Report Coordinator

Shahla Shapouri

Stacey Rosen

Principal Contributors 

M.S. Deepak

Matthew Edwards 

Michael Kurtzig

William Liefert

Birgit Meade

Anita Regmi

Stacey Rosen

Shahla Shapouri

Michael Trueblood

Technical Editor

Diane Decker

Production/Design

Wynnice Pointer-Napper

Victor Phillips, Jr.

Cover Photo

FAO

Ecuador, by J. Bravo

Approved by the World

Agricultural Outlook Board.

Summary released December 7,

1999. Summary and full report

may be accessed electronically via

the ERS web site at

http://www.econ.ag.gov.

FOOD SECURITY

ASSESSMENT

Situation and Outlook Series

Contents

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Global Food Security: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Regional Summaries:

North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

New Independent States (NIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Special Articles:

Low-Income Developing Countries and Trade Liberalization: 

An Overview of the Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Trade Liberalization and the Sub-Saharan African Countries . .29 

Trade Issues for Low-Income Countries in the Latin America 

and Caribbean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

Trade Liberalization and the South Asian Economies: 

Adjusting to the Challenges of Globalization . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

Boxes:

How Food Security Is Assessed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Population Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Accelerated Export Growth Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Food Aid for Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24

Country Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
 ✺ 

				
 
	



Preface

This report continues the series of food assessments begun in the late 1970s. Global Food Assessments were done from 1990

to 1992, hence the GFA series. In 1993, the title was changed to Food Aid Needs Assessment to more accurately reflect the

contents of the report, which focuses on selected developing countries with past or continuing food deficits. In 1997, we

widened our analysis beyond the assessment of aggregate food availability to include more aspects of food security. We therefore changed the title to Food Security Assessment.

Acknowledgments

Appreciation is extended to Neil Conklin, Director of the Market and Trade Economics Division, for his support of the food

security work and to Cheryl Christensen for valuable comments on the articles. We would also like to thank the reviewers,

especially Mary Bohman, Fred Surls, Phil Abbott, Bob Thompson, Ron Trostle, Carol Goodloe, Jane Bardon, Amy Haught,

and Sharon Sheffield for their comments. Special thanks are extended to Diane Decker, Wynnice Pointer-Napper, and Victor

Phillips, Jr. for editorial and design assistance.

	

	


	











	









 
	

		
	

!"#


"$






	





	

	
%


&
'(')'(#'*((




	


"+&,,
-'*#../01
2	.

.
&'('3(#410(
'(')'(#34*1 
$
			

	
	





 

Broad trends in food production and prices indicate a decline

in the share of people who do not have access to adequate

food levels. However, the aggregate figure masks variation in

food security among regions, countries, and income groups

within countries. The food security position of low-income

countries is evaluated by projecting the gaps between food

consumption (domestic production, plus commercial imports,

minus non-food use) and consumption targets through the next

decade. The targets are: 1) maintaining per capita food consumption at 1996-98 levels (also referred to as status quo), and

2) meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements.

In 1999, the food gap to maintain per capita consumption at

1996-98 levels in 67 low-income developing countries is estimated at nearly 13 million tons, about 2 million tons more

than estimated for 1998. Around 400,000 tons of the increase

arose from adding a new country, North Korea, to the analysis

this year. The gap to meet minimum nutritional requirements

is estimated to be higher at 15 million tons. Despite the

increase in the gap, the share of people who do not have

access to adequate food levels is projected to decline from 34

percent in 1999 to 32 percent in 2009. The 67 countries in the

study either have been or may become food aid recipients. In

the projections, however, the availability of food aid is

excluded. Therefore, depending upon future food aid availabilities, some or all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated.

During the next decade, the food gaps with respect to both

consumption targets are projected to widen. The gap to

maintain per capita consumption increases 37 percent to

17.4 million tons in 2009, while the nutritional gap expands

54 percent to more than 23 million tons. Food consumption

is projected to fall short of the nutritional requirement in 30

countries, while 45 countries are expected to face a decline

in per capita consumption in 2009.

Unequal purchasing power exacerbates food insecurity in the

67 countries. As would be expected, the estimated results

show food consumption in the lowest income quintile to be

much lower than that of the highest income quintile. For

example, food consumption by people in the lowest income

quintile in the Latin American countries—the region with the

most skewed income distribution—is estimated to equal only

79 percent of the minimum nutritional requirement in 1999,

compared with 126 percent in the highest income quintile. 

For the 67 countries as a whole, the “distribution gap” (the

amount of food needed to raise consumption of each income

group to the minimum nutritional requirement) is projected

to widen 17 percent over the next decade and exceed 33

million tons in 2009. The growth of this gap surpasses the

growth in the number of people becoming food insecure. In

fact, the number of people failing to meet nutritional

requirements is projected to grow less than 13 percent to

nearly 1 billion by 2009. This implies that the distributionrelated problems will intensify more than they will spread.

Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to account for about 50 

percent of the food gap to maintain consumption and 70

percent of the nutritional gap of the 67 countries in 2009.

Despite significant growth in the region’s agricultural 

production, the relatively high population growth and 

limited financial resources that constrain imports will lead

to declining per capita consumption. 

The distribution gap, which incorporates the impact of

skewed income distribution, is projected to be 33 percent

higher than Sub-Saharan Africa’s average national nutritional gap. Based on the estimated distribution gap, the

number of people who fail to meet their nutritional requirement is projected to jump 40 percent over the next decade to

438 million in 2009. This means that 60 percent of the

region’s population will be food insecure.

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and North Korea account for all

of the nutritional food gaps in the Asian region. The number

of people who can not meet their nutritional requirements is

projected to decline 19 percent through 2009.

Per capita food consumption in the Latin American and

Caribbean countries is expected to stagnate over the next

decade. The projected distribution gap for the region is more

than two times the average national nutritional gap in 2009.

The number of people who can not meet their nutritional

requirement is projected to increase 32 percent between

1999 and 2009. The region’s food import dependency is

projected to rise to 47 percent by 2009, indicating that foreign exchange availability to support food imports will be

crucial to the food security of Latin America and the

Caribbean over the long term.

Per capita food consumption in North Africa, on average, is

projected to remain above nutritional requirements during

the next decade. However, a relatively small food gap to

maintain base per capita consumption levels is projected,

primarily in Algeria and to a lesser extent in Egypt.

Of the five New Independent States included in the study,

only Tajikistan is projected to be vulnerable to food insecurity in the long term. Consumption in the other four countries is projected to rise, assuming continued peace.


	

 

				


✺ 

Summary
!"#$%	

The broad trends in global food production and prices indicate an improvement in food security and a decline in the proportion of people who do not have access to adequate food.

The aggregate figure, however, masks the variation in food

security among regions, countries, and income groups. The

nature of food security problems also differs both in magnitude and in causes among countries. In lower income countries, inadequate resources, both physical and financial, are

the root causes of the food security problem. In higher

income, developing countries, food insecurity stems from

the unequal distribution of food resulting from wide disparities in purchasing power. The differences in the causes of

food insecurity influence the assessment of the amount of

food needed and strategies required to achieve food security. 

The future food security position of the 67 developing countries included in this study is evaluated by projecting the

gaps between food consumption (domestic production, plus

commercial imports, minus nonfood use) and two different

consumption targets through the next decade. It should be

emphasized that the availability of food aid is excluded in

these projections. The two consumption targets are: 1) maintaining per capita consumption at 1996-98 levels (also

referred to as status quo) and 2) meeting minimum recommended nutritional requirements (see box “How Food

Security Is Assessed”). The estimated nutritional gap only

measures the gap in calorie consumption and does not consider other factors such as poor utilization of food due to

inadequate consumption of micronutrients and lack of health

and sanitary facilities.

These national level analyses mask the impact of unequal

incomes on food security. People in lower income groups

have larger nutrition gaps than wealthier people. The distribution gap is the amount of food required to raise food consumption for each income group to the level that meets the

nutritional requirement. 

&'!$'(
)))

This report focuses on 67 lower income developing countries, one country—North Korea—more than was included in

the 1998 Food Security Assessment report. All historical and

projected data have been updated. The food production estimates for 1999 are based on USDA data as of October 1999.

The most significant changes in projection results are due to

the use of the latest United Nations population projections

that show a much faster decline in population growth than

their earlier projections (see box “Population Estimates”). 

In this report, we have included an accelerated export

growth scenario that examines the implications of faster

export earnings growth on food security of the study countries (see box “Accelerated Export Growth Scenario”). 

This report also includes an overview section on the issues

important to developing countries with respect to upcoming

trade liberalization rounds. Trade issues that are particularly

important for Sub-Saharan Africa, lower income Latin

America, and South Asian countries are highlighted in separate articles. 

$*#$'("'

+'#


The long term food gaps for the 67 countries are lower than

those reported in last year’s assessment, principally due to

lower rates of population growth. The regional pattern of

food insecurity, however, remains the same. Slow production growth continues to be a threat to the food security of

countries facing foreign exchange constraints that limit their

ability to use food imports to compensate for production

shortfalls. The status quo food gaps (or food needed to

maintain per capita consumption at the 1996-98 base level)

are estimated at 13 million tons for 1999. The food gaps to

meet minimum nutritional requirements are estimated at 15

million tons. Weather-related production shortfalls account

for about 62 percent of the status quo and 9 percent of nutritional gaps in 1999. 

Depending on the future availability of food aid, a portion or

all of the projected food gaps can be eliminated. For example, in 1998 roughly 7.1 million tons of food aid were distributed globally. If the same amount is provided in 1999, it

would fill more than 70 percent of the calculated gap to

maintain per capita consumption and nearly half of the nutritional gap. The latest forecast for 1999 global food aid is

much higher, 9.65 million tons, but the amount going to low-

 ✺ 

				
 
	



Global Food Security: Overview 

	


			





		
		

		



	

		
	


					

 !
income, food-deficit countries is estimated to be below 7

million tons, less than half of the estimated nutritional gap. 

The long term projections indicate growing food gaps with

respect to both consumption targets in the 67 countries.

Forty-five of the countries are expected to face a declining

per capita consumption trend through the next decade. Food

consumption is projected to fall short of nutritional requirements in 30 countries in 2009.

When the impact of unequal incomes is taken into account,

the estimated results show food consumption in the lowest

income quintile to be much lower than the national average.

For example, the lowest income quintile in the Latin

American countries—the region with the most skewed

income distribution—is estimated to consume only 79 percent of the nutritional requirement in 1999, compared to 126

percent in the highest income quintile. The distribution gap

(the amount of food need to raise consumption of each

income group to meet the minimum nutritional requirement)

in all study countries is projected to increase more than 17

percent during the next decade, exceeding 33 million tons in

2009. This gap is 43 percent wider than the regions’ average

national nutrition food gap.

Based on the estimated distribution gaps, we calculated the

number of people (in each income quintile) whose consumption falls short of the minimum nutritional requirement

in each country. For the 67 countries, the number of people

failing to meet the nutritional target is projected to grow less

than 13 percent during the next decade, reaching 978 million by 2009. (It should be noted that in the 1998 Food

Security Assessment Report, this number was higher

because of the higher population growth projections—1.14

billion for 2008). The results also indicate that the estimated

growth of the distribution gap—17 percent—surpasses the

growth in the number of people becoming food insecure.

This means distribution-related nutritional problems will

intensify more than they will spread. 


	

 

				


✺ !

Table 1--Food Availability and Food Gaps for 67 Countries

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate Population

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons --- Million

1990 359,382 48,863 29,893 10,136 558,363 2,141

1991 374,218 52,856 30,353 10,638 577,435 2,188

1992 378,099 55,535 42,585 10,189 597,221 2,262

1993 386,545 57,389 44,549 8,224 619,280 2,310

1994 395,402 58,559 46,570 7,757 625,951 2,358

1995 397,171 59,428 54,204 6,117 656,991 2,406

1996 419,032 61,053 48,269 5,516 668,989 2,454

1997 406,284 60,912 56,816 4,690 697,155 2,503

1998 423,931 61,318 68,143 5,034 706,255 2,552

Projections Food gap*

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 423,891 62,609 62,534 12,709 15,023 694,736 2,600

2004 472,056 67,726 69,179 12,245 18,204 766,722 2,847

2009 514,343 73,213 78,561 17,427 23,141 840,095 3,090

(grain equiv.)

Figure 1

Food Gaps in All 67 Countries, 1999-2009

Million tons

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

25

20

15

10

5

0 0

5

10

15

20

25

Nutritional gap

Gap to maintain consumption

*SQ stands for status quo and describes the amount of grain equivalent needed to support 1996-98 levels of per capita consumption and NR stands for nutritional

requirements and describes the amount needed to support minimum nutritional standards (see box “ How Food Security Is Assessed.”)
,-'."(	'/

0,(

Sub-Saharan Africa (37 countries) is projected to account

for about 50 percent of the food gap to maintain consumption and 70 percent of the total nutritional gap (of the 67

study countries) in 2009. Despite significant growth in SubSaharan Africa’s agricultural production, relatively high

population growth, and limited financial resources that constrain imports, will lead to declining per capita consumption. Projected production growth of 2.1 percent per year

through the next decade is slightly lower than the projection

included in the 1998 assessment because of slower growth

in the availability of labor, the principal input in production.

It should be noted that in the Food Security model, the marginal productivity of labor is assumed constant over the projection period. For the Sub-Saharan countries, this may be

an overestimation because the decline in population growth

is in part due to the spread of AIDS, which affects the most

productive segment of the population, those aged 15 to 45.

This age cohort comprises nearly 50 percent of the region’s

population. Their deaths lead to a disproportionately high

number of old people and children, including millions of

orphans, who are less productive members of the economy. 

The decline in per capita consumption is reflected in an

almost twofold increase in the status quo food gap and a 44-

percent increase in the region’s nutrition gap over the next

decade. Of the 37 countries covered in the study, on average, per capita food consumption is projected to rise in only

8 countries, and 15 countries should be able to supply adequate food to meet their nutritional requirement in 2009. 

The distribution gap, which incorporates the impact of

skewed income distribution, is projected to rise from more

than 15 million tons in 1999 to more than 21 million tons in

2009, 33 percent higher than the national average nutrition

gap. Based on the estimated distribution gap, the number of

people in different income quintiles who fail to meet their

nutritional requirement is projected to jump 40 percent to

438 million in 2009. This increase is roughly triple the rate

of the 67 countries as a whole. 

The 1999 estimates of food gaps are highly influenced by

production variability, either weather-related or due to civil

strife. Food aid shipments to these countries have declined

through time, from 8.1 million tons or about 50 percent of

total food imports in the early 1980s, to roughly 2 million

tons or 13 percent in 1998. Without a significant increase in

food aid, per capita food consumption will certainly decline

for the next decade.

$-"	..	"

"	
"

,*,	

The 10 countries in the Asian region studied here are projected to face declining per capita consumption levels, on

average, and the food required to maintain per capita consumption and the minimum nutritional standard is projected

to double during the next decade. Afghanistan, Bangladesh,

and North Korea account for all of the region’s nutrition

gaps during the projection period. The region’s distribution

gap is projected to decrease 11 percent between 1999 and

2009, and the number of people who cannot meet their

nutritional requirement is projected to decline 19 percent

over the next decade. However, the region is still projected

to account for nearly half of the people who cannot meet

their nutritional requirement in the study countries in 2009.

Per capita food consumption in the lower income Latin

American and Caribbean countries (eleven countries) is

expected to stagnate over the next decade. Despite a relatively slow increase in food production of 1.7 percent per

year, strong commercial import growth of 2.1 percent will

raise food supplies sufficiently to keep up with population

growth. The average regional performance masks the 

individual country situation. Among countries, Ecuador, El

Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru

are projected to experience declining per capita consumption

" ✺ 

				
 
	



Table 2--Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirements

Region Year Income quintiles

Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest

North Africa 1999 1.10 1.18 1.24 1.30 1.41

2009 1.21 1.27 1.32 1.37 1.48

Sub-Saharan Africa 1999 0.81 0.90 0.96 1.03 1.19

2009 0.80 0.88 0.95 1.01 1.17

Asia 1999 0.95 1.02 1.07 1.13 1.23

2009 0.97 1.04 1.10 1.15 1.27

Latin America & Caribbean 1999 0.79 0.94 1.02 1.10 1.26

2009 0.83 0.93 1.01 1.08 1.28

NIS 1/ 1999 0.78 0.88 0.93 0.99 1.08

2009 0.96 1.05 1.11 1.18 1.30

1/ Based on average regional income distribution.

	

 

				


✺ #

25%

64%

5%

1% 5%

Figure 2

Sub-Saharan Africa Has Only 25 Percent of the Population of the 67 Countries, But Accounts

for 75 Percent of the Nutritional Gap in 1999

37%

28%

2%

7%

26%

51%

35%

7%

7%

70%

22%

6% 2%

75%

15%

4%

6%

Population in 2009

1999--Nutritional Gap 2009--Nutritional Gap

1999--Status Quo Gap 2009--Status Quo Gap

SS-Africa

Asia

Latin America

NIS

North Africa
levels. The distribution gap that stems from highly skewed

purchasing power intensifies food insecurity in Latin

America and the Caribbean. The projected distribution gap

for the region in 2009 is more than two times the average

national nutritional gap. Based on the estimated distribution

gap, the number of people who cannot meet their nutritional

requirement is projected to increase 32 percent between 1999

and 2009. 

The food import dependency of the 11 countries in the

region is growing. During the 1980s, the import share of

food supplies averaged around 30 percent. In 1999, it is estimated at 45 percent and is projected to reach 47 percent in

2009. This means foreign exchange availability to support

food imports will play an important role in the region’s food

security over the long term.

'."!"&'(

"!	


Food imports make up about 42 percent of North Africa’s

consumption needs and this level is projected to continue

through 2009. Financing this level of imports in the next

decade may be difficult. The region’s two largest food

importers, Egypt and Algeria, are, to varying degrees,

dependent on oil and gas revenues (directly through exports

and also indirectly for Egypt through worker remittances

from neighboring OPEC countries). With the real prices of

oil and gas recovering, these countries should be able to

cover their import needs. 

Per capita consumption in Algeria, and to a lesser extent

Egypt, is projected to fall short of the base (1996-98) level

during the entire projection period. Drought in Morocco in

1999 will reduce food supplies significantly unless food

imports are increased 3 million tons above their normal

level. The two dominant features of food production in the

region are scarcity of physical resources and highly variable

output due to erratic rainfall (except in Egypt where irrigation is prevalent).

Of the five NIS countries covered in this report, only

Tajikistan is vulnerable to food insecurity in the long term.

Consumption in the four other countries is projected to rise

during the next decade, assuming continued peace. Political

and economic uncertainty is a major issue in the region.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have had an uneasy truce over the

Karabakh region for a few years now, and Azerbaijan and

Turkey continue their trade embargo of Armenia. Georgia

$ ✺ 

				
 
	



How Food Security Is Assessed

The commodity coverage in this report has been expanded from the Food Security Assessment published in 1998. In addition to grains and root crops, the commodity coverage includes a group called “other.” The three commodity groups in

total, account for 100 percent of all calories consumed in the study countries. This report projects food consumption and

access in 67 lower income developing countries—37 in Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in North Africa, 11 in Latin America and

the Caribbean, 10 in Asia, and 5 in the NIS (see appendix 2 for a list of countries and appendix 1 for a detailed description of the methodology). The projections are based on 1996-98 data. The periods covered are 1999 (current), 2004 (5

years out), and 2009 (10 years out). Projections of food gaps for the countries through 2009 are based on differences

between consumption targets and estimates of food availability, which is domestic supply (production plus commercial

imports) minus nonfood use. The estimated gaps are used to evaluate food security of the countries.

The food gaps are calculated using two consumption targets: 1) maintaining base per capita consumption or status

quo (SQ), which is the amount of food needed to support 1996-98 levels of per capita consumption, and 2) meeting nutritional requirements (NR), which is the gap between available food and food needed to support a minimum per capita

nutritional standard (for definitions of terms used see the methodology in appendix 1). Comparison of the two measures

either for countries, regions, or the aggregate, indicates the two different aspects of food security: consumption stability

and meeting the nutritional standard. 

The aggregate food availability projections do not take into account food insecurity problems due to food distribution difficulties within a country. Although lack of data is a major problem, an attempt was made in this report to project food

consumption by different income groups based on income distribution data for each country. The concept of the incomeconsumption relationship was used to allocate the projected level of food availability among different income groups. The

estimated “distribution gap” measures the food needed to raise food consumption of each income quintile to the minimum

nutritional requirement. Finally, based on the projected population, the number of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirements is projected. 

The common terms used in the reports are: domestic food supply, which is the sum of domestic production and commercial imports; food availability, which is food supply minus nonfood use such as feed and waste; import dependency,

which is the ratio of food imports to food supply, and food consumption which is equal to food availability.
has on-going internal tensions. Recently, Kyrgyzstan has

been battling rebels in the southern part of the country. In

Tajikistan, despite its recent peace agreement, there are ongoing concerns of rebel activity. In each instance, there is a

possibility that conflicts could re-emerge and disrupt agricultural production and trade. 

	.!!"

Food aid, although valuable to food-insecure countries,

remains inadequate both in terms of availability and distribution to alter the food security prospects of low-income

countries. Food aid shipments for 1998/99 are estimated at

roughly 9.5 million tons, about 52 percent larger than the

previous year. The main source of the hike in donations was

the United States, but the European Union and Japan

increased their allocations as well. Although this is the

largest food aid donation during the last 5 years, the quantities allocated to low-income, food-deficit countries did not

increase much. 

The allocation of the available food aid is not necessarily

based on nutritional needs. Other factors such as political

instability, collapse of internal marketing systems, and

financial difficulties that disrupt commercial imports can

play an important role in food aid allocations among countries. For example, in 1999, the bulk of the increase in U.S.

food aid was allocated to Russia. Indonesia, which is facing

internal political problems, is the third largest recipient of

food aid (900,000 tons) after Bangladesh. The share of food

aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa—the most food insecure

region according to our estimates—is only 23 percent. This

food aid will cover only 20 percent of the region’s estimated

nutritional gap in 1999.


	

 

				


✺ 

2009

1999

0 5 10 15 20 25

2009

1999

0 5 10 15 20 25

Figure 3

Food Gaps

Gap To Maintain Consumption Levels in 1999 and 2009

Nutritional Gap in 1999 and 2009

Million tons of grain equivalent

Million tons of grain equivalent

SS-Africa

Asia Latin America

NIS

North Africa
The latest Food Aid Convention, which set the minimum

food aid commitment in July 1999, will be implemented for

a period of 3 years. Under this latest convention, there is

increased flexibility in the list of eligible commodities and

distribution methods. The new commodity list includes

some products that are part of the diet of the low-income,

vulnerable countries such as root crops, cassava, potatoes,

and sugar. These products, however, should be limited to

less than 20 percent of each donor’s commitment, and each

individual commodity should not exceed more than 3-7 percent of each donor’s total commitments. Under the new convention, the total volume of food aid that the donors have

committed to provide is less than the 1995 level, 4.895 million tons versus 5.35 million tons. Although this figure represents a minimum commitment for the donors, it may be an

indicator of future trends. If this is the case, future food aid

allocations cannot be expected to rise significantly and

therefore, certainly not play a role in closing the food gaps

for the most vulnerable countries.

"(
!"

12
1

Since the conclusion of the last multinational trade negotiations, the issue of food security of low-income, food-importing countries, has been the subject of frequent debate. One

major concern for developing countries is their ability to

finance food imports. Food import dependency among

developing countries has grown through time and global

agricultural liberalization is expected to reduce food aid

availability as export subsidies fall and food import prices

rise. Between 1980 and 1998, grain imports accounted for

43 percent of food supplies in North Africa, on average. The

Latin America region was close behind with an import share

of 34.3 percent. Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia relied on

imports to a much lesser extent, with dependency ratios of

6.3 and less than 3 percent. The low growth of food imports

in Sub-Saharan Africa stems from its financial problems,

while Asia’s policy of self-sufficiency dampens its imports.

A reduction in trade barriers, the subject of multilateral

trade negotiations, is expected to boost global trade. In this

report, we examined the likely impact of increased export

earnings—above projected levels—of the countries on food

security (see box “Accelerated Export Growth Scenario”).

The accelerated export growth scenario resulted in a 28-percent jump in commercial imports for all the countries combined by 2009. As for the implications for food security,

2009 status quo gaps are projected to fall 35 percent and

nutritional gaps by 10 percent, on average, under this scenario. The number of people who fail to meet their nutritional requirement is reduced 9 percent, or 89 million people, by 2009 compared to the baseline projection. 

The greatest impact, with respect to a reduction in the nutrition food gap, is expected in the NIS region, 40 percent, followed by Latin America, 33 percent, and Asia, 11 percent.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, commercial imports remain small

% ✺ 

				
 
	



Population Estimates

This year’s analysis was based on the 1998 Revision of UN population estimates and projections. The highlights of those

estimates include:

World population reached 6 billion in 1999. Between 1995 and 2000, the world population is projected to grow at 1.3 percent per year, considerably less than the 2 percent per year achieved in 1965-70. In mid-1998, 80 percent of the world’s

population was living in the less developed regions, and Asia accounted for 61 percent of the world total. Africa’s population of almost 750 million has surpassed Europe’s (730 million). Latin America and the Caribbean are estimated to exceed

500 million. Ninety-seven percent of the world population increase takes place in the less developed regions.

In the 1998 Revision, population estimates and growth rates are lower than estimated a couple of years ago. The difference is in part due to lower fertility rates in Eastern Europe, but mainly to the devastating impact of AIDS, especially in

Sub-Saharan Africa, where 29 countries were studied. In those 29 countries, life expectancy declined to 47 years in

1995-2000 whereas it could have reached 54 years in the absence of AIDS. The region’s population growth rate projections have declined from 2.8 percent to 2.5 percent. According to the UN Children’s Fund, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts

for 48 percent of the world’s AIDS cases. The disease has surpassed armed conflict as the number one killer in the

region. AIDS killed 1.4 million people in East and Southern Africa in 1998 and left 6 million children orphaned.

What impact does the change in population estimates have on our food security assessment?

This year’s food gap projection for 2009 is based on population estimates that are almost 2 percent lower than estimated in

last year’s report. Latin America and the Caribbean is the only region where population estimates were revised upward (by

2.5 percent). Sub-Saharan Africa shows the most drastic decline, where our 37 countries are projected to have 7 percent less

people by 2009 than previously projected. Consequently, food gaps are projected to be lower there, as available food has to

be divided among fewer people.
relative to overall food supplies despite the fact that they are

33 percent higher in this scenario. Consequently, the reduction in the nutrition gap is small, measuring only 7 percent.

In sum, the analysis clearly shows that improved export performance can enhance the food security of the countries, but

the impact is much less in the lowest income countries. In

many cases, the export growth needed to boost import

capacity enough to close the food gaps is simply unrealistic.

For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, commercial food

imports must grow nearly 10 percent annually to close the

average nutritional gap by 2009. 

The parameters used in the model assume that the response

of food imports to changes in foreign exchange availability

is less than one-to-one (in the range of 0.5 to 0.8, varying by

country, with estimates based on cross-country data). This

means that, everything being equal, to achieve a 1-percent

growth in food imports, foreign exchange availability must

grow 1.3 to 2 percent. Foreign exchange earnings are the

sum of net flow of credit and export earnings. 

For Sub-Saharan Africa, exports would have to grow about

13 percent per year to achieve the 10-percent growth

requirement for imports (assuming net inflow of credit also

grows at this rate). Clearly, achieving such a high growth in

export earnings in this region is unlikely. Export earnings

growth in Sub-Saharan Africa has been very slow through

the 1990s. Export volumes have increased marginally, on

average, and prices for the commodities exported by the

region have not rebounded from their peaks in the early

1980s. This also means that ensuring food security in the

poor countries is a complicated task and requires a comprehensive strategy to both increase export earnings and

domestic production. 


	

 

				


✺ 
Over the next decade, average per capita food consumption

throughout North Africa is projected to remain above nutritional requirements. However, a relatively small food gap to

maintain per capita consumption (2 percent, or about 1.2

million tons) is projected in the region by 2009, primarily in

Algeria and to a lesser extent Egypt. Algeria’s problems are

more political, which has affected the performance of all

sectors of the economy. Egyptian grain production growth is

expected to slow from a very high rate (5 percent) in the

historical period (1980-98). Such productivity gains result

from improved seeds and area expansion and are not likely

to be sustained. Between 1980 and 1997, North Africa was

the most import-dependent region in this study, with imports

contributing 44 percent of food supply, on average. This

trend is projected to continue during the next decade. 

Short term production shortfalls continue to cause food security problems for North Africa, where grain production varies

more than in any other region (see appendix 3). Egypt is an

exception because most of its crops are irrigated. Morocco’s

1999 grain harvest is estimated 44 percent lower than in

1998, and is expected to lead to a food deficit of about 3 million tons based on 1996-98 per capita consumption levels. A

country that has become less reliant on food aid in the last

few years, Morocco has to double its commercial imports

from the 1996-98 average to fill this gap.

Algeria May Be Able To Sustain Current Consumption

Levels—While our projection shows a decline in per capita

consumption in Algeria, there are signs that the economic

situation may improve because of the recently improved

political climate. The new government’s recent peace agreement with the Islamic opposition may reduce civil strife,

which has plagued the country for years. Still, pressing economic problems persist, including high unemployment and a

burdensome foreign debt. The turnaround in oil prices is a

positive development because outside the country’s hydrocarbon sector, foreign investment remains weak. Algerian

agriculture suffers from low yields, inadequate inputs, lack

of credit, confusing land reform regulations, insufficient irrigated area, and high dependence on rainfall. As a result, a

food gap based on 1996-98 per capita consumption levels is

projected for both 2004 and 2009. Closing this food gap

from production alone is unlikely. Alternatively, the food

gap could be filled by imports if the current growth in oil

prices continues, thereby improving the country’s financial

situation. Currently, imports contribute more than half of

food consumption and import dependency is projected to

grow in the next decade.

Improvement in Export Performance Could Enhance Food

Security—This year’s report considers the potential impact

of trade liberalization on import capacity. Under the higher

export earnings scenario, imports as a share of aggregate

availability of all food increase from 42 percent to 48 percent and commercial imports rise about 19 percent, from

24.8 million tons to 29.4 million. Under this scenario, the

food gap that is projected in Algeria, with a baseline deficit

estimated at 1.1 million tons by 2009, would be eliminated.

The higher export earnings can become a reality because all

countries in the region have been liberalizing their trade in

recent years and have become more outward oriented.

Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are members of the World

Trade Organization; Algeria has applied for accession and

currently has observer status. Trade in the region could be

affected by the recent Association Agreement with the

European Union (AAEU) since the EU has accounted for

about 50-80 percent of the export market of the four North

African countries in recent years. The AAEU offers trade

openings and is a catalyst for trade growth in the region. 

 ✺ 

				
 
	



North Africa

"		#$$$%&'


&$	(	

	
		



	

	
		
 "	)
*"	
!

	

 

				


✺ 

Table 3--Food Availability and Food Gaps for North Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 21,261 988 13,277 2,604 36,710

1991 26,890 1,162 13,219 1,345 39,293

1992 20,765 1,085 15,013 831 38,884

1993 19,082 1,053 16,731 418 39,710

1994 24,645 945 19,083 239 41,968

1995 19,881 1,318 19,656 249 47,412

1996 33,105 1,476 16,268 204 45,047

1997 22,440 1,201 20,446 169 46,350

1998 26,990 1,266 20,000 65 45,755

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 24,206 1,382 20,680 3,360 0 45,961

2004 29,562 1,507 22,355 1,047 0 52,814

2009 31,946 1,639 24,761 1,223 0 57,955

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009

Commercial grain imports Nutritional food gap

High- Highexport export

scenario Baseline scenario Baseline

-----1,000 tons----

North Africa 30,213 24,761 0 0

Algeria 7,346 6,206 0 0

Egypt 15,415 12,564 0 0

Morocco 4,959 3,951 0 0

Tunisia 2,493 2,040 0 0

North Africa: 

135 million people

North Africa’s per capita food 

consumption is projected above the 

nutritional requirement level. Major 

production fluctuations disguise the 

region’s growing import dependency. 

Morocco’s low harvest in 1999 will 

create a food gap of 3.4 million tons 

based upon recent consumption levels. 

Algeria faces the most serious food gap 

over the next decade (1.1 million tons). 

There are regional concerns about 

future export earnings, which are heavily 

dependent on unstable sources such as 

oil, tourism, and worker remittances.

North Africa’s Average Food Consumption Levels Meet 

Nutritional Requirements

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100

Income quintiles

Calories consumed /

required calories

1999 2009 projection

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

Percent surplus or

deficit

1980198219841986198819901992199419961998

North Africa’s Grain Production Deviations

From Trend (Excludes Egypt)

(grain equiv.)
Per capita consumption in Sub-Saharan Africa stagnated

during the last two decades even though annual agricultural

production grew 2.5 percent—a rate that met or exceeded

that of all the other regions included in this report, except

North Africa. With limited financial resources constraining

imports, this growth was not sufficient to offset the high

population growth rate of more than 2.8 percent per year.

While food aid has often played a key role in augmenting

food supplies—raising per capita consumption 5-10 percent

in many years—it has not been able to accelerate the per

capita consumption trend. Moreover, food aid as a share of

total imports declined from roughly 50 percent in the early

1980s to 25 percent in more recent years despite the fact

that, of all the regions, food aid has played the most significant role in Sub-Saharan Africa. This declining trend is

reflective of overall trends in global food aid allocations to

food-deficit countries. 

The region’s production growth is projected to slow to about

2 percent per year through the next decade, slightly lower

than the projection included in the 1998 assessment. The

main reason for the slower growth is the cut in the population growth rate which lowers the availability of labor. In

Sub-Saharan Africa, labor is the principal input in production. In the model, the marginal productivity of labor is

assumed constant for the projection period. In Sub-Saharan

Africa, this may be considered an overestimation because

AIDS is the principal reason for the slower population

growth. This being the case, the disease reduces productivity

of the most productive segment of a population, those aged

15-45. Nevertheless, the growth in yields is expected to

more than double during the projection period relative to the

historical period (1980-98). Sub-Saharan Africa’s grain

yields remain the lowest in the world and with increased use

of fertilizer and improved seed varieties, yields could

improve considerably. During the historical period, most of

the production growth stemmed mainly from an increase in

area planted, but that is projected to slow considerably as

the land suitable for agriculture diminishes and population

pressures limit the potential for expansion.

The region’s poor financial position has long constrained the

capacity to import and compensate for inadequate production. In the base period (1996-98), imports accounted for

only 12 percent of food supplies. In addition to export earnings, net flow of credit is an important determinant of

import capacity in the region. During 1980-98, almost half

of the region’s import bill was supported by external assistance. For the projection period, this inflow is assumed to

remain constant. This means that higher export growth will

be needed to raise imports. 

Although Sub-Saharan Africa’s commercial imports are projected to rise 2.6 percent annually through 2009, the import

share of food supplies will reach only 16 percent. Therefore,

performance of the agricultural sector remains key to the

region’s food security. Given that production growth is projected to fall short of population growth, per capita consumption will decline 0.3 percent annually through 2009.

The decline in per capita consumption is reflected in the

growing status quo food gap, which measures the amount of

food needed to maintain per capita consumption at base levels. The gap is estimated at 4.7 million tons in 1999, and

increases nearly twofold by 2009. The region’s nutrition

gap, which measures the amount of food needed to maintain

the minimum nutritional requirement, is projected to rise

from 11.2 million tons in 1999 to 16.2 million in 2009. The

nutrition food gap is projected to exceed commercial

imports by 17 percent in 2009.

Poverty and skewed income distribution exacerbate the food

insecurity of the region by limiting purchasing power. While

the two food gaps mentioned above measure food security at

the aggregate level, the “distribution gap” measures food

security across five income groups within a country. This

gap, which measures the amount of food necessary to raise

consumption of each income group to the minimum nutritional target, is projected to rise from more than 15 million

tons in 1999 to 21.5 million in 2009, 33 percent higher than

the nutrition gap. Examining per capita consumption by

income group, the projections indicate that consumption in

only the two highest income groups will exceed the minimum nutritional target in 2009. Consumption in the second

highest group barely exceeds the target at 101 percent.

Fifty-four percent of the region’s population is estimated to

consume below the nutritional requirement in 1999. This

figure is projected to jump to 60 percent (or 438 million

people) in 2009.

 ✺ 

				
 
	



Sub-Saharan Africa


	+
		





,--$.
		


			


	/			


	
	

 	
0!

	

 

				


✺ !

Table 4--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 53,026 31,012 4,661 3,586 107,988

1991 59,185 34,512 5,292 4,756 116,527

1992 57,345 36,283 6,597 5,687 118,380

1993 61,122 38,123 7,681 3,485 126,047

1994 64,370 39,199 8,029 3,040 130,280

1995 64,872 39,727 7,285 2,091 134,070

1996 69,804 40,397 7,383 2,159 139,242

1997 63,880 39,486 9,352 1,857 138,207

1998 69,242 39,973 12,215 1,789 147,216

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 69,224 41,425 10,935 4,664 11,222 143,489

2004 80,715 45,104 12,136 5,254 12,542 162,273

2009 89,724 49,066 13,875 8,769 16,175 179,773

Sub-Saharan Africa

574 million people in 1998.

Only eight of the 37 countries 

are projected to have rising per 

capita consumption trends 

through the next decade.

While Sub-Saharan Africa will 

have only 25 percent of the 

population of the study countries 

in 2009, it is projected to 

account for 70 percent of the 

total nutrition gap.

Sixty percent of the region’s 

population is projected to 

consume at levels below the 

minimum nutritional requirement 

in 2009.

Grain and Root Production in SS-Africa

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Million tons

0.78

0.80

0.82

0.84

0.86

0.88

0.90

0.92

Tons/ha 0.94

Grain Roots Yields

0

5

10

15

20

Million tons

1999 2004 2009

Nutritional Food Gap in SS-Africa 

High-export scenario Baseline

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009

Commercial grain imports Nutritional food gap

High- Highexport export

scenario Baseline scenario Baseline

-----1,000 tons----

SSA 18,559 13,875 15,647 16,175

Angola 632 443 742 1,001

Cameroon 431 326 0 106

Kenya 3,066 2,150 0 0

Lesotho 366 295 0 42

Madagascar 227 166 567 635

Tanzania 656 538 585 733

(grain equiv.)
The model results for 1999 are based on actual data and

therefore reflect the current situation in these countries.

Unfavorable weather conditions and civil strife continue to

hinder agricultural output for many countries in 1999. In

Ethiopia, inadequate rainfall in some areas and untimely rainfall in other areas have contributed to a smaller harvest.

Output in Somalia has been severely affected by the longterm civil war and little rainfall. In an area of the country

known for its sorghum production, output of the crop for

1999 is estimated at only 20 percent of pre-war production in

the mid-late 1980s. In Kenya, inadequate rainfall has lead to

dry conditions and a smaller crop. Production of corn, the

country’s staple crop, is estimated to have fallen 20 percent

below the recent average and consequently, food prices have

risen. Continued civil strife in Southern Sudan has disrupted

agricultural activities and prompted a need for relief assistance. Fighting in parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo

has heightened insecurity and created food shortages. Despite

favorable weather conditions in Angola, the food supply situation is precarious as renewed fighting in December 1998 has

displaced farmers and interrupted food distribution.

With the exception of Sierra Leone, West Africa has escaped

the ravages of war and unfavorable weather conditions in

1999. As a result, food prospects are good. Bumper crops

were harvested in 1998 in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and

Niger, and the 1999 harvests are expected to be above average as well.

Depending on the responsiveness of import capacity to

export earnings and the importance of imports in food supplies, the boost to exports stemming from trade liberalization could significantly affect food security in Sub-Saharan

Africa. Export earnings have grown slowly in the region

through the 1990s. Export volumes have increased marginally, on average, and prices for the commodities exported

have not rebounded from their peaks in the early 1980s. The

low level of export earnings has constrained import capacity.

The import share of food supplies averaged just over 12 percent in the base period and is projected to rise only marginally through 2009. Despite the fact that commercial imports

under the high export scenario (see box “Accelerated Export

Growth Scenario”) exceed those under the base scenario by

34 percent in 2009, the impact of this change on food security is minimal. The import share of food supplies remains

relatively small (9 percent in 2009) and the nutritional food

gap is projected to be only 7 percent smaller in this scenario

than that of the base scenario in 2009. 

It should be noted that the assumption of significant

increases in export earnings for this region is highly optimistic. Most studies indicate that the gains will be small following global trade liberalization unless additional investment is made in the export sector (see article “Trade

Liberalization and the Sub-Saharan African Countries.”)

The countries in this region need to make significant policy

changes that will promote export growth. Diversification of

exports is one possible answer in that the region would be

less dependent on a small number of commodities and less

vulnerable to the price variability of those commodities.

Another possibility is to encourage output of manufactured

goods where price variation would be less of a consideration

than agricultural exports.

" ✺ 

				
 
	


Ten countries constitute the Asian region for this study—

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nepal, North

Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. The

region faces increasing food insecurity in selected countries

during the next decade as the amount of food needed to

maintain consumption at the base (1996-98) level—also

known as the status quo food gap—is projected to nearly

double, reaching more than 6 million tons in 2009. The nutrition food gap, the amount of food needed to raise consumption to the minimum nutritional standard, is projected at 5.2

million tons in 2009. 

Throughout the projection period, the nutritional food gap is

forecast to be smaller than the food gap to maintain consumption. In all other regions (except North Africa) in this

study, the opposite is true. The results are principally driven

by Pakistan, where the nutrition gaps are zero, but the gaps

to maintain consumption are projected to grow nearly threefold between 1999 and 2009. Despite the fact that the country has no nutrition gap, this increase in the status quo gap

represents a decline in the standard of living.

Results vary considerably by country. North Korea (included

in this study for the first time), Afghanistan, and Bangladesh

are the only countries in the region projected to have both

nutritional and status quo food gaps. In each case, the nutrition gap is the larger gap, meaning that base consumption

levels are below the minimum nutritional target. In

Afghanistan, grain output is projected to follow pre-war

trends, but the growth is not adequate to keep pace with the

high population growth, which averages 3.8 percent per year

through 2009. While Bangladesh is projected to face food

gaps, they are quite small relative to overall food supplies as

growth in grain output and commercial imports are nearly

sufficient to meet food requirements. For example, the nutrition food gap as a share of aggregate food availability is

projected at only 4 percent. By comparison, this share in

Afghanistan measures 52 percent. North Korea’s agricultural

sector continues to be depressed, suffering from a lack of

fertilizers, old machinery, and energy shortages. Grain output in 1999 is estimated at about 40 percent of the 1990

level. The small harvest and limited commercial import

capacity resulting from a stagnant economy are expected to

create large food gaps. While grain output is projected to

grow through the next decade, the rate of growth will be

slow and food gaps will widen as commercial imports will

remain quite small.

India and Vietnam are projected to be able to maintain base

consumption levels and meet minimum nutritional targets

through 2009. In other words, the gaps for both countries

are zero. In both India and Vietnam, growth in grain output

is not expected to match the high rates achieved in the historical period (1980-98). However, domestic food supplies

will be sufficient to meet food requirements due to a considerable slowing of the population growth rate. 

The common thread among Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the

Philippines, and Sri Lanka is that these countries will face

food gaps to maintain consumption, but not to meet minimum nutritional requirements. This means that they are projected to have an adequate supply of food with respect to the

nutritional standard, but not necessarily enough to maintain

recent per capita consumption levels. Pakistan is projected

to have the largest status quo gap—rising from an estimated

505,000 tons in 1999 to about 1.4 million tons in 2009. A

slowdown in the growth in grain area relative to the historical period, and a 2.5-percent annual population growth rate

are the main factors behind the widening gap. 

Unequal access to food due to skewed income distribution

intensifies food insecurity in several countries. This is

reflected in the difference between the region’s nutrition gap

and the “distribution gap,” which measures the amount of

food needed to raise consumption in each income group to

the minimum nutritional target. Asia’s distribution gap is

projected to be 8.2 million tons in 2009, 3 million tons

higher than the nutrition gap. While India, Nepal, and Sri

Lanka are projected to have no nutritional gaps at the aggregate level, they will face distribution gaps as consumption in

the lowest income groups in these countries is projected to

fall short of the minimum nutritional target. 

The depth of food insecurity is clearly illustrated in

Afghanistan and North Korea, where consumption in every

income group is projected to fall below the nutritional target

in 2009 in the absence of external assistance and/or significant gains in agricultural performance. As a result, distribution gaps in these countries will be higher—roughly 10 percent—than the aggregate level nutrition gaps. Conversely,

consumption is projected to exceed the nutritional target

across all income groups in Indonesia, Pakistan, the

Philippines, and Vietnam in 2009, assuming no major political disruptions. This means that distribution gaps in these

countries will be zero.


	

 

				


✺ #

Asia


	

	

	
,-	
	+




	(12) 	
0"34!
It is worth noting that the distribution gap for the region as a

whole shrinks between 1999 and 2009, reflecting some convergence in food consumption among income groups.

Consistent with this finding is the decline in the number of

hungry people in the region during the next decade. It is estimated that 548 million people—32 percent of the region’s

population—are food insecure in 1999. This number is projected to fall to 442 million—or 22 percent— in 2009.

The accelerated export growth scenario (see box

“Accelerated Export Growth Scenario”) results in a 33-percent jump in commercial imports in 2009 as compared with

the base scenario. Consequently, the food gap to maintain

consumption is projected to fall by almost half while the

nutrition gap falls 11 percent. Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,

the Philippines, and Vietnam have the greatest import

response to the higher export earnings. This result can be

attributed to a combination of already high export growth

and, in most cases, a higher responsiveness of import capacity to changes in foreign exchange availability. In the case of

Vietnam, commercial imports jumped roughly 50 percent.

Because of the higher imports, status quo food gaps were

eliminated in Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Commercial imports in Afghanistan and North Korea

increased only marginally in this scenario, and therefore the

impact on food security was negligible.

$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Accelerated Export Growth Scenario

The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which took place during 1986-94, is projected to have significant

positive implications on global trade. Global market liberalization is expected to increase market access for exports from

developing countries and generally enhance market efficiency. The trade gains will vary by country, and larger countries

with diversified exports are in a better position to benefit than the small countries that are dependent on only a few export

commodities.

To reflect this possible impact on food security of the study countries, we used the Food Security model and assumed a

very optimistic export growth path. In this scenario, export growth rates were increased over the base scenario rate by 25

percent for the first 5 years of the projection period and by 50 percent during the last 5 years. For example, if export

earnings grow 4 percent per year in the base scenario, the growth rate under this export scenario would be 5 percent for

the first 5 years and 6 percent for the last 5 years. It is important to note that this is a highly optimistic scenario, particularly for the lower income countries. 

The expected result of the higher export growth is an increase in commercial import capacity of the countries. In the food

security model, commercial imports are specified to respond positively to an increase in commercial import capacity,

which is assumed to be the sum of export earnings and net flow of credit (see appendix 1). A 1-percent increase in foreign

exchange earnings is projected to lead to a 0.5- to 0.8-percent increase in commercial imports (estimated based on crosscountry times series of 60 of the study countries). It is important to note that based on this assumption we have ignored

the internal multiplier impact of growth in export earnings and any changes in the policy responses of the countries. 

The impact of changes in export growth on food security of the countries also depends on their baseline export growth

projections and the extent of their food import dependencies. For example, if the baseline export growth rate is 2 percent,

a 25-percent increase raises the annual rate to 2.5 percent in the scenario. On the other hand, when the baseline rate is 8

percent, the 25-percent increase generates a 10-percent growth rate. Similarly, if half of the food availability consists of

imports, a 1-percent growth in imports will increase total food availability by 0.5 percent. If the import share is smaller,

say 10 percent, a 1-percent increase in food imports will increase food availability by only 0.01 percent.

	

 

				


✺ 

Table 5--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Asia

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 271,078 14,370 7,950 2,522 385,781

1991 274,715 14,717 7,429 2,721 393,738

1992 285,767 15,563 11,147 1,859 402,754

1993 291,725 15,248 11,264 1,792 416,880

1994 293,315 15,363 10,728 1,952 416,878

1995 299,597 15,133 17,790 2,231 437,115

1996 302,485 15,932 14,560 1,798 445,704

1997 305,950 16,764 15,885 1,962 472,909

1998 313,692 16,617 23,282 2,367 471,575

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 302,931 16,387 18,457 3,495 2,225 296,635

2004 331,774 17,488 21,058 5,049 4,260 321,628

2009 363,683 18,659 24,617 6,185 5,160 353,730

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009

Commercial grain imports Nutritional food gap

High- Highexport export

scenario Baseline scenario Baseline

-----1,000 tons----

Asia 32,799 24,617 4,569 5,160

Bangladesh 2,269 1,785 709 1,263

India 3,513 2,539 0 0

North Korea 280 263 1,239 1,263

Pakistan 5,249 4,026 0 0

Philippines 7,462 5,470 0 0

Vietnam 1,262 863 0 0

Asia

1,650 million people

By 2009, Asia s population--64 

percent of the population of the 67 

study countries--is projected to 

account for 22 percent of the 

nutritional food deficit.

As food production growth slows and 

food aid to the region shrinks, 

commercial imports become 

increasingly important in feeding the 

burgeoning population.

By boosting their export earnings, 

Asian countries can augment their 

food imports to cut their collective 

nutritional gap 25 percent and their 

status quo gap 50 percent by 2009.

Status Quo Gaps in Selected Asian 

Countries

012345

2009

2004

1999

Million tons

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

Pakistan

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Status Quo Food Gap in Asia

High export scenario Baseline scenario

(grain equiv.)
Average per capita food consumption in the eleven Latin

American and Caribbean countries1 is projected to stagnate

over the next decade. Despite relatively slow increases in

food production of 1.7 percent per year, strong commercial

import growth of 2.8 percent will increase food supply

enough to keep pace with population growth.

Among individual countries, however, Ecuador, El Salvador,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Peru will experience declining per capita consumption. Among that group,

all except for Ecuador but also Bolivia face status quo

and/or nutritional food gaps over the next decade. Four of

these countries were severely affected by Hurricane Mitch

in 1998. The destruction of crops, plantations, and infrastructure will have a long-lasting impact on agricultural production and export earnings.

Of the five countries with nutritional food gaps, (Bolivia,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua) all but Haiti

have the resources to close the food gap during the next

decade provided they adopt policies to attract investment in

the agricultural sector. Domestic production still provides

the bulk of food consumption. Historical annual growth in

grain yields in these countries ranged from -0.4 percent in

Haiti to 1.6 percent in Bolivia. Much higher growth is

required to satisfy food needs. To simply keep up with population growth, food production must grow 2.4 to 2.8 percent per year in these countries. Closing food gaps requires

even higher growth rates. 

Between 1980 and 1998, per capita consumption increased

less than 1 percent per year. Because food production did

not keep up with population growth, rising imports prevented declines in per capita consumption in all countries,

except Nicaragua. Not all food imports are commercial.

During the 1980s, imports consisted to a large extent of

food aid. In 1987, food aid’s share of total imports reached a

high of 42 percent. This share dropped dramatically to 2

percent by 1998, in response to improved commercial

import capacity in the region and declining food aid availability. Improved import capacity driven by rising export

earnings has made Latin America and the Caribbean one of

the most import-dependent regions in the world. During the

1980s, imports’ share of food supplies averaged around 30

percent. By 1999, it has increased to 45 percent and is projected to reach 47 percent in 2009.

In the accelerated export growth scenario (see box “Accelerated

Export Growth Scenario”) imports’ share of food supplies is

projected to reach 53 percent by 2009, which translates into a

3.4-million-ton increase in commercial grain imports, compared to the baseline scenario. The food gaps would be reduced

on average by about half a million tons. The increase in

regional commercial imports is projected to be much larger

than the decline in gaps because the impact of the accelerated

export growth is most dramatic in countries without food gaps.

Those countries tend to start out with a relatively high percentage rate in export growth, thus giving more weight to the highexport scenario. Furthermore, the impact is stronger in the

import-dependent countries. 

By contrast, the five countries with nutritional food gaps are

precisely those whose imports provide the smallest shares of

total supplies. Commercial imports by the five countries

would average less than 30 percent, while the other group’s

share reaches 53 percent in 1999 and is projected to exceed

60 percent by 2009.

In Latin American countries, the most difficult dimension of

food security is the distribution of food within countries.

Poverty is widespread and income distribution is more unequal

than in other parts of the world. For this reason our projection

shows that the number of people unable to consume the nutritional minimum will increase from 57 to 75 million by 2009.

The problem becomes more severe in Guatemala, Honduras,

and Nicaragua, where food insecurity will affect larger parts of

the population if current trends persist.

The amount of food necessary to raise consumption of each

income group to the minimum nutritional target, the “distribution gap”, is projected to reach about 3 million tons by

2009. The distribution gap would therefore be twice as big

as the nutritional gap, which measures nutritional needs on

an average national level. Close to 75 percent of this distribution gap arises in Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and

Nicaragua, even though they comprise only one-third of the

population. Haiti has the largest distribution gap of 670,000

tons. Without any food aid, Haiti’s lowest income group is

projected to consume only half the nutritional requirement.

% ✺ 

				
 
	



Latin America and the Caribbean

5			
		



6	718
66


2	
7		
	
	

	

	

 1"!

1The countries studied here are four Central American countries: El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; three Caribbean countries:

the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica; and four South American

countries: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

	

 

				


✺ 

Table 6--Food Availability and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 9,947 2,493 4,005 1,423 27,884

1991 9,614 2,465 4,413 1,817 27,878

1992 10,423 2,369 5,609 1,335 29,123

1993 11,065 2,720 5,727 1,371 29,247

1994 10,161 2,802 7,569 1,002 30,547

1995 10,013 2,960 8,623 434 32,459

1996 9,941 2,941 9,328 294 32,947

1997 9,761 3,133 9,673 360 32,932

1998 9,853 3,080 11,240 255 34,816

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 10,497 3,089 11,136 316 632 35,393

2004 10,901 3,273 12,156 883 992 37,794

2009 11,821 3,467 13,581 1,249 1,391 41,618

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009

Commercial grain imports Nutritional food gap

High- Highexport export

scenario Baseline scenario Baseline

-----1,000 tons----

Latin America

& Caribbean 17,007 13,581 934 1,391

Bolivia 247 216 143 186

Guatemala 1,206 969 0 196

Haiti 330 322 554 565

Honduras 532 427 86 254

Nicaragua 228 201 151 190

Colombia 6,206 4,718 0 0

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Nutritional Food Gap in Latin America

High-export scenario Baseline

Latin America and the Caribbean 

135 million people

In 1999, agricultural infrastructure and 

consequently, food security continued 

to be negatively affected by the longlasting repercussions of Hurricanes 

Mitch and Georges, which hit the 

region late in 1998. 

Besides natural catastrophes, the 

region continues to struggle with 

poverty and hunger due to a very 

skewed income distribution. The 

distribution food gap, which measures 

the amount of food necessary to 

prevent hunger in all income groups, is 

projected to exceed 3 million tons by 

2009--twice as much as the nutritional 

gap.

Latin America’s Grain Imports

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

1980198219841986198819901992199419961998

1,000 tons

Commercial imports

Food Aid

(grain equiv.)
This report monitors the food security of five New

Independent States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Food gaps based on current consumption levels are estimated for the 1999 in all five countries. However, only Tajikistan is projected to have sizable

short run and long run nutrition-based food gaps due to

widespread poverty and recovery from war. The other NIS

countries are expected to reduce poverty and hunger with

economic growth over the longer term, assuming continued

peace. In the short run, though, lower income groups in several of these countries are projected to consume below nutritionally recommended levels.

Most of the NIS countries have achieved macroeconomic

and agricultural stability in recent years. Inflation has been

brought under control compared to previous years with

many of the countries achieving positive economic growth.

The dramatic contraction of the livestock sector related to

the removal of subsides, which affected the feed sector, may

be leveling off. Grain used for human consumption has

remained somewhat stable on a per capita basis in recent

years, despite all the economic and agricultural changes, in

part due to food aid. The challenge remains to improve

domestic agricultural productivity and increase the capacity

to commercially finance food imports in order to achieve

pre-reform consumption levels and improve nutrition for

vulnerable groups without relying on food aid.

Political and economic uncertainty is a major issue in

the region—There are three sources of uncertainty that

are expected to significantly affect economic growth, food

production, and food consumption in the short- and

medium-run: the Russian currency devaluation, questions

about political stability, and the progress and speed of oil

and gas developments. 

The Russian currency devaluation in August 1998, had

important direct and indirect effects on the former Soviet

republics. As a direct effect, the devaluation hurt Russian

purchasing power, thereby depressing demand for these

countries’ exports and lowering their export earnings.

Indirectly many countries suffered because they still rely

heavily on trade with Russia and the other NIS states (ranging from 41 percent of total trade in Armenia to 77 percent

in Georgia). The devaluation pressured several of these

countries to devalue their currencies to maintain their export

competitiveness, which led to a short run inflationary surge

in a few countries as import prices rose. In the case of

Armenia, remittances from Russia were severely reduced.

The devaluation appears to have worked its way through

most of the NIS economies, but fears of another devaluation

are having an important psychological effect on investment

and may be inducing capital flight. The episode also has

highlighted the vulnerability of some countries that are

largely dependent upon trade with other NIS countries.

Questions about peace persist in each of these five NIS

countries. Armenia and Azerbaijan have had an uneasy truce

over the Karabakh region for a few years now, but

Azerbaijan and Turkey continue their trade embargo of

Armenia. Georgia has on-going internal tensions, with

President Shavardnaze surviving two assassination attempts

in recent years. The current military battles between Russia

and Chechna/Dagestan also are potentially destabilizing to

these Caucasus countries. Recently, Kyrgyzstan has been

battling rebels in the southern part of the country. Tajikistan

has managed to move forward with its peace agreement, but

there are on-going concerns of rebel activity and fears of

potential refugees coming from Afghanistan. In each

instance, the possibility exists that conflicts could re-emerge

and disrupt agricultural production and trade.

The future of oil and gas discoveries in the Caspian Sea will

have strong economic implications for Azerbaijan and have

spillovers to the rest of the region. However, there are several question marks and layers of intrigue. One question is

the actual size of reserves, as recent drilling has led to

mixed results. Another contentious issue has been the negotiation of acceptable pipeline routes between countries. At

least four different routes have been proposed for the

pipeline (going over Turkey, Georgia, Russia, or Iran), complicated by environmental (earthquake) concerns. Another

obstacle is the financing of such a large venture among large

companies, possibly backed by government credit guarantees by unstable governments. Additional questions have

been raised regarding the long term downward trend for oil

and gas prices and what that could mean for these investments. A final issue, most relevant to this report, is whether

the potential wealth will be distributed among some of the

lower income groups and lead to improved economic and

food security.

 ✺ 

				
 
	



New Independent States (NIS)

/#$$$2/		

			4
2/	
	

	4	
	


0


 "	
!

	

 

				


✺ 

Table 7--Food Availability and Food Gaps for NIS

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 4,070 --- --- ---

1991 3,814 --- --- ---

1992 3,799 --- 4,219 --- ---

1993 3,551 246 3,147 1,159 7,396

1994 2,911 250 1,160 1,524 6,279

1995 2,808 291 851 1,112 5,935

1996 3,697 308 730 1,061 6,049

1997 4,254 328 1,460 342 6,758

1998 4,154 382 1,407 558 6,893

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 3,582 326 1,325 874 945 5,668

2004 4,741 353 1,474 13 410 7,153

2009 5,074 382 1,727 0 415 7,909

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009

Commercial grain imports Nutritional food gap

High- Highexport export

scenario Baseline scenario Baseline

-----1,000 tons----

NIS 2,275 1,727 251 415

Armenia 380 296 0 0

Azerbaijan 823 609 0 0

Georgia 467 357 0 0

Kyrgyzstan 137 103 0 0

Tajikistan 468 363 251 415

NIS

27 million people

Production in 1999 is down 

throughout the region, leading 

to short run food gaps in each 

country based on recent 

consumption levels. Tajikistan 

is projected to have on-going 

nutrition-based food gaps as it 

continues to recover from war. 

Food security in the short and 

medium term will depend on 

lingering Russian currency 

devaluation effects, political 

stability, and oil and gas 

developments. Tajikistan 

would benefit in terms of food 

security from trade 

liberalization, but it has not 

even begun the WTO 

application process.

NIS Countries’ Currencies Devalued To 

Keep Exports Competitive After Russian 

Devaluation

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Trade Dependency to other NIS Countries (percent)

Currency

devaluation 

(perc ent)

NIS Current and Projected Average Per 

Capita Grain Consumption Levels

0 100 200 300 400

Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan

Georgia

Azerbaijan

Armenia

Kg/year

1999

2009

(grain equiv.)

---

---
Short run food gaps exist throughout the region, but only

Tajikistan is projected to have long run nutrition-based food

gaps—Tajikistan, which is still recovering from war, is estimated to have a relatively small food gap in 1999 based on

current consumption levels (about 10 percent below requirements), but relatively large nutrition-based food gaps through

the next decade (about 33 percent below requirements).

However, data used in this analysis are very weak. Last

year’s grain production appears to have been substantially

overestimated as some land reportedly sown to wheat was

diverted to cotton. Nonetheless, Tajikistan’s poverty and low

food consumption levels extend to the upper income groups,

resulting in consumption that is much below recommended

nutrition levels. Over the next 10 years, the nutrition-based

food gap is projected to narrow but remain a problem (the

only NIS country with this projection outcome).

Production is down this year in the other four NIS countries,

which is expected to lead to short-run food gaps based on

recent per capita consumption levels. Armenia’s grain production is down about 22 percent from the previous years

due to a poor harvest. Azerbaijan’s production is down

almost 27 percent, reflecting growing import competition,

inadequate marketing channels, and land privatization,

which has led to greater household food production.

Georgia’s production is about the same as last year, but the

modest food gap highlights the role that food aid has played

in meeting previous per capita consumption levels.

Trade liberalization will have a limited impact on NIS 

food security—At this time, only Kyrgyzstan has been

accepted into the World Trade Organization, while Armenia

and Georgia have been making good progress to join.

Azerbaijan’s negotiations are not as far along. The country

that would benefit the most in terms of food security from

increased export earnings in trade liberalization modeling

scenarios—Tajikistan—has not even started the process of

joining. The other NIS countries are projected to eliminate

their food security gaps with economic growth, even without

trade liberalization.

 ✺ 

				
 
	



In 1999 the Russian grain harvest will again be relatively

low, keeping alive concerns about the country’s food security. Despite the disappointing harvest, food grain production

should be sufficient to maintain per capita consumption of

bread products on a par with average levels during the past

decade. Russian agricultural officials are in fact arguing that

the country does not need food grain or other foodstuffs, but

rather animal feed, to help stem the severe contraction of the

livestock sector that began during the reform period. Adding

to concerns about low output is the distribution problem that

grain surplus-producing regions are restricting outflows to

deficit regions, which can result in local shortages.

According to September 1999 USDA figures, Russian grain

output in 1999 is projected at 55 million metric tons, following 48 million in 1998, the country’s worst harvest in

decades. These figures compare to an average output of 70

million tons over the last 5 years.

However, the critical variable affecting human consumption

is the output of food grain. During the reform period,

Russian food grain consumption averaged no more than 20

million tons a year. In 1998, Russia’s food grain production

was only slightly below this level, and the quality was high.

Another factor that mitigated the poor 1998 harvest is that

Russia carried over large stocks of grain from the bountiful

1997 crop of 88 million tons. Although by mid-1999 Russian

grain stocks had been drawn down to less than 2 million tons

(according to USDA figures), food grain output will again be

close to 20 million tons, and quality once more will be good.

Russian agricultural officials have publicly stated in 1999

that the country does not need more food aid (that is, aid 

in the form of food grain or other foodstuffs for human 

consumption), and rather are requesting additional aid in the

form of animal feed. They have expressed specific interest in

feed wheat, corn, soybeans, and soybean meal. Since reform

began in the early 1990s, the Russian livestock sector (both

animal inventories and production) has contracted by about

half, and the downsizing continues. Preliminary Russian figures indicate that from August 1998 to August 1999 Russian

production of meat and milk fell by about 8 and 4 percent.

A mitigating point concerning how the livestock sector’s

downsizing is affecting food security is that the contraction

can be viewed as a necessary and inevitable part of market

reform. Livestock production and consumption drop to levels

more consistent with the country’s real wealth and income. In

1990, per capita meat consumption in Russia was about twice

as high as in other countries with the same level of per capita

GNP, and equal to consumption in rich OECD nations.

Reform has substantially reduced the large producer and consumer subsidies that were necessary to support the artificially

high levels of livestock production and consumption.

However, a point that justifies any additional grain to Russia

(whether food or feed grain) is that stocks have fallen to low

levels. Adding to this concern is that most grain surplus-producing regions within Russia are restricting the outflow of

foodstuffs, which can prevent deficit regions from obtaining

necessary supplies.

In 1998/99 the United States and EU gave Russia food aid

packages, with wheat and meat being the main commodities

provided. The United States agreed to give 3.2 million tons

of commodities worth $1.1 billion (with $520 million being

a trade credit), and the EU 1.8 million tons of products worth

$470 million. [William Liefert]

Food Aid for Russia
!"

Food insecurity of the low-income countries is deeply rooted

in many factors that are not all affected by global trade policies. However, with the increasing role food imports play in

low income countries, global agricultural market conditions

could significantly affect the food security of these countries.

Decisions in the new round of trade negotiations can affect

food security of the low-income countries through: 1) world

price levels and variability; 2) the ability of food insecure

countries to increase export earnings, which often come from

agricultural products; and 3) availability of food aid for

emergency assistance as well as development.

The Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations,

which took place over 1986-94, gave heightened attention

to agriculture. The resulting Uruguay Round Agreement

on Agriculture (URAA), which was signed by a majority

of countries, will condition future policies of countries

both at the international and national level. Therefore, it is

important to understand the main features of the agreement and the likely issues that could be negotiated in an

upcoming round.

In this overview, we highlight the major issues that are

likely to emerge in the next trade round, especially those

that are important to developing countries. Issues that are

particularly important for different geographic regions are

highlighted in the following articles.

!(

'2(

The most important components of the URAA are the “three

pillars”—market access, domestic support, and export competition. Highlights of the changes agreed to in the last

round are presented in table A-1. In the area of market

access, an element of the agreement was the conversion of

nontariff barriers into bound tariff levels and the reduction

of existing tariffs. This has set the stage for deeper cuts in

future rounds. In the area of domestic support, countries

determined which policies were permitted and which were

subject to discipline. Domestic support policies were placed

into different categories (“amber box,” “green box”, and

“blue box”), depending on how distorting the policies are to

world markets. Trade distorting domestic support levels are

scheduled for reductions based on an “Aggregate

Measurement of Support” (AMS), which is an index that

measures the monetary value of total government support to

a sector. In the area of export competition, countries agreed

to reduce their existing export subsidy programs and to not

introduce new subsidy programs.2

Other agreements that are likely to affect agriculture but are

not explicitly included in the URAA are the Sanitary and

Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the establishment of the

dispute resolution mechanism. The SPS Agreement recognizes each country’s sovereignty in establishing levels of

SPS protection, but requires that such measures be sciencebased and non-discriminatory. The dispute resolution mechanism established a panel system to arbitrate trade disagreements and enforce decisions regarding all Uruguay Round

agreements, including those for agriculture.

Not all of the above issues are equally important for all

countries. For example, the farm policies and programs of

the exporting countries have direct implications for food

security of low-income countries. If domestic price supports

are reduced, the expected effect would be a decline in the

production of staple foods and an increase in world prices

(other market conditions being constant). Such a policy

would have different implications for the food security of


	

 

				


✺ !

	


Low-Income Developing Countries and Trade

Liberalization: An Overview of the Issues

Michael Trueblood and Shahla Shapouri1

Abstract: The next round of trade negotiations will continue agricultural trade negotiations

in the areas of market access, domestic support, and export competition. These issues have

major implications for the food security of low-income food-importing countries. Other

issues with direct or indirect impacts on the food security of developing countries that may

be examined or renegotiated in the next round (or in concurrent international negotiations)

include food aid, special preference arrangements, technical assistance, state trading enterprises, biotechnology, and production process issues.

1 Agricultural economists with the Market and Trade Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA. 2 For more information on these and other issues, see USDA (1998).
" ✺ 

				
 
	



Table A-1--Highlights of Commitments from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA)

Category/item Developed countries (DCs) Less developed countries (LDCs) Least developed countries

Market access:

Tariffication: Convert all nontariff barriers Same as DCs Same as DCs

to tariffs

Reduce tariffs by 36 percent Reduce tariffs by 24 percent Exempt from reductions, but

in 6 years; min. 15 per line in 10 years; min. 10 per line must at least bind tariffs

Imports of staple foods at Imports of staple foods at least 1-4 Same as LDCs

least 4-8 percent of supplies percent by 10 years; allow "appropriate

by 6 years market access" for other agricultural

products in return for more lenient terms

Tariff rate quotas: Increase access from 3 to Same as DCs Same as DCs

5 percent

Most-favored nation: No special regional schemes Same as DCs Same as DCs

unless offered to all

Special safeguard: Duties allowed on tariff-rate quota Same as DCs Same as DCs

commodities if import volume

or prices meet certain criteria

Export subsidies:

New subsidies: Disallowed Disallowed Disallowed

Reductions of old: Reduced 21 percent over Reduced 14 percent over Exempt, but no increases either

6 years from base 10 years from base

Credits/guarantees: To be negotiated further Same as DCs Same as DCs

Domestic support

Categorization of "Amber box", "green box", Same as DCs Same as DCs

policies: and "blue box"

Aggregate Measurement Reduce 20 percent over 6 years Reduce 13.3 percent over 10 years Same as LDCs

of Support (AMS): 

"De minimus" provision exempts "De minimus" provision exempts Same as LDCs

commodity if less than 5 percent commodity if less than 10 percent

of total value of production of total value of production

--- Investment, input and diversification Same as LDCs

subsidies exempt

Source: Derived from Valdes and McCalla (1996).
developing countries. Those developing countries that have

adequate agricultural resources, produce similar or substitutable crops, and have open economic policies would be

faced with a higher price incentive to produce. This would

increase their domestic food availability and food access and

decrease their dependence on food imports to meet overall

food needs. 

In the short run, however, the impact of higher world

prices could hurt the resource-poor countries with high

food import dependency, increasing the costs of food

imports and reducing foreign exchange earnings for alternative uses. Another related effect of lowering domestic

subsidies in exporting countries is that it could reduce

stocks, which could increase global price variability. For

developing countries, stability in food import prices

reduces short-term financial difficulties of importing and

allows a more stable flow of capital goods that are important to economic growth.

Foreign exchange availability to finance food imports for

food insecure countries is closely linked to the issue of market access. Agricultural commodity exports are a major

source of foreign exchange earnings for developing countries. Prices of the primary commodities have been declining

for the last two decades. The World Bank estimates that the

loss in foreign exchange earnings to developing countries

from declining commodity prices totaled $100 billion a year

from 1980 to 1993. While complete liberalization of the

global market may not reverse the long term decline in commodity market prices, protection of commodities such as

sugar and peanuts limits market access and therefore

demand, thereby reducing prices of commodities exported

by low-income countries. Consequently, this reduces their

ability to import foods.

The next round is expected to follow the URAA agenda and

continue negotiation in the areas of market access, domestic

support, and export competition.3 In the area of market

access, possible areas for negotiation include continuing

efforts to finish converting nontariff barriers to tariff barriers, lowering existing tariffs, increasing minimum access

levels for tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and reducing export

taxes. With domestic support, continued reductions in subsidies and further clarification as to which policies and programs distort trade are key subjects for negotiation. With

export competition, continued negotiated reductions in existing export subsidies is a significant negotiating objective for

many countries.

Several other agricultural trade issues are likely to receive

attention in the next round, although it is unclear at this

point whether new protocols will be opened. These include:

✺ Food aid. This is an important issue for developing countries. Among some donors, there are concerns that food

aid may be used as a hidden export subsidy (relatedly,

export credits have come under similar criticism). For the

recipient countries, there are concerns that food aid quantities have dropped sharply in recent years, despite provisions in place to address possible adverse consequences

for food security.4 With the end of government-held surpluses, food aid availability could become essentially a

budgetary issue and a pressing consideration for both

emergency and developmental programs if high food aid

needs coincide with periods of high prices.

✺ Preferential trade arrangements. Many trade arrangement

programs provide special market access for developing

countries’ commodities and goods. The margin of preference has varied by commodity and time, but for some

commodities (such as sugar) the prices received by

exporters to the EU and U.S. market have been two to

three times the world price since 1980. While these

arrangements provide economic benefits to producers in

these countries, the arrangements also discriminate

against other countries that may be able to produce the

same goods more efficiently and at lower cost. If the

arrangements are removed, the current producers may not

be able to compete effectively in the future, suggesting

that these protections may need to be phased out to allow

for adjustment.

✺ Technical assistance. Many developing countries signed

the Uruguay Round agreements, but lacked the capacity

to implement and enforce them. These countries are likely to demand more specific language and funding to support such activities.

✺ State trading enterprises (STEs). Some STEs have

monopoly trading power, although countries disagree

over the effects of STE privileges on world trade and

prices. Given that STEs exist in both developed as well as

in developing countries, disciplines imposed on STEs

would affect developing countries directly and indirectly.

✺ Biotechnology. Many consumer groups have raised concerns about the possible health and environmental effects

from crops using genetically modified organisms

(GMOs). Developing countries may be affected by any

new standards or regulations that ultimately influence

prices as well as the way in which such standards may

restrict trade with some developed countries.

✺ Production process issues. Production practices have come

under greater international scrutiny and may be addressed

through trade negotiations. Examples of these issues

include animal welfare (confinement) and different types

of fishing nets. Developing countries already have been


	

 

				


✺ #

3 The following two sections synthesize the discussions of Valdes and

McCalla (1996), IATRC (1997), Hanrahan (1998), Salinger (1998),

Thompson (1998), and Valdez and Young (1998). In addition, the authors have

benefited from attendance at several recent seminars and conferences sponsored by the Federal government, think tanks and other research institutions.

4 These provisions are detailed in Part X, Article 16 of the Uruguay Round

Agreement (“Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the

Uruguay Round Agricultural Reform Program on Least-Developed and Net

Food-Importing Developing Countries”).
affected directly by new regulations for the way in which

they produce some items (notably fishery products). They

also could be affected by rising prices of food exports from

developed countries (for example, higher poultry prices if

new animal confinement regulations are adopted).

/3/

!	
('2(

Many observers believe that the developing countries will

have a greater influence in the next trade round compared

with the Uruguay Round. Membership in the WTO (previously GATT) has grown very rapidly in the past decade,

especially among developing countries. For example, only

48 countries participated in the Kennedy Round negotiations

in the mid-1960s, but by the end of the Uruguay Round 118

countries were participants (FAO, 1998). Several countries

have new membership applications in progress, some of

which have the United Nations “least developed” country

status or may seek to join the WTO as a developing country. 

Sorting and understanding the developing countries’ trade

interests is a daunting task. Middle-income developing

countries like Argentina and Brazil are leading food

exporters and advocate free trade in agriculture. Other lower

income countries, many in Sub-Saharan Africa, are net food

importers and are vulnerable to external shocks (particularly

commodity price shocks) and favor “special and differential

treatment” trade provisions. For example, these provisions

allow developing countries to make relatively smaller tariff

reductions over longer periods of time compared with the

developed countries (see table A-1).

("

FAO. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement on

Agriculture for Developing Countries, A Training

Manual. Rome, 1998. 

Hanrahan, Charles E. “Agriculture in the Next Round of

Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” CRS Report for

Congress, March 1998.

International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.

“Bringing Agriculture into the GATT: Implementation of

the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and Issues

for the Next Round of Agricultural Negotiations.”

IATRC Commissioned Paper No. 12, October 1997

(http://www.umn.edu/iatrc).

Salinger, Lynn B. “In the Wake of the Uruguay Round:

Whither Aid Policies?” Associates for International

Resources and Development, mimeo, 1998.

Thompson, Robert. “World Agricultural Trade Negotiations:

Emerging Issues and the 1999 Agenda,” Presentation at

FAO Workshop on Uruguay Round Agreement on

Agriculture: Present and Future Implications for

Agriculture and Fisheries in the South Pacific Region,”

Auckland, New Zealand, Sept. 1998.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Agriculture in the WTO.

Economic Research Service, Situation and Outlook

Series, WRS-98-4, Washington, DC, 1998.

Valdes, Alberto and Alex McCalla. “The Uruguay Round

and Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries and

Economies in Transition,” Food Policy, Vol. 21 No. 4/5

(1996): 419-431.

Valdez, C. and E. Young. “Developing Countries’ Issues in

the WTO Related to Agriculture,” in Agriculture in the

WTO: Situation and Outlook Series, U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Economic Research Service, WRS-98-4,

Washington, DC, 1998, pp. 48-52.

$ ✺ 

				
 
	


!"

A new round of multilateral trade negotiations will aim to

cover a broad set of rules that will affect global production

and trade of agricultural commodities. Both exports and

imports of agricultural commodities are vital to the economic development and food security of the Sub-Saharan

countries. Agriculture contributes about 35 percent to the

region’s gross domestic product (GDP), more than any other

region in the world. The share of agriculture is about 40 percent of total export earnings, while imports of food products

have been growing. The slow growth of food production and

the sluggish performance of exports, which are necessary to

finance imports, mean that the region is very food insecure.

With more than half of the population dependent on the

agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is imperative

that these countries take measures to improve their agricultural and trade performance. 

However, there are also reasons to be optimistic about several countries.2 Since the mid-1980s, these countries

adopted structural adjustment policies aimed at liberalizing

their markets and adjusting their macroeconomic policies, in

particular exchange rate policies to improve their trade performance. The implications include: positive recent per

capita GDP growth rates, increased macroeconomic stability

(inflation, fiscal deficits, trade deficits), privatization efforts,

efforts to improve legal systems, and improvement in agricultural performance.

Trade could play an important role for the Sub-Saharan

African countries. Economically, trade offers short- and

long-run opportunities to improve economic efficiency, raise

incomes, and increase the variety and quality of consumer

goods at lower prices—all of which raise living standards

over time. Politically, trade also can help “lock in” domestic

reforms that lead to greater stability and peace.

4"*

The agricultural sector has a crucial role in the long-term

development of most countries in the region. Agriculture

remains the most important source of employment in the

region. It has been argued that the poor performance of the

African agricultural sector is what has prevented the typical

economic structural transformation, that is, the decline in

the relative contribution of agriculture to the economy that

has been experienced in other developing regions. Internal

political situations are often blamed for some of these problems. Currently, of the 508 million people in Sub-Saharan

Africa, 12 percent live in countries that are at war, 46 percent live in countries with unstable macroeconomic environments (defined as countries with inflation of greater than 25

percent annually), 19 percent live in minimally economically stable countries, and 23 percent live in strong performing countries (Collier et al., 1997) (table B-1).

Quantitatively, trade flows in Sub-Saharan Africa are distinguished by three features. The first is that Sub-Saharan

Africa’s share of world trade has been shrinking, from 3.7

percent in 1960-62 to 1.5 percent in 1994-96 (World Bank,

1998). The second feature is that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to be highly dependent upon European trade partners

(recently about 51 percent, down from around 80 percent in


	

 

				


✺ 

	


Trade Liberalization and the Sub-Saharan 

African Countries

Michael Trueblood and Shahla Shapouri1

Abstract: The Sub-Saharan African countries could benefit more from participation in the next

round of trade negotiations than they did in the last Uruguay Round if they improve their overall economic competitiveness. This could allow them to increase foreign market access for

export goods in which they have a comparative advantage and for traditional export commodities. They also could make potentially significant gains if they are able to reduce foreign tariff

escalation on value-added goods that they could process in their home countries. These countries also will need to continue monitoring food security issues related to the availability of food

aid and the growth and volatility of prices of staple import commodities. Finally, Sub-Saharan

African domestic reforms could have more impact than trade reform. The countries will benefit by using the international trading system to help re-enforce domestic policy reforms.

1 Agricultural economists with the Markets and Trade Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA.

2 The countries include Angola, Benin, Botswana, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial

Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mauritius, and Uganda (see

Fischer, Hernández-Catá, and Khan, 1998).
% ✺ 

				
 
	



Table B-1--Selected Macroeconomic, Trade, and Transportation Indicators

Collier Openness Avg. Avg.

Per et al. ratio OECD tariff, post-UR Freight

Country capita stability [(X+M) industrial bound tariff, costs/

GNP category 1/ WTO /GDP]* 3/ exports agriculture exports

(1996) (1996) status 2/ (1994-96) (1994) (1995) (1991)

U.S. dollars Ratio -----Percent-----

Benin 350 A 3 0.60 0.7 80 15.1

Botswana 3,210 --- 2 0.83 0.9 --- ---

Burkina Faso 230 A 3 0.41 1.1 150 25.0

Burundi 170 D 3 0.28 6.9 --- ---

Cameroon 610 B 2 0.40 3.4 310 38.1

Central Af. Rep. 310 --- 3 0.46 3.7 --- 47.6

Chad 160 B 3 0.74 --- --- 60.5

Congo, Dem. Rep. 130 C 3 0.58 --- --- 13.7

Congo, Rep. 670 B 2 1.49 2.1 30 9.4

C te d’Ivoire 660 A 2 0.79 7.6 215 7.4

Ethiopia 100 A 4 0.37 --- --- 55.0

Gabon 3,950 --- 2 0.96 0.5 260 6.8

Gambia 320 A 3 1.24 9.6 --- 21.1

Ghana 360 C 2 0.63 4.3 98 10.6

Kenya 320 B 2 0.73 7.6 100 21.4

Lesotho 660 B 3 1.40 9.1 --- ---

Madagascar 250 C 3 0.50 11.1 280 14.2

Malawi 180 C 3 0.66 --- --- 56.2

Mali 240 A 3 0.60 1.2 110 52.6

Mauritania 470 A 3 1.06 3.9 54 7.0

Mauritius 3,710 --- 2 1.24 55.8 135 11.0

Mozambique 80 C 3 0.88 --- --- 18.3

Namibia 2,250 --- 2 1.08 0.8 40 ---

Niger 200 C 3 0.40 0.1 132 20.7

Nigeria 240 C 2 0.34 0.6 230 8.3

Rwanda 190 D 3 0.45 --- --- ---

Senegal 570 A 2 0.69 7.4 180 18.8

Sierra Leone 200 --- 3 0.41 2.1 --- 15.6

South Africa 3,520 --- 1 0.49 --- 40 ---

Swaziland 1,210 --- 2 1.75 67.5 40 ---

Tanzania 170 C 3 0.62 9.9 240 40.6

Togo 300 C 3 0.71 2.2 --- 13.4

Uganda 300 A 3 0.31 --- 80 71.1

Zambia 360 C 3 0.84 --- 124 12.0

Zimbabwe 610 B 2 0.86 --- 161 6.2

Key:

 --- = Not available.

 1/ WTO Status: 1-Developed; 2-Developing; 3-Least Developing; 4-Nonparticipant.

2/ Collier et al.: A - Stable and high growth; B - Stable macroeconomics;

 C - Unstable macroeconomics; D - War torn or unrest.

3/ * X = Exports of merchandise and goods and services, M = imports of merchandise and goods and services.

Sources: W. Bank, STARS CD-ROM database; Yeats et al. (1997); Harrold (1995); Collier et al. (1997).
the 1960s) (IMF, 1999). Third, exports continue to be highly

dependent on primary commodities despite efforts to diversify. In Sub-Saharan Africa, 29 out of 47 countries depend

on three primary commodities to provide at least 50 percent

of their export revenues (UNCTAD, 1998).

Qualitatively, imports in Sub-Saharan African have been

inhibited by tariff and nontariff trade barriers. The SubSaharan African countries have higher import tariffs than the

rest of the world. According to the World Bank, in 1992-94

average tariffs in Sub-Saharan Africa were about 27 percent,

compared with 9 percent for the fast growing exporters and

6 percent in OECD countries (Yeats et al., 1997). Even after

the Uruguay Round, Sub-Saharan Africa’s tariffs, which

were already high by world standards, have remained relatively unchanged. The nontariff barriers in Sub-Saharan

Africa also are high compared with other countries: 34 percent on average compared with 4 percent in the fast growing

exporters and OECD countries (Yeats et al., 1997).

Trade in Sub-Saharan Africa also has been strongly affected

by trade preference arrangements. The major preference

arrangement for Sub-Saharan Africa is the Lomé agreement

for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries

(currently Lomé IV; Lomé V is being negotiated now), in

which the EU offers preferential trade access for goods from

Sub-Saharan African countries. The United States has also

offered preferential treatment under the General System of

Preferences (GSP), but historically this program has not

been that significant in promoting trade between the United

States and Sub-Saharan Africa. In both regions, tariffs on

goods from Sub-Saharan African rise sharply if the goods

involve value-added processing (“tariff escalation”).

Two related aspects of trade preferences are emerging that

could affect trade patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa. One phenomenon is that there has been a rise in regional free trade

agreements around the world in recent years. Most of these

regional agreements appear to have contributed to increased

intra-regional trade. These agreements generally are

believed to have led to trade creation (USDA, 1998;

Robinson and Thierfelder, 1999). There are currently efforts

to negotiate (or re-negotiate) trade agreements in SubSaharan Africa (such as the Common Market for East and

Southern Africa or COMESA; and the Southern African

Development Community or SADC), but historically these

agreements have not increased trade much in the region.

Another aspect of trade preferences is the WTO’s trading

system, which allows nations to self-select their country status in order to take advantage of the special and differential

treatment (SDT) provisions (see table A-1 in overview article). Of the Sub-Saharan African countries, one country

(South Africa) has chosen to be a “developed country,” 13

countries have chosen to be considered “less developed

countries,” 24 countries are considered “least developed

countries” because of their designation as such by the

United Nations, and 9 countries are not members of the

World Trade Organization.

Finally, given the importance of agriculture to Sub-Saharan

Africa, it is important to understand that only three countries

(South Africa, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) are self-sufficient in

grain consumption (slight grain exporters) in recent years.

On average during 1996-98, 19 countries required imports

to meet about 3-20 percent of their consumption needs,

while another 25 countries required imports to meet at least

20 percent of their consumption needs. Higher prices for

food on world markets for these import-dependent countries

can significantly affect their capacity for commercial

imports of food and nonagricultural commodities. Currently,

due to limited financial capacity, 18 of 46 countries rely on

food aid to meet at least 20 percent of their grain imports

(table B-2).

1"	"*"*	"

There is general agreement in the economic literature that

policy accounts for much of economic performance. There

is also abundant available research confirming that countries

that choose to trade openly perform better. As for SubSaharan African countries, most studies have reached the

conclusion that sustained domestic reforms are the keys to

economic recovery.

Since the mid-1980s, most Sub-Saharan African countries

have liberalized their markets. In the area of trade policy,

many countries have significantly liberalized and adjusted

their exchanges rates. In general, the region can be divided

into two groups of countries based on their exchange rate

policies. One group, the Western and Central African countries, has adopted a monetary union and has pegged (fixed) its

exchange rates to the French franc (the CFA franc zone). This

group has been able to avoid foreign exchange rationing, with

less import restriction policies, and have been required to

maintain fiscal discipline. The second group (non-CFA countries) has adopted a variable exchange rate policy. The countries in this group have erected tariff and nontariff trade barriers. Among this group, only Mauritius and Ghana have come

close to completely liberalizing their foreign exchange markets. Some countries in this group, such as Zimbabwe and

Kenya, initially had less distorted exchange rates and financial problems, but have not completed the policy reforms necessary to achieve full liberalization.

In Sub-Saharan African countries, nontariff barriers are

mainly in the form of government licenses or approval of

imports. The problem with this type of trade distortion is the

lack of transparency that could significantly change the price

signals that are important incentives for trade. Since the mid1980s, progress has been made by most countries to reduce

the number of products requiring prior approval of imports.

Tariff reform in the region typically has been proceeding in

three steps. The first step has been to rationalize tariffs,

which reduces the number of tariff rates and systematically

organizes any exceptions. This step has been implemented

in most countries. The second step has been to reduce the


	

 

				


✺ 
 ✺ 

				
 
	



Table B-2--Selected Agricultural Indicators (most recent data available)

Per capita calorie Cereal food aid Primary commodity

consumption Cereal imports / total cereal export dependency

Country per day 1/ prod. / cereal use imports ratio 2/

(1994-1996) (1995-1997) (1995-1997) (1995)

Number Percent

Angola 1,927 0.46 0.39 94.5

Benin 2,362 0.89 0.17 93.8

Botswana 2,253 0.26 0.00 ---

Burkina Faso 2,254 0.96 0.22 99.0

Burundi 1,711 0.91 0.08 87.9

Cameroon 2,200 0.90 0.01 ---

Central African Rep. 1,928 0.87 0.07 55.7

Chad 1,902 0.96 0.46 60.9

Comoros 1,828 0.34 0.04 70.5

Congo, Dem. Rep. 1,880 0.83 0.06 81.5

Congo, Rep. 2,125 0.15 0.10 99.0

Côte d'Ivoire 2,378 0.76 0.06 55.0

Djibouti 1,886 0.00 0.25 ---

Eritrea 1,638 0.41 0.34 ---

Ethiopia 1,781 0.95 0.99 79.0

Gabon 2,497 0.23 0.00 99.0

Gambia 2,271 0.51 0.05 ---

Ghana 2,561 0.87 0.20 67.4

Guinea 2,135 0.71 0.02 91.3

Guinea-Bissau 2,426 0.73 0.06 92.0

Kenya 1,991 0.82 0.11 56.0

Lesotho 2,169 0.45 0.07 ---

Liberia 2,098 0.38 0.40 ---

Madagascar 1,991 0.96 0.26 ---

Malawi 2,048 0.85 0.21 88.8

Mali 2,099 0.97 0.31 73.8

Mauritania 2,632 0.42 0.00 87.8

Mauritius 2,975 0.00 0.10 ---

Mozambique 1,719 0.75 0.38 58.1

Namibia 2,164 0.46 0.04 ---

Niger 2,090 0.95 0.36 95.7

Nigeria 2,554 0.95 0.00 ---

Rwanda 2,064 0.44 0.96 78.8

Senegal 2,391 0.58 0.01 ---

Seychelles 2,411 0.00 0.00 ---

Sierra Leone 2,017 0.61 0.15 ---

Somalia 1,579 0.73 0.10 ---

South Africa 2,881 1.00 0.00 ---

Sudan 2,355 0.92 0.19 55.7

Swaziland 2,529 0.59 0.04 ---

Tanzania 2,016 0.94 0.14 ---

Togo 2,096 0.89 0.05 63.3

Uganda 2,196 1.02 0.99 81.5

Zambia 1,940 0.90 0.20 99.0

Zimbabwe 2,035 1.07 0.01 53.0

--- = Not available.

1/ UNFAO recommends a nutritional minimum 2,100 calories per person per day.

2/ Top 3 primary commodity exports / total merchandise exports.

Sources: UNFAO FAOSTAT internet database; UNCTAD.

Ratio Ratio
dispersion of tariffs, which is done by increasing the lowest

tariffs and reducing the highest tariffs. This step also has

been implemented by most countries. The third step has

been to reduce overall protection by lowering average tariffs. This has been implemented in selected countries

(Kenya, for example).

In addition to tariff reform, several countries in the Southern

African region have cooperated regionally to harmonize

their trade policies, which could enhance trade for both the

individual countries and the region. For example, the crossborder initiative in South/East Africa is in its final stage,

which will eliminate tariffs on intra-regional trade and harmonize external tariffs for all imports.

Several countries also have taken steps to promote exports

using various means. Export licences and controls have been

significantly reduced, export taxes have been lowered, the

role of marketing boards have been reduced, and economic

processing zones (EPZs) promoting exports have been

established (examples include Madagascar, Kenya, Nigeria

and Zambia).

Foreign direct investment (FDI) could be an important

stimulant to economic development. However, the share of

FDI in the Sub-Saharan African countries has declined

from 6 percent in 1984-89 to 3 percent in 1994-95 (twothirds was accounted for by Nigeria). A World Bank study

found that the reasons for the low inflow of FDI to the

region were low GDP growth rates, low trade openness,

and highly variable real effective exchange rates (World

Bank, 1997). Another study found that “red tape” was

extensive, expensive, and time-consuming in many countries, which discouraged trade and investment (Lancaster,

1991). FDI also has been discouraged by poor market

infrastructure, which has meant that there are high costs to

exporting and less flexibility to take advantage of international market opportunities.

Domestic policy reforms have tended to reduce the government role at the sectoral level. As for the agricultural sector,

most countries eliminated the role of marketing boards,

allowing markets to determine prices for both products and

inputs. However, transportation policy remains an important

source of inefficiencies. The region’s anti-competitive cargo

reservation policies that favor domestic carriers have led to

high shipping costs, recently estimated to be 20 percent

above the world average. One recent study projected that

lowering shipping costs to average world levels would have

a much greater impact than any trade policy changes

(Hertel, Master, and Elbehri, 1998). Burdensome domestic

regulatory policies or nationalized transportation carriers

also have raised transportation costs over time (Carbajo,

1993). Finally, transportation freight costs escalate for

value-added products, which contributes toward dependency

on primary commodity exports.

3$'5(."

,-'6

Most of the quantitative analysis reported here was done

during and immediately following the Uruguay Round.

These studies are at the regional level and have been computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Most studies

projected that there would be very slight negative impacts

(-0.2 to -0.5) on African GDP growth compared to the status quo of no global trade liberalization (Golding and van

der Mensbrugghe, 1995; Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr,

1995). Most African countries already received high preferential treatment, so uniformly lowering developed country

tariffs has the greatest benefit for other exporting regions

(especially Asia). This reduces the market shares of SubSaharan African countries. Other studies have made qualitative judgements about the impact of the Uruguay Round,

reviewing each region’s or country’s trade structure, the

nature of the trade barriers, and the trade commitments.

These studies argue that the Uruguay Round was likely to

have very little impact on African countries. The basis for

this conclusion was the argument that African countries are

not fully committed to trade reforms, at least in the short

run (Sorsa, 1996).

One must be cautious about over-interpreting the results of

these studies because most of the studies are based upon inadequate data, which limit the quality of the results. The overall

evaluation of the previous studies indicates that results are

highly dependent on the assumptions related to the flexibility

and responsiveness of the economies of these countries. 

!*"!	


."

One area particularly important to African countries is food

security. Four aspects of food security concerns are: higher

food prices, more volatile food prices, declining food aid,

and export taxes/restraints. A preliminary assessment of the

first two issues shows that so far international food prices

have not risen or become more volatile because of the

Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, but these issues

will continue to be monitored by the United Nations Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) so that guidelines may

be adopted for providing foodstuffs concessionally

(Greenfield, de Nigris, and Konandreas, 1996; Sharma et al.,

1996; FAO, 1996; Sarris, 1997).

There are at least three other areas of special concern to

Sub-Saharan African countries. One area is the erosion of

special preferences such as the General System of

Preferences (GSP), but especially the EU’s Lomé Treaty,

which has created preferential access to the EU market.

Currently, the African countries face almost no tariffs to

Europe for their export products (but the reverse is not true),

so there is not much room to negotiate. However, as developed countries have lowered their tariffs to other developing

countries (especially Asian countries), this has eroded the


	

 

				


✺ 
 ✺ 

				
 
	



Table B-3--Decomposition of Agricultural Trade, Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries (SSA), 1995-97 averages

Total Fruits & Bev. Oilmerch. Agri. Cereals Meats Dairy veg. crops seeds Sugar Other

 --- $ billion ---- ----------------------------------- Percent -----------------------------------

Exports

Benin 0.41 0.20 0 0 0 2 0 9 0 89

Cameroon 1.75 0.57 0 0 0 13 50 0 0 36

Chad 0.20 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100

Côte d'Ivoire 4.09 2.24 1 0 0 8 75 0 1 16

Ethiopia 0.49 0.45 0 0 0 3 69 2 0 25

Ghana 1.49 0.55 1 0 0 4 91 1 0 4

Kenya 2.13 1.16 4 0 0 12 60 0 2 21

Madagascar 0.32 0.14 1 3 0 17 64 0 4 11

Malawi 0.51 0.38 1 0 0 1 10 0 7 81

Mali 0.48 0.28 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 98

Mauritius 1.76 0.44 2 3 0 0 1 0 89 6

Namibia 1.38 0.20 0 43 1 0 0 0 0 56

Nigeria 16.25 0.52 0 0 0 5 39 3 0 54

South Africa 29.61 2.41 16 3 2 36 2 1 6 34

Sudan 0.57 0.54 4 5 0 3 0 22 3 63

Swaziland 0.91 0.30 0 1 0 11 0 1 47 39

Tanzania 0.72 0.44 0 0 0 19 38 2 2 39

Togo 0.23 0.13 1 0 1 0 23 1 0 73

Uganda 0.60 0.46 4 0 0 4 83 2 0 6

Zimbabwe 2.36 1.09 7 2 1 3 5 1 8 73

 SSA 83.49 13.74 4 2 1 12 35 2 7 38

Imports

Benin 0.67 0.12 34 11 6 8 1 0 11 29

Cameroon 1.18 0.12 50 2 7 4 1 0 7 29

Chad 0.25 0.05 41 2 6 2 2 0 21 26

Côte d'Ivoire 3.07 0.44 47 2 11 4 1 0 4 30

Ethiopia 1.09 0.20 58 0 1 2 0 0 6 32

Ghana 1.73 0.24 45 7 5 4 1 0 24 15

Kenya 3.14 0.38 43 0 1 3 1 0 4 47

Madagascar 0.54 0.08 44 0 7 1 1 0 7 40

Malawi 0.57 0.08 58 1 7 3 1 0 0 30

Mali 0.78 0.10 26 0 16 10 16 0 17 14

Mauritius 2.21 0.34 24 10 15 11 2 0 4 35

Namibia 1.55 0.10 20 7 0 44 0 1 23 5

Nigeria 15.67 1.36 31 0 17 0 1 0 16 33

South Africa 27.79 1.99 23 9 3 5 6 2 1 52

Sudan 1.37 0.29 45 0 3 7 16 0 0 28

Swaziland 1.09 0.10 19 11 12 16 6 1 0 36

Tanzania 1.42 0.20 26 0 2 4 0 0 13 54

Togo 0.44 0.07 33 5 8 4 2 0 7 40

Uganda 0.86 0.06 40 0 4 1 0 0 22 32

Zimbabwe 2.87 0.23 33 0 2 8 2 4 2 49

 SSA 84.49 10.36 34 5 8 6 3 1 8 35
relative competitive edge of Sub-Saharan African countries.

This process of tariff reduction will probably continue in the

next round, which will add further pressure on the SubSaharan African economies to perform better.

Another area of special concern is tariff escalation. SubSaharan African countries, similar to other developing countries, typically face high tariff rates from developed countries as they engage in value-added production. Less well

known, however, is that developing countries have even

greater escalating tariff rates than the developed countries,

which discourages trade among developing countries. 

"

Over time, the economic benefits of trade liberalization

include rising incomes, a greater variety of consumer goods

at lower prices, and greater production efficiency. The SubSaharan African countries are aware of the importance of

the next WTO negotiations, and many intend to be more

active participants than they were in the Uruguay Round.

They hope to protect their trading interests, learn about new

trading opportunities, discipline their economies, and attract

foreign investment.

Analysis of the Uruguay Round suggests that Sub-Saharan

African countries would not be affected by the global trade

commitments, but this analysis requires some caution

because of data limitations and the assumptions about countries’ commitments to trade liberalization. In the next trade

round, the Sub-Saharan African countries will need to continue monitoring food security issues, in particular regarding

the effects of the agreements on food import bills. It would

be to their benefit if they could increase foreign market

access for export goods in which they have a comparative

advantage (such as textiles, shoes, and leather goods) as

well as for traditional export goods (such as sugar, cocoa

and coffee) (table B-3). They also could make potentially

significant gains if they are able to reduce foreign tariff

escalation on value-added goods, which they could process

in their home countries.

Eroding trade preference arrangements and the further erosion likely in the next trade round make policy reform critical to Sub-Saharan African countries. Domestic reforms

may hold more promise for improving economic performance than trade policy reforms such as lowering tariffs.

Any cost-cutting measure is very important to helping the

countries be competitive in foreign trade. For example,

elimination of cargo preferences that lead to competitive

shipping rates and streamlining regulations of domestic

transportation carriers and freight could promote exports of

value-added goods. The Sub-Saharan countries should also

use the international trading system to help re-enforce

domestic policy reforms.

("

Carbajo, Jose (ed.). Regulatory Reform in Transport: Some

Recent Experiences. World Bank, 1993.

Collier et al., “The Future of Lomé: Europe’s Role in

African Growth,” The World Economy, Vol. 20 (1997):

285-305.

FAO. “Report of a Meeting of Experts on Agricultural Price

Instability,” Mimeo., June 1996. 

FAO. The Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement on

Agriculture for Developing Countries, A Training

Manual. Rome, 1998. 

Fischer, S., E. Hernández-Catá, and M. Khan. “Africa: Is

This the Turning Point?” Washington, DC: International

Monetary Fund Paper on Policy Analysis and

Assessment, No. PPAA/98/6, 1998. 

Golding, Ian and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “The

Uruguay Round: An Assessment of Economywide and

Agricultural Reforms,” in The Uruguay Round and the

Developing Economies (Eds. W. Martin and L.A.

Winters). Washington, DC: World Bank Discussion Paper

#307, 1995: 25-52.

Greenfield, J., M. de Nigris, and P. Konandreas. “The

Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: Food

Security Implications for Developing Countries,” Food

Policy, Vol. 21 No. 4/5 (1996): 365-375.

Harold, Peter. “The Impact of the Uruguay Round on

Africa.” Washington, DC: World Bank Discussion Paper

#311, 1995.

Harrison, G., T. Rutherford and D. Tarr, “Quantifying the

Uruguay Round,” in The Uruguay Round and the

Developing Economies (Eds. W. Martin and L.A.

Winters). Washington, DC: World Bank Discussion Paper

#307, 1995: 215-284.

Hertel, T., W. Masters, and A. Elbehri. “The Uruguay Round

and Africa: A Global, General Equilibrium Analysis,”

Journal of African Economies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1998): 208-

236.

International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics,

various yearbooks.

Lancaster, Carol. African Economic Reform: the External

Dimension. Washington, DC: Institute for International

Economics, 1991.

Robinson, Sherman and Karen Thierfelder. “Trade

Liberalization and Regional Integration: The Search for

Large Numbers,” International Food Policy Research

Institute, Trade and Macroeconomics Division, Working

Paper No. 34, 1999.


	

 

				


✺ !
Sarris, Alexander, “The Evolving Nature of Price Instability

in Cereals Markets,” International Agricultural Trade

Research Consortium Conference Paper, Alexandria, VA,

June, 1998.

Sharma, R., P. Konandreas, and J. Greenfield. “An Overview

of Assessments of the Impact of the Uruguay Round on

Agricultural Prices and Incomes,” Food Policy, Vol. 21

No. 4/5 (1996): 351-363.

Sorsa, Piritta. “Sub-Saharan African Own Commitments in

the Uruguay Round—Myth or Reality?” The World

Economy, Vol. 19 (1996): 287-305.

UNCTAD. “International Trade Liberalization and

Implications for Diversification in Africa.” United

Nations, 1998.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Regional Trade Agreements

and U.S. Agriculture. Economic Research Service,

Agriculture Economic Report No. 771, Washington, DC,

1998.

World Bank. Global Economic Perspective. Washington,

DC, 1997.

World Bank. STARS CD-ROM Economic Database.

Washington, DC: 1998.

Yeats, Alexander et al. Did Domestic Policies Marginalized

Africa in International Trade? Washington, DC: World

Bank, 1997.

" ✺ 

				
 
	


!"

The Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region is very heterogenous in many ways, including the types of agricultural

goods that are produced, consumed, and traded. In this article,

we review some of the key agricultural trade issues that are

likely to be important to the region in the next trade round.

The major theme that will emerge in this article is the trend

over the past 15 years of greater trade openness. This trend

has its roots in major policy changes that occurred in

response to the debt crisis of the 1980s. The result for most

countries has been greater macroeconomic stability and

rapid economic and trade growth. However, income inequality has remained a stubborn problem throughout the region,

despite this growth.

In this article, we identify some of the major regional agricultural trade interests, examine the net food-importing

countries such as those monitored in this report, review the

relative importance of multilateral and regional trade negotiations, and discuss the outlook for a few key regional

trade agreements currently being negotiated that may affect

the extent to which some LAC countries participate in the

WTO negotiations.

4"!

%'.(

Compared with other developing regions, the LAC region

is relatively well off. The region’s per capita income averages $3,390 per year, in contrast to $910 in East Asia and

$510 in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 1998). Food

calorie supplies also are relatively high at 2,812 calories

per person per day, compared with 2,706 in East Asia and

2,164 in Sub-Saharan Africa (FAO, 1999). Other socioeconomic indicators also suggest that the region is relatively

well off. However, these simple national averages mask

relatively more skewed income distributions compared

with other regions, meaning that the consequences of suffering from poverty are widespread among some of the

lower income groups.

The LAC region is host to a wide variety of agricultural

trading interests. The region is a net food exporter with an

average food trade surplus of $9.4 billion in 1995-97.

However, if Argentina and Brazil—two of the largest net

food exporters among all developing countries—are

excluded, then the region is a net food importer ($0.3 billion

deficit). In general, most countries in Central and South

America are exporters of beverage crops, fruits and vegetables, and sugar; they tend to be importers of grains, oilseed

products, and dairy products. The Caribbean countries are

largely service-oriented economies that typically depend on

agricultural imports to meet the bulk of their food supplies.

Several countries are among the top producers or exporters

for different commodities. Argentina is the world’s fifth

largest wheat exporter, second largest coarse grain exporter,

and third largest soybean exporter. Brazil is the largest coffee exporter in the world, followed closely by Colombia.

Brazil is also the second largest soybean exporter. Ecuador

is the world’s largest banana exporter. Costa Rica is the

world’s second largest exporter of both bananas and pineapples. Chile is the largest exporter of grapes, while Cuba is

the fourth largest sugar exporter.


	

 

				


✺ #

	


Trade Issues for Low-Income Countries in the 

Latin America and Caribbean Region

Matthew Edwards and Michael Trueblood1

Abstract: The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries and the United States are significant trade partners, but the LAC region has very diverse economies and trade interests.

Since the debt crisis in the 1980s, many countries have displayed much more trade openness.

Commitments from regional trade agreements, which continue to proliferate, are often more

stringent than the Uruguay Round commitments for the larger countries, that may use the

more demanding commitments in the next trade round. The smaller low-income net foodimporting countries have struggled to form coalitions that allow them to voice their trade concerns. The loss or erosion of special trade preference arrangements may have negative short

run effects on many of the smaller low-income countries.

1 Matthew Edwards and Michael Trueblood are respectively summer intern

and agricultural economist with the Market and Trade Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA.
It is also important to note that this region is a very important trading partner for the United States. In 1997, the

United States exported $57.2 billion in agricultural products

to the world, of which $10.4 billion (18.2 percent) went to

this region. U.S. agricultural imports totaled $36.3 billion in

the same year, of which $12.2 billion came from Latin

America (33.6 percent). Mexico is the United States’ third

largest export market (after Japan and Canada) at $5.2 billion (USDA, 1998a).

'!	


/'(


Economic and trade structure. To some extent, the countries monitored in this annual report exemplify the diversity

of the region, representing South America (Bolivia,

Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), Central America (El

Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), and the

Caribbean (Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica).

However, all these countries are net food importers.

The monitored countries all fall below the LAC region’s

average per capita income level of $3,940, ranging from

$380 in Haiti to $2,610 in Peru (table C-1).2 All of these

countries (except for Haiti, which has suffered from political

instability) have followed the regional pattern of showing a

decline in per capita income growth in the 1980s compared

with the 1970s, followed by a rebound in the 1990s.

Reasons for this pattern will be discussed later. In 1996,

agriculture represented on average about 17 percent of gross

domestic product (GDP) for the 11 countries compared with

only 8 percent of the LAC region as a whole (World Bank,

1998). Industry represented about 30 percent of GDP on

average while services represent about 53 percent.

The countries also have kept pace with the regional trend of

greater trade openness (table C-2). One commonly used

indicator of openness is total trade (exports plus imports) as

a percentage of gross national product (GNP). By this measurement, nearly every one of the 11 countries has become

more open since the debt crisis in the mid-1980s. Jamaica is

typical of the smaller, service-oriented economies in the

Caribbean where trade is very dominant, which shows up as

a very high openness ratio (typically over one).3

Agricultural exports are a significant share of total merchandise exports for these countries, accounting for about 31

percent in 1995-97 (table C-3). The largest component of

exports is beverage crops (44 percent), followed by fruits

and vegetables (25 percent). Agricultural imports represent a

smaller share of imports, accounting for about 12 percent.

The largest component of agricultural imports is cereals at

38 percent, followed by dairy products (8 percent) and fruits

and vegetables (7 percent).

Policies. To appreciate the current policy setting, it is important to have some understanding for the region’s economic

history. The LAC region traditionally was known for import

substitution industrialization (ISI) policies, about which

much has been written. The ISI policies were established

with the primary goal of achieving rapid industrialization. It

was believed that the agricultural sector suffered from

declining long run real output prices and by itself would

never lead to an effective development strategy. Industry and

manufacturing were artificially stimulated at the expense of

agriculture by using policy instruments such as overvalued

exchange rates, import quotas, and export taxes on agricultural commodities.

Several countries achieved high economic growth rates during the 1950s and 1960s, but the deeper problems with ISI

policies eventually were exposed during the 1980s with the

debt crisis. In the late 1970s, “petrodollars” from the oil and

petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) countries were

$ ✺ 

				
 
	



2 Data are for 1997 using the Atlas method. Only Haiti is classified by the

United Nations as a Least Developed Country. This allows it to claim Least

Developed status in the Uruguay Round’s Special and Differential

Treatment (SDT) provisions (see table A-1, overview article). 

3 Larger countries tend to have smaller openness ratios as domestic markets

serve a larger role in their economies.

Table C-1--Per Capita Income Levels and Growth Rates

Income Growth rates

Country 1997 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1997

$U.S. --- Percent per year ---

Bolivia 970 NA NA 1.41

Colombia 2,180 3.45 0.85 2.26

Dominican Rep. 1,750 5.74 1.00 2.09

Ecuador 1,570 5.77 -0.50 1.35

El Salvador 1,810 1.19 -3.10 3.29

Guatemala 1,580 3.30 -1.72 1.43

Haiti 380 1.86 -1.48 -3.38

Honduras 740 2.29 -0.70 0.46

Jamaica 1,550 -0.41 0.11 0.74

Nicaragua 410 -3.03 -4.43 2.25

Peru 2,610 0.80 -2.00 3.67

 LAC region 3,940 3.44 -0.16 1.18

NA = Not available.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.

Table C-2--Trade Openness in Latin America

Country 1980-81 1984-86 1989-91 1994-96

------(X+M)/GDP*------

Bolivia 0.35 0.32 0.44 0.50

Colombia 0.21 0.20 0.23 0.35

Dominican Rep. 0.46 0.42 0.42 0.96

Ecuador 0.54 0.46 0.50 0.57

El Salvador 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.57

Guatemala 0.49 0.32 0.37 0.44

Haiti 0.18 0.20 0.28 0.34

Honduras 1.10 0.92 0.88 0.86

Jamaica 0.86 1.07 1.17 1.29

Nicaragua 0.88 0.62 0.72 1.00

Peru 0.25 0.21 0.22 0.27

 LAC region 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.32

*X = Exports of merchandise and goods and services, 

 M = Imports of merchandise and goods and services.

Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1999.
invested in western banks. Given the general commodity

boom of the 1970s and overall investment optimism of the

time, these banks lent large sums of money to the developing countries, which borrowed the funds to help survive the

oil price shocks. However, several countries quickly became

overextended when their economies experienced downturns.

In particular, the large outstanding foreign debts of

Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico threatened the global financial system. However, several other smaller countries, such

as Bolivia and Peru, were also very overexposed with total

debt to gross domestic product ratios near or above one.

The debt crisis of the mid-1980s led to a series of major

policy changes throughout the region. ISI policies came to

be viewed as unsustainable over the long run, leading to

economic problems such as high inflation, import rationing,

and a lack of spare parts. Under pressure to improve overall

economic performance, particularly exports for debt servicing obligations, many countries abandoned ISI policies and

embarked on several major policy reforms. Substantial

macroeconomic changes brought many countries under

monetary and fiscal discipline, resulting in lower inflation

and budget deficits. Legal reforms also improved the protection of property rights and foreign investment.

While the macroeconomic reforms have been very important

in establishing stability and encouraging investment, the

trade reforms that were implemented have been quite

remarkable, particularly in light of the region’s economic

history. Exchange rates have been unified and allowed to

drop to market levels. Quantitative import restrictions have

been eliminated for the most part. Tariffs have been dramatically lowered and simplified (table C-4). The dispersion of

tariff rates within countries was also significantly reduced

while export taxes have been eliminated. As indicated

above, export growth has increased over the past decade in

most countries.

As part of the goal to improve economic and trade performance over the past 15 years, countries in the LAC region

have become much more active in negotiating trade agreements, both multilaterally through the World Trade

Organization (WTO) and via regional trade agreements. 

.('/



Prior to the Uruguay Round, only 18 LAC countries were

signatory members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade (GATT, now WTO). However, as the negotiations

continued, several more countries joined. Today, nearly

every country in the LAC region is a member of the World

Trade Organization.

The Uruguay Round was helpful in advancing the trade

interests of the LAC region. For example, Argentina and

Brazil became prominent members of the Cairns Group,

which has gained influence by promoting free trade in agriculture. Several countries, particularly in the Caribbean,


	

 

				


✺ 

Table C-3--Decomposition of Agricultural Trade for the 11 Selected Countries, 1995-97 Averages

Total Fruits/ Beverage OilCountry merch. Agri. Cereals Meats Dairy Veg. crops seeds Sugar Other

--- $ bilion. --- ----------------------------------------- Percent --------------------------------------------

Exports

Bolivia 1.15 0.34 1 1 0 12 6 22 6 50

Colombia 10.68 3.52 1 0 0 15 58 0 6 19

Dominican Rep. 0.83 0.39 0 3 0 13 33 0 31 20

Ecuador 4.86 1.67 3 0 0 67 19 0 1 10

El Salvador 1.95 0.59 4 0 1 2 70 1 7 14

Guatemala 2.18 1.36 4 0 0 18 42 3 17 16

Haiti 0.13 0.03 0 0 0 23 72 0 0 5

Honduras 1.33 0.51 0 2 0 35 57 0 1 5

Jamaica 1.40 0.30 3 1 1 27 12 0 35 21

Nicaragua 0.66 0.32 2 14 3 10 39 8 10 13

Peru 6.07 0.57 1 0 0 30 45 0 6 18

 Total 11 31.25 9.60 2 1 0 25 44 2 8 17

Imports

Bolivia 1.61 0.17 51 1 10 5 4 3 0 26

Colombia 14.30 1.62 40 2 3 12 1 6 1 36

Dominican Rep. 3.05 0.53 37 1 15 3 1 0 2 42

Ecuador 4.35 0.42 31 1 3 8 4 1 6 47

El Salvador 3.42 0.49 25 5 12 8 2 1 0 47

Guatemala 3.38 0.47 31 3 9 7 2 1 0 47

Haiti 0.65 0.32 42 1 7 6 0 0 16 27

Honduras 1.79 0.30 34 2 10 7 1 2 0 44

Jamaica 2.95 0.36 31 13 11 6 2 1 7 28

Nicaragua 1.18 0.20 36 1 8 9 1 1 0 44

Peru 8.01 1.24 45 2 10 4 1 1 8 28

 Total 11 44.69 6.11 38 3 8 7 2 2 4 37
were strong advocates for the development of the General

Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). This agreement

has “three pillars” that are comparable to those of the

Agreement on Agriculture 4—general obligations (for example, most favored nation (MFN) treatment, transparency,

etc.), market access commitments, and sectoral annexes. The

three are expected to have a positive effect on the trade of

services. 

To get further insight on the next round of multilateral trade

negotiations, it is useful to review the projected benefits and

costs from the Uruguay Round.5 Quantitative models of the

Uruguay Round projected that global trade would increase

income by $212-510 billion (Nguyen, Perroni, and Wigle,

1994; Francois, McDonald, and Nordstrom, 1994). The models provided a range of estimated impacts upon the LAC

region, from -0.3 to 1.68 percent of additional national

income growth, although most of the studies suggest a positive economic effect for the LAC region. Much of the modeled regional gains were due to projected agricultural price

increases from the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture

(URAA), which were expected to have positive effects on

Argentina and Brazil, two of the dominant food-exporting

countries. Conversely, many of the net food importing countries were expected to be hurt by rising food prices.6

Another reason why some studies projected that there might

be regional losses is the erosion of preference arrangements.

In the LAC region, two preference arrangements that are

important are the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)

with the United States and the Lomé Agreement with the

European Union for the African, Caribbean, and Pacific

(ACP) countries (which is currently being renegogiated). The

erosion of the preference arrangements for some countries

was projected to allow other regions (notably Asia) to gain. 

The issues of preferences recently has pitted some of the

LAC countries against each other. In the Central American

and the Caribbean regions, exports of bananas, sugar and

coffee—commodities typically covered by preferences—

account for 40-60 percent of total agricultural exports in

recent years (as much as 73 percent for a country like

Ecuador). The recent WTO battle over the legality of EU

preferences for bananas set the high-cost, less efficient

banana producers in the Caribbean, who have benefited

from the preferences, against the interests of low-cost producers in Central and South America who have not had such

preferential arrangements (Rajapatirana, 1996). This and

other WTO rulings may signal the end of preference

arrangements over the long run, which might have important

implications for production and trade patterns in certain

countries (Josling and Tangermann, 1999).

(.	34"	

!"!	
'(

A very important force for the LAC countries has been the

bilateral and regional trade negotiations between LAC countries. Regional trade agreements (RTAs)—there are now 40

separate trade treaties in effect throughout the LAC region—

have proliferated rapidly. Some of the larger treaties include

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the

Common Market of the Southern Hemisphere (known as

MERCOSUR), the Andean Group, the Central American

Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean Community

 % ✺ 

				
 
	



Table C-4--Trade Regime Indicators, Pre- and Post-Reform Periods for Selected Countries

Average unweighted Tariff range, bound Coverage of quotas

Period bound tariff rates tariff weight on imports

Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- Post- Pre- PostCountry reform reform reform reform reform reform reform reform

Bolivia 1985 1991 12a 8 --- 5-10 --- (-)

Colombia 1984 1992 61 12 0-220 5-20 99 1

Ecuador 1989 1992 37b 18 0-338b 2-25c 100 0

Guatemala 1985 1992 50b 15b 5-90 5-20 6d 0d

Honduras 1985 1992 41b 15b,e 5-90 5-20 --- 0

Jamaica 1981 1991 --- 20 --- 0-45 --- 0f

Peru 1988 1992 --- 17 0-120 5-25 100 0d

(---) Negligible.

a. Import weighted average tariff. b. Including tariff surcharges. c. Ecuador also has a specific tariff of 40 percent on automobiles.

d. Percentage of domestic product. Guatamala has significant quotas for health and safety reasons; pre-reform they covered 29 percent of

domestic manufacturing production. e. Including tariff surcharges. f. Some quotas exist for health and safety reasons. 

Source: Rajapatirana 35, (1997). 

4 The “three pillars” of the Agreement on Agriculture are market access,

export subsidies, and domestic support.

5 One must be careful about overinterpreting these results, given the rapidly changing economic environment in the LAC region and older data used

for the modeling projections. The results discussed here are only meant to

be suggestive.

6 As it has turned out, grain prices have continued to go down, despite a

short run weather-related price bubble in 1996. Five of the LAC countries

monitored in this report (Colombia, Dominican Rep., Haiti, Jamaica, and

Peru) particularly would be hurt in the short run by rising grain prices since

imports comprise at least 45 percent of their total supplies. Jamaica is an

extreme case with nearly 100 percent of its grain supplies coming from

imports. There has been very little research on the impact of trade liberalization on smaller net food importing countries. Many economists argue that

any short run losses would be more than offset by long run dynamic gains.
(CARICOM), and the Organization of the Eastern Caribbean

States (OECS). NAFTA, which covers inter-regional trade of

about $500 billion, is by far the largest RTA (table C-5). The

share of trade with other countries within the LAC region has

increased from about 15 percent of all regional trade in 1988

to 21 percent in 1997 (IMF, 1998). 

Regional trade agreements have stimulated much economic

debate about whether RTAs enhance or hinder global trade.

Some economists argue that a world of regional trading

blocs would lead to a relatively high cost trading system

compared with a multilateral trading system. However,

defenders of RTAs argue that it depends on the circumstances. RTAs can be useful catalysts in stimulating deeper

concessions in multilateral trade negotiations that might not

otherwise occur without the RTAs. RTAs also can be viewed

as stepping stones for some countries to move towards multilateral trade openness (USDA, 1998c).

Several LAC countries, particularly the larger ones, now

have more stringent or binding trade agreements with other

LAC countries because of the regional trade agreements. For

these countries, such binding RTA commitments may be

used as leverage to extract deeper concessions from other

countries in the multilateral negotiation process. That is, a

country may not be interested in a particular proposal if it

already has more stringent commitments with important

trade partners in a regional agreement. Therefore it may take

a disinterested negotiating position in order to obtain deeper

concessions from other countries in the WTO negotiations.

However, many of the smaller low-income net food importing countries will have very little negotiating leverage by

themselves. For these countries, the challenge will be

whether they will be able to join other countries with similar

interests to voice their trade concerns, such as the Caribbean

countries are doing through CARICOM.

$(

.	!

The short- to medium-run trade outlook could be affected by

a few key regional trade agreements that are currently being

negotiated. Whether these negotiations will lead to signed

agreements is unclear at this time. However, the potential

agreements discussed below could affect some of the lowincome net food-importing countries directly by their possible membership inclusion or indirectly by their exclusion.

NAFTA-Chile. Currently the North American Free Trade

Agreement is between Canada, United States, and Mexico.

However, there have been discussions about allowing Chile

to join this agreement.7 Trade between the present three

NAFTA countries has been accelerating in recent years. It is

unclear the extent to which the three are willing to consider

a fourth trading partner in the agreement. Recent data show

Mexico’s exports to the other NAFTA partners have grown

13.6 percent on average during 1994-98, compared with 7.9

percent by Canada and 8.6 percent by the United States

(IMF, 1999). Recent agricultural trade data also show that

U.S. agricultural imports from Mexico have grown 12 percent for the same period, while agricultural imports from

Canada have grown 10.8 percent (USDA, 1999).

EU-MERCOSUR. The European Union and the MERCOSUR countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay)

began a 3-year trade negotiation period in August 1999. It is

very unclear at this time if such an agreement will be successfully negotiated. Agriculturally, these trading blocs face

large obstacles since the MERCOSUR (exporting) countries

compete with the EU countries in several arenas. The MERCOSUR countries would like to see EU agricultural subsidies eliminated and want increased access to the EU market.

Free Trade Agreement in the Americas. The free trade zone

for all of the Americas—from Canada to Chile—was originally proposed at the first Summit of the Americas in

December 1994. Formal negotiations began at the second

formal summit with 34 heads of state in April 1998. With

such a large number of countries, the agreement obviously

faces many potential economic, political, legal, and technical obstacles. However, the potential agreement offers the

opportunity to simplify the Americas’ many bilateral and

multilateral trade agreements. Preliminary modeling projections suggest that the agreement would have a very minor

economic impact on the United States and that most LAC

countries would stand to gain to varying degrees (USDA,

1998b). Again, this potential agreement might put pressure

on the MERCOSUR and NAFTA countries to make important economic alliance choices. The agreement could also

strain U.S.-EU relations if the EU thinks it has been effectively excluded from this market.

"

The LAC region is relatively well off compared to other

developing regions and has much economic and agricultural

diversity. The economic policy environment in most countries is now conducive to macroeconomic stability, investment, and trade opportunities. The LAC countries will be


	

 

				


✺ 

7 It should be noted that there are bilateral treaties currently in effect between

Canada-Chile and Mexico-Chile, but not between United States-Chile.

Table C-5--Selected Regional Trade Agreements

1997

Intraregional

Acronym Full name exports

($ million)

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 496,423

MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 20,761

--- Andean Group 5,102

CACM Central American Common Market 1,736

CARICOM Caribbean Community 1,006

OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 59

Source: World Bank 1999, 6.5.
engaged in the WTO trade negotiations, but the many

regional trade agreements are likely to continue to have a

strong influence on the trade environment.

The low-income net food-importing countries in the LAC

region are likely to express their on-going concerns about

agricultural trade issues that affect their food security. These

issues include projected food price rises, more volatile food

prices, and declining food aid availability. Many of these

countries also are concerned about eroding trade preference

arrangements, such as the Lomé Agreement for ACP countries. The recent WTO ruling against the EU on its preference arrangements for bananas illustrates how competition

is likely to intensify between high-cost, less efficient producers in developing countries who benefit from preference

arrangements and lower cost producers who do not enjoy

such arrangements.

Little is known at this time about trade liberalization

impacts on the food security of smaller countries, but it may

be fair to conjecture that there will be both winners and

losers. Some of these countries may face the unpleasant

choice of either liberalizing trade (via regional trade agreements, for example) and hoping for positive results or not

joining any trade treaties and getting left behind.

("

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FAOSTAT database (http://www.fao.org), 1999.

Francois, J., B. McDonald, and H. Norström, “Assessing the

Uruguay Round,” in The Uruguay Round and the

Developing Economies (Eds. W. Martin and L.A.

Winters). Washington, DC: World Bank Discussion Paper

#307, 1995: 117-214.

International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics,

various yearbooks.

Nguyen, T., C. Perroni, and R.M. Wigle, “An Evaluation of

the Draft Final Act of the Uruguay Round,” Economic

Journal 103(1994): 1540-1558.

Rajapatirana, Sarath. “Small Developing Economies After

the Uruguay Round: Opportunities and Challenges.” The

Enterprise Research Institute for Latin America, Special

Report, December, 1996.

Tangermann, Stefan and Tim Josling, “The Interests of

Developing Countries in the Next Round of WTO

Agricultural Negotiations.” Report prepared for the

UNCTAD Workshop on Developing a Proactive and

Coherent Trade Agenda for African Countries, Pretoria,

South Africa, July 1999.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Food and Agriculture Trade

for the United States (FATUS). Economic Research

Service, 1998 Calendar Year report, Washington, DC,

1998a.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Free Trade in the Americas.

Economic Research Service, Situation and Outlook

Series, WRS-98-1, Washington, DC, 1998b.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. Regional Trade Agreements

and U.S. Agriculture. Economic Research Service,

Agriculture Economic Report No. 771, Washington, DC,

1998c.

U.S. Department of Agriculture. NAFTA. Economic

Research Service, Situation and Outlook Series, WRS99-1, Washington, DC, August, 1999.

World Bank. STARS CD-ROM Economic Database.

Washington, DC: 1998.

  ✺ 

				
 
	


!"

Despite significant improvements during the past two

decades to combat poverty and hunger, more reform policies

need to be adopted to improve food security in South Asia.

With about 263 people for every square kilometer, South

Asia represents the world’s most densely populated region

(World Bank, 1999). The region is characterized by large

income disparities, with 43 percent of its population living

below the poverty line (UNDP, 1997). The overall food supply, although sufficient in quantity, is not distributed uniformly, with Bangladesh and Nepal in danger of shortfalls.

Trade is, therefore, vital in alleviating regional food shortfalls, and can also play an important role in generating further policy reform and economic growth. Exports from

South Asia increased on average by over 12 percent annually during 1991-95, and the World Bank (1997) estimates

that, led by India, South Asia has the potential to have the

world’s fastest growth in exports for the next 20 years.

Exports from the region have also witnessed a large shift

from primary agricultural products to manufactured goods,

and a significant proportion of high-tech products—primarily from India.

'.7. 4"*

South Asia’s economy encompasses traditional village farming, modern agriculture, handicrafts, a wide range of modern industries, and a multitude of support services.

Production, trade, and investment reforms implemented during the past two decades have provided new opportunities

and generated faster economic growth. Unlike other Asian

countries, this region has generally avoided financial problems, attracted some foreign investment, and revived confidence in economic prospects for the sub-continent.

Although the overall macro-economic indicators in the

region remain fairly strong, Pakistan is currently experiencing political and financial problems, government instability

has plagued Nepal’s economic development, and further

policy changes are needed in India to restore the momentum

of reform, especially by continuing reductions in the

remaining government regulations. 

Despite growing optimism for the region, South Asia’s share

of global trade has remained unchanged, around 1-percent.

The primary exports from this region are textiles, garments,

carpets, leather products, and agricultural commodities such

as cotton, rice, and tea. In recent years, there has been a significant shift from food and primary product exports to

exports of manufactured products. The share of manufactures in South Asia’s total exports increased from 53 percent

in 1980 to 76 percent in 1996 (World Bank, 1999).

Although textiles and apparels dominate the manufactures

exports, there is a small but increasing share of machinery

and equipment exports from the region. Led by India, South

Asia is also increasingly exporting science-based high technology products. 

Capital and intermediate goods represent the major imports

in South Asia. These include petroleum, petroleum products,

machinery, fertilizer, and chemicals. Unlike Sub-Saharan

Africa which largely depends on the European market for its

trade, South Asia’s trading partners are diverse and include

Western Europe, as well as the United States, Hong Kong,

Japan, and many other countries. Although the European


	

 

				


✺ 

	


Trade Liberalization and the South Asian Economies:

Adjusting to the Challenges of Globalization

Anita Regmi1

Abstract: The new round of WTO negotiations presents special opportunities and challenges

for the South Asian countries. Active participation by South Asian countries may enable them

to secure better market access for their exports. It may also preserve or secure changes in the

existing regulations that will enable them to fully integrate in the global trading system, while

allowing them to meet their developmental goals. However, to achieve a favorable agreement,

South Asian countries, especially India, will need to reform their own protectionist trade and

domestic policies. Despite significant trade liberalization within the last two decades, the

regional supply of agricultural commodities remains constrained by trade restrictions and antiagricultural bias in domestic policies. Reforming regional domestic and trade policies will

facilitate negotiations, provide impetus for increased agricultural production, stimulate trade

and further economic growth, and enhance the overall food security situation in South Asia. 

1 Agricultural economist with the Market and Trade Economics Division,

Economic Research Service, USDA.
Union and the United States remain major destinations for

South Asian exports, exports to East Asia have increased

significantly in recent years, accounting for over 19 percent

of total exports in 1995. 

Regional trade within South Asia is limited, accounting for

less than 4 percent of the region’s total trade (World Bank,

1997). This figure does not take into account the illegal

trade between neighbors, which is thought to be substantial.

India maintains a growing trade surplus in the region with

its 1995 regional exports accounting for 5 percent of its total

exports. By contrast, its imports from the region account for

only half a percent of its total imports. Regional trade in

South Asia is hampered by India’s protectionist policies and

the long standing political conflict between India and

Pakistan. India’s refusal to provide transit facilities to Nepal

and Bhutan for regional export, and its growing trade surplus are also considered by its neighbors to be impediments

toward improving regional trade. 

In December 1985, the South Asian countries formed the

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

(SAARC) to promote economic, social, and cultural cooperation. Members of SAARC include Bhutan and Maldives

in addition to the five countries covered in this paper

(Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka). Due to

the ongoing political conflict between India and Pakistan,

SAARC has achieved little in promoting regional economic

cooperation. 

In 1993, the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement,

SAPTA, was initiated to promote greater regional economic

cooperation. Although SAPTA allows for negotiations on a

sectoral basis, the approach taken to date has been to negotiate trade concessions on a product-by-product basis.

Therefore, except for a few minor tariff concessions, not

much has been accomplished through SAPTA. Studies on

regional integration in South Asia point out that unilateral

trade liberalization rather than regional trade arrangements

will be most beneficial for South Asia (de Melo and Rodrik,

1993). However, other studies indicate that the small

economies in the region, such as Nepal and Bangladesh,

would gain considerably from a regional trade agreement

(Srinivasan, 1994).

Excepting Nepal, which has a very open trade policy, trade

in South Asia has been inhibited by restrictive and interventionist government policies. Import tariffs are high, averaging about 39 percent between 1994-98, compared with

about 6 percent for OECD countries (UNCTAD, 1994 and

1999). Nontariff barriers, such as quantitative restrictions

on imports and the control of imports by parastatal government monopolies, are prevalent in the region. Exports of

many commodities are also restricted or controlled by

parastatal monopolies designed to manage domestic supply

and to protect the domestic manufacturing sector. Despite

these barriers, South Asia has come a long way since the

early 1970s in opening its market to imports. Current tariffs, although very high, are less than half of those prevailing in the 1970s, the frequency of nontariff barrier use has

declined by about 85 percent (UNCTAD, 1994 and 1999),

and parastatal control of commodity trade is currently limited primarily to India. 

Government policies in South Asia have historically discriminated against agriculture through measures designed to protect the manufacturing sectors. The policies include exchange

rate overvaluation, direct control of agricultural commodity

trade, and taxes on agricultural exports (Pursell, 1999). 

Nevertheless, agriculture has remained an important sector in

the economy, accounting for about 25 percent of total GDP

and employing over 60 percent of the labor force. In 1997,

South Asia produced 29 percent of the world’s rice crop, 24

percent of the world’s cotton, 15 percent of the world’s

wheat, and 11 percent of the world’s oil crops (FAO, 1999). 

South Asia is generally self-sufficient in cereals and the

overall food supply, expressed as 2,449 calories per capita

per day, exceeds the FAO recommended minimum level of

2,100 calories. However, this figure is below the world average of 2,782 calories per capita per day. Moreover, the food

supply is not distributed evenly in the region, and the 1997

per capita daily calorie supply in Bangladesh was below the

FAO recommended nutritional minimum. USDA/ERS projections of supplies of grain and other commodities in

Bangladesh suggest that per capita calorie supplies will not

increase over the next 10 years. Although, excepting

Bangladesh, projected regional food supplies are sufficient

 ✺ 

				
 
	



Table D-1--Comparative Development Indicators

GDP per GDP Trade share of GDP Regional trade Agriculture Labor force

capita growth 1970 1990 share share of GDP in agriculture

$ U.S. --- Percent ---

Bangladesh 360 4.6 15 31 7 24 65

India 370 4.3 8 27 67 25 64

Nepal 220 1.7 13 64 1 41 83

Pakistan 500 2.5 22 37 16 25 52

Sri Lanka 800 5.9 54 80 9 22 48

South Asia 380 12 31 1(global trade) 25 63

2 (global ag trade)

Source: 1999 World Development Indicators, The World Bank. 1997 FAO data.
to meet the minimum nutritional requirements of the population, regional per capita food availability is expected to

decline between 1999 and 2009.

The share of food aid in South Asia’s total imports has

declined during the 1990s. However, food aid continues to

play an important role in meeting food demand in the

region, exceeding 1.2 million metric tons in 1997.

Bangladesh received over 44 percent of the region’s food aid

in 1997, while India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh together

accounted for about 90 percent of the total aid. Although

food aid’s share of total food imports has generally declined,

it has been increasing in Nepal. This reflects Nepal’s

increasing vulnerability to food shortfalls due to growing

population pressures and a sluggish economy.

1"	"*"*	"

Starting with Sri Lanka in the 1970s, South Asian countries

embarked on an economic liberalization that accelerated significantly in the 1990s. The liberalization was driven by a

general disenchantment with economic planning implemented in individual countries, and the feeling that the

region was missing the growth and development opportunities that East Asian countries were enjoying. Multilateral

trade negotiations did not influence the liberalization

process. The process was, however, facilitated by substantial

devaluation of South Asian currencies that occurred between

the 1980s and 1990s. For example, the Indian rupee was

devalued in real terms by about 130 percent between 1985

and 1992. 

In recent years, reform in government policies has also

been undertaken under the International Monetary Fund’s

(IMF’s) structural adjustment program. Nevertheless, trade

liberalization has not been uniform within the sub-continent, with India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan still implementing several interventionist policies. Between 1970 and

1997, Nepal’s indicator of trade openness (measured as

total imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP)

increased from 13 to 64 percent. Although Sri Lanka’s

trade openness indicator changed by only 26 percent, Sri

Lanka has a relatively open economy, as indicated by its

1997 trade openness measurement of 80 percent. The

remaining three countries, especially India with the lowest

measure at 27 percent, would benefit from further reform to

liberalize their trade. 

Market access reform in South Asia, in general, was

launched with the objective of streamlining procedures,

reducing and harmonizing tariffs, and gradually removing

import prohibitions. The average applied tariff rate on

imports decreased about 37 percent between the 1980s and

1990s (UNCTAD, 1994 and 1999). However, current tariff

rates remain high, averaging about 39 percent. There is a

large difference in applied tariff rates across the region.

Nepal has no tariffs on primary products, and tariffs on

most other products range between zero and 20 percent

(Pant, 1999). The applied tariff rates in India and Pakistan,

on the other hand, often exceed 50 percent (Sharma 1999;

Qureshi, 1999). 

South Asia’s nontariff barriers declined more than 85 percent between the 1980s and 1990s (UNCTAD, 1994 and

1999). Nevertheless, import restrictions and prohibitions

remain on over a quarter of all tariff lines in India and on a

very small number of commodities in other South Asian

countries (Athukorala and Kelegama 1999; Chowdhury et

al. 1999). Given the recent WTO ruling against India, on a


	

 

				


✺ !

Table D-2--Food Availability Indicators

Wheat Rice Cereal Per capita daily

production production self-sufficiency calorie supply

------1,000 mt------- Percent Number

Bangladesh 1,803 28,293 88 2,085

India 66,000 122,244 100 2,496

Nepal 1,030 3,641 105 2,366

Pakistan 18,694 6,587 94 2,476

Sri Lanka 2,692 54 2,302

South Asia 87,532 163,507 98 2,449

World 588,841 563,188 2,782

South Asian share of

 world production (%) 15 29

Source: 1997 FAO data.

Table D-3--Share of Food Aid in Total Food Imports

Share of food aid 

in total imports Food aid Food imports

1991 1997 1997 1997

----Percent------- ----Metric tons----

Bangladesh 76 44 548,340 1,257,553

India 32 8 310,251 3,879,714

Nepal 8 25 40,833 164,714

Pakistan 22 7 203,551 2,997,453

Sri Lanka 29 6 137,669 2,392,491

South Asia 41 11 1,245,903 10,840,607

Source: FAO.
case brought up by the United States, the Government of

India is expected to accelerate the phase-out of all import

restrictions.2

Export restrictions, licensing, monopoly control, and 

export taxes generally burdened the agricultural sector in

South Asia. Since the reform policies implemented in the

1990s, export restrictions have been removed on almost all

agricultural commodities in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Sri

Lanka, and on a number of agricultural commodities in

India. However, parastatal control of exports and licensing

requirements continue to inhibit the export of most major

agricultural commodities in India and some agricultural

commodities in Pakistan. 

South Asia’s domestic policies in the 1990s have been characterized by reform measures such as privatization of state

enterprises, reduction of subsidies to industries, liberalization of capital markets, and other reforms that encourage

trade and foreign investment. Liberalization of trade regimes

and deregulation of domestic markets have created new

business and export opportunities. Although the overall climate in the region looks very promising, there are significant hurdles on the horizon. Sri Lanka’s robust economy is

constantly burdened by the fighting between the Sinhalese

and the minority Tamils. Bangladesh’s progress is often

halted by recurring natural disasters. Pakistan has been battling financial problems stemming from years of loose fiscal

policies. Nepal’s growth is inhibited by its landlocked geographic position and the frequent change of governments.

Finally, India’s economic growth has been hampered by the

slow pace with which the government implements reform.

&'&'1	!	
"	'

('.6

Most of the studies that looked at the impact of the Uruguay

Round on developing countries noted that the implementation of the Uruguay Round may marginally increase agricultural commodity prices (Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe,

1996; Ingco, 1997). However, analysis of agricultural commodity prices indicates that such increases did not occur.

Studies on the Uruguay Round’s impact also point out that

the negative impacts of increased food prices on consumers

can be more than offset by gains arising from reforms in

domestic policy. All studies emphasize that the gains from

multilateral trade agreements are particularly large in developing countries that open their trade regimes. In general, the

studies have estimated the impacts of the Uruguay Round on

South Asia to be positive (Ingco, 1997; Sharma et al., 1999). 

For a major agricultural producing region such as South

Asia, where yields (despite some improvements brought

about by the Green Revolution) have remained well below

the world average, increased commodity prices and reduction of trade barriers provide incentives for increased production and exports. Sharma et al. (1999) indicate that the

Uruguay Round Agreement may result in a net trade surplus

of over US$1.3 billion in South Asia, with food imports

reduced by about $1 billion and additional exports of about

$300 million. 

The manufacturing sector of South Asia, which produces

mainly textiles and apparel, has actually been estimated to

benefit more from the Uruguay Round than agriculture

(Majd, 1995). The eventual elimination of the Multi-Fibre

Arrangement (MFA) by 2005 is expected to increase South

Asia’s textile output by 17 percent and exports by 26 percent. Hertel et al. (1996) have further argued that the gains

from MFA reform will amount to about 27 percent of South

Asia’s overall gains from implementation of the Uruguay

Round Agreement. Martin (1999) points out that although

South Asian textile and apparel industries are poised for

rapid growth, South Asia will need to implement complementary domestic policy reform to take full advantage of the

MFA reform.

&%!*"!	


'.

Market access for export commodities is a top priority for

South Asia, especially access for textiles and apparel. Tariffs

on textiles and apparel were generally excluded from the

Uruguay Round reduction commitments and have remained

high. Because the MFA will be fully implemented by 2005

and textiles may not be on the negotiating table, tariffs on

textiles will be a difficult issue to tackle in the next trade

negotiations. It has often been noted that importing countries

have chosen to phase out textile quotas in such a way that

very little liberalization occurs during the phase-out period

(Martin, 1999). Exporting countries, including South Asian

countries, are concerned that having deferred a significant

proportion of the liberalization to the end of the phase-out

period, it may be politically impossible for importing countries to carry out their Uruguay Round obligations by 2005. 

Maintaining, in some form, the provisions of the “special

and differential treatment” accorded to developing countries

under the Uruguay Round Agreement is important for South

Asia. The value of this provision has often been debated by

those who question whether exemptions and lesser reform

requirements for developing countries have contributed to

their smaller gains from the Uruguay Round Agreement.

Nevertheless, special provisions, especially those that will

provide flexibility in reducing domestic support measures,

are very important to South Asian countries. Many developing countries, including South Asian countries, did not set

up a domestic support reduction schedule after the Uruguay

Round Agreement, thus precluding themselves from implementing support programs for agriculture outside of “Green

 " ✺ 

				
 
	



2 In April 1999, a WTO Dispute Settlement Panel ruled that India’s continued use of quantitative restrictions on imports of a wide range of consumer

goods under the Balance of Payments provisions of GATT Article XVIII:B

was inconsistent with the GATT guidelines and called for their removal.
box” policies and in excess of de minimus levels (see

Overview table A-1). 

However, the special and differential treatment provisions

currently allow developing countries to implement these

programs to support their agricultural and rural sectors. If

the special and differential treatment provisions are not

extended in the a round, many developing countries will be

unable to provide any support to their agriculture. South

Asian countries are also concerned that the current domestic

support provisions do not take into consideration the

impacts of inflation and currency exchange rate fluctuations

on a country’s ability to comply with its WTO obligations.3

Given the important role that imports and food aid play in

meeting South Asia’s food demand, most countries in the

region consider it a priority that a new round take into consideration the concerns of net food-importing developing

countries and adopt measures to ensure that the outcome

does not result in higher food prices and decreased food

availability. South Asian countries, like many other net

food-importing countries, seek assurances from exporting

countries that food export supplies will remain reliable and

not subject to sudden restrictions. Additionally, importing

countries also argue that since global food sufficiency does

not always address local food insecurity concerns, especially when the purchasing power of a food-insecure country is limited, a new round will need to consider special

measures to address food security concerns of foodimporting countries.

"

The next round of WTO negotiations represents an opportunity for South Asian countries to seek better access for their

export products, especially textiles. Further reform of the

global trading system will likely require accelerated reform

in the domestic policies of South Asian countries. Reforms

in domestic policy and global trade rules have the potential

to propel additional growth in a region that is already on a

rising economic growth path. 

Reform in domestic policies and agricultural trading rules

will create incentives to remove the anti-agricultural bias

existing in the region. This should lead to significant

increases in agricultural production in the sub-continent,

where average yields are well below the world average.

Likewise, South Asia’s manufacturing sector, especially textiles and apparel, is estimated to be poised for major expansion with the impending open trade environment. Increased

food production, and rising economic growth brought about

by trade liberalization should substantially enhance regional

food security and improve general living conditions for

many in the region. 

("

Athukorala, Prema-Chandra and Saman Kelegama,

“Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay

Round: Implications for Sri Lanka,” in Implications of

the Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The Case

of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel, Garry Pursell and

Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999.

Chowdhury, Nuimuddin, Habibur Rahman and Sajjad Zohir,

“Bangladesh Agriculture and the Uruguay Round:

Policies, Commitments and Prospects,” in Implications of

the Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The Case

of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel, Garry Pursell and

Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999.

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.

FAOSTAT database (http://www.fao.org), 1999.

Goldin, Ian and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe,

“Assessing agricultural tariffication under the 

Uruguay Round” in The Uruguay Round and the

Developing Countries edited by Will Martin and L. Alan

Winters, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp 156-182.

Hertel, Thomas, Christian F. Bach, Betina Dimaranan and

Will Martin, “Growth, Globalization, and Gains from the

Uruguay Round,” Working Paper # 1614, The World

Bank, Washington D.C., May 1996.

Ingco, Merlinda, “Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization

Improved Welfare in the Least-Developed Countries?

Yes,” Policy Reserach Working Paper # 1748, The World

Bank, Washington D.C., April 1997.

Majd, Nader, “The Uruguay Round and South Asia: An

Overview of the Impact and Opportunities,” Working

paper # 1484, The World Bank, Washington D.C., July

1995.

Martin, Will, “The Abolition of the Multi-fibre Arrangement

and its Implications for Fibre Markets,” in Implications

of the Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The

Case of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel, Garry

Pursell and Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999. 

De Melo, Jaime Panagriya, and Dani Arvind Rodrik, “The

New Regionalism: A Country Prespective,” The World

Bank, 1993.

Pant, Thakur Nath, “Nepal: Agricultural Trade Policies and

Programmes,” in Implications of the Uruguay Round

Agreement for South Asia: The Case of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel, Garry Pursell and Alberto Valdés,

The World Bank, 1999.

Pursell, Garry, “Some Aspects of the Liberalization of South

Asian Agricultural Policies: How Can the WTO Help?”

in Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement for


	

 

				


✺ #

3 Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the comparison of

current domestic support with the base period support level is done using

nominal prices. The use of nominal prices can cause current support to

exceed the base levels even when the actual level of support has decreased.
South Asia: The Case of Agriculture, edited by Benoit

Blarel, Garry Pursell and Alberto Valdés, The World

Bank, 1999.

Qureshi, Sarfraz Khan, “Impact of Uruguay Round

Agreement on Pakistan’s Agriculture Sector,” in

Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement for South

Asia: The Case of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel,

Garry Pursell and Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999. 

Sharma, Anil, “Indian Agricultural Trade Liberalization and

the Uruguay Round Agreement,” in Implications of the

Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The Case of

Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel, Garry Pursell and

Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999. 

Sharma, Ramesh, Panos Konandreas and Jim Greenfield, “A

Synthesis of Assessments of the Impact of the Uruguay

Round on Global and South Asian Agriculture,” in

Implications of the Uruguay Round Agreement for South

Asia: The Case of Agriculture, edited by Benoit Blarel,

Garry Pursell and Alberto Valdés, The World Bank, 1999.

Srinivasan, T.N. “Regional Trading Arrangements and

Beyond. Exploring Some Options for South Asia, Theory,

Empirics and Policy,” The World Bank, South Asia

Regional Series IDP-142, July 1994.

UNDP, Human Development Report 1997, 1 UN Plaza, New

York, New York 10016, 1997.

UNCTAD, Directory of Import Regimes, 1994.

UNCTAD, Trade Analysis and Information System, Version

6.02 (CD-ROM), 1999.

USDA/ERS, Food Security Assessment, GFA-10,

Washington D.C., December 1998.

World Bank, 1999 World Development Indicators,

Washington D.C. 1999.

World Bank, South Asia’s Integration into the World

Economy, 1997.

 $ ✺ 

				
 
	



	

 

				


✺ 

Statistical table 1--Algeria (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,619 206 4,741 26 7,564

1991 3,730 275 4,190 19 8,361

1992 3,348 295 4,688 15 8,639

1993 1,563 272 5,482 18 8,362

1994 959 183 6,939 24 9,595

1995 2,137 306 5,719 17 11,580

1996 4,883 294 3,690 0 9,294

1997 886 242 5,791 0 9,388

1998 3,023 285 5,490 0 10,027

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,172 303 5,454 348 0 9,943

2004 2,702 334 5,784 660 0 10,800

2009 2,867 367 6,206 1,105 0 11,491

Algeria is projected to have the 

largest projected food gap of 

the North African countries. 

Production growth will remain 

static, leading to growing 

reliance upon imports. Future 

commercial import capacity 

will depend on gas and oil 

exports, which account for 80 

percent of all exports.

0

2

4

6

8

10

Million tons

1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008

 Algeria’s Historical and 

Projected Grain Sources

Production Imports

Statistical table 2--Egypt (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 11,787 460 6,076 2,003 17,189

1991 12,016 508 6,440 1,026 17,733

1992 12,329 460 6,545 482 17,680

1993 13,205 466 6,717 230 18,272

1994 13,510 398 8,886 180 19,980

1995 14,578 721 7,658 215 21,456

1996 15,323 731 8,437 202 21,364

1997 16,301 523 9,908 167 23,112

1998 15,580 574 9,934 52 22,813

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 16,427 672 10,298 0 0 23,983

2004 17,101 719 11,195 387 0 25,193

2009 18,107 767 12,564 118 0 27,428

Egypt may develop a small food 

gap based upon recent per 

capita food consumption levels. 

The recent high yield growth is 

projected to slow down in the 

next decade. Food aid has 

become relatively neglible 

recently, reflecting production 

gains and better commercial 

import capacity.

Egypt’s Historical and Projected

Grain Production

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Million tons
!% ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 3--Morocco (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 6,254 268 1,390 204 8,776

1991 8,636 325 1,758 203 9,610

1992 2,933 276 2,860 234 8,830

1993 2,753 265 3,531 124 9,843

1994 9,530 312 1,683 13 9,384

1995 1,800 232 3,602 0 9,880

1996 10,037 374 2,905 2 10,720

1997 4,101 355 2,772 2 9,996

1998 6,733 335 3,076 13 9,298

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 3,791 332 3,209 3,012 0 8,076

2004 7,670 372 3,526 0 0 12,400

2009 8,706 416 3,951 0 0 14,167

Morocco’s grain production is 39 

percent below trend in 1999. 

Stocks may help buffer this 

shock, but consumption levels 

could decline this year without 

large imports. There are no 

projected long run food gaps 

based on trends, but frequent 

production-related food deficits 

are the norm.

Morocco’s Grain Production is 

Down 39 Percent in 1999

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998

Million tons

Statistical table 4--Tunisia (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,601 54 1,070 371 3,180

1991 2,508 55 831 96 3,589

1992 2,155 54 920 100 3,735

1993 1,561 49 1,001 46 3,233

1994 646 52 1,576 22 3,009

1995 1,366 58 2,678 18 4,497

1996 2,862 78 1,236 0 3,668

1997 1,151 81 1,975 0 3,853

1998 1,654 72 1,500 0 3,617

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,816 75 1,719 0 0 3,960

2004 2,089 82 1,849 0 0 4,421

2009 2,265 90 2,040 0 0 4,869

Tunisia’s grain harvest is above 

average in 1999, so there is no 

short run food gap. There are 

no food gaps projected over the 

next decade based upon 

production and consumption 

trends, but Tunisia’s production 

volatility will lead to occasional 

short run food gaps.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1986198819901992199419961998

Tunisia’s Food Aid Has 

Declined in Recent Years

	

 

				


✺ !

Statistical table 5--Cameroon (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 826 755 381 10 2,979

1991 950 747 253 13 3,007

1992 868 755 434 1 3,132

1993 878 784 307 2 3,098

1994 892 778 417 2 3,236

1995 1,140 749 314 4 3,370

1996 1,240 892 118 4 3,413

1997 1,065 926 225 2 3,421

1998 1,155 830 258 3 3,506

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,215 906 267 6 0 3,652

2004 1,293 987 293 195 0 3,962

2009 1,425 1,075 326 329 106 4,352

Production is projected to grow at 

an annual rate of 1.8 percent 

through 2009, marking a 

slowdown from the historical 

trend. This rate is well below the 

projected population growth rate 

of 2.5 percent. As a result, per 

capita consumption is projected 

to fall about 0.7 percent annually.

All Food Availability Versus 

Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food availability Nutr. req.

Statistical table 6--Central African Republic (Cental Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 123 258 32 4 683

1991 129 270 22 3 691

1992 93 281 25 5 673

1993 93 279 24 6 682

1994 85 271 43 1 709

1995 105 281 28 0 720

1996 110 298 14 0 739

1997 120 315 31 0 789

1998 120 324 37 2 816

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 120 304 37 12 71 788

2004 122 321 39 49 114 827

2009 129 339 42 85 156 874

The nutritional situation is 

projected to deteriorate during 

the next decade. Production 

growth of just over 1 percent per

year will not be sufficient to fill 

nutritional requirements and 

imports will continue to play a 

minimal role in contributing to 

domestic food supplies.

0

20

40

60

80

100

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Grain Imports and Food Gaps

Commercial imports SQ gap
! ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 7--Congo, Democratic Republic (Cental Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,011 6,590 318 86 8,726

1991 1,229 6,826 164 129 9,120

1992 1,408 6,968 238 27 9,548

1993 1,567 6,668 246 31 9,910

1994 1,545 6,744 223 86 9,858

1995 1,452 6,841 333 35 10,046

1996 1,465 5,974 275 8 9,359

1997 1,305 5,974 258 7 9,123

1998 1,585 5,867 248 2 9,391

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,445 6,474 276 136 1,838 9,869

2004 1,756 7,096 275 455 2,421 11,102

2009 1,935 7,766 279 1,254 3,533 12,139

Consumption in each income 

group is projected to fall short 

of that needed to fulfill 

minimum nutritional 

requirements. Production 

would need to grow at double 

the projected annual rate of 1.9 

percent to close the nutritional 

food gap.

Food Gaps as Share of Total 

Availability

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1999 2004 2009

Percent

SQ gap

Nutr.gap

Statistical table 8--Burundi (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 360 380 19 3 1,284

1991 385 389 33 1 1,339

1992 258 399 18 6 1,225

1993 249 389 0 28 1,196

1994 185 339 34 78 1,140

1995 225 356 45 5 1,159

1996 220 366 10 3 1,145

1997 225 389 17 0 1,168

1998 215 355 42 1 1,166

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 220 379 30 22 401 1,180

2004 236 410 30 85 513 1,274

2009 280 444 30 107 587 1,415

Even though projected 

production growth far outstrips 

the historical trend, food 

supplies will not be sufficient to 

meet nutritional requirements 

through the next decade. 

Consumption in even the 

highest income group is 

projected at only 84 percent of 

the nutritional target in 2009.

Grain Production 

0

100

200

300

400

500

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998

1,000 tons

1.10

1.15

1.20

1.25

1.30

1.35

Tons/ ha

Production Yield

	

 

				


✺ !

Statistical table 9--Eritrea (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 72 -- -- 100 72

1991 72 -- -- 253 72

1992 198 -- -- 39 198

1993 87 23 -- 235 334

1994 259 23 192 63 668

1995 153 23 29 62 406

1996 124 23 169 72 520

1997 130 23 264 54 617

1998 140 23 224 103 646

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 150 24 237 80 307 557

2004 148 26 250 151 411 579

2009 161 28 273 193 485 628

Slow growth of production and 

imports, each roughly 1.4 

percent per year, will lead to 

widening food gaps through the 

next decade. The nutritional 

situation is expected to 

deteriorate as per capita 

consumption is projected to 

decline 1.2 percent annually.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Sources of Grain

Production Com.imports Food aid

Statistical table 10--Ethiopia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 5,052 --- --- 808 4,560

1991 4,876 --- --- 1,046 4,401

1992 5,342 --- --- 543 4,824

1993 5,276 746 --- 942 8,048

1994 5,702 767 336 687 8,972

1995 6,922 773 244 403 10,057

1996 9,076 780 88 354 12,091

1997 6,870 780 0 394 9,813

1998 8,185 785 62 546 11,402

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 7,925 806 77 901 4,023 10,487

2004 10,343 892 80 0 3,057 13,280

2009 11,909 987 86 0 3,270 15,236

Production growth through the 

next decade will be sufficient to 

maintain base per capita 

consumption levels. Despite this 

growth--a continuation of the 

strong post-war trend--food 

supplies are projected to fall 

short of nutritional 

requirements. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

20

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.
! ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 11--Kenya (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 2,723 485 296 65 5,996

1991 3,033 480 136 186 6,168

1992 3,085 500 359 288 5,789

1993 2,220 525 312 236 4,907

1994 3,554 520 1,004 111 6,445

1995 3,227 571 284 56 6,718

1996 2,778 606 593 32 5,944

1997 2,930 644 1,506 75 7,309

1998 3,030 651 1,875 76 7,831

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,715 626 1,513 209 249 7,099

2004 3,075 685 1,791 0 0 8,013

2009 3,251 749 2,150 0 0 8,896

The population growth rate is 

projected at 1.6 percent per year, 

significantly below the 3 percent 

between 1980 and 1998, due to 

more widespread use of birth 

control and the impact of AIDS. 

This trend, combined with strong 

import growth, is projected to 

result in a food secure 

environment through 2009. 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 12--Rwanda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 269 629 15 15 1,582

1991 254 739 19 11 1,585

1992 267 673 0 90 1,597

1993 188 598 46 90 1,505

1994 149 499 0 272 1,272

1995 154 480 0 244 1,337

1996 174 526 71 218 1,542

1997 214 548 0 232 1,611

1998 214 557 58 142 1,642

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 194 520 56 527 326 1,372

2004 238 565 55 724 488 1,498

2009 254 613 55 848 588 1,602

Production fails to return to prewar levels before the end of the 

projection period and commercial 

imports stagnate. As a result, 

food supplies will fall well short of 

those required to maintain base 

per capita consumption levels 

and to meet minimum nutritional 

requirements.

Food Gaps as a Share of 

Total Availability

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1999 2004 2009

Percent

SQ gap

Nutr.gap

	

 

				


✺ !!

Statistical table 13--Somalia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 477 16 97 100 1,290

1991 257 16 77 132 1,117

1992 202 14 0 312 1,188

1993 162 14 125 75 1,133

1994 228 13 115 13 1,210

1995 293 16 81 12 1,263

1996 313 18 84 12 1,336

1997 320 18 100 5 1,379

1998 254 18 265 17 1,547

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 204 18 160 192 882 1,327

2004 320 19 160 355 1,189 1,481

2009 346 21 163 589 1,567 1,565

The 1999 grain crops have been 

adversely affected by insufficient 

rainfall, pests, and high 

temperatures. The precarious 

food situation is exacerbated by 

localized fighting, which displaces 

populations and interrupts 

agricultural activities and food 

distribution.

Consumption by Income 

Quintile in 2009:

Share of Nutritional 

Requirements

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent 

Statistical table 14--Sudan (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 2,119 36 120 513 5,244

1991 4,488 49 488 711 7,179

1992 5,307 49 334 286 7,546

1993 3,087 47 93 293 5,869

1994 5,152 50 682 134 7,909

1995 3,307 51 319 64 6,375

1996 5,207 52 362 40 8,116

1997 4,507 52 596 46 8,398

1998 5,707 53 509 63 8,424

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 5,272 52 522 67 0 8,478

2004 5,925 55 530 130 0 9,360

2009 6,587 58 545 178 0 10,339

Grain output growth is projected 

to slow considerably relative to the 

historical period due to a slowing 

of area expansion. However, the 

projected growth of 1.9 percent 

per year will be more than 

sufficient to meet minimum 

nutritional requirements and nearly 

adequate to maintain base per 

capita consumption levels.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1998 2003 2008

Grain Imports and Food Gaps

Com. imports Nutr.gap
!" ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 15--Tanzania (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 3,565 1,966 43 34 6,245

1991 3,540 1,736 111 18 6,688

1992 3,390 1,648 154 36 6,495

1993 3,700 1,593 150 47 6,556

1994 3,305 1,681 228 108 6,460

1995 4,355 1,451 194 25 6,813

1996 4,180 1,450 146 22 6,862

1997 3,355 1,368 227 5 6,471

1998 3,925 1,491 637 25 7,594

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 3,685 1,440 467 351 536 7,082

2004 4,410 1,555 495 251 458 8,083

2009 4,867 1,677 538 501 733 8,856

Although production growth rates 

are projected to exceed those of 

the historical period, they will not 

keep pace with the annual 

population growth rate of 2.3 

percent. As a result, the food 

gaps are projected to widen and 

consumption in only the highest 

income group will exceed the 

nutritional target in 2009. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 16--Uganda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,520 1,858 0 74 5,163

1991 1,460 1,834 0 30 5,147

1992 1,666 1,765 0 40 5,254

1993 1,794 1,886 36 46 5,569

1994 1,900 1,593 0 60 5,518

1995 2,020 1,688 0 41 5,797

1996 1,750 1,431 16 20 5,451

1997 1,550 1,582 105 21 5,610

1998 1,680 1,579 25 0 5,742

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,670 1,599 45 178 0 5,844

2004 2,127 1,777 47 209 0 6,842

2009 2,400 1,973 51 586 0 7,658

While the projected production 

growth rate of roughly 2.6 percent 

per year is adequate to provide 

enough food to meet nutritional 

requirements, it falls about 1 

percentage point short of that 

needed to maintain base per 

capita consumption levels. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

	

 

				


✺ !#

Statistical table 17--Angola (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 227 617 210 124 1,946

1991 346 633 162 142 1,988

1992 452 714 200 116 2,207

1993 317 707 103 222 2,019

1994 261 887 173 229 2,235

1995 302 950 185 224 2,397

1996 473 938 276 228 2,667

1997 513 876 208 154 2,541

1998 443 1,181 358 151 2,962

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 603 964 314 105 366 2,675

2004 547 1,035 366 437 742 2,812

2009 588 1,111 443 650 1,001 3,087

Per capita consumption is 

projected to decline 1.3 percent 

per year through the next decade 

as production growth slows 

considerably relative to the 

historical period. Even if 

historical rates were maintained, 

Angola would still face food 

gaps. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 18--Lesotho (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 214 13 167 36 458

1991 148 14 195 37 439

1992 75 16 173 45 343

1993 151 17 187 32 408

1994 243 20 172 15 405

1995 106 20 318 28 526

1996 261 20 287 30 615

1997 210 22 285 32 571

1998 135 23 127 8 395

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 175 21 252 49 44 484

2004 224 23 266 39 34 548

2009 241 24 295 47 42 599

Food aid imports averaged more 

than 25,000 tons per year during 

the base period. If this volume is 

maintained through 2009, it will 

cover more than half of the 

projected food gaps.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid
!$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 19--Madagascar (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,700 926 99 38 2,984

1991 1,553 932 28 54 2,836

1992 1,715 916 73 59 3,051

1993 1,812 953 77 34 3,141

1994 1,670 972 123 20 3,056

1995 1,780 956 131 21 3,204

1996 1,830 962 63 28 3,230

1997 1,830 986 98 18 3,324

1998 1,700 981 176 38 3,328

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,875 1,000 126 75 162 3,342

2004 2,008 1,084 143 300 400 3,617

2009 2,172 1,174 166 521 635 3,930

Per capita consumption is 

projected to drop 1 percent 

per year as food production 

remains near historical trends. 

Production would need to grow 

at nearly two times the projected 

rate of 1.64 percent per year to 

close the nutritional food gap.

Food Gaps

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

SQ gap

Nutritional gap

Statistical table 20--Malawi (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,373 108 90 65 2,051

1991 1,629 116 0 285 2,320

1992 670 105 0 605 1,760

1993 2,016 128 493 67 2,603

1994 1,093 118 221 284 2,409

1995 1,628 124 194 105 2,254

1996 1,833 125 0 222 2,344

1997 1,270 127 0 99 1,949

1998 1,795 128 113 4 2,476

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,400 127 132 0 0 3,007

2004 1,895 139 140 216 362 2,554

2009 2,093 152 153 316 481 2,814

A record grain crop was 

harvested in 1999 due to 

abundant rainfall throughout the 

growing season. As a result, 

food supplies are estimated to 

be adequate to maintain base 

level per capita consumption 

(status quo) as well as to meet 

nutritional requirements in 1999.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1998 2003 2008

Million tons

All food avail. Nutr. req.

	

 

				


✺ !

Statistical table 21--Mozambique (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 706 1,674 0 523 3,319

1991 544 1,355 0 664 3,071

1992 278 1,193 123 929 2,953

1993 715 1,292 297 356 3,284

1994 756 1,238 214 304 3,158

1995 1,080 1,528 276 251 3,617

1996 1,313 1,727 43 302 3,854

1997 1,453 1,941 213 109 4,159

1998 1,573 2,049 152 165 4,482

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,623 1,779 137 144 656 4,087

2004 1,861 1,907 141 191 751 4,444

2009 2,148 2,043 149 59 663 4,934

Mozambique’s dependence on 

food aid continues to fall as 

production remains on an 

upward trend. By 2009, food 

supplies derived from domestic 

production and imports will be 

nearly sufficient to maintain 

base level per capita 

consumption.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

1,000 tons

1992199319941995199619971998

Sources of Grain

Grain prod. Root prod.

Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 22--Swaziland (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 85 2 84 4 279

1991 158 2 89 5 352

1992 59 2 57 40 268

1993 78 2 78 10 271

1994 104 2 100 1 313

1995 81 2 60 12 264

1996 140 2 56 6 319

1997 105 2 65 6 295

1998 105 2 62 0 291

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 105 2 70 16 0 302

2004 124 2 88 10 0 355

2009 127 2 118 4 0 411

Growth in grain production and 

imports will be sufficient to 

provide enough food to meet 

nutritional requirements through 

the next decade. Consumption 

in all income groups, except the 

lowest, will exceed the 

minimum nutritional target.

0

50

100

150

200

250

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid
"% ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 23--Zambia (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,195 214 0 110 2,115

1991 1,309 234 0 56 1,999

1992 597 227 0 715 1,760

1993 1,759 252 342 11 2,290

1994 1,195 243 54 12 1,656

1995 929 239 78 74 1,602

1996 1,563 251 88 58 2,020

1997 1,157 280 114 4 1,776

1998 702 322 369 2 1,686

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,157 261 209 30 538 1,804

2004 1,199 278 222 145 708 1,886

2009 1,283 295 240 265 897 2,015

The projected production growth 

rate would need to nearly triple 

to achieve the growth necessary 

to close the nutritional food gap. 

Consumption in all income 

groups is projected to fall short 

of the minimum nutritional 

requirement in 2009.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutritional req.

Statistical table 24--Zimbabwe (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 2,758 45 0 54 2,690

1991 2,139 47 0 41 2,776

1992 675 52 583 896 2,178

1993 2,249 57 586 16 2,673

1994 2,622 58 86 5 2,188

1995 1,225 64 117 4 2,406

1996 2,900 65 452 0 3,234

1997 2,417 68 214 1 2,944

1998 1,870 69 543 7 2,958

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,945 67 470 454 420 2,658

2004 2,430 70 586 0 0 3,282

2009 2,526 74 742 0 0 3,589

Higher export earnings are 

projected to support strong 

growth in import capacity. The 

imports will offset the sluggish 

growth in grain output. As a 

result, food supplies will be 

adequate to maintain base per 

capita consumption levels and 

meet minimum nutritional 

requirements in the long term.

Consumption by Income 

Quintile in 2008:

Share of Nutritional Requirements

0

20

40

60

80

100

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent 

	

 

				


✺ "

Statistical table 25--Benin (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 522 717 146 9 1,382

1991 524 802 138 7 1,470

1992 602 782 161 19 1,560

1993 635 843 106 26 1,620

1994 635 868 85 15 1,613

1995 746 946 85 18 1,786

1996 651 1,018 84 9 1,747

1997 805 1,098 85 32 1,903

1998 795 1,098 111 10 1,915

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 835 1,073 107 0 0 2,014

2004 887 1,192 134 101 0 2,168

2009 987 1,322 178 136 0 2,445

Production growth between 

1980-98 exceeded 5 percent per 

year. Although this is projected to 

slow to just over 2 percent through 

2009, food supplies will be 

adequate to meet minimum 

nutritional requirements. 

Consumption in all income 

groups will exceed the nutritional 

target in 2009.

Crop Production 

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1,000 tons

Root prod (in grain equiv.) Grain production

Statistical table 26--Burkina Faso (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,547 20 0 124 1,975

1991 2,220 21 167 42 2,673

1992 2,438 25 126 31 2,851

1993 2,515 22 115 27 2,987

1994 2,453 19 104 19 2,871

1995 2,265 23 82 37 2,702

1996 2,425 23 101 26 2,911

1997 1,965 20 120 16 2,438

1998 2,640 20 195 21 3,204

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,590 21 150 0 0 3,073

2004 2,828 23 163 40 49 3,364

2009 3,161 24 186 150 160 3,765

Grain production is projected to 

grow 2.3 percent per year 

through 2009. This rate would 

need to rise to 2.8 percent to 

close both the status quo and 

nutritional food gaps. 

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutr. req.
" ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 27--Cape Verde (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 10 5 0 76 132

1991 4 3 0 76 128

1992 10 2 85 45 192

1993 12 4 11 58 141

1994 9 3 18 64 145

1995 10 2 27 50 151

1996 10 2 23 46 135

1997 10 2 10 61 134

1998 10 2 36 46 146

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 10 2 25 54 3 96

2004 13 2 27 65 8 102

2009 14 3 31 75 11 111

Cape Verde is more dependent 

upon imports than domestic 

production to fulfill food 

requirements. Import growth is 

projected to be slow--roughly 2 

percent per year--and food gaps 

will grow as a result. 

Consumption in only the highest 

income group will exceed the 

minimum nutritional target.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

50

100

150

200

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

Statistical table 28--Chad (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 536 240 0 33 1,111

1991 794 212 0 67 1,390

1992 836 183 51 0 1,407

1993 671 187 58 17 1,285

1994 846 186 33 15 1,400

1995 779 215 24 11 1,457

1996 786 215 17 28 1,490

1997 916 209 31 26 1,688

1998 1,236 220 64 22 2,071

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,096 218 43 0 141 1,781

2004 1,196 239 54 0 211 1,976

2009 1,377 264 73 0 209 2,276

Grain production grew a strong 

4 percent per year during the 

last two decades due principally 

to acreage expansion. While 

growth is projected to slow to 

under 3 percent per year 

through 2009, it will be 

adequate to maintain base per 

capita consumption levels.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. Nutr. req.

	

 

				


✺ "

Statistical table 29--Côte d’Ivoire (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 972 1,486 495 59 3,577

1991 1,031 1,579 572 36 3,774

1992 962 1,619 557 41 3,759

1993 1,009 1,629 597 45 3,792

1994 1,042 1,669 443 56 3,708

1995 1,092 1,270 678 30 3,716

1996 1,160 1,744 517 47 4,043

1997 1,440 1,786 708 52 4,644

1998 1,245 1,715 603 23 4,298

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,115 1,635 682 187 0 4,075

2004 1,526 1,795 789 0 0 4,841

2009 1,696 1,971 941 0 0 5,442

Production growth of more than 2 

percent per year, coupled with 

import growth of more than 3 

percent, is more than adequate 

to provide enough food to meet 

nutritional requirements. 

Consumption in each income 

group is projected to exceed the 

minimum nutritional target.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 30--Gambia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 100 2 77 14 288

1991 108 2 80 10 305

1992 87 2 78 6 285

1993 93 2 66 11 286

1994 101 2 85 2 295

1995 101 2 92 4 313

1996 101 2 95 4 322

1997 83 2 98 7 322

1998 94 2 116 6 355

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 94 2 120 0 0 350

2004 102 2 154 0 0 419

2009 109 2 208 0 0 520

Gambia is projected to be in a 

secure position with respect to 

food availability through the next 

decade. Even when accounting 

for skewed income distribution, 

consumption in all income 

groups is projected to exceed the 

minimum nutritional 

requirements in 2009.

Consumption by Income 

Quintile in 2009:

Share of Nutritional Requirements

0

50

100

150

200

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent 
" ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 31--Ghana (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 813 1,184 244 76 2,877

1991 1,375 1,690 197 215 3,180

1992 1,198 1,799 323 75 3,531

1993 1,582 1,969 252 126 3,953

1994 1,532 2,382 401 101 4,752

1995 1,737 2,724 224 36 4,959

1996 1,673 2,936 284 40 5,104

1997 1,550 2,936 334 84 5,228

1998 1,610 3,074 419 52 5,554

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,635 3,027 386 135 0 5,386

2004 2,107 3,270 440 118 0 6,201

2009 2,436 3,531 520 291 0 6,919

Production between 1980-98 

grew at a remarkably strong rate 

of nearly 8 percent per year due 

to large increases in area planted 

and significant gains in yields. 

While production growth is 

projected to slow to 2.3 percent 

per year, food supplies will be 

adequate to meet nutritional 

requirements.

All Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

Statistical table 32--Guinea (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 475 198 241 12 1,340

1991 581 232 236 30 1,523

1992 505 255 284 30 1,577

1993 553 277 243 46 1,661

1994 574 284 331 29 1,723

1995 600 298 380 5 1,833

1996 610 319 282 7 1,822

1997 630 346 296 3 1,845

1998 630 372 403 7 1,991

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 640 329 357 0 0 1,933

2004 723 358 384 0 0 2,128

2009 808 389 422 0 0 2,352

Production and import growth are 

adequate to supply enough food 

to maintain consumption levels 

and meet nutritional requirements 

through 2009. However, skewed 

income distribution does limit 

access for the two lower income 

groups. As a result, consumption 

for roughly 40 percent of the 

population will fall below the 

nutritional target in 2009.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

	

 

				


✺ "!

Statistical table 33--Guinea-Bissau (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 152 24 38 9 291

1991 172 22 42 21 323

1992 125 24 72 9 307

1993 134 24 61 9 296

1994 154 24 64 2 313

1995 152 25 60 2 311

1996 150 26 66 6 320

1997 145 26 68 5 319

1998 125 26 103 1 333

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 145 26 85 4 0 333

2004 164 27 87 14 0 360

2009 183 28 90 23 0 390

During 1980-98, food aid 

contributed little to overall food 

supplies. Food aid, which is 

excluded from the projections, 

will not be necessary to meet 

nutritional requirements at the 

aggregate level. Food supplies, 

however, are projected to fall just 

short of those needed to maintain 

base per capita consumption 

levels.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

500

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

Statistical table 34--Liberia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 126 173 2 69 500

1991 120 135 31 143 554

1992 61 141 0 142 485

1993 39 127 42 138 494

1994 30 131 19 119 477

1995 35 99 114 104 533

1996 60 116 93 117 573

1997 100 146 48 130 617

1998 125 158 95 105 707

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 160 123 86 173 95 574

2004 108 131 88 390 293 543

2009 115 140 93 524 409 574

Favorable growing conditions 

and improved security 

conditions have resulted in an 

improved harvest for 1999. 

However, food supplies are 

estimated to fall well short of 

those needed to maintain base 

consumption levels and meet 

nutritional requirements. 

Food Gaps as a Share of 

Total Availability

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1999 2004 2009

Percent

SQ gap

Nutr.gap
"" ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 35--Mali (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,807 7 29 47 2,304

1991 2,245 8 184 51 2,991

1992 1,714 6 63 35 2,322

1993 1,965 9 53 29 2,490

1994 2,234 7 22 16 2,798

1995 2,050 8 83 11 2,655

1996 2,075 10 70 5 2,660

1997 2,000 8 56 25 2,437

1998 2,275 8 84 10 2,806

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,320 9 78 0 0 2,939

2004 2,498 10 89 55 0 3,190

2009 2,773 10 107 148 0 3,553

Grain output grew nearly 5 

percent per year between 1980 

and 1998, supported mainly by 

a large jump in area planted. 

Although this growth is 

projected to slow during the 

next decade as area expansion 

slows, it will be adequate to 

meet nutritional requirements 

through 2009. 

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1999 2004 2009

Million tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

Statistical table 36--Mauritania (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 85 2 62 116 524

1991 96 2 274 50 672

1992 103 1 163 45 572

1993 158 1 187 63 677

1994 204 1 172 22 673

1995 210 1 175 25 724

1996 195 1 240 27 763

1997 108 1 265 24 732

1998 158 1 303 17 826

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 193 1 299 0 0 832

2004 180 1 344 6 0 904

2009 188 1 405 7 0 1,025

Growth in imports, which 

provide the bulk of food 

supplies, is projected to be 

strong enough to fulfill 

nutritional requirements, at the 

aggregate level, through the 

next decade. 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

	

 

				


✺ "#

Statistical table 37--Niger (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,596 108 22 91 2,020

1991 2,290 110 88 45 2,703

1992 2,227 111 95 28 2,637

1993 2,119 112 91 31 2,509

1994 2,190 114 67 39 2,628

1995 2,153 114 40 27 2,594

1996 2,296 116 53 6 2,813

1997 2,195 115 54 13 2,904

1998 2,940 117 479 26 4,129

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,645 118 209 5 0 3,173

2004 2,860 127 214 281 90 3,425

2009 3,156 137 222 533 311 3,767

Grain output is projected to 

grow just under 2 percent per 

year through the next decade. 

This is 1 percentage point below

the projected population growth 

rate. As a result, per capita 

consumption will decline more 

than 1 percent per year and the 

food gaps will widen.

All Food Availability

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

All food avail. SQ requirement

Statistical table 38--Nigeria (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 16,345 9,831 422 0 26,165

1991 17,531 12,885 750 1 28,727

1992 18,248 14,684 976 0 31,004

1993 19,278 15,544 1,572 0 34,110

1994 19,897 16,269 922 0 34,084

1995 20,810 16,305 995 0 35,657

1996 18,885 16,807 1,216 0 35,031

1997 18,700 15,251 1,755 1 35,300

1998 19,340 15,251 1,845 0 35,904

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 19,245 16,884 1,740 365 0 36,018

2004 23,349 18,357 1,859 0 0 41,622

2009 25,929 19,937 2,044 0 0 45,876

Growth in food supplies is 

projected to basically match the 

population growth rate. 

Consequently, per capita 

consumption is projected to hold 

steady at base levels and there 

will be no food gaps in the long 

term. Consumption across all 

income groups is projected to 

exceed nutritional requirements 

in 2009.

Consumption by Income 

Quintile in 2009:

Share of Nutritional

Requirements

0

50

100

150

200

1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th

Percent 
"$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 39--Senegal (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 912 29 669 47 2,212

1991 900 14 552 65 2,202

1992 817 20 524 71 2,198

1993 1,029 19 558 38 2,468

1994 895 31 564 18 2,350

1995 1,005 23 693 9 2,454

1996 917 16 769 11 2,590

1997 707 17 606 8 2,329

1998 686 20 896 2 2,684

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 928 19 853 0 0 2,777

2004 851 19 985 0 0 2,954

2009 907 20 1,166 0 0 3,342

Production and import growth are 

projected to be strong enough to 

provide sufficient food supplies to 

meet status quo and nutritional 

requirements on the aggregate 

level. However, consumption is 

projected to fall short of 

nutritional requirements for 40 

percent of the population due to 

skewed income distribution in 

2009.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 40--Sierra Leone (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 264 50 135 20 746

1991 268 50 115 66 783

1992 315 48 114 29 732

1993 321 44 116 29 774

1994 270 104 238 30 922

1995 193 93 234 46 934

1996 260 118 177 117 974

1997 275 129 193 100 831

1998 235 129 206 88 859

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 255 119 208 138 151 902

2004 273 124 212 228 242 941

2009 290 130 220 315 331 984

Recovery of the agricultural 

sector and the overall economy 

is projected to be slow in this 

country, which has been 

adversely affected by civil strife. 

Consumption across all income 

groups is projected to fall short 

of the nutritional requirement in 

2009.

Food Gaps as a Share of 

Total Availability

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

SQ gap

Nutr.gap

	

 

				


✺ "

Statistical table 41--Togo (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 389 365 109 16 878

1991 427 327 88 14 833

1992 492 302 155 4 973

1993 611 351 55 11 1,008

1994 405 289 48 8 712

1995 450 416 68 4 961

1996 600 423 88 4 1,144

1997 705 470 103 7 1,266

1998 565 468 119 3 1,150

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 620 451 112 50 14 1,140

2004 769 500 118 15 0 1,335

2009 874 554 127 37 0 1,494

The nutritional food gap, on the 

aggregate level, is projected to 

be zero in the long term. 

Skewed income distribution, 

however, will preclude 60 

percent of the population from 

consuming a nutritionally 

adequate diet in 2009.

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 42--Afghanistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 2,980 86 248 41 3,955

1991 2,830 86 82 56 3,626

1992 2,830 86 45 108 3,675

1993 2,930 88 144 71 3,777

1994 3,210 88 0 151 3,953

1995 3,320 90 73 127 4,319

1996 3,420 90 0 194 4,315

1997 3,510 90 93 150 4,436

1998 3,620 90 562 145 3,743

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 3,630 93 230 248 681 4,571

2004 3,780 100 229 1,341 1,890 4,766

2009 4,037 108 232 1,999 2,635 5,075

The growth rate of Afghanistan’s 

food imports is expected to fall 

from 4.3 percent in 1988-98 to 0.1

percent in 1999-2009, while its 

population is projected to grow 4 

percent annually. As a result, the 

nation’s nutritional gap will nearly 

quadruple by 2009.

Afghanistan’s Grain 

Production

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

19961997

1998

Million tons

1.1

1.1

1.2

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.4

Yield 1,000 kg/ha

Production Yields
#% ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 43--Bangladesh (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 18,903 387 89 1,452 23,406

1991 19,301 422 157 1,469 23,609

1992 19,452 454 777 719 24,140

1993 19,264 446 325 745 23,617

1994 18,011 457 0 858 21,807

1995 18,979 467 2,145 825 25,535

1996 20,299 472 851 743 25,772

1997 20,413 469 346 618 25,223

1998 20,985 478 2,698 549 26,999

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 21,445 481 1,432 410 773 26,464

2004 23,012 513 1,572 801 1,196 28,468

2009 24,850 548 1,785 834 1,263 30,845

A marked reduction in average 

food aid to Bangladesh from 1.37 

million tons during 1981-90 to 

816,000 tons during 1991-98 has 

exerted additional pressure on 

domestic production and 

commercial import capacity to 

satisfy the country’s growing food

needs.

Imports in Bangladesh

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

1990

1991

1992

1993

19941995

1996

1997

1998

1,000 tons

Commercial grain imports Food aid

Statistical table 44--India (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 156,694 5,029 88 217 225,406

1991 155,744 5,248 0 187 228,960

1992 165,337 5,597 1,262 351 235,310

1993 168,530 5,239 67 336 240,334

1994 170,844 5,906 0 271 243,357

1995 174,870 5,845 0 313 250,830

1996 177,758 6,102 410 257 258,974

1997 182,592 7,701 2,129 208 285,560

1998 181,847 7,701 2,264 208 269,778

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 186,186 6,766 1,817 0 0 269,250

2004 203,640 7,317 2,107 0 0 293,086

2009 221,071 7,909 2,539 0 0 318,842

Sustained growth in grain 

production, a significant 

enhancement of commercial 

food import potential, and a 

slowdown in population growth 

will enable India to reduce its 

distribution gap nearly 75 

percent by 2009.

India’s GDP Growth

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1987

1989

1991

19931995

1997

Percent

	

 

				


✺ #

Statistical table 45--Indonesia (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 34,042 5,686 1,810 46 51,457

1991 36,750 5,713 2,760 59 53,998

1992 36,968 5,977 3,155 41 56,860

1993 35,715 6,218 3,075 52 56,582

1994 38,433 5,693 5,154 15 57,649

1995 39,215 5,755 8,388 12 63,970

1996 38,034 6,204 6,965 18 63,617

1997 36,283 5,496 5,126 0 57,372

1998 38,661 5,406 6,858 0 62,568

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 37,845 5,956 5,787 1,841 0 61,493

2004 42,489 6,269 6,867 0 0 68,893

2009 45,962 6,595 8,044 0 0 75,269

A severe drought and a 

crippling financial crisis created 

a transitory status quo food gap 

in 1999 but pose no threat to 

Indonesia’s long-term food 

security since base 

consumption levels are well 

above the recommended 

nutritional minimum.

Indonesia’s Imports 

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19901991

1992

199319941995

1996

19971998

Million tons

Commercial grain

imports

Statistical table 46--Korea, D.P. Rep. (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 8,071 255 596 0 6,568

1991 8,836 250 1,570 0 8,446

1992 8,681 277 1,130 0 6,028

1993 9,137 129 1,570 0 10,079

1994 7,215 184 495 75 6,239

1995 3,662 43 219 736 4,858

1996 2,491 164 239 470 3,513

1997 2,786 164 335 849 6,054

1998 4,148 164 579 1,197 8,324

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 3,093 126 264 391 771 4,754

2004 3,335 134 261 767 1,173 4,731

2009 3,512 143 263 836 1,263 4,949

International food aid has lately 

provided substantial relief to 

vulnerable population groups in 

North Korea. In the long run, 

however, large-scale agricultural 

rehabilitation measures are 

necessary to bolster domestic 

production capacity.

North Korea’s Imports 

and Food Gaps

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Imports SQ gap Nutr. Gap
# ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 47--Nepal (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 4,674 185 20 1 5,211

1991 4,437 199 4 8 4,973

1992 4,003 198 41 18 4,621

1993 4,075 199 15 44 4,764

1994 4,427 211 49 26 5,224

1995 4,585 223 14 43 5,422

1996 4,985 237 53 33 5,735

1997 5,110 259 48 6 5,871

1998 5,140 253 24 5 5,918

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 5,238 247 46 100 0 5,991

2004 5,676 262 48 326 0 6,492

2009 6,157 278 52 543 0 7,041

Although grain yields are 

projected to grow twice as 

rapidly as in the past decade, 

smaller acreage gains and a 

sharply curtailed capacity for 

commercial imports will give 

rise to a growing status quo 

food gap in Nepal during the 

next decade.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Grain Imports and 

Food Gaps

Commercial imports Status quo gap

Statistical table 48--Pakistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 19,445 261 1,673 380 32,590

1991 19,390 248 603 373 31,543

1992 20,458 279 1,813 236 32,984

1993 21,915 301 2,831 67 36,166

1994 20,537 331 1,817 103 35,556

1995 22,833 343 2,679 18 38,671

1996 23,013 336 1,971 15 38,714

1997 22,834 316 2,503 8 38,732

1998 25,178 422 4,148 173 43,151

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 24,620 343 3,147 505 0 41,524

2004 27,770 371 3,486 1,161 0 46,580

2009 31,185 400 4,026 1,390 0 52,461

A steep decline in the growth of 

commercial food imports and a 

modest slowdown in domestic 

food production threaten 

Pakistan’s ability to maintain 

current consumption levels over 

the next decade. However, 

nutritional adequacy will not be 

impaired.

Pakistan’s GDP Growth

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

19871988198919901991199219931994199519961997

Percent

	

 

				


✺ #

Statistical table 49--Philippines (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 11,527 913 2,625 109 17,856

1991 10,426 902 1,642 48 17,497

1992 11,000 901 1,956 53 17,209

1993 11,480 924 2,140 52 18,485

1994 11,343 954 2,380 44 19,213

1995 11,587 948 2,786 17 18,760

1996 11,480 942 2,398 11 19,833

1997 10,033 951 3,610 40 20,271

1998 11,465 874 4,600 9 21,239

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 11,581 962 3,947 0 0 21,493

2004 11,859 999 4,538 537 0 22,721

2009 12,521 1,036 5,470 402 0 24,904

By reversing a downward trend 

in grain acreage, the Philippines 

is projected to double the 

growth rate of its domestic food 

production relative to the past 

decade, despite slower growth 

in grain yields.

Agriculture, Value 

Added 1987-97

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

% growth

Statistical table 50--Sri Lanka (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,678 173 700 201 4,159

1991 1,691 162 421 439 4,267

1992 1,649 140 813 249 4,414

1993 1,748 145 803 338 4,512

1994 1,905 140 590 346 4,861

1995 1,679 138 1,022 120 4,775

1996 1,502 137 1,221 57 4,747

1997 1,758 118 1,216 83 5,028

1998 1,783 107 999 82 5,046

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,765 132 1,222 0 0 4,983

2004 1,750 136 1,266 115 0 5,072

2009 1,800 140 1,344 181 0 5,282

Smaller annual increases in 

domestic grain output and a 

diminished capacity for 

commercial food imports are 

expected to lead to a modest but 

growing status quo food gap in 

Sri Lanka from 2004 through 

2009.

Sri Lanka’s Food Prices 

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Index, 1995=100
# ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 51--Vietnam (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 13,064 1,394 99 75 15,174

1991 15,310 1,488 190 80 16,821

1992 15,389 1,654 156 84 17,512

1993 16,931 1,561 293 87 18,564

1994 17,390 1,400 242 64 19,018

1995 18,867 1,281 464 21 19,975

1996 19,503 1,246 451 0 20,483

1997 20,632 1,198 479 0 24,362

1998 20,865 1,120 550 0 24,808

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 20,979 1,281 565 0 0 23,703

2004 22,827 1,387 684 0 0 25,879

2009 24,684 1,502 863 0 0 28,171

Because of slower population 

growth, Vietnam will continue to 

remain food secure despite 

much lower growth rates of food 

production and commercial 

imports and increased grain 

exports.

Fertilizer Use 1986-96

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

198619881990

199219941996

100 gm/ha.

Statistical table 52--Bolivia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 692 288 0 235 1,618

1991 760 309 143 238 1,794

1992 780 291 130 243 1,806

1993 1,055 318 89 205 1,917

1994 875 268 155 176 1,773

1995 825 272 274 67 1,847

1996 965 296 160 75 1,866

1997 1,090 338 89 130 2,034

1998 1,015 247 322 68 2,099

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,035 314 207 118 244 1,936

2004 1,251 347 210 61 202 2,231

2009 1,427 383 216 30 186 2,502

Growth in grain, root, and tuber 

production has been strong and is 

projected to stay at 2.5 percent 

per year through 2009. This will 

be enough to virtually eliminate 

Bolivia’s status quo gap, but not 

its nutritional gap.

Grain Production 

and Yields

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1994

1995

1996

199719981999

1,000 tons

1.25

1.30

1.35

1.40

1.45

1.50

1.55

1.60

Tons/ha

Production Yields

	

 

				


✺ #!

Statistical table 53--Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 3,093 1,150 952 1 9,701

1991 2,816 1,053 791 8 9,102

1992 2,688 1,037 1,590 17 9,894

1993 2,806 1,250 1,694 31 9,741

1994 2,811 1,257 2,373 15 10,237

1995 2,394 1,236 2,572 0 10,843

1996 2,159 1,176 3,272 0 11,597

1997 1,834 1,258 3,286 0 11,057

1998 1,924 1,258 2,991 0 11,050

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,164 1,254 3,574 0 0 12,115

2004 2,086 1,314 4,046 0 0 13,067

2009 2,201 1,376 4,718 0 0 14,650

Colombia has the highest per 

capita income ($2,600) of the 

group of 11 countries. However, 

its income distribution is among 

the most unequal, and the lowest 

income quintile--i.e. about 8.3 

million people in 1999--is 

estimated to fall short of nutritional 

requirements. Projections indicate

improvements by 2009.

Grain Production and Imports

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Production

"High-exports" imports

Baseline imports 

Statistical table 54--Dominican Republic (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 323 73 682 6 1,803

1991 343 76 731 14 1,693

1992 390 84 785 7 1,709

1993 350 57 972 7 1,944

1994 329 63 924 3 1,903

1995 316 85 1,018 1 1,997

1996 360 78 1,036 0 1,971

1997 301 63 1,151 2 2,178

1998 282 76 1,191 0 2,183

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 307 77 1,270 0 0 2,383

2004 314 79 1,404 0 0 2,598

2009 323 81 1,590 0 0 2,931

By 2009, the Dominican Republic 

is projected to reach a level of 

food security where everybody 

should be able to consume above 

the minimum nutritional 

requirements. Despite some 

negative lingering impact of 

Hurricane Georges (fall 1998) 

general economic growth is strong 

for the second year in a row, 

exceeding 7 percent.

Grain Production and Imports

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Production

"High-exports" imports

Baseline imports 
#" ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 55--Ecuador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 865 116 365 98 2,651

1991 956 104 416 45 2,800

1992 1,028 128 346 14 2,810

1993 1,104 113 271 12 2,677

1994 1,050 137 321 32 2,880

1995 1,009 123 377 1 2,807

1996 767 120 433 8 2,992

1997 831 164 646 17 3,000

1998 811 164 1,022 7 3,450

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 941 134 788 0 0 3,393

2004 909 140 886 0 0 3,591

2009 965 146 1,007 0 0 3,942

Ecuador suffers from a very 

unequal income distribution that 

leaves about 40 percent of the 

population with insufficient 

purchasing power to consume the 

minimum nutritional requirements. 

In 1998, the country suffered from 

three adverse shocks: El Niño, low 

international prices for petrol, and 

repercussions from the financial 

crisis in Russia.

0

400

800

1,200

1,600

2,000

1000 tons

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

Sources of Grain

Production Com. imports Food aid

Statistical table 56--El Salvador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 795 10 72 84 1,294

1991 699 11 368 86 1,556

1992 953 15 141 131 1,463

1993 858 14 212 79 1,393

1994 690 32 467 7 1,537

1995 873 27 415 13 1,543

1996 841 26 402 0 1,377

1997 860 26 571 0 1,706

1998 790 25 575 0 1,630

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 855 27 569 0 0 1,664

2004 922 29 601 22 0 1,765

2009 1,006 31 647 24 0 1,915

El Salvador has suffered set backs

--like other countries in the region--

due to natural disasters (El Niño 

and Hurricane Mitch) and due to 

the international financial crisis 

that reduced foreign capital flows 

into the region. We project a slight 

status quo gap to persist during the 

next decade.

Grain Production and Imports

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Production

"High-exports" imports

Baseline imports 

	

 

				


✺ ##

Statistical table 57--Guatemala (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,398 16 185 171 2,153

1991 1,355 14 176 252 2,252

1992 1,454 16 280 109 2,281

1993 1,400 17 275 151 2,253

1994 1,343 17 430 144 2,353

1995 1,423 17 462 30 2,378

1996 1,436 17 616 25 2,294

1997 1,258 17 563 40 2,455

1998 1,235 17 972 13 2,652

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,285 18 801 73 0 2,533

2004 1,413 20 871 243 54 2,726

2009 1,524 23 969 409 196 2,950

Economic growth in Guatemala 

has been steady but not 

sufficient to prevent the prospect 

of widening food gaps. Total and

grain imports have been 

increasing at a very fast rate. 

Unless export earnings 

accelerate, this trend is not 

expected to continue into the 

medium term future.

Fertilizer Use 1980-96

0

40

80

120

160

200

19801982

19841986198819901992

19941996

1,000 tons

Statistical table 58--Haiti (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 350 224 254 42 1,421

1991 330 225 218 55 1,378

1992 320 231 268 75 1,445

1993 340 223 217 114 1,412

1994 330 216 159 117 1,355

1995 345 219 336 81 1,593

1996 345 215 276 86 1,550

1997 405 211 245 104 1,663

1998 455 213 420 115 1,928

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 455 219 326 75 285 1,620

2004 427 232 322 224 453 1,615

2009 453 246 322 317 565 1,677

Even though Haiti’s political crisis 

remains unresolved, the economic 

situation improved somewhat during 

1998. This year, however, the impact 

of Hurricane George’s destruction of 

agricultural infrastucture led to a 

slowdown in overall economic 

growth. Poverty and hunger continue 

to afflict the overwhelming majority of 

the population.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Grain Imports and Food Gaps

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
#$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 59--Honduras (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 684 8 88 84 1,047

1991 693 7 100 160 1,074

1992 710 8 73 64 1,058

1993 690 8 66 149 1,131

1994 617 7 250 73 1,190

1995 780 7 233 42 1,217

1996 679 8 190 58 1,096

1997 730 8 385 32 1,378

1998 601 9 371 23 1,318

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 730 8 357 0 102 1,319

2004 791 9 387 56 200 1,414

2009 876 9 427 93 254 1,553

Honduras, the country most 

severely affected by Hurricane 

Mitch, is fortunate to obtain 

substantial financial and 

technical aid. Cheap imports and

food aid, however, lead to 

suppressed prices that might 

drive producers to switch from 

grains to more profitable crops 

such as tobacco and sugar.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

1,000 tons

1999 2004 2009

Grain Imports and Food Gaps

Commerical imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 60--Jamaica (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 2 68 172 163 618

1991 3 72 131 323 753

1992 4 84 251 201 735

1993 5 92 298 157 795

1994 5 97 313 53 675

1995 5 102 385 49 722

1996 5 108 312 0 651

1997 5 90 359 0 689

1998 5 90 500 0 826

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 5 104 431 0 0 787

2004 5 109 477 0 0 874

2009 5 115 537 0 0 986

Jamaica is the only country in this 

region where even the lowest 

income group is projected to meet 

nutritional requirements. Current 

trends, however, indicate a 

continued decline in GDP growth for 

the 4th year in a row. Export 

earnings fell 6.5 percent to 1.6 billion 

dollars in 1998, mainly due to 

declining banana and coffee exports.

Grain Production and Imports

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Production (Grain, R&T)

"High-exports" imports

Baseline imports 

	

 

				


✺ #

Statistical table 61--Nicaragua (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 357 20 33 141 891

1991 409 20 1 145 911

1992 427 20 61 97 938

1993 485 21 85 55 954

1994 290 21 156 34 932

1995 409 21 155 43 1,028

1996 557 21 184 43 1,160

1997 494 22 159 35 1,090

1998 490 21 166 30 1,162

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 530 22 186 50 0 1,144

2004 556 23 191 177 82 1,190

2009 585 25 201 297 190 1,247

Nicaragua benefits from good 

weather conditions that raise 

expectations for an above 

average grain harvest. Corn and 

rice production are expected to 

increase 25 and 20 percent 

compared with last year’s 

hurricane-reduced output.

Nicaragua’s Imports

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1,000 tons

Grain imports

Food aid

Statistical table 62--Peru (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,388 521 1,202 398 4,688

1991 1,250 575 1,339 492 4,565

1992 1,669 455 1,684 377 4,984

1993 1,972 607 1,549 410 5,031

1994 1,821 686 2,021 348 5,712

1995 1,634 850 2,396 108 6,484

1996 1,827 877 2,447 0 6,393

1997 1,953 935 2,219 0 5,682

1998 2,245 959 2,710 0 6,518

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 2,190 913 2,627 0 0 6,499

2004 2,226 971 2,761 100 0 6,723

2009 2,456 1,033 2,945 80 0 7,266

Peru’s fast growing economy 

came to a virtual standstill in 1998 

due to the wave of international 

financial crises and El Niño, which 

reduced agricultural output 1.7 

percent. Income losses and 

destruction of infrastructure 

reduced GDP nearly 5 percent. 

Positive but slow growth is 

expected to resume in 1999.

Grain Production and Imports

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

1989 1994 1999 2004 2009

1,000 tons

Production

"High-exports" imports

Baseline imports 
$% ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 63--Armenia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 246 --- --- --- ---

1991 292 --- --- --- ---

1992 292 62 380 117 709

1993 301 80 189 277 719

1994 213 77 64 366 804

1995 236 87 106 279 966

1996 306 82 147 200 927

1997 290 69 258 101 924

1998 320 82 251 138 965

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 250 80 239 150 96 737

2004 400 86 258 0 0 941

2009 429 93 296 0 0 1,040

Armenia faces a food gap in 

1999 due to a below average 

grain harvest. Meeting the 

food gap will be difficult this 

year due to the Russian ruble 

devaluation, which has hurt 

Armenia’s exports as well as 

remittances from Armenians 

living in Russia.

Armenia’s Food and Feed Use

Are Stabilizing

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999

1,000 tons

Food Feed

Statistical table 64--Azerbaijan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,349 --- --- --- ---

1991 1,324 --- --- --- ---

1992 1,266 30 894 6 2,137

1993 1,084 29 810 58 1,827

1994 1,015 29 204 424 1,779

1995 878 30 38 180 1,253

1996 1,000 41 360 187 1,748

1997 1,130 43 474 33 1,854

1998 1,120 60 370 60 1,855

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 820 41 445 287 290 1,528

2004 1,233 44 508 0 0 2,050

2009 1,316 47 609 0 0 2,289

Azerbaijan faces a sizable food 

gap in 1999 due to a 20-percent 

production shock from a bad 

harvest. Development of the 

petroleum sector should help 

the economy in the medium 

term, but importing the 

necessary grain commercially 

this year may be difficult.

Azerbaijan’s Grain Production

is Down 20 Percent in 1999

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1987198919911993199519971999

Million tons

	

 

				


✺ $

Statistical table 65--Georgia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 658 --- --- --- ---

1991 565 --- --- --- ---

1992 496 41 443 194 1,377

1993 403 49 69 585 1,046

1994 470 58 152 569 1,209

1995 497 69 398 281 1,356

1996 630 56 114 381 1,185

1997 815 60 196 92 1,217

1998 795 78 447 160 1,472

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 795 65 276 79 84 1,098

2004 914 68 305 0 0 1,288

2009 967 71 357 0 0 1,423

Georgia’s 1999 grain harvest is 

about the same as last year, 

which is still not quite adequate 

to meet recent consumption 

levels. Georgia, which is very 

reliant upon trade with Russia, 

was hurt by the ruble devaluation 

but is projected to recover well in 

the medium term.

Georgia’s Grain Production Has

Recovered Recently

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999

1000 tons

Statistical table 66--Kyrgyzstan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 1,535 --- --- --- ---

1991 1,369 --- --- --- ---

1992 1,510 70 1,017 91 2,003

1993 1,511 59 694 156 1,732

1994 993 60 45 61 1,043

1995 985 83 0 165 1,216

1996 1,415 108 4 154 1,389

1997 1,713 130 145 19 1,676

1998 1,613 139 59 72 1,614

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 1,411 110 77 255 0 1,339

2004 1,793 122 87 0 0 1,746

2009 1,934 135 103 0 0 1,913

Kyrgyzstan could face a short 

run food gap due to a grain 

harvest that is below the levels 

achieved in the past 2 years.

The country should be able to 

avoid food gaps in the future if it 

can maintain peace and sustain 

its economic development.

Kygyzstan Has Been a Grain 

Exporter in Recent Years

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999

Million tons

Production Domestic use
$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Statistical table 67--Tajikistan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year production production imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of all food

---1,000 tons ---

1990 282 --- --- --- ---

1991 264 --- --- --- ---

1992 235 32 1,485 71 1,854

1993 252 28 1,384 82 2,073

1994 220 26 696 104 1,444

1995 212 22 309 206 1,144

1996 346 21 106 139 799

1997 306 25 386 97 1,086

1998 306 23 280 128 986

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1999 306 29 288 103 475 966

2004 400 33 316 13 410 1,127

2009 428 36 363 0 415 1,243

Tajikistan faces severe shortand long-run nutrition-based 

food gaps. Poverty extends to 

upper income groups within the 

country, which also do not 

consume adequate amounts of 

food. Rebuilding from war will 

take time. 

Tajikistan’s Nutritional Food

Gaps Extend to All Income 

Quintiles

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100

Income quintiles

Avg. per cap. calories/ 

recommended calories

	

 

				


✺ $

The Food Security Assessment model used in this report was

developed at the USDA-ERS for use in projecting food consumption and access, and food gaps (previously called food

needs) in 67 low-income countries through 2009. This year,

North Korea was for the first time included in the analysis.

The reference to food includes grains, root crops, and a category called “other,” which includes all other commodities

consumed, thus covering 100 percent of food consumption.

All of these commodities are expressed in grain equivalent. 

Food security of a country is evaluated based on the gap

between projected domestic food consumption (produced

domestically plus imported commercially minus nonfood

use) and a consumption requirement. Although food aid is

expected to be available during the projection period, it is

not included in the projection of food consumption. It

should be noted that while projection results will provide a

baseline for the food security situation of the countries, they

depend on assumptions and specifications of the model.

Since the model is based on historical data, it implicitly

assumes that the historical trend in key variables will continue in the future. 

Food gaps are projected using two consumption criteria:

1) Status quo target, where the objective is to maintain average

per capita consumption of the recent past. The most recent 3-

year average (1996-98) is used for the per capita consumption

target in order to eliminate short-term fluctuations. 

2) Nutrition-based target, where the objective is to maintain

the minimum daily caloric intake standards recommended

by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The

caloric requirements (based on total share of grains, root

crops, and “other”) used in this assessment are those necessary to sustain life with minimum food-gathering activities.

They are comparable to the activity level for a refugee—

they do not allow for play, work, or any activity other than

food gathering.

The status quo measure embodies a “safety-net” criterion by

providing food consumption stability at recently achieved

levels. The nutrition-based target assists in comparisons of

relative well-being. Comparing the two consumption measures either for countries or regions provides an indicator of

the need depending on whether the objectives are to achieve

consumption stability and/or to meet a nutritional standard.

Large nutrition-based needs relative to status quo needs, for

example, mean additional food must be provided if

improved nutrition levels are the main objective. In cases

where nutrition-based requirements are below status quo

consumption needs, food availability could decline without

risking nutritional adequacy, on average. Both methods,

however, fail to address inequalities of food distribution

within a country. 

"	$*8"

	
'.,

!"	#


Projection of Food Availability—The simulation framework used for projecting aggregate food availability is based

on partial equilibrium recursive models of 67 lower income

countries. The country models are synthetic, meaning that

the parameters that are used are either cross country estimates or are estimated by other studies. Each country model

includes three commodity groups, grains, root crops and

“other.” The production side of the grain and root crops are

divided into yield and area response. Crop area is a function

of 1-year lag return (real price times yield), while yield

responds to input use. Commercial imports are assumed to

be a function of domestic price, world commodity price, and

foreign exchange availability. Foreign exchange availability

is a key determinant of commercial food imports and is the

sum of the value of export earnings and net flow of credit.

Foreign exchange availability is assumed to be equal to foreign exchange use, meaning that foreign exchange reserve is

assumed constant during the projection period. Countries

are assumed to be price takers in the international market,

meaning that world prices are exogenous in the model.

However, producer prices are linked to the international

market. The projections of consumption for the “other”

commodities is simply based on a trend that follows the projected growth in supply of the food crops (grains plus root

crops). Although this is a very simplistic approach, it represents an improvement from the previous assessments where

the contribution to the diet of commodities such as meat and

dairy products was overlooked. The plan is to enhance this

aspect of the model in the future. 

For the commodity group grains and root crops (c), food

consumption (FC) is defined as domestic supply (DS) minus

nonfood use (NF). n is country index and t is time index.

FCcnt = DScnt - NFcnt (1)

Nonfood use is the sum of seed use (SD), feed use (FD),

exports (EX), and other uses (OU). 

NFcnt = SDcnt + FDcnt + EXcnt + OUcnt (2)

Domestic supply of a commodity group is the sum of

domestic production (PR) plus commercial imports (CI) and

changes in stocks (CSTK).

DScnt = PRcnt + CIcnt + CSTKcnt (3)

Appendix 1—Food Security Model: Definition and Methodology
$ ✺ 

				
 
	



Production is generally determined by the area and yield

response functions:

PRcnt =ARcnt * YLcnt (4) 

YLcnt = f ( LBcnt ,FRcnt , Kcnt ,Tcnt ) (5)

RPYcnt =YL cnt * DPcnt (6)

RNPYcnt =NYLcnt * NDPcnt (7)

ARcnt = f (ARcnt-1, RPYcnt-1, RNPYcnt-1, Zcnt ) (8)

where AR is area, YL is yield, LB is rural labor, FR is fertilizer

use, K is indicator of capital use, T is the indicator of technology change, DP is real domestic price, RPY is yield times real

price, NDP is real domestic substitute price, NYL is yield of

substitute commodity, RNPY is yield of substitute commodity

times substitute price, and Z is exogenous policies.

The commercial import demand function is defined as:

CIcnt = f (WPRct , NWPRct , FEXnt , PRcnt, Mnt ) (9)

where WPR is real world food price, NWPR is real world

substitute price, FEX is real foreign exchange availability,

and M is import restriction policies.

The real domestic price is defined as:

DPcnt = f (DPcnt-1 , DScnt , NDScnt ,GDnt , EXRnt ) (10)

where NDS is supply of substitute commodity, GD is real

income, and EXR is real exchange rate.

Projections of food consumption by income group—

Inadequate economic access is the most important cause of

chronic undernutrition among developing countries and is

related to the level of income. Estimates of food gaps at the

aggregate or national level fail to take into account the distribution of food consumption among different income

groups. Lack of consumption distribution data for the countries is the key factor preventing estimation of food consumption by income group. An attempt was made to fill this

information gap by using an indirect method of projecting

calorie consumption by different income groups based on

income distribution data1. It should be noted that this

approach ignores the consumption substitution of different

food groups by income class. The procedure uses the concept of the income/consumption relationship and allocates

the total projected amount of available food among different

income groups in each country (income distributions are

assumed constant during the projection period). 

Assuming a declining consumption and income relationship

(semi log functional form):

C = a + b ln Y (11)

C = Co/P (12)

P = P1 +........+ Pi (13)

Y = Yo/P (14)

i = 1 to 5

where C and Y are known average per capita food consumption (all commodities in grain equivalent) and per capita

income (all quintiles), Co is total food consumption, P is the

total population, i is income quintile, a is the intercept, b is

the consumption income propensity, and b/C is consumption

income elasticity (point estimate elasticity is calculated for

individual countries). To estimate per capita consumption by

income group, the parameter of b was estimated based on

cross-country (67 low-income countries) data for per capita

calorie consumption and income. The parameter a is estimated for each country based on the known data for average

per capita calorie consumption and per capita income. 

3"

Historical supply and use data for 1980-98 for most variables are from a USDA database. Data for grain production

in 1999 for most countries are based on a USDA database as

of October 1999. Food aid data are from the UN’s Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), and financial data are from

the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Historical

nonfood-use data, including seed, waste, processing use, and

other use, are estimated from the FAO Food Balance series.

The base year data used for projections are the average for

1996-98, except export earnings that are 1995-97.

Endogenous variables:

Production, area, yield, commercial import, domestic producer price, and food consumption.

Exogenous variables:

Population— data are medium UN population projections as

of 1998. 

World prices—data are USDA/baseline projections. 

Stocks—USDA data, assumed constant during the projection

period. 

Seed use—USDA data, projections are based on area projections using constant base seed/area ratio. 

Food exports—USDA data, projections are either based on

the population growth rate or extrapolation of historical

trends. 

Inputs—fertilizer and capital projections are, in general, an

extrapolation of historical growth data from FAO.

Agricultural labor—projections are based on UN population

projections, accounting for urbanization growth.

Food aid—historical data from FAO, no food aid assumed

during the projection period.

Gross Domestic Product—World Bank data.

Merchandise and service imports and exports—World Bank

data.

1 The method is similar to that used by Shlomo Reutlinger and Marcelo

Selowsky in “Malnutrition and Poverty”, World Bank, 1978.

	

 

				


✺ $!

Net foreign credit—is assumed constant during the projection period.

Value of exports—projections are based on World Bank

(Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries,

various issues), IMF (World Economic Outlook, various

issues), or an extrapolation of historical growth. 

Export deflator or terms of trade—World Bank

(Commodity Markets—Projection of Inflation Indices for

Developed Countries).

Income— projected based on World Bank report (Global

Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, various

issues) or extrapolation of historical growth.

Income distribution—World Bank data. Income distributions

are assumed constant during the projection period.

(Shahla Shapouri)
$" ✺ 

				
 
	



Appendix 2a--List of Countries and Their Food Gaps in 1999 

1999 food gaps 1999 food gaps

Status quo Nutrition Distribution Status quo Nutrition Distribution

---Million tons--- ---Million tons---

Cameroon 6 0 138 Algeria 348 0 88

Centr. Afr. Rep. 12 71 128 Egypt 0 0 0

Congo (Zaire) 136 1,838 2,136 Morocco 3,012 0 483

Burundi 22 401 451 Tunisia 0 0 0

Eritrea 80 307 321 North Africa 3,360 0 571

Ethiopia 901 4,023 4,285

Kenya 209 249 1,016 Afghanistan 248 681 1,045

Rwanda 527 326 351 Bangladesh 410 773 1,757

Somalia 192 882 932 India 0 0 5,416

Sudan 67 0 54 Indonesia 1,841 0 0

Tanzania 351 536 872 Korea, North 391 771 931

Uganda 178 0 93 Nepal 100 0 71

Angola 105 366 516 Pakistan 505 0 0

Lesotho 49 44 88 Philippines 0 0 0

Madagascar 75 162 371 Sri Lanka 0 0 0

Malawi 0 0 0 Vietnam 0 0 0

Mozambique 144 656 1,086 Asia 3,495 2,225 9,221

Swaziland 16 0 3

Zambia 30 538 635 Bolivia 118 244 337

Zimbabwe 454 420 651 Colombia 0 0 252

Benin 0 0 0 Dominican Rep. 0 0 39

Burkina Faso 0 0 147 Ecuador 0 0 217

Cape Verde 54 3 8 El Salvador 0 0 40

Chad 0 141 251 Guatemala 73 0 285

Côte d’Ivoire 187 0 7 Haiti 75 285 419

Gambia 0 0 1 Honduras 0 102 235

Ghana 135 0 71 Jamaica 0 0 0

Guinea 0 0 45 Nicaragua 50 0 98

Guinea-Bissau 4 0 4 Peru 0 0 291

Liberia 173 95 139 Latin Am. 316 632 2,214

Mali 0 0 31

Mauritania 0 0 1 Armenia 150 96 121

Niger 5 0 81 Azerbaijan 287 290 346

Nigeria 365 0 0 Georgia 79 84 131

Senegal 0 0 61 Kyrgyzstan 255 0 4

Sierra Leone 138 151 202 Tajikistan 103 475 514

Togo 50 14 95 NIS 874 945 1,116

SSA 4,664 11,222 15,268

Total 12,709 15,023 28,390

	

 

				


✺ $#

Appendix 2b--List of Countries and Their Food Gaps in 2009 

2009 food gaps 2009 food gaps

SQ Nutrition Distribution SQ Nutrition Distribution

---Million tons--- ---Million tons---

Cameroon 329 106 350 Algeria 1,105 0 143

Centr. Afr. Rep. 85 156 203 Egypt 118 0 0

Congo (Zaire) 1,254 3,533 3,899 Morocco 0 0 0

Burundi 107 587 646 Tunisia 0 0 0

Eritrea 193 485 501 North Afr. 1,223 0 143

Ethiopia 0 3,270 3,651

Kenya 0 0 813 Afghanistan 1,999 2,635 2,887

Rwanda 848 588 618 Bangladesh 834 1,263 2,310

Somalia 589 1,567 1,626 India 0 0 1,378

Sudan 178 0 83 Indonesia 0 0 0

Tanzania 501 733 1,141 Korea, North 836 1,263 1,396

Uganda 586 0 265 Nepal 543 0 187

Angola 650 1,001 1,136 Pakistan 1,390 0 0

Lesotho 47 42 98 Philippines 402 0 12

Madagascar 521 635 791 Sri Lanka 181 0 36

Malawi 316 481 534 Vietnam 0 0 0

Mozambique 59 663 1,208 Asia 6,185 5,160 8,207

Swaziland 4 0 1

Zambia 265 897 1,005 Bolivia 30 186 326

Zimbabwe 0 0 293 Colombia 0 0 63

Benin 136 0 0 Dominican Rep. 0 0 0

Burkina Faso 150 160 375 Ecuador 0 0 180

Cape Verde 75 11 15 El Salvador 24 0 25

Chad 0 209 344 Guatemala 409 196 509

Côte d’Ivoire 0 0 0 Haiti 317 565 671

Gambia 0 0 0 Honduras 93 254 352

Ghana 291 0 129 Jamaica 0 0 0

Guinea 0 0 73 Nicaragua 297 190 285

Guinea-Bissau 23 0 8 Peru 80 0 579

Liberia 524 409 446 Latin Am. 1,249 1,391 2,990

Mali 148 0 145

Mauritania 7 0 9 Armenia 0 0 6

Niger 533 311 445 Azerbaijan 0 0 9

Nigeria 0 0 0 Georgia 0 0 0

Senegal 0 0 152 Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0

Sierra Leone 315 331 377 Tajikistan 0 415 447

Togo 37 0 107 NIS 0 415 462

SSA 8,769 16,175 21,487

Total 17,427 23,141 33,288
$$ ✺ 

				
 
	

 Appendix 3--Country Indicators Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators Region Population Population Growth Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP 

and 1998 growth 1981-96 of variation growth annual growth GNP GNP growth e

country rate 1981-95 1981-96 in supply 1996 growth 1996 g

1996 

1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. dollars ------ Percent----- 

North Africa Algeria 30,481 2.2 -1.3 43.9 5.6 2.1 1,520 1.8 3.8 

 Egypt 66,009 1.9 5.0 5.3 2.4 1.5 1,080 3.5 5.0 

 Morocco 31,004 2.0 3.9 51.1 5.0 2.4 1,290 10.4 11.5 

 Tunisia 9,326 1.6 2.8 63.2 5.1 2.6 1,930 -0.4 7.0 

Central Africa Cameroon 14,762 3.0 0.5 8.0 1.6 1.6 610 4.5 5.0 

 Central African Rep. 3,399 1.8 1.8 16.7 -1.4 0.8 310 -5.0 -2.8 

 Zaire 48,371 3.1 3.5 8.3 2.4 1.8 130 -0.1 1.3 West Africa Benin 6,101 3.4 4.4 10.6 5.4 2.5 350 3.2 5.8  Burkina Faso 11,295 2.6 6.6 13.7 -5.9 2.3 230 3.3 6.1  Cape Verde 476 2.9 11.8 89.1 -0.9 0.9 1,010 -24.6 4.7  Chad 5,961 2.2 3.8 18.8 1.2 2.4 160 0.5 2.8 

 Côte d’Ivoire 16,320 3.3 3.9 7.4 2.4 2.4 660 4.6 5.9 

 Gambia 1,085 3.1 3.8 16.9 0.0 3.0 -- -- -- 

 Ghana 19,439 3.0 3.2 22.2 6.7 3.6 360 2.3 5.0 

 Guinea 7,036 2.4 3.5 9.8 1.2 2.1 560 1.8 4.5  Guinea-Bissau 1,206 2.4 9.3 16.1 2.6 1.8 250 3.7 5.2 

 Liberia 3,392 3.3 -6.0 40.7 9.2 1.0 -- -- -- 

 Mali 10,185 2.8 6.5 13.9 -0.1 2.9 240 1.2 4.0 

 Mauritania 2,478 3.0 12.9 47.1 -0.6 1.7 470 1.8 4.5 

 Niger 10,205 3.0 2.2 16.0 1.7 2.1 200 -0.1 3.3 

 Nigeria 111,081 3.0 0.2 18.2 10.3 2.6 240 1.9 3.5 

 Senegal 9,894 3.2 2.2 20.1 3.3 1.7 570 3.2 5.6 

 Sierra Leone 5,143 2.7 -2.6 11.3 4.6 0.9 200 7.6 4.8  Togo 4,897 3.4 4.8 16.1 0.2 2.3 300 4.3 6.2 East Africa Burundi 6,669 2.1 -1.1 19.6 1.9 1.7 170 -11.1 -8.8 - Eritrea 4,270 3.1 1.0 -- 1.3 1.3 -- -- -- 

 Ethiopia 60,310 2.7 2.0 11.0 1.3 3.0 100 7.2 10.3 

 Kenya 30,975 2.6 1.1 14.8 2.3 2.0 320 3.1 4.3 

 Rwanda 9,280 2.5 -2.5 14.6 -1.6 2.2 190 7.8 11.4 

 Somalia 8,596 3.3 -1.8 37.1 0.5 1.1 -- -- -- 

 Sudan 33,060 3.3 2.9 39.0 -5.0 1.8 -- -- --  Tanzania 30,481 2.2 1.4 12.6 0.3 2.2 170 -- -- 

 Uganda 21,042 2.1 2.6 6.0 1.3 2.6 300 6.2 9.1 

See note at end of table.

	

 

				


✺ $ Appendix 3--Country Indicators (continued) Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators Region Population Population Growth Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP 

and 1998 growth 1981-96 of variation growth annual growth GNP GNP growth ecountry rate 1981-95 1981-96 in supply 1996 growth 1996 g

1996 

1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. dollars ------ Percent----- 

Southern Africa Angola 10,913 2.7 -1.9 19.3 4.5 1.7 270 -1.7 7.0 

 Lesotho 2,088 2.4 1.2 30.2 9.2 1.7 660 6.7 11.9 

 Madagascar 15,243 3.2 1.4 3.1 2.1 1.6 250 0.5 2.0 

 Malawi 11,018 2.4 3.0 21.7 0.2 2.3 180 13.0 14.5 

 Mozambique 19,728 2.9 1.4 24.7 0.4 2.4 80 5.0 6.1 

 Swaziland 1,066 3.3 2.5 30.8 0.0 2.4 1,210 -0.3 2.5 

 Zambia 10,178 2.4 2.0 31.7 4.6 1.7 360 3.4 4.9 

 Zimbabwe 12,084 2.2 1.1 37.4 5.4 1.1 610 5.8 7.3 Asia Afghanistan 26,519 6.1 -3.6 7.9 -0.5 1.2 -- -- -- 

 Bangladesh 137,240 2.3 2.2 4.0 0.3 1.6 260 3.8 5.3 

 India 985,921 1.7 2.9 5.2 2.9 1.7 380 5.1 7.5  Indonesia 213,133 1.5 2.0 3.3 1.7 1.2 1,080 5.8 7.6 

 Nepal 23,202 2.5 3.2 8.3 7.2 1.6 210 1.8 5.3 

 Pakistan 141,030 2.6 2.2 4.8 6.0 2.3 480 0.3 4.6  Philippines 78,229 2.2 2.5 4.5 0.4 2.1 1,160 4.5 5.7 

 Sri Lanka 18,969 1.1 0.9 9.1 -4.6 1.0 740 0.5 3.8 

 Vietnam 78,147 1.6 0.9 5.0 -1.9 1.7 290 -- 9.3 

Latin America Bolivia 8,435 2.2 3.1 15.2 0.6 2.0 830 2.6 --  Colombia 38,014 1.6 -3.5 6.2 0.0 2.5 2,140 -0.5 2.0 

 Dominican Republic 8,366 1.7 0.1 9.7 2.5 2.6 1,600 5.7 7.4 

 Ecuador 11,915 1.9 0.7 0.0 2.0 1,500 1.2 1.9 

 El Salvador 6,226 1.9 2.7 10.4 9.0 2.7 1,700 0.0 2.5 

 Guatemala 11,841 2.4 2.0 4.3 1.7 1.0 1,470 8.6 3.0 

 Haiti 6,807 1.4 -1.8 8.3 0.4 1.8 310 0.0 2.0 

 Honduras 5,737 2.6 3.1 12.0 4.3 2.4 660 -0.3 3.1 

 Jamaica 2,609 0.7 -6.4 60.2 3.2 1.7 1,600 -1.9 -1.7  Nicaragua 4,537 2.5 1.7 16.1 4.2 2.7 380 4.2 4.7 

 Peru 25,393 1.7 2.0 13.9 0.8 2.0 2,420 0.0 2.8 

New Independent States Armenia 3,469 0.1 2.0 53.6 0.8 2.1 630 7.4 -- 

 Azerbaijan 7,793 0.7 2.0 52.7 0.8 2.1 480 -1.3 1.2  Georgia 5,145 -0.6 2.0 52.6 0.8 1.8 850 12.7 --  Kyrgystan 4,566 0.6 2.0 51.8 0.8 1.5 550 4.1 5.6 

 Tajikistan 6,124 1.8 2.0 51.2 0.8 1.9 340 -8.4 -4.4 

-- = data unavailable or not applicable due to inconsistent data set. Source: Population=Census data. 
1. Food Availability and Food Gaps for 67 Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6

Regional tables:

3. Food Availability and Food Gaps for North Africa; and 

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

4. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa; and

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

5. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Asia; and 

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

6. Food Availability and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean; and

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

7. Food Availability and Food Gaps for New Independent States; and 

Impact of Accelerated Export Growth Compared to Baseline in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Special Articles

A-1. Highlights of Commitments from Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

B-1. Selected Macroeconomic, Trade, and Transportation Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

B-2. Selected Agricultural Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

B-3. Decomposition of Agricultural Trade, Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries, 1995-97 averages . . . . . . . . . . . .34

C-1. Per Capita Income Levels and Growth Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

C-2. Trade Openness in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

C-3. Decomposition of Agricultural Trade for the 11 selected Latin American countries, 1995-97 Averages . . . . . . . .39

C-4. Trade Regime Indicators, Pre- and Post-Reform Periods for Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40

C-5. Selected Regional Trade Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

D-1. Comparative Development Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

D-2. Food Availability Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

D-3. Share in Food Aid in Total Food Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

Country Statistical Tables

North Africa (4 countries)

1. Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

2. Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

3. Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

4. Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Central Africa (3 countries)

5. Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

6. Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

7. Congo, Democratic Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

East Africa (9 countries)

8. Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

9. Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

10. Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

11. Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

12. Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

% ✺ 

				
 
	



List of Tables
13. Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

14. Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

15. Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

16. Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

Southern Africa (8 countries)

17. Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

18. Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

19. Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

20. Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

21. Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

22. Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

23. Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

24. Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

West Africa (17 countries)

25. Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

26. Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

27. Cape Verde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

28. Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

29. Côte d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

30. Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

31. Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

32. Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

33. Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

34. Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

35. Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

36. Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

37. Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

38. Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

39. Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

40. Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

41. Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Asia (10 countries)

42. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

43. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

44. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

45. Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

46. Korea, D.P. Rep. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

47. Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

48. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

49. Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

50. Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

51. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries)

52. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

53. Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

54. Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

55. Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

56. El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

57. Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77


	

 

				


✺ 
58. Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

59. Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

60. Jamaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

61. Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

62. Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

NIS (5 countries)

63. Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

64. Azerbaijan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

65. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

66. Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

67. Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

Appendices

Appendix 1. Food Security Model: Definition and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83

Appendix 2a. List of Countries and Their Food Gaps in 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86

Appendix 2b. List of Countries and Their Food Gaps in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87

Appendix 3. Country Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88

List of Figures

1. Food Gaps in All 67 Countries: 1999-2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Sub-Saharan Africa Has Only 25 Percent of the Population of the 67 Countries, But Accounts for 

75 Percent of the Nutritional Gap in 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

3. Food Gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9

Regional figures:

North Africa

Grain Production Deviations From Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Average Food Consumption Levels Meet Nutritional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Sub-Saharan Africa

Nutritional Food Gap in SS Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Grain and Root Production in SS Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Asia

Status Quo Gaps in Selected Asian Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Status Quo Food Gap in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

Latin America and the Caribbean

Nutritional Food Gap in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Latin America’s Grain Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

NIS

NIS Countries’ Currencies Devalued To Keep Exports Competitive After Russian Devaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

NIS Current and Projected Average Per Capita Grain Consumption Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

 ✺ 

				
 
	



	

 

				


✺