Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on

Transportation and Infrastructure, House of

Representatives

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery

Expected at

10:00 a.m. EDT

Friday

September 21, 2001

AVIATION SECURITY

Weaknesses in Airport

Security and Options for

Assigning Screening

Responsibilities

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues

GAO-01-1165T
Page 1 GAO-01-1165T

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the

nation’s overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic

foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies have

been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully known at

this time what actually occurred or which of the weaknesses in the

nation’s aviation security apparatus contributed to the horrendous events

of last week, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist in our aviation

security system and that their impact can be far more devastating than

previously imagined.

We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have identified in

the safeguards to protect passengers and prevent unauthorized access to

or attacks on aircraft. Our testimony is based on our prior work and a

review that we have underway for this Subcommittee and includes

assessments of security concerns with (1) airport access controls, (2)

passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3) alternatives to current

screening practices, including practices in selected other countries.

In summary:

• Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not

always worked as intended. As we reported in May 2000, our special

agents used counterfeit law enforcement badges and credentials to gain

access to secure areas at two airports, bypassing security checkpoints and

walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been

issued tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons,

explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is acting on the

weaknesses we identified and is implementing actions to more closely

check the credentials of law enforcement officers. The Department of

Transportation’s Inspector General has also documented numerous

problems with airport access controls, and in one series of tests, the

Inspector General’s staff successfully gained access to secure areas 68

percent of the time.

• As we reported in June 2000, testing of screeners shows that significant,

long-standing weaknesses—measured by the screeners’ abilities to detect

threat objects located on passengers or contained in their carry-on

luggage—continue to exist. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the

potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. At that time, FAA

characterized this level of performance as unsatisfactory. More recent

results have shown that as testing gets more realistic—that is, as tests

more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a
Page 2 GAO-01-1165T

checkpoint—screeners’ performance declines significantly. A principal

cause of screeners’ performance problems is the rapid turnover among

screeners. Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at most large

airports, leaving few skilled and experienced screeners, primarily because

of the low wages, limited benefits, and repetitive, monotonous nature of

their work. Additionally, too little attention has been given to factors such

as the sufficiency of the training given to screeners. FAA’s efforts to

address these problems have been slow. We recommended that FAA

develop an integrated plan to focus its efforts, set priorities, and measure

progress in improving screening. FAA is addressing these

recommendations, but progress on one key effort—the certification of

screening companies—is still not complete because the implementing

regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2 1⁄2 years since FAA

originally planned to implement the regulation.

• Weaknesses in the current system in which airlines are responsible for

screening passengers and controlling access to secure areas have raised

questions about whether alternative approaches should be considered. In

work that we have under way for the Subcommittee, we surveyed aviation

stakeholders and aviation and terrorism experts and have identified four

options for assigning screening responsibilities: continue with air carriers

but with new requirements, assign responsibility to airports, or shift

responsibility to the federal government, either through the creation of a

new federal agency or the creation of a federal corporation. In assessing

alternatives, respondents identified 5 important criteria: improving

screening performance, establishing accountability, ensuring cooperation

among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal and

liability issues. The majority of respondents believed that screening

performance and accountability would improve if screening were placed

with the federal government. Many indicated that assigning screening

responsibility to the airports would not likely improve screeners’

performance and accountability. Still, some respondents believed that a

professional screening workforce could be developed in any

organizational context.

The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country

looks at aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers

implemented new controls that promise a greater sense of security. We

support these actions. Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in our

aviation security system, more needs to be done. Aviation security has

truly become a national security issue, and as we will discuss today,

responsibility for screening may no longer appropriately rest with air

carriers. Mr. Chairman, it has been observed that previous tragedies have

resulted in congressional hearings, studies, recommendations, and
Page 3 GAO-01-1165T

debates, but little long-term resolve to correct flaws in the system as the

memory of the crisis recedes. The future of aviation security hinges in

large part on overcoming this cycle of limited action that has too often

characterized the response to aviation security concerns.

Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism was

significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U.S. airliners was

discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the task of providing

security to the nation’s aviation system is unquestionably daunting, and we

must reluctantly acknowledge that any form of travel can never be made

totally secure. The enormous size of U.S. airspace alone defies easy

protection. Furthermore, given this country’s hundreds of airports,

thousands of planes, tens of thousands of daily flights, and the seemingly

limitless ways terrorists or criminals can devise to attack the system,

aviation security must be enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding

airplanes and passengers requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators

are kept from breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to

aircraft. FAA has developed several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts

against aircraft, such as adopting technology to detect explosives and

establishing procedures to ensure that passengers are positively identified

before boarding a flight. Still, in recent years, we and others have often

demonstrated that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation’s

aviation security.

The current aviation security structure, its policies, requirements, and

practices have evolved since the early 1960s and were heavily influenced

by a series of high profile aviation security incidents. Historically, the

federal government has maintained that providing security was the

responsibility of air carriers and airports as part of their cost of doing

business. Beginning in 1972, air carriers were required to provide

screening personnel and the airport operators to provide law enforcement

support. However, with the rise in air piracy and terrorist activities that

not only threatened commercial aviation but the national security of the

United States, discussions began to emerge as to who should have the

responsibility for providing security at our nations airports. With the

events of the last week, concerns have been raised again as to who should

be responsible for security and screening passengers at our nation’s

airports. This issue has evoked numerous discussions through the years

and just as many options of who and how security at our nation’s airports

Background
Page 4 GAO-01-1165T

should be handled. But as pointed out in a 1998 FAA study, there had not

been a consensus among the various aviation-related entities.1

To identify options for assigning screening responsibilities, we surveyed

aviation stakeholders—security officials at the major air carriers and the

largest airports, large screening companies, and industry associations—

and aviation and terrorism experts. We asked our respondents to provide

their opinions about the current screening program, criteria they believe

are important in considering options, the advantages and disadvantages of

each options, and their comments on implementing a different screening

approach. It is important to understand that we gathered this information

prior to September 11, 2001, and some respondents’ views may have

changed.

Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport facilities is a

critical component of aviation security. Existing access controls include

requirements intended to prevent unauthorized individuals from using

forged, stolen, or outdated identification or their familiarity with airport

procedures to gain access to secured areas. In May 2000, we reported that

our special agents, in an undercover capacity, obtained access to secure

areas of two airports by using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and

badges.2

 At these airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law

enforcement officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created

from commercially available software packages or downloaded from the

Internet, and were issued “law enforcement” boarding passes. They were

then waved around the screening checkpoints without being screened.

Our agents could thus have carried weapons, explosives,

chemical/biological agents, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. In

response to our findings, FAA now requires that each airport’s law

enforcement officers examine the badges and credentials of any individual

seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is also working on a “smart

card” computer system that would verify law enforcement officers’

identity and authorization for bypassing passenger screening.

The Department of Transportation’s Inspector General has also uncovered

problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector General’s staff

 1

Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security Responsibilities and Funding,

Dec. 1998.

2

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-00-10, May 25, 2000).

Weaknesses in Airport

Access Controls
Page 5 GAO-01-1165T

conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access controls at eight major

airports and succeeded in gaining access to secure areas in 68 percent of

the tests; they were able to board aircraft 117 times. After the release of its

report describing its successes in breaching security,3

 the Inspector

General conducted additional testing between December 1999 and March

2000 and found that, although improvements had been made, access to

secure areas was still gained more than 30 percent of the time.

Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key line

of defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the aviation

system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be checked each

day for articles that could pose threats to the safety of an aircraft and

those aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for screening passengers

and their baggage before they are permitted into the secure areas of an

airport or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can use their own employees to

conduct screening activities, but mostly air carriers hire security

companies to do the screening. Currently, multiple carriers and screening

companies are responsible for screening at some of the nation’s larger

airports.

Concerns have long existed about screeners’ ability to detect and prevent

dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year, weapons were

discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have later been

found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors the

performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to detect

potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents posing as

passengers. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the objects

during FAA tests. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the objects

during the same type of test. Test data for the 1991 to 1999 period show

that the declining trend in detection rates continues.4

 Furthermore, the

recent tests show that as tests become more realistic and more closely

approximate how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint,

screeners’ ability to detect dangerous objects declines even further.

 3

Airport Access Control (AV-2000-017, Nov. 18, 1999).

4

Information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive security information and

cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we cannot discuss the actual detection rates for

the 1991-99 period.

Inadequate Detection

of Dangerous Objects

by Screeners
Page 6 GAO-01-1165T

As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners fail to

identify dangerous objects.5

 Two conditions—rapid screener turnover and

inadequate attention to human factors—are believed to be important

causes. Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing

problem, having been identified as a concern by FAA and by us in reports

dating back to at least 1979. We reported in 1987 that turnover among

screeners was about 100 percent a year at some airports, and according to

our more recent work, the turnover is considerably higher.6

 From May

1998 through April 1999, screener turnover averaged 126 percent at the

nation’s 19 largest airports; 5 of these airports reported turnover of 200

percent or more, and one reported turnover of 416 percent. At one airport

we visited, of the 993 screeners trained at that airport over about a 1-year

period, only 142, or 14 percent, were still employed at the end of that year.

Such rapid turnover can seriously limit the level of experience among

screeners operating a checkpoint.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to the low

wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the daily stress

of the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the minimum wage. We

reported last year that some of the screening companies at 14 of the

nation’s 19 largest airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6.00 an hour

or less and, at 5 of these airports, the starting salary was the minimum

wage—$5.15 an hour. It is common for the starting wages at airport fastfood restaurants to be higher than the wages screeners receive. For

instance, at one airport we visited, screeners’ wages started as low as

$6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage at one of the airport’s fast-food

restaurants was $7 an hour.

The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties require

repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare event when

a dangerous object might be observed. Too little attention has been given

to factors such as (1) improving individuals’ aptitudes for effectively

performing screener duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to

screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the

job and the distractions that reduce screeners’ vigilance. As a result,

screeners are being placed on the job who do not have the necessary

 5

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance

(GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

6

Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance Standards

(GAO-RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).
Page 7 GAO-01-1165T

aptitudes, nor the adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work,

and who then find the duties tedious and dull.

We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of actions

to improve screeners’ performance. However, FAA did not have an

integrated management plan for these efforts that would identify and

prioritize checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be

resolved, and identify measures—and related milestone and funding

information—for addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA

did not have adequate goals by which to measure and report its progress in

improving screeners’ performance.

FAA is implementing our recommendations to develop an integrated

management plan. However, two key actions to improving screeners’

performance are still not complete. These actions are the deployment of

threat image projection (TIP) systems—which place images of dangerous

objects on the monitors of X-ray machines to keep screeners alert and

monitor their performance—and a certification program to make

screening companies accountable for the training and performance of the

screeners they employ. Threat image projection systems are expected to

keep screeners alert by periodically imposing the image of a dangerous

object on the X-ray screen. They also are used to measure how well

screeners perform in detecting these objects. Additionally, the systems

serve as a device to train screeners to become more adept at identifying

harder-to-spot objects. FAA is currently deploying the threat image

projections systems and expects to have them deployed at all airports by

2003.

The screening company certification program, required by the Federal

Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish performance, training,

and equipment standards that screening companies will have to meet to

earn and retain certification. However, FAA has still not issued its final

regulation establishing the certification program. This regulation is

particularly significant because it is to include requirements mandated by

the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000 to increase screener

training—from 12 hours to 40 hours—as well as to expand background

check requirements. FAA had been expecting to issue the final regulation

this month, 2 1⁄2 years later than it originally planned. According to FAA, it

needed the additional time to develop performance standards based on

screener performance data.
Page 8 GAO-01-1165T

Because of the Subcommittee’s long-standing concerns about the

performance of screeners, you asked us to examine options for conducting

screening and to outline some advantages and disadvantages associated

with these alternatives.

Many aviation stakeholders agreed that a stable, highly trained, and

professional workforce is critical to improving screening performance.

They identified compensation and improved training as the highest

priorities in improving performance. Respondents also believed that the

implementation of performance standards, team and image building,

awards for exemplary work, better supervision, and certification of

individual screeners would improve performance. Some respondents

believed that a professional workforce could be developed in any

organizational context, and that changing the delegation of screening

responsibilities would increase the costs of screening.

We identified four principal alternative approaches to screening. Each

alternative could be structured and implemented in many different ways;

for instance, an entity might use its own employees to screen passengers,

or it might use an outside contractor to perform the job. In each

alternative, we assumed that FAA would continue to be responsible for

regulating screening, overseeing performance, and imposing penalties for

poor performance. Table 1 outlines the four options.

Table 1: Description of Screening Alternatives

Alternative Summary

Airlines with new certification rules Air carriers could continue to be responsible for conducting screening. However, this

alternative assumes that FAA will impose new requirements on screening companies to

ensure that screeners are better trained and demonstrate proficiency in using screening

equipment.

Airports Each airport management authority could be responsible for its own screening. Given the

number and diversity of the nation’s airports, screening operations might vary

considerably throughout the country.

Federal agency A new DOT agency (with headquarters and field structure) could be created to conduct

the national screening program. It could be accountable to the Congress through the

annual appropriations and oversight processes.

Federal corporation A government corporation created solely to conduct passenger and baggage screening.

Like other government corporations—such as the Tennessee Valley Authority—it would

be accountable to the Congress but would have more autonomy than other agencies.

Source: GAO’s analysis of Booze-Allen and Hamilton, Independent Assessment of Airport Security

Screener Performance and Retention, Sept. 15, 2000.

Options for Assigning

Screening

Responsibility to

Other Entities

Four Major Alternatives

for Screening
Page 9 GAO-01-1165T

Shifting responsibility for screening would be a step affecting many

stakeholders and might demand many resources. Accordingly, a number of

criteria must be weighed before changing the status quo. We asked

aviation stakeholders to identify key criteria that should be used in

assessing screening alternatives. These criteria are to

• improve screening performance;

• establish accountability for screening performance;

• ensure cooperation among stakeholders, such as airlines, airports, FAA,

and screening companies;

• efficiently move passengers to flights; and

• minimize legal and liability issues.

We asked airline and airport security officials to assess each option for

reassigning screener responsibility against the key criteria. Specifically, we

asked them to indicate whether an alternative would be better, the same,

or worse than the current situation with regard to each criterion. Table 2

summarizes their responses.

Table 2: Summary of Respondent’s Views of Alternatives to the Current Program

Options

Screener

performance Accountability

Stakeholder

cooperation

Legal and

liability

Passengers moved

efficiently

Airlines with new rules Better Better Same Same Same

Airports Undecided Undecided Undecided Undecided Undecided

Federal agency Better Better Undecided Undecided Undecided

Federal corporation Better Better Undecided Undecided Same

Note: The views expressed about the airlines and airports options are based on the opinions of 17

major air carriers and airports we interviewed; views about the federal agency and the federal

corporation are based on the opinions of 9 and 4 of these respondents, respectively. A consensus of

Better, Same, or Worse was determined by having about 60 percent agree on the response.

At the time of our review, FAA was finalizing a certification rule that

would make a number of changes to the screening program, including

requiring FAA- certification of screening companies and the installation of

TIP systems on X-ray machines at screening checkpoints. Our respondents

believed that these actions would improve screeners’ performance and

accountability. Some respondents approved of the proposed changes since

they would result in FAA having a direct regulatory role vis-a-vis the

screening companies. Others indicated that the installation of TIP systems

nationwide could improve screener awareness and ability to detect

potentially threatening objects and result in better screener performance.

Respondents did not believe that this option would affect stakeholder

Criteria for Assessing

Screening

Alternatives

Leaving Responsibility to

Air Carriers With New

Certification Rules
Page 10 GAO-01-1165T

cooperation, affect passenger movement through checkpoints, or pose any

additional legal issues.

No consensus existed among aviation stakeholders about how airport

control of screening would affect any of the key criteria. Almost half

indicated that screener performance would not change if the airport

authority were to assume responsibility, particularly if the airport

authority were to contract out the screening operation. Some commented

that screening accountability would likely blur because of the substantial

differences among airport management and governance. Many

respondents indicated that the airport option would produce the same or

worse results than the current situation in terms of accountability,

legal/liability issues, cooperation among stakeholders, and passenger

movement. Several respondents noted that cooperation between air

carriers and airports could suffer because the airports might raise the cost

of passenger screening and slow down the flow of passengers through the

screening checkpoint—to the detriment of the air carriers’ operations.

Others indicated that the legal issue of whether employees of a

government-owned airport could conduct searches of passengers might

pose a significant barrier to this option.

Screening performance and accountability would improve if a new agency

were created in DOT to control screening operations, according to those

we interviewed. Some respondents viewed having one entity whose sole

focus would be security would be advantageous and believed it fitting for

the federal government to take a more direct role in ensuring aviation

security. Respondents indicated that federal control could lead to better

screener performance because a federal entity most likely would offer

better pay and benefits, attract a more professional workforce, and reduce

employee turnover. There was no consensus among the respondents

preferring this option on how federal control might affect stakeholder

cooperation, passenger movement, or legal and liability issues.

For some of the same reasons mentioned above, respondents believed that

screening performance and accountability would improve under a

government corporation charged with screening. The majority of the

respondents preferred the government corporation to the DOT agency,

because they viewed it as more flexible and less bureaucratic than a

federal agency. For instance, the corporation would have more autonomy

in funding and budgeting requirements that typically govern the operations

Assigning Screening

Responsibilities to

Airports

Creating a New Federal

Agency Within DOT

Creating a Federal

Corporation
Page 11 GAO-01-1165T

of federal agencies. Respondents believed that the speed of passengers

through checkpoints was likely to remain unchanged. No consensus

existed among respondents preferring the government corporation option

about how federal control might affect stakeholder cooperation or legal

and liability issues.

We visited five countries—Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and

the United Kingdom—viewed by FAA and the civil aviation industry as

having effective screening operations to identify screening practices that

differ from those in the United States.7

 The responsibility for screening in

most of these countries is placed with the airport authority or with the

government, not with the air carriers as it is in the United States. In

Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the responsibility for screening

has been placed with the airports, which either hire screening companies

to conduct the screening operations or, as at some airports in the United

Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the

Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger screening and

hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are

overseen by a Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other

countries with international airports, 100 have placed screening

responsibility with the airports or the government; only 2 other

countries—Canada and Bermuda—place screening responsibility with air

carriers.

We also identified differences between the U.S. and the five countries in

three other areas: screening operations, screener qualifications, and

screener pay and benefits. As we move to improve the screening function

in the United States, practices of these countries may provide some useful

insights.

First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are more

stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom

routinely touch or “pat down” passengers in response to metal detector

alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed passengers

through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the screeners to

more thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also have a greater

police or military presence near checkpoints. In the United Kingdom, for

 7

See Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance

(GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

Potential Lessons

About Screening

Practices From Other

Countries
Page 12 GAO-01-1165T

example, security forces—often armed with automatic weapons—patrol at

or near checkpoints. At Belgium’s main airport in Brussels, a constant

police presence is maintained at one of two glass-enclosed rooms directly

behind the checkpoints.

Second, screeners’ qualifications are usually more extensive. In contrast to

the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be citizens; France

requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union country. In the

Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but they must have been

residents of the country for 5 years. Training requirements for screeners

were also greater in four of the countries we visited than in the United

States. While FAA requires that screeners in this country have 12 hours of

classroom training before they can begin work, Belgium, Canada, France,

and the Netherlands require more. For example, France requires 60 hours

of training and Belgium requires at least 40 hours of training with an

additional 16 to 24 hours for each activity, such as X-ray machine

operations, that the screener will conduct.

Finally, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most of

these countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive wages that

are at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some countries

receive wages that are viewed as being at the “middle income” level in

those countries. In the Netherlands, for example, screeners received at

least the equivalent of about $7.50 per hour. This wage was about 30

percent higher than the wages at fast-food restaurants in that country. In

Belgium, screeners received the equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only

is pay higher, but the screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as

health care or vacations—in large part because these benefits are required

under the laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly

lower screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about

50 percent or lower in these countries.

Because each country follows its own unique set of screening practices,

and because data on screeners’ performance in each country were not

available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of these different

practices on improving screeners’ performance. Nevertheless, there are

indications that for least one country, practices may help to improve

screeners’ performance. This country conducted a screener-testing

program jointly with FAA that showed that its screeners detected over

twice as many test objects as did screeners in the United States.
Page 13 GAO-01-1165T

Mr. Chairman, we commend the Subcommittee for the foresight to begin

the debate on options for assigning the screening functions even before

the tragic events of last week. Those events have elevated the discussion;

however, we all recognize that an alternative to the current approach will

take time to implement. Many of the stakeholders we consulted expected

that changes would be difficult and may require much time and labor to

avoid disruption of screening operations. Incremental actions might be

necessary, such as testing a new alternative at selected sites while

maintaining the current situation elsewhere.

In the meantime, the Department of Transportation and the FAA should

continue with efforts under way to improve screener performance. We

also believe that in the immediate future, additional actions should be

considered. These actions could include prioritizing outstanding

recommendations that address security, developing a strategic plan to

address the recommendations, assigning specific executive responsibility

for carrying out this plan, and identifying the sources and amounts of

funding needed. A key action needed is to complete the promulgation of

the screening company certification regulation, which also implements the

requirements of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, enacted by

the Congress last November. Furthermore, this committee and others are

considering various types of assistance for the airline industry.

Consideration of the role of air carriers in conducting passenger screening

could be examined as part of the ongoing effort to identify and structure

mechanisms to provide such assistance to help the carriers emerge from

the current crisis.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to

answer any questions that you or Members of the Subcommittee may have.

For more information, please contact Gerald L. Dillingham at (202) 512-

2834. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony included

Samer W. Abbas, J. Michael Bollinger, Colin J. Fallon, Libby Halperin, Gail

F. Marnik, Belva M. Martin, John R. Schulze, and Daniel J. Semick.

Contacts and

Acknowledgments

(391006)