NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE V. JUAREZ MORALES, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

ROBERT M. WILKINSON, Acting 

Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 19-71441 

Agency No. A202-064-171 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 5, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: RAWLINSON and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and S. MURPHY,***

District Judge.

Jose Juarez Morales, a Guatemalan native, petitions for review of the denial 

of his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy III, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 18 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition. 

1. As a threshold matter, Juarez Morales argues that the immigration judge 

(“IJ”) did not have jurisdiction over his case because his Notice to Appear failed to 

specify a date and time for his removal hearing. But recent precedent forecloses this 

argument. In United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, we held that “the jurisdiction of 

the immigration court vests upon the filing of an NTA, even one that does not at that 

time inform the alien of the time, date, and location of the hearing.” No. 19-30006, 

2021 WL 345581, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2021). Accordingly, the immigration court 

had jurisdiction over Juarez Morales’s removal proceedings. 

2. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Juarez 

Morales has not established the requisite nexus between the persecution suffered and 

a protected ground like “nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 

political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); see also Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 

F.3d 351, 357 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the protected ground must be “a 

reason” for the persecution). 

Although Juarez Morales testified that his partner ran for an “assessor” 

position as part of the Unionist party, he also admitted that neither of them have been 

harmed or threatened because of this. Indeed, none of the extortion calls included a 

reference to his partner’s political involvement. And Juarez Morales himself 

admitted that these calls could have occurred for any reason. Finally, Juarez Morales 
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admitted in his credible fear interview that he did not think the extortion was related 

to his wife’s politics.1 “An alien’s desire to be free from harassment by criminals 

motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a 

protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010); see also

Gormley v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding no-nexus 

finding where there was “no evidence that the perpetrators victimized him on 

account of his race as opposed to their observation” that he could be targeted for 

theft).

Contrary to Juarez Morales’s arguments, Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012, 

1015 (9th Cir. 2017), is irrelevant here. In Ayala, we recognized the possibility of 

“extortion plus” as a colorable argument for being targeted for extortion “on the

basis of a protected characteristic.” Id. Here, Juarez Morales offers no evidence 

that a protected ground was a reason for his extortion. Indeed, Juarez Morales 

states in a declaration that the type of extortion he experienced is common in 

Guatemala, which suggests that he was not targeted at all—let alone on account of 

1

Juarez Morales did testify that on the first call the extortionists mentioned that they 

knew his partner was involved in politics. But this says little about whether the 

partner’s politics motivated them. Indeed, they mentioned Juarez Morales’s work 

and where his children studied. But in any event, this one reference to his partner’s 

politics is insufficient to compel us to reach a result contrary to the BIA’s. See INS 

v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483–84 (1992) (reversal is warranted only where 

“the evidence [a petitioner] presented was so compelling that no reasonable 

factfinder could fail to find the requisite [element]”). 
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a protected ground.

Nor do we find merit to Juarez Morales’s claim that the BIA erroneously

rejected his proposed social group of “persons who have been extorted by unknown 

parties in Guatemala.” Although Juarez Morales suggests that the BIA denied his 

proposed group by relying on Matter of A-B without making an individualized 

determination, the record belies that assertion. The IJ specifically considered and 

rejected his proposed group, and the BIA incorporated that part of the IJ’s order in 

its own. And the BIA did not err in doing so because “a particular social group must 

exist independently of the harm asserted[.]” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070, 

1080 (9th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (citing Matter of A-B, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 

316 (2018)). 

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Juarez 

Morales has not established a likelihood of torture “inflicted by or at the instigation 

of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in 

an official capacity.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(simplified). Juarez Morales argues that the Guatemalan police will not protect him 

or his family from the extortionists. He believes this because in 2005 he was 

arrested and was allegedly bruised in the process. But he offers no explanation for 

why he was arrested, or how this (potentially legitimate arrest) from over 10 years 

prior would render the police unavailable to him. Next, Juarez Morales argues that 
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the government would acquiesce in potential torture by his extortionists. But Juarez 

Morales never even reported the extortion attempts to the police. See id. at 1034 

(“[T]here must be evidence that the police are unable or unwilling to oppose the 

crime.”). And his generalized country-conditions evidence showing corruption in 

Guatemala is insufficient to compel the conclusion that the government would 

acquiesce in his torture. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“generalized evidence of violence and crime” in country of removal is 

“insufficient”). 

PETITION DENIED.