U.S.-China 

Relations:

On a collision course? 

Background and perspective on important national security and defense policy issues. 

Written and produced by House Armed Services Committee Chairman,

Volume 4, Issue 2 May 2000

China in the Ascendancy:

 A growing threat to U.S. security?

BACKGROUND

BRIEF

BACKGROUND

BRIEF

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NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

FROM THE

CHAIRMAN

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Although the Clinton Administration has 

asserted that China and 

the United States are now 

“strategic partners,” recent events seem 

to suggest that this characterization is at 

odds with reality. Earlier this year, the 

State Department avowed that the recent 

downturn in U.S.-China relations had 

ended and that friendly relations would 

soon be “back on track.” However, Beijing recently threatened war over Taiwan 

and China joined with Russia and Iran in 

a call to resist “U.S. world domination.” 

These events call into question whether 

U.S. relations with China were better 

during the Cold War than they are today. 

In the 1970s, the United States fostered a 

strategic partnership with China that was 

grounded in common concern over Soviet 

expansionism. China helped the West 

wage the Cold War against the Soviet 

Union, supporting freedom fighters in 

Afghanistan, and tying down dozens of 

Soviet divisions on its frontier. China’s 

actions were not altruistic – they coincided with Beijing’s strategic interests – 

but they also served broader U.S. foreign 

policy and national security goals.

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, 

a Chinese leadership emboldened by 

strong economic and military growth is 

creating serious security challenges for 

the United States. Instead of a strengthened U.S.-China strategic relationship, 

the United States faces a communist giant 

I

n recent years, the strategic relationship between 

the United States and the 

People’s Republic of China 

has become increasingly 

strained. Relations reached a 

new low last year when a U.S. 

aircraft accidentally bombed 

the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during NATO’s Operation Allied Force campaign 

against Yugoslavia. Despite 

U.S. apologies, Chinese assertions that the bombing was 

deliberate led to governmentsponsored demonstrations, violent protests against the U.S. 

Embassy in Beijing, and the 

severing of contacts between 

the United States and China. 

U.S. relations with Beijing 

were further strained by 

revelations that China had 

acquired sensitive U.S. 

nuclear weapons secrets 

through espionage. The report 

of the House Select Committee on U.S. National Security 

and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (the so-called “Cox committee”) 

sparked an intense debate over the compromise of U.S. nuclear weapons secrets and led 

to landmark legislation to improve security at 

U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories.

Since last year, the Administration has 

sought to mend relations with the Chinese 

government. As part of this effort, the Administration agreed to compensate China for the 

accidental bombing of its Belgrade embassy, 

and has pushed vigorously for permanent 

normal trade status with China and to reestablish high-level contacts between the two sides. 

In February, Undersecretary of State Strobe 

Talbott and Admiral Dennis Blair, commander 

in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, met 

with their Chinese counterparts in Beijing to 

work on improving relations. 

However, Beijing and Washington view 

each other differently. While the Administration views China as a “strategic partner,” 

China’s attitude is conditioned by a belief 

that the United States seeks to “contain” 

China and to prevent it from becoming the 

dominant power in Asia. Although Chinese 

public pronouncements suggest that China’s 

regional goals are benign and defensive in 

Photo courtesy of Muzi.com
2 NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

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nature, many official Chinese military writings reflect a harsher, more aggressive tone, 

characterizing the United States as “the 

enemy.” In a society as tightly controlled 

as China, these statements are often a reliable barometer of the state of U.S.-Chinese 

relations and the military leadership’s intentions.

 The Administration’s China policy, as 

reiterated by President Clinton in a recent 

speech, is based on the “Russia model” 

– the theory that growing trade and economic prosperity will gradually undermine 

the authoritarian order and eventually lead 

to democracy. Unfortunately, the “Russia 

model” has not worked according to theory 

in Russia, and its applicability to China, 

which remains a tightly controlled totalitarian state, is also questionable.

The Taiwan Crisis

China’s actions toward Taiwan in recent 

years have dramatically exacerbated tensions in the region. In 1996, Chinese leaders 

ordered military exercises around Taiwan 

that included the firing of several ballistic 

missiles on trajectories that bracketed the 

island and landed in nearby shipping lanes. 

The exercises coincided with Taiwan’s first 

democratic presidential election, and were 

seen by many analysts as an attempt to influence the results by undermining support for 

pro-independence candidates. In response 

to Chinese military threats and activities 

directed against Taiwan, the United States 

deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups 

to the region. 

The most recent crisis 

centered around Taiwan’s 

March 18, 2000 presidential election, which 

was won by Chen Shuibian, whose candidacy 

was strongly opposed by 

Beijing. In February 2000, 

as part of its effort to influence Taiwan’s presidential politics and policy on 

sovereignty, China again 

warned Taiwan against 

declaring independence or 

resisting eventual reunification with the mainland. On February 21, 

2000, China released an 

official White Paper, The 

One-China Principle and 

the Taiwan Issue, which 

adopts a strident tone 

toward Taiwan and the 

United States and warns, 

“If the Taiwan authorities 

refuse...the peaceful settlement of cross-Strait 

reunification through 

negotiations, then the Chinese government will only 

be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force.” 

Adding credence to this threat, China has been 

deploying hundreds of M-9 and M-11 shortrange ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan.

The White Paper accuses the United States 

as acting in bad faith: “Regrettably, the U.S. 

has repeatedly violated its solemn commitments to China... and continued its sale 

of advanced arms and military equipment 

to Taiwan.” Furthermore, the document 

outlines a framework to guide the international community’s relations with Taiwan 

that would prohibit arms sales to the island 

and reduce Taiwan to a de facto province 

of China. In addition, senior military officials from the People’s Liberation Army 

attending the National People’s Congress in 

March 2000 reiterated China’s threat to take 

military action if Taiwan delays reunification talks indefinitely. 

On March 6, 2000, China’s main army newspaper, Liberation Army Daily, said that U.S. 

intervention in any conflict between China 

and Taiwan would result in “serious damage” 

to U.S. security interests, with the U.S. military being “forced to [make] a complete withdrawal from the East Asian region.” The paper 

again raised the prospect of a nuclear confrontation with the United States, noting that 

China “is a country that has certain abilities 

of launching strategic counterattack and the 

capacity of launching a long-distance strike.... 

It is not a wise move to be at war with a country such as China, a point which the U.S. policymakers know fairly well also.” 

China has acquired several Russian Kilo-class submarines, a stealthier platform with 

more firepower than Chinese submarines, which present a significant additional 

threat to U.S. naval forces.

China recently received the first of several Sovremenny-class

destroyers, which will be armed with “Sunburn” anti-ship 

missiles designed for use against U.S. aircraft carrier groups.
NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT 3

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Moreover, an internal document prepared 

by China’s Central Military Commission and 

published in the Western press states that 

the United States will “pay a high price” if 

it intervenes in any China-Taiwan military 

conflict. This document notes the “increased 

possibility” of war with the United States 

over Taiwan and makes recommendations 

for “winning the war should it break out.” 

It also raises the nuclear specter, declaring 

that “unlike Iraq or Yugoslavia, China is 

not only a big country, but also possesses a 

nuclear arsenal that... [plays] a real role in 

our national defense.” 

While some analysts downplay these 

statements as rhetorical propaganda, others 

believe they accurately reflect the views of 

China’s military leadership and should not 

be discounted.

China’s view of U.S. resolve over Taiwan 

has been conditioned by how it perceives U.S. 

behavior elsewhere in the world. Chinese 

political and military leaders, as reflected in 

statements and writings, are well aware of 

the Administration’s decision to grant North 

Korea diplomatic, economic, and technological incentives in an effort to encourage that 

country to suspend its nuclear and missile 

programs. Chinese military writings have 

also noted that the leaders of countries that 

have challenged the Western alliance militarily – for example, Saddam Hussein in Iraq 

and Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia – are 

still in power.

Congressional concern over China’s threats 

toward Taiwan led the House of Representatives to adopt the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by a vote of 341-70 on February 1, 

2000. The legislation authorizes the President to sell U.S. arms to Taiwan, including 

theater missile defense systems, and requires 

the strengthening of military ties between 

the United States and Taiwan. The Senate 

has not yet acted on the bill, but the Administration has already threatened to veto it. 

The Dragon’s Teeth

China has embarked on an ambitious program to improve its conventional and nuclear 

forces. On March 6, 2000, Chinese Finance 

Minister Xiang Huaicheng announced that 

China’s military budget for 2000 would 

increase by 12.7 percent over the 1999 

level, at least the eighth straight annual 

double-digit increase. Most Western analysts believe that China’s public military 

budget significantly 

understates actual military spending because 

large expenses such as 

weapons procurement 

and research and 

development costs are 

hidden in other allocations. As such, 

analysts estimate that 

actual military spending is three to ten times 

higher than the 

published figures. 

One analyst recently 

pointed out to the 

Hong Kong Standard 

that the cost to China 

of recent weapons purchases from Russia 

likely exceeded China’s total publicly projected military budget for 2000.

Weapons purchases from Russia have given 

China, for the first time, power projection 

capabilities that can be expected to pose new 

challenges to U.S. forces operating in the 

China Seas. Beijing is replacing its inventory 

of antiquated aircraft with modern air superiority fighters, like the Russian Su-27, and 

long-range attack aircraft, like Russia’s Su30MK and Su-37. China has also acquired 

air refueling tankers and airborne warning and 

control (AWACs) aircraft that will enable the 

Chinese military to sustain and manage major 

air operations well beyond coastal waters.

Beijing also recently received from Russia 

the first of two Sovremenny-class destroyers. 

These vessels, armed with SS-N-22 “Sunburn” anti-ship missiles, are an advanced 

technology platform designed specifically 

for use against U.S. aircraft carrier groups. 

Published reports indicate that China will 

receive a second Sovremenny-class destroyer 

in November 2000, and is negotiating the 

purchase of several more. China has also 

acquired several Russian Kilo-class submarines, a stealthier platform with more firepower 

than Chinese submarines, which present an 

additional threat to U.S. naval forces.

In addition to its conventional forces, 

China possesses a limited but capable 

nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic 

missile (ICBM) force, and has targeted 

many of its long-range missiles at U.S. 

cities. Currently, China has more missiles 

under development than any nation in 

the world, including two new land-mobile 

ICBMs, the DF-31 and the DF-41. Both 

of these ICBMs may be armed with multiple-independently targetable warheads 

(MIRVs) based on technology provided 

by Russia and illicitly acquired from the 

United States. By arming its ICBMs with 

MIRVs, China will multiply the number 

of sites it is able to target with each missile. China also has under development a 

new submarine-launched ballistic missile, 

the JL-2, which will give Chinese missile 

submarines the ability to strike the United 

States from areas near China.

Unfortunately, the United States may have 

unintentionally aided the development of China’s weapons programs in recent years. The 

transfer of sophisticated U.S. military-related 

technology – facilitated by a significant liberalization in U.S. export control policy – coupled with China’s exploitation of lax security at 

U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories, has likely 

improved the capabilities of China’s ballistic 

missile force. Furthermore, China’s efforts 

to acquire significant and sensitive U.S. military technology have increased, according to 

an unclassified report to Congress prepared 

jointly by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

and the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although Chinese officials openly declare 

their adherence to international nonproliferation agreements intended to prevent dangerous technology transfers – such as the nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime – Beijing continues to 

sell missile technology and advanced conventional weapons to countries that remain hostile to the United States. A 1999 unclassified 

In early 1996, China launched several M-9 short range 

ballistic missiles (shown above) on trajectories that bracketed 

Taiwan. China has deployed hundreds of M-11 and M-9 

missiles within range of Taiwan.

Photo courtesy of CDISS, Lancaster Univ., UK
FROM THE CHAIRMAN

(CONTINUED)

The National Security Report is archived on the House Armed Services Committee website (http://www.house.gov/hasc). 

Additional background information may be obtained from the committee staff (x54151).

4 NATIONAL SECURITY REPORT

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that appears increasingly determined to 

assert its power and to challenge American 

interests.

In the past four years, during Taiwan’s 

democratic presidential election campaigns in 1996 and 2000, China twice rattled its nuclear saber against the United 

States, something it did not do once during 

the détente of the Cold War. China is also 

engaged in an ambitious program to build 

additional and more capable intercontinental ballistic missiles, even as it retools its 

conventional forces in ways that will pose 

a more serious challenge to the United 

States in the Asia-Pacific region.

The People’s Republic of China is also 

one of the most serious proliferators of 

weapons of mass destruction and related 

technologies to nations such as Iran and 

Pakistan, demonstrating that it will neither 

be guided by Western notions of strategic 

stability nor bound by international nonproliferation norms. Furthermore, recent 

congressional investigations exposed China’s theft of some of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear weapons technologies. 

Although the Administration has asserted 

that America’s nuclear secrets are now 

secure, a joint FBI-CIA report recently 

concluded that the level of Chinese espionage activities directed against the United 

States has increased over the last decade. 

Finally, China and Russia now appear to be 

moving toward an anti-U.S. condominium, 

raising new and potentially serious implications for U.S. national security. 

This is clearly not a picture of a “strategic 

partnership.” What went wrong?

Unfortunately, the Administration has 

allowed its desire to improve overall relations with Beijing to displace the critical 

need to assert vital U.S. national interests 

with clarity and purpose. Fundamental to 

any successful strategic partnership is the 

need for each party to understand the other’s 

vital interests. In this regard, the Administration has failed to communicate U.S. interests effectively to the Chinese leadership, a 

failure that has encouraged a more assertive 

Chinese foreign policy with potentially dangerous consequences. 

One such failure is the message sent to 

Beijing by the Administration’s reluctance to 

arm Taiwan with the defensive weapons it 

needs to deter aggression from China. Similarly, the Administration’s unwillingness to 

sanction China for its proliferation practices 

or to discourage China from pursuing stronger security ties with Russia have encouraged Chinese military and political leaders 

to become increasingly confident that this 

Administration lacks the will to defend the 

United States’ vital interests. 

The Administration has also elevated 

trade and economic relations with China 

above the need to protect U.S. nationalsecurity interests. Although increased 

trade was intended to “Westernize” China, 

the trade relationships fostered by the 

Administration’s policies appear to have 

had little appreciable effect on China’s 

political evolution. Instead, U.S. policy 

has become hostage to the fear of losing 

a large emerging commercial market. In 

this way, a policy that was crafted to 

shape China’s behavior has become a 

tool that China has used to shape ours 

instead.

In sum, current Administration policy 

appears to have set the United States and 

China on a collision course over Taiwan, 

proliferation, and the Asia-Pacific military balance. U.S. interests must be articulated clearly and unambiguously in order 

to avoid a major misunderstanding that 

may lead to a serious miscalculation.

intelligence community report lists China as 

a “key supplier” of technology to countries 

seeking weapons of mass destruction and 

advanced conventional arms. According to 

the report, “Firms in China provided missilerelated items, raw materials, and/or assistance 

to several countries of proliferation concern – 

such as Iran.” The report further asserts that, 

despite its 1996 promise to the United States, 

China may be continuing to support Pakistan’s 

nuclear and missile program. 

China on the Global Stage

China’s military modernization program 

has been accompanied by a more assertive 

foreign policy that is at odds with Western 

interests. For example, China has criticized 

U.S. policy in the Balkans and strongly 

opposed the U.S.-led NATO action against 

Yugoslavia. Beijing has also been critical of 

U.S. policy toward Iraq, opposing the U.S. 

military’s enforcement of the “no-fly” zones 

and supporting an easing of the international 

economic sanctions imposed on Baghdad 

after the 1991 Gulf War. 

In addition, China has disregarded Western admonitions to show greater sensitivity 

to human rights. Indeed, concerns over China’s poor human rights record have added 

to the level of congressional concern and 

called into question Congress’ willingness 

to approve permanent normal trade relations 

status for China.

Chinese officials have also been vocal 

opponents of any movement by the United 

States away from the 1972 U.S.-Soviet AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and toward 

a national missile defense. In November 

1999, Chinese Foreign Ministry official Sha 

Zukang stated that amendments to the ABM 

Treaty to allow deployment of a national 

missile defense system, “will tip the global 

balance, trigger a new arms race, and jeopardize world and regional stability.” 

Conclusion

In recent years, the People’s Republic of 

China has laid the foundations for expanding 

its influence over regional events through 

political and military means. China’s military has undergone significant modernization 

– enhancing both conventional and strategic 

forces in ways that may pose additional threats 

to the United States, U.S. interests, and U.S. 

military forces in the region – with significant 

implications for future U.S. national security.

The resulting combination of China’s military modernization campaign, its apparent 

unwillingness to stop the spread of weapons 

of mass destruction, its growing ties with 

Russia, its opposition to the U.S. national 

missile defense program, its criticism of 

NATO, and its threatening posture toward 

Taiwan have led many in Congress to 

wonder if China’s path is one that will lead 

it to become an adversary, rather than a 

“strategic partner.”