Report to Congressional Committees

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

September 2001 COMBATING

TERRORISM

Selected Challenges

and Related

Recommendations

GAO-01-822
Page i GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Letter 1

Executive Summary 4

Purpose 4

Background 5

Results in Brief 6

Principal Findings 10

Recommendations for Executive Action 17

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 18

Chapter 1 Introduction 20

The Federal Government’s Role in Combating Domestic Terrorism 23

Risks of Cyber-Attacks and Related Government Strategy 27

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 27

Chapter 2 Overall Leadership and Coordination Responsibilities

Need to Be Centralized and Clarified 31

Some Leadership and Coordination Functions Transcend

Individual Agencies 31

National Coordinator Established, but Some Responsibilities Are

Fragmented Across Agencies 32

The Congress and the President Also Are Concerned About

Leadership and Coordination 36

Different Proposals on Leadership and Coordination Have Their

Pros and Cons 37

Focal Point Should Be Located in the Executive Office of the

President 39

Conclusions 40

Recommendations for Executive Action 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Chapter 3 Progress Made in Developing a National Strategy to

Combat Domestic Terrorism 44

Threat Assessments Are Being Completed 44

Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan Represents a Substantial Effort,

but Key Elements Still Are Lacking for a National Strategy 48

Progress Made in Tracking Spending to Combat Terrorism 52

Agencies Complete Interagency Operational Guidance, Enhancing

Unified and Coordinated Response Capability 54

Contents
Page ii GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Individual Agencies Complete or Develop Plans and Guidance 56

Conclusions 56

Recommendations for Executive Action 57

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 57

Chapter 4 Federal Response Capabilities Are Improving 59

The Federal Government Has a Broad Array of Response

Capabilities 59

Coordination of Special Events Has Improved 65

Federal Counterterrorism Exercises Are Improving 66

Evaluations of Exercises Need Improvement 75

Research and Development Enhances Future Federal Capabilities 79

Conclusions 85

Recommendations for Executive Action 86

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 87

Chapter 5 Federal Assistance to State and Local Governments

Can Be Consolidated 90

Federal Programs Have Provided Training, Equipment, and

Exercises 90

Improvements Made in Delivery and Coordination of Assistance 96

Federal Liaison for State and Local Responders Did Not Meet

Expectations 98

New Office Offers Potential to Consolidate Assistance Programs

Under FEMA 99

Federally Funded National Guard Teams Continue to Experience

Problems 101

Conclusions 103

Recommendations for Executive Action 104

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 104

Chapter 6 Limited Progress in Implementing a Strategy to

Counter Computer-Based Threats 108

Risks of Cyber-Attacks and Related Government Strategy 109

Despite Increased Efforts, Critical Federal Operations Remain at

Risk 113

CIP Activities Have Raised Awareness and Prompted Information

Sharing; However, Substantive Analysis of Infrastructure

Vulnerabilities Has Been Limited 119

Many Research and Development Efforts Are Underway 124
Page iii GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

National Plan Is Not Fully Developed; Responsibilities Still Are

Evolving 126

Conclusions 127

Recommendations for Executive Action 128

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 129

Appendix I Compendium of Relevant Federal Policy and

Planning Documents 131

Appendix II Individual Agency Plans and Guidance for Combating

Terrorism 137

Appendix III Selected Federal Crisis Management Response

Teams 145

Appendix IV Selected Federal Consequence Management

Response Teams 147

Appendix V Compendium of Relevant GAO Recommendations 150

Appendix VI Organizations Visited and Contacted 158

Appendix VII Comments From the Executive Office of the

President 163

Appendix VIII Comments From the Department of Agriculture 168
Page iv GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IX Comments From the Department of Commerce 172

Appendix X Comments From the Department of Defense 176

Appendix XI Comments From the Department of Energy 179

Appendix XII Comments From the Department of Health and

Human Services 183

Appendix XIII Comments From the Department of Justice 188

Appendix XIV Comments From the Department of the Treasury 194

Appendix XV Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs 196

Appendix XVI Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency 199

Appendix XVII GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 204

Related GAO Products 205
Page v GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Tables

Table 1: Organizations Currently Responsible for Key Interagency

Leadership and Coordination Functions for Programs to

Combat Terrorism 34

Table 2: Proposals to Create a Focal Point for Overall Leadership

and Coordination of Programs to Combat Terrorism 38

Table 3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Leadership

Approaches 39

Table 4: Interagency Plans and Guidance for Combating Terrorism 55

Table 5: Characteristics of Federal Agencies’ Processes to Capture

Lessons Learned From Counterterrorist Operations,

Special Events, and Exercises 77

Table 6: State and Local Responders Receiving Federal WMD

Training, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001 92

Table 7: Status of Key CIP Efforts in Eight Infrastructure Sectors 122

Figures

Figure 1: Aftermath of the April 1995 Terrorist Bombing of the

Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma 21

Figure 2: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1980 to 1999 23

Figure 3: Key Federal Crisis Management Response Teams 60

Figure 4: FBI Enhanced SWAT Team Executes Search During

Wasatch Rings Exercise 61

Figure 5: Key Federal Consequence Management Response Teams 63

Figure 6: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile

Push-Package During TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 72

Figure 7: U.S. Coast Guard Personnel Inspect Vehicle Remains for

Chemical Residue During TOPOFF 2000 Exercise 73

Figure 8: FBI Enhanced SWAT Team Seizes Aircraft Suspected of

Carrying Radiological Material During Wasatch Rings

Exercise 75

Figure 9: Relationships Between Risk, Time, and Cost in

Developing Products to Combat Terrorism 81

Figure 10: Status of 53 Remaining Cities Receiving Domestic

Preparedness Program First Responder Training 94

Figure 11: Salt Lake City, Utah, Fire Department Personnel Treat

“Victim” During Wasatch Rings Exercise in Preparation

for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games 95

Figure 12: Risks to Computer-Based Operations 110
Page vi GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 13: CIP Responsibilities Outlined by PDD 63 113

Abbreviations

AAR after-action report

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

CBIRF Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force

CERT Computer Emergency Response Team

CIAO Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

CIP critical infrastructure protection

CONPLAN Concept of Operations Plan

DOD Department of Defense

DOE Department of Energy

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FedCIRC Federal Computer Incident Response Center

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

GAO General Accounting Office

HHS Department of Health and Human Services

ISAC Information Sharing and Analysis Center

NDPO National Domestic Preparedness Office

NIPC National Infrastructure Protection Center

NSC National Security Council

NSF National Science Foundation

OCTAVE Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability

 Evaluation

OEP Office of Emergency Preparedness

OMB Office of Management and Budget

OSTP Office of Science and Technology Policy

PCIE/ECIE President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency and

 Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency

PDD Presidential Decision Directive

SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics

TOPOFF Top Officials

TSWG Technical Support Working Group

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

WMD weapons of mass destruction

VA Department of Veterans Affairs
Page 1 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

September 20, 2001

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John Warner

Ranking Minority Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Stump

Chairman

The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Democratic Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

We at the U.S. General Accounting Office, as all Americans, were shocked

by the coordinated terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington,

D.C., on September 11, 2001. This report, which already was scheduled for

release this month before the events of September 11, summarizes federal

efforts to combat terrorism prior to these events. Given the tragic events

of September 11, it is clear that combating terrorism efforts are now at the

top of the national agenda. This report does not include recent efforts

made in light of these recent attacks. While this report is a dispassionate

and analytical discussion of the progress made and challenges faced by the

federal government and the nation, we recognize the terrible cost of

terrorism in human terms. The events of September 11 remind us that the

victims of terrorism are real people—men, women, and children—and are

our families, colleagues, friends, and neighbors. Our hearts go out to the

victims, including the heroic first responders who were lost, and their

families. We hope that this report promotes a reasoned discussion and

additional actions designed to better prepare the nation to combat

terrorism.

Concerned that terrorists might use weapons of mass destructiona

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or weaponagainst

civilian targets within the United States, or attack critical infrastructure

through computer systems, the Congress and various federal agencies

have undertaken numerous initiatives over the past few years designed to

improve the nation’s ability to combat terrorism. As mandated in section

1035 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398, Oct. 30, 2000), we reviewed the strategy, policies,

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548

Comptroller General

of the United States
Page 2 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

and programs to combat domestic terrorism, particularly domestic

terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. We briefed your staffs

previously on the preliminary results of our work. This report contains the

final results of our review.

In response to the mandate and, as agreed with your offices, this report

assesses (1) the current framework for leadership and coordination of

federal agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, and proposals

for change, (2) progress the federal government has made in developing

and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically,

(3) the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist

incident, (4) progress the federal government has made in helping state

and local emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident, and

(5) progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for

combating cyber-based attacks. This capping report updates and

summarizes our extensive evaluations conducted in recent years of federal

programs to combat domestic terrorism and protect critical infrastructure.

We include a series of Recommendations for Executive Action, including

three recommendations to the President, to improve overall leadership

and coordination of federal efforts to combat terrorism as well as other

improvements. Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on

their efforts prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional

committees. We also are sending copies to the President; the Vice

President; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy,

Health and Human Services, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and

Veterans Affairs; and the Attorney General. In addition, we are sending

copies to the Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the

Director, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; the Director of

Central Intelligence; the Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency;

the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; the Director,

Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Administrator, General Services

Administration; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;

the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the Director,

Office of Management and Budget; the Commandant of the U.S. Coast

Guard; and the Director, U.S. Secret Service. We will make copies

available to other interested parties upon request. This report also will be

available on GAO’s web site at www.gao.gov.

If you or your offices have any questions about matters discussed in this

report, please contact me at (202) 512-5500; Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Managing

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, at (202) 512-4300; or
Page 3 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Raymond J. Decker, Director, at (202) 512-6020. They also can be reached

by e-mail at hintonh@gao.gov and deckerrj@gao.gov, respectively.

Contacts and key contributors are listed in appendix XVII.

David M. Walker

Comptroller General

of the United States
Executive Summary

Page 4 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

With the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in

New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11,

2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the top of the country’s national

security and law enforcement agendas. Even before these catastrophic

events, terrorism was a growing national security and law enforcement

concern. Current federal efforts to combat terrorism are inherently

difficult to lead and manage because the policies, strategies, programs,

budgets, and activities are spread across more than 40 different federal

agencies. For fiscal year 2002, the federal government’s proposed budget

for these programs is over $12 billion. In addition, the Congress recently

approved the President’s request for $20 billion in emergency assistance

and provided an additional $20 billion to supplement existing contingency

funds.

Concerned about the preparedness of the federal government and state

and local emergency responders to cope with a large-scale terrorist attack

involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, the Congress in section

1035 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398) mandated that GAO report on the strategies,

policies, and programs for combating domestic terrorism involving

weapons of mass destruction.1

 As agreed with your offices, this report

assesses

• the current framework for leadership and coordination of federal agencies’

efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, and proposals for change;

• progress the federal government has made in developing and

implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically;

• the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist

incident;

• progress the federal government has made in helping state and local

emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident; and

• progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for

combating cyber-based attacks.

 1

Throughout this report, we use the term weapons of mass destruction to refer to chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Some agencies define it to include

large conventional explosives as well. As clearly demonstrated by the September 11, 2001,

incidents, a terrorist attack would not have to fit this definition of weapons of mass

destruction to result in mass casualties, destruction of critical infrastructures, economic

losses, and disruption of daily life nationwide.

Executive Summary

Purpose
Executive Summary

Page 5 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The threat of terrorism is a high-priority U.S. national security and law

enforcement concern. U.S. policy on combating terrorism has been

evolving for about 30 years. A series of presidential decision directives

along with implementing guidance, executive orders, interagency

agreements, and legislation provide the basis for counterterrorism

programs and activities in more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and

offices. In addition to reducing vulnerabilities and preventing and

deterring terrorist acts before they occur, the U.S. strategy for combating

terrorism consists of crisis management and consequence management.

Crisis management involves efforts to prevent and deter a terrorist attack,

protect public health and safety, arrest terrorists, and gather evidence for

criminal prosecution. Consequence management includes efforts to

provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate people from

dangerous areas, and restore government services.

Since 1982, the Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, has been responsible for crisis management. Presidential

Decision Directive 39, issued in June 1995 in the aftermath of the bombing

of the federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, reaffirmed the

Department of Justice, through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as the

lead agency responsible for crisis management of domestic terrorist

incidents. Although state and local governments have the primary

responsibility for managing the consequences of a domestic terrorist

incident, the 1995 directive designated the Federal Emergency

Management Agency as the lead agency responsible for coordinating

federal agencies’ responses and activities when state and local authorities

request assistance.

In May 1998, the President issued Presidential Decision Directive 62,

which reaffirmed the earlier directive and established within the National

Security Council in the Executive Office of the President a National

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism

to provide a focal point for federal efforts to combat terrorism. In May

2001, the President tasked the Vice President with overseeing the

development of a coordinated effort to improve national preparedness

(see app. VII). Also, the President established, within the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, a new Office of National Preparedness,

which will coordinate all federal domestic preparedness and consequence

management programs and activities for terrorist-related weapons of mass

destruction incidents or other threats.

The United States also is developing and implementing a strategy for

combating the threat of cyber, or computer-based, attacks. This strategy is

Background
Executive Summary

Page 6 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

articulated in Presidential Decision Directive 63, which was issued in May

1998 concurrently with Presidential Decision Directive 62. Protection

against computer-based attacks requires vigilance against a broader array

of threats, to include not only terrorists, but nation states, criminals, and

others. Attacks could severely disrupt computer-supported operations and

infrastructures, such as telecommunications, power distribution, financial

services, national defense, and critical government operations. The risk to

these infrastructures has increased in recent years due to their growing

dependence on computers and the greater interconnectivity among

computers.

The proposed federal budget for these programs for fiscal year 2002 is

over $12.8 billion, of which about $8.6 billion is to combat terrorism, about

$1.8 billion is to combat weapons of mass destruction, and about $2.6

billion is for critical infrastructure protection. This proposed budget

represents about a 78-percent increase in total funding to combat

terrorism compared with the fiscal year 1998 funding level of about $7.2

billion. In addition, the Congress recently approved the President’s request

for $20 billion in emergency assistance and provided an additional $20

billion to supplement existing contingency funds. The Office of

Management and Budget tracks federal funds to combat terrorism and has

provided this information to the Congress on an annual basis since fiscal

year 1998.

This capping report updates GAO’s extensive evaluations in recent years

of federal programs to combat domestic terrorism and protect critical

infrastructure.

Greater attention has been placed on combating terrorism as concerns

have grown. Assignment of Executive Branch responsibilities and

authorities also has received additional emphasis, including the

appointment of a national coordinator in 1998 in the National Security

Council to serve as a focal point for overall leadership and coordination.

The growing threat of terrorism, combined with the significant increase in

funding and growth in the number of programs to combat terrorism over

the past several years, presents evolving challenges to the existing

framework for leadership and coordination. GAO’s analysis indicates that

a need now exists to clarify and expand the responsibilities of the

Executive Branch focal point. While the National Coordinator serves as a

focal point for some interagency functions, other key overall leadership

and coordination functions, such as guiding the development of a national

strategy, are not clearly assigned to the focal point. In GAO’s view, the

Results in Brief
Executive Summary

Page 7 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

functions and responsibilities of the focal point should include overseeing

a threat and risk assessment and the development of a national strategy,

coordinating governmentwide budgets, and monitoring overall agency

implementation. A clear assignment of these responsibilities and the

authority to discharge them are needed to provide assurance that (1)

federal programs are based upon a coherent strategy and the programs are

well coordinated and (2) gaps and duplication in capabilities are avoided

as threats are likely to grow more complex and diffuse.

The Congress and the President both have recognized the need to review

and clarify the structure for overall leadership and coordination. At the

request of the President in May 2001, the Vice President will oversee the

development of a coordinated national effort to improve national

preparedness, including efforts to combat terrorism. GAO believes it is

important that the President, in conjunction with the Vice President’s

efforts, focus on the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of the focal

point. GAO makes a recommendation to the President that he assign a

single focal point within the Executive Office of the President, with the

time, responsibility, authority, and resources for overall leadership and

coordination of federal programs to combat terrorism.

Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism and

related guidance have progressed, but key challenges remain. The initial

step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat

and risk assessment. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation have collaborated on taking steps to conduct such an

assessment. They have developed an assessment tool at the state and local

level that will provide important information for federal resource

decisions. However, at the national level, they have not completed

assessments of the most likely weapon-of-mass-destruction agents and

other terrorist threats. With regard to drafting a national strategy to

combat terrorism, the Attorney General, working with several other

agencies, published a Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime Plan. The Five-Year Plan, which was an interagency

effort, identifies goals and objectives, sets priorities, and tracks agencies’

progress; but it lacks two critical elements. First, while citing goals and

objectives, the plan does not include measurable outcomes. Second, it

does not identify state and local government roles in combating terrorism.

The Five-Year Plan is not linked to resources, but the Office of

Management and Budget has made progress in tracking and reporting on

terrorism-related budgets and spending. However, the National Security

Council and the Office of Management and Budget in the annual report to

the Congress on combating terrorism have not identified priorities or
Executive Summary

Page 8 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

reported on duplication of efforts. GAO makes two related

recommendations: one to complete a threat assessment and one to revise

the Five-Year Plan to better serve as a national strategy.

Beyond a national strategy, substantial progress has been made in

completing operational guidance and related plans to coordinate agencies’

responses at the site of a terrorist incident. A number of previous GAO

recommendations that the federal government complete interagency

operational guidance have been implemented. Progress also has been

made by some individual agencies that have completed or are developing

internal plans and guidance.

Under current policy, the federal government also has improved its

capabilities to prevent, deter, and respond to a domestic terrorist incident.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency are tasked with leading federal efforts in their

respective roles for managing a terrorist crisis and the consequences of an

incident. These two agencies would be supported by a number of other

federal agencies with response capabilities. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the U.S. Secret Service have better coordinated their

response capabilities during special events, such as the presidential

inauguration, political conventions, and preparation for the 2002 Olympic

Winter Games.

Also, federal agencies have conducted a variety of exercises to test their

response capabilities. These exercises have improved considerably in

recent years and now regularly include interagency and intergovernmental

command and control. Field exercises actually tested deployments with

scenarios that practiced crisis and consequence management

simultaneously. Improvements still are needed in consequence

management exercises and in evaluating interagency aspects of federal

exercises. Activities to develop future capabilities—through research and

development and applying technology—are coordinated by interagency

working groups. However, limits to the scope of these working groups’

activities, in conjunction with the large number of projects and funding,

provide the potential for duplication of efforts. GAO makes one

recommendation to the President to direct the focal point to capture and

evaluate interagency lessons learned from federal counterterrorism

exercises and three other recommendations to improve readiness in

consequence management, increase agencies’ benefits from exercises, and

complete a strategy to coordinate counterterrorism research and

development.
Executive Summary

Page 9 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Federal assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist

incidents has resulted in training for thousands of first responders—those

state and local officials who would first respond at the scene of an

incident. Some of these programs initially were developed without

recognizing existing state and regional coordinating mechanisms for

emergency preparedness. Moreover, these assistance programs

overlapped because several federal agencies had similar efforts that were

not well coordinated with each other. Since our earlier work, some

programs have been consolidated; and there have been increased efforts

to coordinate programs across agencies.

To further improve this coordination, state and local officials have called

for a single federal liaison for state and local preparedness programs. In

response, the Attorney General established the National Domestic

Preparedness Office within the Federal Bureau of Investigation to

coordinate federal agencies’ efforts to train first responders. However, this

Office has not been effective due to funding, personnel, and organizational

problems. Recently, the President directed that the Federal Emergency

Management Agency establish an Office of National Preparedness to

coordinate all federal consequence management programs dealing with

weapons of mass destruction. This development creates an opportunity to

consolidate within the Federal Emergency Management Agency the

federal consequence management assistance programs to state and local

governments that are at the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of

Investigation. GAO recommends that this be done.

Finally, the federal government has provided some states with specialized

National Guard teams, but these teams continue to experience problems

that undermine their usefulness. GAO makes a recommendation to place a

temporary moratorium on adding new, specialized National Guard

response teams until their roles and missions are fully coordinated.

Regarding risks to computer systems and, more importantly, to the critical

operations and infrastructures they support, an array of efforts has been

undertaken to implement a national strategy outlined in Presidential

Decision Directive 63. However, progress in certain key areas has been

slow. Specifically, federal agencies have taken initial steps to develop

critical infrastructure protection plans; but independent audits continue to

identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses that place

federal operations at high risk of tampering and disruption. In addition,

outreach efforts by numerous federal entities to establish cooperative

relationships with and among private and other non-federal entities have

raised awareness and prompted information sharing, and the federal
Executive Summary

Page 10 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

government and the private sector have initiated a variety of critical

infrastructure protection-related research and development efforts.

However, substantive analysis of sector-wide and cross-sector

interdependencies and related vulnerabilities has been limited. An

underlying deficiency impeding progress is the lack of a national plan that

fully defines the roles and responsibilities of key participants and

establishes interim objectives. The administration currently is reviewing

and considering adjustments to the government’s critical infrastructure

protection strategy that may address this deficiency. GAO recommends

developing a more detailed strategy for combating computer-based

attacks, which should be linked to a national strategy to combat terrorism.

The management structure for leading and coordinating federal efforts to

combat terrorism has evolved since June 1995 when Presidential Decision

Directive 39 assigned the Department of Justice, through the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, responsibility as the lead federal agency for crisis

management and the Federal Emergency Management Agency

responsibility as the lead federal agency for consequence management of

domestic terrorist incidents. In May 1998, Presidential Decision Directive

62 established the position of National Coordinator within the National

Security Council; however, its functions were never detailed in either an

executive order or through legislation. Many of the overall leadership and

coordination functions GAO has identified as critical were not given to the

National Coordinator. In fact, several other agencies, such as the

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, and the Office of Management and

Budget, currently perform these functions. Some of the functions currently

located in different agencies include overseeing a threat and risk

assessment, developing a national strategy, and coordinating program

implementation across agencies. The interagency roles of these various

agencies are not always clear and sometimes overlap, which leads to a

fragmented approach. For example, the Department of Justice, the

National Security Council, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency have developed—or plan to

develop—aspects of national strategies to combat terrorism. National

efforts to combat illegal drugs offer potential lessons in addressing the

overall leadership and coordination of interagency efforts to combat

terrorism. Importantly, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, through

legislation, has the legitimacy and authority to carry out its functions.

Principal Findings

Overall Leadership and

Coordination Need to Be

Addressed
Executive Summary

Page 11 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Both the Congress and the President have expressed concern about the

overall national leadership and coordination of programs to combat

terrorism. The Congress has held hearings, appointed commissions, and

proposed legislation on these issues. The President asked the Vice

President in May 2001 to oversee the development of a coordinated effort

to improve national preparedness (see app. VII). While it is not yet clear

what the Vice President specifically will be responsible for, agencies

involved do not anticipate that his position will be one of permanent,

overall leadership and coordination. The President also established an

Office of National Preparedness within the Federal Emergency

Management Agency to coordinate all federal consequence management

programs dealing with weapons of mass destruction. Several proposals

have been advanced to improve the overall leadership and coordination of

programs to combat terrorism. These approaches generally create a single

focal point located in either the Executive Office of the President or a lead

executive agency. Each location has its advantages and disadvantages.

Based upon numerous evaluations, the identification of recurring

problems in the overall leadership and coordination of programs, and an

analysis of various proposals, GAO believes a single focal point, with all

critical functions and responsibilities, should be assigned to lead and

coordinate these programs. This focal point, for example, could be an

individual, an executive office, or a council. Furthermore, this focal point

should be in the Executive Office of the President and be independent of

any existing federal agency. A focal point within the Executive Office of

the President would be independent, above the interests of any of the

several individual agencies involved. The focal point needs to have the

time, responsibility, authority, and resources for coordinating both crisis

management and consequence management activities. Current proposals

to create a new agency to combine functions currently in several agencies

still would not contain all the government agencies and functions needed

to combat terrorism. While not endorsing any specific organizational

structure for the single focal point, GAO has identified basic functions that

any focal point should perform.

An important initial step in developing a national strategy is to conduct

threat and risk assessments to define and prioritize requirements. The

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have made

limited progress in implementing GAO’s recommendations that such

assessments be performed at both the local and national level. For

example, the Department of Justice and the Bureau have worked together

to provide a threat and risk assessment tool to state and local

Limited Progress Made in

Developing a National

Strategy and Related

Guidance and Plans
Executive Summary

Page 12 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

governments. These state and local assessments may complement

national-level threat and risk assessments and related policy-making.

Regarding GAO’s recommendation for national-level authoritative threat

assessments, the Bureau agreed to lead such assessments in July 1999. The

Bureau is collaborating with other agencies to complete two assessments

of terrorist threats, including those involving weapons of mass

destruction.

The Department of Justice has made progress toward developing a

national strategy through its publication of the Attorney General’s FiveYear Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan. The plan

represents a substantial interagency effort and is the one current

document that could serve as a basis for the development of a national

strategy. However, GAO believes the plan should be improved to better

serve as a national strategy. First, the plan needs to have measurable

outcomes consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act of

1993. Although the plan has objectives and performance indicators, it

focuses on agency activities, which represent outputs as opposed to

results-oriented outcomes. Second, the plan needs to better define the

roles of state and local governments. Although the Department of Justice

obtained state and local input in preparing the Five-Year Plan and

identifies specific ways to enhance state and local responder capabilities,

the plan does not identify state and local government roles in responding

to a terrorist incident. To the extent that the plan should better address the

roles of state and local authorities, and be developed with them, GAO

believes it can become more of a national strategy than a federal plan.

The Office of Management and Budget has made progress tracking

budgets and expenditures for programs to combat terrorism and has

issued four annual reports to the Congress. Through these reports, the

executive branch and the Congress now have strategic oversight of the

magnitude and direction of federal funding to combat terrorism. Each

annual report progressively has contained more details about agency

budgets and spending by various categories. In 1999, the National Security

Council and the Office of Management and Budget initiated a new process

by which interagency working groups reviewed the agencies’ proposals

and developed recommendations on whether they should be funded. The

Office has stated that this new process resulted in the reallocation of

resources to fund critical shortfalls and eliminate duplication. However, its

annual reports have not identified priorities or reported on duplication of

efforts.
Executive Summary

Page 13 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Federal agencies also have made progress in completing guidance and

plans related to terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and

Federal Emergency Management Agency now have completed interagency

guidance to combat terrorism domestically, thereby clarifying many

command and control issues. Similarly, agencies have completed or are

developing internal guidance and concepts of operations to respond to

terrorist incidents.

Federal capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents have improved. Such

capabilities include a broad array of teams and related assets, such as

mobile laboratories for initial on-site analysis of a weapon of mass

destruction. The Federal Bureau of Investigation leads a variety of

potential federal teams for crisis management, while the Federal

Emergency Management Agency leads a variety of potential federal teams

for consequence management. These capabilities have been improved in

several ways. First, these capabilities have been enhanced through agency

participation in special events. These events provide federal agencies with

valuable experience working together to develop and practice plans to

combat terrorism. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Secret

Service have improved their cooperation for such events. For example,

they now have a written agreement on command and control issues and

jointly conduct some planning and exercises. Second, federal agencies

also have improved their capabilities by conducting exercises. The Federal

Bureau of Investigation has made progress in regularly practicing its

interagency and intergovernmental leadership role in crisis management.

However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency still is not using

exercises to fully practice its leadership role over consequence

management. Third, federal capabilities have been improved when

agencies learn lessons from exercises and operations, such as special

events. As in its earlier reviews, GAO found that some federal agencies

have relatively good processes in place to capture and share lessons

learned while others have less rigorous processes. Some federal agencies

work to capture and share interagency lessons learned; however, as yet,

there is no regular process in place to capture and share these types of

evaluations that cross agency lines.

Federal capabilities also have been enhanced through research and

development projects. Examples of recently developed and fielded

technologies include products to detect and identify weapons of mass

destruction, transport contaminated materials, and validate protection

equipment life spans. Federal agencies and an interagency working group

presently are developing technologies, including vehicle explosives

Federal Response

Capabilities Have

Improved but Further

Action Could Be Taken
Executive Summary

Page 14 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

screening and barrier technologies, as well as decontamination products

for use in urban facilities, such as subways and airports. Because of the

high risk, long development time, and high cost, federal government

involvement probably will be required for research and development

projects related to weapons of mass destruction. Federal research and

development programs are coordinated in a variety of ways, but primarily

through an interagency working group. However, coordination is limited

by a number of factors, raising the potential for duplication of efforts

among different federal agencies.

Recent developments may allow the consolidation of federal programs

that provide assistance to state and local governments. These programs

have improved domestic preparedness by training and equipping over

273,000 first responders since fiscal year 1998. These programs also have

included exercises to allow first responders to interact with each other

and with federal responders during realistic field conditions. However,

some of these programs initially were implemented without leveraging

existing regional and state structures for emergency management. For

example, the Department of Defense provided training to localities

without taking advantage of the existing state emergency management

structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions, or other

collaborative arrangements for emergency response. In addition, the

number of programs led by three different federal agencies—the

Departments of Defense and Justice and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency—created an overlapping approach with potential

duplication. More recently, some programs have been consolidated, such

as the Department of Defense’s domestic preparedness programs, which

were transferred to the Department of Justice. In addition, efforts have

increased to better coordinate assistance programs across agencies.

The number of federal agencies involved in the programs led to confusion

on the part of state and local officials. These officials asked the federal

government to establish a single federal liaison for state and local

governments. In 1998, the Attorney General established the National

Domestic Preparedness Office under the management of the Federal

Bureau of Investigation to serve as a single point of contact for state and

local authorities. However, the Office has not been effective in carrying

out its tasks due to insufficient funding, lack of key functional expertise,

potential organizational duplication, and a perceived lack of independence

due to its location within the Bureau.

In May 2001, the President asked the Director of the Federal Emergency

Management Agency to establish an Office of National Preparedness that

Federal Assistance to State

and Local Governments

Can Be Consolidated
Executive Summary

Page 15 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

will serve as the focal point within the federal government for the

oversight, coordination, integration, and implementation of preparedness

and consequence management programs and activities for weapons of

mass destruction and related threats. This new Office provides an

opportunity to consolidate federal programs to assist state and local

governments, including some assistance programs currently under the

Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation. However, the

Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation would

retain their lead federal agency responsibilities for crisis management and

their law enforcement and investigative roles and responsibilities.

Federal assistance also has been provided in the form of special National

Guard teams that are trained and equipped to provide states with

capabilities to detect and analyze weapons of mass destruction and

provide technical advice. These teams continue to experience problems

with readiness, doctrine and roles, and deployment that undermine their

usefulness in an actual terrorist incident. Until the Department of Defense

has completed its coordination of the teams’ roles and missions with the

Federal Bureau of Investigation—the lead federal agency for crisis

management—the establishment of any additional teams would be

premature. The Department of Defense agrees with GAO’s assessment.

To protect critical federal systems from computer-based attacks, federal

entities, such as the Chief Information Officers Council and the Critical

Infrastructure Assurance Office, have developed model policies and tools

for measuring the effectiveness of agency information security programs

and taken steps to identify critical assets and better coordinate the federal

response to computer incidents. In addition, individual executive agencies

have taken significant actions to correct identified computer security

weaknesses associated with their systems and improve their information

security programs. However, audits have continued to identify significant

information security weaknesses in virtually every major federal agency

and, since 1996, GAO has reported that poor security program

management is an underlying cause that has diminished agencies’ abilities

to ensure that controls are appropriate and effective. In addition, a March

2001 report by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the

Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency identified significant

deficiencies in agencies’ implementation of Presidential Decision Directive

63 and questioned the federal government’s ability to achieve the

directive’s goal to protect the nation’s critical infrastructures from

intentional destructive acts by May 2003. Factors cited as impediments to

Limited Progress in

Implementing a Strategy to

Counter Computer-Based

Threats
Executive Summary

Page 16 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

federal efforts include uncertainty regarding Presidential Decision

Directive 63’s applicability and resource constraints.

Beyond efforts to protect their own computer-dependent operations, lead

agencies also have taken steps to foster cooperative relationships with the

eight infrastructure sectors identified in Presidential Decision Directive 63,

which include telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation,

energy, and emergency services. For most of the infrastructure sectors,

representatives had been selected to coordinate and lead efforts, and

education and outreach efforts had been undertaken to promote

understanding of the risk and encourage cooperation. In addition, five

industry specific centers had been established to gather and share

information about vulnerabilities and computer-based attacks. However,

substantive, comprehensive analysis of infrastructure sector

vulnerabilities and development of related remedial plans had been limited

because relationships were still being established, critical assets and

entities had not been identified completely, and appropriate

methodologies still were being identified and developed. Factors that had

impeded progress in gaining private sector involvement included lack of

senior executives’ awareness about the importance of their assets to

national and economic security and concerns about antitrust violations

and release of sensitive information. Further, in April 2001, GAO reported

significant deficiencies in progress made by the Federal Bureau of

Investigation’s National Infrastructure Protection Center, which was

established to serve as a national analysis and warning center for cyber

threats and attacks. In that report, GAO identified several impediments to

progress, including staffing shortfalls and inconsistent interpretations of

the Center’s role and responsibilities among other entities involved in

critical infrastructure protection.

Other federal efforts include activities to expand international cooperation

regarding critical infrastructure protection. The Departments of State,

Justice, and Commerce have organized and participated in meetings with

representatives of other countries to discuss infrastructure protection,

developed a United Nations Resolution on cyber-crime, and were in the

process of negotiating a Council of Europe treaty on cyber-crime. In

addition, GAO identified a variety of research and development efforts that

were either being planned or performed.

A recurring finding resulting from work done by GAO and by agency

inspectors general is that a fundamental deficiency in the implementation

of Presidential Decision Directive 63 has been the lack of an adequate

national plan that delineates interim objectives and the specific roles and
Executive Summary

Page 17 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

responsibilities of federal and non-federal entities involved in critical

infrastructure protection. In addition, several agency officials said that

funding and staffing constraints contributed to their delays in

implementing Presidential Decision Directive 63 requirements. The

administration currently is reviewing the federal critical infrastructure

protection strategy and, according to a May 2001 White House press

statement, is developing recommendations on how to structure an

integrated approach to cyber-security and critical infrastructure

protection.

The federal government’s cyber-security strategy should be linked to a

national strategy to combat terrorism as discussed earlier. However, the

two areas are different in that the threats to computer-based

infrastructures are broader than terrorism and programs to protect them

are more closely associated with traditional information security activities.

GAO is making multiple recommendations, which are summarized below.

Chief among these are three recommendations to the President in chapters

2, 4, and 5. They are the following:

• Designate a single focal point with responsibility and authority for all

critical functions necessary to provide overall leadership and coordination

of federal programs to combat terrorism (see ch. 2).

• Direct the focal point to develop a formal process to evaluate interagency

lessons learned from major federal exercises to combat terrorism (see

ch. 4).

• Consolidate selected Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of

Investigation assistance programs to state and local governments into the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (see ch. 5).

GAO also is making a number of additional recommendations for

executive action to improve federal efforts to combat terrorism. They

entail taking the following actions:

• Complete a threat assessment on likely weapons of mass destruction and

other weapons that might be used by terrorists (see ch. 3).

• Revise the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime Plan to better serve as a national strategy (see ch. 3).

• Expand the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s role in managing

federal exercises (see ch. 4).

• Prepare agencies’ after-action reports or similar evaluations of exercises

and operations (see ch. 4).

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Executive Summary

Page 18 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Complete a strategy to coordinate research and development to improve

federal capabilities and to avoid duplication of effort (see ch. 4).

• Place a temporary moratorium on new National Guard teams until their

roles and missions are fully coordinated in writing with the lead federal

agency for crisis management (see ch. 5).

• Develop a strategy for combating computer-based attacks that more

clearly defines specific roles and responsibilities of organizations involved,

interim objectives and milestones for achieving goals, and related

performance measures (see ch. 6).

GAO provided a draft of this report to appropriate federal agencies for

their review and comment in August 2001. Agency comments were based

on their efforts prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New

York City and Washington, D.C. The Office of Management and Budget

provided consolidated written comments from the National Security

Council, Office of Management and Budget, and Office of Science and

Technology Policy on a draft of this report. The Departments of

Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services,

Justice, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs and the Federal Emergency

Management Agency also provided written comments on a draft of this

report. These comments are reprinted, along with GAO’s comments, in

appendixes VII to XVI. The Departments of State and Transportation, the

Environmental Protection Agency, and the General Services

Administration provided GAO with oral comments on a draft of this

report. Written and oral comments from all of these agencies, as well as

their technical comments, have been incorporated in the report, as

appropriate.

Several agencies generally concurred with GAO’s report and/or its

recommendations, including the Departments of Commerce, Defense,

Energy, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs; the Federal Emergency

Management Agency; and the Environmental Protection Agency. The

Department of Health and Human Services stated that the report’s

observations and comments will be useful for the Vice President’s pending

comprehensive review on national preparedness. The Department of

Transportation noted that, overall, the report provides a useful,

comprehensive “capping” effort identifying the efforts undertaken by

multiple federal agencies to combat terrorism. The Department of Energy

said the report accurately describes both the recent accomplishments and

the lack of progress within the interagency community in this area. In

contrast, the Department of Justice had “serious reservations” about some

of the discussion and recommendations in the report that the President

designate a single focal point and that its assistance programs to state and

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Executive Summary

Page 19 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

local governments be consolidated under the Federal Emergency

Management Agency.

Two agencies—the Departments of Energy and Transportation—

supported GAO’s most important recommendation to the President—that

he work with the Congress to establish a single focal point for overall

leadership and coordination for programs to combat terrorism. The

Department of Energy stated that a single responsible and accountable

focal point for combating terrorism should be established, independent of

any existing federal agency. The Department of Transportation said the

report makes a reasonable case for a single point of focus for terrorism

issues in the Executive Branch. In contrast, the Department of Justice

said, in light of the Vice President’s pending review, this recommendation

is premature. The Department also said that, in its view, there is no need at

this time to change or expand the role of the current NSC National

Coordinator. Other federal agencies—including the Executive Office of the

President—did not comment on this recommendation. The Office of

Management and Budget referred us to the President’s May 8, 2001,

statement (see app. VII) in which the President tasked the Vice President

with overseeing the development of a coordinated effort to improve

national preparedness. Officials from several other agencies indicated that

it would be premature for them to comment on this recommendation until

the Vice President has completed his review of national preparedness.

GAO disagrees that its recommendation on this matter is premature.

Notwithstanding the Vice President’s review, GAO’s recommendation is

based upon its own reviews over a 5-year period. Those reviews

consistently showed problems related to overall leadership and

coordination, as discussed in this report.

Agency comments on GAO’s other recommendations, along with GAO’s

evaluation, are presented at the end of chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. In some

cases, agencies did not directly comment on recommendations that GAO

made to them.

GAO also provided a draft of this report to state officials in Colorado and

Utah for their review and comment. Officials representing Colorado’s

Office of Emergency Management and Utah’s Olympic Public Safety

Command concurred with those sections of GAO’s report they reviewed

regarding the Top Officials 2000 and Wasatch Rings exercises,

respectively. The official from Utah strongly supported our

recommendation that the President designate a single focal point. The

official stated that it is critical that the focal point have adequate authority

to carry out its responsibilities.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 20 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

With the coordinated terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center in

New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., on September 11,

2001, the threat of terrorism rose to the top of the country’s national

security and law enforcement agendas. Even before these catastrophic

incidents, the threat of attacks against people, property, and

infrastructures had increased concerns about terrorism. The terrorist

bombings in 1993 of the World Trade Center in New York City and in 1995

of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (see fig. 1),

which killed 168 people and wounded hundreds of others, prompted

increased emphasis on the need to strengthen and coordinate the federal

government’s ability to effectively combat terrorism domestically. Also,

the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway

system raised new concerns about U.S. preparedness to combat terrorist

incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—a chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear agent or weapon.1

 1

Throughout this report, we use the term weapons of mass destruction to refer to chemical,

biological, radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Some agencies define it to include

large conventional explosives as well. As clearly demonstrated by the September 11, 2001,

incidents, a terrorist attack would not have to fit this definition of weapons of mass

destruction to result in mass casualties, destruction of critical infrastructures, economic

losses, and disruption of daily life nationwide.

Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 21 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 1: Aftermath of the April 1995 Terrorist Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah

Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 22 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities continuously assess

both foreign and domestic terrorist threats to the United States. The U.S.

foreign intelligence community—the Central Intelligence Agency, the

Defense Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),

and the Department of State’s Bureau of Research and Intelligence—

monitors the foreign-origin terrorist threat to the United States. In

addition, the FBI gathers intelligence and assesses the threat posed by

domestic sources. According to the U.S. intelligence community,

conventional explosives and firearms continue to be the terrorists’

weapons of choice. Terrorists are less likely to use weapons of mass

destruction, although the possibility that terrorists will use these weapons

may increase over the next decade.

According to the FBI, during the 1990s, there were, on average, about five

terrorist incidents in the United States each year.2

 In contrast, during the

1980s, there were, on average, 22 terrorist incidents in the United States

each year. Figure 2 provides FBI statistics on the number of terrorist

incidents in the United States between 1980 and 1999, five of which the

FBI categorized as WMD incidents.

 2

The FBI broadly defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of violence, committed by a group

of two or more individuals against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a

government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or

social objectives.” The FBI includes in its annual reports on terrorism in the United States

acts such as bombings, arson, kidnapping, assaults, and hijackings committed by persons

who may be suspected of associating with militia groups, animal rights groups, and others.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 23 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 2: Terrorist Incidents in the United States, 1980 to 1999

Note: As of August 31, 2001, FBI officials said that 2000 data were not available.

Source: FBI.

U.S. policy and strategy for dealing with terrorism, along with the nature

and perception of the terrorist threat, has been evolving over the past

30 years. A complex framework of programs and activities across more

than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices are in place to combat

terrorism. The evolution of these programs came from a variety of

presidential decision directives, implementing guidance, executive orders,

interagency agreements, and legislation.3

 Formal interagency coordination

intended to combat terrorism is managed by the National Security Council

(NSC), which also sponsors a number of interagency working groups on

terrorism issues.

The United States regards terrorist attacks against its territory, citizens, or

facilities as a national security threat and criminal act, wherever the attack

may occur. U.S. policy is to react rapidly and decisively to terrorism

 3

See app. I, which summarizes presidential decision directives, executive orders, and other

guidance. Also see app. II, Selected Laws Related to Terrorism, in Combating Terrorism:

Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254,

Sept. 26, 1997), p. 73.

The Federal

Government’s Role in

Combating Domestic

Terrorism
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 24 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

directed at the United States, whether it occurs domestically or

internationally and whether it involves the use of conventional weapons or

WMD devices. U.S. policy on combating terrorism for terrorist incidents

overseas was formalized in 1986 under National Security Decision

Directive 207. The Department of State was reaffirmed as the lead agency

for international terrorism policy, procedures, and programs; and the FBI,

through the Department of Justice, was reaffirmed as the lead agency for

handling domestic terrorist threats. Following the April 1995 bombing of

the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the

President issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39, which

enumerated responsibilities for federal agencies in combating terrorism,

including domestic incidents. In May 1998, the President reaffirmed PDD

39 with the issuance of PDD 62, which further articulated responsibilities

for specific agencies. PDD 62 also established a National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism within the NSC,

to coordinate agencies’ programs. Both presidential decision directives

and implementing guidance divide the federal response to terrorist attacks

into two categories—crisis management and consequence management.

Throughout the management of a terrorist incident, crisis and

consequence management components operate concurrently. The concept

of operations for a federal response to a terrorist threat or incident

provides for an overall lead federal agency to ensure multi-agency

coordination and a tailored, time-phased deployment of specialized federal

assets. It is critical that all participating federal, state, and local agencies

interact in a seamless manner.

Prior to an event involving a weapon of mass destruction or the release of

biological, chemical, or nuclear/radiological material, crisis management

activities and the achievement of law enforcement goals and objectives

generally will have priority. However, consequence management planning

to address the effects of a terrorist incident also will occur. When an

incident results in the use of a weapon of mass destruction or the release

of material, the execution of consequence management activities generally

will have priority, with crisis management activities continuing until law

enforcement goals and objectives have been met. Therefore, crisis and

consequence management activities may overlap and/or run concurrently

during the emergency response and are dependent upon the threat and/or

strategies for responding to the incident.

The Department of State is the lead federal agency for crisis and

consequence management of international terrorist incidents. Although

the Department has a number of contingency arrangements and plans

already in place to respond to a terrorist attack on U.S. interests abroad,
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 25 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

support for international crisis and consequence management comes from

domestic assets. For example, Department of Defense (DOD); FBI; Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); or

Department of Energy (DOE) teams could support overseas operations

involving a WMD incident. Finally, a domestic terrorist incident may have

significant international implications. For example, a domestic incident

may involve a foreign terrorist organization or a biological terrorist

incident could involve spreading the biological agent to virtually any city

that has an international airport.

The Department of Justice, through the FBI, is the lead agency for crisis

management of domestic terrorist incidents. The Department of Justice

and the FBI manage and resolve a crisis resulting from a terrorist incident.

They also conduct criminal investigations and pursue, arrest, and

prosecute terrorists. When threats are communicated, particularly

involving the use of weapons of mass destruction, the FBI initiates threat

credibility assessments in close coordination with experts from other

federal departments and agencies, such as DOD, DOE, HHS, EPA, and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), to assess the threat

from technical, operational, and behavioral perspectives. All federal

agencies and departments, as needed, support the overall lead federal

agency and the FBI on-scene commander.

Based on the preliminary threat assessment, the FBI Director, through the

Attorney General, may authorize the deployment of a Domestic

Emergency Support Team, which is comprised of those agencies that can

advise or provide assistance to the FBI in managing the crisis on site.

Upon the Attorney General’s approval of the FBI’s request, each agency’s

representatives are expected to be ready to deploy quickly.

In the event the President declares a national emergency, FEMA becomes

the lead agency in charge of consequence management, which includes

efforts to provide medical treatment and emergency services, evacuate

people from dangerous areas, and restore government services. Unlike

crisis management, the federal government does not have primary

responsibility for consequence management; state and local authorities do.

FEMA, using the Federal Response Plan, coordinates federal agencies’

response and activities when the state and local authorities request
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 26 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

assistance.4 Although state and local authorities will be the first to respond

to a terrorist attack, any mass casualty-producing event would prompt a

rapid, vigorous federal response, not just monitoring activity. The plan

outlines the roles of other federal agencies, such as the Departments of

Agriculture (USDA), Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services,

Transportation, and Veterans Affairs (VA), and EPA, in consequence

management covering a wide variety of contingencies, involving both

conventional or WMD terrorists attacks.

The transition from crisis management to consequence management can

occur in a variety of ways, although in general, both activities occur

concurrently. If a terrorist incident becomes imminent or actually occurs,

state and local authorities would initiate consequence management

actions, while FEMA would monitor the situation. In the event state and

local authorities become overwhelmed, the President could direct FEMA,

with support of other federal agencies, to assist the state, in coordination

with the FBI. Upon determination that applicable law enforcement goals

and objectives have been met, no further immediate threat(s) exist(s), and

federal crisis management actions are no longer required, the Attorney

General, in consultation with the FBI Director and FEMA Director, will

transfer the overall lead federal agency role to FEMA.

For fiscal year 2002, the federal government’s proposed budget for these

programs is over $12.8 billion, of which about $8.6 billion is to combat

terrorism, about $1.8 billion is to combat weapons of mass destruction,

and about $2.6 billion is for critical infrastructure protection (CIP).5

Compared with the fiscal year 1998 funding level of about $7.2 billion, this

proposed budget represents about a 78-percent increase in total funding to

combat terrorism. In addition, the Congress recently approved the

President’s request for $20 billion in emergency assistance and provided

an additional $20 billion to supplement existing contingency funds.

 4

The Federal Response Plan implements the authorities of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.) to respond to incidents or

situations requiring federal emergency disaster assistance.

5

The actual figures are $8.567 billion to combat terrorism, $1.766 billion for defense against

weapons of mass destruction, and $2.595 billion for critical infrastructure protection. The

total amount of $12.821 billion is the sum of these three categories less funding that

overlaps categories.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 27 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

During the 1990s, concerns surfaced regarding computer-based attacks

because of the nation’s growing reliance on interconnected computer

systems. Attacks could severely disrupt computer-supported operations,

compromise the confidentiality of sensitive information, and diminish the

integrity of critical data. A significant concern is that terrorists or hostile

foreign states could severely damage or disrupt critical operations,

resulting in harm to the public welfare.

In response to concerns about the potentially devastating implications of

computer-based attacks, the President issued PDD 63 in May 1998, which

described a range of activities to improve the nation’s ability to detect and

respond to serious physical and computer-based attacks. The directive

called on the federal government to serve as a model of how infrastructure

assurance is best achieved and designated “lead agencies” to work with

private-sector and government entities in each of eight infrastructure

sectors and five special function areas. In addition, PDD 63 established

entities to provide central coordination and support and encourage

private-sector cooperation. Chapter 6 contains a more detailed description

of the directive’s requirements and the organizations established to

address critical infrastructure protection.

Section 1035 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2001 (P.L. 106-398) mandated that we submit to the Senate

and House Committees on Armed Services a report on the strategy,

policies, and programs of the United States for combating domestic

terrorism, particularly domestic terrorism involving weapons of mass

destruction.

Based upon the act and, as agreed with your offices, our objectives were

to evaluate (1) the current framework for leadership and coordination of

federal agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, and proposals

for change, (2) progress the federal government has made in developing

and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically,

(3) the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist

incident, (4) progress the federal government has made in helping state

and local emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident, and

(5) progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for

combating cyber-based attacks. This capping report updates and

summarizes our extensive evaluations conducted in recent years of federal

programs to combat domestic terrorism and protect critical

infrastructures. A comprehensive list of GAO reports and testimonies

related to terrorism appears at the end of this report.

Risks of CyberAttacks and Related

Government Strategy

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 28 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The scope of this effort was governmentwide, including selected state and

local emergency response agencies. A complete listing of organizations

visited and contacted and locations visited are found in appendix VI.

The scope was limited to terrorist incidents on U.S. soil, whether foreign

or domestic in origin. Our review did not include terrorist incidents

outside of the United States or federal agencies’ efforts to combat

terrorism overseas. While we recognize that the role of intelligence and

counter-intelligence for both operational and cyber issues is a key

component of U.S. policies to combat terrorism, the scope did not include

efforts by the U.S. intelligence community to gather and coordinate

intelligence and counter-intelligence on terrorists, detect terrorist plans

overseas, or respond to a terrorist incident. The scope also did not include

efforts by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Border Patrol,

or U.S. Customs Service to prevent terrorists’ entry into the United States.

In addition, the report’s discussion of DOD’s terrorist response capabilities

and assets is limited, since much of this information is classified.

For each objective, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed supporting

documentation, compared current programs with our previous findings to

review progress that has been made, reviewed about 30 of our prior

counterterrorism reports, and followed up on findings and

recommendations made in our previous reports (see app. V for the status

of relevant prior GAO recommendations).

To evaluate the current framework for leadership and coordination of

federal agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, we conducted an

analysis of interagency leadership and coordination functions and the

roles and responsibilities of lead federal agencies and various interagency

working groups. In addition, we reviewed a variety of proposals to change

overall leadership and coordination, including various bills introduced in

the U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate, proposals contained in

congressional committee reports, and related commissions. Also, we met

with officials who helped prepare various commission reports that

proposed changes to the leadership and coordination of federal

counterterrorism efforts. Finally, we attended congressional briefings and

hearings on terrorism issues and a national conference on WMD terrorism

preparedness and response.

To evaluate what progress the federal government has made in developing

a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically, we conducted an

analysis of the process to develop and track budgets to combat terrorism,

the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 29 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Technology Crime Plan to determine whether it serves as a national

counterterrorism strategy, agency response and concept of operation

plans and their adequacy, interagency guidance, and agency threat and

risk assessments.

To evaluate the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a terrorist

incident, we conducted an analysis of federal response teams and their

missions, other support assets and specialized capabilities, how response

teams and support assets are coordinated, the effectiveness of federal

interagency exercise programs, and the status of research and

development efforts and how they are coordinated.

To evaluate what progress the federal government has made in helping

state and local emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident, we

conducted an analysis of how well federal agencies coordinate assistance

to state and local emergency response agencies; how requirements are

determined for training, equipment, and exercises; how well training and

equipment are provided to and exercises conducted with state and local

responders; whether training is provided efficiently and effectively; and

whether exercises have tested the command and control system of federal,

state, and local emergency responders. Also, we observed “Wasatch

Rings,” a multi-agency WMD field training exercise cosponsored by the

FBI and the Utah Olympic Public Safety Command in preparation for the

2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City, Utah. Regarding National

Guard teams, we reviewed recent audit reports by GAO and the DOD

Inspector General, reviewed testimony from related congressional

hearings, and held discussions with state and local officials.

To evaluate federal efforts to combat computer-based attacks, we

conducted an analysis of progress made in implementing PDD 63 to

protect critical federal systems and ensure protection of private and other

non-federal critical systems. We also surveyed related research and

development. To accomplish this, we reviewed reports related to PDD 63,

including the

• President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency/Executive Council on

Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE/ECIE) report on federal implementation of

PDD 63, March 2001;

• Report of the President of the United States on the Status of Critical

Infrastructure Protection Activities, January 2001;

• Individual agency inspector general reports; and
Chapter 1: Introduction

Page 30 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Defending America’s Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems

Protection: Version 1.0: An Invitation to Dialogue, The White House,

January 2000.

We also reviewed CIP plans and other relevant documents and

interviewed key officials from the Departments of Commerce, Defense,

Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice, State, Transportation, and

the Treasury and the EPA, FEMA, and General Services Administration. In

addition, we interviewed officials from the NSC, Office of Science and

Technology Policy (OSTP), and Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office

(CIAO), as well as representatives from the banking and finance and

emergency law enforcement infrastructure sectors.

We performed our review from December 2000 through August 2001 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
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Because of the interagency and intergovernmental nature of programs to

combat terrorism, certain leadership and coordination functions are

needed above the level of individual agencies. These include, among

others, overseeing a threat and risk assessment, developing a national

strategy, monitoring governmentwide budgets, and coordinating agency

implementation. The President established, within the NSC, a national

coordinator for terrorism, with general responsibilities to coordinate

federal activities. However, the coordinator was not specifically given

responsibilities for all the requisite leadership and coordination functions.

Further, these functions are fragmented across different organizations and

some individual agencies are performing functions that would be more

appropriately coordinated above that level. The Congress and the

President also have expressed concerns about the overall leadership and

coordination of programs to combat terrorism. The Congress and various

commissions have proposed several changes to create a single focal point

for overall leadership and coordination and to centralize key functions

within it. These proposals vary in their scope of coverage and their

location for the focal point. The proposals generally place their focal point

in either the Executive Office of the President or in a lead executive

agency. Each location has its advantages and disadvantages. These

proposals also vary in the interagency functions they centralize within the

focal point. Because overall leadership and coordination must encompass

both crisis and consequence management programs, we believe that the

single focal point for overall leadership and coordination would be most

effective in the Executive Office of the President rather than in any

executive agency. While we do not endorse any specific model for the

single focal point, we have identified basic characteristics and functions

for such a focal point.

The challenge to provide overall leadership and coordination of federal

programs to combat terrorism is significantly affected by several factors.

First, there are numerous federal agencies—more than 40—which have

some role in combating terrorism. Second, these federal agencies

represent different types of organizations, including those involved in

intelligence, law enforcement, military matters, health services,

environmental protection, emergency management, and diplomacy.1

 1

Activities involving diplomacy, carried out by the Department of State, are relevant to the

extent that some domestic terrorist incidents could have a foreign origin and/or

international implications.

Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

Coordination Responsibilities Need to Be

Centralized and Clarified

Some Leadership and

Coordination

Functions Transcend

Individual Agencies
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Agencies’ missions often include both domestic and international

components. In addition, these agencies undertake a wide variety of

activities to combat terrorism, including prevention, detection, crisis

response, criminal prosecution, and consequence management, which

require effective interagency coordination. Further, because terrorist

incidents could potentially occur anywhere in the United States, federal

efforts to combat terrorism must be intergovernmental to include state

and local governments. As a result of these factors, no individual agency is

in charge of all relevant capabilities needed to combat terrorism. These

factors make it important that certain overall leadership and coordination

functions are performed above the level of individual agencies. Examples

of such functions that we have identified in the course of our previous

work are as follows:2

• Act as the top official accountable to the President and the Congress.

• Oversee a national threat and risk assessment.

• Lead the development of a national strategy.

• Set priorities within the national strategy.

• Coordinate and monitor international programs.

• Provide liaison and assistance to state and local governments.

• Monitor governmentwide budgets across federal agencies.

• Develop and monitor overall performance measures.

• Coordinate overall research and development.

In May 1998, the President issued PDD 62, which established the position

of a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counterterrorism at the NSC within the Executive Office of the President

to provide a focal point for federal efforts to combat terrorism. Part of the

rationale for creating this National Coordinator was to improve leadership

and coordination among the various federal agencies. The directive

enumerated responsibilities for the coordinator that included general

coordination of federal efforts, chairing certain meetings, sponsoring

interagency working groups, and providing budget advice. Many efforts of

the Office of the National Coordinator have been positive and are

discussed later in this report. Specific examples include tracking

budgeting and spending and the activities of some of the working groups.

 2

See Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected

Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-85, May 4, 2000) and Combating Terrorism:

Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response (GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

National Coordinator

Established, but Some

Responsibilities Are

Fragmented Across

Agencies
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Centralized and Clarified

Page 33 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

However, other than the general responsibilities identified in PDD 62, the

functions of the National Coordinator were never detailed in either an

executive order or legislation. Many of the overall leadership and

coordination functions we have identified as critical were not given to the

National Coordinator. In fact, several other agencies have these leadership

and coordination functions, such as the Department of Justice, the FBI,

FEMA, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Some of the

functions currently resident in different agencies include completing a

threat and risk assessment, developing a national strategy, providing

liaison to state and local governments, and developing and monitoring

performance measures. Officials from a number of agencies that combat

terrorism have indicated to us that the interagency roles of these various

agencies are not always clear and sometimes overlap, leading to a

fragmented approach. Table 1 below shows that several of the key

leadership and coordination functions are spread across different or

multiple agencies.
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Table 1: Organizations Currently Responsible for Key Interagency Leadership and

Coordination Functions for Programs to Combat Terrorism

Key interagency leadership and

coordination function

Current organization responsible for the

function

Act as the top official accountable to

the President

NSC (National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism),

as appointed by the President in PDD 62.

Act as the top official accountable to

the Congress

Numerous officials (including the Attorney

General, Director of the FBI, Secretary of State,

and Secretary of Defense) who testify before

the Congress on these matters.

Oversee a national threat and risk

assessment

FBI. See ch. 3 for more information on this

function.

Lead the development of a national

strategy

Attorney General (other offices also have

discussed doing this). See ch. 3 for more

information on this function.

Set priorities within a national strategy OMB, on behalf of the President, is required to

identify priorities in its annual reports; to date, it

has not done so. See ch. 3 for more information

on this function.

Coordinate and monitor international

programs

Secretary of State (via Coordinator for

Counterterrorism).

Provide liaison and assistance to state

and local governments

Department of Justice (the Office for State and

Local Domestic Preparedness Support and the

National Domestic Preparedness Office) and

FEMA. See ch. 5 for more information on this

function.

Monitor budgets across federal

agencies

NSC and OMB. See ch. 3 for more information

on this function.

Develop and monitor overall

performance measures

No agency assigned to do this overall task. See

ch. 3 for more information on this function.

Coordinate overall research and

development

NSC (via the Preparedness Against Weapons

of Mass Destruction Research and

Development Subgroup). See ch. 4 for more

information on this function.

Source: GAO analysis of interagency functions to combat terrorism.

The current fragmented placement of these functions limits accountability

and hinders unity of effort. To the extent that a single focal point—such as

the current National Coordinator or other proposed focal points as

discussed later in this chapter—is assigned these functions and held

accountable for them, more progress might be made in developing and

advancing federal efforts to combat terrorism. Our analysis indicates that

the following deficiencies discussed in this report are due, in part, to the

current fragmented structure for overall leadership and coordination.

• Overall Accountability. In some cases, the President and the Congress

have held different officials accountable for interagency functions. For
Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

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Centralized and Clarified

Page 35 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

example, while the President appointed a national coordinator, the

Congress directed a different official, the Attorney General, to develop an

interagency strategy (see ch. 3).

• Threat and risk assessment. There has been only limited progress in the 3

years since the FBI agreed to perform an assessment; meanwhile, agencies

may continue to expend resources for less likely threats and worst case

chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear scenarios (see ch. 3).

• National strategy. A strategy was developed by the Department of Justice,

but it does not have measurable outcomes and should include the roles of

state and local governments to truly become a national strategy. Also,

other agencies may be developing competing “national” strategies (see ch.

3).

• Monitoring budgets. OMB, working with the National Coordinator, has

made progress in tracking and analyzing agency funding to combat

terrorism. However, these offices have not identified priorities or

duplication (see ch. 3). Also, there is no clear linkage between these

budgets and the implementation of a national strategy (see ch. 3).

• Tracking and Implementing Lessons Learned. An interagency working

group is responsible for planning exercises that combine federal efforts

and practice coordination with state and local governments. While this

group has made some attempts to develop a system for tracking lessons

learned from these exercises, the process is not standardized and varies

from exercise to exercise (see ch. 4).

• Coordinating agency implementation. Different agencies developed

programs to provide assistance to state and local governments that are

similar and potentially duplicative. These multiple programs have created

confusion and frustration among state and local officials (see ch. 5).

National efforts to combat illegal drugs offer potential lessons in

addressing the overall leadership and coordination of interagency efforts

to combat terrorism. There are similarities between combating illegal

drugs and combating terrorism in terms of the number of agencies,

disciplines, and activities, and the intergovernmental nature of the effort.

The Congress created the Office of National Drug Control Policy in 1988

because fragmentation had hampered federal efforts to share information

and coordinate programs. The Congress wanted strong, centralized

leadership so the Office was located within the Executive Office of the

President where it could rise above the particular interests of any one

federal agency. The duties of the Office are to (1) develop a national drug

control strategy containing both long- and short-term objectives, which is

revised annually; (2) develop an annual consolidated drug control budget

providing funding estimates for implementing the strategy; and (3) oversee

and coordinate implementation of the strategy by the various federal
Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

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Page 36 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

agencies. The Office, however, is not responsible for implementing the

strategy—that is the role of individual agencies. Despite continuing

difficulties in combating illegal drugs, the Office has set up a useful

framework for leadership and coordination, and we supported its

reauthorization in 1998. Most of the interagency leadership and

coordination functions that we believe are needed for combating terrorism

are resident in the Office of National Drug Control Policy structure.

Moreover, through legislation, the Office has the legitimacy and authority

to carry out these functions.

Both the Congress and the President have expressed concerns about the

overall leadership and coordination of programs to combat terrorism. The

Congress has demonstrated its concerns by holding hearings, appointing

commissions, and introducing various bills. The President has

demonstrated concern by recently appointing the Vice President to

oversee domestic preparedness efforts and by establishing an Office of

National Preparedness within FEMA to coordinate all federal programs

dealing with WMD consequence management programs.

The Congress has expressed concerns about the overall leadership and

coordination of programs to combat terrorism. Congressional committees

have demonstrated this concern through a variety of hearings, committee

reports, proposed legislation, and congressionally chartered commissions

to examine programs related to terrorism. Examples of these are as

follows:

• Multiple hearings have been held in the last several years that addressed

problems in coordinating programs related to terrorism. These include

hearings by the House Committee on Government Reform, House

Committee on Armed Services, House Committee on Transportation and

Infrastructure, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senate

Committee on Appropriations, Senate Committee on Armed Services,

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, or their related subcommittees.

• Several legislative bills have been introduced in the last few years to

resolve problems in coordinating programs related to terrorism. These

bills included H.R. 4210, the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000; H.R. 525,

the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001; H.R. 1158, the

National Homeland Security Act; and H.R. 1292 the Homeland Security

Strategy Act of 2001. In addition, laws have been passed that addressed

improvements in programs related to terrorism.

• The Congress established three separate commissions to examine, among

other things, problems coordinating programs related to terrorism. These

The Congress and the

President Also Are

Concerned About

Leadership and

Coordination

The Congress Shows

Concern Through

Hearings, Commissions,

and Legislation
Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

Coordination Responsibilities Need to Be

Centralized and Clarified

Page 37 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

include the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for

Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (also known as the

Gilmore Panel because it was chaired by Governor James Gilmore III of

Virginia); the United States Commission on National Security in the 21st

Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission because it was

chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman); and the

National Commission on Terrorism (also known as the Bremer

Commission because its Chairman was former Ambassador Paul Bremer).3

More details on these legislative proposals and commission

recommendations appear below and in table 2.

The President also has expressed concerns that efforts to protect the

United States against a WMD weapon must have maximum effectiveness

and be seamlessly integrated, harmonious, and comprehensive. In May

2001, the President asked the Vice President to oversee the development

of a coordinated national effort on these matters. According to the Office

of the Vice President, as of August 31, 2001, details on the Vice President’s

efforts had not yet been determined. While it is not yet clear what specific

areas the Vice President will be responsible for, agencies involved do not

anticipate that this position will be permanent or provide overall

leadership and coordination of federal efforts to combat terrorism. The

President also asked the Director of FEMA to create a new Office of

National Preparedness to assist the Vice President in implementing a

national strategy on consequence management. This new Office, which

was established in July 2001, was created to coordinate all federal

programs dealing with WMD consequence management.

Several proposals have been advanced to improve the overall leadership

and coordination of programs to combat terrorism. These approaches

generally create a single focal point located in either the Executive Office

of the President or a lead executive agency. Each location has its

advantages and disadvantages.

 3

The Bremer commission was focused on international terrorism. As noted earlier,

international matters are relevant to the extent that some domestic terrorist incidents

could have a foreign origin.

President Appointed Vice

President to Oversee

National Effort

Different Proposals

on Leadership and

Coordination Have

Their Pros and Cons
Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

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Centralized and Clarified

Page 38 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Several new proposals have been advanced—through proposed

legislation, committee reports, or various commissions—to change the

overall leadership and coordination of programs to combat terrorism. All

of these proposals provide for a focal point for the overall leadership and

coordination of programs to combat terrorism. The proposals provide the

focal point with different, but often similar, functions to centralize the

interagency leadership and coordination of federal programs. However,

the various proposals differ in the scope of their coverage. Some limit the

scope to domestic preparedness, others to all programs to combat

terrorism, and still others to the larger issue of homeland security that

encompasses threats other than terrorism, such as military attacks. The

proposals also vary as to the location of the focal point. They generally

place the focal point in either the Executive Office of the President or in a

lead executive agency. Table 2 shows various proposals regarding the

focal point for overall leadership, the scope of the focal point’s activities,

and its location.

Table 2: Proposals to Create a Focal Point for Overall Leadership and Coordination of Programs to Combat Terrorism

Source of proposal

Focal point for overall

leadership Scope of responsibilities Location of focal point

H.R. 4210

(original version)

Office of Terrorism

Preparedness

Domestic terrorism incidents involving

weapons of mass destruction

Executive Office of the

President

H.R. 525 President’s Council on

Domestic Terrorism

Preparedness

Domestic terrorism preparedness

(consequence management only)

Executive Office of the

President

H.R. 1158 Cabinet-level head of

proposed National

Homeland Security

Agency

Homeland security (including domestic

terrorism, maritime and border security,

disaster relief, and critical infrastructure

activities)

Lead executive agency

(National Homeland Security

Agency)

H.R. 1292 Single official to be

designated by the

President

Homeland security (including

antiterrorism and protection of territory

and critical infrastructures from

unconventional and conventional

threats by military or other means)

To be determined based upon

the President’s designation

Senate Report 106-404 Deputy Attorney General

for Combating

Counterterrorism

Domestic terrorism preparedness (crisis

and consequence management)

Lead executive agency

(Department of Justice)

Gilmore Panel National Office for

Combating Terrorism

Domestic and international terrorism

(crisis and consequence management)

Executive Office of the

President

Hart-Rudman Commission Cabinet-level head of

proposed National

Homeland Security

Agency

Homeland security (including domestic

terrorism, maritime and border security,

disaster relief, and critical infrastructure

activities)

Lead executive agency

(National Homeland Security

Agency)

Center for Strategic and

International Studies

Assistant to the President

or Vice President for

Combating Terrorism

Homeland Defense (including domestic

terrorism and critical infrastructure

protection)

Executive Office of the

President

Source: GAO analysis of various proposals.

Several New Proposals on

Leadership and

Coordination
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The two locations for the focal point have their pros and cons. Table 3

summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of placing the single focal

point within the Executive Office of the President versus within a lead

executive agency.

Table 3: Advantages and Disadvantages of Various Leadership Approaches

Location Advantages Disadvantages

Focal point within the Executive Office of the

President

• Would be positioned outside the

particular interests of any one federal

agency

• Would be located close to the President

to resolve cross agency disagreement

• Could increase coordination and

accountability while leveraging expertise

located in different agencies

• Could potentially interfere with

operations conducted by the

respective executive agencies

• Could hinder direct communications

between the President and the cabinet

officer in charge of the respective

executive agencies

Focal point within a lead executive agency • Would provide a clear and streamlined

chain of command within agency in

matters of policy and coordination

• Could have better access to President

than a mid-level focal point within the

Executive Office of the President

• Would lack autonomy

• Would have other major missions and

duties that might distract the focal

point from combating terrorism

• Could be viewed by other agencies as

parochial rather than working in the

collective best interest

Source: GAO analysis.

In contrast to these proposals, the current system is a hybrid approach

because it combines leadership and coordination responsibilities in both

the Executive Office of the President and specific lead executive agencies.

As shown previously in table 1, many of the key interagency leadership

and coordination functions are fragmented because they are spread across

different organizations. Two of the proposals (the original H.R. 4210 and

the Gilmore Panel) model their focal point after the Office of National

Drug Control Policy because of its centralized approach to overall

leadership and coordination.

Based upon years of evaluations, the fragmentation of leadership and

coordination (as discussed above and throughout this report), and our

assessment of the various proposals, our analysis indicates there needs to

be a single focal point with responsibility for all critical functions to lead

and coordinate these programs.4

 Furthermore, the focal point should be in

the Executive Office of the President and be independent of any existing

 4

A list of our reports and testimonies related to terrorism appears at the end of this report.

Various Locations for

Focal Point Have Pros and

Cons

Focal Point Should Be

Located in the

Executive Office of

the President
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federal agency. Such a position would allow the focal point to be outside

the interests of any individual agency. Proposals to create a focal point

within a lead agency—whether the Department of Justice or FEMA—

would not allow the focal point to have the governmentwide perspective

needed. Specifically, the focal point needs to be above both crisis and

consequence management. In addition, creating a new agency to combine

functions currently in several agencies—such as the proposed National

Homeland Security Agency—still would not contain all the government

agencies and functions needed to combat terrorism.5

Notwithstanding our belief that the focal point should be in the Executive

Office of the President, the exact structure for the focal point could vary.

The various proposals potentially make this focal point a new office (e.g.,

the proposed National Office for Combating Terrorism) or a council (e.g.,

the proposed President’s Council on Domestic Terrorism Preparedness) or

a person (e.g., the proposed Assistant to the President for Combating

Terrorism). The current National Coordinator within the NSC also could

potentially serve as the focal point if it were clearly responsible for the key

functions we have identified.

Key interagency functions are resident in several different organizations,

resulting in fragmented leadership and coordination. These circumstances

hinder unity of effort and limit accountability. However, the current

attention being focused on this issue provides an opportunity to improve

the overall leadership and coordination of programs to combat terrorism.

The Congress has introduced various bills to create a focal point for

terrorism-related efforts. Several commissions and research organizations,

some of which were chartered by the Congress, also have recommended

major changes to the manner in which terrorism-related programs are led

and coordinated. The President has expressed concerns over current

efforts and recently has tasked the Vice President to review these

activities across the government. While there are many proposals to create

a focal point, there is no clear consensus on where the focal point should

be located or what responsibilities it should have. Given the consensus

 5

The Hart-Rudman Commission, and subsequently H.R. 1158, called for the creation of a

National Homeland Security Agency, which would combine several existing agencies from

different departments, including FEMA (its regional offices), the Department of the

Treasury (U.S. Customs Service), the Department of Justice (U.S. Border Patrol), the

Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard), and several elements from other

departments.

Conclusions
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Page 41 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

that there is a need to address the overall leadership and coordination

issues, and the uncertainty about the location of the focal point for these

matters, we are making our recommendations to the President of the

United States. In our view, the President and the Congress need to work

together to implement a governmentwide solution on overall leadership

and coordination to combat terrorism. We believe the President, in

conjunction with the Vice President’s overall assessment, should clearly

determine the responsibilities and functions of this critical focal point and

place the authority for them within the focal point.

We recommend that the President, in conjunction with the Vice

President’s efforts, appoint a single focal point that has the responsibility

and authority for all critical leadership and coordination functions to

combat terrorism. The focal point should have the following

characteristics and responsibilities.

• The focal point should be in the Executive Office of the President, outside

individual agencies, and encompass activities to include prevention, crisis

management, and consequence management.

• The focal point should oversee a national-level authoritative threat and

risk assessment on the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by

terrorists on U.S. soil. Such assessments should be updated regularly.

• The focal point also should lead the development of a national strategy for

combating terrorism. The current Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan could

serve as an initial point of departure with revisions to include measurable

outcomes and the roles and participation of state and local governments.

In addition, the national strategy should include research and development

priorities and needs in order to facilitate interagency coordination,

decrease duplication, and leverage monetary resources.

• The focal point should coordinate implementation of the national strategy

among the various federal agencies. This would entail reviewing agency

and interagency programs to ensure that they are being implemented in

accordance with the national strategy and do not constitute duplication of

effort.

• The focal point should analyze and prioritize governmentwide budgets and

spending to combat terrorism to eliminate gaps and duplication of effort.

The focal point’s role will be to provide advice or to certify that the

budgets are consistent with the national strategy, not to make final budget

decisions.

• The focal point should coordinate the nation’s strategy for combating

terrorism with efforts to prevent, detect, and respond to computer-based

attacks on critical infrastructures. We do not see the focal point for

Recommendations for

Executive Action
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Page 42 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

combating terrorism with responsibility for also protecting computerbased infrastructures because the threats are broader than terrorism and

such programs are more closely associated with traditional information

security activities. Nonetheless, there should be close coordination

between the two areas.

• The focal point should be established by legislation to provide it with

legitimacy and authority and its head should be appointed by the President

with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. This would provide

accountability to both the President and the Congress. Also, it would

provide continuity across administrations.

• The focal point should be adequately staffed to carry out its duties for

planning and oversight across the federal government.

While some of the details of these interagency functions could be

delegated to other agencies, the focal point should retain overall

responsibility and be held accountable for their implementation.

Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on their efforts

prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Departments of

Energy and Transportation agreed with our recommendation that the

President appoint a single focal point for all critical leadership and

coordination functions to combat terrorism. DOE agreed that a single

responsible and accountable “focal point” for combating terrorism should

be established, independent of any existing federal agency. DOE said that

regardless of where this entity is placed, it should be given the authority to

cut across agency lines with a clear set of obtainable goals and milestones.

The key to its success will be strong leadership, an organization with a

sense of purpose, and access to the tools necessary to do the job.

Similarly, Department of Transportation officials believe the report makes

a reasonable case for a single point of focus for terrorism issues in the

Executive Branch.

The Department of Justice disagreed with our recommendation to create a

single focal point with specific functions. The Department said that the

National Coordinator at the NSC was working in a “manner that

recognizes the unique roles and contributions of each agency to the overall

effort.” In its view, there is no need to change or expand that role at this

time. Moreover, the Department stated that our recommendation was

premature in light of the Vice President’s pending review. We agree that

the National Coordinator at the NSC has made some important

contributions. However, this position’s responsibilities are not clearly

defined and it lacks responsibilities for some overall leadership and

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 2: Overall Leadership and

Coordination Responsibilities Need to Be

Centralized and Clarified

Page 43 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

coordination functions that it should have. With respect to the Vice

President’s pending review, our recommendation states that the President

should make the appointment working with the Congress and in

conjunction with the Vice President’s efforts.

The Executive Office of the President did not comment on this

recommendation. OMB referred us to the President’s May 8, 2001,

statement (see app. VII) in which he tasked the Vice President with

overseeing the development of a coordinated national effort to improve

national preparedness. Most agencies did not comment directly on our

recommendation that the President create a single focal point. Officials

from these other agencies indicated that it would be premature for them to

comment on the recommendation in deference to the Vice President’s

review of national preparedness. We disagree that our recommendation

for a single focal point is premature. Notwithstanding the Vice President’s

pending review, our recommendation is based upon our own reviews over

a 5-year period. Our reviews consistently showed problems related to

overall leadership and coordination, as discussed in this report.
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 44 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The federal government has made progress in recent years in developing a

national strategy to combat terrorism, but several key components still are

not complete or are missing. In the past, we have recommended that the

federal government conduct a terrorist threat and risk assessment to

establish requirements and prioritize program investments. The

Department of Justice and the FBI have made some progress in

implementing our recommendations. The Attorney General’s Five-Year

Plan represents a substantial interagency effort and is the one document

that could serve as the basis for a national strategy. However, it lacks two

critical elements: measurable outcomes and identification of state and

local government roles. In the past, the amount of funds being spent to

combat terrorism was unknown and difficult to determine. Now, OMB is

tracking counterterrorism budgets and expenditures and issuing annual

reports to the Congress—a significant step toward improving the

management and coordination of these programs and activities.

Nonetheless, the NSC and OMB have not identified priorities or reported

on duplication of efforts. Finally, consistent with our prior

recommendations, agencies now have completed interagency guidance to

combat domestic terrorism, clarified command and control issues, and

completed or are developing internal guidance and concepts of operations

to manage terrorist incidents.

An important step in developing sound programs to combat terrorism is to

develop a thorough assessment of the terrorist threat. Intelligence and law

enforcement agencies continuously assess the foreign and domestic

terrorist threats to the United States. To be considered a threat, a terrorist

group must not only exist, but also have the intention and capability to

launch attacks.1

The intelligence community (both foreign and domestic agencies) reports

an increased possibility that terrorists may use weapons of mass

destruction in the next decade. However, there are several qualifications

to this threat. For example, terrorists would have to overcome significant

technical and operational challenges to successfully make and release

chemical or biological agents of sufficient quality and quantity to kill or

injure large numbers of people without substantial assistance from a

foreign government sponsor. In most cases, specialized knowledge is

 1

Other factors to consider in analyzing threats include a terrorist group’s history, its

targeting, and the security environment in which it operates.

Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Threat Assessments

Are Being Completed
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 45 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

required in the manufacturing process and in improvising an effective

delivery device for most chemical and nearly all biological agents that

could be used in terrorist attacks. Moreover, some of the required

components of chemical agents and highly infective strains of biological

agents are difficult to obtain. Finally, terrorists may have to overcome

other obstacles to successfully launch an attack that would result in mass

casualties, such as unfavorable meteorological conditions and personal

safety risks. These types of qualifications are important because, without

them, decisionmakers in both the executive or legislative branch may get

an exaggerated view of the terrorist threat, particularly as it relates to

WMD materials.

In prior reports, we have recommended that the federal government

conduct multidisciplinary and analytically sound threat and risk

assessments to define and prioritize requirements and properly focus

programs and investments in combating terrorism.2

 Threat and risk

assessments are decision-making support tools that are used to establish

requirements and prioritize program investments. Without the benefits

that a threat and risk assessment provides, many agencies have been

relying on worst case chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear

scenarios to generate countermeasures or establish their programs. By

using these worst case scenarios, the federal government is focusing on

vulnerabilities (which are unlimited) rather than credible threats (which

are limited).

The Department of Justice and the FBI have made some progress in

implementing our recommendations that threat and risk assessments be

done at both the local and national level.

Regarding local threat and risk assessments, the Department of Justice’s

Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support and the FBI

have worked together to provide a threat and risk assessment tool to state

and local governments.3

 This tool includes a step-by-step methodology for

 2

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target

Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998) and Combating Terrorism: Need

for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack

(GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999).

3

Fiscal Year 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program, Assessment and

Strategy Development Tool Kit, May 15, 2000. This document was published by the

Department of Justice’s Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support.

Progress Made in

Completing State and

Local Assessments
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 46 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

assessing threats, risks, and requirements. It also includes information on

how to prioritize programs and project spending amounts. Department of

Justice officials told us that, as of August 31, 2001, four states had

completed these assessments. The information from the risk and needs

assessment will be used to develop statewide domestic preparedness

strategic plans. The statewide assessment process includes an initial risk

assessment and identification of the most likely scenarios. This risk

assessment is the culmination of three other assessments: threat,

vulnerability, and public health assessments. This design feature enables

the preparedness programs to focus resources on preparing for the “most

likely” scenarios. The Department plans to use the results of these

assessments to drive the allocation of its equipment, training, and exercise

program resources, which is consistent with previous GAO

recommendations. Department of Justice officials stated that the

systematic collection of these data is an unprecedented undertaking to

remedy the federal government’s current reliance on anecdotal

information. They view the state assessments as being profoundly useful

in presenting a national picture of preparedness and priorities. Thus, these

officials believe that the compilation of all the state assessments and plans

can be a foundation for a national domestic preparedness strategy.

Regarding our 1999 recommendations for national-level authoritative

threat and risk assessments, the FBI agreed to lead two assessments.

However, the FBI noted some limitations to its methodology for producing

such assessments in the domestic context. For example, the FBI stated

that its law enforcement role placed limitations on its collection and use of

intelligence data. FBI officials also said that they had little intelligence on

specific domestic terrorist groups. They said the largest domestic threat is

the “lone wolf” terrorist—an individual who operates alone and thus is

difficult to identify or collect intelligence on. When the FBI has credible

intelligence on a specific terrorist, it would make an arrest first and

analyze the intelligence afterwards. FBI officials also noted that these

would be threat assessments—not risk assessments.

The first threat assessment that the FBI is doing is a report on those

chemical and biological agents that may be more likely to be used in the

United States by a terrorist group that was not state sponsored (e.g.,

terrorist groups without access to foreign government chemical or

biological stockpiles, production capabilities, or funding). Because of the

limitations on intelligence discussed above, the FBI decided to focus on

such WMD agents. While not identifying specific terrorist groups, this

assessment would still be useful in determining requirements for programs

National-Level Threat

Assessments Are

Underway
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 47 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

to combat terrorism. Once FBI officials became aware of a similar

assessment being conducted jointly by the Department of Justice’s

National Institute of Justice and the Technical Support Working Group

(TSWG), the FBI became a co-sponsor.4

 This report will be provided to

state and local governments to help them conduct their own threat and

risk assessments and reduce their vulnerabilities. The Department of

Justice anticipated that a draft of the assessment would be available for

interagency review and comment in September 2001 and the final

assessment would be published in December 2001.

The second threat assessment is a national-level threat assessment of the

terrorist threat in the United States. According to the Department of

Justice, the FBI is in the process of conducting such an assessment. It will

be a comprehensive assessment that encompasses domestic terrorism,

international terrorism, WMD terrorism, cyber-terrorism, and proliferation.

The report will assess the current threat, the projected threat, emerging

threats, and related FBI initiatives. The Department stated that this

assessment is being finalized and anticipated that the classified report

would be published in October 2001.

While not fully responsive to our recommendation that threat and risk

assessments be done, we are hopeful that these threat assessments by the

FBI, once completed, will set priorities and help guide federal programs to

combat terrorism. In our draft report, we raised concerns that the FBI was

not going to coordinate these threat assessments with other intelligence

agencies. The Department of Justice indicated that these assessments will

be fully coordinated before publication.

 4

TSWG conducts the national interagency research and development program for

combating terrorism. TSWG and its coordination role are discussed in more detail in

chapter 4.
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 48 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

As we have noted in our prior work, a national strategy on combating

terrorism is needed that has a clear outcome or goal against which

performance can be measured.5 The Attorney General’s Five-Year

Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan, issued in

December 1998, represents a substantial interagency effort and is the one

document that could serve as a basis for a national strategy. However, we

believe it lacks two critical elements: (1) measurable outcomes and

(2) identification of state and local government roles in responding to a

terrorist incident.

A national strategy should provide a clear statement as to what the nation

hopes to achieve through its programs to combat terrorism. A national

strategy should not only define the roles and missions of federal, state, and

local governments, but also establish objectives, priorities, outcomerelated goals with milestones, and performance measures. A national

strategy should incorporate the principles of the Government Performance

and Results Act of 1993, which requires federal agencies to set strategic

goals, measure performance, and report on the degree to which goals are

met.6

 Further, the Department of State emphasized that a national strategy

also has to be comprehensive, that is, it must include the international

component.

The Congress directed the Attorney General to develop the Five-Year Plan

to serve as a baseline strategy for coordination of national policy and

operational capabilities to combat terrorism in the United States and

against American interests overseas.7

 Department of Justice officials

believe that this plan, in combination with several related presidential

decision directives, represents a comprehensive national strategy. The

classified plan identifies several high-level goals aimed at preventing and

deterring terrorism, maximizing international cooperation to combat

terrorism, improving domestic crisis and consequence planning and

management, improving state and local capabilities, safeguarding

 5

See Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/TNSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000), p. 7.

6

P.L. 103-62 (Aug. 3, 1993).

7

See the Conference Committee Report (House Report 105-405, Nov. 13, 1997)

accompanying the Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce,

Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies (P.L. 105-119, Nov. 26, 1997).

Attorney General’s

Five-Year Plan

Represents a

Substantial Effort, but

Key Elements Still Are

Lacking for a National

Strategy

Five-Year Plan Serves as a

Baseline for a National

Strategy to Combat

Terrorism
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 49 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

information infrastructure, and leading research and development efforts

to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. It sets forth current and

projected efforts by the Attorney General in partnership with other federal

agencies and state and local entities to improve readiness to address the

terrorist threat.

In September 1999, the Attorney General released an unclassified edition

of the Five-Year Plan, which was distributed to state and local

governments. In addition, the Attorney General issues an annual update to

the Five-Year Plan, which tracks agencies’ progress. The annual updates

do not revise the basic Five-Year Plan.

A national strategy on combating terrorism needs a clear outcome or goal

against which performance can be measured. Although the Attorney

General’s Five-Year Plan links performance to objectives, it focuses on

agency activities representing outputs rather than results-oriented

outcomes.

In 1993, the Congress enacted the Government Performance and Results

Act (commonly referred to as the Results Act). The legislation was

designed to have agencies focus on the performance and results of their

programs rather than on program resources and activities, as they had

done in the past. Thus, the Results Act became the primary legislative

framework through which agencies are required to set strategic goals,

measure performance, and report on the degree to which goals are met.

The outcome-oriented principles of the Results Act include

(1) establishing general goals and quantifiable, measurable, outcomeoriented performance goals and related measures; (2) developing

strategies for achieving the goals, including strategies for overcoming or

mitigating major impediments; (3) ensuring that goals at lower

organizational levels align with and support general goals; and

(4) identifying the resources that will be required to achieve the goals.

Moreover, in its guidance on implementing the Results Act, the Chief

Financial Officers Council advised agencies that to comply with the spirit

and intent of the act, the goals and measures used at lower organizational

levels should be linked with the agency’s strategic goals.

According to the Department of Justice, the Fiscal Year 1999 Update to the

Five-Year Plan reports outcomes that can be used to gauge progress. For

example, the FBI, FEMA, and the U.S. Secret Service are working together

to coordinate the planning of special events (see a more detailed

discussion of this cooperation in ch. 4). The FBI determined that bomb

Five-Year Plan Focuses on

Outputs, Not Outcomes
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 50 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

squads need radiological monitors and personal protective equipment and

it is providing that equipment to every accredited bomb squad in the

United States. OSTP established an annual process to develop and

coordinate broad national technical goals and priorities to combat

terrorism. The Fiscal Year 2000 Update to the Five-Year Plan also cited

completed measurable outcomes. For example, the Department of Justice

drafted proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the Biological Weapons AntiTerrorism Act of 1989.8

 HHS designed and developed a national

pharmaceutical stockpile and delivery system. The Department of Justice

began detailing Assistant U.S. Attorneys to the Criminal Division to

develop prosecutive expertise in computer crime investigations.

While the Department of Justice considers these outcomes, we consider

them outputs, since they represent agency activities rather than the results

that agency activities would achieve. While these Department of Justice

examples of measurable outputs are important, the plan does not have a

defined outcome of where the nation should be in terms of domestic

preparedness and capabilities within a specified period of time. Such an

outcome would be useful in establishing requirements and priorities.

While the plan lays out goals for preparedness, it does not attempt to (1)

define the level(s) of preparedness necessary to handle a weapon of mass

destruction incident, (2) determine how much preparedness is enough

given the terrorist threat, or (3) identify what level of risk is desirable—or

attainable.

If the Department of Justice applied the Results Act principles to the FiveYear Plan—and ultimately to a national strategy to combat terrorism—

then we believe all performance indicators could be measured and a

defined outcome of where the nation should be in terms of domestic

preparedness and capabilities within a certain time frame could help

establish counterterrorism program requirements and priorities. The result

would be a more rational and efficient counterterrorism effort

governmentwide.

Although the Department of Justice obtained state and local input in

preparing the Five-Year Plan and identifies specific ways to enhance state

and local responder capabilities, the plan does not identify state and local

government roles in responding to a terrorist incident. According to the

 8

P.L. 101-298 (May 22, 1990).

Five-Year Plan Does Not

Identify Roles for State

and Local Governments
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 51 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Department of Justice, state and local input was obtained through (1) a

Stakeholders Forum held in 1998 for state and local jurisdictions

concerning response incidents of domestic terrorism, (2) a questionnaire

distributed by national associations representing the state and local

emergency preparedness community to a cross-section of their

constituencies, (3) the Inventory of State and Local Law Enforcement

Technology Needs to Combat Terrorism, (4) a 1998 study funded by the

National Institute of Justice, and (5) the State and Local Experts Forum

convened by the Attorney General in 1999 for 25 leading state and local

law enforcement, fire, medical/public health, and emergency management

professionals. One of the six goals in the Five-Year Plan (Safeguard Public

Safety by Improving State and Local Capabilities) focuses exclusively on

state and local concerns.

However, state and local first responder organizationsthose entities that

represent state and local officials who would respond first to the scene of

an incidentcontinue to criticize the plan. For example, according to the

International Association of Fire Chiefs, the current national preparedness

effort, though useful, has overlooked goal setting. The lack of clearly

defined preparedness goals should be addressed through the development

of performance capability objectives that, once met through the rational

deployment of local, state, and federal assets, define the end-game, or goal:

adequate preparedness. The Association also noted that until a national

strategy is put in place, it would be exceedingly difficult to quantify the

level of preparedness reached by the collective national response

mechanism. Several other organizations have taken the same or similar

positions.9

Although combating terrorism is primarily a federal responsibility, state

and local emergency responders (police, fire, and emergency medical

personnel) are almost certain to be the first to respond to the use of a

weapon of mass destruction. We believe the Five-Year Plan should

specifically address the role of state and local emergency responders,

since their initial actions in handling a conventional explosive or

incendiary device, or an unconventional weapon containing WMD matter

will be critical to the success of the overall response and, thus, to public

health and safety. To the extent the plan can better address the roles of

 9

These include, for example, the National Governors Association, the National Emergency

Management Association, and the National League of Cities.
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 52 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

state and local authorities, and be developed with them, it can become

more of a national strategy than a federal plan.

Efforts to develop a national strategy also may be hindered by other

agencies developing competing national strategies. It also demonstrates

that the President and the Congress sometimes have provided different

messages on overall leadership and coordination. Notwithstanding the

creation of the position of National Coordinator, the Congress directed the

Attorney General to develop a national strategy.10 In addition to the

resultant Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime Plan, both the NSC and the National Domestic

Preparedness Office (NDPO) (discussed in ch. 5) also have planned to

develop national strategies. More recently, FEMA’s new Office of National

Preparedness (also discussed in ch. 5) will develop a national strategy.

This potential proliferation of “national” strategies written by different

entities clearly demonstrates the current fragmentation of overall

leadership and coordination.

The NSC and OMB both have roles in overseeing governmentwide

programs to combat terrorism. The NSC has the responsibility to

coordinate policies and operations and OMB has the responsibility to

track funding for terrorism-related programs. At the time of our initial

report, we found that the amount of funds being spent to combat terrorism

was unknown and difficult to determine.11 Despite their oversight roles,

the NSC and OMB were not regularly collecting, aggregating, and

reviewing funding and spending data relative to combating terrorism on a

crosscutting, governmentwide basis. Further, funding priorities for

terrorism-related programs were not established. As a result, there was no

assurance that (1) agencies’ requests were funded through a coordinated

and focused approach, (2) the highest priority requirements were being

met, (3) terrorism-related activities and capabilities were not

unnecessarily duplicative, and (4) funding gaps or misallocation had not

 10This plan was directed in the Conference Committee Report (House Report 105-405, Nov.

13, 1997) accompanying the Fiscal Year 1998 Appropriations Act for the Departments of

Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies (P.L. 105-119, Nov. 26,

1997).

11Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better

Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997).

Other Agencies May

Produce Competing

Strategies

Progress Made in

Tracking Spending to

Combat Terrorism
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 53 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

occurred. Based upon our findings, the Congress required OMB to

establish a reporting system on the budgeting and expenditure of funds to

combat terrorism.12 Further, the Congress mandated an annual report

containing agency budget and expenditure information that would identify

any priorities and any duplication of efforts to combat terrorism.

Subsequent to this requirement being established, OMB has tracked

budgets and expenditures for programs to combat terrorism and has

issued four annual reports to the Congress. These OMB reports are a

significant step toward improving the management and coordination of

these programs and activities. The reports capture governmentwide

information in a uniform fashion, highlight budget initiatives, and provide

increasingly detailed information about individual agencies’ spending. The

last two reports have an annex with several years of budget data on

programs to combat terrorism and critical infrastructure protection

presented by agency, category, and categories within agencies.13 The most

recent report also has a detailed discussion of the different agencies’ roles,

missions, and activities. Through these reports, the executive branch and

the Congress have strategic oversight of the magnitude and direction of

federal funding for this priority national security and law enforcement

concern.

In 1999, the NSC and OMB began a new process to identify priorities and

duplication—as required by law. Interagency working groups reviewed the

agencies’ proposals and developed recommendations on whether they

should be funded. The agencies integrated the working groups’ funding

recommendations into their fiscal year 2001 President’s Budget

submissions. According to OMB, the NSC and OMB then reviewed

agencies’ actions on the recommendations and made necessary course

corrections during the final decision-making by the President, based on

information from the working groups, other agency priorities, and

available resources. The new process may represent progress because,

before it was implemented, agencies would make budget

recommendations related to terrorism through the annual OMB budget

submission. At that time, decisions were made on an agency-by-agency

basis rather than in a governmentwide context. OMB has stated that this

interagency budget review resulted in reallocation of resources—within

and between agencies—to fund critical shortfalls and to eliminate

 12Section 1051 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85).

13See OMB’s Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism, July 2001.
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 54 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

duplication. However, to date, OMB’s annual reports have not identified

priorities or reported on duplication of efforts.

Although OMB notes that the Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan sets

priorities, the plan does not link recommended actions to budget

resources—a key step in developing a national strategy. While the original

plan indicated that the annual updates would address this matter, they

also have not linked actions with required resources. In the absence of a

national strategy with measurable outcomes (as discussed earlier in this

chapter), we are concerned that this new process could be used to justify

higher budgets for all programs to combat terrorism rather than to

establish governmentwide requirements and prioritize programs to focus

resources.

Federal agencies have completed interagency guidance to combat

terrorism domestically and clarified many command and control issues.

Completed interagency guidance should positively impact federal

response operations leading to a more organized, unified, and coordinated

national terrorism response capability. This is significant progress since

1999 when we reported that federal agencies had neither completed

interagency guidance as directed by PDD 39 nor coordinated all proposed

guidance with all federal agencies with domestic counterterrorism roles.14

As a result, federal response operations potentially were not as wellcoordinated and highly integrated as intended, sometimes resulting in

conflict or confusion over roles and responsibilities as well as the transfer

of tactical authority. Table 4 summarizes recently completed interagency

plans and guidance.15

 14Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

15A more complete listing of interagency plans and guidance for combating terrorism

appears in app. I.

Agencies Complete

Interagency

Operational

Guidance, Enhancing

Unified and

Coordinated

Response Capability
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 55 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Table 4: Interagency Plans and Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Interagency plan or guidance Description

Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency

Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan

Drafted by the Department of Justice in conjunction with other agencies, this plan

and its annual updates serve as a baseline strategy for the coordination of national

policy and operational capabilities to combat domestic terrorism. The classified plan

was issued in December 1998.

Federal Response Plan and Terrorism Incident

Annex

Drafted by FEMA and coordinated with 26 other federal departments and agencies

and the American Red Cross, the plan outlines the way the federal government

responds to domestic incidents in which the President has declared an emergency

requiring federal emergency disaster assistance. The plan was issued in April 1992

and revised in April 1999. The Terrorism Incident Annex, issued in February 1997,

provides a concept of operations outlining how the federal government would assist

state and local authorities in managing the consequences of a terrorist attack in the

United States.

CONPLAN

(United States Government Interagency

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations

Plan)

Drafted by the FBI and coordinated with FEMA, DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA, the

CONPLAN was issued in January 2001. It provides overall guidance to federal,

state, and local agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a

potential or actual terrorist threat or incident in the United States, particularly one

involving weapons of mass destruction. It is intended to integrate the plans and

procedures of individual agencies and departments with responsibilities to respond

to a WMD incident and to establish a conceptual framework for integrating federal

crisis and consequence WMD response.

Domestic Guidelines (Guidelines for the

Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of

U.S. Government Agencies in Response to a

Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incidents in

Accordance with Presidential Decision

Directive 39)

Drafted by the FBI, the classified document provides guidance for deploying federal

capabilities in response to a terrorist threat or incident. The Domestic Guidelines

were issued in November 2000.

International Guidelines (Coordinating

Subgroup Guidelines for the Mobilization,

Deployment, and Employment of U.S.

Government Elements in Response to an

Overseas Terrorist Incident)

Drafted by the Department of State, the classified International Guidelines outline

procedures for deploying the Foreign Emergency Support Team and for coordinating

federal operations overseas. The International Guidelines were issued in January

2001.

Source: GAO analysis.

Federal agencies also are updating and revising interagency guidance to

meet responders’ needs and new developments. For example, FEMA is

clarifying the Federal Response Plan to include an explanation of its

relationship to other federal emergency plans, such as the Federal

Emergency Response Plan, National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan (National Contingency Plan), and Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan. A change to the Federal Response

Plan will be issued to expand and clarify individual agency roles and

responsibilities as well as funding arrangements. Also, HHS is developing

an annex to the Federal Response Plan for biological terrorism. (See app. I

for a compendium of related federal policy and planning documents.)
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 56 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Agencies have completed or are developing internal guidance and

concepts of operations to deal with terrorist incidents, including those

involving a weapon of mass destruction. For example, DOD developed a

detailed contingency plan to guide its actions in deploying and responding

to a terrorist incident (including domestic incidents) and HHS developed a

concept of operations plan to deal with the health and medical

consequences of terrorist attacks and augment and support state and local

governments. HHS is completing additional plans that coordinate efforts

among state health departments and agencies and the federal government,

and has developed medical and health responses for smallpox. The

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Office of Emergency

Preparedness developed plans that support HHS’ strategic objectives and

goals for preventing bioterrorism, conducting epidemiological

surveillance, providing medical and public health readiness for mass

casualty events, ensuring a national pharmaceutical stockpile, and

securing information technology infrastructures.

Another example of the progress made is FEMA’s completion of the final

draft of a terrorism supplement (Attachment G) to the State and Local

Guide 101 for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan. FEMA issued the

attachment in April 2001. The attachment will aid state and local

emergency planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident

Appendix to their Emergency Operations Plans for terrorist incidents

involving weapons of mass destruction.

Appendix II describes individual agency plans and guidance for combating

terrorism.

The federal government has made progress in recent years in developing a

national strategy to combat terrorism, but several key components still are

incomplete or are missing. Although the Department of Justice and the FBI

agreed to implement our 1999 recommendations to conduct

multidisciplinary and analytically sound threat and risk assessments, these

still are not complete more than 2 years after the FBI agreed to do them.

The Attorney General should ensure that national-level threat assessments

regarding terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction are completed

expeditiously.

While the Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan is a substantial interagency

effort and could serve as the basis for a national strategy, we believe it

lacks two critical elements: measurable outcomes and identification of

state and local government roles. By including measurable outcomes, the

Individual Agencies

Complete or Develop

Plans and Guidance

Conclusions
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 57 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Five-Year Plan would incorporate the principal tenets of the Government

Performance and Results Act of 1993, which holds federal agencies

accountable for achieving program results and requires them to clarify

their missions, set program goals, and measure performance toward

achieving these goals.

To help support a national strategy, we recommend that the Attorney

General direct the Director of the FBI to work with appropriate agencies

across government to complete ongoing national-level threat assessments

regarding terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. If a single focal

point is established in the Executive Office of the President to lead and

coordinate federal programs to combat terrorism, then this focal point

should maintain oversight to ensure the assessments are coordinated fully

with key federal agencies that combat terrorism (see Recommendations

for Executive Action in ch. 2).

To guide federal efforts in combating domestic terrorism, we recommend

that the Attorney General use the Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism

and Technology Crime Plan and similar plans of other agencies as a basis

for developing a national strategy by including (1) desired outcomes that

can be measured and that are consistent with the Results Act and (2) state

and local government input to better define their roles in combating

terrorism. If a single focal point is established in the Executive Office of

the President to lead and coordinate federal programs to combat

terrorism, then the focal point should take over this role from the

Department of Justice to ensure that the national strategy is seen as an

interagency document (see Recommendations for Executive Action in

ch. 2).

Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on their efforts

prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Department of

Energy agreed with our recommendation to complete a national-level

threat assessment. DOE said that the first step toward developing a

national strategy is to conduct a thorough threat and risk assessment to

define and prioritize requirements. The Department of Justice did not

comment on our recommendation that the Attorney General direct the

Director of the FBI to complete a national-level threat assessment

regarding terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. However,

Department of Justice officials provided us with an update on their

progress and we revised the report, as appropriate. While the Department

of Justice and the FBI appear to be working to produce threat

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 3: Progress Made in Developing a

National Strategy to Combat Domestic

Terrorism

Page 58 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

assessments, we believe our recommendation still is valid until such

assessments are complete.

The Department of Justice disagreed with our recommendation that the

Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan be revised to include measurable

outcomes. According to the Department, each agency must have the

flexibility to link the goals and objectives of the Five-Year Plan to its own

strategic goals and measures. We disagree with the Department of Justice

and still believe that the Five-Year Plan focuses more on agency outputs

than outcomes that are results oriented. We believe that having overall

results-oriented outcomes would not limit the flexibility of individual

agency strategic goals and measures. We believe it would improve the

strategic planning process across agencies.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 59 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Federal capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents are improving.

Federal agencies have a broad array of capabilities to respond to terrorist

incidents. The FBI and FEMA could lead a variety of potential federal

teams and related assets for crisis and consequence management. These

federal capabilities are enhanced through agency participation in special

events, such as political conventions, sporting events, and international

meetings. Since our last review, the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service have

improved their cooperation for such events. Federal agencies also

exercise their capabilities to respond to a terrorist incident through

exercises. The FBI has made progress in exercising its interagency and

intergovernmental leadership role in crisis management. FEMA is not

using exercises to practice fully its leadership role over consequence

management. Evaluations from such exercises, as well as from actual

operations, allow agencies to learn lessons from their successes and

mistakes. Based upon our earlier work, we found that some individual

federal agencies have improved their processes to capture and share

lessons learned. However, as yet, there is no regular process in place to

capture and share lessons learned at the interagency level. Federal

capabilities also are enhanced through research and development projects.

While federal research and development programs are coordinated in a

variety of ways, coordination is limited, raising the potential for

duplication of efforts among different federal agencies.

The FBI leads a variety of potential federal teams for crisis management.

In exceptionally grave situations, DOD could play an important role in

crisis management. FEMA also leads a variety of potential federal teams

for consequence management. We found that these consequence

management teams generally do not duplicate each other due to their

unique capabilities and other mission requirements. Other federal assets,

such as mobile laboratories to perform an initial on-site analysis of a

weapon of mass destruction, would potentially support crisis and

consequence management.

The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, is the overall lead

federal agency for domestic terrorist incidents and the FBI is the lead

agency for crisis response to domestic incidents. Crisis response assets

within the FBI include the Critical Incident Response Group, which

integrates the tactical and investigative expertise necessary to deal with

terrorist incidents. The group includes crisis managers, hostage

negotiators, behaviorists, and surveillance assets. The group also contains

the Hostage Rescue Team, which can operate in a chemical and biological

Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

The Federal

Government Has a

Broad Array of

Response Capabilities

FBI Leads Federal Crisis

Management Response

Teams
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 60 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

environment, and is trained in hostage rescue, precision shooting,

advanced medical support, and tactical site survey. Furthermore, all but

one of the FBI’s 56 field offices include a Special Weapons and Tactics

(SWAT) team trained to plan and execute high-risk tactical operations.

Numerous other federal agencies may be called upon for support as

needed. The FBI uses the United States Interagency Domestic Terrorism

Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) (discussed in ch. 3) to manage its

operations with interagency and intergovernmental partners. Figure 3

illustrates key federal crisis management teams.

Figure 3: Key Federal Crisis Management Response Teams

Note: The U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit has a dual role and may serve as a consequence

management response team as well. It is marked with an asterisk.

Source: GAO analysis.

Appendix III provides more detailed information on the mission and

personnel strength for the crisis management response teams shown in

figure 3 above.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 61 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 4 shows an FBI enhanced SWAT team executing a law enforcement

search of a building during the Wasatch Rings counterterrorism exercise

in preparation for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Figure 4: FBI Enhanced SWAT Team Executes Search During Wasatch Rings Exercise

Source: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education.

If an exceptionally serious terrorist threat or incident is beyond the FBI’s

capabilities to resolve, a military joint special operations task force may be

established to respond in accordance with contingency plans developed by

DOD. As a general principle, the Posse Comitatus Act and DOD

regulations prohibit the Armed Forces of the United States from being

used to enforce domestic law.1

 However, the Posse Comitatus Act is

 1

See 18 U.S.C. section 1385.

In Extreme Situations,

Military Could Have Crisis

Management Role
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 62 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

subject to exceptions that permit the use of the Armed Forces in dealing

with domestic terrorist incidents in special situations. According to

Department of Justice officials, these statutory exceptions would require a

request from the Attorney General and concurrence by the Secretary of

Defense. Department of Justice officials added that, in most cases, as a

matter of policy, approval by the President will also be sought whenever

possible. Further, Department of Justice officials state that if military

forces are required to restore order as a result of an act of domestic

terrorism that renders ordinary means of enforcement unworkable or

hinders the ability of civilian law enforcement authorities, the President

must issue an executive order and a proclamation. These documents are

maintained in draft form and are ready for the President’s signature, if

needed.

If military force is required and approved, the on-scene FBI commander

passes operational control of the incident site to the military commander.

The military commander develops and submits courses of action to the

National Command Authority. If the incident cannot be resolved

peacefully, then the National Command Authority may order a military

operation, including disabling a weapon of mass destruction. Once this is

accomplished, the military commander returns operational control of the

site to the FBI. To date, military action has never been required to resolve

a domestic terrorist incident. Further, FBI officials stated that the FBI’s

own tactical skills to resolve a terrorist incident generally are equal to the

military’s, although technical assistance would be required in certain WMD

incidents.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 63 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Although state and local governments have primary responsibility for

managing the consequences of a domestic terrorist incident, their

response capabilities may quickly become overwhelmed. Should state and

local authorities request assistance, FEMA would coordinate federal

agencies’ responses and activities. The federal government can provide

considerable assets to assist state and local authorities. For example, 8

federal agencies have 24 types of teams that could respond to terrorist use

of weapons of mass destruction. FEMA uses the Federal Response Plan

(discussed in ch. 3) to task and manage other federal agencies. Figure 5

illustrates key federal consequence management teams.

Figure 5: Key Federal Consequence Management Response Teams

Note: The U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit has a dual role and may serve as a crisis management

response team as well. It is marked with an asterisk.

Source: GAO analysis.

FEMA Leads Federal

Consequence Management

Response Teams
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 64 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of State noted

consequence management assets are finite and the same assets that would

be used to respond to a domestic terrorist incident also would be used to

respond to an overseas terrorist incident.

Appendix IV provides more detailed information on the mission and

personnel strength for the consequence management response teams

shown in figure 5.

While there are numerous federal teams, we found that the response teams

do not duplicate one another for a number of reasons. In general, each

team has a unique combination of capabilities and functions when

deployed to or near the site of a terrorist incident. No single team or

agency has all the capabilities and functions that might be required to

respond to a terrorist incident. Some federal response teams have

capabilities and functions that are clearly unique, such as the ability of

HHS’ Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams to process, prepare,

and dispose of contaminated fatalities. Several federal teams would be

more likely to respond to certain types of incidents because they have

expertise concerning the type of agent used in the attack. For example,

DOE teams specialize in responding to incidents involving radiological

agents or weapons. Other teams have similar capabilities and functions,

but there are also distinctions among these teams that differentiate them.

One distinction is that they perform a wide variety of functions. In general,

these functions fall into one of three categories: performing hands-on

response functions; providing technical advice to federal, state, and local

authorities; or coordinating the response efforts and activities of other

federal teams. Because of the differences in the capabilities and expertise

of teams, the type of incident would determine which individual teams

would be most appropriate to deploy.2

Even in the absence of a terrorist threat, federal agencies still would need

most of their response teams to carry out other missions. Most federal

teams are long-standing and have purposes other than combating

terrorism, such as responding to natural disasters, hazardous material

spills, and military crises. For example, DOD teams can provide a wide

variety of consequence management capabilities in response to domestic

 2

For a detailed review of federal consequence management response capabilities, see our

report Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities;

Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

Consequence Management

Teams Generally Are Not

Duplicative
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 65 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

terrorist incident. However, these teams have a primary military role and

mission.

A few agencies have fixed assets, such as laboratories, which may

augment teams and the overall federal response in a chemical or biological

terrorist incident. In some incidents, these laboratories may perform

functions that enable deployed federal response teams to perform their

role. For example, when a diagnosis is confirmed by one of the

laboratories at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the U.S.

Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, or those within

the Laboratory Response Network, the National Medical Response Teams

and the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams can begin to treat victims

appropriately. According to HHS, this Laboratory Response Network has

responded to hundreds of state and local events since its inception. It

represents an operational partnership for early detection and laboratory

confirmation between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the

FBI, DOD, and state and local health departments. The network has a

common training doctrine and develops standardized assays that it

distributes to its partners. It is a critical new component of national

preparedness for bioterrorism.

Federal capabilities are demonstrated and enhanced through agency

participation in special events. These events provide federal agencies with

valuable experience working together to develop and practice plans to

combat terrorism. PDD 62 established a process to designate certain

events as National Special Security Events. The FBI and the U.S. Secret

Service have improved their cooperation for such events. For example,

they now have a written agreement on command and control and conduct

planning and exercises together.

Special events are high-visibility events in which federal agencies initiate

contingency measures against terrorist attacks and most agencies involved

gain valuable experience coordinating their activities. PDD 62 created a

category of special events called National Special Security Events, which

are events of such significance that they warrant greater federal planning

and protection than other special events. Upcoming events must be

nominated by the NSC, then certified by the Attorney General and

Secretary of the Treasury before they officially are designated as National

Special Security Events. Such events have included the major political

party conventions, Presidential inaugurations, Olympic games, and the

Agency Laboratories

Augment Federal

Response Teams

Coordination of

Special Events Has

Improved

Special Events Provide

Coordination Experience
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 66 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting. For these events, PDD 62

reaffirmed the FBI’s lead federal agency role for crisis management, but

designated the U.S. Secret Service as lead federal agency for security

design, planning, and implementation at such events. The directive also

encouraged cooperation among federal agencies in counterterrorism

planning for these events.

In a previous report, we noted that the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI did

not always coordinate their command and control structures or

contingency plans, and agency officials acknowledged that their agencies

had not worked well together.3

 Since then, special event cooperation and

coordination between the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI has improved.

Specifically,

• The FBI and the U.S. Secret Service have a written agreement on

command and control arrangements for special events, and officials from

both agencies agreed that this document is followed when preparing for

special events.

• The FBI’s Special Events Management Planning Handbook enumerates the

roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies (including the U.S.

Secret Service) for special events and stresses the need for cooperative

planning for terrorist incidents.

• U.S. Secret Service evaluations on special events discuss interaction with

the FBI and FEMA and identify the need for additional cooperative

planning.

• We observed close cooperation and detailed planning between the U.S.

Secret Service, the FBI, and other federal agencies during an exercise in

preparation for the 2002 Olympic Winter Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.

To improve their preparedness to respond to a terrorist incident, federal

agencies exercise their capabilities. The FBI has made progress in

practicing its interagency and intergovernmental leadership role in crisis

management through a number of exercises. FEMA has made some

progress, but is not using exercises to fully practice its leadership role

over consequence management. Two recent exercises, “Top Officials

 3

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

FBI and U.S. Secret

Service Have Improved

Coordination

Federal

Counterterrorism

Exercises Are

Improving
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 67 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

(TOPOFF) 2000” and “Wasatch Rings,” provide good examples of federally

sponsored interagency and intergovernmental exercises.

PDD 39 required key federal agencies to exercise their capabilities to

combat terrorism. Exercises test and evaluate policies and procedures,

test the effectiveness of response capabilities, and increase the confidence

and skill level of personnel. Exercises also identify strengths and

weaknesses before they arise in an actual incident. Exercises further allow

agencies to apply operational lessons learned from past exercises and

actual deployments.

In counterterrorism, where federal operations are inherently interagency

matters, exercises also allow various department and agency personnel to

become familiar with each other’s missions and procedures and learn to

coordinate and operate together. Interagency exercises can help identify

aspects of cooperation that work well and problems and conflicts that

require interagency resolution. Interagency exercises are planned through

an interagency Exercise Subgroup cochaired by the Department of State

(for international exercises) and the FBI (for domestic exercises). The

Department of State and the FBI alternate as host for bi-monthly exercise

planning meetings. These meetings address both domestic and

international exercise plans. The major agencies most likely to react to

terrorist incidents participate regularly, and other agencies participate less

frequently. The meetings allow various agencies to address issues, plan

future exercises, and compare and resolve agency exercise schedule

conflicts. They also serve as a forum for interagency discussion and

planning for national-level counterterrorism exercises.

We previously reported that domestic crisis exercises led by federal law

enforcement agencies did not include many of the federal, state, and local

authorities that would be needed to effectively respond to a terrorist crisis.

We noted that the FBI’s domestic crisis response program was well

developed with regularly scheduled field exercises that tested regional and

field office capabilities at the tactical level, but generally did not exercise

the broader interagency leadership role that the FBI would play in a major

terrorist incident. In addition, we reported that crisis management

exercises were ending in a successful tactical resolution of the incidents

and did not include more likely scenarios where terrorist attacks were

successful, requiring consequence management.

Exercises Important to

Response Readiness

The FBI Regularly

Practices Its Crisis

Management Leadership

Role Through Exercises
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 68 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Since our earlier review, the FBI has taken steps to strengthen its

leadership role through a number of interagency and intergovernmental

exercises. In planning national-level field exercises, the FBI has given

priority for state and local agencies’ participation. In addition to its own

regional field exercises, the FBI participated in or sponsored a major

interagency and intergovernmental field exercises at least once per year.

These have been field exercises that included both crisis and consequence

management and tested interagency command and control and

communications issues by establishing a Joint Operations Center. These

exercises included the following:

• In June 1998, the FBI participated in the “Gauged Strength” exercise in

Norfolk, Va. Although this exercise was sponsored by DOD, the FBI had

robust participation and established interagency organizations, such as a

Joint Operations Center and a Joint Information and Intelligence Support

Element. State and local participation was limited by DOD classification

requirements.

• In February 1999, the FBI sponsored the “Westwind” exercise in Los

Angeles, Calif. This exercise, cosponsored by the state, tested the

compatibility of federal, state, and local terrorism response plans through

the integration of the Joint Operation Center and Incident Command Post.

The exercise also tested the activation of the Terrorism Early Warning

Group and the mobilization and deployment of the Domestic Emergency

Support Team.

• In May 2000, the FBI participated in the TOPOFF 2000 exercise in three

locations across the country. This Department of Justice-sponsored

exercise included a radiological scenario in Washington, D.C.; a chemical

scenario in Portsmouth, NH, and a biological scenario in Denver, Colo.

The FBI established interagency Joint Operations Centers in all three

cities. FBI officials told us that this was the largest, most complex federal

counterterrorist exercise ever conducted.

• In April 2001, the FBI sponsored the Wasatch Rings exercise in Salt Lake

City, Utah. This exercise, cosponsored by the state, tested federal, state,

and local contingency plans related to the upcoming 2002 Olympic Winter

Games. The FBI established a Joint Operations Center, which was

co-located with a state and local command center. Again, the interagency

Domestic Emergency Support Team was deployed.

For additional information and our observations on these last two

exercises, see the information in the text boxes that follow.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 69 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

FEMA was designated as the lead federal agency for consequence

management under PDD 39 and was also tasked under a fiscal year 1995

emergency supplemental appropriation to develop exercises that focused

on consequences of a terrorist incident.4

 We previously reported that

FEMA held a number of tabletop exercises in response to these directives,

but only planned or sponsored one interagency field exercise to test its

consequence management leadership role. Tabletop exercises identify

important policy and operational issues, but are not a substitute for field

exercises that test the federal government’s ability to use and coordinate

teams and assets in a realistic setting.

Although federal agencies are beginning to work together to improve

consequence management exercises, agency officials said the

consequence management component needs to be carried out further to

effectively test agency capabilities. For example, the consequences of a

biological incident that can include mass casualties or an overwhelmed

health care system have not been fully included as part of the consequence

management exercises. These scenarios present unique challenges, such

as identifying alternative facilities for mass casualties, identifying military

reserve units that need to be brought in, determining how mass casualties

would be moved, and establishing quarantine areas.

In our review of exercises over the last 3 years, we found that FEMA

participated in some field exercises and held numerous tabletop exercises.

However, FEMA generally did not sponsor any interagency field exercise.

Without field exercises involving a consequence management component,

federal agencies are not able to train and exercise their response

capabilities, deploy personnel and equipment, and practice roles and

responsibilities in realistic settings. One FBI official said that more of the

major interagency field exercises could include a robust consequence

management component if FEMA was more involved in the initial planning

phases of the exercises within the interagency exercise group. FEMA,

however, is taking on leadership roles during field exercises in which it

participates. For instance, during the Wasatch Rings exercise briefing, we

observed FEMA outlining various consequences to possible WMD

scenarios and coordinating with federal agency officials on the

appropriate response.

 4

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for

Counterterrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery From the Tragedy That

Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Recission Act (P.L. 104-19, July 27, 1995).

FEMA Not Fully Practicing

Its Leadership Role

Through Exercises
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 70 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

FEMA’s participation in the Interagency Working Group on Exercises has

been sporadic. For example, during our observation of the January 2001

meeting of the Interagency Working Group on Exercises, FEMA did not

actively participate. In March 2001, we were told that FEMA formally was

attending meetings within the Exercise Subgroup. Active participation

within the Exercise Subgroup allows federal agencies to establish

objectives and prepare a schedule of large interagency counter-terrorist

exercises. This also allows agencies the opportunity to discuss complex

transfers of command and control between agencies. Without interagency

exercise objectives set by the Exercise Subgroup, agencies are not likely

to exercise key scenarios and, as a result, the federal government will be

less prepared to respond in a tailored, synchronized manner if an incident

occurs.

The following textbox provides our observations on TOPOFF 2000, a

congressionally directed, Department of Justice and FEMA cosponsored

field exercise to assess the nation’s crisis and consequence management

capacity.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 71 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 6 shows simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile pushpackages after they had been delivered and unloaded at Buckley Air

National Guard Base in Denver, Colorado, for the first time in TOPOFF
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 72 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

2000 to treat victims exposed to plague. The items in the simulated

stockpile were subsequently distributed to hospitals and other points of

distribution, such as makeshift medical treatment centers, so that victims

could be appropriately treated. The delivery of the stockpile during an

exercise provided an opportunity for federal, state, and local governments

to coordinate their respective responses.

Figure 6: Arrival of a Simulated National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Push-Package During TOPOFF 2000 Exercise

Note: The aircraft shown was used by technical assistance personnel; it is far too small to deliver an

actual push-package from the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. Also, the Stockpile uses

specialized cargo containers for air transportation of its pharmaceuticals, supplies, and equipment.

Source: GAO.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 73 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 7 shows members of the U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Strike Team

hazardous materials unit inspecting remains of a vehicle for chemical

residue during the TOPOFF 2000 exercise in Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

Figure 7: U.S. Coast Guard Personnel Inspect Vehicle Remains for Chemical Residue During TOPOFF 2000 Exercise

Source: U.S. Coast Guard.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 74 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following textbox provides our observations on Wasatch Rings, an

FBI and Utah Olympic Public Safety Command cosponsored multi-agency

WMD field training exercise in preparation for the 2002 Olympic Winter

Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Figure 8 shows an FBI enhanced SWAT team seizing an aircraft suspected

of carrying radiological material during the Wasatch Rings

counterterrorism exercise in preparation for the 2002 Olympic Winter

Games in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 75 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 8: FBI Enhanced SWAT Team Seizes Aircraft Suspected of Carrying Radiological Material During Wasatch Rings

Exercise

Source: Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education.

Federal capabilities also are enhanced when agencies learn lessons from

their successes and mistakes from exercises and operations. As in our

earlier work, we found that some federal agencies have relatively good

processes in place to capture and share lessons learned internally within

departments and externally with participating agencies, while others have

less rigorous processes. Some federal agencies continue to work on

implementing an interagency process to capture and share lessons

learned; however, as yet, there is no regular process being used to capture

and share lessons learned.

Evaluations of

Exercises Need

Improvement
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 76 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

A valuable part of the lessons learned process is preparation of an afteraction report (AAR) or other evaluation that documents the results of an

exercise, special event, or operation. Characteristics of an AAR typically

include a summary of objectives, operational limitations, major

participants, a description of strengths and weaknesses, and corrective

actions. Effective follow-up and validation of the strengths and

weaknesses also are important steps in the process, as they are the means

to ensure that problems are corrected. Dissemination of AARs within an

organization, and when appropriate to other participating agencies, is

another important feature that provides aspects of the operations that

worked well and those that need improvement. For counterterrorism

operations that are inherently interagency matters, the lessons learned

should also address the interaction between different agencies to highlight

problems for resolution in interagency forums.

In our prior review of agencies’ processes to capture lessons learned, we

found that while some agencies had relatively good processes in place to

capture and share lessons learned, other agencies had less rigorous

processes. For example, the other agencies did not have a written policy

that required that they produce AARs or a formal process to capture

lessons learned. The production of AARs by some of these agencies was

sporadic, in particularly for operations, special events, and exercises led

by other agencies. In addition, few of these other agencies included

discussions of interagency issues in their AARs. The dissemination of

AARs was limited at many agencies, which minimized the benefits of

lessons learned. These limitations make it more difficult for the agencies

to capture the strengths and weaknesses shown in operations or exercises

so they can continue or expand good practices or take corrective actions

when necessary to improve future performance.

In our most recent review from July 1998 to August 2001 of agencies’

processes to capture lessons learned, we found that some agencies’

processes had improved. HHS and the U.S. Secret Service have adopted a

formal policy to produce AARs to capture lessons learned, while three

other agencies, VA, EPA, and the FBI, are in the process of drafting a

policy. In addition, those agencies that adopted a formal process generally

produced AARs for special events and select exercises. HHS began

producing AARs for special events while the U.S. Secret Service started

producing AARs on special events and tabletop exercises. In other

agencies, our review found little, if any, improvement. Performance by the

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and FEMA, however,

fared worse compared to our prior review because they did not capture

After-Action Reports Are

Important Learning Tools

Some Individual Agencies

Have Improved AfterAction Reports, Although

Deficiencies Remain
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 77 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

lessons learned for any exercises, special events, or operations. Overall,

agency officials generally cited a lack of dedicated staff or the tempo of

ongoing operations or exercises as reasons why they did not write AARs

or capture lessons learned. Table 5 describes selected agencies’ processes

for capturing lessons learned and producing AARs.

Table 5: Characteristics of Federal Agencies’ Processes to Capture Lessons Learned From Counterterrorist Operations,

Special Events, and Exercises

Agency Formal policy and/or

process to capture

lessons learned

Actual agency

production of AARs

AAR discussion of

interagency issues and

dissemination

Changes from prior

GAO review of AARs

DOE Policy requires AARs;

formal process is After

Action Tracking System

Generally produces

AARs for exercises,

including those led by

other agencies; AARs

were not produced for

special events

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

disseminated internally and

sometimes externally

No change in formal

policy; AARs not produced

for special events

FEMA Policy requires AARs;

formal process is the

Corrective Action

Program

Produces no AARs for

exercises and special

events

Not applicable; AARs not

done

Performance degraded

because FEMA previously

produced AARs for its

exercises

U.S. Coast Guard Policy requires AARs;

formal process is Coast

Guard Standard After

Action Information and

Lessons Learned

System (CGSails)

Produces AARs for

some field exercises

and some tabletop

exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

disseminated widely via

web-based system/reporting

process

GAO previously did not

conduct a detailed review

of U.S. Coast Guard

processes to capture

lessons learned

DOD Policy requires AARs;

new formal process is

the Joint Lessons

Learned Program

Some units produce

AARs; DOD does not

have visibility over

them to determine the

extent to which the

requirement is met

When produced, AARs

generally discuss

interagency issues and are

disseminated internally and

sometimes externally

Adopted new formal policy

to capture lessons

learned; new office

reviews and analyzes

terrorism-related

operations and exercise

lessons learned

FBI Formal policy is being

drafted

Produces no AARs for

operations or special

events; generally,

produces AARs for FBI

field exercises, but not

tabletop exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

disseminated internally to

participating FBI offices, but

not externally

No change in production

of AARs; FBI is in the

process of drafting a

formal policy

U.S. Secret Service Policy requires AARs to

capture lessons learned

Generally produces

AARs for special

events and some

tabletop exercises;

rarely produces AARs

for field exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

are disseminated internally,

but not externally

Adopted formal policy to

capture lessons learned;

produced AARs for

special events and some

tabletop exercises
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 78 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Agency Formal policy and/or

process to capture

lessons learned

Actual agency

production of AARs

AAR discussion of

interagency issues and

dissemination

Changes from prior

GAO review of AARs

HHS Policy requires AARs to

capture lessons learned

Produces AARs for

special events; rarely

produces AARs for

exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

disseminated internally, but

not externally

Generally produces AARs

for special events;

adopted formal policy to

capture lessons learned

EPA Formal policy is being

drafted

Produced AAR for

exercise sponsored by

another agency

Not applicable; AARs not

done

EPA is in the process of

drafting a formal AAR

policy

USDA No formal policy or

process

Produces AARs for

some exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

disseminated internally

GAO previously did not

conduct a detailed review

of USDA processes to

capture lessons learned

VA Formal policy is being

drafted

Produces AARs for

field exercises

AARs generally discuss

interagency issues; AARs

are disseminated internally,

but not externally

GAO previously did not

conduct a detailed review

of VA processes to

capture lessons learned

ATF No formal policy Does not produce

AARs for exercises

and special events

Not applicable; AARs not

done

Performance degraded

because AARs previously

were produced for ATF

exercises

Note: The period of review was July 1998 to June 2001.

Source: GAO analysis.

Although some agencies adopted formal policies to capture lessons

learned, there were recurring interagency problems because there was no

central place where officials assembled and analyzed AARs together to

discuss interagency problems. The Exercise Subgroup discussed

developing a formal interagency process and has looked specifically at the

processes being used by DOD and DOE, although no process has been

adopted and developed. At the interagency level, there continues to be no

formal process implemented to review and analyze AARs. The lack of an

interagency process to centralize lessons learned prevents agencies from

learning or cause them to make the same mistakes. This problem is further

magnified because agencies that participated in national-level field

exercises may have to wait up to a year before reviewing AARs because of

the time it takes agencies to prepare AARs. After more than a year, the

Department of Justice’s Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness

Support released its AAR on the TOPOFF 2000 no-notice field exercise.

Without AARs, agencies may not be able to correct previously identified

shortfalls or fully implement lessons learned. The Office currently is

planning the TOPOFF II exercise for fiscal year 2003.

Interagency Process to

Capture After-Action

Reports Is Not in Place
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Page 79 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Federal capabilities to combat terrorism can be enhanced through

research and development. The considerable risk, long development time,

and high cost necessitate federal government involvement to promote

research and development related to WMD terrorism. Federal research

and development programs are coordinated through a variety of

mechanisms, but primarily through an interagency working group called

the Technical Support Working Group (TSWG).5

 However, coordination is

limited by a number of factors, raising the potential for duplicative efforts

among federal agencies.

Federally sponsored research and development efforts enhance the

government’s capability to combat terrorism by providing products that

meet a range of crisis and consequence management needs. Federal

agencies and interagency working groups have or are developing a variety

of products to combat terrorism. Examples of recently developed and

fielded technologies include products to detect and identify weapons of

mass destruction, transport contaminated materials, and validate

protection equipment life spans, such as

• tools for assessing exposure risks of airborne chemical and biological

agents in new and existing structures in order to compare the relative risk

to occupants under different release and protection scenarios,

• puncture- and tear-resistant containers in multiple sizes for the initial

packaging and transport of chemical- and biological-contaminated objects,

• tests to determine the life span of chemical gas mask canisters when

removed from protective containers and attached to gas masks, and

• computer-based information and instruction tool sets for first responders.

Additional technologies presently are under development by TSWG and

federal agencies. These endeavors include developing continuousmonitoring chemical detectors for facility protection, filtration

 5

TSWG was established as the technology development component of the Department of

State-chaired Interagency Group on Terrorism. Its mission is to conduct the national

interagency research and development program for combating terrorism. TSWG operates

under the policy oversight of the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for

Counterterrorism and the management and technical oversight of the DOD Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. An

Executive Committee chaired by a Department of State representative provides program

direction. Members of the Executive Committee include representatives from DOD, DOE,

and the FBI. DOD manages and executes the program through the Combating Terrorism

Technology Support Office.

Research and

Development

Enhances Future

Federal Capabilities

Research and

Development Enhances

Response Capabilities
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 80 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

systems for small rooms and buildings, modeling systems that project the

spread of animal or plant disease outbreaks resulting from terrorist

attacks, vehicle explosive screening and barrier technologies, and

decontamination technologies for urban facilities, including subways and

airports. The National Institutes of Health is engaged in research that will

lead to the development of new or improved vaccines, antibiotics, and

antivirals. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, in

collaboration with other federal agencies, is conducting research on the

diagnosis and treatment of smallpox. The Food and Drug Administration is

investigating a variety of biological agents that could be used as terrorist

weapons.

Research and development related to WMD terrorism can involve

considerable risk, lengthy development times, and high costs as well as

specific requirements not available in off-the-shelf products. These factors

not only limit and affect the type of research and development in which

various sectors of the private and public markets engage, but necessitate

federal government involvement and collaboration to promote research

and development. For example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency and the National Institutes of Health conduct high cost, very high

risk, and time-intensive research and development in which industry

typically may not engage. Figure 9 below depicts the relationship between

risk, time, and cost associated with the development of products to

combat terrorism, demonstrating that the federal government is the

primary driver of WMD research and development.

Research and

Development Will Likely

Require Government

Involvement
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Page 81 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Figure 9: Relationships Between Risk, Time, and Cost in Developing Products to Combat Terrorism

Source: GAO analysis of TSWG data.
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Page 82 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The Assistant to the President for Science and Technology heads the

Office of Science and Technology Policy and serves on the cabinet-level

National Science and Technology Council. These entities advise the

President on the coordination of federal research and development

investments and macro-level policies, plans, and programs. The Council

establishes national goals for federal science and technology investment

and prepares research and development strategies that are coordinated

across federal agencies. The Council's Committee on National Security

provides a formal mechanism for interagency policy review, planning, and

coordination as well as the exchange of information regarding national

security-related research and development. However, these organizations

have not created a national research and development strategy specific to

combating WMD-related terrorism. They also do not coordinate individual

agency projects. As a result, the management of technology research and

development at the agency-level is self-governing and highly dependent on

voluntary coordination mechanisms. Individual agencies have a number of

research and development or applied technology programs that are

coordinated in varying ways and degrees with other agencies through

formal and informal mechanisms.

The primary coordination mechanism for terrorism-related research and

development is TSWG, an interagency working group that, in fiscal year

2000, coordinated more than $60 million in research and development

activities across the counterterrorism community in eight categories of

terrorism-related products. The eight categories are (1) explosives

detection and defeat; (2) personnel protection; (3) tactical operations

support; (4) infrastructure protection; (5) chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclear countermeasures; (6) investigative support and

forensics; (7) physical security; and (8) surveillance, collection, and

operations support. TSWG serves an important function, providing a way

for technologies to be developed when a single agency cannot invest

sufficiently in a technology that would benefit multiple agencies,

collaborate directly with other agencies in such investments, or afford to

risk investing scarce operational resources and manpower in unproven

technologies. TSWG’s purview represents a minor share of all terrorismrelated research and development being conducted across the federal

government because numerous federal agencies also independently

engage in research and development or technology application projects

specific to their respective agency missions for combating terrorism. In

addition, TSWG’s activities are limited to the development of products of

use to—and supported by—the majority of its members.

Federal Research and

Development Is

Coordinated in a Variety of

Ways
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Page 83 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Federal agencies also depend on informal coordination mechanisms, such

as liaison programs and personal relationships, to facilitate information

sharing concerning ongoing and planned research and development

activities. For example, DOE maintains an informal liaison program with

other agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration. However,

officials acknowledge that informal relationships cannot be expected to

capture the universe of projects or inform agencies of all relevant and

related research and development projects. For example, the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency was unaware of U.S. Coast Guard

plans to develop methods to detect biological agents on infected cruise

ships and, therefore, was unable to share information on its research to

develop chemical and biological detection devices for buildings that could

have applicability in this area.

In commenting on a draft of this report, OSTP described more recent

mechanisms to coordinate research and development related to combating

terrorism within the NSC’s Policy Coordinating Committee on

Counterterrorism and National Preparedness. In implementing National

Security Presidential Decision-1, dated February 2001, the NSC established

the NSC-chaired Preparedness Against Weapons of Mass Destruction

Group. It has eight subgroups, including the OSTP-chaired Research and

Development Subgroup, which reports to the NSC chair. According to

OSTP, all federal departments and agencies with interests, equities, or

needs in research and development for combating terrorism are

represented on the Research and Development Subgroup. To ensure

communication and coordination of Subgroup activities and TSWG, a

TSWG cochair is a member of the Subgroup.

According to OSTP, the Subgroup assesses federal research and

development programs to help agencies integrate the highest priority

items into their budgets, thereby reducing gaps and duplication in efforts

to prevent, counter, and respond to chemical, biological, radiological, or

nuclear terrorist attack. The Subgroup has a broad role in identifying longrange, large-scale research and development issues that involve

preventing, countering, and responding to chemical, biological,

radiological, or nuclear terrorist attacks. According to OSTP, the Subgroup

is consulting with other subgroup chairs to identify comprehensive

research and development needs in preparedness for combating terrorism;

identifying and prioritizing research and development gap-filling

objectives; implementing a process for reporting progress toward

achieving research and development objectives; and continuing the

ongoing effort to achieve concordance of research and development

objectives with agency programs.
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 84 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

We reported in 1999 that current formal and informal research and

development coordination mechanisms may not ensure that potential

overlaps, gaps, and opportunities for collaboration are addressed.6

A number of factors continue to limit research and development

coordination, creating the potential for duplicative efforts among federal

agencies. For example, TSWG’s scope is limited to projects with relatively

short-term development cycles and member federal agencies only propose

and discuss projects that they believe will garner broad interest and

support from other agencies. Information concerning research and

development projects with more narrow applicability, but potentially of

equal importance, either are not shared or are communicated through

alternate methods. Furthermore, excluding TSWG, federal agency

announcements and requests for proposals generally do not require

contractors and national laboratories to disclose whether they are

conducting the same or similar projects for other agencies or even to

identify other requesters.

Federal agencies need to coordinate their research and development

efforts because they pursue many of the same capabilities and may

contract with many of the same laboratories and industries to perform

research and development work. A DOE official acknowledged that a

national laboratory developed similar products for multiple agencies and

charged each of them separately. For example, two offices within Sandia

National Laboratory concurrently and separately worked on similar

thermal imagery projects for two different federal agencies, rather than

consolidating the requests and combining resources. The Attorney

General’s Five-Year Plan recommended that responses to federal research

and development requests for proposals identify pending similar

submissions to mitigate against duplicate funding for essentially the same

project and to facilitate collaboration among federal agencies.

The extent of compartmentalization of research and development

activities further limits coordination. Many programs are

compartmentalized or classified; therefore, results often are not widely

shared, even among agencies with similar missions and, in some instances,

even within the same agency. For example, DOE has three programs that

focus on agency mission-specific research, development, and applied

technology. DOE coordinates some programs’ activities with a number of

 6

Chemical and Biological Defense: Coordination of Nonmedical Chemical and Biological

R&D Programs (GAO/NSIAD-99-160, Aug. 16, 1999).

Limits to Coordination

Raise Potential for

Duplication
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

Improving

Page 85 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

interagency organizations and groups, but does not coordinate other

initiatives due to classification concerns. However, some DOE program

officials coordinate with or participate in at least 12 interagency

organizations and groups involved in technology application programs for

combating terrorism.

Federal coordination is limited by the lack of formal mechanisms to

capture the entire universe of governmentwide research and development

efforts. The absence of a single oversight and coordinating entity to ensure

against duplication further hinders coordination. To address this problem,

the Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan calls for a comprehensive

mechanism and research and development strategy consistent with and

complementary to the nation’s overall technology goals. The plan

advocates setting national counter-terrorism priorities, tracking ongoing

projects consistent with these priorities, defining near- and longer-term

technology needs, supporting fundamental research in targeted technical

sectors, and promoting technological breakthroughs.

The development of such a plan may benefit individual agency efforts.

Some individual agencies, such as DOE and the Department of

Transportation, have developed agency-specific research and development

plans that are linked to their overall agency strategic plans that may

identify agency-specific research and development goals and objectives as

well as the roles of other federal agencies in achieving those goals. For

example, the Department of Transportation Research and Development

Plan supports the Department’s budget and program development process,

establishes priorities, and links research and technology development

initiatives occurring throughout the Department to specific strategic goals.

By focusing on research and development needs that concern the

Department as a whole, the plan allows the Department of Transportation

to transcend individual research and development projects and facilitates

internal planning and coordination. If a governmentwide research and

development strategy to combat terrorism was completed, then it would

provide a way for agencies, through their own plans or related efforts, to

link their research and development to related efforts where appropriate.

Although FEMA has made some progress, it is not using exercises to fully

practice its leadership role over consequence management. If FEMA

played a larger role in managing federal exercises to combat terrorism,

then it would improve federal agencies’ overall readiness in consequence

management. In addition, if FEMA was more involved in the initial

planning phases of field exercises within the Interagency Working Group

Conclusions
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 86 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

on Exercises, then major interagency field exercises could include a more

robust consequence management component. Active leadership and

participation within the Working Group would allow FEMA to

(1) establish objectives and prepare a schedule of large interagency

counter-terrorist exercises and (2) ensure that complex transfers of

command and control between agencies are exercised. Without field

exercises involving a consequence management component, federal

agencies are not able to train and exercise their response capabilities,

deploy personnel and equipment, and practice roles and responsibilities

under realistic conditions.

To ensure that individual agencies learn lessons after each federal

counterterrorism exercise, special event, or operation, agencies should

prepare a timely AAR or other evaluation that documents the results.

Dissemination of AARs within an agency—and, whenever possible and

appropriate, to other participating agencies—would provide participants

with information on the operations that worked well and those that need

improvement. Finally, taking corrective action and effective follow-up

would help ensure that problems are corrected.

At the interagency level it is also important to capture and evaluate lessons

learned. While most agencies are making progress evaluating their own

exercises, little progress has been made at the interagency level. There is a

need for a regular lessons learned process for major interagency exercises.

Although research and development efforts are being coordinated through

a variety of mechanisms, development of a strategic plan for research and

development could help prevent duplication and leverage resources.

OSTP’s efforts are on hold pending the Vice President’s review of national

preparedness.

To improve readiness in consequence management, we recommend that

the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency play a larger

role in managing federal exercises to combat terrorism. As part of this,

FEMA should seek a formal role as a cochair of the Interagency Working

Group on Exercises and help to plan and conduct major interagency

counterterrorist exercises to ensure that consequence management is

adequately addressed.

To ensure that agencies benefit fully from exercises in which they

participate, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense,

Energy, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs; the Directors of

the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Federal Emergency

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 87 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the U.S. Secret

Service; the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency; and

the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard require their agencies to prepare

AARs or similar evaluations for all exercises they lead and for all field

exercises in which they participate.

To ensure that individual agencies capture, evaluate, and disseminate

interagency lessons learned after each federal counterterrorism exercise,

special event, or operation, we recommend that the President direct the

focal point for overall leadership and coordination (discussed at the end of

ch. 2) to develop a formal process to capture and evaluate interagency

lessons learned from major interagency and intergovernmental federal

exercises to combat terrorism. While agencies sponsoring and

participating in such exercises should continue to collect and analyze

information on their individual performance, the focal point should

analyze interagency lessons learned and task individual agencies to take

corrective actions as appropriate.

To reduce duplication and leverage resources, we recommend that the

Assistant to the President for Science and Technology complete efforts to

develop a strategic plan for research and development to combat

terrorism, coordinating this with federal agencies and state and local

authorities. If our recommendation in chapter 2 is adopted and a single

focal point is established in the Executive Office of the President to lead

and coordinate federal programs to combat terrorism, then the focal point

should also ensure that a research and development strategy for

combating terrorism is integrated or coordinated with the national

strategy to combat terrorism (see Recommendations for Executive Action

in ch. 2).

Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on their efforts

prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. FEMA agreed with our

recommendation that it play a larger role in managing federal exercises to

combat terrorism. FEMA said the creation of the Office of National

Preparedness in FEMA to coordinate all federal programs dealing with

WMD consequence management and its May 8, 2001, charge (see app. VII)

by the President to work with the Department of Justice to ensure that “all

facets of our response to the threat from weapons of mass destruction are

coordinated and cohesive” will improve consequence management

readiness and will ensure that FEMA plays a larger role in federal

exercises. FEMA also agreed with our recommendation that it should seek

a formal role as cochair of the Interagency Working Group on Exercises.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
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Page 88 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The Departments of Energy and Health and Human Services and EPA also

agreed that exercises to combat terrorism need a more robust

consequence management emphasis. For example, DOE said it would be

very beneficial to exercise the complete domestic counterterrorism

command and control and response mechanisms using a realistic,

progressive, end-to-end scenario with participation by the actual decision

makers through both the crisis management and consequence

management phases. In general, EPA is in agreement with the report. One

of EPA’s principal concerns has been the lack of development of

consequence management in exercises. Beyond the immediate

consequences caused by the use of a weapon of mass destruction, the

long-term consequences of cleaning up to a safe level have not been

played out.

The Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and Veterans Affairs and

FEMA concurred with our recommendation that agencies prepare AARs or

similar evaluations for all exercises they lead and for all field exercises in

which they participate. DOD encourages this practice. DOE said the

report’s recommendations on the importance of interagency exercises and

feedback on lessons learned are completely accurate. FEMA said it will

review and evaluate its current procedures regarding AARs and make any

necessary changes to ensure that its AARs for weapons of mass

destruction are completed in a timely fashion.

The Department of Agriculture agreed with the practice of writing AARs,

but asked that we delete our recommendation to the Secretary of

Agriculture because the Department already produces AARs for exercises

it sponsors. We continue to believe that this is a valid recommendation

because the Department could learn important lessons when it

participates in field exercises sponsored by other agencies.

The Department of Health and Human Services, ATF, the U.S. Secret

Service, EPA, and U.S. Coast Guard did not comment on this

recommendation.

The Department of Justice supported our recommendation about agencies

capturing and sharing lessons learned at the interagency level. The

Department also cited efforts begun by the NDPO to develop a program to

address this concern. This program would include a mechanism for not

only identifying interagency problems, but assigning responsibility for

corrective actions and tracking progress as well. The Executive Office of

the President did not comment on our recommendation that the President
Chapter 4: Federal Response Capabilities Are

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Page 89 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

direct the focal point to develop a formal process to capture and evaluate

interagency lessons learned from exercises to combat terrorism.

DOE said it shares our observations on the importance of an aggressive

counterterrorism research and development effort. DOE stated that better

interagency communication and a more extensive and formal coordination

mechanism would increase efficiency, be more cost effective, and ensure

against duplication of effort. Department of Transportation officials

commented that the report may help them in their research and

development efforts. The Executive Office of the President—and the

Office of Science and Technology Policy—did not comment on our

recommendation that the Assistant to the President for Science and

Technology complete efforts to develop a strategic plan for research and

development to combat terrorism. Notwithstanding agencies’ lack of

comment on this recommendation, we still believe it has merit as one

method to better coordinate research and development.
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

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The federal government has several programs to train and equip state and

local authorities to respond to terrorist WMD incidents. These programs

have improved domestic preparedness training and equipped over 273,000

first responders. The programs also have included exercises to allow first

responders to interact with themselves and federal responders. Some of

these programs initially were implemented without appreciation for

existing state and regional structures for emergency management. In

addition, the fact that these programs have been led by three different

federal agencies—DOD, the Department of Justice, and FEMA—created

overlapping and duplicative activities. The multitude and overlap of these

programs led to confusion on the part of state and local officials. These

officials asked the federal government to establish a single federal liaison

for them. In 1998, the Attorney General established the National Domestic

Preparedness Office (NDPO) within the FBI to serve as such a liaison.

However, the Office never met its expected role due to a variety of reasons

related to its budget, personnel, and location. In May 2001, the President

asked the Director of FEMA to establish an Office of National

Preparedness to coordinate all federal programs dealing with WMD

consequence management programs. This new Office provides a logical

location for consolidating many programs to assist state and local

governments, including some programs currently under the Department of

Justice and the FBI. Federal assistance also has been provided in the form

of special National Guard teams that are trained and equipped to provide

states with capabilities to detect and analyze WMD agents and provide

technical advice. These teams continue to experience problems with

readiness, doctrine and roles, and deployment that undermine their

usefulness in an actual terrorist incident.

The federal government has had several programs that train and/or equip

state and local authorities to respond to terrorist WMD incidents. Whereas

DOD ran the Domestic Preparedness Program from 1997 until 2000, the

Department of Justice, HHS, and FEMA are the main agencies now

conducting these programs. They also have included exercises to allow

first responders to interact with themselves and federal responders in

realistic field settings. These programs are as follows:

• DOD began the Domestic Preparedness Program in 1997 to enhance the

nation’s ability to mitigate the effects of terrorist use of weapons of mass

Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

Local Governments Can Be Consolidated

Federal Programs

Have Provided

Training, Equipment,

and Exercises
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

Local Governments Can Be Consolidated

Page 91 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

destruction.1 The program identified 120 cities to receive training,

exercises, and funding for training equipment support. The program

provided cities with classroom training, exercises, and 5-year renewable

loans of equipment to be used for training. Beginning in fiscal year 2001,

the President transferred responsibility for the program from DOD to the

Department of Justice.

• The Department of Justice’s Office for State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support, which was created in 1998, provides assistance to

state and local governments. This Office has a variety of programs, such as

its Metropolitan Firefighters and Emergency Medical Services program.

Since fiscal year 2001, it also implements the domestic preparedness

program formerly managed by DOD. The Office also uses DOD’s Pine Bluff

Arsenal, the National Sheriff’s Association, the International Association of

Fire Fighters, private corporations, and the National Domestic

Preparedness Consortium to train first responders.2

 In total, the Office

provides 30 courses using 10 different partner organizations to deliver

training.

• FEMA provides WMD-related courses at its National Fire Academy and

Emergency Management Institute in Maryland. The Academy and Institute

also provide WMD course materials to local and state organizations for

their use in training first responders. FEMA makes grants for terrorismrelated training to states at either local or FEMA regional locations. FEMA

also makes grants to help states develop and test their emergency plans

through exercises.

• HHS supports the development of Metropolitan Medical Response Systems

in order to enhance local planning and health care capacity to respond to

the health consequences of a WMD release. This program encourages local

jurisdictions to strengthen regional and state response relationships.

Begun in 1996, the program now includes 97 metropolitan jurisdictions or

areas with a total population of approximately 150 million people. The U.S.

Public Health Service Noble Training Center, located in the former Noble

Army Community Hospital at Fort McClellan in Anniston, Alabama,

provides a unique medical training facility dedicated to preparing health

personnel to respond to chemical and biological weapons attacks.

 1

The program was directed by the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of

1996 (P.L. 104-201, Sept. 23, 1996). Because of the Senators who authored the original bill in

the U.S. Senate, the program was also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program.

2

The consortium consists of five facilities that provide training, including Fort McClellen,

Ala., New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, Texas A&M University, Louisiana

State University, and the Nevada Test Site.
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Page 92 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Several other federal organizations offer courses that are not directed

specifically at responding to WMD incidents, but provide first responders

with valuable skills and knowledge in handling hazardous materials. For

example, the EPA offers several courses in how to handle incidents

involving hazardous materials and DOE offers several courses aimed at

handling the consequences of radiological incidents. In addition, HHS’

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health offers training to the

health community in areas such as hazardous materials. Many of these

courses are related to the agencies’ core mission and basic functions

independent of combating terrorism.

Through these programs, thousands of first responders have been trained

and now have a greater awareness of how to respond to a potential

chemical or biological terrorist incident. For example, local officials

credited DOD’s Domestic Preparedness Program with bringing local, state,

and federal regional emergency response agencies together into a closer

working relationship. As of October 1, 2000 (when the Department of

Justice took over the program), DOD had completed training in 105 cities

that included 4 days of training plus a chemical tabletop exercise. In

addition, 68 of those 105 cities also received additional training, which

included delivery of equipment plus a chemical field exercise and a

biological tabletop exercise. Table 6 shows the number of first responders

trained by DOD, the Department of Justice, and FEMA.

Table 6: State and Local Responders Receiving Federal WMD Training, Fiscal Years 1998 to 2001

Federal WMD Training Program FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 Total

Department of Justice Metropolitan Firefighters and

Emergency Medical Services Program

 24,955 20,925 4,221 1,695 51,796

Department of Justice National Domestic Preparedness

Consortium

 49 2,022 9,375 14,059 25,505

Department of Defense/Department of Justice Domestic

Preparedness Program

 9,348 9,119 9,077 630 28,174

FEMA National Fire Academy and Emergency

Management Institute

43,759 51,693 40,982 31,891 168,325

Total 78,111 83,759 63,655 48,275 273,800

Note: Fiscal year 1998-2000 data are complete. Department of Justice data for fiscal year 2001 are

through August 31, 2001; and FEMA data for fiscal year 2001 are through July 31, 2001. All Domestic

Preparedness Program training for fiscal years 1998-2000 was conducted by DOD; thereafter, by the

Department of Justice.

Source: Data from DOD, the Department of Justice, and FEMA.

Figure 10 shows the status of 53 remaining cities that are receiving

Domestic Preparedness Program first responder training. These 53 cities

represent the number of the original 120 cities that remained after DOD
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

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Page 93 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

transferred the program to the Department of Justice on October 1, 2000.

As shown by the map, about two-thirds of the cities have completed the

initial training and have begun the exercise phase. The remaining one-third

of the cities have initiated the training phase, but have not begun the

exercise phase. Phase I initial training includes 4 days of training and a 1-

day chemical tabletop exercise. Phase II consists of equipment support

and exercises.
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Figure 10: Status of 53 Remaining Cities Receiving Domestic Preparedness Program First Responder Training

Note: Data are current as of August 31, 2001.

Source: Department of Justice.
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Figure 11 shows an intergovernmental exercise in which federal, state, and

local emergency responders exercised together.

Figure 11: Salt Lake City, Utah, Fire Department Personnel Treat “Victim” During Wasatch Rings Exercise in Preparation for

the 2002 Olympic Winter Games

Source: GAO.
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As we reported earlier, some WMD training programs initially failed to

leverage existing state and local response mechanisms.3

 DOD provided

training to cities without taking advantage of the existing state emergency

management structures, mutual aid agreements among local jurisdictions,

or other collaborative arrangement for emergency response. For example,

California has a Specialized Training Institute that provides emergency

management training to first responders statewide; in Texas, the state’s

Division of Emergency Management conducts training for local

responders. Use of these capabilities and mechanisms could have allowed

training consolidation and could have resulted in far fewer training

sessions. Training in fewer locations and taking advantage of existing

emergency response structures could have hastened the accomplishment

of program goals and have the added benefit of reinforcing local response

integration. Such an approach also could have covered a greater

percentage of the population and make effective use of existing state

emergency management training venues.

In taking over the DOD domestic preparedness program, the Department

of Justice has taken a number of steps to improve the delivery of the

program to better leverage existing state and local programs. For example,

the Department plans to modify the former DOD program’s delivery in

metropolitan areas by requiring cities to include their mutual aid partners

in all training and exercise activities. The Department also has made the

training timeline more flexible, to better fit into state and local training

schedules. In addition, the Department has provided grants to defray

administrative costs of conducting analysis and planning for the programs.

Equipment loans from DOD—a source of confusion and frustration among

local officials over maintenance responsibility and the final disposition of

the equipment—were converted into a grant program when the

Department of Justice took over.

FEMA programs did not appear to have these deficiencies. FEMA already

leveraged state and local mechanisms by delivering numerous courses

through and in cooperation with state and local fire training academies

and emergency managers.

Our earlier reports also found that federal assistance programs were

overlapping and potentially duplicative. In a March 2000 report, based

 3

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus

and Efficiency, (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Improvements Made

in Delivery and

Coordination of

Assistance
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Page 97 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

upon an extensive review and comparison of training programs and

curriculum, we found that federal training programs on WMD

preparedness are not well coordinated among agencies, resulting in

inefficiencies and concerns in the first responder communities.4

 The three

main agencies at that time—DOD, the Department of Justice, and FEMA—

were providing similar awareness courses as part of their train-the-trainer

programs. We recommended that DOD, the Department of Justice, and

FEMA eliminate their duplicative training programs.

Based upon our previous recommendation, a number of steps have been

taken to reduce duplication and improve coordination. DOD transferred

its Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice starting

in fiscal year 2001. The Department of Justice is integrating the DOD

program into its own program. It conducted a side-by-side analysis of

course content, learning objectives, and instructional methods for its

existing program and the DOD program it took over. The Department of

Justice eliminated DOD’s awareness course because it duplicated a similar

course. The Department of Justice and FEMA have coordinated their

awareness training courses, with the FEMA course being delivered to state

training academies and the Department of Justice course being delivered

to local jurisdictions that have not been reached by the state academies.

Efforts also have increased to coordinate assistance efforts across all

agencies. The NSC established an interagency working group on

Assistance to State and Local Authorities to review and guide WMD

training and equipment programs. Several other agencies involved in

training have established a Training Resources and Data Exchange

working group. This group has initiated the development of agreed-upon

learning objectives by discipline and competency level for federal training

efforts. Other efforts include an interagency joint course development and

review process. According to the Department of Justice, this group

represents an effort towards the elimination of duplicative federal efforts

and non-standard federal training curriculum. The Department of Justice

has set up a centralized scheduling desk to help manage the many training

and exercise activities in which state and local governments participate.

Despite these changes, state and local officials have expressed concerns

about duplication and overlap among federal programs for WMD training

 4

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass

Destruction Training, (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

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and other related courses. Some officials said that the number of federal

organizations involved in WMD training creates confusion about which

federal organization is in charge of that training. Department of Justice

officials believe that their efforts have eliminated confusion among state

and local officials. However, our recent discussions with state and local

officials from Colorado and recent testimonies by organizations

representing first responders, indicate that there still is confusion about

federal assistance programs. For example, a representative of the

International Association of Fire Chiefs—a Department of Justice partner

for providing training to state and local governments—testified that it has

been their experience in a number of jurisdictions that efforts undertaken

to date at the federal level, while by themselves valuable, would benefit

greatly from an increased level of coordination and accountability.

According to the Association, efforts that may be duplicative or worse,

contradictory, lead to confusion at the local level and expend precious

federal resources unnecessarily. The Association said efforts underway at

the federal, state, and local levels of government ought to be better

synchronized for the benefit of public safety. At the federal level, there

certainly is expertise located in different agencies that should be leveraged

to create the most effective preparedness effort possible. The Association

representative believed this could be better accomplished by designating

one federal official with responsibility and authority to coordinate and

deliver these programs. The Association has in the past requested a single

point-of-contact in Washington to whom it can turn for answers and

provide input.5

Groups representing first responders repeatedly called for a single liaison

in the federal government to provide “one stop shopping” for federal

assistance. They said that first responders were confused by the multitude

of federal programs from different agencies. In response to these

concerns, the Attorney General established the NDPO in October 1998

under the management of the FBI to serve as a single point of contact for

state and local authorities. NDPO was to be staffed by personnel detailed

from a variety of federal, state, and local governments with consequence

 5

See Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 525), Statement by the

International Association of Fire Chiefs before the Subcommittee on Economic

Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, Committee on Transportation

and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, May 9, 2001, pp. 2-3. Officials from other

organizations representing first responders, such as the National Emergency Management

Association and the National League of Cities, made similar comments.

Federal Liaison for

State and Local

Responders Did Not

Meet Expectations
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Page 99 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

management roles. NDPO was to coordinate federal efforts and resources

to assist state and local governments in planning, training, exercising, and

providing equipment to enhance their readiness to respond to a WMD

incident. NDPO officials have cited a number of accomplishments to

include starting a state and local advisory group, developing planning

guides, and publishing an on-scene commander’s guide.

However, groups representing first responders have said that the NDPO

had not met their expectations. Our work indicates that there were several

reasons for NDPO not realizing its original purpose, including the

following.

• There was insufficient funding for NDPO (it had no direct funding for its

first 2 years).

• There was little staffing from NDPO’s interagency and intergovernmental

partners, so the Office lacked key functional expertise.

• There was no consensus on NDPO’s role in relation to other federal

entities.

• NDPO’s location in the FBI building hampered interaction with first

responders.

• First responders did not perceive NDPO as independent.

In May 2001, the President announced the establishment of a new Office of

National Preparedness in FEMA that will lead the federal government in

the oversight, coordination, integration, and implementation of domestic

preparedness and consequence management programs and activities for

WMD-related threats. The new Office will be expected to coordinate all

federal programs to support state and local preparedness and

consequence management response involving planning, training,

exercises, research and development, expert advice, and equipment

acquisition. At the time of our review, FEMA was still planning this Office.

We believe the creation of this Office is a positive development for three

reasons. The first reason is that FEMA—as the lead agency for

consequence management and preparing state and local governments for

WMD terrorism—is the most logical agency to coordinate these functions.

The second reason is that the announcement, coming from the President,

clearly puts FEMA in the lead for this governmentwide matter. Finally, we

believe the creation of the new Office of National Preparedness within

FEMA provides the opportunity to consolidate certain programs or offices

currently run by the Department of Justice and the FBI. However, the

Department of Justice and the FBI would retain their law enforcement and

investigative roles and responsibilities.

New Office Offers

Potential to

Consolidate

Assistance Programs

Under FEMA
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Establishment of the Office of National Preparedness creates the potential

to consolidate some Department of Justice assistance programs into

FEMA. The Department of Justice’s Office for State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support provides assistance to state and local governments

in the form of grants and exercise support. This Department of Justice

Office also performs substantial liaison with state and local governments

when administering its grants. In fact, the lead recipients of these

Department of Justice grants are the state emergency management

agencies—the core clients for FEMA’s assistance programs. These

Department of Justice programs might be more appropriately consolidated

within FEMA because it is the lead agency for domestic preparedness as

well as emergency management in general. While it is unclear whether the

new FEMA Office will administer grants and related assistance, having

such programs consolidated under FEMA, in proximity to its new Office of

National Preparedness, may simplify federal assistance from the

perspective of state and local governments. Conversely, the continuance

of multiple assistance programs run by FEMA and the Department of

Justice may continue the current confusion and frustration among the first

responder community.

In addition, the creation of the Office of National Preparedness provides

the opportunity to consolidate the NDPO or its functions into FEMA. As

stated above, the new FEMA Office will be expected to coordinate all

federal consequence management programs to support state and local

preparedness involving planning, training, exercises, expert advice, and

equipment acquisition. These activities are very similar to the purpose of

the NDPO. Once the Office of National Preparedness is in place, we

believe that the continued existence and operations of the NDPO would

not be needed. As with the Office for State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support, the existence of both the NDPO and the new Office

of National Preparedness will continue to create confusion and frustration

among the first responder community. As of August 2001, negotiations

were ongoing between the Attorney General and the Director of FEMA

about transferring NDPO’s functions and some of its personnel to FEMA’s

new Office of National Preparedness. Once the new Office is operational,

the Department of Justice plans to shut down NDPO.
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In addition to training and equipping first responders, the federal

government has provided assistance to state governments by establishing

specialized National Guard teams, known as Weapons of Mass Destruction

Civil Support Teams. These teams—originally called Rapid Assessment

and Initial Detection or “RAID” teams—were developed to assist state and

local authorities in responding to a terrorist incident involving weapons of

mass destruction. Although the federal government funds the teams, they

are considered state assets operating under the Governor and Adjutant

General of their state.6

 Twenty-seven teams have been established and the

Congress has authorized an additional five teams. DOD plans—and

officials suggested—that there eventually should be a team in each state,

territory, and the District of Columbia, for a total of 54 teams. At least one

state, California, has two teams. The teams are composed of 22 full-time

members of the National Guard, organized into six functional areas. The

teams include personnel with a military occupational specialty in WMD

warfare.

Earlier GAO and DOD Inspector General reports, as well as our more

recent observations, indicated there are continued problems with these

teams regarding their readiness, doctrine, roles compared to other teams,

and time to deploy.7

 DOD concurred with recent recommendations by its

Inspector General to address these problems. The specific problems

experienced by these teams are as follows.

• The readiness of the teams has fallen behind schedule. In the Strom

Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, the

Congress required that none of the National Guard teams could be used to

respond to an emergency unless the Secretary of Defense certifies that the

team has the requisite skills, training, and equipment to be proficient in all

mission requirements. According to the DOD Inspector General, the

Army’s process for certifying the teams lacked rigor and would not

provide meaningful assurance of their readiness. As a result, the program

schedule has slipped. Although the first 10 teams originally were

 6

Although the National Guard teams generally would remain as state assets when activated

in response to a terrorist incident under title 32, they could be federalized into the U.S.

military under title 10.

7

Our earlier report was Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). The DOD Inspector General report was

Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams

(DOD-IG D-2001-043, Jan. 31, 2001).

Federally Funded

National Guard Teams

Continue to

Experience Problems
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Page 102 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

scheduled to be fully operational by January 2000, a total of nine teams

had been certified as operational during July and August 2001.

• The doctrine and role for the teams were not well developed. According to

the DOD Inspector General, the Army developed doctrine for the teams

independently, without coordinating with appropriate military and civilian

organizations. Specifically, the Army developed the doctrine independent

of the Joint Task Force for Civil Support (which would be the higher

headquarters for the teams if they were federalized) and the FBI (which

would act as the lead federal agency during a crisis). The absence of

finalized doctrine has encouraged and promoted an environment of

persistent changes to operational concepts and mission requirements. The

DOD Inspector General recommended that DOD coordinate with the FBI

to determine the exact roles and missions that the National Guard teams

would fulfill.

• The teams’ original role of planning for follow-on military assets is now

done by another organization. Both DOD and the Army have stated that

the National Guard teams could be used to identify additional military

units that could provide support in an incident. However, the

establishment of the Joint Task Force for Civil Support in October 1999

made this task no longer necessary for the National Guard teams. The

Joint Task Force for Civil Support is DOD’s single point for command,

control, and advice on DOD support to terrorist WMD incidents.

• The team’s role in providing technical assistance overlaps with other

federal teams. There are numerous other military and federal

organizations that can help incident commanders deal with WMD by

providing advice, technical experts, and equipment. As in our earlier

review, officials with the two agencies responsible for managing the

federal response to a terrorist incident—the FBI and FEMA—continue to

be skeptical about the role of the National Guard teams. For example, the

head of the FBI’s Hazardous Materials Response Unit noted that the FBI

unit, not the National Guard teams, would be the authoritative source of

technical advice on WMD matters during crisis management. The FBI

official also noted that many of the same federal experts from DOD, HHS,

and DOE would be providing advice to both the National Guard teams and

the Hazardous Materials Response Unit.

• The teams’ role in providing technical assistance may also overlap with

state and/or local teams. There are over 600 local and state hazardous

materials teams in the United States that daily have to assess and take

appropriate actions in incidents involving highly toxic industrial chemicals

and other hazardous materials. Large jurisdictions, for example, usually

have robust capabilities to deal with hazardous materials. DOD’s plans for

the National Guard teams did not consider these state and local teams.
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• The teams’ deployment times remain uncertain. The original plans for the

teams were based upon an assumption that they would deploy and arrive

quickly. Although plans call for the teams to deploy within 4 hours,

transporting the team to a distant location with its equipment may require

military airlift. However, there are no plans to arrange for dedicated airlift

to the teams in case of contingencies. In our earlier review, officials at the

state and local level cited the importance of the first 2 hours and thus

questioned the benefits of the National Guard teams because of potential

time lags before they arrive. For example, officials from two states

indicated that the usefulness of the National Guard teams may have been

overstated in the recent TOPOFF 2000 exercise because both were

essentially pre-deployed.

In our earlier report, we stated that the Congress may wish to consider

restricting the use of appropriated funds for any additional National Guard

teams without further assessments. Similarly, the DOD Inspector General

recommended that DOD conduct a thorough program evaluation of the

teams, including such areas as operational concept and doctrine. DOD

concurred with the recommendations of the Inspector General to address

these problems and is initiating a comprehensive review of the teams.

DOD, among other corrective actions, has agreed to coordinate the roles

of the National Guard teams with the FBI. However, our assessment is

that, until some of the above issues are resolved, the roles and use of these

National Guard teams are unclear.

Despite efforts to reduce duplication in assistance programs, there are still

multiple programs that create confusion among the first responders these

programs are meant to serve. Based upon our earlier recommendations,

the Executive Branch has taken steps to reduce duplication and improve

coordination of assistance programs. However, an attempt to create a

single liaison for state and local governments through the NDPO was not

successful for a variety of reasons. The creation of the new Office of

National Preparedness in FEMA, while leaving the Department of Justice’s

Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support and FBI’s NDPO

programs in place, will create additional duplication of effort and more

confusion among the first responders. The new FEMA Office provides a

logical location for consolidating federal programs to assist state and local

governments, including the Office for State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support and the NDPO.

National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support teams

continue to experience problems with readiness, doctrine and roles, and

Conclusions
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

Local Governments Can Be Consolidated

Page 104 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

deployment that could undermine their usefulness in an actual terrorist

incident. The establishment of any additional teams would be premature

until DOD has completed its coordination of the teams’ roles and missions

with the FBI—the lead federal agency for crisis management. In our view,

such coordination will not be complete until there is a written agreement

between the DOD and the FBI that clarifies the roles of the teams in

relation to the FBI.

To eliminate overlapping assistance programs and to provide a single

liaison for state and local officials, we recommend that the President,

working closely with Congress, consolidate the activities of the FBI’s

National Domestic Preparedness Office and the Department of Justice’s

Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support under the

Federal Emergency Management Agency.

To clarify the roles and missions of specialized National Guard response

teams in a terrorist incident involving weapons of mass destruction, we

recommend that the Secretary of Defense suspend the establishment of

any additional National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support

Teams until DOD has completed its coordination of the teams’ roles and

missions with the FBI. We also recommend that the Secretary of Defense

reach a written agreement with the Director of the FBI that clarifies the

roles of the teams in relation to the FBI.

Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on their efforts

prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Department of

Justice agreed with our recommendation that the NDPO be consolidated

into FEMA’s new Office of National Preparedness. The Department said it

is prepared to coordinate the transfer of the functions of that office to

FEMA, including the detailing of staff as appropriate, once the new Office

is operational.

However, the Department of Justice disagreed with our recommendation

that its Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support also be

consolidated into FEMA. According to the Department, shifting the

facilitation and coordination function to FEMA should not affect its

programs in the Office of Justice Programs, including the Office for State

and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. The Department stated that

those programs “fit squarely” within the Office of Justice Program’s

mission of providing grant assistance to state and local governments. We

are not challenging the basic mission of the Office of Justice Programs to

Recommendations for

Executive Action

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

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Page 105 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

provide grant assistance to state and local governments. However, it is

important to note that other federal agencies, including FEMA, also

provide grants to state and local governments. The key question is what

agency is the most appropriate one to provide such assistance specifically

related to domestic preparedness. In our view, FEMA is the lead agency

for domestic preparedness and should, therefore, coordinate and

implement such programs. Therefore, we continue to believe our

recommendation has merit.

In technical comments that supplemented their letter, officials from the

Department of Justice and its Office for State and Local Domestic

Preparedness Support cited additional reasons why they did not agree

with our recommendation that the Department’s assistance programs be

consolidated under FEMA. They said that the responsibilities we state for

FEMA’s new Office of National Preparedness are broader than those

announced by the President and those agreed upon between FEMA and

the Department of Justice. They also said that our recommendation was

based upon the erroneous conclusion that FEMA is the lead agency for

preparing state and local governments to deal with the consequences of

WMD terrorism. These officials stated that from both a legal and

programmatic perspective, the Department of Justice clearly is the lead

agency for domestic preparedness and such programs are already

consolidated there. We disagree. While the responsibilities of FEMA’s new

Office of National Preparedness are still in development, we continue to

believe that FEMA is the lead agency for preparing state and local

governments for the consequences of WMD terrorism.8

Officials from the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness

Support also said that our recommendation was done without any analysis

of FEMA’s capacity or capability to lead national preparedness efforts.

Specifically, they said that “investing domestic preparedness programs

responsibilities in a sub-Cabinet agency charged with dealing with dozens

of disasters and emergencies each year places responsibility in an agency

that will be severely challenged to provide the necessary sustainment and

continuity.” We disagree with this position because we believe that

FEMA’s continuous experience in dealing with the consequences of a wide

variety of disasters—through both preparedness programs and responses

 8

FEMA is responsible for emergency preparedness under 42 U.S.C. chapter 68. FEMA also

has lead responsibilities for emergency preparedness under Executive Order 12656 and is

responsible for ensuring that state plans are adequate and capabilities are tested under

PDD 39.
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to real incidents—makes it the most appropriate agency to lead national

preparedness efforts. FEMA officials indicated to us that the new Office of

National Preparedness would be responsible for providing sustainment

and continuity to the efforts—by both FEMA and the rest of the federal

government—to improve national preparedness.

FEMA indicated that our recommendation to consolidate programs was

premature. FEMA believes that before any additional mandates or changes

are placed on the new Office of National Preparedness, it needs a chance

to accomplish its tasks as put forth by the President—to coordinate

federal programs dealing with WMD consequence management, working

closely with state and local governments to ensure that their needs are

addressed. FEMA said there are no plans to take programs away from

other departments or agencies. However, officials from FEMA told us they

disagreed with the position taken by the Office for State and Local

Domestic Preparedness Support that the Department of Justice, and not

FEMA, is the lead agency for preparing state and local governments for

WMD terrorism. These officials stated that FEMA is designated the lead

agency, and that the President’s May 8, 2001, statement (see app. VII)

clearly reinforces FEMA’s lead role.

Although the Department of Justice and FEMA did not support our

recommendation, we still believe it has merit. Consolidation of DOD’s

programs to the Department of Justice simplified the delivery of assistance

and resulted in reduced duplication. Further consolidation under FEMA—

the lead agency for domestic preparedness—could simplify and

coordinate these programs even more. Contrary to Department of Justice

assertions, confusion still exists among first responders regarding the

multitude of federal agencies involved. Organizations representing first

responders still are calling for a single coordination point. In addition, the

fundamental disagreement between the Department of Justice and FEMA

as to which agency is the lead for national preparedness reinforces our

recommendations that a single focal point is needed above the level of

individual agencies (see ch. 2) and our recommendation above that

preparedness programs should be consolidated.

The Department of Defense concurred with GAO’s recommendation that

the Secretary of Defense suspend the establishment of any additional

National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams until

the Department has completed its coordination of the teams’ roles and

missions with the FBI. Finally, the Department concurred with GAO’s

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense reach a written agreement

with the Director of the FBI that clarifies the roles of the teams in relation
Chapter 5: Federal Assistance to State and

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Page 107 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

to the Bureau. FEMA, in its response to a draft of this report, said DOD

also should consult with FEMA on the role of the Civil Support Teams.
Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

a Strategy to Counter Computer-Based

Threats

Page 108 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

In addition to efforts to combat terrorism discussed in chapters 2 through

5, the federal government has begun to develop and implement a strategy

for combating the threat of cyber, or computer-based, attacks. Protection

against cyber attacks requires vigilance against a broader array of threats,

to include not only terrorists, but nation states, criminals, and others. The

strategy was outlined in PDD 63, issued in May 1998, which describes a

plan for protecting the nation’s critical computer-supported

infrastructures, such as telecommunications, power distribution, financial

services, national defense, and critical government operations, from

physical and cyber attacks.

The computer-based risks to these infrastructures have increased during

the 1990s due to their growing dependence on computers and the greater

interconnectivity among computers. While no devastating instances of

“cyber-terrorism” have occurred, computer-based incidents, such as the

ILOVEYOU virus in May 2000, have caused significant disruptions and

damage. In addition, the number of incidents reported has increased

dramatically, as have the number of computer crime cases opened by the

FBI and other law enforcement agencies. As a result, government officials

are increasingly concerned about attacks from individuals and groups with

malicious intentions.

In accordance with PDD 63 and other information security requirements

outlined in laws and federal guidance, an array of efforts has been

undertaken to address these risks. However, progress in certain key areas

has been slow. For example, federal agencies have taken initial steps to

develop critical infrastructure protection (CIP) plans. However,

independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information

security weaknesses at virtually all major federal agencies that place their

operations at high risk of tampering and disruption.1

 Outreach efforts by

numerous federal entities to establish cooperative relationships with and

among private and other non-federal entities have raised awareness and

prompted information sharing, and the federal government and the private

sector have initiated a variety of CIP research and development efforts.

However, substantive analysis of interdependencies within and among

industry sectors and related vulnerabilities has been limited.

 1

Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies,

(GAO/AIMD-00-295, Sept. 6, 2000).

Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

a Strategy to Counter Computer-Based

Threats
Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

a Strategy to Counter Computer-Based

Threats

Page 109 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

An underlying deficiency impeding progress is the lack of a national plan

that fully defines the roles and responsibilities of key participants and

establishes interim objectives.

The risks associated with our nation’s reliance on interconnected

computer systems are substantial and varied. Attacks could severely

disrupt computer-supported operations, compromise the confidentiality of

sensitive information, and diminish the integrity of critical data. A

significant concern is that terrorists or hostile foreign states could severely

damage or disrupt critical operations resulting in harm to the public

welfare. Threats are increasing, in part, because the number of individuals

with computer skills is increasing and because intrusion, or “hacking,”

techniques have become readily accessible through magazines, computer

bulletin boards, and Internet web sites. In addition, the Director of Central

Intelligence has stated that some terrorists groups are acquiring

rudimentary cyber-attack tools.2 Further, according to the National

Security Agency, foreign governments already have or are developing

computer attack capabilities and potential adversaries are developing a

body of knowledge about U.S. systems and methods to attack these

systems. However, the sources of and motives behind cyber-attacks often

cannot be readily determined. This is because groups or individuals can

attack remotely from anywhere in the world, over the Internet, other

networks, or dial-up lines, and they can disguise their identity, location,

and intent by launching attacks across a span of communications systems

and computers. As a result, efforts to combat such attacks must consider

the entire range of threats, including criminals intent on fraud and

disgruntled employees. Accordingly, efforts to protect critical

infrastructures from devastating computer-based attacks by terrorist and

hostile nation states are similar to and must be integrated with other

federal computer security activities. Figure 12 provides an overview of the

related risks.

 2

Prepared statements by George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, before the

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 7, 2001, and Feb. 2, 2000.

Risks of CyberAttacks and Related

Government Strategy
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Figure 12: Risks to Computer-Based Operations

Source: GAO analysis.

While complete data are not available because many incidents are not

reported, available data show that the number of attacks is increasing. The

number of incidents reported to Carnegie-Mellon University’s CERT
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Coordination Center3 has increased from about 1,300 in 1993 to about

9,800 in 1999 and to over 21,000 in 2000—figures that the Center estimates

may represent only about 20 percent of the incidents that are actually

occurring because most are not detected or reported. Similarly, the FBI

reports that its caseload of computer intrusion-related investigations more

than doubled from 1998 to 2000. Additionally, other federal law

enforcement agencies have reported significant increases in the number of

computer intrusion-related investigations. While PDD 63 covered both

physical and computer-based threats, federal efforts to meet the directive’s

requirements have pertained primarily to computer-based threats, since

this was an area that the leaders of the administration’s critical

infrastructure protection strategy viewed as needing attention.

Concerns about computer-based vulnerabilities have been publicly

reported repeatedly during the 1990s. In 1991, the National Research

Council studied the issue and reported that “as computer systems become

more prevalent, sophisticated, embedded in physical processes and

interconnected, society becomes more vulnerable to poor system design,

accidents that disable systems, and attacks on computer systems.”

4

 In July

1996, the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was

established to investigate the nation’s vulnerability to both cyber and

physical threats. The Commission’s October 1997 report, Critical

Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, described the

potentially devastating implications of poor information security from a

national perspective. Also, since 1996, congressional interest in protecting

national infrastructures has remained strong and, since 1997—most

recently in January 2001—GAO has designated information security as a

governmentwide high-risk area, in reports to the Congress.5

 3

Originally called the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the CERT

Coordination Center was established in 1988 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency. The center is charged with (1) establishing a capability to quickly and effectively

coordinate communication among experts in order to limit the damage associated with,

and respond to, incidents and (2) building awareness of security issues across the Internet

community.

4

Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age, The National Research

Council, 1991.

5

High-Risk Series: Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9,

Feb. 1, 1997); High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999); and High-Risks

Series: An Update (GAO-01-263, Jan. 2001).
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In response to the Commission’s 1997 report, the President issued PDD 63,

which called for a range of activities to improve federal agency security

programs, improve the nation’s ability to detect and respond to serious

attacks, and establish a partnership between the government and private

sector. The directive called on the federal government to serve as a model

of how infrastructure assurance is best achieved and designated “lead

agencies” to work with private-sector and government entities in each of

eight infrastructure sectors and five special function areas. PDD 63 further

stated that the United States would have an initial operating capability by

the year 2000 and, by 2003, have developed the ability to protect the

nation’s critical infrastructures from intentional destructive attacks.

PDD 63 also designated and established entities to provide central

coordination and support, including

• the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counterterrorism under the Assistant to the President for National

Security Affairs, to oversee national policy development and

implementation;

• a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, made up of senior level

officials, to coordinate the implementation of PDD 63 with the National

Coordinator;6

• the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), housed in the

Department of Commerce, to develop a national plan for critical

infrastructure protection based upon infrastructure plans developed by

the private sector and federal agencies; and

• the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI as a

national-level threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law

enforcement investigation and response entity.

To facilitate private-sector participation, PDD 63 also encouraged creation

of information sharing and analysis centers (ISAC) that could serve as

mechanisms for gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing, and

disseminating information to and from infrastructure sectors and the

NIPC. Figure 13 shows the responsibilities outlined in PDD 63.

 6

In February 2001, the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group was replaced with the

Information Infrastructure Protection and Assurance Group under the Policy Coordinating

Committee on Counter-terrorism and National Preparedness.
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Figure 13: CIP Responsibilities Outlined by PDD 63

Source: CIAO.

Federal entities have long been required to protect their computer systems

and data. However, since 1998, a number of new activities have been

initiated in response to the growing risks to critical operations and to

respond to computer-based incidents. Key efforts include the following:

• The federal Chief Information Officers and the Chief Financial Officers

Councils, under the auspices of OMB, have sponsored a number of

activities, including security conferences, best practices initiatives, and

distribution of model policies. Also, during 2000, the Chief Information

Officers Council sponsored development of the Federal Information

Technology Security Assessment Framework as a tool for measuring the

Despite Increased

Efforts, Critical

Federal Operations

Remain at Risk
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completeness and effectiveness of agencies’ information security

programs.

• The CIAO, as required in PDD 63, coordinated development of the

National Plan for Information Systems Protection: Version 1.0: An

Invitation to a Dialogue, which the White House released in January 2000.

In addition, the CIAO has assisted federal agencies in identifying their

critical assets and associated infrastructure interdependencies through a

process referred to as Project Matrix. According to the Report of the

President of the United States on the Status of Federal Critical

Infrastructure Protection Activities, issued in January 2001, 14 federal

departments and agencies had been asked to participate in Project Matrix.

• The Federal Computer Incident Response Center (FedCIRC), initially

established by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in 1996

and, since 1998, operated by the General Services Administration, has

coordinated the response to computer incidents of federal civilian

agencies. In addition, it has provided civilian agencies technical

information, tools, methods, and guidance; provided a mechanism for

sharing information among agencies, law enforcement, the private sector

and academia; and issued advisories.

• The Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense was established in

December 1998 by DOD as the primary agent to coordinate and direct the

department’s efforts to prevent and detect cyber attacks on DOD

computers, contain damage, and restore computer functionality.7

 Its

efforts include developing standard tactics, techniques, and procedures for

responding to cyber incidents and sharing information on cyber threats

and attacks.

Further, the Congress has continued to demonstrate its interest in

improving the protection of federal operations through hearings and by

enacting information security reform provisions as part of the Floyd D.

Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 that

supplement requirements outlined in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

and the Computer Security Act of 1987 and that are consistent with

National Institute of Standards and Technology and OMB guidance. These

new provisions require agencies’ information security programs to

incorporate a cycle of risk management activities that

• assess risks and determine protection needs,

 7

In April 2001, the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense was renamed the Joint

Task Force for Computer Network Operations.
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• select and implement cost-effective policies and controls,

• promote awareness of risks, policies, and the need for controls, and

• implement a program of routine tests and examinations for evaluating the

effectiveness of policies and related controls and report the results to

those who can take appropriate corrective action.

The new provisions also require annual evaluations of agency information

security programs by both management and agency inspectors general.

The results of these reviews, which are initially scheduled to become

available in late 2001, are expected to provide a more complete picture of

the status of federal information security than currently exists, thereby

providing the Congress and OMB an improved means of overseeing agency

progress and identifying areas needing improvement.

In addition to these broad efforts, our recent audits have shown that

individual agencies, including the EPA, the Internal Revenue Service, and

VA, have taken significant actions to correct identified computer security

weaknesses and improve their information security management

programs. Further, according to the President’s Status Report, the DOD

has initiated efforts to bolster its encryption capabilities, advance its

computer forensics capabilities by establishing a lab in September 1999,

improve its ability to actively defend computer systems, focus attention on

infrastructures critical to operations by designating lead components, and

create better relationships between installation commanders and local and

private sector leaders.

Despite the many improvements initiated, we reported in September 2000

and April 2001 that audits have continued to identify information security

weaknesses in virtually every major federal agency.8

 These weaknesses

place a broad array of federal operations and assets at risk of fraud,

misuse, and disruption. For example, weaknesses at the Department of the

Treasury increased the risk of fraud and disruption associated with

billions of dollars of federal payments and collections and weaknesses at

DOD increase the vulnerability of various military operations. These

weaknesses also place enormous amounts of confidential data, ranging

from personal and tax data to proprietary business information, at risk of

inappropriate disclosure.

 8

(GAO/AIMD-00-295) and Computer Security: Weaknesses Continue to Place Critical

Federal Operations and Assets at Risk (GAO-01-600T, Apr. 5, 2001).
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In addition, a March 2001 report by the President’s Council on Integrity

and Efficiency and the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency

(PCIE/ECIE) identified significant deficiencies in agencies’

implementation of PDD 63 based on reviews conducted by agency

inspectors general.9

 For example, PDD 63 required federal departments

and agencies to establish plans for protecting their own critical

infrastructure that were to be implemented within 2 years, or by May 2000,

and it required federal departments and agencies to develop procedures

and conduct vulnerability assessments. However, the PCIE/ECIE report

stated that

• many agency CIP plans were incomplete and some agencies had not

developed CIP plans,

• most agencies had not completely identified their mission-essential

infrastructure assets, and

• few agencies had completed vulnerability assessments of their minimum

essential infrastructure assets or developed remediation plans.

The PCIE/ECIE report concluded that the federal government could

improve its PDD 63 planning and assessment activities and questioned the

federal government’s ability to protect the nation’s critical infrastructures

from intentional destructive acts by May 2003, as required in PDD 63.

The results of our review of PDD 63-related activities at eight lead

agencies were generally consistent with the PCIE/ECIE report’s findings,

although some agencies had made progress since their respective

inspectors general reviews. For example, while five agencies had or were

in the process of updating their plans based on inspector general reviews,

other independent reviews, or more recent initiatives, three were not

revising their plans to address reported deficiencies. In addition, while

most of the agencies we reviewed had identified critical assets, many had

not completed vulnerability assessments on all of their critical assets. For

example, one agency had not performed vulnerability assessments on 4 of

13 of its critical assets. Another department had not supplemented its

vulnerability assessment procedures to include CIP aspects, such as

determining a system’s significance to national security. Further, most of

 9

The PCIE primarily is comprised of the presidentially-appointed inspectors general and

the ECIE is primarily comprised of the agency head-appointed inspectors general. In

November 1999, PCIE and ECIE formed a working group to review the adequacy of federal

agencies’ implementation of PDD 63. The March 2001 report is based on reviews by 21

inspectors general of their respective agencies’ PDD 63 planning and assessment activities.
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the eight agencies we reviewed had not taken the additional steps to

identify interdependencies and, as a result, some agency officials said that

they were not sure which of their assets were critical from a national

perspective and, therefore, subject to PDD 63. According to a report by the

CIP Research and Development Interagency Working Group, the effect of

interdependencies is that a disruption in one infrastructure can spread and

cause appreciable impact on other infrastructures.10 The report also stated

that understanding interdependencies is important because the

proliferation of information technology has made the infrastructures more

interconnected and the advent of competition, “just in time” business, and

mergers among infrastructure owners and operators have eroded spare

infrastructure capacity.

We identified several factors that had impeded federal agency efforts to

comply with PDD 63. First, no clear definitions have been developed to

guide development and implementation of agency plans and measure

performance. For example, PDD 63 established December 2000 as the

deadline for achieving an initial operating capability and May 2003 for

achieving full operational capability of key functions. However, the

specific capabilities to be achieved at each milestone had not been

defined. The PCIE/ECIE report noted that agencies had used various

interpretations of initial operating capability and stated that, without a

definition, there is no consistent measure of progress toward achieving full

security preparedness.

Several agency officials said that funding and staffing constraints

contributed to their delays in implementing PDD 63 requirements.

According to one chief information officer, this may be because senior

officials do not fully understand the importance of their agency’s assets to

the nation’s critical infrastructures and the magnitude of the related risks.

In addition, the availability of adequate technical expertise to provide

information security has been a continuing concern to agencies. Further,

though we specifically have not analyzed the technical skills of agency

personnel involved in computer security across government, we have

observed a number of instances where agency staff did not have the skills

needed to carry out their computer security responsibilities and were not

adequately overseeing activities conducted by contractors. Recognizing

 10Report on the Federal Agenda in Critical Infrastructure Protection Research and

Development, Research Vision, Objectives, and Programs, CIP Research and Development

Interagency Working Group, Jan. 2001.
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the need to improve the government’s ability to attract and retain workers

and expand training and education opportunities, the Chief Information

Officers Council established a Federal Information Technology Workforce

Committee to focus on this issue. In addition, in November 2000, the

Office of Personnel Management established higher pay for information

technology workers to give agencies flexibility in addressing recruitment

and retention problems affecting the government’s information technology

workforce. These new pay rates became effective in January 2001.

Finally, since 1996, we have reported that poor security program

management is an underlying cause of federal information security

weaknesses and this has diminished agencies’ ability to ensure that

controls are appropriate and effective.11 Specifically, many agencies have

not developed security plans for major systems based on risk, documented

security policies, and implemented a program for testing and evaluating

the effectiveness of the controls they relied on. As a result, agencies

• were not fully aware of the information security risks to their operations,

• had accepted an unknown level of risk by default rather than consciously

deciding what level of risk was tolerable,

• had a false sense of security because they were relying on controls that

were not effective, and

• could not make informed judgments as to whether they were spending too

little or too much of their resources on security.

For example, audits by us and DOD’s Inspector General have reported that

an underlying cause of weak information security at DOD is poor security

management. The Department has taken steps to improve its information

security—notably, establishing the Defense-wide Information Assurance

Program under the jurisdiction of the Chief Information Officer and, as

mentioned earlier, the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense.

However, in March 2001, we reported that a number of challenges faced by

both programs, including departmentwide planning, data collection and

 11Information Security: Opportunities for Improved OMB Oversight of Agency Practices

(GAO/AIMD-96-110, Sept. 24, 1996); Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place

Critical Federal Operations and Assets at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, Sept. 23, 1998); and

(GAO/AIMD-00-295).
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integration, vulnerability assessment procedures, and performance

management, have limited their progress.12

As required by PDD 63, federal entities have taken steps to foster

cooperative relationships between the federal government and non-federal

sectors. For example, in December 1999, the CIAO helped establish the

Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security as a forum of private-sector

member companies for raising awareness and understanding of crossindustry critical infrastructure issues and as a catalyst for action among

the owners and operators of the critical infrastructures. As of March 2001,

the Partnership had 51 members from various infrastructure sectors. It

also had created working groups to address interdependency vulnerability

assessment; information sharing, awareness, and education; legislation

and public policy objectives; research and development and workforce

development; and organization issues/public private cooperation. Further,

the CIAO has worked with the audit community to produce and distribute

a guide for corporate boards on managing information security risks and

coordinated or sponsored a series of conferences to raise awareness—

including conferences for the legal community to advance the

understanding of legal issues associated with information security.

The NIPC, which is responsible for analysis, warning, and response related

to cyber incidents, also had made some progress in this area. Specifically,

in April 2001,13 we reported that the NIPC had worked to build

information-sharing relationships with the private sector through the

adoption and expansion of the InfraGard Program, which started in 1996,

to provide a secure mechanism for two-way information sharing about

intrusion, incidents, and system vulnerabilities. By early January 2001, 518

entities were InfraGard members—up from 277 members in October 2000.

Members included representatives from private industry, other

government agencies, state and local law enforcement, and the academic

community. The NIPC also had established computer crime squads and

teams in the FBI’s 56 field offices across the country to support the

investigation of the growing number of crimes involving attacks on

 12Information Security: Challenges to Improving DOD’s Incident Response Capabilities

(GAO-01-341, Mar. 29, 2001) and Information Security: Progress and Challenges to an

Effective Defense-wide Information Assurance Program (GAO-01-307, Mar. 30, 2001).

13Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing National

Capabilities (GAO-01-323, Apr. 25, 2001).

CIP Activities Have

Raised Awareness and

Prompted Information

Sharing; However,

Substantive Analysis

of Infrastructure

Vulnerabilities Has

Been Limited
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computers. In addition, as of December 2000, one interagency task force

had been created to coordinate investigative work and facilitate

information sharing regarding computer crime with other law enforcement

entities.

We also reported that the NIPC had (1) issued assessments, advisories,

and alerts to warn the public about identified vulnerabilities, attacks

underway, and potential attacks and (2) standardized its procedures for

implementing crisis action teams and developed a detailed concept of

operations to guide the federal government’s response to computer-based

attacks. However, the report stated that most of the NIPC’s activities had

been focused on tactical analysis related to individual cyber incidents or

notices of recently reported vulnerabilities and that strategic analysis to

determine the broader implications of individual incidents had been

limited. We noted that the NIPC faced a number of impediments to

developing more substantive analytical capabilities, including a lack of a

methodology for strategic analysis, a lack of needed staff and expertise,

and inadequate data on infrastructure vulnerabilities. We also identified

barriers to issuing early warnings, including (1) a lack of a comprehensive

governmentwide or nationwide framework for promptly obtaining and

analyzing information on imminent attacks, (2) shortage of skilled staff,

(3) the need to ensure that the NIPC does not raise undue alarm for

insignificant incidents, and (4) the need to ensure that sensitive

information is protected. Finally, we reported that the NIPC’s plans for

developing its analytical and warning capabilities were fragmented and

incomplete.

To assist in establishing relationships with major infrastructure owners

and operators, PDD 63 required lead agencies to assign a high-ranking

official, as an agency sector liaison, to lead efforts in cooperation with the

sector owners and operators in addressing problems related to critical

infrastructure protection and, in particular, in recommending components

of a national infrastructure assurance plan. Similarly, the directive

required the agency sector liaison officials, after discussions and

coordination with entities of their infrastructure sector, to identify

infrastructure sector coordinators to represent their sector. In addition,

PDD 63 outlined tasks that the lead agencies were to encourage and assist

the infrastructure sectors in accomplishing, including developing

vulnerability education and outreach programs, establishing ISACs,

performing vulnerability assessments of the sectors, and developing

related remediation plans.
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As of March 2001, progress in meeting some of these requirements was

well underway. Each of the eight lead agencies we reviewed had

designated sector liaisons, and seven of the eight major infrastructure

sectors had identified one or more individuals or groups as sector

coordinators for their respective infrastructure sector. Infrastructure

sector coordinators had not been selected for the public health services

sector because, according to officials at the Department of Health and

Human Services, the infrastructure owners and operators had not been

fully identified due to the large and diverse communities involved. Also,

according to relevant agency and private sector officials and the

President’s Status Report, most infrastructure sectors had planned or held

education and outreach events, such as workshops, conferences, and

industry meetings to address broad CIP needs and specific concerns.

Further, six ISACs within five infrastructures had been established to

gather and share information about vulnerabilities, attempted intrusions,

and attacks within their respective infrastructures and to meet specific

sector objectives. Three of these ISACs—for the telecommunications and

electric power industries and emergency fire services segment—were

based on groups that had existed previously. The three other ISACs—for

the financial services, information technology, and emergency law

enforcement sectors—had been established since October 1999. In

addition, at the time of our audit, the formation of at least three more

ISACs for various infrastructure segments was being discussed.

However, beyond building partnerships, raising awareness, and improving

information sharing, substantive, comprehensive analysis of infrastructure

sector vulnerabilities and development of related remedial plans had been

limited. While some assessments had been performed for individual sector

components, these did not necessarily consider the interdependencies

within and among the infrastructures. For example, within the banking

and finance sector, most large institutions individually had undergone

vulnerability assessments. However, a vulnerability assessment of the

most important banking and finance institutions as a group to identify

interdependencies and events that could cause a system failure across the

infrastructure had not occurred. Such sector-wide assessments had not yet

been performed because sector coordinators were still establishing the

necessary relationships, identifying critical assets and critical entities, and

researching and identifying appropriate methodologies. In addition, some

federal officials stated that their agencies did not have the resources to

assist in the completion of sector vulnerability assessments. In addition,

the emergency fire services sector liaison officials told us that a sectorwide vulnerability assessment would be impractical due to the thousands
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of local organizations that would have to participate and the lack of

national associations or government organizations of fire departments.

Table 7 shows the status of key CIP efforts in the eight infrastructure

sectors as of March 2001.

Table 7: Status of Key CIP Efforts in Eight Infrastructure Sectors

Infrastructure sector Sector liaisons and

sector coordinators

designated

Vulnerability assessments

and remedial plans

developed

Education and

awareness programs

implemented

Information sharing

and analysis centers

established

Banking and finance Yes • Some assessments

performed

• No remedial plans

• Assessment methodology

being researched

• Some efforts

• Sector developing a

program

• ISAC formally

established in October

1999

Electric power, oil and

gas

Yes • Some assessments for

electric and gas

• No remedial plans

• Some efforts • Electric industry ISAC

only

• None for oil and gas

Emergency fire services

segment

Yes • Some assessments

performed

• No remedial plans

• Some training for

states and localities

• United States Fire

Academy designated

March 1, 2001

Emergency law

enforcement

Yes • No assessments

• Methodology being

researched

• No remedial plans

• Some meetings to

discuss legal issues

• “Cybercitizen

Partnership” to raise

ethics issues with

children

• NIPC designated to

act as the sector ISAC

in December 2000

Information and

communication

Yes • Methodology developed

• No assessments yet

performed

• Department of Commerce

coordinating with industry

and DOD to perform

regional communications

assessments

• No remedial plans

• Some meetings on

CIP issues held

• Information

Technology ISAC

established January

2001

• Telecommunication

ISAC function

recognized in January

2000

Public health services Liaison only • No assessment

• No remedial plans

• Some discussions held

about performing

assessments

• Some meetings on

CIP issues held

No

Transportation

segments

• Liaison

• Coordinator for rail

and aviation only

• No sector assessments

• DOT performed a surface

transportation assessment

• No remedial plans

• Some efforts No

Water supply Yes • One assessment

performed

• Methodology being further

tested

• No remedial plans

• Some efforts No
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Factors cited by the private sector as impeding progress in building the

necessary government/private-sector partnerships and identifying and

addressing vulnerabilities included the following:

• Concerns have been raised that organizations potentially could face

antitrust violations for sharing information with other industry partners,

subject their information to Freedom of Information Act disclosures, or

face potential liability concerns for information shared in good faith.

• An inadvertent release of confidential business information, such as trade

secrets or proprietary information, could damage reputations, lower

consumer confidence, hurt competitiveness, and decrease market shares

of firms. Further, the private sector may have reservations about sharing

information with law enforcement agencies because compliance with law

enforcement procedures can be costly.

• Some senior executives are not fully aware of the importance of their

assets to the national and economic security of the nation.

• Due to the complexity and breadth of some infrastructures, organizations

and entities that could coordinate CIP efforts across the infrastructure do

not exist.

In addition, PDD 63 called for a plan to expand international cooperation

on critical infrastructure protection and designated the Department of

State as the lead agency in this area. According to Department of State

officials and the President’s Status Report on CIP, an international

strategy is being implemented that coordinates CIP outreach to other

governments and international intergovernmental organizations and

promotes CIP awareness, vigilance in security standards and practices,

and law enforcement cooperation. As part of this strategy, the Department

of State had organized meetings with key allies to discuss common issues

related to infrastructure protection. Also, according to agency officials, in

early 2001, the Department of State developed a United Nations Resolution

on cyber-crime, which passed unanimously in the United Nations General

Assembly and, as of March 2001, was developing follow-up actions. In

addition, Department of Justice officials were negotiating a Council of

Europe convention intended to facilitate international law enforcement

issues related to computer crime and, as of March 2001, this treaty still

was being negotiated. The Department of Justice also chairs the G-8 High

Tech Crime Subgroup that is focused on enhancing law enforcement’s

abilities to prevent, investigate, and prosecute high-tech crime.14 Further,

 14Eight major industrialized countries comprise the G-8, which includes Canada, France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Department of Commerce officials had participated in meetings with

representatives from other countries to discuss and negotiate CIP issues,

including the Council of Europe treaty.

The National Plan recognized that a vigorous and effective program for

CIP research and development should seek to enhance security by rapidly

identifying, developing, and facilitating the fielding of technological

solutions to existing and emerging infrastructure threats and

vulnerabilities. According to PDD 63, OSTP is responsible for coordinating

research and development efforts through the National Science and

Technology Council. In January 2001, the CIP Research and Development

Interagency Working Group, tasked by the National Science and

Technology Council’s Committee on National Science and Technology and

the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group, identified eight priority

research and development areas:

• establishment of an Institute for Information Infrastructure Protection;

• education and training of research personnel;

• interdependency analyses;

• threat, vulnerability, and risk assessment studies;

• system protection and information assurance;

• reconstitution of damaged or compromised systems;

• security of automated infrastructure control systems; and

• intrusion detection and monitoring.

Assessing the extent to which these priorities are being addressed was not

within the scope of our review. However, we identified a variety of

research and development efforts that were either being planned or

performed by federal entities and, in some cases, were being sponsored by

the infrastructure sectors. These included the following:

• The National Institute of Standards and Technology has established the

CIP Grants Program to fund research to provide commercial solutions to

information technology security problems central to critical infrastructure

protection that are not being adequately addressed. According to

Department of Commerce officials, this initial funding is inadequate to

address the scope and breadth of CIP research challenges.

• As part of a Department of Energy proposal to conduct nine

complementary, interrelated CIP research and development programs

encompassing analysis and risk management and protection and

mitigation, work is underway to (1) develop energy infrastructure

interdependencies analysis methodologies and tools and (2) develop and

Many Research and

Development Efforts

Are Underway
Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

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Threats

Page 125 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

leverage databases, methodologies, and tools to evaluate consequences of

disruptions and processes for restoration.

• The Department of Transportation has ongoing projects to analyze the

vulnerabilities of the Global Positioning System and identify cyber-security

gaps in transportation information systems. In addition, the Department,

under the National Science and Technology Council, has formulated a

transportation infrastructure assurance research and development plan

with the goal of developing a comprehensive approach to assessing threats

to the nation’s transportation system and preparing projects that provide

solutions to these threats. The plan addresses security of vital

communications, navigation, and information systems and networks.

• The Carnegie-Mellon CERT Coordination Center has ongoing research and

development efforts pertaining to development of a risk assessment

methodology—”OCTAVE” (Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and

Vulnerability Evaluation).

• The Banking and Finance Sector’s Research and Development Working

Group is undertaking projects to (1) model the infrastructure sector to

identify vulnerabilities and (2) develop forensic tools needed by law

enforcement in combating electronic crimes and attacks.

• The TSWG, an interagency group to coordinate and conduct research and

development projects for combating terrorism, has funded efforts to

examine vulnerabilities associated with specific types of attacks and

determining the precise locations of critical assets.

• The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has supported efforts

focusing on the security of the Internet and anomaly and misuse detection.

• The Department of State has sponsored international activities to

coordinate CIP-related research and development with other nations,

including (1) holding bilateral negotiations and meetings aimed at

identifying, developing, and facilitating CIP solutions; (2) sponsoring with

the European Union workshops to exchange information on cybersecurity research; and (3) establishing dialogue on telecommunicationsrelated issues.

According to the CIP Research and Development Interagency Working

Group, one area that has received almost no attention is identifying the

interdependencies and cascading effects among infrastructures. The

working group’s January 2001 report stated that, to address this

deficiency, the government, the national laboratories, academia, and

private industry were working to build understanding and tools to address

interdependencies, including efforts to build test facilities and to learn
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about secure operations of complex interactive networks and about

various aspects of damage caused by earthquakes.15

In addition to the impediments previously identified, an underlying

deficiency in the implementation of the strategy outlined in PDD 63 is the

lack of a national plan that clearly delineates the roles and responsibilities

of federal and non-federal entities and defines interim objectives. We first

identified the need for a detailed plan in September 1998, when we

reported that developing a governmentwide strategy that clearly defined

and coordinated the roles of new and existing federal entities was

important to ensure governmentwide cooperation and support for PDD

63.16 At that time, we recommended that OMB and the Assistant to the

President for National Security Affairs ensure such coordination.

PDD 63 required, within 180 days, a schedule for the completion of a

national infrastructure assurance plan with milestones for accomplishing a

number of tasks that included

• developing vulnerability assessments and related remedial plans,

• establishing a national center to warn of significant events,

• creating a system for responding to significant infrastructure attacks,

• developing an education and awareness program, and

• establishing a research and development program.

In January 2000, the President issued Defending America’s Cyberspace:

National Plan for Information Systems Protection: Version 1.0: An

Invitation to a Dialogue as a first major element of a more comprehensive

effort to protect the nation’s information systems and critical assets from

future attacks. The plan proposed achieving the twin goals of making the

U.S. government a model of information security and developing a publicprivate partnership to defend our national infrastructures by achieving

three crosscutting infrastructure protection objectives:

• minimize the possibility of significant and successful attacks;

• identify, assess, contain, and quickly recover from an attack; and

• create and build strong foundations, including people, organizations, and

laws, for preparing, preventing, detecting and responding to attacks.

 15CIP Research and Development Interagency Working Group Report, January 2001.

16Information Security: Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal Operations and Assets

at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, Sept. 23, 1998).

National Plan Is Not

Fully Developed;

Responsibilities Still

Are Evolving
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However, this plan focused largely on federal CIP efforts, saying little

about the private-sector role.

A more complete plan is needed because, although some progress has

been made in implementing PDD 63, questions have surfaced regarding

specific roles and responsibilities and the time frames within which

objectives are to be met. For example, the PCIE/ECIE reported that

several agencies had decided not to implement PDD 63 requirements

because they believed that they were exempt from the directive. As a

result, these agencies had not prepared CIP plans, identified critical assets,

performed related vulnerability assessments, or developed remediation

plans. However, according to the CIAO, PDD 63 requirements apply to all

departments and agencies. Also, in a recent review of the NIPC, we found

that various officials involved in critical infrastructure protection did not

consistently interpret the NIPC’s role. Several expressed an opinion that

this lack of consensus had hindered the NIPC’s progress and diminished

support from other federal agencies. In addition, without clearly defined

interim objectives and milestones, the success of efforts to improve

federal and non-federal critical infrastructure protection cannot be

measured. The PCIE/ECIE report noted that, as of March 2001, agencies

still needed guidance for measuring their progress in identifying critical

assets, performing vulnerability assessments, and developing and

implementing remedial plans.

The new administration has been reviewing and considering adjustments

to the government’s CIP strategy that may address these deficiencies. In a

May 2001 White House press statement, it was announced that the

administration was reviewing how it is organized to deal with information

security issues and that recommendations would be made on how to

structure an integrated approach to cyber-security and critical

infrastructure protection. Specifically, the announcement stated that the

White House, federal agencies, and private industry had begun to

collaboratively prepare a new version of the National Plan that would be

completed later this year.

An array of efforts has been undertaken to address risks to the critical

infrastructures and implement PDD 63 requirements. Many of these efforts

have built on longstanding efforts to strengthen federal information

security. However, substantive analysis and related remedial actions to

protect critical infrastructures have been very limited. In addition, a

national strategy has not been fully developed for accomplishing CIP goals

and integrating CIP activities with the established framework of federal

Conclusions
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Page 128 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

information security laws and organizational responsibilities. Developing

such a strategy and gaining both public and private sector support is

important to ensuring that our nation has the capability to deal with the

growing threat of computer-based attacks on our nation’s critical

infrastructures. Meeting the challenges of accomplishing these efforts will

not be easy and will require clear central direction and dedication of

expertise and resources from multiple federal agencies.

We have made scores of recommendations in reports to individual

executive agencies regarding weaknesses in their individual computer

security practices, and most agencies have corrective actions underway.

Accordingly, we are making no additional recommendations to the

agencies at this time. In addition, in our recent report regarding the

progress of the NIPC, we made recommendations to the Attorney General

and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs regarding

the need to define more fully the role and responsibilities of the NIPC,

develop plans for establishing analysis and warning capabilities, and

improve information-sharing relationships between the private-sector and

federal entities.

To supplement our previous recommendations, we further recommend

that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ensure that

the federal government’s CIP strategy, which is currently under review,

define

• specific roles and responsibilities of organizations involved in critical

infrastructure protection and related information security activities;

• interim objectives and milestones for achieving CIP goals and a specific

action plan for achieving these objectives, including implementation of

vulnerability assessments and related remedial plans; and

• performance measures for which entities can be held accountable.

We believe the federal government’s cyber-security strategy should be

linked to the national strategy to combat terrorism as discussed in chapter

3. However, the two areas are different in that the threats to computerbased infrastructures are broader than terrorism and programs to protect

them are more closely associated with traditional information security

activities.

Recommendations for

Executive Action
Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

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Page 129 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Agency comments on a draft of this report were based on their efforts

prior to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In commenting on a

draft of this report, none of the agencies addressed our recommendation.

However, the agencies did provide us with comments on their concerns

regarding the protection of the nation’s critical computer-dependent

infrastructures from computer-based attacks.

DOE highlighted two points in the area of critical infrastructure

protection. First, DOE stated that while computer-based attacks are real

and viable threats, and in some cases may be interpreted as terrorism, they

cannot be labeled as such in many instances. Second, DOE raised the

concern that we should not allow the highly visible cyber issues to

overshadow the threat of possible physical attacks against other

infrastructure elements, particularly energy, transportation, and water

supply systems. In addition, DOE stated that further focus and resources

need to be applied to better understand the threat and how best to protect,

mitigate, respond, and recover from attacks against our critical

infrastructures. DOE also made separate technical comments, which have

been incorporated in the report, as appropriate.

The Department of Justice stated that establishing a central authority

within the Executive Branch for formulating policy regarding computerbased attacks on critical infrastructure facilities may help coordinate

efforts underway in agencies across the federal government. However, the

Department added that careful consideration should be given to how such

central authority would be administered, noting that data gathered under

criminal and intelligence authorities often is carefully prescribed and that

court-sanctioned criminal and intelligence techniques are subject to

different legal requirements. The Department made no technical

comments related to chapter 6.

HHS provided specific comments on its public health service critical

infrastructure sector efforts. In particular, HHS stated that it was

researching a vulnerability assessment methodology, had held some

education and awareness meetings, was working jointly with the CIAO to

develop an education and awareness program, and was developing a

virtual ISAC. We made these changes in the report, as appropriate.

The Department of Commerce stated that the administration is reviewing

the organizational structures for counter-terrorism and CIP to provide

leadership and ensure effective coordination of federal government

efforts. In addition, the Department said that the administration is

committed to developing a new National Plan for Critical Infrastructure

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
Chapter 6: Limited Progress in Implementing

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Page 130 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Protection. The Department also provided technical comments, which

have been incorporated in the report, as appropriate.

The Departments of the Treasury and Transportation also provided

technical comments on the draft of this report. We made these changes in

the report, as appropriate.

Despite the lack of agency comments on our recommendation, we still

believe that it has merit and will supplement our previous

recommendations.
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 131 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix I describes, in chronological order, selected federal interagency

policy and planning documents related to combating terrorism that form

the foundation for the federal government’s efforts to combat terrorism

and protect the nation’s critical infrastructure against attack. These

documents delineate federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities for

responding to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents as well as

the processes and mechanisms by which the federal government mobilizes

and deploys resources and coordinates assistance to state and local

authorities.

This August 1973 plan provides the organizational structure and

procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and

releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The plan

lists the general responsibilities of federal agencies regarding such

incidents, identifies the fundamental kinds of activities that are performed

pursuant to the plan, and describes the specific responsibilities of the

National Response Team, the Regional Response Teams, the National

Response Center, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s National Strike Force Teams

for planning and responding to such incidents.

Federal agencies may conduct consequence management activities in a

terrorist incident under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances

Pollution Contingency Plan because it provides authority and funding

sources to respond to hazardous materials incidents regardless of the

suspected cause. For example, a terrorist act may at first appear to be a

routine hazardous materials incident, leading to the activation of a federal

response under this plan. If the Federal Response Plan is activated, the

response actions of the National Contingency Plan are conducted as one

of the Federal Response Plan’s emergency support functions.

The National Contingency Plan is authorized under section 105 of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9605, and 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300.

This November 1988 Executive Order assigns specific responsibilities

during national security emergencies to federal departments and agencies

based on extensions of their regular missions. The order also designates

the National Security Council (NSC) as the principal forum for

consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy, and

instructs the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) to advise the NSC on issues of national security emergency

preparedness, including mobilizing preparedness, civil defense, continuity

Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant

Federal Policy and Planning Documents

National Contingency

Plan (National Oil and

Hazardous

Substances Pollution

Contingency Plan)

Executive Order

12656: Assignment of

Emergency

Preparedness

Responsibilities
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 132 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

of government, technological disasters, and other issues. It also directs the

FEMA Director to assist in the implementation of national security

emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with other federal

departments and agencies and with state and local governments.

The April 1992 Federal Response Plan, as amended, lays out the manner in

which the federal government, with FEMA coordinating the

support/assistance efforts of other agencies, responds to domestic

incidents or situations in which the President has declared an emergency

requiring federal emergency disaster assistance. More specifically, the plan

outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concept of operation,

organizational structures, and specific assignment of responsibilities to

lead departments and agencies in providing federal assistance. The plan

also categorizes the types of federal assistance into specific emergency

support functions, such as transportation, communications, fire fighting,

and health and medical services.

The Terrorism Incident Annex establishes a general concept of operations

for the federal response to a terrorist incident, including the concurrent

operation under other plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological

Emergency Response Plan.

The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., and

44 Code of Federal Regulations Subchapters D (Disaster Assistance) and

F (Preparedness).

This June 1995 directive sets forth U.S. general policy to use all

appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks

against U.S. interests. More specifically, Presidential Decision Directive

(PDD) 39 directs federal departments and agencies to take various

measures to (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism (e.g., to assess the

vulnerabilities of government facilities and critical national

infrastructure); (2) deter and respond to terrorism (e.g., to pursue, arrest,

and prosecute terrorists and to minimize damage and loss of life and

provide emergency assistance); and (3) develop effective capabilities to

prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of weapons of mass

destruction.

Federal Response

Plan and Terrorism

Incident Annex

Presidential Decision

Directive 39
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 133 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

This May 1996 plan establishes an organizational and operational structure

for coordinated responses by federal agencies to peacetime radiological

emergencies, taking into consideration the specific statutory authorities

and responsibilities of each agency. The plan provides guidance as to

which agency will lead and coordinate the federal response to a

radiological emergency (i.e., the lead federal agency). According to the

guidance, the specific agency depends on the type of emergency involved.

For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead agency for an

emergency that occurs at a nuclear facility or any activity licensed by the

Commission. The plan also identifies the specific roles and responsibilities

of each federal lead agency, such as responding to requests from state and

local governments for technical information and assistance.

This plan may be used whenever any of the signatory agencies respond to

a radiological emergency, which would include terrorist acts to spread

radioactivity in the environment. The Federal Response Plan may be

implemented concurrently with the Federal Radiological Emergency

Response Plan. The functions and responsibilities of the Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan do not change, except for the

coordination that occurs between the lead federal agency and the Federal

Coordinating Officer (usually a FEMA official).

This May 1998 directive attempts to increase the federal government’s

effectiveness in countering terrorism threats against U.S. targets. PDD 62

organizes and clarifies the roles and activities of many agencies

responsible for combating a wide range of terrorism, including preventing

terrorist acts, apprehending and prosecuting terrorists, increasing

transportation security and protecting critical computer-based systems.

This directive also provides for consequence management of terrorist

incidents.

To carry out the integrated program, PDD 62 establishes the Office of the

National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and

Counterterrorism. Working with the NSC, the National Coordinator is

responsible for overseeing the wide range of policies and programs

covered by PDD 62 and is to take the lead in developing guidelines that

might be needed for crisis management.

Federal Radiological

Emergency Response

Plan

Presidential Decision

Directive 62
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 134 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

This May 1998 directive acknowledges computer security as a national

security risk and established several entities within the NSC, the

Department of Commerce, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

to address critical infrastructure protection, including federal agencies’

information infrastructures. PDD 63 tasks federal agencies with

developing critical infrastructure protection (CIP) plans and establishing

related links with private industry sectors. It called for the development of

a national plan for critical infrastructure protection.

The December 1998 classified Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan and its

annual updates are intended to provide a baseline strategy for

coordination of national policy and operational capabilities to combat

terrorism in the United States and against American interests overseas.

The plan identifies several high-level goals aimed at preventing and

deterring terrorism, facilitating international cooperation to combat

terrorism, improving domestic crisis and consequence planning and

management, improving state and local capabilities, safeguarding

information infrastructure, and leading research and development efforts

to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. It also identifies the specific

tasks federal agencies perform when responding to terrorist incidents and

sets forth current and projected efforts by the Attorney General in

partnership with other federal agencies; the National Coordinator for

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism; and state and

local entities to improve readiness to address the threat of terrorism.

The January 2000 National Plan for Information Systems Protection

provides a vision and framework for the federal government to prevent,

detect, respond to, and protect the nation’s critical cyber-based

infrastructure from attack and reduce existing vulnerabilities by

complementing and focusing existing Federal Computer Security and

Information Technology requirements. Subsequent versions of the plan

will (1) define the roles of industry and state and local governments

working in partnership with the federal government to protect privately

owned physical and cyber-based infrastructures from deliberate attack

and (2) examine the international aspects of critical infrastructure

protection.

The National Plan for Information Systems Protection is authorized by

PDD 63, which calls for the development of a national plan for information

system protection to prioritize CIP goals, principles, and long-term

planning efforts.

Presidential Decision

Directive 63

Attorney General’s

Five-Year Interagency

Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime

Plan

National Plan for

Information Systems

Protection
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 135 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The November 2000 Domestic Guidelines (Guidelines for the Mobilization,

Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response

to Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incidence in Accordance With Presidential

Decision Directive 39) provide a road map for government agencies’

mobilization, deployment, and use under PDD 39 in response to a terrorist

threat or incident. The Domestic Guidelines describe specific procedures

and responsibilities for deploying the Domestic Emergency Support Team,

particularly in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents, and

facilitate interagency coordination in support of the lead federal agency’s

mission to combat terrorism in the United States.

The January 2001 CONPLAN (U.S. Government Interagency Domestic

Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan) provides overall guidance to

federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the federal government

would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that

occurs in the United States, particularly one involving weapons of mass

destruction. The CONPLAN outlines an organized and unified capability

for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies—specifically, the

Department of Justice, the FBI, Department of Defense, Department of

Energy, FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department

of Health and Human Services—to a terrorist threat or act. It establishes

conceptual guidelines for assessing and monitoring a developing threat,

notifying appropriate agencies concerning the nature of the threat, and

deploying necessary advisory and technical resources to assist the lead

federal agency in facilitating interdepartmental coordination of crisis and

consequence management activities.

The January 2001 International Guidelines (Coordinating Subgroup

Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S.

Government Elements in Response to an Overseas Terrorist Incident)

outline procedures for deploying the Foreign Emergency Support Team

and otherwise coordinating federal operations overseas.

This February 2001 directive communicates presidential decisions

concerning the national security policies of the United States. It also

reiterates the role of the NSC system as the process to coordinate

executive departments and agencies in the effective development and

implementation of those national security policies. The directive

designates the NSC Principals Committee as the senior interagency forum

for consideration of policy issues affecting national security and tasks the

Domestic Guidelines

CONPLAN

International

Guidelines

National Security

Presidential

Directive-1 (NSPD-1)
Appendix I: Compendium of Relevant Federal

Policy and Planning Documents

Page 136 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

NSC Policy Coordination Committees with the management of the

development and implementation of national security policies by multiple

U.S. agencies. It also establishes the Policy Coordination Committees and

defines their roles and responsibilities.
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 137 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix II describes, in chronological order, selected individual agency

plans and guidance for combating terrorism that either have been

completed recently or are being drafted. These documents clarify

agencies’ roles and procedures for responding to terrorist attacks; provide

guidance for the allocation of resources for planning, exercising, and

implementing agency plans and programs; and delineate agency strategies

for addressing terrorism.

This unclassified directive issued on February 18, 1997, establishes DOD

policy and assigns responsibility for providing military assistance to civil

authorities. The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or

threats of domestic terrorism is contingent upon authorization by the

President as well as approval by the Secretary of Defense. The directive

does not address non-federalized National Guard assets in support of local

and/or state civil agencies approved by the governor.

The guide includes a Biological Warfare Response Template that

addresses both crisis and consequence management within five scenarios.

States may use the template to formulate an integrated approach to

biological weapons emergency responses. The Biological Weapons

Improved Program was initiated in 1998 and the final draft of the planning

guide was issued on August 1, 2000. The guide was developed as the result

of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-

201, Sept. 23, 1996), which required the Secretary of Defense to develop

and implement a program to improve the responses of federal, state, and

local agencies to emergencies involving biological and chemical weapons.

DOD developed the Biological Warfare Improved Response Program and

coordinated the associated planning guide with the Department of Health

and Human Services (HHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the

Department of Agriculture.

Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Department of

Defense

DOD Directive 3025.15

Military Assistance to Civil

Authorities

Improving Local and State

Agency Response to

Terrorist Incidents

Involving Biological

Weapons. Interim Planning

Guide
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 138 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The August 10, 2000, memorandum states that some chemical, biological,

radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents may have

qualitative and quantitative differences from routine incidents. Thus, all

official requests for DOD support for chemical, biological, radiological,

nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents are routed through the

Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, who determines if the

incident warrants special operational management. For incidents not

requiring special operations, the Secretary of the Army will serve as the

Executive Agent through the Director of Military Support channels.

DOD has several contingency plans to address its potential crisis and

consequence management support roles in both domestic and

international situations. Some of these are classified.

The April 1999 document, Design Basis Threat for the Department of

Energy Programs and Facilities, identifies and characterizes potential

adversary threats to DOE’s programs and facilities that could adversely

affect national security, the health and safety of employees, the public, or

the environment. The document specifically addresses the protection of

DOE facilities in the United States against terrorist attacks and is

coordinated with DOD and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as

with the intelligence community and the FBI. It serves as the foundation

for DOE’s defensive policies and requirements, including facility

protection strategies and countermeasures.

Management of DOD

Operational Response to

Consequences of Certain

Incidents Involving

Chemical, Biological,

Radiological, Nuclear, and

High Yield Explosives

Contingency Plans

Department of Energy

Design Basis Threat for the

Department of Energy

Programs and Facilities
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 139 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The June 1996 plan provides a coordinated federal response for urgent

public health and medical care needs resulting from chemical and/or

biological terrorist threats or acts within the United States. The plan

supports the FBI and FEMA by leading the Emergency Support Function

No. 8 response to the health and medical aspects of a chemical or

biological terrorist incident. It also supplements and assists affected state

and local governments by providing resources from (1) HHS and its

supporting federal agencies and departments and (2) non-federal sources,

such as major pharmaceutical suppliers and international disaster

response organizations like the Canadian Ministry of Health. The plan is an

appendix to Emergency Support Function No. 8 of the Federal Response

Plan. Portions of the plan may be implemented under HHS authorities

prior to formal implementation of the Federal Response Plan.

The April 1999 plan serves as a tool for infection control professionals and

healthcare epidemiologists to guide the development of response plans for

their institutions in preparation for a real or suspected bioterrorism attack

and encourages institution-specific response plans to be prepared in

partnership with local and state health departments. The plan is updated

as needed to reflect public health guidelines and new information.

The unpublished April 2000 report outlines steps for strengthening public

health and health care capacity to protect the United States against

chemical and biological terrorism in cooperation with law enforcement,

intelligence, and defense agencies in addition to the Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention (CDC).

The June 2000 draft manual outlines criteria for implementation of the

smallpox response plan and CDC vaccine and personnel mobilization

activities. The draft manual assists state and local health officials with

specific activities essential for the management of a smallpox emergency.

Department of Health

and Human Services

Department of Health and

Human Services Health

and Medical Services

Support Plan for the

Federal Response to Acts

of Chemical/Biological

(C/B) Terrorism

Bioterrorism Readiness

Plan: A Template for

Healthcare Facilities

Preparedness and

Response to Biological and

Chemical Terrorism: A

Strategic Plan

Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention

Smallpox Outbreak

Response Plan and

Guidelines
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 140 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The January 2001 departmental 5-year plan builds on HHS’ strategic plan

to include budget projections for the agencies and offices involved in

achieving the department’s goals for (1) prevention of bioterrorism; (2)

infectious disease surveillance; (3) medical and public health readiness for

mass casualty events; (4) the national pharmaceutical stockpile; (5)

research and development; and (6) secure and continuously operating

information technology infrastructure.

This February 2001 draft-planning guidance is designed to help state

public health officials determine their role in terrorism response and

understand the emergency response roles of local health departments and

emergency management communities. It also may be used to help

coordinate efforts among state health departments and agencies and

organizations at all levels of government that would respond to a WMD

terrorist event.

The draft plan describes how HHS will provide coordinated federal

assistance for public health and medical care needs resulting from

terrorist threats or acts using weapons of mass destruction within the

United States or its territories and possessions. The plan encompasses

both crisis and consequence management responsibilities; describes the

essential features for a systematic, coordinated and effective national

health and medical response; and defines procedures for the use of

Department resources to augment and support state and local

governments.

The December 1999 manual serves as a planning resource for special

events held within the United States. It provides an overview of the issues

FBI personnel consider when planning and coordinating support for

special events and identifies the roles and functions of other federal

agencies that often support special events.

Fiscal Years 2002 and 2006

Plan for Combating

Bioterrorism

The Public Health

Response to Terrorism:

Planning Guidance for

State Public Health

Officials, Centers for

Disease Control and

Prevention.

U.S. Department of Health

and Human Services

Counterterrorism Concept

of Operations Plan

Department of

Justice/FBI

National Special Security

Events Operations Manual
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 141 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The December 1999 blueprint discusses the role of the National Domestic

Preparedness Office as a single coordinating office and information

clearinghouse for federal assistance programs to prepare state and local

officials to respond to WMD acts of terrorism within the United States.

The plan provides guidance to the FBI On-Scene Commander to effectively

respond to a WMD threat or incident. The plan highlights the FBI’s policy

for crisis management of WMD terrorist events and delineates specific

responsibilities of FBI components during a WMD incident. The plan sets

out procedures and resources available to support the FBI’s investigative

and crisis management responsibilities.

This June 2000 interim document provides guidance to the U.S. Coast

Guard concerning participation in WMD incidents and planning while

recognizing resource and training shortfalls. It also provides guidance

concerning command and control and operating procedures.

The August 2000 plan provides a national framework for current and

future U.S. Coast Guard program operations and strategies for attaining

the Marine Safety and Environmental Protection Program’s mission to

protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests through

the prevention and mitigation of maritime accidents. The plan aims to

reduce the vulnerability of the marine transportation system to intentional

harm from terrorist acts. It also directs the U.S. Coast Guard to achieve a

specific readiness level in interdiction and consequence management

responsibilities concerning the use or threat of use of weapons of mass

destruction. The Marine Transportation System Report submitted to the

Congress in September 1999 and the President’s Commission on Seaport

Crime and Security, along with the Oceans Report to the President,

“Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future,” provide the blueprint for

the U.S. Coast Guard to obtain these objectives as part of their

responsibility for port security.

Blueprint for the National

Domestic Preparedness

Office

Weapons of Mass

Destruction Incident

Contingency Plan

Department of

Transportation/U.S.

Coast Guard

Interim Guidance

Regarding Coast Guard

Response to Weapons of

Mass Destruction (WMD)

Incidents

U.S. Coast Guard Marine

Safety and Environmental

Protection Business Plan,

FY 2001-2005
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 142 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The December 2000 document provides guidance for the allocation of

resources for planning, exercising, and executing the U.S. Coast Guard’s

contingency preparedness program that includes, but is not limited to,

terrorist incidents. The guidance seeks to encourage standardization and

consistency in the U.S. Coast Guard’s contingency preparedness efforts

and to help focus limited resources toward high-risk contingencies. It

directs the U.S. Coast Guard to update outdated plans; strengthen ties with

federal, state, and local governments, and industry to improve

coordination during responses; develop a 5-year national exercise

schedule to anticipate planning and resource requirements; and record all

exercise after-action reports and lessons learned in a centralized U.S.

Coast Guard database.

The January 2000 plan supercedes the 1986 version and represents EPA’s

current programmatic and operational concepts for responding to

radiological incidents and emergencies. It is used as a guide for planning

and maintaining readiness to respond to those releases in accordance with

EPA’s mission to protect the environment and support the Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan and National Oil and Hazardous

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The plan covers both EPA’s role

as a lead federal agency for response coordination under the Federal

Radiological Emergency Response Plan and its role as a lead agency for

directing and managing an emergency response pursuant to the National

Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.

The March 2000 manual serves as a resource for EPA regional and

headquarters personnel to use during domestic terrorism-related planning

or response activities. Although the manual is not agency policy, EPA

updates it periodically. It provides background information on the

response framework and other agencies’ responsibilities and presents

details pertaining to the specific roles and responsibilities of EPA

response personnel during a terrorist threat or incident.

Several annexes provide an overview of EPA’s strategy for addressing

counterterrorism, including the EPA organizations involved in developing

and implementing its counterterrorism strategy to protect public health

and the environment from the threat or adverse effects of nuclear,

U.S. Coast Guard

Contingency Preparedness

Program Guidance

Environmental

Protection Agency

Environmental Protection

Agency Radiological

Emergency Response Plan

EPA Regional CounterTerrorism Program

Reference Manual

including Annexes for

EPA’s Counterterrorism

Planning, Preparedness,

and Response Strategy
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 143 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

biological, and/or chemical substances released during terrorist incidents.

The annexes also discuss funding for regional counterterrorism activities,

supporting legal authorities, and interagency counterterrorism

workgroups.

FEMA’s September 1997 Strategic Plan presents three strategic goals that

support the agency’s mission to reduce the loss of life and property and

protect U.S. institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the

nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of

mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Several of the goals

address FEMA’s role as the lead agency for consequence management in a

terrorist incident and describe related activities.

The June 2000 Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan outlines the mission,

vision, and goals of FEMA’s Terrorism Preparedness Program and

supports FEMA’s Strategic Plan by clarifying agency goals and objectives

related to terrorism. The Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan presents

several goals related to mitigation and preparedness. It emphasizes

providing guidance on FEMA’s roles and responsibilities in terrorism

related activities; supporting federal, state, and local consequence

management planning, training, and exercise programs; improving

coordination and sharing of information at all levels of government;

establishing an organizational structure for coordinating terrorism

preparedness within FEMA; and developing systems to monitor and track

resources needed to support FEMA’s terrorism consequence management

programs and activities.

The August 2000 plan clarifies roles and responsibilities in the

implementation of FEMA-wide programs and activities in terrorism

preparedness and supports FEMA’s June 2000 Terrorism Preparedness

Strategic Plan and overall FEMA Strategic Plan. Under this plan, the

Senior Advisor for Terrorism Preparedness provides overall direction,

coordination, and oversight for the implementation of FEMA’s terrorismrelated programs and activities. It also sets forth the roles and

responsibilities of each of FEMA’s directorates that support terrorismrelated consequence management activities.

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Strategic Plan Fiscal

Year 1998 through Fiscal

Year 2007 With Operational

Objectives through Fiscal

Year 2003

FEMA Terrorism

Preparedness Strategic

Plan

FEMA Implementation

Plan
Appendix II: Individual Agency Plans and

Guidance for Combating Terrorism

Page 144 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

In April 2001, FEMA issued Attachment G to the State and Local Guide 101

for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning under the authority of the

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act and the Emergency Assistance Act,

as amended. Issued in September 1996, the State and Local Guide 101

provides emergency managers with information on FEMA’s concept for

developing risk-based, all-hazard emergency operations plans. The

voluntary guide provides a “toolbox” of ideas and advice for state and

local authorities and clarifies the preparedness, response, and short-term

recovery planning elements that warrant inclusion in state and local

emergency operations plans.

Attachment G to the State and Local Guide 101 aids state and local

emergency planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident

Appendix to their Emergency Operations Plan for incidents involving

terrorist-initiated weapons of mass destruction.

Attachment G: Terrorism

Supplement to the State

and Local Guide 101 for

All-Hazard Emergency

Operations Planning
Appendix III: Selected Federal Crisis

Management Response Teams

Page 145 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix III lists selected federal crisis management response teams by

agency. It describes their mission and number of personnel that could be

deployed. If state and local first responders are unable to manage a

weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident or become overwhelmed,

the incident commander can request these and other federal assets.

Agency/Team Mission Number of personnel

Department of Defense

U.S. Army 52nd Ordnance Group (Explosive

Ordnance Disposal)

Trained on chemical and nuclear weapons of mass

destruction and on specialized equipment for

diagnostics and render-safe/mitigation of a nuclear

device.

Three Explosive Ordnance

Disposal companies

located in San Diego, CA;

San Antonio, TX; and

Andrews AFB, Washington,

D.C.

U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit Provides field sampling, monitoring, recovery,

decontamination, transportation, and verification of

weaponized and non-weaponized chemical and

biological materials.

Approximately 150 military

and civilian personnel at

Aberdeen Proving

Grounds, MD; Pine Bluff

Arsenal, AR; and Dugway

Proving Grounds, UT.

Joint Special Operations Task Force Determined based upon circumstances. Determined based upon

circumstances.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Critical Incident Response Group

(includes Hostage Rescue Team, Crisis

Negotiation, Crisis Management, and Behavioral

Assessment)

Facilitates rapid response to and management of

crisis incidents. Provides on-scene commander with

rapid response/support in crisis incidents, including

crisis negotiations, command post, behavioral

assessment, and crisis information management.

Approximately 230,

including the Hostage

Rescue Team.

Hostage Rescue Team Deploys to any location within 4 hours and conducts

a successful rescue operation of persons held by a

criminal or terrorist force.

Authorized about 90

personnel at the FBI

Academy at Quantico, VA.

Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams Plan and execute high-risk tactical operations that

exceed the capabilities of field office investigative

resources. Provide management support of SWAT

operations.

Over 1,000 trained

personnel in 56 field

offices, with nine enhanced

SWAT teams.

Hazardous Materials Response Unit Responds safely and effectively to incidents

involving hazardous materials and develops the

FBI’s technical proficiency and readiness for crime

scene and evidence-related operations in cases

involving chemical, biological, and radiological

materials.

Headquarters unit plus 17

smaller and less capable

units through the United

States.

Department of Energy

Nuclear Emergency Search Team Provides specialized technical expertise in resolving

nuclear or radiological terrorist incidents. Searches

for lost or stolen nuclear material, weapons, or

devices.

Varies in size from a fiveperson technical advisory

team to a tailored

deployment of dozens.

Basic team consists of

seven persons.

Appendix III: Selected Federal Crisis

Management Response Teams
Appendix III: Selected Federal Crisis

Management Response Teams

Page 146 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Agency/Team Mission Number of personnel

Nuclear/Radiological Advisory Team Provides technical advice, emergency response,

and follow-on expertise to the On-Scene

Commander.

Eight-person team.

Lincoln Gold Augmentation Team Provides expert technical advice to deployable U.S.

military Explosive Ordnance Disposal operators

concerning diagnostics, render-safe procedures,

weapons analysis, and device modeling and effects

prediction.

Five-person team.

Joint Technical Operations Team Provides advanced technical capabilities to move or

neutralize nuclear weapons.

Thirty one-person team

composed of 21 DOE and

10 DOD personnel, all of

whom have other primary

duties.

Department of Health and Human Services

Domestic Emergency Support Team component Provides technical assistance as needed. The size and composition

of each team is determined

by the type and location of

the event or threat.

National Medical Response Team/WMD Each team provides an operational response

capability, including a pharmaceutical cache for

treating up to 5,000 people for chemical weapons

exposure.

The size and composition

of each team is determined

by the type and location of

the event or threat.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

National Response Team Assists federal, state, and local investigators in

meeting the challenges faced at the scenes of

significant arson and explosives incidents.

Four teams organized

geographically to cover the

United States.

Environmental Protection Agency

Radiological Emergency Response Team Conducts environmental monitoring, performs

laboratory analyses, and provides advice and

guidance on measures to protect the public.

As many as 60 personnel

with these collateral duties

are located in Las Vegas,

NV, and Montgomery, AL.

Source: GAO analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams

Page 147 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IV lists selected federal consequence management response

teams by agency. It describes their mission and number of personnel that

could be deployed. If state and local first responders are unable to manage

a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident or become overwhelmed,

the incident commander can request these and other federal assets.

Response team Mission

Number of team

(dedicated/collateral) members

and team’s primary location

Department of Defense

Joint Task Force for Civil Support Supports lead federal agency, establishes

command and control of designated Department of

Defense (DOD) forces, and provides military

assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent

human suffering, and provide temporary critical life

support.

Sixty dedicated personnel located at

Fort Monroe, VA.

Chemical/Biological Rapid Response

Team

Coordinates and integrates DOD’s technical

assistance for the neutralization, containment,

dismantlement, and disposal of chemical or

biological materials. Assists first responders in

dealing with consequence management.

Fourteen dedicated personnel

located at Aberdeen Proving

Grounds, MD.

U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit Provides chemical/biological advice, assessment,

sampling, detection, field verification, packaging,

escort, and render-safe for chemical/biological

devices or hazards.

Approximately 190 personnel located

at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD;

Fort Belvoir, VA; Pine Bluff, AR; and

Dugway, UT.

U.S. Army Special Medical

Augmentation Response Team—

Nuclear/Biological/Chemical

Provides technical advice in the detection,

neutralization, and containment of chemical,

biological, or radiological hazardous materials in a

terrorist event.

Six teams located at various sites

with six members per team who have

these collateral duties.

U.S. Army Special Medical

Augmentation Response Team—AeroMedical Isolation

Provides a rapid response evacuation unit to any

area of the world to transport and provide patient

care under conditions of biological containment to

service members or U. S. civilians exposed to

certain contagious and highly dangerous diseases.

Approximately 20 personnel who

have this collateral duty are stationed

at Fort Detrick, MD.

U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological

Incident Response Force

Provides force protection or mitigation in the event

of a terrorist incident, domestically or overseas.

Three hundred seventy-three

dedicated personnel at Indian Head,

MD.

U.S. Army Radiological Advisory

Medical Team

Assists and furnishes radiological health hazard

guidance to the on-scene commander or other

responsible officials at an incident site and the

installation medical authority.

Eight to 10 personnel who have

these collateral duties are located at

Walter Reed Army Hospital,

Washington, D.C.

Department of Health and Human

Services

Management Support Teams Manage federal medical teams and assets that are

deployed in response to an incident.

Six to eight dedicated personnel

located at Rockville, MD,

supplemented by 18 to 20

Department of Veterans Affairs

personnel who have these collateral

duties.

Appendix IV: Selected Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams

Page 148 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Response team Mission

Number of team

(dedicated/collateral) members

and team’s primary location

National Medical Response Teams Decontaminate casualties resulting from a

hazardous materials incident, provide medical care,

and deploy with pharmaceutical cache of antidotes

and medical equipment.

Four teams located at Washington,

D.C. (non-deployable); WinstonSalem, NC; Denver, CO; and Los

Angeles, CA, with 36 members per

team who have these collateral

duties.

Disaster Medical Assistance Teams Provide emergency medical care during a disaster

or other event.

Forty-four teams at various locations

nationwide with 34 members per

team who have these collateral

duties.

Disaster Mortuary Operational

Response Teams

Provide identification and mortuary services to state

and local health officials upon request in the event

of major disasters and emergencies.

Ten teams at various locations

nationwide with 25 to 31 members

per team who have these collateral

duties.

National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Resupplies state and local public health agencies

with pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies in

the event of a terrorist incident.

Six rapid response inventories are

located at five of six permanent sites.

Department of Energy

Radiological Assistance Program

Teams

Assist federal agencies, state and local

governments, private business, or individuals in

incidents involving radiological materials.

Twenty-six teams at various locations

nationwide with seven members per

team who have these collateral

duties.

Federal Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Centera

Collects, evaluates, interprets, and distributes offsite radiological data in support of the lead federal

agency, state, and local governments. Coordinates

federal resources in responding to the off-site

monitoring and assessment needs at the scene of a

radiological emergency.

Team members deploy in phases.

Phases I (15 members) and II (45

members) consist of Department of

Energy personnel with these

collateral duties from Nellis Air Force

Base, NV, and other locations. Phase

III (known as Full Federal

Radiological Monitoring and

Assessment Center) involves multiple

federal agencies and may have 150

or more personnel from various

federal agencies.

Aerial Measuring System Detects, measures, and tracks ground and airborne

radioactivity over large areas using fixed-wing and

rotary-wing aircraft.

Five to 10 dedicated and collateral

duty personnel located at Nellis Air

Force Base, NV, and Andrews Air

Force Base, MD.

Radiation Emergency Assistance

Center/Training Site

Provides medical advice and on-site assistance in

triage, diagnosis, and treatment of all types of

radiation exposure events.

Four to eight dedicated personnel

located in Oak Ridge, TN.

Department of Transportation

U.S. Coast Guard National Strike

Teams

Respond to oil and hazardous substance pollution

incidents in and around waterways to protect public

health and the environment. Area of responsibility

includes all Coast Guard Districts and Federal

Response Regions. Support Environmental

Protection Agency’s On-Scene Coordinators for

inland area incidents.

Three teams located in Fort Dix, NJ;

Mobile, AL; and Novato, CA, with 35

to 39 dedicated members per team.
Appendix IV: Selected Federal Consequence

Management Response Teams

Page 149 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Response team Mission

Number of team

(dedicated/collateral) members

and team’s primary location

U.S. Coast Guard On-Scene

Coordinators

Coordinate all containment, removal and disposal

efforts, and resources during a hazardous release

incident in coastal or major navigational waterways.

Approximately 50 dedicated

personnel in pre-designated Coast

Guard regional zones at various

locations nationwide.

Department of Veterans Affairs

Medical Emergency Radiological

Response Team

Provides technical advice, radiological monitoring,

decontamination expertise, and medical care as a

supplement to an institutional health care provider.

Twenty-one to 23 personnel with

these collateral duties are located at

various sites nationwide.

Environmental Protection Agency

On-Scene Coordinators Direct response efforts and coordinates all other

efforts at the scene of a hazardous materials

discharge or release.

Approximately 200 dedicated

personnel, plus contractor support, at

various locations nationwide.

Environmental Response Team Provides technical support for assessing, managing,

and disposing of hazardous waste.

Twenty-two dedicated personnel,

plus contractor support, located in

Edison, NJ, and Cincinnati, OH.

Radiological Emergency Response

Team

Provides mobile laboratories for field analysis of

samples and technical expertise in radiation

monitoring, radiation health physics, and risk

assessment.

As many as 60 personnel with these

collateral duties are located in Las

Vegas, NV, and Montgomery, AL.

Federal Emergency Management

Agency

Emergency Response Team Coordinates federal response and recovery

activities within a state.

Size is dependent on the severity and

magnitude of the incident. Team

members with these collateral duties

are geographically dispersed at

Federal Emergency Management

Agency headquarters and 10 regional

offices.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Regional Incident Response Teams Carry out the responsibilities and functions of the

lead federal agency during incidents at licensed

facilities, such as nuclear power plants.

Four teams located in Atlanta, GA;

Lisle, IL; Arlington, TX; and King of

Prussia, PA, with 25-30 members per

team who have these collateral

duties.

a

The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the Federal Radiological

Monitoring Assessment Center during the early phase of an emergency. The Environmental

Protection Agency assumes control during later phases.

Source: GAO analysis and discussions with agency officials.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 150 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix V provides a compendium of selected GAO recommendations

for combating domestic terrorism made over the last 5 years. This

appendix also provides the current status of GAO’s prior

recommendations.

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39,

Dec. 1, 1997). Recommendations, p. 13.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for

coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council (NSC),

in consultation with the Director, Office of Management and

Budget (OMB), and the heads of other executive branch

agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities

to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are

established; (2) agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and

requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to

established governmentwide priorities; and (3) resources are

allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of

the threat and risk of terrorist attack.

Recommendation partially implemented. (1) The Attorney

General’s Five-Year Counter-Terrorism and Technology Crime

Plan, issued in December 1998, included priority actions for

combating terrorism. According to the NSC and OMB, the FiveYear Plan, in combination with Presidential Decision Directives

(PDD) 39 and 62, represent governmentwide priorities that they

use in developing budgets to combat terrorism. (2) According to

the NSC and OMB, they analyze agencies’ programs, projects,

activities, and requirements using the Five-Year Plan and related

presidential decision directives. (3) According to the NSC and

OMB, they allocate agency resources based upon the priorities

established above. However, there is no clear link between

resources and threats. No national threat and risk assessment

has been completed to use for resource decisions.

To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism-related activities

are well-coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals

of U.S. policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director,

OMB, use data on funds budgeted and spent by executive

departments and agencies to evaluate and coordinate projects

and recommend resource allocation annually on a crosscutting

basis to ensure that governmentwide priorities for combating

terrorism are met and programs are based on analytically sound

threat and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication.

Recommendation partially implemented. OMB now is tracking

agency budgets and spending to combat terrorism. According to

the NSC and OMB, they have a process in place to analyze these

budgets and allocate resources based upon established priorities.

However, there is no clear link between resources and threats. No

national threat and risk assessment has been completed to use

for resource decisions.

Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 151 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Recommendations, p. 22.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Secretary of Defense—or the head of any subsequent lead

agency—in consultation with the other five cooperating agencies

in the Domestic Preparedness Program, refocus the program to

more efficiently and economically deliver training to local

communities.

Recommendation implemented. The Department of Defense

(DOD) transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the

Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of

Justice has implemented this recommendation by emphasizing

the program’s train-the-trainer approach and concentrating

resources on training metropolitan trainers in recipient

jurisdictions.

The Secretary of Defense, or the head of any subsequent lead

agency, use existing state and local emergency management

response systems or arrangements to select locations and

training structures to deliver courses and consider the

geographical proximity of program cities.

Recommendation implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic

Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on October

1, 2000. The Department of Justice has implemented this

recommendation by modifying the programs in metropolitan areas

and requiring cities to include their mutual aid partners in all

training and exercise activities.

The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection

and Counterterrorism actively review and guide the growing

number of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence

management training and equipment programs and response

elements to ensure that agencies’ separate efforts leverage

existing state and local emergency management systems and are

coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly

defined end state.

Recommendation partially implemented. The NSC established an

interagency working group called the Interagency Working Group

on Assistance to State and Local Authorities. One function of this

working group is to review and guide the growing number of WMD

consequence management training and equipment programs.

However, as described in our current report, we believe that more

needs to be done to ensure that federal efforts are coordinated,

unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end

state—a results-oriented outcome as intended for government

programs by the Results Act. We make a related recommendation

in this current report to consolidate assistance programs.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 152 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/C-NSIAD-99-3, February 26, 1999). Recommendations,

pp. 38, 39, and 65.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Attorney General direct the Director, FBI, to coordinate the

Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with all federal agencies with

counterterrorism roles and finalize them. Further, the Domestic

Guidelines and/or CONPLAN should seek to clarify federal, state,

and local roles, missions, and responsibilities at the incident site.

Recommendation implemented. The Domestic Guidelines were

issued in November 2000. The CONPLAN was coordinated with

key federal agencies and was issued in January 2001.

The Secretary of Defense review command and control structures

and make changes, as appropriate, to ensure there is unity of

command to DOD units participating in domestic counterterrorist

operations to include both crisis response and consequence

response management and cases in which they might be

concurrent.

Recommendation implemented. In May 2001, the Secretary of

Defense assigned responsibility for providing civilian oversight of

all DOD activities to combat terrorism and domestic WMD

(including both crisis and consequence management) to the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low

Intensity Conflict.

The Secretary of Defense require the services produce after-action

reports (AAR) or similar evaluations for all counterterrorism field

exercises that they participate in. When appropriate, these AARs

or evaluations should include a discussion of interagency issues

and be disseminated to relevant internal and external

organizations.

Recommendation partially implemented. The Joint After Action

Reports database contains lessons learned. These reports

address interagency issues, where appropriate. Many DOD units

produce AARs and many of them address interagency issues.

However, DOD officials acknowledged that service units or

commands do not always produce AARs and/or disseminate

them internally and externally as appropriate. We make a similar

recommendation to DOD and other agencies in this current

report.

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Recommendations, p. 20.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection

and Counterterrorism, in consultation with the Attorney General,

the Director, FEMA, and the Secretary of Defense, reassess the

need for the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams in light

of the numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can

provide similar functions and submit the results of the

reassessment to the Congress. If the teams are needed, we

recommend that the National Coordinator direct a test of the

Rapid Assessment and Initial Deployment team concept in the

initial 10 states to determine how the teams can best fit into

coordinated state and federal response plans and whether the

teams can effectively perform their functions. If the teams are not

needed, we further recommend that they be inactivated.

Recommendation partially implemented. With authorization from

the Congress, DOD established additional National Guard teams

and changed their names from Rapid Assessment and Initial

Detection teams to WMD Civil Support Teams. However,

subsequent to our report and a report by the DOD Inspector

General, which found some similar problems, DOD has agreed to

review the National Guard teams and work with other agencies to

clarify their roles in responding to terrorist incidents. We make a

similar recommendation in this current report.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 153 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163,

Sept. 7, 1999). Recommendations, p. 22.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to prepare a formal,

authoritative intelligence threat assessment that specifically

assesses the chemical and biological agents that would more

likely be used by a domestic-origin terrorist—non-state actors

working outside a state run laboratory infrastructure.

Recommendation partially implemented. The Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) agreed with our recommendation. The FBI,

working with the National Institute of Justice and the Technical

Support Working Group, has produced a draft threat assessment

of the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be

used by terrorists. Along these lines, we make a similar

recommendation in this current report. The Department of Justice

anticipated that a draft of the assessment would be available for

interagency review and comment in September 2001 and the final

assessment would be published in December 2001.

The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a

national-level risk assessment that uses national intelligence

estimates and inputs from the intelligence community and others

to help form the basis for, and prioritize, programs developed to

combat terrorism. Because threats are dynamic, the Director

should determine when the completed national-level risk

assessment should be updated.

Recommendation partially implemented. According to the

Department of Justice, the FBI is in the process of conducting

such an assessment. The report will assess the current threat, the

projected threat, emerging threats, and related FBI initiatives.

Along these lines, we make a similar recommendation in this

current report. The Department stated that this assessment is

being finalized and anticipated that the classified report would be

published in October 2001.

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are

Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Recommendations, p. 10.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of

Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),

and U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response

Force (CBIRF) establish sufficient systems of internal control over

chemical and biological pharmaceutical and medical supplies by

(1) conducting risk assessments, (2) arranging for periodic,

independent inventories of stockpiles, (3) implementing a tracking

system that retains complete documentation for all supplies

ordered, received, and destroyed, and (4) rotating stock properly.

Recommendation partially implemented. All of the agencies have

made significant progress toward implementing our

recommendations. They have conducted risk assessments,

completed periodic physical inventories of the stockpiles, and

developed and implemented procedures for stock rotation. Each

of the agencies is taking steps to replace their current tracking

systems with ones that are capable of tracking pharmaceutical

and medical supplies from the time an order is placed until the

item is consumed or otherwise disposed of.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 154 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Recommendations, p. 25.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General eliminate

duplicative training to the same metropolitan areas. If the

Department of Justice extends the Domestic Preparedness

Program to more than the currently planned 120 cities, it should

integrate the program with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program

to capitalize on the strengths of each program and eliminate

duplication and overlap.

Recommendation partially implemented. DOD transferred the

Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on

October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice, is attempting to

better integrate the assistance programs under its management.

We make a similar recommendation in this current report to

further consolidate these programs.

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000). Recommendations, p. 27.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

To guide resource investments for combating terrorism, we

recommend that the Attorney General modify the Attorney

General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and

Technology Crime Plan to cite desired outcomes that could be

used to develop budget requirements for agencies and their

respective response teams. This process should be coordinated

as an interagency effort.

Recommendation not implemented. The Department of Justice

asserts that the current plan includes desired outcomes. As

discussed in this report, we disagree with the Department and

believe what it cites as outcomes are outputs—agency activities

rather than results the federal government is trying to achieve. In

this current report, we repeat this recommendation to the Attorney

General. We also recommend that the President establish a

single focal point for overall leadership and coordination to

combat terrorism. If such a focal point is established, then we

believe that the focal point, and not the Attorney General, should

be responsible for developing a national strategy.

The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, take

steps to require that the Weapons of Mass Destruction

Interagency Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving

chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and

weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence

communities.

FEMA said it will take steps to ensure that the Weapons of Mass

Destruction Interagency Steering Group works with relevant

scientific and intelligence communities in developing WMD

scenarios.

The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor

periodic national-level consequence management field exercises

involving federal, state, and local governments. Such exercises

should be conducted together with national-level crisis

management field exercises.

FEMA stated it would support and sponsor periodic national

consequence management field exercises to ensure better

coordination among federal and state and local response teams.

Along these lines, we make a similar recommendation in this

current report.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 155 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001). Recommendations, pp.

25 and 26.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

We recommended that the Secretary of Health and Human

Services require the Director of the Centers for Disease Control

and Prevention to

• execute written agreements as soon as possible with all CDC’s

partners covering the storage, management, stock rotation, and

transporting of medical supplies designated for treatment of

biological or chemical terrorism victims;

• issue written guidance on security to private warehouses that

store stockpiles; and

• install proper fencing, to the extent practical, prior to placing

inventories at storage locations.

Recommendation partially implemented. CDC’s National

Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program has final written agreements in

place with most partners and anticipates finalizing those under

negotiation within the next few months. CDC also issued written

standard operating procedures that address security to its private

warehouse partners and installed fencing at all locations where

inventories are currently stored.

The Secretary of Health and Human Services require the Director

of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) to

• finalize, approve, and issue an inventory requirements list;

• improve physical security at its central location to comply with

DEA regulations, or move the supplies as soon as possible to a

location that meets these requirements;

• issue a written policy on the frequency of inventory counts and

acceptable discrepancy rates;

• finalize and implement approved national and local operating

plans addressing VA’s responsibilities for the procurement,

storage, management, and deployment of OEP’s stockpiles;

• train VA personnel and conduct periodic quality reviews to

ensure that national and local operating plans are followed; and

• immediately contact FDA or the pharmaceutical and medical

supply manufacturers of items stored at its central location to

determine the impact of items exposed to extreme

temperatures, replace those items deemed no longer usable,

and either add environmental controls to the current location or

move the supplies as soon as possible to a climate controlled

space.

Recommendation partially implemented. OEP finalized its

inventory requirements list in February 2001. In June 2001, the

supplies stored at the central location were moved to a facility that

meets security and controlled temperature requirements.

Pharmaceuticals at the central cache are in the process of being

potency tested by FDA, and VA has ordered drugs to replace

those no longer deemed usable. Further, OEP issued written

policies on the frequency of inventory counts and acceptable

discrepancy rates. In March 2001, OEP issued national and local

operating plans to VA and provided training and conducted

periodic quality reviews to ensure that these plans are followed.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the Marine Corps

Systems Command to program funding and complete the fielding

plan for the CBIRF-specific authorized medical allowance list,

require the Commanding Officer of the CBIRF to adjust its stock

levels to conform with this list, and remove expired items from

stock and replace them with current pharmaceutical and medical

supplies.

Recommendation partially implemented. The Marine Corps

Systems Command programmed funding in June 2001 to cover

deficiencies identified in its authorized medical allowance list.

CBIRF expects to fill these deficiencies by October 1, 2001.

Further, it removed and destroyed expired items from its stock.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 156 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing

National Capabilities (GAO-01-323, Apr. 25, 2001). Recommendations,

pp. 57, 68, and 85.

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in

coordination with pertinent executive agencies,

• establish a capability for strategic analysis of computer-based

threats, including developing a related methodology, acquiring

staff expertise, and obtaining infrastructure data;

• develop a comprehensive governmentwide data-collection and

analysis framework and ensure that national watch and

warning operations for computer-based attacks are supported

by sufficient staff and resources; and

• clearly define the role of the National Infrastructure Protection

Center (NIPC) in relation to other government and privatesector entities, including

• lines of authority among the NIPC and the National Security

Council, Justice, the FBI, and other entities;

• the NIPC’s integration into the national warning system; and

• protocols that articulate how and under what circumstances

the NIPC would be placed in a support function to either the

DOD or the intelligence community.

Recommendation not implemented. The Administration currently

is reviewing the federal critical infrastructure protection (CIP)

strategy. As of July 2001, no final documents on this strategy had

been issued.

The Attorney General task the FBI Director to require the NIPC

Director to develop a comprehensive written plan for establishing

analysis and warning capabilities that integrates existing planning

elements and includes

• milestones and performance measures;

• approaches (or strategies) and the various resources needed

to achieve the goals and objectives;

• a description of the relationship between the long-term goals

and objectives and the annual performance goals; and

• a description of how program evaluations could be used to

establish or revise strategic goals, along with a schedule for

future program evaluations.

Recommendation not implemented. According to the Director of

the NIPC, the NIPC has begun developing a plan that incorporates

these elements.

The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to task the NIPC

Director to

• ensure that the Special Technologies and Applications Unit

has access to the computer and communications resources

necessary to analyze data associated with the increasing

number of complex investigations;

• monitor implementation of new performance measures to

ensure that they result in field offices’ fully reporting

information on potential computer crimes to the NIPC; and

• complete development of the emergency law enforcement

plan, after comments are received from law enforcement

sector members.

As the national strategy for critical infrastructure protection is

reviewed and possible changes considered, we recommend that

the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs define

the NIPC’s responsibilities for monitoring reconstitution.

Recommendation partially implemented. An emergency law

enforcement services sector plan has been issued.
Appendix V: Compendium of Relevant GAO

Recommendations

Page 157 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

GAO recommendations Status of recommendations

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1)

direct federal agencies and encourage the private sector to better

define the types of information that are necessary and

appropriate to exchange in order to combat computer-based

attacks and procedures for performing such exchanges; (2)

initiate development of a strategy for identifying assets of national

significance that includes coordinating efforts already underway,

such as those at DOD and Commerce; and (3) resolve

discrepancies between PDD 63 requirements and guidance

provided by the federal Chief Information Officers Council

regarding computer incident reporting by federal agencies.

The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to direct the NIPC

Director to (1) formalize relationships between the NIPC and

other federal entities, including DOD and the Secret Service, and

private-sector ISACs so that a clear understanding of what is

expected from the respective organizations exists; (2) develop a

plan to foster the two-way exchange of information between the

NIPC and the ISACs; and (3) ensure that the Key Asset Initiative

is integrated with other similar federal activities.

Recommendation partially implemented. The Administration

currently is reviewing the federal CIP strategy. As of July 2001, no

final documents on this strategy had been issued. The NIPC has

created the Interagency Coordination Cell to foster cooperation

across government agencies in investigative matters and on

matters of common interest and has continued to foster better

relationships with the information sharing and analysis centers.
Appendix VI: Organizations

Visited and Contacted

Page 158 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

During the course of our review, we visited and/or contacted officials from

the following organizations:

• Office of Crisis Planning and Management, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Procurement, Property and Emergency Preparedness,

Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and

Information, National Telecommunications and Information

Administration, Washington, D.C.

• Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Washington, D.C.

• National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology

Laboratory, Computer Security Division, Gaithersburg, Md.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence, Principal Director (Acting), Security

and Information Operations, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence, Director, Critical Infrastructure

Protection, Arlington, Va.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs,

Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and

Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterterrorism,

Plans, and Support, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate of Operations (J-3),

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Material, or High-Yield

Explosive Division, Washington, D.C.

• Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Va.

• Office of Defense Programs, Germantown, Md.

• Office of Non-Proliferation Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Security and Emergency Operations, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Chief Information Officer, Office of the Associate CIO for

Cyber Security, Washington, D.C.

Appendix VI: Organizations Visited and

Contacted

Cabinet Departments

and Related Agencies

Department of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy
Appendix VI: Organizations

Visited and Contacted

Page 159 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Security Affairs, Germantown, Md.

• Office of Safeguards and Security, Germantown, Md.

• Office of Emergency Operations, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Management, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Response, Germantown, Md.

• Office of the Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget, Office of

Information Resources Management, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Preparedness, Rockville, Md.

• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Ga.

• U.S. Public Health Service, Rockville, Md.

• U.S. Public Health Service, Region VIII, Denver, Colo.

• Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Washington, D.C.

• Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section,

Washington, D.C.

• Justice Management Division, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C.

• Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support,

Washington, D.C.

• National Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C.

• Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C.

• Counter Terrorism Division, Washington, D.C.

• Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section, Washington,

D.C.

• Special Events Management Unit, Washington, D.C.

• National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.

• WMD Countermeasures Unit, Washington, D.C.

National Infrastructure Protection Center, Washington, D.C.

• Critical Incident Response Group, Quantico, Va.

• Crisis Management Unit, Quantico, Va.

• Hazardous Materials Response Unit, Quantico, Va.

• Salt Lake City Field Office, Utah

• Office of the Undersecretary of Management, Bureau of Information

Resource Management/Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security

Affairs, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Bureau for International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C.

• Technical Support Working Group, Arlington, Va.

Department of Health and

Human Services

Department of Justice

Department of State
Appendix VI: Organizations

Visited and Contacted

Page 160 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Office of the Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Security and Administrative Management, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Intelligence and Security, Washington, D.C.

• Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Assistant Administrator for

Information Services and Chief Information Officer, Office of Information

Systems Security, Washington, D.C.

• Research and Special Programs Administration, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Transportation, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Innovation, Research and Education, Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Coast Guard, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• National Response Center, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Under Secretary for Enforcement, Washington, D.C.

• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Headquarters, Washington,

D.C.

• United States Secret Service, Washington, D.C.

• Major Events Division, Washington, D.C.

• Technical Security Division, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Protective Operations, Olympic Coordinator, Salt Lake

City, Utah

• Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Washington,

D.C.

• Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Information Systems) and Chief

Information Officer, Washington, D.C.

• Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Management Strategic

Healthcare Group, Martinsburg, W.Va.

• Office of the Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information,

Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Assistant Administrator for Water, Office of Ground and

Drinking Water, Washington, D.C.

• Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Washington,

D.C.

• Region VIII, Denver, Colo.

• National Security Council Staff; National Coordinator for Security,

Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C.

• Office of Management and Budget, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Department of

Transportation

Department of the

Treasury

Department of Veterans

Affairs

Other Agencies

Environmental Protection

Agency

Executive Office of the

President
Appendix VI: Organizations

Visited and Contacted

Page 161 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Office of Science and Technology Policy, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Director, Washington, D.C.

• Information Technology Services, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Inspector General , Washington, D.C.

• Office of National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C.

• Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate, Washington, D.C.

• Readiness Division, Washington, D.C.

• Program Development Branch, Washington, D.C.

• Response and Recovery Directorate, Washington, D.C.

• Region VIII, Denver, Colo.

• Federal Technology Service, Office of Information Assurance and Critical

Infrastructure Protection, Washington, D.C.

• Federal Computer Incident Response Center, Washington, D.C.

• Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C.

• Tri-County Health Department, Commerce City, Colo.

• Office of Emergency Management, Arapahoe County, Colo.

• Sheriff/Emergency Law Enforcement Services Sector Coordinator,

Arapahoe County, Colo.

• Aurora Fire Department, Aurora, Colo.

• Office of Emergency Management, Aurora, Colo.

• Aurora Police Department, Aurora, Colo.

• Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colo.

• 8th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, Aurora, Colo.

• Denver Police Department, Denver, Colo.

• Department of Environmental Health, Denver, Colo.

• Department of Fire, Denver, Colo.

• Department of Safety, Denver, Colo.

• Office of Health and Emergency Management, Denver, Colo.

• Denver Health, Colo.

• Denver Public Health Department, Denver, Colo.

• Department of Emergency Medicine, Denver, Colo.

Federal Emergency

Management Agency

General Services

Administration

State and Local

Organizations

Adams, Arapahoe, and

Douglas Counties, Colo.

Arapahoe County, Colo.

Aurora, Colo.

City and County of

Denver, Colo.
Appendix VI: Organizations

Visited and Contacted

Page 162 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

• Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, Colo.

• Office of Emergency Management, Department of Local Affairs, Division

of Local Government, Golden, Colo.

• Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug Center, Denver, Colo.

• Department of Public Safety, Salt Lake City, Utah

• Utah Olympic Public Safety Command, Salt Lake City, Utah

• Banking and Finance Infrastructure Sector Coordinator (a position

outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63), in Washington, D.C.

• Financial Services—Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Reston, Va.

State of Colorado

State of Utah

Private Sector
Appendix VII: Comments From the Executive Office of the

President

Page 163 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VII: Comments From the Executive

Office of the President

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix VII: Comments From the Executive Office of the

President

Page 164 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on pp. 83, 85.

Now on p. 148.

Now on p. 34.
Appendix VII: Comments From the Executive Office of the

President

Page 165 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VII: Comments From the Executive Office of the

President

Page 166 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VII: Comments From

the Executive Office of the

President

Page 167 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of Management and

Budget’s (OMB) letter dated September 4, 2001, which provided a

consolidated response from selected offices within the Executive Office of

the President, including OMB, the Office of Science and Technology

Policy, and the National Security Council.

We incorporated the consolidated comments where appropriate

throughout the report. In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix,

OMB referred us to the President’s May 8, 2001, statement about the Vice

President’s effort related to national preparedness. As a result, we have

reprinted that statement in this appendix.

GAO Comments
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of

Agriculture

Page 168 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix VIII: Comments From the

Department of Agriculture

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix VIII: Comments From the Department of

Agriculture

Page 169 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix VIII: Comments From

the Department of Agriculture

Page 170 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Agriculture’s

letter dated September 5, 2001.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) requested that we revise our

discussion of after-action reports (AARs) in chapter 4. After USDA

provided us with AARs, we updated table 5 in chapter 4 to indicate that the

Department does produce evaluations for terrorism-related exercises that

it sponsors. USDA agrees with the practice of writing AARs, but asked that

we delete our recommendation to the Secretary of Agriculture because the

Department already produces AARs for exercises that it sponsors. We

continue to believe that this is a valid recommendation because the

Department also could learn valuable lessons when it participates in field

exercises sponsored by other agencies. We have incorporated this

discussion at the end of chapter 4.

In addition, USDA requested that we revise the report to address the issue

of terrorism targeted at U.S. agriculture and the role of the Department in

such incidents. Its letter stated that an attack aimed at the safety of our

food supply and agricultural infrastructure would cause widespread and

long-range damage. As our report clearly states, the objectives and scope

of our report focused on federal efforts to respond to terrorist using WMD

directly against civilian targets. Therefore, we did not focus on terrorism

directed against agricultural targets. Consequently, our discussion of

USDA was limited.

The Department also requested that we address the issue of terrorism

targeted at federal government employees, facilities, and programs. Its

letter stated that there is an increase in the intensity and frequency of

domestic terrorist incidents aimed at its employees, facilities, and

programs—particularly those of the Forest Service, Animal and Plant

Health Inspection Service, and Agricultural Research Service. Again, the

objectives and scope of this report focused on federal efforts to respond to

terrorist incidents involving WMD against civilian targets. Therefore, we

did not focus on terrorism directed against federal government employees

and programs.

The Department further requested that we revise the report to include

agriculture in our discussion of critical infrastructures in chapter 6. The

objectives and scope of this report focused on the critical infrastructures

identified by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure

Protection and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. While we

recognize the importance of the food supply, agriculture has not been

GAO Comments
Appendix VIII: Comments From

the Department of Agriculture

Page 171 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

designated as a critical infrastructure by either group; therefore, it was not

included in our review.

The Department provided us with a separate discussion and summary of

USDA’s capabilities to prepare for and respond to a terrorist incident.

Given the objectives and scope of our review, we have not reprinted that

document in this report.
Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Commerce

Page 172 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix IX: Comments From the

Department of Commerce

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Commerce

Page 173 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 124.

Now on pp. 113-115.

Now on p. 112.
Appendix IX: Comments From the Department of Commerce

Page 174 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 119.
Appendix IX: Comments From

the Department of Commerce

Page 175 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Commerce’s letter

dated September 7, 2001.

We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate in

chapter 6. GAO Comment
Appendix X: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 176 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix X: Comments From the

Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix X: Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 177 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on pp. 18, 104.

Now on pp. 17, 86-87.
Appendix X: Comments From

the Department of Defense

Page 178 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter

dated August 27, 2001.

We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate in

chapters 4 and 5. In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix,

officials from the Department provided us with technical comments,

which we also incorporated where appropriate.

GAO Comments
Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 179 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XI: Comments From the

Department of Energy

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 180 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 181 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XI: Comments From the Department of Energy

Page 182 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Energy’s letter

dated August 27, 2001.

We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate

throughout the report. GAO Comment
Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

Page 183 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XII: Comments From the

Department of Health and Human Services

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

Page 184 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 57.

Now on p. 56.

Now on p. 55.

Now on p. 26.
Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

Page 185 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 91.

Now on pp. 80-81.

Now on p. 80.

Now on p. 72.

Now on p. 71.

Now on p. 65.

Now on p. 65.

Now on p. 60.
Appendix XII: Comments From the Department of Health

and Human Services

Page 186 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 148.

Now on p. 146.

Now on p. 122.
Appendix XII: Comments From

the Department of Health and

Human Services

Page 187 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Health and Human

Service’s letter dated August 29, 2001.

We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate

throughout the report. GAO Comment
Appendix XIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 188 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XIII: Comments From the

Department of Justice

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 189 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 190 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XIII: Comments From the Department of Justice

Page 191 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XIII: Comments From

the Department of Justice

Page 192 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter

dated September 6, 2001.

Regarding the Department of Justice’s comments on chapter 2 about

creating a single focal point, on chapter 3 about the Attorney General’s

Five-Year Plan, on chapter 4 about lessons learned, on chapter 5 about

consolidating some of its functions under FEMA, and on chapter 6 about

computer-based threats, we have incorporated its comments as

appropriate in those respective chapters.

In addition to the letter in this appendix, the Department of Justice

provided us with technical comments on our report. The Department’s

Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support also provided

us with extensive technical comments and supporting documentation.

Because these points were not fully addressed in the Department’s letter,

we are summarizing them below, including our response.

• The Department commented that chapter 1 of our draft report needed to

clarify its discussion of the concurrency of crisis and consequence

management and the respective roles of lead and support agencies. We

incorporated its comments as appropriate.

• The Department commented that chapter 3 of our draft report downplayed

the significance of its efforts to help states and local governments conduct

threat and risk assessments. It said that the Department plans to use the

results of these assessments in deciding how to allocate its equipment,

training, and exercise program resources consistent with previous GAO

recommendations. We revised the report to discuss these assessments in

more detail and to reflect their potential importance. We also separated

our discussion of state and local-level assessments from our discussion of

a national-level assessment that the FBI had previously agreed to produce.

• The Department commented that chapter 5 of our draft report did not

adequately reflect its efforts to reduce duplication and improve the

delivery and coordination of assistance to state and local governments.

The Department said it had taken a number of actions to reduce

duplication and better integrate these programs across the federal

government. We updated the report to reflect these ongoing efforts. The

Department also asserted that because of its efforts, state and local first

responders are no longer confused by the multitude of federal assistance

programs. We disagree with this point and revised the report by providing

additional evidence of continued confusion.

• The Department commented that chapter 5 of our draft report incorrectly

stated that FEMA was the lead agency for preparing state and local

GAO Comments
Appendix XIII: Comments From

the Department of Justice

Page 193 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

governments to manage the consequences of WMD terrorism. The Office

for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support took the position that

the Department of Justice, in both legal and programmatic terms, was the

lead agency for preparing state and local governments for WMD terrorism.

We disagree with the Office’s position and discuss this issue at the end of

chapter 5.

In addition, the Department provided us with an update related to chapter

3 on our previous recommendations that it develop threat and risk

assessments. We updated chapter 3 of the report to reflect these efforts

and provide the Department’s latest milestones for their completion.
Appendix XIV: Comments From the Department of the

Treasury

Page 194 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XIV: Comments From the

Department of the Treasury

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XIV: Comments From

the Department of the Treasury

Page 195 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of the Treasury’s

letter dated September 10, 2001.

In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix, the Department

provided technical comments from the U.S. Secret Service; the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and the Office of Enforcement. We

incorporated these technical comments where appropriate throughout the

report.

GAO Comment
Appendix XV: Comments From the Department of Veterans

Affairs

Page 196 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XV: Comments From the

Department of Veterans Affairs

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XV: Comments From the Department of Veterans

Affairs

Page 197 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism
Appendix XV: Comments From the Department of Veterans Affairs

Page 198 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Veterans Affairs’

letter dated September 5, 2001.

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) concurred with the intent of our

recommendation on after-action reports (AARs) in chapter 4 and agreed

that it will implement the recommendation. Our past and ongoing work

has already demonstrated that VA has a good record of producing AARs.

However, VA asked that we change the wording of the recommendation to

limit it to exercises that are “designated as federal interagency

counterterrorist exercises by the lead federal agency.” We disagree with

this revision because it might limit the production of AARs in a manner to

exclude important exercises. In our previous work, we found that some of

the better consequence management exercises were sponsored by VA or

the Department of Defense (DOD), not by FEMA—the lead federal agency

for consequence management.1

 For example, in September 1997, VA and

DOD sponsored a field exercise to practice providing medical care to

victims of a terrorist WMD attack. That exercise, which had over 2,000

participants, also included state and local responders and local community

hospitals. Changing the wording of our recommendation, as suggested by

VA, might exempt agencies from producing AARs for such exercises.

Given the Department’s good record in producing AARs, even in cases

when they were not “designated” by a lead federal agency, we believe that

the wording in our recommendation will not place any additional burden

upon the Department.

 1

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations

(GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

GAO Comments
Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 199 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in

the report text appear at

the end of this appendix.
Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 200 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 52.

Now on p. 37.

Now on pp. 13, 17, 69-70.

Now on p. 86.
Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 201 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on pp. 15, 103-104,

107.

Now on p. 77.

Now on p. 55.

Now on p. 104.

Now on pp. 14, 90, 99-

100.
Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal Emergency

Management Agency

Page 202 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Now on p. 122.

See comment, p. 203.

Now on p. 92.
Appendix XVI: Comments From the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

Page 203 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

The following is GAO’s comment on the Federal Emergency Management

Agency’s letter dated August 31, 2001.

After we received FEMA’s written comments, FEMA provided us with

revised figures for the number of persons trained at the National Fire

Academy and Emergency Management Institute from fiscal year 1998

through July 31, 2001, of fiscal year 2001. We incorporated the Agency’s

comments where appropriate throughout the report.

GAO Comment
Appendix XVII: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

Page 204 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Counterterrorism:

Raymond J. Decker (202) 512-6020

Stephen L. Caldwell (202) 512-9610

Cyberterrorism:

Robert F. Dacey (202) 512-3317

Jean L. Boltz (202) 512-5247

In addition to those named above, Mark A. Pross, Michael W. Gilmore,

Richard A. McGeary, Danielle P. Hollomon, James C. Lawson, Krislin M.

Nalwalk, Harry L. Purdy, Karl W. Siefert, Yvonne J. Vigil, Keith A. Rhodes,

Rahul Gupta, Grace A. Alexander, Jane D. Trahan, and Heather J. Taylor

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix XVII: GAO Contacts and Staff

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts:

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 205 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism

Program Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, Sept. 19, 2001).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting

Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities

(GAO-01-1132T, Sept. 12, 2001).

International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of

Federal Response Needed (GAO-01-629, Aug. 13, 2001).

FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on

Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited (GAO-01-780, July 16,

2001).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing

Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO-01-769T, May 22,

2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s

Council on Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing

National Capabilities (GAO-01-323, Apr. 25, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal

Response (GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs

Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and

National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, Mar. 27, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in

Coordinating Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, Mar. 20, 2001).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied

Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination

(GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000).

West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness

(GAO/HEHS-00-180, Sept. 11, 2000).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 206 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at

Federal Agencies (GAO/AIMD-00-295, Sept. 6, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a

Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination

(GAO/T-AIMD-00-268, July 26, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for

Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000).

Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of

Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, July 11, 2000).

Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’

Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber

Security Information Act of 2000 (GAO/T-AIMD-00-229, June 22, 2000).

Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use

Should Be More Integrated and Focused (GAO/NSIAD-00-97,

May 26, 2000).

Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-00-10,

May 25, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: “I LOVE YOU” Computer Virus

Highlights Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities

(GAO/T-AIMD-00-181, May 18, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected

Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to

Combat Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000).
Related GAO Products

Page 207 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of

Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information

Systems Protection (GAO/AIMD-00-90R, Feb. 11, 2000).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for

Information Systems Protection (GAO/T-AIMD-00-72, Feb. 1, 2000).

Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are

Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999).

Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to

Deliberate Contamination (GAO/RCED-00-3, Oct. 27, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and

Biological Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, Oct. 20, 1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed

to Assure Security of Federal Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, Oct. 6,

1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Status of Computer Security at

the Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO/AIMD-00-5, Oct. 4, 1999).

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw

on Year 2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999).

Information Security: The Proposed Computer Security Enhancement

Act of 1999 (GAO/T-AIMD-99-302, Sept. 30, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk

Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163,

Sept. 7, 1999).

Information Security: NRC’s Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities

(GAO/AIMD-99-273R, Aug. 27, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises

(GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June 25, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs

(GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999).
Related GAO Products

Page 208 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response

Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is

Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist

Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public

Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat

Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999).

Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for CounterterrorismRelated Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness

Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici

Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues

(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize

and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998).

Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs

Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39,

Dec. 1, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National

Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997).

Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces

Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997).

Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management

Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91,

June 11, 1997).
Related GAO Products

Page 209 GAO-01-822 Combating Terrorism

Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices

(GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997).

Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives

Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing

Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95,

Apr. 15, 1997).

Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13

Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996).

Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives

and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996).

Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security

(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996).

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and

Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR,

Mar. 27, 1996).

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear

Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/

RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996).

Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and

International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994).

Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at

DOE’s Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992).

Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE’s

Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992).

Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical

Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

(350016)

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