" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 108TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

108–414

Union Calendar No. 237

EVERYTHING SECRET DEGENERATES: THE

FBI’S USE OF MURDERERS AS INFORMANTS

THIRD REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Volume 1 of 2

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

FEBRUARY 3, 2004.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

EVERYTHING SECRET DEGENERATES: THE FBI’S USE OF MURDERERS AS INFORMANTS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON :

1

90–615 PDF

" ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 108TH CONGRESS

2d Session

REPORT

2004

108–414

Union Calendar No. 237

EVERYTHING SECRET DEGENERATES: THE

FBI’S USE OF MURDERERS AS INFORMANTS

THIRD REPORT

BY THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

Volume 1 of 2

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL MINORITY VIEWS

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

FEBRUARY 3, 2004.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS BELL, Texas

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

PETER SIRH, Staff Director

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Deputy Staff Director

J. KEITH AUSBROOK, Chief Counsel

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

RANDY KAPLAN, Senior Counsel

CHAD BUNGARD, Counsel

ANN MARIE TURNER, Counsel

ALLYSON BLANDFORD, Office Manager

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHILIP M. SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief Counsel

MICHAEL YEAGER, Minority Deputy Chief Counsel

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

Washington, DC, February 3, 2004.

Hon. J. DENNIS HASTERT,

Speaker of the House of Representatives,

Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee’s third report to the

108th Congress.

TOM DAVIS,

Chairman.

(III)

(V)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Volume 1

I. Executive Summary ....................................................................................... 1

II. Why the Committee Investigated these Matters ........................................ 9

III. Joseph Barboza and the Deegan Murder Prosecution: An Extraordinary

Failure to Serve the Ends of Justice ........................................................ 10

A. Barboza, the Flemmis, and the Deegan Murder Prosecution .......... 10

1. Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza .................................................. 11

2. The Murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan .................................. 13

3. Developing the Flemmi Brothers as Informants ..................... 15

4. The Deegan Murder Prosecution .............................................. 17

i. Barboza’s Pretrial Dealings with Federal Officials .......... 19

ii. Barboza’s Grand Jury Testimony ..................................... 22

iii. Barboza’s Testimony Compared to Preexisting Information ............................................................................... 25

iv. Anthony Stathopoulos and the Deegan Murder Prosecution ............................................................................... 32

v. Federal Involvement in the Deegan Prosecution ............. 33

5. The Failure to Prosecute Raymond Patriarca ......................... 41

6. Post-Conviction Indications That a Grave Miscarriage of

Justice Had Occurred ................................................................. 42

7. The Deegan Murder Defendants After Conviction ................. 48

i. Joseph Salvati ..................................................................... 48

ii. Peter Limone ...................................................................... 54

8. Efforts to Protect Stephen Flemmi After the Deegan Murder

Trial ............................................................................................. 56

9. The Misuse of the Flemmi Brothers as Informants: Two

Human Perspectives ................................................................... 62

B. Interference with State Law Enforcement ........................................ 64

1. California .................................................................................... 65

i. Joseph Barboza’s Relocation to California ........................ 65

ii. The Murder of Clay Wilson ............................................... 70

iii. The Clay Wilson Murder Trial in California .................. 76

iv. Joseph Barboza Returns to Prison ................................... 81

2. Nevada ........................................................................................ 83

3. Oklahoma ................................................................................... 89

4. Florida ........................................................................................ 92

5. Massachusetts ............................................................................ 93

i. Operation Lobster ............................................................... 93

ii. The Lancaster Street Garage ............................................ 94

iii. The Howard Johnson’s Investigation .............................. 95

iv. The DEA Investigation ..................................................... 95

6. Connecticut ................................................................................ 96

7. Rhode Island .............................................................................. 98

IV. The Use of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as An Informant Raised Questions

About Whether the FBI Used its Authority to Advance or Protect

Former Massachusetts State Senate President William Bulger ............ 103

A. William Bulger’s Testimony Before the Committee .......................... 104

1. FY82 Massachusetts State Budget Line Item ......................... 105

2. 75 State Street Real Estate Venture ....................................... 106

3. Massachusetts State Police Trooper Billy Johnson’s Encounter with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger at Logan Airport .................. 108

4. William Bulger’s Relationship with Former FBI Special

Agent and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s Handler, John Connolly 109

Page

VI

A. William Bulger’s Testimony Before the Committee—Continued

5. William Bulger’s January 1995 Telephone Conversation

with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger ...................................................... 111

6. FBI Contact with William Bulger and the Bulger Family

Concerning James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s Whereabouts ................. 112

B. Subsequent Investigation of William Bulger’s Testimony ................ 113

1. Interview of John Gamel ........................................................... 114

2. Interview of Carl Gustin ........................................................... 116

3. Interview of William Nally ....................................................... 118

4. Interview of Robert Zoulas ....................................................... 120

5. Contact with John O’Donovan .................................................. 120

6. Contact with Peter Agnes ......................................................... 121

7. Research at Massachusetts State House and Library ............ 121

V. Institutional Reluctance to Accept Oversight .............................................. 124

A. Congressional Oversight ..................................................................... 124

1. The Patriarca Microphone Surveillance Logs ......................... 126

2. Documents Pertaining to Robert Daddeico .............................. 126

3. U.S. Attorney’s Office Gangland Murder Summaries ............ 127

B. Institutional Oversight ........................................................................ 128

C. The Claim of Executive Privilege Over Key Documents .................. 129

1. The Committee’s Request for the Documents ......................... 129

2. The President’s Claim of Executive Privilege ......................... 130

3. The Justice Department’s Shifting Explanations ................... 130

i. The Administration’s Denial that it Was Creating an

Inflexible Policy ................................................................ 131

ii. The Administration’s Failure to Compromise with the

Committee ......................................................................... 131

iii. The Administration’s Misrepresentations Regarding

Historical Precedent ......................................................... 131

4. The Justice Department Finally Provided the Committee

with Access to the Subpoenaed Documents .............................. 132

5. The Documents Which Were Withheld Contained Vital Information ..................................................................................... 134

VI. Conclusions and Recommendations .............................................................. 135

APPENDICES

Appendix I.—Committee Correspondence ............................................................. 137

Appendix II.—FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report .......................... 381

CHRONOLOGY

Chronology of events from the 40’s through 2002 ................................................. 452

Selected exhibits 1 through 350 ............................................................................. 631

Volume 2

Selected exhibits 351 through 981 ......................................................................... 1803

VIEWS

Minority views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman, Hon. Tom Lantos, Hon. Major

R. Owens, Hon. Bernard Sanders, Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, Hon. Dennis

J. Kucinich, Hon. Diane E. Watson, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch, and Hon.

Eleanor Holmes Norton ....................................................................................... 3514

Additional minority views of Hon. John F. Tierney, Hon. Stephen F. Lynch,

Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, and Hon. Bernard Sanders .................................... 3517

Union Calendar No. 237

108TH CONGRESS REPORT " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session 108–414

EVERYTHING SECRET DEGENERATES: THE FBI’s USE OF

MURDERERS AS INFORMANTS

FEBRUARY 3, 2004.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State

of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia, from the Committee on Government

Reform submitted the following

THIRD REPORT

On November 20, 2003, the Committee on Government Reform

approved and adopted a report entitled, ‘‘Everything Secret Degenerates: The FBI’s Use of Murderers as Informants.’’ The chairman

was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Federal law enforcement officials made a decision to use murderers as informants beginning in the 1960s. Known killers were

protected from the consequences of their crimes and purposefully

kept on the streets. This report discusses some of the disastrous

consequences of the use of murderers as informants in New England.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(‘‘FBI’’ or ‘‘Bureau’’) began a course of conduct in New England that

must be considered one of the greatest failures in the history of

federal law enforcement. This Committee report focuses on only a

small segment of what happened. It discusses primarily the 1965

murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan, the subsequent prosecution of

six defendants for that murder, and the actions of federal law enforcement officials to protect cooperating witness Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza and government informants Jimmy ‘‘The Bear’’

Flemmi and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi.

In order to understand the FBI’s misuse of informants in New

England, it is essential to examine the Deegan murder prosecution.

The story of this trial and subsequent events provides a foundation

to assess what happened during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when

Stephen Flemmi and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger allegedly murdered at

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least 19 individuals while serving as government informants. It is

now clear that FBI Special Agent John Connolly developed an improper relationship with Whitey Bulger and others who served as

government informants. Connolly now stands convicted of obstruction of justice for his role in helping Whitey Bulger escape by tipping him off to his impending indictment. Stephen Flemmi, as part

of his plea agreement, has also implicated Connolly in providing information that resulted in the murder of others.

The results of the Committee’s investigation make clear that the

FBI must improve management of its informant programs to ensure that agents are not corrupted. The Committee will examine

the current FBI’s management, security, and discipline to prevent

similar events in the future.

This report finds that:

• Federal law enforcement personnel appear to have tolerated,

and perhaps encouraged, false testimony in a state death penalty prosecution. When Joseph Barboza testified in the 1968

trial of six men for the murder of Teddy Deegan, his testimony

was contradicted by a compelling body of evidence collected by

federal law enforcement. Most of this evidence was kept from

defendants and prosecutors. In all probability, this happened because informants were being protected and some officials at the

FBI adopted an ‘‘ends justifies the means’’ approach to law enforcement. To date, there have been no adverse consequences for

those who permitted the false testimony.

• As a result of Barboza’s false testimony, four men were sentenced to death and two men were sentenced to life in prison.

Evidence provided to the Committee indicates that four of these

individuals did not commit the crime for which they were convicted. Two died in prison and the other two spent in excess of

thirty years in prison. Furthermore, federal officials appear to

have taken affirmative steps to ensure that the individuals convicted would not obtain post-conviction relief and that they

would die in prison.

• Raymond Patriarca was one of the most significant organized

crime figures in the United States in the 1960s. He was one of

the Justice Department’s top targets for prosecution. According

to documents provided to the Committee, the Justice Department had microphone surveillance information indicating that

Patriarca sanctioned the murder of Teddy Deegan, and that

Vincent James Flemmi (‘‘Jimmy Flemmi’’) and Joseph Barboza

committed the crime a few days after Patriarca gave his assent

to the murder. When asked if Patriarca would have been

complicit in the Deegan murder, Judge Edward Harrington,

then a top federal prosecutor intimately involved with cooperating witness Joseph Barboza, stated, ‘‘No doubt about it.’’ Later,

federal prosecutors were able to obtain the cooperation of Joseph Barboza. Two unanswered questions arise from these facts.

First, was Patriarca not prosecuted for his involvement in the

Deegan murder because Joseph Barboza would not tell the true

story about the Deegan murder, thereby implicating Jimmy

Flemmi? Second, did federal officials refrain from indicting

Patriarca for the applicable federal crimes relating to the

3

Deegan murder because the federal government would have

been compelled to provide all defendants with evidence from the

microphone surveillance of Patriarca that would have undermined Barboza’s testimony?

• The FBI had microphone surveillance that Joseph Barboza and

Jimmy Flemmi intended to murder Teddy Deegan, and that

Raymond Patriarca was involved in the conspiracy to commit

this murder. Nevertheless, little appears to have been done to

prevent Deegan from being killed. On the same day that the

murder occurred, Jimmy Flemmi was assigned to be developed

as an informant by FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico. Unfortunately, many documents that might shed light on whether false

testimony in the Deegan murder trial was tolerated to develop

Jimmy Flemmi as an informant have been redacted by the Justice Department, and the Committee has been unable to do a

thorough investigation of this matter. Furthermore, the Justice

Department has withheld potentially significant information

pertaining to informants, which has created additional investigative hurdles.

• Microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca indicated Jimmy

Flemmi’s motive for killing Teddy Deegan. This motive clearly

contradicted Joseph Barboza’s testimony that Deegan was killed

because Patriarca wanted revenge for a burglary and for the

murder of Rico Sacrimone. In fact, Flemmi indicated that his interest in killing Deegan was based on matters pertaining to the

McLean-McLaughlin gang war. The FBI was aware of this discrepancy, but allowed Barboza to provide a false rationale for

the Deegan murder.

• Compelling evidence indicates that Jimmy Flemmi did participate in the murder of Teddy Deegan. Nevertheless, he was not

prosecuted for the murder. This leads to three areas of particular concern. First, was Flemmi spared prosecution for murder

because of his role as a government informant? Second, was Joseph Barboza permitted to leave Flemmi out of his testimony in

exchange for testimony against others? Third, was Jimmy

Flemmi spared prosecution for murder because the federal government was using his brother, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’

Flemmi, as a ‘‘Top Echelon’’ informant? Unfortunately, it is difficult to provide a definitive answer to these questions because

the Committee has been denied access to potentially relevant

evidence.

• When FBI Special Agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon developed Joseph Barboza as a cooperating witness, Barboza told

them that he would not provide information that would allow

Jimmy Flemmi to ‘‘fry,’’ which should have alerted federal officials that Barboza would not provide accurate testimony as part

of the Deegan murder prosecution. There is no evidence that

any affirmative steps were taken to prevent Barboza from committing perjury in the Deegan capital murder trial, or to communicate to prosecutors or the court that Barboza had previously told the FBI he would not provide information about

Jimmy Flemmi. Furthermore, it appears that the FBI’s knowlVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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edge regarding Jimmy Flemmi’s motive for killing Deegan was

withheld until March of 2003. The failure to press Barboza regarding Flemmi’s involvement in the Deegan murder appears to

support the conclusion that Barboza’s false testimony was acceptable to some law enforcement officials.

• The lead prosecutor in the Deegan case testified that if he had

the information available to the FBI, he not only would have refrained from seeking the death penalty, he never would have indicted the defendants. He said:

I must tell you this, that I was outraged—outraged—at the

fact that if [the exculpatory documents] had ever been

shown to me, we wouldn’t be sitting here . . . I certainly

would never have allowed myself to prosecute this case

having that knowledge. No way. . . . That information

should have been in my hands. It should have been in the

hands of the defense attorneys. It is outrageous, it’s terrible, and that trial shouldn’t have gone forward.

He further testified that he now believes that Barboza’s FBI

handlers ‘‘knew from the beginning that Joe Barboza was lying.

. . . They have a witness that they knew was lying to me, and

they never told me he was lying.’’ He concluded: ‘‘[The FBI] figured, well, let’s flip Joe, and let Joe know that we’re not going

to push him on his friend Jimmy Flemmi. So they let Joe go on

and tell the story, leaving out Jimmy Flemmi; and then Jimmy

Flemmi is allowed to go on and be their informer.’’

• On January 5, 2001, Judge Margaret Hinkle of the Suffolk

County Superior Court stated, in granting defendant Peter

Limone a new trial:

[T]he jury would likely have reached a different conclusion

by this previously undisclosed evidence for two principal

reasons. First, the new evidence [previously undisclosed

FBI documents] casts serious doubt on Barboza’s credibility in his account of Limone’s role. Second, the new evidence reveals that Vincent James Flemmi, a participant of

some sort in the Deegan murder, was an FBI informant

around the time of the murder.

Thus, the court system responsible for the Deegan trial now recognizes that evidence in the hands of federal officials was indispensable to the administration of justice in the Deegan murder

prosecution.

• Senior staff close to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover were kept

personally informed of steps taken to develop Joseph Barboza as

a cooperating witness. Hoover or other senior law enforcement

officials were in possession of information that could have led

them to the conclusion that Barboza was committing perjury in

a capital murder case. If Barboza had not been permitted to lie

at trial, those indicted would not have been convicted. Furthermore, when Barboza was part of the Witness Protection Program, affirmative steps were taken to help him escape the consequences of a murder he committed in California. Director Hoover’s office was aware of these initiatives.

5

• Senior FBI staff—and possibly FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover—

appear to have been personally involved in decisions relating to

the development of Jimmy Flemmi as an informant. Notwithstanding the fact that those officials had received reports by

memorandum that Flemmi wanted ‘‘to become recognized as the

No. One ‘hit man’ in this area as a contract killer’’ and that

Flemmi had committed seven murders, ‘‘and, from all indications, he is going to continue to commit murder[,]’’ the FBI continued its efforts to develop and keep Flemmi as a Top Echelon

criminal informant. There was no evidence that anyone expressed concern that Jimmy Flemmi would kill people while

serving as a government informant. This is consistent with what

happened later when agents in the FBI’s Boston office used Stephen Flemmi and James Bulger—who appear to have been involved in at least nineteen homicides—as informants for nearly

a quarter of a century.

• Numerous murders—well in excess of 20—were allegedly committed by government informants Jimmy Flemmi, Stephen

Flemmi, and James Bulger. Evidence obtained by the Committee leaves no doubt that at least some law enforcement personnel, including officials in FBI Director Hoover’s office, were well

aware that federal informants were committing murders.

• The Committee received testimony and other evidence that

major homicide and criminal investigations in a number of

states—including Massachusetts, Connecticut, Oklahoma, California, Nevada, Florida and Rhode Island—were frustrated or

compromised by federal law enforcement officials intent on protecting informants. It appears that federal law enforcement actively worked to prevent homicide cases from being resolved.

• When the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility conducted an

investigation of the activities of New England law enforcement,

it concluded in 1997: ‘‘There is no evidence that prosecutorial

discretion was exercised on behalf of [James] Bulger and/or [Stephen] Flemmi.’’ This is untrue. Former U.S. Attorney Jeremiah

O’Sullivan was asked at the December 5, 2002 Committee hearing whether prosecutorial discretion had been exercised on behalf of Bulger and Flemmi, and he said that it had. A review

of documents in the possession of the Justice Department also

confirms this to be true. Had the Committee permitted an assertion of executive privilege by the President to go unchallenged,

this information would never have been known. That the Justice

Department concluded that prosecutorial discretion had not benefited Bulger or Flemmi—while at the same time fighting to

keep Congress from obtaining information proving this statement to be untrue—is extremely troubling.

• Although the Committee’s investigation focused on the Deegan

murder, a few observations must be made regarding James

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi:

• Former U.S. Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan testified that he

was aware Bulger and Flemmi were murderers, but that

they were not indicted in a race-fixing case because they

were minor players and their role was confined to receiving

6

ill-gotten gains from the illegal scheme. When confronted at

a hearing with his own memorandum indicating that Bulger

and Flemmi had a substantial role in every part of the criminal enterprise, O’Sullivan testified ‘‘[Y]ou got me[.]’’

• Former U.S. Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan testified that

there were fundamental problems between federal prosecutors and FBI investigators. O’Sullivan stated, for example,

‘‘[I]f you go against [the FBI], they will try to get you. They

will wage war on you. They will cause major administrative

problems for me as a prosecutor.’’ O’Sullivan also testified

that it ‘‘would have precipitated World War III if I tried to

get inside the FBI to deal with informants. That was the

holy of holies, inner sanctum. They wouldn’t have allowed

me to do anything about that[.]’’ O’Sullivan had so little confidence in the FBI that he recommended that federal agencies other than the FBI participate in a state investigation

of Bulger and Flemmi. Upon learning that O’Sullivan circumvented the FBI, the head of the Boston FBI office berated O’Sullivan for targeting Bureau informants for investigation.

• The use of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as an informant specifically undermined public confidence in the integrity of state

government by raising serious questions about whether the

FBI used its authority to protect former Massachusetts State

Senate President William Bulger from scrutiny by law enforcement or to advance his political career and whether he,

in turn, used his authority improperly and with impunity to

punish those who investigated his brother.

• Former State Senate President and now former University of

Massachusetts President William M. Bulger’s exercise of his

Fifth Amendment rights before the Committee in December

2002 delayed Congress’s receipt of his testimony regarding

Bulger’s possible knowledge of the favors done by FBI agents

for James Bulger, his knowledge of whether FBI personnel

assisted his own political career, his relationship with convicted former FBI Agent John Connolly, whether state government actions discouraged investigations of James Bulger,

and other information pertinent to the Committee’s investigation.

• The evidence before the Committee was insufficient to substantiate that William Bulger was complicit in any effort by

federal law enforcement to advance his career or that he

took any action to punish those who investigated his brother.

William Bulger’s testimony before the Committee, however,

with respect to the FBI’s efforts to contact him regarding his

brother’s whereabouts appeared to be inconsistent with a

former Special Agent’s recollection and his contemporaneous

report of his efforts to contact William Bulger. Nor could the

Committee substantiate William Bulger’s testimony that he

informed his lawyer who informed law enforcement of a telephone call with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger after he fled.

7

• Evidence regarding the relationship of former FBI agent

John Connolly and other FBI officials with James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and other informants remains the subject of ongoing

law enforcement efforts. The plea agreement of Stephen

Flemmi has implicated John Connolly in other murders and

resulted in the arrest of former FBI agent H. Paul Rico for

the 1981 murder of Oklahoma businessman Roger Wheeler.

Evidence related to these ongoing law enforcement efforts,

including the testimony of John Connolly, has not been

available to the Committee to date.

• The Justice Department made it very difficult for this Committee to conduct timely and effective oversight. Commenting specifically on the situation of Joseph Salvati, former FBI Director

Louis Freeh stated that the case is ‘‘obviously a great travesty,

a great failure, disgraceful to the extent that my agency or any

other law enforcement agency contributed to that.’’ Nevertheless, notwithstanding the certainty that a terrible injustice occurred, a number of steps were taken that were a major impediment to the Committee’s investigation:

• Executive privilege was claimed over documents important

to the Committee’s investigation. Although the Committee

eventually obtained access to the documents sought, months

of investigative time was lost.

• Disregarding a Committee document request made on June

5, 2001, the Justice Department failed to make adequate effort to provide the Committee with important FBI 209 interview summaries that purportedly document former FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico’s use of Stephen Flemmi in efforts

to obtain Joseph Barboza’s testimony in the Deegan murder

case.

• Many documents received by the Committee were unnecessarily redacted, making it difficult to understand the substance and context of the factual information communicated.

• The Justice Department claimed that it was unable to locate

significant information sought by the Committee. For example, four months after its April 16, 2002 request for documents related to a key witness, Robert Daddeico, who was

also well known to the FBI and the Justice Department, the

Justice Department claimed it needed more information to

be able to identify ‘‘Robert Daddeico’’ in Justice Department

files.

• The Justice Department failed to produce to the Committee

a document until December 16, 2002 prepared for the U.S.

Attorney’s Office in Boston in 1966 which indicates contemporaneous knowledge of who committed the Deegan murder.

• Another extremely disturbing document production failure

pertains to a June 5, 2001, request to the Justice Department to produce ‘‘all audiotape recordings, telephone wiretaps, other audio interceptions and transcripts relating to

Raymond Patriarca from January 1, 1962, to December 31,

1968.’’ Because Barboza and Flemmi traveled to Rhode IsVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
8

land to get Patriarca’s permission to kill Teddy Deegan, and

because there was microphone surveillance capturing conversations, documents pertaining to this request were of

paramount importance to the Committee. Indeed, the Justice

Department was aware of the importance attributed by the

Committee to these records. A few months after the initial

request, the Justice Department indicated that the Committee had received all documents relevant to the Patriarca

microphone surveillance. However, on December 2, 2002, one

and a half years after the Committee’s initial request, Task

Force supervisor John Durham indicated that contemporaneous handwritten logs had been prepared by FBI Special

Agents as conversations picked up by the microphone surveillance were monitored. These logs were not produced to

the Committee until late December of 2002. Many of the

most important sections of these documents were illegible.

When the Committee was finally able to review legible copies

of these documents in March of 2003, the Committee was

able to ascertain that there was unique and significant information in these documents. For example, one is able to discern a motive for Jimmy Flemmi’s wanting to murder

Deegan in these documents. This motive contradicts the motive offered by Joseph Barboza at trial and would have had

a significant bearing on the outcome of the Deegan case.

This information would have also been a significant element

in a number of Committee hearings and interviews.

These are but a few of the many examples that have led to concern with the Justice Department’s performance in assisting the

Committee with its investigation.

• The FBI’s Boston office continued to exhibit insensitivity to the

evidence of impropriety in the Deegan case. In early 2001, the

Special Agent in Charge of the Boston Office stated: ‘‘The FBI

was forthcoming. We didn’t conceal the information. We didn’t

attempt to frame anyone.’’ This supervisor was presumably referring to one document which indicates some information was

provided, by means of an anonymous tip, to the Chelsea Police

Department right after the Deegan murder. However, three

years later when the Deegan trial began, the FBI was in possession of considerable and reliable exculpatory evidence—including knowledge that Joseph Barboza would not provide accurate

information at trial—and this information was withheld from

state prosecutors. Moreover, those who received the information

provided in 1965 did not know it came from microphone surveillance and thus had a high degree of reliability. More significant,

however, is the contrast between the FBI’s representation that

information was not concealed and the Deegan prosecutor’s observation that if the relevant information had been shown to

him ‘‘we wouldn’t be sitting here . . . I certainly would never

have allowed myself to prosecute this case[.]’’

• In excess of two billion dollars in civil lawsuits were filed as the

direct result of federal law enforcement decisions to use Jimmy

Flemmi, Stephen Flemmi, and James Bulger as criminal informants. From the outset, the Department of Justice has used litiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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1 JOHN EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG ACTON, LORD ACTON AND HIS CIRCLE 166 (Abbot Gasquet

ed., 1968). 2 U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub nom. U.S. v.

Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000).

gation tactics to defeat these lawsuits that, at best, can be characterized as contrary to respect for the rule of law.

• The use of murderers as government informants created problems that were, and continue to be, extremely harmful to the

administration of justice.

• Incalculable damage to the public’s respect for the rule of law

has been done by the actions of federal law enforcement personnel in Boston from 1965 until the present.

II. WHY THE COMMITTEE INVESTIGATED THESE MATTERS

Edmund Burke said: ‘‘The only thing necessary for the triumph

of evil is for good men to do nothing.’’ No truer words could have

been written about federal law enforcement in Boston from the

1960s until the mid-1990s. While it is undoubtedly true that some

things done by federal law enforcement in Boston can be cited with

justifiable pride, it is also true that there was an undercurrent of

failure and corrupt practices. Unfortunately, that undercurrent

traveled to Washington and through the highest levels of the FBI.

It also had significant negative consequences for many states.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy of the Boston debacle is the doubt

cast on the integrity of the men and women who work for the Justice Department and, particularly, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The United States Department of Justice is, without a doubt,

the finest federal law enforcement organization in the world. The

men and women of the Justice Department are dedicated, professional public servants. The integrity of the vast majority of these

men and women is beyond reproach. Nevertheless, what happened

in New England over a forty year period raises doubts that can be

dispelled only by an obvious dedication to full disclosure of the

truth. It is the greatest strength of our democratic system that the

mistakes of the government can be assessed and placed before the

American people. This report attempts to serve this end, not only

for the purpose of informing, but also as a preamble to future legislative action.

At a time when the United States is faced by threats from international terrorism, and a number of law enforcement tools are

being justifiably strengthened, it is particularly important to remember that Lord Acton’s words are true:‘‘Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice.’’ 1 Federal District

Court Judge Mark Wolf began the landmark decision U.S. v.

Salemme 2 with Lord Acton’s words, and it is fitting that they be

repeated here because Judge Wolf began the oversight process that

led to this Committee’s investigation. He is owed a significant debt

of gratitude by everyone devoted to law enforcement in a democratic society.

10

3 CARTHA ‘‘DEKE’’ DELOACH, HOOVER’S FBI: THE INSIDE STORY BY HOOVER’S TRUSTED LIEUTENANT 302–03 (Regnery Publishing, Inc. 1995).

III. JOSEPH BARBOZA AND THE DEEGAN MURDER PROSECUTION: AN

EXTRAORDINARY FAILURE TO SERVE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE

What happened in New England over a forty year period is, without doubt, one of the greatest failures in federal law enforcement

history. It began with the development of Jimmy and Stephen

Flemmi as federal criminal informants, and with the prosecution of

six individuals for the murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. Evidence obtained by the Committee leads to the conclusion that the

death penalty was sought against innocent men regardless of compelling evidence of an injustice. In all probability, this happened

because informants were being protected and some members of the

FBI adopted an ‘‘ends justifies the means’’ approach to law enforcement.

A. BARBOZA, THE FLEMMIS, AND THE DEEGAN MURDER PROSECUTION

The two greatest challenges facing law enforcement in New England in the mid-1960s were organized crime and a gang war between supporters of feuding local criminals. It is not surprising,

therefore, that heavy reliance was placed on developing informants

to provide both advance notice of criminal activity and after-thefact intelligence. The need to develop informants was particularly

great in the area of organized crime. For decades, FBI Director J.

Edgar Hoover publicly maintained that there was no such thing as

organized crime. As Hoover’s long-time aide Cartha ‘‘Deke’’

DeLoach pointed out:

Despite this now-familiar history of the mob in America,

it surprises most people to learn that from the early 1930s

until 1957, J. Edgar Hoover had insisted that there was no

such thing as La Cosa Nostra—that is, a network of interrelated mobs that coordinated activities and maintained a

kind of corporate discipline. . . . His profound contempt of

the criminal mind, combined with his enormous faith in

the agency he created, persuaded him that no such complex national criminal organization could exist without

him knowing about it. He didn’t know about it; ergo it did

not exist.3

In retrospect, it is difficult to believe that federal law enforcement

failed to recognize decades of significant national, interstate criminal activity. Nevertheless, the Justice Department did not make organized crime a priority until the 1960s.

An important part of the initiative against organized crime began

with a decision in 1962 to commence a program of microphone surveillance of major suspected crime figures. In New England, this

began with the installation of a listening device in the headquarters of organized crime leader Raymond Patriarca. According

to a memorandum drafted in 1967 to recommend the prosecution

of Patriarca:

Raymond Patriarca was the subject of an F.B.I. electronic

surveillance by means of an electronic eavesdropping deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
11

4Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Assistant U.S. Attorney,

to Henry Petersen, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (June 6, 1967) (document

is retained by the Justice Department); see also Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, to Acting Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Dec. 22, 1966) (Exhibit 127) (‘‘The installation of the eavesdropping device placed in Jay’s Lounge was made under the general authority

of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. By memorandum of May 12, 1965, Attorney General

Katzenbach was advised that the device had been in operation since January 9, 1963, and he

authorized its continuance. It was discontinued on July 12, 1965.’’) (Exhibit numbers are derived

from an investigative chronology. The exhibits referred to in this Report are published at the

end of this Report in increasing numerical order). 5Memorandum from J.B. Adams to Mr. Callahan (Apr. 29, 1968) (Exhibit 226).

6Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 20, 1967) (Exhibit 141).

vice installed by trespass at his place of business, 168

Atwells Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island, during the period March 6, 1962 to July 12, 1965.4

The fact that such listening devices were installed ‘‘by trespass’’

proved to be of significance because it meant that information received from the listening device could not be used during prosecutions unless obtained by independent means. This proved to be of

consequence for a number of reasons. First, microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca provided significant information critical to one of the most important capital murder prosecutions in

Massachusetts’s history. Second, the microphone surveillance provided important insights into the conduct of government informants and cooperating witnesses.

The use of the Flemmi brothers as informants over three decades, and Joseph Barboza’s testimony as a cooperating witness in

the 1968 Teddy Deegan murder prosecution, appear to have commenced a pattern of unfortunate, and sometimes illegal, conduct

that will have ramifications for federal law enforcement for years

to come. The following sections discuss events from nearly forty

years ago that began with the murder of Teddy Deegan and continue today with the filing of over two billion dollars of civil claims

against the federal government.

1. Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza

Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza was described by the FBI as ‘‘the

most vicious criminal in New England’’ 5 and ‘‘a professional assassin responsible for numerous homicides and acknowledged by the

professional law enforcement representatives in this area to be the

most dangerous individual known.’’ 6 In addition to the Deegan

murder, the FBI had considerable information that he committed

a large number of particularly brutal homicides. An example of

Barboza’s extreme disregard for life is found in a memorandum addressed to FBI Director Hoover which discusses information obtained by microphone surveillance:

Joe Barboza requests permission from Patriarca to kill

some unknown person. This person lives in a three-story

house but Barboza has never been able to line him up to

kill him. Barboza told Raymond that he plans to pour gasoline in the basement part of the house and set it afire and

thus either kill the individual by smoke inhalation or fire,

or in the event he starts to climb out a window, Barboza

would have two or three individuals there with rifles to

kill him as he started to step out a window or door. Upon

12

7 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (May 18, 1965) (Exhibit 98). 8 VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 167 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1973). 9 Alan Jehlen, Two Say Grieco [sic] Innocent of Deegan Murder, PEABODY TIMES, June 9, 1971

(Exhibit 402). 10 Interview with Joseph Williams, former Supervisor of the Warrant & Investigation Unit,

Massachusetts Parole Board (June 29, 2001). 11 James Southwood, A Letter from Barboza, Why I Decided to Tell All, BOSTON HERALD, July

9, 1967 (Exhibit 148). 12 U.S. Dept. of Justice Identification Record (Mar. 2, 1976) (Exhibit 129). 13Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 20, 1967) (Exhibit 141). 14 Id.

questioning by Patriarca, Barboza said that he had

planned to cut the telephone wires so that the individual

could not call for assistance and also to ring false alarms

in other sections of the city so that the engines could not

respond quickly. He also explained that the third floor

apartment was vacant but the first floor apartment was

apparently occupied by the intended victim’s mother. This

apparently caused no concern to Barboza who stated it was

not his fault that the mother would be present, and he

would not care whether the mother died or not. Patriarca

told him that he did not think it was a good idea to effect

the killing in the above manner and attempted to dissuade

Barboza from this type of killing as innocent people would

probably be killed. It was not clear to the informant

whether Barboza accepted Patriarca’s objections, but

Patriarca indicated very strongly against this type of killing.7

Another description of Barboza’s cold-blooded nature was provided

by mafia informant Vincent Teresa:

Barboza went into the club [searching for a member of the

McLaughlin mob named Ray DiStasio] and caught

DiStasio cold. The trouble was, a poor slob named John B.

O’Neil, who had a bunch of kids, walked in to get a pack

of cigarettes. Barboza killed them both because he didn’t

want any witnesses. DiStasio got two in the back of the

head and O’Neil got three. It was a shame. I mean, this

O’Neil was a family man—he had nothing to do with the

mob. Barboza should have waited. That’s why he was so

dangerous. He was unpredictable. When he tasted blood,

everyone in his way got it.8

Barboza was reputed to have killed more than twenty people,9 and

he killed at least one person while part of the federal Witness Protection Program.10

In 1966, Barboza was arrested on a weapons charge.11 Due to a

large number of previous convictions, he faced an extremely

lengthy prison sentence for the charges brought against him. Perhaps because of this, he began cooperating with law enforcement

personnel the following year and received a relatively light four to

five year sentence.12 At this time, FBI Special Agents H. Paul Rico

and Dennis Condon began to work with Barboza to turn him into

a cooperating witness.13 Apparently, Barboza initially declined to

cooperate.14 However, Rico and Condon were able to use Stephen

Flemmi, the brother of Barboza’s best friend and partner Jimmy

13

15 Id. 16Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Cartha DeLoach (June 23, 1967) (Exhibit 144). 17See Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. July 2, 1968) (Exhibit 243); Patriarca v. U.S., 402 F. 2d 314 (D. Mass. 1968), cert. denied, 89 S. Ct. 633 (Jan.

20, 1969); and the murder trial of Rocco DiSeglio. 18See ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 170 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington). 19Memorandum to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Apr. 14, 1969) (Exhibit 272). Dennis

Condon’s name is written on this document. Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special

Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 150 (Feb. 21, 2002). 20 Robert Walsh, Baron Returning to Walpole for Week on Parole Violation, BOSTON GLOBE, August 28, 1970 (Exhibit 332). 21Killer Barboza Slain, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 12, 1976 (Exhibit 636). 22Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Oct. 19, 1964) (Exhibit 56); Airtel from Boston FBI Field Office to J.

Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 19, 1964) (Exhibit 56). 23 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Oct. 20, 1964) (Exhibit 57). 24 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Mar. 10, 1965) (Exhibit 68). Due to Justice Department redactions, it is impossible to determine when this request to kill Deegan actually took place. However, because the entry regarding Deegan is made in a series of chronological entries after a March 5, 1965, entry, and

before a March 8, 1965, entry, a reasonable reading of the document seems to indicate that the

request took place between March 5 and 7, 1965. This would distinguish this request from a

very clear request to kill Deegan made by Jimmy Flemmi and Joseph Barboza on March 9,

1965.

Flemmi, to obtain his cooperation.15 In fact, one high level FBI

memorandum indicates that Rico and Condon ‘‘developed’’ Stephen

Flemmi to obtain Barboza’s cooperation.16 It is unclear from the

records whether the FBI’s knowledge of Jimmy Flemmi’s participation in the Deegan murder—or any other murder—was used to convince Stephen Flemmi or Joseph Barboza to cooperate with federal

law enforcement.

Barboza eventually testified in three trials as a cooperating witness.17 He is generally acknowledged to be the first participant in

the federal Witness Protection Program.18 After being relocated to

California, he was considered as a possible Top Echelon informant

by the FBI.19 According to testimony provided by Barboza, he also

returned to Massachusetts at the behest of the FBI on a number

of occasions to assist them on a case involving the theft of a

$500,000 painting.20 If true, this would have meant that federal

law enforcement actively encouraged Barboza to break the terms of

his parole. Barboza later committed at least one additional homicide and was incarcerated, a subject which is discussed extensively

later in this report. Barboza was murdered on February 11, 1976.21

2. The Murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan was, by all accounts, a peripheral figure

in the Boston underworld of the 1960s. In late 1964, the FBI

learned from an informant that Jimmy Flemmi wanted to kill

Deegan.22 Two days later, on October 20, 1964, Deegan was called

and warned that Flemmi was looking for him and that Flemmi intended to kill him.23 Five months later, between March 5 and

March 7, 1965, Jimmy Flemmi met with Raymond Patriarca and

asked for permission to kill Deegan.24 This request was renewed a

couple of days later on March 9, 1965, when Flemmi and Joseph

Barboza visited Patriarca and ‘‘explained that they are having a

problem with Teddy Deegan and desired to get the ‘OK’ to kill him.

. . . Flemmi stated that Deegan is an arrogant, nasty sneak and

14

25 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, and Special Agents in Charge, Albany, Buffalo, and Miami FBI Field Offices (Mar. 12,

1965) (Exhibit 70). 26FBI Report by Charles A. Reppucci, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (July 20, 1965)

(Exhibit 69). 27 Handwritten Notes of Microphone Surveillance of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, (March 9, 1965)

(Exhibit 967). 28Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 72). This information has been characterized as

believable and coming from a credible source in a position clearly to have heard what was communicated. Interview with John Durham, Special Attorney, District of Massachusetts, U.S.

Dept. of Justice, and Gary Bald, Special Agent in Charge, Baltimore FBI Field Office (Dec. 2,

2002). There is, however, some confusion on the point of whether Patriarca provided his assent

on March 9, 1965, and at least one FBI document states that Barboza and Flemmi were told

to check with Gennaro Angiulo before taking any action. 29Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 77). 30 Id. The informant was Flemmi’s associate. 31Memorandum from H.E. Campbell, Inspector, to James L. Handley, Special Agent in

Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 10, 1965) (Exhibit 74). 32For a more complete review of contradictory information, refer to Statement of Captain Joseph Kozlowski (March 12, 1965) (Exhibit 76); Boston Police Department Report (Mar. 14, 1965)

(Exhibit 79); Statement by Thomas F. Evans, Lieutenant, Chelsea Police Department (Mar. 14,

1965) (Exhibit 80); Massachusetts State Police Report by Richard J. Cass, Detective Lieutenant

Inspector, to Daniel I. Murphy, Captain of Detectives (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 81); Airtel from

Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 19,

1965) (Exhibit 84); Memorandum from [Redacted], Special Agent, to Special Agent in Charge,

Boston FBI Field Office (Apr. 6, 1965) (Exhibit 85); Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston

FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 24, 1965) (Exhibit 86); Airtel from

Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and Special

Agents in Charge, New Haven, New York, and Washington FBI Field Offices (May 7, 1965) (Exhibit 96); Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (June 9, 1965) (Exhibit 102) (On April 25, 2002, the Department of Justice

released an unredacted version of this document to the Committee. That document revealed that

‘‘BS–919–PC [Jimmy Flemmi] has murdered Frank Benjamin, John Murray, George Ashe, Joseph Francione, Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan, and ‘Iggy’ Lowry[.]’’ The document further divulged

should be killed.’’ 25 An FBI agent who prepared a memorandum

about the microphone surveillance noted that Flemmi and Barboza

requested permission to kill Deegan. He also stated that mob boss

Raymond ‘‘Patriarca ultimately furnished this ‘OK.’ ’’ 26 Perhaps as

important, handwritten notes prepared by an FBI Special Agent

who was monitoring the conversation between Flemmi, Barboza

and Patriarca indicate that Flemmi’s motive for killing Deegan was

tied to the McLean-McLaughlin gang war, and that Flemmi was

particularly concerned that ‘‘Deegan fills Peter Limone’s head with

all kinds of stories.’’ 27 Reporting on his contacts of the following

day, FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico wrote a memorandum explaining that an informant told him that he had just heard from Jimmy

Flemmi and that Patriarca had put out the word that Deegan was

to be ‘‘hit.’’ 28 On March 12, 1965, Deegan was murdered.

Recording his contacts on the day after the murder, Special

Agent Rico wrote a memorandum based on information obtained

from an informant. The memorandum describes the Deegan murder in detail, including information Jimmy Flemmi personally provided to an informant.29 Flemmi admitted that he was one of the

men who killed Deegan.30 This is a matter of great importance because the previous day—the day that Deegan was murdered—

Jimmy Flemmi was assigned to Special Agent Rico to be developed

as an informant.31 Over the course of the next few weeks, at least

nine descriptions of the Deegan murder were prepared by federal

and state law enforcement officials. Each of these descriptions provides details of the murder substantially different than the

uncorroborated testimony provided three years later by Joseph

Barboza when the matter finally went to trial.32 Unfortunately for

15

that Flemmi feels that the McLaughlin group will try to kill him.); Memorandum from Helen

Hatch, Correlator, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 14, 1965) (Exhibit

104). 33There is some evidence that a small subset of this information was made available to two

lawyers who represented defendants in the Deegan case. It is fair to say, however, that no one

was exposed to the cumulative weight of all of the different pieces of evidence. More important,

it is certain that attorneys for at least four defendants were not permitted to review any information obtained by microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca. Thus, witness Joseph

Barboza could not be effectively impeached, nor could alternative theories of the murder be

properly explored. 34Those convicted were: Henry Tameleo (death), Louis Greco (death), Ronald Cassesso (death),

Peter Limone (death), Joseph Salvati (life), and Roy French (life). 35On December 2, 2002, it became clear that the Committee had not been furnished the informant file of Stephen Flemmi. This seemed to come as a surprise to Justice Department Task

Force Supervisor John Durham. Justice Department officials pointed out at this meeting that

the file was sealed by Judge Wolf in U.S. v. Salemme. This observation ignored Judge Wolf’s

request that the Justice Department work with the Committee to permit the Committee access

to documents important to its investigation. Letter from the Honorable Mark L. Wolf, District

Judge, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, to the Honorable Dan

Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Jan. 11, 2002) (Appendix I). 36FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report by Joshua Hochberg and Charles S. Prouty

(Aug. 13, 1997) (Appendix II). 37Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 9, 1965) (Exhibit 71). 38 Id. 39Memorandum from H.E. Campbell, Inspector, to James L. Handley, Special Agent in

Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 10, 1965) (Exhibit 74). 40Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (Apr. 9, 1965) (Exhibit 90); Letter from John H. Durham,

Special Attorney, and Donald K. Stern, U.S. Attorney, District of Massachusetts, U.S. Dept. of

Justice, to John Cavicchi, Attorney (Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit 928). Flemmi was contacted at least

Continued

the defendants at that trial, relevant information was covered up

when the government failed to disclose to all defendants that exculpatory information had been captured by the FBI’s microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca. Perhaps more unfortunate, federal

officials failed to step in and prevent Joseph Barboza from committing perjury, notwithstanding the fact that it was a death penalty

case.33 Four men received the death penalty, and two men received

a sentence of life in prison.34

3. Developing the Flemmi Brothers as Informants

It is difficult to assess the Deegan murder and prosecution without an understanding of how federal law enforcement was attempting to develop Jimmy and Stephen Flemmi as criminal informants.35 The following is a brief chronological description of efforts

known to the Committee to obtain the services of the Flemmi

brothers as informants during the 1960s:

November 1964—Stephen Flemmi was first targeted as an informant for the FBI’s Boston office’s bank robbery squad.36

March 9, 1965—FBI Director Hoover was informed by memorandum that Jimmy Flemmi was targeted to be a Top Echelon informant.37 He was also told that Flemmi had murdered three individuals, one of whom was an FBI informant.38 This was the same day

that Flemmi and Barboza asked Raymond Patriarca for permission

to kill Teddy Deegan.

March 12, 1965—Jimmy Flemmi was assigned to Special Agent

Rico to be developed as an informant by Special Agent Rico.39

March 12, 1965—Teddy Deegan was murdered.

April 5, 1965—Jimmy Flemmi gave Rico information.40

16

four additional times as an informant by Special Agent Rico. Id. Those dates of contact were

May 10, 1965, June 4, 1965, July 22, 1965, and July 27, 1965. Id. 41Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI

Field Office (June 4, 1965) (Exhibit 100). 42Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 8, 1965) (Exhibit 101). 43Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 9, 1965) (Exhibit 102). 44Memorandum from H.E. Campbell, Inspector, to James L. Handley, Special Agent in

Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 10, 1965) (Exhibit 74). 45Letter from John H. Durham, Special Attorney, and Donald K. Stern, U.S. Attorney, District of Massachusetts, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to John Cavicchi, Attorney (Dec. 19, 2000) (Exhibit

928). 46Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Nov. 3, 1965) (Exhibit 111). 47 Interview with John Durham, Special Attorney, District of Massachusetts, U.S. Dept. of

Justice, and Gary Bald, Special Agent in Charge, Baltimore FBI Field Office (Dec. 2, 2002). 48FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report by Joshua Hochberg and Charles S. Prouty

(Aug. 13, 1997) (Appendix II). 49Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 20, 1967) (Exhibit 141). 50 Id. 51FBI Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Cartha DeLoach (June 23, 1967) (Exhibit 144). 52Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 29, 1968) (Exhibit 213).

June 4, 1965—Director Hoover made an inquiry about Jimmy

Flemmi.41

June 8, 1965—Rico talked to Jimmy Flemmi about financial payments.42

June 9, 1965—Director Hoover’s office was informed by memorandum that Jimmy Flemmi had committed seven murders, including

the Deegan murder, ‘‘he is going to continue to commit murder[,]’’

but ‘‘the informant’s potential outweighs the risk involved.’’ 43

June 10, 1965—Memorandum indicating that Jimmy Flemmi was

assigned to Rico on March 12, 1965.44

September 15, 1965—Jimmy Flemmi was closed as an informant

due to a crime.45

November 3, 1965—FBI Director Hoover’s office was informed by

memorandum that Stephen Flemmi was targeted as an informant.46

February 7, 1967—Stephen Flemmi began to work for the FBI as

a Top Echelon Criminal Informant.47

February 14, 1967—Stephen Flemmi was approved as a Top Echelon informant.48

Early 1967—Stephen Flemmi was used to convince Barboza to testify.49

June 20, 1967—FBI Director Hoover’s office was informed by

memorandum that Stephen Flemmi was developed by Rico and

Condon and used in interviews with Joseph Barboza.50

June 23, 1967—FBI senior official Cartha DeLoach was told that

Special Agents Rico and Condon developed Stephen Flemmi.51

March 29, 1968—FBI Director Hoover’s office was informed by

memorandum that Special Agent Rico used Stephen Flemmi to develop Barboza.52

17

53Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. May 27, 1968) (Exhibit

235). 54Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 9, 1965) (Exhibit 71). 55 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, and Special Agent in Charge, New York FBI Field Office (Apr. 13, 1965) (Exhibit 89). 56FBI Report by Charles A. Reppucci, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (July 20, 1965)

(Exhibit 94). 57Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Sept. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 109). 58Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171). 59Memorandum from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 25,

1967) (Exhibit 172).

May 27, 1968—The Deegan murder trial began.53

As this chronology makes clear, the effort to develop both Jimmy

and Stephen Flemmi began either before or at the time of the

Deegan murder. Moreover, despite the fact that the FBI knew that

Jimmy Flemmi had committed seven murders—including the

Deegan murder—and was ‘‘going to continue to commit murder,’’

Director Hoover and his staff decided to use Flemmi as an informant. On this point there was no ambiguity: just three days before

Jimmy Flemmi was assigned to Special Agent Rico to be developed

as an informant, Director Hoover’s office was notified that Flemmi

was a murderer.54 Indeed, Jimmy Flemmi’s proclivity to commit serious crimes was not in doubt. One memorandum from the head of

the FBI’s Boston office to Director Hoover discusses how Flemmi

had been paid $1,500 for disposing of the body of a girl.55 The following month, on May 5, 1965, microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca showed that Flemmi, and Joseph Barboza and Ronald Cassesso, asked Raymond Patriarca for permission to murder

a man named Sammy Linden.56 The fact that Flemmi was a murderer, and planned to commit additional murders, went

unremarked. Apparently, the decision had already been made to

take on murderers as informants. Flemmi was eventually closed as

an informant not because of concerns that he would commit additional homicides. Rather, in September of 1965, he was charged by

state authorities with ‘‘Assault with a Dangerous Weapon with Intent to Murder’’ after he had shot another person. The FBI decided

to close him as an informant ‘‘[i]n view of the fact that informant

is presently a local fugitive’’ and ‘‘any contacts with him might

prove to be difficult and embarrassing.’’57

By the time of the Deegan murder prosecution, both Jimmy and

Stephen Flemmi had been active federal law enforcement informants, and both men were known to have been involved in a number

of homicides. This fact is important when assessing the efforts to

develop Joseph Barboza as a cooperating witness in 1967 and 1968.

Jimmy Flemmi had been closed because he might become embarrassing. It would take another three decades for Stephen Flemmi

to become one of the greatest embarrassments in FBI history.

4. The Deegan Murder Prosecution

Teddy Deegan was murdered on March 12, 1965. Two and a half

years later, Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza testified about the

Deegan murder before a Suffolk County grand jury.58 Immediately

afterwards, a number of individuals were arrested.59 The following

year, on May 27, 1968, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts began

18

60Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. May 27, 1968) (Exhibit

235). The six individuals tried for the murder of Deegan were: Wilfred ‘‘Roy’’ French, Peter

Limone, Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso, Louis Greco, and Joseph Salvati. 61 Judge Margaret Hinkle provides a concise summary of the testimony:

Barboza testified at trial that about January 20, 1965, Limone saw Barboza and offered

him a ‘‘contract’’ to kill Deegan for $7,500, and told Barboza that this had been approved by the ‘‘office.’’ Barboza spoke with Tameleo a few days later to confirm that

the ‘‘office’’ approved of the murder. Tameleo agreed to it. Some weeks later, after securing the assistance of others, some of whom would become Limone’s codefendants at

trial, Barboza reported to Limone that the murder would occur soon but that

Stathopoulos would be involved. According to Barboza, Limone agreed to add $2,500 if

Stathopoulos were also killed. Barboza confirmed with Tameleo that it was okay to kill

Stathopoulos as well. According to the evidence presented at trial, the murder of

Deegan was carried out by Barboza, Cassesso, Salvati, French, Grieco [sic] and others,

not including Limone. Stathopoulos escaped. Some time later, Barboza testified, he met

with Limone, who paid him for the Deegan murder.

Commonwealth v. Limone, Cr. No. 32367, 32369, 32370, slip op. at *3 (Suffolk County Sup. Ct.,

Jan. 5, 2001)) (Exhibit 931). If this testimony were true, there would have been no need for

Flemmi and Barboza to travel to Providence to seek permission to kill Deegan in March of 1965. 62 Barboza told the Deegan jury that he was ‘‘hoping for a break,’’ that he was hoping that

his testimony ‘‘would be taken into consideration,’’ and ‘‘the only promise that has been made

in regards to [his testimony] is that the FBI will bring it to the attention of the Judge.’’ Trial

Transcript, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. July 2, 1968) at 4456, 4460

(Exhibit 243). He also said his wife and child would be protected. Id. at 4652. When asked if

‘‘they made more promises than what you’ve told us about,’’ Barboza answered, ‘‘No, sir.’’ Id.

at 4653. Thus testimony, which does not appear to be accurate, will be discussed later in this

report. 63Deegan Trial: 4 Get Chair, 2 Life; Judge Hails Jury, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1968 (Exhibit

247). The death penalty sentences were later changed to life in prison after the Supreme Court

determined that the death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238

(1972). 64The FBI had opened a file on Edward Deegan in 1965. Thus, at the time that Joseph

Barboza was beginning to cooperate with federal officials, those officials had available to them

information collected at the time of the Deegan murder. In addition, federal prosecutors had

been furnished with information that contradicted the version of events provided by Barboza in

1967 and 1968. See FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special Agent,

Boston FBI Field Office (January 14, 1966).

the prosecution of six individuals implicated by Joseph Barboza for

the murder of Teddy Deegan.60 Barboza testified about the details

of the conspiracy to murder Deegan, how the homicide was carried

out,61 and about promises or inducements offered to him by the

federal government.62 After a two month trial, all six defendants

were convicted: four men received the death penalty and two individuals were sentenced to life in prison.63

Any assessment of the Deegan murder prosecution must focus on

five areas. First, did Barboza’s pretrial dealings with federal law

enforcement officials inspire confidence that he was telling the

truth? 64 Second, was his grand jury testimony consistent with facts

known to law enforcement personnel. Third, did the story told at

trial by Joseph Barboza bear any relationship to information in

possession of federal and state law enforcement officials about who

really killed Deegan? Fourth, did law enforcement personnel obtain

false testimony from Anthony Stathopoulos, who had accompanied

Deegan to the location where Deegan was ultimately murdered.

Fifth, did those who provided testimony give an accurate summary

of what Barboza had been promised in exchange for his testimony.

Each of these areas raises significant questions, and now that evidence withheld from defendants at the time of trial has been obtained by the Committee, it appears that Barboza’s story was so

different from information known to federal officials that he should

never have been permitted to testify. At the very least, contemporaneous FBI interviews should have reflected a vigorous effort to determine why Barboza’s story differed from what was already known

19

65Document is retained by the Justice Department. 66‘‘Investigations of Allegations of Law Enforcement Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearing

Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 21, 34 (May 11, 2002) (testimony of Jack

Zalkind). 67 Id. at 52, 68–69, 76. 68Memorandum from [Redacted] to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Apr. 14, 1969) (Exhibit

272). The FBI historically categorized its informants according to their potential productivity.

The most potentially productive informants were designated as Top Echelon informants. See

generally RALPH RANALLI, DEADLY ALLIANCE (HarperTorch 2001) (provides an analysis of the

FBI’s informant program). 69 Robert Walsh, Baron Returning to Walpole for Week on Parole Violation, BOSTON GLOBE,

August 28, 1970 (Exhibit 332).

to federal law enforcement. This is particularly important because,

just after the Deegan murder, FBI Director Hoover or his staff

thought that the information contained in the logs of microphone

surveillance of Raymond Patriarca was significant.65 Nevertheless,

the FBI interviews obtained by the Committee show that no effort

was made to compare what Barboza was prepared to say about the

Deegan murder with information already in the FBI’s possession.

As Jack Zalkind, the prosecutor in the Deegan case, told the Committee:

I must tell you this, that I was outraged—outraged—at the

fact that if [the exculpatory documents] had ever been

shown to me, we wouldn’t be sitting here . . . I certainly

would never have allowed myself to prosecute this case

having that knowledge. No way. . . . That information

should have been in my hands. It should have been in the

hands of the defense attorneys. It is outrageous, it’s terrible, and that trial shouldn’t have gone forward.66

***

[Barboza’s FBI handlers] knew from the beginning that

Joe Barboza was lying. . . . They have a witness that they

knew was lying to me, and they never told me he was

lying. . . . [The FBI] figured, well, let’s flip Joe, and let

Joe know that we’re not going to push him on his friend

Jimmy Flemmi. So they let Joe go on and tell the story,

leaving out Jimmy Flemmi; and then Jimmy Flemmi is allowed to go on and be their informer.67

The evidence is overwhelming that Barboza should not have been

permitted to testify in the Deegan murder prosecution. Nevertheless, it was his uncorroborated testimony that was used in the

Deegan prosecution that led to four men being sentenced to death

and two others receiving life sentences.

i. Barboza’s Pretrial Dealings with Federal Officials

Prior to the Deegan trial, Barboza, in effect, told federal law enforcement that he was not going to tell the truth about the Deegan

murder and that at least some federal officials were unconcerned

that he would commit perjury in a death penalty case. Nevertheless, federal law enforcement officials continued to supply him with

money and protection. Incredibly, federal officials even considered

using him in California as a Top Echelon informant,68 and he may

have been encouraged by federal law enforcement personnel to violate the terms of his state parole by returning to Massachusetts.69

20

70 In a memorandum to Attorney General Elliot L. Richardson, H. Paul Rico, Dennis Condon,

and Edward Harrington were praised for developing Joseph Barboza as a successful witness.

Memorandum from Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S.

Dept. of Justice, to Elliot L. Richardson, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (July 24, 1973)

(Exhibit 576). 71FBI Interview Report by Dennis M. Condon and H. Paul Rico, Special Agents, Boston FBI

Field Office (Mar. 8, 1967) (Exhibit 131). When asked about Barboza’s statement, Condon said:

‘‘I don’t have any recollection of the conversation; but reading what I have in front of me, I think

it’s an accurate portrayal of what he said.’’ Condon further indicated that the interview summary of Barboza’s comment that he would not provide information that would allow Jimmy

Flemmi to ‘‘fry’’ was ‘‘prepared by both of us [Rico and Condon], contemporaneously.’’ Deposition

of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 81–82 (February 21, 2002).

When asked whether the plain meaning of Barboza’s statement was that Barboza would not provide information that would put Flemmi ‘‘in a situation where he would face a capital murder

charge,’’ Condon replied ‘‘I would have to say that that looks like a true statement.’’ Id. at 83. 72Memorandum from SAC, Boston, to Director, FBI (June 20, 1967).

The first recorded meeting between Barboza and FBI Special

Agents Rico and Condon, which took place on March 8, 1967, was

probably the most significant.70 Barboza informed the agents that

he would consider providing information about murders committed

in the Boston area, but that ‘‘he would never provide information

that would allow James Vincent Flemmi [sic] to ‘fry[.]’ ’’ 71 Barboza

was true to his word. Shortly thereafter, he did begin providing information. Two questions are of particular concern to the Committee: (1) why did Barboza provide information? and (2) how did he

succeed in keeping his friend and confederate Jimmy Flemmi out

of his story about the Deegan murder? Part of the answer can be

found in a document that recommends a pay increase for Special

Agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon. Approximately three

months after Rico and Condon began working to develop Barboza’s

testimony, the head of the FBI’s Boston office sent the following

‘‘Recommendation for Quality Salary Increase’’ to Washington:

Realizing the potential that [redacted name] might one

day be victim of a homicide, SAs Condon and Rico have

continued vigorous attempts to obtain additional high

quality LCN sources. Accordingly, BS 955 C–TE [Stephen

Flemmi] was developed by these agents and via imaginative direction and professional ingenuity utilized said

source in connections with interviews of JOSEPH

[BARBOZA], a professional assassin responsible for numerous homicides and acknowledged by all professional

law enforcement representatives in this area to be the

most dangerous individual known. SAs Rico and Condon

contacted [Barboza] in an effort to convince him he should

testify against the LCN. [Barboza] initially declined to testify but through utilization of BS 955 C–TE, the agents

were able to convey to [Barboza] that his present incarceration and potential for continues incarceration for the rest

of his life, was wholly attributable to LCN efforts directed

by Gennaro J. Angiulo, LCN Boston head. As a result of

this information received by [Barboza] from BS 955 C–TE,

said individual said he would testify against the LCN

members.72

This memorandum appears to contradict testimony to the Committee provided by former Special Agent Dennis Condon who, when

asked whether he used a particular informant, either human or

21

73Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 8 (February

21, 2002). Condon was asked whether he knew the identity of ‘‘BS 955 C–TE’’ and he stated

that he did not. Id. 74 It is worth noting that, the previous year, Dennis Condon was ‘‘involved in a substantive

error write-up case when a review of an informant file disclosed an instance of failure to properly disseminate information obtained from the informant.’’ Memorandum from S.R. Burns to

Mr. Walsh (Oct. 22, 1975) at 19 (Exhibit 123). Nevertheless, a few weeks after Condon and Rico

first interviewed Barboza, Condon’s participation in the informant program was considered outstanding. Id. (Exhibit 135). When testifying in U.S. v. Salemme, former Special Agent Condon

insisted that at the time Frank Salemme was apprehended in New York in November 1972, he

had no idea Stephen Flemmi was an informant. Given the personnel records indicating that Rico

and Condon used Flemmi to obtain Joseph Barboza’s testimony, this does not seem credible. 75 Critical information about the Deegan murder had also been provided to a number of federal prosecutors. See, e.g., FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special

Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Jan. 14, 1966) (Exhibit 116); Memorandum from Walter T.

Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Henry Petersen, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (June 6, 1967) (document retained by the Justice Department). Therefore, it is not implausible that federal prosecutors also realized that Barboza would

not tell the truth at the Deegan murder trial. 76Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 28, 1967) (Exhibit 134). 77 Id.

electronic, to help obtain Barboza’s testimony, replied ‘‘No, I

didn’t.’’ 73

Thus, at the time Special Agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis

Condon first began to develop Barboza’s testimony, two facts were

critical. First, Barboza said that he would not provide information

that would allow Jimmy Flemmi to ‘‘fry.’’ Second, Stephen Flemmi,

Jimmy Flemmi’s brother, was used by Rico and Condon to convince

Barboza to testify.74 It is highly unlikely that Stephen Flemmi

would have allowed himself to be used by the FBI if his efforts led

his brother to the electric chair. With all these facts in mind, it is

almost inconceivable that at least Special Agents Rico and Condon

were not aware that Barboza was going to commit perjury at the

Deegan trial.75 Furthermore, Rico and Condon were aware that

Barboza had consulted with Jimmy Flemmi between the FBI’s first

and second interviews of Barboza. Barboza had gone so far as to

tell Flemmi that he was thinking of having one of his gang members corroborate his testimony. Flemmi told Barboza that he

thought obtaining corroboration was an excellent idea.76 This was

of particular importance at the time because the head of the FBI’s

Boston office informed Washington that ‘‘[t]his office is aware of

the distinct possibility that [Barboza], in order to save himself from

a long prison sentence, may try to intimidate [Patrick] Fabiano into

testifying to something that he may not be a witness to.’’ 77 It is

not explained how the FBI had come to this conclusion. Nevertheless, the consultation between Barboza and Flemmi, and Barboza’s

exploration of having someone corroborate his testimony, provide

additional reasons for concern with his testimony.

It is also particularly revealing that in the many thousands of

pages of documents produced to the Committee by the Justice Department, no one appears to have confronted Barboza with the obvious question: given the convincing information that Flemmi committed the Deegan murder and that Barboza told the FBI he would

not give the government information about Flemmi that would

allow Flemmi to ‘‘fry,’’ why should the FBI not conclude that you

are going to commit perjury when you testify.

When former FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon testified, he

made it clear that he did not remember anyone asking the critical

22

78Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (February

21, 2002). 79Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171). 80 Barboza was in federal custody, his interviews were conducted in the presence of federal

law enforcement officials, he was the subject of intense interest at the highest levels of the Justice Department, he was a witness in a federal trial, and his testimony in one case would undoubtedly have ramifications for other cases. In order for Barboza to be a federal witness, and

to merit protection by the federal government, federal officials would have had to have known

what his testimony would have been regarding the various matters about which he was prepared to testify. They would also have had to know the details of his testimony in order to dequestions about Jimmy Flemmi and his participation in the Deegan

murder:

Rep. LATOURETTE: The question I have is, if you follow

this time line—and the time line is Rico receives confidential information that Barboza and Flemmi want to kill

Deegan [and the Patriarca bug confirms a] confidential

conversation where they overhear a conversation that

Barboza and Flemmi say they actually go down and say

they want to take out Teddy. The Department has that.

Were you aware of that in 1965 or 1966?

Mr. CONDON: Not to my knowledge.

Rep. LATOURETTE: But when this prosecution memo that

you have in front of you was written, apparently the Assistant United States Attorneys are able to ferret that out.

Was that disclosed to you?

Mr. CONDON: That’s correct.

Rep. LATOURETTE: I think the difficulty I had is this, and

it came about when Mr. Wilson was asking questions before. When Mr. Barboza is being prepared as a witness in

the Deegan trial, which we now know was testimony that

wasn’t right in terms of who he fingered, were you ever in

a meeting with Mr. Rico or the representatives of the state

prosecuting authority when somebody asked him or confronted him about the discrepancies in versions that the

Department had information on, both the Rico documents

and also these tapes from Patriarca’s place of business?

Mr. CONDON: Not to my memory, no.

Rep. LATOURETTE: Were you ever in a meeting where anybody asked him, where was Jimmy Flemmi?

Mr. CONDON: I don’t remember ever being in such a meeting.78

ii. Barboza’s Grand Jury Testimony

Joseph Barboza testified before a Suffolk County grand jury on

October 25, 1967.79 The information he provided was contradicted

by information already known to federal officials, which rendered

Barboza’s testimony suspect. It is inconceivable that federal law enforcement officials did not know what Barboza was going to tell the

grand jury and what he did tell the grand jury. Therefore, it is very

likely that at least some federal officials understood that Barboza

had committed perjury before the Suffolk County grand jury and

that he was prepared to provide testimony at trial that was not

true.80

23

velop their own cases and investigations. Moreover, federal officials had information that Raymond Patriarca was involved in the Deegan murder, and it is inconceivable that this would not

have been the subject of intense interest. 81Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza 115 (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171). 82 Id. 83FBI Report by Charles A. Reppucci, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (July 20, 1965)

(Exhibit 69). 84Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 72). 85Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171).

Barboza did not provide any information to the grand jury about

Jimmy Flemmi and Flemmi’s involvement in the Deegan murder.

More important, however, he explained that he and Ronald

Cassesso planned to take credit for the murder, and that the only

person besides himself who knew that ‘‘the Office’’ was involved in

the prospective murder was Ronald Cassesso.81 Barboza was asked

‘‘So the only one at this time that knew you were doing this for the

Office was Ronnie Cassesso?’’ Barboza replied: ‘‘Yes.’’ 82 This testimony completely avoids the fact that Barboza and Flemmi had visited Raymond Patriarca three days before the murder to seek his

permission to kill Deegan.83 It also avoids the fact, known to the

FBI and memorialized in an FBI memorandum authored by H.

Paul Rico, that Jimmy Flemmi had told an informant that ‘‘Raymond Patriarca has put out the word that Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan

is to be ‘hit’ and that a dry run has already been made and that

a close associate of Deegan’s has agreed to set him up.’’ 84 Thus,

Barboza’s story about how he and Cassesso were the only two who

knew that Patriarca had been consulted was obviously false to anyone who had knowledge of the FBI’s microphone surveillance of

Patriarca and who had access to the informant to whom Jimmy

Flemmi had confided. This information was not provided to the

Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, and consequently it was

not available at a time when Barboza’s credibility was being assessed.

The chronology of events provided by Barboza to the grand jury

also makes it plain that he was committing perjury. Barboza stated

that Peter Limone first approached him in February of 1965 to hire

Barboza to kill Deegan.85 And yet when Barboza and Flemmi approached Patriarca in March to seek Patriarca’s permission for the

Deegan murder, all indications are that this was the first time the

subject had come up. Furthermore, the microphone surveillance

captured no discussion about Limone’s involvement. Indeed, one

FBI memorandum suggests that Patriarca told Barboza and

Flemmi to consult with Gennaro Angiulo about their intention to

kill Deegan. It is highly unlikely that if Limone had already offered

money to have Deegan killed, that either Barboza or Flemmi would

have asked Patriarca for permission to kill Deegan and failed to

have told him that they had already been contracted to kill

Deegan.

It is also curious that Barboza testified that Peter Limone had

offered money for Barboza to kill Deegan. According to documents

provided by the Justice Department to the Committee, Limone and

Deegan appeared to be on good terms. A few months before Limone

allegedly hired Barboza to kill Deegan, Limone gave Deegan two

24

86Memorandum from SAC, Boston, to Director, FBI and SAC, New Haven (September 17,

1964) (Exhibit 52). 87Memorandum from H. Paul Rico to Redacted Name (October 18, 1964) (Exhibit 56) (stating

‘‘Flemmi advised that Deegan owes Flemmi’s brother, Stevie, some money, and that he told him

once to get the money up. He has not gotten the money up, and Flemmi wants to kill Deegan

and wanted the informant to go with him on the ‘hit.’ ’’); Memorandum from SAC, Boston, to

Director, FBI (October 20, 1964) (Exhibit 57) (stating ‘‘Immediately after [Jimmy] Flemmi left,

he [Limone] called Deegan and told him that Flemmi was looking for him, allegedly for a

$300.00 loan which Deegan owes Flemmi. Deegan denied any such loan. Therefore, they were

of the opinion that Flemmi was out to kill Deegan.’’) 88 Handwritten Notes of Raymond Patriarca Microphone Surveillance (March 9, 1965) (Exhibit

967) 89Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza 119 (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171).

guns.86 The following month, after hearing that Jimmy Flemmi

wanted to murder Deegan, Limone warned Deegan about the murder threat.87 More important, three days before Deegan was killed,

Flemmi told Raymond Patriarca that ‘‘Deegan fills Limone’s head

with all kinds of stories.’’ 88 Thus, Flemmi seemed to be indicating

to Patriarca that one reason to kill Deegan was that he was close

to Limone and that he was the source of ‘‘all kinds of stories.’’

Barboza also provided information that makes it appear that his

testimony was coached. He stated that before Deegan was murdered he was at a bar called the Ebb Tide. He noted that the bar

was very crowded, and he states that when he left the Ebb Tide

with the people that he implicated in the Deegan murder, others

also left the bar at the same time.89 He recalled that the others

who left at the same time he did were men named Femia, Chiampa

and Imbruglia. It is difficult to believe that Barboza would be able

to recall, more than two and a half years after the fact, the precise

names of those who coincidentally left the bar at the same time

that he did. More to the point, however, was the existence of various reports and informant descriptions of how Femia, Chiampa

and Imbruglia were involved in the Deegan murder and had actually been part of the conspiracy to kill Deegan. Thus, when

Barboza was falsely describing how one set of people was involved

in the Deegan murder, he also attempted to provide an explanation

that diminished the importance of information known to a number

of federal and state law enforcement officials. Thus, if any police

reports about the Deegan murder had been admitted into evidence

at trial, Barboza would have had an explanation regarding those

who left the Ebb Tide at the same time that he did and, coincidentally, whose names appeared in contemporaneous police reports

about who participated in the Deegan murder. It appears that

Barboza’s testimony about how Femia, Chiampa and Imbruglia coincidentally left the Ebb Tide at the same time that he did could

only have been given if police reports and informant information

had been shared with Barboza prior to his testimony.

There can be no doubt that if federal officials were privy to

Barboza’s grand jury testimony they would have known that he

had lied, and that he was preparing to commit perjury in the

Deegan capital murder prosecution. Furthermore, the fact that federal officials remained with Barboza when he spoke to local prosecutors indicates that they were aware of what he was preparing

to tell the grand jury.

25

90Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Oct. 19, 1964) (Exhibit 56). 91Memorandum from the Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (June 4,

1964) (Exhibit 50). 92Memorandum from Dennis Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (May 25, 1964)

(Exhibit 48). 93See Letter from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Jan. 8, 1965)

(Exhibit 60). 94 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Mar. 10, 1965) (Exhibit 68). 95 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, and Special Agents in Charge, Albany, Buffalo, and Miami FBI Field Offices (Mar. 12,

1965) (Exhibit 70); Memorandum from Helen Hatch, Correlator, to Special Agent in Charge,

Boston FBI Field Office (June 14, 1965) (Exhibit 104). 96 Id. 97Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 72). The identity of this informant was not provided to Congress. However, according to the Justice Department, the information is described

as ‘‘believable.’’ It also came from a clearly credible source who was in a position to have heard

what was happening at the time. Interview with John Durham, Special Attorney, District of

Massachusetts, U.S. Dept. of Justice, and Gary Bald, Special Agent in Charge, Baltimore FBI

Field Office (Dec. 2, 2002). 98 Airtel from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 10, 1965) (Exhibit 73).

iii. Barboza’s Testimony Compared to Preexisting Information

Even before Teddy Deegan was murdered, the FBI had information that could have led to the conclusion that there would soon be

a murder and that Jimmy Flemmi would be involved. As early as

October 18, 1964, the head of the FBI office in Boston was told by

Special Agent H. Paul Rico that Jimmy Flemmi wanted to kill

Deegan.90 Four months earlier, FBI Director Hoover or his staff

was given specific information by the Boston FBI office that

‘‘[Jimmy] Flemmi is suspected of a number of gangland murders

and has told the informant of his plans to become recognized as the

No. One ‘hit man’ in this area as a contract killer.’’ 91 Just days before this memorandum to FBI Director Hoover, Special Agent

Condon wrote a memorandum stating: ‘‘Flemmi told him [an informant] that all he wants to do now is kill people, and that it is

better than hitting banks. . . . Informant said, Flemmi said that

he feels he can now be the best hit man in this area and intends

to be.’’ 92 Later in the year, Flemmi killed an FBI informant by

stabbing him fifty times and then, in a surfeit of enthusiasm,

shooting him.93

In the days before Deegan was murdered, the FBI was aware of

a great deal of activity relating to Deegan. Between March 5 and

March 7, 1965, Jimmy Flemmi appears to have met with Raymond

Patriarca to obtain permission to kill Deegan.94 A couple of days

later, on March 9, 1965, Jimmy Flemmi and Joseph Barboza asked

Raymond Patriarca for permission to kill Deegan because ‘‘Deegan

is a nasty sneak and should be killed.’’ 95 According to one summary of microphone surveillance, Patriarca gave his permission for

Deegan to be murdered.96 The following day, according to a memorandum by Special Agent Rico, an ‘‘[i]nformant advised that he had

just heard from ‘Jimmy’ Flemmi that Flemmi told the informant

that Raymond Patriarca has put out the word that Edward ‘Teddy’

Deegan is to be ‘hit’ and that a dry run has already been

made[.]’’ 97 That same day, Director Hoover or his staff was informed that ‘‘Flemmi came to Providence to contact [Patriarca] . . .

to get the ‘OK’ to kill Eddie Deegan[.]’’ 98 Two days later, Barboza,

Flemmi and others murdered Teddy Deegan. Earlier that day,

26

99Memorandum from H.E. Campbell, Inspector, to James L. Handley, Special Agent in

Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (June 10, 1965) (Exhibit 74). 100 If Barboza had been telling the truth, nearly two months of planning went into the Deegan

murder conspiracy. It is interesting to note that when former FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon

was asked about the disguise that Barboza testified was worn by Joseph Salvati, Condon stated:

‘‘I’m not of the opinion that they think that far ahead into those matters. I just don’t think so.

I don’t think there’s that much advance planning.’’ Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 209 (Feb. 21, 2002). 101Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v. French, (Suffolk County Super. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. Limone, Cr. No. 32367, 32370, slip op. at *3 (Suffolk County Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 2001)

(Exhibit 931). 102 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, and Special Agents in Charge, Albany, Buffalo, and Miami FBI Field Offices (Mar. 12,

1965) (Exhibit 70). 103Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza (Oct. 25, 1967) (Exhibit 171). In

1966, the FBI prepared a memorandum for federal prosecutors that described the deaths of Harold Hannon and Wilfred Delaney. It stated that Hannon ‘‘was tortured by Edwad Bennett, the

Flemmi brothers—Jimmy and Stevie Flemmi—in an effort to ascertain where the proceeds of

the $30,000 burglary was [sic] that he and Delaney committed on Carmen Puopolo, a bookmaker

from Everett, Massachusetts. During the torturing, Hannon was apparently killed, as the medical report reflected that he had died by suffocating.’’ FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by

John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Jan. 14, 1966) (Exhibit 116).

Jimmy Flemmi had been assigned to be developed by Special Agent

Rico as an informant.99

When Barboza did testify at the Deegan murder trial, he explained that he was approached by Peter Limone on approximately

January 20, 1965, and that Limone offered him $7,500 to kill

Teddy Deegan.100 Barboza also testified that ‘‘the Office’’ had approved the murder, that Henry Tameleo was involved in the murder conspiracy, and that Tameleo was involved as early as January

of 1965.101 The FBI’s microphone surveillance did not provide evidence of a January approach to Barboza, but it did provide evidence that Barboza and Jimmy Flemmi approached Patriarca in

March of 1965 to seek his permission to kill Deegan. Thus, the

dates do not match, and Barboza’s story that he was approached

with an offer of money for a contract assassination is diametrically

opposed to the reality—captured on tape—that Barboza and

Flemmi sought permission to murder Deegan because he was an

‘‘arrogant, nasty sneak and should be killed.’’ 102 Federal law enforcement officials, the only individuals with access to this microphone surveillance information, appear to have purposefully kept

this information from the prosecutors who tried the case and

sought the death penalty for the six defendants.

Perhaps more important, however, is the fact that the motive for

the murder advanced by Barboza was different from the motive

captured by the FBI’s microphone surveillance. Barboza testified

that Peter Limone offered $7,500 for him to murder Deegan because of a burglary that Deegan had committed:

[T]he Popoulo [sic] home was broken into and from eighty

to eighty-two thousand dollars was taken out of the house,

and Harold Hannon, Wilfred Delaney and Teddy Deegan

were supposed to be in on the score. Peter Limone said

they would pay any amount of money to get these three

people killed. I think it was before that that Hannon and

Delaney were found floating in the river. He said they

wanted to get Deegan for that and said that Deegan had

killed Sacremone [sic] from Everett[.] 103

Over two years earlier, however, the FBI’s microphone surveillance

of Raymond Patriarca captured the following exchange:

27

104 Handwritten Notes of Microphone Surveillance of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, March 9, 1965)

(Exhibit 967). 105The Justice Department has not made its position officially known on this point. There is

an indication that two defense attorneys in the Deegan case may have been provided some information from the microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca during the course of another

trial involving the prosecution of Raymond Patriarca for conspiracy to murder Willie Marfeo.

However, the Justice Department has not furnished the Committee with the information provided to the two defense attorneys. In any event, there is no indication that defense counsel

for defendants Joseph Salvati, Peter Limone, or Louis Greco were ever provided information

from the Patriarca microphone surveillance prior to the Deegan trial. 106Motion of the Defendant for the Production of Police Department Reports, Commonwealth v. Salvati (Suffolk Super. Ct.) (Exhibit 184). The defendants also requested information regarding ‘‘promises, rewards and inducements.’’ It appears from the record before the Committee that

the jury was not given an accurate indication of what Barboza had been promised and what

he had been given. 107Docket Sheet, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1968) (Exhibit

220). 108Statement of Captain Joseph Kozlowski (Mar. 12, 1965) (Exhibit 76). 109Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent

in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 77). This information was provided by an associate of Jimmy Flemmi’s. Interview with John Durham, Special Attorney, District of Massachusetts, U.S. Dept. of Justice, and Gary Bald, Special Agent in Charge, Baltimore FBI Field Office

(Dec. 2, 2002).

Jimmie [Flemmi] tells Raymond they are having a problem

with Teddy Deegan (ph). Teddy did what he did to press

some other people. Jimmie says that the kid [Rico

Sacrimone] did not have to be killed. . . . Bobby Donati is

friendly with Rico Sacrimone and Deegan is looking for an

excuse to whack Donati. . . . Deegan thinks Donati is trying to set him up for Buddy McLean. Jimmie says Deegan

is an arrogant, nasty sneak. Deegan fills Peter Limone’s

head with all kinds of stories.104

These two rationales for the Deegan murder are fundamentally incompatible. The fact that Jimmy Flemmi was being protected, and

the fact that Barboza’s testimony bore no relationship to evidence

in the hands of the FBI at the time of the Deegan trial are clear

indications that federal law enforcement was aware that Barboza’s

story about the Deegan murder was false.

In the days following the Deegan murder, a great deal of information about the crime was developed. The following is a brief description of the information in the hands of federal and state law

enforcement officials after Deegan was murdered. Every piece of information contradicted Barboza’s ultimate trial testimony.105 Indeed, the defendants filed a motion requesting police reports 106

and this motion was denied,107 presumably with the concurrence of

the prosecution. The Committee recognizes that discovery requirements were very different in 1965 than today and that state prosecutors were involved in responding to the motion. Nevertheless,

this was a death penalty case and prosecutors should have disclosed this information to the defendants.

The following information existed at the time of the Deegan murder prosecution:

• On March 12, 1965, Captain Joseph Kozlowski prepared a statement indicating, among other things, that ‘‘the man in the back

[of the car used to take people to the Deegan murder scene] had

dark hair with a bald spot in center of head.’’ 108

• On March 13, 1965, Special Agent Rico reported that an informant told him who killed Deegan and how he was killed.109 Rico

filed a report and said, among other things, that Jimmy Flemmi

28

110 Boston Police Department Report (Mar. 14, 1965) (Exhibit 79). 111Memorandum from SAC, Butte, Montana, to Director, FBI, (February 1, 1974) (Exhibit

596). 112See, e.g., FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Jan. 14, 1966) (Exhibit 116) (Barboza admits to a role in the Martin homicide); see also VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 248 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1973). 113Memorandum from SAC, Butte, Montana, to Director, FBI, (February 1, 1974) (Exhibit

596) 114Statement by Thomas F. Evans, Lieutenant, Chelsea Police Department (Mar. 14, 1965)

(Exhibit 80). 115Massachusetts State Police Report by Richard J. Cass, Detective Lieutenant Inspector, to

Daniel I. Murphy, Captain of Detectives (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 81). 116 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Mar. 19, 1965) (Exhibit 84). 117Memorandum from [Redacted], Special Agent, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI

Field Office (Apr. 6, 1965) (Exhibit 85). 118 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Mar. 24, 1965) (Exhibit 86).

was involved in the murder. This information contradicts

Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On March 14, 1965, a Boston Police Department report was

filed.110 The information recorded contradicts Barboza’s trial

testimony. This report is of particular interest because nine

years later Joseph Barboza told federal officials that Romeo

Martin was murdered because he was an informant in the

Deegan case and provided the information that was the basis of

the March 14, 1965, Boston Police Department report.111 An

FBI document which describes the Martin homicide is heavily

redacted and it is not possible to ascertain what was known to

the FBI.112 Nevertheless, it appears that Barboza himself committed the Romeo Martin murder,113 thereby killing one of the

eyewitnesses to the Deegan murder.

• A report, which indicates that Jimmy Flemmi was involved in

the Deegan murder, was filed by the Chelsea Police a couple of

days after the murder.114 The information recorded contradicts

Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On March 15, 1965, a report was filed with the Massachusetts

State Police.115 Again, the report indicated that Jimmy Flemmi

was involved in the murder. The information recorded contradicts Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On March 19, 1965, FBI Director Hoover or his staff was provided information about the Deegan murder.116 Hoover was told

that Jimmy Flemmi was involved in the murder. The information recorded contradicts Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On March 23, 1965, an informant advised the FBI that

‘‘Barbosa [sic] claims that he had shot Teddy Deegan with a .45

gun.’’ 117 The information recorded contradicts Barboza’s trial

testimony.

• On March 24, 1965, Director Hoover or his staff was provided

more information about the Deegan murder.118 Again, the information provided contradicts Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On May 7, 1965, Director Hoover or his staff was told that

microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca captured the following: ‘‘information had been put out to the effect that Barboza

29

119 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI, and Special Agents in Charge, New Haven, New York, and Washington FBI Field Offices

(May 7, 1965) (Exhibit 96). 120Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 9, 1965) (Exhibit 102). 121FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special Agent, Boston FBI

Field Office (Jan. 14, 1966) (Exhibit 116). 122 James Southwood, A Letter from Barboza: Why I Decided to Tell All, BOSTON HERALD

TRAVELER (Exhibit 122). 123 U.S. Dept. of Justice Identification Record (Mar. 2, 1976) (Exhibit 129); Cornelius Moynihan, Two Others Convicted, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1967 (Exhibit 129). 124FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report by Joshua Hochberg and Charles S. Prouty

(Aug. 13, 1997) (Appendix II). Flemmi was first targeted as an informant in November of 1964.

Id.125Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 20, 1967) (Exhibit 141). 126See Exhibits 131–134, 138, 140, 141, 144, and 146 (dated between March 8, 1967, and July

2, 1968). Rico and Condon also were present for meetings between Joseph Barboza and state

investigators and prosecutors. 127Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 117–118

(Feb. 21, 2002).

was with Flemmi when they killed Edward Deegan.’’ 119 This

contradicts Barboza’s trial testimony.

• On June 9, 1965, FBI Director Hoover or his staff was told that

Jimmy Flemmi had killed Teddy Deegan.120

• On January 14, 1966, the Boston FBI Office prepared a memorandum for the U.S. Attorney in Boston. It described gangland

murders and provided information about the Deegan homicide

that contradicted Barboza’s trial testimony.121

Notwithstanding the information developed by law enforcement

about the Deegan murder, nothing happened for over two years.

The break in the case came when Joseph Barboza was arrested in

late 1966 for a weapons offense.122 Facing a lengthy prison sentence, he began to cooperate with law enforcement officials. On

January 25, 1967, Barboza received a relatively light sentence for

the weapons offenses.123 The following month, Stephen Flemmi

was taken into the federal Top Echelon informant program,124 and

on March 8, 1967, he began to work with FBI Special Agents H.

Paul Rico and Dennis Condon in an effort to develop Barboza to

testify.125

In the period between Barboza’s first recorded meeting with FBI

Agents Rico and Condon and his testimony in the Suffolk County

prosecution for the Deegan murder, Barboza met with either Rico,

Condon, or Edward Harrington at least 41 times.126 When Barboza

finally did testify at the Deegan trial between July 2 and July 11,

1968, there were a number of discrepancies between information

available to law enforcement at the time of the Deegan murder and

Barboza’s testimony. The three most significant involve the absence

of Jimmy Flemmi, the chronology and origin of the murder plot,

and the use of a .45 caliber weapon to kill Deegan.

It is particularly significant that the documents produced to the

Committee by the Justice Department do not show a single instance of Barboza being confronted with the discrepancies between

the record compiled by law enforcement and his proposed testimony. When Dennis Condon was asked why he did not question

Barboza about the discrepancies in his story, Condon offered no explanation, stating, ‘‘I can’t answer that. I can’t answer that.’’ 127

The majority of significant evidence, however, was in the possesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
30

128 At the time of the Deegan murder prosecution, Joseph Salvati owed a debt of money to

Joseph Barboza. Barboza, who was a professional loanshark, had loaned Salvati $400. At the

time of Barboza’s arrest in 1966, he sent two associates to collect outstanding debts in order

that he would have sufficient money to meet bail requirements. Salvati was unable to pay.

Barboza sent his associates back a second time, an altercation resulted, and Salvati said he

would not repay the money owed to Barboza. The following year, Barboza retaliated by putting

Salvati into the Deegan murder conspiracy. Interview with Joseph Salvati (March 27, 2001);

Alan Jehlen, Two Say Grieco [sic] Innocent of Deegan Murder, PEABODY TIMES, June 9, 1971

(Exhibit 402). 129Massachusetts State Police Report by Richard J. Cass, Detective Lieutenant Inspector, to

Daniel I. Murphy, Captain of Detectives (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 81). 130Statement of Captain Joseph Kozlowski (March 12, 1965) (Exhibit 76). 131Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. July 2, 1968) at

3367 (Exhibit 243). 132Flemmi was balding, and Salvati had thick, dark hair styled in such a way that it was

noticeable. 133 It is worth noting that Joseph Salvati’s attorney for the Deegan murder trial told the Committee that Al Farese, the partner of Joseph Barboza’s attorney, told him that Jimmy Flemmi

was the bald man at the Deegan murder, not Joseph Salvati. This is important because Farese’s

partner was John Fitzgerald, who represented Joseph Barboza. Farese also learned about

Deegan being in trouble on March 12, 1965, before the Chelsea Police Department, which suggests an important familiarity with key participants. Interview with Chester Paris, attorney for

Joseph Salvati during the Deegan trial (Aug. 6, 2002).

sion of federal authorities. For example, FBI officials were aware

of microphone surveillance information, and state officials were not

aware of relevant microphone surveillance evidence.

The absence of Jimmy Flemmi from Barboza’s testimony is the

single greatest indication that Barboza was not telling the truth.

Perhaps as important, however, was the addition of Joseph Salvati

to the fact pattern as described by Barboza at trial.128 Salvati’s introduction to the list of defendants is significant because just before

the crime was committed an eyewitness—who also happened to be

a police officer—saw some of the men who killed Deegan in the vicinity of the crime.129 The eyewitness described a man who had an

appearance similar to Jimmy Flemmi’s. Thus, Barboza was confronted with a dilemma: minutes before Deegan was murdered,

someone saw a man with Barboza who looked like Jimmy Flemmi

near the scene of the crime. Perhaps more important, this was recorded in a police report.130 Jimmy Flemmi was Barboza’s best

friend and was a frequent accomplice in criminal endeavors. Thus,

it would not have been unusual for Flemmi to have been with

Barboza. Barboza solved this dilemma by adding Joseph Salvati to

his story and then testifying that Salvati was wearing a disguise

which included, among other things, a wig that made him appear

bald.131 As described by Barboza, the disguise made Joe Salvati -

who in real life looked nothing like Jimmy Flemmi 132—resemble

Flemmi. For the jury, of course, this might have been believable,

but only because the jury had received no evidence that Jimmy

Flemmi was involved in the crime or that Flemmi had a motive to

kill Deegan. For the federal law enforcement officers who had access to the contemporaneous evidence that Flemmi was part of the

Deegan homicide, however, this story should have indicated that

Barboza was not telling the truth.133

Barboza was also aware that he had been observed leaving a

popular night club with a number of individuals just before Deegan

was killed. In all of the written reports compiled by law enforcement at the time of the Deegan murder, no one had placed Salvati

in the night club and no one indicated he left with Barboza.

Barboza solved this inconsistency by testifying that Salvati was not

with him because he had instructed Salvati to warm up the car.

31

134Memorandum from [Redacted], Special Agent, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI

Field Office (Apr. 6, 1965) (Exhibit 85). 135Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 28, 1967) (Exhibit 132). 136Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 21, 1967)

(Exhibit 133). 137 Airtel from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field

Office (May 24, 1967) (Exhibit 140). 138FBI Report by Thomas Sullivan, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (July 18, 1967)

(Exhibit 149). When Barboza met with Anthony Stathopoulos at Barnstable County Jail on September 8, 1967, Barboza told him that on the night on March 12, 1965, he had a .45 caliber

gun. This statement was made in the presence of a number of law enforcement officials. Interview with Anthony Stathopouols (February 21, 2003). 139Suffolk County Grand Jury Testimony of Joseph Barboza (Oct. 25, 1967) at 123–25 (Exhibit 171).

However, his testimony had him sending Salvati to warm the car

up over ninety minutes before he left the night club. Again, the

jury might well have believed this story in the absence of the withheld exculpatory evidence. Had all evidence been provided to the

defendants, however, Barboza’s testimony would have been far less

credible.

Another significant discrepancy between information available to

federal law enforcement and Barboza’s trial testimony is whether

Barboza actually shot Deegan. Less than two weeks after Deegan

was murdered, an informant told the FBI that ‘‘Barbosa [sic]

claims that he had shot Teddy Deegan with a .45 caliber gun.’’ 134

Two years later, on March 21, 1967, Barboza was interviewed by

Special Agents Rico and Condon.135 Although the documents provided to the Committee are heavily redacted, a significant focus of

this interview was the Deegan murder and Joseph Barboza’s

knowledge about the Deegan murder.

On the same day that Barboza was interviewed, March 21, 1967,

a Boston newspaper indicated that Barboza appeared before a federal grand jury.136 Responding to this activity, a memorandum

drafted in the name of the FBI Director states the following:

A review of the Bureau records reveals that no investigation of [Barboza] has ever been conducted by your office.

In view of the current circumstances, the Bureau should

be cognizant of all background information. Therefore, you

should submit to the Bureau an investigative report per

instructions set out under the Criminal Intelligence Program containing all background and identifying data available.137

The Boston office complied with the instructions from Washington

when Thomas Sullivan transmitted a memorandum to Washington

which summarizes information about Joseph Barboza. In this

memorandum, the Boston office re-states the information from two

years earlier: ‘‘[An informant states that] Barboza claims that he

shot Teddy Deegan with a .45 caliber gun. Barboza indicated that

Roy French was with Deegan and another individual when Deegan

was shot by Barboza and two other individuals, one of whom the

informant believes was Romeo Martin.’’ 138

Barboza’s grand jury testimony states not only that he did not

shoot Deegan but also that he did not see who shot Deegan.139 Obviously, this is a significant factual discrepancy that should have

been lost on no one. Furthermore, it is telling that law enforcement

permitted Barboza the luxury of saying that he neither pulled the

32

140See Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Feb.

21, 2002); ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt.

Reform, 107th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington); Interview with

Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section,

Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001); ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. (Dec. 5,

2002) (testimony of Paul Markham). 141 Interview with Anthony Stathopouols (February 21, 2003). Unless there is a citation to the

contrary, the information provided in this section is derived from this interview. 142Stathopoulos does not recall whether he was shown a photograph of Romeo Martin.

trigger nor saw who did pull the trigger. It is also important to

note that Barboza was important enough in Washington that a request was made to have information about him transmitted to

headquarters. This appears to contradict individuals who have told

this Committee that federal prosecutors and investigators were interested only in the murder of Willie Marfeo and the resulting federal prosecution.140

iv. Anthony Stathopoulos and the Deegan Murder Prosecution

At the time of his death, Teddy Deegan was attempting to commit a robbery. He was accompanied to the intended site of the

crime by Wilfred ‘‘Roy’’ French and Anthony Stathopoulos.141 After

Deegan and French walked into an alley, Stathopoulos saw flashes

and heard shots. Shortly thereafter, Stathopoulos, who was sitting

in an automobile, saw French and another man exit the alley. At

the same time he also heard someone still in the alley say ‘‘get him

too.’’ Stathopoulos immediately drove away and, after a short

delay, went to the home of attorney Al Farese. Shortly thereafter,

Farese called the Chelsea Police Department. Later that night,

Stathopoulos and Farese went to the site of Deegan’s murder and

Stathopoulos identified the body.

The day following Deegan’s murder, Stathopoulos—this time accompanied by attorney John Fitzgerald—went to the Chelsea Police

Department. He was shown photographs of Roy French, Joseph

Barboza, Jimmy Flemmi, and Ronald Cassessa.142 The police also

mentioned an individual named Freddie Chiampa. Stathopoulos

asked how the police were able to know the identities of those who

committed the Deegan murder and he was told that an informant

had provided the information. Stathopoulos was also told that the

individuals whose pictures had been provided were the ones that

he had to watch out for.

Prior to the Deegan murder trial, Joseph Barboza told

Stathopoulos on two occasions that he would protect Jimmy

Flemmi. The more significant of the two times was on September

8, 1967, when Stathopoulos was taken by law enforcement officials

to meet with Joseph Barboza in Barnstable County Jail. When

Stathopoulos arrived at the jail, he was met by FBI Special Agents

H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon. During the course of the meeting

between Barboza and Stathopoulos, which was conducted in the

presence of law enforcement officials including Rico and Condon,

Barboza explained that he was keeping Jimmy Flemmi out of the

Deegan murder because Flemmi had been good to him in the past.

Stathopoulos testified for the prosecution in the Deegan murder

trial. Prior to his testimony, Stathopoulos was asked to identify

Louis Greco as one of the men at the scene of the Deegan murder.

33

143Stathopoulos’s description of his Deegan murder trial testimony is similar to a description

provided by John ‘‘Red’’ Kelly about his testimony in a murder trial which involved former Special Agent H. Paul Rico. ‘‘Red’’ Kelly testified that he was asked to commit perjury by Special

Agent Rico in a Rhode Island murder trial. He testified that he did commit perjury, and Special

Agent Rico was also found to have committed perjury in that trial. When asked why he committed perjury, Kelly stated ‘‘Well, my life was in their hands.’’ Sworn Statement of Urbano

Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763). Thus, Kelly and Stathopoulos provided similar explanations for the perjury that was committed in two different trials. 144See Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (February 21, 2002); ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on

Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington); Interview

with Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001); ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use

of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. (Dec.

5, 2002) (testimony of Paul Markham); ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime

Investigations in Boston: The Case of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 220–21 (May 3, 2001) (testimony of H. Paul Rico).

According to Stathopoulos, prosecutor Jack Zalkind pressed him to

testify that Louis Greco was the other man who came out of the

alley with Roy French. Stathopoulos told Zalkind that he was not

able to identify the second man. Zalkind then informed

Stathopoulos that he did not have to be 100% certain, but that 99%

certainty was sufficient. Stathopoulos was aware that the individual who came out of the alley was carrying a gun in his right hand,

and that he did not have a limp. Later, Stathopoulos was told that

Greco was left-handed, and that he did have a limp. When

Stathopoulos asked Zalkind how he would be able to identify Greco

in court he was provided the order of seating for the defendants.

In Stathopoulos’s opinion, both Jack Zalkind and Detective John

Doyle knew that Louis Greco was not at the scene of the Deegan

murder, but ‘‘they wanted him bad.’’

Stathopoulos did testify that he saw Greco come out of the alley.

He knew at the time that this was not truthful testimony; nevertheless, he had been led to believe by law enforcement officials that

Greco would kill him if he were not locked up. Perhaps more important, Stathopoulos thought it prudent simply to do what he had

been asked to do.143

v. Federal Involvement in the Deegan Prosecution

The Deegan murder prosecution was conducted by the office of

the Suffolk County District Attorney. Thus, it was not a federal

criminal prosecution. During the course of its investigation, the

Committee received testimony that federal personnel had little to

do with the two Suffolk County murder prosecutions.144 Documents

produced to this Committee, however, suggest that FBI agents collaborated with local authorities as part of the prosecution. For example, on August 9, 1967, the head of the FBI’s Boston office sent

the following urgent teletype regarding the DiSeglio murder prosecution to FBI Director Hoover:

In statement to press, District Attorney Byrne stated that

this tremendous penetration into the La Cosa Nostra and

the hoodlum element was effected through the outstanding

investigative efforts of the FBI and his office. As a matter

of information, this entire case which was presented to the

grand jury by DA Byrne was developed through the efforts

and able handling of Barboza by SA H. Paul Rico and Dennis M. Condon of the Boston office. They also cooperated

34

145Teletype from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 9, 1967) (Exhibit 151). 146The date of this document indicates that it refers to the DiSeglio murder prosecution. 147See Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Feb.

21, 2002); ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt.

Reform, 107th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington); Interview with

Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section,

Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001); ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. (Dec. 5,

2002) (testimony of Paul Markham); ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform,

107th Cong. 220–21 (May 3, 2001) (testimony of H. Paul Rico). 148Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (July 31, 1968)

(Exhibit 248).

fully with DA Byrne in the preparation of this matter for

the grand jury. I know that this indictment would not

have been possible in any sense of the word if it were not

for the efforts of these agents and the FBI at Boston. . . .

I further recommend that Supervisor John F. Kehoe who

supervised this entire program and was involved deeply in

the developments and the planning relative to Barboza

and the matters attendant to this indictment be strongly

commended for his excellent supervision.145

As this document makes clear, Special Agents Rico and Condon

were so involved in the state case that they participated in the

state grand jury preparation. Thirty-five years later, the FBI has

redacted information pertaining to grand jury appearances. Nevertheless, it appears that the FBI Director himself or his staff was

being kept informed of state grand jury developments in this

case.146

It is worth noting that federal law enforcement officials closely

involved with Barboza—H. Paul Rico, Dennis Condon, Paul Markham, and Edward Harrington—told the Committee that they did

not pay close attention to the Deegan trial.147 Given the extraordinary importance of the Deegan trial—it was a death penalty case

involving the alleged right hand men of New England organized

crime bosses Raymond Patriarca and Gennaro Angiulo—it is hard

to believe that federal officials failed to pay attention to Barboza’s

testimony. Moreover, FBI Director Hoover’s office was notified of

the Deegan murder trial result on the same day the verdict was

returned.148 A claim of disinterest in the Deegan murder trial

could have the effect of distancing federal law enforcement officials

from Barboza and his perjurious testimony.

At the time of the Deegan murder prosecution, Special Agent

Condon testified under oath that he was not a major figure in developing Barboza’s testimony regarding the Deegan murder:

Mr. BALLIRO: And is it fair to say that you and Agent Rico

have been major figures, so to speak, with regard to the

investigations surrounding the information furnished by

Mr. [Barboza]?

Mr. CONDON: No, sir.

Mr. BALLIRO: It is not?

Mr. CONDON: No, sir.

35

149Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v. French (Suffolk County Super. Ct. July 19, 1968) at

5810–11 (Exhibit 244). 150 Id. 151Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 210 (Feb.

21, 2002). 152Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Dennis Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI

Field Office (Aug. 5, 1968) (Exhibit 251).

Mr. BALLIRO: Well, you have been participating in it, is

that correct?

Mr. CONDON: As it pertains to Federal matters, yes.

Mr. BALLIRO: But not as it pertains to State matters?

Mr. CONDON: We have not been the principal figures, no,

sir.

Mr. BALLIRO: I see. But you have been part of it, is that

correct?

Mr. CONDON: Yes, sir.149

***

Mr. BALLIRO: All right. Since Mr. [Barboza] has been testifying on State matters rather than Federal matters, do

you say that you have no longer been concerned about the

purity of testimony that he might give in a State court, a

Federal court or any kind of court?

Mr. CONDON: I am always concerned about the purity of

testimony on the part of any witness involving any matter

that I am concerned with.150

When the Committee interviewed Mr. Condon, he suggested that

local prosecutors developed the Deegan case, and that the FBI did

not take credit for developing the Deegan prosecution:

Mr. WILSON: Is it fair for us to characterize the FBI as

having taken a great deal of credit for the Deegan prosecution?

Mr. CONDON: No, I don’t believe so. I don’t believe so.151

These answers, however, conflict with the FBI’s own internal documents, where the FBI not only took credit for playing a role in developing Barboza’s testimony, but also awarded bonuses and commendations for the successful effort to develop the Deegan case.

For example, on August 5, 1968, just five days after the Deegan defendants were convicted, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sent the following note to Dennis Condon:

In recognition of the excellent fashion in which you performed in the investigation of a local murder case involving Roy French and others, I am pleased to commend you.

You were highly instrumental in the development of principal witnesses and, through your effective testimony at

the trial, all the subjects were successfully prosecuted. I do

not want the occasion to pass without conveying my appreciation to you.152

Condon was commended for his work both in the Deegan murder

investigation and for his trial testimony, and there can be little

36

153See, e.g., Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (July

31, 1968) (Exhibit 248); Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to H. Paul Rico, Special

Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Aug. 5, 1968) (Exhibit 251); Memorandum from S.R. Burns to

Mr. Walsh (Oct. 22, 1975) (Exhibit 254); Special Investigative Division Note (Oct. 4, 1968) (Exhibit 255); see also Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J.

Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 29, 1968) (Exhibit 213) (‘‘SA Condon’s ability to develop Joseph . . . Barboza described as the most vicious criminal in New England and one whom law

enforcement generally felt could never be compromised, required months of labor, seven days

weekly, coupled with intelligence, aggressiveness and foresight.’’) 154Trial Transcript, Commonwealth v. French, at 4655 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. July 2,

1968) (Exhibit 243). 155Teletype from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 9, 1967) (Exhibit 151).

doubt that the dozens of times Special Agents Rico and Condon visited Joseph Barboza resulted in a great deal of discussion about the

Deegan case.153 Indeed, Barboza himself testified that he discussed

the Deegan case with law enforcement, including the FBI, eight or

nine time before he told the entire story about the Deegan killing.154

It is particularly important to compare Condon’s testimony before

the Committee with the teletype to FBI Director Hoover that explains how Special Agents Rico and Condon worked so closely with

the local prosecutors that they ‘‘cooperated fully with DA Byrne in

the preparation of this matter [presumably the DiSeglio case] for

the grand jury.’’ 155 There appears to be no doubt whatsoever that

the FBI played the pivotal role in the state’s case. There is no indication that FBI personnel did not play as significant a role in assisting the state in the Deegan case. Indeed, a letter from federal

prosecutor Edward Harrington to Gerald Schur, who ran the Justice Department’s Witness Protection Program from Washington,

D.C., indicates just how involved federal law enforcement was in

the Deegan case and its aftermath:

It is requested that employment be procured for Lawrence

P. Hughes. Mr. Lawrence P. Hughes . . . has been kept in

protective custody by the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office as a potential witness for the last two months.

Hughes furnished information relative to a meeting in the

woods in the Freetown, Massachusetts area between Joseph [Barboza] Baron and Frank Davis, an associate of

Raymond L.S. Patriarca, relative to negotiations for a

change of testimony on the part of Baron to release the organized crime figures that he had testified against.

Hughes also was present when F. Lee Bailey turned over

$800 to Baron and told him (Baron), ‘The people would pay

the $500,000 but he would not be the intermediary.’

Hughes will testify to this in a hearing relating to a motion for a new trial which has been filed by six Cosa

Nostra members who had previously been convicted for the

first-degree murder of Boston gangster Edward Deegan.

The Deegan murder case, one of the most significant organized crime convictions in New England, resulted in four

other defendants being sentenced to death and the two

other defendants being sentenced to life imprisonment. Although tried in the state court, the conviction resulted

from the joint cooperation of federal and state authorities

in Massachusetts. . . . The Suffolk County District AttorVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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156Memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Boston Field Office, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, to Gerald Shur, Criminal Division, U.S. Department of

Justice (November 16, 1970) (Exhibit 366). 157 Id. 158FBI Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Mr. DeLoach (Nov. 15, 1968) (Exhibit 262). This

memorandum also points to the importance the FBI attached to favorable publicity. Discussing

the creation of organized crime task forces, Gale states that the ‘‘principal objection [to the Task

Force concept] is that the FBI’s accomplishments would be submerged in the claiming of credit

by the Task Force beyond its actual contribution, and they will wind up grabbing the lion’s

share of favorable publicity.’’ Id.

ney’s Office, which has been extremely cooperative with

the Strike Force, is requesting Strike Force assistance in

obtaining employment for Hughes until this matter is resolved.156

As this request indicates, Harrington not only states that the

Deegan trial convictions resulted from the joint cooperation of federal and state authorities in Massachusetts, but that federal officials were eager to help obtain a job for Lawrence Hughes at a time

when it was anticipated that Hughes would testify in response to

a motion for a new trial for the Deegan defendants. Support by federal officials would permit state officials to deny that they had provided Hughes any financial or job-related assistance in advance of

his testimony.

In addition to the request regarding Hughes, there are also numerous indications that the FBI played the key role in preparing

Joseph Barboza to testify in the Deegan case.157 As one senior FBI

supervisor wrote to Deputy Director Cartha DeLoach in referring

to the ‘‘prosecutive achievement’’ in Boston: ‘‘[A]s a result of FBI

investigation, in State court in Boston, Massachusetts, six more

were convicted in the 1965 slaying of Edward Deegan. La Cosa

Nostra members Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso, Peter Limone,

and Louis Greco were all sentenced to death while two confederates

were given life sentences.’’ 158 Two years later, senior FBI official

Cartha DeLoach was provided additional information about the

FBI’s role in the Deegan murder prosecution:

With the murder conspiracy conviction of New England

Mafia boss Raymond Patriarca and four other racket figures in Rhode Island on 3/27/70, it is believed appropriate

to bring to your attention the truly remarkable record established by SA [Paul] Rico in organized crime investigations during recent years. The achievements in question

primarily involve SA Rico’s development of high-level organized crime informants and witnesses, a field in which he

is most adept. SA Rico’s development of Boston mobster

Joseph Barboza, a vicious killer and organized crime leader in his own right, set off a chain of events which have

seen the surfacing of a number of additional racket figures

in New England as cooperative witnesses during the past

few years. Making use of compromising information he had

received from other top echelon informants he had previously turned, Rico brought Barboza to the point where

he testified against Patriarca and two of his La Cosa

Nostra (LCN) subordinates in a[] . . . [g]ambling case resulting in [the] conviction of all three in Boston Federal

Court on 3/8/68. . . . SA Rico also induced Barboza to tesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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159FBI Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Cartha DeLoach (March 31, 1970) (Exhibit 308). 160Letter from Edward F. Harrington, Of Counsel, Sheridan, Garrahan & Lander, to Senator

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 20, 1988) (Exhibit 813). 161Letter from Edward F. Harrington, Of Counsel, Sheridan, Garrahan & Lander, to Senator

Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 29, 1988) (Exhibit 813). 162 ‘‘Investigations of Allegations of Law Enforcement Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearing

Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 25–26, 48 (May 11, 2002) (testimony of Jack

Zalkind). Former Special Agent Dennis Condon was informed that the FBI maintained a file

on the Deegan murder. He indicated that he had not seen any documents prepared by former

Special Agent Rico about the Deegan murder. When asked ‘‘do you wish that you had been made

aware of those documents[,]’’ Condon replied ‘‘I would prefer that I had been aware of them,

yes.’’ Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 212–214

(Feb. 21, 2002).

tify as the state’s key witness in Massachusetts in the

gang slaying of hoodlum Edward Deegan. In this case, Rico

was additionally instrumental in developing a second witness, attorney John Fitzgerald, resulting in the 7/31/68

murder convictions of LCN members Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso and Peter Lamone [sic], who were sentenced

to death; one additional death sentence for another hoodlum, and life sentences for two others also convicted in this

case.159

Prior to his becoming a cooperating witness, Barboza faced lengthy

prison sentences for a variety of criminal offences. As this communication makes clear, however, it was information from other Top

Echelon informants that convinced Barboza to testify. Specifically,

it was Stephen Flemmi who was used to convince Barboza to testify. There is no doubt that before problems were discovered, the

FBI claimed credit for the Deegan murder prosecution. Later, of

course, when the Deegan prosecution became the subject of controversy, this approach changed.

It is worth noting that when Judge Harrington was approaching

his Senate confirmation hearings, he told the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee: ‘‘As a public prosecutor, I developed such

significant accomplice witnesses as Joseph [Barboza], Vincent Teresa, ‘Red’ Kelley, William Masiello and many others whose use as

witnesses I always made available to local prosecution authorities.

Cooperation with local law enforcement was my hallmark.’’ 160 Nine

days later, Harrington again wrote to the Judiciary Committee

Chairman: ‘‘I never used an accomplice witness unless I was convinced that he was telling the truth and his testimony had been

corroborated to the fullest extent possible. Nor did I ever condone

any wrongdoing on any witness’ part.’’ 161 These statements are

subject to question. Barboza was made available to local authorities

but, as the Deegan prosecutor testified before the Committee:

I must tell you this, that I was outraged—outraged—at the

fact that if [the exculpatory documents] had ever been

shown to me, we wouldn’t be sitting here . . . I certainly

would never have allowed myself to prosecute this case

having that knowledge. No way. . . . That information

should have been in my hands. It should have been in the

hands of the defense attorneys. It is outrageous, it’s terrible, and that trial shouldn’t have gone forward.162

Barboza was never directly confronted with his reluctance to provide information that would have Jimmy Flemmi ‘‘fry,’’ the discrepancy between the information obtained by microphone surveillance

39

163 Id. at 48. 164 A more complete discussion of this matter can be found at Section II.B.7. It is worth noting

that Judge Edward Harrington stated that he was not aware of the finding that former FBI

Special Agent Rico had suborned perjury, and had himself committed perjury. 165 Id. at 4456 (Exhibit 243). 166 Id. at 4460. 167 Id. at 4652. 168 Id. at 4653. 169Memorandum from Henry E. Peterson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, to William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, (March 3, 1970) (Exhibit 295).

and his assertion that he was approached in January of 1965 and

offered a contract to kill Deegan, and his inexplicable failure to include Raymond Patriarca as a co-conspirator in the Deegan homicide. Deegan murder prosecutor Jack Zalkind told the Committee

that: ‘‘[t]he information that Joe Barboza had told an FBI agent

that he would not implicate Jimmy Flemmi in a murder case is the

most exculpatory piece of evidence that anyone could have.’’ 163

Also, singling out Red Kelley as a successful accomplice witness

carried a certain danger in that the Rhode Island Supreme Court

vacated a homicide conviction when it found that FBI Special

Agent H. Paul Rico had suborned perjurious testimony from ‘‘Red’’

Kelley and had himself committed perjury in a Rhode Island murder trial.164

Barboza’s testimony about promises made to him also presents

an interesting window into the relationship between federal law

enforcement personnel and Joseph Barboza. During the Deegan

trial, Barboza told the jury that he was ‘‘hoping for a break,’’ and

that he was also hoping that his testimony ‘‘would be taken into

consideration.’’ 165 He further stated that ‘‘the only promise that

has been made in regards to [his testimony] is that the FBI will

bring it to the attention of the Judge.’’ 166 He also said that his wife

and child would be protected.167 When asked if ‘‘they made more

promises than what you’ve told us about,’’ Barboza answered ‘‘No,

sir.’’ 168 This testimony appears to conflict with what senior Justice

Department officials in Washington knew at the time. For example,

one senior official, responding to a request for money to be given

to Barboza communicated the following to another senior official

two years after Barboza’s testimony:

The memoranda submitted by Walter Barnes do not in my

judgment support the expenditure of Nine Thousand

Bucks. . . . The additional $4,000 requested to make up

the total of Nine, obviously has no support. I am bothered

by the thought on this score that [Barboza], if my recollection is correct, expected a $10,000 payment at the time his

testimony was concluded.169

This communication indicates that Barboza did have an expectation of more than he testified to. Indeed, in a letter to Washington,

two senior prosecutors in Boston state that they:

[T]hink it is fair to state that it was agreed by all in the

Department of Justice that at the time [Joseph Barboza]

was released from Government protection every effort

would be made to provide his [sic] with a job and an unspecified sum of money. However, in the event it was impossible to obtain a job for him because of [his] extensive

40

170Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Attorneys, Organized

Crime and Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Department of Justice Field Office, to Henry E.

Peterson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division (June 6, 1967) (emphasis

added) (Exhibit 292). 171Transcript of an interview conducted by Jack Zalkind and William J. Powers, Suffolk

County District Attorneys Office, of John Fitzgerald (August 7, 1970) (Exhibit 324). During this

interview, Fitzgerald also states that Barboza told him that federal law enforcement had agreed

to pay for plastic surgery and promised him $2,500 ‘‘for recuperating.’’ Id. 172Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 193 (February 21, 2002). 173Document on file at the Department of Justice.

record (36 years old—17 in prison) and inability to do anything, it was agreed that he would be provided additional

money. This position was made known to [Barboza].170

While this communication does not record the amount of money

Barboza expected the government to provide, it does show that

there was an understanding that Barboza would receive money,

and that he would perhaps need additional sums in the future.

In an interview conducted by the prosecutor who had tried the

Deegan murder case, Barboza’s former attorney, John Fitzgerald

also confirmed that Barboza had an expectation that money would

be paid to him by the federal government: ‘‘He felt that they had

promised him plastic surgery, he felt that two, they had promised

him a lump sum of money, he felt that three, they had promised

him a job as a V.A. cook.’’ 171

When former Special Agent Dennis Condon was asked about

promises or inducements made to Barboza, he indicated that officials in Boston would not necessarily have known about such matters. Condon was asked: ‘‘So, if the Justice Department had decided

to do something specific for Barboza, you may not have known

about that?’’ Condon replied: ‘‘True.’’ 172 Condon appears to have

been aware that officials in Washington might not inform him of

efforts made for Barboza that would have permitted him to testify

that he was unaware of those efforts. Law enforcement personnel

in Washington were aware that Condon or Rico would testify, and

the purpose of their testimony would be to discuss promises made

to Barboza. For example, on May 23, 1968, a memorandum was directed to FBI Director Hoover about the Deegan case and the federal personnel who would testify: ‘‘Special Agents Condon and/or

Rico regarding witness [Barboza] first mentioning Deegan murder

to them, referral of matter to District Attorney’s office, no promises

made, etc.’’ 173

The Committee requested all documents that would provide a

more complete understanding of the deal proposed by the federal

government to Joseph Barboza. The Justice Department was unable to provide any such records, nor did it indicate that there were

such records but that they would not be provided to Congress.

Thus, it appears that the government has not kept any records of

proposals regarding Barboza’s post-testimony accommodations, nor

do there appear to be any records of the amounts of money provided to Barboza. The failure to keep records regarding individuals

placed in the Witness Protection Program is another disturbing fact

uncovered by the Committee’s investigation.

41

174See Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and Special Agents in Charge, Albany, Buffalo, and Miami (Mar. 12, 1965) (Exhibit

70); Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Mar. 10, 1965) (Exhibit 73). 175 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 113 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington). 176 Id. at 131–32. 177 Id. at 133.

5. The Failure to Prosecute Raymond Patriarca

The FBI had clear information that Raymond Patriarca was

complicit in the murder of Teddy Deegan.174 At the time of the

Deegan murder trial, federal prosecutors believed that Patriarca

had played a part in the Deegan murder. As Judge Edward Harrington testified:

Judge HARRINGTON: At least two references to the Deegan

murder gleaned from the [Patriarca microphone surveillance] logs were cited in the prosecution memorandum to

manifest [Barboza’s] veracity as a witness, namely, that he

had personal access to Patriarca and would received authorizations from him, as [Barboza] was asserting.175

***

Judge HARRINGTON: The fact that reference that Patriarca

gave authority to [Barboza] to kill Deegan tended to corroborate his testimony in the federal Marfeo case because

it showed two things. One, that Joseph [Barboza] had personal access to the boss of the New England Mafia. That

was something that some people, including me, thought

might not have been valid. The second reason why it tended to corroborate [Barboza’s] testimony in the federal

Patriarca case is it showed that he received authorizations

to kill from Patriarca. And that, again, substantiated his

testimony in the federal Marfeo case.176

***

Mr. BURTON: Now Patriarca would have been guilty of

complicity in a murder by giving permission to Barboza

and Flemmi to kill Deegan.

Judge HARRINGTON: No doubt about it.

Mr. BURTON: There is no question about that.

Judge HARRINGTON: No doubt about it.

Mr. BURTON: [W]hy didn’t you prosecute him for that case?

Judge HARRINGTON: The reason why we would not prosecute him for that case is because it was a murder case.

But the fact that I said nothing when I did not see

Patriarca’s name as a defendant in the Deegan murder

case proves that at that time, 5 months later, I had no

memory of the one reference in 3 years of logs that I had

looked at 5 months earlier.177

Notwithstanding Patriarca’s complicity in the Deegan murder,

Patriarca was not prosecuted for this murder. Patriarca was the

42

178 Id. at 157. 179 Id. at 187. 180 Id. at 130–31.

most important criminal target in New England, and one of the top

criminal targets in the United States. Indeed as Judge Harrington

testified, ‘‘I would have loved to have seen Patriarca charged with

the murder case.’’ 178 Despite Patriarca’s importance as a target for

criminal prosecution, no federal law enforcement personnel worked

to convict Patriarca for the Deegan murder. Nor can these federal

officials recall whether concerns were expressed about why

Patriarca was not implicated by Barboza and why his failure to implicate Patriarca was not questioned.

Joseph Barboza did testify in one federal trial. When asked why

a federal case was not brought for the Deegan murder, Judge Harrington replied:

Because the object of the conspiracy, the killing of Marfeo,

was not completed at that time. He was killed sometime

later as a result of another conspiracy. The Patriarca case

and so-called Marfeo conspiracy was brought federally because the object was not attained, therefore we tried that

as a travel act case in Massachusetts. Whereas in Deegan

and in DeSeglio the murder was accomplished, therefore at

that time it had to be a State prosecution.179

The most surprising aspect of the failure to prosecute Patriarca

for the Deegan murder is the absolute denials that the Deegan case

was of interest to federal law enforcement. For example, Judge

Harrington testified: ‘‘I discussed with Mr. Rico about Mr. Barboza,

but with respect to the federal Patriarca case, not the state Deegan

murder case. . . . I will say it again. I never discussed the Deegan

murder case with Joseph Barboza or with Mr. Rico.’’ 180

It is difficult to believe that, as Barboza was being developed as

a witness, it was not a matter of intense discussion and debate as

to whether Patriarca would be brought to justice for his part in the

Deegan murder. At a minimum, it is unlikely that there would

have been no discussion of why Barboza was not prepared to testify

about facts that federal prosecutors believed to be true, particularly

when those facts would have put Raymond Patriarca into a death

penalty situation. Microphone surveillance gave the FBI access to

Raymond Patriarca’s confidential conversations. Indeed, it was

through their bug that federal personnel were able to learn that

Patriarca was involved in the Deegan murder. Thus, it is difficult

to understand why Joseph Barboza did not testify truthfully regarding his visit to obtain Patriarca’s permission to kill Teddy

Deegan. That testimony, however, would have implicated Jimmy

Flemmi, which Barboza wanted to avoid. It defies any rational

thought process to argue that federal personnel did not discuss, at

length, why Barboza did not put Raymond Patriarca into what

would potentially have been a death penalty situation.

6. Post-Conviction Indications That a Grave Miscarriage of Justice

Had Occurred

Guilty verdicts were returned against Joseph Salvati, Ronald

Cassesso, Louis Greco, Henry Tameleo, Roy French, and Peter

43

181Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (July 31, 1968)

(Exhibit 247); Deegan Trial: 4 Get Chair, 2 Life; Judge Hails Jury, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 1968

(Exhibit 247). 182Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Aug. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 403). 183Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Aug. 3, 1971) (Exhibit 405). 184Memorandum from Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept.

of Justice, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 6, 1971) (Exhibit 406); Memorandum from

Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to J. Edgar

Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 10, 1971) (Exhibit 407). 185Memorandum from [Redacted], Special Agent, to [Redacted], Special Agent in Charge (Aug.

2, 1968) (Exhibit 250). 186 BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1970 (Exhibit 311). The Committee is aware that William Stuart

was later implicated in the William Bennett murder. 187 Jerome Sullivan, Baron Admits Perjury in Deegan Murder Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29,

1970 (Exhibit 321); Affidavit of Joseph (Barboza) Baron (July 28, 1970) (Exhibit 321). 188 Id.

Limone on July 31, 1968.181 Almost immediately, information

began to emerge that cast doubt on the verdicts. Most of this information would not, in the normal course of events, have led to a reevaluation of the verdict without the government’s direct intervention. Nevertheless, if federal or state officials were conducting

themselves in good faith, particularly given the information in their

possession that had been denied to the Deegan defendants, one

would have thought some form of post-conviction relief might have

been entertained or discussed.

The information obtained from microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca would have provided some indication that there

were problems with the Deegan murder prosecution. On August 8,

1971, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed the Attorney General

that Boston Police Commissioner Edmund McNamara had requested that the Patriarca information be made available to his office.182 Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett Byrne made the

same request.183 A few days later, those requests were rejected.184

Although these requests did not target information relevant only to

the Deegan prosecution, the information found in the logs would

have shown that Barboza had not been forthcoming at trial.

The following is a brief summary of information indicating that

the Deegan verdict might have been wrong:

• According to an FBI memorandum, a couple of days after the

Deegan verdict, an informant advised that on July 31, 1968,

Stephen Flemmi’s crime partner, Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme, told

the informant that in regards to the Deegan trial, ‘‘the District

Attorney’s Office had lied, the witnesses in the trial had lied

and also the Feds had lied and according to the informant, the

only ones that did not lie were the defendants.’’ 185

• On May 4, 1970, The Boston Globe reported that Boston Police

Detective William Stuart said that he believed Tameleo,

Limone, and Greco were not involved in the Deegan murder.186

• Joseph Barboza submitted an affidavit on July 28, 1970, stating

that he intended to recant his Deegan trial testimony.187 He

said that he wished to recant ‘‘certain portions’’ of his testimony

that related to ‘‘the involvement of Henry Tameleo, Peter J.

Limone, Joseph L. Salvati and Lewis [sic] Grieco [sic] in the

killing of Teddy Deegan.’’ 188 It is important to note that the

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189Memorandum from Lee Bailey to Joe Balliro (Aug. 27, 1970) (Exhibit 328). 190 Affidavit of William Geraway (Nov. 9, 1970) (Exhibit 363). 191 Affidavit of Anthony Stathopoulos (Jan. 5, 1971) (Exhibit 375). 192 Affidavit of William Geraway (Mar. 29, 1971) (Exhibit 391). 193 Alan Jehlen, Byrne Had Evidence of Grieco’s [sic] Innocence, PEABODY TIMES, Apr. 16, 1971

(Exhibit 395). 194 VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 248 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1973).

tion already in the hands of law enforcement, and that the two

names not mentioned were also consistent with information in

the hands of law enforcement in that those two individuals really were involved in the murder.

• On August 27, 1970, attorney F. Lee Bailey wrote a memorandum to attorney Joseph Balliro, saying, among other things,

that ‘‘[Joseph] Salvati and Louis Greco were not present at all.

Further, [Henry] Tamelio [sic] and [Peter] Lemone [sic] had

nothing to do with arranging Deegan’s murder nor had they any

reason to believe that it was going to occur. The person sitting

in the rear of the automobile which the Chelsea Police Captain

saw was in fact bald and was Vincent Felemi [sic].’’ 189

• On November 9, 1970, William Geraway executed an affidavit

stating that ‘‘[Barboza] admitted to me that five out of the six

men he gave testimony against, four of whom are on death row,

were innocent[.]’’ The men he included among the innocent were

Henry Tameleo, Peter Limone, Louis Greco, and Joseph

Salvati.190

• Anthony Stathopoulos, who was present when Deegan was murdered and who was almost killed himself, executed an affidavit

on January 5, 1971. It states that ‘‘[Barboza] told me that he

was going to keep Flemmi out of it [the Deegan prosecution] because he said that Flemmi was a friend of his and the only one

who treated him decently.’’ 191

• On March 29, 1971, William Geraway executed an affidavit that

says Barboza told him that Joseph Salvati had ‘‘no part in the

crime whatsoever, nor any knowledge that it was to happen.’’ 192

• On April 16, 1971, a Boston newspaper reported that Boston

Detective William Stuart swore in an affidavit that he gave evidence to John Doyle, Chief Investigator for the Suffolk County

District Attorney’s office, that Louis Greco, Peter Limone, Henry

Tameleo, and Joseph Salvati were innocent of the Teddy Deegan

murder. Stuart said that Doyle did not care and indicated that

the men were probably guilty of other crimes.193

• Vincent Teresa, one of the most heralded cooperating witnesses

in organized crime trials, wrote a book in 1973. He says that he

did not think that Henry Tameleo had anything to do with the

murder, and that Joseph Salvati ‘‘was just an innocent sucker

who Barboza didn’t like, but he’s doing life because of what

Barboza said. He never had anything to do with the hit.’’ 194

• On May 28, 1974, The Boston Globe reported that Anthony

Stathopoulos said in an affidavit that Barboza told him he lied

during the Deegan trial by omitting the name of a participant

45

195William F. Doherty, Pair Charge Perjury, Seek New Trial in Deegan Killing, BOSTON

GLOBE, May 28, 1974 (Exhibit 606). 196 Affidavit of Gerald Alch (Apr. 9, 1976) (Exhibit 639). 197Memorandum from Joseph M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor, Warrant, Investigation Unit, to

Board of Pardons, Special Attention Board Member Gershengorn (Nov. 29, 1976) (Exhibit 654). 198 Affidavit of Richard Barest (Dec. 21, 1977) (Exhibit 663). Greco had also taken a polygraph

in 1967 that indicated he was not involved in the Deegan homicide. Commonwealth v. Grieco

[sic], Case No. 31601 (Suffolk County Super. Ct. Nov. 3, 1978) (Exhibit 673). 199Memorandum from Charles R. Jones, Case Review Committee, American Polygraph Association, to Whom It May Concern (Oct. 11, 1978) (Exhibit 667). 200 Affidavit of Francis Lee Bailey (Oct. 16, 1978) (Exhibit 668). 201 Affidavit of Roy French (Apr. 27, 1983) (Exhibit 758). 202Letter from Ronald Cassesso to The Review Committee (July 11, 1984) (Exhibit 783).

out of friendship. The article also provides information that

Louis Greco and Joseph Salvati were not involved.195

• Gerald Alch, a lawyer who worked with F. Lee Bailey, signed

an affidavit on April 9, 1976. It was based on interviews he conducted with Joseph Barboza in Walpole Prison, and it states

that Barboza testified falsely about Peter Limone because he

thought he would be strengthening his position with regard to

promises made to him by law enforcement officials.196

• On November 29, 1976, Joseph Williams, Supervisor of the Investigation Unit, Board of Pardons prepared a memorandum for

Board member Wendie Gershengorn. He states: ‘‘The ‘word’

from reputable law enforcement officers was that [Salvati] was

just thrown in by Barboza on the murder because he hated

subject[.]’’ 197

• Louis Greco submitted to a polygraph examination that indicated he was not at the Deegan crime scene, according to an affidavit executed by attorney Richard Barest on December 21,

1977.198

• Louis Greco takes another polygraph examination on October

11, 1978, that indicates he was not in Massachusetts when

Teddy Deegan was killed.199

• F. Lee Bailey executed an affidavit on October 16, 1978, which

indicates that of those convicted for the Deegan homicide,

French and Cassesso were involved, and Tameleo and Limone

were not. Barboza implicated Tameleo and Limone because he

was led by various authorities to believe that in order to escape

punishment of charges pending against him, he would have to

implicate someone of ‘‘importance.’’ Barboza said that he implicated Greco because of a personal grudge.200

• Roy French executed an affidavit on April 27, 1983, stating that

Greco, Tameleo, and Limone were not involved in the shooting

of Deegan.201

• On July 11, 1984, Ronald Cassesso told ‘‘The Review Committee’’ that Louis Greco was not in Massachusetts at the time of

the Deegan murder.202

• In a 1993 book titled The Godson: A True Life Account of 20

Years Inside the Mob, Willie Fopiano stated that most of those

convicted in the Deegan murder were innocent. He said Salvati

46

203WILLIE FOPIANO, THE GODSON: A TRUE-LIFE ACCOUNT OF 20 YEARS INSIDE THE MOB 127

(St. Martin’s Press 1993). 204Memorandum from Bruce A. Holloway, Sergeant Detective, Office of Special Investigations,

to James T. Curran, Lieutenant Detective, Office of Special Investigations (July 30, 1993) (Exhibit 855). 205 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 97 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Victor Garo); see also Interview with Dan Rea (May 1, 2001). 206 Affidavit of James Southwood (July 11, 1995) (Exhibit 871). 207Letter from Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, by James D. Herbert, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, Chief, Organized Crime Strike Force Unit, to the Honorable Ralph C. Martin, II, District Attorney, Suffolk County (Apr. 3, 1996) (Exhibit 875). 208Memorandum from Daniel M. Doherty, Special Agent, to Fred Wyshak, Assistant United

States Attorney (Feb. 10, 2000) (Exhibit 916).

was not involved, commenting ‘‘Salvati, who was just a doorman

at an after hours joint, wouldn’t swat a mosquito.’’ 203

• On July 30, 1993, a Detective Sergeant Bruce Holloway wrote

a memorandum stating that former State Police Lieutenant

Richard Schneiderhan indicated that he once heard Joseph

Barboza’s lawyer, Robert Fitzgerald, say that Joseph Salvati

was included as one of the defendants by Barboza to obtain revenge for a past financial debt.204

• Investigative reporter Dan Rea contacted John Doyle in 1993 to

discuss the Deegan murder prosecution. Rea had just obtained

the original copy of the Chelsea Police Report from the Deegan

murder file at the Chelsea Police Department. Doyle, at the

time of the Deegan homicide, was the Suffolk County District

Attorney’s investigator handling the case. The exchange between Rea and Doyle went as follows:

[Doyle] said to him, what is it that you’re bothering me

about now? And he said, well, he said that Chelsea police

report. Yeah, there was no Chelsea police report. He said,

yes, there is. As a matter of fact, I found the original Chelsea police report, and I have a copy of it. I would like to

come over and show it to you and discuss it with you. I

don’t want to see you. Don’t call me anymore. And that

was the end of the conversation.205

• On July 11, 1995, James Southwood executed an affidavit which

states that while preparing to write a book about Joseph

Barboza in the early 1970s, Barboza said to him ‘‘Louie Greco

wasn’t in the alley.’’ 206

• In an April 3, 1996, letter from federal prosecutor James Herbert to Suffolk County District Attorney Ralph Martin, Herbert

indicated that Anthony Ciulla, who was friendly with Barboza

and sometimes acted as his driver, said that Salvati was never

mentioned by Barboza in connection with the Deegan murder

and as a result he concluded Salvati was not involved in the

crime. Jimmy Flemmi, however, was discussed.207

• On February 10, 2000, FBI Agent Daniel Doherty prepared a

memorandum for federal prosecutor Fred Wyshak, stating that

he had interviewed John Martorano, and that Martorano had

indicated that both Jimmy Flemmi and Joseph Barboza had told

him that they were participants in the murder of Teddy

Deegan.208

47

209 Affidavit of Francis Imbruglia (July 27, 2000) (Exhibit 921). According to the Chelsea Police Report describing the Deegan murder, just before Deegan was killed Joseph Barboza left

the Ebb Tide with ‘‘Ronald Cassesso, Vincent [‘‘Jimmy’’] Flemmi, Francis Imbruglia, Romeo Martin, Nicky Femia and a man by the name of Freddi[.]’’ Statement by Thomas F. Evans, Lieutenant, Chelsea Police Department (Mar. 14, 1965) (Exhibit 80). 210Letter from Wilfred Roy French to John Cavicchi (Aug. 30, 2000) (Exhibit 922). 211 Affidavit of Joseph J. Balliro, Commonwealth v. Limone (Nov. 14, 2000) (Exhibit 926). 212 Edmund H. Mahony, Murdered Said Four More Innocent in ’65 Slaying, Lawyer Says,

HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 3, 2001, at A8. (Exhibit 929). 213 Affidavit of Joseph J. Balliro, Commonwealth v. Limone (Jan. 2, 2001) (Exhibit 930).

• Francis Imbruglia executed an affidavit on July 27, 2000, indicating that he was aware that Peter Limone, Henry Tameleo

and Louis Greco had nothing to do with the Deegan murder.209

• On August 30, 2000, Wilfred ‘‘Roy’’ French indicated that his

previous affidavit was accurate with the exception that he neglected to state that Joseph Salvati had nothing to do with the

Deegan murder. He had made no mention of Salvati in the previous affidavit.210

• Joseph Balliro, the most experienced attorney among the

Deegan defense lawyers, executed an affidavit on November 14,

2000, stating that Jimmy Flemmi had provided him with information that was exculpatory for the Deegan defendants, and

that he would divulge this information if ordered to do so by a

court.211

• On January 2, 2001, Ronald Chisholm, who was Ronnie

Cassesso’s lawyer at the Deegan trial, said in a newspaper

interview that Cassesso admitted to being a participant in the

Deegan murder. Cassesso had told him that four of the six convicted were innocent. Cassesso also told him that before the

Deegan trial began, FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico approached

him and said that he could escape prison if he corroborated

Barboza’s testimony. He refused and spent the remainder of his

life in prison.212

• Joseph Balliro executed an affidavit on January 2, 2001, indicating that Jimmy Flemmi told him that Barboza planned the

Deegan murder and he participated in the crime.213

The above chronology, in a vacuum, cannot be considered dispositive. If federal and state law enforcement had not been in possession of information indicating that there had been a miscarriage of

justice, and that Barboza had committed perjury, then it would

have been easy to dismiss the above statements and affidavits as

the type of routine information that attaches to any high profile

criminal conviction. However, the above evidence is worth mentioning because it was consistent with what FBI officials already knew.

It appears that the efforts to ignore information about the Deegan

murder were almost directly related to the strength of the evidence

indicating that some of those on trial were not involved in the

crime as charged.

Barboza also made a number of potentially significant comments

in his private correspondence. In closing arguments, Limone’s attorney, Robert Stranziani, quoted from a letter Barboza wrote to

his then-girlfriend, ‘‘I don’t care whether they’re innocent or not.

48

214See Ronald Wysocki, Baron Dashed at Deegan Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1968 (Exhibit

245). 215Letter from John Costa [Joseph Barboza] to [Name Redacted by Committee] (Jan. 14, 1974)

(‘‘Smiley face’’ appears in the original letter) (Exhibit 593). 216Letter from Joseph Bentley [Joseph Barboza] to Greg Evans (Mar. 22, 1974) (Exhibit 605).

It is illustrative of the failures of the past forty years in New England that, while the federal

government is opposing civil lawsuits in Boston alleging government misconduct, the Justice Department appears disinterested in obtaining evidence about Barboza and his perjurious testimony. For example, the Committee was able to obtain a large body of correspondence between

Barboza and a number of individuals simply by asking the individuals. The Justice Department

has not only refrained from making such a request, it has also failed to approach the individuals

to ask them any questions about their substantive knowledge of Barboza, his testimony in the

various cases during which he was a cooperating witness, and his subsequent criminal conduct.

They go.’’ 214 In another letter to a different friend, Barboza made

a request that Dennis Condon and Edward Harrington be contacted so that he could talk to them. He further instructed this

friend to place the calls from a particular individual’s office, and he

added: ‘‘after all he wouldn’t want to obstruct justice in a capital

case! A’’ 215 In another letter to a Santa Rosa investigator he implied that he had the ability to upset the convictions caused by his

testimony ‘‘& a small Watergate will develop, & Walpole prison

doors will open.’’ 216

7. The Deegan Murder Defendants After Conviction

Federal law enforcement officials worked against the Deegan defendants receiving a fair trial by withholding significant exculpatory evidence. It appears, moreover, that once the Deegan defendants were incarcerated, federal law enforcement officials took

affirmative steps to prevent them from receiving any form of executive clemency. The record is not complete on this point. Nevertheless, it appears that some of these steps were not grounded in fact.

The Committee did not investigate efforts by Louis Greco and

Henry Tameleo to obtain clemency. Therefore, commentary regarding their efforts to obtain executive clemency is omitted. The following sections discuss efforts by Joseph Salvati and Peter Limone

to obtain executive clemency.

i. Joseph Salvati

After Joseph Salvati was convicted and sentenced to life in prison, he filed numerous commutation petitions in an effort to reduce

his life sentence. Nearly thirty years after being sentenced, the

Governor of Massachusetts finally commuted Salvati’s sentence.

Salvati’s attorney, Victor Garo, described the commutation process

in a May 3, 2001, Committee hearing:

In Massachusetts when you are convicted of murder in the

first degree, you have no right to parole. The only way that

you have the right to parole is if you receive a commutation, and a commutation is considered to be an extraordinary legal remedy. In order to get a commutation, three

votes have to be taken, one by the parole board sitting as

the advisory board of pardons, the second vote by the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and the

third vote by the Governor’s Council . . . a duly elected

49

217 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 70 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Victor Garo). 218Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Martin

K. Leppo, Partner, Leppo and Paris, to Executive Secretary, State of Massachusetts (Nov. 28,

1975)) (Exhibit 630). 219Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Received Dec. 10, 1975)) (Exhibit 635). 220Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Frank

L. Walsh, former Sergeant Detective, Boston Police Department, to Paul Carr, Administrative

Assistant, Massachusetts Parole Board (Jan. 26, 1976)) (Exhibit 634). 221 Id. 222 Id. 223Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Jack

I. Zalkind, former Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County, to Paul Carr, Administrative Assistant, Massachusetts Parole Board (Feb. 20, 1976)) (Exhibit 637). 224 Id.

body. The three of those votes have to be situated for you

to get a commutation. It is not easy to obtain.217

Commutation applicants must initially file a petition for a commutation hearing with the Massachusetts Parole Board. If approved, petitioners earn the opportunity to present their case to the

Advisory Board of Pardons. The Advisory Board of Pardons forwards approved petitions to the Governor. If the Governor concurs

with the Advisory Board’s recommendation that a prisoner’s sentence be commuted, the petition is considered by the Governor’s

Council, a group of eight elected officials. With the Council’s consent, a prisoner is granted clemency.

Joseph Salvati’s greatest obstacle proved to be the first one: receiving a hearing before the Advisory Board of Pardons. On November 28, 1975, Salvati filed his first petition for a commutation hearing with the Parole Board.218 The Parole Board voted unanimously

to deny Salvati’s petition for a hearing, pointing out that insufficient time had elapsed since his sentencing.219

For his second petition, Salvati enlisted the support of two officials who assisted in his prosecution: Frank Walsh and Jack

Zalkind. Frank Walsh, Sergeant for the Boston Police Department,

was an investigating officer in the Deegan murder.220 Walsh arrested Salvati on October 25, 1967, for the Deegan murder and assisted in Salvati’s prosecution and conviction.221 In a letter to the

Parole Board, the former detective wrote, ‘‘This is the first time I

have ever written to a Parole Board on behalf of any person. My

sincere conviction that Mr. Salvati should be granted the opportunity to be heard by the Parole Board prompts me to express my

views.’’ 222

Jack Zalkind, the prosecutor in the Deegan trial, expressed an

even stronger opinion. Mr. Zalkind’s letter to the Parole Board stated, ‘‘Mr. Salvati’s involvement was minimal.’’ 223 He continued, ‘‘I

would have no hesitation to recommend that Mr. Salvati’s Petition

for Commutation be granted by the Parole Board. Furthermore, if

the Board would like me to appear personally on behalf of Mr.

Salvati, I would be willing to do so.’’ 224 Thus, two officials who had

significant responsibility for putting Salvati in prison agreed that,

at the very least, he deserved a hearing.

In addition to these two letters, Parole Board member Wendie

Gershengorn requested that Parole Board Investigator Joseph Williams prepare a confidential memorandum regarding Joseph

50

225Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Memorandum from

Joseph M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor, Warrant & Investigation Unit, to Massachusetts Parole

Board (Nov. 29, 1976)) (Exhibit 654); see also ‘‘Investigations of Allegations of Law Enforcement

Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 105 (May

11, 2002) (testimony of Wendie Gershengorn). In an interview with Williams, the Parole Board

Investigator initially claimed that there were no documents indicating his involvement in

Salvati’s commutation attempts. Williams said he very rarely produced written reports on petitioners and was never asked to compile a report on Salvati. Contrary to Williams’ claims, the

Committee obtained a memorandum regarding Salvati that was drafted by Williams. In addition, the Committee has a second report written by Williams regarding Peter Limone, another

Deegan defendant. Interview with Joseph Williams, former Supervisor of the Warrant & Investigation Unit, Massachusetts Parole Board (June 29, 2001). 226Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Memorandum from

Joseph M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor, Warrant & Investigation Unit, to Massachusetts Parole

Board (Nov. 29, 1976)) (Exhibit 654). 227 ‘‘Investigations of Allegations of Law Enforcement Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearing

Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 105–07 (May 11, 2002) (testimony of Wendie

Gershengorn). 228 Interview with Joseph Williams, Supervisor of the Warrant & Investigation Unit, Massachusetts Parole Board (June 29, 2001). 229Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Massachusetts Advisory Board of Pardons, to the Governor, State of Massachusetts (Feb. 28, 1977))

(Exhibit 657). 230Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Petition for Commutation of Sentence of Joseph L. Salvati (Feb. 1, 1979)) (Exhibit 679). 231Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Jack

Zalkind, former Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County (Mar. 12, 1979)) (Exhibit 683); Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Frank L. Walsh,

former Sergeant Detective, Boston Police Department (Mar. 15, 1979)) (Exhibit 684). 232Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

E. Bates, Superintendent, Framingham Correctional Institution (Nov. 13, 1978)) (Exhibit 675). 233Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from the

Massachusetts Advisory Board of Pardons, to the Governor, State of Massachusetts (Feb. 23,

1979)) (Exhibit 681). 234Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Petition for Commutation of Joseph L. Salvati (July 2, 1980)) (Exhibit 699).

Salvati.225 The memorandum stated: ‘‘The ‘word’ from reputable

law enforcement officers was that subject [Joe Salvati] was just

thrown in by Barboza on the murder because he hated subject, that

Joseph Barboza was asked by people was this true and that

Barboza denied this.’’ 226 Notwithstanding this observation by Williams, Gershengorn did not ask for any additional information.

During testimony before the Committee, Gershengorn could not recall why she asked Williams to prepare a report or whether she

asked for more information after she reviewed the report.227 In an

interview with Committee investigators, Williams said the following about Salvati: ‘‘To my knowledge, he was never involved in the

[Deegan] murder.’’ 228 Despite this information, the Parole Board

denied Salvati’s second petition for a commutation hearing on February 28, 1977. The Board found that Salvati had served an insufficient amount of time to warrant a hearing.229

Nearly two years later, on February 1, 1979, Salvati filed his

third petition for a commutation hearing.230 Jack Zalkind and

Frank Walsh again wrote letters supporting a commutation.231 The

Superintendent of Framingham Correctional Institute, where

Salvati had been imprisoned for over five years, added his voice to

the growing chorus advocating a shortened sentence for Salvati.232

Moreover, correction officers, social workers, businessmen, and

family members wrote letters of support for Salvati. Unpersuaded,

the Parole Board voted on February 16, 1979, not to grant him a

hearing because ‘‘this petition has been presented too soon following conviction of Murder-First Degree.’’ 233

Salvati submitted his fourth petition for a commutation hearing

on July 2, 1980.234 Several months later, on November 18, 1980,

51

235Department of Justice Document Production (Memorandum from John J. Cloherty, Jr.,

Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office

(Nov. 20, 1980)) (Exhibit 701). 236 Id. 237 Id. Salvati was later indicted for these offenses. See Prison Probe Indictments, BOSTON

GLOBE, Mar. 28, 1982, at 40 (Exhibit 734). 238See Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from

Massachusetts Advisory Board of Pardons to the Governor, State of Massachusetts (undated))

(Exhibit 702). 239Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Memorandum from

Tammy E. Perry, Assistant, to the Director, Massachusetts Advisory Board of Pardons (Nov. 28,

1988)) (Exhibit 749). 240Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Victor

J. Garo, Attorney for Joseph Salvati, to Louise Maloof, Executive Secretary, Governor’s Council

(Nov. 12, 1985)) (Exhibit 792). 241Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Dec. 26, 1985, and Jan. 6, 1986)) (Exhibit 794). 242 Id. 243Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to James Greenleaf, Special Agent in

Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (Feb. 4, 1986)) (Exhibit 795). 244Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to Michael V. Fair, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Correction (Feb. 4, 1986)) (Exhibit 795). 245Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to Frank Trabucco, Commissioner, Massachusetts Department of Public Safety (Feb. 4, 1986)) (Exhibit 795). 246Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to Newman Flanagan, District Attorney,

Suffolk County (Feb. 4, 1986)) (Exhibit 795).

FBI Agents John J. Cloherty, Jr., and Robert R. Turgiss met with

the Deputy Commissioner of Corrections, the Director of Internal

Affairs at the Department of Corrections, and the Superintendent

at Framingham Correctional Institute, where Salvati was imprisoned.235 One of the purposes of this meeting was to discuss allegations that Salvati was using the prison’s canteen to bring drugs

into the institution.236 The FBI also alleged that Salvati was operating a gambling ring using the prison’s telephones and computer

equipment.237 On the same day the FBI brought these allegations

to the attention of Corrections authorities, the Advisory Board of

Pardons voted to deny Salvati a commutation hearing.238 Salvati

was later cleared of any misconduct arising from these allegations.239

Salvati petitioned the Board again on November 12, 1985.240 By

this time, the Board’s reservations about granting Salvati a hearing had apparently abated. In a unanimous vote, the Board approved Salvati’s petition in early January 1986.241 The Board reasoned that Salvati deserved a hearing based on his ‘‘excellent institutional record,’’ and the fact that three co-defendants in the

Deegan trial had already received a hearing.242

Following this vote, the Board requested information on Salvati

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation,243 the Massachusetts

Department of Correction,244 the Massachusetts Department of

Public Safety,245 and the Suffolk County District Attorney.246 The

FBI responded to the Board’s request in a letter signed by Supervisory Special Agent James A. Ring. The letter connected Salvati

to Frank Oreto, who was under investigation at the time for running a loansharking business. The letter notified the Board of the

following:

Concerning Joseph Salvati, investigation by the FBI and

Massachusetts State Police placed Salvati in contact with

Frank Oreto during November and December of 1985, and

52

247Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from James

W. Greenleaf, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Mar. 24, 1986)) (Exhibit 797). The names of both SAC James

Greenleaf and Supervisory Special Agent James Ring appear on the letter, but only James

Ring’s signature is on the letter. Although Salvati was in prison, he did receive occasional furloughs. 248Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John

Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Dec. 18, 2001) (Appendix I). At this time, the

FBI and Massachusetts State Police were conducting a joint investigation of Oreto. Oreto was

under surveillance, and his telephone lines were wiretapped. 249Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from James

W. Greenleaf, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Mar. 24, 1986)) (Exhibit 797). Salvati’s attorney, Victor Garo,

maintains that his client and Oreto harmlessly met to discuss selling an antique car that

sparked Oreto’s interest. Interview of Victor Garo, Attorney for Joseph Salvati (Mar. 26, 2001). 250 Communicated by telephone to James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Comm. on Govt. Reform. 251Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Dec. 4, 1986)) (Exhibit 800). 252Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge,

Boston FBI Field Office (Aug. 8, 1988)) (Exhibit 822). 253Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from Victor

J. Garo to Louise Maloof, Executive Secretary, Governor’s Council (Oct. 17, 1988)) (Exhibit 823). 254Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Mar. 14, 1989)) (Exhibit 824).

particular details regarding a meeting between these two

individuals in the vicinity of the Museum of Fine Arts in

Boston has already been provided to you by the Massachusetts State Police and is therefore not being reiterated.247

The implication of this communication is that there might be something to the Salvati-Oreto contact for the Board to consider. In an

effort to determine whether there was an innocent explanation for

this contact, the Committee requested that the Department of Justice provide all records of intercepted conversations between

Salvati and Oreto.248 If the Oreto surveillance tapes indicated that

the contacts were innocuous, one would have expected the FBI to

make this clear in its letter to the Parole Board.249 Similarly, if the

tapes raised a matter of concern, one would have expected the FBI

to provide that specific information to the Parole Board. The Justice Department, however, was unable to locate the tapes of the

conversations or any transcripts of the tapes.250

The impact of the letter from the FBI, however, was significant

in that the Parole Board reversed its decision to grant Salvati a

commutation hearing. All seven of the Board members cited the information provided by the FBI as the reason for denying Salvati a

chance to be heard.251

On August 8, 1988, over twenty months after the FBI notified

the Parole Board of the Salvati-Oreto contacts, the Board requested

an update on the FBI’s investigation.252 An FBI response to the

Board’s request for information was not included in the documents

provided to the Committee by the Massachusetts Parole Board,

which suggests that the FBI never responded to the Board’s request.

Salvati again applied for a commutation hearing on October 17,

1988.253 The Board approved Salvati’s petition for a hearing this

time with Board member Michael Albano commenting that the concern raised by the FBI in 1986 was ‘‘apparently resolved.’’ 254 Uncertain about the status of the investigation, the Board for a second

time had requested an update on the FBI’s probe into the relationVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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255Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from John

J. Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board, to James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge,

Boston FBI Field Office (Nov. 30, 1989)) (Exhibit 836). 256Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from James

F. Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Dec. 1, 1989)) (Exhibit 837). 257 Id. 258Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Executive Clemency

Vote Sheet (Dec. 8, 1989)) (Exhibit 838). 259Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from James

W. Greenleaf, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Mar. 24, 1986)) (Exhibit 797). 260Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from James

F. Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Dec. 1, 1989)) (Exhibit 837). 261 Interview with James A. Ring, Supervisory Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Sept.

25, 2002). 262Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Opinion of the Advisory Board of Pardons (Apr. 29, 1991)) (Exhibit 845). 263 Id.; see also Letter from William F. Weld, U.S. Attorney, Dept. of Justice, to Michael S.

Dukakis, Governor, State of Massachusetts (Sept. 12, 1983) (strongly recommending that the

Governor deny clemency for Peter Limone, a Deegan defendant) (Exhibit 775); Letter from William F. Weld, U.S. Attorney, Dept. of Justice, to Brian A. Callery, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (July 1, 1983) (urging the Board to deny a commutation to Limone) (Exhibit 770). 264Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Opinion of the Advisory Board of Pardons (Apr. 29, 1991)) (Exhibit 845).

ship between Salvati and Oreto.255 The FBI responded in a letter

stating that it had dropped the investigation of the contacts between Oreto and Salvati sometime after the Board’s vote in

1986.256 Based on the evidence it had gathered, the FBI arrived at

two conclusions: Salvati had no relationship with Oreto’s loanshark

operation, and Salvati likely met with Oreto so his wife could borrow money from Oreto.257 The Board was not informed that the

Salvati-Oreto investigation was closed until it received this letter.

With the FBI having reached an innocuous conclusion about the relationship between Salvati and Oreto, the Board unanimously

granted Salvati clemency on December 8, 1989.258 Although this

was a positive step, it was only the first step in the process to obtain a release from prison.

The FBI first raised the possibility that Salvati was involved in

Frank Oreto’s loansharking business on March 24, 1986.259 Over

three and a half years later, the FBI finally resolved this concern

on December 1, 1989.260 During this time, action on Salvati’s commutation requests ground to a halt. Most disturbing, however, is

that the FBI could have determined that Salvati was not involved

in Oreto’s loansharking business before writing the March 24, 1986,

letter. According to Agent James Ring, the FBI official who signed

the March 24, 1986, letter, the FBI found the Oreto’s book of

records on January 9, 1986 that indicated that Salvati was a debtor to, not an owner of, the loansharking business.261 Although the

FBI and Massachusetts State Police had the records two and a half

months before the FBI’s warning letter to the Parole Board, their

conclusions about Salvati’s relationship to Oreto were not included

in the letter.

After approving Salvati’s clemency petition, the Board waited

seventeen months before forwarding its recommendation to the

Governor.262 Incoming Governor William Weld had already voiced

opposition to clemency for the Deegan defendants.263

The Board finally submitted its opinion to Governor Weld on

April 29, 1991.264 For over a year and a half, Governor Weld took

no action on Salvati’s petition. The Governor ultimately responded

54

265Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Letter from William

F. Weld, Governor, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to Joseph Salvati (Jan. 19, 1993)). (Exhibit

854). 266 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 72 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Victor Garo). The 1956 conviction involved the theft of some pliers. See Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Opinion of the Advisory Board of

Pardons (Apr. 29, 1991)) (Exhibit 845). 267Don Aucoin, Weld Seeks Clemency for Salvati, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1996, at B1. 268Don Aucoin, Dead Convict’s Lawyer Hits Weld on Sentence Commutation, BOSTON GLOBE,

Jan. 4, 1997, at B6. 269Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation of Joseph Salvati (Feb. 5, 1997)). 270Don Aucoin, Dead Convict’s Lawyer Hits Weld on Sentence Commutation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1997, at B6. 271Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheets (Nov. 8, 1978, June 2, 1981, and Mar. 23, 1982)) (Exhibit 674). 272Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Received Nov. 4, 1982)) (Exhibit 750). 273Letter from John M. Morris, Supervisory Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, and

James A. Ring, Acting Supervisory Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Brian A. Callery,

Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (Jan. 27, 1983) (Exhibit 751). This letter was a response

to the Parole Board’s request for information on Peter Limone. Though Agent Ring signed the

letter, he stated that he had no memory of the letter. Ring also stated that he suspected Agent

Morris wrote the letter because Ring had just arrived at the Boston FBI Office in January 1983. 274Memorandum from Joseph Williams, Warrant & Investigation Unit, Massachusetts Parole

Board, to the Advisory Board of Pardons (Apr. 22, 1983) (Exhibit 756). 275 Interview with Richard Luccio, Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (May 31, 2001).

on January 19, 1993, with a tersely worded rejection. The Governor

based his denial ‘‘in part upon the seriousness of the crimes and

the length of your criminal record.’’ 265 However, ‘‘the length of

[Salvati’s] criminal record’’ only included a 1956 conviction for

stealing a pair of pliers and a couple of traffic tickets.266

Soon after Weld’s 1993 denial, Boston television journalist Dan

Rea began to cover the Salvati case.267 Rea spotlighted evidence

and witnesses that pointed to Salvati’s innocence in a series of over

thirty television reports.268 On February 5, 1997, Governor Weld

commuted Salvati’s sentence.269 Despite the fact that Weld had

recommended only six other commutations during his administration, the Governor insisted that his decision was unrelated to

Salvati’s newfound notoriety.270

ii. Peter Limone

A second Deegan defendant, Peter Limone, also encountered FBI

opposition to his efforts to seek clemency. On his first three attempts, the Parole Board denied Limone a commutation hearing.271

On January 3, 1983, his luck changed when the Board granted

Limone an opportunity to present his case for clemency.272 Within

the month, the FBI wrote a letter to the Board stating, ‘‘Current

law enforcement intelligence reflects that Peter Limone continues

to be considered an important cog in the Boston Organized Criminal element. Should Mr. Limone be released, he would enjoy a position of elevated status within the Boston Organized Crime Structure.’’ 273 Parole Board Investigator Joseph Williams concurred

with the FBI’s opinion that Limone was a member of the Boston

mafia.274

Several Board members told Committee investigators about personal contacts by FBI agents lobbying against Limone’s release.

Richard Luccio said he received an unsolicited telephone call from

FBI agents, requesting that Limone’s hearing be denied.275 Luccio

told Committee investigators that the agents were attempting to

55

276 Id. 277 Interview with Michael Albano, former Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (Sept. 23,

2002). Mr. Albano believes the two agents were Special Agent John Connolly and Supervisory

Special Agent John Morris. Id. The Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Boston FBI Office at

this time, James W. Greenleaf, said it would be unusual for an agent to request a meeting with

a Board member regarding a petitioner, but SAC Greenleaf was unsure whether such actions

violated Bureau policy. Interview with James W. Greenleaf, Special Agent in Charge, Boston

FBI Field Office (Sept. 25, 2002). 278 Interview with Kevin Burke, Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (May 30, 2001). James

Ahearn, who served as Special Agent in Charge of the Boston Office from 1986 to 1989, commented that it would be ‘‘most unusual and improper’’ for an FBI agent to attend a commutation

hearing unless authorized. 279Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (Aug. 1, 1983)) (Exhibit 773). 280Shelley Murphy, Parole Panelists Cite Retaliation After Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19,

2001. 281 Interview with Brian Callery, former Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (June 26,

2001). 282 Interview with Kevin Burke, former Board Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (May 30,

2001). Another Board member recalls that income tax records were searched for irregularities.

Interview with Michael Albano, former Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (Sept. 23, 2002). 283 Interview with Michael Albano, former Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (Sept. 23,

2002). 284See Interview with Jack Curran, former Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (June 28,

2001); Shelley Murphy, Parole Panelists Cite Retaliation After Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, June 19,

2001, at B2. 285See Interview with Dick Luccio, former Board Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (May

31, 2001); Interview with Michael Albano, former Member, Massachusetts Parole Board (Sept.

23, 2002).

influence his decision but were unsuccessful.276 Michael Albano,

who was also a Board Member, told the Committee that two FBI

agents personally visited him regarding the Limone commutation

and asked him ‘‘intimidating’’ questions.277 Albano said that one of

the agents told him, ‘‘If you let this bastard [Limone] out, you’ll

have to let them all out,’’ referring to the other Deegan defendants.

In addition, Mr. Albano and another Board Member, Kevin Burke,

both recall that FBI agents attended the Limone hearing.278 In

spite of the FBI’s lobbying effort, the Board approved Limone’s petition for a commutation on August 1, 1983, by a 5–2 vote.279 Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, however, did not support

the Board’s recommendation and denied Limone clemency the following month.280

The full ramifications of the Limone vote were not felt until the

following year. The former chairman of the Massachusetts Parole

Board told Committee investigators that in 1984, the two Board

members who opposed Limone’s commutation requested an investigation of the five Board members who favored Limone’s commutation to determine whether they were influenced by organized crime

figures.281 Another former Board member told Committee investigators that State Police Colonel Peter Agnes conducted the investigation in a ‘‘very accusatory manner.’’ 282 Another Board member

recalled for Committee investigators that Colonel Agnes told him

that the FBI was either a partner in the investigation or interested

in the results of the investigation.283 After the accused Board members were cleared of any criminal wrongdoing, the allegations were

then referred to the state Ethics Commission, which found no violations.284 Former Board members told Committee investigators that

the multiple investigations fractured the Board and caused its

members to be wary of organized crime cases.285

56

286Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Clemency Vote

Sheet (Nov. 16, 1987)) (Exhibit 812). 287Letter from James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J.

Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (Oct. 19, 1987) (Exhibit 810); Letter from

James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Oct. 28, 1987) (Exhibit 811). 288Letter from James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J.

Curran, Chairman, Massachusetts Parole Board (Oct. 19, 1987) (Exhibit 810); Letter from

James Ahearn, Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to John J. Curran, Chairman,

Massachusetts Parole Board (Oct. 28, 1987) (Exhibit 811). 289Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety Document Production (Commutation Hearing Vote Sheet (June 25, 1990)) (Exhibit 842). 290 Commonwealth v. Limone, No. 32367, 32369, 32370, slip op. at *14 (Suffolk County Sup.

Ct. Jan. 5, 2001). 291 Interview with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001); see also Shelley Murphy, Playing Both

Sides Pays Off, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 23, 1993. 292 ‘‘Law enforcement officials said Mr. Fitzgerald was targeted for death because he was the

lawyer for a famed Cosa Nostra soldier turned-informer, Joseph Barboza Baron.’’ Andy Dabilis

& Ralph Ranalli, Mob Lawyer Maimed in ’68 Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2001. 293See Office of Professional Responsibility Investigative Report (focusing on allegations of

FBI mishandling of confidential informants) (Exhibit 280). 294 Commonwealth v. Salemme, 323 N.E. 2d 922 (Mass. App. 1975). 295 U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148, 182 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub nom.

U.S. v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000). 296 Id.

Peter Limone received a second commutation hearing in 1987.286

Upon request of the Parole Board, the FBI submitted two separate

letters detailing contacts between Limone and organized crime

members.287 The Board denied Limone’s clemency request based,

in part, on the FBI’s letters.288 In 1990, Limone again petitioned

for clemency, but was not even granted a hearing.289 Judge Hinkle

ordered Limone’s release on January 5, 2001, because new evidence

cast serious doubts on the credibility of Joseph Barboza, whose testimony helped convict Limone.290 Limone did not receive a commutation.

8. Efforts to Protect Stephen Flemmi After the Deegan Murder Trial

After the Deegan murder trial, Stephen Flemmi led a charmed

life. The FBI protected Flemmi from being prosecuted for his role

in major criminal activities—including murder and attempted murder, drug dealing, and arms running—for the next two decades.

The Committee has not thoroughly investigated these matters; nevertheless, a brief recapitulation of efforts to protect Stephen

Flemmi provides an indication of how far the government went to

assist their Top Echelon informant. Although the Justice Department has not yet provided the Committee with all documents pertaining to Stephen Flemmi, the following efforts to protect Flemmi

have come to the Committee’s attention:

• On December 23, 1967, Stephen Flemmi allegedly murdered

William Bennett.291 On January 30, 1968, Flemmi allegedly

planted a car bomb in attorney John Fitzgerald’s car.292 Flemmi

was indicted for the Bennett murder on September 11, 1969.293

He was indicted for his role in the Fitzgerald bombing on October 10, 1969.294 Prior to being indicted for these crimes, FBI

Special Agent H. Paul Rico called Flemmi to warn him that he

was about to be indicted and that he should flee.295 Flemmi followed Agent Rico’s advice and left the country.296 Flemmi did

not return to Boston until 1974, when Agent Rico advised

Flemmi to return because his legal problems would be favorably

57

297 Id. at 185. 298 Interview with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001); Former FBI Special Agent Dennis

Condon testified: ‘‘It’s also my understanding that Daddeico positively refused to testify against

Flemmi, supposedly because he had a dislike for Salemme that he did not have for Flemmi, and

refused to testify. That’s my understanding. Deposition of Dennis M. Condon, former Special

Agent, Boston FBI Field Office 187 (Fenruary 21, 2002). It is worth noting that law enforcement

did not pressure Daddeico to testify against Flemmi, and it appears that it was acceptable to

law enforcement to allow the witness to testify against one defendant and refrain from testifying

against another defendant based on personal friendship. 299Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 185. 300 Id. at 182, 185. The Salemme court found:

If Flemmi had been prosecuted in 1969 for the Fitzgerald bombing or the William Bennett murder, his role as an FBI informant might have been disclosed, and its legal implications might have been examined, three decades ago. Flemmi’s successful flight to

avoid prosecution spared Rico, and the FBI the risk of the embarrassment and controversy that disclosure of Flemmi’s dual status as an FBI informant and an alleged

murderer has recently entailed. Rico had reason to be concerned about embarrassment

to the FBI. . . . By honoring his promise to protect Flemmi, Rico also promoted the

possibility that Flemmi would in the future again become a valuable FBI informant.

301 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 302Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 303 Id. 304 Id. 305 Id. 306 Id. 307 Id. 308 Id.

resolved.297 Rico was correct. Robert Daddeico told Committee

investigators that he was not pressed to testify against Flemmi

for the Bennett murder and the Fitzgerald car bombing.298 On

May 6, 1974, as arranged by Rico, Flemmi returned to Boston

and was promptly released on bail.299 Soon thereafter, Flemmi’s

fugitive charges, the Bennett murder charges, and the car

bombing charge were dismissed.300

• A former Las Vegas police detective told Committee investigators that in 1970, the FBI interfered with a Nevada law enforcement investigation to protect Flemmi from being prosecuted for

the murder of Peter Poulos.301

• In 1977, FBI Special Agent John Connolly alerted Flemmi that

a cleaning company had been ‘‘wired’’ to obtain evidence of

Flemmi’s loansharking.302 ‘‘As a result, Flemmi avoided that location and was not intercepted.’’ 303

• In 1977 or 1978, National Melotone, a vending machine company, attempted to prompt an FBI probe of Stephen Flemmi for

using threats of violence against National Melotone officials to

have their machines replaced with machines from Flemmi’s National Vending Company.304 Connolly sought to protect Flemmi

and successfully dissuaded National Melotone officials from pursuing their allegations.305

• In October 1977, informant information indicated that Stephen

Flemmi made death threats to an individual named Francis

Green.306 Green corroborated this information.307 However, although Green was used as an important government witness in

another matter, the FBI never sought to develop Green as a witness against Flemmi.308

• In 1979, Boston Organized Crime Strike Force prosecutor Jeremiah O’Sullivan was conducting an investigation into allegaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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309 Id. at 199; Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney in Charge, and Jeremiah T.

O’Sullivan, Prosecutor, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice

Field Office, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S.

Dept. of Justice (Jan. 29, 1979) (document retained by the Justice Department). 310Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 199; Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney in

Charge, and Jeremiah T. O’Sullivan, Prosecutor, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime

& Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Jan. 29, 1979) (document retained by the Justice

Department). 311Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 200; ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New

England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 300–02 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan). 312Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 200; Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney in

Charge, and Jeremiah T. O’Sullivan, Prosecutor, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime

& Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Jan. 29, 1979) (document retained by the Justice

Department). 313 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 335 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan); see also

Shelley Murphy, Former US Attorney Denies Protecting FBI Informants, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.

6, 2002, at A1. 314 Id.; see also Shelley Murphy, Former US Attorney Denies Protecting FBI Informants, BOS- TON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2002, at A1. 315See Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Henry Petersen, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (June 6, 1967) (document retained by the Justice Department) (‘‘James L. Sims—The case against Sims rests solely

on Ciulla’s testimony.’’). O’Sullivan also admitted this when testifying before the Committee.

‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on

Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 301–02 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan). 316 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 325 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan). 317 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 326 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan); Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney in Charge of the Boston Strike Force, and Jeremiah

T. O’Sullivan, of the Boston Organized Crime Strike Force, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief

of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (Jan. 29, 1979) (document is retained by the

tions of a horse race-fixing scheme.309 The key witness, Anthony

Ciulla, provided evidence that Stephen Flemmi participated in

the scheme.310 Understanding that they could lose Flemmi as

an informant, in early January 1979, FBI Supervisory Special

Agent John Morris and FBI Special Agent John Connolly met

with O’Sullivan in an effort to convince him not to indict and

prosecute Flemmi.311 Notwithstanding evidence that Flemmi

was a principal in the criminal conspiracy, Flemmi was not indicted for his role in the race-fixing scheme.312 O’Sullivan testified before the Committee on December 5, 2002, that at the time

he was considering indictments for the Ciulla race-fixing case,

he knew Flemmi was a murderer but used ‘‘prosecutorial discretion’’ in deciding not to prosecute Flemmi.313 O’Sullivan claimed

that he did not indict Flemmi because the testimony against

him was uncorroborated.314 However, a prosecution memorandum shows that O’Sullivan indicted another individual, James

Sims, even though the testimony against him was also

uncorroborated.315 Moreover, O’Sullivan testified before the

Committee that another reason that he did not indict Flemmi

was because Flemmi’s role in the race-fixing scheme was limited

to receipt of proceeds from the illegal scheme.316 This testimony

was false. When confronted with his own memorandum that

Stephen Flemmi and James Bulger participated in a meeting to

discuss the race-fixing scheme, that Bulger and Flemmi ‘‘would

help find outside bookmakers to accept the bets of the group’’

that they were financiers of the conspiracy and that Flemmi appeared to be a part of the core working group of the conspiracy,

O’Sullivan replied, ‘‘You’ve got me.’’ 317

59

Justice Department). The memorandum states the following: ‘‘The Boston Strike Force recommends the indictment of the twenty-one individuals listed below, including the principals of

the Winter Hill gang, for their involvement with Anthony Ciulla in a multi-state pari-mutuel

thoroughbred horse race fixing scheme involving race tracks in five states.’’ The net profits were

almost two million dollars. Ciulla and Barnoski met with Howard Winter ‘‘and six of his associates’’ in late 1973 to discuss a race fixing scheme. ‘‘Winter and his partners would provide the

money necessary to carry out the scheme.’’ The six associates included Flemmi and James Bulger. The memo states that after the initial meeting with Winter, Ciulla and Barnoski met with

Winter’s other partners in the scheme—John Martorano, Joseph McDonald, James Sims, John

Martorano, James Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. Bulger and Flemmi ‘‘would help find outside

bookmakers to accept the bets of the group.’’ ‘‘Ciulla and the Winter group then began to fix

races at tracks around the country.’’ The scheme lasted for 2 years and more than 200 races

were fixed. In an interview with the Committee, Anthony Ciulla confirmed that Bulger and

Flemmi played a significant role in the race-fixing conspiracy and that prosecutors were fully

aware of the extent of Bulger and Flemmi’s activities. Interview with Anthony Ciulla (Dec. 5,

2002); see also J.M. Lawrence, Mob Scene; Bulger May Stay Mum on Whitey, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 6, 2002, at 1. 318Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 319 Id. 320 Id. 321 Id. at 202–03; Interview with Bob Long, Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr.17,

2001). 322Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 208. 323 Id. at 209. 324See id. at 208. 325 Id. 326See id. at 208, 211–12; ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’

Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 272–73 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of

Michael Huff). 327See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 208–09.

• Notwithstanding the fact that FBI Supervisory Special Agent

John Morris received informant information in July 1979 that

Flemmi was ‘‘shaking down’’ bookmakers, the FBI made no effort to investigate this matter.318

• In 1979 and early 1980, the FBI received informant information

that Flemmi was involved in additional criminal activity, including illegal gambling and drug trafficking.319 The FBI did not investigate these allegations.320

• ‘‘In 1980, the FBI contributed to frustrating a Massachusetts

State Police investigation of criminal activity of . . . [Stephen]

Flemmi and many others occurring at the Lancaster Street

Garage[.]’’ 321

• In 1981 and 1982, the FBI received reliable informant information that Stephen Flemmi was involved in illegal drug distribution and demanded money from bookmakers to operate in South

Boston.322 However, the FBI did not investigate these allegations.323

• On May 27, 1981, business tycoon and owner of World Jai Alai,

Roger Wheeler, was murdered in Tulsa, Oklahoma.324 Shortly

thereafter, Flemmi became a major suspect in the Wheeler murder.325 Boston FBI officials prevented other FBI offices and local

law enforcement agents, including Tulsa, Oklahoma, police officials, from interviewing Flemmi.326 Brian Halloran, who was

facing a state murder charge, began cooperating with the FBI

in Boston and implicated Flemmi in the Wheeler murder by

stating that he met with Flemmi at former World Jai Alai President John Callahan’s apartment and was asked to kill Wheeler.327 Concerned that Halloran’s allegations would jeopardize

Flemmi’s informant status, FBI Supervisory Special Agent John

Morris told FBI Special Agent John Connolly of Halloran’s coVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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328See id. 329See id. 330See id. at 209–10. 331See id. at 210–13. 332See id. at 211. 333See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 334 Interview with Shelton Merritt, former Detective, Metro Dade Police Dept. (Dec. 2, 2001)

(‘‘I was stonewalled and snowballed [by the FBI] and left to hang out and dry.’’); See also

Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 335Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 213. 336 Id. 337 Id. 338 Id. 339 Id. at 213. 340 Id. at 214. 341 Id. 342 Id. at 214–15; see also Dick Lehr, Mob Underling’s Tale of Guns, Drugs, Fear Weeks Before

His Death, McIntyre Felt ‘Trapped, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2000 at A1. 343Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 344See Shelley Murphy, Remains of Slay Victim Cremated, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 15, 2001, at

B3; Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 345Shelley Murphy, 3 Bodies Unearthed in Dorchester, Bulger Confidant is Said to Give Tip,

BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 15, 2000, at A1; Dick Lehr, Mob Underling’s Tale of Guns, Drugs, Fear

Weeks Before His Death, McIntyre Felt ‘Trapped, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 27, 2000 at A1.

operation and claims against Flemmi.328 Agent Connolly then,

in turn, told Flemmi.329 Halloran was murdered on May 11,

1982.330 Shortly after Halloran’s murder, John Callahan’s body

was found in the trunk of his car at Miami International Airport on August 4, 1982.331 Callahan had been killed weeks earlier.332 Callahan had been interviewed by the FBI in connection

with the Wheeler murder.333 According to one former Miami

Dade Police Detective, the Boston FBI Office also ‘‘stonewalled’’

Florida’s efforts in investigating Flemmi’s role in the Callahan

murder.334

• According to U.S. v. Salemme,335 Brian Halloran was not the

only informant that the FBI identified for Flemmi.336 FBI Special Agent H. Paul ‘‘Rico disclosed the identity of several informants to Flemmi’’ and FBI Special Agent John Connolly identified

for ‘‘Flemmi at least a dozen individuals who were either FBI

informants or sources for other law enforcement agencies.’’ 337

The purpose of these disclosures was so that Flemmi ‘‘could

avoid making any unnecessary incriminating statements to

other informants.’’ 338

• In mid-October 1984, John McIntyre, an engineer on a ship

named the Valhalla, which was used in an attempt to deliver

guns and ammunition from Massachusetts to the Irish Republican Army in Ireland, began providing information to local

Massachusetts law enforcement about Flemmi’s involvement in

the Valhalla arms shipment.339 Local law enforcement told the

FBI about McIntyre’s cooperation.340 The FBI subsequently

interviewed McIntyre regarding his allegations.341 The FBI then

allegedly told Flemmi about McIntyre’s cooperation and

claims.342 ‘‘[D]espite the obvious potential for McIntyre’s cooperation to result in several significant, if not sensational

cases, no evidence has been presented that the FBI conducted

any investigation based on McIntyre’s charges concerning . . .

Flemmi[.]’’ 343 McIntyre disappeared around November 1984.344

His remains were found in a make-shift grave on January 14,

2000.345 Flemmi was later indicted for aiding and abetting in

61

346 U.S. v. O’Neil, 99–CR–10371–RGS, Superseding Indictment. 347Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 215. 348 Id. at 210, 212. 349 Id. 350 Id. at 220–42. 351 Id. at 242. 352 Id. at 242–43. 353 Id. at 254–55. 354 Id. at 258. 355 Id. 356 Id. at 256–58. 357 Id. at 258. 358 Id. at 259. 359 Id. 360 Id.

McIntyre’s murder.346 Moreover, notwithstanding other evidence demonstrating Flemmi’s involvement with the Valhalla

arms shipment, Flemmi was not charged in a prosecution that

took place years later regarding the Valhalla.347

• In January 1984, FBI Special Agent John Connolly received reliable information that Stephen Flemmi was involved in an ongoing extortion of the owners of the South Boston Liquor

Mart.348 However, the FBI did not investigate this extortion in

any way.349

• In 1984 and 1985, the FBI told Stephen Flemmi that he was

being targeted in a major Drug Enforcement Agency (‘‘DEA’’) investigation, which included electronic surveillance.350 The

DEA’s ‘‘lengthy and expensive investigation was deemed unsuccessful and was eventually closed.’’ 351

• In April 1985, FBI Supervisory Special Agent John Morris told

Stephen Flemmi that ‘‘you can do anything you want as long as

you don’t clip anyone.’’ 352

• In the late 1980’s, Stephen Flemmi was protected from being

prosecuted for his role in the extortion of reputed drug dealer

Hobart Willis.353

• In 1986, the FBI continued an investigation regarding payoffs

to members of the Boston Police Department.354 Agent John

Connolly forewarned Stephen Flemmi not to make incriminating

statements to Boston Police Lieutenant James Cox, who was

going to attempt to record conversations with Flemmi.355

• In 1988, the FBI received information implicating Stephen

Flemmi in the Brian Halloran and Bucky Barrett murders.356

Notwithstanding receiving such significant information, this information ‘‘was not provided to any agents responsible for investigating those matters or indexed so that it could be accessed by

such agents.’’ 357

• In the spring of 1988, FBI Special Agents Robert Jordan and

Stanley Moody prepared an application for electronic surveillance targeting bookmaker John Baharoian, Stephen Flemmi,

and others.358 Prior to the inception of the surveillance, Agents

John Morris and John Connolly warned Flemmi about the

planned surveillance.359 The surveillance produced evidence

that led to the indictment of John Baharoian and others.360

62

361 Id. 362 Id. at 263. 363 Id. at 294. 364 Id. at 295–96. 365 Id. at 296. 366 Id. at 297. 367 Id. 368 Id. at 148. At times he was technically closed as an informant. There appear to be few,

if any, practical ramifications pertaining to these closures. 369 Id. at 151.

However, because he was forewarned, Flemmi was not intercepted, and therefore not indicted.361

• In 1988 or 1989, Agent John Connolly indirectly warned Stephen Flemmi through James Bulger that alleged extortion victim Timothy Connolly was cooperating with the FBI and would

attempt to record conversations with Flemmi.362

• In 1992, the United States Attorney’s Office began a grand jury

investigation targeting Stephen Flemmi.363 From 1992 to 1995,

Flemmi received frequent reports concerning the progress of the

grand jury investigation from retired FBI Agent John Connolly,

who was being fed information from his contacts at the FBI.364

Flemmi spoke to Connolly ‘‘ ‘constantly’ concerning the ongoing

grand jury investigation.’’ 365 Finally, on or about January 3,

1995, Connolly indirectly informed Flemmi, through James

Bulger, that Flemmi was about to be indicted on or about January 10, 1995.366 However, despite the fact that he received the

advance warning, Flemmi did not flee immediately and was arrested on January 5, 1995, prior to his indictment.367

Stephen Flemmi served as an FBI informant for thirty years.368

During that time, the FBI promised him protection.369 As discussed

above, the FBI made good on this promise, protecting him from a

long list of crimes, including murder, attempted murder, and even

gun smuggling to a foreign country. Notwithstanding knowledge of

his involvement in the Poulos and William Bennett murders, the

maiming of attorney John Fitzgerald, and the certainty by at least

one U.S. Attorney that he was a murderer, nothing was done until

the mid-1990s to bring Stephen Flemmi to justice. To the contrary,

extraordinary measures were taken to protect him. The protection

of Stephen Flemmi is another unfortunate example of what happened in New England when the government used an ‘‘ends justifies the means’’ approach to law enforcement. No one disputes the

proposition that destroying organized crime in the United States

was an important law enforcement objective. However, the steps

that were taken may have been more injurious than the results obtained. Along the way, lives were destroyed, witnesses were murdered, respect for the rule of law was eviscerated, and the government has been exposed to billions of dollars in potential civil liability.

9. The Misuse of the Flemmi Brothers as Informants: Two Human

Perspectives

The FBI’s misuse of informants had profound human consequences for a number of individuals. In the Deegan prosecution

alone it appears that the death penalty was unfairly assessed and

men innocent of the crime for which they were convicted died in

63

370 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 32 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Victor Garo). 371 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 39 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Joseph Salvati). 372 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 43 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of Marie Salvati).

prison. The following testimony, however, provides an indication of

the human suffering caused by the FBI and Justice Department’s

failure to police its own use of informants:

In returning from one of the visits before the trial of her

father, [Joe Salvati’s daughter Sharon—around 8 or 9

years old at the time] came home and asked her mother

and then asked her father, daddy, what’s the electric

chair? They say you’re going to get the electric chair. Are

they giving you a present? 370

Testimony of Victor Garo

Attorney for Joseph Salvati

***

The government stole more than 30 years of my life. . . .

My life as a husband and father came to a tumbling halt.

In order to clear my name, it has been a long and frustrating battle. Yet, through all the heartbreak and sometimes

throughout the years, my wife and I have remained very

much in love. Prison may have separated us physically,

but our love has always kept us together mentally and

emotionally. Our children have always been foremost in

our minds. We tried our best to raise them in a loving and

caring atmosphere even though we were separated by prison walls. More than once my heart was broken because I

was unable to be with my family at very important

times.371

Testimony of Joseph Salvati

***

From October 25, 1967, the date my husband was arrested, until January 30, 2001, when all the charges were

dropped, my life was extremely difficult. The government

took away my husband and the father of our children in

1967. My world was shattered. This wonderful life that we

shared was gone. Many people looked down on me. Children in the neighborhood would tease our kids. I did my

best to comfort my children but no one was there to comfort me. Many a night I cried by myself, and I suffered in

silence.372

***

From the very beginning of imprisonment, I knew that it

would be important for the children to have constant contact with their family, with their father. And every weekend, you know, I’d dress up, pack a little lunch, and we’d

64

373 Id. 374 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268–69 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of David Wheeler).

go off to see him for their hugs and their kisses and whatever went on. And he would give them a father’s guidance,

even though he was not home with them. Sometimes it

took hours to get there, and every time you got there, you

were all nervous.373

Testimony of Marie Salvati

***

My father’s life represented what many consider to be the

American ideal: vision, hard work, a good sense of opportunity and maybe a little bit of luck. . . . One Wednesday

afternoon I received a call, telling me only that my father

had been shot in the head . . . . The next day I had to repeatedly negotiate between the funeral home and my

mother. She kept asking to see her husband. They kept

asking for more time and finally, in desperation, asked me,

‘‘Do you realize where he was shot?’’ When we arrived at

the funeral home to view my father I finally started to lose

control. My mother kissed my father’s body. I almost

passed out fearing that part of dad’s face would fall

apart.374

Testimony of David Wheeler

The Committee regrets that it has been unable to receive testimony from more of the victims of Joseph Barboza, the Flemmis,

and James Bulger. Their stories are all tragic, and the Committee,

by quoting the above testimony, does not wish to indicate that any

one set of circumstances is worse than another.

B. INTERFERENCE WITH STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT

The use of Joseph Barboza as a cooperating witness and the development of Jimmy and Stephen Flemmi as informants led to

problems in other state law enforcement activities. In California,

for example, Joseph Barboza committed a murder, for which federal law enforcement officials tried to help him escape the legal

consequences. In Nevada, Oklahoma, and Florida, murders were

committed apparently involving Stephen Flemmi. The ensuing investigations appear to have been hampered by federal law enforcement officials. In Connecticut, federal officials appear to have

worked against a state-wide probe of organized crime in the jai alai

industry. Finally, FBI agent H. Paul Rico—who was intimately involved with the development of Joseph Barboza as a cooperating

witness and Jimmy and Stephen Flemmi as confidential informants—was found by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island to have

suborned perjury and to have himself committed perjury. As a result, one participant in a homicide was released from prison.

This section discusses the intersection of state and federal law

enforcement efforts, and how the use of Barboza and the Flemmis

interfered with state efforts to enforce criminal laws.

65

375 Interview with Chuck Hiner, former Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco FBI Field Office (Sept. 25, 2001). Special Agent Dennis Condon told Chuck Hiner that Barboza had testified

and was in the Witness Protection Program. Id. Hiner described the cooking school as a ‘‘den

of thieves.’’ Id. 376 Interview with Chuck Hiner, former Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco FBI Field Office (Sept. 25, 2001). 377 Interview with Doug Ahlstrom, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office (Aug.

28, 2001); Interview with Bill Baseman, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office

(Sept. 24, 2001). 378 Interview with Doug Ahlstrom, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office (Aug.

28, 2001); Interview with Bill Baseman, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office

(Sept. 24, 2001); Interview with Chuck Hiner, former Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco

FBI Field Office (Sept. 25, 2001). 379 Interview with Bill Baseman, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office (Sept. 24,

2001). 380 Interview with Doug Ahlstrom, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office (Aug.

28, 2001); Interview with Bill Baseman, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office

(Sept. 24, 2001); Interview with Chuck Hiner, former Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco

FBI Field Office (Sept. 25, 2001). 381Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (June 20, 1967) (Exhibit 141). According to Vincent Teresa, Barboza was ‘‘dangerous. He was unpredictable. When he tasted blood, everyone in his way got it.’’ VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 167 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1973). 382 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 40 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ed Cameron and Tim Brown).

1. California

The murder of Clay Wilson by Joseph Barboza, and the ensuing

prosecution for this homicide present one of the more bizarre stories in the annals of federal law enforcement. Notwithstanding

Barboza’s past as a brutal killer, he was resettled in Santa Rosa,

California, as the first member of the federal Witness Protection

Program. Shortly thereafter, he murdered a local criminal named

Clay Wilson. Once this murder was discovered and Barboza was

charged with the crime, the federal government went to great

lengths to help Barboza escape the consequences of his crime.

i. Joseph Barboza’s Relocation to California

Following his testimony in the Raymond Patriarca, Jerry

Angiulo, and Edward Deegan cases in 1967 and 1968, the FBI relocated Joseph Barboza to Santa Rosa, California, in April 1969.

Barboza, also known as Joseph Baron, was given the name Joe

Bentley. According to interviews by Committee investigators of FBI

agents assigned to the Santa Rosa area at that time, the U.S. Marshals enrolled Barboza in a cooking school,375 and the FBI provided

him with an automobile 376 and took mail to him.377 Other than

these minimal contacts, the agents said they had no contact with

Barboza.378 In fact, Bill Baseman, the agent who ran the Santa

Rosa FBI Field Office, said he did not want to have any contact

with Barboza because he knew Barboza would get into trouble.379

FBI headquarters did not provide the Santa Rosa Office with any

directions or instructions regarding Barboza and provided little or

no information about Barboza’s criminal background and cooperation with the government.380 Barboza’s murderous past was clearly

understood. One memorandum directed to FBI Director Hoover

called Barboza ‘‘a professional assassin responsible for numerous

homicides and acknowledged by all professional law enforcement

representatives in [the Boston] area to be the most dangerous individual known.’’ 381 Notwithstanding this belief, the FBI failed to inform local law enforcement of Barboza’s presence in Santa Rosa.382

66

383One of the conditions of Barboza’s parole was that he not return to Massachusetts. See

Edward Counihan, Informer Baron Arrested, Parole Revoked, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1970 (Exhibit 316). 384Trial Transcript, California v. Bentley (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1971) at 192 (cross-examination of Joseph [Barboza]) (Exhibit 433). Another alleged reason for Barboza’s return to Massachusetts concerned his apparent attempts to sell bonds or stock certificates that were stolen in

California. 385 Id. at 196–97; Interview with James Southwood, former reporter, BOSTON HERALD TRAVELER (Sept. 28, 2001). 386 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 122 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of F. Lee Bailey); see also Affidavit of Francis Lee Bailey (Oct. 16, 1978) (Exhibit

668). 387 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 122 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of F. Lee Bailey); see also Affidavit of Francis Lee Bailey (Oct. 16, 1978) (Exhibit

668). 388 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 122–23 (May 3,

2001) (testimony of F. Lee Bailey). 389 Id. at 123. 390 Baron Seized, Held on Arms, Pot Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17, 1970 (Exhibit 316). 391 Id. 392 Edward Counihan, Charges Against Baron Dropped, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 1970 (Exhibit

317). 393 Id. 394 Edward Counihan, Court Asked to Release Baron from Walpole, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 11,

1970 (Exhibit 325).

Once settled in California, Barboza began making trips back to

Massachusetts in violation of the terms of his parole.383 During

these trips, Barboza negotiated with the mafia to recant his testimony in the Deegan trial in return for money.384 In May of 1970,

Barboza met with an associate of New England Mafia boss Raymond L.S. Patriarca in Massachusetts. Barboza told Patriarca’s associate that he would recant his testimony in exchange for

$500,000 and the legal services of F. Lee Bailey.385

In July of 1970, Barboza met with Bailey in New Bedford, Massachusetts.386 At this meeting, Barboza told Bailey that Henry

Tameleo, Joe Salvati, Peter Limone, and Louie Greco were innocent

of the Deegan murder.387 Furthermore, Barboza told Bailey that

his testimony in the Patriarca case was largely fabricated and that

FBI Agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon assisted him with the

fabrication.388 In light of these allegations, Bailey demanded that

Barboza submit to a lie detector test.389

Before Bailey could begin documenting Barboza’s perjured testimony, Barboza was arrested on July 17, 1970, in New Bedford,

Massachusetts, and imprisoned on firearm and narcotics

charges.390 Once the Massachusetts Parole Board learned of his arrest, Barboza’s parole was revoked based on a provision of his parole that prohibited him from ever returning to Massachusetts.391

On July 20, 1970, District Attorney Edmund Dinis dropped the

firearms and narcotics charges purportedly due to constitutional

problems arising because Barboza had no legal representation at

his arraignment.392 However, according to Dinis, federal authorities had contacted him before he dropped the charges, stating that

that they ‘‘were concerned with [Barboza’s] welfare’’ and that ‘‘[h]e

[Barboza] ha[d] been most cooperative with them and given them

vital testimony.’’ 393 After the firearm and narcotics charges were

dropped, Barboza was imprisoned in Massachusetts’ Walpole State

Prison where he was held pending charges for his parole violation.394

67

395Letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept.

of Justice (July 22, 1970) (Exhibit 320). 396Memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James F. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Nov. 29, 1971) (Exhibit

426). 397 Affidavit of Joseph Baron (July 28, 1970) (Exhibit 321). On August 3, 1970, Edward Harrington, Deputy Chief of the Strike Force, met with Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett

Byrne and Jack Zalkind, the prosecutor of the Deegan case, to discuss ‘‘the affidavit signed by

Joseph Barboza Baron and filed in connection with the motion for a new trial on the Deegan

murder case.’’ FBI Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar

Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 3, 1970) (Exhibit 323). At the meeting, Byrne told Harrington that

Barboza’s affidavit was insufficient to warrant a hearing because it contained only a general

statement. Id. 398 ‘‘The FBI’s Controversial Handling of Organized Crime Investigations in Boston: The Case

of Joseph Salvati,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 123 (May 3, 2001)

(testimony of F. Lee Bailey); see also Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Special Attorneys, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James Featherstone, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Aug. 28, 1970) (Exhibit 330).

Barboza’s arrest prompted FBI Director Hoover’s office to relay

the following information to Attorney General John Mitchell:

Without the knowledge of the Strike Force, Barboza returned to New Bedford, Massachusetts, and was arrested

by the New Bedford Police Department[.]

***

On July 20, 1970, the charges against Barboza were nolprossed by the District Attorney’s Office in that Barboza’s

rights had been violated as he was not represented by

counsel.

***

Our Boston office has advised that the Strike Force in Boston and the District Attorney’s Office, Suffolk County, are

attempting to have Barboza transferred from the Massachusetts Correctional Institution because his life could be

in danger from other inmates.

This matter will be followed and you will be advised of additional pertinent information.395

Though FBI Director Hoover’s statement that Barboza returned to

Massachusetts without the knowledge of the Strike Force may have

been true, FBI agents certainly knew that Barboza had been traveling to Massachusetts in violation of his parole terms. For example, in February 1970, FBI Special Agent Paul Rico warned

Barboza to leave Massachusetts because of threats against his

life.396

Despite Barboza’s arrest, F. Lee Bailey continued to extract information from Barboza concerning his testimony in the Deegan

trial. On July 28, 1970, Barboza signed an affidavit stating, ‘‘I wish

to recant certain portions of my testimony during the course of the

above-said trial [Commonwealth v. French] insofar as my testimony

concerned the involvement of Henry Tameleo, Peter J. Limone, Joseph L. Salvati and Lewis [sic] Grieco [sic] in the killing of Teddy

Deegan.’’ 397 Bailey, attempting to buttress the credibility of

Barboza’s affidavit, scheduled a lie-detector test for Barboza.398 In

the meantime, Barboza began giving Bailey details of the Deegan

68

399Memorandum from Lee Bailey to Joe Balliro (Aug. 27, 1970) (Exhibit 328). 400 Edward Counihan, Hearing on Barboza Test Continued, Starts Row, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.

25, 1970 (Exhibit 326).

murder and the circumstances surrounding his recantation. Bailey

memorialized this information in a memorandum to Deegan defense attorney Joseph Balliro:

As you recall, when I met with [Barboza] at his request in

New Bedford, he stated that he had felt for some time that

he should make a direct effort to right the injustice which

his testimony had caused. He indicated that he had been

assured all along that (especially in the murder cases) a

conviction was unlikely, and after the conviction occurred

he was told to expect that due to trial errors the Supreme

Court would reverse the cases, and of course there would

never be a re-trial; therefore, no permanent harm would be

done to anyone whereas the government would have accomplished its primary objection: much publicity about

prosecuting organized crime.

***

Nonetheless, after many hours of conversation with

[Barboza] at Walpole I am convinced that I have most of

the details of what actually took place.

***

It appears that Mr. French did in fact shoot Deegan, that

Mr. Cassesso was present with [Barboza] in the car and

conspired to kill Stathopoulos but was not involved in the

Deegan killing, and that Salvati and Greco were not

present at all. Further, Tamelio [sic] and Lemone [sic] had

nothing to do with arranging Deegan’s murder nor had

they any reason to believe that it was going to occur. The

person sitting in the rear of the automobile which the

Chelsea Police Captain saw was in fact bald and was Vincent Felemi [sic]. Romeo Martin in fact shot Deegan but

the role ascribed to Greco as the third assailant of Deegan

in fact involved another man whose last name begins with

‘‘C’’ as you had earlier suggested to me.399

Barboza told authorities that he was recanting his testimony in

exchange for payment from the mafia. Yet, the information

Barboza divulged to Bailey regarding the Deegan murder was more

consistent with police reports on the murder, information received

from informants, and information the FBI received independent of

Barboza, both before and after the murder, than it was with

Barboza’s testimony at the Deegan trial.

Barboza’s arrest, however, presented the immediate problem of a

potential prison sentence. On August 20, 1970, Barboza was

charged with violating his parole, which carried a four to five year

prison sentence. Five days later, on August 25, 1970, Bailey petitioned the court to allow Barboza to take a lie detector test.400 That

same day, Walter Barnes, Special Attorney of the Organized Crime

and Racketeering Section, was told that Barboza requested a meetVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
69

401Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Aug. 25, 1970)

(Exhibit 327). The memorandum states that Barboza wanted FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon

to attend the meeting but that ‘‘Condon will not see Barboza;’’ see also Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Special Attorneys, Organized Crime & Racketeering

Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James Featherstone, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Aug. 28, 1970) (Exhibit 330). 402Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Special Attorneys, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James

Featherstone, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice

(Aug. 28, 1970) (Exhibit 330).

ing.401 Barnes and his colleague, Edward Harrington, met with

Barboza at Walpole State Prison on August 28, 1970. Barnes and

Harrington’s memorandum of the meeting states that Barboza:

Requested Barnes and Harrington to relocate his wife and

family from California in light of the fact that their whereabouts had become public knowledge, having been disclosed by his counsel, F. Lee Bailey, at a prior court proceeding. Barnes and Harrington did not make any response to this request. [Barboza] also requested that his

probation revocation warrant be withdrawn. Barnes and

Harrington advised [Barboza] that they had no control

over the Massachusetts Parole Board and that they could

make no promises in this regard.

***

[Barboza] stated that it was his original intention to inveigle members of the underworld into giving him money on

the pretext that he would recant his testimony given in

previous trials and that, when he received the money, he

would leave the area without recanting;

[Barboza] also stated that his counsel, F. Lee Bailey,

‘‘made him sign the affidavit’’ and that ‘‘they’’ have sent

his wife money in return for his signing the affidavits[.]

***

[Barboza] also advised that his testimony in the Deegan

case was truthful and that he had signed the affidavits

only for money; that he is not going to take the lie-detector

test on August 31, 1970, for he feels that once he has

taken the test Bailey will have no further use for him and

that his life will be in danger; that he will tell Bailey that

he had spoken with Barnes and Harrington merely to tell

them that, if they were going to pressure him by initiating

criminal charges, he would open up a ‘‘Pandora’s box.’’

***

Barnes and Harrington told [Barboza] that they would and

could make no promises to him but that they would merely

pass the results of their conversation on to [Suffolk County] District Attorney Garrett Byrne, which was done by

Harrington at approximately 3:30 P.M. on August 28,

1970.402

70

403 Id; see also ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal

Government Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 191–92 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington). 404Letter from Joseph Barboza to Edward Harrington, Special Attorney, Organized Crime &

Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Sept. 28, 1970) (Exhibit 342). 405Memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Edward F. Harrington, Special Attorneys, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James

Featherstone, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice

(Aug. 28, 1970) (Exhibit 330). 406Trial Transcript, California v. Bentley (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1971) at 276 (cross-examination of Joseph Barboza) (Exhibit 433). 407Limone Files Appeal of Deegan Slay Conviction, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 1970; Appeals for

4th in Slaying, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1970. 408 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Sept. 21, 1970) (Exhibit 341). 409See Affidavit of Edwin F. Cameron (Oct. 13, 1970) (Exhibit 343).

According to both this memorandum and Harrington’s testimony

before the Committee, neither Barnes nor Harrington gave Barboza

any instructions or guidance about recanting his testimony or taking the lie detector test.403 In a subsequent letter, however,

Barboza appears to be referring to advice that Barnes and Harrington provided on this matter: ‘‘Ted, when you [and] Walter came

down to see me, you and Walter asked me not to do something and

I didn’t. How long can the little money I bled out of those creeps

last, what’ll happen to my wife and babies then?’’ 404

Barboza also told Barnes and Harrington that F. Lee Bailey

‘‘made him sign the affidavit.’’ 405 However, when Barboza was

prosecuted for murder the following year, the prosecutor asked

Barboza whether the affidavit was truthful, and Barboza replied,

‘‘It wasn’t clearly understood by me.’’ 406

The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office had its own reasons

for wanting to keep Barboza in custody. In August 1970, Henry

Tameleo, Ronnie Cassesso, Peter Limone, and Louis Greco filed

motions for new trials.407 According to the FBI, the Suffolk County

District Attorney planned to delay any proceedings against Barboza

for violating his parole to ensure Barboza’s presence in case the

Deegan defendants were granted new trials.408 Thus, Barboza’s

fate would remain uncertain until the motions by the Deegan defendants were settled. The FBI’s detailed understanding of what

was happening to the Deegan defendants also indicates that the

Deegan murder prosecution was a great deal more important than

former Justice Department officials have depicted it to be.

During this time, Barboza was in contact with both organized

crime figures and federal authorities about recanting his testimony

in the Deegan murder trial. Barboza had two choices: either he

could recant his testimony and possibly receive money from the

mafia, or he could reassert his trial testimony and possibly avoid

jail. Before he made his decision, law enforcement learned that

Barboza had committed a murder in California while in the Witness Protection Program.

ii. The Murder of Clay Wilson

In October 1970, the Santa Rosa Police Department received letters from William Geraway and Lawrence Woods, two inmates in

Walpole State Prison in Massachusetts, stating that Joe Barboza

had committed a murder in California.409 Geraway had occupied

the prison cell next to Barboza. A letter sent by Geraway and received by the Santa Rosa Police Department on October 1, 1970,

71

410See Memorandum from Dennis M. Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (Oct. 5, 1970) (Exhibit 345). 411While everyone involved with Geraway stated that his credibility was questionable,

Geraway provided very precise details about the Wilson murder that the police were able to corroborate. See Letter from Tim R. Brown, Detective Sergeant, Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office,

to William R. Geraway (Jan. 14, 1972) (Exhibit 454). Geraway told the authorities that Wilson

was shot in the head, bound, and buried in a shallow grave. Id. He also provided the names

of two female witnesses to the murder, the location of the witnesses’ residence, a description

of their vehicles, and the names of one of the witness’ children and pets. Id. Lawrence Wood

later denied that Barboza told him details of the murder and said he learned the details only

from Geraway. 412 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 37–39 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ed Cameron); see also Interview with

Tim Brown, former Detective Sergeant, Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office (Aug. 30, 2001). 413Memorandum from Dennis M. Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office, to Special

Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office (Oct. 5, 1970) (Exhibit 345). 414 Id. 415 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Oct. 5, 1970) (Exhibit 344). 416Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and Boston FBI Field Office (Oct. 13, 1970) (Exhibit 352). 417Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and San Francisco FBI Field Office (Oct. 15, 1970) (Exhibit 355). 418Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI

Field Office (Dec. 23, 1970) (Exhibit 373). 419 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 37 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Edwin Cameron).

claimed that Barboza had described in extensive detail how he

murdered an individual in the first week of July 1970.410 Based on

Geraway and Wood’s letters and the disappearance of a man

named Clay Wilson, Sonoma County law enforcement personnel

began an investigation.411

From the outset, the seasoned, veteran investigators from

Sonoma County were not comfortable working with the FBI in the

Wilson murder investigation. Ed Cameron, Investigator for the

Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office, stated that the FBI was

not forthcoming with information about Barboza at the outset of

their investigation.412

Although not officially involved in the Wilson murder investigation, the FBI followed the investigation intently. On October 5,

1970, the San Francisco office informed FBI Special Agent Dennis

Condon of Geraway’s letter to the Santa Rosa police.413 Condon relayed this information to the Special Agent in Charge of the Boston

office,414 who then passed the information on to FBI Director Hoover that same day.415 The San Francisco office informed the Boston

office and Director Hoover that it was ‘‘closely following [the Wilson] matter with local authorities.’’ 416 The Boston office requested

that the San Francisco office apprise both Boston and FBI headquarters of all developments in the Wilson case.417 A memo from

FBI Director Hoover then instructed the Boston and San Francisco

offices to advise headquarters of the status of any prosecutions

pending against Barboza.418

Sonoma County Investigator Ed Cameron traveled to Boston to

learn more about Barboza and to interview William Geraway. Cameron met with FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon for a briefing on

Barboza, but Condon provided only publicly available information.419 Cameron received more assistance and information from

John Reagan of the Massachusetts State Police than from the FBI,

72

420 Id. 421 Id. 422 Id. at 34. 423 Id. 424 Id. at 33. 425 Id. at 39. 426Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office Police Report on the Murder of Clayton Rickey Wilson (Oct.

22, 1970) (Exhibit 358). 427 Interview with Doug Ahlstrom, former Special Agent, Santa Rosa FBI Field Office (Aug.

28, 2001). 428Letter from Tim R. Brown, Detective Sergeant, Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office, to William

R. Geraway (Jan. 14, 1972) (Exhibit 454); Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J.

Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 13, 1970) (Exhibit 352). 429 Id.; Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and

Boston FBI Field Office (Oct. 16, 1970) (Exhibit 357). 430 Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director,

FBI (Feb. 23, 1971) (Exhibit 379). 431 Baron Pleads Not Guilty, Mar. 1, 1971 (Exhibit 382) (newspaper source illegible).

which had harbored Barboza for the past four years.420 Cameron,

who spent fifteen years in law enforcement as a police officer and

then as an investigator with the District Attorney’s Office, said

that he had a bad feeling about the FBI in this case and was baffled as to why another law enforcement agency would not assist his

investigation.421 In fact, Cameron’s intuition about the FBI’s malfeasance led him to take special precautions to determine whether

someone was tampering with papers left in his hotel room.422 Although he did not know who was responsible, he told the Committee that he believed his briefcase was searched at a time when it

was supposed to be securely locked in his room.423 Cameron’s FBI

contacts were Special Agents Rico and Condon.424

After returning to California, Cameron met with the prosecution

team to discuss the status of the investigation. The team decided

that Cameron should call Agent Condon to request records on

Barboza. Cameron placed numerous telephone calls to Condon requesting the records, but Condon never returned his calls or produced the records.425

In the meantime, Detective Sergeant Tim Brown pursued the

Barboza investigation for the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office. Prior

to the discovery of the Wilson murder, Brown had routine contacts

with FBI Special Agent Doug Ahlstrom of the Santa Rosa FBI Office. Agent Ahlstrom apparently became concerned after the sheriff’s office received the letters from the two inmates regarding the

Wilson murder. According to the police report on the murder,

Agent Ahlstrom accompanied Detective Sergeant Brown to the

home of the two eyewitnesses, Paulette Ramos and Clay Wilson’s

wife, Dee Wilson.426 Ahlstrom denied to Committee investigators

that he went to the house in connection with the Wilson murder

investigation, saying it concerned an unrelated matter.427

Law enforcement in Sonoma County was quickly able to corroborate the details provided by the inmates’ letters. On October 12,

1970, investigators discovered Clay Wilson’s body exactly where

Geraway said it would be located.428 Over the next several days,

the FBI learned that both eyewitnesses, Dee Wilson and Paulette

Ramos, told local authorities that they saw Barboza shoot Wilson.429 Barboza was charged with first degree murder, a charge

carrying a possible death penalty in California. He was then turned

over to California authorities in late February 1971 430 and entered

a plea of not guilty on March 1, 1971.431

73

432 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 54 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Tim Brown). 433 Id. at 55. The Committee was unable to obtain any of the tapes of the visits to Barboza

either from the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office or the FBI. 434 Id. at 54. 435 Id. at 48, 89. Brown believes that this information was provided to him by William

Geraway. Id. 436 Id. at 89. 437 Id. at 48, 89. Brown believes that this information was provided to him by William

Geraway. Id. Although the police tracked the alleged killers to their last known address in California, the men were never apprehended. The two witnesses were unharmed. 438 Id. at 89. 439 Id. at 49. 440 Id. 441 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 43 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Tim Brown). 442Letter from Joe Barboza to Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime &

Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Mar. 7, 1971) (Exhibit 385).

Once Barboza was in the custody of Sonoma County law enforcement, Detective Sergeant Brown began meeting with Agent

Ahlstrom several times a week to discuss any developments. One

reason for their continual contacts was the fact that Brown began

to surreptitiously record Barboza’s conversations with visitors to

his prison cell upon learning that a known bookmaker named

Theodore Sharliss, also known as Jimmy Chalmis, was frequently

visiting Barboza.432 Whenever the recordings yielded information

Brown thought would be of interest to the FBI, he made a cassette

tape of the relevant portion and gave it to Agent Ahlstrom.433 In

fact, Brown stated that one of the tapes helped solve a murder in

Las Vegas.434

Even though Sonoma County investigators shared information on

the investigation with the FBI, the FBI failed to reciprocate and

assist Sonoma County. Three or four months prior to the commencement of Barboza’s trial, Brown was told that three individuals were coming from the East Coast to kill the two witnesses to

the Wilson murder.435 Brown reached out to the FBI to identify the

potential killers, but he received no response.436 Instead, non-FBI

sources gave Brown the name of a Boston attorney who in turn

provided the names of the assassins sent to the West Coast.437

Brown told the Committee that he was worried his two eyewitnesses would be murdered, yet federal law enforcement officials

refused to provide assistance.438

Eventually, Agent Ahlstrom began to give Detective Sergeant

Brown some information. Agent Ahlstrom informed Brown that

three federal officials would testify on Barboza’s behalf.439 Brown

believed that Agent Ahlstrom was unhappy with the fact that the

federal officials were going to assist Barboza.440 Through their constant contact, Brown learned more about Barboza from Agent

Ahlstrom than from any other source.441

Before Barboza was extradited to California in late February

1971, he extracted a promise from Edward Harrington, Attorneyin-Charge of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Boston. In a letter to Harrington on March 7, 1971, Barboza stated,

‘‘You promised me you’d be down two weeks after I left. . . .

[P]lease come down like you promised me, this can throw my case

wide open[.]’’ 442 Harrington did indeed visit Barboza in his CaliforVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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443Memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James J. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 23, 1971) (Exhibit

386). 444 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 163–64 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington); Interview

with Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001). 445 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 164 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington).

nia prison cell, and he explained his visit in a memorandum to his

superior, James Featherstone:

Government witnesses John J. Kelley and Vincent C. Teresa have advised the writer that the reason that they decided to cooperate with the government was the government’s treatment of [Barboza] while he was in protective

custody and because the government fulfilled their obligations to him.

***

In keeping with the government’s obligation to [Barboza],

I have assured [Barboza] that this office would take all

proper steps to insure that he receives a fair and impartial

trial on his pending murder charge. This obligation must

be kept in view of the fact that many law enforcement officials in the Boston area consider that the pending murder

charge has been concocted by the underworld as a means

of retaliating against [Barboza].

***

This trip to confer with [Barboza] is important to the interests of the government in that it is a fulfillment of this office’s commitments to do all within its power to insure that

[Barboza] suffers no harm as a result of his cooperation

with the federal government.

The writer will do nothing to attempt to dissuade the prosecution from bringing its case but will alert them of the

possibility that the murder is a Mafia frame. The fulfillment of this obligation is also in the practical interests of

the government as [Barboza] may otherwise determine

that the government has failed him in his time of need

and, it is my judgment, that he will then retaliate against

the government by submitting false affidavits to the effect

that his testimony in the Patriarca and Deegan cases was

in fact false, and thus tarnish those most significant prosecutions.443

Harrington visited Barboza in California on March 25, 1971, and

Barboza told Harrington that he had indeed killed Wilson and was

not being framed by the Mafia.444 Barboza told Harrington that he

shot Wilson in self-defense.445 However, Harrington admitted before the Committee that he was not convinced by Barboza’s claim

of self defense:

75

446 Id. at 163–64. 447Memorandum from Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James J. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 31, 1971) (Exhibit

392). 448 Id. 449 Id. 450 Id. At the end of the memorandum to Featherstone, Harrington said that Barboza told him

that the ‘‘underworld’’ would take no steps to try to overturn the Deegan murder convictions

until Barboza was found guilty of the Wilson murder. At that time, the underworld would then

offer him the money he would need to support his family from prison in return for affidavits

disavowing his testimony in the Deegan trial. However, it should be noted that Barboza began

negotiating with the underworld to change his testimony, including executing an affidavit renouncing certain portions of his testimony, before the Wilson murder was ever discovered. 451 Id.

Judge HARRINGTON: Well, I have to reconstruct it. But in

essence, I wanted to find out whether he was framed or

was he involved in it.

Mr. TIERNEY: So he told you he was involved in it, he was

guilty, right?

Judge HARRINGTON: No. He told me that it was self-defense.

Mr. TIERNEY: But then you became familiar with the circumstances of the case and you did not believe that for a

second.

Judge HARRINGTON: It was irrelevant. I was out there——

Mr. TIERNEY: Please, Judge. You did not believe it. You

are a seasoned attorney at that time, you did not believe

that at all, right?

Judge HARRINGTON: Well, if forced to answer, I would say

I would have thought that he killed him.446

Barboza’s admission that he shot Wilson and was not being framed

by the Mafia still did not prevent the Justice Department and the

FBI from continuing to assist him. Upon his return from California, Harrington again wrote his boss, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section James Featherstone, to report on the results of his trip.447 Harrington stated that he met

with Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan Hyland and assured him that the Justice Department was not attempting to

interfere with the prosecution.448 Rather, the Justice Department

was merely fulfilling its promise to Barboza to inform the Sonoma

County District Attorney’s Office of the possibility that the Mafia

framed Barboza for the Wilson murder.449 Remarkably, in the

same memorandum, Harrington stated that he told Barboza’s defense attorney, Marteen Miller, that FBI Agents Rico and Condon,

along with John Doyle, Chief Investigator for the Suffolk County

District Attorney’s Office, were ‘‘available to testify on behalf of

[Barboza], if subpoenaed, as they possess information which would

tend to discredit the veracity of prospective state witnesses

Geraway and Wood.’’ 450

As Harrington stated in his memorandum, he met with District

Attorney Hyland.451 Yet, the meeting was apparently more eventful than Harrington recalled. Hyland requested to meet with Harrington after learning from jail officials that Harrington had visited

76

452Letter from Kiernan Hyland, District Attorney, Sonoma County, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 26, 1971) (Exhibit 418); Letter from Kiernan Hyland, District Attorney, Sonoma

County, to John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 26, 1971) (Exhibit 419). 453 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 55 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ed Cameron). 454 Id. 455Memorandum from Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James J. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 31, 1971) (Exhibit

392). 456Memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James J. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 23, 1971) (Exhibit

386). 457 Bony Saludes, The Defense Strategy: Mafia Planned to Kill Baron, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Oct.

24, 1971 (Exhibit 417). 458Letter from Kiernan Hyland, District Attorney, Sonoma County, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 26, 1971) (Exhibit 418); Letter from Kiernan Hyland, District Attorney, Sonoma

County, to John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Oct. 26, 1971) (Exhibit 419).

Barboza.452 According to Cameron, who attended the brief meeting,

Hyland was angry that a prominent Justice Department official

would visit a prisoner without telling the district attorney the purpose of his visit.453 Thereafter, the prosecutors prevented federal

officials from having any more clandestine visits with Barboza.454

In the same memorandum in which Harrington reported that the

Justice Department would not interfere with Barboza’s prosecution,

Harrington explicitly stated that the Justice Department, the FBI,

and the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office would be available to undermine the only two witnesses who were able to speak

about Barboza’s confession to the Wilson murder.455 Harrington’s

statement that they should ensure that Barboza ‘‘suffers no harm

as a result of his cooperation with the federal government’’ 456 appears to be an accurate description of the Justice Department’s actions, and the fact that federal law enforcement personnel were

preparing to undermine a California murder prosecution appears to

have been a matter of no concern.

iii. The Clay Wilson Murder Trial in California

Barboza’s first degree murder trial began on October 19, 1971. At

the beginning of the trial, Marteen Miller, Barboza’s defense attorney, stated his intention to call Strike Force Attorney Edward Harrington and FBI Agents H. Paul Rico and Dennis Condon as witnesses for Barboza.457 Kiernan Hyland, the Sonoma County District Attorney, upset that federal officials were being called to testify on Barboza’s behalf, sent letters to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General John Mitchell arguing:

[The intention of the defense to call Harrington, Rico, and

Condon] is disconcerting for the prosecution because it presents a picture of a house divided against itself. The murder for which we are prosecuting [Barboza] has nothing to

do with his Mafia connections. When and if [Mr. Harrington and the FBI agents testify as defense witnesses],

it would be appreciated [if they] would do me the courtesy

of contacting me first and allowing me to interview [them]

concerning [their] possible testimony.458

Harrington wrote another memorandum to James Featherstone

in late November 1971, outlining the proposed testimony of Agent

77

459Memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James F. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Nov. 29, 1971) (Exhibit

426). 460 Id. The alleged request by Barboza to carry a gun because his life was in danger would

have bolstered the defense’s argument that Barboza shot Wilson in self-defense. 461 Id. In the memorandum, Harrington stated that Agent Rico told Barboza on February 3,

1970, that he should leave Massachusetts because the Mafia knew he was in Massachusetts and

two individuals were going to kill him. The problem with this admission by Harrington was that

Barboza’s presence in Massachusetts was a direct violation of his parole agreement with the

state, which required that Barboza not return to Massachusetts. Thus, the Justice Department

knew that Barboza was violating the terms of his parole. There is no indication that this was

made known to state authorities. In July of 1970, Barboza was arrested in New Bedford, Massachusetts, on firearm and narcotics charges. The charges were dropped, but Barboza was held

because his parole had been revoked for re-entering Massachusetts. 462Teletype from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI

Field Office, and Special Agent in Charge, Miami FBI Field Office (Nov. 17, 1771) (Exhibit 423). 463Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to H. Paul Rico, Special

Agent, Miami FBI Field Office (Dec. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 429); Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney

General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Dennis Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Dec.

2, 1971) (Exhibit 430). 464 Id. Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to H. Paul Rico,

Special Agent, Miami FBI Field Office (Dec. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 429). 465Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 431). 466 Id. 467 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 137–38 (Feb. 14, 2002) (testimony of Judge Edward Harrington); Deposition

of Dennis M. Condon, former Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Feb. 21, 2002) at 107.

Rico, Agent Condon, and himself.459 According to Harrington, he

would say that Barboza had testified against underworld figures in

state and federal trials, was placed in protective custody and relocated to California under an assumed name, and wanted to carry

a gun but his request was denied.460 Harrington stated that Agents

Rico and Condon would testify that the Mafia both in Massachusetts and California had threatened Barboza’s life and that William

Geraway was known to be a liar.461

On November 17, 1971, FBI Director Hoover’s office informed the

Boston and Miami offices that Special Agents Condon and Rico

were to comply with subpoenas demanding their appearance at the

Wilson trial in California.462 On December 2, 1971, the Attorney

General gave Special Agents Rico and Condon authority to testify

in the Clay Wilson murder trial. This authority, however, was limited to testifying about threats made in Massachusetts and California on Barboza’s life.463 The Attorney General’s letters to the

agents also contained the following prohibition: ‘‘You may not disclose any other information or produce any material acquired as a

result of your official duties or because of your official status[.]’’ 464

On the same day, the Attorney General authorized Harrington to

testify in the Wilson case regarding Barboza’s testimony against individuals in the Mafia, his protective custody, his relocation with

an assumed name, his entry into a cooking school, and Harrington’s denial of Barboza’s request to carry a gun.465 The Attorney General’s letter to Harrington carried the same restriction as

the letters to the FBI agents.466

Harrington and Condon both told the Committee that they appeared as witnesses for Barboza because they received subpoenas,

implying that they had no choice in the matter.467 While it is true

that the three federal officials were subpoenaed to testify on

Barboza’s behalf, it was disingenuous to state that they were forced

78

468See Memorandum from Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to James J. Featherstone, Deputy

Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Mar. 31, 1971) (Exhibit

392). 469 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 33 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Marteen Miller). 470Sonoma County Sheriff Police Report on the Murder of Clayton Rickey Wilson (Nov. 21,

1971) (Exhibit 425). Lawrence W. Brown was actually Lawrence Hughes. The information given

to Lt. Maybrun was consistent with Lawrence Hughes’ testimony in the Clay Wilson murder

trial. 471 Id. 472Trial Transcript, California v. Bentley (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1971) at 334 (direct examination of Lawrence Hughes) (Exhibit 427). 473Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and Boston FBI Field Office (Dec. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 428). The teletype to Director Hoover noted that

both District Attorney Kiernan Hyland and Edward Harrington believed that Hughes had been

sent out to California by the Mafia to help get Barboza convicted. Id. 474 Id.

to appear because of the subpoenas because Harrington had previously volunteered their services to Barboza’s defense attorney.468

Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the defense would have called

federal law enforcement officials unless the defense was certain

that the officials would not harm the defendant on either direct

questioning or cross-examination. According to Barboza’s attorney,

the FBI had agreed to testify in support of Barboza.469

During the trial, Lieutenant Ed Maybrun of the Sonoma County

Sheriff’s Office received a telephone call from Lawrence W. Brown

of New Bedford, Massachusetts, who said he read in the newspaper

about some items the sheriff’s office was seeking for the Barboza

trial.470 According to Lieutenant Maybrun, Lawrence Brown, also

known as Lawrence Hughes, stated that he had received some

bonds or stock certificates from Barboza and he wished to speak to

someone handling the Barboza case.471 The issue of the stolen

bonds or stock certificates was important to the prosecution’s contention that Barboza murdered Wilson over the stolen bonds and

not in self-defense. The prosecutors, therefore, called Lawrence

Hughes to testify at the Barboza trial about the stolen bonds he received from Barboza.472 Hughes, who was already known by the

FBI, had become an obstacle in the federal government’s attempt

to help Barboza.

Lawrence Hughes’s injection into the Barboza murder trial revealed the lengths to which the Justice Department and the FBI

would go in order to help Barboza. When the prosecutor informed

federal officials that Hughes was being called as a witness against

Barboza, the San Francisco FBI office immediately notified FBI Director Hoover’s office.473 As the teletype revealed, the FBI had

known about Hughes since September of 1970 when Hughes contacted the Boston FBI office to inform it of Barboza’s meetings in

Massachusetts with Mafia representatives to negotiate the recantation of his testimony in the Deegan trial in exchange for money.474

In fact, after Hughes approached the FBI with information about

Barboza’s meetings with the Mafia, Edward Harrington wrote a

letter to Gerald Shur at the Criminal Division of the Justice Department requesting help for Hughes. The letter stated:

It is requested that employment be procured for Lawrence

P. Hughes. Mr. Lawrence P. Hughes . . . has been kept in

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475Letter from Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering

Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Gerald Shur, Criminal Division, U.S. Dept.

of Justice (Nov. 16, 1970) (Exhibit 366). 476Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, and Boston FBI Field Office (Dec. 2, 1971) (Exhibit 428). 477Letter from John Mitchell, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to Dennis Condon, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Dec. 7, 1971) (Exhibit 437). 478 Although Agent Condon did testify at the Barboza trial, he was not asked any questions

about Lawrence Hughes. Hughes was able to produce some of the bonds or stock certificates

at trial. When Barboza testified at his trial, he admitted that he attempted to sell the stolen

bonds in Massachusetts. 479Trial Transcript, California v. Bentley (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1971) at 303 (cross-examination of FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon) (Exhibit 439). 480 Id.

ney’s Office as a potential witness for the last two months.

Hughes furnished information relative to a meeting in the

woods in the Freetown, Massachusetts area between Joseph [Barboza] and Frank Davis, an associate of Raymond

L.S. Patriarca, relative to negotiations for a change of testimony on the part of [Barboza] to release the organized

crime figures that he had testified against. . . . Hughes

will testify to this in a hearing relating to a motion for a

new trial which has been filed by six Cosa Nostra members who had previously been convicted for the first-degree

murder of Boston gangster Edward Deegan.475

With Hughes’s information jeopardizing Barboza’s fate, the FBI

and the Justice Department sought authorization to expand the

scope of Condon’s testimony. The Justice Department now wanted

to disclose Condon’s interview with Hughes in September of 1970

in which Hughes allegedly did not mention Barboza’s admission of

involvement in Wilson’s murder.476 On December 7, 1971, Attorney

General John Mitchell authorized Agent Condon to testify that

Hughes did not mention Barboza’s involvement with the stolen

bonds or the Wilson murder during their interview.477 Thus, the

same FBI and Justice Department officials who thought Hughes

was credible enough to testify about Barboza the previous year to

keep the Deegan defendants in jail were now going to question his

honesty about Barboza.478

On the witness stand, the prosecution asked Special Agent

Condon if he had any knowledge about Barboza negotiating with

the Mafia to change his testimony.479 Condon, who knew about the

negotiations from his interview of Lawrence Hughes, responded, ‘‘I

respectfully decline to answer on instructions from the Attorney

General of the United States.’’ 480 Thus, when the answer would

have harmed Barboza, Agent Condon used the limited authority

granted by the Attorney General to refuse to answer.

The three federal officials called as witnesses for Barboza—

Strike Force Attorney Edward Harrington, FBI Special Agent H.

Paul Rico, and FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon—all testified on

December 8, 1971. None of them testified to any of the circumstances surrounding the Wilson murder. Essentially, all three

testified about the same matters regarding Barboza: he was a government witness who testified against the Mafia, he was placed in

protective custody and relocated, and his life was threatened.

80

481 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 33 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Marteen Miller). 482 Id. 483 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 80 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ed Cameron). 484 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 80 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Marteen Miller). 485 Id.

According to Barboza’s attorney, Marteen Miller, the federal officials were not called to speak to the Wilson murder.481 They were

called because ‘‘[t]he FBI was held in such esteem that if I could

call them as a witness and have them say substantially anything,

relevant or not, that would be a point in my favor.’’ 482

Miller’s assertion that basically anything the FBI and a highly

placed Justice Department official said would be a point in

Barboza’s favor was substantiated in testimony before the Committee by Ed Cameron, Investigator for the Sonoma County District

Attorney’s Office, who worked on the Wilson case:

Mr. CAMERON: Well, our concern was that, we thought we

had a pretty good capital murder case. And we didn’t have

the best witnesses in the world, but we had witnesses, and

we had evidence. And we had testimony from people who,

and all of that. And we got to the end and we’re having

FBI agents suddenly appear as almost character witnesses. We had a long talk about what we should do with

them as far as attacking them.

And you have to keep in mind, this is in the early 1970’s.

The FBI, as far as we were concerned, was pretty sacrosanct. And our feeling was that if they really started getting into it and we knew what was going to happen, they

were going to say, we can’t go into that because of this,

that and the other thing. Plus they had damaged our case

to the point we didn’t think the jury was going to convict

on a first degree murder case.483

Miller concurred with Cameron’s assessment of the impact of the

testimony by the FBI agents and Harrington in favor of Barboza

at the Wilson trial:

Rep. LATOURETTE: Mr. Miller, do you have an opinion as

to . . . whether or not these agents, Mr. Harrington had

an impact on the jury?

Mr. MILLER: No question they had an impact, sir.484

Two days following the testimony of the three federal officials for

Barboza, the prosecution decided to start discussing a plea agreement with Barboza’s attorney.485 On December 13, 1971, a plea

agreement whereby Barboza pleaded guilty to second-degree murder was entered with the court. Investigator Cameron, Prosecutor

Ron Fahey, and Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan Hyland

agreed that the testimony by Harrington, Rico, and Condon had

weakened their case to such a point that the prosecution accepted

81

486 ‘‘The California Murder Trial of Joe ‘The Animal’ Barboza: Did the Federal Government

Support the Release of a Dangerous Mafia Assassin?,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 80 (Feb. 13, 2002) (testimony of Ed Cameron); Interview with Ron Fahey,

former Chief Deputy District Attorney, Sonoma County (July 9, 2001). 487 According to interviews with the judge, prosecutors and other witnesses, the five-year sentence appears to have been routine and not influenced by the Justice Department or the FBI.

See Interview with Marteen Miller, former Public Defender, Sonoma County, and Bony Saludes,

former reporter, PRESS DEMOCRAT (July 9, 2001); Interview with Ed Cameron, former Investigator, Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office (July 10, 2001); Interview with Ron Fahey, former

Chief Deputy District Attorney, Sonoma County, and Gary Bricker, former U.S. Marshal (July

9, 2001); Interview with Judge Joseph P. Murphy, Jr. (Aug. 29, 2001) (Judge Joseph Murphy

was the presiding judge for the Wilson murder trial.) 488Letter from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering

Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Lois Eggers, Correctional Counselor I, California Medical Facility (Jan. 19, 1972) (Exhibit 456). 489Letter from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney-in-Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering

Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Joe Barboza (June 19, 1972) (Exhibit 480). 490Letter from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering

Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Joe Barboza (May 17, 1972) (Exhibit 469).

Harrington’s assistance with Barboza’s book earned Harrington the dubious honor of having the

book dedicated to him. 491 ‘‘Organized Crime in Sports (Racing), Part 2,’’ Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Crime,

92d Cong. 752, 755, 763 (May 24, 1972) (testimony of Joseph Barboza). 492 Interview with John Partington, former U.S. Marshal (Sept. 24, 2001).

the second-degree murder plea.486 On December 14, 1971, Barboza

was sentenced to prison for five years.487

iv. Joseph Barboza Returns to Prison

Even while Barboza was serving his prison sentence in California, his contacts with Edward Harrington did not end. Almost immediately, Harrington began helping Barboza plot his course for

parole. On January 19, 1972, less than one month after Barboza

was sentenced, Harrington wrote to the Correctional Counselor at

Barboza’s prison stating:

It is the United States Government’s desire that the State

of California place [Barboza] in a constructive correction

program designed for his ultimate release as a contributing member of society. . . . The government also requests

that [Barboza’s] significant contribution to law enforcement in the organized crime field be weighed when his eligibility for parole is considered.488

Harrington also informed Barboza that the Justice Department

would inform the parole board of Barboza’s contribution ‘‘to the

government’s campaign against organized crime.’’ 489

In the meantime, Barboza kept himself busy in prison by writing

a book about his life. Barboza enlisted the aid of Harrington, who

told Barboza he would be happy to talk to the author and identify

‘‘other individuals who would have background information relating

to your career.’’ 490 In addition, Barboza was invited to appear before the Select Committee on Crime in the U.S. House of Representatives to discuss organized crime where he stated that Frank

Sinatra was involved in organized crime.491 John Partington, the

U.S. Marshal who led the detail to guard Barboza for three years,

told Committee investigators that he later accused Barboza of lying

about Sinatra’s alleged involvement with organized crime.492

In September of 1972, Barboza was transferred from California

to the Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge, Montana, to protect

his life. While there, Barboza became increasingly concerned about

parole. Barboza enlisted the help of Harrington to increase his

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493Letter from Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Robert Miles, Director of the Parole Board, Montana State Prison (June 1, 1973) (Exhibit 566). 494Letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans, Investigator, Sonoma County Public Defender’s

Office (July 31, 1973) (Exhibit 580). 495 Romeo Martin was killed in July of 1966. There are a number of indications that Barboza

murdered his old friend. FBI Report by Thomas Sullivan, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office

(July 18, 1967) (Exhibit 149); VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA 117 (Doubleday & Company, Inc. 1973).

chances of a favorable decision from the parole board. On June 1,

1973, Harrington wrote the following to the Director of the Parole

Board for Montana:

I have been requested by Joseph Bentley, who will appear

before the Montana Parole Board on June 26, 1973, to testify as a witness in his behalf.

***

[Barboza’s] defection from the organized underworld and

his decision to become a government witness against his

former associates constitutes the single most important

factor in the success of the federal government’s campaign

against organized crime in the New England area. . . .

Please advise me if the appearance of witnesses before the

Montana Parole Board is in conformity with your practices.493

On July 31, 1973, Barboza received a hearing before the Montana

Parole Board. Although the Committee was unable to obtain the

hearing records, Barboza revealed part of the proceedings in a letter to Greg Evans, investigator for Barboza’s former attorney in

California, Marteen Miller:

How can I ever thank you and Marty [Miller] for what you

two and Ted H. [Harrington] did for me today. Words can

never even begin to express what I feel . . . The parole

board said this is the fastest hearing in the History of

Montana . . . I didn’t even say one word! . . . You, Marty

and Ted H. made this all come true. Nobody did I ever owe

so much to! 494

Instead of being paroled, however, Barboza was transferred back to

California. Barboza then attempted to contact Harrington, Condon,

the Rhode Island Attorney General, and the Superintendent of the

Rhode Island State Police to disclose information Barboza claimed

he had regarding the murder of Romeo Martin.495 However, the reactions to Barboza’s offer by Harrington and Gerald McDowell, an

attorney in the Boston Office of the Organized Crime Strike Force,

show that the government had concerns about any additional information provided by Barboza:

Mr. McDowell and Mr. Harrington had previously advised

that [Barboza’s] credibility as a witness had been seriously

diminished by events that have transpirted [sic] in regard

to him since his testimony in Federal and State Courts in

1968 and this is also the opinion of authorities in the Organized Crime Section of the Justice Department at Washington, D.C. . . . Boston sees no useful purpose in interVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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496Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to Clarence Kelley,

Director, FBI (Jan. 23, 1974) (Exhibit 594). 497See Memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Chief Attorney, Organized Crime Strike

Force, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief, Organized

Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 17, 1975) (Exhibit 623); Airtel from

Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to Clarence Kelley, Director, FBI (Sept. 19,

1975) (Exhibit 626). 498Former New England Mafia Figure Paroled, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Nov. 7, 1975 (Exhibit 628). 499Killer Barboza Slain, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 12, 1976 (Exhibit 636). 500Teletype from San Francisco FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (June 6,

1979) (Exhibit 678). 501 Nation Briefly, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 23, 1992. 502Flemmi began exchanging information with the FBI in the early 1960s, U.S. v. Salemme,

91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 176 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub nom. U.S. v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78

(1st Cir. 2000), and was targeted as an informant in November 1964. See Office of Professional

Responsibility Summary Report (Exhibit 58). He served as an FBI informant for almost 30

years. Id. 503 Interview with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001); Shelley Murphy, Playing Both Sides

Pays Off, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 23, 1993. 504Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299)

(stating that information received from the Boston Police Department indicated that Flemmi

and Salemme used Poulos as a ‘‘ ‘decoy’ to get Bennett into a position where he could be killed’’);

Interview with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001).

view of [Barboza] at this time and events referred to by

him occurred prior to his testimony in 1968. It is felt that

this is another effort on part of [Barboza] to obtain Government support in bid for parole. Strike Force will not

consider any future prosecutions based on [Barboza’s] testimony.496

Although the Justice Department apparently would no longer use

Barboza or listen to his information, it was concerned about his

welfare. During 1975, media reports stated that the Mafia knew

where Barboza was located and that a contract had been put out

for his murder. The Justice Department and the FBI were concerned that the effectiveness of the Witness Protection Act would

be adversely affected if Barboza were murdered.497 Consequently,

after serving a mere four years in prison for the Wilson murder,

Barboza was ‘‘quietly paroled’’ from the Sierra Conservation Camp

in California on October 30, 1975.498

On February 11, 1976, Joe Barboza was murdered in San Francisco.499 Theodore Sharliss, also known as Jimmy Chalmis, a constant companion of Barboza while they were in prison in California, pleaded guilty in January of 1979 to setting up Barboza’s murder.500 In 1992, Joseph Russo pleaded guilty to murdering

Barboza.501

2. Nevada

There is substantial evidence that the FBI interfered with the

Las Vegas Police investigation of the murder of Peter J. Poulos to

protect its informants. In this instance, the FBI sought to protect

Top Echelon informant Stephen Flemmi from being prosecuted for

the Poulos murder.502

William Bennett, one of the central figures in Boston’s gang wars

of the 1960’s, was fatally shot and thrown from a moving car into

a snow bank near Boston on December 23, 1967.503 He was apparently murdered by Stephen Flemmi and Frank Salemme with the

assistance of Robert Daddeico and Peter J. Poulos.504 A short time

thereafter, on January 30, 1968, Flemmi and Salemme planted a

bomb in the automobile of Joseph Barboza’s attorney, John E. FitzVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00093 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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505 ‘‘Law enforcement officials said Mr. Fitzgerald was targeted for death because he was the

lawyer for a famed Cosa Nostra soldier turned-informer, Joseph Barboza Baron.’’ Andy Dabilis

& Ralph Ranalli, Mob Lawyer Maimed in ’68 Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2001. 506Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 507 Id. According to the Salemme court, in warning Flemmi and Salemme about the impending

indictments, Rico aided and abetted the unlawful flight of a fugitive, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2 and 1073. Id. The FBI’s protection of Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi is discussed in Section II.A.8, supra. 508Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 182. 509Office of Professional Responsibility Investigative Report (Exhibit 9–11–69) (focusing on allegations of FBI mishandling of confidential informants); DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK

MASS 12 (Perennial 2001). 510 Commonwealth v. Salemme, 323 N.E.2d 922 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975). 511Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 512 Id. 513 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 514 Id. Lee also indicated that the victim was well dressed and his fingers were well manicured. Id. 515Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299);

Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr. 4,

2002). 516Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299);

Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr. 4,

2002). 517Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 518 Id.

gerald. This resulted in the loss of one of Fitzgerald’s legs and part

of the other.505

In early September 1969, FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico called

Flemmi and warned him that ‘‘indictments were coming down’’ for

the William Bennett murder and Fitzgerald bombing.506 Agent

Rico suggested that Flemmi and ‘‘his friend,’’ referring to Salemme,

leave town.507 Flemmi took Rico’s advice and he, Salemme, and

Poulos fled together.508 A few days later, on September 11, 1969,

a Suffolk County indictment was returned against Flemmi,

Salemme, and Poulos for the Bennett murder.509 A month later, on

October 10, 1969, Flemmi and Salemme were indicted for the Fitzgerald bombing.510

On that same day, October 10, 1969, the body of an unidentified

man, later determined to be Peter J. Poulos, was found forty feet

south of a desert highway, just outside of Las Vegas in Clark County.511 Employees of the Nevada Highway Department found the

body while picking up trash.512 Clark County Detectives Charles

Lee and Jim Duggan were assigned to the investigation but did not

know the victim’s identity.513

Upon arriving at the crime scene, Lee believed that it looked like

a ‘‘hit.’’ 514 After searching the victim, Detectives Lee and Duggan

found no identification.515 They did, however, find a small looseleaf notebook in the victim’s jacket pocket, which revealed the

name Paul J. Andrews and the address of a Los Angeles apartment.516 After the body was examined at the scene, it was sent to

a mortuary in Las Vegas, where an autopsy determined that the

cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds.517

Lee and Duggan then contacted the Los Angeles Police Department and requested a check of the address to ascertain if it was

the residence of Paul J. Andrews.518 Los Angeles detectives confirmed that Paul J. Andrews had, in fact, rented an apartment at

85

519 Id. 520 Id. 521 Id. 522Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299);

Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr. 4,

2002). 523Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 524 Id. 525 Id. As noted in this memorandum, this is the likely date that Poulos left the apartment.

First, the apartment manager stated that she saw the man whom she knew to be Paul Andrews

and the person accompanying him carrying groceries into the apartment that day. Los Angeles

Police found two sacks of unpacked groceries inside the apartment. Second, this date comports

with the estimated time of death given by the coroner, who estimated that the death occurred

ten to fourteen days prior to the discovery of the body. See id. The investigation conducted after

the discovery of the body revealed that the death likely occurred on September 29, 1969. Id. 526Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299).

According to Lee, there was not a nationwide fingerprint database in 1969 like there is today.

Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr. 4,

2002). 527 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 528 Id. 529 Id.; see also Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and

Charles Lee, Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970)

(Exhibit 299) (stating that the fliers were sent out on January 6, 1970). 530Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299);

Clark County Sheriff’s Department Follow-Up Police Report [‘‘Follow-Up Report’’] (Feb. 9, 1970)

(Exhibit 290).

the address.519 The detectives also discovered that Andrews had

not been at the apartment for some time.520 The Los Angeles Police

compared fingerprints found in the apartment to the victim’s fingerprints, positively establishing that the victim had been present

in Andrews’ apartment.521 As a result, Detectives Lee and Duggan

traveled to Los Angeles to investigate the case further.522 They

spoke with the former apartment manager of the apartment where

Andrews resided.523 The manager provided a physical description,

which resembled that of Peter Poulos.524 The manager also stated

that another man accompanied the victim when he rented the

apartment, and she last saw both men on September 27, 1969.525

Detectives Lee and Duggan forwarded the victim’s fingerprint

cards to the FBI, but the FBI failed to identify the victim.526 To

establish the victim’s identity, the detectives were forced to go another route. In addition to being well-dressed, the victim had extensive gold dental work.527 Therefore, the Clark County Detectives

requested that the victim’s teeth be extracted for the purpose of

creating a dental mold.528 The detectives then sent the ‘‘elaborate

photographs’’ of the dental mold, along with a flier with a description of the victim, to all major police departments throughout the

United States.529

The first big break in the case came on January 30, 1970.530 Responding to the flier and photographs sent by Detectives Lee and

Duggan, Sergeant Frank Walsh of the Organized Crime Section of

the Boston Police Department tentatively identified the murder victim found near Las Vegas on October 10, 1969, as being Peter J.

86

531Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299).

This memorandum states that it was the Las Vegas FBI Office that notified the Clark County

Sheriff’s Department that it had received information from the Boston FBI Office that the Boston Police Department had established tentative identification of Poulos. See also Follow-Up Report (Exhibit 290); Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police

Dept. (Apr. 4, 2002). 532 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 533Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 534 Id. 535 Id.; Follow-Up Report (Exhibit 290). 536 Clark County Sheriff’s Evidence Examined Report (Feb. 2, 1970) (Exhibit 289); Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee, Detectives, to

George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299); Follow-Up Report (Exhibit 290). 537 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 538Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 539 Id. Although both were associated with La Cosa Nostra criminal activity, at the time neither were members of the organization. 540 Id.; Follow-Up Report (Exhibit 290). 541Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299).

But see Letter from Frank Walsh, Sergeant Detective, Organized Crime Section, Boston Police

Department (Feb. 3, 1970) (Exhibit 291), which states that on a night previous to the return

of the true bill ‘‘Peter received a telephone call from a person who stated to Mrs. Poulos that

it was very important for Peter to get in touch with Steve. This message was given to Peter

when he came home on Monday, September 8, 1969, and he stated to her that he was going

to Cape Cod for a couple of weeks vacation.’’

Poulos.531 Indeed, Detective Lee said that it was ‘‘Frank Walsh

[who] broke the case for us. He was a world of information.’’ 532

On that same day, January 30, 1970, Special Agent McKinnley

of the Las Vegas FBI Office notified the Clark County Sheriff Department that his office received information from the Boston FBI

Office that the Boston Police Department had established tentative

identification of the victim as being Peter Poulos.533 Agent

McKinnley further stated that Poulos was wanted by the Boston

Police Department for the murder of William Bennett and was

wanted by the FBI for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution in connection with the Bennett murder.534

Three days later, on February 2, 1970, Agent McKinnley provided Clark County Detectives with an apparent FBI wanted poster on Poulos that contained his fingerprints.535 A comparison of the

victim’s fingerprints with that of Poulos’ fingerprints positively established the victim as being Peter J. Poulos.536 That same day,

the Clark County Detectives talked to Sergeant Walsh on the

phone. Sergeant Walsh told the detectives that Stephen Flemmi

and Frank Salemme probably murdered Poulos.537

Sergeant Walsh stated that the Boston Police Department wanted Poulos, Flemmi, and Salemme for their role in the William Bennett murder.538 He further stated that Poulos was a loan shark

and racketeer in the Boston area and that Flemmi and Salemme

were members of the Boston La Cosa Nostra.539 Walsh told the detectives that on the day that Poulos, Flemmi, and Salemme were

indicted for the Bennett murder, they all disappeared from the Boston area.540 In fact, Sergeant Walsh stated that the Boston Police

Department discovered that Poulos, who lived with his mother, received several phone calls on September 11, 1969, asking him to

contact a person named ‘‘Steve,’’ presumably Stephen Flemmi.541

Once Poulos returned home that day, his mother gave him the

87

542Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299);

Letter from Frank Walsh, Sergeant Detective, Organized Crime Section, Boston Police Department (Feb. 3, 1970) (Exhibit 291); Follow-Up Report (Exhibit 290). 543Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299).

Four days later, Mrs. Poulos notified the Boston Police that her son’s car was parked outside

of her home. See Letter from Frank Walsh, Sergeant Detective, Organized Crime Section, Boston

Police Department to Charles Lee, Detective, Office of the Clark County Sheriff (Feb. 3, 1970)

(Exhibit 291). Mrs. Poulos stated that someone placed the car in the driveway during the night.

Id. Human blood was found on the right front bumper of the car. Id. This was probably the

blood of William Bennett since Poulos’ car was used for the William Bennett murder. Interview

with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001). 544Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 545 Id. 546 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). Detective Lee also thinks that Sergeant Walsh said something about a grand jury. Id.

See also John Smith, Police Frustrated over Federal Protection of Slaying Suspects, LAS VEGAS

REVIEW JOURNAL, Oct. 21, 1998 (Exhibit 281). 547Detective Lee stated that Sergeant Walsh knew that Poulos was an informant, so he postulated that others in the Boston Police Department may have too, which may have led to Flemmi

and Salemme being tipped off as to Poulos’ status as an informant. Interview with Charles Lee,

former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr. 4, 2002); see also John Smith, Police

Frustrated over Federal Protection of Slaying Suspects, LAS VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, Oct. 21,

1998 (Exhibit 281) (‘‘Someone tipped [Flemmi and Salemme] off and Poulos was silenced.’’) 548Memorandum from Ralph Lamb, Sheriff, Clark County, by Jim Duggan and Charles Lee,

Detectives, to George Franklin, District Attorney, Clark County (Mar. 11, 1970) (Exhibit 299). 549 Id. 550 Id. 551 Id. 552 Id.

message. He told his mother that he was going to vacation on Cape

Cod for a while.542 Poulos then left immediately, taking very few

clothes.543

Walsh also told the detectives that additional information received by the Boston Police Department established that Poulos

took $50,000 with him.544 Walsh conveyed that local police expected that Poulos would never be seen alive again, because

Flemmi and Salemme considered him a ‘‘weak link’’ and would

eventually kill him.545 Detective Lee told Committee staff that

Walsh told him that just before the three fled, Poulos ‘‘rolled over

as an informant’’ and was going to incriminate Flemmi and

Salemme.546 Detective Lee also thinks that Sergeant Walsh mentioned a grand jury. Hence, Flemmi and Salemme were likely

tipped off that Poulos was an informant, or was considering becoming an informant or cooperating witness, and that Poulos testified

or agreed to testify before a grand jury regarding the Bennett murder or another crime.547

Once the identity of the victim was established as Peter J.

Poulos, photographs of Flemmi, Salemme, and Poulos were shown

to the apartment manager in Los Angeles.548 The manager indicated that the photographs of Poulos and Salemme closely resembled Andrews and his associate.549 Moreover, information received

from Sergeant Walsh indicated that the bullets that killed William

Bennett matched the bullets that killed Poulos.550

The detectives’ case was coming together. All of the evidence

pointed directly at Flemmi and Salemme as Poulos’ murderers.551

Detectives Lee and Duggan’s police report concluded that Poulos,

Flemmi, and Salemme fled Boston together on September 11, 1969,

and traveled to Los Angeles, where one of the three rented an

apartment using the alias, ‘‘Paul J. Andrews.’’ 552 On September 27,

1969, the three left the apartment, heading towards Las Vegas. BeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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553 Id. 554 Interview with David Hatch, Detective, Las Vegas Metro Police Dept., Cold Case Review,

Homicide Section (Apr. 4, 2002). 555 Id. 556 Clark County Sheriff’s Department Case Cleared Report (Mar. 19, 1970) (Exhibit 300). 557 Interview with Charles Lee, former Detective, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept. (Apr.

4, 2002). 558 Id. 559 Id. 560 Id. 561 Id. 562 Id. 563 Id. 564 Id. 565 Id. 566 Id. 567 Id. 568 John L. Smith, Police Frustrated over Federal Protection of Slaying Suspects, LAS VEGAS

REVIEW JOURNAL, Oct. 21, 1998 (Exhibit 281). 569 Id. 570 Interview with Tom Monahan, Lieutenant, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Dept., Homicide

Section (Apr. 4, 2002).

fore arriving in Las Vegas, ‘‘Flemmi and Salemme shot and killed

victim Peter J. Poulos leaving his body alongside the highway

where it was subsequently discovered.’’ 553

With everything ostensibly in order, Clark County District Attorney George Franklin was ready to move forward with the case. He

approved a criminal complaint charging Flemmi and Salemme for

the murder of Poulos.554 District Attorney Franklin then issued a

warrant charging Flemmi and Salemme for Poulos’ murder.555 On

March 12, 1970, Judge Roy Woofter signed the arrest warrant.556

The investigation then came to an unexpected and sudden halt.557

First, Detectives Lee and Duggan asked for routine permission to

travel to Boston to interview the key witnesses and suspects.558

District Attorney Franklin denied their routine request.559 Lee told

Committee staff that in all of his years as a homicide detective he

‘‘never ran across a case where you could not interview [the] suspects.’’ 560 Second, despite getting an arrest warrant signed by

Judge Woofter, which Franklin himself issued, Franklin refused to

initiate extradition proceedings against Flemmi and Salemme.561

Undeterred, Lee then asked Franklin if a fellow detective from

Clark County, who was going back East to visit his family, could

conduct some interviews and an investigation while he was

there.562 This request was also denied.563

Lee was perplexed.564 He then asked Franklin why his investigation was being blocked and why Franklin suddenly refused to initiate extradition proceedings.565 Franklin told Lee that ‘‘the FBI

stopped the case.’’ 566 Lee said that he remembers this encounter

vividly, because ‘‘it was the only case where he got a murder warrant and it was not pursued.’’ 567 Lee remarked, ‘‘We got murder

warrants on the two, but everything came to a sudden stop.’’ 568

Lee further recalls, ‘‘They wouldn’t let us go back to interview

them. And there was no move to extradite them. I worked a lot of

homicides. That’s the only one that ended up like this.’’ 569 Lieutenant Tom Monahan told Committee staff that ‘‘it is clear the FBI

asked the DA to step aside and not do anything.’’ 570

In conclusion, the FBI’s interference with Nevada law enforcement’s efforts to prosecute Flemmi and Salemme for the murder of

Poulos inhibited the administration of justice. The reason this murder investigation was unexpectedly halted by the FBI is apparent.

89

571See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 268 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of David Wheeler); U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 208 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub nom. U.S. v. Flemmi, 225

F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000). 572 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266, 269 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of David Wheeler). 573Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 208. 574See id. at 209. 575See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 26 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff). 576See id. 577See id. at 27. 578See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 209. 579See id. 580See id. 581See id. 582See id. 583See id. 584See id. at 209–10.

In fact, it is the same reason Rico encouraged Flemmi to flee before

he was indicted for the William Bennett murder and the Fitzgerald

bombing. The FBI was protecting its Top Echelon informant Stephen Flemmi.

3. Oklahoma

In the late 1970s, Oklahoma businessman Roger Wheeler, Sr.,

purchased World Jai Alai, a company that owned facilities where

it was legal to gamble on the handball-like sport.571 Although rumors of organized crime’s involvement in the gaming industry

made him hesitate to invest in the company, Wheeler was comforted by the fact that his staff was composed of former FBI agents,

including former Special Agent H. Paul Rico, who assured him that

his company was ‘‘clean.’’ 572 Wheeler, however, came to suspect the

president of World Jai Alai of skimming money from the company

for Winter Hill Gang members, including James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

and Stephen Flemmi.573 Wheeler fired the World Jai Alai president

and began a company-wide audit.574 Shortly thereafter, Winter Hill

Gang hit men murdered Wheeler at the Southern Hills Country

Club in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on May 27, 1981.575

Sergeant Michael T. Huff was the first detective to arrive at the

scene.576 Soon after the murder, the Massachusetts State Police

provided Huff with information that Bulger and Flemmi were possibly involved.577 Bulger, Flemmi, and John Callahan—the former

President of World Jai Alai whom Wheeler fired—allegedly attempted to arrange Wheeler’s murder.578 They asked Brian

Halloran, a Winter Hill Gang member, if he was willing to kill

Wheeler.579 Several months later, Halloran was facing a state murder charge for a separate incident and offered to cooperate with the

FBI.580 He told FBI agents about his meeting regarding Wheeler.581 The agents informed the supervisor of the Organized Crime

squad, John Morris, of Halloran’s allegations.582 Morris told Agent

John Connolly, who handled Bulger and Flemmi, of Halloran’s cooperation, expecting Connolly to relate the information to his informants.583 Agent Connolly, in turn, informed Bulger and Flemmi

of Halloran’s cooperation, and Bulger and Flemmi promptly killed

Halloran.584

Sergeant Huff, and other local officials in Oklahoma and Boston,

did not have an opportunity to speak with Halloran before he was

90

585See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff). 586See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 210–11. 587See id. at 212. 588See id. at 208. 589 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff). 590See id. 591See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 211. 592See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 277 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff). 593See id. 594See id. 595See id. O’Sullivan testified that he did not recall telling Sergeant Huff that Rico socialized

with Winter Hill Gang members. When pressed, O’Sullivan said that it was possible that he

told Sergeant Huff this information, but the prosecutor could not specifically recall doing so. See

‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on

Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 266 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah T. O’Sullivan). 596See id. at 28. 597See id. 598See id. at 44.

murdered.585 The Miami, Oklahoma City, and Boston FBI offices

held a meeting soon after Halloran’s murder, but they did not discuss advising the local law enforcement agencies investigating the

Wheeler murder of the information Halloran had provided concerning Bulger and Flemmi.586 The Boston FBI departed from the Bureau’s standard procedures to ensure that the information it had

received from Halloran regarding Bulger and Flemmi was virtually

inaccessible to anyone who might want to review it.587 The Boston

FBI also succeeded in keeping local law enforcement officials such

as Huff from ever speaking to Bulger and Flemmi.588

In July 1982, Huff traveled to Boston to meet with detectives

from the Connecticut State Police and Massachusetts State Police.589 Huff wanted information on the activities and location of

former World Jai Alai President John Callahan.590 Before Huff

could locate Callahan and question him about the Wheeler murder,

Callahan’s body was found in the trunk of his car in Miami, Florida.591

While in Boston, Huff also met with Organized Crime Strike

Force Prosecutor Jeremiah O’Sullivan.592 At this meeting, Huff was

shocked by what he learned.593 Federal authorities knew that

Flemmi and Bulger were hit men.594 O’Sullivan described former

FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico, then vice-president of World Jai

Alai, as a ‘‘rogue agent’’ who caroused with Winter Hill Gang members.595 During the meeting, the Massachusetts State Police mentioned that FBI Special Agent John Connolly had real estate transactions with the Winter Hill Gang, but O’Sullivan downplayed

these transactions.596 Despite all of this information, the FBI’s official position was that Rico and Connolly were the ‘‘cream of the

crop.’’ 597 Huff also discussed Halloran with O’Sullivan, but

O’Sullivan called Halloran a liar and questioned his credibility.598

Huff candidly described his meeting with O’Sullivan to the Committee:

Over the past twenty years, there have been many such

instances of surprise and disappointment during this investigation. I look back to the July meeting in this very

building as an ‘‘end of innocence’’ in my career in law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00100 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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599 Id. at 28. 600See id. 601See id. at 29. 602See id. 603See id. 604See id. at 29–30. 605See J.M. Lawrence, Oh, Brother; Hit Man Says Bulger Asked Agent to Watch over Whitey,

BOSTON HERALD, May 14, 2002, at 1. 606See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 269 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff); Edmund

H. Mahony, Detective: Jai Alai Slaying Investigation Still Active, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 6,

2002, at A14. 607See Edmund H. Mahony, Detective: Jai Alai Slaying Investigation Still Active, HARTFORD

COURANT, Dec. 6, 2002, at A14. 608See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 272 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Michael T. Huff); Edmund

H. Mahony, Detective: Jai Alai Slaying Investigation Still Active, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 6,

2002, at A14. 609 Ralph Ranalli, Break Seen In Fight on Corruption, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10, 2003.

forcement. I had never been exposed to such a cesspool of

dirt and corruption.599

This meeting had a deep impact on Huff, and the information provided by O’Sullivan led him to include FBI Special Agents Paul

Rico and John Connolly as associates of the Winter Hill Gang when

he subsequently drafted a report in August of 1982.600

Without cooperation from the FBI, the Wheeler murder investigation sputtered until 1995.601 In January 1995, the Massachusetts State Police called Huff and informed him that Flemmi, Bulger, and others would soon be prosecuted.602 From his experience

with the Wheeler investigation, Huff knew that ‘‘unimaginable corruption within the FBI’’ would soon be discovered.603 Despite FBI

corruption and lack of cooperation, the Wheeler murder investigation is still active.604 In May 2002, John Martorano, the Winter

Hill Gang hit man who murdered Wheeler, told a federal jury that

former Agent H. Paul Rico furnished information about Wheeler’s

habits that helped Martorano plan Wheeler’s murder.605 Rico was

the vice president and director of security at World Jai Alai when

Wheeler was murdered.606 Martorano reportedly testified that he

was given ‘‘a piece of paper written by Rico with all the information—his phone numbers, addresses.’’ 607 The Tulsa Police Department continued to investigate Rico as a conspirator in the Wheeler

murder.608 Following Stephen Flemmi’s acceptance of a plea agreement on federal charges, Rico was finally arrested in connection

with the Wheeler murder.609

While the Wheeler investigation and now prosecution continues,

Roger Wheeler’s son David poignantly reminded:

Forgotten in all of this are the people the Agency is sworn

to serve, the people it was designed to protect: People like

my father. People like all of the others murdered by this

Agency’s informants, whose families—some of them

present today, in this room—grieve to this day.

Something else has been lost, too, perhaps forever, as a result of these disclosures of FBI abuse: Trust and confidence. The trust of people who, like my father, believed

the FBI served a good and honorable purpose. People who

would like to trust the Bureau, but now, sadly, do not.

92

610See ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 270 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of David Wheeler). 611 U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 211 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub nom. U.S. v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000). 612Telephone interview with Shelton Merritt, former Detective, Metro Dade Police Dept. (Dec.

2, 2002). 613 Id. 614 Id. 615 Id. 616 Id. 617 Id. 618 Id. 619 Id. 620 Id. 621 Id. 622 Id.

Where there was once trust, there is now fear. And that

is a loss we cannot afford.610

David Wheeler’s story is not unique; FBI informants destroyed the

lives of many other families.

4. Florida

There is substantial evidence that state and local law enforcement efforts in Florida were obstructed by the FBI during a Miami

homicide investigation. On August 4, 1982, John Callahan’s body

was found in the trunk of his car at the Miami Airport.611 Shelton

Merritt, lead investigator in the homicide investigation, told Committee investigators that he had received information that there

might be a Boston connection to the Callahan murder. Consequently, he and Sergeant Mike Hammerschmidt traveled to Boston shortly after Callahan’s body was discovered to pursue various

leads.612 Merritt and Hammerschmidt met with Special Agent Gerald Montanari in the Boston FBI Office and indicated they wanted

to interview witnesses about the Callahan murder.613 Montanari

said ‘‘let’s walk outside,’’ and, when they were outside, he told the

Florida police officers that that they could not talk in the office.614

Montanari said the FBI was interviewing the witnesses and that

Merritt and Hammerschmidt could not.615 Montanari told Merritt

and Hammerschmidt that Callahan had been planning to provide

the FBI with information but was killed before doing so.616 Merritt

went back to Miami, aware that he was dealing with organized

crime.617

From the outset of the investigation, the FBI had access to the

Florida homicide unit’s investigative findings.618 H. Paul Rico, a

former FBI Special Agent and the Security Director of World Jai

Alai, soon became aware of every move Merritt and the other investigators made.619 Florida homicide investigators became uncomfortable with this arrangement. As a result, FBI agents were not

allowed to look at reports or even to go on the homicide floor without supervision.620

Upon returning to Florida, Merritt began working with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (‘‘FDLE’’), which was conducting an investigation of corruption in the gaming industry.621 Merritt and the FDLE began working with IRS auditors in an attempt

to understand the alleged motive for the Callahan murder.622

Lewis Wilson, an FDLE Special Agent, was involved in the invesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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623Telephone interview with Lewis Wilson, former Special Agent, Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (Dec. 2, 2002). 624 Id. 625World Jai Alai Purchase Report (May 11, 1981) (Exhibit 719). 626Telephone interview with Lewis Wilson, former Special Agent, Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (Dec. 2, 2002). 627 Id. 628Telephone interview with Shelton Merritt, former Detective, Metro Dade Police Dept. (Dec.

2, 2002). 629 Id. 630See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001). 631 Id. 632 Id. 633See United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 197 (D. Mass. 1999), rev’d in part sub

nom. U.S. v. Flemmi, 225 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000). 634See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 61 (Perennial 2000). 635See id. Flemmi contradicted Connolly’s account, saying that Connolly was informed of a

possible shakedown of Gianturco, not a planned murder. Connolly would later claim that Bulger

helped save an FBI agent’s life as a justification for leaving Bulger open as an informant. See

id. at 130; Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 636See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001).

tigation.623 At the time, Wilson was aware that Rico employed the

wife of one FBI Special Agent at World Jai Alai.624 Documents obtained by the Committee also show that the previous year Rico had

entertained FBI Special Agents Tom Dowd, whose wife worked for

Rico, and Jerry Forrester in the Bahamas and that this business

relationship was paid for by World Jai Alai.625 Wilson has had a

persistent feeling for the last twenty years that ‘‘things didn’t feel

right’’ with the FBI.626 According to Wilson, ‘‘this case has haunted

[him] for the last twenty years.’’ 627

The Callahan murder investigation and the related investigation

of corruption in the jai alai business gradually fizzled out.628 According to Merritt, he was ‘‘stonewalled and snowballed’’ by the

FBI and ‘‘the FBI gave them the cold shoulder.’’ 629

5. Massachusetts

This section makes no attempt to provide a complete accounting

of the problems experienced by state investigators. Although there

may be many more, this section discusses four investigations that

appear to have been compromised in an effort to protect Stephen

Flemmi and James Bulger.

i. Operation Lobster

FBI personnel appear to have compromised a number of state investigations in Massachusetts. In 1977, the Boston FBI and the

Massachusetts State Police initiated Operation Lobster, a joint

probe of the widespread hijacking of trucks in New England.630

The lead state police representative, Bob Long, recalled that there

was no cooperation from the FBI on the operation.631 Operation

Lobster intended to target James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen

Flemmi, and other members of the Winter Hill Gang.632 FBI Agent

Nick Gianturco went undercover, posing as a fence for the truck hijackers.633 The investigation continued into 1978 when, in an offhand remark, Bulger told FBI Agent John Connolly that some of

his associates were considering robbing a fence (Gianturco) in Boston.634 Connolly was concerned for Gianturco’s safety, called the

undercover agent, and warned him that the hijackers were going

to kill him.635 Sergeant Bob Long, however, said there was never

any evidence that Gianturco’s life was in danger.636 Agent Connolly

94

637See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 61, 130 (Perennial 2000). The authors of

Black Mass concluded that Flemmi—not Bulger—informed Connolly of the plan to rob the fence.

Compare id. with Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 638See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001). 639See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 202. 640See id.; DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 85 (Perennial 2000). 641See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 202; DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 84–85

(Perennial 2000). 642See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 202; Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001). 643 Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001).

Concerning the exclusion of the FBI from Long’s investigation, O’Sullivan also advised Long that

it would be suicide for him to go against the FBI. See id. 644See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. at 202; DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 85 (Perennial 2000). 645See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. at 202. 646See id. 647 Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001). 648See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001);

DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 85 (Perennial 2000). 649 Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001). 650See Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 202.

did not notify the FBI and state police officials responsible for

Gianturco’s safety or Bulger’s remark, nor did he document the episode in an FBI report until two years later.637 After Connolly

warned Gianturco of the possible threat on his life, Operation Lobster was quickly concluded with the arrest of 46 people from every

organized crime faction in the city except Bulger’s and Flemmi’s

South Boston.638

ii. The Lancaster Street Garage

In 1980, the Massachusetts State Police determined that the

Lancaster Street Garage (‘‘Garage’’) in downtown Boston was a hub

for organized crime figures conducting illegal activities.639 From an

apartment across Lancaster Street, the state police saw virtually

every organized crime figure in New England visit James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi at the Garage.640 After watching the

Garage for eleven weeks, the police consulted Jeremiah O’Sullivan,

the top federal prosecutor for the New England Organized Crime

Strike Force, about obtaining authority for microphone surveillance.641 The Massachusetts State Police insisted that the FBI not

be told about the microphone because state officials believed that

Bulger and Flemmi were FBI informants who might compromise

the investigation if they knew about the bug.642 Considering the request to conduct the investigation without the FBI, O’Sullivan recommended that the state police work with the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office.643 With the local prosecutor’s assistance, the

state police obtained a warrant to bug the Lancaster Street Garage.644 On July 24, 1980, the state police successfully installed a

microphone in the Garage.645

For about two weeks, the Lancaster Street bug was ‘‘extremely

productive.’’ 646 Bob Long, a Sergeant for the Massachusetts State

Police, said that they initially picked up transmissions of Bulger

and Flemmi meeting in the Garage’s office.647 However, within a

few weeks Bulger and Flemmi abruptly changed their routine and

no longer discussed business in the office.648 Instead, Bulger and

Flemmi joked about what great guys the state police were, and the

two informants eventually stopped using the Garage altogether.649

The state police knew that Bulger and Flemmi had been tipped off

concerning the electronic surveillance.650 According to Judge Mark

95

651See id. 652See id. 653See id. 654See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 90 (Perennial 2000). 655See id. at 90–91; Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police

(Apr. 17, 2001). 656See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 91 (Perennial 2000). 657See id. 658See id. 659See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001);

DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 91 (Perennial 2000). 660See Interview with Bob Long, former Sergeant, Massachusetts State Police (Apr. 17, 2001);

DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEILL, BLACK MASS 91 (Perennial 2000). 661Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d at 220. 662 Id. at 223. 663See id. at 220, 223. 664See id. at 223.

Wolf, Flemmi originally learned of the bug from a Massachusetts

State Police Trooper.651 Flemmi then discussed this matter with

Agent John Connolly, who was able to confirm for Flemmi and

Bulger that the Lancaster Street Garage was bugged.652 Flemmi

and Bulger conveyed the information to their organized crime associates, and discussion of criminal activity at the Garage stopped.653

The Lancaster Street Garage investigation was a failure.

iii. The Howard Johnson’s Investigation

A few weeks after the Lancaster Street Garage investigation was

compromised, the Massachusetts State Police began a new investigation of Bulger and Flemmi.654 The state police determined that

Bulger and Flemmi were using a bank of pay phones at a Howard

Johnson’s restaurant in Boston to conduct business.655 State troopers believed that Bulger and Flemmi were involved in drug trafficking after they were seen meeting with Frank Lepere, a marijuana dealer, who had visited the Lancaster Street Garage.656 The

following day, September 5, 1980, Bulger and Flemmi met at Howard Johnson’s with Mickey Caruna, reputedly the biggest drug trafficker in New England.657 Based on this information, the state police obtained a second warrant to conduct electronic surveillance of

Bulger and Flemmi.658 On September 17, 1980, the five pay phones

outside the Howard Johnson’s were tapped.659 The state troopers

awaited the targets’ arrival, but Bulger and Flemmi never used the

Howard Johnson’s for business again.660

iv. The DEA Investigation

Several years later, in 1984, the DEA initiated an investigation

targeting Bulger and Flemmi.661 DEA officials understood that any

effort to obtain a court order to conduct electronic surveillance of

Bulger and Flemmi would have to include a law enforcement agency with the authority to investigate non-narcotics offenses because

the DEA expected to overhear evidence of loansharking, gambling,

and extortion.662 The DEA preferred not to collaborate with the

FBI, which had the authority to investigate these offenses, because

DEA agents believed that Bulger and Flemmi were FBI informants.663 Thus, the DEA recruited the Massachusetts State Police,

instead of the FBI, to assist with the investigation.664 Despite efforts to keep the joint investigation secret, Special Agent Connolly

learned of the investigation and advised his informants of the posVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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665See id. at 227–28. 666See id. at 230. 667See id. 668See id. 669See id. at 242. 670 Jai alai is a court game similar to handball in which players use a long hand-shaped basket strapped to the wrist to catch and propel the ball. 671 Edmund Mahony, Sources: Gangster Admits to Jai Alai Killing, HARTFORD COURANT, July

23, 1998, at A1. 672 ‘‘Justice Department Misconduct in Boston: Are Legislative Solutions Required?,’’ Hearing

Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 681 (Feb. 27, 2002) (testimony of Austin

McGuigan). 673Lyn Bixby, 25 Years of Gambling in Connecticut; A Quarter-Century of Gambling, Hidden

Costs, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 24, 1997, at A1. 674 A fronton is a building in which jai alai is played. 675 Edmund Mahony & Lyn Bixby, Did the FBI Hinder the Investigation into the 1980s Jai

Alai Killings? A Tale of Murder and Frustration, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 9, 1997, at A1. 676 ‘‘Justice Department Misconduct in Boston: Are Legislative Solutions Required?,’’ Hearing

Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 675 (Feb. 27, 2002) (testimony of Austin

McGuigan).

sibility of electronic surveillance.665 The DEA and U.S. Attorney’s

Office soon realized that Bulger and Flemmi were aware that they

had been targeted, but decided to continue the investigation.666

Federal authorities wanted to convey the impression to Bulger and

Flemmi that the investigation had been concluded.667 In an effort

to reduce the number of people who knew about the investigation

and minimize the risk of leaks, the DEA cut the Massachusetts

State Police out of the investigation on the pretext that it was

being abandoned. Thus, the DEA lost the partner in the joint investigation with the authority and experience to investigate gambling

and loansharking.668 The DEA investigation was ultimately unsuccessful, and, due to Agent Connolly’s leak, the Massachusetts State

Police’s role in another Bulger and Flemmi investigation had been

compromised.669

6. Connecticut

Connecticut state law enforcement also encountered interference

with important investigations, particularly in regard to its scrutiny

of organized crime involvement in the sport of jai alai.670 ‘‘Investigators from agencies for various states, in particular state police

detectives from Connecticut, have long complained that FBI agents

in Boston impeded jai alai investigations in an effort to protect two

bureau informants.’’ 671 According to Austin McGuigan, former

chief prosecutor of the Connecticut Statewide Organized Crime

Task Force, ‘‘Federal agents were all too willing to provide information regarding state and local investigations to former FBI agents

who were employed by the very businesses that were under investigation . . . [, but] the same information was not provided to the

agencies mandated by law to prosecute these cases.’’ 672

The Connecticut legislature legalized jai alai gambling in April

1972.673 This authorization led to several state law enforcement jai

alai investigations concerning game fixing and connections to organized crime. ‘‘Before the first [Connecticut] fronton 674 opened in

1976, allegations surfaced that mob-connected businessmen from

Florida were trying to expedite the Connecticut licensing process

with a substantial cash payment.’’ 675 As a result, the Connecticut

Statewide Organized Crime Task Force, with Austin McGuigan as

its chief prosecutor, began an investigation in the fall of 1975 into

the opening of a Bridgeport Jai Alai fronton.676 During the invesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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677 Id. 678 Id. at 675, 682. 679 Id. at 675. 680 Id. at 676, 682. 681 Id. 682 Id. 683 Id. 684 Id. at 677, 683. 685 Id. 686 Id. at 676, 682. 687 Id. 688 Id. 689 Id.

tigation, the task force discovered meetings between major New

York and New Jersey La Cosa Nostra figures and the President of

Bridgeport Jai Alai and determined that a loan from the Central

State Teamsters Fund had funded the fronton.677 The task force revoked Bridgeport Jai Alai’s license because of its connection to organized crime but did not have jurisdiction to conduct a thorough

investigation because certain meetings were occurring in New Jersey and New York and the loans were originating in Chicago.678

Consequently, the task force attempted to turn over the information it had uncovered to federal law enforcement.679 However, according to McGuigan, ‘‘they displayed a singular lack of interest in

pursuing the case and, to say the least, were uncooperative.’’ 680

Chief Prosecutor McGuigan and the task force then began a licensing investigation into World Jai Alai, which was planning to

open a fronton in Hartford.681 Members of the task force had previously met a number of ex-FBI agents engaged as security specialists at World Jai Alai, including H. Paul Rico, the head of security

who had formerly worked as a Special Agent in the Boston FBI Office.682 As a Justice Department employee, Rico specialized in organized crime investigations and the development of confidential informants. The task force requested information about World Jai

Alai President John Callahan from federal law enforcement agencies but received no information of consequence.683 McGuigan later

discovered that the federal government was aware, in January

1976, of allegations that Callahan was involved in loan sharking

with Boston’s Winter Hill Gang.684 This information was shared

with former FBI Special Agent Paul Rico while the task force’s request for information from federal officials was met with silence.685

Although federal law enforcement had not provided information

about Callahan sufficient to raise concerns, Connecticut investigators were suspicious of his activities and connections. As a result,

task force investigators decided to follow Callahan when he left a

meeting in Hartford.686 Callahan had told the task force that he

was going directly to Miami after meeting with the task force.

McGuigan, however, followed Callahan, who went to Boston instead of Miami.687 McGuigan mentioned Callahan’s name to Chief

Prosecutor Tom Dwyer of the Suffolk County Organized Crime

Prosecution Unit, and was told that Callahan had ‘‘organized crime

connections, Winter Hill Gang.’’ 688 Dwyer further told McGuigan

that his unit had done surveillance on Callahan and that Callahan

‘‘had meetings with the Winter Hill Gang, John Martorano, the

Flemmis, Howie Winter, and so forth.’’ 689 McGuigan was puzzled

98

690 Id. 691 Id. 692 Id. at 676–77. 693 Id. at 677, 683. 694 Id. 695 Id. 696 Id. at 677. 697 Id. at 677–78. 698 Id. 699 Id. 700See State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 305 (R.I. 1973). 701See id.

as to how this information was not known to the former FBI agents

working in security at World Jai Alai.690

The Connecticut task force scheduled a hearing to obtain testimony from Callahan on May 3, 1976.691 However, Jai Alai Security

Director Rico learned of the investigation shortly before the hearing, and Callahan resigned before the task force could secure his

testimony. This removed Callahan from the task force’s jurisdiction, since he was no longer tied to Connecticut.692

World Jai Alai opened its Hartford fronton after Callahan’s resignation.693 Following its opening, the Connecticut task force obtained the first convictions for the fixing of Jai Alai games.694 The

task force’s jurisdiction was limited to the State of Connecticut’s

borders, however, and McGuigan was not aware of a federal agency

ever conducting any interstate jai alai investigation.695

Roger Wheeler, an Oklahoma businessman, purchased World Jai

Alai in 1978. In 1981, however, Wheeler was murdered at the

Southern Hills Country Club in Tulsa, Oklahoma.696 The Connecticut task force opened an investigation to determine whether a link

existed between the jai alai skimming allegations, the Winter Hill

Gang, and the Wheeler murder.697 McGuigan and his task force

contacted the Dade County Strike Force to interview Callahan.698

However, the day McGuigan arrived in Miami for the interview,

Callahan’s body was discovered in the trunk of a car parked at the

Miami Airport.699

The FBI’s treatment of the Connecticut task force during the jai

alai investigations provides yet another example of a major failure

to cooperate with state law enforcement. Because of the FBI’s failure to provide information to the task force, Connecticut law enforcement was impeded in its efforts to investigate and prosecute

wrongdoing in the jai alai industry.

7. Rhode Island

Joseph Barboza was not the only cooperating witness developed

by FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico. Not long after Barboza testified

in the Deegan murder prosecution, Rico developed and handled

Rhode Island state witness John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley in connection with

the prosecution of mob boss Raymond Patriarca and four of his associates. In doing so, Rico interfered with state law enforcement.

Specifically, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Kelley

was directed by Rico to commit perjury to protect an informant, to

protect and further an ongoing FBI investigation, and to ensure the

conviction of the defendants at trial.700 The court also found that

Rico lied under oath to corroborate portions of Kelley’s perjury.701

99

702See id. 703See id. 704The seven who were indicted, and the crimes with which they were charged, were as follows: Robert Fairbrothers, Maurice Lerner, and John Rossi were charged with murder and conspiracy. Patriarca, Louis Manocchio, Rudolpho Sciarra, and Frank Vendituoli were charged with

accessory to murder and conspiracy. The conspiracy charge against Vendituoli was dismissed,

and he was found not guilty of the accessory charges. See Patriarca, 308 A.2d at 395; State v.

Manocchio, 496 A.2d 931 (R.I. 1985). 705See Patriarca, 308 A.2d at 305–07 (providing a detailed factual account of the murders). 706See Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to the Honorable Mortimer M. Caplan, Commissioner, IRS (Feb. 13, 1961) (Exhibit 16) (Kennedy lists Raymond Patriarca as one of the 39 top echelon racketeers in the country targeted for investigation

and prosecution.) 707Memorandum from Gerald McDowell, Attorney, Organized Crime Strike Force, Boston U.S.

Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Thomas Kennelly, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Aug. 11, 1969) (document is retained by the Justice Department). A senior FBI official later called the convictions ‘‘an achievement of major dimension

causing telling disruption at organized crime’s top-level in New England.’’ FBI Memorandum

from J.H. Gale to Mr. DeLoach (Mar. 31, 1970) (Exhibit 308). 708See FBI Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Mr. DeLoach (Mar. 31, 1970) (Exhibit 308). (‘‘Rico

was instrumental in the development and handling of notorious Boston hoodlum John Kelley

as an informant and witness.’’) Rico also likely believed that Kelley’s testimony would solidify

the veracity of Barboza’s previous testimony against Patriarca for the conspiracy to murder Rudolph Marfeo’s brother Willie, which would further demonstrate Barboza’s importance as a witness. 709Trial Transcript, State v. Lerner (R.I. Super. Ct.) at 2571, 2610, 2622, 2623 [‘‘Lerner Trial

Transcript’’] (Exhibit 302). 710See Lerner Trial Transcript at 2550, 2555, 2557–2567, 2571, 2610, 2622–23 (Exhibit 302).

Israel told the Committee that he never interviewed Kelley without Rico being present. Israel

noted that the FBI was particularly esteemed at the time and Rico’s constant presence never

struck him as suspicious. Interview with Richard Israel, former Assistant Attorney General,

Rhode Island (Sept. 26, 2001).

On April 20, 1968, Rudolph Marfeo and his associate Anthony

Melei were shot to death while shopping at a market in Providence,

Rhode Island.702 These gangland slayings, committed at the behest

of Raymond Patriarca, were the culmination of a conspiracy to

eliminate Marfeo’s involvement in a gambling operation.703 Seven

men were charged with murder, conspiracy to murder, and accessory before the fact to murder.704 An eighth participant in the murders was John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley. However, instead of being charged

and standing trial for his role in the murders, Kelley became a government witness.705

Patriarca was considered one of the nation’s top organized crime

leaders, and his conviction would have dealt a severe blow to organized crime in New England.706 In fact, a Department of Justice

memorandum recommending Patriarca’s prosecution stated: ‘‘[I]t

was generally agreed among the FBI, Strike Force Attorneys, and

the Rhode Island Attorney General that [the] conviction of

Patriarca . . . in this matter would deal a death blow to the Rhode

Island LCN’’ [‘‘La Cosa Nostra’’] and ‘‘the conviction of Maurice R.

‘Pro’ Lerner will remove from the scene one of the most vicious and

affective [sic] killers in New England.’’ 707

Not long after the Marfeo-Melei murders, Special Agent Rico developed John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley as a cooperating witness.708 In the process, Rico met with Kelley on several occasions to prepare for the

Rhode Island prosecution of the murders of Marfeo and Melei.709

By the time Kelley was turned over to Assistant Rhode Island Attorney General Richard Israel, Kelley was a fully prepared witness.710 In an interview with the Committee, Israel remarked that

he ‘‘had no reason to question the FBI’’ regarding the scope of the

promises, rewards, or inducements Kelly was going to receive to

100

711 Interview with Richard Israel, former Assistant Attorney General, Rhode Island (Sept. 26,

2001). 712 Id. 713Docket Sheet, State v. Lerner (R.I. Super. Ct.) [‘‘Lerner Docket Sheet’’] (Exhibit 294). Kelley

was granted immunity in exchange for his testimony. Order, In re: Application of Attorney General under Chapter 54 of the Public Laws of 1969 (Exhibit 277). 714Manocchio, 496 A.2d at 931. 715See Lerner Trial Transcript at 1994 (Exhibit 296). 716Lerner Trial Transcript at 1994–2448 (Exhibit 296); see also Patriarca, 308 A.2d at 305–

07; Lerner v. Moran, 542 A.2d 1089, 1090–91 (R.I. 1988). 717Lerner Trial Transcript at 2613–16, 2621–22, 2630–31, 2636 (Exhibit 302); See also Moran,

542 A.2d at 1090–91. 718Lerner Docket Sheet (Exhibit 306); see also State v. Lerner, 308 A.2d 324, 330 (R.I. 1973).

Lerner was later sentenced on September 14, 1970, to consecutive life sentences on the murder

charges and ten years on the conspiracy charge. See Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 771). Patriarca was sentenced to a term of 10 years imprisonment for conspiracy to murder. 719Lerner Docket Sheet (Exhibit 306); see also Lerner, 308 A.2d at 330. Rico was praised for

his ‘‘outstanding accomplishments in the development and handling’’ of Kelley and received an

incentive award approved by Director Hoover. See FBI Airtel from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Mar. 30, 1970) (Exhibit 307); FBI

Memorandum from J.H. Gale to Cartha DeLoach (Mar. 31, 1970) (Exhibit 308); Letter from J.

Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to H. Paul Rico, Special Agent, Boston FBI Field Office (Apr. 1,

1970) (Exhibit 310). 720 Interview with David Leach, former Assistant Attorney General for Rhode Island (Sept. 25,

2001). 721 Id. 722See Sworn Statement of David H. Leach (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 762); Sworn Statement

of Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 762). 723Sworn Statement of Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763).

testify at the Marfeo/Melei murder trial.711 Israel continued saying,

‘‘[T]hey [we]re handing me a major crime on a silver platter—hell

a gold platter and we were going to break down the major element

of Patriarca’s unit.’’ 712

The trial began for Maurice Lerner, Raymond Patriarca, Robert

Fairbrothers, John Rossi, and Rudolpho Sciarra on February 27,

1970 (the ‘‘Lerner trial’’).713 Luigi Manocchio, who had also been indicted, earlier fled the jurisdiction and evaded arraignment and

prosecution until May of 1983.714 On March 9, 1970, Kelley took

the stand at the Lerner trial as the state’s main witness.715 Kelley

testified as to the planning and execution of the murders, including

his own role, and as to the promises, rewards, and inducements he

was receiving in exchange for his testimony.716 Rico also took the

stand to corroborate Kelley’s testimony as to the promises, rewards,

or inducements Kelley was receiving for testifying.717 As a result,

Lerner was convicted of murder and conspiracy to murder.718 The

other defendants were convicted of conspiring to murder.719

It was not until 1983 that it was publicly revealed that Kelley

and Rico testified falsely at the Lerner trial. In preparing for the

trial of Manocchio for his role in the Marfeo/Melei murders, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island David Leach

looked at the Lerner trial transcript as a ‘‘script’’ for the Manocchio

trial.720 Knowing that Kelley would have to be called as the state’s

main witness,721 Leach and Rhode Island Detective Urbano

Prignano met with Kelley before he was called as a witness.722 At

that time, Kelley relayed to them that certain portions of his prior

testimony at the Lerner trial were false and that Special Agent

Rico had instructed him to commit perjury. When asked why he

went along with Rico’s suggestions, Kelley responded, ‘‘Well, my

life was in their hands.’’ 723

At the Manocchio trial, Kelley testified that he had committed

perjury during the Lerner trial in three aspects, all at the behest

101

724See Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090. 725See id. See also Karen Ellsworth, Sciarra Given Term for Contempt, PROVIDENCE JOURNALBULLETIN, June 3, 1983 (Exhibit 765). 726See Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090. See also Karen Ellsworth, Sciarra Given Term For Contempt,

PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June 3, 1983 (Exhibit 765). 727See Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090. 728See id.; Sworn Statement of David H. Leach (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 762); Sworn Statement of Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763). 729Sworn Statement of David H. Leach (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 762); Sworn Statement of

Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763). 730Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090. 731See Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090; Sworn Statement of David H. Leach (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit

762); Sworn Statement of Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763). 732See Moran, 542 A.2d at 1090; Sworn Statement of David H. Leach (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit

762); Sworn Statement of Urbano Prignano (May 24, 1983) (Exhibit 763). 733Lerner Trial Transcript at 2274, 2275, 2278–81, 2300, 2306 (Exhibit 296); Moran, 542 A.2d

at 1090. 734Lerner Trial Transcript at 2613–16, 2620–22, 2630–31, 2636 (Exhibit 302). Rico testified

that he told Kelley that any cooperation Kelley gave to the United States Government would

be brought to the attention of the proper authorities and that the United States Government

had agreed to give him personal security. However, Rico testified that he never described to

Kelley the kind of personal security and protection that he might expect to receive. Rico testified

that he spoke with Theodore F. Harrington of the Justice Department regarding the personal

security which Kelley would receive. Rico specifically denied that he told Kelley that he would

be provided with a new identity and relocation. Id. 735Trial Transcript, State v. Manocchio (R.I. Super. Ct.) at 898, 899, 905–07, 910, 1042–48,

1059–61 [‘‘Manocchio Trial Transcript’’] (Exhibit 765).

of Rico. First, Kelley testified at the Lerner trial that he cut down

a shotgun for use in the murders.724 However, at the Manocchio

trial, Kelley admitted that his armorer actually ‘‘cut down’’ the

weapon.725 Kelley said Rico told him not to mention the armorer’s

role in the murders because the armorer was an important FBI informant who Rico wanted to keep on the streets in an effort to dismantle the Boston group of the Patriarca crime family.726

Second, Kelley testified at the Lerner trial that the gang had a

key meeting with Patriarca prior to the murders at a particular

restaurant.727 However, at the Manocchio trial, Kelley admitted

that the meeting did not take place at the restaurant he had previously named.728 In fact, the previously named restaurant had

been destroyed by fire by the time of the purported meeting.729

Kelley stated that Rico wanted him to put the meeting at that particular restaurant to establish a connection between Patriarca and

the owner of the restaurant, effectively assisting Rico in his investigation against the restaurant owner.730 According to Kelley, the

FBI had invested millions of dollars in trying to tie the owner of

the restaurant to Patriarca, but, up to that point, their investigation had not been successful.731 Rico apparently believed that

Kelley’s testimony about that particular restaurant would produce

valuable circumstantial evidence against the restaurant owner.732

Third, Kelley testified at the Lerner trial that Rico promised him

only immunity and protection for his family in exchange for his testimony and did not promise him income, a new identity, and relocation.733 Rico under oath then corroborated Kelley’s testimony regarding such promises.734 However, at the Manocchio trial, Kelley

testified that Rico did, in fact, promise Kelley income for the rest

of his life, a new identity, and relocation.735 This was buttressed

by the state’s filing of the Financial Report for Witness Protection

Program participant Kelley. That report revealed that Kelley was

a member of the witness protection program since May 1970 and

that he was receiving alimentation payments in the form of subsistence, housing, medical, travel, documents, relocation, trial, movVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00111 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
102

736See Financial Report for Witness Program Participant John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley (Exhibit 764). The

report was generated on May 6, 1983, and signed by the Chief of the Witness Security Division

of the U.S. Marshal’s Service on May 10, 1983. 737Financial Report for Witness Program Participant John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley (Exhibit 764). 738Manocchio Trial Transcript at 907 (Exhibit 765). Notwithstanding Kelley’s admissions of

his prior perjury, Manocchio was found guilty on two charges of accessory before the fact and

one charge of conspiracy to commit murder. See Manocchio, 496 A.2d at 931; Karen Ellsworth,

Manocchio Guilty on All Charges in Mob Murders, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June 14,

1983 (Exhibit 768). Manocchio’s conviction was later reversed on other grounds. Manocchio, 496

A.2d at 931. 739Teletype from Boston FBI Field Office to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (June 2, 1983)

(Exhibit 767). Notwithstanding the extensive coverage received by this testimony in New England, Edward Harrington told the Committee that he was unaware of Kelley’s testimony regarding his and Rico’s perjury. 740 Application for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 771). 741Lerner v. Moran, Civil No. PM833005 (R.I. Super. Ct. 1987) (Exhibit 805). 742Moran, 542 A.2d at 1091. 743 Id. 744 Id. at 1090–1093. At a hearing before this Committee, Rico denied committing perjury or

suborning Kelley’s perjury at the 1970 Lerner trial. ‘‘Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong.

215 (May 3, 2001) (testimony of H. Paul Rico).

ing, and miscellaneous expenses from 1971 to 1982.736 He received

no less than $114,848.06.737 When asked why he had lied during

Lerner’s trial about the promises made to him, Kelley stated,

‘‘Agent Rico told me I shouldn’t tell all of these things because it

looked like I was being paid; that I should just do as he said, and

everything would come out all right.’’ 738 Shortly afterwards, the

Boston FBI office sent a teletype to Washington, stating that Red

Kelley testified that he committed perjury at the behest of Special

Agent H. Paul Rico.739

Following the Manocchio trial, Lerner filed an application for

post-conviction relief in Rhode Island Superior Court based on

Kelley’s perjurious testimony at his trial in 1970.740 The Superior

Court of Rhode Island denied Lerner’s application for post conviction relief in January 1987, despite finding that ‘‘Kelley committed

perjury in the 1970 [Lerner] trial.’’ 741 However, on June 10, 1988,

the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated Lerner’s conviction. The

court held ‘‘that Kelley’s perjury at Lerner’s trial relating to the extent of promises made to Kelley by the FBI in exchange for his testimony and Special Agent Rico’s corroboration of that perjury were

material to Kelley’s credibility and therefore to the issue of

Lerner’s guilt.’’ 742 The court ruled that ‘‘Kelley’s perjury, elicited

by the FBI, constituted material exculpatory evidence withheld in

violation of the applicant’s due process rights.’’ 743 In its decision,

the court found that FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico encouraged

the state’s main witness, ‘‘Red’’ Kelley, to lie under oath at the

Lerner trial to protect an informant, to protect and further an ongoing FBI investigation, and to ensure the conviction of the defendants on trial. The court even found that Rico lied to corroborate

portions of Kelley’s perjury.744

Other Department of Justice officials may have known of the perjury at the time of the Lerner trial yet remained silent. When

interviewed by Committee staff, Judge Edward Harrington, who at

the time of the Lerner trial was Deputy Chief of the United States

Department of Justice’s Strike Force Against Organized Crime for

New England, stated that he knew nothing about Rico’s testimony

at the Lerner trial and the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s finding

103

745See Interview with Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime

and Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001). 746 Interview with Edward F. Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001). 747Letter from Edward Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to the Honorable Joseph Biden,

United States Senator (Jan. 20, 1988) (Exhibit 813). 748Lerner Trial Transcript at 2621–22 (Exhibit 302). 749See Letter from Edward Harrington, former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to the Honorable Joseph Biden,

United States Senator (Jan. 20, 1988) (Exhibit 813); Interview with Edward F. Harrington,

former Attorney in Charge, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of

Justice Field Office (Dec. 20, 2001). 750Financial Statement for Witness Program Participant John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley (May 6, 1983)

(Exhibit 764). This document was prepared by the U.S. Marshal’s Service of the United States

Department of Justice and sets forth what Kelley was receiving as a witness in the Witness

Protection Program.

of perjury.745 Harrington, when asked about the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s finding that Rico committed perjury, said: ‘‘It’s a stupid lie. Why would Rico tell him that? It’s ludicrous.’’ 746 However,

Harrington held out with great pride that he ‘‘developed such significant accomplice witnesses as . . . ‘Red’ Kelley.’’ 747 Rico also

identified Harrington at the Lerner trial as being the one to whom

Rico spoke in connection with providing personal security to

Kelley.748 Moreover, as Head of the Strike Force, Harrington was

one of the individuals who decided what terms a witness would receive in exchange for his testimony and, in fact, was instrumental

in arranging the terms for Joe ‘‘the Animal’’ Barboza’s testimony in

three trials.749 Likewise, it is quite possible that Harrington decided Kelley’s terms as well. In addition, employees of the U.S.

Marshals Service and other Department of Justice officials may

have known of the perjury due to their involvement with and protection of Kelley.750

In conclusion, Rico’s interference with Rhode Island law enforcement interfered with the administration of justice and resulted in

a considerable waste of government resources in opposing the appeals of guilty defendants. Furthermore, a convicted murderer was

released from prison specifically because of the perjury committed

by Red Kelley and encouraged by Special Agent Rico. The Rhode

Island Supreme Court found that Rico did whatever it took to

achieve the ends he desired, which included committing perjury

and encouraging the state’s main witness to commit perjury. This

is just another unfortunate example of the FBI’s interference with

state law enforcement.

IV. THE USE OF JAMES ‘‘WHITEY’’ BULGER AS AN INFORMANT

RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE FBI USED ITS AUTHORITY TO ADVANCE OR PROTECT FORMER MASSACHUSETTS STATE

SENATE PRESIDENT WILLIAM BULGER

The revelation that the FBI had used James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as

an informant raised serious questions for the Committee regarding

whether former Special Agent John Connnolly or others used the

authority of the FBI to advance or protect James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s

brother former Massachusetts State Senate President William

Bulger. Accordingly, the Committee sought to take testimony from

William Bulger regarding his knowledge of the relationship between the FBI and his brother.

104

751 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearing Before the Comm.

on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 406 (Dec. 6, 2002). 752 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 5,

76–77, 84–85, 103 (June 19, 2003). 753 Id. at 40. 754 Id. 755 J.M. Lawrence, Panel Wanted Info on Bulger-extort link, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 10, 2002.

On December 6, 2002, William Bulger appeared before the Committee and asserted his right under the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution not to be compelled to give testimony that may tend

to incriminate him.751 In response to this assertion, the Committee

voted 30–1 on April 9, 2003 to grant Bulger immunity. On Thursday, June 19, 2003, the Committee on Government Reform held a

public hearing entitled ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the

Use of Informants by the Department of Justice: The Testimony of

William Bulger.’’ Massachusetts Representatives William Delahunt

and Marty Meehan attended the hearing as guests of the Committee.

The Committee is concerned about the factual accuracy in two

areas of William Bulger’s testimony before the Committee. Specifically, William Bulger testified concerning the FBI’s contacts with

him regarding the whereabouts of his brother. William Bulger’s

testimony regarding contacts with the FBI 752 appeared to conflict

with information provided to the press and Committee investigators by former Special Agent John Gamel. A full discussion of that

testimony is set forth below.

Second, William Bulger testified that he had informed his lawyer

about a telephone call from his brother shortly after his brother’s

flight and that his lawyer had informed law enforcement authorities. The Committee was unable to substantiate the communication

by any lawyer retained by William Bulger. Three lawyers retained

by William Bulger who are alive either were not told of the call at

the time or if told, did not report it to law enforcement authorities.

A fourth lawyer is deceased. A full discussion of this testimony is

set forth below as well.

A. WILLIAM BULGER’S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

At the Committee hearing, Chairman Davis’s first question was

as follows:

Did there come a time when you came to believe that the

FBI had protected your brother and that John Connolly

may have used his authority to protect you or advance

your political career? 753

William Bulger responded: ‘‘I never asked [Connolly] to interfere in

any such procedures. Never.’’ When asked if he was aware that

Connolly may have interfered whether he asked him to or not, William Bulger responded, ‘‘No.’’ 754

When asked about the FBI’s investigation and prosecution of

former State Senate Majority Leader Joseph DiCarlo that resulted

in William Bulger’s rise to leadership in the Massachusetts State

Senate,755 he denied any knowledge of it other than public reports

105

756 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 41

(June 19, 2003). 757Frank Mahoney, Budget Item Threatens Crime Intelligence Unit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10,

1981. 758 Id. 759 Id. 760 Id. 761 Id. 762 Id. 763 Id. 764 Id. 765 Interview with William Nally (July 22, 2003) (Exhibit 972).

and rumors, and he testified that he had ‘‘no recollection of ever

speaking of that matter with John Connolly.’’ 756

The remaining questioning of William Bulger can be categorized

into six topics:

1. The FY82 Massachusetts state budget line item that, if

passed, would have forced five State Police Officers into

early retirement;

2. The 1985 loan William Bulger received from his law associate, Tom Finnerty, as part of Finnerty’s 75 State Street real

estate venture;

3. The circumstances surrounding Massachusetts State Police

Trooper Billy Johnson’s encounter with James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger at Boston’s Logan International Airport in 1987 and

William Bulger’s subsequent involvement;

4. William Bulger’s relationship with former FBI Special Agent

and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s handler, John Connolly;

5. William Bulger’s January 1995 telephone conversation with

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger; and

6. The FBI’s contact with William Bulger and the Bulger family concerning James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s whereabouts.

1. FY82 Massachusetts State Budget Line Item

Prior to 1974, the Public Safety Division of the Massachusetts

State Police had two detective bureaus: the uniformed branch and

Civil Service.757 The difference between these bureaus was that the

Civil Service Detectives were required to have previous law enforcement experience, pass a written exam, and were permitted to

retire at age 65,758 whereas, the uniformed branch officers were required to retire at age 50.759 In 1974, the two branches were consolidated.760 A grandfather clause was created to ensure that the

former Civil Service Detectives would not be forced to retire until

the age of 65.761

In 1981, a line item was added to the FY82 Massachusetts state

budget that, if passed, would have imposed mandatory retirement

or a reduction in grade at the age of 50 for all state police, both

detectives and the uniformed branch.762 No sponsor was attributed

to the line item.763 At the time, there were five state police officers

who would have been affected by the line item: Lt. Col. John R.

O’Donovan, bureau commander Maj. John F. Regan, and Captains

Peter Agnes, William Nally, and Robert Zoulas.764 In 1980,

O’Donovan led the Lancaster Street garage investigation that targeted members of the Winter Hill Gang, including James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger.765 Regan served as District Attorney William Delahunt’s

106

766 Id. 767 Affidavit of William C. Nally (June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 972); Affidavit of Peter W. Agnes

(June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 973); Interview with Robert Zoulas (July 22, 2003). 768Frank Mahoney, Budget Item Threatens Crime Intelligence Unit, BOSTON GLOBE, July 10,

1981. 769 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 47–

48, 51–52, 108 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 770 Id. at 47, 51. 771 Id. at 48. 772 Affidavit of William C. Nally (June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 972); Affidavit of Peter W. Agnes

(June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 973). 773 Affidavit of William C. Nally (June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 972). 774 Affidavit of Peter W. Agnes (June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 973). 775 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 67–

68 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 776 Id. 777 Id. at 68. 778 Id. at 68, 88–90, 93. 779See Statement of Attorney General Scott Harshbarger on the Investigation of the 75 State

Street Project (Jan. 29, 1992) 780 Id.

chief detective.766 Agnes, Nally, and Zoulas were not involved in

the Lancaster Street garage investigation.767 The line item was ultimately vetoed by the Governor.768

Committee Members questioned William Bulger on whether he

used his power as the President of the Massachusetts State Senate

to introduce the line item anonymously as a tool to penalize members of the state police who were investigating James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger. William Bulger testified that he did not recall the line item

as part of the FY82 state budget and had no knowledge of its origins.769 William Bulger further testified that he never discussed

the Lancaster Street garage investigation with anyone, including

former FBI Special Agent John Connolly.770

William Bulger entered affidavits from Nally and Agnes into the

record.771 Both affidavits exerted that they did not investigate

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as part of the Lancaster Street garage investigation.772 Nally’s affidavit stated he knew ‘‘of no facts which

support the comparatively recent allegations that the budget item

was payback for an investigation of ‘James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger . . .

there was no payback message ever delivered to [him] by the Senate President.’’ 773 Agnes’ affidavit stated that Agnes ‘‘never believed William Bulger to be unfavorably disposed to [him].’’ 774

2. 75 State Street Real Estate Venture

According to William Bulger’s testimony at the hearing, in 1985,

he received a $240,000 payment that he claimed was a loan against

advanced fees, from his law associate, Tom Finnerty.775 The loan

money came from the same account into which Finnerty deposited

$500,000 he received from Boston real estate developer, Harold

Brown.776 William Bulger testified that Brown later alleged that

Finnerty extorted the $500,000 as part of the 75 State Street real

estate venture.777 William Bulger subsequently returned the loan

to Finnerty.778 The 75 State Street project was investigated by the

federal government and Massachusetts state government.779 All of

the investigations concluded that there was no evidence of involvement by William Bulger in the 75 State Street project.780

107

781Dick Lehr, FBI Ties Renew Questions on 75 State Street Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, June

14, 1998. 782 Id. 783 Id. 784 J.M. Lawrence, Trial: Agent Meddled in 75 State St. Case, BOSTON HERALD, May 21, 2002. 785See ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of

Justice: The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th

Cong. 41–42, 68, 98–101 (June 19, 2003). 786 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 67,

88 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 787 Id. at 67. 788 Id. 789 Id. at 67–68, 89, 90. 790 Id. at 68, 88–89, 93. 791 Id. at 68. 792 Id. 793 Id. 794 Id. 795 Id. at 41–42, 64, 68, 87, 100. 796 Id. at 42. 797 Affidavit of Harold Brown (June 16, 2003) (Exhibit 974).

FBI Special Agent John Morris was the Supervisor of the Public

Corruption Crime Unit during the 75 State Street investigation.781

Morris formerly served as the Supervisor of the Boston Organized

Crime Squad.782 In April 1998, Morris testified under oath to taking gifts and money from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger in 1982, 1984,

and 1985.783 Former Assistant United States Attorney Jonathan

Chiel testified at the trial of former FBI Special Agent John

Connolly that Connolly sought to gain inside information about the

75 State Street investigation.784 The Committee Members voiced

concern that Morris and Connolly’s illegal relationship with James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger may have resulted in the FBI and the U.S. Attorney’s Office turning a blind eye to William Bulger’s involvement in

the 75 State Street project.785

William Bulger testified that he and Finnerty were former law

partners.786 William Bulger represented brothers, Bruce and Robert Quirk, who had a dispute about property with National Semiconductor.787 The case was ultimately settled and William Bulger

was owed a $350,000 fee.788 Finnerty advanced William Bulger

$240,000 of the $350,000, as the fee was late.789 When William

Bulger discovered that the $240,000 came from Brown, William

Bulger returned the money to Finnerty.790 William Bulger testified

that he knew Brown was in ‘‘some kind of trouble.’’ 791 Therefore,

William Bulger returned the money so that no one could misconstrue that a relationship existed between William Bulger and

Brown.792 After the money was returned, Finnerty brought suit

against Brown.793 In his defense, Brown alleged that Finnerty extorted $500,000.794

William Bulger testified that he did not recall ever meeting Morris or discussing 75 State Street with Connolly.795 William Bulger

entered an affidavit from Brown into the Committee record.796 In

the affidavit, Brown stated that William Bulger had ‘‘zero’’ involvement in the 75 State Street project.797

108

798Peter Gelzinis, Kin Await Vindication for Trooper who Crossed James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger,

BOSTON HERALD, June 19, 2003. 799 Id. 800Peter Gelzinis, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger Leaves Surrogate Son Out of the $ $ $, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 14, 1999. 801Peter Gelzinis, Kin Await Vindication for Trooper who Crossed James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger,

BOSTON HERALD, June 19, 2003. 802 Id. 803 Id. 804 Id. 805 Id. 806 Id. 807 Id. 808See ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of

Justice: The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th

Cong. 45, 47, 56, 114 (June 19, 2003). 809 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 47

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 810 Id. at 45, 47, 56. 811 Id. at 45. 812 Id. at 108. 813 Id. at 45. 814 Affidavit of David Davis (June 16, 2003) (Exhibit 975). 815 Id.

3. Massachusetts State Police Trooper Billy Johnson’s Encounter

with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger at Logan Airport

On September 8, 1987, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and his girlfriend,

Teresa Stanley, were scheduled to fly from Boston to Montreal.798

Screeners at Logan International Airport identified two bricks of

$100 bills in James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s carry on baggage.799 It has

been reported that the bag contained at least $50,000 in cash.800

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger refused to have the bag searched and gave

the bag to Kevin Weeks.801 Massachusetts State Police Trooper

Billy Johnson arrived after Weeks fled the airport with the bag.802

Johnson confiscated $9,923 from Stanley and released the couple.803

After his encounter with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Johnson wrote

an incident report.804 Johnson later claimed that David Davis, the

Executive Director of the Massachusetts Port Authority, requested

a copy of the report on behalf of William Bulger.805 Johnson, a

decorated officer, was later demoted.806 After an early retirement,

Johnson committed suicide in 1998.807

The Committee Members’ questions regarding Trooper Johnson

again focused on the concern that William Bulger used his position

as the President of the Massachusetts State Senate to penalize a

law enforcement officer who may have investigated James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger.808 William Bulger testified that his relationship with Davis

was business in nature.809 William Bulger further stated that he

never spoke to Davis regarding the incident or the incident report

or sought sanctions against Johnson.810 William Bulger did not

learn of the incident involving James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Johnson

at Logan Airport until it was reported in the newspapers.811 William Bulger testified that he never saw Johnson’s incident report.812

William Bulger introduced an affidavit from Davis into the Committee record.813 The affidavit stated that at no time did William

Bulger, or anyone acting on William Bulger’s behalf, contact Davis

regarding the Johnson incident.814 In addition, Davis never provided a copy of Johnson’s report to William Bulger.815 The affidavit

109

816 Id. 817 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 54

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 818 Id. at 54, 64. 819 Ralph Ranalli & Patrick Healy, Hitman: Connolly Aided Bulger as Favor to Brother, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002. 820 Id. 821 Jonathan Wells, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s Ex-FBI Pal Leaves Job at Nstar, BOSTON HER- ALD, Mar. 1, 2001. 822 Id. 823 Andrea Estes & Jack Sullivan, Ex-agent Busted—Former FBI man Connolly Indicted for

Racketeering, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 23, 1999. 824 Id. 825 Id. 826 Id. 827 Jose Martinez, G-man’s Ties to Bulger Began on Southie Streets, BOSTON HERALD, May 29,

2002. 828 Ralph Ranalli, Sentence for Connolly Outstrips Others, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2002. 829 Ralph Ranalli & Patrick Healy, Hitman: Connolly Aided Bulger as Favor to Brother, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002. 830 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 64,

72, 90, 97 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger).

further stated that no form of sanction was imposed on Johnson regarding the incident with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.816

4. William Bulger’s Relationship with Former FBI Special Agent

and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s Handler, John Connolly

According to William Bulger’s testimony, he and James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger grew up in the same South Boston neighborhood as former

FBI Special Agent John Connolly.817 As an adult, Connolly worked

on William Bulger’s district campaigns.818 In 1975, Connolly recruited James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as an FBI informant.819 Connolly

served as James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s FBI handler until 1990, when

Connolly retired from the FBI.820 Connolly was subsequently hired

as the head of security for Boston Edison Company.821 After six

years, Connolly took a position as a lobbyist for Boston Edison’s

government affairs position.822

On December 23, 1999, Connolly was indicted on charges of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to obstruct justice,

and obstruction of justice.823 Connolly was accused of tipping off

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen ‘‘the Rifleman’’ Flemmi, and

Francis ‘‘Cadillac Frank’’ Salemme that they would be indicted on

racketeering charges in January 1995.824 Additionally, Connolly

was accused of informing James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Flemmi of

ongoing FBI investigations and failing to report James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Flemmi’s participation in extortion, loansharking and

gambling to FBI superiors.825 Connolly pled innocent to the

charges.826 On May 28, 2002, Connolly was found guilty of obstructing justice, racketeering, and making a false statement.827

Connolly was sentenced to ten years and one month in prison.828

Press reports have alleged that William Bulger used his political

position, as well as his relationship with Connolly, to protect James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger from prosecution. At Connolly’s trial, former mob

hitman, John Martorano, testified that William Bulger asked

Connolly to keep James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger out of trouble.829 William

Bulger testified that Connolly periodically stopped by his office

with new FBI Agents assigned to Boston.830 In addition, Connolly

occasionally met James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Flemmi at the home

110

831Dick Lehr, FBI Ties Renew Questions on 75 State Street Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, June

14, 1998. 832 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger.’’ Hearing before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 112

(2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 833Dick Lehr, FBI Ties Renew Questions on 75 State Street Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, June

14, 1998. 834 Id. 835 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 54

(2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 836 Id. at 94. 837 Id. at 72, 90, 97. 838 Id. at 66, 73, 104–105. 839 Id. at 55, 72–73, 91–92, 105. 840 Id. at 66, 96, 109. 841 Id. at 66, 96. 842 Id. at 55, 57, 106–107. 843 Id. at 91. 844 Id. 845 Id. 846 Id. at 64. 847 Affidavit of Carl Gustin (June 12, 2003) (Exhibit 976). 848 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 64,

66, 70–71, 87–88 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger).

of Flemmi’s mother.831 Mrs. Flemmi lived next door to William

Bulger.832 James Ring, former Supervisor for the Organized Crime

Squad, testified that William Bulger walked in on a dinner at Mrs.

Flemmi’s house.833 The dinner was attended by Ring, Connolly,

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, and Flemmi.834

William Bulger testified that he and Connolly were not close

friends growing up, due to the seven-year age difference.835 The

two men were closer friends as adults.836 Although he recalled that

Connolly brought FBI agents who were new to Boston to the State

House, William Bulger did not consider Connolly to be a frequent

visitor or telephone caller to his office.837

William Bulger testified that he first learned that James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger might be an FBI informant from a Boston Globe

article.838 William Bulger stated that he never discussed James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s possible role as an FBI informant or involvement

in illegal activities with Connolly.839 In addition, William Bulger

never witnessed Connolly in the presence of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

or Flemmi.840 William Bulger denied ever being present at a dinner at Mrs. Flemmi’s house at which James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger,

Flemmi, Connolly, or any other FBI agents were in attendance.841

William Bulger denied asking Connolly or any law enforcement

officer to use his or her position within law enforcement to keep

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger out of trouble.842 William Bulger testified

that the only discussion he had with Connolly regarding James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger occurred after reading a newspaper article that alleged James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was involved with drugs.843 William

Bulger asked Connolly if he could find out if the report was

valid.844 According to William Bulger, Connolly informed William

Bulger that the allegations were not true.845

William Bulger testified that he believed he sent a letter of recommendation on Connolly’s behalf to Harvard’s Kennedy School of

Government.846 Connolly was accepted by the Kennedy School and

earned a master’s degree in Public Administration.847 William

Bulger denied providing any assistance in securing Connolly a position outside the FBI, including at Boston Edison.848 William Bulger

111

849 Id. at 64. 850 Affidavit of Carl Gustin (June 12, 2003) (Exhibit 976). 851 Id. 852 Ralph Ranalli & Patrick Healy, Hitman: Connolly Aided Bulger as Favor to Brother, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2002. 853 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 33,

58–59, 74, 79, 82–84, 88, 93–95 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 854 Id. at 83–84, 88. 855 Id. at 58–59, 83, 856 Id. at 33. 857See ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of

Justice: The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th

Cong. 59, 83 (June 19, 2003). 858 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 33,

58, 79 (June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 859 Id. at 58. 860 Id. at 33, 58, 79. 861 Id. at 83. 862 Id. at 59. 863 Id. at 58, 74, 88, 104.

submitted an affidavit signed by Carl Gustin, former Senior Vice

President of Boston Edison, into the Committee record.849 According to the affidavit, Gustin was responsible for hiring Connolly as

a lobbyist for Boston Edison.850 Gustin’s affidavit further stated

that Connolly was hired based upon his merits and that no external influences caused him to hire Connolly.851

5. William Bulger’s January 1995 Telephone Conversation with

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger fled his January 10, 1995 indictments.852

William Bulger has admitted to speaking with James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger on the telephone in January 1995 after he fled.853 William

Bulger took the telephone call from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger at the

home of Edward Phillips, who worked for William Bulger.854 William Bulger did not personally notify authorities of the telephone

call.855 The phone call did not become public until William Bulger’s

grand jury testimony was leaked to the media.856

Committee Members expressed concern over William Bulger’s decision to keep the telephone call with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger a secret from law enforcement officials.857 William Bulger stated that

his telephone call with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was ‘‘brief’’ and

lasted approximately three to four minutes.858 William Bulger testified that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger told him not to believe everything that was being said about him.859 In addition, the two brothers did not discuss whether James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger should turn

himself in and William Bulger did not recommend that James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger stay at-large.860

William Bulger testified that he ‘‘informed [his] attorney just

about immediately’’ after the telephone call and ‘‘he [William

Bulger’s attorney], in turn, told the officials.’’ 861 William Bulger

testified to his belief that Massachusetts statute Chapter 274, Section 4 protected his sibling relationship with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and did not require William Bulger to personally notify law enforcement officials of the telephone call.862 Furthermore, William

Bulger denied taking the telephone call at Phillips’ home as a way

to avoid telephone taps that may have been placed on William

Bulger’s home telephone.863

112

864 Affidavit of William M. Bulger (July 22, 2003) (Exhibit 977). 865 Id. 866 Id. 867 Affidavit of R. Robert Popeo (July 17, 2003) (Exhibit 978). 868 Id. 869 Affidavit of Thomas E. Finnerty (July 18, 2003) (Exhibit 979). 870 Affidavit of Thomas R. Kiley (July 18, 2003) (Exhibit 980). 871See ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of

Justice: The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th

Cong. 5, 76–77, 84–85, 103 (June 19, 2003). 872 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 77

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 873 Id. at 84–85.

After the conclusion of the hearing, William Bulger provided the

Committee with a personal affidavit.864 In the affidavit, William

Bulger stated that he informed four attorneys of his telephone conversation with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger: Robert Popeo, Thomas

Finnerty, Thomas Kiley, and William Homans, who is now deceased.865 William Bulger further stated that the attorney to whom

he referred during his testimony before the Committee was

Popeo.866

Affidavits from Popeo, Finnerty, and Kiley were also provided to

the Committee. Popeo stated that he did discuss the telephone call

from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger with William Bulger.867 However,

Popeo stated that he was not the attorney who contacted the

United States Attorney’s office regarding the telephone call between William Bulger and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.868 Finnerty’s affidavit stated that he was ‘‘told virtually immediately about the

call.’’ 869 Kiley’s affidavit was silent as to William Bulger’s communication with him about telephone call with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

shortly after the call.870

6. FBI Contact with William Bulger and the Bulger Family Concerning James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s Whereabouts

Committee members were interested as to whether the FBI used

William Bulger as a source in locating James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger,

after he fled his January 1995 indictments.871 After establishing

that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger fled in 1995, Mr. Delahunt asked:

So 8 years later the FBI gets around to inquiring of you

and your wife, in your case some 6 years as to the whereabouts of your brother?

William Bulger responded: ‘‘That is the first direct effort, yes.’’ 872

Mr. Shays questioned William Bulger as to whether the FBI or

other law enforcement officers came to his home or office.873

Rep. SHAYS: . . . I am asking whether you gave a signal

to the FBI that you did not want to answer their questions, and that they should not ask you and that they

should leave.

Mr. BULGER: I don’t recall meeting the FBI. I really don’t

recall it.

Rep. SHAYS: Did the FBI ever come to your home?

Mr. BULGER: I am told that they did, but I do not recall

it.

113

874 Id. 875 Id. at 84. 876 Id. at 60–61. 877 Id. 878 Id. at 61–63. 879 Id. at 76–77. 880Shelley Murphy, Retired FBI Agent Contradicts Bulger, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2003. 881 Id. 882 Id. 883 Id. 884 Affidavit of William M. Bulger (July 22, 2003) (Exhibit 977). 885 Id. 886 Affidavit of R. Robert Popeo (July 17, 2003) (Exhibit 978).

Rep. SHAYS: Did the FBI ever come to your offices?

Mr. BULGER: No, I don’t think so.

Rep. SHAYS: Did any other law enforcement people come to

your home?

Mr. BULGER: I don’t think so.

Rep. SHAYS: Did any law enforcement people come to your

offices to ask you questions?

Mr. BULGER: I don’t believe so.874

William Bulger testified that the first time he was asked of his

telephone call with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was during his grand

jury testimony in 2001.875

William Bulger testified that a week before the Committee hearing, two FBI agents, James Stover and J. Michael Doyle, came to

his home.876 The two agents talked to William Bulger’s daughter.877 William Bulger submitted his daughter’s written account of

her conversation with the agents into the Committee record.878

This encounter, on June 10, 2003, was the first time William Bulger could recall the FBI visiting his home.879

On June 28, 2003, an article entitled ‘‘Retired FBI Agent Contradicts Bulger’’ appeared in the Boston Globe.880 In the article,

former FBI Special Agent John Gamel stated that he spoke to William Bulger regarding his brother James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger on January 9, 1995.881 Gamel stated he paid an unannounced visit to the

state house to speak with William Bulger, who was unavailable.882

Later, Gamel and William Bulger spoke briefly on the telephone.883

In William Bulger’s affidavit submitted after the Committee

hearing, he further addressed his testimony as to whether the FBI

contacted him after James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger disappeared.884 William Bulger stated that his former attorney, Popeo, confirmed a

January 9, 1995 conversation between the two regarding Gamel’s

visit to the state house.885 Popeo’s affidavit submitted after the

Committee hearing, also confirmed that he and William Bulger discussed William Bulger’s conversation with Gamel.886

B. SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGATION OF WILLIAM BULGER’S TESTIMONY

Following the testimony received from William Bulger at the

June 19, 2003 Committee hearing entitled ‘‘The Next Step in the

Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice: The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Committee staff members

traveled to Boston, Massachusetts to substantiate the information

and affidavits that were submitted by William Bulger during the

114

887 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 76

(June 19, 2003) (statement of William Bulger). 888 Id. at 77. 889 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 84

(June 19, 2003) (statement of William Bulger). 890Shelley Murphy, Retired FBI Agent Contradicts Bulger, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2003. 891 Interview with John Gamel, retired FBI Special Agent (July 21, 2003). 892 Id. 893 Id.

Committee’s hearing. Committee staff interviewed the following individuals:

(1) John Gamel, retired FBI Special Agent and case agent for

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger;

(2) Carl Gustin, former Senior Vice President for Boston Edison;

(3) Captain William Nally, retired Massachusetts State Police;

and

(4) Captain Robert Zoulas, retired Massachusetts State Police.

The Committee also contacted Massachusetts State Police Lt. Col.

John O’Donovan, and Lt. Col. Peter Agnes.

1. Interview of John Gamel

When asked at the Committee’s hearing whether he had been

‘‘interviewed’’ by the FBI prior to 2001 regarding the whereabouts

of his brother, William Bulger testified: ‘‘I don’t believe I was.’’ and

‘‘I don’t think I was.’’ 887 Later in the same questioning, after establishing that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger fled in 1995, Mr. Delahunt

asked:

So 8 years later the FBI gets around to inquiring of you

and your wife, in your case some 6 years as to the whereabouts of your brother?

Bulger responded: ‘‘That is the first direct effort, yes.’’ 888 Similarly,

when Mr. Shays asked whether the FBI had ever come to his office,

he responded ‘‘No. I don’t think so.’’ 889 These answers certainly

had the potential for leading the Committee to conclude wrongly

that the FBI had never contacted William Bulger in its effort to

find James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger. Several days later, Special Agent John

Gamel, a retired FBI case agent who was assigned to investigate

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger from 1990 to 1995 appeared to contradict

this testimony in an interview with the press.890

On July 21, 2003, Committee staff interviewed Special Agent

Gamel about his contacts with William Bulger, and other Bulger

family members. Assistant U.S. Attorney Joshua Levy was also

present to monitor the interview on behalf of the Department of

Justice. Gamel recalled the case started in July 1990, when Tim

Connelly was referred to the FBI by Tom Riley, a private attorney.891 Connelly was a mortgage broker who prepared fraudulent

mortgage schemes for associates of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.892

Connelly informed the FBI that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger had personally extorted $50,000 from him and that he had been ‘‘shook

down’’ in the backroom of a liquor store with a knife to his chest.893

115

894 Id. 895 Id. 896 Id. 897 Id. 898 Id. 899 Id. 900 Id. 901Special Agent John Gamel, Interview Report, FBI Form 302 (Jan. 9, 1995) (Exhibit 981). 902 Interview with John Gamel, retired FBI Special Agent (July 21, 2003). 903 Id. 904 Id. 905 Id. 906 Id. 907 Id. 908 Id.

At that time, Gamel was working for Richard Watson, head of

FBI’s Counter-Terrorism Unit in Boston.894 According to Gamel, he

was assigned to the case because Watson knew James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger was an FBI informant and wanted to isolate the case from

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s involvement with the Organized Crime

Squad.895 In March 1992, Gamel was transferred to the Organized

Crime Squad where he continued as the case agent for the James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger investigation.896 After James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was

indicted on January 5, 1995 and became a fugitive, the case was

transferred from the Organized Crime Unit to the Fugitive

Squad.897

According to Gamel, on January 9, 1995, Gamel and Special

Agent Joseph Hanigan went to the Massachusetts State House to

speak with Senate President William Bulger regarding the whereabouts of his brother.898 Gamel said the receptionist at the Senate

President’s Office told them that William Bulger was unavailable,

and after a short wait, they provided their business cards and

left.899 Later that day, William Bulger called Gamel and they

spoke for about forty-five seconds where he denied any recent contact with his brother.900 According to Gamel’s interview report,

William Bulger also stated that he ‘‘. . . did not wish to be interviewed by the FBI, nor answer any questions posed to him by the

interviewing Agent.’’ 901

In the summer of 1995, Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard Hoffman

seized lottery winnings of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, valued at about

$119,000 a year.902 James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s siblings filed a case

with the Norfolk Probate Court to protect these lottery

winnings.903 As a result of the seizure and subsequent lawsuit,

Gamel and Special Agent Walter Seffens attempted to contact all

the Bulger siblings regarding the whereabouts of James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger.904 Gamel and Seffens were only able to speak with John

Bulger and Jean Bulger Holland.905 John Bulger and Holland were

informed of the Harboring Act.906

In response to questions, Gamel said the FBI had given him

‘‘carte blanche’’ to conduct his investigation and denied that anyone

tried to hinder his efforts in locating James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.907

Gamel explained that he made a professional decision not to follow

up on his efforts in reaching William Bulger because, in his experience, a family member would either immediately give up or never

give up a fugitive.908 Gamel stated that he was unaware of the

116

909 Id. 910 Id. 911 Id. 912 Affidavit of Thomas R. Kiley (July 18, 2003) (Exhibit 980). 913 Id. 914Special Agent John Gamel, Interview Report, FBI Form 302 (Jan. 9, 1995) (emphasis supplied) (Exhibit 981). 915 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 64,

66, 88 (June 19, 2003) (statement of William Bulger). 916 Id. at 64.

January 1995 phone call between William Bulger and James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger until it became public knowledge.909

In January 1996, Gamel became the supervisor for the Organized

Crime Unit and stopped being a case agent in the James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger investigation.910 Subsequently, the investigation was

worked on by Special Agents Jan Galbreath, Robert Walther, and

Charles Gianturco.911

William Bulger’s lawyer, Tom Kiley, sought to respond to the apparent inconsistency between William Bulger’s testimony and

Gamel’s statements that the FBI had tried to talk to him about his

brother on January 9, 1995. In an affidavit submitted to the Committee, he notes that Gamel’s contact could not have been in furtherance of the fugitive investigation after the January 10, 1995 indictment but was a contact in furtherance of executing arrest warrants under the January 4, 1995 conspiracy complaint.912 He asserts that he reviewed the criminal docket, recites the docket entries, notes that Judge Wolf wrote that the FBI opened a fugitive

investigation of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger after the January 10, 1995

indictment, and concludes that ‘‘When Agent Gamel and President

Bulger spoke on January 9, 1995 (according to The Boston Globe

reports quoting Gamel) the Agent had to have the same purpose,

as the complaint was sealed and the superceding [sic] indictment

had not yet been returned.’’ 913

Even if it is true that a fugitive investigation had not been

opened, there is no evidence that William Bulger actually knew the

information that Kiley researched or that he actually used that information in the course of his testimony to distinguish between the

types of contacts. Indeed, Agent Gamel’s interview report expressly

states that William Bulger was expressly informed of the existence

of a fugitive investigation: ‘‘Gamel advised [William Bulger] that

his brother was the subject of a Federal fugitive investigation that

would not end until he was captured.’’ 914

2. Interview of Carl Gustin

During the Committee hearing, William Bulger responded ‘‘No,’’

when asked whether he helped former FBI Special Agent John

Connolly get a job at Boston Edison.915 William Bulger also submitted an affidavit signed by Carl Gustin, former Senior Vice

President of Boston Edison, who hired Connolly as a lobbyist in

1995, from his position as head of security.916 Gustin’s affidavit

stated that the rumors that former Senate President William Bulger got Connolly his job at Boston Edison were false and ‘‘When I

tapped John Connolly for the government affairs position, there

117

917 Affidavit of Carl Gustin (June 12, 2003) (Exhibit 976). 918 Interview with Carl Gustin, former Senior Vice President of Boston Edison (July 21, 2003). 919 Id. 920 Id. 921 Id. 922 Id. 923 Id. 924 Id. 925 Id. 926 Id. 927 Id. 928 Id. 929 Id. 930 Id. 931 Id. 932 Id. 933 Id. 934 Id.

was no intercession from William Bulger or anyone in his office.’’ 917

On July 21, 2003, Committee staff interviewed Gustin to determine the circumstance surround the hiring of Connolly at Boston

Edison. Gustin stated that he did not know Connolly before he was

hired as the head of security and did not play a role in his initial

hiring in 1990.918 Gustin said that John Higgins, Vice President for

Human Resources, hired Connolly based upon a strong recommendation from Jack Keough, who was the outgoing head of security at Boston Edison.919 Gustin understood that Keough had a

prior relationship with Connolly and was familiar with his qualifications.920 As head of security, Connolly’s responsibilities included working with local public safety officials and protecting Boston Edison’s facilities and the safety of its 4,000 employees.921

As part of a corporate restructuring in 1995, Gustin hired

Connolly as a lobbyist for Boston Edison’s Government Affairs Division.922 Gustin asserted that he received no outside influence about

hiring Connolly for the lobbyist position.923 The policy then was to

fill the position internally due to the extensive layoffs and

downsizing of personnel.924 Gustin said he discussed Connolly’s

qualifications with Higgins.925 Gustin hired Connolly because he

was the internal candidate with the most experience and maturity.926 Connolly had a Masters in Public Administration from Harvard and was a highly decorated FBI agent.927 In addition,

Connolly was well known in Boston and had extensive contacts in

the city and State legislature.928 Gustin said he initiated the contact with Connolly about the position, he did not recall Connolly

applying for the position.929 Gustin believed Connolly was hired

based on his merits and that no one had exerted external influences on him to hire Connolly.930 Gustin added that the hiring was

considered a lateral transfer and may have included a slight increase in salary.931 Connolly managed a staff of five to six people

who were assigned to oversee community relations at various

towns around Boston.932

According to Gustin, he met with Connolly about every two

weeks to discuss ongoing projects.933 Gustin was aware that

Connolly and William Bulger were friends and speculated that they

would have shared information about activities at the State Senate.934 Gustin recalled that Connolly and William Bulger had a

118

935 Id. 936 Id. 937 Id. 938 Id. 939 Id. 940 Id. 941 Id. 942 Id. 943 Id. 944 Id. 945 Id. 946 Id. 947 Id. 948 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 52

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 949Fox Butterfield, Subpoena for UMass Leader Over Brothers Crime Role, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.

30, 2002. 950 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 48

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger) (Exhibit 972). 951 Affidavit of William Nally (June 14, 2003).

professional interaction during the electric utility restructuring.935

In particular, Gustin remembered that Boston Edison was receiving environmental pressures about power plant emissions in South

Boston.936 Gustin said that Connolly participated in the efforts between Boston Edison and William Bulger in seeking a modification

of an environmental order from EPA.937

Gustin never heard Connolly talk about James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

prior to the public disclosure of their relationship.938 Gustin recalled that he had to field numerous press inquires before

Connolly’s indictment.939 Although Connolly professed his innocence, he was forced to take a leave of absence.940 Gustin was unsure if Connolly was ultimately fired or retired.941 Gustin left Boston Edison at the end of 2000.942

According to Gustin, he spoke with Higgins after allegations

began to surface that William Bulger interceded in Connolly’s hiring at Boston Edison.943 Higgins told Gustin that William Bulger

had nothing to do with Connolly being hired.944 According to Higgins, Connolly had numerous job opportunities after retiring from

the FBI.945 Higgins said he respected Keough’s judgment and seriously considered his recommendation in hiring Connolly.946 Finally, Gustin said he did not recall ever asking Jack Keough about

the relationship between John Connolly and William Bulger.947

3. Interview of William Nally

During the Committee hearing, in response to questions regarding the introduction of FY82 Massachusetts State budget line item

that, if passed, would have caused the early retirement or demotion

of five Massachusetts State Police officers, William Bulger testified:

‘‘I have never sought to punish anyone who was in law enforcement

and was in pursuit of my brother.’’ 948 One of the five officers had

participated in the Lancaster Street Garage investigation involving

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and other leaders of the Boston mob.949

William Bulger submitted an affidavit signed by retired Massachusetts State Police Major William Nally.950 Nally, who was a Captain in 1981, would have been affected by the state budget line

item.951 Nally’s affidavit stated that he played no role in the Lancaster Street garage matter and stated, ‘‘I know of no facts which

119

952 Id. 953 Interview with William Nally, retired Massachusetts State Police Major (July 22, 2003). 954 Id. 955 Id. 956 Id. 957 Id. 958 Id. 959 Id. 960 Id. 961 Id. 962 Id. 963 Id. 964 Id. 965 Id. 966 Id. 967 Id. 968 Id.

support the comparatively recent allegations that the budget item

was payback for an investigation of ‘Whitey’ Bulger.’’ 952

On July 22, 2003, Committee staff interviewed Nally. He explained that in the 1960s, the Department of Public Safety had two

competing branches of police detectives.953 The state detectives

were civil service employees with retirement at age 65.954 The state

uniformed officers were not civil service employees and retired at

age 50.955 The state detectives were paid a higher salary than the

state uniform officers.956 In order to become a state detective, an

individual was required to obtain a rank of police sergeant, have

ten years in the FBI or Secret Service, or pass a competitive law

exam and physical.957

Nally said that in 1974, when the Department of Public Safety

was reorganized, a division of state detectives and uniformed officers named CPacks was created to work in the District Attorneys’

offices.958 However, the uniformed officers had to retire from the

CPacks at age 50 or return to the uniform division.959 Around 1998

or 1999, the law was changed to give state detectives and uniformed officers equal status, which allowed uniformed officers to

stay in CPacks as long as they desired.960 Lt. Col. John O’Donovan

was responsible for the uniformed officers within the CPacks.961

Nally said he first learned of the state budget line item from

Major John Regan, a few days before the measure went to the Governor for signature.962 Nally recalled Regan and O’Donovan were

concerned about the budget line item. Nally doubted that the measure would ever be passed.963

Nally provided two possible motives for the budget line item.

First, the union had sufficient influence to get the item introduced

to equalize treatment of the uniformed officers and detectives—the

union was concerned that uniformed officers had difficulty passing

the state detective exam and could not otherwise escape the mandatory retirement at age 50.964 Second, the District Attorneys also

had enough influence to have used the budget line item as a means

to retaliate against O’Donovan for the way he managed CPacks.965

Nally expressed doubt that William Bulger attempted to use the

budget line item as a way to punish the officers who investigated

Lancaster Street.966 Nally said he never met William Bulger or investigated James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.967 Nally first learned of the

Lancaster Street investigation when he questioned O’Donovan’s

overtime submissions.968 At that time, the Lancaster Street invesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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969 Id. 970 Interview with Robert Zoulas, retired Massachusetts State Police Captain (July 22, 2003). 971 Id. 972 Id. 973 Id. 974 Id. 975 Id. 976 Id. 977 Id. 978Telephone call with John O’Donovan, retired Massachusetts State Police Lt. Col. (July 21,

2003). 979 Id. (July 22, 2003). 980 Id. 981 Id. (Aug. 14, 2003). 982 Id.

tigation was already closed, and O’Donovan showed him the books

and pictures regarding the investigation.969

4. Interview of Robert Zoulas

On July 22, 2003, Committee staff interviewed retired Massachusetts State Police Captain Robert Zoulas. Zoulas was a state detective who would have been affected by the FY82 Massachusetts

State budget line item. Zoulas was not asked by William Bulger to

sign an affidavit for the Committee hearing.

Zoulas stated that he first learned of the budget line item from

Nally a few days before the Governor vetoed the measure.970

Zoulas suggested three theories as to who was responsible for the

budget line item. The first theory was that the union was responsible.971 The union would benefit because five younger officers

would advance into higher positions.972 The second theory was that

the District Attorneys were responsible because they were unhappy

with the organizational setup within law enforcement.973 The third

theory, and in his mind the least credible, was that there was an

ulterior motive to upset the State Police.974 Zoulas stated he has

no specific idea of who introduced the budget line item.975

Zoulas was not involved in the Lancaster Street investigation

and never investigated James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.976 Zoulas did not

recall any discussion that William Bulger was responsible for the

budget line item.977

5. Contact with John O’Donovan

On July 21, 2003, Committee staff contacted retired Massachusetts State Police Lt. Col. John O’Donovan. O’Donovan would have

been affected by the FY82 Massachusetts State budget line item.

O’Donovan was not asked by William Bulger to sign an affidavit for

the Committee hearing.

O’Donovan asked Committee staff to call back the next day so he

could have time to consider the interview request.978 On July 22,

2003, O’Donovan agreed to an interview but due to prior commitments, the Committee staff could not meet with him on that

day.979 O’Donovan then stated he would be available for a conference call the following week.980

On August 14, 2003, in a follow-up attempt to interview

O’Donovan, he advised that he was a uniformed police officer and

passed a civil service exam to become a Lieutenant Detective.981

He stated that the budget line item never became law and therefore had no affect on his career.982 O’Donovan said, however, the

121

983 Id. 984 Id. 985 ‘‘The Next Step in the Investigation of the Use of Informants by the Department of Justice:

The Testimony of William Bulger,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 108th Cong. 48

(June 19, 2003) (testimony of William Bulger). 986 Affidavit of Peter W. Agnes (June 14, 2003) (Exhibit 973). 987Telephone call with Peter Agnes, retired Massachusetts State Police Lt. Col. (July 16,

2003). 988Telephone call with Eileen Agnes, counsel to Peter Agnes (July 16, 2003). 989 Id. 990S. Bill S2254, (Mass. 1981).

effort to reorganize the State Police that precipitated the budget

line item had decimated his detective division.983 He said he believes that he was a ‘‘target’’ of the state budget line item and

claimed the Committee knows the identity of the ‘‘suspect’’ or instigator of the budget line item.984

6. Contact with Peter Agnes

During the Committee hearing, William Bulger submitted an affidavit signed by retired Massachusetts State Police Lt. Col. Peter

Agnes, who would have been affected by the FY82 Massachusetts

State budget line item.985 Agnes’s affidavit stated: ‘‘I am aware of

the news stories and columns written some time later attributing

the outside section which would have affected me to former Senate

President William Bulger and suggesting that its insertion in the

state budget was some form of retribution for the work of the state

police in a surveillance effort related to his brother James ‘Whitey’

Bulger that focused on a Lancaster Street garage. I believe that

this is inaccurate.’’ 986

On July 15, 2003, Committee staff contacted Agnes who referred

them to Eileen Agnes, his attorney and daughter-in-law.987 On

July 16, 2003, Committee staff spoke with Ms. Agnes, who stated

that she assisted Agnes in preparing his affidavit that was submitted to the Committee.988 She stated that Agnes was assigned to the

Massachusetts State Police’s Homicide and Auto Theft Divisions

and never investigated James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.989

7. Research at Massachusetts State House and Library

In July 2003, Committee staff also visited the Massachusetts

State House and Library. The purpose was to determine if William

Bulger, as the Senate President, participated in the introduction of

a budget line item to the 1982 Appropriations Bill that would have

required Massachusetts civil service detectives, over 50 years of

age, to take a demotion in grade or early retirement. The budget

line item was identified as Section 99 in the House Bill(s) and as

Section 108 in the Senate Bill(s). Both sections contained the following language:

Section 6 of chapter 639 of the act of 1974, added by section 3 of chapter 389 of the acts of 1976, is hereby amended by inserting after the word ‘‘rights’’, in line 6, the

words:- ‘‘provided, that no such person shall serve in a

grade above detective lieutenant inspector in the office of

investigation and intelligence or the bureau of investigative services upon attaining the age of fifty years.990

122

991 H.R. Bill H6929, (Mass. 1981). 992S. Bill S2222, (Mass. 1981). 993 Journal of the Senate, at 59, (Mass. 1981). 994 Id. at 801. 995 1981 Mass. Acts 351. 996S. Bill S2254, (Mass. 1981). 997 Journal of the House, at 2968, (Mass. 1981). 998 Id. at 2970. 999 Journal of the House, at 1383, (Mass. 1981). 1000Discussion with Massachusetts Representative Brad Jones, House Minority Leader (July

22, 2003).

A search of the legislative history on the budget line item provided

the following chronology:

June 4 and 5, 1981—Earliest record of the language as Section

99 was found in House Bill H6969 from the House Ways and

Means Committee.991 The record did not indicate when or who

introduced the language, section and bill.

June 17, 1981—Earliest record of the language as Section 108

was found in Senate Bill S2222 from the Senate Ways and

Means Committee.992 The record did not indicate when or who

introduced the language, section and bill.

June 17, 1981—The text of House Bill H6969 was inserted in

place of Senate Bill S2222 upon recommendation by Mr. Atkin

and Ms. Buckly from the Senate Ways and Means Committee.993

June 17, 1981—On motion of William Bulger, House Bill

H6969 was ordered to be printed as amended.994

June 20, 1981—House Bill H6969 was enacted as Senate Bill

S2254 by the Senate and House of Representatives in General

Court assembled.995 Senate Bill S2254 incorporated the language in House Section 99 as Senate Section 108.996 The

record did not indicate who voted on the enactment.

July 21, 1981—Governor King disapproved certain unidentified

sections in the Appropriation Bill.997 Subsequent House

records indicated that House Section 99 was vetoed by the

Governor.998

September 15, 1981—The House Journal indicated that ‘‘Section 99, which had been vetoed by the Governor, was considered as follows: . . . notwithstanding the objections of His Excellency the Governor, was determined by yeas and nays; and

the roll call 0 members voted in the affirmative and 149 in the

negative.’’ 999

Committee staff also contacted Massachusetts Representative

Brad Jones, House Minority Leader, and his legal counsel Fred

Van Magness, for their assistance in locating any information that

would indicate who introduced the FY82 Massachusetts State

budget line item. Representative Jones explained that the House

Ways and Means Committee usually introduced the Appropriations

Bill as House Bill No.1, sometimes in the month of May.1000 The

Committee staff and Representative Jones then reviewed the 1981

Bulletin of Committee Work and concluded that the original House

Bill already contained Section 99 when it came out of the House

123

1001 Id. 1002 Id. 1003Telephone call with Fred Van Magness, legal counsel to Massachusetts House Minority

Leader (July 29, 2003). 1004 Id. 1005 Id. 1006 Id. 1007 Affidavit of Thomas R. Kiley (July 18, 2003) (Exhibit 980). 1008 Id. 1009 Id.

Means and Ways Committee.1001 Representatives Jones explained

that any legislator could introduce the provision, even verbally,

anywhere along the bill’s progression with no recordation of who

made the introduction.1002

On July 29, 2003, Van Magness said that after thorough research, the legislative history confirmed for him that the budget

line item first appeared from House Bill H6969 in June 1981.1003

He explained that a line item, unlike a bill, did not require a sponsor and any member could introduce the amendment without leaving a documented trail.1004 He said the then leadership of the

House Ways and Means Committee should have personal knowledge of who inserted the language into the bill.1005 However, he

doubted if after 20 years, anyone would recall the circumstances

surrounding its introduction.1006

Committee staff contacted the Massachusetts House Clerk’s office. The receptionist stated that the Clerk’s office does not maintain any historical logs or journals and referred the Committee

staff to the State Archive office. Similar responses were received

from the Senate and House Ways and Means Committees.

After the Committee hearing, Thomas Kiley, counsel to William

Bulger, provided an affidavit that was signed by him on July 18,

2003.1007 The Committee reviewed the affidavit and found no inconsistencies regarding the subject matter. The affidavit in part

contained the following statements:

***

I have since researched the matter and concluded . . . the

budget rider was inserted while the budget was in the

Massachusetts House of Representatives in June of

1981.1008

***

When the House engrossed House 6969 and sent the measure to the Senate, House Journal pp. 1060–1061 (1981),

the supposedly offensive rider was clearly already part of

the bill.1009

***

When then Governor King signed the FY’82 budget into

law on July 21, 1981, and it became Chapter 351 of the

Acts of 1981, he vetoed section 99 . . . Section 99 was one

of seventy seven sections in the general appropriation act

disapproved by the Governor, prompting the House of Representatives, where most of the sections originated, to ask

the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts whether the

124

1010 Id. 1011Shelley Murphy, FBI Says Documents Clear It of Wrongdoing in ’65 Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2001. 1012 Hearing Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and

Judiciary, 107th Cong. 47 (testimony of Louis Freeh) (2001 WL 518397). 1013 Airtel from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field

Office (Mar. 16, 1965) (Exhibit 83). 1014 Id.; FBI Boston Gangland Murders Report by John F. Kehoe, Jr., Special Agent, Boston

FBI Field Office (Jan. 14, 1966) (Exhibit 116); Memorandum from H. Paul Rico, Special Agent,

to Special Agent in Charge, [Redacted] (Mar. 15, 1965) (Exhibit 82).

Governor had the constitutional power to disapprove such

items. Opinion of the Justices, 384 Mass. 820, 820 (1981)

. . . The Court’s affirmative answer was issued on September 2, 1981. On September 15, 1981, the House voted

149 to 0 to sustain the Governor’s disapproval of Section

99. Supplement, No. 409 (1981). No Senate vote occurred

concerning the veto. The story ends, or so it ought to.1010

V. INSTITUTIONAL RELUCTANCE TO ACCEPT OVERSIGHT

A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

It is hard to understand why it was so difficult to conduct a thorough investigation of the FBI’s use of informants in New England.

In hindsight, a statement made by a senior FBI official provides a

glimpse of what may have been happening. In early 2001, just as

the Committee was beginning to focus on the FBI’s use of informants in New England, Charles Prouty—then the Special Agent in

Charge of the Boston office—made the following statements about

the Deegan case: ‘‘The FBI was forthcoming. We didn’t conceal the

information. We didn’t attempt to frame anyone.’’ 1011 In retrospect,

Prouty’s assertion appears ill-considered. Indeed, its contrast with

a statement made by FBI Director Louis Freeh just a few months

later is stark. Freeh stated that the case is ‘‘obviously a great travesty, a great failure, disgraceful to the extent that my agency or

any other law enforcement agency contributed to that.’’ 1012

In support of his statement, Prouty cited a document created just

after the Deegan murder was committed. A memorandum from the

Director of the FBI to the Special Agent in Charge, dated just four

days after the Deegan murder, states: ‘‘You should advise appropriate authorities of the identities of the possible perpetrators of

the murders of Sacrimone and Deegan.’’ 1013 A handwritten annotation on one copy of this document indicates that information regarding the Deegan murder was provided to ‘‘Renfrew Chelsea PD’’

on March 15, 1965.1014

The Committee has searched for other indications that the FBI

provided exculpatory evidence to the Deegan prosecutors. Thus far,

none has been located. Suffice it to say, however, that local prosecutors were never made aware of significant exculpatory information. For example:

• Local prosecutors were not aware that Joseph Barboza and

Jimmy Flemmi went to Patriarca to request permission to

murder Deegan just days before the crime occurred. Furthermore, they were not aware that the source of this information was microphone surveillance, a form of information

more reliable than most informant information.

125

• Local prosecutors were not aware that the FBI had evidence

that Jimmy Flemmi had a motive for killing Deegan, and

that this motive conflicted with the motive Barboza provided in sworn testimony.

• Local prosecutors were not aware that Barboza had told

federal law enforcement personnel that he would not provide information that would allow Jimmy Flemmi to ‘‘fry.’’

• Local prosecutors were not aware that both Jimmy Flemmi

and Stephen Flemmi were government informants.

At a minimum, the FBI failed to provide exculpatory evidence in

a death penalty case. More important, however, is the likelihood

that the FBI shared information when there was no reason to keep

it covered up, but, at a time when Barboza was readying himself

to tell a story that benefited the goals of federal law enforcement,

federal officials kept exculpatory information from state law enforcement officials.

At the outset of its investigation, the Committee requested that

it be permitted to speak with the head of a Justice Department

task force investigating many of the same matters of interest to the

Committee. The stated purpose of this proposed line of communication was to ensure that Congress was receiving everything it was

entitled to receive and to help the Committee refrain from taking

steps that might harm ongoing criminal prosecutions. The Justice

Department did not accede to this request. The Committee also

made a request to speak to the Department about the identities of

certain informants and the significance of information provided by

these informants. It took well over one year for a meeting on this

subject to be arranged. On December 2, 2002, almost two years into

the Committee’s investigation, the Justice Department did convene

a meeting to address the Committee’s request about informants.

This meeting was of particular significance for three reasons. First,

it became clear that critical documents had been withheld from

Congress. Second, the Justice Department simply refused to provide Congress with essential information about informants, including information that had previously been made available to civil

litigants during U.S. v. Salemme. Finally, the meeting confirmed

the general sense that the Justice Department has failed to understand the seriousness of the Committee’s investigation.

While it is true that the Department has assigned people of unimpeachable integrity to spearhead its own investigation, it also

appears true that it has failed to understand that Congress has not

only a legitimate right to investigate the matters covered in this report, but that Congress also has a right to expect the Justice Department to do everything in its power to ensure that Congress is

able to discharge its own constitutional responsibilities.

Unfortunately, the relationship between the executive branch

and the legislative branch—particularly where oversight is concerned—is often more adversarial than collegial. This has proved to

be the case during the Committee’s investigation of the Justice Department’s use of informants in New England. Congress cannot discharge its responsibilities if information is not provided or dilatory

tactics are employed.

126

Throughout the Committee’s investigation, it encountered an institutional reluctance to accept oversight. Executive privilege was

claimed over certain documents, redactions were used in such a

way that it was difficult to understand the significance of information, and some categories of documents that should have been

turned over to Congress were withheld. Indeed, the Committee was

left with the general sense that the specter of a subpoena or the

threat of compelled testimony was necessary to make any progress

at all.

The following three examples provide a sense of why the Committee has concluded that the Justice Department failed to take its

responsibilities to assist Congress as seriously as it should have.

1. The Patriarca Microphone Surveillance Logs

The single most important category of information needed by the

Committee to conduct its investigation of the use of Joseph

Barboza as a cooperating witness was that derived from microphone surveillance of Raymond Patriarca. On June 5, 2001, the

Committee asked the Justice Department to produce ‘‘all audiotape

recordings, telephone wiretaps, other audio interceptions and transcripts relating to Raymond Patriarca from January 1, 1962, to December 31, 1968.’’ Because Barboza and Flemmi traveled to Rhode

Island to get Patriarca’s permission to kill Teddy Deegan, and because there was microphone surveillance capturing conversations,

documents pertaining to this request were of paramount importance to the Committee. Indeed, the Justice Department was aware

of the importance attributed by the Committee to these records. A

few months after the initial request, the Justice Department indicated that the Committee had received all documents relevant to

the Patriarca microphone surveillance. However, on December 2,

2002, one and a half years after the Committee’s initial request,

Task Force supervisor John Durham indicated that contemporaneous handwritten logs had been prepared by FBI Special Agents

as conversations picked up by the microphone surveillance were

monitored. These logs were finally produced to the Committee, although legible copies of the most important pages were not received

until March 25, 2003. The handwritten logs contained significant

information that had not previously been provided to Congress.

2. Documents Pertaining to Robert Daddeico

Robert Daddeico participated in a number of criminal activities

in the 1960s. He was close to Stephen Flemmi and was used as a

cooperating government witness in the car bombing of attorney

John Fitzgerald. He also had first hand knowledge of the William

Bennett murder.

The Committee requested documents pertaining to Daddeico on

April 16, 2002. Four months later, on August 20, 2002, Committee

staff were told that the Justice Department needed more information to be able to identify ‘‘Robert Daddeico’’ in Justice Department

files. This statement was particularly curious. There are five clear

reasons why the Justice Department should have had no trouble

deciding which ‘‘Robert Daddeico’’ the Committee was interested in:

(1) a Justice Department employee contacted Daddeico to inform

127

1015 Robert Daddeico Agreement (Oct. 1, 2001) and Message (Sept. 13, 2001) (Exhibit 950). 1016 Id. 1017 Interview with Robert Daddeico (Oct. 17–18, 2001). 1018 Id. 1019 Id. 1020Daddeico also provided the Committee with a check from a local prosecutor for $500. This

check, drawn on a personal bank account, was allegedly provided at a time when the FBI was

contacting Daddeico to assist in an ongoing investigation. Daddeico claims that the individual

who provided this check once attempted to coach him to provide false testimony in the trial for

the car bombing of attorney John Fitzgerald.

him that the Committee wanted to interview him; 1015 (2) a few

days before the Committee interviewed Daddeico the FBI offered

him a payment of $15,000; 1016 (3) a number of currently employed

Justice Department personnel have personally interviewed

Daddeico; 1017 (4) in the last few years Daddeico has been in personal contact with the FBI’s former number two official; 1018 and,

finally, (5) Daddeico has been living for 30 years under an assumed

name known to the government and he had maintained frequent

contact with FBI officials.1019 It is hardly unreasonable for the

Committee to expect prompt production of documents related to

Robert Daddeico, and it is hard to believe, given all of these facts,

that the Justice Department was uncertain which ‘‘Robert

Daddeico’’ the Committee was interested in.1020 The failure to

produce this information in a timely fashion is inexcusable.

3. U.S. Attorney’s Office Gangland Murder Summaries

On March 30, 2001, the Committee requested ‘‘all records relating to the March 12, 1965, murder of Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan.’’ On

December 2, 2002, Justice Department Task Force Supervisor John

Durham mentioned a January 14, 1966, memorandum which discusses gangland murders. This document was prepared for the Boston U.S. Attorney’s Office and discusses the Deegan murder. It had

not been provided to the Committee.

On December 9, 2002, Justice Department officials indicated that

although the document was not responsive to Committee requests,

it would be produced. Based on the description of the document

provided by John Durham, it is difficult to understand how it was

not responsive to a request for documents relating to the Deegan

murder.

On December 16, 2002, the Justice Department finally produced

this document to the Committee. The fact that this document was

not provided to the Committee earlier is significant for a number

of reasons. First, it could not be used in Committee hearings or

most interviews. Second, it leads to the concern that there are

other significant documents that have been withheld from the Committee. Additionally, this document is of particular interest because

it is a document prepared for prosecutors, and it potentially shifts

blame for what happened in the Deegan prosecution towards prosecutors.

Although the Justice Department has provided many documents

from the files of the FBI, it has been reluctant to shed light on the

possible misconduct of its prosecutors. This was first seen in the

claim of executive privilege over prosecution memoranda, and it appears to have resurfaced with the gangland murders summary. It

was also particularly apparent when the Committee staff asked for

a list of Boston U.S. Attorneys from the 1960s until the present.

128

1021FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report by Joshua Hochberg and Charles S.

Prouty (Aug. 13, 1997) (Appendix II). 1022 Id. at 2; see also ‘‘Justice Department Misconduct in Boston: Are Legislative Solutions Required?,’’ Hearing Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 641–747 (Feb. 27, 2002) (discussing proposed changes to the statute of limitations). 1023FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report by Joshua Hochberg and Charles S.

Prouty (Aug. 13, 1997) at 2 (Exhibit 887). 1024 Id. 1025 Id. at 13. In reaching this conclusion, the OPR report states that ‘‘all reasonable and apparent leads have been covered.’’ Id. at 3. 1026Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney in Charge, and Jeremiah T. O’Sullivan, Prosecutor, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, Boston U.S. Dept. of Justice Field Office, to Gerald T.

McGuire, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Jan.

29, 1979) (document is retained by the Justice Department).

Although a staff member of the Executive Office of United States

Attorneys indicated the information was readily available, a list

was never provided to the Committee.

B. INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT

The FBI’s office of Professional Responsibility (‘‘OPR’’) conducted

its own investigation of possible improper law enforcement conduct

in 1997.1021 This investigation ‘‘uncovered no evidence that any potentially criminal acts were part of a continuing crime which would

bring the acts within the statute of limitations.’’ 1022 Thus, former

FBI Special Agent John Connolly—now serving a ten year sentence

in federal prison—was given a free pass by internal investigators.

The investigation did, however find ‘‘a number of violations of FBI

rules and regulations which would have warranted administrative

action if those employees were still employed by the FBI.’’ 1023 The

investigation also determined that ‘‘no current FBI employees . . .

[were] in violation of FBI policies.’’ 1024

One conclusion reached by the OPR investigation, however,

should be considered in light of information obtained by the Committee. The OPR report on its investigation states:

We also looked for instances in which [James ‘‘Whitey’’]

Bulger and [Stephen] Flemmi were under investigation by

a law enforcement agency and in which the USAO or DOJ

exercised prosecutorial discretion in their favor due to the

value of information provided by Bulger and Flemmi.

There is no evidence that prosecutorial discretion was exercised on behalf of Bulger and/or Flemmi.1025

This conclusion is troubling in light of a document obtained by the

Committee. After a protracted battle with the executive branch

over specific documents—during which the President claimed executive privilege over the documents sought—the Committee ultimately was able to determine that prosecutorial discretion had

been exercised on behalf of Bulger and Flemmi.

A memorandum dated January 29, 1979, from Boston federal

prosecutor Gerald E. McDowell to supervisors in Washington, and

also brought to the attention of then-United States Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan, recommends prosecution of 21 individuals for a

major conspiracy to fix the outcomes of more than 200 horse racing

contests, in over five states, with profits in excess of two million

dollars.1026 At the center of the criminal activity were both Stephen

Flemmi and James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger.

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1027 Id. at 62. 1028 Id. at 55. 1029 ‘‘The Justice Department’s Use of Informants in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. 308, 335 (Dec. 5, 2002) (testimony of Jeremiah O’Sullivan). 1030 Also included in this subpoena were requests related to the Committee’s campaign finance

investigation.

Notwithstanding the knowledge that Bulger and Flemmi were involved, and notwithstanding the fact that the government had a cooperating witness prepared to testify against Bulger and Flemmi,

the memorandum specifically indicates that the two would not be

prosecuted with 21 other co-conspirators. The memorandum indicates that Bulger and Flemmi would not be prosecuted because

‘‘the cases against them rest, in most instances, solely on the testimony of Anthony Ciulla.’’ 1027

Two points are worth noting. First, the use of the term ‘‘in most

instances.’’ A close reading of the memorandum indicates that

there was other evidence against Bulger and Flemmi. Thus, it is

inexplicable, given the details provided by the memorandum, that

Bulger and Flemmi were not prosecuted, while others who were

less involved in the criminal enterprise were prosecuted. Second,

others were indicted solely on the testimony of Ciulla. For example,

the memorandum states: ‘‘James L. Sims—The case against Sims

rests solely on Ciulla’s testimony.’’ 1028 Sims was subsequently indicted and convicted. Thus, Bulger and Flemmi did receive preferential treatment.

When former U.S. Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan was asked specifically about whether Bulger and Flemmi benefited from prosecutorial discretion, he stated clearly that they had.1029 It is, therefore, troubling that the FBI’s OPR investigation failed to develop

this information. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the concern

that the Justice Department attempted to keep such an important

piece of information from the Committee. Indeed, it appears that

Justice Department investigators had failed to pursue this line of

inquiry prior to the Committee’s request. But for the Committee’s

perseverance, the final word on prosecutorial discretion pertaining

to Stephen Flemmi and James Bulger would have been the incorrect 1997 OPR report.

C. THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER KEY DOCUMENTS

The Committee’s investigation was delayed for months by President Bush’s assertion of executive privilege over a number of key

documents. While the Committee was ultimately able to obtain access to the documents it needed, the President’s privilege claim was

regrettable and unnecessary.

1. The Committee’s Request for the Documents

On September 6, 2001, the Committee issued a subpoena for a

number of prosecution and declination memoranda relating to the

Committee’s investigation of the handling of confidential informants in New England.1030 The Justice Department made it clear

that it would not comply with the Committee’s subpoena. Senior

Administration personnel, including the White House Counsel, the

Attorney General, and two Assistant Attorneys General, explained

to the Chairman and Committee staff that the Administration

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1031Memorandum from President George W. Bush to John Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S.

Dept. of Justice (Dec. 12, 2001) (Appendix I).

wished to establish an inflexible policy to withhold from Congress

all deliberative prosecutorial documents. The Committee scheduled

a hearing for September 13, 2001, and invited the Attorney General to testify at this hearing to explain his refusal to provide the

subpoenaed documents to the Committee. Of course, just two days

before the scheduled hearings, terrorists launched the September

11 attacks. The Committee canceled the hearing and postponed any

discussion of the subpoena for several months.

2. The President’s Claim of Executive Privilege

In December 2001, the Committee renewed its request for the

subpoenaed documents, and called as a witness Michael Horowitz,

the Chief of Staff for the Justice Department’s Criminal Division.

On December 12, 2001, the day before the Committee’s hearing,

President Bush invoked executive privilege over the subpoenaed

documents. In a memorandum to Attorney General Ashcroft, President Bush stated that disclosure of the documents to Congress

would:

Inhibit the candor necessary to the effectiveness of the deliberative processes by which the Department makes prosecutorial decisions. Moreover, I am concerned that congressional access to prosecutorial decisionmaking documents of

this kind threatens to politicize the criminal justice process. . . . Because I believe that congressional access to

these documents would be contrary to the national interest, I have decided to assert executive privilege with respect to the documents and to instruct you not to release

them or otherwise make them available to the Committee.1031

The President’s claim of privilege was a surprise in that during the

three months between the Committee’s issuance of the subpoena

for the prosecutorial memoranda and the President’s claim of executive privilege, the Justice Department had never had a single discussion with the Committee regarding the Committee’s need for the

documents. Therefore, the claim could not have relied upon any

consideration of the Committee’s need for the documents. Given the

Committee’s previous discussions with the White House and Justice department officials and the assertion of privilege without consideration of the Committee’s need for the documents, it was clear

that the Administration sought to establish a new restrictive policy

regarding prosecutorial documents and that no demonstration of

need by the Committee would be sufficient for the Justice Department to produce the documents.

3. The Justice Department’s Shifting Explanations

In the weeks following the President’s claim of executive privilege, the Administration made a number of attempts to explain the

President’s actions to a skeptical Committee and public. In Committee hearings and in correspondence with the Committee, the

Justice Department and the White House frequently distorted the

facts to try to justify the President’s claim of privilege. These stateVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ments had the effect of prolonging the negotiations with the Committee and delaying the resolution of this dispute.

i. The Administration’s Denial that it Was Creating an Inflexible Policy

Immediately after the President’s claim of privilege, the Justice

Department began to move away from its earlier assertions that it

was attempting to implement an inflexible new policy regarding

Congressional access to deliberative prosecutorial documents. Certainly, prior to the President’s claim of privilege, this fact was plain

enough. In separate meetings with Chairman Burton, Attorney

General Ashcroft, and White House Counsel Gonzales announced

such a policy. However, the Justice Department’s witness at the

first hearing regarding the claim of executive privilege, Michael

Horowitz, denied that the Department was implementing such a

policy at all. Rather, he claimed that the Department was using a

case-by-case analysis which weighed the Congressional need for the

documents against the Administration’s need to keep the documents secret. However, as a number of members at the hearing

pointed out, the claims of a case-by-case analysis were seriously

undermined by the fact that the Justice Department had never had

a discussion with the Committee about the Committee’s need for

the documents. If the Department did not understand the Committee’s need for the documents, it could hardly weigh that need

against the need to keep the documents secret.

ii. The Administration’s Failure to Compromise with the

Committee

A second and related point which was raised by the December

13, 2001, hearing was the failure of the Justice Department to engage in a reasonable process of compromise with the Committee.

Before the Committee had even issued its subpoena for the Bostonrelated prosecution and declination memoranda, it was clear that

the Justice Department was intent on establishing a restrictive

new document policy. It was not until January—four months after

the issuance of the subpoena—that the Administration even offered

a compromise to the Committee. On January 10, 2002, White

House Counsel Alberto Gonzales wrote to offer to have Justice Department staff brief the Committee staff regarding the contents of

the deliberative memoranda. Chairman Burton responded to Judge

Gonzales’s offer by stating that he would be pleased to receive a

briefing regarding the documents, but only in conjunction with a

review of the documents by Committee staff. This offer was initially rejected by the Justice Department.

iii. The Administration’s Misrepresentations Regarding Historical Precedent

The third issue which was raised at the December 13, 2001,

hearing was the fact that there was little precedent for the President’s decision to withhold the subpoenaed documents. Michael

Horowitz asserted that the executive privilege claim was consistent

with longstanding Justice Department policy, and in a letter shortly after the hearing, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales made

much the same claim:

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1032Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, to the Honorable Dan Burton,

Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Jan. 10, 2002) (Appendix I). 1033Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to the

Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 1, 2002) (Appendix I).

Absent unusual circumstances, the Executive Branch has

traditionally protected those highly sensitive deliberative

documents against public or congressional disclosure. This

traditional Executive Branch practice is based on the compelling need to protect both the candor of the deliberative

processes by which the Department of Justice decides to

prosecute individuals and the privacy interests and reputations of uncharged individuals named in such documents.1032

Despite these and a number of other similar assertions, the

President’s claim of executive privilege was a drastic departure

from the longstanding history of Congressional access to precisely

the types of documents sought by the Committee. In fact, at a hearing of the Committee on February 6, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Dan Bryant acknowledged that Congress had been given access to these types of documents on multiple occasions. In one letter leading up to the February 6 hearing, Bryant stated that ‘‘the

Department has often provided Congress with access to deliberative documents of one sort or another. Consequently, it would be

impossible to catalogue all of the occasions in which that has occurred.’’ 1033

In short, over a period of six months, the Justice Department’s

position had retracted its claim that Congress had never received

prosecution and declination memoranda prior to the Clinton Administration and replaced it with the claim that it happened so frequently that it is impossible to provide an accurate number. At the

Committee’s February 6, 2002, hearing, the Committee established

that on dozens of occasions over the previous eighty years, Congress had received access to documents precisely like those sought

by the Committee. It was also clear that the Committee’s need for

the documents under subpoena was at least as great as Congress’s

need for the documents in any of those other cases.

4. The Justice Department Finally Provided the Committee with Access to the Subpoenaed Documents

The five-month stalemate over the subpoenaed documents finally

broke when the Committee scheduled a hearing to hear testimony

from Judge Edward Harrington. When the Justice Department

learned that Judge Harrington was scheduled to testify, Justice Department personnel informed the Committee that one of the documents sought by the Committee was a prosecution memorandum

drafted by then-Assistant U.S. Attorney Harrington which contained information about the Deegan murder. Chairman Burton

wrote to the Department and demanded access to the Harrington

memorandum:

Judge Harrington is testifying before the Committee on

February 14, and the Committee has a great interest in

knowing what Judge Harrington knew about the evidence

in the Deegan murder case, including, but not limited to,

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1034Letter from the Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform, to John

Ashcroft, Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Feb. 12, 2002) (Appendix I). 1035Letter from Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of Justice, to the

Honorable Dan Burton, Chairman, Comm. on Govt. Reform (Feb. 13, 2002) (Appendix I).

the evidence in the case, the reliability of witnesses in the

case, and whether key witnesses in the case were government informants. Perhaps as important, Judge Harrington

was a prosecutor in a 1968 trial of Raymond Patriarca,

and it is important to understand the facts pertaining to

this prosecution as well. It appears that the Justice Department agrees that it is essential that the Committee receive the Harrington memorandum in advance of the February 14 hearing, and that the Committee can clearly meet

even the high threshold of proof being demanded (inappropriately, in my view) by the Justice Department. If that is

the case, please provide the Committee with access to the

document now, without a briefing.

While I appreciate the fact that the Justice Department

has admitted that one of the 10 withheld documents has

great relevance to the Committee’s upcoming hearing, the

Department’s admission reveals the flaws with its approach to this entire matter. The Justice Department only

recognized the importance of the Harrington document

once the Committee announced that Judge Harrington was

testifying at an upcoming hearing. The Department did

not know that Committee staff interviewed Judge Harrington almost two months ago, and did not have the benefit of the Harrington memorandum for that interview. The

other nine memoranda being withheld by the Justice Department likely have just as much relevance to the Committee’s investigation as the Harrington memorandum, except that the Justice Department is unwilling to recognize

that fact.

I believe that the Committee’s investigation of Justice Department corruption in Boston is far too important to be

wasting time with procedural gamesmanship. Rather than

seeing this as an opportunity to establish precedents to

place roadblocks in the way of Congressional oversight, the

Justice Department should see this case as an opportunity

to come clean and right past wrongs. I hope you will agree,

and that you will provide the Committee with access to the

subpoenaed Boston documents.1034

The following day, Assistant Attorney General Bryant wrote that

the Committee had ‘‘demonstrated a particular and critical need for

access to the one Harrington memorandum sufficient to satisfy constitutional standards and we are prepared to meet with you and

make it available for your review in advance of the hearing.’’ 1035

Of course, the Committee did not provide any additional information to the Department which it had not provided months earlier.

Informing the Justice Department that Judge Harrington had once

been a federal prosecutor and that the Committee was requesting

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his testimony at an upcoming hearing hardly constituted demonstration of ‘‘a particular and critical need.’’

On February 26, 2002, Committee staff met with Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff to discuss Committee access to the

remaining memoranda being withheld under the President’s claim

of executive privilege. Assistant Attorney General Chertoff described the documents, and Committee staff agreed that four of the

subpoenaed memoranda were not relevant to the Committee’s investigation. Assistant Attorney General Chertoff agreed to provide

the Committee with access to the remaining five memoranda. Committee staff reviewed the memoranda, took notes regarding their

contents, and used the memoranda to question witnesses in interviews and public hearings.

5. The Documents Which Were Withheld Contained Vital Information

The documents withheld from the Committee for over five

months contained vital information. The President’s claim of executive privilege delayed the Committee’s investigation, and distracted

the Committee from pursuing a number of issues relating to the

use of confidential informants. The following is a summary of some

of the key information which was contained in the memoranda

withheld from the Committee:

• The 1967 Marfeo prosecution memorandum contains information about the murder of Teddy Deegan. According to Judge

Harrington’s testimony, the information was deemed reliable

and included in the memorandum to show that Joseph Barboza

was a reliable witness because it proved his contention that he

had access to Raymond Patriarca. This is significant because

the following year, in a capital murder trial, Barboza did not

provide the information that had been considered so important

by federal prosecutors. This raises the possibility that federal

prosecutors were aware that Barboza was committing perjury in

the Deegan murder prosecution. Indeed, there are two fundamentally incompatible facts:

1. Barboza’s credibility in the eyes of federal personnel was

bolstered by microphone surveillance evidence of the request made by Flemmi and Barboza to murder Teddy

Deegan.

2. Barboza was considered credible even though he omitted the

evidence about the request to murder Deegan, and even

though this was the foundation of his being considered credible in the first place.

These two contradictory facts simply cannot be reconciled.

• The 1967 Marfeo prosecution memorandum states that the electronic surveillance of Barboza proves that ‘‘his testimony is

true[,]’’ and this is ‘‘of special significance.’’ Thus, federal prosecutors were convinced that the microphone surveillance provided accurate information. This weakens their claims that his

Deegan testimony was unremarkable.

• The 1967 Marfeo prosecution memorandum states that

‘‘[Barboza’s] testimony will be corroborated in certain parts by

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1036Memorandum from Special Agent in Charge, Boston FBI Field Office, to J. Edgar Hoover,

Director, FBI (Mar. 28, 1967) (Exhibit 134).

Patrick Fabiano’s testimony with respect to the fact that

[Barboza] had been well acquainted with Tameleo prior to the

offenses charged here and that both Tameleo and [Barboza] had

conferred together on numerous occasions at the Ebb Tide Club

in Revere, Massachusetts.’’ This is potentially significant because three months earlier FBI Director Hoover’s office had

been informed that, in order to save himself, Barboza ‘‘may try

to intimidate Fabiano into testifying to something he may not

be a witness to.’’ 1036 This information appears to have been left

out of the prosecution memorandum.

• The 1979 Ciulla race-fixing prosecution memorandum provides

extremely important information about how prosecutorial discretion was exercised to benefit FBI informants James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. It demonstrates that former U.S.

Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan’s testimony before the Committee

is subject to question. Perhaps more important, it shows that a

1997 FBI Office of Professional Responsibility conclusion that

prosecutorial discretion had never been exercised by the federal

government on behalf of James Bulger and Stephen Flemmi was

not correct.

As these observations make clear, these documents have been very

important to the Committee’s investigation. It is regrettable that

the Committee’s good faith effort to investigate Justice Department

corruption in New England was impeded by the Justice Department’s refusal to negotiate over these documents.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Democracy succeeds in the United States when the rule of law

is respected. When the government strays from the rule of law, the

harm outweighs the benefit. In Boston, this is what happened. As

a result, men died in prison—and spent their lives in prison—for

crimes they did not commit. A number of men were murdered because they came to the government with information incriminating

informants. Government officials also became corrupted. The legacy

of the Justice Department’s use of informants in New England is

a lack of confidence in those charged with administering our laws,

families torn apart by a government that permitted murders and

unjust prison terms, and exposure of the government to civil liability that could amount to billions of dollars.

The Committee on Government Reform is committed to ensuring

that these abuses are not repeated. As a result of the Committee’s

investigation, the Committee has received numerous letters and

other materials alleging misconduct by the FBI. The Committee intends to examine these allegations closely to determine whether

the FBI handled them appropriately and to consider whether further investigation is warranted.

The Committee also recommends further review of the FBI’s

human source program. The Committee has been informed by the

FBI that following the revelations regarding the misuse of informants, FBI Director Robert Mueller has undertaken re-engineering

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the administration and operation of human sources. This effort includes the centralization of the administration of all human

sources, development of a ‘‘Risk Factor Model,’’ and, for certain categories of human sources, implementation of a validation process.

Each FBI Field office has at least one human source coordinator,

and 34 offices have two coordinators. Inspections and on-site assessments are conducted. Files are reviewed by Supervisory Special

Agents and Assistant Special Agents in Charge at least every 60

days, and in some cases every 90 days. The FBI has implemented

significant new training requirements in connection with its informant program.

Other measures have been undertaken that may also prevent

FBI misuse of informants. Director Mueller has undertaken a review of the Office of Professional Responsibility to ensure that the

system of internal discipline is effective. The FBI is also seeking to

enhance oversight and accountability of human source management in the wake of the revelations as a result of undertaking a

new internal security program following the allegations against

former Agent James Smith and his source Katrina Leung regarding the loss of classified information. In January 2001, the Department of Justice revised its Confidential Informant Guidelines that,

among other things, established a Criminal Informant Review

Committee consisting of senior FBI and Department officials. Finally, the Department of Justice’s Inspector General now also has

authority to investigate allegations of misconduct against employees of the FBI.

The Committee will examine these reforms to ensure that they

are being implemented and to ensure that, as implemented, they

are effective.

[The appendices referred to follow:]

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A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I.—COMMITTEE CORRESPONDENCE

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APPENDIX II.—FBI OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

REPORT

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Investigative Chronology

The Committee’s Report and the entries in this Investigative

Chronology are supported by cases, memoranda, published books,

articles, and reports, and other documents. The superscripts identify the number of the entry and generally, an associated exhibit.

All exhibits that are referenced in the Committee’s Report are reproduced and published in conjunction with the Report and the Investigative Chronology. Other exhibits that have been reproduced

and published are generally those documents that are not currently

available to the public or easily accessible by the public.

The 40’s

1945: Joseph Barboza is arrested at the age of thirteen for breaking and entering.1

December 1949: The Boston Herald Traveler reports, ‘‘In a

space of a few days in December 1949, Barboza’s gang broke into

16 houses in various parts of New Bedford and stole money, watches, liquor and guns.’’ 2

12–31–49: At age seventeen, Joseph Barboza is imprisoned for

the first time.3

The 50’s

1–29–51: Dennis Condon becomes an FBI Special Agent. He retires on May 20, 1977.4

2–26–51: H. Paul Rico joins the FBI. He retires on May 27,

1975.5

April 1952: Paul Rico is assigned to the Boston FBI Office.6

7–13–53: At age twenty, Joseph Barboza leads a revolt and escapes from prison in Concord, Massachusetts.7

5–19–54: Joseph Barboza is convicted of robbery by force and violence, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, assault and

battery, kidnapping, larceny of autos, and escape from prison. He

is sentenced to 10–12 years, 8–10 years, 10–12 years, 21⁄2–3 years,

and 2–3 years.8

1–19–56: Dr. Daniel Levinson administers a psychological exam

to Joseph Barboza. Dr. Levinson concludes that Barboza’s ‘‘features

make him look less bright than he actually is; his I.Q. is of the

order of 90–100 and he has the intellectual ability to do well in a

moderately skilled occupation.’’ 9

3–5–56: A personal and confidential memorandum from the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in Boston to FBI Director J. Edgar

Hoover states the following information about James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger: ‘‘This office had known Bulger because of his suspected imVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00462 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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plication in TFIS tailgate thefts. We knew of his extremely dangerous character, his remarkable agility, his reckless daring in

driving vehicles, and his unstable, vicious characteristics.’’ Agents

Paul Rico and Herbert F. Briick, ‘‘undertook to develop a PCI [Possible Confidential Informant] who could and would inform on

Bulger’s location. . . . SA’s Briick and Rico continued to contact RE- DACTED and ultimately developed his confidence and willingness to

cooperate.’’ The SAC recommends that Rico, who took Bulger in to

physical custody, and the other agents involved in Bulger’s arrest

receive a letter of commendation, with particular emphasis on ‘‘the

fine work of SA’s Rico and Briick in cultivating the informant who

made the arrest possible.’’ 10

3–28–56: In a letter from FBI Director Hoover to Paul Rico, Hoover notifies Rico of his promotion to the position of Special Agent.

Hoover states, ‘‘It is a pleasure to approve this promotion in view

of your superior accomplishments in connection with the Bank Robbery case involving James J. Bulger, Jr., and others.’’ Hoover also

commends Rico for his outstanding work ‘‘in developing a valuable

source of information’’ and ‘‘in developing other confidential sources

of information.’’ 11

3–13–58: A psychiatric report by Dr. Saltzman states that Joseph

Barboza has a ‘‘sociopathic personality disturbance, anti social reaction.’’ He continues, ‘‘There is always a great possibility of further anti social behavior in the future.’’ 12

7–12–58: Joseph Barboza marries Philomena Termini.13

9–6–58: Joseph Barboza is convicted of possession of burglary

tools and attempted breaking and entering. He is subsequently sentenced to 3–5 years.14

11–14–58: Joseph Barboza is convicted of attempted breaking

and entering at night with intent to commit larceny and possession

of burglary tools. He is subsequently sentenced to 3–5 years.15

1961

2–13–61: In a letter from Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy

to the Honorable Mortimer M. Caplan, IRS Commissioner, Kennedy lists Raymond Patriarca, as one of the 39 top echelon racketeers in the country targeted for investigation and prosecution.16

3–1–61: In an FBI Memorandum from Director Hoover regarding

the Criminal Intelligence Program, Hoover states, ‘‘I desire to insure [sic] that each office is fulfilling its obligations under this program and to be certain we have that type of coverage of the criminal underworld comparable to that which we achieved in our investigations of the Communist Party. . . . You should carefully . . .

follow through with a planned program to develop high-level live

informants[.] It cannot be stressed too strongly that this matter is

to receive your personal attention and that having understood the

Bureau’s objective, effective and vigorous action is to be exerted to

accomplish the aims outlined.’’ 17

3–14–61: An FBI Letter to Field Office SACs regarding criminal

informants states in relevant part: ‘‘Through well placed informants we must infiltrate organized crime groups to the same degree

454

that we have been able to penetrate the Communist Party and

other subversive organizations. . . . Today the press, television,

and radio along with the express interests of the Administration

keep this phase of criminal activity in a position of prominence in

the public eye. Certainly we cannot relax even momentarily our efforts in combating the criminal underworld including the prosecution of Top Hoodlums. The foundation from which we forge our attack must be kept strong and fresh with a full flow of information

from well placed informants. . . . All Agents in conducting investigation of criminal matters should be constantly alert for the development of new informants and new potential informants who

may be in a position to assist us.’’ 18

4–27–61: The Attorney General held a meeting in his office regarding the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. Those in

attendance were: Deputy Attorney General White, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Walter Sheridan, a special consultant to the

Attorney General with reference to organized crime matters; Edward Silberling, Head of the Organized Crime and Racketeering

Section, and his assistant, Henry Petersen. ‘‘The Attorney General

stated in very emphatic terms his dissatisfaction with the lack of

progress by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. . . .

The Deputy Attorney General pointed up the need for the receipt

of full information in order to develop a case and cautioned against

too speedy action. The Attorney General took issue with this, saying that while it was necessary to develop information, nevertheless, he expected the attorneys in the Organized Crime Section to

be more aggressive and get something accomplished. . . . The Attorney General concluded the meeting by reiterating that he was

going to insist on action being taken by the Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section and he expected something to be accomplished. He advised he intended to hold another meeting on May

20 and by that time, those in the section would have to be in a position to report more favorably or he might have to take other action to get the job done.’’ (This information is contained in an FBI

Memorandum from C.A. Evans to Mr. Parsons dated April 28,

1961).19

6–21–61: The Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program was inaugurated. (See 12/7/62 entry). A letter from Director Hoover to

FBI SACs states in relevant part: ‘‘To successfully complete our intelligence picture of the controlling forces which make organized

crime operative, it is now urgently necessary to develop particularly qualified, live sources within the upper echelon of the organized hoodlum element who will be capable of furnishing the quality information required. The most significant information developed to date indicating organization among the nation’s hoodlum

leaders has been obtained from highly confidential sources in Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia concerning the existence of a

‘commission’ of top leaders of the organized hoodlum element exerting a controlling influence on racket activities in this country.’’

Raymond Patriarca was listed as Boston’s Top Hoodlum and as a

‘‘commission’’ member. The letter further states that ‘‘there is an

urgent need for amplifying information which will reveal full details concerning the operations of these interrelated organized

455

criminal groups throughout the nation. Our urgent need for new

live sources strategically placed in the upper echelon of organized

crime is brought into clear focus by the fact that no information regarding the ‘commission’ has been reported by any live criminal

source to date. . . . [I]t is mandatory that the development of quality criminal informants be emphasized and the existing program be

implemented and greatly expanded. You are again reminded that

the penetration and infiltration of organized criminal activity is a

prime objective of the Bureau, and to accomplish this it is necessary to give a renewed impetus to the development of quality

criminal informants. . . . [T]he best source we could possibly obtain would be a criminal informant who is highly placed in organized crime. . . . To insure [sic] the success of this program, it is

necessary to utilize Special Agents with the will and desire to employ new approaches and means to secure the Bureau’s goals.’’ Selection of a particular criminal informant should be based on ‘‘a

combination of a particular hoodlum’s qualification by virtue of his

position in the organized crime hoodlum element, and upon circumstances indicating his possible vulnerability to development.

. . . To properly develop informants of this caliber, varied approaches can and should be utilized, dependent upon the individual

under development. . . . Every office is being advised of this program since in the future it may be appropriate to expand it to include additional offices. . . . This program has, as its primary purpose, the development of quality criminal intelligence informants.

The two most important components of this program are the selection of individuals for development as informants and the designation of the Special Agents who will participate.’’ 20

1962

3–6–62: The FBI installs electronic microphone surveillance at

Raymond L.S. Patriarca’s office at the Coin-O-Matic Distributing

Company, located at 168 Atwells Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island. ‘‘[F]rom March 6, 1962 until July 12, 1965, inclusive, agents

of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter called ‘F.B.I.’)

maintained an electronic surveillance of the place of business of a

business associate of the defendant [Louis ‘‘the Fox’’ Taglianetti] located at 168 Atwells Avenue, in the City of Providence, in the State

of Rhode Island. The overall purpose of said surveillance was to

gather criminal intelligence with respect to organized crime. It was

conducted under the direction of Mr. John F. Kehoe, Jr., a Special

Agent in Boston. . . . At the end of each day said log and tape recording were mailed or delivered to Special Agent Kehoe in Boston.

. . . Special Agent Kehoe would review the log and listen to the

tape recording. After doing so, he would dictate a memorandum

and an airtel summarizing the contents thereof. The tape recording

would then be routinely erased.’’ (U.S. v. Taglianetti, 274 F. Supp.

220, 223 (1967); see also Memo from SAC, Boston to Director, FBI

dated 5/31/62; Richard Connolly, The Story of the Patriarca Transcripts, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1971)).21

3–12–62: In an airtel from FBI Director Hoover to the SAC in

Boston regarding Raymond Patriarca, FBI Director Hoover orders,

‘‘You are authorized to discontinue submission of daily teletypes in

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this case and in lieu of same submit summary type airtels on Tuesday and Thursday of each week. . . . This case is to continue to

receive full-time attention and every effort must be made on a daily

basis to develop any criminal violation which Patriarca is committing or has committed with any relevant statute of limitations period.’’ 22

3–30–62: Memorandum from Director Hoover to the personal attention of the SAC in Boston. The memorandum states that on

March 6, 1962, the Boston SAC activated the microphone surveillance at Raymond Patriarca’s place of business in Providence,

Rhode Island. The memorandum discusses the ‘‘wealth of worthwhile information’’ obtained from the microphone. The memorandum authorizes the Boston SAC ‘‘to give immediate consideration

to submitting recommendations for incentive awards and/or commendations for the personnel responsible for the success of this

matter.’’ (Hoover later receives recommendations to keep the surveillance in place. See, e.g., Memorandum from SAC, Boston, to Director, FBI (Oct. 2, 1963); Airtel from Director, FBI, to SAC, Boston

(Mar. 3, 1964)).23

4–9–62: Memorandum from Director Hoover to the personal attention of the Boston SAC discussing ‘‘additional misur [microphone surveillance] coverage.’’ 24

4–10–62: An FBI letter to Field Office SACs entitled, Criminal

Intelligence Program—Necessity of Affording Protection to Highly

Confidential Informants and Techniques states: ‘‘It is mandatory

that our highly confidential informants and techniques are afforded

complete protection at all times. When attributing information to

these sources, care must be exercised in order that our operations

are not impaired through the divulgence of their identities.’’ 25

May 1962: Joseph Barboza is arrested for assault and battery

with a deadly weapon but no disposition is given.26

5–8–62: The Boston SAC prepares a memorandum to Director

Hoover noting that Raymond Patriarca is one of the original forty

hoodlums selected by the FBI for intensive investigation and early

prosecution.

5–31–62: In a memorandum from the Boston SAC, Director Hoover is informed that since the microphone surveillance was installed on March 6, 1962, in Raymond Patriarca’s office in Providence, Rhode Island, it ‘‘has furnished a wealth of worthwhile information concerning Patriarca’s activities and associates.’’ The

memo further states that the microphone surveillance ‘‘has shown

that Patriarca exerts real control over the racketeers and racketeering activities in Rhode Island and Massachusetts . . . and has

also shown definite connections between Patriarca and the New

York City hoodlum element and has strongly indicated that

Patriarca is a member of the ‘commission.’ ’’ The memorandum recommends that the microphone surveillance be continued until September 5, 1962.27

8–1–62: The Boston SAC prepares a memorandum to Director

Hoover stating: ‘‘In accordance with Bureau instructions set forth

in re[ferenced] let[ter], a complete review has been made of the enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00466 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
457

tire program of inquiry concerning gambling matters in the Boston

Division. This review points out that the primary target of this office has been to develop admissible evidence which would result in

the prosecution of Raymond L.S. Patriarca . . . . In furtherance of

this phase, Boston informant 837–C* [microphone surveillance] has

been developed and this informant has indicated clearly that

Patriarca is conducting activities which appear to be in violation of

the ITAR statute. Intensive efforts are continuing to develop proof

of his involvement. This investigation, which is being conducted,

consists of surveillances to determine contacts outside his regular

place of business and to identify his lieutenants and close confidants. Informants are being utilized and where information is developed which can be disseminated, it is being furnished to other

law enforcement agencies for the purpose of harassing Patriarca

and his associates with the hope that a provable violation may develop. Patriarca’s activities seem to concern gambling, attempts to

corrupt officials and he furnishes general aid and counsel to assorted members of the underworld. In investigating those who are

identified as lieutenants or close associates of Patriarca, it is felt

that some violation of which they are guilty might serve as a leverage to break through the barriers with which Patriarca has surrounded himself. Some of the persons close to Patriarca and identified to date, have been Gennaro [Jerry] Angiulo and his brothers

. . . Henry Tamaleo [sic], Samuel Granito and Ted Fuccillo. . . .

As the Bureau is aware, the data being made available regularly

through BS 837–C* [microphone surveillance] highlights the activities of these individuals. Probing of individual situations has been

and will be intensified. Wherever possible, efforts are made to so

utilize this information so as to develop separate independent

cases.’’ Four examples of independent cases currently being developed against Henry Tameleo, Raymond Patriarca, Herbert Ashton

Page, Jr., and Carl L. Strobeck were discussed. The memorandum

states that two of these cases will go before a grand jury soon and

convictions in these cases could lead to more information on other

crimes.28

8–9–62: According to an FBI memorandum, IRS Agent Edgerly

was paid money to ‘‘straighten out’’ the Nicholas Angiulo tax

case.29

8–14–62: Director Hoover notifies the Boston SAC that the

‘‘[r]eferenced airtel [8–9–62 Airtel from Boston SAC] sets forth information regarding Internal Revenue Service Agent Edgerly who

reportedly accepted a payment of $3,000 in connection with his

handling of the [Jerry] Angiulo investigation. In order that this information may be properly disseminated to the Internal Revenue

Service and to the Department you should promptly furnish further

identifying information regarding Edgerly, including his full name.

You should also include available information regarding the actual

outcome of the Internal Revenue Service case involved. . . . Note:

BS 837–C* [microphone surveillance] advised that Jerry Angiulo

informed Raymond Patriarca on 8–3–62 that IRS Agent Edgerly

had accepted $3,000 to straighten out Nick Angiulo’s case.’’ Additional corruption is mentioned. In a letter dated November 21,

2001, the IRS informed this Committee that it ‘‘could not identify’’

458

the aforementioned Agent Edgerly. (However, see 1975 entry regarding a rogue IRS Agent.) The IRS also indicated to this Committee that it was unable to identify the Nicholas Angiulo tax

case.31

10–11–62: Raymond Patriarca takes a polygraph test regarding

allegations of his involvement in a mail robbery.32

11–15–62: Director Hoover authorizes microphone surveillance of

Jerry Angiulo, the ‘‘over-all boss of rackets in the Boston area’’ and

‘‘chief lieutenant of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, notorious New England hoodlum,’’ at Jay’s Lounge in Boston, Massachusetts.34

11–27–62: In a memorandum, Director Hoover requests of the

Boston SAC: ‘‘Advise your progress in connection with the installation at Jay’s Lounge, 255 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts.’’ 34

1963

1–9–63: The FBI commences microphone surveillance on Jerry

Angiulo at Jay’s Lounge, located at 255 Tremont Street in Boston,

Massachusetts. The FBI assigns BS 856–C* as the reference code

for the Jay’s Lounge bug.35

2–21–63: Dennis Condon receives a $150 cash award for his contributions to the establishment of a ‘‘highly confidential source of

information’’ of interest to the Bureau in the criminal field regarding Jerry Angiulo. [Note: The reference to a ‘‘highly confidential

source of information’’ is referring to microphone surveillance.] 36

3–12–63: Microphone surveillance at Jay’s Lounge picks up Jerry

Angiulo speculating that Ronald Cassesso may be an informant.37

4–22–63: Joseph Barboza divorces Philomena Termini.38

5–9–63: During a conversation with Raymond Patriarca, Jerry

Angiulo states that John Callahan had approached him and ‘‘John

Callahan, Chairman of the Boston Licensing Board, Boston, Mass.,

stood up 100%.’’ 39

8–8–63: The FBI learns from the Raymond Patriarca microphone

surveillance: ‘‘On 8/8/63 the informant advised that an unman [unknown man] was of the opinion that Rocco Balliro did not kill the

child in Roxbury, Mass., several months ago for which crime

Balliro is now being held. He is of the opinion that the police officers who were trying to apprehend Balliro at the time were responsible for the death of the child.’’ 40

11–14–63: A memorandum to a top FBI official, named Belmont,

from C.A. Evans, discusses a dispute between Salvatore Iacone and

Jerry Angiulo. The memorandum states that a ‘‘highly confidential

source’’ provided the following information: ‘‘In the morning hours

of 11/9/63 Angiulo’s car was found riddled with bullets in the vicinity of his apartment in Boston, Massachusetts. The highly confidential source giving direct coverage of Angiulo has since furnished information indicating that Angiulo professes ignorance of the shooting. He is shown to have left his car at 3:30 a.m. the morning in

which the shooting took place and the car had not been shot at at

that time. It is possible the shooting was done by some person who

459

mistakenly believed Angiulo was still in the car or done as a warning. The highly confidential source directly covering [Raymond]

Patriarca in Providence, Rhode Island, has advised that on the day

before the shooting Salvatore Iacone complained to Patriarca that

Angiulo on the previous night had visited Iacone in the company

of others and verbally abused him, calling him an obscene name on

four different occasions during an argument over the proprietorship

of the Indian Meadow Country Club of Worcester, a joint enterprise

of Iacone and Angiulo. Iacone told Patriarca that he was about to

kill Angiulo for this insult but that had restrained himself because

of the possibility that such action would indicate disrespect for

Patriarca. In reply Patriarca told Iacone that he should have killed

Angiulo at the time the name was called and if Angiulo ever called

Iacone the obscene name again Iacone had the right to kill Angiulo

on the spot and no questions would be asked by Patriarca. The

shooting of Angiulo’s car occurred the following morning. We have

had recent indications of a growing coolness in attitude by

Patriarca toward Angiulo.’’ This information came from ‘‘very sensitive valuable sources.’’ 41

11–21–63: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by memorandum that the FBI is monitoring Jerry Angiulo’s contacts with

his lawyer.42

12–8–63: A memorandum from Boston SAC to Director Hoover,

dated 1–31–64, states that the FBI learns from the Jerry Angiulo

microphone surveillance that ‘‘Jerry Angiulo complained that Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett Byrne upset the deal that he

had made in connection with the sentencing of his brother, Nick,

after conviction for the afore-mentioned charges. He said that he

had made no deal with Judge Felix Forte, but that it was Forte’s

idea that if Nick Angiulo brought in the two individuals who allegedly accompanied Nick at the time of the assault on Albert

Christensen, Forte would show leniency. He said that now since

Garry Byrne pressured Forte, he, Forte, was backing down.

Angiulo said that there was talk around that Forte had been

reached by the Angiulos, but the truth of the matter was that they

had not reached Forte, and Forte, according to Angiulo, did not

have the guts to be a party to any deal.’’ 43

In a separate airtel, Director Hoover tells the Boston SAC, ‘‘Boston should submit a weekly summary airtel to the Bureau setting

forth information obtained from this source and a verbatim transcript of any significant data specifically set out.’’ The airtel also

states: ‘‘In the future your airtels setting forth the information received from BS 856–C* can be set out as you would information received from a regular informant. By doing so, it will not be necessary to submit your communications as JUNE mail and the information can be filed in the regular case file.’’

1964

1964: Informants report that Joseph Barboza is engaged in

money lending activities.44

From 1964 to 1966, Joseph Barboza is employed at Shawmut Insurance Company in Boston as a salesman and a clerk. Also, he

460

works in a public relations capacity and payroll clerk for $100 a

week at the Blue Bunny Lounge and Duffey’s Lounge.45

5–4–64: Police find the body of Francis Regis Benjamin a couple

of days after he is murdered. Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi, who Vincent Teresa calls ‘‘Vinnie the Butcher,’’ allegedly committed the

murder. (See 6–9–65 and 1973 entries).46

5–7–64: The FBI installs an electronic eavesdropping device at

the place of business of Joseph Modica, an associate of Raymond

Patriarca’s. The device is installed at the Piranha Finance Company on 85 State Street in Boston, Massachusetts. The conversations overheard at the Piranha Finance Company are reflected in

memoranda, logs, and airtels. See Prosecution memorandum from

Walter T. Barnes and Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward F. Harrington to Henry Petersen, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section (June 6, 1967) [Note: Executive privilege was

claimed over this document. It is in the custody of the Justice Department].47

5–25–64: Special Agent Dennis Condon writes in a memorandum

that REDACTED was contacted on 5/22/64 and said he was in contact

with Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi. The memorandum continues,

‘‘Flemmi told him that all he wants to do now is to kill people, and

that it is better than hitting banks. . . . Informant said, Flemmi

said that he feels he can now be the top hit man in this area and

intends to be.’’ 48

A letter from the Boston FBI Office to Director Hoover and the

Newark SAC states: ‘‘Informant stated that it appears that [Vincent ‘Jimmy’] Flemmi, a Roxbury, Mass. Hoodlum, will probably become the ‘contract man’ in the Boston area.’’ 49

6–4–64: In a letter from the Boston Office to Director Hoover, the

Director is told ‘‘[Vincent ‘Jimmy’] Flemmi is suspected of a number

of gangland murders and has told the informant of his plans to become recognized as the No. One ‘hit man’ in this area as a contract

killer.’’ The Director is further told that the informant is ‘‘presently

associated’’ with Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi.50

8–21–64: A memorandum from Dennis Condon states that informant advised that ‘‘[Joseph] Barboza told him that he [Barboza]

heard that Jimmy Flemmi had killed Frank Benjamin and cut off

his head.’’ 51

9–15–64: The FBI Director is informed that the Raymond

Patriarca microphone surveillance caught a conversation about

Peter Limone giving Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan two guns.52

9–28–64: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi throws a substance into the

eyes of someone and knocks him unconscious. One week later, the

victim still has not regained his sight. The informant who provides

this information indicates that he thinks Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi

has committed several murders. This information is contained in a

memorandum from H. Paul Rico to the Boston SAC dated October

8, 1964.53

10–8–64: Special Agent Paul Rico informs the Boston SAC by

memorandum of the following: ‘‘Informant advised that REDACTED

461

SECTION and [Vincent] ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi wanted to be considered

the ‘best hit man’ in the area.’’ 54

10–17–64: Anthony Sacrimone is murdered. Edward ‘‘Teddy’’

Deegan is the suspected killer. See 1993 entry.55

10–18–64: The FBI learns from an informant that Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi wants to kill Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. (This information is recorded in a memorandum from Special Agent Paul Rico

to the Boston SAC and in another memorandum from the Boston

SAC to Director Hoover.) 56

10–20–64: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by airtel

that Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi asked Peter Limone about Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. After Flemmi left, Limone called Deegan and told

him Flemmi was looking for him concerning a $300 loan that

Flemmi claimed Deegan owed him. Deegan denied owing the loan.

Limone and Deegan believed that Flemmi was out to kill Deegan.57

November 1964: Stephen Flemmi is first targeted as an informant, according to a Summary Report from the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (published as Appendix II to the Report).58

11–5–64: The Raymond Patriarca bug captures Raymond Patriarca telling Gennaro Angiulo that ‘‘$5,000 was paid to the

Massachusetts Attorney General Edward W. Brooke to obtain the

acquittal of Patriarca’s associate, Joseph Krikorian[.]’’ 59 This conversation was also reported in handwritten notes taken by the FBI

Special Agent listening to the microphone surveillance.

12–28–64: A letter from the Boston FBI Office to Director Hoover

states that FBI Informant BS 771C was stabbed fifty times and

then shot. His body is found in the South End. Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi committed the murder, and Director Hoover was informed

of this fact on the day of the murder.60

1965

1965: On July 18, 1967, FBI Agent Thomas H. Sullivan writes

a report describing Joseph Barboza’s activities in 1965. The report

states, ‘‘In 1965 it was rumored REDACTED SECTION that Barboza

was under contract to be assassinated since he was tied into the

Buddy McLean-George McLaughlin feud. He was reported in frequent attendance at the Ebb Tide, Revere, Mass., with Romeo Martin and Ronnie Cassessa [sic]. In 1965, Barboza was rumored to be

the killer of Joseph Francione.’’ (See 7–18–67 entry).61

1–7–65: In an airtel from the Boston Office, Director Hoover is

informed that ‘‘Patriarca had told the group [on 1/4/65] that is too

bad the McLeans and the McLaughlins could not settle their feud

over a handshake[.]’’ 62

1–26–65: Joseph Francione is murdered. Vincent Teresa writes in

his book, My Life In The Mafia, that Joseph Barboza went to Joseph Francione’s apartment as a favor for his friend Johnny Bullets, since Francione cut Bullets out of a deal, and shot Francione

through the back of the head. (See 1973 entry).63

An airtel from the Boston Office to Director Hoover indicates

that the Patriarca microphone surveillance revealed that a man

462

named Frankie told Raymond Patriarca that ‘‘all the people are

getting scared of Jimmy (apparently referring to [Vincent] James

Flemmi) and asked Raymond [Patriarca] to talk to Jimmy and impress upon him that there should be no more killings in Boston.’’

The surveillance further revealed that Louis Taglianetti met with

Patriarca and expressed concern that the FBI had an interest in

him, Taglianetti. Taglianetti also told Patriarca of an illegal

scheme that he has been involved in for the past two years.64

2–2–65: The Boston SAC apprises Director Hoover by airtel that

the Raymond Patriarca microphone surveillance overheard Henry

Tameleo say that Joseph Barboza killed Joseph Francione in Revere, Massachusetts.65

2–24–65: Raymond Patriarca is told that ‘‘Ronnie’’ and Louis

Greco are in Florida.966

2–25–65: Dennis Condon receives a $150 incentive award for his

outstanding work investigating and apprehending top ten fugitive

George Patrick McLaughlin, the subject of an unlawful flight to

avoid prosecution for murder.66

3–3–65: A memorandum from the Boston FBI Office to Director

Hoover dated 3–10–65 states: ‘‘BS 837–C* advised on 3/3/65 that

unman [‘‘unknown man’’] contacted Patriarca and stated he had

brought down Vincent [‘‘Jimmy’’] Flemmi and another individual

(who was later identified as Joe Barboza from East Boston, Mass.)

It appeared that Frank Smith, Boston hoodlum, was giving orders

to Flemmi to ‘hit this guy and that guy.’ Raymond Patriarca appeared infuriated at Frank Smith giving such orders without his

clearance and made arrangements to meet Flemmi and Barboza in

a garage shortly thereafter. He pointed out that he did not want

Flemmi or Barboza contacting him at his place of business.’’ The

following additional information obtained by the FBI took place between 3–3–65 and 3–10–65, and was sent to Director Hoover:

‘‘Angiulo told Patriarca that Vincent [‘‘Jimmy’’] Flemmi was with

Joe Barboza when he, Barboza, killed Jackie Francione in Revere,

Mass. Several months ago. It appeared that Frank Smith, Boston

hoodlum, had ordered the ‘hit.’ Patriarca again became enraged

that Smith had the audacity to order a ‘hit’ without Patriarca’s

knowledge. Patriarca told Angiulo that he explained to Flemmi

that he was to tell Smith that no more killings were to take place

unless, he Patriarca, cleared him. Jerry explained that he also had

a talk with Flemmi. He pointed out that Patriarca has a high regard for Flemmi but that he, Patriarca, thought that Flemmi did

not use sufficient common sense when it came to killing people.

Angiulo gave Flemmi a lecture on killing people, pointing out that

he should not kill people because he had an argument with him at

any time. If an argument does ensue, he should leave and get word

to Raymond Patriarca who, in turn, will either ‘OK’ or deny the

‘hit’ on this individual, depending on the circumstances.’’ 67

3–4–65: Handwritten notes of the Patriarca microphone surveillance state as follows for 11:20 a.m.: ‘‘UNMAN [unnamed man] in

to see [Patriarca]—says he saw Henry Tameleo last night in Boston. He says he brought down Flemmi and another guy—since [illegible word] and involvement he should know about—Frank Smith

463

is going around giving orders to hit this guy & that guy. R.P.

[Patriarca] wants to know where they are. Man says in [illegible

word] Parking Lot. R.P. [Patriarca] then says since they are here

I’ll see them. He tells Richie—office worker to go with man and

show them where Badway’s Garage is—he tells man I’ll see you

over there.’’ Patriarca came back to his office at 12:15 p.m. (Document on File at the Department of Justice).

3–5–65: Handwritten notes of the Patriarca microphone surveillance cover a discussion between Gennaro Angiulo and Raymond

Patriarca about how Angiulo was trying to influence clerks to

Judge Ford. The names of the clerks are provided, so it can be determined whether they were discussing Judge Ford or Judge Forte.

Angiulo also states that a certain Assistant United States Attorney

is ‘‘his boy.’’ The notes make it seem that a man named

‘‘Flemming’’ or ‘‘Fleming’’ is a part of the conversation. A comment

in the margin states ‘‘Flemmi with Barbosa [sic] when whacked

Francione.’’ States that Sacrimone was with McLean and that

Deegan, who killed Sacrimone, was with McLaughlin.

3–5/7–65: In a memorandum from the Boston SAC to Director

Hoover dated 3–10–65, Hoover is notified of the following, which

appears to have taken place between 3–5–65 and 3–7–65: ‘‘According to Patriarca, another reason that REDACTED came to Providence

to contact him was to get the ‘OK’ to kill Eddie Deegan of Boston

who was with REDACTED SECTION. It was not clear to the informant

whether he received permission to kill Deegan; however, the story

that REDACTED had concerning the activities of Deegan in connection with his, Deegan’s, killing of [Anthony] Sacrimone was not the

same as REDACTED SECTION.’’ (See 3–10–65’s second entry) [Note:

Due to Justice Department redactions, it is impossible to determine

when the request to kill Deegan actually took place. However, a

reasonable reading of the document seems to indicate that the request took place between March 5–7, 1965. On April 25, 2002, the

Department of Justice released portions of this document to the

Committee in unredacted form. That document also revealed that

‘‘another reason that [Vincent ‘Jimmy’] Flemmi came to Providence

to contact him was to get the ‘OK’ to kill Eddie Deegan of Boston

who was ‘with the McLaughlin,’ Top 10 Fugitive.’’ In addition, the

unredacted document revealed that Flemmi’s story ‘‘concerning the

activities of Deegan in connection with his, Deegan’s, killing of [Anthony] Sacrimone was not the same as Jerry Angiulo’s.’’] 68

3–9–65: Handwritten notes made by an FBI Special Agent while

listening to the conversation indicate that Henry Tameleo told

Patriarca that ‘‘Brownie (ph) is coming today—they have been talking about Deegan (ph).’’ Later, the notes continue: ‘‘Unman

[unnamed man] says Jimmie (ph) is coming in today. They only

want the stuff that is signed and the bearer bonds. The other stuff

from Boston they don’t want. (This probably refers to hot bonds

Henry had.) Unman says Jimmie has a guy with him who is a real

desperado.’’

The handwritten notes continue to describe the conversation between Raymond Patriarca and Joseph Barboza and Jimmy Flemmi:

‘‘Jimmie tells Raymond they are having a problem with Teddy

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Deegan (ph). Teddy did what he did to press some other people.

Jimmie says that the kid [Rico Sacrimone] did not have to be

killed. . . . Bobby Donati is friendly with Rico Sacrimone and

Deegan is looking for an excuse to whack Donati. . . . Deegan

thinks Donati is trying to set him up for Buddy McLean. Jimmie

says Deegan is an arrogant, nasty sneak. Deegan fills Peter

Limone’s head with all kinds of stories. Raymond asks if they have

discussed this matter with Jerry—They have. Raymond instructs

them to check out Deegan and get more information about him.’’

Later, Patriarca states that: ‘‘the happiest days of his life were

when he was on the street clipping.’’ 967

A report by Charles Reppucci regarding the Raymond Patriarca

microphone surveillance, and dated July 20, 1965, reads, ‘‘[The

microphone surveillance] advised on 3/9/65 that James Flemmi and

Joseph Barboza requested permission from Patriarca to kill Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan, as they are having a problem with him.

Patriarca ultimately furnished this ‘OK.’ ’’ 69

On March 12, 1965, the Boston Office informs Director Hoover

and the SACs of the FBI offices in Albany, Buffalo, and Miami by

airtel that ‘‘REDACTED advised on 3/9/65 that [Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’]

James Flemmi and Joseph Barboza contacted [Raymond] Patriarca,

and they explained that they are having a problem with Teddy

Deegan and desired to get the ‘OK’ to kill him. . . . Flemmi stated

that Deegan is an arrogant, nasty sneak and should be killed.

Patriarca instructed them to obtain more information relative to

Deegan and then to contact Jerry Angiulo at Boston who would furnish them with a decision.’’ ‘‘Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearings Before the

Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. at 132 (May 11, 2002).70 [On

April 25, 2002, the Department of Justice released this document to

the Committee in unredacted form. The unredacted document revealed that the portion redacted was ‘‘BS 837–C*’’—the Patriarca

microphone surveillance.]

According to a memorandum from the SAC in Boston to Director

Hoover, ‘‘Vincent Jimmy Flemmi, aka ‘Jimmy’ Flemmi, is being

designated as a target in [the Top Echelon Criminal Informant Program].’’ The document further states that ‘‘Flemmi also is believed

to be involved in the murders of the following individuals: REDACTED SECTION.’’ The document also states that Flemmi was the

subject of an ‘‘Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution’’ for armed robbery investigation.71 [On April 25, 2002, the Department of Justice

released this document to the Committee in unredacted form. The

unredacted document revealed that Jimmy Flemmi murdered Frank

Benjamin, John Murray and George Ashe.]

3–10–65: Special Agent Paul Rico writes in an FBI memorandum

dated 3–15–65, ‘‘Informant advised [on 3–10–65] that he had just

heard from ‘Jimmy’ Flemmi that Flemmi told the informant that

Raymond Patriarca has put out the word that Edward ‘Teddy’

Deegan is to be ‘hit’ and that a dry run has already been made and

that a close associate of Deegan’s has agreed to set him up.’’ 72

A Boston airtel apprises Director Hoover that ‘‘REDACTED told

[Raymond] Patriarca that REDACTED was with Joe Barboza when

465

he, Barboza, killed REDACTED in Revere, Mass. several months ago.

. . . ‘‘According to Patriarca, another reason that REDACTED came

to Providence to contact him was to get the ‘OK’ to kill Eddie

Deegan of Boston who was with REDACTED SECTION. It was not

clear to the informant whether he received permission to kill

Deegan; however, the story that REDACTED had concerning the activities of Deegan in connection with his, Deegan’s, killing of [Anthony] Sacrimone was not the same as REDACTED SECTION.’’ 73 [On

April 25, 2002, the Department of Justice released this document to

the Committee in unredacted form. That document revealed that

Jerry Angiulo told Patriarca that Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi was

with Barboza when Barboza killed Jackie Francione. That document also revealed that ‘‘another reason that [Vincent ‘Jimmy’]

Flemmi came to Providence to contact him was to get the ‘OK’ to

kill Eddie Deegan of Boston who was ‘with the McLaughlin,’ Top

10 Fugitive.’’ In addition, the unredacted document revealed that

Flemmi’s story ‘‘concerning the activities of Deegan in connection

with his, Deegan’s, killing of [Anthony] Sacrimone was not the same

as Jerry Angiulo’s.’’]

3–12–65: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is assigned as an informant

to Special Agent Paul Rico. This information is contained in an FBI

memorandum dated 6–10–65 from Inspector H.E. Campbell to Boston Special Agent in Charge James L. Handley.74

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan is killed in a Chelsea, Massachusetts,

alleyway between 9:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M.75

Statement of Joseph Kozlowski states: ‘‘About 10:P.M. went to

Fourth St. Chelsea and saw a red car with motor running with

three men sitting in it, two in the front and one in the rear seat.

This car was parked about the second meter from Broadway between Broadway and Luther Place on the side near the P.A.V. I

walked behind the car and saw the rear number plate Mass. Reg.

# 404 - - - with the right half of plate folded towards the center

obstructing the other three digits. I then went to the drivers [sic]

side of the car and rapped on window motioning the driver to lower

the window. As I did this the driver took off at a fast rate of speed

and took a screeching turn to the right on Broadway. I observed

that the man in the back had dark hair with a bald spot in center

of head.’’ 76

3–13–65: The same informant from the March 10 memorandum

tells Special Agent Paul Rico in detail who killed Edward ‘‘Teddy’’

Deegan and how. The informant said Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi contacted the informant and said that Deegan was lured to the finance

company to be killed. The memorandum states: ‘‘Informant advised

that [Vincent] ‘Jimmy’ Flemmi contacted him and told him that the

previous evening Deegan was lured to a finance company in Chelsea and that the door of the finance company had been left open

by an employee of the company and that when they got to the door

Roy French, who was setting Deegan up, shot Deegan, and Joseph

Romeo Martin and Ronnie Cassessa [sic] came out of the door and

one of them fired into Deegan’s body. While Deegan was approaching the doorway, he (Flemmi) and Joe Barboza walked over towards a car driven by Tony ‘Stats’ [Anthony Stathopolous] and they

466

were going to kill ‘Stats’ but ‘Stats’ saw them coming and drove off

before any shots were fired. Flemmi told informant that Ronnie

Cassessa [sic] and Romeo Martin wanted to prove to Raymond

Patriarca they were capable individuals, and that is why they

wanted to ‘hit’ Deegan. Flemmi indicated that they did an ‘awful

sloppy job.’ This information has been disseminated by SA Donald

V. Shannon to Capt. Robert Renfrew (NA) of the Chelsea, Mass.

PD.’’ Special Agent Paul Rico memorializes this information in a

March 15, 1965, memorandum to the Boston SAC.77

‘‘Three ex-convicts were questioned Saturday in connection with

the gangland slaying of Edward [Teddy] Deegan[.]’’ (3 Quizzed In

Chelsea Gang Killing, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1965).78

3–14–65: A Boston Police Department report on the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder, likely written by Detective William W.

Stuart, contains the following information: ‘‘From a reliable informant the following facts were obtained to the [Deegan murder]: Informant states that the following men were Joseph Barron aka

Barboza, Romeo Martin, Freddie Chiampi, Roy French, Ronnie

Cassesso, Tony Stats. (Greek) Chico Amico[.] . . . Informant states

that they were over lounge in Revere when they received the call

from French that everything was OK then they all left together.

. . . Romeo Martin is a former informant but since hanging in the

North End hasn’t been to [sic] helpful. . . . Informant states that

the reason for the killing of Deegan was that Barren [sic] claims

that he is with the Hughes brothers and McLaughlins and he felt

that Deegan was a threat to his friends in Roxbury (Flemmi &

Bennett).’’ 79

The Chelsea Police also received evidence about who murdered

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. Lieutenant Thomas Evans of the Chelsea

Police Department writes an undated report containing meticulous

details of the Teddy Deegan murder. In the report, Lieutenant

Evans states, ‘‘I received information from Capt. Renfrew that a[n]

informant of his had contacted him and told him that [Roy] French

had received a telephone call at the Ebb Tide at 9 P.M. on 3–12–

65 and after a short conversation he had left the cafe ́ with the following men: Joseph Barboza, Ronald Cassesso, Vincent Flemmi,

Francis Imbruglia, Romeo Martin, Nicky Femia and a man by the

name of Freddi who is about 40 years old and said to be a ‘Strong

arm.’ They are said to have returned at about 11 P.M. and Martin

was alleged to have said to French, ‘We nailed him.’ ’’ There is no

mention whatsoever of Joseph Salvati, Peter Limone, Henry

Tameleo, or Louis Greco in the report.80

3–15–65: Detective Lieutenant Inspector Richard J. Cass of the

Massachusetts State Police writes a report to Captain of Detectives

Daniel I. Murphy regarding the homicide of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’

Deegan. The report states that Chelsea Officer James O’Brien was

the routeman for the area where Deegan was found. Officer

O’Brien checked the alley around 9:00 P.M. and turned the lights

on; he returned around 10:59 P.M., found the alley lights out, explored the alley, and found Deegan’s body. The report continues by

stating that during the evening of Friday, March 12, Joseph

Barboza was at the Ebb Tide with Francis Imbruglia, Ronald

467

Cassosa (sic), Vincent Flemmi, Romeo Martin, Nick Femia and

man known as ‘‘Freddy.’’ At about 9:00 P.M., Roy French received

a phone call, and the above group left the Ebb Tide with him. According to the report, Chelsea Captain Joseph Kozlowski was

around Fourth Street at about 9:30 P.M. and saw a red car with

the motor running and three men inside. The rear license plate

was obstructed. [This was Romeo Martin’s car. See 10–25–65

entry.] Officer Kozlowski approached the driver and the driver sped

off. Officer Kozlowski described the driver as Romeo Martin. The

man in the back seat was ‘‘stocky with dark hair and a bald spot

in the center of his head.’’ In addition, the report states that the

Massachusetts State Police received information three weeks ago

indicating Deegan pulled a gun on Barboza at Ebb Tide, forcing

Barboza to back down. Inspector Cass writes in his report:

‘‘Unconfirmed information was received that Romeo Martin and

Ronald Cassessa [sic] had entered the building and were waiting

just inside the rear door. [Anthony] Stathopoulos was waiting on

Fourth Street in a car and French and Deegan entered the alley.

Deegan opened the rear door. He was shot twice in the back of the

head and also in the body. The information at the time was that

three guns were used. Lieutenant John Collins of Ballistics confirmed the report of three guns being used at a later time. Two

men approached the car in which Stathopoulos was waiting and he

took off.’’ 81

Special Agent Paul Rico writes in a memorandum to REDACTED

SAC that SA Donald Shannon allegedly provided information about

the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder to Captain Robert Renfrew.82

(See 3–13–65 entry).

3–16–65: Director Hoover instructs the Boston SAC: ‘‘At the earliest possible time that dissemination can be made with full security to BS 837–C* [Patriarca microphone surveillance], you should

advise appropriate authorities of the identities of the possible perpetrators of the murders of [Anthony] Sacrimone and [Edward

‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan. Advise the Bureau when this has been done.’’

[There are two versions of this document. The second document

contains the following handwritten annotation: ‘‘already disseminated, Sacramone [sic] 10/18/64—Doherty, Everett PD, Deegan 3/

15/65—Renfrew Chelsea PD’’].83

3–19–65: The Boston SAC advises Director Hoover by airtel: ‘‘Informants report that Ronald Casessa [sic], Romeo Martin, Vincent

James Flemmi, and Joseph Barboza, prominent local hoodlums,

were responsible for the killing. They accomplished this by having

Roy French, another Boston hoodlum, set [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’]

Deegan up[.] French apparently walked in behind Deegan when

they were gaining entrance to the building and fired the first shot

hitting Deegan in the back of the head. Casessa [sic] and Martin

immediately thereafter shot Deegan from the front. Anthony

Stathopoulos was also in on the burglary but had remained outside

in the car. When Flemmi and Barboza walked over to

Stathopoulos’s car, Stathopoulos thought it was the law and took

off. Flemmi and Barboza were going to kill Stathopoulos also. . . .

Efforts are now being made by the Chelsea PD to force [Anthony]

Stathopoulos to furnish them the necessary information to prosVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00477 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
468

ecute the persons responsible. It should be noted that this information was furnished to the Chelsea PD and it has been established

by the Chelsea Police that Roy French, Barboza, Flemmi, Casessa

[sic], and Martin were all together at the Ebb Tide night club in

Revere, Mass. and they all left at approximately 9 o’clock and returned 45 minutes later. It should be noted that the killing took

place at approximately 9:30 p.m., Friday, 3/12/65. Informant also

advised that REDACTED had given the ‘ok’ to Joe Barboza and

‘Jimmy’ Flemmi to kill REDACTED SECTION who was killed approximately one month ago.’’ 84

3–23–65: An FBI memorandum from Special Agent REDACTED to

the Boston SAC, dated 4–6–65, states the following: ‘‘On 3/23/65,

PCI [Potential Confidential Informant] advised that Joe Barbosa

[sic] is from East Boston and an ex-fighter, was very friendly with

Romeo Martin, Ronnie Cassessi [sic] and REDACTED SECTION. PCI

stated that Barbosa [sic] was supposed ‘to have hit’ Francione from

Revere and Eaton. He stated that Barbosa [sic] reportedly killed

Eaton with a Magnum gun. PCI stated that Barbosa [sic] was in

prison with Benjamin who was murdered after he left prison and

beheaded.

He stated that Barbosa [sic] is a Portuguese kid who would otherwise be accepted into La Cosa Nostra except for his nationality.

He stated that Barbosa [sic] claims that he had shot [Edward]

Teddy Deegan with a .45 caliber gun. PCI related that Barbosa

[sic] indicated that Roy French was with Deegan and another individual when Deegan was shot by Barbosa [sic] and two other individuals, one of whom informant believed was Romeo Martin.

REDACTED SECTION. Informant stated that he had heard Barbosa

[sic] indicate that one of the guys with Deegan whom they had

planned to kill along with Deegan ran off when the law showed up

and fled.

PCI stated that rumors have it that Roy French actually set up

Deegan to be killed.

PCI stated that he had heard that Joe Barbosa [sic] was extremely friendly with Jimmy Flemma [sic] from Dudley Street. He

stated that Barbosa [sic] had tried to reach Jimmy Flemma [sic] a

short time ago and wanted to know if Flemma [sic] has gone to

Providence to see Raymond (Patriarca). PCI subsequently determined from a source that Jimmy Flemma [sic] had gone to Providence, R.I. earlier on the day that Barbosa [sic] had tried to contact

Flemma [sic].

PCI stated that Jimmy Flemma [sic] had gone to Providence just

before Teddy Deegan was slain in Chelsea. REDACTED SECTION. REDACTED SECTION. REDACTED SECTION. PCI further advised that

about a week ago, there was a big party for Romeo Martin at the

Ebtide [sic] Restaurant and Bar in Revere and that [Edward]

Wimpy Bennett, Jimmy Flemma [sic], REDACTED SECTION, Roy

French, Joe Barbosa [sic], Ronnie Cassessi [sic] and REDACTED SECTION were in attendance. He stated that this party was in honor

of the recent marriage of REDACTED SECTION.’’ [The informant information provided is categorized as ‘‘very good.’’] 85 See also Limone’s

Motion to Vacate Conviction and Dismiss Indictments. The CommitVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00478 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
469

tee compiled the aforementioned names from two partially redacted

versions of this document, one of which was from a version released

by the Department of Justice to the Committee on April 25, 2002,

that contained less redacted material.

3–24–65: An airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover discusses the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder: ‘‘In connection with

the information furnished by BS 837–C* relative to the possible

perpetrators of the murders of Anthony Sacrimone and Edward

Deegan, Capt. Robert Renfrew (NA), Chelsea, Mass. PD, was advised of the same information, as furnished by REDACTED. This informant also furnished basically the same information as did BS

837–C* relative to the murder of Edward Deegan [this appears to

be an error because Sacrimone was killed on 10/17/64] on 10/17/64.

This information was furnished to Inspector Henry Doherty of the

Everett, Mass. PD on 10/18/64.’’ The memorandum continues by

stating: ‘‘The Chelsea Police at that time had no knowledge of the

murder; however, when the body was discovered, they immediately

started to look for Roy French. French told them he was at the Ebb

Tide night club, Revere, Mass., all night and their investigation has

indicated that French got a telephone call about 8:45 p.m. After the

phone call he left the Ebb Tide with Joseph Barboza, Vincent

Flemmi, Ronnie Casessa [sic], Romeo Martin, and Frank [Francis]

Imbruglia. Further investigation reflected that they all returned

about 45 minutes later. The time of the murder was approximately

9:30 p.m., 3/12/65. Romeo Martin’s car was identified by a Chelsea

Police Officer as being parked with two men in it in the vicinity

of the murder. When the police officer approached the car, it sped

off.’’ 86

3–26–65: Special Agent Dennis Condon drafts a memorandum

that was completely redacted when released to this Committee.87

4–5–65: The first reported contact between Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi as an informant and Special Agent Paul Rico occurs. Rico

contacts Flemmi as an informant four times (5–10–65, 6–4–65, 7–

22–65 and 7–27–65) prior to Flemmi being closed on September 15,

1965.88

4–8–65: A memorandum from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover

and the New York SAC dated 4–13–65 states: ‘‘Informant [BS 837–

C*] also advised [on 4–8–65] that [Jerry Angiulo told Raymond

Patriarca that] Angiulo is of the opinion that Edward ‘Wimpy’ Bennett and [Vincent] James Flemmi are ‘stool pigeons.’ ’’ This memorandum also discusses how Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi was paid

$1,500 for disposing of the body of a girl. The handwritten notes

prepared by Special Agent Murphy while listening to the microphone surveillance indicate that Flemmi also cut the body into

pieces. In addition, the memorandum stated that Flemmi ‘‘admitted

that he was very friendly with Det. William Stewart [sic].’’ 89

4–9–65: An FBI Memorandum reflects information provided to

Special Agent Paul Rico by Jimmy Flemmi.90 [There are a number

of memoranda reflecting information provided by Flemmi to Rico.

Flemmi was closed on September 15, 1965.]

4–18–65: Raymond Patriarca is told that ‘‘[Boston Police Department employee] Stuart must be getting info from the Feds.’’

470

Gennaro Angiulo was also told that ‘‘Stuart + Flemmi went to NYC

on $100,000 of AMEXCO check (counterfeit) 5 or 6 months ago[.]’’

Patriarca is also told that Stuart and Flemmi were at a New York

grand jury.968

4–23–65: A three page FBI Memorandum is written on this date.

This document was entirely redacted by the Justice Department

when given to the Committee.91

5–3–65: FBI informant Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi, on his way to

meet Joseph Barboza, is shot at by two individuals with shotguns.

Flemmi is wounded. [This information is contained in a memorandum from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover dated 6–9–65.] (See

6–9–65 entry).92

Director Hoover is informed that the Raymond Patriarca microphone surveillance captured Patriarca questioning Jimmy Flemmi

about his association with Detective William Stuart of the Boston

Police. The summary notes that Patriarca ‘‘was concerned with

Flemmi being a ‘stool pigeon’ for Stewart [sic].’’ The surveillance

also captured Patriarca giving Flemmi permission to ‘‘finish off’’

Frank Smith.93

5–5–65: The Raymond Patriarca microphone surveillance gathers

the following information: ‘‘[I]nformant advised that Patriarca had

been approached by Joseph Barboza, Ronald Cassessa [sic], and

James Flemmi in order to obtain permission to kill Sammy Linden

of Revere, Mass. The reason for this killing was that Linden was

furnishing a considerable amount of money to the McLaughlin

group in their efforts to kill various individuals of the McLean

group. Subsequently the informant stated that Patriarca had not

given a definite ‘OK’ for the killing, but Barboza and his group was

of the opinion that he did. Linden heard of the fact that he was

marked for a ‘hit’ and went to Joseph Lombardo of Boston, Mass.

Lombardo, in turn, sent word to Patriarca, and after explaining the

situation the ‘hit’ was called off.’’ [This information is contained in

report prepared by Special Agent Charles Reppucci on 7–20–65.] 94

Also on this day, Henry Tameleo contacts Raymond Patriarca

and tells him that Joseph Lombardo told Tameleo that he had

heard that Barboza, Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi and Ronald Cassesso

received permission to kill Linden. Lombardo also told Tameleo to

instruct Barboza and Flemmi not to kill Linden. [This information

is contained in an airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover

and other field offices. (See 5–7–65 entry)]. 95

5–7–65: The Boston SAC sends an airtel to Director Hoover and

the SACs in New Haven, Connecticut, New York and Washington.

The airtel cites the BS 837–C* [Patriarca microphone surveillance]

as the source for the following: ‘‘A . . . lengthy discussion took

place wherein Joe Lombardo was very perturbed because Cassessa

[sic] and Joseph Barboza were associating with the Flemmi brothers; and further, that information had been put out to the effect

that Barboza was with Flemmi when they killed Edward

Deegan.’’ 96

471

5–12–65: By memorandum, Director Hoover informs the Attorney

General Nicholas Katzenbach of microphone surveillance at Jay’s

Lounge, located at 255 Tremont Street in Boston, Massachusetts.97

5–18–65: The Boston SAC notifies Director Hoover by airtel of

the following developments concerning Raymond Patriarca: ‘‘Joe

Barboza requests permission from Patriarca to kill some unknown

person. This person lives in a three-story house but Barboza has

never been able to line him up to kill him. Barboza told Raymond

that he plans to pour gasoline in the basement part of the house

and set it afire and thus either kill the individual by smoke inhalation or fire, or in the event he starts to climb out a window,

Barboza would have two or three individuals there with rifles to

kill him as he started to step out a window or door. Upon questioning by Patriarca, Barboza said that he had planned to cut the telephone wires so that the individual could not call for assistance and

also to ring false alarms in other sections of the city so that the

engines could not respond quickly. He also explained that the third

floor apartment was vacant but the first floor apartment was apparently occupied by the intended victim’s mother. This apparently

caused no concern to Barboza who stated it was not his fault that

the mother would be present, and he would not care whether the

mother died or not. Patriarca told him that he did not think it was

a good idea to effect the killing in the above manner and attempted

to dissuade Barboza from this type of killing as innocent people

would probably be killed. It was not clear to the informant whether

Barboza accepted Patriarca’s objections, but Patriarca indicated

very strongly against this type of killing.’’ 98

6–4–65: An airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover states

that the previous day ‘‘[REDACTED] went into detail concerning the

killing of Edward [Teddy] Deegan which had been previously reported, and the fact that the Attorney REDACTED of Everett, Mass.,

was called by Deegan’s accomplice at the time Deegan was killed.’’

The airtel later states ‘‘Taglianetti discussed a yard which he contemplates using in order to make a ‘hit.’ Informant did not know

who Taglianetti was referring to, but possibly Willy Marfeo, which

information had been disseminated previously. This group has been

attempting to kill Marfeo for over one year, but has not been successful, as yet.’’ 99

In a memorandum from Director Hoover to the Boston SAC, Hoover requests the following regarding BS 919 PC [Jimmy Flemmi]:

‘‘Advise Bureau by 7/1/65 [the] status of your efforts to effect the

development of the above-captioned target.’’ 100

6–8–65: Special Agent Paul Rico advises Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi ‘‘of the FBI’s jurisdiction and of his confidential relationship with the Bureau. Flemmi was told he was not a Bureau employee and that he was to furnish information only to the Bureau.

He also was told that any payments he received are to be considered as income and he is not to contact the office personally.’’ In

response, Flemmi states that ‘‘he is willing to aid the Bureau, as

he can help put away the individuals who attempted to kill

him.’’ 101

472

6–9–65: The Boston SAC writes a memorandum to Director Hoover, in response to Director Hoover’s inquiry five days earlier: ‘‘It

is known through other informants and sources of his office that

this individual has been in contact with Raymond L.S. Patriarca

and other members of La Cosa Nostra in this area, and potentially

could be an excellent informant. Concerning the informant’s emotional stability, the Agent handling the informant believes, from information obtained from other informants and sources, that BS–

919–PC [Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi] has murdered (REDACTED), (RE- DACTED), (REDACTED), (REDACTED), Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan, and (redacted), as well as a fellow inmate at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, Mass., and, from all indications, he is

going to continue to commit murder. . . . Although the informant

will be difficult to contact once he is released from the hospital because he feels that REDACTED SECTION will try to kill him, the informant’s potential outweighs the risk involved.’’ 102 [On April 25,

2002, the Department of Justice released an unredacted version of

this document to the Committee. That document revealed that ‘‘BS–

919–PC [Jimmy Flemmi] has murdered Frank Benjamin, John

Murray, George Ashe, Joseph Francione, Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan,

and ‘Iggy’ Lowry[.]’’ The document further divulged that Flemmi

feels that the McLaughlin group will try to kill him.]

6–10–65: An FBI document indicates that James Vincent Flemmi

was assigned to Special Agent Paul Rico on March 12, 1965. (See

3–12–65 entry).103

6–14–65: The Boston SAC is advised in an FBI Memorandum

from Correlator Helen Hatch, that on 3–9–65 ‘‘James [Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’] Flemmi and Joseph Barboza contacted [Raymond]

Patriarca, and they explained that they were having a problem

with [Edward] Teddy Deegan, and desired to get the ‘OK’ to kill

him. . . . Flemmi stated that Deegan is an arrogant, nasty sneak

and should be killed. Patriarca instructed them to obtain more information relative to Deegan and then to contact Jerry Angiulo at

Boston who would furnish them a decision.’’ [See 3–9–65 entry].

The memorandum also states that ‘‘Joe Lombardo was very perturbed because Cassessa [sic] and Joseph Barboza were associating

with the Flemmi brothers; and further, that information had been

put out to the effect that Barboza was with Flemmi when they

killed Edward Deegan.’’ The memorandum also reiterates the same

information provided in the FBI memorandum from Special Agent

REDACTED to the Boston SAC, dated 4–6–65. [See 3–23–65]. [This

memorandum also appears to bear Paul Rico’s signature, dated

March 20, 1967, at the bottom of the first page.] 104

7–9–65: Romeo Martin is shot and killed. In his 1973 book, My

Life In The Mafia, Vincent Teresa writes that Joseph Barboza

killed Martin. Teresa provides the following account of the Martin

murder: ‘‘In the time I knew him [Barboza], he handled more than

twenty-three murders, most of them on his own—I mean, they

weren’t ordered by the Office. Romeo Martin is a typical example

of what I mean. This was in 1965 [sic], in July. I’d been out all day

with Castucci and Romeo playing golf. Romeo was planning to

leave for Florida the next day with his wife. He’d just gotten married and was going to Florida for sort of a honeymoon. After we’d

473

played golf, I told Romeo to come over to the Ebbtide for a steak

dinner and a couple of drinks. While we’re talking, he said that he

and Barboza, after busting up a club, had had an argument. He

said he’d shaken the owner down for more money than he was supposed to and had held out on Barboza. Barboza had found out and

threatened to kill him. . . . When he [Martin] went outside,

Barboza and Cassesso were waiting for him. They grabbed him,

took him someplace, and pumped five slugs into him before dumping his body. When the cops found him, [Henry] Tameleo blew his

top at me. . . . [H]e said[,] ‘Why didn’t you get a hold of Joe

[Barboza] and stop it?’ . . . [I responded,] ‘Christ, Henry [Tameleo],

they were supposed to be friends. Who knows this animal is going

to kill him?’ That’s how treacherous Barboza was. The slightest

thing, the slightest word and he’d want to kill you.’’ (See 1973 and

1–29–74 entries).105

7–12–65: The microphone surveillance on Raymond Patriarca is

discontinued. See Prosecution memorandum from Walter T. Barnes

and Assistant U.S. Attorney Edward F. Harrington to Henry Petersen, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section regarding Raymond Patriarca, Henry Tameleo, and Ronald Cassesso

(June 6, 1967). [Note: Executive privilege was claimed over this

document. It is in the custody of the Justice Department.]

7–20–65: A report by Charles Reppucci of the Boston FBI Office

discusses the Raymond Patriarca microphone surveillance. The report reads, ‘‘[The microphone surveillance] advised on 3/9/65 that

James Flemmi and Joseph Barboza requested permission from

Patriarca to kill Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan, as they are having a problem with him. Patriarca ultimately furnished his ‘OK.’ ’’ 106 [See

also 3–9–65 entry.]

7–27–65: Special Agents Paul Rico and Raymond Ball author a

memorandum to the SAC regarding BS 919–PC (Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi) stating, ‘‘Informant advised that he himself is still recovering from wounds after being shot by Jimmy O’Toole and two

other unknown individuals, whom he believes were Stevie Hughes

and Edward ‘Punchy’ McLaughlin. . . . Informant also advised his

biggest regret is that he did not kill George McLaughlin . . . before

he became sought for murder.’’ 107

9–10–65: An FBI memorandum indicates that ‘‘REDACTED SECTION advised that Joseph Barboza had been arrested Friday night,

September 10, 1965, for beating a policeman with a gun at the Ebb

Tide in Revere, Massachusetts. REDACTED SECTION.’’ 108

9–15–65: According to a memorandum from the Boston Office to

Director Hoover, Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is closed as an informant after being charged with ‘‘Assault with a Dangerous Weapon

with Intent to Murder,’’ after shooting John Cutliffe. The memorandum further states that Flemmi failed to appear in court on September 3, 1965. The memorandum continues, ‘‘In view of the fact

that informant [Jimmy Flemmi] is presently a local fugitive, any

contacts with him might prove to be difficult and embarrassing. In

view of the above, this case is being closed.’’ [Paul Rico prepared

this memorandum.] See also Robert Turner, Vincent Flemmi Missing; Target of Underworld, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1965.109

474

10–20–65: Edward J. ‘‘Punchy’’ McLaughlin is killed by Joseph

Barboza and Chico ‘‘Joseph’’ Amico. See VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE

IN THE MAFIA 173 (1973).110

11–3–65: The Boston SAC notifies Director Hoover by memorandum of a potential addition to the Top Echelon Criminal Informant

Program, stating, ‘‘Stephen Joseph Flemmi, FBI REDACTED is being

designated as a target in this program.’’ The Boston SAC continues,

‘‘Although the LCN [La Cosa Nostra] in this area has not actively

taken part in this gang war, there is every possibility that they

may move into the picture in the near future and since Flemmi is

in contact with the leaders of the different groups that are against

the remaining McLaughlin faction, and that all these groups are

very aware of the possibility of LCN moving in to support the

McLaughlin group, it is felt that Flemmi will be in a position to

furnish information on LCN members in this area.’’ 111

11–15–65: Joseph Barboza murders Ray DiStasio, a member of

the McLaughlin mob, and John B. O’Neil, an innocent bystander.

In his book, My Life in the Mafia, Vincent Teresa writes, ‘‘Barboza

went into the club [searching for a member of the McLaughin mob

named Ray DiStasio] and caught DiStasio cold. The trouble was, a

poor slob named John B. O’Neil, who had a bunch of kids, walked

in to get a pack of cigarettes. Barboza killed them both because he

didn’t want any witnesses. DiStasio got two in the back of the head

and O’Neil got three. It was a shame. I mean, this O’Neil was a

family man—he had nothing to do with the mob. Barboza should

have waited. That’s why he was so dangerous. He was unpredictable. When he tasted blood, everyone in his way got it.’’ (See 1973

entry).112

11–19–65: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is convicted of armed assault

with intent to murder. He serves his time at the Massachusetts

State Prison at Walpole and is discharged on March 28, 1969.113

11–30–65: The Boston Globe reports that Joseph Barboza attended a bail hearing with his attorney, F. Lee Bailey. Assistant

District Attorney for Suffolk County Jack Zalkind said he had

three East Boston policemen in court who knew of three attempts

to kill Barboza. Ed Burns and Gordon Hillman, 3 Tries to Kill

Barboza, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 1965.114

1966

1966: Informants report that Barboza split with Connie Frizzi in

loan sharking to go into partnership with Arthur Bratsos.115

1–14–66: The United States Attorney’s Office in Boston, Massachusetts, receives a Boston gangland murder report that includes

a summary of the Deegan murder. The report, entitled ‘‘Boston

Gangland Murders; Criminal Intelligence Program’’ was prepared

by John Kehoe Jr. and is dated January 14, 1966. It covers the investigative period between November 15, 1965, and January 11,

1966. This report was approved by Boston SAC James Handley and

contains a section entitled ‘‘Informants’’ that is completely redacted

except for the following sentence: ‘‘REDACTED is BS 955–PC [Stephen Flemmi], contacted by SA H. Paul Rico.’’ The synopsis of the

report reads: ‘‘This report contains information concerning the varVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00484 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
475

ious gangland murders that have occurred in Boston and vicinity

from 5/4/64 through 11/15/65.’’ The report states the following

about the Deegan murder: ‘‘Method of Killing Teddy Deegan’s body

was found in a doorway in the alley off Fourth Street, Chelsea,

Massachusetts, behind the Lincoln National Bank, at 10:59 PM,

Monday, March 12, 1965. Shot in head and body with three different guns, one a .45 caliber and two .38 calibers. Background Edward Deegan was born January 2, 1930, Boston, Massachusetts,

and was employed spasmodically as a laborer. His record consisted

of ‘Larceny, Breaking and Entering, Felonious Assaults, Armed

Robbery, Accessory After the Fact to Assault with a Dangerous

Weapon, and Automobile thefts.’ REDACTED advised that James

Flemmi has told him that Deegan was lured to a finance company

in Chelsea, Massachusetts, where the door of the finance company

had been left open by an employee. At that time he was accompanied by Roy French who was actually setting Deegan up to be

killed, Joseph Romeo Martin, and Ronald Cassessa [sic]. All of

these individuals hung out at the Ebb Tide restaurant in Revere,

Massachusetts, and were close associates of Henry Tameleo, top

lieutenant of Raymond L.S. Patriarca. While Deegan was approaching the doorway, James Flemmi and Joseph Barboza, hoodlums

who were in the immediate vicinity, walked over to the car driven

by Tony ‘Stats’ Stathopoulos who had brought Deegan to the scene

of the proposed burglary. Barboza and Flemmi were going to kill

‘Stats’; however, ‘Stats’ saw them coming and immediately drove off

before any shots were fired. Flemmi told informant that Ronald

Cassessa [sic] and Romeo Martin wanted to prove to Raymond

Patriarca they were capable individuals and that is why they wanted to ‘hit’ Deegan. Flemmi indicated that they did an awful sloppy

job. It should be noted that prior to the time Deegan’s body was

found, ‘Stats’ apparently immediately proceeded to the offices of Attorney John Fitzgerald, thinking that the two individuals who approached him while waiting for Deegan to come out of the finance

company were Police Officers. After telling Fitzgerald the story,

Fitzgerald called the Chelsea, Massachusetts Police Department requesting information concerning Deegan. The Police Officer suggested that Fitzgerald come to the Police Department for the information, which Fitzgerald did. When he came the Police Officers,

having no knowledge of the escape or shooting, and having not, as

yet, found the body, talked to Fitzgerald at the station and commenced looking for the break. At this time they came upon the

body of Deegan behind the finance company. The above information

was furnished to the Police Department. However, as yet, they

have not obtained sufficient evidence to warrant production against

any of the above individuals.’’ 116

3–9–66: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi goes to prison in Massachusetts for 4–6 years for armed assault with intent to murder.117

3–31–66: According to Special Agent Paul Rico’s FBI personnel

records, Rico is rated excellent with comments that he had been assigned exclusively ‘‘to the development of Top Echelon informants

and had worked primarily on this important program.’’ The comments further state that Rico ‘‘had exceptional talent in his ability

476

to develop informants and his participation was considered outstanding.’’ 118

6–15–66: Rocco DiSeglio is murdered.119

7–13–66: William Marfeo is shot and killed. Vincent Teresa

writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, the following account of

William Marfeo’s murder: Butch Micelli’s ‘‘gang handled . . . the

hit on Willie Marfeo, a bookie who tried to operate on his own on

Federal Hill in Providence. Raymond [Patriarca] called [Joe]

Paterno [from New Jersey] for outside talent to whack out Marfeo

because Marfeo knew all our assassins. Butch paid a visit to the

office in Providence, and two days later [July 13, 1966] Marfeo was

shot while he was eating a pizza in the Korner Kitchen Restaurant

in Providence.’’ 120

9–23–66: Stephen Hughes and Samuel D. Lindenbaum are murdered. Vincent Teresa writes in My Life In The Mafia that

‘‘Barboza and Chico Amico knew that Hughes and Lindenbaum

were heading for Lawrence to take over some numbers and lottery

action’’ and ‘‘dropped Hughes and Lindenbaum right in their

seats.’’ 121

10–6–66: After receiving a letter from Joseph Barboza, Boston

Herald reporter James Southwood writes, ‘‘Barboza was arrested at

gunpoint in downtown Boston with Nicholas F. Femia, 27, Patrick

J. Fabiano, 24, both of East Boston, and Arthur C. Bratsos, 33, of

Medford. Police said the car the three were in had in it an Army

M–1 rifle, a loaded .45 caliber automatic pistol and a knife. At the

time, Barboza and Femia were out on bail in connection with a

stabbing three months earlier. Because of the pending court action

and a new charge of illegal possession of firearms, the bail set on

Barboza was high—$100,000.’’ James Southwood, A Letter from

Barboza, Why I Decided to Tell All, BOSTON HERALD, July 9, 1967.

[According to Vincent Teresa, this is when ‘‘[t]he law then began

applying a squeeze that was to force [Raymond] Patriarca to make

fatal mistakes.’’ (VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA

(1973).] 122

11–1–66: According to Dennis Condon’s personnel file, he is ‘‘involved in a substantive error write-up case when a review of an informant file assigned to him disclosed an instance of failure to

properly disseminate information obtained from the informant.’’

The informant had reported that an individual who was a suspect

in another FBI case had a machine gun in his possession and was

‘‘crazy.’’ Condon did not disseminate this information to the Treasury Department in accordance with the provisions of Manual of Instructions. Condon explained that he inadvertently failed to make

the appropriate dissemination because the suspect was under active investigation by the FBI. The SAC initialed the serial for filing

with the belief that the appropriate dissemination would be made

in a separate communication. No administrative action was taken

against Condon.123

Arthur Bratsos and Thomas J. DePrisco are found dead. The

Boston Herald reports, ‘‘Bratsos [32 of Medford] and Thomas J.

DePrisco, 27, of Roslindale, . . . friend[s] of Barboza, went out and

tried to raise bail for [Barboza, who was in jail on a gun-carrying

477

charge.] They started shaking down the wrong people and on Nov.

1, 1966[,] Bratsos and DePrisco were found in a black Cadillac in

South Boston. They were dead. And the money was gone.’’ James

Southwood, A Letter from Barboza, Why I Decided to Tell All, BOSTON HERALD, July 9, 1967; see also Killer Barboza Slain, BOSTON

HERALD, Feb. 12, 1976; 1973 entry. [Note: On January 25, 1967,

Barboza is found guilty of the gun-carrying charge and is sentenced

to four to five years at Walpole. Nick Femia and Patrick Fabiano

are sentenced with him. See 1–25–67 entry.] 124

11–7–66: The U.S. Supreme Court issues its landmark decision

regarding electronic surveillance in Black v. U.S., 385 U.S. 26

(1966). The Court finds that the listening ‘‘device monitored and

taped conversations held in the hotel suite during the period the

[alleged criminal] offense was being investigated and beginning

some two months before and continuing until about one month

after the evidence in this case was presented to the Grand Jury.

During that period, ‘the monitoring agents,’ the Solicitor General

advised overheard, among other conversations, exchanges between

petitioner and the attorney who was then representing him (Black)

in this case.’’ Thus, the Court holds, ‘‘In view of these facts it appears that justice requires that a new trial be held so as to afford

the petitioner an opportunity to protect himself from the use of evidence that might be otherwise inadmissible.’’ U.S. v. Black, 385

U.S. 26, 27–29 (1966).125

12–7–66: Joseph Barboza’s partner Chico Joseph Amico is killed

while Barboza is incarcerated in Charles Street Jail.126

12–22–66: Director Hoover advises the Acting Attorney General

by memorandum: ‘‘The installation of the eavesdropping device

placed in Jay’s Lounge was made under the general authority of

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. By memorandum of May 12,

1965, Attorney General Katzenbach was advised that the device

had been in operation since January 9, 1963, and he authorized its

continuance. It was discontinued on July 12, 1965.’’ This document

was copied to the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.127

12–27–66: In U.S. v. Taglianetti, 274 F.Supp. 220, 221–22 (D.

R.I. 1967), the Court finds, ‘‘[T]he Government filed with [First Circuit Court] of Appeals [on 12–27–66] a motion to remand the

[Taglianetti] case to this court [U.S. District Court for the District

of Rhode Island] for ‘further proceedings.’ In said motion the Government stated in substance that the Federal Bureau of Investigation in March, 1962, installed a microphone, by means of a trespass, at the place of business of a close business associate of defendant [Louis Taglianetti] where defendant and others frequently

met; that on various occasions between 1962 and 1965 defendant’s

conversations were monitored by agents of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, certain of which related to that indictment upon

which the defendant was tried and convicted; that logs were kept

in which there appear summaries of these and other conversations

in which defendant participated; that although tape recordings

were also made of said conversations, they were later routinely

erased, but the logs are in existence[.]’’ According to Taglianetti,

478

‘‘on January 17, 1967, the Court of Appeals remanded said case for

the limited purpose requested by the Government in its motion[.]

. . . After said remand, this court, upon the motion of the defendant, entered its orders dated March 8, 1967 and April 17, 1967, directing the Government to deliver to the defendant and his counsel

for examination and inspection copies of all logs containing summaries of all monitored conversations in which the defendant

[Taglianetti] participated at said place of business of his close business associate, and copies of any and all memoranda and airtels

summarizing such conversations.’’ The defendants motion for production and inspection of all logs, memoranda and airtels containing summaries of the monitored conversations of other persons on

said premises in which he did not participate. U.S. v. Taglianetti,

274 F. Supp. 220, 221–22 (1967).128

1967

1–25–67: Joseph Barboza, Nick Femia, and Patrick Fabiano are

all found guilty on possession of weapons charges and immediately

sentenced to prison. Barboza is sentenced to 4–5 years for having

a gun in an automobile, and 4–5 years for a similar charge involving a knife. These sentences will run concurrently. Barboza also is

sentenced to 4–5 years probation following his prison term on a receiving stolen property charge. The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘Extraordinary precautions were taken with the transport of Baron and

Femia to state prison. . . . [P]recautions were taken because of ‘the

climate in the underworld today.’ In the past two years, 42 persons

have been slain in gangland warfare.’’ (Cornelius Moynihan, Two

Others Convicted, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1967). [Note: The following year, law enforcement officials were concerned that Barboza

would force Fabiano to provide perjured testimony in trials occurring in 1968. See 3–28–67 entry.] 129

2–7–67: According to the Justice Department, Stephen Flemmi

began to work for the FBI as a Top Echelon Criminal Informant.

(Interview with Assistant United States Attorney John Durham

(Dec. 2, 2002)).

2–14–67: Stephen Flemmi is approved as a Top Echelon Informant, according to an FBI Office of Professional Responsibility Report (published as Appendix II to the Report).130

3–8–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon interview

Joseph Barboza at Walpole State Prison. Barboza says he will talk

to the agents as long as they do not testify against him for what

he tells them. The say they will respect his confidence. Barboza advised that ‘‘as a matter of fact, he used to see Raymond Patriarca

and get an ‘OK’ before he made most of his moves.’’ Barboza ‘‘made

statements that he was going to kill several’’ people who killed

three of Barboza’s friends (Thomas J. DePrisco, Arthur C. Bratsos,

Joseph W. Amico) and stole $70,000 from him. The agents learn

that Barboza ‘‘knows what has happened in practically every murder that has been committed in this area. He said that he would

never provide information that would allow James Vincent

[‘Jimmy’] Flemmi to ‘fry’ but that he will consider furnishing inforVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00488 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
479

mation on these murders.’’ [There appears to be a REDACTED SECTION immediately following this quote.] 131

3–21–67: Joseph Barboza is interviewed in Boston by H. Paul

Rico and Dennis Condon. John Fitzgerald was present. (See 3–28–

67 entry).132

A teletype from the Boston Office to Director Hoover reads, ‘‘REDACTED SECTION. Boston ‘Record American’ received call from someone at Walpole Correctional Institution, Walpole, Mass., that

Barboza was taken out by federal authorities and headlines in this

afternoon’s paper stated that U.S. Government opened its war on

crime by bringing gang leader from Walpole for appearance before

federal grand jury.’’ 133

3–28–67: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by memorandum of an interview of Joseph Barboza conducted on March 21,

1967. This interview was a follow-up to an interview conducted on

March 8, 1967. Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon conducted the interview at the Federal Building in Boston. Barboza

conferred with his attorney, John Fitzgerald, at one point, received

some advice, and then continued the interview. [Information obtained by the Committee from the FBI indicates that Fitzgerald’s

girlfriend may have been an FBI informant.] Barboza said he

would talk to the agents, but he would not testify to any information that he was furnishing at this time. Barboza stated that since

the last time he talked to the agents, he had concluded that they

have a common enemy in the ‘‘Italian organization.’’ He would like

to help the FBI in its efforts to obtain evidence against the ‘‘Italian

organization.’’ Barboza said he hopes Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett Byrne appreciates Barboza’s assistance and gives him

a break on his two cases pending in Suffolk County. Barboza said

he also discussed his last interview with the agents with Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi, and he told Flemmi that he was considering having Patrick Fabiano cooperate with the FBI. Flemmi thought that

was an excellent idea. Barboza was informed that he could be making a very serious mistake in talking to any other inmate concerning his interview with the FBI. Barboza told the agents that Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan had been causing some problems and had

been ‘‘out of order’’ at the Ebb Tide Restaurant. This document further states, ‘‘This office is aware of the distinct possibility that Barron [Barboza], in order to save himself from a long prison sentence,

may try to intimidate Fabiano into testifying to something that he

may not be a witness to.’’ Joseph Barboza says he does not know

who killed William Marfeo, and he had nothing to do with the murder. (This information was redacted in the documented provided to

the Committee but was discovered when the Justice Department

permitted the Committee to review an unredacted version of the

document.) [There are many redactions in this document, including

entire pages.] 134

3–31–67: In a performance appraisal, Special Agent Dennis

Condon receives an excellent rating. It is noted that he handled

complicated matters in an able and capable fashion. It is further

noted that he is dependable, enthusiastic and showed a great interest in the Bureau’s work. The appraisal also states that he has an

480

outstanding knowledge of the hoodlum and gambling element in

the Boston area and is considered to be an outstanding investigator. In particular, his participation in the informant program is

considered outstanding. However, according to the appraisal,

Condon is not interested in administrative advancement.135

4–18–67: Police informer Joe Lanzi is killed by three of Jerry

Angiulo’s enforcers—Benjamin DeChristoforo, Carmine Gagliardi,

and Frank Oreto. (VINCENT TERESA, MY LIFE IN THE MAFIA

(1973)).136

4–24–67: Joseph Barboza is convicted for unlawfully carrying a

weapon and a dagger in a motor vehicle. He is subsequently sentenced to not more than 4–5 years for the first charge and 4–5

years for the second charge. Both sentences are to be served concurrently.137

4–27–67: FBI Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon interview Joseph Barboza at Barnstable County Jail.

5–16–67: FBI Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact Ronald Cassesso at the U.S. Attorney’s Office prior to his appearance before a federal grand jury: ‘‘Cassessa [sic] was told that

if he would cooperate in the investigation of organized crime, and,

if he was of material help, his assistance would be brought to the

attention of local authorities and his degree of cooperation would

also be made known to the Parole Board. Cassessa [sic] said that

he had nothing to worry about and did not plan to furnish any information before a Grand Jury.’’ 138

5–19–67: Chief Judge Edward Day of the U.S. District Court in

Providence, Rhode Island, releases the ‘‘Taglianetti Logs’’ to Louis

Taglianetti and his attorneys. The logs are summaries of wiretapped conversations recorded by the Raymond Patriarca microphone surveillance. (CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE: ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE GOVERNMENT 124 (1972)).139

5–24–67: Director Hoover instructs the Boston SAC by airtel that

‘‘a review of the Bureau records reveals that no investigation of

Barron [Barboza] has ever been conducted by your office. In view

of the current circumstances, the Bureau should be cognizant of all

background information. Therefore, you should submit to the Bureau an investigative report per instructions set out under the

Criminal Intelligence Program containing all background and identifying data available.’’ 140

6–6–67: A memorandum from Walter T. Barnes and Assistant

U.S. Attorney Edward F. Harrington to Henry Peterson, Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. The memorandum is

typed by Harrington, dated June 6, 1967, and discusses proposed

prosecutions of Raymond Patriarca, Henry Tameleo and Ronald

Cassesso. Joseph Barboza is an unindicted co-conspirator. The following are important points made in this memorandum. Numbers

in parentheses coincide with page numbers in the memorandum.

[Note: The original memorandum is not appended to the Committee’s chronology and is retained in Justice Department files.]

‘‘[T]here has . . . been excellent cooperation between United States

Attorney Paul Markham, District Attorney Garrett Byrne, and the

481

F.B.I. District Attorney Byrne has, at our request, held off calling

Baron before a local grand jury until we have concluded our investigation.’’ (3) There is a short redacted section. (3) ‘‘Lastly, with respect to Baron’s willingness to talk, he is, of course, desirous of obtaining some favorable consideration in connection with the local

charges still pending against him.’’ (3) Patriarca, in the presence of

Henry Tameleo, told Baron and Cassesso that he wanted Willie

Marfeo ‘‘whacked out.’’ (4) ‘‘Patriarca told Baron and Cassesso that

he would give all the help he could in aiding them to kill Willie

Marfeo.’’ (4) ‘‘Patriarca explained to Baron that he was angry because Marfeo’s crap game had been creating a lot of ‘‘heat’’ on

Patriarca’s crap game and on his booking operations.’’ (4) Shortly

thereafter, Patriarca called off the proposed murder. (5) Seven or

eight months later, Tameleo told Barboza that ‘‘Marfeo got it.’’

Tameleo explained the details of Marfeo’s murder to Barboza. (5–

6) ‘‘The establishment of the agreement will not be based on circumstantial evidence or inferences arising therefrom but rather the

very agreement itself will be testified to by one of the individuals

who was to participate in its execution. The overt acts which took

place in Massachusetts are especially appropriate in a case involving a gangland assassination in that it has always been one of the

essential factors in perpetrating a successful ‘‘hit’’ that the contract

be given to an out-of-state ‘‘torpedo’’ as a means of minimizing the

chance of detection of the assassination and thus lessening the risk

that the individual who planned the assassination be traced.’’ (13)

There is a short redacted section that appears to discuss a discrepancy in dates. (13) In a section discussing weak points in the government’s case, it is noted that the electronic surveillance of

Barboza proves that ‘‘his testimony is true[,]’’ and this is ‘‘of special

significance[.]’’ (15) ‘‘Raymond Patriarca was the subject of an

F.B.I. electronic surveillance by means of an electronic eavesdropping device installed by trespass at his place of business, 168

Atwells Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island, during the period

March 6, 1962 to July 12, 1965.’’ (16) ‘‘Walter Barnes . . . and Edward F. Harrington reviewed 26 volumes of FBI logs, memoranda

and airtels in the Boston office of the FBI.’’ (16) ‘‘It is clear that

we will have to disclose all of the material pertaining to the FBI

electronic surveillance of Patriarca since the device was in his place

of business and some of the overheard conversations are clearly relevant. Some of this material has already been disclosed in connection with the income tax case against Louis Taglianetti of Providence, Rhode Island.’’ (16) ‘‘We were also informed that an other

[sic] associate of Patriarca’s namely Joseph Modica, was the subject

of an electronic surveillance by means of an electronic eavesdropping device installed by trespass at his place of business, the

Piranha Finance Company, 85 State Street, Boston, Massachusetts,

during the period May 7, 1964 and July 12, 1965. The overheard

conversations are reflected in logs, memoranda and airtels.’’ (16)

There is a six page section titled ‘‘Pertinent Excerpts from the Logs

of the Electronics [sic] Surveillance at 168 Atwells Avenue, Providence, Rhode Island.’’ (17) ‘‘January 28, 1965—Henry Tameleo tells

Patriarca that Joseph Barboza ‘‘hit’’ the guy in Revere.’’ (17)

‘‘March 4, 1965—An unman contacts Patriarca and states that he

has brought down Flemmi and Joseph Barboza. Patriarca is infuriVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00491 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ated at Frank Smith for allowing Flemmi and Barboza to come to

see him without prior authorization. Patriarca makes arrangements to meet with Barboza and Flemmi in a garage shortly thereafter, as he does not want to meet these two individuals at his

place of business.’’ (17) ‘‘March 5, 1965—Jerry Angiulo states to

Patriarca that Vin [Jimmy] Flemmi was with Joseph Barboza when

Barboza killed Jackie Francione in Revere, Massachusetts, several

months ago.’’ (18) ‘‘March 9, 1965—James Flemmi and Joseph

Barboza contact Patriarca and during the meeting explain to

Patriarca that they are having a problem with Teddy Deegan and

desire to get an ‘‘okay’’ to kill him. Flemmi and Barboza tell

Patriarca that Deegan is looking for an excuse to ‘‘wack [sic] out’’

Bobby Donati who is friendly with Rico Sacrimone. Patriarca instructs Flemmi and Barboza to obtain more information relating to

Deegan and then to contact Jerry Angiulo at Boston who would furnish them with a decision whether they could kill Deegan.’’ (18)

‘‘May 3, 1965—James Flemmi, Ronald Cassessa, and Joseph

Barboza contact Patriarca and discuss ‘‘hitting’’ an unnamed individual.’’ (19) ‘‘May 5, 1965—Henry Tameleo tells Patriarca that Joe

Lombardo of Boston told Tameleo that he had received information

that Barboza, Cassessa and Jimmy Flemmi had received the ‘‘okay’’

to kill Sammy Linden for the reason that Linden was on the side

of the McLaughlin group and had been furnishing them with considerable money so that they could continue in their efforts to kill

individuals connected with the McLean group. Patriarca tells

Tameleo to contact Barboza and Flemmi and to instruct them to

forget the ‘‘hit’’ on Sammy Linden in that ‘‘he is connected with one

of our group.’’ Tameleo tells Patriarca that Joe Lombardo was perturbed because Cassessa and Barboza were associating with the

Flemmi brothers and information had been put out to the effect

that Barboza was with Flemmi when Teddy Deegan was killed;

that Lombardo had expressed concern that the Italian group, because of Barboza’s and Cassessa’s associations might be drawn into

the McLaughlin-McLean feud, and because of this, Lombardo had

told Barboza and Cassessa to stay away from the Flemmis.’’ (19)

‘‘May 10, 1965—An unman mentions that Barboza had previously

talked with Patriarca regarding unknown topic and that Flemmi

had told Barboza that Patriarca had given him an ‘‘okay’’ to kill

Linden.’’ ‘‘May 13, 1965—Cassessa and Barboza and Henry

Tameleo contact Patriarca. Barboza discusses his prospective killing of an individual by the name of O’Toole and the means by

which he is to carry out the murder.’’ (19) The June 22, 1965, entry

is a very long detailed recitation of the plan to murder Willie

Marfeo. Patriarca is clearly the principal involved in planning the

murder. ‘‘The killers are named as Barboza and Cassessa. . . .

Patriarca states that he would love to kill Marfeo himself.’’ (20)

‘‘The Bureau monitor overheard the conversation between

Patriarca, Tameleo and Baron on June 22, 1965, in which Patriarca

hired Baron to kill Marfeo and recorded it in the log. However, the

conversation was not picked up on the tape recorder through some

inexplicable mechanical failure. Accordingly, the Bureau supervisor

in Boston who regularly reviewed the logs and tapes, in noting that

the tape had failed to record the conversation, did not incorporate

the information in any memoranda, airtel, or Bureau report, nor

483

did the Bureau supervisor disseminate the information to other

agents.’’ (23) Information about an attempt by someone other than

Barboza to kill Marfeo was disseminated to Paul Rico and Dennis

Condon. (23) ‘‘It should also be noted that Special Agent Rico of the

F.B.I. did receive information on July 1, 1965, from a live informant, that Patriarca had hired Joe Baron to ‘‘hit’’ Willie Marfeo.’’

(23) ‘‘On January 12, 1967, the I.R.S. informant furnished information to [REDACTED] that in view of the fact that the Boston organization had killed several of Baron’s criminal associates, Baron

might be willing to talk.’’ This information was given to Walter

Barnes, who gave it to U.S. Attorney Markham and Henry Peterson. Peterson then requested Barnes to arrange an interview with

Barboza at ‘‘the earliest opportunity.’’ (24) Barnes found that

Barboza was on trial in local court for illegal possession of firearms. ‘‘It was inappropriate to interview Baron at this time so Mr.

Barnes returned to Washington and was later advised that Baron

had been convicted and sentenced to four to five years on January

25, 1967, and was immediately incarcerated in Walpole Prison. Mr.

Barnes returned to Boston in February, 1967, at which time

Barnes requested Special Agents Rico and Condon of the F.B.I. to

interview Baron at an appropriate time and place.’’ (24) ‘‘It should

be noted again that Special Agents Rico and Condon were, as a

matter of fact, never made aware of the information overheard by

a Bureau monitor on June 22, 1965, and which forms the basis of

this indictment. As mentioned above, Special Agent Rico received

information from a live source on July 1, 1965, that Patriarca had

hired Baron to kill Marfeo.’’ (24)

6–20–67: By memorandum, the Boston SAC recommends to Director Hoover that Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon receive quality salary increases. The memorandum discusses Rico

and Condon’s handling and development of Top Echelon Criminal

Informants in the Boston Office, including informant BS 955 C–TE

[Stephen Flemmi], and praised their efforts and results. The memorandum also describes Barboza as a murderous ruffian: ‘‘BS 955 C–

TE [Stephen Flemmi] was developed by [Rico and Condon] and via

imaginative direction and professional ingenuity utilized said

source in connection[] with interviews of Joseph Baron, a professional assassin responsible for numerous homicides and acknowledged by all professional law enforcement representatives in this

area to be the most dangerous individual known. SAs Rico and

Condon contacted Baron in an effort to convince him he should testify against the LCN [La Cosa Nostra]. Baron initially declined to

testify but through utilization of BS 955 C–TE [Stephen Flemmi],

the agents were able to convey to Baron that his present incarceration and potential for continued incarceration for the rest of his

life, was wholly attributable to LCN efforts directed by Gennaro

[Jerry] Angiulo, LCN Boston head. As a result of this information

received by Baron from BS 955 C–TE [Stephen Flemmi], said individual said he would testify against the LCN members.’’ This

memorandum also states: ‘‘The indictments against Patriarca,

Tameleo and Casesso are the first major blow to the LCN in New

England. Patriarca, as LCN boss and possible Commission member, and his top lieutenant, Henry Tameleo, were felt to be beyond

prosecution by top state and local police officials based on what for

484

years resulted in frustration in securing witnesses who would testify. . . . SAs Condon and Rico were assigned to develop a prosecutable quality case against top LCN members in New England.

They have done so via highest devotion to duty, requiring personal

sacrifices, in time, on a continuing basis.’’ [This document is heavily redacted.] 141 [Note: Dennis Condon later told the Committee

that he was not involved in the development of Stephen Flemmi as

an informant.]

A federal grand jury indicts Raymond Patriarca on charges that

he and two others had conspired to engineer the murder of William

Marfeo over a competitive gambling enterprise Marfeo was running. (CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE: ORGANIZED CRIME

AND THE GOVERNMENT 124 (1972)).142

6–22–67: Between June 22, 1967 and July 3, 1967, Officer

Robson talked to Anthony Stathopoulos on several occasions. While

Stathopoulos was incarcerated with Patrick Fabiano at Deer Island, Fabiano said the ‘‘beef’’ between Barboza and Stathopoulos

had been cleared up. Stathopoulos told Officer Robson that on the

night Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan was murdered, he actually saw Ronnie Cassesso with a gun in his hand and Romeo Martin. ‘‘He did

not see the others involved.’’ Stathopoulos also said that Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi met with him, Deegan, and one other at a restaurant to discuss ‘‘arrangement to silence’’ Anthony Sacrimone because Sacrimone was too talkative about the Populo theft. Shortly

after this meeting, Flemmi was shot and unable to complete the

job. (Undated and Undetermined Police Report; see also 5–3–65

entry).143

6–23–67: J.H. Gale, the Boston SAC, writes a memorandum to

Cartha DeLoach recommending incentive awards for Paul Rico and

Dennis Condon. The memorandum states, ‘‘SA Rico through a resourceful and diligent effort in October 1964, obtained the cooperation of REDACTED SECTION. Based upon development of this source,

the Boston Office was able to determine the basic reasons for the

numerous gangland slayings in the Boston area and the identities

of many of the individuals involved in these murders. . . . As a direct result of the shrewd guidance given the informant by SAs Rico

and Condon, REDACTED SECTION. This information has been vitally

important in establishing the Interstate Transportation in Aid of

Racketeering violation against [Raymond] Patriarca and his chief

LCN [La Cosa Nostra] henchman, Henry Tameleo, who were arrested this week by Bureau Agents. REDACTED SECTION. SAs

Condon and Rico also developed another top echelon informant, BS

955–C–TE [Stephen Flemmi]. He [Stephen Flemmi] was most effectively utilized to convince Joseph Barboza, the professional assassin, that he should testify against Patriarca and his associates. The

informant’s efforts with skillful interviews of REDACTED by SAs

Rico and Condon resulted in REDACTED appearance before a Federal Grand Jury and the indictments of Patriarca and Tameleo.

The arrest of Patriarca and Tameleo by Bureau Agents received extensive publicity and constituted a major blow against LCN. These

noteworthy achievements were brought about by the development

and handling of top echelon informants by SAs Rico and Condon.’’

The document continues, ‘‘SA Rico’s resourcefulness and diligent efVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00494 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
485

forts to obtain cooperation of an informant, REDACTED SECTION resulted in receipt of much accurate and authentic data regarding

gangland slayings in the Boston area. SAs Rico and Condon thereafter shrewdly guided him, which, REDACTED SECTION. They developed still another top echelon informant and their efforts culminated in the arrest of Raymond Patriarca, La Cosa Nostra leader

in New England, and Henry Tameleo, his chief henchman.’’ This

memorandum also indicates that Rico and Condon were censured.144

6–27–67: The Government files a memorandum and places logs

of the Raymond Patriarca surveillance conducted at 168 Atwells

Avenue in Providence, Rhode Island, in the custody of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts.145

7–3–67: According to letters from Director Hoover to Paul Rico

and Dennis Condon, the agents each receive a $150 incentive

award for the ‘‘developing and skillful handling of several confidential sources of great concern to the Bureau in the criminal

field[.]’’ 146

An FBI Memorandum from S.R. Burns to Mr. Walsh, dated October 22, 1975, states that Dennis Condon received a $150 incentive

award on this date (7–3–67) ‘‘in recognition of his developing and

handling several confidential sources of much interest to the Bureau in the criminal field. (Re: BS 868 C–TE, BS 954 C–TE, BS

955 C–TE [Stephen Flemmi]).’’ 147

7–9–67: James Southwood writes in the Boston Herald: ‘‘A few

months ago, Barboza was transferred from the state prison to the

Barnstable County House of Correction on Cape Cod—for the obvious reason of removing him from the company of men still loyal to

the Cosa Nostra. He was placed in isolation there and only the two

FBI agents [presumably Rico and Condon] can get in to see

him.’’ 148

7–18–67: Thomas Sullivan from the Boston FBI Office reports on

Joseph Barboza per instructions from Director Hoover (See 5–24–

67 entry). Sullivan’s report reads, ‘‘Enclosures to Bureau—Original

and one copy of a letterhead memorandum characterizing informants used in this report.’’ The section on informants is completely

redacted. A large portion of the text under the heading Administrative is also redacted. That portion reads as follows: ‘‘REDACTED SECTION. REDACTED SECTION that Ronnie Cassessa [sic] and Joe

Barboza were responsible for the shooting of Romeo Martin in Revere, Massachusetts. REDACTED SECTION. REDACTED SECTION that

Joseph Barboza was the individual who shot and killed Di Stasio

and O’Neil at the Mickey Mouse Lounge in Revere, Massachusetts,

the previous weekend. The informant stated that Barboza had been

in the Mickey Mouse Lounge a couple of weeks ago and after he

left, someone took several shots at him and Barboza suspected that

Di Stasio had set him up with the McLaughlin crowd. As a result

of this, Barboza returned and killed Di Stasio and O’Neil. REDACTED SECTION that Joseph ‘‘Chico’’ Amico and Guy Frizzi are always together and were usually with Joe Barboza before Barboza

went to jail. The informant stated he heard reports that Barboza

and Guy Frizzi were the ones who ‘‘bumped off’’ [Edward] Teddy

486

Deegan a few months ago in Chelsea, Massachusetts. REDACTED

SECTION that while Joe Barboza was on trial in Suffolk Superior

Court he decided to make one more ‘‘hit.’’ He was trying to hit ‘‘Indian Al’’ from Medford, Massachusetts. At the time Barboza made

his move against ‘‘Indian Al,’’ he was in the company of ‘‘Chico’’

Amico, Rick [sic] Femia, and Guy Frizzi. REDACTED SECTION that

Joseph Barboza, Romeo Martin and Ronnie Cassessa [sic] are frequently in attendance at the Ebb Tide in Revere, Massachusetts.

REDACTED SECTION that Joe Barboza is very frequently with Romeo

Martin, Ronnie Cassessa [sic], and Frank [Francis] Imbruglia.

Barboza was supposed to have ‘‘hit’’ Francione of Revere, Massachusetts, and also ‘‘hit’’ Eaton. He also stated that Barboza was in

prison with Benjamin, who was murdered after he left prison. The

informant stated that Barboza is a Portuguese kid who would otherwise be accepted into the LCN [La Cosa Nostra] except for his

nationality. Barboza claims that he shot Teddy Deegan with a .45

caliber gun. Barboza indicated that Roy French was with Deegan

and another individual when Deegan was shot by Barboza and two

other individuals, one of whom the informant believes was Romeo

Martin. The informant stated he heard that Joe Barboza was extremely friendly with Jimmy Flemmi. The informant added that

Barboza tried to reach [Vincent] Jimmy Flemmi a short time ago

and wanted to know if Flemmi had gone to Providence, Rhode Island, to see Raymond Patriarca. REDACTED stated that he had

heard that Joe Barboza made the statement that Roy French was

on the way out. Informant stated that French hangs around the

Ebb Tide in Revere and appears to be friendly with Barboza, Ronnie Cassessa [sic] and other individuals.’’ REDACTED SECTION. RE- DACTED SECTION. This case is being placed in a closed status inasmuch as all information developed from interviews of Barboza by

SA Dennis M. Condon and SA H. Paul Rico is being placed in Boston File 166–629 entitled ‘Raymond L.S. Patriarca, aka; et al.

ITAR.’ ’’ (See also Barboza’s Suffolk County Court Record from 1945

to 1967).149

Thomas Sullivan from the Boston FBI Office files an additional

report regarding Joseph Barboza. A large portion of the text under

the heading Activities is redacted. That portion reads as follows:

‘‘REDACTED SECTION advised that Joseph Barboza had been arrested Friday night, September 10, 1965, for beating a policeman

with a gun at the Ebb Tide in Revere, Massachusetts. REDACTED

SECTION. REDACTED SECTION stated that the general rumor REDACTED SECTION was that Joseph Barboza of Revere was under

contract to be assassinated since he was tied into the McLean—

McLaughlin feud. REDACTED SECTION stated that Joseph Barboza

split with Connie Frizzi in loansharking and was then in partnership with Arthur Bratsos. Informant added that Barboza had plenty of money and had just purchased a new home in Swampscott,

Massachusetts. REDACTED SECTION advised that he had been frequenting the Ebb Tide in Revere, Massachusetts, that it was being

operated by Richard Castucci and Nicholas Junior Ventola. Informant added that Joseph Barboza, Romeo Martin and Ronnie

Cassessa [sic] were frequently in attendance at the Ebb Tide. REDACTED SECTION stated that Joseph Barboza had married[.] . . .

Informant added that the subject frequently visited the Ebb Tide

487

and it was rumored that Barboza was the killer of Joseph

Francione in Revere. REDACTED SECTION stated that Guy Frizzi

and Joseph Barboza, who hung around at North Station, occasionally were there to see Johnny Bats who worked for the Boston Garden Corporation. Informant added that Bats was associated with

Frizzi and Barboza in the money lending activities. REDACTED SECTION stated that on May 3, 1965, Joseph Barboza and Ronnie

Cassessa [sic] were looking for [Vincent] Jimmy Flemmi REDACTED

SECTION and returned in the evening of May 3, 1965. Informant

further stated that it was later during the evening of May 3, 1967

[sic], that Flemmi was shot when he left his home on Adams

Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts. REDACTED SECTION.’’ 150

8–9–67: A memorandum from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover

advises, ‘‘In statement to press, District Attorney Byrne stated that

this tremendous penetration into the La Cosa Nostra and the hoodlum element was effected through the outstanding investigative efforts of the FBI and his office. As a matter of information, this entire case which was presented to the grand jury by DA Byrne was

developed through the efforts and able handling of Barboza by SA

H. Paul Rico and Dennis M. Condon of the Boston office. They also

cooperated fully with DA Byrne in the preparation of this matter

for the grand jury. I know that this indictment would not have

been possible in any sense of the word if it were not for the efforts

of these agents and the FBI at Boston. . . . I further recommend

that Supervisor John F. Kehoe who supervised this entire program

and was involved deeply in the developments and the planning relative to Barboza and the matters attendant to this indictment be

strongly commended for his excellent supervision.’’ 151

8–14–67: In a letter from Director Hoover to Special Agent Paul

Rico, Hoover commends Rico for his ‘‘splendid services in a phase

of the investigation of Raymond L.S. Patriarca and others[.]’’ 152

Dennis Condon also receives a letter of commendation from the

FBI for his excellent performance in connection with the investigation of the Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering case

involving Raymond L.S. Patriarca and others.153

8–28–67: ‘‘On [this date] August 28, 1967, BS 955–CTE [Stephen

Flemmi] furnished the following information to SA H. Paul Rico:

The informant advised that Larry Baione asked the informant to

contact [Vincent] ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi on behalf of Gennaro [Jerry]

Angiulo to see what Flemmi can do to keep Nick Femmia from testifying against anyone and to see if Flemmi can find some way to

destroy Joe Barboza’s testimony against [Raymond] Patriarca and

[Jerry] Angiulo. The informant advised that this puts Jimmy

Flemmi in a very bad position because Jimmy Flemmi owes

Angiulo over $10,000, and is therefore indebted to him. The informant knows that Jimmy Flemmi would just as soon see Patriarca

and Tameleo get hurt but that he has always looked down on

Angiulo as a source of money for him and he feels that Flemmi

would want to help Angiulo. The informant advised, however, that

he will, when he is talking to Flemmi point out to him that

Barboza could end up seriously hurting him, Jimmy Flemmi, if he,

Flemmi, did anything to attempt to discredit Barboza. Informant

488

further advised that he has learned that Larry Baione and Peter

Limone have received information that Joe Barboza is going to testify for Suffolk County on the murder of [Edward] Teddy Deegan

and that they in all probability attempt to make sure that Anthony

Stathopoulos will not be around to corroborate Barboza’s testimony.

The informant advised that he believes Stathopoulos’ life is in danger.’’ [This information is contained in a report dated 9–18–67 from

FBI Special Agent Charles Reppucci.] 154

9–8–67: Detective John Doyle of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office interviews Joseph Barboza at the Barnstable County

Jail in Barnstable, Massachusetts, in the presence of FBI Special

Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon.155

Boston police take Anthony Stathopoulos to the Barnstable

County Jail where he talks with Joseph Barboza. Barboza and

Stathopoulos talk about the events of the day of the Deegan murder, March 12, 1965, and about testimony that he and Barboza

were going to give before a grand jury about the night of the

Deegan murder. Stathopoulos asks Barboza about Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi. Barboza tells Stathopoulos that he is going to keep

Flemmi out of it because Flemmi is a good friend of his and is the

only one that treated him decently. (See 1–5–71 entry).156

9–9–67: The Boston SAC writes a memorandum to Director Hoover containing the following information: ‘‘[T]he Bureau was advised that Joseph Baron has furnished information relative to subject Limone’s involvement in the gangland killing of one Edward

[‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan.’’ 157

9–11–67: John Doyle prepares a report of the September 8, 1967,

interview with Joseph Barboza conducted at Barnstable County

Jail. Barboza stated that he was approached by Peter Limone during the first week of February 1965. Deegan’s death was desired

because of his participation in the robbery of an Angiulo bookmaker. Limone told him that Henry Tameleo had approved the

murder. Barboza then confirmed this with Henry Tameleo. Barboza

stated that he had been in Florida until around March 8, 1965.

When Barboza was told by Roy French that there would be another

man with him and Deegan on a ‘‘score.’’ Barboza allegedly said that

another $2500 would be paid if the other man were also killed.

Jimmy Flemmi is not mentioned in the six page report.970

9–12–67: Sergeant Detective Frank Walsh and Detective John

Doyle, of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, interview

Barboza in the presence of FBI Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon at the Barnstable County Jail regarding the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder.158 A six page statement was prepared. It

states that Barboza came back from Florida the first week of

March. Barboza said that ‘‘[a]nother reason for them wanting

Deegan out of the way was the fact that John Fitzgerald went to

a gas station and , with Deegan, got a $1000.00 off of Peter Limone

for George McLaughlin.’’ Barboza explained that Limone was angry

because he thought that McLaughlin was ‘‘shaking him down.’’

Barboza also stated that Chiampa and Imbruglia left the Ebb Tide

the same time that he did, but that they had ‘‘no part in the

thing.’’ 971

489

9–14–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza at the Barnstable County Jail. Barboza tells Rico

and Condon that his attorney, John Fitzgerald, called him the previous evening and told him that ‘‘a good many people were going

to be picked up’’ and that Baron ‘‘was going to be going to court.’’

The agents and Barboza also briefly discuss transferring Barboza

out of Barnstable. Barboza states that he would welcome a transfer

since he fears for his life.159

9–15–67: In an airtel to Director Hoover, the Boston SAC describes the weekly developments: Anthony Stathopoulos turned

himself in to the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office for protection. The airtel also informs that during the latter part of last

week, an attempt was made to kill Stathopoulos. Joseph Barboza

had previously advised that Stathopoulos’ life was in jeopardy. In

addition, Stathopoulos furnished information relative to the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder.160

9–16–67: From jail, Joseph Barboza calls Dennis Condon at

home. Barboza is concerned that he may appear before the grand

jury the next day. He is also greatly concerned about his safety because he is still at Barnstable County Jail.161

9–18–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza at the U.S. Marshals Office in Boston while he is

in the process of transferring from Barnstable County Jail.162

Barboza is placed in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service by

Order of U.S. District Judge Ford. Judge Ford’s Order issued in the

federal trial of Raymond Patriarca, Henry Tameleo and Ronald

Cassesso for the murder of William Marfeo, also indicates that the

government filed transcripts of the logs obtained from the Patriarca

microphone surveillance on June 27, 1967.163

In a handwritten order, Judge Ford ‘‘ordered that the [Patriarca]

logs be impounded and placed in the custody of the Clerk, and the

inspection of said logs is restricted to counsel for the defendants,

namely Messrs. [Joseph] Balliro, Curran and [Ronald] Chisholm.’’

Attorneys Balliro and Chisholm will later represent two of the

same defendants in the William Marfeo murder trial as they represented in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder trial. (Judge Ford

held a hearing regarding these transcripts on June 27, 1967.) 164

[This Order was not produced by the Justice Department until May

8, 2002.]

9–19–67: Joseph Barboza is transferred from Barnstable County

Jail, Massachusetts, to federal custody. Barboza is taken to Thatcher Island in Gloucester, Massachusetts. He is later taken to a private estate in Gloucester.165

9–21–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza at Thatcher Island and inquire about his physical

welfare. During this contact, Barboza states that Detective Walsh

observed him at the Florentine Cafe ́ on Boston’s Hanover Street in

the past with Ronald Cassesso, Henry Tameleo and possibly Roy

Thomas. Barboza said that Detective Walsh should be able to testify to these observations.166

490

10–6–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza at Thatcher Island.167

10–10–67: Ronald Chisholm, attorney for Ronald Cassesso, discusses the Raymond Patriarca logs in federal court. United States

v. Patriarca et al., Hearing Transcript, Crim. No. 47–192–0 (D.

Mass. October 10, 1967). 168

10–16–67: Detective Sergeant Frank Walsh and Detective John

Doyle interview Joseph Barboza at Thatcher Island in the presence

of Special Agent Paul Rico. According to Barboza’s statement on

the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder, he told the detectives that

Peter Limone said to Barboza, ‘‘I’ll give you a contract for

$7,500.00’’ to murder Deegan.’’ Barboza also stated that Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi was with Barboza in the Ebbtide on the night of

the Deegan murder.169

Special Agent Paul Rico notifies the Boston SAC by memorandum that an informant learned that Raymond Patriarca ‘‘has told

everyone that is to be indicted on the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan

murder to surrender when the indictments are returned rather

than fleeing[.]’’ 170

10–25–67: Joseph Barboza testifies before the Suffolk County

Grand Jury regarding the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder.

Barboza testifies that they used Romeo Martin’s maroon Oldsmobile convertible as a getaway car for the Deegan murder. (119)

According to Barboza’s testimony, Ronald Cassesso bent back the

rear license plate on the car so only the numbers ‘‘404’’ were showing. (122) Barboza also testifies that no promises were made to him

in exchange for his testimony. (103) He also testifies that Peter

Limone offered him a total of $10,000 for killing both Deegan and

Anthony Stathopoulos. (112) Further, Barboza’s testimony implicates Henry Tameleo as agreeing to the killing. (112) Barboza also

testifies that he left the scene before the murder and got the details later in a meeting in a back room at the Ebb Tide. (125–6).

According to Barboza’s testimony, Roy French told him that French

shot Deegan first in the head with a .38, and Romeo Martin told

him that Martin shot Deegan in the chest and Louis Greco shot

Deegan with a .45 in the stomach (126). [An FBI memorandum

dated 4–6–65 refutes the veracity of this testimony. This memorandum states that Barboza told a PCI (Potential Confidential Informant) that he ‘‘shot Teddy Deegan with a .45 caliber gun.’’ See 3–

23–65 entry.] Barboza also testified that Peter Limone gave him

the money he promised (131). In addition, notwithstanding the fact

that Barboza told Detective Sergeant Frank Walsh, Detective John

Doyle and FBI Special Agent H. Paul Rico in an interview on 10–

16–67 that Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi was in the Ebbtide on the

night of the Deegan murder, Barboza does not mention Flemmi as

being one of the individuals at the Ebbtide on the night of the

Deegan murder in his grand jury testimony. (118) (See 10–16–67

entry).171

The Boston SAC notifies Director Hoover by memorandum of the

following: ‘‘REDACTED SECTION testified before the Suffolk County

Grand Jury this date in connection with the gangland murder of

Edward Deegan on March twelve, sixty five. REDACTED SECTION as

491

a result of REDACTED testimony before this Grand Jury, indictments were rendered against Henry Tameleo, Peter Limone, []

Ronald Cassesso, Roy French, ‘‘Joe the Horse’’ Salvati, Louis Greco

and Joseph Baron.’’ 172

Joseph Salvati is arrested.173

November 1967: Edward ‘‘Wimpy’’ Bennett is murdered. In Vincent Teresa’s book My Life In The Mafia, Teresa claims that ‘‘it

was a cop that was responsible for the murder of Wimpy Bennett.’’

Henry Tameleo told Teresa that Wimpy’s ‘‘a stoolie. We got the information straight from our man on the Boston Police Department.’’ Teresa further describes the circumstances surrounding

Wimpy’s murder: ‘‘Tameleo’s warning was clear as a bell. I didn’t

go near Wimpy. Then in November 1967, Wimpy disappeared.

Steve Flemmi and Frank Salemmi [sic] handled the job. They’re a

couple of assassins for [Raymond] Patriarca. Both of them are

missing, either whacked out or in hiding. They’re wanted in a murder case, for killing Wimpy’s brother, Billy. They hit Wimpy and

dumped him in lye in a construction site that’s now part of Route

93. After the mob hit Wimpy, they had to hit his three brothers.

Walter ran a nightclub in Boston, and when Wimpy disappeared,

Walter began talking about hitting Patriarca. He disappeared, too,

without a trace. They found Billy in the Dorchester section of Boston on December 23, 1967. They indicted Daddieco, Salemmi [sic],

a kid named Peter Poulos, and another kid named Richie Grasso

for the murder. Grasso was talking, so he was hit about six days

after Billy Bennett got his. They found Poulos’ body later on in the

desert in Nevada. After that they whacked out the two other Bennett brothers. That’s six guys that died all because a cop on the

take fingered one man for the mob.’’ 174

11–1–67: Paul Rico, Dennis Condon, U.S. Attorney Paul Markham and U.S. Marshal Robert Morey contact Joseph Barboza at

Thatcher Island in Rockport, Massachusetts. They discuss

Barboza’s physical well being, and Markham discusses the possibility of moving Barboza to a new location in the near future.175

11–4–67: The Boston Globe reports that Assistant Suffolk County

District Attorney John J. Pino told a Superior Court judge that the

government made no promises, offers or inducements to Barboza in

return for his Grand Jury testimony. (DA Tells Judge: No Offer to

Barboza, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1967).176

11–6–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza at Thatcher Island in Rockport, Massachusetts.177

11–8–67: Notes on the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder are

taken from Joseph Barboza in the presence of Detective John Doyle

and Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon.178

11–9–67: Paul Rico, Dennis Condon, Detective John Doyle, and

Sergeant Detective Francis Walsh of the Suffolk County District

Attorney’s Office contact Joseph Barboza at Thatcher Island in

Rockport, Massachusetts. Rico and Condon check on the physical

well-being of Barboza and his family. Walsh briefly discusses the

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder with Barboza.179

492

11–14–67: Louis Greco, defendant in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

case, takes a polygraph examination regarding Deegan’s murder.

The polygraph indicates that Greco responded truthfully when he

said he did not shoot or kill Teddy Deegan. According to the polygraph, Greco truthfully says that he was in Florida on March 12,

1965, and not in Chelsea, Massachusetts. Harold Lokos, the Director of the Polygraph Unit of the City of Miami Police Department,

conducts the examination.180

11–15–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and William J. Welby interview Joseph Barboza’s attorney. According to the write-up, ‘‘John

E. Fitzgerald, Jr. was interviewed in a restaurant across the street

from the Dorchester District Court, Washington Street, Dorchester,

Massachusetts. He advised that he has learned that his law partner, Alfred Paul Farese, has decided to testify as a defense witness

against his client, Joe Barboza, if he is indicted federally for ‘Obstruction of Justice.’ Fitzgerald advised that Farese has in his possession a letter that Joe Barboza had sent to Joseph ‘Chico’ Amico

after Tommy De Prisco and Arthur Bratsos had been murdered,

and in this letter Barboza allegedly tells of the movements of Larry

Baione, Gennaro [Jerry] Angiulo, and others. In addition, Farese

has in his possession three by five cards on which he has recorded

conversations he has had with Barboza.

Fitzgerald advised that some time ago Guy Frizzi came up to his

law office and he had made some threatening statements to the girl

running the office; he said that he had killed before and he would

kill again; he would not stand for this, and he was referring to

something that had gone wrong with his income tax that was supposed to have been handled by his Attorneys. Fitzgerald advised

that he went down to the Bat Cove on Friend Street, Boston, and

he walked up to the person who seemed to be in charge and introduced himself as Attorney John Fitzgerald, and this individual introduced himself as Larry Baione. Fitzgerald said that he was looking for Peter Limone, and Larry said he was sitting right over here,

and he called Peter over to Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald said he told

Limone how Guy Frizzi had been up to his office threatening this

45 year-old woman and how Frizzi has been telling everyone that

he is Peter Limone’s partner, and he wondered if Peter could do

anything about this. Limone said he could stop Frizzi from going

up to his law office, if that is what he wanted.

Fitzgerald advised that last week he got a telephone call at his

office from Larry Baione. Larry wanted to talk to him. Fitzgerald

advised he would agree to meet Baione at Howard Johnson’s Restaurant on Route 1 in Dedham, Massachusetts. Before he made the

meet with Baione, he notified someone that he was going to have

this meet. He advised that Baione arrived by car and the person

that was with him in the car remained in the car. Fitzgerald believes this party was Phil Waggonheim. Baione told Fitzgerald that

he understood that he was going to be indicted on information furnished by Joe Barboza, and he wanted to know what Fitzgerald

could do to help him. Fitzgerald said that he told him that there

was nothing he could do; that he does not influence Joe Barboza;

that he is only his legal counsel, and Baione said that it would be

worth money to him if he could tell him everything he could about

493

Joe and everything he could find out. Fitzgerald claimed that he

told Baione that he does not discuss these matters with Joe and

could not be of any help to him. Fitzgerald advised that, shortly

thereafter, his girl friend, Dorothy Barchard, received a telephone

call in which the caller indicated that if she did not stop associating ‘with that guy,’ that she and her children could be killed. Fitzgerald advised that, in addition, his wife received a telephone call

in which the caller told his wife about how he, Fitzgerald, was

‘keeping’ Dorothy Barchard. Fitzgerald stated that he also had

been told that if he would help them weaken Joe Barboza, they

would have Jimmy O’Toole killed at Concord where O’Toole is presently incarcerated.

Fitzgerald was asked who made this statement to him, and he

said, ‘I am not going to divulge the identity of this person, but I

have given the identity of this party to Jimmy O’Toole, and he will

probably be in trouble when O’Toole comes out of jail.’ Fitzgerald

also advised that when he was checking around as to who made

the telephone calls to this wife and to Dorothy Barchard, ‘the office’

tried to lead him to believe that it was Jimmy O’Toole’s friends;

that he checked with O’Toole, and this was not so. Fitzgerald said

that recently, while he was out of the office, two men came up to

the office and asked if ‘Joe Barboza’s braintrust’ was there? Fitzgerald said that his secretary told him that one of the men was

about 5’7’’, paunchy and in his late 50’s, and the other one was

about 6’, about the same age and was smoking a cigarette held in

a cigarette holder, and that both of these individuals had accents

and were not from this area. Fitzgerald later had ascertained that

one of these individuals was Henry Tamelo’s brother. Fitzgerald

stated that he blamed Al Farese for causing some of his problems

and he made some statements to Farese concerning what he was

going to do to Raymond Patriarca and other individuals for the

trouble they are causing him, and he feels sure that, for this reason, he is now ‘‘on the hit parade.’’ 181

11–24–67: Detective John Doyle and Detective Robson of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office contact Roberta Grimes, a

former waitress at the Ebb Tide who worked the night Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan was killed. She identifies pictures of the following

persons as being present at the Ebb Tide on the night Deegan was

murdered: Joseph Barboza, Ronald Cassesso, Joseph Salvati, Nick

Femia, Frank [Francis] Imbruglia, Freddie Chiampi, Romeo Martin, and Roy French. According to the interview summary, Grimes

was aware that these men left the Ebb Tide at approximately 9:00

p.m. in groups of three or four at a time and returned within two

hours. Grimes, however, refused to testify at the Deegan trial because her husband prohibited it, and she feared her family in Chelsea would be in danger.182

Barboza is contacted at Thatcher Island. Special Agents Rico and

Condon are there to check on the ‘‘physical well being’’ of Barboza

and his family; Frank Walsh and John Doyle have a brief discussion with Barboza about some points concerning the Deegan murder.183

494

11–30–67: Deegan defendants file a motion to obtain ‘‘Police Department reports’’ and information regarding ‘‘promises, rewards or

inducements.’’ 184

Detective John Doyle and Investigator Joseph Fallon of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, along with Special Agents

Paul Rico and Dennis Condon, meet with Joseph Barboza in

Gloucester, Massachusetts. Doyle and Fallon review with Barboza

information regarding the gangland murder of Rocco Di Seglio.185

12–7–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts.186

12–14–67: Assistant District Attorney John Pino and Investigator

Joseph Fallon of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, meet

with Joseph Barboza in the presence of Special Agent Dennis

Condon in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Pino and Fallon review with

Barboza information regarding the gangland murder of Rocco Di

Seglio in preparation for trial.187

12–20–67: Special Agent Paul Rico, in addition to Assistant District Attorney John Pino and Investigator Joseph Fallon of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, meet with Joseph Barboza in

Gloucester, Massachusetts. Pino prepares Barboza for trial.188

12–23–67: William ‘‘Billy’’ Bennett’s bullet-riddled body is thrown

from a moving car on Harvard Street in Dorchester, Massachusetts. Stephen Flemmi and Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme are later indicted for Bennett’s murder. (Shelley Murphy, Playing Both Sides

Pays Off, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 23, 1993).189

12–27–67: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts.190

1968

1–3–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon meet with

Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts. They tell him that

he will probably be required to testify in Suffolk County Superior

Court during the week of January 8, 1968, in connection with the

gangland murder of Rocco Di Seglio. Barboza says that he is ready

to testify and hopes good arrangements have been made for his

protection since ‘‘the organization’’ will do everything possible to

prevent him from testifying.191

1–8–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact Joseph Barboza and advise him that he would be called to testify in

Suffolk County Superior Court within the next few days regarding

the gangland murder of Rocco DiSeglio.192

1–18–68: Jerry Angiulo, Benjamin Zinna, Marino Lepore and

Richard De Vincent are found not guilty in a jury trial in Suffolk

County Superior Court of the gangland murder of Rocco Di

Seglio.193

1–25–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts.194

495

1–30–68: John E. Fitzgerald loses one leg and part of the other

when a car bomb explodes in his car. Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme

and Stevie Flemmi allegedly planted the bomb. Salemme and

Flemmi are indicted on October 10, 1969. Salemme is convicted on

the basis of testimony from Robert Daddieco and ultimately serves

17 years; Flemmi flees on H. Paul Rico’s advice. See United States

v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 151 (1999). ‘‘Law enforcement officials said Mr. Fitzgerald was targeted for death because he was the

lawyer for a famed Cosa Nostra soldier-turned-informer, Joseph

Barboza Baron[.]’’ Andy Dabilis and Ralph Ranalli, Mob Lawyer

Maimed in ’68 Dies, THE BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2001. After the

bombing, Fitzgerald and his family moved to Colorado. They relocated to Rapid City, South Dakota in 1972. Fitzgerald lived there

until his death on July 3, 2001. Ed Hayward, Man Dies 33 Years

After Surviving Mob Hit, BOSTON HERALD, July 5, 2001. Fitzgerald

had been a noted judge in the South Dakota State Court system

since 1992. J.M. Lawrence, Prosecutors Rip Salemme Claim of FBI

Frame Job, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 24, 2001.195

Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza.196

Dennis Condon files a report indicating that he will maintain

contact with Joseph Barboza.197

1–31–68: Cartha DeLoach telephones and speaks with Director

Hoover four separate times over the course of one hour and thirteen minutes. The first call is placed at 9:15 am.964 The log of Hoover’s telephone calls lists no other business calls for the day. There

also appears to be no other day over a two year period where there

is a similar pattern of telephone calls from DeLoach or any other

aide.

2–2–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza.198

2–9–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza.199

2–19–68: Special Agent Paul Rico, Sergeant Detective Frank

Walsh, and Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind meet with Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Zalkind reviews with

Barboza the details of the Deegan murder in preparation for trial

in Suffolk County Superior Court.200

2–21–68: Special Agent Paul Rico, Sergeant Frank Walsh, and

Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind interview Joseph Baron

about the Deegan murder. Barboza tells them that he got the okay

to ‘‘hit’’ Deegan from Henry Tameleo.201

3–5/6–68: Joseph Barboza testifies in the Raymond Patriarca,

Henry Tameleo and Ronald Cassesso case in federal court, involving the murder of William Marfeo. Ronald A. Wysocki, Patriarca

Prosecution Rests Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1968.202

3–6–68: The Boston Globe reports that Ronald Cassesso’s attorney, Ronald Chisholm cross-examined Joseph Barboza, in the trial

of Cassesso, Raymond Patriarca, and Henry Tameleo for conspiracy

to murder William Marfeo. Barboza was asked if he said that

496

Cassesso was present when he first told Special Agents Paul Rico

and Dennis Condon about the alleged conspiracy. When Barboza

said he could not recall, Barboza was shown a piece of paper that

he said refreshed his memory. Barboza then said he did not tell

Rico and Condon who went with him to Rhode Island. Ronald A.

Wysocki, Patriarca Prosecution Rests Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6,

1968.203

3–8–68: Raymond Patriarca, Ronald Cassesso, and Henry

Tameleo are convicted in federal court of conspiring to kill William

Marfeo. Joseph Barboza testified against the defendants. (Barboza

was an unindicted co-conspirator, whom they allegedly tried to hire

as the ‘‘hitman’’ to kill Marfeo. CLARK MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE:

ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE GOVERNMENT 124 (1972)). With regard

to Barboza’s testimony, U.S. Attorney Paul Markham said, ‘‘The

case in the main depended on his [Barboza’s] credibility. The jury

obviously believed him, believed him 100 percent. It was a significant victory.’’ Asked how the outcome of the case would affect the

government’s battle against organized crime, Markham said, ‘‘To

put it in a negative way, if we didn’t win it, it would be all over.’’

Walter T. Barnes, an attorney on Markham’s staff, declared, ‘‘We

can’t overemphasize the importance of this case.’’ Another attorney

on Markham’s staff, Edward Harrington, commented, ‘‘Because of

these convictions there may be more information coming to us, and

because of this there may be further cases developing.’’ Robert J.

Anglin, Patriarca, 2 Others Guilty; Face 5 to 15 Years, BOSTON

GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1968.204

3–12–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Barboza where he is in the protective

custody of the U.S. Marshals Service.205

3–15–68: Dennis Condon receives a $150 incentive award ‘‘in appreciation for his noteworthy performance in the investigation of

the Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering-Gambling

case involving Raymond L.S. Patriarca and others.’’ Condon is acknowledged for skillfully handling an important Government witness whose cooperation was vital to the conviction of Patriarca and

his two associates.206

3–19–68: According to a memorandum by Special Agents Paul

Rico and Dennis Condon, Joseph Barboza is contacted where he is

in the custody of the U.S. Marshals and a check is made of his

physical well-being. Barboza indicates that he is very disappointed

in the attorneys who handled the Raymond Patriarca prosecution:

Paul Markham, U.S. Attorney; Edward Harrington, Assistant U.S.

Attorney; and Walter Barnes, Departmental Attorney; for not immediately coming down to personally thank him for his contribution to convicting Patriarca. Barboza is told that U.S. Attorney

Markham had gone to Washington for, possibly, matters relating to

Barboza. Barboza responded, ‘‘While these people don’t want to

show their appreciation, I am sure that Joe Balliro, the chief attorney for the defense, would show his appreciation in me, and I am

sure that if things don’t work out, that I can at least end up with

$150,000 from Balliro.’’ 207

497

Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact attorney

John Fitzgerald at Massachusetts General Hospital where Fitzgerald is recovering from injuries sustained in the bombing of his car.

Fitzgerald says he has come in contact with or has knowledge of

many criminals, whom he believes are all now his enemy. Fitzgerald tells the agents that he is about to write a letter to Joseph

Barboza telling Barboza that because he lost a leg in this bombing,

Barboza should turn on these people and provide testimony that

will send them to jail. Rico tells Fitzgerald that Rico would prefer

that Barboza testify about whatever he could, without Barboza

being pressured into testifying against specific individuals. Rico

summarizes, ‘‘If we feel that at a later date that Baron is ‘holding

out,’ we then may ask Fitzgerald’s assistance, but we do not want

Baron to be motivated by [Fitzgerald’s] revenge.208

3–20–68: In a letter from Attorney General Ramsey Clark to Director Hoover, Clark states the following: ‘‘The recent conviction of

New England Cosa Nostra leader, Raymond Patriarca, and two of

his cohorts is one of the major accomplishments in the Organized

Crime Drive Program. I have been advised by the Organized Crime

and Racketeering Section and Mr. Paul Markham, the United

States Attorney in Boston, that without the outstanding work performed by Special Agents Dennis Condon and H. Paul Rico these

convictions could not have been obtained.’’ 209

3–21–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held

in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. Assistant

District Attorney Jack Zalkind and Detective Frank Walsh both of

the Suffolk County DA’s Office are also present. Barboza discussed

some aspects of the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder, including the

involvement of Louis Greco.210

3–28–68: Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind, Sergeant

Frank Walsh, and Detective John Doyle interview Joseph Barboza

about the Deegan murder.211

3–29–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

attorney John Fitzgerald at the hospital where he is recovering

from the car bomb. Fitzgerald tells them that he told Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind that he will testify in the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan trial if his testimony is the difference between convicting these people and letting them go free, but he does want to

testify unless his testimony is critical.212

By memorandum, the Boston SAC recommends to Director Hoover that Special Agent Paul Rico receive a quality salary increase:

‘‘Through his intensive and most skillful efforts, SA Rico developed

four Top Echelon informants, namely, REDACTED SECTION BS 955

C–TE and REDACTED SECTION. The Top Echelon informants have

furnished the day-to-day activities of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, LCN

[La Cosa Nostra] boss from Providence, Rhode Island, and LCN hierarchy in the New England area. . . . Through the careful, selective use of the information derived from these informants, SA Rico

was able to exploit same and develop Joseph Baron, aka Joseph

Barboza, to a point where he testified against Raymond L.S.

Patriarca; his underboss, Henry Tameleo; and LCN member, RonVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00507 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
498

ald Cassesso. This resulted in the conviction of above-named individuals and also, the indictment of LCN members Ralph Lamattina

and Peter Limone in the gangland slaying of Edward Deegan[.]’’ 213

3–31–68: In his performance appraisal, Dennis Condon receives

an ‘‘excellent’’ rating and is considered outstanding in his knowledge of the hoodlum element and La Cosa Nostra (LCN) activities

in the Boston area. Condon is recognized for being particularly

adept in the development of informants and was instrumental in

obtaining a conviction of Raymond Patriarca and several other

LCN members. The appraisal also notes that five informants are

assigned to Condon. He is also considered an ‘‘outstanding probative-type investigator.’’ The review further states that Condon

handled the most complicated matters, such as his handling of the

Government witness in the Patriarca case. He is also considered

dependable and resourceful.214

4–2–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact Joseph Barboza in Gloucester, Massachusetts, to check on his physical well-being. Barboza also stated that he spoke to United States

Attorney Paul Markham.215

4–4–68: While in custody of the U.S. Marshals Service, Joseph

Barboza is contacted by Special Agent Paul Rico, Detective Frank

Walsh, and Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind. Walsh and

Zalkind review aspects of the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder with

Barboza.216

4–5–68: Sergeant Frank Walsh and Detective Edward Walsh

interview Geno Cognato, a bartender at Stella’s Restaurant, on

Boston’s Fleet Street. Cognato states that he knew Ronald

Cassesso and Joseph Salvati. Cognato did not know Joseph

Barboza but had seen him on a few occasions. Cognato tells the detectives that Cassesso and Salvati were frequent customers of

Stella’s, but he never saw Peter Limone or ‘‘any of the others’’ in

the restaurant. Cognato has no recollection of the night of Deegan’s

murder, and he does not recall seeing any of the men on the list

in Stella’s on the night of Deegan’s murder.217

4–9–68: Special Agents James D. McKenzie, Paul Rico, and Dennis Condon check on the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza at

the location where he is in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service.218

4–17–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Barboza at the location where he is held

in custody of the United States Marshals Service in Gloucester,

Massachusetts.219

4–18–68: The motions made by the Deegan defendants for police

reports are denied.220

4–20–68: Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei are shot to death

while shopping at a market in Providence, Rhode Island. State v.

Patriarcha, 308 A.2d 300, 305 (R.I. 1988).221

4–24–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is held in the

499

protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts.222

Special Agent Dennis Condon reports the following on Joseph

Barboza: ‘‘Baron contacted on 3/21/68 and 4/4/68 by representatives

of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office in preparation for

the murder trial involving the gangland death of Edward Deegan.

[Attorney John] Fitzgerald also in contact with Suffolk County authorities relative to Deegan case. Subject should be considered

armed and dangerous.’’ 223

Special Agent Dennis Condon reports that he will maintain contact with Joseph Barboza.224

4–26–68: Sergeant Detective Frank Walsh, Detective John Doyle,

and Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind interview Joseph

Barboza about the Deegan murder.225

4–29–68: Special Agent Dennis M. Condon met with FBI Director

J. Edgar Hoover in Washington, D.C.965

J.B. Adams writes an FBI memorandum to Mr. Callahan regarding Dennis Condon stating, ‘‘He developed Joseph Baron, aka Joseph Barboza, described as the most vicious criminal in New England and one whom law enforcement generally felt could never be

compromised to testify against La Cosa Nostra’s head, [Raymond]

Patriarca, and Patriarca’s associates. SA Condon directed Baron to

the point where Baron testified for the Federal Government. The

trial was finalized with the conviction of Patriarca, his underboss,

Henry Tameleo, and La Cosa Nostra member Ronald Cassesso in

U.S. District Court, Boston, in March 1968.’’ 226

5–8–68: An FBI memorandum describes a letter written by Joseph Barboza to Senator Robert Kennedy, complaining about his

treatment since being in federal custody.227

5–9–68: Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind interviews Joseph Barboza on the Deegan murder. Sergeant Frank Walsh takes

notes of Barboza’s statements.228

5–13–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held

in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts. The FBI summary reads, ‘‘Baron advised that

United States Attorney Paul Markham and Departmental Attorney

Walter Barnes had contacted him with Attorney General De

Simone from Rhode Island and Colonel Walter Stone of the Rhode

Island State Police. De Simone was trying to ascertain if Baron

would be willing to testify against [Raymond] Patriarca in the

State of Rhode Island. Baron said he listened to what they had to

say but gave them no definite answer. He said he would be very

much concerned for his personal safety if he had to go to Rhode Island and testify against Patriarca.’’ 229

5–17–68: Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind interviews Joseph Barboza on the Deegan murder, with Sergeant Walsh taking

notes.230

5–20–68: Special Agents Dennis Condon and James D. McKenzie

check on the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is in

500

the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts. Barboza expresses concern that Assistant District Attorney

Zalkind is not spending enough time with Barboza in preparation

for his court appearance in Suffolk County. Barboza is advised that

this matter would be brought to the attention of Zalkind and John

Doyle of the District Attorney’s office.231

4–29–68: Special Agent Dennis Condon personally meets with Director Hoover in Washington.965

5–21–68: According to the Boston Globe, Joseph Barboza ‘‘pleaded

guilty Monday to two counts of [c]onspiracy to murder at the outset

of the Suffolk Superior Court trial of seven men in connection with

the gangland slaying of Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan.’’ Barboza Pleads

Guilty, BOSTON GLOBE, May 21, 1968.232

5–23–68: Director Hoover’s office is informed who will testify in

the Deegan trial. ‘‘Special Agents Condon and/or Rico regarding

witness Baron first mentioning Deegan murder to them, referral of

matter to District Attorney’s office, no promises made, etc.’’ (Document retained by the Department of Justice).233 [Subsequently at

trial, SA Condon testifies that Barboza was not shown papers or

reports. Condon further testifies that no facts about Deegan’s death

were communicated to Barboza. Moreover, Condon testifies that it

was not fair to say that he and Rico were ‘‘major figures, so to

speak, with regard to the investigations surrounding the information furnished by Mr. Baron.’’ He further testified that he was very

careful not to impart any information to Barboza. See 7–19–68

entry.]

Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind, Sergeant Detective

Frank Walsh, and Joseph B. Fallon meet with Joseph Barboza.

Zalkind discusses Barboza’s testimony before the Grand Jury with

Barboza. Barboza read personally prepared handwritten notes relative to matters that Zalkind had previously discussed with him to

Zalkind.234

5–27–68: The Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder trial begins.235

5–28–68: Special Agent Paul Rico notifies the Boston SAC by

memorandum that an informant advised that Jerry Angiulo and

Larry Baione are very concerned about the Deegan trial that recently commenced; they have tried ‘‘to reach’’ prospective jurors

and defense witnesses, and they are going to try and reach Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind. The informant indicated to Rico

that Angiulo said that they are going to offer Zalkind $200,000 for

a guaranteed ‘‘not guilty.’’ 236

5–31–68: Special Agent Dennis Condon checks on the physical

well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts. In his memorandum, Condon states, ‘‘Baron advised that

there have been a number of occasions when Assistant District Attorney for Suffolk County, Jack Zalkind, notified him that he was

going to meet with Baron in preparation for the pending Deegan

murder trial in Suffolk County and then Zalkind called him to cancel the meeting. He complained that he did not feel Zalkind was

spending adequate time with him in preparation for the case. HowVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00510 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
501

ever, he was advised that this would be brought to the attention

of Mr. Zalkind and that Zalkind would take the matter up with

him.’’ 237

6–5–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held

in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts.238

6–12–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held

in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts. According to the report, Barboza advises that

‘‘he has been in touch with Suffolk County authorities and hopes

to testify in the near future in the Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan murder

case. Baron advised that he knows that the Rhode Island authorities want him to testify against [Raymond] Patriarca in State proceedings but he had not made up his mind whether he wants to

do this as he would be concerned for his protection if he had to go

to the State or Rhode Island where Patriarca had had so much influence for so many years.’’ 239

6–19–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza where he is being held

in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts.240

6–24–68: Special Agent Dennis Condon prepares a memorandum

regarding Joseph Barboza, describing him as ‘‘armed and dangerous.’’ 241

6–28–68: Special Agent Dennis Condon contacts Joseph Barboza

at the Suffolk County Superior Court in Boston. Barboza is being

held at the Court prior to his appearance to furnish evidence in the

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder trial. Condon writes that no matters of any pertinence are discussed.242

7–2/11–68: Joseph Barboza testifies at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’

Deegan murder trial that he did not shoot Deegan, nor did he did

see who shot Teddy Deegan. [An FBI Memorandum dated 4–6–65

contradicts this testimony. According to this memorandum,

Barboza told a PCI (‘‘Potential Confidential Informant’’) that he

‘‘shot Teddy Deegan with a .45 caliber gun.’’ See 3–23–65 entry.]

Barboza also testifies that hours before the perpetrators left the

Ebb Tide for the Deegan murder Barboza told Joseph Salvati to ‘‘go

outside and put Romeo’s car down the far end of the parking lot.’’

(3363–64). Barboza also testifies that he told Salvati that when

Salvati saw him and the others come out the back door of the Ebb

Tide to ‘‘blink your lights once to let us know where you are, in

what direction in the back of the parking lot you are.’’ (3364).

Barboza further testifies that Salvati wore a disguise consisting of

glasses, a moustache and a wig that made him look bald. (3367,

3370, 3372). Barboza testified that once they were in the car ‘‘I

could see Joe [Salvati] putting on this wig and the snapping of the

elastic. . . . [The wig] had hair around this way and it had few

strands over here. It gave you a very high—there’s a few strands

in front that went back here and you were bald.’’ When asked what

the wig looked like from the back, Barboza responded, ‘‘You were

502

bald.’’ (3391–92). Barboza also testifies that Salvati was sitting in

the back of the car. (3388). Barboza tells the Court that he is testifying in part to get ‘‘a break.’’ Barboza explains, ‘‘I am hoping that

in regards to a break that what I give before this Court would be

taken into consideration[.] . . . And the only promise that has been

made in regards to that is that the FBI will bring it to the attention of the Judge and it shall rise and fall, in regards to the cooperation that I gave, to the Court.’’ Yet, Barboza claims that his

‘‘hoping for a break’’ has nothing do with his testimony. Barboza

further testifies that he was promised that his wife and child would

be protected. (4455–4466, 4651–4658).243

7–19–68: Special Agent Dennis Condon testifies in the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder trial. Condon states that he did not show

Joseph Barboza any reports or papers concerning the death of

Deegan. He further testified that he communicated no facts about

Deegan’s death to Barboza. Condon denies that it is fair to say that

he and Rico were ‘‘major figures’’ in the investigations surrounding

the information furnished by Barboza. Agent Condon again testifies

that he was ‘‘very careful not to impart any information’’ about the

case to Barboza.244

7–29–68: In his closing argument, Joseph Salvati’s attorney,

Chester Paris, emphasizes that the only evidence inculpating

Salvati came from ‘‘the lips of Joseph Barboza, uncorroborated in

every respect.’’ (See David Taylor, Deegan Trial Lawyers Call

Baron ‘Liar,’’ BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 1968). In his closing argument, Robert Stranziani, attorney for Peter Limone, quotes from a

letter Barboza wrote to his girlfriend, ‘‘ ‘I don’t care whether they’re

innocent or not. They go.’’ (See Ronald Wysocki, Baron Bashed at

Deegan Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1968).245

In the prosecutor’s summation at the Deegan murder trial, he

made the following argument to the jury: ‘‘Can you believe Joseph

Baron? I suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, Joseph Baron—and

this would apply to anyone who took the stand—that in order for

that person to tell a story such as Joseph Baron told in this case,

he would have to have the cooperation of the FBI, the Chelsea Police Department, the District Attorney’s Office, the Federal Bureau

of Investigation, the United States Attorney’s Office[.]’’ (Prosecutor’s Summation Commonwealth v. Greco, et al., No. 31601, at

7440 (Mass. July 31, 1968)).246

7–31–68: Joseph Salvati, Ronald Cassesso, Louis Greco, Henry

Tameleo, Roy French, and Peter Limone are convicted of the murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. The jury deliberated for more than

seven hours over a two-day period. (BOSTON GLOBE, July 31,

1968)).247 Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi was neither prosecuted, nor

convicted for the Deegan murder. Furthermore, Joseph Barboza received no additional time beyond what he had already been sentenced for a firearms conviction. Romeo Martin and Chico Amico,

also allegedly involved in the Deegan murder, were murdered in

1965 and 1966 respectively.

By teletype, the Boston FBI Office informs Director Hoover of the

convictions and sentences for the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder.

Joseph Salvati and Roy French are sentenced to life. Louis Greco,

503

Ronald Cassesso, Peter Limone and Henry Tameleo are sentenced

to death. The teletype notes that Paul Rico and Dennis Condon

were instrumental in developing Barboza and recommends they receive letters of commendation.248

8–1–68: In a letter to Director Hoover from Congressman John

W. McCormack, Congressman McCormack recommends John J.

Connolly, Jr., for the FBI’s favorable consideration.249

8–2–68: An FBI memorandum from SA (redacted) in the Boston

Office to the Boston SAC advises that an informant said Francis

‘‘Frank’’ Salemme was very angry with the verdict in the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan trial and stated that (REDACTED) was trying to

make an empire for himself (REDACTED) and that something should

be done regarding (REDACTED). He further indicated that it was too

bad that they did not finish the guy that they wheeled into court

[John E. Fitzgerald, Barboza’s attorney at the Deegan trial, was injured in a car bomb in Jan. 1968. Fitzgerald used a wheelchair

sometimes in court.] Salemme indicated that the DA’s office had

lied, the witnesses in the trial had lied and also the Feds had lied

and according to the informant, the only ones that did not lie were

the defendants. Informant stated that he considered Frankie

Salemme one of the worst and most treacherous individuals in the

Boston area. He stated that he is constantly with Larry Baione and

has made a statement that he did not care about the results of the

verdict in the Deegan murder case except for the verdict against

Peter Limone and Henry Tameleo. ‘‘On August 2, 1968, District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne was informed of the above information by

SA H. Paul Rico.’’ 250

8–5–68: Director Hoover commends Paul Rico and Dennis

Condon by letter for their work ‘‘in the investigation of a local murder case involving Roy French and others.’’ 251

8–12–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon check on

the physical well-being of Joseph Barboza, who is in the protective

custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts.

Barboza advises the agents that his wife had given birth a few

days ago to a healthy baby boy.252

8–14–68: Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon contact

Joseph Barboza, who is in the protective custody of the U.S. Marshals Service in Gloucester, Massachusetts, and check on his physical well being. Though Barboza understands that he is going to be

moved from his protective custody location within the next few

days, he hopes to remain in contact with Special Agents Rico and

Condon even if moved from the area.253

8–15–68: In a letter from the FBI, Dennis Condon is commended

for ‘‘the excellent fashion in which he performed in the investigation of a local murder case involving Roy French and others.’’ 254

10–4–68: The Special Investigative Division of the Department of

Justice requests an ‘‘interview of Boston hoodlum Baron [Barboza]

by 2 Boston Agents [Rico and Condon] who developed Baron as a

cooperative witness which resulted in the conviction of six hoodlums in connection with gangland slaying in that area. . . . Department advises Baron has indicated having additional informaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00513 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tion to discuss with Boston agents Condon and Rico who developed

his cooperative attitude.’’ 255

10–7–68: By airtel, Director Hoover authorizes the Boston SAC

to have Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon to ‘‘proceed

to REDACTED SECTION to interview Baron and obtain additional information in his possession’’ as requested by the DOJ.256

Congressman John W. McCormack writes a second letter to Director Hoover recommending John J. Connolly for Hoover’s ‘‘favorable consideration.’’ 257

10–8–68: In a letter from Director Hoover to Congressman John

W. McCormack, Hoover states: ‘‘I am indeed pleased to inform you

that Mr. John J. Connolly, Jr., in whom you have expressed an interest, has been tendered an appointment as a Special Agent in the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.’’ 258

10–10–68: The Boston SAC writes a memorandum to Director

Hoover stating that Special Agent Dennis Condon has known the

applicant, John Connolly, for one year and recommends him favorably for the position of Special Agent.259

11–1–68: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by airtel that

Barboza appeared in Suffolk County Superior Court where ‘‘habitual criminal’’ indictments were filed against him, and he was sentenced to ‘‘not less than one year nor more than a year and a day’’

on other counts. This sentence was in connection with the conspiracy indictment for the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. John Fitzgerald, standing on an artificial limb with the aid of a cane, represented Barboza at the proceedings.260 [Barboza was arrested on

October 6, 1966, and convicted of weapons charges on January 25,

1967. See 10–6–66 and 1–25–67 entries].

The Boston SAC writes an airtel to Director Hoover stating, ‘‘Joseph Baron appeared today before Suffolk Superior Court Judge

Felix Forte, Boston, Massachusetts Judge Forte, on the recommendation of the District Attorney’s Office, Suffolk County, dismissed indictments against Baron stemming from Baron’s alleged

attempt to assault and murder Arthur Pearson inasmuch as Arthur

Pearson, who was the main witness in these indictments, has subsequently been murdered by others. Joseph Baron pled guilty to all

remaining indictments and Judge Forte again, on the recommendation of the District Attorney’s office, in view of the cooperation that

Baron had given both the federal and local authorities, sentenced

Baron to not less than one year, nor more than one year and one

day, which sentenced to be served concurrently with the sentence

he is presently serving on the indictment of ‘Conspiracy to Murder

Edward Teddy Deegan.’ The Judge placed on file the other indictments. It should be noted that Baron is presently doing 4–5 years

on a ‘Possession of Firearms’ and this sentence will expire in 9/69

and that the new sentence will expire at the same time. Baron actually is being retained by the USMs and he has left this area this

date to return to the military reservation in REDACTED.’’ 261

11–15–68: J.H. Gale writes a memorandum to F.B.I. Deputy Director Cartha DeLoach ‘‘to set forth the FBI’s views with reference

to the Department of Justice—‘Task Force’ (also called ‘Strike

505

Force’) concept on organized crime.’’ The memorandum notes that

a ‘‘principal objection [to the Task Force concept] is that the FBI’s

accomplishments would be submerged in the claiming of credit by

the Task Force beyond its actual contribution, and they will wind

up grabbing the lion’s share of favorable publicity.’’ The memorandum mentions the Boston prosecutions as primary examples of

‘‘prosecutive achievement,’’ and states ‘‘as a result of FBI investigation, in State court in Boston, Massachusetts, six more were convicted in the 1965 slaying of Edward Deegan. La Cosa Nostra

members Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso, Peter Limone, and

Louis Greco were all sentenced to death while two confederates

were given life sentences.’’ 262

1969

1969: Special Agent Paul Rico tells Stephen Flemmi that he and

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme will soon be indicted for the attempted

murder of John Fitzgerald, Joseph Barboza’s attorney. Rico suggested that Flemmi and Salemme flee; they heed his advice. While

a fugitive, Flemmi stays in touch with Rico. Yet, Rico does not

share this information with the fellow FBI agents responsible for

finding Flemmi. [The FBI apprehends Salemme on December 4,

1972, and he is convicted in June 1973. Salemme serves 12 years

in prison. (United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.2d 141, 151–52 (D.

Mass. 1999); see also Commonwealth v. Salemme, 323 NE 2d 922

(Mass. App. 1975)); 1974 entry.263

1–24–69: Assistant Attorney General Nathaniel E. Kossack, of

the Criminal Division, states in a letter to Director Hoover, ‘‘[W]e

have been recently advised by District Attorney Garret Byrne, Suffolk County, Massachusetts, that there is a possibility that Baron

may be paroled within the next three months. If such proves to be

the case, we feel we have the responsibility to relocate this witness

and his family. Accordingly, we have made some preliminary inquiries and determined that it may be possible to send Baron to

Australia.’’ 264

The Washington Capital News Service reports that Joseph

Barboza’s former attorney John E. Fitzgerald, who is marked for

assassination, left the United States for a new job, a new name,

and a new country. [Fitzgerald later serves as a judge in South Dakota.] 265

1–28–69: Director Hoover responds by letter to Assistant Attorney General Nathaniel E. Kossack’s January 24, 1969, letter proposing that Barboza be relocated possibly in Australia if he is paroled in three months. Director Hoover states in the letter that the

FBI has ‘‘no objection to the relocation of Baron as proposed,’’ since

‘‘the FBI investigations stemming from information furnished by

Baron have been completed.’’ 266

3–28–69: After serving three years for armed assault with intent

to murder, Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is released from prison. He receives a good conduct discharge from Massachusetts Correctional

Institute at Walpole. Flemmi was incarcerated for this crime on

March 9, 1966.267

506

‘‘Joseph (Baron) Barboza 36, self admitted hired gun was granted

freedom . . . on the condition that he leave the state and never return. Baron . . . was released . . . after a special hearing of the

state Parole Board at Charles street jail. He was taken under

guard to Logan Airport and put aboard a plane for a secret destination. Baron was paroled from a four to five year state prison sentence for carrying a gun. Earlier in the day, Superior Court Judge

Felix Forte suspended a year-and-a-day sentence for conspiracy to

murder. Also hanging over Baron’s head had been habitual criminal indictments carrying sentences up to 70 years. These were

dropped by Suffolk County District Atty. Garrett H. Byrne after

Baron kept his promise to testify against his former gangland associates.’’ (Baron Free, State Put Off Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 29,

1969).268

3–31–69: In a performance appraisal, Special Agent Dennis

Condon is rated excellent. He is considered outstanding in dependability, loyalty and enthusiasm, and he is ‘‘capable of handling the

most complicated investigative matters with a minimum degree of

supervision.’’ The evaluation notes that Condon is not interested in

administrative advancement.269

April 1969: Joseph Barboza is moved from Fort Knox, Kentucky,

to Santa Rosa, California, by federal authorities.270

4–2–69: The Boston SAC advises Director Hoover by airtel that

a letter was found in a box provided for prisoners to send uncensored letters from Barnstable County Jail. The letter was printed

and unsigned by an unknown writer. Portions of that letter read,

‘‘There has been a security leak in the transfer of Barboza-Baron

from the Barnstable Jail. Certain people now know the method in

which he was taken. Steps are now being taken to recheck the

route. Parties in Providence have been told to find him.’’ 271

4–14–69: A memorandum is written to Director Hoover with

what appears to be Special Agent Dennis Condon’s signature in the

bottom right-hand corner. The memorandum regarding Joseph

Barboza states, ‘‘Investigation is being initiated in connection with

the TECIP to develop Subject as a top echelon criminal informant;

therefore, Subject is being designated a target under this program.’’ 272

5–7–69: An FBI memorandum from SAs REDACTED SECTION to

SAC REDACTED contains the following statement: ‘‘Informant advised that REDACTED and Jimmy Flemmi are in very strong with

Larry Baione and Jerry Angiulo. Informant said that should they

want anyone ‘whacked out,’ these would be the two that would do

it.’’ Special Agent Paul Rico’s last name is handwritten in the bottom right hand corner of the first page. [Note: This document is

heavily redacted.] 273

6–5–69: Special Agent Paul Rico meets with John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley

at the Charles Street Jail, where Kelley was incarcerated. Subsequently, Rico meets with Kelley on several occasions (June 6, June

25, July 8, July 9, July 10, and July 17) before Kelley testifies before the grand jury on August 14.274

507

7–10–69: According to a memorandum from Mr. Gale to T.J.

McAndrews, John Buckley of the Massachusetts Council on Crime

and Correction said the Raymond Patriarca logs were in the possession of an unidentified individual. Henry Petersen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division instructed Walter Barnes, Department Attorney in Boston to contact Buckley

again and demand the identity of the individual in possession of

the documents. The memorandum also directs Barnes to instruct

Buckley that there must be no publication of the documents. If

Barnes cannot successfully arrange the return of the documents,

Assistant Attorney General Wilson will talk to Buckley in an effort

to secure the return of the documents. If these approaches fail, the

Department will consider bringing Buckley before a Grand Jury in

Boston. In addition, the memorandum states that if Buckley cooperates and furnishes the identity of the individual, the Department is considering obtaining an injunction to prevent this individual from publishing these documents. If all of these efforts fail, Petersen advised that ‘‘he contemplates requesting the Bureau, by letter, to conduct an inquiry of those individuals who had possession

of these documents in connection with the Patriarca and [Louis]

Taglianetti cases.’’ 275

8–11–69: In a prosecution memorandum from Mr. Gerald E.

McDowell, Organized Crime Strike Force, Boston, Massachusetts,

to Mr. Thomas Kennelly, Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.,

McDowell recommends prosecuting Raymond Patriarca for his role

in the Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei murders. This memorandum states that this case is ‘‘remarkably similar’’ to the Willie

Marfeo case. The memorandum also indicated that there could be

concurrent state and federal prosecutions. [Note: The original

memorandum is not appended to the Committee’s chronology and

is retained in Justice Department files.]

8–14–69: John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley appears before a Grand Jury to answer questions regarding the murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei.276 Kelley is granted immunity in exchange for his testimony.277

Indictments are filed, ordered, and issued for defendants Maurice

‘‘Pro’’ Lerner, Robert E. Fairbrothers, Rudolph Sciarra, John Rossi,

Luigi Manocchio and Raymond Patriarca for the murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei. In particular, an indictment

charges Lerner with two counts of murder and one count of conspiracy to murder.278 [Note: Two published opinions, State v.

Lerner, 308 A.2d 324 (R.I. 1973) and State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d

300 (R.I. 1973), both state that indictments were returned against

Lerner and Patriarca on June 2, 1969.]

8–19–69: In a letter from John E. Fitzgerald to Director Hoover,

Fitzgerald writes, ‘‘[T]hrough the assistance of the Boston Office of

the Federal Bureau of Investigation; more particularly, Special

Agent in Charge Handley, Special Agents Rico and Condon and REDACTED SECTION has agreed to insure my home. . . . I have no

question in my mind that the principal reason that Joseph

(Barboza) Baron cooperated with the Federal Bureau of InvestigaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00517 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
508

tion was the personal qualities manifested by Agents Rico and

Condon. In the near future a book will be published telling a part

of that story. This book will make a public record of my feelings

toward your Agency.’’ 279

9–11–69: Indictment returned against Stephen Flemmi, Francis

‘‘Frank’’ Salemme and Peter Poulos for the murder of William Bennett. Flemmi, Salemme and Poulos flee the Boston area, traveling

to Los Angeles, California.280

9–29–69: Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme and Stephen Flemmi allegedly murder Peter Poulos, in the desert outside of Las Vegas.

Poulos is shot three times in the head with a .38 caliber pistol.

Poulos could have tied Salemme and Flemmi to the William Bennett murder. (See November 1967 entry). Chuck Lee, the homicide

detective who investigated the Poulos slaying and built the case

against Flemmi and Salemme learned that Poulos was a Boston police informant who decided to flip. Someone tipped Flemmi and

Salemme off and Poulos was killed. The Las Vegas-Review Journal

reported, ‘‘It was obvious to Lee early on that the investigation was

officially being hampered, and after a few months the FBI took control of the case.’’ Despite the fact that the Court issued murder

warrants, Lee said that ‘‘ ‘everything came to a sudden stop.’ ’’ The

local police were not allowed to interview the suspects, and there

was no move to extradite them. (John L. Smith, Police Frustrated

Over Federal Protection of Slaying Suspects, LAS VEGAS REVIEWJOURNAL, Oct. 21, 1998; See also John L. Smith, Years After His

Death, Bit Player in Mob has Chance to Make It Big, LAS VEGAS

REVIEW-JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 2002; Indicted Hub Man Slain in Las

Vegas, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1970).281

10–10–69: Indictments are returned against Stephen Flemmi and

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme for their roles in bombing John

Fitzgerald’s car, severely injuring Fitzgerald. (Commonwealth v.

Salemme, 323 N.E. 2d 922 (1975)).282

Peter Poulos’ body is discovered near Las Vegas, Nevada. The

identity of the body is unknown at this time. A tentative identification was made on January 30, 1970, and a positive identification

was made on February 2, 1970.283

10–15–69: In a letter from Middlesex County District Attorney

John Droney to Director Hoover, Droney expresses his appreciation

for the cooperation his office received from the Boston FBI Office

in the investigation into the bombing of John Fitzgerald’s automobile. Droney’s letter explicitly states, ‘‘Through the cooperation

of the Boston office, and in particular through the efforts of Special

Agents James D. McKenzie and Floyd I. Clarke, we were able to

obtain indictments against one Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme and one

Stephen Flemmi, both of whom are major organized crime figures

in this area. This bombing took place on January 30, 1968, and

from that day until the present, Special Agents H. Paul Rico and

Dennis M. Condon have maintained contact with our office concerning this incident.’’ 284

12–13–69: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi stabs Lawrence Pacino and

his brother, Leonard Pacino, according to an FBI memorandum.

509

The memorandum cites Boston police detective Ed Walsh as the

source of this information.285

1970

1–8–70: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is arrested for assault with intent to murder James Abbout. This incident occurred when Flemmi

accused Abbout of being an informant for the Boston Task Force

on counterfeit money. Flemmi is subsequently convicted on March

20, 1970. (See 3–20–70 entry).286

1–19–70: The Boston FBI reports that Boston police detectives

suspect that Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is collecting shylock money

for his brother, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, who along with

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme and Peter Poulos are currently the subjects of an unlawful flight investigation.287

1–30–70: The Las Vegas FBI Office notified the Clark County

Sheriff’s Department that it had received information from the Boston FBI Office that the Boston P.D. had established tentative identification of the murder victim found near Las Vegas on October 10,

1969, as being Peter J. Poulos.288

2–2–70: The unknown murder victim found on October 10, 1969,

near Las Vegas is positively identified as Peter J. Poulos using the

victim’s fingerprints.289

Sergeant Frank Walsh of the Organized Crime Section of the

Boston Police Department is contacted by the Clark County Sheriff’s Department regarding the Peter Poulos murder. Walsh stated

that Poulos, known to be a loan shark and racketeer, was wanted

by the Boston Police Department, along with Stephen Flemmi and

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme, for the murder of William Bennett. All

three were indicted for the Bennett murder on September 11, 1969.

Flemmi, Salemme and Poulos disappeared from Boston on that

date. Walsh also indicates that these three men are suspected of

several more murders in the Boston area. Walsh states that it is

common knowledge that Flemmi and Salemme considered Poulos to

be a ‘‘weak link’’ and would eventually kill him.290

2–3–70: Sergeant Detective Frank Walsh of Boston’s Organized

Crime Section writes a letter to Detective Charles Lee of the Clark

County Sheriff’s Office. On a night prior to the September 11, 1969,

William Bennett murder indictment, the letter states that ‘‘Peter

[Poulos] received a telephone call from a person who stated to Mrs.

Katherine Poulos [Peter’s mother] that it was very important for

Peter to get in touch with Steve [presumably Flemmi]. This message was given to Peter when he came home on Monday, September 8, 1969[,] and he stated to her that he was going to Cape Cod

for a couple of weeks vacation. He took some clothes in a paper bag

and left [in his car]. . . . On September 15, 1969, Katherine Poulos

notified the office of the Organized Crime Section [of the Boston

Police Department that [Peter’s] car was now parked outside of her

home. . . . She stated that the vehicle was put there sometime

during the night by person(s) unknown. . . . Further examination

of the right front fender of the vehicle disclosed what appeared to

be blood.’’ The department chemist determined that the blood was

human blood. The letter advises that William Fopiano is a known

510

criminal who may have been in the Las Vegas area recently. The

letter concludes, ‘‘There is a strong possibility that this man may

be involved in this matter[.]’’ 291

2–12–70: Walter T. Barnes and Edward Harrington, attorneys for

the Department of Justice’s Boston Strike Force write a memorandum to Henry E. Petersen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General.

The memorandum opines, ‘‘I think it fair to state that it was

agreed by all in the Department of Justice that at the time [Joseph

Barboza] was released from Government protection every effort

would be made to provide his [sic] with a job and an unspecified

sum of money. However, in the event it was impossible to obtain

a job for him because of [Barboza’s] extensive record (36 years

old—17 in prison) and inability to do anything, it was agreed that

he would be provided additional money. This position was made

known to [Barboza]. A year has passed and we have been unable

to provide [Barboza] with a job. At the time he was released from

protective custody he was given only $1,000 in Government funds[.]

. . . However, he is now almost penniless and feels that he has not

been given a fair chance to begin a new life. . . . In addition, it

should be noted that FBI Intelligence indicates that [Barboza] has

been recognized at his present location by an individual who knows

some of the Massachusetts hoodlum element. . . . [Barboza] is now

desperate. He states he is without any money and feels that the

Government has reneged on its promise to provide him with sufficient money. He has indicated that he will publicly retract his testimony given in the aforementioned cases and will make known to

the press that the Government did not give him a fair chance to

go ‘straight.’ In the opinion of the writers if either of the above

should occur, the Federal Government will receive a severe setback

as the [Raymond] Patriarca and [Henry] Tameleo cases might be

overturned and plunge the Government into protracted and acrimonious litigation. In addition, informants willing to testify will be

almost impossible to secure. We recommend that by some manner

or means [Barboza’s] request be honored to the degree possible. Of

course it would be made perfectly clear to him that such money

would be all that he would ever receive.’’ 292

2–13–70: According to Boston SAC James Handley’s letter to Department of Justice Attorney Walter T. Barnes, since Joseph

Barboza’s re-location, he ‘‘was observed and identified at a union

hall for the Marine Cooks and Stewards Union. He was observed

by an individual named Manuel Gonzales, a Portuguese from New

Bedford, Massachusetts. . . . I also wish to call to your attention

that in January, 1970, after Gonzales had observed and confronted

Barboza with REDACTED SECTION two well known ‘hit’ men from the

Boston area, Harry Johnson and Allen Leavitt Fidler, also known

as ‘Suitcase,’ traveled to the San Francisco area and, according to

informants of this office, were supposed to be making the trip to

harm someone in that area.’’ 293

2–27–70: Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner’s trial for the murders of Rudolph

Marfeo and Anthony Melei begins.294

3–3–70: Henry E. Petersen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General

of the Criminal Division, authors a memorandum to William

511

Lynch, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section.

With regard to Joseph Barboza, Petersen writes, ‘‘The memoranda

submitted by Walter Barnes do not in my judgment support the expenditure of Nine Thousand Bucks. . . . The additional $4,000 requested to make up the total of Nine, obviously has no support. I

am bothered by the thought on this score that Baron, if my recollection is correct, expected a $10,000 payment at the time his testimony was concluded.’’ 295

3–9–70: John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley takes the stand at the Maurice ‘‘Pro’’

Lerner trial. Under direct examination by Assistant Attorney General Richard Israel, Kelley testifies that no law officer or any prosecutor of any jurisdiction made any promises to Kelley before he

testified and no one promised Kelley that he would receive any consideration for his testimony. Kelley testifies that he was granted

immunity from prosecution for crimes related to the Marfeo/Melei

murders in Rhode Island and he hopes ‘‘that my testimony will be

in cooperation with and brought to the attention of the other jurisdiction [Massachusetts] in the final outcome of [the Brink’s Robbery] case.’’ 296

3–10–70: Ronald J. Chisholm, attorney for defendant Maurice

‘‘Pro’’ Lerner, cross-examines John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley at the Rudoph

Marfeo and Anthony Melei murder trial. In the exchange, Kelley

states that Special Agent Paul Rico and Robert E. Sheehan

‘‘couldn’t promise but they’d bring any testimony that I would give

to the attention of the proper authorities, that’s all they said.’’

Moreover, without giving any detail, Kelley testifies that the Government (presumably the FBI) promised him protection. Kelley

then adds that there were no other promises, ‘‘none whatsoever.’’

In particular, Kelley states that he was not promised a new identity, saying agents of the U.S. Government ‘‘didn’t promise me anything.’’ He also testifies that the U.S. Government made ‘‘no promises at all’’ to relocate Kelley to another part of the world. In addition, Kelley tells the Court, ‘‘I refused to testify unless I was given

immunity’’ for his acts in relation to the Marfeo and Melei murders.297

Under cross-examination by Robert S. Ciresi, attorney for defendant Robert Fairbrothers, John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley states that he was not

being supplied with income from the U.S. Government.298

3–11–70: Clark County Sheriff Ralph Lamb sends Clark County

District Attorney George Franklin a case summary on the Peter

Poulos murder, which was compiled by Detectives Jim Duggan and

Charles Lee. The case summary concludes, ‘‘[I]t becomes apparent

that victim Peter J. Poulos and suspects Stephen J. Flemmi and

Francis P. Salemme left Boston, Massachusetts on or about 9/11/

69, traveling to Los Angeles, California. On 9/18/69, [an apartment]

was rented by one of the subjects, using the name ‘Paul J. Andrews.’ On or about 9/27/69 victim Poulos and suspects Flemmi and

Salemme left the apartment in Los Angeles en route to Las Vegas.

. . . Suspects Flemmi and Salemme shot and killed victim Peter J.

Poulos leaving his body alongside the highway where it was subsequently discovered. This Department has been unable to find any

evidence to indicate that victim Poulos ever arrived at Las Vegas.

512

. . . To date no trace of either suspect has been found. . . . [Sgt.

Frank Walsh] can . . . testify to the fact that [Poulos, Flemmi, and

Salemme] were, and are now under indictment for murder, and

that Poulos was a potential witness against them.’’ The Detectives

request that murder warrants and complaints be issued for Flemmi

and Salemme for the murder of Poulos.299

3–12–70: A warrant for the arrest of Stephen Flemmi and

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme is issued in Clark County, Nevada.

Judge Roy Woofter signs the warrant charging Flemmi and

Salemme for the murder of Peter Poulos.300

3–13–70: Special Agent Paul Rico testifies at the Maurice ‘‘Pro’’

Lerner trial for the murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei.

Prosecutor Richard Israel conducts the direct examination of Rico.

The following exchange takes place:

Q: Now, in the course of any of your conversations with

Mr. Kelley, did you make any promises to him regarding his making statements in your presence, any promises regarding the statements he might have made in

your presence?

A: I made no promises to him.

Q: Now, regarding any testimony which he might give, did

you make any promises to him regarding any testimony

he might give?

A: I made a statement to him.

***

Q: You made certain statements to him?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Regarding what?

A: I told him than any cooperation that he gave to the

United States Government will be brought to the attention of the proper authorities.

Q: Now, did you make any statements to him regarding

testimony that he might give in Rhode Island?

A: No, I did not.

***

Q: Did you make any promise or any statements to him as

to what might happen if he were to make statements

to authorities from Rhode Island?

***

A: I made no such statements.

Rico also testifies that he told Kelley that the U.S. Government,

meaning the U.S. Marshals Service, would give him personal security, but Rico did not describe to Kelley the kind of personal security and protection that Kelley might expect to receive.301

513

Rico is then cross-examined by Ronald J. Chisholm, attorney for

defendant Lerner. During the examination, Rico states that neither

he nor anyone in his presence told Kelley that he would be provided with a new identity. Rico also testifies that he did not tell

Kelley that he would be relocated to another part of the world.

When asked what members of the U.S. Government were going to

provide Kelley with personal security, Rico responds that the U.S.

Marshals Service agreed to provide such security. Yet, Rico tells

the Court that he spoke with ‘‘Theodore F. Harrington’’ of the Department of Justice—not a representative of the U.S. Marshals

Service—about Kelley’s security. Rico also states that he promised

Kelley that he would bring any cooperation Kelley gave to the attention of the proper authorities. The proper authorities Rico was

referring to were Walter Barnes, of the Strike Force in New England and Garret Byrne, Suffolk County District Attorney.302

3–16–70: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi’s trial for assault with intent

to murder James Abbout begins. Joseph Balliro represents

Flemmi.303

3–19–70: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi leaves the courthouse, where

he is on trial for the James Abbout case, and becomes a fugitive.304

3–20–70: Despite his absence, the jury returns a guilty verdict

against Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi for assault with intent to murder

James Abbout. Flemmi is apprehended and arrested on October 28,

1970. (See 10–28–70 entry).305

3–27–70: Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner is convicted of murdering Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei and conspiracy to murder. John

‘‘Red’’ Kelley, an FBI cooperating witness handled by Special Agent

Paul Rico, provides crucial testimony against Lerner. The jury also

returns verdicts convicting Robert Fairbrothers, John Rossi, Rudolph Sciarra, and Raymond Patriarca only of conspiring to murder

Marfeo and Melei. These defendants are later sentenced to ten

years in prison. As for the indictments charging these defendants

with the murders of Marfeo and Melei, the jury is unable to reach

a verdict.306

3–30–70: The Boston SAC sends an airtel to Director Hoover recommending incentive awards for Special Agents Paul Rico and Robert Sheehan ‘‘for their outstanding accomplishments in the development of and handling of John J. [‘‘Red’’] Kelley.’’ Kelley was ‘‘the

star witness’’ in the prosecution of Raymond Patriarca, Rudolph

Sciarra, Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner, Robert Fairbrothers, and John

Rossi. Kelley will also be a witness in several other Federal cases.

According to the airtel, ‘‘The handling of Kelley posed numerous

problems on a day-to-day basis as he has always been a professional thief and ‘standup guy’ and the idea of being a witness

against many of his associates was repulsive to Kelley but all this

was overcome by the patience, diligence and intellectual approach

of SAs Rico and Sheehan. Both Rico and Sheehan were in close

contact with the Attorney General’s Office in Providence concerning

the testimony of Kelley, the preparation of the case and both appeared as witnesses in corroboration on the part of Kelley’s testimony.’’ 307

514

3–31–70: In an FBI memorandum to Mr. DeLoach, J.H. Gale

writes, ‘‘With the murder conspiracy conviction of New England

Mafia boss Raymond Patriarca and four other racket figures in

Rhode Island on 3/27/70, it is believed appropriate to bring to your

attention the truly remarkable record established by SA [Paul] Rico

in organized crime investigations during recent years. The achievements in question primarily involve SA Rico’s development of highlevel organized crime informants and witnesses, a field in which he

is most adept. SA Rico’s development of Boston mobster Joseph

Barboza, a vicious killer and organized crime leader in his own

right, set off a chain of events which have seen the surfacing of a

number of additional racket figures in New England as cooperative

witnesses during the past few years. Making use of compromising

information he had received from other top echelon informants he

had previously turned, Rico brought Barboza to the point where he

testified against Patriarca and two of his La Cosa Nostra (LCN)

subordinates in a[] . . . [g]ambling case resulting in [the] conviction of all three in Boston Federal Court on 3/8/68. . . . SA Rico

also induced Barboza to testify as the state’s key witness in Massachusetts in the gang slaying of hoodlum Edward Deegan. In this

case, Rico was additionally instrumental in developing a second

witness, attorney John Fitzgerald, resulting in the 7/31/68 murder

convictions of LCN members Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso and

Peter Lamone [sic], who were sentenced to death; one additional

death sentence for another hoodlum, and life sentences for two others also convicted in this case. Following the above major achievements, Rico was instrumental in the development and handling of

notorious Boston hoodlum John [‘‘Red’’] Kelley as an informant and

witness. Kelley was the state’s principal witness in the recently

concluded trial of Patriarca and four others in Rhode Island for the

murder of Rudolph Marfeo. Patriarca and four others were convicted of murder conspiracy while Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner, the gunman, was convicted of first-degree murder. This is considered an

achievement of major dimension causing telling disruption at organized crime’s top-level in New England. At the Director’s approval,

this has been called to the Attorney General’s attention by memorandum of 3/31/70. . . . Further, SA Rico’s development of Boston

gang leader REDACTED SECTION as an informant resulted in the obtaining of a wealth of information regarding high-level organized

crime activities in New England including a number of murders.

REDACTED SECTION. SA Rico’s overall performance has also contributed materially to the development REDACTED SECTION and were

induced to cooperate following Kelley’s defection.’’ The memorandum states that La Cosa Nostra plotted to kill Rico and Kelley in

August 1969 ‘‘for the disruption Rico had caused in La Cosa Nostra

circles through his development of informants and witnesses.’’ Appropriate precautionary measures were taken to prevent harm to

Rico. The memorandum recommends the following: ‘‘In recognition

of SA Rico’s superior performance which has resulted in the murder convictions of Patriarca and four of his racket associates, it is

recommended that SA Rico be granted an incentive award in an

amount to be decided by the Administrative Division. SA Rico’s efforts have virtually decimated the Mafia’s top-level structure in

New England and his proven ability to develop organized crime inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00524 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
515

formants and witnesses would be of significant value to the Bureau

in an area such as Miami, which is his first office of preference.’’ 308

Special Agent Paul Rico’s performance rating report for the period of April 1, 1969, to March 31, 1970, states the following: ‘‘During the rating period, SA Rico has been assigned exclusively to the

development of criminal informants and investigations of LCN [La

Cosa Nostra] members and their associates. He is considered outstanding in this category and is responsible for the development of

several PCs and informants who have been converted into Government witnesses, the most outstanding one of whom is John J.

[‘‘Red’’] Kelley, notorious armored car robber in this country.

Through his resourcefulness, ingenuity, and aggressiveness, he developed Kelley which at this time, has resulted in the conviction of

Raymond L.S. Patriarca, LCN boss, New England area, and other

members of the LCN and their close associates. . . . Also indicted

through the efforts of SA Rico have been Gennaro [Jerry] Angiulo,

acting boss, LCN, Boston, and other prominent hoodlums in this

area. His knowledge of duties and the know-how of application

both in investigative matters and development of informants is outstanding. . . . During the rating period, SA Rico has handled REDACTED top echelon criminal informants all of whom are considered

to be outstanding, and also REDACTED PCs. He is considered outstanding in this regard.’’ 309

4–1–70: Director Hoover sends a congratulatory letter to Special

Agent Paul Rico: ‘‘It is with considerable pleasure that I commend

you and advise that I have approved an incentive award of $300.00

for you in recognition of the excellence of your services in developing and handling sources of information of great importance to the

Bureau in the criminal field. A check representing this award will

be sent to you at a later date. It is obvious that you have not only

fulfilled your duties with a high degree of professional skill but

have approached your assignments with a dedication that truly

serves as an inspiration to your associates. I want you to know how

much I appreciate your valuable contributions to our work which

have enabled us to fulfill our vitally important obligations.’’ 310

5–4–70: The Boston Globe reports that Boston police detective

William W. Stuart said last week that he believed Henry Tameleo,

Louis Greco and Peter Limone were innocent of the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. (BOSTON GLOBE, May 4, 1970).311

6–24–70: A memorandum from Director Hoover to SAC REDACTED attaches a letter dated June 17, 1970, from John E. Fitzgerald, Jr. In the letter, Fitzgerald wrote, ‘‘In all my dealings with

[Paul Rico] I have never found him making unethical promises or

deals or undertaking committments [sic] which he could not fulfill.

. . . In closing, although I lost a leg in the so called ‘war against

organized crime,’ if I had to do it over again I would follow the

same road, and my motivations would largely be the result of the

integrity, professionalism, and the high traditions of your organization as exemplified in my eyes by Paul Rico.’’ 312

July 1970: Joseph Barboza is told by Dennis Condon that his life

was in danger on this date (July 1970) while he is in California.

Based on information furnished to Condon from confidential

516

sources of the FBI, Condon concluded that Barboza’s life was in

‘‘serious jeopardy.’’ Condon further testifies ‘‘that in January of

1970 we received information that two individuals were coming to

the San Francisco area to either kill or do bodily harm to an individual in this area. We did not know at that particular time the

identify of the intended victim but as a precautionary measure, I

did advise Mr. Baron about those people coming to the area.’’ 313

7–5–70: Joseph Barboza kills Clay Wilson.314

7–11–70: While at a friend’s (Larry Hughes) house back East, Joseph Barboza talks with attorney F. Lee Bailey. Barboza testifies

at the Clay Wilson murder trial that a retainer was paid to Bailey

by Frank Davis ‘‘on behalf of Raymond Patriarca.’’ When Barboza

and Bailey are alone, Bailey hands Barboza an envelope containing

$800 and says, ‘‘Somebody left it in my office. I don’t know who left

it for you.’’ Barboza and Bailey discuss his ‘‘Mafia testimony’’ and

that Bailey would arrange to see him. Barboza gives Bailey his address and telephone number in Santa Rosa, California.

7–17–70: Joseph Barboza is arrested in New Bedford, Massachusetts, on narcotics and firearms charges. Once informed of his arrest, the Massachusetts Parole Board revokes his parole. Barboza

is held on $100,000 bail and taken to the Bristol House of Correction after pleading innocent in New Bedford Municipal Court. He

had been free for 16 months. (Informer Baron Arrested, Parole Revoked, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 1970; Baron Seized, Held on Arms,

Pot Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, July 17, 1970 ). [While in prison,

Barboza apparently tells William Geraway about the Clay Wilson

murder. Later, Geraway is able to recount to police that Barboza

said he killed Dee Mancini’s husband, and that there were two female witnesses (one to the killing and one to the burial). See 10–

5–70 entry.] 316

7–20–70: According to the Boston Globe, ‘‘Firearms and narcotics

charges against underworld informer Joseph (Barboza) Baron, 37,

were dropped yesterday by Dist. Atty. Edmund Dinis in a surprise

move.’’ Before charges were dropped, Dinis said federal officials

telephoned him and said they were concerned with Barboza’s welfare and that Barboza has been ‘‘most cooperative with them and

given them vital testimony.’’ The article continues, ‘‘When Baron

was arrested he told officials he came to New Bedford on orders

from Federal officials ‘to help restore law and order in the West

End,’ where there had been over a week of racial turmoil.’’ An FBI

spokesman responded, ‘‘Baron is not at the present time, nor has

he been since March of 1969, under the control of the US government. Nor is he used as an emissary.’’ The charges against Barboza

are supposedly dropped because Barboza had no legal representation at the arraignment, making it unconstitutional. Barboza is

taken to the Bristol County House of Correction on a parole violation detainer because Barboza violated a provision of his parole

prohibiting him from ever returning to Massachusetts. (Charges

Against Baron Dropped, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 1970; see also

Charges Against Baron are Dropped, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20,

1970).317

517

7–21–70: Joseph Barboza is housed in Massachusetts’ Walpole

State Prison for violating parole. (Prison Officials Fear for Baron’s

Safety, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 1970).318

From July 21, 1970, until September 25, 1970, Joseph Barboza

shares the same Walpole cell blocks as William Geraway. Informers

Hit Joe Baron With Charge of Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15,

1970.319

7–22–70: Director Hoover writes a memorandum to the Attorney

General that describes how Joseph Barboza was a significant government witness and yet was arrested on July 17, 1970, in New

Bedford, Massachusetts. The memorandum further states, ‘On July

20, 1970, the charges against Barboza were nolle-prossed by the

District Attorney’s Office in that Barboza’s rights had been violated

as he was not represented by counsel. Barboza was released; however, the parole board revoked his parole and returned him to the

Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Walpole, Massachusetts,

where he is supposed to stay until October 5, 1970.’’ This memorandum is copied to the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division.320

7–29–70: Jerome Sullivan, a reporter for the Boston Globe writes,

‘‘Joseph (Barboza) Baron . . . is recanting his testimony which put

four men in Death Row at Walpole, two others in prison for life,

and stuck Cosa Nostra chief Raymond L.S. Patriarca in a Federal

prison for five years. First indication of Baron’s turn-around came

this morning when Attorney Joseph J. Balliro filed a motion for a

new trial in Suffolk Superior Court for Henry Tameleo[.] Balliro, in

filing his motion, also presented an affidavit signed by Joseph

(Barboza) Baron, stating that Baron wants to recant his testimony

against Tameleo and three others convicted in the same murder

case, and now wants to tell the truth.’’ Joseph Barboza’s July 28,

1970, affidavit states in pertinent part, ‘‘That I wish to recant certain portions of my testimony during the course of the [Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan] trial insofar as my testimony concerned the involvement of Henry Tameleo, Peter J. Limone, Joseph L. Salvati

and Lewis Grieco [sic] in the killing of Teddy Deegan.’’ [It is interesting to note that Barboza does not suggest recanting his testimony regarding Ronald Cassesso and Roy French who were, in

fact, participants.] (Jerome Sullivan, Baron Admits Perjury in

Deegan Murder Trial, BOSTON GLOBE, July 29, 1970; see 10–16–78

entry).321

7–30–70: According to the Boston Globe, Raymond Patriarca attorney Charles Curran ‘‘filed an affidavit by [Joseph Barboza]

Baron, which asserted that Baron was ready to present testimony

‘which will exonerate’ Patriarca, [Henry] Tameleo and Ronald

Cassesso in the death of William Marfeo.’’ (Baron Wants to Change

Story, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 1970).322

According to the Boston Globe, Peter Limone files a motion for

a new trial. Accompanying the motion is ‘‘an affidavit signed by police detective William W. Stuart of Mattapan, stating that he (Stuart) has information that Limone and three co-defendants are innocent of the Deegan killing.’’ Henry Tameleo filed a similar motion

yesterday on the basis that Joseph Barboza wants to recant his tesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00527 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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timony. (Limone Files Appeal of Deegan Slay Conviction, BOSTON

GLOBE, July 30, 1970). [Note: Louis Greco and Ronald Cassesso

later file similar motions. See Appeal for 4th in Slaying, BOSTON

GLOBE, Aug. 18, 1970.]

8–3–70: The Boston SAC notifies Director Hoover by airtel that

the Deputy Chief of the Strike Force Edward Harrington met with

Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett Byrne and Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind. At this meeting, Byrne said the affidavit signed by Barboza and filed with the motion for a new trial was

not sufficient to warrant a hearing as it simply contains a general

statement. District Attorney Byrne is going to confer with the

judge in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder trial, Judge Felix

Forte, and request that the motion is denied on this basis. The District Attorney also plans to confer with John Fitzgerald who testified in the Deegan case. [Note: Assistant District Attorney Zalkind

meets with John Fitzgerald on August 7, 1970. See 8–7–70 entry.]

The airtel also states, ‘‘Boston informant reports that Baron had

been seeking $250,000 from the defense on the promise of helping

them out.’’ Attorney Fitzgerald advised that Barboza wanted him

to contact Joseph Balliro to obtain money from him for changing

Barboza’s testimony. During the last week, Attorney F. Lee Bailey

called Barboza’s wife and told her not to pick up a Western Union

money order that had been forwarded to her because other funds

would be sent to her.323

8–7–70: In New York City, Attorney John Fitzgerald, Assistant

District Attorney Jack Zalkind, and Detective William Powers of

the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office meet to discuss a 1969

meeting in Massachusetts between Fitzgerald, Joseph Barboza, and

James Southwood, which Channel 5 in Boston filmed for the purpose of a television special. According to the transcript of the New

York City meeting, Barboza claimed to Fitzgerald that he had 50

pages of material that if he left out, would overturn three cases

without Barboza being charged with perjury. Barboza also allegedly told Special Agent Paul Rico that a guy named Jimmy was

missing and buried at the Cape. Fitzgerald says Barboza was trying to leave the impression that he killed someone. Fitzgerald relates a discussion he had with Barboza where Barboza felt he could

return to the streets of Boston by contacting Joseph Balliro.

Barboza said, ‘‘I got enough that will convince any Court that I was

lying, so we will change the testimony and we will pick up a bundle

of dough and everything will be straighten [sic][.]’’ Southwood allegedly told Edward Harrington that Barboza was willing to say

Louis Greco was innocent, which upset Barboza. Barboza said his

testimony was that Ronald Cassesso and he went to Peter Limone,

and that Romeo Martin never had any dealings with Limone.

Later, Barboza supposedly told Harrington that he never said any

of the men were innocent, according to Special Agent Dennis

Condon.324

8–20–70: The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘Superior Court Judge Joseph Ford signed an application in Suffolk Superior Court yesterday authorizing the issuance of a warrant charging underworld informer Joseph (Barboza) Baron with violation of his probation. The

Probation Department of Suffolk is seeking to have the probation

519

revoked and have Baron serve a four to five year suspended sentence he received on various charges in 1967.’’ (Baron Faces Parole

Charge, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1970; see also Edward Counihan,

Court Asked to Release Baron from Walpole, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.

11, 1970).325

8–25–70: According to the Boston Globe, Attorney F. Lee Bailey

filed a petition for a hearing on behalf of Joseph Barboza. The petition requested that Barboza be allowed to take a lie detector test

to prove that his testimony in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder

trial was false. Assistant District Attorney Jack Zalkind tells the

court that his office is against the use of a lie detector test because

it is inadmissible in court. (Hearing on Baron Test Continued, BOS- TON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1970).326

A memorandum from Boston REDACTED to Director REDACTED

designated ‘‘urgent’’ states, ‘‘Pursuant to a telephonic request of

Donald Barboza, brother of Joseph Baron, Donald Barboza was

interviewed late P.M. yesterday and early A.M. today. Donald said

Baron requested him to contact SA Dennis M. Condon and to relate

the following to him: He, Baron, is scheduled to be transported

from MCI, Walpole, Mass., Four A.M., August Twentyseventh next,

in connection with hearing in Superior Court, Boston, that date.

Baron wanted SA Condon, Walter Barnes, Chief of Strike Force,

Boston, and John Partington, Deputy USM, Providence, R.I., who

was in charge of Baron’s detail, to meet and talk to him at Five

A.M., August Twentyseventh next so that F. Lee Bailey would not

be aware of this contact. Donald Barboza said Baron made statement that there would be no polygraph and that he, Baron, was

just trying to move these people for some money; that his arrest

in New Bedford, Mass., ‘screwed up’ this move; that attorney Joe

Balliro ‘screwed him up’ by going into court with the affidavits.

Baron told his brother to relay the fact that his wife has his papers

re[garding the] Deegan murder trial and on which numerous handwritten notations of Assistant Suffolk County District Attorney

Zalkind appear, who prosecuted this case. Baron also told his

brother that F. Lee Bailey assured him that the probation violator

warrant recently served on him would not become effective until

the end of his present sentence on October Fifth next; that since

he will actually be released from the parole violation on September

Twenty-third, next, because of having given blood, the latter warrant will not affect his continued incarceration. Barboza told his

brother that Bailey also assured him that the District Attorney in

Bristol County could not do anything with the drug and gun

charges for which he was arrested in July last. Boston Office will

advise Barnes of Barboza’s desire to see him and UACB, SA

Condon will not see Barboza.’’ 327

8–27–70: F. Lee Bailey writes a memorandum to Joseph Balliro

relaying the following information: ‘‘This is a status report of the

present situation with respect to [Joseph Barboza] Baron and his

proposed recantation of testimony given before the Superior Court

in Commonwealth v. French. Although I have necessarily excluded

a few matters as confidential between Mr. Baron and myself, he

has authorized me to inform you as to the matters described below.

As you recall, when I met with Baron at his request in New BedVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00529 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ford, he stated that he had felt for some time that he should make

a direct effort to right the injustice which his testimony had

caused. He indicated that he had been assured all along that (especially in the murder cases) a conviction was unlikely, and after the

conviction occurred he was told to expect that due to trial errors

the Supreme Court would reverse the cases, and of course there

would never be a re-trial; therefore, no permanent harm would be

done to anyone whereas the government would have accomplished

its primary objection: much publicity about prosecuting organized

crime. After he learned that the Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and discussed this fact with many friends, he became persuaded that these men might be executed for something they

hadn’t done and therefore took steps on his own to make his feelings known to the victims of his testimony. His arrest in New Bedford following my agreement to represent him was of course an unanticipated and unfortunate intervening factor, and has prevented

me from going over exhaustively with Baron all of the events that

led up to his trial testimony and caused it to seem credible. Nonetheless, after many hours of conversation with him at Walpole I am

convinced that I have most of the details of what actually took

place. It appears that the reports you have described given to three

different police officers in three different departments by persons

other than Baron correctly describe the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan

killing and the attempt on the life of [Anthony] Stathopoulos. It appears that Mr. [Roy] French did in fact shoot Deegan, that Mr.

[Ronald] Cassesso was present with Baron in the car and conspired

to kill Stathopoulos but was not involved in the Deegan killing, and

that [Joseph] Salvati and Louis Greco were not present at all. Further, [Henry] Tamelio [sic] and [Peter] Lemone [sic] had nothing to

do with arranging Deegan’s murder nor had they any reason to believe that it was going to occur. The person sitting in the rear of

the automobile which the Chelsea Police Captain saw was in fact

bald and was Vincent Flemmi. Romeo Martin in fact shot Deegan

but the role ascribed to Greco as the third assailant of Deegan in

fact involved another man whose last name begins with ‘‘C’’ as you

had earlier suggested to me. All of this information will be verified

by polygraph test within the next few days, but I believe that an

additional affidavit from Baron naming the actual participants together with a statement by Cassesso, who has never testified,

would be helpful in corroboration. I have had no response to my

letter to the Attorney General asking for help in writing [sic] the

injustice that Baron has caused. . . . If the law enforcement authorities are interested in correcting the wrongful convictions

which were obtained in the Superior Court, they have the power

to do so and they certainly by this time have every reason to believe that a terrible mistake has been made. I will do everything

I can consistent with Baron’s legal rights to aid in attaining this

result. I am very hopeful that before much more time goes by

someone in authority will recognize the serious responsibilities to

be faced and confer with me about some reasonable and practical

means of setting these clients free. Until that time there is not very

much that I can do directly except to try to prevent Baron’s continued incarceration. I must be frank in saying that because of his

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521

dom (as he did before) for the conviction (even if wrongful) of people whom the law is out to get.’’ 328

Santa Rosa’s Press Democrat reports that Raymond ‘‘Patriarca

was granted parole by the Rhode Island Parole Board after serving

five years of a 10-year sentence.’’ (Ex-Crime Boss Patriarca Paroled

in Rhode Island, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Aug. 27,

1970; see also Patriarca v. State, No. 74–44–M.P. (Dec. 9, 1974)).329

8–28–70: In a memorandum to James Featherstone, Deputy

Chief Counsel of the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section, Edward F. Harrington and Walter T. Barnes,

attorneys with the Organized Crime Section, describe their interview with Joseph Barboza conducted that day. In the interview,

Barboza explains he was offering to recant to obtain money from

‘‘the underworld.’’ He indicates that he would leave the area once

he got the money. Barboza states that F. Lee Bailey ‘‘made him

sign the affidavit.’’ According to the memorandum, Barboza claims

that his Deegan testimony was truthful. He says he will not take

the lie detector test scheduled for August 31, 1970. (See 10–31–78

entry which explains that this memo was provided to a court during one of Louis Greco’s appeals).330

Walter Barnes and Edward Harrington interview Joseph

Barboza at Walpole State Prison, according to an ‘‘urgent’’ teletype

from Boston REDACTED to Director REDACTED. Barboza says his performance in court on August 27, 1970, at the last habeas corpus

proceeding was just an act. He is really still on the side of government; he just wants the organization to think that he was with

them. Barboza says that he was only indicating that he would recant because the organization is paying him money. The teletype

informs that Barboza is extremely disturbed about his probation

revocation warrant and wants District Attorney Garrett Byrne to

lift this warrant. Barboza would like his wife relocated, and he

would like to return to Fort Knox, Kentucky. He reiterates that his

testimony in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan trial was truthful and a

lie detector would prove this. He advises that Frank Davis of

Rhode Island, a close associate of Raymond Patriarca, operates the

Hi-Lo Construction Company. Davis paid Barboza in connection

with this recent move on two occasions. The Strike Force is considering bringing the Davis matter before a federal grand jury in

Rhode Island.331

Robert Walsh writes a Boston Globe article on Joseph Barboza’s

appearance in court the day before in a habeas corpus hearing:

‘‘Under direct questioning by F. Lee Bailey, Baron’s lawyer, Baron

admitted visiting Massachusetts, despite terms of his parole, on

five occasions. But he claimed he did so under FBI auspices on four

of those five occasions. . . . He said that, on one occasion, he was

asked by Federal agents to ‘work’ on a case involving the theft of

a $500,000 painting.’’ (Robert E. Walsh, Baron Returning to Walpole for Week on Parole Violation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28,

1970).332

8–31–70: In a letter to Department of Justice attorney Walter

Barnes, Joseph Barboza states: ‘‘[F. Lee] Bailey said he is not

bound by the secrecy of Atty. and client relationship. . . . Bailey

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wants me to take a lie detector test Monday, [and] I said no because of the fact the guys on death row were taking it, which is

today, and that I am to[o] upset to take one right now, [and] if I

did later it would prove affirmative that I was telling the truth.

. . . I am going to wait till the twelved [sic] before I take a lie detector test or the eleventh if I take a test! But if Rico was here he’d

help me.’’ 333

September 1970: Lawrence Patrick Hughes’ testimony at the

Clay Wilson murder trial indicates that from September 1970 to

March 1971, Hughes has about a dozen contacts with John Doyle

of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office regarding stolen

bonds in Joseph Barboza’s possession. During one of their conversations, Doyle asks Hughes to photocopy the stolen bonds.334

9–1–70: According to William Geraway, Joseph Barboza receives

a letter from attorney F. Lee Bailey summarizing their conversations and purportedly describing details of Barboza’s murders and

false testimony. Geraway states in an affidavit that Barboza

showed the letter to Geraway in prison. Further, Geraway claims

that Barboza was aware that he was waiving the attorney-client

privilege by permitting Geraway to read the letter.335

Joseph Barboza writes a letter to Walter Barnes and Edward

Harrington, stating that he received a letter from F. Lee Bailey informing Barboza that he will no longer receive legal services from

Bailey or his associate, Gerald Alch. Barboza comments that he is

‘‘not at liberty’’ to reveal why Bailey made this decision. Barboza

also writes that he would like to discuss a criminal matter regarding inter-state conspiracy. Barboza continues, ‘‘I suggest that I be

brought to the Federal Bldg. on a writ-of-habeas-copus [sic] [and]

have present FBI Agent Paul Ricco [sic], FBI Agent Dennis

Condon, Special Atty. Walter Barns [sic], [and] Asst. U.S. Atty. Ted

Harrington because I have also other information that concerns

them to the utmost.’’ 336

9–2–70: The Boston Globe quotes portions of F. Lee Bailey’s August 27, 1970, letter to Joseph Balliro. The article states that ‘‘the

real truth, as Baron’s counsel, Bailey, relates it in a letter to attorney Balliro, is that the four sentenced to death for the Deegan slaying had nothing to do with it.’’ (Jerome Sullivan, Bailey Says Baron

Clears Death Row Four, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 2, 1970).337

F. Lee Bailey files a motion for leave to withdraw as Joseph

Barboza’s counsel in Suffolk Superior Court. Bailey’s motion states

that Barboza ‘‘held a secret meeting with attorneys for the United

States Department of Justice without the knowledge or consent of

[Bailey.]’’ After this meeting, ‘‘Barboza refused to take a lie detector

test on the Deegan killing, as he had promised Bailey he would. He

also claimed he had not understood his [July 28, 1971] affidavit offering to recant parts of his Deegan trial testimony when he signed

it.’’ Bailey claims that both Barboza’s refusal to take the lie detector test and his secret meeting with federal authorities violated

their agreement. (Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, Baron

v. Moore (Sept. 2, 1970); Alan Jehlen, Baron Reportedly Fluctuates

on Whether Grieco [sic] was Involved in Murder, PEABODY TIMES,

523

Apr. 14, 1971; see also Robert E. Walsh, Baron Letters May Be Key

to Death Row, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1970).338

9–3–70: The Boston Globe writes, ‘‘Some ‘interesting material’ is

contained in three letters which Joseph Barboza wrote to Suffolk

County Dist. Atty. Garrett [sic] H. Byrne[.] Byrne, questioned

about the letters this morning, said he could not reveal their contents but acknowledged their receipt and said the letters along

with a report from Federal officials who talked to Baron, contained

‘some interesting material.’ ’’ (Robert E. Walsh, Baron Letters May

be Key to Death Row, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1970).339

9–14–70: Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner is sentenced to consecutive life

sentences for the murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei,

in addition to a ten-year sentence for conspiracy to murder.340

9–21–70: The Boston SAC advises Director Hoover by airtel: ‘‘[Joseph Barboza] Baron’s parole violation time expires on 9/23/70.

Baron [is] being brought into Suffolk Superior Court on that date

to be arraigned on Probation Violation charges. Suffolk County District Attorney plans to have the Probation Violation proceedings

continued pending the outcome of motions filed for new trial in the

[Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan murder case, so as to insure Baron’s

presence in this area. District Attorney contemplates confining

Baron in a local county house of correction. Indications are that

Baron will be indicted on [a] gun charge in Bristol County stemming from his arrest on gun charges in New Bedford, Mass. on 7/

17/70.’’ 341

9–28–70: In a letter to Edward Harrington, Joseph Barboza

pleads, ‘‘Ted, when you [and] Walter came down to see me, you

[and] Walter asked me not to do something [and] I didn’t. How long

can the little money I bled out of those creeps last, what’ll happen

to my wife [and] babies then? Bailey, said I’ll come running to him

in the end, I never will!! . . . That’s all I want is that job, to be

moved to a new location [and] new I.D. [and] I’ll be out of your hair

[and] Walters completely! I’ll never complain again.’’ 342

10–1–70: Santa Rosa police receive two letters from two Massachusetts state prisoners, William Geraway and Lawrence Wood,

about the Clay Wilson murder.343

10–5–70: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by airtel, ‘‘Enclosed is a copy of [a] memo [by] SA Dennis M. Condon containing

a letter received from Geraway. . . . San Francisco [FBI Office]

subsequently advised that the Chief of Police from Santa Rosa and

the Assistant District Attorney will be in Boston on 10/6/70, to

interview [William] Geraway and [Lawrence] Wood.’’ 344

In a memorandum from Special Agent Dennis Condon to the Boston SAC, Condon writes, ‘‘On 10/5/70, the San Francisco Office advised telephonically of the following letter received by Chief of Police, Santa Rosa, in Santa Rosa, California, on 10/1/70 and was

mailed from South Walpole, Massachusetts on 9/29/70.’’ Relevant

portions of William Geraway’s letter follow: ‘‘A former Boston

loanshark and ‘hit’ man from the Mafia was living in your city recently. He is now in custody here but will return to your city upon

release from here. While in Santa Rosa, he murdered a man and

524

buried the body with the help of a female. Two witnesses were

within 50 feet when the man, Joseph Barboza Baron, killed the victim. I know from Baron what the victim was wearing, how many

times he was shot and why, and who the witnesses were. I know

this because he wanted me to move the body if my appeal should

come through soon since he is afraid the female will eventually divulge the whereabouts of the body. Please send a detective or Attorney General’s representative to this prison immediately along

with a polygraph expert. Another man of this unit, Lawrence Wood,

has knowledge and is willing to appear before a Grand Jury there

after we convince you of the facts in an institutional interview—

in keeping with their attitude of secrecy and cooperation, the Department of Corrections will make us available as witnesses there.

We will give you two eyewitnesses in the location of the body. . . .

Interview Lawrence Wood and myself, me first[.]’’ Condon also

notes that Chuck Hiner, Supervisor of the FBI, San Francisco Office, advised that the Chief in Santa Rosa called William Debham

of the Massachusetts State Police, who said that he would give

Geraway and Wood a polygraph test. Hiner said that the Chief in

Santa Rosa was concerned since one of Barboza’s friends has been

missing for a couple of months.345

Lieutenant William Bergin of the Massachusetts State Police obtains affidavits from William Geraway and Lawrence Wood averring that Joseph Barboza killed an unidentified individual in Santa

Rosa, California in early July 1970. The affidavits state that a

woman named Paulette, who lives with Dee (believed to be Dee

Mancini), knows the location of the body and supposedly helped

bury it. California officials feel that if Geraway and Wood’s information is accurate, the deceased could be either Raymond Pinole

or Clay Wilson, Santa Rosa associates of Barboza. Director Hoover

is informed of these affidavits in an airtel from the Boston SAC October 6, 1970.346

10–6–70: Two Santa Rosa investigators interview William

Geraway and Lawrence Wood at the Massachusetts State Prison

about their letters discussing the Clay Wilson murder.347

The Boston SAC notifies Director Hoover by airtel that the Chief

of the Santa Rosa Police Department, D. Flohr, and Assistant District Attorney of Sonoma County, Edward Cameron, will interview

William Geraway and Lawrence Wood at Walpole State Prison on

this date.348

10–8–70: According to a teletype from the Boston FBI Office to

Director Hoover, the Chief of the Santa Rosa Police Department,

Melvin Flohr, and Edwin Cameron of the Sonoma County District

Attorney’s Office left Boston this morning to return to Santa Rosa,

California. William Geraway and Lawrence Wood furnished affidavits implicating Joseph Barboza of a murder in Santa Rosa in early

July 1970. The victim is believed to be Dee Mancini, Clay Wilson

or Raymond Pinole. An eighteen-year-old female named Paulette,

who lived with Dee Mancini, allegedly helped bury the body. The

teletype also warns that Geraway has a reputation for furnishing

false information.349

525

10–12–70: Santa Rosa police find the buried body of Clay Wilson.350

Special Agent Ahlstrom and Lieutenant Brown of the Sonoma

County Sheriff’s Office contact Dee Wilson who denies any knowledge of her husband Clay’s murder.351

10–13–70: In a teletype, the San Francisco FBI Office notifies Director Hoover of the following: ‘‘Chief of Police Melvin Flohr, Santa

Rosa, Calif., just advised that Paulette Ramos, Santa Rosa, under

questioning by local authorities, disclosed that Joseph Baron shot

and killed Clay Wilson, local Santa Rosa hoodlum, several months

ago. Ramos admitted assisting Baron with disposal of [the] body by

burying in wooded area several miles outside Santa Rosa. Ramos

led local authorities to said area and a body has been recovered.

Chief Flohr states body being examined today; however, due to

badly decomposed condition, positive identification has not been

made.’’ 352

In a memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell to File, McDowell

states that Joseph Barboza made a collect call to Walter Barnes,

and McDowell made notes of their conversation. According to

McDowell, Barboza states the following: ‘ ‘‘The only lie detector test

I ever agreed to take had to do with my gun charge.’ ’’ Barboza also

adds, ‘‘As far as the Deegan trial coming up I stand on the transcript as being the gospel truth.’’ 353

10–15–70: Norfolk County District Attorney George Burke holds

a press conference where he says the Clay Wilson murder came to

his attention about three weeks ago when he was contacted by two

inmates in Walpole State Prison. (Bony Saludes, S[anta] R[osa]

Murder Charge for Gangland Informer, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Oct. 16, 1970; see also Bony Saludes, S[anta] R[osa]

Murder Charge for Gangland Informer, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Oct. 15, 1970. Joseph Barboza reportedly telephones

Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan Hyland from his

Barnstable prison cell to discuss the Clay Wilson murder case.

While Hyland does not disclose the content of the conversation, he

said Barboza apparently was on a ‘‘fishing expedition,’’ trying to

learn what the authorities had against him.354

A teletype from the Boston FBI Office to Director Hoover and the

San Francisco Office reads, ‘‘Joseph Baron telephonically contacted

Boston office of FBI this A.M. He said he had been in telephonic

contact with his wife who told him she had been contacted at her

home by two police officers who informed her that the body of Clay

Wilson had been recovered in that area, that he was a prime suspect and that his residence was searched. Baron alleged that he

had a good relationship with Clay Wilson and that he was being

‘framed.’ It is felt that the San Francisco Office should notify local

authorities in Santa Rosa that Baron, through telephonic conversation with his wife, is now aware of the recovery of Clay Wilson’s

body and the fact that he is considered a prime suspect. Baron is

still being held in the Barnstable County Jail, Barnstable, Mass.,

in lieu of [$100,000] bail for possession of a gun and has a detainer

on him as a probation violator. If murder process obtained relative

526

to him, it is felt that [the] Sheriff of the Barnstable County Jail

should be promptly notified.’’ 355

Joseph Barboza tells an FBI agent that he took trips back to Boston.356

10–16–70: A teletype from the San Francisco FBI Office to Director Hoover and the Boston Office informs that Dee Mancini witnessed Joseph Barboza shoot Clay Wilson in the presence of Paulette Ramos.357

10–22–70: Lieutenant Brown of the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office completes a police report on the Clay Wilson murder.358

10–28–70: Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is arrested. He was convicted on December 1, 1970, in Suffolk Superior Court for attempted murder and subsequently sentenced to fourteen to eighteen years at the Walpole State Prison.359

10–30–70: The Boston FBI sends Director Hoover a teletype advising, ‘‘Lawrence Wood, inmate, MSP at Walpole, who, with inmate William Garaway [sic], provided affidavit implicating [Joseph

Barboza] Baron in [Clay Wilson] murder, sent word to State Police

that he wanted to be taken out of Walpole on a ruse and talk to

SP and FBI. This was accomplished and Wood provided the following information: Data he provided re[garding] Baron’s story of murder in California accurate. However, at request of Garaway [sic], he

has provided defense in [the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan murder trial,

Suffolk County, Mass., four affidavits, not yet signed. First affidavit pertains to Baron’s statements that he did not know what word

recant meant. Wood said this affidavit is true; that Baron did [not]

know what word meant. Second affidavit concerns Baron allegedly

telling him that he testified falsely re[garding] Deegan murder

trial, as well as other miscellaneous data concerning Baron’s custodial detention by U.S. Government. Wood said facts provided by

Baron re[garding] his handling by Government accurate but that

facts re[garding] Baron allegedly admitting he testified falsely

re[garding] Deegan murder trial not true; that Baron never told

him this story but facts dictated to him by Garaway [sic]. Third affidavit concerns data Baron allegedly told Wood that all information he testified to in federal trial of Raymond Patriarca flase [sic];

that data provided to him for testimony via coaching of federal

agents, specific names not set forth. Wood said this is all false, that

Baron never told him this; that this data also provided to him for

affidavit by Garaway [sic]. Fourth affidavit alleges Baron told him

that authorities, not specified, brought Anthony Stathopoulos to

him so that he, Baron, could tell Stathopoulos what he should testify about. Wood said again this is not true but facts provided to

him by Garaway [sic] for affidavit. Wood claims Garaway [sic] is

to receive [$35,000] from ‘Office,’ he, Wood, [$25,000]; that

Garaway [sic] told him Jerry Angiulo (LCN Head, Boston) will

spend a million dollars to tip over the Deegan case, realizing this

is the last hope of the ‘Office’ to bail themselves out. Wood has had

no personal contact with anyone re[garding] this plan other than

Garaway [sic]; claimed Garaway [sic] in process of putting together

a lengthy affidavit in which Garaway [sic] will allege Baron told

him he lied re[garding] Deegan and Patriarca cases, specifying FBI

527

agents, U.S. Attorney, Task Force Attorneys and Suffolk County

Officials as being responsible for this testimony.’’ 360

11–2–70: The FBI interviews Lawrence Wood at Walpole State

Prison. Joseph Barboza told Wood the following information: (1) the

federal government promised Barboza $20,000 but did not give it

to him; (2) federal officials gave Barboza alcohol and marijuana at

Gloucester, Massachusetts; (3) the affidavit William Geraway provided to Lieutenant Bergen of the Massachusetts State Police regarding the Clay Wilson murder was true; (4) Barboza wanted to

kill Paulette Ramos and Dee Wilson; (5) Barboza said that he

killed two other individuals on the West Coast; (6) Barboza admitted killing Frankie Balliro and New Bedford Police Chief Frank

Durfee; (7) Wood said that he was in the process of providing information about the Frank Durfee murder to the Massachusetts State

Police and the New Bedford Police; (8) Barboza, confided that he

killed Carlton Eaton; (9) Barboza told Wood ‘‘that he personally

whacked out six people since he had been released by the United

States Government’’; and (10) [Barboza provided Geraway with

specific details about 2 murders at the Mickey Mouse club.] 361

11–5–70: Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Boston, writes a memorandum to James W. Featherstone, Deputy Chief of the Organized

Crime and Racketeering Section at the Department of Justice. The

memorandum states that: Walpole State Prison inmates William

Geraway and Lawrence Woods told the Santa Rosa, California,

Chief of Police that Joseph Barboza told them that Barboza murdered someone in Santa Rosa. Through attorney Ronald Chisholm,

Geraway has had Woods create false affidavits claiming that

Barboza told Woods that he did not testify truthfully at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan and William Marfeo murder trials. Woods

now says that Barboza never talked to him about the Deegan and

Marfeo cases, but Barboza did discuss the Clay Wilson murder. According to the memorandum, ‘‘[i]nformation received from a witness

now in the protective custody of [the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office] indicates that [Barboza] had tried to obtain $500,000

from the organization in this area with the promise of recanting his

testimony. This witness has furnished information about a meeting

between [Barboza] and F. Lee Bailey where Bailey gave [Barboza]

$800 and told him that ‘the poeple’ [sic] had agreed to the $500,000

but that he, Bailey, would not act as the intermediary.’’ Barboza

dropped F. Lee Bailey and ‘‘would not go through for the organization.’’ The memorandum provides background information indicating that Geraway has lied to law enforcement in the past regarding

capital cases. In conclusion, the memorandum states, ‘‘Since

[Barboza] has now done a turn-about, drop[ped] F. Lee Bailey and

refused to go through for the organization, in order to upset the

Deegan murder convictions and the Patriarca [William Marfeo

murder] case, his wife and children could now be in danger as a

result of the organization.’’ 362

11–9–70: William Geraway signs an affidavit stating in relevant

part: ‘‘[Joseph Barboza] Baron admitted to me that five out of the

six men he gave testimony against, four of whom are on death row,

were innocent, and he stated that [F. Lee] Bailey and [Gerald] Alch

528

knew many details of this. The men he named as being innocent

are Henry Tameleo, Peter Limone, Ronald Casseso [sic], Louis

Grieco [sic] and Joseph Salvati. Baron admitted that a federal case

resulting in convictions against Tameleo, Casseso [sic] and Raymond Patriarca [for the murder of William Marfeo] was also based

upon perjured testimony, and that this, too, was known to Bailey’s

law firm.’’ Geraway further states that on September 1, 1970, a

ten-page letter from Bailey was delivered to Barboza, and Barboza

allowed Geraway to read the letter, effectively waiving the attorney-client privilege. Geraway claims that ‘‘Bailey said that . . .

Baron had admitted to committing perjury against [Jerry] Angiulo,

[Raymond] Patriarca and four men on death row.’’ Geraway also

states in his affidavit that Bailey said, ‘‘Innocent men’s lives have

been destroyed by your testimony.’’ The affidavit continues, ‘‘Bailey

pleaded with Baron to come forth for once in his life and tell the

truth, just because it’s right[.]’’ 363

11–13–70: Edward J. Harrington Jr., as the Chief Public Defender for Massachusetts, writes a letter to the Public Defender of

Sacramento County. [Note: Chief Public Defender Edward J. Harrington Jr. should not be confused with Attorney in Charge of the

Boston’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section Edward F.

Harrington.] Harrington undercuts William Geraway and Lawrence

Wood’s credibility, informing the Public Defender that Geraway

was called a ‘‘chronic liar’’ in court. Harrington suggests that California further investigate the allegations before extraditing

Barboza.364

11–16–70: In a memorandum concerning Lawrence Hughes, Special Agent Dennis Condon notifies Edward Harrington, Attorney in

Charge of Boston’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,

that Hughes has been kept in the protective custody of the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office as a potential witness for the last

two months. The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office is requesting assistance in finding Hughes employment.365

Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s Organized

Crime and Racketeering Section, writes a letter to Gerald Shur of

the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division regarding Lawrence

Hughes. Harrington’s letter states, ‘‘It is requested that employment be procured for Lawrence P. Hughes. Mr. Lawrence P.

Hughes . . . has been kept in protective custody by the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office as a potential witness for the last

two months. Hughes furnished information relative to a meeting in

the woods in the Freetown, Massachusetts area between Joseph

[Barboza] Baron and Frank Davis, an associate of Raymond L.S.

Patriarca, relative to negotiations for a change of testimony on the

part of Baron to release the organized crime figures that he had

testified against. Hughes also was present when F. Lee Bailey

turned over $800 to Baron and told him (Baron), ‘The people would

pay the $500,000 but he would not be the intermediary.’ Hughes

will testify to this in a hearing relating to a motion for a new trial

which has been filed by six Cosa Nostra members who had previously been convicted for the first-degree murder of Boston gangster Edward Deegan. . . . Although tried in the state court, the

conviction resulted from the joint cooperation of federal and state

529

authorities in Massachusetts. The Deegan murder case, one of the

most significant organized crime convictions in New England, resulted in four other defendants being sentenced to death and the

two other defendants being sentenced to life imprisonment. Although tried in the state court, the conviction resulted from the

joint cooperation of federal and state authorities in Massachusetts

. . . The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, which has been

extremely cooperative with the Strike Force, is requesting Strike

Force assistance in obtaining employment for Hughes until this

matter is resolved.’’ 366

11–18–70: Judge Felix Forte of Suffolk County Superior Court

dismisses motions for a new trial in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

murder case, according to an airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover.367 Five defendants were seeking new trials: Peter

Limone, Henry Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso, Louis Greco, and Joseph

Salvati. The sixth defendant, Roy French, did not seek a new trial.

See 5 Denied Retrials in Gang Slaying, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20,

1970.368

December 1970: Lawrence Patrick Hughes (a.k.a. Larry Brown)

and his wife meet with Special Agent Dennis Condon, and Assistant District Attorneys Jack Zalkind, and John Doyle in Dedham,

Massachusetts, to discuss relocating Hughes to Texas, according to

Hughes’ testimony at the Clay Wilson murder trial.369

12–1–70: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by memorandum that an investigation disclosed that Joseph Badway, a close

associate of Raymond Patriarca, was involved in meetings discussing Joseph Barboza changing his testimony to effect the release of

Patriarca and other La Cosa Nostra (LCN) members in exchange

for a large sum of money. [The majority of this memorandum has

been redacted.] 370

Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi is convicted in Suffolk Superior Court

for attempted murder. He is subsequently sentenced to 14 to 18

years at Walpole State Prison.371

12–3–70: An airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover apprises Hoover that ‘‘Lt. Det. William Bergin, Mass. State Police, attached to Norfolk County DA’s Office, and assigned to handle MCI,

Walpole, Mass., advises he received two affidavits from inmate William Geraway, dated 11/24/70. Geraway alleges Attorney Ronald

Chisholm has furnished him $150, then $200 and a $395 watch, as

well as a promise of $35,000 to furnish affidavits and testify in

court relative to statements made to Geraway by [Baron] about innocence of individuals convicted on Baron testimony. Geraway alleges that Baron did make such statements but he, Geraway, was

not aware that he could not ethically accept these things. Admits

at instigation of Attorney Ronald Chisholm, who was in contact

with Jerry Angiulo, he, Geraway, was to ‘fill in’ inmate Lawrence

Wood with information provided by Baron to Geraway so that

Wood could also submit affidavits.’’ In addition, the airtel informs

that Geraway wanted to meet with Edward Harrington, but Harrington will not meet with Geraway since he is a ‘‘self-admitted

liar.’’ 372

530

12–23–70: Director Hoover notifies the Boston SAC in a memorandum regarding Boston of the following: ‘‘By return mail both

Boston and San Francisco advise the Bureau concerning any prosecution pending against the subject. Also include details as to the

stage to which the prosecutive steps have progressed.’’ A copy of

this memorandum is sent to the San Francisco Office.373

12–28–70: In an airtel, the Boston SAC informs Director Hoover:

‘‘[Joseph Barboza] Baron has been indicted in Bristol County on

gun carrying charges, armed assault and possession of marijuana.

No trial date has been set and he is held in $100,000 bail. He is

also being held for Suffolk County authorities for Probation Violation. He is currently in custody in the Hampden County Jail in

Springfield, Mass. A request for his removal to California has been

received by Governor of Mass. from California authorities to face

a murder charge in Sonoma County, California.’’ 374

1971

1–5–71: Anthony Stathopoulos executes an affidavit that states

in part: ‘‘Officer [John] Doyle told me that [Joseph Barboza] Baron

had told him that [Louis] Grieco [sic] was in the alley shooting [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan. Someone from the District Attorney’s staff

had told me the seating arrangement of the defendants in the

courtroom before I testified. On September 8, 1967, I was taken by

Boston police officers to the County Jail at Barnstable where I had

a talk with Joseph Baron. We talked about the events of March 12,

1965, and about testimony that both he and I were going to give

before a grand jury about that night. I told Baron that I wasn’t

sure that Charles Moore had set up the shooting so that, since I

wasn’t sure, I would not want to involve him. I asked Baron about

[Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’] Flemmi because Baron, had told me in Charles

Street Jail that he, Baron could straighten me out with Flemmi.

Baron told me that he was going to keep Flemmi out of it because

he said that Flemmi was a friend of his and the only one who

treated him decently. Before the trial in 1968, I talked with Mr.

Zalkind about the lawyers for the defendants wanting to talk with

me before the trial. I thought that I would so that I would know

what kind of questions they would ask me when I was on the witness stand. Mr. Zalkind told me that I shouldn’t do this because

someone was trying to kill me. Since the trial I learned from Mr.

Bailey about police reports and I talked with Mr. Zalkind about the

reports. The reports were attached together and the first was headed ‘John Doyle’s office’ and related to the events of September 8,

1967, and the second related to certain statements made by Officer

Robson about talks with me in June and July of 1967 [see 6–22–

67 entry]. Mr. Zalkind informed me, in August or September of

1970, to the best of my memory, that the second report had been

delivered to Mr. Zalkind by Officer Doyle sometime after the trial

was over and that Mr. Doyle believed that a copy of the second report had been delivered to one of the lawyers for the defendants

by a police officer. I also talked with Officer Doyle who had some

papers in his hand. He said that this was what the defense lawyers

were talking about. He read parts of it to me. He asked me if parts

were accurate and I agreed with him.’’ 375

531

1–12–71: The Assistant Attorney-in-Charge of the Department of

Justice’s San Francisco Office, Phillip Michael, writes a memorandum to Edward Harrington. Michael informs Harrington that he

had a lengthy conversation with Sonoma County District Attorney

Kiernan Hyland on January 11, 1971. Michael told Hyland that the

Department of Justice had no desire to interfere with Joseph

Barboza’s pending murder prosecution. However, the Department

of Justice wanted to ‘‘satisfy ourselves, (1) that Barboza was not

being framed, and (2) that Barboza was represented by competent

counsel. . . . Hyland believes Barboza became involved with Clay

Wilson, the victim, in connection with stolen non-negotiable bonds

Barboza was attempting to sell. Wilson was a known criminal operator in Santa Rosa who apparently attempted to cheat Barboza, not

knowing the character or propensities of Barboza. Barboza also became quite friendly with Wilson’s attractive wife, who is a known

user of hard narcotics.’’ According to the memorandum, Hyland told

Michael that the first information they received about the murder

came from Massachusetts prisoners, who provided ‘‘vague, sketchy

and inaccurate’’ information, yet enough to stimulate the investigation. The prisoners did not know the location of the body and other

crucial information. Michael comments, ‘‘Hyland sees no organized

crime ramifications to this crime,’’ because everybody involved were

just local and known to local law enforcement for years. Hyland

also does not believe the women were persuaded to frame Barboza.

Michael informs Harrington that Hyland discussed this matter

frankly and invited Michael to review his files. Michael advised

Hyland that an attorney from the Boston Strike Force might contact him, which caused him no concern. The memorandum concludes, ‘‘Let me know if you wish me to make any new contact with

Hyland or assist you further in this matter.’’ 376

2–10–71: The Governor of Massachusetts signs extradition papers on Joseph Barboza for the State of California. [This information is contained in an airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover.] 377

2–22–71: A Santa Rosa Press Democrat article reports that a

Massachusetts judge denies Joseph Barboza’s request to fight extradition to California for the Clay Wilson murder. Massachusetts

Judge Denies Baron Block to Extradition, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Feb. 22, 1971.378

According to an airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover,

Joseph Barboza waives extradition and is turned over to California

authorities for removal to California.379

2–24–71: Joseph Barboza is due to arrive in California to stand

trial for the Clay Wilson murder. (Bony Saludes, Two Deputies Returning with Accused Murderer, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa,

CA), Feb. 23, 1971).380

2–25–71: The Boston Herald Traveler reports, ‘‘Federal authorities sought [Joseph Barboza] Baron’s parole as a reward for his

cooperation[.] . . . [A]t the request of local and federal officials, the

State Parole Board, in a most unusual move, scheduled a parole

hearing for Baron at the Charles St. jail[.]’’ The parole hearing was

held in March 1969, and Barboza was granted parole with the folVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00541 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
532

lowing stipulations: Baron was to be released into the custody of

Walter Barnes of the Justice Department, and Baron was not to return to Massachusetts without the parole board’s permission.

(Thomas C. Gallagher, Was Baron’s Parole Legal?, BOSTON HER- ALD-TRAVELER, Feb. 28, 1971.) 381

3–1–71: Joseph Barboza pleads not guilty to the murder of Clay

Wilson.382

Spring 1971: According to a July 11, 1995, affidavit by Joseph

Barboza’s former biographer James Southwood, ‘‘[I]n the spring of

1971, Mr. Barboza said: ‘Louis Greco wasn’t in the alley!’ I have

previously made this known to Mr. Louis Greco’s then attorney. To

this end, Mr. Barboza apparently sent a message to Raymond

Patriarca, boss of the New England Mob, who was presently in jail

as a result of Mr. Barboza’s testimony, that the writer, James

Southwood, was in possession of the Grand Jury minutes of the socalled ‘Teddy Deegan Murder’ case. Among those convicted in this

case was Louis Greco. Mr. Barboza told me that the Grand Jury

minutes would prove that he lied in the courtroom. He instructed

me to return the Grand Jury minutes to Attorney Joseph Balliro.

To the best of my knowledge, the Barboza copy of the Grand Jury

minutes was given to Attorney Balliro in the summer of 1971.’’ 383

3–4–71: Edward Harrington, Chief Public Defender for BristolDukes-Nantucket Counties, writes to Marteen Miller Public Defender of Sonoma County. Harrington informs Miller that he has

been representing Joseph Barboza. The letter apprises that the alleged murder date, time and place is of ‘‘great concern to us in

Massachusetts.’’ Harrington states, ‘‘[W]e came within an eyelash

of establishing that he was in Massachusetts at about the time of

the alleged murder.’’ Harrington also undercuts Geraway and

Woods’ credibility stating, ‘‘it is my opinion that Garraway [sic] and

Woods are playing a game with the California authorities for the

sole purpose of going to California on a vacation.’’ 384

3–7–71: Joseph Barboza informs Edward Harrington by letter

that he was arraigned on March 1 and appointed a public defender

named Marteen Miller. Barboza writes that Miller informed him

that he would see Harrington in a day or two. Barboza then pleads,

‘‘You promised me you’d be down two weeks after I left. . . .

[P]lease come down like you promised me, this can throw my case

wide open[.]’’ 385

3–23–71: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, Attorney in Charge of the

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section in Boston, writes a

memorandum to James Featherstone, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. Harrington notifies

Featherstone of his trip to California: ‘‘The purpose of this trip is

to confer with former government witness, Joseph [Barboza] Baron,

presently imprisoned pending a charge of first degree murder[.] In

keeping with the government’s obligation to Baron, I have assured

Baron that this office would take all proper steps to insure that he

receives a fair and impartial trial on his pending murder charge.

This obligation must be kept in view of the fact that many law enforcement officials in the Boston area consider that the pending

murder charge has been concocted by the underworld as a means

533

of retaliating against Baron. This belief is supported by the fact

that the murder investigation was initiated by information provided by cell mates of Baron in a Massachusetts prison who advised state authorities that Baron had admitted to them of his involvement in this murder. These same cell mates subsequently advised the same state authorities that they have been receiving

monies from Attorney Ronald Chisholm, syndicate lawyer in the

Boston area. . . . I have been informed that he intends to call me

as a witness in his behalf. This trip to confer with Baron is important to the interests of the government in that it is a fulfillment

of this office’s commitments to do all within its power to insure

that Baron suffers no harm as a result of his cooperation with the

federal government. The writer will do nothing to attempt to dissuade the prosecution from bringing its case but will alert them of

the possibility that the murder is a Mafia frame. The fulfillment

of this obligation is also in the practical interests of the government as Baron may otherwise determine that the government has

failed him in his time of need and, it is my judgment, that he will

then retaliate against the government by submitting false affidavits to the effect that his testimony in the Patriarca and Deegan

cases was in fact false, and thus tarnish those most significant

prosecutions.’’ 386

3–25–71: Edward F. Harrington, U.S. Attorney in Charge of the

Organized Crime Strike Force visits Joseph Barboza in prison in

California. Harrington also reportedly visits with Barboza’s attorney, Marteen Miller, District Attorney Kiernan Hyland, and Sheriff

Don Striepeke. As Harrington leaves California, he says, ‘‘I just

made a courtesy call. I just happened to be in town.’’ According to

the Press Democrat, Harrington has a good rapport with Barboza

and has communicated with him on underworld matters for about

four years. Miller says he and Harrington discussed Barboza, but

not the Clay Wilson case. District Attorney Hyland states that Harrington made no requests of him. (Bony Saludes, Special U.S.

Agent Visits The Baron, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Mar.

26, 1971).387

Director Hoover writes a letter to Sheriff of Sonoma County Don

Striepeke thanking him for writing a letter commending FBI

agents Dennis Condon, James Scanlan, and Albert Rose in connection with the extradition of Joseph Barboza.388

3–26–71: The State of California formally charges Joseph

Barboza for the murder of Clay Wilson.389

3–27–71: In a letter from Barboza to Ted Harrington, Barboza

writes, ‘‘[I]f I still have my sanity by the time trial come around[,]

I’ll see you Denny [Condon], [John] Doyle and Paul [Rico].’’ 390

3–29–71: William Geraway’s affidavit states, ‘‘[O]ne of the men

against whom [Barboza] gave perjured testimony was a man

named Joseph Salvati[.] That Salvati was entirely innocent of participation or complicity in the crime[.] That he had testified at trial

that when a witness or witnesses had described one of the men in

the getaway vehicle as bald or balding, he stated that this man was

Joseph Salvati, when in reality it was a man named Joseph Romeo

Martin[.] He said his motive for placing Salvati on the scene of the

534

murder was a personal feud[.] Baron stated that Salvati had no

part in the crime whatsoever, nor any knowledge that it was to

happen.’’ 391

3–31–71: In a memorandum to James Featherstone, Deputy

Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Edward

‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s Organized Crime

and Racketeering Section, summarizes his meeting in California regarding Joseph Barboza. Harrington states that he met with

Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan Hyland on March 25,

1971, and advised him that the Department of Justice was not attempting to interfere with his prosecution of Barboza for the Clay

Wilson murder. Rather, Harrington was fulfilling his promise to

Barboza to advise the District Attorney’s Office of the possibility

that Barboza was being framed for the Wilson murder in retaliation for Barboza’s cooperation with the government in major organized crime prosecutions. Harrington also informs Featherstone

that he conferred with Chief Public Defender Marteen Miller and

told him about the possibility of a frame. In addition, Harrington

told Miller that Dennis Condon, Paul Rico and Suffolk County Investigator John Doyle were available to testify on behalf of

Barboza, and ‘‘they possess information which would tend to discredit the veracity of prospective state witnesses Garroway [sic]

and Wood.’’ While speaking to Barboza at the Sonoma County Jail,

Harrington writes that Barboza ‘‘told me that the underworld

would take no steps to overturn the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan murder conviction until he was convicted of the pending murder

charge, at which time the underworld believed that he (Baron)

would be willing to file an affidavit that he gave false testimony

at the Deegan trial in return for monies which he would then need

to support his wife and children while he served a term of life imprisonment.’’ 392

4–14–71: Alan Jehlen writes an article in the Peabody Times

(Essex County Newspapers) entitled ‘‘Was Louis Grieco [sic] framed

by Joe Baron?’’ The article reports, ‘‘There are strong indications

that underworld informer Joseph (Barboza) Baron, the star government witness at the [Deegan murder] trial, may have lied.’’ 393

A Boston Globe article about the Clay Wilson trial in California

states, ‘‘The situation [of Joseph Barboza on trial for murder in

California] is ‘delicate’ for the government because Baron reportedly has told them that if they don’t get him off the hook in the

California murder he will blow the whistle on how he cooperated

with them in the Deegan case.’’ (Jerome Sullivan, Informer Baron

to Switch Story?, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 14, 1971).394

4–16–71: The Peabody Times (Essex County Newspapers) reports

that Boston Detective William W. Stuart swore in an affidavit that

he gave evidence to John Doyle, Chief Investigator for the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office, that Louis Greco, Peter Limone,

Henry Tameleo, and Joseph Salvati were innocent of the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. Doyle, however, did not care, saying the

men were probably guilty of other crimes. Stuart’s affidavit states

that Edward ‘‘Wimpy’’ Bennett told him an account similar to Joseph Barboza’s trial testimony, but with different participants.

535

(Alan Jehlen, Byrne had Evidence of Grieco’s [sic] Innocence, PEABODY TIMES, Apr. 16, 1971).395

In another Peabody Times (Essex County Newspapers) article,

William Geraway reportedly told Suffolk County District Attorney

Garrett Byrne about four murders that Joseph Barboza told

Geraway about in prison. Byrne did not respond. Geraway then

gave Norfolk County District Attorney George G. Burke information about another murder Barboza committed recently, which led

to Barboza’s arrest for the Clay Wilson murder. (Alan Jehlen, ‘The

Taking of a Life is a Serious Matter,’ PEABODY TIMES, Apr. 16,

1971).396

4–20–71: Raymond Patriarca files a Motion to Vacate in U.S.

District Court in Boston with affidavits from William Geraway, according to an airtel from the Boston SAC to Director Hoover dated

4/30/71.397

4–30–71: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by airtel that

since the filing of Raymond Patriarca’s ‘‘Motion to Vacate,’’ Walpole

inmate William Geraway advised that he was furnishing a false affidavit for Ronald Cassesso in an attempt to free Cassesso in the

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. In return, Geraway was supposed

to receive $10,000, given by Cassesso’s relative to Geraway’s sister

on the evening of 4/29/71. After the meeting, Geraway’s sister

turned over the money to Norfolk County authorities. Attorney Edward Harrington, who is handling the Raymond Patriarca motion,

is fully aware of those developments.398

5–13–71: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger is opened as an informant by

Special Agent Dennis Condon. Bulger is closed on 9–10–71 due to

‘‘unproductivity.’’ 399

6–4–71: A Press Democrat article states that two FBI agents visited Joseph Barboza in his California prison cell last week. The

agents returned to the East Coast with affidavits signed by

Barboza affirming his testimony, which resulted in the convictions

of several Mafia figures in 1968.400

6–9–71: The Peabody Times (Essex County Newspapers) reports

that according to inmate Kenneth Landers, Anthony Stathopoulos

testified that Louis Greco was at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder scene out of fear for his life, believing that Roy French would

kill him. Stathopoulos testified for the state to put French safely

behind bars. (Alan Jehlen, Two Support Innocence of Convicted

Killer, PEABODY TIMES, June 9, 1971).401

A Peabody Times article discusses a letter F. Lee Bailey sent to

Joseph Barboza in prison which summarized their conversations.

The letter includes Barboza’s admission that he killed more than

twenty people, and that Barboza’s testimony against Raymond

Patriarca, Jerry Angiulo, and the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan defendants was false. According to Bailey, Barboza showed the letter to

a fellow inmate while in prison, which may have broken the attorney-client privilege on everything Barboza said to Bailey, including

the names of officials with whom Barboza said he worked out the

false testimony. Bailey declined to release the letter without a

court ruling, but Bailey said William Geraway’s affidavit about the

536

contents of the letter was accurate. The article further states that

Barboza told Geraway that he included Joseph Salvati in the

Deegan murder because Salvati owed him $400. After members of

the Justice Department’s ‘‘Strike Force’’ on Organized Crime, Walters and Harrington, visited Barboza in prison, he refused to recant

his testimony or take a lie detector test as he promised Bailey. Bailey then withdrew as Barboza’s counsel. Outraged by Bailey’s withdrawal, Barboza threatened Bailey’s family. Bailey also said he saw

two police reports by three reliable informants which were fairly

consistent with each other and with Barboza’s statements at Walpole State Prison, but very different from Barboza’s trial testimony.

(Alan Jehlen, Two Say Greco Innocent of Deegan Murder, PEABODY

TIMES, June 9, 1971).402

8–2–71: Director Hoover informs the Attorney General by memorandum that Boston Police Commissioner Edmund McNamara has

requested that he be allowed to review the transcripts of the electronic surveillance on Raymond Patriarca. Further, during the

1968 trial of Patriarca, ‘‘logs of the FBI electronic surveillance were

made available to the Court for in camera inspection. It appears

that the newspapers then acquired copies of this material.’’ 403 (See

also Richard Connolly, The Story of the Patriarca Transcripts, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 21, 1971).404

8–3–71: By memorandum, Director Hoover notifies the Attorney

General that the Boston Office has received a letter from Suffolk

County District Attorney Garrett Byrne requesting copies of all references in the Raymond Patriarca surveillance to incidents and

people in Suffolk County. A note on the memorandum reads, ‘‘District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne has been cooperative with the FBI

in matters of mutual interest. His office handled the successful

prosecution in State Court of the perpetrators of the robbery of

Brinks, Inc., which occurred in Boston, 1/17/50, the basic evidence

having been developed by FBI investigation.’’ 405

8–6–71: Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division,

Will Wilson, writes a memorandum to Director Hoover in response

to the Director’s request for advice as to whether Boston Police

Commissioner Edmund McNamara should be allowed to review the

transcripts of the electronic surveillance on Raymond Patriarca.

Wilson writes, ‘‘It is our view that Commissioner McNamara’s request should be declined.’’ The memorandum also states, ‘‘We have

uniformly declined requests from state and local investigative and

prosecutive agencies for transcripts of unauthorized electronic surveillances involving members of organized crime. Strict adherence

to this policy is particularly necessary where, as here, a question

of law may exist as to the use which may be made of such information by such agencies and where future state prosecutions involving

the subjects of such electronic surveillance may be jeopardized as

a result of its disclosure and use.’’ 406

8–10–71: Will Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division advises Director Hoover that Suffolk County District

Attorney Garrett Byrne be denied access to all references in the

transcripts of the Raymond Patriarca electronic surveillance to incidents and people in Suffolk County. Wilson states, ‘‘It is our view

537

that District Attorney Byrne’s request should be declined for the

same reasons set forth in my memorandum to you dated August 6,

1971,’’ expressing our view that a similar request by Boston Police

Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara should be denied. (See 8–6–

71 entry).407

8–11–71: An airtel from Director Hoover to the Boston SAC

states, ‘‘[A]ttached is a copy of a letter from Will Wilson, Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated August 10, 1971 . . .

concerning the request of District Attorney Garrett H. Byrne, Suffolk County, Massachusetts, that he be allowed to obtain copies of

all materials contained in the transcripts of the electronic surveillance maintained on Raymond L.S. Patriarca. The Boston office

should be certain that both District Attorney Byrne and Police

Commissioner McNamara are told that this is the instruction from

Assistant Attorney General Wilson that their request for this electronic surveillance material be declined.’’ 408

9–10–71: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger is closed as an informant due

to ‘‘unproductivity.’’ John Connolly later reopens Bulger on 9–18–

75.409

9–15–71: The Boston SAC informs Director Hoover by airtel that

the Boston FBI Office received two letters, dated 9/10/71 and 9/13/

71, from Lawrence Wood, an inmate at Walpole. Wood complains

that he is being abused by members of ‘‘the organization.’’ He also

states that Joseph Barboza is innocent of the Clay Wilson murder,

and he is being framed by the Mafia. Wood states that a man from

Rhode Island and Boston committed the murder and that mafia attorney Ronald Chisholm paid off a woman witness. The airtel

states that Wood’s 9/13/71 letter ‘‘has serious overtones of

suicide[.]’’ 410

9–21–71: In a letter from William Geraway to Suffolk County

District Attorney Garrett Byrne, Geraway states, ‘‘(If you had submitted Baron to a polygraph, a number of men would not be on

death row and/or in prison today, but of course you couldn’t do that

because your subordinates, WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE, were rehearsing with him his perjured testimony.) The cases smell so

badly that their odor is beginning to reach even the most secluded

public nostrils. . . . Please keep one thing in mind, all you can do

to me, all the government can do, is keep me in prison the rest of

my life for a crime I didn’t commit. If that is the price for seeing

that the men on the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan murder receive fair

treatment and that Baron is convicted of murder, then let it be.’’ 411

9–22–71: The Sonoma County District Attorney requests that

William Geraway be brought from Walpole State Prison in Massachusetts to testify in the Clay Wilson murder trial.412

9–27–71: Joseph Barboza’s attorney, Marteen Miller, requests

that prisoner Lawrence Wood be brought to California to testify on

Barboza’s behalf in the Clay Wilson murder trial. Wood, a fellow

inmate with Barboza and Geraway, initially implicated Barboza in

the murder and later retracted his statement. (See 9–15–71

entry).413

538

10–13–71: Edward Harrington reportedly visits Joseph Barboza

in prison in California. Greg Evans, investigator for Marteen Miller, Barboza’s attorney, reportedly picks Harrington up at the airport. Harrington also meets with District Attorney Kiernan

Hyland, Assistant District Attorney John W. Hawkes, and Sheriff

Don Striepeke. When asked the purpose of his visit by a reporter,

Harrington replies ‘‘no comment.’’ Harrington says his purpose for

being in California was the Organized Crime Task Force’s interest

in some recent bookies arrested in San Francisco. (Bony Saludes,

U.S. Lawyer Visits Baron, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Oct.

14, 1971).414

10–18–71: Edward Harrington writes a memorandum to File regarding his trip to California. The memorandum notes that ‘‘on October 13, 1971, I spoke with Assistant District Attorney John

Hawkes and advised him that I was in Santa Rosa. . . . The

[Sonoma County] Sheriff also said that I had previously told the

District Attorney that if [Joseph Barboza] Baron were convicted on

the pending murder charge that I would get him off with a light

sentence. I denied that I had ever made this statement to the District Attorney. . . . The Public Defender wanted Special Agent

[Dennis] Condon and me to testify for the defense with specific reference to the reason for Baron’s relocation to the Santa Rosa, California, area and to the fact that Baron sought, without success, to

receive permission to carry a gun while he was in California from

federal authorities. The Public Defender also asked me to request

John Doyle of the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office to testify on behalf of the defense with respect to the credibility of prospective state witness William Geraway. On October 14, 1971, I received permission from the Sheriff of Sonoma County to speak with

Baron[.] . . . I made [it] clear to Baron that both the FBI and the

Department of Justice were doing all within their power to insure

that Baron received a fair and impartial trial.’’ 415

10–19–71: The Clay Wilson murder trial in California begins.416

10–24–71: The Press Democrat reports, ‘‘Public Defender Marteen

Miller disclosed Friday he will call as a defense witness Edward

Francis Harrington, attorney in charge of the U.S. crime task force

for the Justice Department. Mr. Harrington’s planned appearance

is not unexpected since he visited the 39-year-old New Bedford,

Mass., man twice in the county jail—Oct. 13 and last March 25.

Mr. Miller’s announcement confirmed speculation the Justice Department is trying to help Mr. Baron, one of its top informants

against Mafia figures on the East Coast. . . . Mr. Miller said he

plans to call Mr. Harrington and two FBI agents from the East to

support Mr. Baron’s contention he killed Mr. Wilson in self defense.

He said the government officials, among other things, will explain

why Mr. Baron carried a gun in spite of the fact he was on parole

from Massachusetts and it was illegal for him to carry guns.’’ (Bony

Saludes, The Defense Strategy: Mafia Planned to Kill Baron, PRESS

DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Oct. 24, 1971).417

10–26–71: Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan R. Hyland

writes the following to Director Hoover: ‘‘The enclosed copy of a

news article which appeared in our local Sunday paper indicates

539

that the defense intends to call two FBI agents from the East as

witnesses for the Baron. This is disconcerting for the prosecution

because it presents a picture of a house divided against itself. The

murder for which we are prosecuting the Baron has nothing to do

with his Mafia connections. When and if FBI agents testify as defense witnesses, it would be appreciated that they do me the courtesy of contacting me first and allowing me to interview them concerning their possible testimony.’’ The article Hyland encloses

states that Public Defender Marteen Miller will call Edward Harrington and two FBI agents from the East to support Barboza’s

contentions that he killed Clay Wilson in self-defense. [Bony

Saludes, The Defense Strategy; Mafia Planned to Kill Baron, PRESS

DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Oct. 24, 1971.] 418

Sonoma County District Attorney Kiernan Hyland writes an

identical letter to U.S. Attorney General John Mitchell. Hyland

states that the defense’s motion to call Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington

‘‘is disconcerting for the prosecution because it presents a picture

of a house divided against itself. The murder for which we are

prosecuting the Baron has nothing to do with his Mafia connections. When and if Mr. Harrington testifies as a defense witness,

it would be appreciated if he would do me the courtesy of contacting me first and allowing me to interview him concerning his possible testimony.’’ 419

11–8–71: Special Agent Paul Rico is subpoenaed to testify for Joseph Barboza in the Clay Wilson murder trial on November 18,

1991.420

11–12–71: In the Clay Wilson murder trial, FBI Agent Frederick

Wallace’s testimony for the prosecution is stipulated.421

11–15–71: Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, writes a memorandum

to James Featherstone, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section. The memorandum is a response to

Featherstone’s request to set forth the testimony expected from

Special Agents Rico and Condon and [Harrington] on behalf of Joseph Barboza in the Clay Wilson murder trial. Harrington states,

‘‘It is my judgment that the federal officials involved should respond to Baron’s subpoena as it is essential that the government

should fulfill its commitment to Baron to do all within its power

to insure that he suffers no harm as a result of his cooperation

with the federal government.’’ Harrington also states that the defense wants him to testify to the extent of Barboza’s cooperation

with the federal government, the names and stature of the individuals convicted by his testimony, and the steps taken by the federal

government to ensure Barboza’s safety. The defense wants Condon

to testify as an expert witness regarding organized crime in the

New England area, and about secret underworld movement during

the spring and summer of 1970 to set up Barboza to be killed.

Likewise, the defense wants Rico to testify as an expert in organized crime in the New England area and about information he received from the Spring to Winter of 1969 regarding the underworld’s plans and movements to kill Barboza.422

540

11–17–71: An FBI Teletype from Director Hoover to the Boston

and Miami SACs directs Special Agents Dennis Condon and Paul

Rico to comply with subpoenas requiring their appearance at Joseph Barboza’s murder trial. Since Department of Justice Attorney

Edward Harrington will also testify in this trial, he will be in the

courtroom to protect Rico and Condon’s interests.423

11–18–71: William Geraway testifies in the Clay Wilson murder

trial. [Geraway testifies for about two days.] 424

11–21–71: Lieutenant Ed Maybrun of the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office receives a call from ‘‘Mr. Lawrence W. Brown’’ of New

Bedford, Massachusetts (supposed to be Lawrence Hughes). Brown

(Hughes) says that after reading the newspapers he believes he has

some items that police in California were looking for in the Joseph

Barboza trial. Brown says he received some bonds from Barboza,

and he had 100 certified copies. The bottom of the report indicates

that the FBI apparently received a copy of this police report.425

11–29–71: Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, notifies James

Featherstone, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, of the upcoming testimony in the Clay Wilson murder

trial by Paul Rico, Dennis Condon, and Edward Harrington. Harrington states that he will testify as to the names of the underworld figures against whom Joseph Barboza testified, steps taken

by the Federal Government to protect Barboza, that the government changed Barboza’s name to Bentley and relocated him to

California, and that Harrington denied Barboza’s request to carry

a gun for his protection. Harrington further states that Rico and

Condon will testify that they both advised Barboza while he was

in protective custody in Massachusetts that they had received information that the La Cosa Nostra (LCN) was attempting to locate

and kill Barboza prior to his testifying for the government. Harrington’s memorandum further states that Rico will testify that on

February 3, 1970, he advised Barboza that the LCN knew he was

in Massachusetts and that two individuals were going to do a ‘‘hit’’

on possibly Barboza. Rico advised Barboza to immediately leave the

Massachusetts area and return to California. Harrington further

states that Condon will testify that he advised Barboza that in

January 1970 two well known ‘‘hit men’’ from the Boston area,

Harry Johnson and Allan Fidler, traveled to the San Francisco

area, possibly to kill Barboza. Harrington also states that Condon

and Rico will testify that William Geraway is considered by law enforcement as a ‘‘congenital liar.’’ 426

12–1/2–71: Lawrence Hughes testifies in the Clay Wilson trial

(the defense attempted to suppress Hughes’ testimony). Hughes

testifies that he gave photocopies of bonds and stock certificates to

an FBI agent (Sheehan). Hughes called the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office to tell them about the existence of the bonds. Hughes

was told that the Sonoma County DA would call him back; instead,

the FBI called Hughes. The FBI asked Hughes why he didn’t come

forward about the bonds, and Hughes told them because Harrington’s office said they wanted to pass the bonds on to California.

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paper that there were $150,000 to $300,00 worth of bonds important to the Clay Wilson murder that were missing. Hughes didn’t

understand because in March 1971 the FBI told him to get a copy

of the bonds and then they said they didn’t want the bonds. In November or December 1970, Hughes met with Jack Zalkind (and

maybe John Doyle also) and told Zalkind of Barboza’s comment

about laying a guy’s wife an hour after burying him. Zalkind told

Hughes that if it’s true that Barboza said that, Hughes should keep

his mouth shut and not get involved. Hughes was asked by his

brother to go see Joe Balliro to sign an affidavit saying that 3 or

4 men in jail for the Deegan murder were innocent. Hughes heard

Barboza himself say the men were innocent, but Hughes refused to

sign the affidavit. According to Hughes, Barboza contacted ‘‘them’’

and said that he had lied in the Deegan case, and he would recant

his testimony for $500,000. Hughes said it was not the case that

‘‘they’’ contacted Barboza and asked him to recant or come forward

and say he lied.427

12–2–71: An FBI Teletype dated February 2, 1971, from the San

Francisco Office to Director Hoover and the Boston FBI Office apprises that Dennis Condon, Paul Rico and Edward Harrington were

interviewed by District Attorney Kiernan Hyland and members of

his staff regarding their possible testimony in the Clay Wilson

murder trial. The teletype reads, ‘‘Hyland advised that Hughes testified that in July, 1970, Baron provided him with access to bonds

stolen in California (the State’s theory is that Baron killed Wilson

as a result of an argument over the disposition of these bonds) and

that Baron allegedly admitted to Hughes that he, Baron, had slept

with Wilson’s wife one hour after he had killed Wilson.’’ District

Attorney Kiernan Hyland ‘‘implied that Hughes also told the FBI

[previously] that Baron had possession of the aforementioned

bonds.’’ The February 2, 1971, teletype refers to a previous teletype

dated November 24, 1970, from the Boston FBI Office to the San

Francisco FBI Office. The previous teletype ‘‘set[] forth information

provided by Hughes to the FBI at the time of this interview on [November 24, 1970], at New Bedford, Massachusetts. Pertinent information contained in referenced teletype was previously made available by FBI, San Francisco, to Sonoma County District Attorney’s

Office. Just prior to using Hughes as a prosecution witness, the

District Attorney turned over to defense counsel the substance of

the referenced teletype. Referenced teletype had set forth therein

that Hughes had been in contact with Boston Office of the FBI in

September [1970], and had not made any statements re[garding]

any knowledge of Baron’s involvement in California homicide. The

February 2, 1971, teletype continues, ‘‘As the Bureau is aware,

Hughes, after his contact with the FBI in September of [1970], was

put in touch with Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office, as his

information had a bearing on the Organization’s attempts to overturn the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan murder case in which Baron

had testified. . . . District Attorney Hyland states that there was

no question in his mind that Hughes was sent out from the Boston

area to solidify the case against Baron. Strike Force Attorney is of

opinion that Hughes has been corrupted by LCN [La Cosa Nostra]

and instigated to furnish false testimony. In interview of SAs

Condon, Rico, and Strike Force Attorney Harrington by public deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00551 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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fender, he requested the results of the FBI interview in September

[1970] of Hughes and identity of agent who conducted the interview. Strike Force Attorney advised public defender that SA

Condon had interviewed Hughes but could not testify concerning

interview without obtaining a grant of authority. Strike Force Attorneys from Boston, Massachusetts, have this date requested that

SA Condon’s grant of authority be expanded to include that fact

that on September [23, 1970], he interviewed Lawrence Hughes

with SA David Divan. At this time Hughes told him about the alleged meeting between Bailey and Baron in July [1970], at which

time the figure of [$500,000] was agreed upon for a change of testimony, and an earlier meeting between Baron and Frank Davis,

close associate of Raymond Patriarca and others, in May of [1970].

But Hughes failed to give any information concerning Baron’s involvement with stolen bonds or the murder. Strike Force Attorneys

feel strongly that in the best interest of the government, this request for testimony should be granted. . . . Defense also calling

John Doyle, Chief Investigator, Suffolk County District Attorney’s

Office, Boston, Massachusetts, as Doyle has been in constant touch

with Hughes since September [1970] and never received any information from Hughes relative to Baron’s alleged admission of involvement in California murder.’’ (See also Bony Saludes, The

Baron Murder Trial, A Surprise Witness, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Dec. 2, 1971).428

An authorization letter stamped December 2, 1971, from the U.S.

Attorney General John Mitchell to Special Agent Paul Rico authorizes Rico to testify in the Clay Wilson murder trial ‘‘concerning the

following facts and their surrounding circumstances: (1) That when

[Joseph] Barboza was in a protective status in Massachusetts

awaiting call as a witness you advised him that efforts were being

made by criminal elements to locate him for the purpose of killing

him before his appearance as a witness; and (2) On or about February 3, 1970, you advised Barboza to leave the Massachusetts

area immediately because of a potential threat to his life. This authorization is subject to the following requirements: (1) You may

not disclose any information which might result in the identification of a confidential informant or source of information; (2) You

may not identify any of the places where Barboza was held in protective status; (3) You may not disclose any other information or

produce any material acquired as a result of your official duties or

because of your official status; and (4) Any information concerning

material in Department of Justice files may not be provided without express authority from the Department of Justice.’’ 429

An authorization letter stamped December 2, 1971, from the U.S.

Attorney General John Mitchell to Special Agent Dennis M.

Condon authorizes Condon to testify in the Clay Wilson murder

trial ‘‘concerning the following facts and their surrounding circumstances: (1) That when Barboza was in a protective status in

Massachusetts awaiting call as a witness you advised him that efforts were being made by criminal elements to locate him for the

purpose of killing him prior to his appearance as a witness; and (2)

That on or about January, 1970, Harry Johnson and Allan Fidler

traveled from the Boston area to the San Francisco area, that they

543

traveled extensively in the northern California area, and that they

were apprehended and the circumstances surrounding their apprehension, detention and identification by local police, as well as the

facts concerning these events of which you advised Barboza. This

authorization is subject to the following requirements: (1) You may

not disclose any information which might result in the identification of a confidential informant or source of information; (2) You

may not identify any of the places where Barboza was held in protective status; (3) You may not disclose any other information or

produce any material acquired as a result of your official duties or

because of your official status; and (4) Any information concerning

material in Department of Justice files may not be provided without express authority from the Department of Justice.’’ 430

An authorization letter stamped December 2, 1971, and memorandum from the U.S. Attorney General to Edward F. Harrington

authorizes Harrington to testify in the Clay Wilson murder trial

concerning the following facts: (1) The names of the persons

against whom Barboza testified in federal and state court; (2)

Barboza was maintained in a protective status by the United

States; (3) The government relocated Barboza to California under

a changed identity; (4) The government assisted Barboza in entering a cooking school; (5) Barboza requested authorization to carry

a gun and authorization was not obtained. The memorandum listed

the following restrictions: (1) You may not identify any of the

places where Barbosa [sic] was held in protective status; (2) You

may not disclose any of the techniques employed in effecting

Barbosa’s [sic] change in identity; (3) You may not disclose any

other information or produce any material acquired as a result of

the performance of your official duties or because of your official

status; and (4) Any information concerning material in Department

of Justice files may not be provided without express authorization

from the Department of Justice.’’ 431

12–3–71: Joseph Barboza testifies in his own defense in the Clay

Wilson murder case in California: ‘‘They [the Feds] told me I was

to be called Joe Wilson.’’ Barboza was relocated from Louisville,

Kentucky, to Santa Rosa, California, in 1969 because the Mafia

was after him. Barboza went back east to try to dispose of some

stolen bonds and had a clandestine meeting in the woods with a

group of men—Frank Davis, Ralph Keating, Donald Barboza, Leonard Hughes, Herbert Jesus, and James Southwood, a reporter.

Barboza told them he was going to recant his testimony in exchange for money. Barboza said he lost his address book which contained names of FBI, Santa Rosa police, US Marshals, Justice Department, special attorneys for the Justice Department, state police, etc. Barboza talked to Ronald Cassesso and Henry Tameleo

and discussed his testimony in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan case.

Barboza got $1000 per month from the Office for a couple of

months, and then the money stopped. Barboza saw Bailey 3 or 4

times at Walpole in regards to recanting his testimony. That is why

Barboza was being paid. Barboza signed an affidavit saying he

would recant his testimony, but he never did recant. Barboza later

told Bailey he would not recant. He and Bailey had no more conversations after that. Barboza was told by the Justice Department

544

not to carry guns, and if he were caught, they would not help him.

Barboza was arrested on gun charges on 7/17/70 in Massachusetts.

(See 7–17–70 entry). However, those charges were dropped on 7/21/

20 by District Attorney Dinnis. Dinnis said that before charges

were dropped, federal officials telephoned him and said they were

concerned with Barboza’s welfare and that Barboza has been cooperative with them and given them vital testimony. (See 7–21–70

entry).432

On cross examination in the Clay Wilson trial, Joseph Barboza

admits to signing an affidavit saying he would recant portions of

his [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan testimony, but he never did recant

his testimony. Barboza also says the Mafia was paying him to recant, but that he was just ‘‘fooling’’ the Mafia. Barboza testifies

that he told federal authorities on September 17, 1971, that he had

no intention of recanting his Deegan testimony.433

The Press Democrat reports that Edward Harrington has visited

Joseph Barboza twice at the county jail since Barboza was extradited from Massachusetts. (Bony Saludes, U.S. Mafia Battle Told

in Santa Rosa Court, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Dec. 3,

1971).434

12–6–71: Interrogatories are filed for Jack Zalkind in the Clay

Wilson murder trial, which Zalkind later answers by telephone.435

12–7–71: In a memorandum from Henry Petersen, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division, to Attorney General

John Mitchell, Petersen attaches a memorandum and a copy of the

FBI report of the interview with Lawrence Patrick Hughes. The attached memorandum ‘‘requests the Attorney General’s authorization to permit Special Agent Dennis M. Condon to include certain

additional matters in his testimony in a criminal case.’’ 436

Attorney General John Mitchell writes a letter to Dennis Condon

expanding the extent of Condon’s testimony at the Clay Wilson

murder trial to the following: (1) You interviewed Lawrence

Hughes on Sept. 23, 1970 with Agent Divan; (2) the interview took

place in a FBI vehicle in the parking lot of the VA hospital in

Brockton, Mass; (3) the length of the interview; (4) the interview

related to the Winter of 1969 to present; (5) Hughes gave no information about Barboza’s involvement with stolen bonds or the Wilson murder.437

Henry E. Petersen, Acting Assistant Attorney General of the

Criminal Division notifies Director Hoover by memorandum of testimony by an FBI agent in the State of California v. Joseph

Barboza. Petersen writes, ‘‘Attached for your information is a copy

of a communication from the Attorney General to Agent Dennis M.

Condon enlarging the scope of the testimony which he is authorized

to provide at the Barboza trial.’’ The attached letter from the Attorney General to Condon expands the authority extended to Condon

to testify at the Clay Wilson murder trial. (See entry above).438

12–8–71: Edward Harrington, Paul Rico, and Dennis Condon testify in Joseph Barboza’s defense at the Clay Wilson trial in California. Harrington testifies that Barboza was a federal government

witness in cases brought against Raymond Patriarca, Henry

545

Tameleo, Ronald Cassesso, and others starting in 1968. The government’s ‘‘security arrangements’’ with Barboza began prior to his

giving testimony and approximately a year after he ceased testifying. Barboza was released from protective custody in March 1969.

Harrington was not asked about visiting Barboza in prison in California in March 1971. According to Dennis Condon’s testimony, a

‘‘confidential source’’ informed Condon that Barboza’s ‘‘life was in

serious jeopardy.’’ Condon testifies that he discussed this with

Barboza in January 1970. When asked if he knew whether Barboza

was negotiating with the Mafia to change his testimony in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan case, Condon replies, ‘‘I would have to respectfully decline to answer that question, sir, on the basis of instructions from the Attorney General of the United States.’’ Prosecutor Hyland responds, ‘‘We’ll respect Mr. Condon’s statement.’’

(See 12–2–71 entry). Paul Rico testifies that he knew of attempts

on Barboza’s life. Rico informed Barboza that during the 1968

trials, the Mafia blew up Attorney John Fitzgerald’s car to ‘‘point

out the seriousness of their efforts.’’ Rico says he last talked to

Barboza in April 1970 in Massachusetts. Rico denies that Barboza

indicated to him that Barboza was setting up negotiations with the

Mafia. (See 12–2–71 entry). (See also Bony Saludes, Baron Admits

Mafia Tie—But Not to Being ‘Enforcer’ PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Dec. 8, 1971).439

According to a Press Democrat article, Barboza testifies that he

sent word to the Mafia through his long-time New Bedford friend,

Leonard Hughes, that he would change his William Marfeo and Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan testimony in exchange for $500,000. But

Barboza says he never intended to recant. It is not clear if the

Mafia contacted Barboza to recant or if Barboza contacted the

Mafia. (Bony Saludes, Baron Admits Mafia Tie—But Not to Being

an ‘Enforcer,’ PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Dec. 8, 1971).440

A memorandum from Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge

of the Boston Strike Force, to James Featherstone, Deputy Chief of

the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, states, ‘‘On today’s

date, Attorney Harrington and Special Agents Dennis Condon and

Paul Rico appeared before Superior Court Judge Murphy in voir

dire, at which time the judge decided that the area of testimony to

be given by the three Federal witnesses would be in conformity

with the Attorney General’s grant of authority.’’ 441

12–9–71: The Press Democrat reports that Edward Harrington

and two FBI Special Agents, Paul Rico and Dennis Condon, confirmed in court that Joseph Barboza was an important government

witness against the Mafia, which endangered his life. Earlier in the

trial, District Attorney Marteen Miller said he would call these witnesses to explain why Barboza carried a gun. Harrington testified

that Barboza was the chief witness in a successful Massachusetts

prosecution of six Mafia members for the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

murder. Harrington also said Barboza was a witness for the March

1968 prosecution of Raymond Patriarca. Harrington confirmed that

security arrangements were made for Barboza prior to and for a

year after he was a prosecution witness. Harrington said the government’s policy was not to inform local authorities that a relocated witness was in their community. District Attorney Miller’s inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00555 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
546

vestigator, Greg Evans, testified that William Geraway told him

that Geraway received the information about Barboza killing Clay

Wilson from Ronald Cassesso. (Bony Saludes, U.S. Agents Tell of

Baron, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Dec. 9, 1971).442

12–10–71: John Fitzgerald testifies on Joseph Barboza’s behalf in

the Clay Wilson murder trial. The Press Democrat reports that

Fitzgerald testified for the sole purpose of impeaching Geraway,

saying he knew Geraway and called him a ‘‘pathological liar.’’ The

Press Democrat also reports that Jack Zalkind answered interrogatory questions by phone in the judge’s chambers. Zalkind replied

‘‘no’’ when asked if Lawrence Hughes told Zalkind about Barboza’s

statement about having sexual intercourse with murder victim

Clay Wilson’s wife an hour after burying Wilson. Zalkind did

admit, though, that he spoke to Hughes and that Hughes was in

protective custody in 1970 and 1971. Zalkind then requested copies

of the testimony of Geraway, Hughes, and Barboza, but did not

state why he wanted them. See Bony Saludes, Baron’s Ex-Attorney

Takes Stand, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Dec. 10, 1971;443

see also Sonoma County Court Record.444

12–13–71: Joseph Barboza pleads guilty to the second degree

murder of Clay Wilson.445

12–14–71: An FBI teletype from the San Francisco FBI Office to

Director Hoover and the Boston and New York FBI Offices states,

‘‘[Barboza] changed his plea from not guilty to guilty in local court

to second degree murder and was subsequently ordered to confinement at Vacaville, California, for preconfinement examination.

Final sentence date to be set. Investigation continuing.’’ 446

Joseph Barboza is sentenced to five years to life for the murder

of Clay Wilson.447

12–31–71: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward Harrington

at the Federal Building on Congress Street in Boston, Massachusetts.448

1972

1972: Joseph Barboza and author Bob Patterson sign a contract

to collaborate on a book called In and Outside the Family. Barboza

is obligated to supply documents, memos, and photographs to Patterson. James Chalmas (aka Theodore Sharliss) is under written

contract with Barboza to pay advances to Patterson.449 In his book,

Strike Force, Organized Crime and the Government, Clark R.

Mollenhoff writes in relevant part the following regarding the Raymond Patriarca tapes: ‘‘The Federal Bureau of Investigation

bugged the office of New England’s crime boss, Raymond Patriarca,

from March 1962 until July 1965. Monitoring of conversations . . .

was stopped on orders from President Lyndon Johnson who told

the public he was against obtaining evidence in this way. . . . The

Johnson Administration’s decision to assure ‘fair play’ for Fred

Black, Jr., had repercussions throughout the country. Since by disclosing the complete bugging file on Black the Department of Justice had enabled him to avoid a federal prison term, it had to apply

the same rule now in similar cases. . . . The decision threatened

to overturn the conviction of Louis (The Fox) Taglianetti, who had

547

been convicted of federal income-tax evasion in 1966. . . . Under

the new ‘Black’ rule, Taglianetti had to be given access to any government information that dealt even remotely with him while he

was under investigation. In May 1967, Justice Department lawyers

delivered the airtels of the bug in the Patriarca office to Chief

Judge Edward Day of the United States District Court in Providence. Judge Day reviewed them all, and concluded that only ten

had to be made available to Taglianetti and his lawyers. Those ten

airtels appeared in the federal court record, and a tremor went

through the East Coast Cosa Nostra and the entire political-criminal world of New England. (p.119–20). . . . Many of the conversations related to gangland murder victims: Samuel Lindenbaum and

Steven Hughes in Middleton, Massachusetts; Joseph Francione,

gunned down in Revere; and Henry Reddington, killed in his Weymouth home. Patriarca was told ‘Joe Barboza of East Boston’ killed

Francione. (p. 123). . . . The so-called ‘Taglianetti logs’ were made

public by Judge Day on May 19, 1967. . . . On June 20, 1967, a

federal grand jury indicted Patriarca on charges that he and two

others had conspired to engineer the murder of William Marfeo

over a competitive gambling enterprise Marfeo was running. . . .

Named as a coconspirator, but not as a defendant, was the man

they had tried to hire in 1965 as the ‘hit man’ to kill Marfeo. Joseph (Barboza) Baron, named in the tapes by [Henry] Tameleo as

the man who had murdered Joseph Francione, had decided to cooperate with the Attorney General’s office in April, immediately before the revelation that Patriarca’s office had been bugged. (p. 124).

. . . The tapes gave federal and local investigators reason to join

forces in developing the Joseph (Barboza) Baron testimony. So long

as the case originated from Baron’s discussion and not from the

FBI eavesdropping it could be used to prosecute. Baron voluntarily

furnished a statement to agents of the FBI in April of 1967 concerning the offense in 1965. (p. 125). . . . Bob Blakey had been a

Special Prosecutor in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the Justice Department from August 1960, until June 1964.

He declared that the Taglianetti airtels were far and above the best

information that he had obtained. [I read] . . . investigation reports that were the product of the use of normal investigative

methods. There is just simply no comparison in the two kinds of

reports. In light of this, I find it nothing short of incredible that

Mr. Clark and others would seriously suggest that the use of electronic-surveillance techniques is ‘‘neither effective nor highly productive. (p. 129). Louis the Fox thought he was sly when he had

his lawyers request the disclosure of all FBI eavesdropping records.

(p. 130). . . . Though the bugging of Patriarca’s headquarters in

Providence had taken place when the results were not admissible

evidence in state or federal courts, the revelation of the ten airtels

in connection with Taglianetti’s income-tax case produced the example that Professor Blakey needed to demonstrate that Ramsey

Clark didn’t know what he was talking about.’’ (p. 131). CLARK R.

MOLLENHOFF, STRIKE FORCE: ORGANIZED CRIME AND THE GOVERNMENT 120, 123–25, 129–31 (1972).450

1–7–72: Edward Harrington writes Joseph Barboza a letter

promising, ‘‘I’ll call Gary to see about his recalling the probation

violation warrant. I’m sure he’ll do it. After the warrant is revoked,

548

I don’t think you’ll have any trouble being eligible for a decent program to present to the Parole Board.’’ 451

1–10–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Special Agent Dennis

Condon at the FBI Building in Boston, Massachusetts.452

1–11–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from the Department

of Justice in Washington, D.C.453

1–14–72: In a letter to William Geraway, Detective Sergeant Tim

Brown of the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Office thanks Geraway for

his assistance in the Clay Wilson murder trial and describes the

details Geraway provided about the murder.454

1–16–72: Barboza sends a letter to District Attorney Garrett

Byrne at the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office in Boston,

Massachusetts.

1–17–72: William Geraway drafts a letter to Kiernan Hyland the

Sonoma County District Attorney. Geraway states that he ‘‘had to

practically force Mr. Fahey to call Mr. Bailey’’ and that Detective

Sergeant Tim Brown threatened to return Geraway to Massachusetts without testifying because Geraway refused to go for a ride

with him over a route Geraway knew from memory.455

1–19–72: Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, sends a letter to Lois

Eggers, Correctional Counselor at the California Medical Facility in

Vacaville. Harrington informs Eggers, ‘‘It is the United States Government’s desire that the State of California place Bentely [sic] [Joseph Barboza] in a constructive correction program designed for his

ultimate release as a contributing member of society. . . . The government also requests that Bentely’s [sic] significant contribution

to law enforcement in the organized crime field be weighed when

his eligibility for parole is considered.’’ 456

1–21–72: The California Department of Corrections prepares a

Cumulative Case Summary stating that before the Clay Wilson

murder, Barboza ‘‘claims that he had protective custody through

the FBI, constantly carried a gun and wore a bullet-proof vest.’’ 457

1–25–72: California Department of Corrections Counselor Albert

Ng comments, ‘‘A figure in the New England area underworld, his

activities there are unknown, but his value as a witness is attested

by a letter from U.S. Department of Justice, organized crime and

racketeering action [sic], dated 1–19–72. [Barboza] is making a satisfactory adjustment in RGC general population. So far, he has not

indicated any desire for protective custody. Request for CMF for his

transfer to fill work/crew position #902 in bakery is noted. In view

of the complexity in this case, [Barboza] is a marginal work/crew

candidate. Accordingly to 4th termer status, age 40, ineligible for

camp or minimum custody, he is also suitable for Folsom. To either

CMF as ‘H’ or Folsom.’’ 458

1–28–72: William Geraway sends a letter to Attorney General

John Mitchell. According to the letter, ‘‘FBI Agent Dennis Condon

told Det. Sgt. Tim Brown that Baron is ‘The most dangerous man

on the East Coast.’ ’’ 459

549

Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward Harrington at the U.S.

Post Office and Courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts. Barboza also

sends a letter to Special Agent Dennis Condon at the FBI in Boston.460

By memorandum, Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of

Boston’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, notifies Gerald Shur of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division that

Barboza has advised Harrington that he will be eligible for parole

in four years. Per Barboza’s request, Harrington asks whether the

Department of Justice would be willing to attempt to find employment for him once he is paroled. Harrington writes, ‘‘The development of Joseph Barboza as a government witness was the single

most important factor in the government’s successful drive against

organized crime in the New England area. It would be in the best

interest of the United States to maintain a continued concern for

the personal problems of an individual who has contributed so

greatly to the government’s campaign against organized crime.’’ 461

2–1–72: The California Department of Corrections approves Joseph Barboza’s transfer. The document states, ‘‘Folsom transfer endorsed as most appropriate in light of all case factors. . . .

[Barboza] is designated a SPECIAL CASE-DEPARTMENTAL-NOTORIETY because he is of special interest to the United States Department of Justice, Boston Field Office, Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section. They request notification by telephone of any

unusual developments in this case. FBI Agents [Edward] Ted Harrington and Dennis Condon. [Note: Harrington is the Attorney in

Charge of Boston’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, not

an FBI agent.] This interest stems from subject’s testifying against

the Mafia in the first successful prosecution of a top Mafia Chief.’’

The transfer was recommended by Correctional Counselor Albert

Ng and approved by Associate Superintendent James A. Kane.462

2–7–72: Edward F. Harrington, Attorney in Charge of Boston’s

Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, writes a letter to Raymond Procunier, Director of the California Department of Corrections. The letter states, ‘‘This is to advise you that [Barboza] . . .

is an individual whose development as a witness on behalf of the

United States Government was the most important breakthrough

in the government’s campaign against organized crime in the New

England area. . . . [Barboza’s] personal security could be a matter

of some concern for your department[.] It is requested that the possibility of underworld retaliation against [Barboza] for his cooperative effort on behalf of the United States Government be a factor

considered by you in determining the appropriate facility for his incarceration.’’ 463

2–14–72: William Geraway’s affidavit reads, ‘‘He [Barboza] is

aware, and letters he wrote from this prison affirm that awareness,

that the Justice Department would like very much to see him

killed, thereby placing blame on alleged mafia members and removing for all time both a threat and an embarrassment. . . . It is my

understanding that Attorney Bailey was to be called as a prosecution witness, and with the rebuttal case available to them, why the

550

prosecution allowed a [second] degree pleading remains a mystery.’’ 464

2–25–72: The Correctional Counselor at the California Correctional Institution at Tehachapi, T.R. Fahey, writes a letter to Edward Harrington. Fahey advises that Joseph Barboza was transferred from the California Medical Facility at Vacaville to

Tehachapi on 2–18–72. He appeared before the screening committee on February 22, 1972, and made some comments that Fahey

believes would interest Harrington. Fahey writes that Barboza

claimed that he was offered $500,000 to change his testimony in

Federal Court, and was considering this offer so his wife would not

have to live on welfare. Fahey further states that Barboza also said

that changing his testimony would require legal maneuvers since

his testimony in court was true. Fahey relays this information to

Harrington in case Barboza attempts to change his prior testimony.465

March 1972: FBI Supervisory Special Agent John Morris is assigned to the Boston FBI Office until approximately November

1991.466

3–7–72: Attorney General Robert Quinn writes a letter to Massachusetts State Senator Joseph Ward regarding allegations made by

William Geraway to Senator Ward about Barboza. Quinn writes

that he inquired into the allegations and was told investigations

(presumably about Barboza) were underway by the District Attorneys of Suffolk and Norfolk Counties, and the FBI. Therefore,

Quinn writes, ‘‘to avoid any interference with current investigations, no direct action has been undertaken by this office with regard to Mr. Geraway’s allegations.’’ 467

3–8–72: A letter from Edward Harrington, Attorney in Charge of

the Boston Strike Force, to T.R. Fahey, Correctional Counselor of

the California Department of Corrections states in relevant part:

‘‘Thank you for your letter dated February 25, 1972[,] relating to

Joseph [Barboza’s] conversation with members of your screening

committee. This information is of great value to the federal government. . . . I greatly appreciate your taking the time to keep us informed of this matter.’’ 468

5–2–72: FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dies.

5–17–72: In a letter from Edward Harrington to Joseph Barboza,

Harrington states that he received Barboza’s letter dated May 7,

1972, and indicates that he will be ‘‘very happy’’ to talk to the person writing Barboza’s book. Harrington promises to introduce the

writer to ‘‘other individuals who would have background information relating to your career.’’ 469

5–24–72: Joseph Barboza testifies before Representative Claude

Pepper’s Select Committee on Crime about organized crime’s involvement in sports, specifically horse racing. Barboza reportedly

testified under heavy guard because he had been given special protection since his testimony against Raymond Patriarca.470

The Boston FBI Office advises the Acting Director by teletype

that Edward Harrington advises the FBI that Joseph Barboza is in

Washington D.C. on subpoena from Claude Pepper’s Select ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00560 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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mittee and is to appear before the Committee the following day,

Thursday, May 25. The teletype states, ‘‘Baron will reportedly give

testimony re[garding] race fixing and organized crime. Justice Department was not aware of Baron’s subpoena and is not in agreement with his appearance before [the] Committee.’’ 471

5–26/29–72: U. S. House of Representatives investigator Roy Bedell conducts an interview of Joseph Barboza, a part of which was

recorded. Barboza describes the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder in

detail and makes no mention of Joseph Salvati.472

6–1–72: A Montana state prison report states: ‘‘Rec’ed from U.S.

Marshall [sic] Wash D.C. PC will receive all PC Privileges. ‘Any

questions’ concerning this man will be referred to Lt. King.’’ [The

word ‘‘confidential’’ is crossed out.] 473

6–2–72: A letter from R.E. Coyle, Assistant Director, Law Enforcement Liaison, California Department of Corrections, to Chris

Nolde, Associate Counsel, Select Committee on Crime, states in relevant part: ‘‘[P]rior to [Barboza’s] transfer to Washington, he alerted other inmates at the institution where he was housed that he

was en route to Washington to testify.’’ The letter continues, because of Barboza’s ‘‘inability to keep his identity and activities limited, . . . I [must] take very stringent action to insure his protection. . . . Effective this date, I have directed that he is a protective

custody case. . . . He will not under any circumstances come in

contact with other inmates.’’ 474

6–4–72: Raymond Patriarca is found not guilty at a second jury

trial of charges alleging he was an Accessory to Murder. During the

trial, John ‘‘Red’’ Kelley again testified about the alleged meeting

that took place in front of the Gaslight Restaurant.475

6–13–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from Edward ‘‘Ted’’

Harrington.476

In a letter from Joseph Barboza to Marteen Miller, Barboza says

that the writer of his book will interview Edward Harrington, Dennis Condon, John Doyle, Col. Walter Stone, Superintendent of the

Rhode Island State Police and others who have consented.477

6–15–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington at the U.S. Post Office and Courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts.478

6–16–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington at the U.S. Post Office and Courthouse in Boston, Massachusetts.479

6–19–72: Edward Harrington’s letter to Joseph Barboza states,

‘‘You are well aware, I know, that there is no requirement for you

to testify in any new cases in order for the Dept. of Justice to bring

to the attention of the Parole Board at the appropriate time the

contribution which you have already made to the government’s

campaign against organized crime.’’ 480

6–20–72: A memorandum from Folsom State Prison, Represa, Associate Warden H. Morphis, to the Visitor Processing Officer grants

‘‘approval to Mr. and Mrs. Sharliss of San Francisco to visit

[Barboza].’’ 481

552

6–21–72: In a letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend, Barboza

shows his gratitude for her work on putting together his biography.

He writes, ‘‘But if in some way through this book that it should

cause and add to the public awareness of the diabolical menacing

foothold which the mafia is embracing this country so that at least

one person will stand up and fight then your work . . . and my

endeavorments [sic] will not entirely in the least be in vain!’’ 482

6–22–72: A letter from William Geraway to Joseph Barboza says

that policeman Bill Stuart ‘‘gave a police report to Gerry [Angiulo]

on Romeo Martin giving him information on the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’]

Deegan murder; Gerry then ordered Romeo killed[.]’’ 483

6–28–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from the Department

of Justice in Washington, DC.484

6–29–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Special Agent Dennis

Condon.485

July 1972: According to William Geraway, in July of 1972, Congressional Investigator Roy Bedell from the Select Committee on

Crime, visits him at the state prison in Walpole. Geraway claims

that it was clear to him that Bedell ‘‘intended to utilize the interviews as a screen to get into the record from me 3 points which

would allow Joseph Barboza Baron freedom: 1) That Baron had

killed Wilson in self-defense, which is absurd; 2) That Baron’s testimony against men in Massachusetts had not been perjury; 3) To

get into the record from my own lips that Baron does not have a

second body in Sonoma County.’’ (See William Geraway Affidavit,

Feb. 13, 1973).486

7–2–72: Joseph Barboza describes sending items to ‘‘the Greek’’

in a letter to Greg Evans.487

7–5–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from the Department of

Justice.488

7–7–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from U.S. Department

of Justice, Section of Organized Crime in Boston, Massachusetts.489

7–9–72: Folsom State Prison Correctional Lieutenant F. Gaul

writes a memorandum to J. Campoy, Correctional Captain. The

memorandum informs that Mr. Sharliss came to visit Joseph

Barboza and was denied entry because of lack of personal identification. Mr. Sharliss was extremely agitated and hostile towards

the Corrections Lieutenant. Sharliss even tacitly threatened the

Lieutenant, explicitly stating that he ‘‘would be sorry [that he] did

not show [Sharliss] more respect and courtesy and take more responsibility on my own.’’ 490

7–10–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, which was returned to Barboza.491

7–18–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington.492

7–24–72: A letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend, states that ‘‘I

learned to cook Chinese food while cooking aboard ship to the orient and I know a lot of secrets to their cooking. But I hurt my back

in Kowloon [and] collected $18,500, strange how well my back feels

553

now?’’ [Note: This probably indicates that Barboza faked the injury.] 493

7–28–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington.494

8–4–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Special Agent Dennis

Condon.495

Joseph Barboza’s letter to a friend states that there have been

over six attempts on his life.496

8–5–72: A letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend states that Ted

Sharliss ‘‘will always let you [Barboza’s friend] use a car to come

and visit.’’ Barboza tells her that he wrote Sharliss and told him

to give a copy of the manuscript of Barboza’s book to her. Barboza

also tells his friend that he told Sharliss that he could not stand

‘‘evasiveness and being undependable’’ and wanted to ‘‘clear the

air’’ with him and ‘‘strengthen our friendship.’’ Barboza also tells

his friend that he told Sharliss that he would give him 25% of his

book’s profits, speculating that would be around $200,000. He also

states that he told Sharliss that he ‘‘wanted to see him because

somebody admitted to perjury in my case, so that it would be best

and was for the best he [sic] hadn’t gone to N.Y. . . . now that this

[sic] as been brought to light.’’ Later he states that he has to

‘‘watch that the Mafia and lawyers like F. Lee Bailey, Joe Balliro,

Ronnie Chisholm don’t try to influence them behind our backs or

try to frighten him. Believe me I know what I am talking about!

Marteen Miller and Greg Evans have the transcripts and are overly knowledgeable on the case which they will supply. I hope?’’ 497

8–9–72: The Supervising Officer of the California State Prison at

Folsom in Represa, California, states in a memorandum to J.

Campoy, Correctional Captain, that ‘‘Greg Evans attorney from

Sonoma County came to the institution this date, for an interview

with [Barboza]. The interview took place in the Adjustment Center

starting at 1150 and terminating at 1405.’’ 498

8–10–72: Joseph Barboza writes to a friend that he received a

letter from Washington and the earliest he will be returning to

Washington to testify before Claude Pepper’s Committee is September 10th. Barboza also tells the friend that Ted Sharliss is an informant. Barboza tells the friend that she is the ‘‘top one in my

book of trust’’ and that ‘‘Ted [Sharliss] is my friend with love but

its mixed with ulterior motives. I know what I am talking about!’’

Barboza further tells her that he has been writing to a guard in

a county jail back east for six years.499

8–14–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington in Boston.500

8–15–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Detective John Doyle

in Boston, Massachusetts.501

In a letter to a friend, Joseph Barboza tells her about two phone

calls he received today—one from D.C. and the other from Boston.

The call from Boston was from a man from D.C. Barboza tells her

that the news he received from the two individuals was ‘‘tremendous.’’ Barboza writes, ‘‘The man in Boston was with the guy who

554

wrote the confessions and it turned out powerful, too powerful for

words in this letter, as to the other call it was powerful too, I suggest you get up here somehow. If you don’t tomorrow because in

two weeks I’ll be gone I won’t know for sure till Friday. The news

today I received was so far out, I am in a trance over it! I am going

to have to write the Codfish and see if I can get him up here as

soon as he can [sic] it is rather urgent. If he doesn’t come up here

than [sic] I’ll know he is purposely avoiding me for an avid reason.’’ 502

8–22–72: In a letter from Joseph Barboza to Dennis Condon and

Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, Barboza states, ‘‘But the fear of others

concern is the [Romeo] Martin case, and Stewart’s police report to

Jerry [Angiulo] on the [Edward ‘‘Teddy’’] Deegan matter[.]’’ 503

8–23–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Special Agent Dennis

Condon in Boston.504

8–24–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington at Congress Street in Boston.505

8–31–72: A letter from Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington to Joseph

Barboza states, ‘‘Responding to your August 22, 1972, letter. I am

not only unaware of the contents of Geraway’s alleged confession,

but was even unaware of its very existence. However, I am informed that District Attorney Burke is planning to use Geraway as

a witness against Cassesso for the attempted bribe of Geraway,

and District Attorney Byrne is still holding Geraway in reserve as

a witness pending any future legal developments in the Deegan

case. I would suggest that you might consult with your Attorney

Miller in California and determine whether to file a motion for a

new trial in your case based on Geraway’s newly discovered testimony, depending on your joint assessment of its weight. As far as

the federal government is concerned, it appears that Geraway’s allegations relate strictly to state matters. As I have previously stated, your cooperation with the federal government will be brought

to the attention of California Parole Authorities at the appropriate

time.’’ A handwritten note at the bottom reads, ‘‘Copy sent to D.

Condon on 8/31.’’ 506

9–7–72: A letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend regarding Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington states, ‘‘I received a letter today from one

of our big brothers back East. Tell Greg that Ted Harrington wrote

me and said that Suffolk County DA has Geraway who will testify

that Ronnie Cassesso tried to bribe him on the Deegan case and

he told me some other very good news about the future. Yes I am

going to Washington in December or January. Do you want to meet

me there[.] [My friend], in that letter from back East I got today,

the man said the Government would bring it to the Parole Board’s

attention the great service I did the government. I should have a

lot of people speaking up for me so that my chances look much better than average.’’ 507

9–8–72: Joseph Barboza receives a letter from Edward Harrington regarding filing a motion for a new trial.508

9–9–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Edward Harrington, replying to Harrington’s letter of September 8, 1972.509

555

9–11–72: Montana state prison notes that California asked that

they place Joseph Barboza in one of its camps ‘‘as quietly as possible.’’ 510

9–15–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Dennis Condon in Boston. He also sends a letter to Roy Bedell, Staff Investigator for the

U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime.511

9–29–72: Joseph Barboza sends a letter to Greg Evans, Investigator for the Sonoma County Public Defender’s Office. The letter is

described as ‘‘legal informative.’’ 512

10–17–72: In a letter from Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington to Joseph

Barboza, Harrington writes, ‘‘[L]ast week the District Attorney of

Norfolk County returned an indictment against Ronald Cassesso

and his aunt in the attempt to bribe you with respect to your testimony in the Deegan murder case. Geraway was the state’s witness

in this matter. It would appear that Geraway is again cooperating

with state authorities and you might consider whether his testimony would be of value in your own case.’’ 513

10–27–72: Joseph Barboza’s personal property is transferred to

Folsom State Prison in California from Eel River Conservation

Camp #31. An item listed in the property transfer receipt includes

an RCA 2-Track Tape Player. An item listed on Barboza’s Inmate

Property Card includes one Trial Transcript.514

10–30–72: Joseph Barboza is transferred to Montana State Prison in Deer Lodge, Montana. Items listed as Barboza’s personal

property include: one RCA cassette recorder, three cassette tapes

and one legal trial transcript. The clothing receipt form indicates

that the prison received from Barboza one RCA cassette recorder

and four cassette tapes and turned them over to the store. A shipping order indicates that Barboza requested that all his personal

clothing in the possession of the institution, which most likely includes all of the items listed on the clothing receipt form, be sent

to his friend in San Francisco, California.515

11–1–72: Joseph Barboza writes in a letter to a friend: ‘‘[Greg

Evans] will convey to you some information he is trying to seek

from the head of the Federal Task Force Ted Harrington in regards

to Counter Part and Massachusetts this is very important! I hope

Greg told you what he is doing for me and gave you the info he

gave me at Folsom!!!!’’ 516

11–2–72: Joseph Barboza requests the following people be allowed to visit and correspond with him in Montana State Prison:

Ted Sharliss and his wife; Greg Evans; Edward Harrington; and

Dennis Condon.517

A letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend regarding Edward ‘‘Ted’’

Harrington states, ‘‘Did you send Greg a photo stat of that news

clipping? Tell him to send you the letter from Ted Harrington and

make sure he photo stated a copy for himself! Also to inform you

about the answer he received from Boston regarding Nepco’s hold,

ask him to explain that to you.’’ 518

11–3–72: Joseph Barboza sends a close friend four cassette tapes

and a recorder.519

556

11–9–72: Joseph Barboza writes a letter to a friend regarding his

book stating, ‘‘You did not tell me what you thought about what

Patterson wrote so far. How is [it]? I would like a copy right away.

Also who did Paterson see back East—Colonel Stone? Harrington?

Condon? Doyle? Who besides Brandt?’’ 520

11–13–72: Joseph Barboza’s letter to a friend regarding his belongings states, ‘‘So you haven’t gotten my belongings yet that I

sent you. Well you will and please list what was sent you, I have

my reasons. Give the Greek back his electric razor, I never used

it. Give the pants and white shirt to some stumble bum, Folsom

gave me those to wear! Blah! Keep the yellow jacket and blue one.

Here is a clipping my brother sent me, I am inserting the clipping

with this letter.’’ Barboza also explains that ‘‘the part of the manuscript that was stolen was the part that I gave Ted that was typed

up, I do not have the rest, that was handwritten because I gave

it to you through Ted to type up. I also have the same amount

hand written in a vault in Washington, D.C.’’ Later he also tells

the friend that ‘‘I’ve now wrote to Coyle in Sacramento, Greg,

Bodell in Wash., Harrington in Boston, Colonel Stone in Rhode Island, let’s see if I get any news. I am most anxious to hear what

Doubleday’s offer was since they have had the book 1 week

now.’’ 521

11–14–72: Greg Evans, investigator for the Sonoma County Public Defender’s Office, requests permission from the Montana State

Prison to correspond with Barboza.522

11–15–72: In a letter to Greg Evans, Joseph Barboza writes that

he received a letter from Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington the previous

day. Barboza states, ‘‘He’ll tell you what he actually means by calling him.’’ 523

11–16–72: A letter from Joseph Barboza to a close friend states,

‘‘Who are these friends of Ted’s that he [h]as told about me and

who is this Harry that g[a]ve you a late call, I want [h]is last

name. I have my reasons. Forget about the call to Bedell, I’ll handle it myself. I mean this and I want to hear no more about it. . . .

You mentioned a blurb by some Dude from back East. WHAT

DUDE? Ted [Sharliss’s] friends and the cops were concerned that

if something hot was going to happen at the Hosp. What friends

[h]as he been talking to? And what [h]as he been telling them? I

suspect what added to the cause of me being here is what he says

on his phone. I don’t want him mentioning my name on his phone

and to be introducing you to people as my friend like white guy

with the rings. I am trembling right now because I have been

called a liar, and also a lot of crap is going on out there that is

making me sick to my stomach! Patterson, his misses and all those

so called righteous citizens who look down their noses at me because they consider themselves true citizens of society. They sure

are and they stink! All trying to take their best shot because of the

money involved in the Book. [H]as it ever dawned on you that the

most Ted ever did for me concerns the Book where he has an end,

everything else he [h]as stalled and lied about. Everybody has a

price tag, well I don’t and I am sick of the Book and you’ll hear

557

how sick I am of the book very shortly by what I am going to

do!’’ 524

11–21–72: (Mrs. Joseph Barboza) requests permission from the

Montana State Prison to correspond with Barboza. She lists her address as ‘‘To Special Agent Dennis Condon—FBI Bldg. Boston,

MA.’’ As her character references, Mrs. Barboza lists Dennis

Condon and Edward Harrington.525

12–5–72: Regina Sharliss, wife of Ted Sharliss, requests permission from the Montana State Prison to correspond with Joseph

Barboza. As a character reference, Regina Sharliss lists FBI Special Agent Bernard Feeney in the San Francisco Office.526

12–12–72: Joseph Barboza’s letter to a friend states that he has

‘‘[g]ot a feeling nothing will get off the ground on this Book till at

least Feb. Looks like the powers to be are having their way. Just

so happens a court matter concerning the Deegan murder and

those convicted come up about that time.’’ Barboza also directs his

friend to call Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington at 617–223–3390.527

12–13–72: A letter from Joseph Barboza to a friend states, ‘‘I

wrote Greg Castnite and told him to call you concerning the incident I had here and that you would tell him. Lets hope he calls

Honey. I’ll be sending you back the manuscript within the next

couple of days. I’ll send it to the office I don’t like the idea of it

laying in your mail box all day. Well tomorrow will be 1 year ago

I was sentenced, also I waited 15 months for trial, that is 27

months, also another 3 months in jail back East that’s 30 months

I have been in. When I see the Parole Board in May I’ll have 35

months in and in our jurisprudent society only 17 months will

count. Now if it happened in Montana I would fully understand

this thought of thinking. Smile. I just missed by something like 80

days when the law went into effect after I got sentenced, in March

1st 1972 and law passed granting all jail time awaiting trial would

count, only to March 1st, it was not retroactive preceding that. But

letters were written to Sacramento by Marteen Miller and letters

from Sacramento stated that they would consider very seriously

those additional 15 months when determining my parole. I found

this out while I was at Folsom [.] This year I’ve spent from the

Santa Rosa Jail, to Vacaville, to Tehachapie, to Wash., to Folsom,

to Eel River to here. Of all of them, this is the worse situation I’ve

been in. . . . I do want Ted Harrington and Colonel Stone to add

something to the Book; they know what they are talking about.

Give Patterson, Harrington’s telephone number and tell him to call

him for a statement, and Colonel Stone. These two people especially Stone are well known in New England. It will enhance the

sale of the Book around there. Get this [my friend], its your book

too!!’’ 528

12–14–72: Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme is apprehended in New

York City by FBI Special Agent John Connolly. (Commonwealth v.

Salemme, 323 N.E. 2d 922 (1975).529

A letter from Joseph Barboza to a close friend states, ‘‘I wrote to

Ted Harrington and asked him to write something like Claude Pepper did. I am sure if he does it will be much better and much more

558

knowledgeable! I am sure he will. Got to keep plugging Honey, if

we are going to get this thing done right.’’ 530

12–21–72: Special Agent John Connolly is recommended to receive a group incentive award for his effort in identifying Francis

‘‘Frank’’ Salemme, a badly wanted fugitive, whom Connolly and

two other agents ‘‘observed walking on a street in New York

City.’’ 531

12–26–72: Joseph Barboza’s letter to a close friend states, ‘‘Well,

it looks like the book [h]as to be shelved until I get home. I am

not going to say anything more about it. A lot of plans have to be

postponed until I do get the Book going. But time will work itself

out. I’ll be coming out broke so we’ll have to plan and adjust to it

until I get his Book going on my own. . . . Yes, the same guy

named Geraway who testified against me in Santa Rosa and who

later wrote that he was bribed to do it, is testifying against some

people convicted in the Deegan trial, who bribed him and told him

to say that I told him I lied on the Deegan trial.’’ 532

12–27–72: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington informs Joseph Barboza by

letter: ‘‘I will be very happy to meet with your ghost writer and

provide him background on you and your dealings with the organization here in New England and your significance as the first government witness to testify against the organization in this area.

. . . I will be quite happy to write some remarks in the preface extolling your contribution to law enforcement in the organized crime

field.’’ 533

1973

1973: Joseph Barboza submits lists of people with whom he has

correspondence privileges at the Montana State Prison in Deer

Lodge, Montana, including Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, Dennis

Condon, Greg Evans, a friend, and his wife. His wife is listed in

the care of FBI Special Agent Dennis Condon.534

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life in the Mafia, the following about Joseph Salvati: ‘‘One of the first to go was a guy

named Edward Teddy Deegan. Deegan was with the McLaughlin

group. He and two of his friends, Harold Hannon and Wilfred

Delaney, had been holding up some of [Jerry] Angiulos’ bookmakers, and it was costing the Office a lot of money. . . . On

March 12,1965, Barboza hit him on orders from Pete Limone,

Angiulo’s right arm. . . . There was one bad thing about that hit.

Two guys went to jail for murder that had nothing to do with setting it up: [Henry] Tameleo and Joe the Horse Salvucci [sic][.] . . .

Tameleo didn’t authorize the hit. Barboza said Tameleo did, but

that wasn’t true, according to Tameleo. Tameleo said he found out

about it the next morning when he read it in a newspaper. I don’t

know if he was telling the truth, but I guess in a way it’s justice.

Tameleo set up a lot of other people and got away with it. The guy

I really feel sorry for is Joe the Horse. He wasn’t a bad guy, and

he was just a flunky. What Barboza did wasn’t right. After that,

Barboza became the top gun for the McLeans and the Office. He

handled more hits than any one guy during the war. On October

20, 1965, he and Chico [Joseph] Amico caught Punchy McLaughlin

559

alone at the Spring Street Metropolitan Transit Authority turnaround in West Roxbury. Punchy had been shot twice before during

the war, in November 1964 and in August 1965, but he’d survived

both. He didn’t survive this one. Barboza cut him down for

good.’’ 535

Vincent Teresa also writes that Barboza ‘‘handled more than

twenty-three murders, most of them on his own—I mean, they

weren’t ordered by the Office. Romeo Martin is a typical example

of what I mean.’’ Regarding the Romeo Martin murder, Teresa

says, ‘‘This was in 1965 [sic—1966], in July. I’d been out all day

with Castucci and Romeo playing golf. Romeo was planning to

leave for Florida the next day with his wife. He’d just gotten married and was going to Florida for sort of a honeymoon. After we’d

played golf, I told Romeo to come over to the Ebbtide for a steak

dinner and a couple of drinks. While we’re talking, he said that he

and Barboza, after busting up a club, had had an argument. He

said he’d shaken the owner down for more money than he was supposed to and had held out on Barboza. Barboza had found out and

threatened to kill him. . . . When he went outside, Barboza and

Cassesso were waiting for him. They grabbed him. Took him someplace, and pumped five slugs into him before dumping his body.

When the cops found him, [Henry] Tameleo blew his top at me.

. . . [H]e said[,] Why didn’t you get a hold of Joe and stop it?’ . . .

[I responded,] Christ, Henry [Tameleo], they were supposed to be

friends. Who knows this animal is going to kill him? That’s how

treacherous Barboza was. The slightest thing, the slightest word

and he’d want to kill you.’’ 536

Teresa also comments that ‘‘Barboza was a stone killer with a

terrible temper.’’ 537

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following: ‘‘McLean had his own mob, but he had some friends that

worked on the fringes with the Office, like Joe Barboza, Steve [The

Rifleman] Flemmi, and his brother, Vinnie the Butcher [Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi]. Vinnie got that nickname because he got his

kicks out of cutting his victims up.’’ 538

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following: ‘‘Barboza went into the club [searching for a member of the

McLaughin mob named Ray DiStasio] and caught DiStasio cold.

The trouble was, a poor slob named John B. O’Neil, who had a

bunch of kids, walked in to get a pack of cigarettes. Barboza killed

them both because he didn’t want any witnesses. DiStasio got two

in the back of the head and O’Neil got three. It was a shame. I

mean, this O’Neil was a family man—he had nothing to do with

the mob. Barboza should have waited. That’s why he was so dangerous. He was unpredictable. When he tasted blood, everyone in

his way got it.’’ 539

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following: ‘‘Then there was one by Vinnie the Butcher. He killed a guy

called Francis Regis Benjamin was a holdup artist who was also a

friend of some of the McLaughlin mob. Anyhow, Vinnie and Benjamin got into an argument at Walter’s Lounge. The Butcher got

a hold of a gun—it was a cop’s gun—and shot Benjamin. He took

560

the body out to a housing project in South Boston, cut the head off,

and cut up the rest of the body.’’ 540

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that

Barboza went to Joseph Francione’s apartment as a favor for his

friend, Johnny Bullets. Francione had cut Bullets out of a deal, so

Barboza shot Francione through the back of the head.541

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that

‘‘Barboza and Chico Amico knew Hughes and Lindenbaum were

heading for Lawrence to take over some numbers and lottery action’’ and ‘‘dropped Hughes and Lindenbaum right in their

seats.’’ 542

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that

Barboza was not a made member and he did not ‘‘live by the same

rules that made people do.’’ He further stated that ‘‘[Barboza] killed

for the hell of it whenever he lost his temper.’’ 543

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following: ‘‘In 1962 the Federal Bureau of Investigation slipped an illegal electronic bug into [Raymond Patriarca’s] office on Atwells

Avenue in Providence. Between 1962 and 1965, the FBI listened

daily to Patriarca’s conversations with such men as Henry Tameleo

and Vincent Teresa. And on October 6, 1966, the mortal blow was

struck. It was on that date that Joseph (The Animal) Barboza and

three colleagues were arrested by police in the heart of Boston. In

Barboza’s car, police found a fully loaded Army M-1 rifle and a .45

caliber pistol. The law then began applying a squeeze that was to

force Patriarca to make fatal mistakes. Barboza was a violent, uncontrollable enforcer [.]’’ 544

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that the

story that has been going around about the two individuals, Thomas DePrisco and Tashe [Arthur] Bratsos, who supposedly raised

seventy thousand dollars for Barboza’s bail, was not true. According to Teresa, DePrisco and Bratsos went all over Boston shaking

down bookies and nightclubs to raise the bail Barboza needed. The

last place they went on the shakedown trail was the 416 Lounge,

also called the Nite Lite Cafe ́. They entered the Lounge like

‘‘Gangbusters’’ and asked for money to help Barboza out. The patrons, who included Larry Baiona, [sic] Ralphie Chong, Joe Black,

and Phil Waggenheim, refused to help. DePrisco and Bratsos then

proceeded to hold them up with a gun and demanded them to

empty their pockets, stating, ‘‘We’ll take what we want.’’ DePrisco

and Bratsos were then killed and ‘‘the mob took [only $12,000]

from their pockets,’’ not [$70,000]. Teresa continues, ‘‘Now what

Baiona, [sic] Chong and Waggenheim didn’t know was that there

was a police informer in the place, a guy by the name of Joe Lanzi.

He was a bartender and part-time owner of the Four Corners bar

and he was in the joint at the time Bratsos and DePrisco came

barging in.’’ Teresa further states, ‘‘Then on April 18, 1967, they

caught up with the informer, Lanzi. Three of [Jerry] Angiulo’s enforcers—Benjamin DeChristoforo, Carmine Gagliardi, and Frank

Oreto—were driving through Medford at four in the morning. In

the front seat of their car was Lanzi, who they’d just shot.’’ Once

Barboza heard about what was going on, ‘‘He got a message to

561

Chico [Joseph] Amico, who was his closest friend, and gave him orders to whack out Waggenheim. The mob found out, and they hit

Chico right outside Alfonso’s Broken Hearts Club, where he’d been

trying to put an arm on some people to help Barboza. Barboza

went wild when he heard what happened. He called Patriarca a

fag, and he promised he’d hit everyone in sight for killing Chico.

. . . [Henry] Tameleo said, ‘[G]o see Butch [Frank Miceli of the

New Jersey assassination squad] and get a supply of shotguns and

rifles. Barboza’s got to get hit.’’ Teresa also writes, ‘‘It wasn’t long

after that that Barboza found out he was going to be killed. I guess

[District Attorney] Byrne told him, and two FBI agents who were

working on him, Paul Rico and Dennis Condon, told him. They convinced him that Patriarca had double-crossed him and was going

to have him killed. Barboza was frantic. He didn’t want to die, and

he didn’t want to be an informer. He hated informers.’’ 545

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that

Raymond Patriarca told him and Henry Tameleo that Joseph

Barboza is ‘‘gonna get killed in or out of the can.’’ Patriarca continued, ‘‘You send the word to him—and that’s all there is to it.’’ 546

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, that

after he listened to Raymond Patriarca’s tirade regarding Joseph

Barboza, Teresa told Barboza’s friend Al that Patriarca said,

‘‘[W]herever [Barboza] is, he’s gonna get it. That’s all I can tell you.

Now you can tell Joe.’’ According to Teresa, ‘‘About a week later the

FBI agents met with Barboza again, and he began talking. What

the hell could the guy do? Patriarca had shoved his back to the

wall. It was the dumbest play Patriarca ever made. If he’d done

what [Henry] Tameleo wanted him to do—convinced Barboza everything was forgiven and then, when he got out of jail, whacked

him, there wouldn’t have been any trouble. But when Barboza

started talking, there was hell to pay. First Barboza claimed that

Patriarca, Tameleo and Ronnie Cassesso had conspired with him to

kill Willie Marfeo. That was true.’’ As a result of Barboza’s testimony, ‘‘They were all convicted, even though the actual murder

was handled by the New Jersey assassination squad. Barboza

wasn’t through talking, though. He accused Tameleo, Cassesso, Roy

French [an Angiulo enforcer], Lou Grieco [sic], Pete Limone, and

Joe the Horse Salvucci [sic] of planning and carrying out the Teddy

Deegan murder. I told you before how that was done. . . . I still

don’t think Tameleo was in on that one. . . . Joe the Horse was

just an innocent sucker who Barboza didn’t like, but he’s doing life

because of what Barboza said. He never had anything to do with

the hit.’’ 547

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following regarding Barboza’s involvement in the Witness Protection

Program: ‘‘The FBI, unable to handle the job alone, called in an

elite, trusted contingent of sixteen deputy U.S. marshals, headed

by Deputy Marshal John Partington, an experienced law officer

with the highest credentials. For the next sixteen months, the marshals would have the task of living with Barboza and his family,

keeping them safe and in a proper frame of mind for the trials that

were to come. During those sixteen months, Hoover would often

562

call personally to determine how the Barboza protection detail was

progressing and what problems were faced.’’ 548

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, My Life In The Mafia, the following regarding John Partington of the U.S. Marshal’s Service:

‘‘Partington was the man in charge of 95 percent of all the protection details the deputies moved me on, whether it was to New England or Florida, New York or Washington. He’s what they call a security specialist, and there are only ten like him in the country. He

headed the detail that protected Joe Barboza long before the federal government ever came up with the Witness Protection Program. He lived for sixteen months with Barboza, day and night.

. . . He’s protected every top mob witness from Barboza to [John]

Red Kelley to me and Bobby Daddieco as well as scores of others.’’ 549

1–14–73: Joseph Barboza’s letter to Greg Evans states that he received a few letters from Edward Harrington and that he also received a phone call from Congressional lawyer Chris Nolde. He also

writes that he received a couple of letters from Roy Bedell.550

1–19–73: In a letter from Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington to Joseph

Barboza, Harrington lists 57 individuals who are either killed or

missing. Harrington provides the information because it ‘‘might be

valuable to [Barboza] in the preparation of [his] book.’’ 551

2–7–73: Edward Harrington requests permission from the Montana State Prison to correspond with Joseph Barboza. Harrington

lists John Kehoe and Garrett Byrne as his character references.

Harrington states that he has known Barboza for six years, since

1967. Harrington lists his occupation as Criminal Attorney for the

Department of Justice and his address as Washington, DC.552

2–20–73: FBI Special Agent John J. Connolly, Jr., is assigned to

the Boston FBI Office, where he stays until December 1990.553

2–27–73: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington writes in a letter to Joseph

Barboza: ‘‘Even though I am going to be in private practice, do not

hesitate to ask me for my assistance to aid you in obtaining a better life in the future.’’ 554

3–15–73: In a letter from Barboza’s friend to Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington, Barboza’s friend writes, ‘‘On March 8th, Joe [Barboza] had

a visit from a Bill Terry of the FBI who questioned Joe about the

stocks and bonds. After a long conversation, he was asked that

should a trial come up concerning the bonds, would Joe testify. Joe

had told him he would have to check with you.’’ 555

3–18–73: In a letter to Greg Evans, Joseph Barboza states that

he was disappointed Marteen Miller and Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington

would not be able to appear before the Parole Board on his behalf.

He further says that ‘‘the FBI came here to see me on the stocks

and bonds[.]’’ Barboza also indicates, ‘‘There is also a Washington

D.C. report in the files concerning an investigation made on

Geraway.’’ He also states that ‘‘Ted H. is leaving the Dept. at the

end of this month. That’s another setback for me when I see the

Board.’’ 556

563

3–20–73: In a letter from Ted Harrington to the California Board

of Parole, Harrington brings Barboza’s cooperation with the U.S.

Government to the Board’s attention. Harrington further states

that one of the reasons John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley and Vincent Teresa

cooperated as government witnesses was because Barboza broke

the ‘‘code of silence’’ and survived the underworld’s reprisal.557

3–21–73: Joseph Barboza’s letter to Greg Evans indicates that

Colonel Stone promised Barboza a letter. He requests that Evans

ask Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington to ask Stone about the letter. He

also indicates that Roy Bedell was going to write a letter and ‘‘submit his investigative findings and report concerning Geraway[.]’’ 558

3–28–73: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington’s letter to Joseph Barboza

states, ‘‘I have written to the California Board of Parole advising

them of your contribution to the federal effort against organized

crime and asking the Board to take it into consideration when

deeming whether to grant you parole. . . . Because it would constitute a conflict of interest under federal law, I will be unable to

be your attorney with respect to negotiations over your book; but

be assured that I will do what I can to aid you in getting your book

published. I am in the process of speaking with all those whom you

requested in order that they might also send letters to the Parole

Board in your behalf.’’ 559

4–16–73: A letter from Alice Darr, California Department of Corrections, to Roger W. Crist, Warden of Montana State Prison,

reads, ‘‘On March 13, 1973, I requested a progress report as Mr.

Bentley’s case is scheduled for review by the California Adult Authority sometime during the week of April 30, 1973.’’ 560

4–19–73: A letter from Glen Darty, Florida State Attorney to

William Geraway acknowledges Geraway’s appearance as a voluntary witness for the State of Florida during the 1967 murder

trial State v. John Sweet.561

5–9–73: A letter from the Records Officer of the California State

Prison at Folsom to the Warden at the Deer Lodge, Montana State

Prison states that Joseph Barboza’s case ‘‘was reviewed by the

California Adult Authority on April 30, 1973, and was referred to

their Administrative Officer, Joseph Spangler, to prepare a request

to the Montana Parole Authorities to conduct a parole hearing. You

should be hearing from Mr. Spangler in the near future.’’ 562

5–14–73: Joseph Barboza writes in a letter to Greg Evans that

Roy Bedell was investigating William Geraway. Barboza states, ‘‘I

gather his cooperation will include his findings of Mr. Geraway.’’ 563

5–24–73: In a letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans,

Barboza tells Evans that he does not understand why the State of

Montana will make the parole decision. Barboza writes, ‘‘Ted Harrington said he definitely would come if I wanted him and I do

want him[.]’’ 564

5–26–73: Joseph Barboza writes to Greg Evans and tells him

that Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington told him in a letter that he would

appear before the California or Montana Parole Board if necessary.

Roy Bedell also said he would cooperate.565

564

6–1–73: Edward F. Harrington writes in a letter to Robert Miles,

Director of the Parole Board, Montana State Prison at Deer Lodge:

‘‘I have been requested by Joseph Bentley, who will appear before

the Montana Parole Board on June 26, 1973, to testify as a witness

in his behalf. I am the former Attorney in Charge of the Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Strike Force for New England

and am extremely knowledgeable of Bentley’s contribution to law

enforcement in its efforts against organized crime. Bentley was the

chief federal government witness in the prosecution which resulted

in the conviction of Raymond L. Patriarca . . . Henry Tameleo . . .

and Ronald Cassesso[.] He was also the chief State of Massachusetts witness in the Boston gangland murder trial of Edward

Deegan . . . which resulted in the conviction of first-degree murder

of six major underworld figures, including . . . Joseph Silvati

[sic][.] The conviction of Patriarca is considered by knowledgeable

law enforcement officials to have been the most important organized crime case in the history of New England law enforcement.

Government witnesses John J. ‘Red’ Kelley, alleged mastermind of

the Plymouth mail robbery, and Vincent C. Teresa, who were developed by the United States subsequent to Bentley and whose testimony resulted in the conviction of many major syndicate leaders

in the New England area have advised that one of the reasons that

they decided to cooperate with the federal government was on account of the fact that Bentley had first broken the syndicate’s ‘code

of silence’ and had survived the underworld’s reprisal. Bentley’s defection from the organized underworld and his decision to become

a government witness against his former associates constitutes the

single most important factor in the success of the federal government’s campaign against organized crime in the New England

area. Bentley’s significant contribution to law enforcement as the

pivotal figure in the government’s effort to combat organized crime

should be weighed when his eligibility for parole is considered.

Please advise me if the appearance of witnesses before the Montana Parole Board is in conformity with your practices.’’ 566

6–11–73: The Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme trial begins. The trial

ends on June 15, 1973, with Salemme being convicted. (Commonwealth v. Salemme, 323 N.E. 2d 922 (1975)).567

6–13–73: In a memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Attorney

in Charge of the Boston Field Office, to James J. Featherstone,

Deputy Chief, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section,

McDowell writes regarding the Parole Hearing for Joseph Barboza:

‘‘[I]t is crucial that the Department favorably act upon this request.

While I have taken a conservative position on the matter of Ted’s

compensation—limiting the request to reimbursement of travel expenses and per diem—Ted is in private practice and could use the

fee.’’ According to McDowell, since Barboza’s parole will probably

be denied, it needs to be clear to him that his continued incarceration is his fault rather than any lack of diligence by the Department of Justice to bring the fact of his cooperation to the Board’s

attention. It is best not to give Barboza the impression that the Department of Justice has abandoned him in light of the fact that La

Cosa Nostra (LCN) has continually pressured Barboza to change

his Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan testimony, in order to free major LCN

565

figures. The memorandum continues, ‘‘While the government has

evidence which would eventually blunt the LCN attempt to get

Barboza to perjure himself, on behalf of [Henry] Tameleo and

[Peter] Limone,’’ this would involve us in long, expensive court

hearings, which would do no good. Ted Harrington is the ‘‘best

equipped to represent us in a careful responsible manner’’ at the

hearing since he has maintained complete familiarity with

Barboza’s situation over the years.568

William B. Lynch, Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, writes a memorandum to Henry E. Petersen, Assistant

Attorney General of the Criminal Division, entitled ‘‘Recommendation that Ted Harrington be appointed a Special Attorney (without

compensation) to represent the department at parole hearing.’’ The

memorandum states that Barboza is a former government witness

and is incarcerated in the Montana State Penitentiary. The California authorities transferred him to Montana to serve out his sentence since California could not guarantee his safety. Barboza is

due to have a parole hearing soon. Although Barboza will not likely

be paroled, ‘‘It is my judgment that a representative of the Dept.

appear at the hearing to give a factual account of Barboza’s cooperation in state and federal prosecutions against the leaders of

New England’s Organized Crime family[.]’’ 569

6–19–73: Joseph Barboza writes a letter to Greg Evans stating

that he received a letter from Roy Bedell on June 18, 1973. Bedell

told Barboza that he was writing a letter on Barboza’s behalf to

California. Barboza says he testified before Congress as a favor to

‘‘Colonel Stone who promised emphatically to write a letter to the

Board for me.’’ 570

6–22–73: A memorandum from A.J. Mehrens of the Montana

Board of Pardons to Joseph Barboza states that there is nothing in

Barboza’s file indicating that Joseph Spangler or anyone from the

California Adult Authority gave Montana permission to bring

Barboza before the Montana Board of Pardons for parole consideration. Further, the memorandum indicates that even if Montana

receives notification that Barboza is eligible to come before the

Montana Board, the Montana Board will also have to approve his

parole.571

6–29–73: A letter from Bobby C. Miles, Director of the Montana

Board of Pardons, to Joseph Spangler, Administrative Officer of the

California Adult Authority, ‘‘We have been besieged by telephone

calls and letters (copies enclosed) requesting the Montana Parole

Board to hold a parole hearing for Mr. Bentley (Barboza). . . . [W]e

cannot and will not hear his case unless your agency initiates the

request under the Western Interstate Corrections Compact.’’ 572

7–16–73: A letter from Raymond Brown, Chairman of the California Adult Authority, and written by Joseph A. Spangler, Administrative Assistant, to Bobby Miles, Director of the Montana Board

of Pardons states, ‘‘[Y]ou will be receiving a request for your Board

to hear [Joseph Barboza] in a parole consideration hearing.’’ Brown

promises to provide the criminal and social history of Barboza. He

notes that Barboza is a fourth termer and was committed less than

two years ago for second-degree murder. His prior convictions inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00575 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
566

clude: robbery by force, assault with a deadly weapon, kidnapping,

etc. He later escaped prison and became involved in attempted auto

theft and assault with a deadly weapon. The letter states, ‘‘We

would appreciate your Board granting a hearing to [Barboza] when

they meet on July 31st or August 1st, which will eliminate the necessity for [Barboza] being transferred to California for a hearing

before the Adult Authority,’’ which he is legally entitled to under

California law.573

7–19–73: A letter from Barboza’s friend to Ted Harrington states,

‘‘Joe called me last night and informed he will be seeing the Parole

Board in Montana[.] . . . Joe asked me to get hold of you, and to

ask you to try and reach John Fitzgerald with the news.’’ In a postscript, Barboza’s friend states that she ‘‘[u]nderstand[s] the book is

progressing, and that you met with Hank [Messick].’’ 574

7–20–73: The Rhode Island Supreme Court sustains Raymond

Patriarca’s conviction of conspiracy to murder Rudolph Marfeo.

(State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300 (R.I. 1973)).575

7–24–73: A memorandum from Henry Petersen, Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division to Attorney General Elliot L.

Richardson, states in relevant part: ‘‘Barboza is due to have a parole hearing before the Montana Board of Pardons, Deer Lodge,

Montana, on July 31, 1973. . . . The Department has had an understanding with Barboza that at such time as he becomes eligible

for parole, the Department would bring to the attention of the authorities the fact of his cooperation with the Department of Justice

as a witness against major organized crime figures in New England. Barboza has requested that Edward F. Harrington be the witness at the hearing.’’ According to the memorandum, Harrington,

Rico and Condon were responsible for developing Barboza as a successful witness. Barboza probably will not be paroled. We will take

no position on the desirability of his parole. Petersen informs, ‘‘It

is important that it be clear to Barboza . . . that his continued incarceration is his own fault, rather than due to the Department’s

failure to keep its promise to bring the facts of his past cooperation

to the attention of the Parole Board.’’ 576

7–31–73: The Rhode Island Supreme Court denies Maurice ‘‘Pro’’

Lerner’s motion for a new trial and affirms each conviction and

sentence. State v. Lerner, 308 A.2d 324, 330 (R.I. 1973).577

At the request of the California Adult Authority, Joseph Barboza

has a hearing before the Montana Parole Board. The Montana Parole Board recommends that Barboza be granted parole. The California Adult Authority will now hold its own hearing on Barboza’s

parole request. Edward F. Harrington testifies on Barboza’s behalf.

(The Baron May Get Parole, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA),

Sept. 4, 1973; Richard Connolly, Baron Asks Parole From Life Sentence, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1973).578

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirms the convictions of Robert E. Fairbrothers, John Rossi and Rudolph Sciarra. State v.

Fairbrothers, 112 R.I. 100 (R.I. 1973).579

Joseph Barboza writes a letter to Greg Evans stating, ‘‘How can

I ever thank you and Marty for what you two and Ted H. did for

567

me today. Words can never even begin to express what I feel[.] . . .

The Parole Board said this is the fastest hearing in the history of

Montana . . . I didn’t even say one word! Except thank you and

floated out in a dream that I never thought would come, truthfully!

You, Marty and Ted H. made this all come true. Nobody did I ever

owe so much to!’’ He says he and Evans have to speak.580

8–24–73: In a letter to Greg Evans, Joseph Barboza writes that

Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington moved and a letter to him was returned.

Barboza says it is ‘‘rather important for many reasons’’ that he contact Harrington. He asks Evans for help in achieving this goal.581

8–30–73: The Boston Globe reveals that Joseph Barboza was ‘‘in

protective custody at the State Prison in Deer Lodge, Mont. He was

moved from a California prison after his life was threatened.’’ The

article also states that Barboza is seeking parole from his life sentence. Richard Connolly, Barboza Asks Parole From Life Sentence,

BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 30, 1973.582

8–31–73: The Boston Herald reveals that Joseph Barboza is ‘‘in

protective custody in Montana.’’ (Baron in Parole Plea for 1970 Cal.

Murder, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 31, 1973; see also Rick Foote, Prisoner Fears For Life, Warden Ponders Transfer, MONTANA STANDARD, Sept. 1, 1973).583

9–6–73: In a letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans, Barboza

expresses a great deal of self-pity. He says he realized he is going

back to Folsom State Prison, and states, ‘‘one week today since the

story broke [.]’’ [Barboza is referring to articles in the Boston Globe,

8–30–73, and the Boston Herald, 8–31–73, indicating that he is

now in protective custody at the state prison in Deer Lodge, Montana. See 8–31–73 entry.] He also says that he was ‘‘on the brink

of realizing my goal and I woke up one morning and there it is all

gone and taken away from me in the form of the newspapers.’’ He

also says that after noting that he will be going back to Folsom,

‘‘I do realize I must open my case but how I will proceed in my case

I have not decided yet, I do realize in regards to my case, I must

make sure that I be my own man. When the case is in court and

I am on the stand, I will cause a scandal that will be nationwide.’’

He goes on to say that ‘‘before I do start my case I will contact attorney Joseph Balliro, of Boston, and have a long interview with

him. Through that interview I am sure that I will tighten up my

defense quite considerably. Barboza continues, ‘‘I have never sat

down with you and told you many things but believe me only one

person out of all the people back in Boston involved in law did not

forget me after they reaped in the political gains, security and rewards that I caused them so that today as they abandoned me,

reneged on promises, they leave me alone to fight the revenge of

the Mafia.’’ Barboza later says, ‘‘I am going to pull the covers on

some very righteous appearing people and believe me of all of the

words I have ever spoken to you I hold all the pieces to cause it!’’

Barboza then makes a strong statement indicating he will move

forward with his plan.584

10–25–73: A letter from Joseph Balliro to the Clark County Sheriff’s Office states that Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme is currently incarcerated at Walpole serving a sentence imposed several months ago.

568

The letter states that this a formal notification of his whereabouts

and his demand that he be taken to Nevada for trial in connection

with the complaint made against him for the murder of Peter

Poulos. Balliro writes, ‘‘I would also call to your attention that the

warrant of arrest from your County has been lodged against Mr.

Salemme here in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts since January 31, 1973, and that no further action has been taken against

him by the State of Nevada.’’ 585

10–26–73: R.E. Coyle from California Department of Corrections

writes to Joseph Barboza: ‘‘Hopefully, one of these days that thick

skull of yours will be penetrated and you will understand most of

us want to make sure you survive so that you will once again be

a free man. At the present time, I don’t have any information regarding your California release. . . . I note in the letter you say

you’re very depressed and under great pressure.’’ 586

11–19–73: A letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans states

that Barboza expresses extreme frustration at not getting out of

prison. He states, ‘‘When all this fails, I still have a case to open

up in court. A case that would blow up into a proportion and magnitude beyond your wildest imagination.’’ 587

11–26–73: Joseph Barboza’s letter to Greg Evans reads, ‘‘Received a letter from Ted Harrington just recently in which he said

he wrote Spangler about my case and on my behalf.’’ 588

12–17–73: Joseph Barboza is reportedly involved in an incident

at the Deer Lodge Prison in Montana where a guard’s jaw was broken. (The Baron in Prison Fracas, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa,

CA), Dec. 18, 1973; see also Montana State Prison Rule Infraction

Report).589

1974

1974: Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi returns to Boston on Special Agent Paul Rico’s advice after being a fugitive since 1969 for

the Fitzgerald car bombing. As Rico promised, Flemmi was released on bail and the attempted murder charges against him were

dropped. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999; see

also 9–11–69 entry).590

1–2–74: A letter from Barboza’s close friend to Ted Harrington

states in relevant part: ‘‘I’m glad you put me in contact with [Hank

Messick]. Believe it or not, they are going to dedicate the book to

you.’’ According to Barboza’s friend, Joseph Barboza has been in

touch with his brother to contact some people back East, including

Dennis Condon. Also, Barboza is getting in contact with Joseph

Balliro.591

1–9–74: Joseph Barboza writes to a friend: ‘‘Hey baby, This is

very important! You must write Ted H[arrington], Denny [Condon],

each in Boston. Then you must write the Attorney General Israel

marked confidential and personal and also Colonel Stone Superintendent of the State Police, State Police Headquarters Rhode Island. In each letter that you type to A.G. Israel State House Rhode

Island and to Colonel Stone do not sign your name, but tell them

these letters can be verified by Ted H[arrington] and FBI Special

569

Agent Denny Condon. Tell them I would like to see the 4 of them

together before California takes any action on my case. I wish to

discuss with them about Romeo Martin concerning Raymond

Patriarca, Jerry Angiulo, Henry Tameleo, Ronnie Cassesso and

Chico Amico and Bill Stewart. It concerns a police report and the

Blue Bunny! Then I will wait until Ted H[arrington] and Denny

contact you and if there is no response then I will have a letter

sent to the Providence Journal and Record American.’’ 592

1–14–74: A Joseph Barboza letter to a friend states, ‘‘Honey by

now you got those letters concerning Israel [and] Stone. I want you

to call from Carson’s office, and he can put Denny [Condon] on the

line for you too. Once Israel hears you want to talk to Stone on the

phone his boss Israel will get him for you. I want the 4 together

to see me Denny, Ted H[arrington], Israel and Stone. This is vitally

important if you got the other letters I explained what to say to

Carson and from him to do after all he wouldn’t want to obstruct

justice in a capital case!( [Smiley face in original]. . . . If you still

don’t understand the Israel, Stone, Ted H. Denny matter concerning Romeo Martin or didn’t get the letter, tell me I’ll write right

away because this is important remember Israel and Stone shall

not know your name stress it to Carson and for him to stress it

to Ted H. and Denny not to let Israel or Stone know. But don’t let

them in anyway stop you from delivering that message to Israel

the A.G. of Rhode Island. Let the ole man deal, he knows their

games dislikes and horrors after 7 years I should. . . . Don’t take

all those legal matters lightly, especially blackie and the cover

blown, also we still haven’t heard from Santa Clara still yet. I hope

not until we get Israel all souped up! Glad to hear Denny wrote

you, yes he has the most class but has viper blood in him too! . . .

So glad to hear you disturbed the——so well [blank line in original]. Wait till you go in the Romeo and Israel bay! HAH.’’ 593

1–23–74: A memorandum from the Boston Special Agent in

Charge to the Director of the FBI attaches a ‘‘copy of a letter received by SA Dennis M. Condon from a female acquaintance of

Baron [Barboza] in San Francisco, California[.] . . . A copy of this

letter has been made available to Attorney Gerald McDowell, Boston Strike Force, U.S. Dept. of Justice; Attorney Edward F. Harrington, former head of the Strike Force; Attorney General Richard

Israel, Rhode Island; and Col. Walter Stone, Superintendent, Rhode

Island State Police, to comply with Baron’s request re Israel and

Stone. Mr. McDowell and Mr. Harrington had previously advised

that Baron’s credibility as a witness had been seriously diminished

by events that have transpired in regard to him since his testimony

in Federal and State Courts in 1968 and this is also the opinion

of authorities in the Organized Crime Section of the Justice Department at Washington, D.C. . . . Boston sees no useful purpose

in interview of [Barboza] at this time and events referred to by him

occurred prior to his testimony in 1968. It is felt that this is another effort on part of [Barboza] to obtain Government support in

bid for parole. Strike Force will not consider any future prosecutions based on [Barboza] testimony.’’ 594

1–28–74: A letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans says he is

in transit back to California because he broke a guard’s jaw. He

570

also says Special Agents Paul Rico and Dennis Condon, along with

an FBI agent from Montana, will testify at a new trial ‘‘concerning

the bonds and stocks.’’ 595

1–29–74: According to an airtel from the Butte SAC to the FBI

Director, Joseph Barboza is interviewed at his request by the FBI

at the Missoula County Jail in Missoula, Montana, where he is

completing his incarceration for a second-degree murder conviction

in California. According to the memorandum, ‘‘Baron advised that

he desired the Justice Department be informed of the fact that he

is willing to furnish new testimony against Raymond Patriarca and

his henchmen concerning the murder of Romeo Martin, who was

shot and killed in July, 1966. He stated that his motives for doing

this were that he has a grudge against Patriarca and his lieutenants and wishes them to remain in jail and also because of the fact

that Patriarca and the ‘New England Family’ have a contract for

his death outstanding in the amount of $100,000.00.’’ Barboza

states that Romeo Martin was shot and killed for two reasons:

First, Martin furnished information to Suffolk County, Massachusetts, Detective Billy Stewart, who was on Patriarca’s payroll, concerning the shooting and death of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan; and,

Second, prior to providing information regarding the Deegan murder, Martin attempted to buy into and control a penny arcade in

which Patriarca was interested, without advising his lieutenant or

Patriarca. Barboza claims to have set up Martin, with William

Geraway’s assistance, by advising him by telephone that Martin

was to meet with Ronald Cassesso and Joseph Dimico. Barboza further claims that his ‘‘assignment during [the Martin] murder was

to drive a back-up car, and immediately prior to the meeting, he

made the last phone call to Martin giving him the time of the

meeting and thus setting him up.’’ Barboza stated that ‘‘the murder

was ordered by Raymond Patriarca, and the plans for it were formulated by his lieutenants, Henry [Tameleo] and Jerry [Angiulo].’’

Barboza also indicates that he is afraid of being returned to California in light of the contract Patriarca has issued for him. Barboza

also states that he wants Rhode Island Attorney General Israel,

who was actively investigating the Martin murder to receive the

foregoing information.596

2–1–74: Joseph Barboza is transferred back to California from

Montana after striking a prison guard. Barboza is in San Quentin,

California, by February 2, 1974. (See Airtel Memo from SAC, Boston to Director, FBI (Feb. 19, 1974); Airtel Memo from SAC, Butte

to Director, FBI (Feb. 12, 1974); Letter from Joseph Barboza to

Greg Evans (Feb. 2, 1974)).597

2–11–74: An airtel from the FBI Director to the SACs in Butte

and Boston states, ‘‘He now appears to be bargaining for a quick

release and has furnished information concerning the murder of a

New England hoodlum, Romeo Martin, July, 1965. Baron’s

[Barboza] information concerning the Martin murder has been furnished to Massachusetts officials and they have concluded that

Baron would not make a credible witness and William Geraway,

who is presently incarcerated in Massachusetts and whom Baron

has stated would corroborate his information, is also considered by

Massachusetts officials as a pathological liar. The Boston office

571

sees no useful purpose to be served in detailed interviews of Baron

at this time, and Butte has been so advised by Boston airtel dated

2–5–74.’’ 598

2–14–74: Lieutenant John S. Regan of the Massachusetts State

Police and Richard Hoffman, Assistant District Attorney at the

Norfolk Complex in Massachusetts interview Joseph Barboza at

San Quentin Prison. (See Airtel from SAC, San Francisco, to Director, FBI (Mar. 28, 1974)).599 The purpose of this interview is to obtain information and possible testimony from Barboza against William Geraway regarding the murder of David Sidlauskas. Regan

and Hoffman believe Geraway may have told Barboza about the

murder while they were in prison at Walpole State Prison. (Airtel

from SAC, Boston, to Director, FBI, (Feb. 19, 1974)).600

In a letter from Joseph Barboza to Marteen Miller, Barboza tells

Miller he does not want to testify.601

2–19–74: An memorandum from the Boston SAC to the Director

of the FBI concerns the veracity of Joseph Barboza’s information

about the Romeo Martin murder. The airtel advises that ‘‘Strike

Force Head Gerald McDowell, Boston, Massachusetts, and Justice

Department officials have previously indicated they would not proceed with [Barboza] as a major witness in future prosecutions as

his credibility has been diminished by events since 1968.’’ Further,

‘‘Attorney General Richard Israel, Rhode Island, advised Mr.

McDowell he would not proceed on any future prosecutions with

[Barboza] as a major witness.’’ Moreover, ‘‘District Attorney Garrett

Byrne, Suffolk County . . . advised he would not proceed with

[Barboza] as a major witness in future prosecutions as happenings

since 1968 have detracted from his value as a witness.’’ The memo

further states that ‘‘[Barboza’s] information regarding Martin may

be brought up at this time as another effort to obtain support in

his bid for parole.’’ 602

The Boston SAC writes an airtel to the FBI Director informing

him that William Geraway furnished many affidavits to defense

lawyers for those convicted on Barboza’s testimony in an effort to

upset the convictions. Geraway’s affidavits alleged that Barboza

told him that he had lied in earlier prosecutions.603

An airtel from the Sacramento SAC to the FBI Director states

that the San Francisco Office will contact logical authorities concerning a possible interview with Joseph Barboza at San Quentin

Prison.604

A letter from Joseph Barboza to Greg Evans states, ‘‘Somewhere

somehow if I have to do this alone I will strive with every fibre of

my being to get out and if I have to use a Boston Criminal Attorney Joe Balliro purely out of satisfaction I will & a small Watergate will develop, & Walpole prison doors will open.’’ 605

5–28–74: The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘[Anthony] Stathopoulos now

says in an affidavit that [Joseph Barboza] Baron told him he lied

during the trial by omitting the name of a participant out of friendship. Boston Police Officer William Stuart in an affidavit stated

that the late Romeo Martin, one of the alleged participants in the

Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan slaying, said that [Louis] Greco and [JoVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00581 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
572

seph] Salvati were not involved. Writer James Southwood, who was

planning a book about Baron, said Baron told him that Greco was

not in the Chelsea alley the night Deegan was shot.’’ (William F.

Doherty, Pair Charge Perjury, Seek New Trial in Deegan Killing,

BOSTON GLOBE, May 28, 1974).606

6–4–74: fter Joseph Barboza is turned down by the California Parole Board, he writes to Marteen Miller asking, ‘‘Are we ready to

do what we should have did [sic] two years ago? If it is at all possible to get Greg [Evans] up here and tell me what is happening

or intended, I would appreciate it.’’ 607

7–19–74: The Boston SAC writes an airtel to the FBI Director directed to the attention of Supervisor William A. Harwood. The

airtel states that Ted Baier, Special Agent, California Bureau of

Identification and Investigation in Sacramento, California, received

a telephone call from an attorney with the last name of Evans from

the Sonoma County Public Defender’s Office. Evans advised Baier

‘‘that through a friend of a friend who is currently incarcerated at

Folsom State Penitentiary in Folsom, California, [Evans] had received a note stating for him to contact’’ Baier and tell him that

Joseph Barboza fears that his life is in danger. Baier advised that

he did not contact anyone other than the Sacramento Division of

the FBI.608

9–4–74: The Miami SAC writes an airtel to the FBI Director regarding the Top Echelon Criminal Informant School at the FBI

Academy in Quantico, Virginia, which states the following: Although a previous airtel recommended that Miami recommend one

agent to receive Top Echelon Informant training, the Miami office

would like to send two qualified experienced agents to this training

session—SA Francis Pieroni and SA Paul Rico. According to the

airtel, ‘‘Rico has for years been outstanding in the development of

Top Echelon Criminal Informants and it is felt that his participation in this program would be of value not only to the Miami Division, but also his participation in this school would be of mutual

value to all who attend.’’ 609

9–23–74: A letter from Raymond C. Brown, Chairman of the

California Adult Authority to Gerald E. McDowell, Chief Attorney

of the Organized Crime Strike Force states in relevant part: ‘‘I

don’t know what [Barboza] has indicated to you, but he is a most

prolific letter writer. He can’t keep his mouth shut. . . . We are

fully aware that if something should happen to [Barboza] it might

further affect your witness development program in the New England area. However, we aren’t getting much help from

[Barboza].’’ 610

10–24–74: An FBI Memorandum states that some U.S. Attorneys

at the 1974 National Conference of U.S. Attorneys expressed a belief that the FBI was overly protective of their informants and that

every effort was made so that informants would not be prosecuted

so that the informants would continue to provide intelligence information. Furthermore, some of the U.S. Attorneys apparently believe that the FBI wants the informants to avoid prosecution so

that the informant would advance in the hierarchy of organized

crime and become a greater value to the FBI’s investigations. In

573

the FBI’s defense, the memorandum states that these suggestions

were false and that it has long been an established practice of the

FBI to apprise the informant that it will not approve any criminal

activity by the informant and will support prosecution of any such

violations.611

11–13–74: The William Bennett murder charges against Stephen

Flemmi are dismissed, as they had already been against Francis

‘‘Frank’’ Salemme. (United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141

(D. Mass. 1999)).612

1975

1975: Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia,

that he is ‘‘responsible for putting fifty guys away in trials and

maybe another three hundred guys because of information I gave

to police in various states.’’ (p.4). He further states that ‘‘right now

. . . there are more than seven hundred guys under federal protection. All of them have squealed on the mob. They’re talking because the government is providing them with something that they

can’t get anymore from their own: protection, real protection.’’

(p.107–08).613

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, that

‘‘the only guy who had the guts to say it was all up to me, that

I had no obligation to [testify in a case in Newark since I fulfilled

all my promises or] do any more if I didn’t want to, was Ted Harrington.’’ (p.33).614

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, the following regarding Claude Pepper’s congressional committee and the

committee’s hearing on horse race fixing: ‘‘That committee didn’t

know what time of day it was. [T]hey had Joe Barboza testify about

fixing races, and Joe never fixed a race in his life. He was an enforcer, a mob assassin, not a moneymover.’’ (p.47).615

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, the following regarding bugging devices: ‘‘Another thing that has shaken

the mob real bad has been bugs [the electronic listening devices

that the FBI placed on mafia bosses around the country]. That

really hurt. A lot of secrets became common knowledge to the FBI.

. . . I remember when Raymond learned he’d been bugged. He was

half out of his mind to think it could happen to him. He blamed

everybody but himself[.]’’ (p. 101).616

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, the following regarding Joseph Barboza: ‘‘Take Joe Barboza. He was one

of the toughest enforcers around in New England before he became

a federal informer. He had a reputation on the street of being a violent, violent guy with a terrible temper. The cops were afraid of

him, street people were scared of him, even me—as close as I was

to the guy, I’d never so much as cross a bridge alone with him in

a car. You never knew what would set the guy off. There was one

incident I remember in particular involving Joe. This happened on

Bennington Street in East Boston. It was about one in the afternoon, and I was standing on the corner. Barboza was in a car with

Guy Frizzi, a street guy that Joe was close with at the time. They

were driving along Bennington Street when some poor guy with his

574

wife and two little kids cut Barboza off by accident. Joe went wild.

He started chasing this guy, blowing the horn and yelling out the

window: ‘You mother . . . you son-of-a-bitch . . . I’ll get you[.]’ Finally, Joe caught up with the guy and cut him off. The driver was

smart enough to lock all his windows and doors. Barboza and

Frizzi pounded on the windows and then jumped up on the hood

of this guy’s car, smashing at the windshield. At the same time

Barboza was yelling nasty things he planned to do to the guy’s

wife. I remember seeing the poor little kids, crying their eyes out,

hanging on to their father while their mother is screaming her

head off. Now, while all this was happening, there was a cop standing on a nearby corner, just watching. Finally, the cop turned away

and walked down the street. He was scared to death of Barboza

himself. Joe wasn’t through though. He ran back to his car and got

out a baseball bat and started pounding on the car. He smashed

the fenders, the windows, everything. He almost destroyed the car

before some cops finally came over and tried to calm Joe down.

While they were trying to cool Joe, they told this poor driver who’s

sitting there in his smashed-up car to get the hell out of the area

fast and forget about the damage. I was standing there all the time

watching it, laughing my head off. At the time it was funny. Now

I think back and it ain’t so funny. The driver would have been

killed if Joe had got his hands on him, and all because he accidentally cut Joe off in traffic.’’ (p.111–113).617

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, that

Louis Greco had an ongoing feud with Benny Zinna and, in fact,

attempted to kill Benny Zinna by firing two shots at him. He further states that ‘‘Grieco [sic] himself was a vicious, vicious guy. He

was always losing his temper. He was six-two, weighed about two

twenty, and he had hands on him like Virginia hams. He could kill

you with his bare hands. He never had to do much fighting because

everyone was afraid to tangle with him. He was a bumbling idiot

and he had a gimp. His close friends used to call him The Gimp,

but nobody else dared. Grieco [sic] had feuds with a lot of guys.’’

(p.119–122).618

Vincent Teresa writes in his book, Vinnie Teresa’s Mafia, the following regarding an IRS agent: ‘‘There was one guy in particular

in New England who was a big [Internal] Revenue [Service] hotshot. He was way up the ladder. He was supposed to be a big

racketbuster while he was on the street. He’d hit the after-hours

joints, the gambling spots. He made all kinds of noise. The only

thing that no one knew was when he was going to raid the Coliseum; he used to call Nick Giso up. ‘Hey, Nicky,’ he’d say. Sure

enough, he’d come busting in and they wouldn’t find a thing. He

tipped a lot of the boys off when he was raiding them. Sometimes

they’d have stand-ins there to take a bust to make it look good.

Then he got out of the IRS. That’s when he started making really

big money. He had a lot of connections with IRS bosses, and he had

the confidence of the mob. He could fix almost anything.’’ (p.145–

146 ). (See also 8–14–62 entry).619

1–3–75: In a letter from Joseph Barboza to William Lynch, attorney for the Organized Crime Section of the Criminal Division,

Barboza discusses how the Mafia sent Lawrence Hughes to testify

575

against Barboza in the Clay Wilson trial. He further explains that

he killed Clay Wilson in self-defense. Barboza also states, ‘‘My public defender attorney advised me at the end of the [Clay Wilson]

trial to plead guilty to 2nd degree. I did so disgruntly [sic]. The

next day newspaper headliners read ‘Too Late for Baron—a Hung

Jury.’ If you want to know why my attorney advised me to plead

guilty ask Ted Harrington, it was a political pressure move, and I

got caught up in it again.’’ Barboza also stated that he ‘‘came up

with the idea that I’d play games with the Mafia by going back

there and leading them to believe I would recant my testimony for

the right price[.] [B]y doing that I could stop any danger happening

to my wife and children. . . . I would leave and leave the Mafia

hanging.’’ At the end of the letter, Barboza pleads with Lynch, asking him for ‘‘help in that I see the parole board in May’’ and ‘‘if I

am released that the Gov’t would still be interested enough to help

me with REDACTED. . . . I turn to you at the advise [sic] of FBI

Agent Dennis Condon. Will you help beat this Mafia revenge?’’ 620

3–7–75: A letter from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney

General, Criminal Division, to Joseph Barboza states in relevant

part: ‘‘Your subsequent conviction of a most serious offense precludes our making a commitment to you at this time to render to

you any additional assistance whatsoever. At such time as your release from confinement is imminent and upon your request, we

shall review your request in light of the then existent circumstances and determine whether the assistance you desire is

warranted.’’ 621

5–27–75: Special Agent Paul Rico retires from the FBI. He became an FBI agent on February 26, 1951. Shortly after retiring

from the FBI, Rico becomes Director of Security for World Jai Alai.

(See U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208 (D. Mass. 1999)).622

9–17–75: A memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell, Chief Attorney of Boston’s Organized Crime Strike Force, to Gerard T.

McGuire, Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering

Section, states: ‘‘I have enclosed an article from the Boston Globe

which all but gives the L.C.N. [La Cosa Nostra] a blueprint on how

to find Joseph Barboza and kill him. . . . [Additionally,] it now appears quite likely that he will be released this fall. . . . Bill Lynch

has strong negative feelings about extending any more assistance

to Barboza. Bill feels that the Department went to a lot of trouble

to give Barboza a chance at a new life as a relocated witness and

Barboza repaid us by murdering a man in California. . . . Whatever our final decision on Barboza we should give a lot of thought

to any response to his requests. He was the key witness in one of

the most important cases this section has ever won, and his survival, or lack thereof, has current importance in the development

of witnesses in the New England area.’’ 623

9–18–75: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger again opened as an FBI informant. (FBI Report by Charles S. Prouty (Aug. 13, 1997); see also

Dick Lehr and Gerard O’Neill, BLACK MASS 16; and U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208 (D. Mass. 1999), which states

that Bulger was opened as an informant on September 30, 1975,

but which does not recognize that FBI Special Agent Dennis

576

Condon had already opened Bulger as an informant four years earlier).624

9–19–75: An FBI Memorandum from the San Francisco, California, Office states, ‘‘By LHM . . . Boston advised Bureau that information received from reliable source indicating members of Boston

LCN [La Cosa Nostra] family [are] interested in making determination as to where [Joseph] Barboza [is] located upon his parole in

order [that] they could kill him. Information received that member

of organization located in Boston area stated sizeable amount of

money available to [a] person who sets up Barboza from organization in order that he be killed. Above LHM based on information

developed by REDACTED. Referenced report indicates that REDACTED

advised on REDACTED the De Sciscio and/or Russo had advised

while in San Francisco area that a $100,000 contract on Barboza

or $25,000 available for ‘lining him up.’ REDACTED SECTION.’’ 625

An airtel from the Boston SAC to the FBI Director states, ‘‘Enclosed for the Bureau are four copies of an LHM setting forth info

received from sources indicating [that] the LCN [La Cosa Nostra]

is interested in locating’’ Joseph Barboza and killing him. This

memorandum also states that Barboza’s murder ‘‘would represent

a lethal blow to the Witness Protection Act and would serve as a

deterrent for future potential witnesses in the Boston area.’’ 626

A U.S. Government Memorandum states that an official from the

DOJ advised that Joseph Barboza will be paroled soon and ‘‘the

word on the street in Boston is that the bad guys know [Barboza’s]

name and they plan on publicly executing him.’’ The DOJ official

requests that we offer technical assistance to the State of California if needed, such as documentation or employment. The ‘‘FBI

have [sic] already requested help in [the] form of job assistance.

This is being done.’’ 627

10–30–75: Joseph Barboza is ‘‘quietly paroled’’ from Sierra Conservation Camp in California where he served four years for the

murder of Clay Wilson. Two underworld figures, one being J.R.

Russo, were reportedly in California in August and said to be looking for Barboza. (Former New England Mafia Figure Paroled,

PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Nov. 7, 1975). A San Francisco

Police Report notes that Barboza was paroled to San Francisco and

is residing with a friend. The report further states that Barboza

works as a cook at the Rathskeller Restaurant.628

11–1–75: Joseph Barboza lives at Ted Sharliss’ residence from

this date until November 15, 1975. (This information is contained

in an FBI memorandum dated December 16, 1976).629

11–28–75: Joseph Salvati’s attorney, Martin K. Leppo, files a petition for commutation for Salvati.630

1976

1976: The Attorney General issues the first guidelines for the

FBI on use of informants. (United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.

2d 141, 150 (D. Mass. 1999)).631

Stephen Flemmi provides information that allows Special Agent

John Connolly to turn a co-conspirator into a cooperating witness

577

who identified Joseph Russo as Barboza’s killer. Russo pleads

guilty in 1992. (United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 151

(D. Mass. 1999)).632

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen Flemmi, and John Martorano

meet Back Side restaurant owner Francis X. Green at his restaurant and threaten his life unless he repays a $175,000 debt.

Green then contacts Edward Harrington and asks what he should

do. The case is turned over to the FBI. The FBI supposedly interviews Green and later denies that an interview took place. About

a year later, the case is dropped because of Green’s supposed reluctance to testify against Bulger. ((United States v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 156 (D. Mass. 1999); Dick Lehr & Gerard O’Neill,

BLACK MASS 32–37 (2000)).633

1–26–76: Frank Walsh, the Boston Police Sergeant responsible

for investigating Joseph Salvati’s involvement in the Edward

Deegan murder, recommends a commutation of Salvati’s sentence.634

1–27–76: The Massachusetts Parole Board votes unanimously to

deny Joseph Salvati’s petition for a hearing.635

2–11–76: Joseph Barboza (a.k.a. Joe Donati or Denati—after release from Wilson murder; Bentley, Baron) is murdered in San

Francisco. According to an FBI Memorandum from the San Francisco, California, Office dated June 8, 1978: ‘‘[A]t about 3:40 PM,

Baron was shot and killed as he attempted to enter his personal

automobile parked at the intersection of 25th Avenue and Moraga

Street, San Francisco, California. Baron had just departed residence of Theodore James Sharliss, 1717–25th Avenue. Baron was

visiting Sharliss for several hours and was returning to his apartment where he was residing with his girlfriend. Baron walked to

his vehicle, a 1969 Ford Thunderbird, two door, parked on Moraga

Street. As Baron reached the driver’s door, a white 1972 Ford

Econoline van pulled up and stopped beside Baron and his automobile. The cargo door on the right side of the van was thrust open

and several shots were fired. A white male American wearing a red

ski cap, pointed at the top, was observed by witnesses firing a shotgun out of the right side of the van. The van drove off at a high

rate of speed and was abandoned some five blocks from the murder

scene.’’ (See also San Francisco Police Department Report; Killer

Barboza Slain, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 12, 1976).636

2–20–76: Jack Zalkind, the Assistant District Attorney in charge

of prosecuting Joseph Salvati for the Edward Deegan murder, recommends a commutation of Salvati’s sentence.637

2–23–76: A teletype from the Los Angeles FBI Office to the Director and the San Francisco FBI Office concerns the details of an

interview of Richard Sydney Watson that took place at Orange

County Jail on February 22, 1976. Relevant portions of that interview summary follow: ‘‘Watson claimed that while in local custody

in Ohio in December, 1975, he met another inmate named Ronnie

Lane. He said that Lane told him that Joey Barboza has killed a

man in SF while residing there under a new identity which had

been supplied by the government after Barboza testified for the

government in the trial of Raymond Patriarca. He said that Lane

578

mentioned that Barboza frequented Luigi’s and the La Pentera

Restaurants in SF 3 or 4 times a week. Watson said that he was

booked into the Orange County Jail on January 16, 1976, and came

into contact with another inmate Ken Hoffman. . . . According to

Watson, Hoffman told him that there had been a $300,000 contract

put out on Barboza but no one had been able to find him. Watson

said that he told Hoffman that he had heard that Barboza frequented Luigi’s and the La Pentera restaurants. Hoffman told him

he would relay this information to his uncle and if Barboza was

where he said, that he would get his cut. Four days before Barboza

was killed, Watson said that Hoffman told him the two ‘torpedos’

each from two separate groups were going to stake out these restaurants. Four days later Watson read in the newspaper that

Barboza had been killed.’’ 638

4–9–76: Gerald Alch, a former employee of F. Lee Bailey, signs

an affidavit based on interviews with Joseph Barboza at Walpole

State Prison in July and August 1970. Alch states that Barboza

said all allegations made by him at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

trial with regard to the involvement of Peter Limone in the crime

were false. Barboza said that during his conversation with prosecutors he was interrogated in regard to Limone’s involvement in such

a way as to cause him to believe that by incriminating Limone, he

would be strengthening his position with regard to the promises

made to him by the authorities. Since Barboza believed the authorities were not keeping their promises, he had no obligation to

adhere to his false implication of Limone. Barboza indicated that

he had in his possession notes which he utilized for testimony preparation which had in their margins handwriting on Limone’s alleged implication. As a result of these interviews, an affidavit was

prepared for Barboza’s signature, which ‘‘to the best of my recollection, was brought to him . . . by my then associate Colin W. Gillis,

Esquire, before whom he acknowledged the contents thereof to be

true and did execute said affidavit.’’ 639

May 1976: Hank Messick writes an article in the Boston Globe

about Joseph Barboza and his book. Messick writes, ‘‘In time he

[Barboza] smuggled out the manuscript. [Barboza’s friend] typed it

and, on the recommendation of former Boston Strike Force chief

Edward F. Harrington, brought it to me to make into a book.’’ 640

5–16–76: An FBI teletype from Boston to the Director and the

San Francisco Office states, ‘‘BS 1544–CTE [Whitey Bulger] advised that he heard that Jimmy Charlmis [Ted Sharliss], formerly

from Boston and currently residing [in] San Francisco, is the individual who set up Joe Barboza to be killed by the ‘outfit’ and the

‘outfit’ people are discussing taking [Sharliss] out because he is

considered a weak link to their involvement in the ‘hit’ on

Barboza.’’ 641

5–19–76: According to an FBI teletype from Boston to the Director and the San Francisco Office, ‘‘Joseph M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor, Investigation Unit, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Parole

Board, advised FBI, Boston, that source close to REDACTED SECTION

advised [Ted Sharliss] former associate of Joe Barboza prior to his

[Sharliss’] leaving the Boston area years ago, is the individual who

579

set up Barboza to be killed and now they (LCN) intend to kill

[Sharliss] to insure [sic] he never talks. Strike Force Chief, New

England area, has had continuing interest in developments surrounding Barboza killing due to serious impact on witness program

and has continually expressed interest in use of FGJ in event evidence developed regarding individuals responsible for hit. Strike

Force Chief advised of above informant information and has expressed intent in having Sharliss subpoenaed before FGJ, Boston.’’ 642

5–24–76: An FBI teletype from Boston to the Director and the

San Francisco Office informs, ‘‘REDACTED SECTION advised that the

‘outfit’ is going to eliminate Jimmy Charlmis [Ted Sharliss] who

helped them line up Baron for a ‘hit’ on the west coast. They don’t

want to take a chance on him folding up.’’ The teletype continues,

‘‘[O]n REDACTED SECTION advised that the Italian outfit had Joseph

Baron ‘taken out.’ They also ‘took out’ [Patrick] Fabiano because of

his connections with Joe Baron. Fabiano had been holding the outfit up over the years, example: getting money from them, etc., because he would not corroborate Baron in Court. They were waiting

until they got Baron to ‘take out’ Fabiano.’’ 643

5–25–76: FBI teletype from the San Francisco Office to the Director and Boston regarding Joseph Barboza states, ‘‘Bureau and Boston office should be alert to the fact that during recent contact with

TE [(Top Echelon Informant)], he has furnished some information

concerning REDACTED SECTION. TE stated that he would in the near

future furnish extensive information concerning these two areas of

criminal activity; however, desired to give the matter further

thought and noted that REDACTED SECTION. At time of last contact,

TE indicated that he would consider testifying if his testimony became necessary in the above matters. On REDACTED it was determined that REDACTED SECTION.’’ 644

5–27–76: An FBI Memorandum from the San Francisco Office

states that Ted Sharliss was interviewed by the San Francisco FBI

Office. Sharliss is told that he is going to be eliminated. Sharliss

denies any involvement or knowledge concerning the Barboza murder.645

5–28–76: According to an FBI Memorandum from the San Francisco Office, Ted Sharliss is re-interviewed by the San Francisco

FBI Office. The memorandum states, ‘‘He admitted that during November, 1975, he furnished LCN [La Cosa Nostra] figure Joseph

Russo of Boston, information as to Sharliss’ address at San Francisco and that [Joseph Barboza] Baron was visiting with him on a

daily basis. Sharliss admitted subsequent thereto he was in telephonic contact with Russo on other matters, including contacts a

day or two prior to the murder. On practically each contact Russo

inquired as to whether or not Baron was still in the area and maintaining contact with Sharliss. He stated that he always advised

Russo that he was. Sharliss emphatically denied any involvement

in the murder of Baron other than the fact that he furnished Russo

the whereabouts of Baron. He admitted that by furnishing this information to Russo he had ‘given Baron up.’ Sharliss stated that he

believes Russo was responsible for Baron’s murder, however, deVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00589 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nied knowing who handled the hit. He denied receiving any money,

consideration, or favors.’’ 646

June 1976: Special Agent John Connolly accepts a diamond ring

from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi, according to

Connolly’s Indictment.647

Theodore James ‘‘Ted’’ Sharliss is interviewed concerning information he had regarding the Barboza murder. Sharliss informs

that Barboza lived at Sharliss’ residence from November 1 to November 15, 1975. Barboza later moved to an apartment with his

girlfriend. Barboza visited with Sharliss on a daily basis. On February 11, 1976, Barboza was murdered just outside Sharliss’ residence at 1710—25th Avenue, San Francisco. According to the interview summary, ‘‘Sharliss advised that during the latter part of

1975, he received a telephone call at his residence from Joseph

Russo, a Boston La Cosa Nostra (LCN) Lieutenant and well known

‘outfit’ hit man. Russo asked Sharliss to meet an individual in the

lobby of the Hilton Hotel in Downtown San Francisco. . . . [T]he

individual . . . at the Hilton Hotel was none other than Russo.

Russo asked Sharliss if he ‘would like to make some big bucks’.

Sharliss immediately knew that Russo wanted him to kill or handle the contract on Baron. Russo talked of $25,000 for the contract

and Sharliss reiterated that he wanted nothing to do with killing

Baron and that he wanted to take a ‘neutral position.’ Russo became extremely mad and pointed out to Sharliss that he had made

friends with a ‘lying bum’ who testified about ‘George’ and a number of other guys that he put on Death Row. Sharliss noted that

when Russo mentioned ‘George’ he was referring to Raymond

Patriarca, head of the New England LCN. Russo calmed down, left

the hotel, and told Sharliss ‘keep your mouth shut,’ don’t say anything to him (Baron) or anybody else.’’ Sharliss also states that he

had no other personal contact with Russo, but did talk with Russo

by telephone on a number of occasions after the November 1975

contact including a day or two before the Baron murder. During

those calls, Russo asked Sharliss if ‘‘that lying bum [is] still out

there.’’ (FBI Memorandum, Dec. 16, 1976).648

8–20–76: A teletype to the FBI Director regarding Joseph

Barboza states: ‘‘For information of Las Vegas, Joseph Barboza was

a well known hoodlum figure and ‘hitman’ in the Boston area who

testified against Raymond Patriarca, New England La Cosa Nostra

(LCN) Leader, and numerous other hoodlum figures during 1967–

1968.’’ 649

October 1976: A San Francisco FBI Office memorandum states,

‘‘John Frederick Loewe, bookmaking associate and confidant to

Sharliss, provided information to the San Francisco FBI that during January 1976, he accompanied Sharliss to the Hilton Inn, San

Francisco International Airport (SFIA). Sharliss related to Loewe

that he (Sharliss) was to meet with Larry Baione, the number two

man in the Boston La Cosa Nostra (LCN). Loewe believes Sharliss

mentioned the name of the other individual from Boston who was

with Baione. Loewe did not recall this individual’s name. Loewe believes Sharliss mentioned at this time or it may have been at a

later date that Baione and his associate had discussed the hit on

581

Baron with him. During late March or early April, 1976, Sharliss

told Loewe he met with the same two individuals at the SFIA Hilton Inn. Loewe, who was arriving from Las Vegas on April 2, 1976,

was met by Sharliss. On the drive home from the airport Sharliss

told Loewe that he had been to the airport at least once, possibly

twice that morning. After dropping Loewe off at his residence,

Sharliss returned to the airport to meet with the previously mentioned individuals from Boston. The purpose of the meeting was for

Sharliss to collect $5,000 for ‘lining up’ Baron. Hotel registration

records at the SFIA Hilton . . . and others . . . in the airport complex were checked for the time period in question with negative results. REDACTED SECTION.’’ (FBI Memorandum, Oct. 26, 1977; see

also FBI Memorandum, Dec. 16, 1976, for virtually the same synopsis of facts). [Note: According to the December 16, 1976, memorandum, Sharliss later told Loewe that he did not get the $5,000

and has never received any money.] 650

11–3–76: John Frederick Loewe takes a polygraph exam. The results provide that ‘‘no specific, consistent significant psychological

responses were detected which indicate[s] deception when Loewe

answered relevant questions.’’ (FBI Memorandum, Oct. 26,

1977).651

The San Francisco FBI Office writes a memorandum stating that

they administered a polygraph examination of an individual whose

name is redacted.652

11–15–76: Suffolk County District Attorney Garrett Byrne opposes a commutation of Joseph Salvati’s sentence.653

11–29–76: A memorandum from Joseph M. Williams, Jr., Supervisor of the Massachusetts Parole Board’s Investigation Unit, to the

Board of Pardons, Special Attention Board Member Wendy

Gershengorn indicates that [Joseph] Salvati associated with a number of Italians tied to organized crime. ‘‘The ‘word’ from reputable

law enforcement officers was that [Salvati] was just thrown in by

Barboza on the murder because he hated subject, that Joseph

Barboza was asked by people was this true and that Barboza denied this.’’ 654

12–17–76: John Loewe is unable to positively identify Larry

Baione from a spread of representative photographs. REDACTED

SECTION. (FBI Memorandum, Oct. 26, 1977).655

12–29–76: Richard Castucci, a nightclub owner and bookmaker

associated with the Winter Hill Gang, is murdered after Special

Agent John Connolly tells James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger that Castucci is

an FBI informant, according to John Connolly’s Indictment.656

1977

2–28–77: The Massachusetts Parole Board denies Joseph

Salvati’s second petition for a commutation hearing because Salvati

had served an insufficient amount of time to warrant a hearing.657

5–20–77: Special Agent Dennis Condon retires from the FBI.658

August 1977: Edward Harrington serves as the U.S. Attorney

for Massachusetts from August 1977 until October 1981.659

582

8–9–77: Phillip Sumner contacts the San Francisco FBI Office

and relays the following: ‘‘On the evening of August 5, 1977, Sumner viewed a television news special dealing with the February 11,

1976, murder of [Joseph Barboza] Baron. In brief, Sumner related

that he was incarcerated at Soledad Prison, California, during

1973–1974. Sumner had occasion to meet Red Hogan, a fellow inmate who told Sumner that he was originally from Boston, Massachusetts. Hogan related to Sumner that he served time at Walpole

State Prison, Boston, Massachusetts, with Joe Barboza. Hogan also

showed Sumner letters received by him from Barboza using the

name of Joe Bentley at a prison facility in Montana, believed to be

Deer Lodge. The letter writing continued between September 1973

to September 1974. Because of his close association with Hogan

and statements by Hogan that he was going to kill Barboza, Sumner feels convinced that Hogan is definitely involved in the Barboza

murder.’’ The memorandum states that Sumner’s information, in

part, has been verified and investigation continues to further identify and locate Hogan. (FBI Memorandum, Oct. 26, 1977).660

10–13–77: FBI Special Agents Thomas Daly and Peter Kennedy

interview Francis X. Green about his loan of $175,000 from James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s associates and Bulger’s threat on Green’s life if

he did not repay the loan. (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as

FBI Looks Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).661

10–26–77: An FBI memorandum states, ‘‘Investigation concerning the murder of Joseph Baron in San Francisco, California, on

February 11, 1976, continued and eventually focused on Baron’s

closest personal friend and associate in San Francisco, Theodore

James Sharliss.’’ 662

12–21–77: Florida Attorney Richard Barest states the following

in an affidavit: ‘‘I was contacted and retained by Mr. [Louis] Greco

to attempt to prove his innocence to a murder charge that he felt

he was being ‘set up’ on involving the alleged murder of one [Edward] Teddy Deegan, which was approximately two years old. He

advised me of things to check out because he felt he could prove

he was in Florida at the time the offense was committed, and that

he was ‘totally’ innocent of that offense, and that he would be willing to take a lie detector test on that specific crime. Pursuant to

his request, my investigator set up an examination with a respected polygraph operator who was then working as the official

police polygraph operator for the City of Miami Police Department.

I gave my approval of the test, with the only specific instructions

to the polygraph operator was that he confine his questions strictly

to the Teddy Deegan homicide, and that he could ask anything he

desired about that case with reference to Louie [sic] Greco’s alleged

participation therein. My recollection is that Mr. Greco’s responses

were truthful and that he did not participate in the Teddy Deegan

homicide.’’ (See 11–14–67 entry).663

1978

4–29–78: A report of Special Agent John Morris’ performance rating for the rating period of 1/15/78 to 4/15/78 states, ‘‘He is imaginative, innovative and extremely industrious and has no hesitation

583

in tackling major projects or complicated which place a heavy demand on his time, often to the detriment of his family. SA Morris

possesses all the necessary attributes to be an outstanding Bureau

executive.’’ 664

5–8–78: William Geraway writes to a Justice Department official:

‘‘I testified in a Florida murder trial that was contracted out of

Boston[.]’’ This trial was State v. John Sweet in 1967. The trial focused on the killing of Charles Von Maxcy which had ‘‘been arranged or procured through the Boston area.’’ 665

5–16–78: Handwritten notes from Butch Carlstadt indicate that

Tim Brown taped conversation between Barboza and Ted Sharliss.

The notes further indicate that there are twelve 7’’ reel-to-reel

tapes, which were in the possession of Rick Oliver at (707) 527–

2127. He appears to be a local homicide detective.666

10–11–78: Louis Greco takes two polygraph examinations. The

results of Louis Greco’s first polygraph examination are determined

to be inconclusive. In the second polygraph, the examiner finds

that Greco was truthful when he said he was not in Massachusetts

when Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan was killed; not present when

Deegan was killed; and was not in Massachusetts on March 12,

1965.667

10–16–78: According to an F. Lee Bailey affidavit, Bailey was

contacted in about July 1970 by a party whose name was Frank,

who had been in recent communication, through intermediaries,

with Joseph Barboza, and that Barboza wished to set the record

straight as to certain perjured testimony he had given in state and

federal courts. A meeting was set in New Bedford, Massachusetts.

Barboza told Bailey that Roy French and Ronnie Cassesso were in

fact involved, but Cassesso indirectly. Henry Tameleo and Peter

Limone were not involved, but Barboza implicated them because he

was led to understand by various authorities that in order to escape punishment on charges pending against him, he would have

to implicate someone of ‘‘importance.’’ Barboza told Bailey the story

he told at court was in very large measure a fabrication. He implicated Louis Greco because of a personal grudge. The authorities

generally assured him that a conviction was unlikely. He stated

that because he had become a government witness he would not expect to live more than a day if he were committed to the general

population in Walpole, as he feared. He authorized Bailey to advise

counsel for some of the defendants as to his intent, and as to what

he hoped to accomplish, and further authorized Bailey to publish

his revised version of the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder (in

which he had admitted personal involvement), so long as he would

not wind up in jail. Subsequently, Barboza was arrested in New

Bedford. After his arrest, he told Bailey that he had been informed

by persons in authority, whom he did not name, that federal agents

would arrange for his release provided he discharge Bailey and terminate his efforts to recant his trial testimony. Prior to this time,

Barboza had agreed to take a polygraph test. Subsequent to his incarceration he informed Bailey that he had been told that if he submitted to such a test he would spend the rest of his years behind

bars.668

584

10–19–78: Attorney Al Farese’s affidavit states that Farese reviewed John Fitzgerald’s testimony at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

trial where Fitzgerald said that Joseph Barboza had two pending

indictments against him, one involving the stabbing of Arthur

Pearson where Barboza is charged as a habitual criminal. Farese

said Fitzgerald told him ‘‘[t]hey are willing’’ to have Arthur Pearson say that Chico Amico stabbed him and that Nick Femia and

Joseph Barboza came over to help Pearson. Barboza would then not

be guilty of a habitual criminal charge. If that were not enough,

Fitzgerald said Greco would ‘‘whack out Pearson.’’ In addition, Fitzgerald said they would give Barboza $25,000 not to testify. Farese

stated that at no time was Fitzgerald present with Greco in his

house and this conversation he testified to had never taken place.

Farese said in April or May 1973, he received a telephone call from

Fitzgerald, who was in South Dakota. Fitzgerald told Farese that

he was going ‘‘to clear the guy with the gimpy leg,’’ meaning Greco,

because he was innocent.669

10–27–78: Theodore Sharliss is indicted for conspiring to violate

Joseph Barboza’s civil rights.670

10–28–78: The Press Democrat reports that a federal grand jury

indicted Theodore J. Sharliss in the murder of Joseph Barboza.

Sharliss allegedly set Barboza up to be murdered in San Francisco

in 1976. Sharliss is indicted on conspiracy to violate Barboza’s civil

rights. (Indictment Returned in Slaying, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Oct. 28, 1978).671

10–31–78: Edward F. Harrington files an affidavit to be used

against Louis Greco’s Motion for New Trial.672

11–3–78: In a Massachusetts Superior Court Order denying a

new trial for Louis Greco, the judge states the Commonwealth’s

submitted materials include an affidavit by U.S. Attorney Edward

Harrington. The judge chooses to rely on Joseph Barboza’s testimony in the Clay Wilson case and the Harrington affidavit to

evaluate Barboza’s testimony in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder case. (Commonwealth v. Grieco [sic], Case No. 31601 (Suffolk

Ct. Sup. Ct., Nov. 3, 1978)).673

11–6–78: The Massachusetts Parole Board unanimously denies

Peter Limone a commutation hearing.674

11–13–78: John E. Bates, the Superintendent of Framingham

Correctional Institute where Joseph Salvati has been imprisoned

for over five years, recommends to the Massachusetts Parole Board

that Salvati’s sentence be commuted.675

1979

1979: The FBI assigns Special Agent in Charge Lawrence

Sarhatt to the Boston office. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141,

203 (D. Mass. 1999)).676

An FBI report reflects what was said at a dinner between James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, and FBI agents.

(The Court found that the dinners were held to celebrate milestones. Although FBI procedures require that all contacts with informants be documented, there was only one, a 1979 report reflectVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00594 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
585

ing matters discussed at these dinners. There was no record of the

gifts exchanged.) (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 149, 150 (D.

Mass. 1999)).

January 1979: Special Agents John Connolly and John Morris

tell U.S. Attorney Jeremiah O’Sullivan that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi are informants. (DICK LEHR

& GERARD O’NEIL, BLACK MASS 65 (2000).677

1–24–79: Theodore Sharliss enters a guilty plea to the charge of

violating Title 18 U.S.C. § 241, Civil Rights—Murder and Conspiracy, for setting up Joseph Barboza’s murder. (This information is

contained in an FBI Memorandum from San Francisco to Director

dated June 6, 1979.) Sharliss agrees to testify against the killers.

(Man Gets 5 Years for ‘Mafia Killing, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa

Rosa, CA), Mar. 1, 1979).678

1–29–79: A prosecution memorandum from Gerald E. McDowell,

Attorney in Charge of the Boston Strike Force, and Jeremiah T.

O’Sullivan, to Gerald T. McGuire, Deputy Chief of the Organized

Crime and Racketeering Section, recommends the indictment of

twenty-one individuals for their involvement with Anthony Ciulla

in a five-state pari-mutuel thoroughbred horse race fixing scheme.

The following are important points made in this memorandum.

Numbers in parentheses coincide with page numbers in the memorandum. [Note: The original memorandum is not appended to the

Committee’s chronology and is retained in Justice Department

files.] ‘‘The Boston Strike Force recommends the indictment of the

twenty-one individuals listed below, including the principals of the

Winter gang, for their involvement with Anthony Ciulla in a multistate pari-mutuel thoroughbred horse race fixing scheme involving

race tracks in five states.’’ The net profits were almost two million

dollars. (1) Ciulla and Barnoski met with Howard Winter ‘‘and six

of his associates’’ in late 1973 to discuss a race fixing scheme.

‘‘Winter and his partners would provide the money necessary to

carry out the scheme.’’ (4) The six associates included Bulger and

Flemmi. The memo states that after the initial meeting with Winter, Ciulla and Barnoski met with Winter’s other partners in the

scheme—John Martorano, Joseph McDonald, James Sims, John

Martorano, James Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. Bulger and

Flemmi ‘‘would help find outside bookmakers to accept the bets of

the group.’’ (4) ‘‘Ciulla and the Winter group then began to fix races

at tracks around the country.’’ The scheme lasted for 2 years and

more than 200 races were fixed. (5) ‘‘James L. Sims—The case

against Sims rests solely on Ciulla’s testimony.’’ (55) Suggests that

Bulger and Flemmi be further investigated. Indicates that they not

be indicted because ‘‘the cases against them rest, in most instances,

solely on the testimony of Anthony Ciulla.’’ Suggests that the cases

against Bulger and Flemmi (and others) might become stronger if

indictees cooperated. (62) There are redacted sections with no indication of the reason for the redaction.

2–1–79: Joseph Salvati files his third petition for a commutation

hearing with the Massachusetts Parole Board.679

2–2–79: Indictments are handed down in the Anthony Ciulla

racehorse-fixing case. James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The RiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00595 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
586

fleman’’ Flemmi warn John Martorano and Joe McDonald, and

Martorano flees. (DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEIL, BLACK MASS 67–

68 (2000)).680

2–16–79: The Massachusetts Parole Board denies Joseph

Salvati’s petition for a commutation because ‘‘this petition has been

presented too soon following conviction of Murder-First Degree.’’ 681

2–27–79: Theodore Sharliss is sentenced to five years in prison

for setting up Joseph Barboza’s murder. (See Man Gets 5 Years for

‘Mafia Killing, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Mar. 1,

1979).682

3–12–79: Jack Zalkind, the Assistant District Attorney in charge

of prosecuting Joseph Salvati for the Edward Deegan murder, recommends that Salvati’s sentence be commuted for a second time.683

3–15–79: Frank Walsh, the Boston Police Sergeant responsible

for investigating Joseph Salvati’s involvement in the Edward

Deegan murder, recommends that Salvati’s sentence be commuted

for a second time. Walsh says he had ‘‘never become aware that

Mr. Salvati has been even remotely connected with firearms or

physical violence.’’ 684

3–28–79: A memorandum from the Boston SAC to the FBI Director states, ‘‘Caption matter [Joseph Baron] contains information

that has enduring investigative value beyond the established destruction period and is essential to our investigative needs. In view

of the foregoing, this file will be retained until such a time as these

criteria no longer apply. An annual review will be conducted by the

Boston Division and when this file is no longer essential for investigative reference it will be destroyed and FBIHQ properly notified.’’ 685

3–31–79: A memorandum from the Boston SAC to the FBI Director states that under John Morris’ direction, ‘‘Operation Lobster

has been broadly acclaimed as one of the most successful law enforcement endeavors in the history of the Boston area. Also during

this rating period [4/16/78 through 3/31/79], Supervisor Morris directed and provided leadership to several Agents on his squad in

bringing to a successful conclusion a ‘bust out’ case, an east coast

horse race fixing scheme and the indictment of several subjects

under the RICO Statute for local burglaries and drug dealing. All

of these cases received considerable notoriety in the Boston area

and were of significant impact against Organized Crime in the Boston area.’’ 686

4–16–79: The FBI Director informs the San Francisco Office by

teletype of the following: ‘‘The Bureau is aware of the sensitivity

of the informant issue in this matter and the FBI’s obligations.

However, the informant and the contacting agent should be aware

that REDACTED SECTION unless the informant’s complete knowledge

REDACTED in this case is known. Unless the informant chooses to

provide all relevant information to the FBI regarding his knowledge REDACTED in this investigation, it will be very difficult REDACTED SECTION as it appears he has chosen not to recall vital information. San Francisco attempt to resolve this matter with the

informant prior to his scheduled appearance before the federal

587

grand jury in order that such appearance can be avoided if possible.’’ 687

5–15–79: An airtel from the San Francisco SAC to the FBI Director regarding a San Francisco telephone call to Special Agent John

Connolly on May 14, 1979, states: ‘‘San Francisco continuing efforts

to obtain a prosecutable case against Joseph Anthony Russo and

any Boston LCN [La Cosa Nostra] associates for the murder of

Barboza.’’ 688

7–6–79: Defendant Luigi Manocchio appears on a warrant for the

murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei and is arraigned.

Manocchio pleads not guilty.689

Vincent James ‘‘Jimmy the Bear’’ Flemmi dies in prison.690

12–7–79: San Francisco Strike Force Attorney Michael Kramer

requests that Special Agent John Connolly of the Boston FBI Office

testify on January 10, 1979, in San Francisco regarding Connolly’s

interview of Ted Sharliss.691

12–20–79: An FBI airtel from the San Francisco SAC to the FBI

Director indicates that Joseph Russo’s FBI Number is 677 979

A.692

1980

1980: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’

Flemmi start giving the FBI evidence against Jerry Angiulo, Boston mafia boss for the Raymond Patriarca family. (U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass. 1999)).693

Kenneth ‘‘Bobby’’ Conrad, a prime witness in a Boston murder,

disappears. James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’

Flemmi associates tell authorities that Conrad is buried in Nova

Scotia. (Jonathan Wells, Jack Meyers and Maggie Mulvihill, Whitey

Gang Victims May be Buried in Canada, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 11,

2000).694

Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi provides Special Agent John

Connolly with information regarding the murder of Federal Judge

James Wood by major drug dealers. Connolly later tells superiors

that the contacts Flemmi made in the investigation, at Connolly’s

direction, may have created the false impression that Flemmi was

involved in drugs. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 205 (D.

Mass. 1999)).695

3–28–80: The Press Democrat reports that Federal authorities

have reopened the Joseph Barboza murder case because of new information. The article says that the Department of Justice wants

to find Barboza’s killer because his murder threatened the success

of the Witness Protection Program. Jerry Angiulo, Ilario Zannino,

J.R. Russo and others were reportedly subpoenaed to appear before

a grand jury. (Jury May Probe Hit Man’s Death, PRESS DEMOCRAT

(Santa Rosa, CA), Mar. 28, 1980).696

4–12–80: According to Brian Halloran’s statements to the FBI, on

this date he drove Louis Litif to Triple O’s in South Boston for a

meeting with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger. Halloran later witnesses

Bulger and an associate bring Litif’s body out of the back door of

588

the South Boston bar and put it in the trunk of Litif’s new Lincoln.

(Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away, BOSTON

GLOBE, July 22, 1998).697

July–August 1980: Agent John Morris tells Special Agent John

Connolly that the Lancaster Garage was bugged; Connolly, in turn,

tells James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi,

two targets of the investigation. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.2d

141, 151 (D. Mass. 1999)).698

7–2–80: Joseph Salvati submits his fourth petition for a commutation hearing with the Massachusetts Parole Board.699

September 1980: Special Agent John Connolly reopens Stephen

‘‘The Rifleman]] Flemmi as an FBI informant. U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 151 (D. Mass. 1983).700

11–18–80: Special Agents John J. Cloherty, Jr., and Robert R.

Turgiss meet with Massachusetts Department of Corrections officials to discuss allegations that Joseph Salvati was using Framingham Correctional Institute’s canteen as a conduit for drugs

into the institution. At this meeting, the FBI also alleges that

Salvati was operating a gambling ring using the prison’s telephones and computer equipment. (But see 12–30–82 entry stating

that Salvati was found not guilty of these charges).701 On this

same day, the Massachusetts Parole Board votes to deny Salvati a

commutation hearing.702

11–28–80: An FBI airtel from the San Francisco SAC to the FBI

Director informs, ‘‘On 11/25/80, the enclosed REDACTED was located,

which places Russo in San Francisco prior to the murder and corroborates the Sharliss testimony. The whereabouts of Russo, at this

time, is unknown. As a result of this finding, San Francisco will

now seek an indictment against Russo. San Francisco Strike Force

Chief requests that an expedite latent fingerprint and handwriting

analysis be conducted by the Bureau Laboratory.’’ 703

December 1980: SAC Lawrence Sarhatt decides to continue

using James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi

as informants. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 205 (D. Mass.

1999)).704

12–2–80: In an FBI Memorandum justifying the use of James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger as an informant, Special Agent John Connolly

falsely credits Bulger with breaking open the Joseph Barboza murder case. Connolly claims that the FBI had ‘‘no positive leads’’ in

the Barboza slaying until Bulger offered a helping hand. Dick Lehr,

The Official Bulger FBI Files: Some Tall Tales, BOSTON GLOBE,

July 21, 1998.705

1981

1981: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris tells superiors that

Stephen Flemmi’s information has been used in six successful applications for electronic surveillance, including the two highest priority organized crime investigations in Boston, one being 98 Prince

Street. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass.

1999)).706

589

Early 1981: Assistant Special Agent in Charge Robert

Fitzpatrick meets with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger. Fitzpatrick later

testifies that he had misgivings about continuing to use Bulger and

Stephen Flemmi as informants because they were not sufficiently

productive, and they engaged in serious criminal activity. U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 207 (D. Mass. 1983).707

January 1981: According to Brian Halloran, he is summoned to

a meeting with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’

Flemmi, and John B. Callahan, former head of World Jai Alai and

Winter Hill Gang associate and financial adviser. (DICK LEHR &

GERARD O’NEIL, BLACK MASS 146 (2000)).708

Assistant Special Agent in Charge Robert Fitzpatrick is assigned

to the Boston FBI Office. (DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEIL, BLACK

MASS 53 (2000).709

1–6–81: The San Francisco SAC sends an airtel to the FBI Director regarding a telephone call to Special Agent John Connolly on

January 5, 1981. [This document is heavily redacted, apparently

including all parts relating to Connolly.] 710

1–9–81: With the help of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen

‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, the FBI wiretaps Jerry Angiulo’s headquarters at 98 Prince Street in Boston. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 206 (D. Mass. 1999)).711

1–26–81: An FBI Memorandum from J.M. Jones to Mr. Stames

states, ‘‘Subject [Ted] Sharliss has stated that he met with Joseph

A. Russo in 1975 and Russo offered a murder contract on [Joseph

Barboza] Baron to him for $25,000.00.’’ 712

February 1981: The FBI is told that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi were involved in cocaine distribution with Brian Halloran. The FBI is also told that bookmakers are required to pay Bulger and Flemmi to operate in South

Boston. U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208 (D. Mass.

1983).713

2–6–81: An FBI memorandum from the San Francisco Office to

the Director and the Boston, Los Angeles, and Las Vegas’ Offices

states, ‘‘[Ted] Sharliss received a five year sentence to the custody

of the Attorney General under the plea agreement which required

that he cooperate and testify against others who are responsible for

the murder of [Joseph Barboza] Baron.’’ Sharliss was interviewed

several times by the FBI and stated that he met with Joseph Russo

in San Francisco in the latter part of 1975, where Russo offered

Sharliss a murder contract on Barboza for $25,000. The memorandum continues, ‘‘During this period of time when Sharliss was

being interviewed and providing information about Russo, the investigators felt that there was insufficient evidence at that time to

possibly indict Russo for conspiracy in the murder of Baron.’’

Sharliss was interviewed by a case agent and two Strike Force attorneys on January 19, 20, 21 and 22. Based on the evidence, interviews, and reexamination of the case, on January 22, Strike Force

Chief Michael Sterrett declined to prosecute the case against

Russo. This determination was made in part for the following reasons: Sharliss was the only main witness and was considered

590

‘‘weak’; Sharliss had questionable credibility since had he lied to

the FBI and the Strike Force in the past; Sharliss had a severe

drinking and drug problem during the time of the conspiracy and

murder that worsened after the murder and existed while he gave

information to the government; and, finally, there were no additional witnesses and no physical evidence left to be uncovered. On

this date, ‘‘Michael Sterrett receive[s] official word of concurrence

in his decision not to prosecute this matter’’ from the Deputy Chief

of the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section.714

March 1981: Roger Wheeler, Sr., decides to sell the Hartford

fronton of World Jai Alai to break its ties with the New England

mafia. Edmund H. Mahony, Former FBI Agent Arrested, HARTFORD

COURANT, Oct. 10, 2003.715

3–9–81: A memorandum from Supervisory Special Agent John M.

Morris to the Boston SAC regarding Henry Tameleo, Benjamin

DeChristoforo and Joseph Salvati states, ‘‘Since 1/9/81, all personnel of the C–3 Squad, augmented by agents from other squads and

resident agencies, have been fully assigned to assist in various aspects of Title III coverage in two (2) cases code named REDACTED

and Mandarin, 00: BS.’’ 716

3–17–81: A memorandum from Special Agent John J. Cloherty,

Jr., to the Boston SAC regarding Henry Tameleo and others states,

‘‘It has been determined through Boston investigation entitled REDACTED that Joe ‘the Horse’ Salvati is aware that REDACTED were

subpoenaed for above.’’ 717

4–15–81: A memorandum from the Boston SAC to the FBI Director recommends awards and commendations for Special Agent John

J. Cloherty, Jr., Special Agent John Connolly, Jr., and Supervisory

Special Agent John Morris for their work in the Myles J. Connor,

Jr., 1st degree murder prosecution.718

5–11–81: A World Jai Alai expense report indicates that Paul

Rico and World Jai Alai entertained FBI Special Agents Tom Dowd

and Jerry Forrester in the Bahamas. [Note: Rico testified at the

Alcee Hasting Impeachment trial before the Senate that Tom

Dowd’s wife was an employee of Miami Jai Alai.] 719

5–15–81: According to a memorandum from Special Agent Shaun

T. Rafferty to the Boston SAC: ‘‘On 5/15/81, Joseph Williams advised that on 5/9/81, Henry Tameleo was visited in prison by the

following individuals: Donald Fraser and Ronald Shurtleff. Both

have robbery arrests and Fraser is on parole.’’ 720

5–26–81: The Massachusetts Parole Board unanimously denies

Peter Limone a commutation hearing.721

5–27–81: Roger Wheeler, Sr., owner of World Jai Alai, is shot

dead at Southern Hills Country Club in Tulsa, Oklahoma. John

Martorano shoots Wheeler, and Joe MacDonald is the getaway

driver. Others implicated are James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen

‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi and H. Paul Rico. Edmund H. Mahony,

Former FBI Agent Arrested, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 10, 2003; see

also U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208–9 (D. Mass. 1999).722

591

July 1981: Tulsa and Connecticut investigators get a tip from

Boston that the Winter Hill Gang is involved in the Wheeler murder.723

7–7–81: A memorandum from Special Agent John J. Cloherty,

Jr., to the Boston SAC regarding Henry Tameleo and others states,

‘‘As Boston investigation entitled (REDACTED) has determined

Salvati aware (REDACTED) subpoenaed and there is no indication at

this time that Con-Puter, Inc. in violation of any statute within Bureau jurisdiction, it is recommended that captioned matter be

placed in a closed status.’’ 724

Late July 1981: H. Paul Rico is brought out of retirement to investigate allegations of corruption by then-U.S. District Judge

Alcee Hastings of Florida. He poses as a Mafioso in an FBI ‘‘sting’’

of Hastings. (See Marjorie Williams, The Perplexing Case of Judge

Alcee Hastings; Is He a Victim of His Own Greed? A House Panel

Must Decide, WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 1988; Ralph Ranalli, ExFBI Man to Testify at Mob Trial, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 4,

1997).725

7–29–81: Kenneth Conrad’s daughter, Elizabeth Conrad Parent,

learns from Special Agent John Connolly about her father’s death.

‘‘When [Parent] expressed her desire to retrieve her father’s body,

she said Connolly told her not to pursue it and to keep quiet about

the murder. ‘This is an ongoing investigation and I’d appreciate it

if you didn’t do anything about it for a while,’ Parent recalled

Connolly saying. ‘We’ve got informants. You could jeopardize them.’

Connolly did not identify the informants, Parent said. In a telephone conversation two years later, Parent said she thanked

Connolly for helping her collect on her father’s life insurance

policy[.]’’ (Jonathan Wells, Jack Meyers, & Maggie Mulvihill,

Whitey Gang Victims May Be Buried in Canada, Woman Says

Agent Knew About Dad’s Murder, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 11,

2000).726

October 1981: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington leaves his position as

U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, according to an affidavit he executed on December 31, 1981.727

9–11–81: H. Paul Rico signs an indemnification agreement with

the FBI to assist the FBI in furtherance of its investigation of alleged misconduct by then-U.S. District Court Judge Alcee

Hastings.728

12–31–81: Edward ‘‘Ted’’ Harrington executes an affidavit that

states: ‘‘At some time in 1975 or 1976, I recall running into Francis

X. Green in a restaurant in downtown Boston. Mr. Green accosted

me in a jovial fashion with words to the effect of ‘Hey, don’t you

say hello to your old campaign supporters?’ after which we exchanged brief social pleasantries. At that time, I did not recognize

Mr. Green, and that is the first occasion upon which I recall having

met him. Thereafter, I may have run into him in a similar situation on one other occasion before becoming U.S. Attorney.’’ 730

Late 1981/Early 1982: Special Supervisory Agent John Morris

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592

phen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, with Special Agent John Connolly’s

involvement, according to Connolly’s indictment.730

1982

1–6–82: Brian Halloran contacts the Boston FBI and says he

wants to cooperate. He tells the Boston FBI that James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi were involved in the

murder of Roger Wheeler, Sr., owner of World Jai Alai. The FBI

dismisses Halloran’s story. Within weeks, Halloran is gunned

down. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208–09 (D. Mass.

1999)).731 Halloran apparently tells the FBI that Bulger and

Flemmi offered him the Wheeler contract and that they told him

that Special Agent Rico would set up the murder. (See Edmund

Mahony, Did the FBI Hinder the Investigation into the 1980’s Jai

Alai Killings?; A Tale of Murder and Frustration, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 9, 1997, at A1).732

1–7–82: The Herald American reports that police are saying the

heroin distribution ring involving Framingham inmates and outsiders originated with an organized crime family in New York and

allegedly involved organized crime figures and convicted murderers

Henry Tameleo and Joseph Salvati. (Paul Corsetti and James O.

Welch, Prison Drug and Gaming Ring Busted, HERALD AMERICAN

(Boston), Jan. 7, 1982).733

3–28–82: The Boston Globe reports that Joseph Salvati, along

with Henry Tameleo, Benjamin DeChristoforo, and Francis

Imbruglia, were indicted in a drug dealing, gaming, and institutional corruption scandal being conducted at Framingham. (New

England News Briefs, Prison Probe Indictments, BOSTON GLOBE,

Mar. 28, 1982).734

3–29–82: The Massachusetts Parole Board unanimously denies

Peter Limone a commutation hearing.735

April 1982: Supervisory Special Agent Morris informs Special

Agent John Connolly, who in turn informs James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, that Brian Halloran is giving

the FBI information about Bulger and Flemmi’s participation in

the Roger Wheeler murder. (See Connolly Indictment at 11).736

Early May 1982: The FBI denies Brian Halloran’s request to be

placed in the Witness Protection Program and tells him his relationship with the FBI is terminated. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.

2d 141, 209 (D. Mass. 1999)).737

5–11–82: Brian Halloran and Michael Donahue are murdered.

Jimmy Flynn is arrested for the murder and acquitted. The FBI is

involved in the investigation and arrest of Flynn. (U.S. v. Salemme,

91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 210 (D. Mass. 1999)). [Jimmy Flynn later appeared as a judge in the movie Good Will Hunting.] 738

According to Special Agent John Connolly, he filed reports prior

to Brian Halloran’s death noting that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger

claimed the Mafia was going to kill Halloran. (Shelley Murphy,

Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22,

1998).739

593

May–June 1982: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris is sent

to Georgia for a training program. He asks Special Agent John

Connolly for money to bring his secretary-girlfriend along. Connolly

gets $1000 in cash from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The

Rifleman’’ Flemmi and gives it to Morris. Morris knows that the

money came from Bulger and Flemmi. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 154 n.4, 210 (D. Mass. 1999)).740

Special Agent John Connolly informs James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and

Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi that John Callahan is being

sought as a witness in the Wheeler investigation. (Connolly Indictment at 12).741

6–30–82: A performance appraisal report of Supervisory Special

Agent John Morris for the rating period of July 7, 1981, to June

30, 1982, states, ‘‘In the area of informant development and direction, he was directly involved in the development of one of the most

valuable and highly placed Top Echelon Organized Crime informants. . . . As a direct result of Supv. Morris’ managerial skills, he

has developed and sustained, a program, the results of which are

potentially the most significant fight against the LCN [La Cosa

Nostra] in the New England area, even in the United States in recent history.’’ 742

7–16–82: In a letter from FBI Director William Webster to Paul

Rico, Webster thanks Rico for his role in the Alcee Hastings investigation.743

8–4–82: John Callahan is found dead in his trunk in Miami. Callahan had apparently been dead for weeks. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 211 (D. Mass. 1999)).744

9–23–82: Administratively, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ is closed as

an informant, but Flemmi is not told. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.

2d 141, 211 (D. Mass. 1999)).745 [Note: He is reopened on July 10,

1986.]

11–3–82: The Hartford Courant reports that the Justice Department organized a meeting of all involved federal and state agencies

in Tulsa to trade information. Participants say nothing happened

and it seemed as if federal officials were trying to learn what evidence the state and local agencies possessed. The Justice Department then asked for any information on Paul Rico because he was

being called out of retirement to help in an undercover investigation of a federal judge in South Florida (Alcee Hastings). Everyone

balked at the request for information on Rico. (HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 3, 1982).746

11–12–82: A performance appraisal for Special Agent John

Connolly for the rating period of November 15, 1981, to November

12, 1982, states, ‘‘SA Connolly’s performance in this area . . . is

truly exceptional. He independently has developed, maintained,

and operated a corps of extremely high level and productive informants. His direction and their resultant information has [sic]

brought about results exceeded by none in the Boston Division’s

Organized Crime Program. Most significantly, he skillfully developed a high ranking LCN [La Cosa Nostra] figure who is presently

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oped since enactment of legislation dealing with organized crime

nearly two decades ago. His performance has been at the level to

which all should aspire to attain but few will realistically

reach.’’ 747

12–16–82: In a letter from Supervisory Special Agent John Morris to Brian Callery, Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board,

Morris says he forwarded copies of Callery’s letter to the Suffolk

County District Attorney and the Organized Crime Strike Force.748

12–30–82: In a memorandum from Tammy E. Perry, Assistant to

the Director, to the Massachusetts Advisory Board of Pardons,

Perry reports that Joseph Salvati was found not guilty of charges

that he was operating an illegal gambling ring inside Framingham

Correctional Institute.749

1983

1–3–83: The Massachusetts Parole Board grants Peter Limone a

commutation hearing.750

1–27–83: Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) John Morris’ letter,

written by SSA James Ring, to Massachusetts Parole Board Chairman Brian Callery states the following about Peter Limone: ‘‘Current law enforcement intelligence reflects that Peter Limone continues to be considered an important cog in the Boston Organized

Criminal element. Should Mr. Limone be released, he would enjoy

a position of elevated status within the Boston Organized Crime

Structure.’’ Morris’ letter is a response to Callery’s December 7,

1982, letter regarding Limone.751

Feb. 1983–May 1986: In this time period, records show 46 contacts between Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi and the FBI, even

though Flemmi was administratively closed as a source in September 1982. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 211 (D. Mass.

1999)).752

February 1983: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger is elevated to Top Echelon informant status. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 211 (D.

Mass. 1999)).753

3–31–83: Acting Supervisory Special Agent James Ring writes a

memorandum to the Boston SAC stating, ‘‘On 3/30/83, SA John

Connolly, Jr. set up a meeting between [James] Ring, and SA

Connolly with Secretary of Public Safety Charles Barry and Deputy

Secretary of Public Safety Dennis M. Condon. Secretary Barry was

advised that the FBI had received a letter from the Massachusetts

Parole Commission concerning one Peter Limone[.] [T]he FBI responded . . . stating that current FBI intelligence indicated that

Limone was an important member of organized crime[.] Barry stated that he would immediately look into the matter to insure that

the Governor would be operating with a full set of facts and would

be aware of the FBI’s response to the Parole Board. Secretary

Barry will also advise if there is any indication of any illegal activities or corruption connected with the attempted release of

Limone.’’ 754

April 1983: Oklahoma City authorities seek permission from the

FBI Director to interview James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen

595

‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi about the Roger Wheeler murder. Assistant Special Agent in Charge Robert Fitzpatrick denies the request

by saying he already interviewed Bulger concerning the Wheeler

and John Callahan murders. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141,

211 (D. Mass. 1983)).755

4–22–83: Massachusetts Parole Board Investigator Joseph Williams submits a report regarding Peter Limone to the Parole

Board. The report states that Williams ‘‘would clearly call him

[Limone] a member of the ‘Family’ of organized crime here in Boston.’’ 756

4–25–83: Suffolk County District Attorney Newman Flanagan

writes to Brian Callery, Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole

Board, to urge against clemency for Peter Limone. Flanagan says

he is informed that Limone was, is, and will continue to be a close

associate of organized crime figures.757

4–27–83: Roy French executes an affidavit that states, ‘‘I am

stating for the record that Louis Greco and Henry Tameleo, Peter

Limone were not in fact involved with me directly or indirectly in

the shooting death of ‘Teddy Deegan,’ on March 12, 1965.’’ 758

May 1983: Special Agent John Connolly urges the Boston SAC

to reopen Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi as an informant because

he voluntarily continues to provide high quality information. (U.S.

v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 211 (D. Mass. 1983)).759

5–9–83: Jury selection begins in defendant Luigi Manocchio’s

trial for the murders of Rudolph Marfeo and Anthony Melei.760

5–24–83: Assistant Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island David Leach signs an affidavit stating that he met with John

J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley on May 21, 1983, and that Kelley told him that certain portions of Kelley’s prior testimony regarding the Marfeo/Melei

murders were false. Such false portions include: (1) his prior testimony regarding promises, rewards, or inducements; (2) his prior

testimony regarding the cutting down of the murder weapon; and

(3) his prior testimony regarding the meeting outside the Gaslight

Restaurant. (Leach Affidavit, May 24, 1983).761 According to a

newspaper article, ‘‘Leach says in his affidavit that Kelley has said

several times before that the only thing he was promised in exchange for his testimony ‘was that his cooperation would be

brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities.’ But Kelley

said last Saturday, according to Leach’s affidavit, that the FBI ‘told

him that he would be taken care of for life, and that he was bitter

that that in fact was not done.’ ’’ Karen Ellsworth, Witness Against

Patriarca Says He Lied at Trial in ’70, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 28, 1983.762

Detective Urbana Prignano signs an affidavit stating that he met

with John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley on two occasions. He first met with

Kelley in the presence of Leach. At that time, the three discussed

certain discrepancies briefly, such as the Gaslight issue, Mr.

Vendituoli’s automobile, etc. Prignano also met with Kelley on May

23, 1983, at an undisclosed location. The following are relevant portions from the affidavit of that meeting: ‘‘[I] said to Mr. Kelley,

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tivities. I cannot believe that you would make such an error in saying that you met with people when you knew this building burned.’

He then stated to me emphatically that he never knew that the

Gaslight had burned. . . . He [Kelley] then rose from his seat and

said to me, ‘I’m going to tell you something, but I’m going to deny

I ever said it to you. I’ll call you a liar.’ He said, ‘The FBI suggested that I put Raymond [Patriarca] in front of the Gaslight the

evening that I met with him.’ I said, ‘I don’t believe it.’ He said,

‘I’m telling you the truth. Mr. [Paul] Rico, the FBI agent, suggested

this to me.’ I said, ‘Well, why did you go along with it?’ He said,

‘Well, my life was in their hands’, and he said, ‘What would you

do?’ And I did not answer that question. I then asked him, ‘Did the

meeting ever take place?’ He said, ‘Yes, it did take place.’ I said,

‘Where?’ He said, ‘It took place near a Brink’s building.’ I said, ‘I

know of a Brink’s counting place which is on Carpenter Street.’ He

also stated there was a large parking lot in that vicinity where he

said, ‘I’ll even tell you the car that Raymond pulled up in.’ He said

he came in a Lincoln Continental with a driver. I said, ‘Did you see

the driver?’ He said no. He said, ‘What happened down at the Gaslight actually happened in the vicinity of this Brink’s building in

a large parking lot.’ We then went to other subject matters that

were pertaining to this trial. I said, ‘John, what about the controversy over the weapons?’ He said to me, ‘I have an armorer, Appleton. Does that answer your question?’ I said, ‘Yes. I understand

what you’re telling me.’ We left that subject matter, and I went

back again to the Gaslight. I said, ‘I can’t understand why the FBI

agent would tell you that you met Raymond at the Gaslight.’ He

said, ‘I’ll, give you my opinion why. I believe Rico wanted to show

an affiliation between Raymond and the Gaslight.’ ’’ He also stated

that Rico’s boss stated that the Government had spent 14 to 15

million dollars up to this period of time and came up with a big

zero, and he indicated with his finger. He also said that Rico told

him to say that he and Raymond went into the Gaslight for a

drink; but he stated to me, ‘I do not remember if I stated that in

the Grand Jury or not.’ ’’ 763

5–25–83: David Leach files an amended response to Luigi

Manocchio’s previously granted motion for promises, rewards and

inducements. The State formally takes the position that notwithstanding prior representations of law enforcement personnel and

John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley himself, ‘‘At some point he [Kelley] was promised or led to believe by a federal agent that ‘I would be taken care

of for the rest of my life.’’ (Amended Answer to Promises, Rewards

and Inducements. (May 25, 1983)). In addition, the State gives the

defense a Financial Disbursement Report from the U.S. Marshal’s

Service. The report was generated on May 6, 1983, and signed by

the Chief of the Witness Security Division of the U.S. Marshal’s

Service on May 10, 1983. The report indicates that Kelley was a

member of the Witness Protection Program since May 1970 and

that he was receiving alimentation payments in the form of subsistence, housing, medical, travel, documents, relocation, trial, and

moving expenses from 1971 to 1982. He receives no less than

$114,848.06 for his testimony.764

597

6–1–83: In the trial of State v. Manocchio, under direct examination by Rhode Island Assistant Attorney General David Leach,

John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley testifies that in exchange for his testimony at

the Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner trial, he was to receive and did in fact

receive a new identity, relocation to another part of the country,

and subsistence allowance. Kelley admits to lying at the Lerner

trial in 1970 and again at the [Raymond] Patriarca trial in 1972

about being promised a new identity, relocation and subsistence allowance. Kelley states that the reason he lied was because ‘‘Agent

[Paul] Rico told me I shouldn’t tell all of these things because it

looked like I was being paid; that I should just do as he said, and

everything would come out all right.’’ Kelley also testified at the

Lerner trial that he cut down a shotgun for use in the murders.

However, at the Manocchio trial, Kelley admitted that his armorer

actually ‘‘cut down’’ the weapon. Kelley said Rico told him not to

mention the armorer’s role in the murders because the armorer

was an important FBI informant that Rico wanted to keep on the

streets in an effort to dismantle the Boston group of the Patriarca

crime family. In addition, Kelley testified at the Lerner trial that

the gang had a key meeting with Patriarca prior to the murders

at a particular restaurant. However, at the Manocchio trial, Kelley

admitted that the meeting did not take place at the restaurant he

previously named. Kelley stated that Rico wanted him to put the

meeting at that particular restaurant to establish a phony connection between Patriarca and the owner of the restaurant, effectively

assisting Rico in his investigation against the restaurant owner.

According to Kelley, the FBI had invested millions of dollars in trying to tie the owner of the restaurant to Patriarca, but up to that

point, their investigation had not been successful. Rico apparently

believed that Kelley’s testimony about that particular restaurant

would produce valuable circumstantial evidence against the restaurant owner. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island later grants a

new trial to Lerner because of perjury. (Manocchio Trial Transcript

(portions); Karen Ellsworth, Sciarra Given Term For Contempt,

PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June 3, 1983; Lerner v. Moran,

542 A.2d 1089 (R.I. 1988).765

6–2–83: Under cross-examination at the Luigi Manocchio trial by

Manocchio’s attorney Martin K. Leppo, John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley testifies that Paul Rico promised Kelley a new identity, that Kelley

would be relocated to another part of the country, and that Kelley

would be given a subsistence allowance from 1970 to 1981. He also

testifies that Rico kept all of these promises. However, Kelley did

testify that Rico did not follow through with his promise that he

would continue to give Kelley a place to live. Kelley also testified

that Rico promised him that he would be taken care of for the rest

of Kelley’s life and Rico did not follow through on that. Kelley admitted to lying before the Grand Jury on more than one occasion

and to other tribunals in the State of Rhode Island at the insistence of Rico. U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 183 (D. Mass.

1999).766

The Boston FBI Office sends a teletype to the FBI Director,

marked to the attention of the Public Affairs Office of the Office of

the Public Responsibility, Organized Crime Section. The message

598

states that FBI cooperating witness John J. ‘‘Red’’ Kelley testified

at the trial of Luigi Manocchio, who is allegedly involved in the Rudolph Marfeo/Anthony Melei murders, that he lied at the behest of

Special Agent Paul Rico at the prior trials of the other defendants

involved in the Marfeo/Melei murders regarding promises made to

Kelley in exchange for his testimony. Kelley also lied about the location of where an alleged meeting took place. The message further

states that substantial news media attention is being given to the

fact that Kelley lied in court at the behest of Rico. Handwritten

notes on the message state: ‘‘No action for OPR at present—former

employee allegedly involved. J. CID should handle.’’ [Note: The

Committee is notified on March 13, 2002, that the Office of Professional Responsibility ‘‘found no record of an investigation of Mr.

Rico in connection with these allegations.’’ Further, a search of FBI

indices uncovered no criminal investigative files suggesting that an

investigation was undertaken by the FBI’s Criminal Investigative

Division, which includes the Organized Crime Section.] 767

6–13–83: A Superior Court finds Luigi Manocchio guilty on two

charges of accessory before the fact and one charge of conspiracy

to commit murder. (See Karen Ellsworth, Manocchio Guilty On All

Charges in Mob Murders, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, June

14, 1983); State v. Manocchio, 496 A.2d 931 (R.I. 1985)).768

6–15–83: In a memorandum from the Boston SAC to the FBI Director, the SAC recommends that Supervisory Special Agent John

Morris be censured for losing four FBI serials. The communications

were teletypes entitled ‘‘Narcotics Policy Matters; Implementation

of Federal Task Force.’’ 769

7–1–83: In a letter from U.S. Attorney William Weld to Brian

Callery, Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board, Weld urges

the rejection of Peter Limone’s commutation petition. Weld refers

to communications from the FBI and Suffolk County District Attorney’s office ‘‘which you have already received.’’ Weld cites the fact

that the ‘‘best information’’ indicates that Limone will assume control of the Boston Organized Crime’s day-to-day operations if released.770

7–12–83: James F. Ring, a legal assistant at Bingham, Dana &

Gould, finishes World Jai Alai: A Chronology. This 196 page report

takes the position that the World Jai Alai organization had been

treated unfairly by a variety of investigators.969

7–15–83: Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner files an application for post-conviction relief in Rhode Island Superior Court based on John ‘‘Red’’

Kelley’s perjurious testimony at Lerner’s trial in 1970, claiming in

part that Kelley ‘‘admitted under oath that he testified falsely at

[Lerner’s] trial and that he knew, and the FBI, through its agent,

knew that his testimony at [Lerner’s] trial was false and perjurious.’’ 771

7–25–83: A letter from Clyde Groover, Jr., Assistant Director of

the Admin. Services Division, to Supervisory Special Agent John

Morris states, ‘‘Careful consideration has been given to the information furnished concerning the loss of FBI documents which were

charged to your custody. It is apparent that you failed to exercise

sufficient care to adequately safeguard this Government property.

599

In the future, you will be expected to be more careful in handling

Bureau property entrusted to you so that there will be no recurrence of a dereliction such as this.’’ 772

8–1–83: In a 5–2 vote, the Massachusetts Parole Board votes to

grant a commutation to Peter Limone. The two dissenting members, Brian Callery and Michael Magruder, vote against Limone’s

commutation because the Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office,

the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and the FBI reported that Limone is and

will continue to be an important member of organized crime. Shelley Murphy, Parole Panelists Cite Retaliation After Vote, BOSTON

GLOBE, June 19, 2001.773

8–24–83: Luigi Manocchio is sentenced for a period of two consecutive life sentences, plus ten years, in the custody of the Warden

of the Adult Correctional Institutions. (See Tracy Breton,

Manocchio Gets 2 Life Terms for Gangland Slaying, PROVIDENCE

JOURNAL-BULLETIN, Aug. 25, 1983).774

8–25–83: A prosecution memorandum from Jeremiah T.

O’Sullivan to David A. Margolis Chief of the Organized Crime and

Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice in Washington,

D.C, requests permission to indict Jerry Angiulo and his principal

associates (five Angiulos, Zannino and Granito), including three

Capo Regimes, for their role in several murders, including the murders of Walter Bennett, William Bennett and Joseph Barboza. The

following are important points made in this memorandum. Numbers in parentheses coincide with page numbers in the memorandum. [Note: The original memorandum is not appended to the

Committee’s chronology and is retained in Justice Department

files.] Discusses indictment of five Angiulos, Zannino and Granito.

Two pages on the Bratsos/DePrisco murders were redacted. Discusses the Walter and William Bennett murders. Walter Bennett

held Larry Zannino responsible and was going to kill Zannino with

the assistance of Flemmi and Salemme. The memorandum further

states, ‘‘Unfortunately for Bennett, Flemmi and Salemme were secretly aligned with Patriarca and the L.C.N. and were under orders

to kill Bennett when he made a ‘‘move’’ on Zannino.’’ (14) Flemmi,

Salemme and Patriarca, along with Richard Grasso, Robert

Daddieco and Hugh Shields, were listed as unindicted co-conspirators in the William Bennett murder. (14) The memorandum continues, ‘‘While it is widely known that the Boston L.C.N., through

Salemme and Flemmi, were responsible for [Richard] Grasso’s murder, there does not exist at this time sufficient proof to allege it as

a predicate offense.’’ (15) The memorandum also states, ‘‘Francis

Salemme and Stephen Flemmi were charged with being accessories

and co-conspirators to this murder [William Bennett]. However, at

the time of the state trial, they were fugitives. Daddeico subsequently refused to testify against Flemmi and the charges were

then dismissed.’’ (105) The memorandum mentions a wiretapped

telephone call from Stephen Flemmi to Gennaro Angiulo where

Flemmi indicates he was present at the murder of William Bennett. (108) The memorandum continues, ‘‘Barboza was placed in

the witness protection program under the name Joseph Bentley

and relocated to the San Francisco, California, area in 1969. . . .

Barboza was removed from the witness protection program when

600

indicted on the murder charge.’’ (117) The William Bennett murder

was prosecuted in Suffolk County in the early 1970s. Daddeico testified against Hugh Shields and William Stuart (and Grasso, who

was already dead). Flemmi and Salemme were charged, and

Daddeico later refused to testify against Flemmi. Intercepted conversations were redacted—for example, at page 106. [Note: There

are numerous sections redacted for ‘‘witness not previously identified.’’ This makes it very difficult to review the documents.] Chuck

Hiner was prepared to testify that in July of 1976 he and Sharliss

agreed to record a telephone call between Sharliss and Russo.

9–12–83: In a letter from U.S. Attorney William Weld to Governor Michael Dukakis, Weld urges the rejection of Peter Limone’s

commutation request. Weld writes, ‘‘Confirming our conversation of

earlier today, it is the understanding of this office and of the Boston Organized Crime Strike Force that top-level members of organized crime in Boston desire to have Peter Limone assume charge

of the day-to-day operations of organized crime in this area[.] The

Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Suffolk County District Attorney, and [the U.S. Attorney’s Office] all submitted letters to the

Massachusetts Parole Board regarding Mr. Limone’s petition.’’ 775

November 1983: FBI Special Agents Montanari and Brendan

Cleary interview James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi about the Roger Wheeler and John Callahan murders. Bulger and Flemmi deny any involvement, but refuse polygraphs and object to be photographed. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 212 (D. Mass. 1999)).776

1984

January 1984: The Boston Globe reports that James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger, Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, and Kevin Weeks forced

Stephen and Julie Rakes to sell them the Rakes’ liquor store in

South Boston for $67,000. (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as

FBI Looks Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).777

Joseph Lundbloom of the Boston Police Department tells Special

Agent John Connolly of the extortion of the Rakes family. Connolly

says the FBI would probably not act unless Rakes agreed to wear

a wire. Connolly fails to report the information he learned from

Lundbloom. (Connolly Indictment, 8–9). Several days after

Lundbloom speaks to Connolly, Bulger allegedly tells the Rakes

that he knew of their contact with the FBI and told them to ‘‘back

off.’’ (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away, BOS- TON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).778

1–11–84: In a letter from FBI Director William Webster to Supervisory Special Agent John Morris, Webster commends Morris for

his ‘‘significant achievements in connection with the ‘Bostar’ investigation’’ and encloses an incentive award for his achievements.779

[Note: ‘‘Bostar’’ refers to the bugging of 98 Prince Street in Boston,

which targeted Jerry Angiulo and the top tier of Boston’s Mafia.

See DICK LEHR & GERARD O’NEIL, BLACK MASS 93, 119 (2000).]

2–12–84: An informant tells the FBI that Bobby Daddeico called

Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi and told him that two ‘‘Feds’’ had

visited him and wanted him to be a witness against the Angiulos

601

and Larry Baione. Daddeico said he ‘‘would not testify under any

circumstances and if he was brought back he might have some

things to say which the authorities would not want to hear.’’ The

write up of the FBI document goes on to say that ‘‘he [Daddeico]

has a lot of guilt over what he did to Frankie Salemme even

though Frankie had it coming.’’ He also said that he would not hurt

Flemmi.780 [Note: The Boston Herald reports, ‘‘Charges against

Flemmi were dropped when a key government witness, Robert

Daddeico, disappeared. Daddeico’s disappearance also forced the

government to drop murder charges against Salemme and Flemmi

for the gangland slaying of William ‘Billy’ Bennett of Mattapan.’’

Shelley Murphy, Playing Both Sides Pays Off; Flemmi Tight with

Italians and Irish, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 23, 1993.] 781

6–22–84: In Peter Joseph Limone and Louis Greco v. Commonwealth, No. 94–223, 94–224, (S.J. Ct. Suffolk County, June 22,

1984), the Court holds, ‘‘The information in the Evans report identifies an entirely different set of killers. If disclosed and properly

developed, the information could have had considerable relevance

to the credibility of Baron’s testimony which was at the core of the

Commonwealth’s case, and it would have supported the defendants’

alibi and other defenses. Quite simply, the jury might have concluded that a reasonable doubt existed as to Baron’s identification

of the killers and their activities, which doubt necessarily, would

have included Limone and Grieco [sic]. I am not dissuaded from

this view as to Grieco [sic] by the somewhat ambiguous identification testimony of [Anthony] Stathopoulos and Mr. [John]

Fitzgerald’s testimony.’’ Thus, the Court ordered the applications

for leave to appeal by Limone and Greco from the denial of their

motions for new trial be allowed in part.782

7–11–84: A letter from Ronald Cassesso to ‘‘The Review Committee’’ states, ‘‘I am telling you unequivocally that Mr. [Louis] Greco

was not even in the state of Massachusetts during any of the time

periods testified to by Mr. [Joseph Barboza] Baron. . . . I, myself,

would be willing to submit to a polygraph examination relative to

Mr. Greco’s involvement.’’ 783

7–18–84: Jack Zalkind writes to the Massachusetts Parole Board

recommending a commutation for Louis Greco.784

November 1984: John McIntyre is murdered after he told the

FBI that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’

Flemmi were in a plot to ship guns to the IRA. (U.S. v. Salemme,

91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 215 (D. Mass. 1999)).785

1984–85: A DEA Title III investigation, targeting James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, is frustrated. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 150 (D. Mass.

1999)).786

1985

1985: At a dinner at Supervisory Special Agent John Morris’

home, Morris, in Special Agent John Connolly’s presence, tells

James ‘‘Whitely’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi that

they would not be prosecuted for anything on the 98 Prince Street

tapes. In addition, Morris tells them, ‘‘[Y]ou can do anything you

602

want as long as you don’t ‘clip’ anyone.’’ (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass. 1999)).787

8–6–85: Luigi Manocchio’s judgments of conviction are vacated.

State v. Manocchio, 496 A.2d 931 (R.I. 1985) (On April 21, 1986,

the U.S. Supreme Court, in Rhode Island v. Manocchio, 106 S.Ct.

1627 (1986), grants a petition for writ of certiorari, vacates the August 6, 1985, judgment, and remands the case to the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island to analyze in light of Delaware v. Van

Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986), a case discussing harmless error. The

Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the judgments of conviction on April 6, 1987; this time in light of a harmless-error analysis. State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872 (R.I. 1987).788

10–7–85: San Francisco District Attorney General Arlo Smith

through Eugene Sweeters, states that in exchange for Theodore

Sharliss’ complete and truthful testimony in United States v.

Gennaro J. Angiulo, et al., Sharliss will not be prosecuted by California for his role in the murder of Joseph Barboza.789

10–13–85: The Press Democrat reports that in preparation for

Gennaro Angiulo’s trial, his attorney Anthony Cardinale, tells the

press that federal authorities were trying to link Angiulo to the assassination of Joseph Barboza. (Bony Saludes, Underworld’s Bloody

Link to S[anta] R[osa], PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Oct. 13,

1985).790

11–12–85: Specialist Russell Davey gives latent print testimony

in federal court in Boston. According to an FBI memorandum regarding Ted Sharliss and Joseph Barboza, ‘‘Davey testified that

two latent fingerprints developed on . . . a Hilton Hotel Registration card[,] are the finger impressions of Joseph Anthony Russo[.]’’

(FBI memorandum from R. Gilbarte to Mr. York (Nov. 13,

1985)).791

11–12–85: Joseph Salvati files a petition for a commutation hearing with the Massachusetts Parole Board.792

1986

1986: According to Judge Wolf’s decision, ‘‘With continued assistance from [Stephen] Flemmi and [James ‘‘Whitey’’] Bulger, the FBI

used the evidence intercepted there to develop a case which secured the convictions, in 1986, of [Jerry] Angiulo, [Ilario] Zannino

and much of the rest of the leadership of the LCN [La Cosa Nostra]

in Boston.’’ ((U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass.

1999)).793

1–6–86: The Massachusetts Parole Board grants Joseph Salvati

a commutation hearing.794

2–4–86: In a letter from the Massachusetts Parole Board to Boston SAC James Greenleaf, the Massachusetts Parole Board requests information about Joseph Salvati because the Board is considering a petition filed by Salvati for commutation of a life sentence that he is serving for the crime of murder. The Massachusetts Parole Board sends similar letters to Michael V. Fair, Commissioner of the Department of Corrections; Frank Trabucco, ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00612 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
603

missioner of the Department of Public Safety; and Newman Flanagan, Suffolk County District Attorney.795

2–26–86: Jerry Angiulo is found guilty on RICO charges. (Jury

Finds Mafia Boss Guilty, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, CA), Feb.

27, 1986).796

3–24–86: A letter from Boston SAC James Greenleaf and signed

by Supervisory Special Agent James Ring to Jack Curran, Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board regarding the Board’s request for information on Joseph Salvati states, ‘‘Concerning Joseph

Salvati, investigation by the FBI and Massachusetts State Police

placed Salvati in contact with Frank Oreto during November and

December of 1985, and particular details regarding a meeting between these two individuals in the vicinity of the Museum of Fine

Arts in Boston has already been provided to you by the Massachusetts State Police and is therefore not being reiterated. I hope that

this information will assist you in carrying out your duties as

Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board.’’ 797

April 1986: A federal indictment is returned against John McIntyre, seventeen months after his disappearance.798

7–15–86: State prosecutor [Name REDACTED by Committee] gives

Bobby Daddeico $500.799

12–1–86: Seven members of the Massachusetts Parole Board vote

to deny Joseph Salvati’s petition for a commutation hearing. All

seven point to the receipt of information from the FBI that Salvati

met with Frank Oreto as the reason for their denial.800

1986 or 1987: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris accepts

$5000 cash from James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi, with Special Agent John Connolly’s involvement.

(Connolly Indictment at 7–8).801

FBI Special Agent James J. Lavin III testifies that he ignored

evidence that city workers erected guardrails on private property

outside the South Boston liquor store controlled by James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger after Special Agent John Connolly reminded him that Bulger was an indispensable informant. (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).802

1987

1987: Nadine Pellegrini, Assistant Massachusetts Attorney General, writes a memorandum to Sydney Hanlon, Chief of the Narcotics Division on an unknown date, presumed to be in 1987. The

memorandum concerns the upcoming Peter Limone commutation

hearing stating, ‘‘[T]he FBI and State Police have informant information which is ‘fairly solid’, according to [Jeremiah] O’Sullivan,

that Limone continues his loan sharking operations from prison

with the help of his brother. Limone and his family continue to receive income from this operation. O’Sullivan further indicated that

there would be no problem using such information as a basis for

a public statement.’’ 803

The Massachusetts Parole Board votes a second time on Louis

Greco’s commutation request. Jack Curran, who voted against comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00613 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
604

mutation for Greco the first time, approves a commutation this

time. Robert Gittens, who allegedly said he would recommend a

commutation to Governor Dukakis when he served as the Governor’s Deputy Legal Counsel in 1984, now, as a member of the

Board, votes against Greco’s commutation.804

1–15–87: Associate Justice Bulman of the Superior Court of

Rhode Island issues an opinion denying Maurice ‘‘Pro’’ Lerner’s application for post-conviction relief. In denying Lerner’s application,

‘‘[T]he Court finds that witness John J. Kelley committed perjury

in the 1970 trial of the captioned indictments before this Court: 1.

In failing to disclose, when asked, the full extent of the promises

made him by federal agent Rico[;] 2. In claiming he alone altered

the murder weapons[;] 3. In describing the meeting outside the

Gaslight Restaurant[;] and[,] 4. As to the color of Vendituoli’s automobile.’’ (Lerner v. Moran, No. PM833005 (R.I. Superior Ct., Jan.

15, 1987)).805

March 1987: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger tells South Boston realtor

Raymond Slinger that someone hired him to kill Slinger. Bulger

tells Slinger he will not kill him if Slinger gives Bulger $50,000.

Agents John Newton and Roderick Kennedy fail to document or follow up on realtor Raymond Slinger’s claim. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 250–51 (D. Mass. 1999)).806

4–6–87: Under a harmless error analysis, judgments of conviction

are vacated for Luigi Manocchio. State v. Manocchio, 523 A.2d 872

(R.I. 1987).807

June 1987: The Massachusetts Parole Board votes to grant

Peter Limone a second commutation hearing.808

8–28–87: A commutation hearing is scheduled for Peter Limone.

Barbara D. Johnson, Pardons Coordinator, sends a letter to Massachusetts Attorney General James Shannon inviting him to attend

or submit his viewpoint.809

10–19–87: Boston SAC James Ahearn writes a letter to John J.

Curran, Jr., Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board, regarding Peter Limone. The letter details Limone’s contacts with members of organized crime. Ahearn’s letter is a response to Curran’s

request for information concerning Limone.810

10–28–87: Boston SAC James Ahearn writes a second letter to

John J. Curran, Jr., Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board,

regarding Peter Limone. This letter provides additional information

about Limone’s contacts with members of organized crime that was

previously under seal and impounded by the U.S. District Court.911

11–16–87: The Massachusetts Parole Board unanimously denies

Peter Limone executive clemency.812

1988

1–20–88: When being considered for the federal bench, Judge Edward F. Harrington writes to Delaware Senator Joseph Biden,

Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. He states, ‘‘As a

public prosecutor, I developed such significant accomplice witnesses

as Joseph Baron, Vincent Teresa, ‘Red’ Kelley, William Masiello

605

and many others whose use as witnesses I always made available

to local prosecutorial authorities. Cooperation with local law enforcement was my hallmark.’’ 813

1–29–88: Edward Harrington writes a second letter to Delaware

Senator Joseph Biden stating, ‘‘I never used an accomplice witness

unless I was convinced that he was telling the truth and his testimony had been corroborated to the fullest extent possible. Nor did

I ever condone any wrongdoing on any witness’ part.’’ 814

1988–89: Winter Hill member Joseph Murray approaches the

FBI and implicates James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Patrick Nee in the

Brian Halloran and Michael Donahue murders. Murray also alleges

that Agents John Connolly and John Newton and others are selling

information on law enforcement activities to Bulger and Stephen

Flemmi. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 256–58 (D. Mass.

1999)).815

1988: At Special Agent John Connolly’s request, Stephen Flemmi

begins to provide information on Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme, who

was just released from prison for the John Fitzgerald car bombing.

(U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 153 (D. Mass. 1999)).816

Supervisory Special Agent John Morris warns James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi that the FBI has tapped the phone of

a Roxbury bookmaker, John Baharoian, who worked for them. Indictments result from the wiretap, but do not include Bulger or

Flemmi. (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away,

BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).817

Agent James Blackburn testifies that he never pursued allegations that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was shaking down a South Boston drug dealer after Special Agent John Connolly told him it was

not true. (Shelley Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away,

BOSTON GLOBE, July 22, 1998).818

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme was ‘‘made’’ in the Mafia after his release from prison, reportedly achieving the rank of Capo Regime,

or Underboss, in the Patriarca family. (Jules Crittenden and Ralph

Ranalli, Alleged Mob Boss Left Behind Bloody Trail, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 13, 1995).819

June 1988: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris learns of a

federal wiretap on telephones used for illegal gambling activity and

tells Special Agent John Connolly. Connolly arranges a meeting between himself, Morris, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, and Stephen

Flemmi so Morris could directly advise them of the wiretap.

(Connolly Indictment at 13–14).820

6–10–88: The Rhode Island Supreme Court vacates Maurice

‘‘Pro’’ Lerner’s conviction. The Court held ‘‘that Kelley’s perjury at

Lerner’s trial relating to the extent of promises made to Kelley by

the FBI in exchange for his testimony and Special Agent Rico’s corroboration of that perjury were material to Kelley’s credibility and

therefore to the issue of Lerner’s guilt.’’ The Court ruled that

‘‘Kelley’s perjury, elicited by the FBI, constituted material exculpatory evidence withheld in violation of the applicant’s due process

rights.’’ See Lerner v. Moran, 542 A.2d 1089, 1091, 1093 (R.I.

1988).821

606

8–8–88: The Massachusetts Parole Board writes a letter to Boston SAC James Ahearn requesting an update on the status of the

FBI’s investigation of the contacts between Frank Oreto and Joseph Salvati.822

10–17–88: Joseph Salvati applies for a commutation hearing with

the Massachusetts Parole Board.823

1989

3–14–89: The Massachusetts Parole Board votes six to one in

favor of granting Joseph Salvati a commutation hearing.824

3–29–89: The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘Seven persons, including

prominent Boston defense attorney Joseph J. Balliro, have been indicted by a federal grand jury on charges of conspiring to conceal

millions of dollars of a Mafia drug kingpin’s profits from the Internal Revenue Service in false companies established in the Bahamas, Panama and the United States. The 37-page indictment was

handed down last Thursday,’’ March 23, 1989, and is unsealed

today. (Elizabeth Neuffer, Balliro Among Seven Indicted, BOSTON

GLOBE, Mar. 30, 1999).825

March 1989: A warrant issued for the arrest of Stephen Flemmi

and Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme for the murder of Peter Poulos is recalled.826

June 1989: Agents Edward Clark and Edward Quinn interview

Joseph Murray, but do not ask about the allegations he made that:

(1) FBI Agents John Connolly and John Newton were selling information regarding wiretaps, to James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stevie

Flemmi; and (2) James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Pat Nee murdered

Brian Halloran and Bucky Barrett. (see 1988–89 entry). However,

a subsequent memorandum drafted from Assistant SAC Dennis

O’Callahan to FBI headquarters states that Murray’s allegations

were unsubstantiated. Murray’s information is not provided to

agents working on the Brian Halloran investigation. (U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 256–58 (D. Mass. 1999)).827

6–7–89: In a letter from Leonard J. Henson, Assistant District

Attorney of Suffolk County and Chief of the Organized Crime Division, to Supervisory Special Agent James Ring, Henson advises

Ring of the upcoming commutation hearing for Joseph Salvati.

Henson asks the FBI for ‘‘any information that your office has with

regard to Mr. Salvati’s involvement with the Deegan murder as

well as his past and present status with organized crime elements

in the area.’’ A notation at the bottom states that information previously had been submitted to the Board of Pardons by Special

Agent Ring.828

6–16–89: Connecticut crime boss William Grasso is murdered.

Many experts on the Mafia say that Grasso, who was found shot

to death along a bank of the Connecticut River outside Hartford,

would not have been killed without the authorization of the New

York families. Grasso was considered to be the second highest

ranking Mafioso in New England behind Raymond Patriarca, Jr.

Yet, some believe Grasso was the real power while Patriarca serves

mainly as titular head. (Matthew Brelis, U.S. to Seek Longer Term

607

for Patriarca, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1992; Kevin Cullen, Two

Seen as Likely Replacements for Grasso as Leader in Mob, BOSTON

GLOBE, June 19, 1989).829

7–14–15–89: Special Agent Paul Rico testifies at a Senate Impeachment Trial Committee hearing on the articles of impeachment filed against U.S. District Court Judge Alcee Hastings. Rico

testifies about his involvement in the Hastings’ investigation.830

8–14–89: Former Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney Jack

Zalkind recommends commuting Joseph Salvati’s sentence for a

third time. He refers to his earlier letter of March 12, 1979.831

8–15–89: Retired Boston Police Detective Frank Walsh recommends commuting Joseph Salvati’s sentence for a third time. He

refers to his earlier letter of March 15, 1979.832

8–16–89: Suffolk County District Attorney Newman Flanagan opposes commuting Joseph Salvati’s sentence.833

8–21–89: Joseph Salvati appears before the Massachusetts Parole

Board in a commutation hearing.834

9–18–89: A prosecution memorandum from Diane M. Kottmyer,

Chief Attorney, Boston Strike Force, to David Margolis, Chief,

OC&RS Criminal Division, discusses a proposed indictment of

Russo, Carrozza, Baione, Ferrara, LePore, Mercurio and Tortora.

The following are important points made in this memorandum.

Numbers in parentheses coincide with page numbers in the memorandum. [Note: The original memorandum is not appended to the

Committee’s chronology and is retained in Justice Department

files.] The memorandum charges an array of criminal activity. The

memorandum states, ‘‘In exchange for protection and a new identity, Barboza agreed to become a government witness.’’ (60) The

memorandum continues, ‘‘Following his testimony Barboza entered

the witness protection program and was relocated to San Francisco

under the name of Joseph Bentley. Barboza was expelled from the

program when he was indicted in 1970 on murder charges.’’ (60)

Sharliss will testify at trial that Russo offered him $25,000 to kill

Barboza. (61)

10–29–89: Raymond Patriarca, Jr., presides over a Mafia induction ceremony held in Medford, Massachusetts. The induction ceremony is secretly tape recorded by the FBI pursuant to a court

order. (Former Patriarca Boss Sentenced to an Eight-Year Term, PR

NEWSWIRE, June 17, 1992). The tape, believed to be the first ever

recording of a mafia induction ceremony, is the cornerstone in the

racketeering case against reputed organized crime boss Raymond

Patriarca, Jr., and six other defendants. The tape is secretly recorded in a clapboard house at 34 Guild Street in Medford, where

four inductees take a blood oath to kill anyone who violated the organization’s secrecy, federal authorities say. (Prosecutor Defends

Mafia Ceremony Tape as Evidence, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), Mar. 26, 1991).835

11–30–89: The Massachusetts Parole Board informs Boston SAC

James Ahearn that a hearing was held on Joseph Salvati’s commutation. The Board states that Salvati’s relationship with Frank

Oreto was a question at the hearing and that the Board was aware

608

of contacts between Salvati and Oreto in 1986. The Board requests

information from the FBI about Salvati’s relationship with

Oreto.836

12–1–89: James Ahearn, the Boston SAC, writes a letter to John

Curran, Chairman of the Massachusetts Parole Board, in response

to the Board’s November 30, 1989, letter requesting information

about a relationship between Joseph Salvati and Frank Oreto.

Ahearn writes that Salvati was intercepted on telephone lines

seven times from January 1985 to January 1986. Ahearn also

writes that Marie Salvati met with Oreto on November 9, 1985.

The FBI concludes that Salvati had no ownership or managerial relationship with Oreto’s loanshark business and that Marie Salvati

probably met with Oreto to borrow money.837

12–8–89: The Massachusetts Parole Board votes 5–0 to approve

clemency for Joseph Salvati.838

1990

1990: A raid by the DEA, Suffolk County Organized Crime

Squad, and the IRS on the South Boston Liquor Mart extorted from

the Rakes by James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi reveals

a receipt indicating the FBI bought liquor there at discount prices

for its Christmas party. The receipt indicates that the liquor was

bought by Agent ‘‘Dick Baker (friend of John Connolly).’’ (Shelley

Murphy, Cases Disappear as FBI Looks Away, BOSTON GLOBE, July

22, 1998).839

3–26–90: The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘In what federal authorities

called an ‘unprecedented assault’ on the leadership of the New

England Mafia, federal authorities have indicted alleged Mafia boss

Raymond J. (Junior) Patriarca and 20 reputed members of the

Patriarca crime family in three states on charges including racketeering, illegal gambling, extortion, drug trafficking and murder.

The indictments, unsealed [on March 26], effectively accuse almost

all of the Patriarca crime family’s reputed top leaders, charging alleged Patriarca underboss Nicholas L. Bianco, consigliere, or adviser, Joseph A. (J.R.) Russo and four of the organization’s six reputed lieutenants with a pattern of crimes that span the past 15

years. Federal authorities said . . . that the indictments resulted

from five years worth of investigation that utilized federal undercover agents, electronic surveillance and cooperating witnesses.

(Elizabeth Neurer, Indictment Aimed at Mob Net Patriarca, 20 Others, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1990).840

4–9–90: Joseph J. Balliro is acquitted in federal court by Judge

Edward Harrington of helping a fugitive and reputed mobster

evade income taxes. The Boston Globe reports that ‘‘Balliro had

been charged with helping Salvatore Michael Caruana, whom he

sometimes represented, evade federal income taxes by helping him

invest in the Islander Hotel in the Bahamas.’’ (Paul Langner,

Balliro Cleared of Aiding Tax Evasion; Charge Dismissed Against

Lawyer, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 10, 1990). According to Balliro’s attorney, Richard M. Egbert, his successful representation of fellow

defense attorney Joseph Balliro was his ‘‘proudest moment.’’ MatVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00618 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
609

thew Brelis, Lawyer Defends His Choice of Clients, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1993.841

6–25–90: The Massachusetts Parole Board unanimously denies

Peter Limone a commutation hearing.842

8–16–90: A memorandum from Weldon Kennedy to FBI Director

Sessions states that Supervisory Special Agent John Morris received a letter of censure, one-year’s probation, and fourteen days

suspension without pay for his involvement in the unauthorized

disclosure of information to the Boston Globe. Special Agent John

Connolly receives a letter of censure for the same offense. Morris’

discipline is based on the conclusion that he had made unauthorized disclosures of information to a local newspaper reporter and

failed to be forthright on certain related issues. With regard to

Connolly, Connolly had imposed upon Morris to initiate an unauthorized contact with Morris’ Boston Globe reporter.843

December 1990: Special Agent John Connolly retires from the

FBI.844

1991: Seventeen months after approving Joseph Salvati’s clemency petition, the Massachusetts Parole Board forwards its recommendation to Governor William Weld.845

November 1991: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris leaves

the Boston Office. (See March 1972 entry).846

11–25–91: Agent Jean F. Wynn writes a memorandum the Boston SAC regarding Angelo Marotta, Joseph Salvati’s first cousin.

Wynn observed Marotta standing near a window, making phone

calls, and seeming very alert to others walking by to the ‘‘extent

of seeming ‘surveillance conscious.’ ’’ Wynn notes that Salvati is a

first cousin of Marotta and that during a letter writing campaign

Marotta was able to obtain a favorable letter from State Department of Corrections Official Michael Fair. In 1989, Fair was hired

as president of Marotta Companies.847

December 1991: Raymond Patriarca, Jr., whose father founded

the New England Patriarca crime family, pleads guilty to conspiracy and racketeering charges. (Reputed Mobsters Admit Racketeering, TULSA TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1992).848

1992

1–22–92: Joseph Russo pleads guilty to the murder of Joseph

Barboza. Five accused members of New England’s largest crime

family plead guilty in Boston to racketeering, kidnapping and murder charges but deny that they belonged to the Mafia. On the day

their trial is to start, a daylong change of plea hearing is held and

guilty pleas are offered by Joseph Russo, Vincent Ferrara, Robert

Carroza, Dennis LePore, and Carmen Tortora. Russo receives a

sentence of sixteen years imprisonment and must forfeit $758,000.

Vincent Ferrara receives twenty-two years and wins immunity

from prosecution for murder and attempted murder. He is ordered

to pay $1.1 million. Robert Carrozza is given nineteen years and

ordered to pay $878,200. Dennis Lepore receives fourteen years and

will have to pay $766,700. Finally, Carmen Tortora is given thirteen years and will have to pay $2,000. (See Nation Briefly, ORVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00619 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
610

ANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Jan. 23, 1992; U.S. v. Salemme, 91

F.Supp. 2d 141, 151–152 (D. Mass. 1999)).849

6–17–92: The former Boss of the Patriarca Family is sentenced

to an eight-year term of imprisonment following his plea of guilty

to charges of racketeering and violations of the Travel Act. Judge

Mark L. Wolf sentences Raymond Patriarca, Jr., to a 97-month

term of incarceration followed by a three-year period of supervised

release and a $50,000 fine. (Boss Sentenced to an Eight-Year Term,

PR NEWSWIRE, June 17, 1992).850

9–1–92: Dugald F. Cameron, private investigator of Massachusetts, signs an affidavit stating that he and John Cavicchi met with

Robert Gittens, Assistant Legal Counsel to Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, on February 15, 1984, about Louis Greco.

Gittens told Cameron and Cavicchi that he would recommend that

the Governor commute Greco’s sentence.851

1993

1993: Frank Walsh’s affidavit states that Joseph Salvati was

never a suspect until Joseph Barboza mentioned him.852

In his book The God Son, A True-Life Account of 20 Years Inside

the Mob, Willie Fopiano writes the following: ‘‘It went like this: A

petty thief named Teddy Deegan was suspected of killing Anthony

Sacramone [sic], a cousin of Rico Sacramone [sic]. Rico [Sacrimone]

wanted revenge, and got the rest of the Barboza gang to help him

carry it out’’ [Nick] Femia, Romeo Martin, Chico Amico, Ronnie

Cassesso and, of course, Barboza himself. Romeo Martin knew

Deegan a little and won him over by telling him about an easy

score at a finance company. When Deegan and Martin drove up to

the back door of the place, Barboza, Femia, Amico, and Cassesso

were waiting. Barboza ran up and shot Deegan five times. That

was in March 1965. It was known even then who shot Deegan and

why, but twenty-six months later Barboza ratted on Ronnie

Cassesso and also put the finger on five other men: Henry Tameleo,

Peter Limone, Louis Grieco [sic], Roy French, and Joe ‘‘the Horse’’

Salvati. Tameleo was an important man in the family. Along with

Limone, Grieco [sic], and Cassesso, he was sentenced to the chair,

and spent almost five years on death row before capital punishment was thrown out. Salvati and French drew life sentences. Of

all of them, only Cassesso had anything to do with the crime. The

others were innocent. . . . Salvati, who was just a doorman at an

after-hours joint, wouldn’t swat a mosquito. . . . He was also behind in shylock payments to Barboza. . . . The prosecutor, Jack

Zalkind, today is in private practice and I’ve heard from reliable

sources that even he now thinks that some of the men—especially

Joe Salvati—might be innocent.’’ (127–28). Fopiano also writes that

‘‘Joe Barboza [was] known as ‘the Killing Machine.’ ’’ (115) (Willie

Fopiano, The Godson, A True-Life Account of 20 Years Inside The

Mob 127–128 ).853

1–19–93: Governor Weld denies Joseph Salvati’s commutation

citing the ‘‘seriousness of the crime’’ and Salvati’s long criminal

record. Weld also denies Louis Greco’s request for a commutation.854

611

7–30–93: Detective Sergeant Bruce A. Holloway writes a memorandum to Lieutenant Detective James T. Curran regarding an

interview with former State Police Lieutenant Richard

Schneiderhan. Holloway writes, ‘‘Lt. Schneiderhan stated that

sometime after the murder of Edward T. Deegan he recalled overhearing a conversation between, then Assistant Attorney General

Donald Con and Attorney John Fitzgerald who represented Joseph

Barbosa [sic], whereby Attorney Fitzgerald advised Attorney Con

that his client, Joe Barbosa [sic] threw Joseph Salvadi [sic] into the

mix because of a dispute over money. Fitzgerald went on to state

that Joe Salvadi [sic] owed Joe Barbosa [sic] some money and that

when Barbosa [sic] associates Arthur Bratsos and Richard DePrisca

made an attempt to collect from Salvadi [sic], he refused to pay as

did many others; however when Salvadi [sic] refused, he also said

words to the effect, ‘I’m not going to pay, and you ain’t going to see

daylight.’ This angered Barbosa [sic] which prompted him to retaliate by throwing Joe Salvadi [sic] into the mix.’’ 855

8–2–93: Joseph Balliro’s affidavit states in relevant part: ‘‘I represented a co-defendant, Henry Tameleo, in the trial of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts against Joseph Salvati, and others,

that concluded with a conviction on July 31, 1968. With respect to

the overall conduct of the trial I served in the role that is generally

referred to as lead counsel. Joseph Salvati was represented at the

trial by Attorney Chester Paris, who at the time was a young but

competent trial lawyer, and associated with me in practice at my

office. . . . Without Barboza’s testimony the case could not have

gone to the jury—and if the jury were to disbelieve Mr. Barboza as

to the identity of any one of the participants there simply was no

other evidence on which to base a conviction. From the outset of

the preparation for the defense of Joseph Salvati, it was the strong

belief of all the defense lawyers that Mr. Salvati was not only innocent, but that Joseph Barboza had substituted Mr. Salvati as a

participant for some other individual, who had actually participated, and who Mr. Barboza was seeking to protect. At the time

of the trial I did not know who that other person was. . . . I have

recently (within the past three weeks) been furnished a three page

police report that purports to be a statement by Thomas F. Evans

of the Chelsea Police Department. . . . I have carefully reviewed

the three page police report authored by Lieutenant Thomas F.

Evans and can categorically state that I was not aware of the existence of that report or its contents until the last few weeks; nor, am

I aware that any other counsel, including Chester Paris who represented Joseph Salvati had any awareness of the report or its contents. . . . The failure of the Commonwealth to provide the defendants with the report of Lieutenant Evans seriously undercut the

ability of the attorneys to conduct a proper investigation and prepare an adequate defense.’’ 856

8–3–93: In an affidavit, Jack Zalkind states that if he had seen

the Chelsea police report sooner, he would have ordered an ‘‘intensive investigation’’ into Joseph Salvati’s involvement.857

8–19–93: Sergeant Detective Bruce A. Holloway writes a memorandum to Lieutenant Detective James T. Curran regarding a follow-up investigation with former State Police Lieutenant Richard

612

Schneiderhan. The letter states that Schniederhan told Holloway

that ‘‘he does not believe that the group involved in the [Edward

‘Teddy’ Deegan] murder would have allowed Joe Salvati to participate in such an event. More importantly he does not believe they

would have allowed him to hang around with them at all.’’ 858

10–1–93: Lieutenant Detective James T. Curran and Sergeant

Detective Bruce A. Holloway of the Massachusetts Office of Special

Investigations interview Roberta Grimes, who police placed in the

Ebb Tide as an employee to collect information on some of the characters who frequented the place. Grimes recalls a visit by two

M.D.C. police detectives who showed her a photo array. She also

recalls the names and faces of Joseph Barboza and Roy French.859

10–4–93: Sergeant Detective Bruce A. Holloway writes a memorandum to Lieutenant Detective James T. Curran regarding a discussion Holloway had with Judge John Fitzgerald. Holloway writes

the following about this discussion: ‘‘Judge Fitzgerald does recall

hearing the rumors about Joseph Salvati and others not being involved [in the Edward ‘Teddy’ Deegan murder] and that Joe

Barbosa [sic] was owed money. However, he stressed that at no

time did he inquire of Barbosa [sic] anything relative to these rumors. Additionally, he stated that Barbosa [sic] never told him of

a plan to frame anyone relative to the Deegan case and he never

supplied him with any information which he, Judge Fitzgerald,

deemed to be exculpatory.’’ 860

10–12–93: James M. McDonough, legal assistant in the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office, signs an affidavit stating, ‘‘I was

aware and saw a report that had been authored by Lieutenant

Thomas Evans of the Chelsea Police Department about the Deegan

murder. . . . [T]o the best of my memory and belief the copy of the

report is the same copy that was in the prosecutor’s file during

prosecution of the defendant’s case.’’ 861

10–27–93: Robert J. McKenna, Jr., Assistant District Attorney

for Suffolk County, writes a letter to Jack Zalkind regarding Joseph Salvati. Zalkind apparently requested a meeting with McKenna to discuss the affidavit Zalkind executed for Commonwealth v.

Salvati, et al. McKenna says he talked with Robert Gittens and

Jack Cinquegrana and is denying Zalkind’s request because the

case is presently before the Superior Court.862

12–1–1993: A hearing on a Motion for a New Trial for Louis

Greco, represented by John Cavicchi; Joseph Salvati, represented

by Victor Garo; and Peter Limone, represented by Robert Sheketoff,

takes place. Robert McKenna represents the State of Massachusetts and Judge Banks presides.863

1994

12–23–94: Former Special Agent John Connolly informs James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi that they would soon be arrested. (Connolly Indictment at 15).864

613

1995

January 1995: Stephen Flemmi informs Francis ‘‘Frank’’

Salemme that an indictment would be coming down on him shortly.

(Connolly Indictment at 15–16).865

1–5–95: Stephen Flemmi is arrested for conspiring to extort bookmaker Burton Krantz; James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and George Kaufman are also charged. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 148

(D. Mass. 1999)).866

1–9–95: The FBI admits to the U.S. Attorney’s Office that James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger is an informant. (U.S. v Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d

141, 295 (D. Mass. 1999)).867

1–10–95: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen Flemmi, and Francis

‘‘Frank’’ Salemme are indicted on multiple charges of federal racketeering, extortion, and other crimes. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.

2d 141, 151–152 (D. Mass. 1999); Shelley Murphy, Mafia Leaders

Still Don’t Know When to Shut Up, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11,

1995)).868

1–29–95: The Boston Globe reports that Jerry Padalino, Special

Agent in Charge of U.S. Customs, publicly stated in 1995 that Customs officials considered John McIntyre a fugitive, affirmatively

stating, ‘‘We have no proof that he is dead.’’ (Kevin Cullen, IRA

Man Tells a Tale of Betrayal, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 29, 1995).869

7–11–95: John Cavicchi, attorney for Louis Greco, signs an affidavit stating that Cavicchi read in a February 17, 1994, news article that Joseph Balliro represented Joseph Barboza and ‘‘one

Flemmi.’’ Jimmy Flemmi was one of those named in the informant’s statement as being involved in the Edward Deegan murder.

Cavicchi obtained an affidavit from Richard Barest, a former Florida judge who represented Greco when he surrendered to authorities in Florida. Barest said he pleaded with the Massachusetts lawyers to let him fight the extradition of Greco, but stated they were

more interested in reading Time than listening to what he had to

say. Barest specifically mentioned ‘‘Joe Bellino,’’ but Cavicchi knew

that he meant Joe Balliro. The affidavit states, ‘‘I returned to Massachusetts and asked Balliro for the Florida investigation of Greco.

[Balliro] told me it had been shredded. In October or November

1994, I visited Greco at the Bay State Correctional Center. He stated that Balliro told him to waive his extradition hearing.’’ 870

James Southwood’s affidavit states, ‘‘In the course of making

preparations to write a book for Joseph Barboza Baron about his

life as an assassin for the New England Mafia and while a reporter

for the Boston Herald Traveler, Barboza, in early 1969, gave me

scrapbooks about the Boston Gang War and numerous documents

pertaining to three major trials at which he testified against New

England Mafia bosses and others. Subsequently, at a time in 1970,

when he claimed to me that the U.S. Justice Department had betrayed him by breaking promises made in exchange for his court

testimony, he said that he was recanting his testimony that sent

men to Death Row. At this time, a date I believe to be in the spring

of 1971, Barboza said: ‘Louie [sic] Greco wasn’t in the alley!’ To this

end, Barboza apparently sent a message to Raymond Patriarca

614

[that] Southwood was in possession of the grand jury minutes of

the so-called Teddy Deegan murder case. . . . Barboza told me that

the Grand Jury minutes would prove that he lied in the courtroom.

He instructed me to return the grand jury minutes to Joseph

Balliro. To the best of my knowledge, the Barboza copy of the

grand jury minutes was given to Balliro in the summer of 1971.’’

John Cavicchi is the notary.871

7–24–95: Louis Greco’s affidavit states, ‘‘In 1968, when I was

waiting for my hearing in Florida on the murder charges, . . . [Joseph] Balliro came to Florida. I did not ask for Mr. Balliro, nor did

I know who sent him. Mr. Balliro said that I should come back to

Massachusetts. He told me that things would turn out allright [sic].

As a result of his advice, I signed some papers and returned to

Massachusetts. He never told me that he represented [Joseph]

Barboza-Baron, nor did I know. He never told me, nor did I know

that he represented Flemmi. He did not tell me, nor did I know

that he was representing Henry Tameleo. Had I known the above,

I would have remained in Florida. In Massachusetts, I was represented by Attorney Lawrence O’Donnell and his office. I have

since learned that during the handling of this case, his office also

represented Henry Tameleo, Roy French, and Ronald Cassesso, codefendants in this case. Had I known this, I would have had a different lawyer. To the best of my memory, none of the evidence regarding my difficulty in walking, and inability to run was presented at trial.’’ John Cavicchi is the notary.872

12–30–95: Louis M. Greco dies in prison.873

12–31–95: Supervisory Special Agent John Morris retires from

the FBI.874

1996

4–3–96: In a letter from James D. Herbert, Assistant U.S. Attorney of the Organized Crime Strike Force, to Ralph Martin, Suffolk

County District Attorney, Herbert writes that Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian T. Kelly recently debriefed Anthony Ciulla. Ciulla was

friendly with Barboza and was his driver. Ciulla has no personal

knowledge of the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. However, Ciulla

claims Barboza discussed the Deegan murder in Ciulla’s presence.

According to the letter, ‘‘Ciulla believes Salvati is innocent because

Barboza never mentioned Salvati when he described the Deegan

murder. According to Ciulla, Barboza did mention the other individuals convicted in the case . . . as well as Vincent ‘The Bear’

Flemmi.’’ 875

12–18–96: Governor William Weld writes to the Executive Council, recommending that Joseph Salvati’s sentence be commuted,

subject to their advice and consent.876

1997

1–7–97: Governor William Weld writes to the Executive Council,

recommending that Salvati’s sentence be commuted, subject to

their advice and consent.877

615

1–15–97: Retired Boston Police Detective Frank Walsh recommends a commutation of Salvati’s sentence for the fourth

time.878

1–22–97: Former Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney Jack

Zalkind recommends a commutation of Salvati’s sentence for the

fourth time.879

2–5–97: Governor William Weld writes to the Executive Council,

recommending that Joseph Salvati’s sentence be commuted, subject

to their advice and consent.880

The Governor’s Executive Council unanimously votes 8–0 to commute Joseph Salvati’s sentence.881

Massachusetts Governor William Weld commutes the sentence of

Joseph Salvati.882

3–27–97: Special Agent John Connolly sends a letter to Judge

Mark Wolf purporting to be from three unnamed members of the

Boston Police Department. The letter says the Massachusetts State

Police, FBI, and DEA are guilty of prosecutorial misconduct in the

investigations of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen Flemmi, and

Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme. The letter states that Boston Police Detective Frank Duwan, the Massachusetts State Police, DEA, FBI,

and the Justice Department Organized Crime Strike Force furnished or relied on false information in efforts to prosecute Bulger

and Flemmi. (Connolly Indictment at 16).883

6–3–97: James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger’s identity as an FBI informant is

made public. In response to the May 22, 1997, Federal Court’s

order, the government disclosed that Bulger had been a government informant. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 309 (D.

Mass. 1999)).884

6–24–97: The Boston Globe reports that while William Weld was

a U.S. Attorney, he learned that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was an informant. Weld requested surveillance on Bulger and was told that

the FBI did not tap active informants. The article also states that

Bulger secretly tape-recorded ‘‘years’ worth’’ of conversations with

FBI agents. (Mike Barnicle, Jimmy Bulger: Fox in FBI Co-op, BOSTON GLOBE, June 24, 1997).885

7–3–97: The Deputy Attorney General directs the Department of

Justice and the FBI to initiate an Office of Professional Responsibility investigation to determine whether any Government official

committed criminal acts in connection with investigations into the

New England La Cosa Nostra and the Winter Hill Gang.886

7–8–97: The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigation to determine whether any Government official committed

criminal acts in connection with investigations into the New England La Cosa Nostra and the Winter Hill Gang begins on this date.

The investigation concludes on August 14, 1997 (with a report published as Appendix I to the Report). The OPR anticipates—but does

not conduct—a second phase of investigation. The investigation

‘‘uncovered no evidence that any potentially criminal acts were part

of a continuing crime which would bring the acts within the statute

of limitations. In addition, we examined and found a number of vioVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00625 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
616

lations of FBI rules and regulations which would have warranted

administrative action if those employees were still employed by the

FBI. However, no current FBI employees were found to be in violation of FBI policies.’’ 887

September 1997: Stephen Flemmi files an affidavit in court

claiming that ‘‘he was told by [Robert] Daddeico some 12 years ago

after the bombing charges against Flemmi were dropped that

Daddieco had set up [Frank] Salemme for the [John] Fitzgerald

bombing and had lied about Flemmi’s alleged involvement.’’ Patricia Nealon, Informant’s Treatment Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE,

May 6, 1998.888

9–29–97: Sergeant Kevin Manning writes a letter on behalf of

Sheriff Jerry Keller, Las Vegas Police Department, to Deputy U.S.

Marshal Tom Bezanson. Keller states that the Department is reviewing the murder case of Peter Poulos and would like to interview Stephen Flemmi and Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme for possible

prosecution. [Note: According to Dave Hatch, Las Vegas Police Department, Cold Case Review, he was later informed that Flemmi

and Salemme could not be interviewed regarding the Poulos murder while under federal indictment.] 889

1998

1998: Joseph ‘‘J. R.’’ Russo, the person who killed Joseph

Barboza, dies of natural causes in prison. (BostonMafia.com, visited

Feb. 5, 2002).890

1–6–98: The Boston Herald reports on the hearing before U.S.

District Court Judge Mark L. Wolf. The Herald writes, ‘‘Winter Hill

wiseguy and FBI informant Stephen Flemmi said he was rewarded

for his work for the agency with a free pass on murder, attempted

murder and fugitive charges in the mid-1970’s, defense lawyers alleged. . . . The lawyers are trying to get racketeering charges

against Flemmi, New England Mob boss Francis P. ‘Cadillac Frank’

Salemme, 64, and wiseguys Robert DeLuca and John Martorano

thrown out of court on a variety of legal bases. . . . Flemmi

claimed he was warned of the indictments by his FBI ‘handler,’

agent H. Paul Rico, and allowed to flee. But in 1974, Rico told him

it was safe to come back and that the murder and attempted murder charges would be taken care of. [Attorney Anthony] Cardinale

said Flemmi’s chief accuser in the case, Robert Daddieco, was an

FBI cooperating witness who had also been developed by Rico. Rico

made sure his promise to Flemmi was kept, Cardinale said. ‘What

happens? Daddieco changes his testimony and says Flemmi was

not with him (at the [John] Fitzgerald bombing) and that he lied

to the grand jury,’ Cardinale said. ‘They control Daddieco and he

changes his testimony to get Flemmi off the hook.’ The murder

charges against Flemmi were dropped when Daddieco disappeared.

Flemmi was also never prosecuted as a federal fugitive per Rico’s

promise, Cardinale said.’’ Ralph Ranalli, Mobster: I had License to

Kill; Flemmi Says He Knew He was Murderer, BOSTON HERALD,

Jan. 7, 1998.891

Early 1998: In preparation to testify in pretrial hearings in U.S.

v. Salemme, Stephen Flemmi informs Special Agent John Connolly

617

through an intermediary that he will testify that Supervisory Special Agent John Morris—not Connolly—alerted him to the indictments coming against James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Flemmi. In return, Connolly tells the intermediary to inform Flemmi to testify

that Morris learned of indictments through Washington, which received a ‘‘pros memo.’’ (Connolly Indictment at 17–18).892

April 1998: John Morris, Organized Crime Squad Supervisor in

the FBI’s Boston Office from 1977–1983, testifies under immunity

that he believes an intentional leak from his squad led to the killing of Brian Halloran. Before Halloran’s murder, Morris told Special Agent John Connolly, handler for James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and

Stephen Flemmi, that Halloran was incriminating them in Roger

Wheeler’s murder. Morris fully expected Connolly to relay this information to Bulger and Flemmi. U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d

141, 208 (D. Mass. 1999).893

Robert Fitzpatrick, Assistant Agent in Charge of the Boston FBI

Office during the early 1980s, testifies that he also thought James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger was a suspect in Roger Wheeler murder, but his

superiors decided to keep him as an informant. (United States v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 209 (D. Mass. 1999)).894

5–5–98: During a criminal hearing in federal court, Condon testifies that he ‘‘spent two years in the early 1970’s trying to hunt

down [Francis ‘‘Frank’’] Salemme and associate Stephen ‘The Rifleman’ Flemmi. But Condon insisted that, at the time, he had no

idea Flemmi was an FBI informant—even though FBI documents

show that another agent he worked closely with, H. Paul Rico, had

recruited Flemmi five years earlier. In fact, one 1967 document

even shows Condon had been designated as Flemmi’s ‘alternate

contact agent’ for times when Rico was out of town. Condon was

also the handling agent for James Bulger, who he had opened as

an informant on May 13, 1971. Condon, however, insisted that he

never saw the document and that Rico never told him he had been

designated as Flemmi’s alternate handler.’’ (Ralph Ranalli, Former

FBI Agent Testifies Salemme’s ’72 Bust No Setup, BOSTON HERALD,

May 6, 1998). At the hearing, Salemme’s attorney, Anthony

Cardinale, tried to show that Flemmi received preferential treatment because he had been feeding the FBI information. The Boston

Globe writes, ‘‘But under cross-examination by Assistant U.S. Attorney James D. Herbert, Condon said he had no ‘specific information’ on where Flemmi could be found, and said neither he nor any

other agent hindered the search for Flemmi. Condon said he had

no contact with Flemmi while he was a fugitive, had never taken

a phone call from him, and had not interceded with state prosecutors to get the charges against Flemmi dropped.’’ (Patricia Nealon,

Informant’s Treatment Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6,

1998).895

June 1998: The Justice Department appoints John Durham to

head a task force investigation into whether Boston FBI agents obstructed the investigation of the jai alai-related murders or otherwise broke the law during their relationship with James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. Edmund Mahony, FBI Agents Face

618

Scrutiny by Prosecutor; Questions of Obstruction in Jai Alai Murder

Cases, HARTFORD COURANT, June 28, 1998, at A1.896

December 1998: Raymond Patriarca, Jr., is released from prison. (BostonMafia.com, visited Feb. 5, 2002).897

1999

1999: John Martorano, a Winter Hill Gang hitman, begins cooperating with federal investigators. Martorano admits to killing

twenty people, including Roger Wheeler, Sr. Martorano said Whitey

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi told him to kill Wheeler. Martorano

says that former FBI Special Agent Paul Rico, through a third

party, provided him with information he used to locate and kill

Wheeler in Tulsa. (Shelley Murphy, Mobster Pleads Guilty to Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1999; Ralph Ranalli, FBI Agents Wander Who’s Next in Probe, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2000).898

7–12–99: Agent Daniel M. Doherty debriefs John Martorano.899

7–14–99: John Durham and Gary Bald meet with Victor Garo

about Garo’s concern that FBI agents engaged in improper, and

possibly criminal, conduct in the investigation, prosecution, and

confinement of Joseph Salvati.900

8–23–99: John Durham and Gary Bald write to Victor Garo asking for another meeting concerning the role of the FBI in Joseph

Salvati’s case.901

9–9–99: The Justice Department task force reaches a plea agreement with John Martorano, a Winter Hill Gang hitman. The plea

agreement states, ‘‘In exchange for a 121⁄2 year prison term,

Martorano has agreed to plead guilty to 10 murders in Massachusetts, along with one in Florida and another in Oklahoma. He will

also provide investigators with details on eight other murders that

took place in Massachusetts as far back as 1965.’’ Martorano is expected to admit to killing Roger Wheeler, Sr., and John Callahan

at the instruction of James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi.

(Andrea Estes, Murderous Rats Mobster Ties Bulger, Flemmi to

Murders, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 10, 1999).902

9–14–99: Agent Daniel M. Doherty debriefs John Martorano.903

9–15–99: District Court Judge Mark L. Wolf issues a 661-page

opinion sharply criticizing the FBI’s handling of James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. (U.S. v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141

(D. Mass. 1999)).904

Judge Wolf concludes that someone in the FBI probably tipped

James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi that Brian Halloran

was informing on them, which led to Halloran’s murder. (U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 208–214 (D. Mass. 1999)).905

Judge Wolf concludes that Special Agent Paul Rico helped Stephen Flemmi escape the country before being prosecuted for a car

bomb planted in defense attorney John Fitzgerald’s car. Fitzgerald

lost a leg but survived. Judge Wolf writes that it appeared Rico arranged to have the charges against Flemmi dropped. (U.S. v.

Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 181–182 (D. Mass. 1999)); see also AsVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00628 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
619

sociated Press Newswires, Salemme Claim of FBI Frame-up Draws

Criticism from Prosecutors, Mar. 24, 2001).906

9–21–99: Linda Reardon, a Bell Atlantic employee, allegedly tells

her father, Edward G. Duff, about electronic surveillance by the

FBI on certain South Boston telephone lines. Duff allegedly tells

Richard Schneiderhan who tells Kevin Weeks. Weeks allegedly

tells one of the targets of the electronic surveillance.907

John Martorano pleads guilty to killing ten people in the 1970’s

on behalf of a racketeering enterprise. The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘A

plea agreement calls for his cooperation against Bulger, Flemmi

and any former FBI agents being targeted in an ongoing corruption

probe. Martorano also agreed to plead guilty to second-degree murder charges in Oklahoma and Florida, two states with the death

penalty, with assurances that he’ll only face a 15-year prison term.

He’s also confessed to another 8 murders . . . for which it appears

he will never be charged.’’ U.S. District Judge Mark Wolf accepts

Martorano’s plea but postpones any decision on whether he will go

along with a government recommendation to sentence Martorano to

121⁄2 to 15 years imprisonment. (Shelley Murphy, Mobster Pleads

Guilty to Murders, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 1999).908

12–9–99: Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme reaches a plea agreement on

racketeering, loansharking, and extortion. In exchange, murder

charges were dropped. He is sentenced to eleven years in prison.

As part of the plea agreement, he agrees to testify against former

FBI Special Agents John Connolly and Paul Rico, and Winter Hill

gang leaders James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. (Shelley

Murphy, Salemme Pleads Guilty to Racketeering, BOSTON GLOBE,

Dec. 10, 1999; J.M. Lawrence, Prosecutors Rip Salemme Claim of

FBI Frame Job, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 24, 2001; Ralph Ranalli,

Salemme Reportedly to Testify Against Bulger, BOSTON GLOBE,

Mar. 13, 2001).909

12–13–99: Stephen Flemmi signs an affidavit stating the following: ‘‘(1) For many years, including the 1980’s, I acted as a confidential informant for the FBI; (2) My FBI handler was Special

Agent John Connolly; (3) In or near 1987, I reported to John

Connolly about information I knew concerning a number of meetings involving Anthony St. Laurent of Rhode Island and other

members of the LCN [La Cosa Nostra] regarding the ‘shakedown’

of a Las Vegas bookmaker; (4) At some point, I received reliable information that an associate of the Las Vegas bookmaker was planning to assassinate Anthony St. Laurent because St. Laurent had

threatened the bookmaker’s 15 year old daughter; (5) I immediately

gave this information to Connolly. At that point, Connolly told me

that St. Laurent was also a confidential informant for the FBI.

Connolly asked me to intercede and stop the attempted assassination. I was able to accomplish this task.’’ 910

12–22–99: Former FBI Special Agent John Connolly is arrested

and charged along with James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen

Flemmi for racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, obstruction of

justice, and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Flemmi is also charged

with passing classified information to Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme.

620

(Edmund Mahony, Former FBI Agent Indicted, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 23, 1999).911

2000

1–14–00: John McIntyre’s remains are found, after Bulger gang

lieutenant Kevin Weeks, who faced racketeering charges in late

1999, cut a deal with investigators and led them to the grave.

(Bulger and Flemmi allegedly killed McIntyre after McIntyre offered to cooperate with the authorities. According to U.S. District

Judge Mark Wolf, ‘‘There is circumstantial evidence to suggest that

[FBI Agent Roderick] Kennedy may have told [FBI Special Agent

John] Connolly about McIntyre’s cooperation . . . and reason to be

concerned that Connolly may have told Bulger and Flemmi.’’ (U.S.

v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp. 2d 141, 214–15 (D. Mass. 1999)).912

1–21–00: In a letter from John Cavicchi, Peter Limone’s attorney,

to John Durham, Cavicchi apparently encloses a file on a redacted

case and says the only published opinion on the F. Lee Bailey affidavit is Greco v. Workman, 481 F. Supp. 481 (1979).913

1–28–00: Agent Daniel M. Doherty debriefs John Martorano.914

2–10–00: Agent Daniel M. Doherty prepares a Report of Investigation. He indicates he interviewed ‘‘CS–00–098739’’ on July 12,

1999, and January 28, 2000, and that the confidential source told

him that Joseph Barboza and Vincent James Flemmi admitted to

killing Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan’s murder. The report states, ‘‘The

CS (Confidential Source) also stated, that either just prior to or immediately after the time period that Barboza began cooperating

with law enforcement, that he, Barboza, told the CS to mind it’s

own business and not to intervene, because ‘They’ (the LCN)

screwed me and now I’m going to screw as many of them as possible. Barboza further stated, that he was not interested in guilt or

innocence. Barboza again reiterated to the CS that the CS should

just stay out of it. Barboza told the CS that the CS was a friend

and that he, Barboza, would not bother the CS.’’ 915

Agent Daniel M. Doherty writes a memorandum to Fred Wyshak,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, stating that John Martorano advised that

he was a close associate to Joseph Barboza in the mid-1960s.

Martorano said that subsequent to the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

murder, Barboza admitted to Martorano that he, Barboza, killed

Deegan. On a separate occasion, Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi told

Martorano that he, Flemmi, killed Deegan. Just prior to or immediately after the time period that Barboza began to cooperate with

law enforcement, Barboza told Martorano to mind his own business

and not intervene. Barboza said La Cosa Nostra screwed me and

now ‘‘I’m going to screw as many of them as possible.’’ Barboza further said he was not interested in innocence or guilt.916

3–20–00: The government waits until this day, two months after

John McIntyre’s body was discovered, to dismiss the indictments

against McIntyre in United States v. Murray et al.917

5–25–00: Less than six months after learning sufficient facts to

verify both the government’s wrongful conduct and John McIntyre’s

fate, the McIntyre Estate presents a duly authorized Notice of Tort

621

Claim, pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671

et seq. The tort claim gives notice to the FBI of McIntyre’s injuries

and wrongful death caused by the negligent or wrongful acts or

omissions of certain employees of the Boston FBI Office. The plaintiff files the complaint on March 2, 2001. Among other things, the

Estate’s administrative claim and complaint allege that former

agents of the FBI conspired to protect and shield James ‘‘Whitey’’

Bulger and Stephen Flemmi from prosecution in exchange for their

agreements to provide information to aid the FBI in its prosecution

of La Cosa Nostra. The complaint also alleges that the Boston FBI

Office ignored the Attorney General’s Guidelines; that the individual agents knew or should have known that Bulger and Flemmi

were committing violent crimes, including the murder of informants cooperating with law enforcement; that despite this knowledge

the agents failed to prosecute and blocked investigations into Bulger and Flemmi; and that as a direct and proximate cause of the

negligence of these agents, Bulger, Flemmi, and Weeks murdered

McIntyre after he agreed to become an FBI informant in 1984.918

6–20–00: Peter Limone files a Motion for a New Trial.919

7–2–00: Peter Limone’s counsel moves to intervene in United

States v. Stephen J. Flemmi et al., Crim. No. 94–10287–MLW (D.

Mass.), before U.S. District Court Judge Mark L. Wolf. Judge Wolf

denies intervention but indicates that certain documents might be

discoverable in this proceeding. Judge Margaret Hinkle, Justice of

the Superior Court, thereafter gives notice to the U.S. Attorney’s

Office of Limone’s request for discovery of matters relating to the

motion. The local U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to review its files.

(This leads to the parties each receiving a telephone call from John

H. Durham, Special Attorney with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. This

telephone contact was followed by a letter to the parties from Durham dated December 19, 2000, enclosing 26 pages of FBI documents.) (See also 12–19–00 entry).920

7–27–00: Francis Imbruglia says in an affidavit, ‘‘I am stating

under oath and of my own personal knowledge that Peter Limone,

Henry Tameleo, and Louie [sic] Greco had nothing to do with . . .

the murder of Teddy Deegan.’’ 921

8–30–00: In a letter to John Cavicchi, who is Peter Limone’s attorney, Roy French writes, ‘‘[M]y affidavit was right on the money

with the exception of Joseph Salvati. . . . For the record, I have

no memory of Joseph Salvati being a part of my involvement with

the shooting death of ‘Teddy Deegan.’ He in no way aided me directly or indirectly . . . to truly defeat the testimony of Tony

Stathopoulos. [Stathopolous testified that he saw Louis Greco come

out of the alley.] [T]here is enough evidence to support that any

stride of walking or slowly running or hurriedly walking, was an

impossibility to perform by Louie [sic] Greco.922

9–19–00: Peter Limone files a Motion to Vacate Conviction and

Dismiss Indictments.923

9–28–00: In an unsealed indictment, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen Flemmi, and several underlings are indicted on 21 murders,

extortion, distribution of drugs, obstruction of justice, racketeering,

and money laundering.924

622

10–11–00: Former Special Agent John Connolly is indicted on a

range of charges, including providing tips to James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi to eliminate threats to their operations and

misleading grand jury investigations in the Winter Hill Gang extortions.925

11–14–00: Joseph Balliro, counsel for Henry Tameleo at the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan trial, submits an affidavit attesting that he

received a memorandum from F. Lee Bailey, and ‘‘it obviously exculpates Mr. Limone from being in any way responsible for the

death of Mr. Deegan.’’ Balliro says he never represented Stephen

Flemmi or Nick Femia. He has no knowledge of any information

that Freddie Chiampa or Frank [Francis] Imbruglia had about the

Deegan murder. He represented Joseph Barboza and Vincent

‘‘Jimmy’’ Flemmi 35–40 years ago on matters unrelated to the

Deegan matter, and he never received any information from

Barboza about the Deegan murder. Balliro says he did receive information about the Deegan murder from Vincent ‘‘Jimmy’’

Flemmi. Balliro says Flemmi’s information is exculpatory for

Limone and others charged and convicted of the murder. Balliro

says he would divulge the information upon court order. (Commonwealth v. Limone, Cr. No. 32367, 69–70 (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct., Nov.

14, 2000)).926

11–15–00: An indictment of former Massachusetts State Police

Officer Lieutenant Richard J. Schneiderhan, Edward G. Duff, and

Linda Reardon is handed down for conspiracy to obstruct justice,

obstruction of justice, and aiding and abetting. Schneiderhan and

Duff are related through marriage as brothers-in-law. Duff is

Reardon’s father. The indictment states that Schneiderhan maintained a personal friendship with Stephen Flemmi since the 1950s;

Schneiderhan maintained a personal, non-law enforcement relationship with John Martorano from the late 1960s to about 1978;

and Schneiderhan helped James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger escape capture by

informing him that certain Boston telephone lines were tapped.927

12–19–00: John Durham, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, writes

a letter to John Cavicchi, attorney for Peter Limone, regarding the

disclosure of FBI documents relating to the March 12, 1965, murder of Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan. The letter states in relevant part:

‘‘Joint Task Force’s [JTF] search first determined that around the

time Deegan was murdered, Vincent James Flemmi was an FBI informant. According to the file maintained in support of efforts to

develop Flemmi as an informant, focus on Flemmi’s potential as a

source began on about 3/9/1965. The first reported contact with

Flemmi was by FBI Boston Special Agent H. Paul Rico on 4/5/1965.

The informant file was officially opened and assigned to SA Rico

on 4/15/1965 and reflects that Flemmi was contacted a total of five

times as an informant, each time by SA Rico. The dates of contact

were 4/5/1965, 5/10/1965, 6/4/1965, 7/22/65 and 7/27/1965. Flemmi’s

file was closed on 9/15/1965 after Flemmi was charged with a

crime, unrelated to the Deegan murder.’’ John Durham makes 26

pages of FBI documents available to Joseph Salvati and Limone relating to the Deegan murder. However, Judge Margaret Hinkle

notes that the documents produced are ‘‘heavily redacted.’’ (ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00632 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
623

monwealth v. Limone, Cr. No. 32367, 32369, 32370 (Suffolk Cty.

Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 2001); see 1–5–01 entry).928

2001

1–2–01: Ronald Cassesso attorney Ronald Chisholm reveals that

Cassesso admitted to participating in the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan

murder and that four of the six convicted were innocent, but were

convicted by Barboza’s false testimony. Cassesso told Chisholm

that he was approached by Special Agent Paul Rico in 1967 while

awaiting trial. Rico told Cassesso that he could escape prison by

corroborating Barboza’s testimony—Cassesso refused. Edmund H.

Mahony, Murdered Said Four More Innocent in ’65 Slaying, Lawyer

Says, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 3, 2001, at A8.929

Joseph Balliro executes an affidavit stating that in the summer

of 1967, Vincent ‘‘James’’ Flemmi told Balliro that Joseph Barboza

planned the Edward ‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder and Flemmi participated in it. Flemmi also stated that Barboza substituted Joseph

Salvati for Flemmi because Salvati disrespected Barboza. Flemmi

also stated that Henry Tameleo and Peter Limone did not arrange

the murder, and Louis Greco was not a participant, but Barboza

implicated them because they also disrespected Barboza.930

1–5–01: Judge Hinkle’s Order granting Peter Limone a new trial

states, ‘‘[T]he jury would likely have reached a different conclusion

by this previously UNDISCUSSED evidence for two reasons. First,

the new evidence [Durham’s Dec. 19, 2000, disclosure of 26 pages

of FBI documents] casts serious doubt on Barboza’s credibility in

his account of Limone’s role. Second, the new evidence reveals that

Vincent James Flemmi, a participant of some sort in the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder, was an FBI informant around the time of

the murder.’’ (Commonwealth v. Limone, Cr. No. 32367, 32369,

32370, slip op. at *14 (Suffolk Cty. Sup. Ct., Jan. 5, 2001)).931

1–30–01: The Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office signs a

non-prosecution motion stating, ‘‘Now comes the Commonwealth in

the above-captioned matter [Commonwealth v. Salvati] and respectfully states that it will not prosecute Indictment No. 32368

[regarding Joseph Salvati] any further. As ground therefor, the

Commonwealth respectfully states as follows: (1) There exists

newly discovered evidence—various FBI documents disclosed to the

Commonwealth and the defendant for the first time on December

19, 2000—which significantly undermines (a) the credibility of the

Commonwealth’s principal witness at the defendant’s first trial, Joseph Barboza, and (b) the Commonwealth’s theory of the defendant’s role in the murder of Edward Deegan, as presented at the defendant’s first trial[;] (2) Joseph Barboza was shot and killed on

February 11, 1976[;] (3) The Commonwealth has conducted a comprehensive review of the facts and circumstances surrounding the

arrest, trial, and conviction of the defendant for his alleged role in

the murder of Edward Deegan, including the impact of the contents

of the newly discovered FBI documents[;] (4) In addition, the Commonwealth has carefully and thoroughly evaluated the nature,

quality, and sufficiency of the alleged evidence against the

defendant[;] (5) As a result of that review and evaluation, the ComVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00633 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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monwealth has concluded that it does not now have a good faith

basis—legally or ethically—to proceed with any further prosecution

of the defendant.’’ 932

A non-prosecution motion is also filed and signed by the Suffolk

County District Attorney’s Office stating that the Office will not

prosecute Peter Limone for his alleged involvement in the Edward

‘‘Teddy’’ Deegan murder. Ralph Ranalli, DA: No New Trials Against

2 in ’65 Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2001; see also Limone’s Motion to Dismiss.933

2–15–01: The Boston Globe reports that Charles Prouty said:

‘‘The FBI was forthcoming. We didn’t conceal the information. We

didn’t attempt to frame anyone.’’ As support for that statement,

Prouty cited the document from 3–16–65 that indicates information

was provided by the FBI to local law enforcement. (Shelley Murphy, FBI Says Documents Clear it of Wrongdoing in ’65 Case, BOS- TON GLOBE, February 15, 2001.)934

3–2–01: The McIntyre Estate files a complaint alleging misconduct on behalf of certain employees of the Boston FBI Office. In

particular, the filing says that the FBI ignored overwhelming evidence that James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi were killers. Plaintiff is seeking $50 million in damages. (See 5–25–00

entry).935

3–12–01: Francis ‘‘Frank’’ Salemme agrees to be a witness

against James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, Stephen Flemmi, and FBI Special

Agents Paul Rico and John Connolly. (Salemme Claim of FBI

Frame-up Draws Criticism from Prosecutors, Associated Press

Newswires, Mar. 24, 2001).936

Francis ‘‘Cadillac Frank’’ Salemme files a habeas corpus prisoner

petition ‘‘asking the judge for whatever relief he finds appropriate.’’

Salemme’s attorney, Anthony P. Cardinale, claims that ‘‘[t]he government literally suborned perjury in order to frame [Salemme] in

the state case.’’ (J.M. Lawrence, Salemme Claims FBI Fudged Evidence Against Him, BOSTON HERALD, Mar. 13, 2001). In said petition, ‘‘Salemme claims the FBI pressured a witness [Robert

Daddeico] to lie in order to protect [Stephen] Flemmi, an informant, and make sure he went to prison.’’ (Salemme Claim of FBI

Frame-up Draws Criticism from Prosecutors, Associated Press

Newswires, Mar. 24, 2001; see also Ralph Ranalli, Salemme Reportedly to Testify Against Bulger, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2001).937

3–13–01: The Estate of Michael J. Donahue files suit against the

FBI, including Special Agent John Connolly, Supervisory Special

Agent John Morris, Boston SAC Lawrence Sarhatt, Assistant SAC

Robert Fitzpatrick, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, and Stephen Flemmi.

The Donahue case centers on: (1) the May 11, 1982, murder of Michael J. Donahue, an innocent bystander to the intentional murder

of Brian Halloran; (2) the systemic wrongful acts and practices of

the FBI which directly and proximately caused this murder; and (3)

the FBI’s intentional and pervasive effort to conceal its role in the

murder. Allegations include that FBI Supervisory Special Agent

John Morris and Special Agent John Connolly provided confidential

law enforcement information to James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger, a known

crime figure, and that Brian Halloran was cooperating with law enVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:39 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00634 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 D:\REPORTS\90615.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
625

forcement and was providing information that Bulger was involved

in the previous murder of Roger Wheeler. It is alleged that they did

so knowing that Bulger was a dangerous criminal and would kill

Halloran. It is also alleged that as a direct result of the information

provided by Connolly and Morris, Bulger and members of his

Group murdered Brian Halloran, killing Donahue as an innocent

bystander. Donahue and Halloran were neighbors and when the

murders occurred, Donahue was giving Halloran a ride home in the

course of errands to plan for a family fishing trip. As causes for Michael Donahue’s death, the Donahue Family points to the intentional acts of line and supervisory FBI agents, the persistent reckless and intentional indifference of the FBI and its supervisory

agents to the wrongdoing of its agents and informants, and the environment created and maintained at the FBI which allowed and

encouraged this wrongful conduct. The Donahue Family seeks $36

million in compensatory damages.938

May 2001: Stephen Flemmi agrees to a plea bargain with the

U.S. Attorney’s Office on extortion, money laundering, and obstruction of justice charges. Flemmi is sentenced to ten years. In return,

prosecutors drop charges on three murders Flemmi and James

‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger allegedly committed in the 1960s. (John Ellement,

Mobster Pleads Guilty to 10 Counts of Murder, BOSTON GLOBE,

July 18, 2001).939

5–3–01: FBI Director Louis J. Freeh issues a statement discussing the goals of an independent Justice Task Force led by Special

Attorney John Durham that is charged with investigating law enforcement corruption arising out of the FBI’s handling of criminal

informants James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen Flemmi. Specifically, he states the Joint Task Force’s ongoing Deegan inquiry is

focused on: ‘‘Whether the FBI’s assistance to local authorities in

this murder investigation was designed, at least in part, to protect

Vincent James Flemmi from being prosecuted; Whether the FBI’s

motivation linked to Flemmi’s status as a former FBI informant

and/or the informant status of his brother, Stephen Flemmi; and,

Whether the FBI properly disseminated potentially exculpatory information to local investigators/prosecutors.’’ 940

The U.S. House Committee on Government Reform holds its first

hearing to explore federal law enforcement initiatives in Boston

over the last three decades. The first hearing focuses on the case

of Joseph Salvati, who spent 30 years in prison for a murder he

did not commit. The convictions were primarily based on the testimony of notorious Boston mobster killer turned FBI witness, Joseph ‘‘The Animal’’ Barboza. Documents obtained by the Committee

prior to the hearing show that not only was the prosecution of Joseph Salvati and three others questionable, but that federal and

state law enforcement authorities had information indicating that

they were sending the wrong men to the death chamber or prison

for life. ‘‘Investigation into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct in New England,’’ Hearings Before the Comm. on Govt. Reform, 107th Cong. (May 3, 2001).

5–4–01: In a letter to the Government Reform Committee from

the Mayor of Springfield, Massachusetts, Michael Albano writes

626

that the FBI conspired to keep Joseph Salvati, Louis Greco, Henry

Tameleo, and Peter Limone in prison.941

5–16–01: FBI Director Louis Freeh testifies before the House

Committee on Appropriations: Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and Judiciary. When asked by Florida Representative

Dan Miller ‘‘[i]s there anything you can say on [the Joseph Salvati]

case and on behalf of the FBI and the Salvati family,’’ Freeh states

that the Salvati case is ‘‘obviously a great travesty, a great failure,

disgraceful to the extent that my agency or any other law enforcement agency contributed to that.’’ He further states, ‘‘What I would

say certainly to the family and any victim in such a situation is

there is nothing worse that can happen under a system of law that

an innocent person is either charged or in this case punished for

that period of time. It’s a travesty, it’s a disgrace, it shouldn’t happen. I don’t believe it happens frequently under our system, but it

does. And when it does, it is of the gravest concern.’’ When Rep.

Miller asks Freeh ‘‘[i]s there someone in the FBI who should have

been more proactive in trying to help him through the process,’’

Freeh responds that ‘‘we came into the situation, unfortunately, too

late, but we did develop—as I understand it, we developed all the

evidence which has gone now to his exoneration, with a lot of other

people in the U.S. Attorney’s office, but we’re the ones who picked

those pieces back up. It should have never gotten to that point.’’ 942

7–3–01: John Fitzgerald dies in South Dakota (Joe Fitzgerald,

Praise for One who Turned Tragedy to Triumph, BOSTON HERALD, July 11, 2001; Andy Dabilis & Ralph Ranalli, Mob Lawyer Maimed

in ’68 Dies, BOSTON GLOBE, July 5, 2001).943

7–17–01: Stephen Flemmi pleads not guilty to ten charges of

murder. (John Ellement, Mobster Pleads Guilty to 10 Counts of

Murder, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 2001).944

Stephen Flemmi’s alleged murder victims in Boston include:

John McIntyre, Edward Connors, Thomas King, Arthur ‘‘Bucky’’

Barrett, Richard Castucci, James Sousa, Debra Davis, and Deborah

Hussey. (J.M. Lawrence, Flemmi Vows Innocence as Case Heads to

Trial, BOSTON HERALD, July 18, 2001).945

7–30–01: Linda Reardon takes a plea bargain on obstruction of

justice charges before Judge Edward Harrington. Reardon admits

telling her father, Edward G. Huff, about the existence of FBI pen

registers on the phones of Billy Bulger and John ‘‘Jackie’’ Bulger.

Huff passed the information to his brother-in-law Richard

Schneiderhan, who passed the information in a note to Kevin

Weeks. (John Ellement, Woman Admits Role in Tipping Bulgers to

Wiretaps, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2001).946

8–2–01: The Estate of Brian Halloran files suit against the

United States, acting through the FBI and DOJ, and others. The

Halloran suit centers on the May 11, 1982, murder of Brian

Halloran. Halloran, at the time, was providing information to the

FBI due to murder charges that he himself was facing. In the

course of his cooperation, Halloran provided information implicating James Bulger and the Winter Hill Gang in the murder of Roger

Wheeler. Halloran had indicated that Bulger and others offered

him the contract to kill Wheeler, but he declined. Like the Donahue

627

action (see 3–13–01 entry), the Halloran Complaint adopts the judicial findings and Government allegations that Supervisory Special

Agent John Morris wrongfully relayed the information regarding

Halloran’s cooperation to Bulger. Plaintiff seeks $25 million in

damages.947

9–10–01: Louis Greco’s attorney John Cavicchi files a Petition for

Pardon to exonerate Greco with the Massachusetts Parole Board by

wiping ‘‘away ‘the stigma of this wrongful conviction’ posthumously

for the sake of Greco’s family.’’ (J.M. Lawrence, Parole Board Asked

to Clear Dead Man of Murder He Didn’t Commit, BOSTON HERALD,

Nov. 12, 2001).948

10–1–01: A few days before he is interviewed by the Committee

on Government Reform and three days after a government prosecutor appears to have spoken to him,949 Robert Daddeico is presented

with the following proposal by the FBI: ‘‘Robert Daddieco, also

known as [Name Redacted by Committee], hereby acknowledges receipt from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of $15,000 for

expenses to assist with his relocation, which expenses are being

paid in consideration of the assistance he provided to the FBI. Mr.

Daddieco acknowledges that the FBI has no further financial obligation to him. In addition, Mr. Daddieco acknowledges that he is

aware of and has been advised by the FBI of potential risks to him

as a result of his cooperation with the FBI. In addition, Mr.

Daddieco acknowledges that he was offered protection in the Witness Security Program (hereafter the ‘‘program’’). Mr. Daddieco acknowledges that he was interviewed by the United States Marshal’s Service and was accepted into the ‘‘program.’’ However, Mr.

Daddieco thereafter indicates that he did not wish to enter the program. Mr. Daddieco acknowledges that he has been advised of and

fully understands the risks he is incurring as a result of his decision, and, fully understanding the risks, still wishes to be responsible for his own relocation. The payment of $15,000 to Mr.

Daddieco is intended to allow Mr. Daddieco to relocate on his own

in lieu of his participation in the program. Since Mr. Daddieco is

not relying on protective assistance from the government and in

further consideration of this payment of $15,000 from the FBI, Mr.

Daddieco agrees, on his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and

assigns, to hold the United States, its agencies and its employees

harmless for any injuries or death to him and/or his family resulting from his cooperation with and assistance to the FBI.’’ Special

Agent Mike Buckley handled this matter. Daddieco does not sign

this agreement, nor does he accept the $15,000.950

10–30–01: Stephen Flemmi’s affidavit dated December 13, 1999,

is submitted today ‘‘by convicted Rhode Island mobster Robert

DeLuca, along with a motion to set aside his May 1994 state gambling conviction. DeLuca argues that he is innocent and that St.

Laurent, a co-defendant in his case, set him up for investigators

while working as an informant for the FBI and Rhode Island State

Police. . . . DeLuca, who gained notoriety as one of four soldiers

inducted into the New England Mafia in 1989 during a blood-oath

ceremony that was bugged by the FBI, has about four years left to

serve in federal prison on racketeering and extortion charges.’’

628

Shelley Murphy, Mobster Says He Stopped a Hit, BOSTON.COM, Oct.

31, 2001.951

11–6–01: In a letter to Attorney General John Ashcroft, three

Massachusetts Congressmen, Representatives Barney Frank, Martin Meehan, and William Delahunt criticize the Justice Department for using ‘‘procedural tactics’’ to try and quash the John

McIntyre suit. The Congressmen called the government’s motion

‘‘embarrassing.’’ They write that ‘‘the Justice Department has resorted to the kinds of procedural tactics that give the legal profession a bad name.’’ 952

11–15–01: In the civil suit The Estate of John L. McIntyre v.

U.S., Plaintiff McIntyre writes the following in its Opposition to

Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss: ‘‘The government’s

motion to dismiss is all the more striking because in hearings before Judge Wolf, the government continued in its obstructionist

conduct concerning McIntyre’s disappearance causing the court to

lament that the question concerning McIntyre’s disappearance and

death could not ‘‘be resolved on the present record, in part because

of the delayed disclosure of documents by the government and in

part because ‘‘it evidently was not in either the interest of Flemmi

or of the FBI to have this issue fully developed in this case.’’ See

United States v. Salemme, 91 F.Supp.2d 141, 213 (D. Mass. 1999).

The government’s shroud of secrecy first began to unravel when

Stephen Flemmi claimed in court pleadings that he was protected

from criminal prosecution based upon direct promises made to him

by government agents. At first, the government suggested that

Flemmi’s claim was preposterous, but due to incessant and insistent judicial prodding, Flemmi’s ‘fiction’ became fact—bodies were

recovered from the frozen earth of Dorchester and on December 22,

1999 the lead government agent was indicted for a RICO violation,

including the allegation of his involvement in two murders. . . .

Though plaintiff presented its administrative claim less then six

months after learning sufficient facts to verify both the government’s wrongful conduct and McIntyre’s fate, the United States has

filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) claiming

the Estate failed to present its administrative claim within two

years of its accrual as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b). . . . The

government’s motion to dismiss is factually insipid, legal deficient,

and flirts with Rule 11. How is it that Mrs. McIntyre living alone

and caring for her disabled daughter—who was treated as an outcast by law enforcement and did not have the power or authority

to investigate criminal wrongdoing, wiretap telephones, conceal

electronic eavesdropping devices in private homes and garages,

offer immunity to those destined to long prison sentences—could

have gained facts sufficient to file a lawsuit when those very facts

allegedly escaped or eluded the investigatory power and resources

of the federal government, until the government was forced fed

them by Judge Wolf.’’ 953

12–19–01: Roy French is freed from prison. The Boston Globe reports, ‘‘The only man to admit he helped murder Edward ‘Teddy’

Deegan in a Chelsea alley 36 years ago saw his convictions wiped

out yesterday by Suffolk prosecutors, who decided recently discovered evidence of FBI misconduct denied Wilfred Roy French a fair

629

trial. . . . Assistant District Attorney Mark T. Lee said that while

the FBI reports strongly indicated Limone and Salvati were not involved in Deegan’s murder, they did not absolve French. ‘It has always been our view that he was one of the shooters,’ Lee said of

French. Deegan was shot by three different weapons. And that

hasn’t changed, he said. Lee said Martin’s office decided to effectively wipe off French’s accessory-to-murder convictions from his

criminal record because the revelations in the FBI reports seriously

undermine their ability to retry French, especially since Barboza is

dead. French’s attorneys were seeking a new trial based on the FBI

reports.’’ John Ellement & Kathleen Burge, Deegan Defendant

Freed After 34 Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 2001.954

2002

1–10–02: The government files for dismissal in the Brian

Halloran lawsuit. The government claims that ‘‘plaintiff failed to

present its administrative claim within two years of its accrual as

required by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).’’ The government argues

that the action should have been filed in 1984, which was two

years after Halloran’s death. In the alternative, it claims that the

deadline was April 1998, which was two years after the reporting

of Supervisory Special Agent John Morris’s testimony. The Motion

is submitted by Assistant Attorney General Robert D. McCallum,

Phyliss Pyles, Peter Schlossman, and Margaret Krawiec.955

2–12–02: Jack Zalkind tells reporter J.M. Lawrence that

Barboza’s testimony was corroborated by others involved in the

case. J.M. Lawrence, Justice Dept. Won’t Turn Over Memo in

Salvati Case, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 12, 2002.956

5–28–02: Former Special Agent John Connolly is convicted of

‘‘charges that he shielded the gangsters, accepted a bribe and

tipped them to impending indictments. After deliberating two days,

a federal jury found Connolly, 61, guilty of one count of racketeering, three counts of obstruction of justice and one count of making

a false statement to the FBI. . . . Jurors found Connolly not guilty

of one crime: leaking the identities of three men who had been

talking to the FBI. The men were killed by mobsters in retaliation,

prosecutors alleged.’’ (Pamela Ferdinand, Ex-FBI Agent Convicted

of Helping Gangsters, Wash. Post, May 28, 2002; see also Shelley

Murphy and Thanassis Cambanis, Connolly Convicted, BOSTON

GLOBE, May 29, 2002; J.M. Lawrence, Former FBI Agent Guilty,

BOSTON HERALD, May 29, 2002).957

7–31–02: Senior U.S. District Judge for the District of Massachusetts Edward Harrington sends a letter to his colleague on the

bench, U.S. District Judge Joseph L. Tauro, who is presiding over

the John Connolly sentencing matter. The letter outlines the reasons why Connolly’s crime-fighting contributions should win him

leniency when he is sentenced on September 16, 2002. This conduct

is in contravention of the code of conduct governing federal judges,

which specifically prohibits judges from initiating contact with a

sentencing judge. See Jonathan Wells, Connolly Letter May be Ethics Violation, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 3, 2002.958

630

8–5–02: Due to public pressure, Senior U.S. District Judge Edward Harrington withdraws his letter urging Judge Joseph Tauro

to be lenient on convicted former FBI Special Agent John Connolly

when he is sentenced in September. In the letter to Judge Tauro

withdrawing his earlier request, Harrington insists that his first

letter was proper: ‘‘I believed that my letter was entirely proper as

it was requested by the defendant, relates to specialized knowledge

acquired as a federal prosecutor, and concerns the type of information traditionally considered by courts.’’ He further writes, ‘‘Given

the present controversy surrounding my letter, I ask that my letter

be withdrawn and not be considered in any way.’’ He also apologizes to the court for any inconvenience or distraction his letter

caused. See Thanassis Cambanis, Judge Withdraws Connolly letter,

BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 2002.959

8–14–02: Joseph Salvati files a notice under the Federal Tort

Claims Act that he plans to sue the government for $300 million.

See J.M. Lawrence, Salvati to Sue Feds for $300M, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 14, 2002.960

8–15–02: The Judicial Council of the First Circuit, a disciplinary

committee, brings a complaint against Senior U.S. District Judge

Edward Harrington for asking a colleague on the bench to be lenient on former FBI Special Agent John Connolly at his sentencing

in September 2002. Harrington responds to the complaint stating:

‘‘Upon reflection, I did commit a clear violation of Canon 2(B) of the

Code of Conduct for United States Judges in writing a letter to District Judge Tauro relating to the sentencing in a criminal matter.’’

He further states, ‘‘For this act, I am exceedingly sorry and sincerely apologize to the Judicial Council and to my fellow judges in

the First Circuit.’’ See Thanassis Cambanis, Council Accepts

Judge’s Apology, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2002.961

8–23–02: The Judicial Council of the First Circuit, a disciplinary

committee, decides that Judge Edward Harrington has been punished enough after he admitted that he broke ethical rules when

he asked Judge Tauro to be lenient on former FBI Special Agent

John Connolly at his sentencing next month. The Chief Judge of

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit writes, ‘‘I find that

Judge Harrington’s withdrawal of his July 31 letter, his admission

of a clear violation of the Code of Conduct, his sincere apology, and

his agreement to allow all complaint materials to be made public

constitute appropriate corrective action to remedy the problem

raised by the complaint.’’ See Thanassis Cambanis, Council Accepts

Judge’s Apology, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 24, 2002.962

9–16–02: Former Special Agent John Connolly is sentenced to ten

years in prison for breaking the law to protect his notorious gangster informants, James ‘‘Whitey’’ Bulger and Stephen ‘‘The Rifleman’’ Flemmi. See Shelley Murphy, Connolly Sentenced to 10-Year

Maximum, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 17, 2002.963

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