outlook, various issues), or an extrapolation of historical 

growth.

Export deflator or terms of trade—World Bank. 

(Commodity Markets—Projection of Inflation Indices for 

Developed Countries).

Income—projected based on World Bank report (Global 

Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, 

various issues) or extrapolation of historical growth.

Income distribution—World Bank data. Income distributions are assumed constant during the projection period.

(Shahla Shapouri)

74 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 75 Appendix 3--Country indicators Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators Region Population Population Annual Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP Export Months of Debt and 1998 growth growth of variation annual annual growth GNP GNP growth earnings import coverage service country rate 1980-97 1981-95 growth in supply 1996 growth 1995/96 growth in reserves ratio 1997/98 1980-97 1998-2008 1995/96 1996 1996 1996 1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. dollars ------ Percent----- Number Percent North Africa Algeria 30,481 2.2 -0.8 43.9 5.3 2.1 1,520 1.8 3.8 9.6 -- 9.7 Egypt 66,009 1.9 5.2 5.3 4.2 1.5 1,080 3.5 5.0 8.4 10.8 3.4 Morocco 31,004 2.0 1.7 51.1 4.9 2.4 1,290 10.4 11.5 6.3 3.9 8.9 Tunisia 9,326 1.6 2.1 63.2 5.0 2.6 1,930 -0.4 7.0 0.5 -- 8.0 Central Africa Cameroon 14,762 3.0 1.6 8.0 2.1 1.6 610 4.5 5.0 6.3 0.0 6.3 Central African Rep. 3,399 1.8 0.7 16.7 -0.5 0.8 310 -5.0 -2.8 -1.4 -- 1.2 Zaire 48,371 3.1 3.8 8.3 2.4 1.8 130 -0.1 1.3 29.9 -- 0.8 West Africa Benin 6,101 3.4 4.3 10.6 5.3 2.5 350 3.2 5.8 20.0 -- 2.0 Burkina Faso 11,295 2.6 6.0 13.7 -5.6 2.3 230 3.3 6.1 1.8 -- 1.9 Cape Verde 476 2.9 8.7 89.1 1.2 0.9 1,010 -24.6 4.7 25.0 -- 1.4 Chad 5,961 2.2 3.3 18.8 1.3 2.4 160 0.5 2.8 7.5 -- 2.7 Cote díIvoire 16,320 3.3 3.0 7.4 0.9 2.4 660 4.6 5.9 24.1 1.5 13.8 Gambia 1,085 3.1 1.9 16.9 0.0 3.0 -- -- -- -- 4.0 -- Ghana 19,439 3.0 7.8 22.2 7.9 3.6 360 2.3 5.0 19.8 4.4 7.6 Guinea 7,036 2.4 4.7 9.8 2.2 2.1 560 1.8 4.5 -3.2 1.0 3.0 Guinea-Bissau 1,206 2.4 5.9 16.1 2.4 1.8 250 3.7 5.2 8.9 -- 4.2 Liberia 3,392 3.3 -9.2 40.7 -1.1 1.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- Mali 10,185 2.8 5.1 13.9 0.4 2.9 240 1.2 4.0 6.4 -- 4.5 Mauritania 2,478 3.0 10.8 47.1 -0.7 1.7 470 1.8 4.5 7.4 -- 11.6 Niger 10,205 3.0 2.5 16.0 1.6 2.1 200 -0.1 3.3 -- -- 2.9 Nigeria 111,081 3.0 6.5 18.2 9.9 2.6 240 1.9 3.5 15.9 4.1 8.1 Senegal 9,894 3.2 2.1 20.1 2.9 1.7 570 3.2 5.6 4.8 -- 5.4 Sierra Leone 5,143 2.7 -2.5 11.3 5.3 0.9 200 7.6 4.8 6.5 -- 6.4 Togo 4,897 3.4 4.8 16.1 1.7 2.3 300 4.3 6.2 -0.9 -- 4.0 East Africa Burundi 6,669 2.1 -2.4 19.6 1.7 1.7 170 -11.1 -8.8 -49.3 -- 2.7 Eritrea 4,270 3.1 -0.8 -- 0.0 1.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- Ethiopia 60,310 2.7 3.6 11.0 1.7 3.0 100 7.2 10.3 4.9 5.1 5.8 Kenya 30,975 2.6 0.7 14.8 2.5 2.0 320 3.1 4.3 13.3 2.5 9.4 Rwanda 9,280 2.5 -3.4 14.6 -1.5 2.2 190 7.8 11.4 40.5 4.9 1.4 Somalia 8,596 3.3 -3.1 37.1 0.6 1.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- Sudan 33,060 3.3 3.8 39.0 -4.6 1.8 -- -- -- -- 0.9 -- Tanzania 30,481 2.2 2.4 12.6 0.0 2.2 170 -- -- -- 2.3 4.5 Uganda 21,042 2.1 2.6 6.0 0.5 2.6 300 6.2 9.1 19.2 3.8 2.5

See note at end of table. Continued--
76 v Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 Economic Research Service/USDA Appendix 3--Country indicators--continued Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators Region Population Population Annual Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP Export Months of Debt and 1998 growth growth of variation annual annual growth GNP GNP growth earnings import coverage service country rate 1980-97 1981-95 growth in supply 1996 growth 1995/96 growth in reserves ratio 1997/98 1980-97 1998-2008 1995/96 1996 1996 1996 1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. dollars ------ Percent----- Number Percent Southern Africa Angola 10,913 2.7 0.2 19.3 4.5 1.7 270 -1.7 7.0 12.8 -- 20.1 Lesotho 2,088 2.4 -0.1 30.2 10.5 1.7 660 6.7 11.9 9.0 -- 2.9 Madagascar 15,243 3.2 1.5 3.1 1.9 1.6 250 0.5 2.0 9.7 2.5 1.9 Malawi 11,018 2.4 0.9 21.7 0.5 2.3 180 13.0 14.5 1.5 -- 4.1 Mozambique 19,728 2.9 4.8 24.7 1.0 2.4 80 5.0 6.1 14.5 -- 11.3 Swaziland 1,066 3.3 0.8 30.8 -1.1 2.4 1,210 -0.3 2.5 3.3 2.4 3.2 Zambia 10,178 2.4 0.8 31.7 4.3 1.7 360 3.4 4.9 -3.5 -- 9.8 Zimbabwe 12,084 2.2 -1.0 37.4 5.4 1.1 610 5.8 7.3 12.2 -- 9.2 Asia Afghanistan 26,519 6.1 2.2 7.9 1.7 1.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- Bangladesh 137,240 2.3 2.0 4.0 0.3 1.6 260 3.8 5.3 10.6 2.9 2.2 India 985,921 1.7 5.1 5.2 -2.0 1.7 380 5.1 7.5 7.5 5.1 3.6 Indonesia 213,133 1.5 -1.9 3.3 -1.1 1.2 1,080 5.8 7.6 6.3 -- 9.9 Nepal 23,202 2.5 1.9 8.3 0.5 1.6 210 1.8 5.3 0.5 4.5 1.9 Pakistan 141,030 2.6 2.8 4.8 2.8 2.3 480 0.3 4.6 2.0 0.9 5.1 Philippines 78,229 2.2 2.9 4.5 7.3 2.1 1,160 4.5 5.7 20.3 -- 6.6 Sri Lanka 18,969 1.1 2.4 9.1 5.7 1.0 740 0.5 3.8 3.9 3.7 3.1 Vietnam 78,147 1.6 0.5 5.0 -4.3 1.7 290 -- 9.3 -- -- 1.5 Latin America Bolivia 8,435 2.2 3.1 15.2 0.8 2.0 830 2.6 -- -- 7.8 6.5 Colombia 38,014 1.6 -1.2 6.2 1.6 2.5 2,140 -0.5 2.0 4.4 5.6 6.6 Dominican Republic 8,366 1.7 -0.8 9.7 2.2 2.6 1,600 5.7 7.4 13.3 0.8 3.5 Ecuador 11,915 1.9 2.2 8.7 2.0 1,500 1.2 1.9 3.6 4.1 7.4 El Salvador 6,226 1.9 1.2 10.4 1.7 2.7 1,700 0.0 2.5 7.4 -- 3.0 Guatemala 11,841 2.4 -1.1 4.3 0.4 1.0 1,470 8.6 3.0 6.1 3.0 2.3 Haiti 6,807 1.4 2.7 8.3 4.2 1.8 310 0.0 2.0 20.7 1.7 1.0 Honduras 5,737 2.6 -4.5 12.0 3.4 2.4 660 -0.3 3.1 15.0 -- 14.1 Jamaica 2,609 0.7 1.3 60.2 3.8 1.7 1,600 -1.9 -1.7 1.0 -- 15.9 Nicaragua 4,537 2.5 4.6 16.1 -0.6 2.7 380 4.2 4.7 37.9 1.5 13.2 Peru 25,393 1.7 2.3 13.9 1.5 2.0 2,420 0.0 2.8 10.1 10.9 4.9 New Independent States Armenia 3,469 0.1 1.6 53.6 6.7 2.1 630 7.4 -- -- 2.2 3.0 Azerbaijan 7,793 0.7 -0.4 52.7 8.3 2.1 480 -1.3 1.2 -- -- 0.3 Georgia 5,145 -0.6 -0.2 52.6 12.8 1.8 850 12.7 -- -- -- 0.3 Kyrgystan 4,566 0.6 -2.5 51.8 13.1 1.5 550 4.1 5.6 -- 60.5 3.1 Tajikistan 6,124 1.8 3.0 51.2 -8.0 1.9 340 -8.4 -4.4 -- -- 0.0 -- = data unavailable or not applicable due to inconsistent data set. Source: Population=Census data. 
List of Tables

1. Food Availability and Food Gaps for 66 Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

3. Food Insecurity in 2008: Unequal national food distribution is the principal factor behind food insecurity

for 30 percent of the population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Regional tables

4. Food Availability and Food Gaps for North Africa; 2008 Food Consumption as a Share of 

Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

5. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa; 2008 Food Consumption as a 

Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

6. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Asia; 2008 Food Consumption as a Share of 

Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

7. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean; 2008 Food 

Consumption as a Share of Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

8. Food Availability and Food Gaps for NIS; 2008 Food Consumption as a Share of 

Nutritional Requirements by Income Quintile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Special Articles

A-1. Agricultural Productivity Levels and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

A-2. Key Studies and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

B-1. Export Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

B-2. Scenario Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Country Statistical Tables

North Africa (4 countries)

1. Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

2. Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

3. Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

4. Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

Central Africa (3 countries)

5. Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

6. Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

7. Congo (formerly known as Zaire) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

East Africa (9 countries) 

8. Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

9. Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

10. Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42

11. Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

12. Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

13. Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

14. Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

15. Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

16. Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Southern Africa (8 countries)

17. Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-10/December 1998 v 77
18. Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

19. Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

20. Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

21. Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

22. Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

23. Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

24. Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

West Africa (17 countries)

25. Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

26. Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

27. Cape Verde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

28. Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

29. Cote d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

30. Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

31. Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

32. Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

33. Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

34. Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

35. Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

36. Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

37. Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

38. Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

39. Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

40. Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

41. Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

Asia (9 countries)

42. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

43. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

44. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

45. Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

46. Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

47. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

48. Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

49. Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

50. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries)

51. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

52. Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

53. Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

54. Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

55. El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

56. Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

57. Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

58. Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

59. Jamaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

60. Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

61. Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

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62. Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

63. Azerbaijan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

64. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

65. Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

66. Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

Appendices

Appendix 1. Country List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

Appendix 2. Food Security Model: Definition and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

Appendix 3. Country Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

List of Figures

1. Food Gaps in all 66 Countries: 1998-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Sub-Saharan Africa Has Only 25 Percent of the World’s Population, But Accounts for 80 Percent of the 

World Nutritional Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Regional Figures

North Africa

Historical, Projected Grain Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

North Africa’s Grain Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Sub-Saharan Africa

All Food Supply vs Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Grain Production in SS-Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Asia

Nutritional Gap in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Asia’s Grain Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 

Latin America and the Caribbean

Nutritional Food Gap in Haiti and the Rest of Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Urban and Rural Population, 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

NIS

Grains: Food vs Feed Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Historical and Projected Grain Supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Special Articles

A-1. Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

B-1. Import Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

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