United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

Nos. 19-1027

19-1745

UNITED STATES,

Appellee,

v.

LUIS SOLÍS-VÁSQUEZ, a/k/a Brujo,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Lynch, Lipez, and Barron

Circuit Judges.

Ian Gold for appellant Luis Solís-Vásquez, a/k/a Brujo. 

Sonja M. Ralston, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal 

Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Andrew E. Lelling, 

United States Attorney, Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Brian C. Rabbitt, Acting Assistant Attorney 

General, and Robert A. Zink, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, were on brief, for appellee.

August 20, 2021
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LYNCH, Circuit Judge. This case raises as a matter of 

first impression whether a conviction for aggravated Racketeer 

Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO") conspiracy based 

on Massachusetts second-degree murder is properly considered a 

"crime of violence" under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act 

("MVRA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, when the jury makes a special finding 

that a defendant has committed murder as part of that conspiracy. 

We conclude that it is not necessary to reach this question because 

the defendant has not met his burden of showing any plain error. 

In 2016, the government indicted Luis Solís-Vásquez, 

a/k/a "Brujo," and sixty others on RICO conspiracy charges for 

their involvement in the "Mara Salvatrucha" gang, commonly known 

as "MS-13." Solís-Vásquez was tried and convicted alongside two 

codefendants, Hector Enamorado, a/k/a "Vida Loca," and Noe 

Salvador Pérez-Vásquez, a/k/a "Crazy." The three appealed their 

convictions and sentences on various grounds, and we addressed the 

bulk of their claims of error in United States v. Pérez-Vásquez, 

No. 18-1867, 2021 WL 3140521 (1st Cir. July 26, 2021). This 

opinion addresses only Solís-Vásquez's challenge to the district 

court's restitution order. 

I. Background

We discuss the facts relevant to the restitution order 

and refer to our companion opinion, Pérez-Vásquez, 2021 WL 3140521,

to describe the background of the case. 
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At the time of the events in this case, Solís-Vásquez 

was a member of MS-13. MS-13's mission is to kill rival gang 

members, and one of MS-13's "rules" is that members should kill 

rival gang members on sight if they have the opportunity to do so. 

They are also required to help fellow MS-13 members to do so when 

asked.

In the early morning of December 14, 2014, at an 

apartment in Chelsea, Enamorado ran into several rival gang members 

who had assaulted him the night before. He called Pérez-Vásquez 

and asked him to bring a gang-owned gun to the apartment because 

he was going to kill the rival gang members. Pérez-Vásquez told 

Solís-Vásquez about this request and said he would bring the gun 

to Enamorado. Solís-Vásquez decided to go with Pérez-Vásquez to 

meet Enamorado and brought a second gun.

When they arrived at the apartment, Enamorado took the 

first gun from Pérez-Vásquez and told Solís-Vásquez to wait at the 

door with the second gun so no one could leave. Solís-Vásquez 

waited for a few minutes, then went to smoke a cigarette on the 

porch. Moments later, Enamorado shot and killed one of the rival 

gang members, Javier Ortiz. Enamorado then shot Saul Rivera, who 

witnessed the shooting of Ortiz, in the chest. Rivera survived 

and sustained losses of $32,984.03 in medical expenses and lost 

wages. F0F Solís-Vásquez does not dispute the loss amount. 
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II. Procedural History

Solís-Vásquez was tried alongside Enamorado and PérezVásquez. A jury convicted Solís-Vásquez and his codefendants of 

RICO conspiracy, with a special finding that each was guilty as 

part of the RICO conspiracy of second-degree murder of Ortiz. The 

jury made no special findings with respect to the shooting of 

Rivera. 

On July 11, 2019, the district court conducted a 

restitution hearing and ordered the defendants to pay restitution 

to Rivera. Solís-Vásquez argued that he should not be made to pay 

restitution because he was a "nonparticipant" in the Rivera 

shooting, and that the shooting was "outside the scope of the 

agreement to kill Javier Ortiz." In the alternative, he argued 

that he should pay a lesser amount than his codefendants because 

of his lesser role in the offense.

The district court determined that restitution was 

mandatory under the MVRA because the RICO conspiracy was a "crime 

of violence with an identifiable victim, Saul Rivera, who suffered 

a physical injury." See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(i). 

Enamorado and Pérez-Vásquez were ordered to pay the full amount. 

Solís-Vásquez was ordered to pay half the loss amount, $16,492.01, 

on account of his lesser role in the offense.
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III. Analysis

The MVRA requires the district court to order 

restitution where the defendant is found guilty of a "crime of 

violence, as defined in section 16 [of Title 18] . . . in which an 

identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or 

pecuniary loss." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1). Section 16 defines a 

crime of violence as "an offense that has as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 

person or property of another." 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).1F1F

1 

The MVRA defines a "victim" as "a person directly and 

proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an 

offense . . . including . . . any person directly harmed by the 

defendant's criminal conduct in the course of [a] scheme, 

conspiracy, or pattern." 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). In United 

States v. Collins, we read this language to mean that "each 

conspirator may be ordered to pay restitution for all the 

1 In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), the Supreme 

Court held that the "residual" clause of Section 16, which defines 

a "crime of violence" to also include "any other offense that is 

a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person or property of another may be 

used in the course of committing the offense," id. at 1211 (quoting 

18 U.S.C. § 16(b)), was unconstitutionally vague as incorporated 

into the Immigration and Nationality Act's definition of 

"aggravated felony," id. at 1223. Neither party argues that the 

residual clause is constitutional as incorporated in the MVRA.
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reasonably foreseeable losses caused by any conspirator in the 

course of the conspiracy."2 209 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999). 

Solís-Vásquez makes three arguments that the district 

court erred in requiring him to pay restitution for the shooting 

of Saul Rivera under the MVRA. As to preserved issues, "[w]e 

review factual findings underlying a restitution order for clear 

error and legal conclusions de novo." United States v. Chin, 965 

F.3d 41, 59 (1st Cir. 2020). "The final order is reviewed for 

abuse of discretion." Id. 

Solís-Vásquez renews his argument on appeal that Rivera 

was not a "victim" under the terms of the MVRA because he was not 

"directly" harmed by Solís-Vásquez's criminal conduct. See 18

U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). In making this argument, Solís-Vásquez asks 

us to overturn our holding in Collins, and hold instead that the 

MVRA's definition of "victim" does not include those injured by a 

defendant's coconspirators. The argument fails. Under the "law 

of the circuit doctrine" we are bound by our decision in Collins. 

United States v. Lewis, 963 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2020). And to 

the extent that this argument rests on Solís-Vásquez's claim that 

he was just a bystander rather than a participant in the crime, 

the jury said that was not the case. 

2 Collins concerned a discretionary order of restitution 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3663 rather than mandatory restitution under 18 

U.S.C. § 3663A, but the sections use identical language to define 

"victim." 
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Solís-Vásquez next argues that he cannot be held 

accountable for Rivera's injuries because Enamorado's shooting of 

Rivera was not within the scope of the conspiracy. This argument 

misunderstands what the issue is. The issue is not whether the 

shooting of Rivera was an aim of the conspiracy but whether the 

harm to Rivera was "reasonably foreseeable . . . in the course of 

the conspiracy." Collins, 209 F.3d at 3. The shooting of Rivera 

in the apartment when he was a witness to the murder in an armed 

conflict between rival gangs was certainly reasonably foreseeable. 

There was no clear error.

Solís-Vásquez's next argument is that RICO conspiracy is 

not a crime of violence under the MVRA. But that is not the issue 

before us. Our issue is whether restitution is mandatory under 

the MVRA when a defendant is convicted of participating in 

aggravated RICO conspiracy and there is a jury finding of seconddegree murder under Massachusetts law. 

Because Solís-Vásquez did not raise this objection in 

the district court, we review only for plain error. United States

v. Flete-Garcia, 925 F.3d 17, 37 (1st Cir. 2019). To prevail, 

Solís-Vásquez must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was 

clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected the defendant's 

substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United 
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States v. Mercado, 777 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting 

United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)). 

Restitution is mandatory under the MVRA where the 

defendant was convicted of a crime that includes as an element

that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use 

physical force against another. 18 U.S.C. §§ 16(a), 

3663A(c)(1)(A)(i); see also Sessions, 138 S. Ct. at 1211. The socalled "categorical approach" requires an assessment of the 

"elements of the statute of conviction" rather than the "facts of 

each defendant's conduct." United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 5 

(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 

601 (1990)). That assessment compels us to "compare the elements 

of the crime for which the defendant was previously convicted with 

Congress's definition of the type of crime that may serve as a 

predicate offense." Id. Thus, the critical inquiry is whether 

the "most innocent conduct" criminalized by the statue under which 

the defendant was convicted qualifies as a crime of violence under 

the categorical approach. Id. (quoting Karimi v. Holder, 715 F.3d 

561, 567 (4th Cir. 2013)).

"If the statute under which the defendant was previously 

convicted is divisible, meaning 'it comprises multiple, 

alternative versions of a crime not all of which qualify [as a 

crime of violence],' courts apply a 'modified' categorical 

approach." United States v. Delgado-Sánchez, 849 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st 
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Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Castro-Vásquez, 802 F.3d 28, 

35 (1st Cir. 2015)). "Under that approach, a sentencing court 

looks to a limited class of documents (for example, the indictment, 

jury instructions, or plea agreement and colloquy) to determine 

what crime, with what elements, a defendant was convicted of." 

Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016); see also

Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 763 (2021) (explaining the 

modified categorial approach). Where a statute includes a 

"sentencing element" permitting the court to impose a higher 

sentence only when certain conditions are met, "it is right to 

consider this as an element of the crime[] of conviction" "for the 

purposes of the modified categorical approach." United States v. 

Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24, 105 (1st Cir. 2020), cert. granted on other 

grounds, 141 S. Ct. 1683 (2021); see also Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 

2256.

This circuit considered whether a divisible conspiracy 

crime was a crime of violence in Tsarnaev. 968 F.3d at 103-05. 

Tsarnaev was convicted of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass 

destruction and conspiracy to bomb a place of public use. Id. at 

103. The conspiracy statutes at issue provided for punishment "by 

death or imprison[ment] for any term of years or for life" only 

where "death result[ed]," and the jury determined beyond a 

reasonable doubt that at least one person had died as a result of 

the conspiracy. Id. at 103 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)). The 
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court held that, in such circumstances, the crime was divisible 

and "while most conspiracies are not crimes of violence, 

conspiracies that are categorically defined to result in death 

are" crimes of violence under the ACCA.3 Id. at 104. The court 

explained that this approach "align[ed] with the purpose" of the 

modified categorical approach and did not risk the "practical 

difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach." Id. 

at 105 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601); see also Mathis, 136 S. 

Ct. at 2252-53 (explaining that the purposes of the categorical 

approach include avoiding Sixth Amendment concerns arising from a 

sentencing judge finding facts that increase a maximum penalty and 

the likelihood of error as to "non-elemental fact[s]" because 

"their proof is unnecessary").

Solís-Vásquez argues that RICO conspiracy is an 

indivisible offense and that it encompasses both violent and nonviolent conduct. The government responds that RICO conspiracy is 

a divisible offense, and that Solís-Vásquez was convicted of 

"aggravated RICO conspiracy," which has an added sentencing 

element that the conspiracy "is based on a racketeering activity 

for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment." 18 

3 In United States v. Simmons, 999 F.3d 199, 216 (4th Cir. 

2021), the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Tsarnaev's conclusion

that "an 'element' relevant only to an enhanced sentence is 

necessarily an element of the conviction." It therefore concluded 

that RICO conspiracy is not a divisible crime. Id.
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U.S.C. § 1963(a). Solís-Vásquez responds that even if RICO 

conspiracy is a divisible offense, it does not follow that 

aggravated RICO conspiracy is "divisible by predicate crime." 

Thus, he argues, because some crimes carrying a penalty of life 

imprisonment are not crimes of violence, aggravated RICO 

conspiracy is not categorically a crime of violence.

Solís-Vásquez also argues that aggravated RICO 

conspiracy does not require a completed predicate act, and thus 

that it cannot be a crime of violence. See Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d at 

100 (holding that conspiracy to commit a violent act does not 

qualify as a crime of violence if it does not have an element of 

actually using, or attempting to use, physical force). The 

government responded in a letter submitted after oral argument 

that § 1963(a) is properly read to mean that a conviction of 

aggravated RICO conspiracy, unlike unenhanced RICO conspiracy, 

requires a completed predicate offense. The government argues 

that aggravated RICO conspiracy incorporates a completed state 

crime as a predicate offense and that it cannot obtain a life 

sentence for a RICO violation without proving that the defendant 

committed the underlying offense carrying a life sentence. Here, 

the predicate offense is second-degree murder. Second-degree 

murder under Massachusetts law is a crime of violence. See United 

States v. Báez-Martínez, 950 F.3d 119, 126-28 (1st Cir. 2020) 

(holding second-degree murder requiring malice aforethought is a 
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crime of violence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)); see

also Commonwealth v. Earle, 937 N.E.2d 42, 47 (Mass. 2010) ("The 

elements of murder in the second degree are (1) an unlawful killing 

and (2) malice.").

United States v. Nguyen offers support for finding that 

aggravated RICO conspiracy is divisible by predicate act for 

purposes of the modified categorical approach. 255 F.3d 1335, 1343 

(11th Cir. 2001). There, the Eleventh Circuit found that, in order 

for a life sentence to be imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the 

jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 

completed the predicate crime. Id. This holding in Nguyen

supports a reading of § 1963(a) which incorporates the elements of 

the predicate act, here, second-degree murder, into the statute. 

Solís-Vásquez fails to point to any binding precedent 

that aggravated RICO conspiracy based on murder is not a crime of 

violence.4 In light of the substantial case law supporting the 

district court's ruling, Solís-Vásquez fails to demonstrate any 

"clear or obvious" error. It is not necessary at this time to 

decide whether aggravated RICO conspiracy is a crime of violence 

4 In a post-argument Rule 28(j) letter, Solís-Vásquez

points to United States v. Green, in which the Eleventh Circuit 

held that 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) was not a crime of violence under 

the MVRA. 981 F.3d 945, 952 (11th Cir. 2020). But that decision 

does not address the divisibility of 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), the 

aggravated form of conspiracy central to this case.
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under § 16(a) where the jury has made a special finding that the 

defendant is guilty of second-degree murder because the "clear or 

obvious" prong of the plain error test has not been met. 

As Solís-Vásquez cannot demonstrate "clear or obvious" 

error by the district court, we do not address the final two prongs 

of plain error review. Ordering restitution in this case aligns 

both with Congress’s goal of ensuring compensation for victims of 

crime and the purposes of the categorical approach. 

IV. Conclusion

Affirmed.