HYPERSPECTRAL IMAGERY: 

Warfighting Through a Different Set of Eyes 

by 

Paul J. Pabich, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

October 2002 

Occasional Paper No. 31 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air War College 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 
Hyperspectral Imagery: 

Warfighting Through a Different Set of Eyes 

Paul J. Pabich, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF 

October 2002 

The Occasional papers series was established by the Center for Strategy 

and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect long-term 

strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national 

security. Copies of No. 31 in this series are available from the Center for 

Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, 

Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112. The fax number is (334) 953-6158; 

phone (334) 953-6460. 

Occasional Paper No. 31 

Center for Strategy and Technology 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 
Contents

Illustrations ...................................................................................................i 

Disclaimer................................................................................................... ii 

Author........................................................................................................ iii 

Acknowledgements.....................................................................................iv 

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1 

II. Current Hyperspectral Imagery Status....................................................9 

III. Challenges: Vision, Doctrine, and the Intelligence Cycle.................23 

IV. Recommendations ..............................................................................37 

Notes................................................................................49 
Illustrations 

Figure 1 Spectral signatures constructed from AVIRIS sensor...................2 

Figure 2 Wavelength groupings for HSI Sensors........................................3 

Figure 3 Example of a hypercube................................................................5 

Figure 4: Comparison of Two False-Color HSI Images with 

Natural Color Photo............................................................................6 

Figure 5 The Intelligence Cycle ................................................................31 

i 
Disclaimer 

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of

the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Air

University, the US government or the Department of Defense. In 

accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is 

the property of the United States government. 

ii 
Author 

Lieutenant Colonel Paul J. Pabich graduated from the Air War 

College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, in June 2002. In 1980, he 

was a Distinguished Graduate of Air Force Reserve Officer Training 

Corps from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. A career space officer,

he began his space systems experience with Orbital Analyst Training at 

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Following training, Colonel Pabich 

was assigned to the Alternate Space Computation Center, 20th Missile 

Warning Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, and in 1983, he was 

part of the initial cadre forming the 1st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force 

Base as part of the then new Air Force Space Command. In 1985, Colonel 

Pabich was selected to attend the Air Force Institute of Technology, 

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, where he earned a Master of 

Science degree in Space Operations in 1986. He was next assigned to the

Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, where he began test 

planning for the upgrades to the Defense Support Program, the United 

States’ space-borne intercontinental ballistic missile warning system. 

Colonel Pabich returned to operations in 1990 as the Chief of Tactical 

Operations at the 19th Space Surveillance Squadron, Pirinclik Air Station,

Turkey. In 1991, he was once again assigned to the test community as a 

branch chief at Air Force Space Command, overseeing the testing of the 

command’s passive space surveillance sensors. He then moved to

Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, first as the executive officer to the 

Commander, 14th Air Force, and in 1996 he assumed command of 

Detachment 1, 22d Space Operations Squadron, a satellite command and 

control facility. His final tour prior to Air War College was once again in

the test community at the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation

Center where he served as Deputy Director of the Air & Space Mission 

Directorate, overseeing the Center’s initial test efforts for all its test 

programs. 

iii 
Acknowledgements 

I begin by thanking Lt Col John Geis of the Air War College 

Center for Strategy and Technology without whose advice, guidance, and 

prodding, this paper would not have been possible. I also wish to thank 

the many people who gave so willingly of their time during the interview 

process. In many instances, my request for “a few minutes of your time” 

resulted in interviews lasting well over an hour. I thank Mr. Marc 

Rodriguez and Dr. Tom Caudill for their expertise and their continuing

patience during this period. Finally, I must thank my family for their love 

and support. They sacrificed much. 

iv 
Hyperspectral Imagery...1

I. Introduction 

Hyperspectral Imagery, or HSI, is a sophisticated, versatile 

intelligence gathering technology that could potentially enable the US

military to make significant strides towards improving the preparation for 

and execution of its missions. Many of the difficulties in bringing the 

promise of HSI to fruition have very little to do with the technology itself. 

As will be discussed shortly, HSI technology has been successfully 

demonstrated in a variety of diverse applications. In point of fact, it is the

versatility of HSI that may be hindering its implementation into the 

mainstream of the U.S. military’s intelligence gathering capability. The 

objective of this paper is threefold. The first goal is to introduce the 

reader to both the technology itself and the myriad potential applications 

of Hyperspectral Imagery. The second goal is to realistically examine the 

challenges that HSI must overcome, specifically in the areas of how HSI 

fits into the world of joint vision, intelligence doctrine, and the 

intelligence cycle. Finally, the paper will provide a series of

recommendations—some focused on organizational issues and others on 

acquisition issues—that will address the majority of the challenges faced 

by the intelligence community as they endeavor to incorporate an HSI 

capability into the U.S. intelligence community. 

Hyperspectral Imaging Technology Concepts 

While the basic concept behind HSI is relatively straightforward,

the implementation is far more difficult. In most applications, HSI sensors 

collect sunlight reflected from a target area into a number of narrow 

wavelength bins, usually across the visible or infrared (or both) portions of 

the electromagnetic spectrum. These bins of photons are both spectrally

and spatially resolved and thus can be used to generate a variety of 

“images” of the target area. The real key to HSI lies in the concept of

spectral signatures. In simple terms, all materials will transmit, reflect, or

absorb electromagnetic radiation based on the inherent physical structure 

and chemical composition of the material and the wavelength of the 

radiation. Said in another way, for any given material, the amount of 

electromagnetic radiation that is absorbed, reflected or transmitted varies 

with the wavelength or frequency of the radiation. If the percentage of 

reflectance for a given material is plotted across a range of wavelengths, 
Hyperspectral Imagery...2

the resulting curve is referred to as the spectral signature for that material.1

 

Because the spectral signature is different and indeed unique for each 

material, it should be possible to discriminate between one material and 

another based on differences in spectral signatures of the materials. For 

example, HSI can differentiate between desert and farmland. Not only are 

broad differences such as those just noted detectable, it is also possible to 

identify particular materials based on a comparison against a database of

known signatures. For example, as shown in Figure 1, within a 

hyperspectral view of farmland it should be possible to differentiate a 

barley crop from potatoes.2

 This concept forms the basis for HSI. 

Figure 1: Spectral Signatures Constructed From AVIRIS Sensor 

The available literature contains several disparate definitions for

the types of sensor platforms that qualify as “hyperspectral” systems. 

These definitions often include the number of bands, the width of each 

spectral band, and the idea that the bands are continuous across a region 

rather than having numerous gaps between the bands. Additionally, the 

spatial resolution (i.e., the size of the smallest distinguishable item in the 

scene) can vary tremendously between sensors. One definition for an HSI 

system indicates it must have “at least sixteen contiguous bands of high 
Hyperspectral Imagery...3

spectral resolution over a region of the electromagnetic spectrum;”

3

another source describes HSI systems by the spectral width of the 

wavelength bands, e.g., .01 micrometer (μm).

4

 As one might suspect, 

there are limited a limited number of photons available for collection 

during a scan period of a hyperspectral system. Therefore, there is a 

tradeoff between the number of bands one wishes to collect in and the 

number of photons one might reasonably expect to collect during a scan 

period. Nevertheless, because the true strength of Hyperspectral Imagery 

lies in its ability to use many narrow wavelength bands to distinguish 

between objects, this paper will consider HSI systems as sensors that 

collect at least 100 spectral bands of .01μm width. Because HSI sensors 

will only be effective in spectral regions where the atmosphere is 

transparent, the nature of the sensor cannot be truly “contiguous” and must

be broken into useful bandwidth groupings. As shown in the Figure 2 

below, HSI practitioners obtain slices of bandwidth from five wavelength 

groupings: visible, near infrared (NIR); short wavelength infrared 

(SWIR)5

; medium wavelength infrared (MWIR); and long wavelength 

infrared (LWIR).6

Figure 2 Wavelength Groupings for HSI Sensors 

The HSI sensors reviewed for this paper were either spaceborne or 

airborne, and the areas of interest may extend from several meters above

the earth’s surface (e.g., treetop height) to a few meters below the surface

(e.g., coral reef depth). These systems most often perform in the visible to 
Hyperspectral Imagery...4

NIR and SWIR ranges, and most HSI sensors do not have the MWIR or 

LWIR capability. One key difference in the choice of sensor wavelength 

bands is that photons received by the sensor in the visible to SWIR

wavelengths are actually reflected from the targeted area. This obviously 

limits the utility of these sensors to daylight hours. By contrast, HSI 

sensors that have MWIR and LWIR capability will capture photons that 

are emitted from the targeted area, thus opening the possibility for 

nighttime and see-through-the-clouds operations.7

 If the processing 

algorithms for a given sensor can separate cloud signals from the ground 

signals, the cloud portion can be subtracted from the overall signal and the 

sensor can essentially "see" through clouds. This is not necessarily as 

easy as it may appear as the physics of the clouds play a tremendously 

challenging role. However, if the imaging system has data regarding 

cloud temperature as well as moisture profile, then algorithms can 

estimate the radiance of the cloud. The system can then subtract the 

cloud’s estimated radiance from the total radiance to obtain an estimate of 

the ground radiance, thus “seeing through” the cloud.8

 Therefore, while 

clouds and nighttime will frustrate HSI collection in the visible and SWIR 

spectrums, bringing LWIR sensors into the picture can help mitigate that 

limitation, though they do bring along other challenges such as proper 

cooling of the long wavelength sensor.9

To appropriately differentiate between HSI and other types of 

imagery, this paper defines panchromatic imagery as black & white 

imagery that is equally sensitive to all wavelengths in the visible 

spectrum.

10 Thus a green tree and a green car will certainly have different 

shapes in the image but their shade of gray will be the same. In addition, 

multispectral imagery is defined as having fewer than 20 non-contiguous 

spectral bands covering wavelengths in the visible to SWIR spectrum. 

Another important term in HSI is “hypercube,” or the data set that 

is provided by HSI sensors. Whereas visual images typically have spatial 

reference points (e.g., latitude, longitude or more simply X and Y), 

hypercubes also provide a third, or Z, axis, which essentially contains an 

X-Y plane for each of the spectral bands observed by that sensor.11 Thus,

hypercubes provide a spectral “depth” that is exploited to identify the

materials within the sensor’s field of view. One challenge facing the 

implementers of HSI is that each hypercube contains a huge amount of 

data that must be moved quickly within the available communications 

systems. Thus implementers must remain cognizant of a limited 

communication system or develop other ways to minimize the size of 
Hyperspectral Imagery...5

hypercubes. A visual example of concepts of hypercube depth and size 

concepts just discussed is shown in Figure 3. 

Figure 3 Example of a Hypercube12

A not so obvious point that needs to be addressed is that images of 

a given area from hyperspectral sensors will look far different to the naked 

eye than they do when appropriate false color has been added. As shown 

in Figure 4, without prior knowledge, it would be difficult to judge that 

these multiple views from an HSI imager are the same area. In this 

instance the leftmost picture is near to natural color, and the two images to 

its right demonstrate the existence of various minerals in the scene with

the reds, yellows, purples, greens, etc. Given this scientific foundation, 

the next portion of the paper will briefly review some of the potential 

military applications of HSI. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...6

Figure 4: Comparison of Two False-Color HSI Images with Natural 

Color Photo13

Uses of Hyperspectral Imagery 

Hyperspectral Imagery holds considerable promise for many 

military applications. The Navy has already begun developing a 

spaceborne HSI system to enhance their intelligence preparation of the 

battlespace. This satellite-based system will collect data for areas of

interest in the littoral environment to include: “underwater hazards, 

currents, oil slicks, bottom type, atmospheric visibility, tides, 

bioluminescence potential, beach characterization, atmospheric water 

vapor, and subvisible cirrus along with terrestrial images of vegetation and 

soil.”14 The utility to the Navy and the Marine Corps comes from the

ability to predict the littoral environment with much better confidence and 

to better prepare for amphibious assault. The satellite will be able to look

for hazards down to a depth of twenty meters depending on water clarity. 

In contrast to other types of sensors, the Navy HSI system is not being 

built for quick analysis for target determination; instead, it is being 

developed to provide longer-term characterization of items that are slow to 

change (e.g., reefs).15

The Air Force also has many uses for hyperspectral imagery. In 

particular, the service is looking for HSI systems that can provide the 
Hyperspectral Imagery...7

warfighter with near-real-time information to enable attacks on targets

such as tanks hiding under trees. The Air Force is also interested in 

knowing what not to attack, as in the case of decoys. Destroying decoys

can be a costly proposition. At $21,000 per copy for the tail kits alone, 

Joint Direct Attack Munition precision-guided weapons should be 

zealously guarded from unwittingly attacking decoys.16 Since decoys will

not have the same material composition as real targets, HSI should be able 

to differentiate between the two. By using HSI to discriminate between 

real and false targets, the U.S. can save money by avoiding bad targets and 

at the same time wisely expend precision munitions on true targets. 

Defeating camouflage is another particularly likely mission candidate for 

HSI because even though the camouflage may show up as the same color 

as the surrounding terrain in the visual spectrum, its material makeup will 

cause it to reflect very differently at other wavelengths. 

The Army and Marine Corps (once ashore) would likely find uses 

for HSI in areas such as large area coverage to characterize a theater of 

interest. HSI could also be used to focus on specific targets in specific 

areas. The a priori knowledge of the amount of grass, trees, shrubs, desert, 

roads and the moisture content of the surface could have tremendous 

impact on their ability to carry out operations.17 Another mission for HSI 

that may be particularly life saving is its potential to detect landmines

along roads and other areas where humans gather.18 Other concepts also

come to mind. For instance, in the war in Afghanistan, would it have been 

possible for an HSI sensor to detect concentrations of carbon dioxide in 

cave-laden areas where the fighting was occurring? Would these

concentrations possibly represent exhaust holes in caves occupied by 

enemy forces? 

This brief look at potential service operational uses for HSI

shouldn’t cloud the potential strategic uses that could emerge for the 

Department of Defense (DOD). In years to come, advanced technologies 

such as HSI could be used to monitor international treaty compliance. For 

example, the ability of HSI to detect byproducts from the manufacture of 

chemicals could be used to monitor the Chemical Weapons Convention 

Treaty.19 So too could HSI be used to monitor the war on drugs. The 

fields used to grow illegal drugs as well as the facilities used to process the

raw materials into illegal substances could be discovered via HSI. 

Eradication of these fields and facilities could totally disrupt the 

distribution cycle, thus preventing drug profits from being used by antiAmerican organizations. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...8

As can be seen by even in this brief review of its possible uses, 

HSI has the potential to dramatically change the methods by which the

military gathers information about the battlespace across the services, and

in turn, makes decisions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of 

war. Having reviewed how HSI works and why it can be so valuable, the 

remainder of the paper will seek to examine the question, “If airborne and 

spaceborne Hyperspectral Imagery are to deliver on their promise, how 

should this technology be integrated into the joint warfighting system?”

The paper will attempt to answer this question by addressing important 

issues in the following three sections. 

In the next section, the paper provides the current status of 

hyperspectral imagery implementation. It will show some of the halting 

steps that the HSI community worldwide is taking to turn this technology 

into working systems. The section is broken into three major subsets: 

military systems, non-military systems, and ground processing systems. 

The military section will review how the DOD is implementing the 

technology in both the airborne and spaceborne arenas. The discussion of 

non-military systems such as NASA’s Hyperion satellite will demonstrate 

that, at least in the spaceborne area, non-military systems are ahead of 

those in the military. Also included in this review is a description of some

example systems that demonstrate how the DOD is also working data 

processing issues. 

The third section of this paper describes some of the doctrinal and 

organizational challenges that currently face the DOD as it attempts to

fully implement hyperspectral imagery. The section addresses the

placement of HSI into the existing vision of the DOD and intelligence 

community doctrine and will show that HSI fits quite easily into the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for the future of the joint force,

although there is a challenge with where to place HSI within the 

intelligence community. The intelligence cycle and the functions of

tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination will also be reviewed

in detail. Finally, current thinking for integrating HSI with other forms of 

intelligence (e.g., radar) will also be noted. 

The final section will address recommendations on how the 

military can implement hyperspectral imagery. The point of view taken

here is that given the current status of technology and doctrine, how can 

the force of the future best integrate HSI into its warfighting system? The 

discussion focuses on key issues such as doctrine, organization, and 

training. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...9

II. Current Hyperspectral Imagery Status 

While the theoretical underpinnings of the technology are already 

well understood, engineers have only recently gained the ability to 

implement the theory. The following discussion examines the status of 

HSI implementation but does not focus exclusively on the technology. In 

fact, it will be seen that, in general, much more thought has been applied 

to defining the proper organization and use of HSI assets, than has been 

devoted to development and engineering to field the required technologies. 

High Level HSI Documentation 

One of the first things noticeable in an investigation of 

hyperspectral imagery is that at present there is no single organization 

charged with oversight of HSI for the DOD. A number of entities, 

however, can claim large stakes in the area. These entities include the 

Central Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) Organization 

and the National Space Security Architect. The Air Force, Navy, and 

Army also have specific programs they are attempting to implement. 

Despite the lack of a lead organization, there are some promising signs of 

purposeful integration of HSI, especially in the processing and 

dissemination areas. Most notable however are various high level 

documents that have been published, or are currently in draft, that describe

how to best use this promising technology. A review of several of these 

documents is now provided to show that much thought is being devoted to 

proper implementation of HSI at both the national and service levels. 

The first of these documents is a Congressionally mandated-report 

published by the National Space Security Architect in December 2000. 

The National Space Security Architect organizationally sits under the 

Under Secretary of the Air Force and is responsible for “developing, 

coordinating, and integrating” future space system architectures for the 

DOD and intelligence agencies.20 This classified report listed several 

items that could potentially improve the usefulness of HSI to the 

warfighter.21 The DOD’s own Space Technology Guide repeatedly listed 

HSI as a supporting technology for a wide variety of missions from target 

acquisition, to nuclear, biological, and chemical monitoring, to

atmospheric monitoring.22 The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has 

also noted that HSI has “great potential,” though the members also 

cautioned that because of technical limitations (e.g., cloud cover for short 
Hyperspectral Imagery...10

wavelength infrared sensors) HSI by itself is insufficient to be a primary 

source of real-time intelligence.

23

It should also come as no surprise that national level political 

leaders are also interested in this topic. Though they did not mention HSI 

specifically, the US Senate has devoted much time to Measurement and 

Signal Intelligence (the most likely location within the intelligence

community in which HSI will be placed), both praising its potential and 

simultaneously criticizing its implementation. The Senate language in the 

Fiscal Year 2001 budget had very positive words to say about how these 

types of systems can help intelligence agencies accomplish critical 

missions, specifically pointing out countering proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction as an important area of interest. HSI is certainly capable 

of playing a significant role in such a mission. The Senate language even 

noted that, historically, they have backed up their praise with significant 

new funding. Though the Senate had positive words for the community, 

they were not reluctant to heap blame on the intelligence community for 

its inability “to come to grips with resources, management, and 

organizational...deficiencies.”24 In December 2000, yet another 

Congressionally mandated independent commission report, this one about 

the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, listed HSI as one of several 

technologies that could help the Agency to improve its capabilities.25 The

National Imagery and Mapping Agency mission is “to provide timely, 

relevant, and accurate intelligence and geospatial information in support of 

national security objectives of the United States.”

26

Organizational Implementation 

In addition to the DOD high level thinking on HSI just discussed, 

various agencies are also working organizational aspects to try to take 

advantage of HSI technologies, even if most of the anticipated 

technologies do not yet exist. For example, the Central Measurement and 

Signal Intelligence (MASINT) Organization (CMO) has already made 

significant progress by providing HSI training to operators as well as by 

narrowing the search for the appropriate software tools to enhance the 

capabilities of the operators. As noted earlier, to the untrained eye HSI 

does not “look” like standard imagery; thus, standard imagery analyst 

training is insufficient to prepare operators for this new field. To 

overcome some of the human and technological issues already identified, 

the CMO established the Hyperspectral MASINT Support to Military 

Operations (HYMSMO) Program Office within the Spectral Information
Hyperspectral Imagery...11

Technology Applications Center. The Center’s mission is to provide key 

infrastructure support to further the DOD’s and intelligence community’s

understanding of HSI and its potential utility.27 To fulfill the HYMSMO 

program’s mission to increase understanding, the CMO has created the

Training Education Coordination Office to obtain the proper training at all 

levels from the Spectral Information Technology Applications Center. 

Various training courses exist depending on the levels of detail needed. 

For example, one course gives senior leaders a broad understanding of 

what HSI brings to the fight. Other courses are tailored for mid-level 

leaders and collection managers. Finally, the CMO offers a very detailed 

course on how to exploit HSI processing. Currently this training is

contracted out, but there is already on-going discussion about how to bring 

the training into standard military intelligence coursework.28

The services are also playing a more active role in HSI. For 

example, the Army took the lead within the former U.S. Space Command, 

now U.S. Strategic Command, by setting up the Spectral Operations

Resource Center. This center’s primary mission is to coordinate and 

manage the command’s hyperspectral and multi-spectral production 

capabilities and to integrate new spectral advances.29 It achieves this goal 

by providing the command with access to spectral products and services 

while advocating new spectral requirements to support the warfighter. 

The center completes the cycle by staying involved in various activities to 

bring the latest in spectral technologies and capabilities to operational 

forces.30 The basic idea is that as the lead HSI servicer for U.S. Strategic 

Command, the Spectral Operations Resource Center will act as an HSI 

clearinghouse along with the Naval Space Command’s Remote Earth

Sensing Information Center and a yet to be decided capability within Air 

Force Space Command.31

As just noted, the Navy performs much of its spectral operations 

through its Remote Earth Sensing Information Center. The Navy center 

has the ability to exploit HSI data and is preparing to use hypercubes 

provided by a Navy HSI satellite when launched.32 The center has

primarily been involved with multi-spectral imagery and has provided 

spectral support to Navy and Marine forces in operations spanning the 

non-combat to combat spectrum for over a decade. This support takes 

many forms including intelligence preparation of the battlefield, mission

planning, order of battle, and change detection among others.33

The Air Force is also stepping up its efforts to incorporate HSI into 

its service roles and missions. The leader of these efforts is Air Combat 
Hyperspectral Imagery...12

Command’s Air Force Command and Control & Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Center (AFC2ISRC), which has created 

an HSI Integrated Product Team (IPT) to bring the maximum HSI utility 

to the warfighter via “architectures, roadmaps, requirements and 

standards.”34 The IPT is also designed to maximize Air Force efforts in 

this technology while minimizing duplication of effort with the other 

services. It would seem the IPT’s greatest contribution is its ability to be

the recognized central point for organizations to bring HSI issues to the 

Air Force.35 Major projects that the HSI IPT is currently working on

include an Air Force level concept of operations and a roadmap for the 

HSI “Family of Systems.”36 This type of strategic thinking within the

service is needed to integrate air and space HSI efforts that are going on in 

various portions of the Air Force. A recent meeting of the HSI IPT noted 

the need to ensure Air Force Space Command is brought into the team.

37 

This should have a strong positive impact on the service’s implementation 

of HSI to ensure space and air are not at odds with each other, and even 

more importantly, it can maximize each organization’s strengths. 

As if to highlight the admonition from the AFC2ISRC’s HSI IPT,

Air Force Space Command and Air Combat Command have already

started to build a roadmap to address the notional requirements for a 

space-based HSI sensor system. The “system” concept is very important 

because HSI is not merely a sensor; it is only one part of a much larger

series of interconnected pieces that starts with a warfighter request for 

information and concludes when the warfighter receives the requested 

information. The Air Force Space Command/Air Combat Command draft 

roadmap for a space-based system recognizes this interconnectedness and 

highlights some of the areas that must be addressed in whatever final 

system is chosen. The draft roadmap also highlights the need to leverage 

the potential of other military and civilian spectral programs.38 By using

this leverage, the two commands can do much to lower acquisition and 

operational risk.39 The roadmap also briefly addresses what will turn out 

to be huge issues such as command and control architectures, sensor 

development, data processing requirements, and how the information is 

actually passed to the customer. The preceding paragraphs have identified 

some of the important doctrinal issues relating to HSI and examined the 

roles and functions of DOD and service organizations. The discussion 

will now turn to a review of actual airborne systems, space-borne systems, 

and ground processing systems with which these organizations intend to, 

or already have, brought HSI to life. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...13

Military Airborne HSI Systems 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a 

key DOD organization that is devoting much effort to HSI, and it controls 

the first HSI airborne sensor reviewed here. DARPA is the DOD’s 

primary research and development organization, and based on its charter,

it actively pursues programs that are high risk yet carry significant 

potential to produce huge payoffs for military missions.40 In 1998, the 

Agency began working on an effort called the Adaptive Spectral 

Reconnaissance Program (ASRP). The main goal of this effort is to 

develop hyperspectral technology that can be used to meet some of the 

potential missions noted earlier, specifically seeing through adversary 

camouflage, concealment, and deception.41 ASRP is focused on 

developing the technology primarily for unmanned airborne systems, and 

it has four specific “technology thrusts”: models and algorithms, data 

analysis and signature databases, LWIR (long-wavelength infrared) sensor 

development, and data collections and demonstrations.42 DARPA would

like to see these technology thrusts result in improved tactical intelligence 

productivity through the use of advanced processing tools for better target 

detection, eventually leading to higher probability of kill and shortened 

time-lines to bring the needed information to the warfighter. They hope 

that through the use of manned and unmanned platforms, ASRP can help 

successfully resolve nagging issues such as the previously noted 

camouflaged vehicles and vehicles hiding in shadows or in tree lines. 

These were particular shortcomings noted from Operation Allied Force in 

Kosovo in 1999.43 

Another airborne sensor program called the Hyperspectral Digital 

Imagery Collection Experiment (HYDICE) was created from a set of 

Naval Research Laboratory requirements and has been flown aboard a 

Convair 580 and a C-141 aircraft at altitudes up to 40,000 feet. The 

advanced design of HYDICE was based on the lessons learned in the

multi-spectral imagery arena, and the system has become very useful for 

assessing the utility of reflective HSI. It collects 206 bands of spectral 

data in the visible, NIR and SWIR (0.4-2.5 μm, overall). The 

Hyperspectral MASINT Support to Military Operations program is one

effort that has used HYDICE as an HSI sensor to collect data on several 

targets in a variety of climatic regions.44
Hyperspectral Imagery...14

Military Spaceborne HSI Systems

One success story that recently completed its scheduled mission is 

MightySat II.1, the Air Force Research Laboratory’s first HSI sensor in 

space. This system had 256 bands covering a wavelength range from

0.35-1.05 μm with a spatial resolution of 1.7 nautical miles.45 As part of a

multi-satellite program, MightySat II.1 was designed to give the Air Force 

a low-cost platform that is capable of demonstrating high risk technologies 

for the purpose of accelerating the maturity of these technologies.46 The

main difference between MightySat’s sensor and the others in this review 

is the method used to gain spectral resolution. While other sensors use a 

grating to spread out the different wavelength photons, MightySat II.1 

uses interference patterns on the sensor that are processed to produce the 

required spectral results. This method has the potential to work very well 

in the LWIR band where it achieves the combination of a wider

wavelength band and smaller spectral resolution (as low as six 

nanometers) than other types of sensors.47 Because this spectral resolution

is smaller, it has the potential to provide a better spectral signature for 

items under surveillance. One could say the “fingerprint” of the items is 

more precise, enhancing our ability to better distinguish between items 

that are similar to one another. 

Following MightySat II.1, military spaceborne HSI success stories

are harder to come by. The plan was to follow up the MightySat 

demonstrator with a much more capable system called Warfighter-1. The 

Air Force Research Laboratory partnered with ORBIMAGE Corporation 

to fly this sensor aboard the commercial OrbView-4 satellite. To enhance 

the sensing capabilities of the satellite, it was designed to be able to

simultaneously image a region using panchromatic and multi-spectral 

imagery techniques in addition to HSI. Its HSI capabilities were to 

acquire spectral images from .45-2.45 μm in bands about .01 μm in width

with a resolution of eight meters and having a swath width of five 

kilometers.48 Key objectives of Warfighter-1 were to, first, continue to

demonstrate the technology and second, to validate the capabilities of the

system needed to produce information useful to a Joint Force 

Commander.

49 Unfortunately, on 21 September 2001, Warfighter-1’s 

Taurus launch vehicle failed about two minutes into launch and 

Warfighter-1 was lost.50 Though this was a very discouraging 

development, the Air Force Research Laboratory has been quick to 

promote the idea of another follow on sensor with even greater capabilities 

than Warfighter-1 called Noble EYE (for Enhanced Hyperspectral 
Hyperspectral Imagery...15

Experiment). This sensor will have the capability to view a twentykilometer swath width with a spatial resolution as low as four to five

meters. The laboratory is currently working with the National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory to design and

build the satellite bus and sensor for a possible launch in the 2005 

timeframe. Expected costs, including launch, are currently in the $200 

million range. Naturally, convincing the holders of the necessary funds to 

release the resources is a large step. The plan is now being proposed to 

the Under Secretary of the Air Force, the single overseer of space 

acquisition projects.51

Of the other services, the Navy is the closest to putting the next 

hyperspectral sensor into orbit. The Naval EarthMap Observer (NEMO) 

is being built to provide unclassified thirty-meter hyperspectral resolution 

for use primarily by naval forces and the civil sector.52 It has a designed

mission life of five years over which it will map large portions of the 

Earth’s surface, focusing on littoral regions. It will also be able to have 

repeat coverage over several of these areas to allow for processing

algorithm validation and improvement. Its HSI sensor has a range from 

.4-2.5 μm broken into 210 spectral bands that are .01 μm wide. NEMO 

also carries a panchromatic camera that can be used simultaneously with 

the HSI sensor to provide fuller characterization of the scene. Key uses 

for the Naval EarthMap Observer are expected to include studies of utility 

for preparing and understanding of the area for amphibious assault, water

clarity, underwater hazards, beach characterization, and runoff effects 

among others.53 

One area in which the Naval EarthMap Observer is expected to

make huge strides is in on-board processing. As discussed earlier, the size

of a hypercube will be an issue when it comes to transmitting the

hypercube to the user; one source envisions raw data rates one day as high 

as 50 Gigabits/sec.54 Even the NEMO’s own high band data rate is only 

150 Mbps. It would appear that much on-board processing is necessary to 

extract only the needed data from the hypercube. In fact, the Navy 

Research Laboratory is attempting to work such an issue with its Optical 

Real-Time Adaptive Signature Identification System. This patented 

system is designed to “significantly reduce the amount of data that NEMO 

must transmit to the ground while preserving 97 to 98 percent of the data 

fidelity.”

55 The system can recognize and eliminate duplicate spectra from 

a scene, it can recognize important spectra that need to be transmitted to 

the ground, and it has already been successfully proven aboard airborne
Hyperspectral Imagery...16

vehicles. Another key aspect of the system is that it provides “greater than 

ten-fold data compression, relieving the bottlenecks of on-board data

storage and transmission to the ground.”56 

As of the writing of this paper, the biggest problem facing the

Naval EarthMap Observer is money. The satellite’s production is 

currently stalled because of the manner in which the program is funded.

The satellite was to be built using a 50-50 split of government and

commercial funds. However, the commercial partner has run out of funds 

and the Naval EarthMap Observer is on hold while further financing is 

procured.57 It currently has no launch date, but the delay is expected to be

at least two years.58 This brief review of military systems is now 

complete, but the military is not the only organization interested in HSI 

technology and its potential applications. 

Non-Military US Government HSI Systems 

One government organization that is devoting much effort to HSI 

is the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). They 

have an airborne sensor called the Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging 

Spectrometer, or AVIRIS. AVIRIS has 224 bands in the spectral region 

from .38-2.5 μm, a .01 μm bandwidth, and 20-meter spatial resolution, 

and it flies aboard a modified U-2 aircraft. On a large scale, the 

spectrometer is used primarily to sense the makeup of the Earth’s surface 

as well as the atmosphere. Investigations using the spectrometer are 

typically focused on climate change and the global environment.59 The

spectrometer has been used to study coastal water flows, snow, and forest 

damage.60

NASA has also moved HSI into the spaceborne realm with their 

Earth Observing-1 satellite, which carries the TRW-developed Hyperion 

HSI sensor. Hyperion has 220 spectral bands in the .4-2.5 μm bandwidth 

with thirty-meter resolution. The satellite has been inserted in an orbit 

where it will sense the same scene as the US Geological Survey’s Landsat 

7 satellite, which is capable of multi-spectral imagery. In so doing, 

scientists and engineers hope to validate data from the Hyperion’s sensors 

and add to the research knowledge base.61

Hyperion’s sensor package is not designed to provide real-time or

even near real-time data. This is because its three sensors will need to

transmit 20 gigabits of data to the ground. This huge amount of data must 

then be stored on digital tapes that are mailed to the appropriate 

organizations for processing.62 This timetable is sufficient for civil
Hyperspectral Imagery...17

purposes and perhaps to assist the military, especially for long-term 

strategic purposes. Unfortunately, the system will not be nearly fast 

enough for military use inside a Joint Force Commander’s campaign 

plan.63 Interestingly, one report indicates the Hyperion sensor was used 

over Afghanistan to give researchers “a unique opportunity to compare 

hyperspectral images of targets before and after they were bombed, adding 

to the store of signature data that can be used in applying the technology to 

targeting and post-attack damage assessment.”64

The next two government sensors to be discussed are not 

hyperspectral, but are actually multi-spectral imagery sensors that 

demonstrate the value that multiple spectra viewers can have over and 

above panchromatic sensors. The first of these is the Landsat satellite run 

by the Department of the Interior’s US Geological Survey. The most 

recent of the Landsat series is Landsat 7, which is used to acquire multispectral images of the Earth's land surface and coastal regions.65 Landsat 

7 flies over the entire globe every 16 days and can sense objects as small 

as thirty meters, much like capabilities of the Navy’s Naval EarthMap

Observer satellite.66 Landsat 7’s sensor collects visible and infrared 

photons in eight different spectral bands. These include four visible and 

near infrared bands from .4-1.0 μm, two bands in the short wavelength 

infrared from 1.0-3.0 μm, and one band in the emissive medium 

wavelength infrared band from 8.0-12.0 μm.

67 The satellite should be able

to provide scientists with unprecedented quantity and quality views of 

changes across the terrestrial environment (e.g., seasonal changes).68

The Department of Energy’s Office of Nonproliferation and 

National Security has also orbited its own multi-spectral imagery satellite.

The Multispectral Thermal Imager was launched on 12 Mar 2000, and has 

as the primary objective of demonstrating “advanced multi-spectral and 

thermal imaging, image processing, and associated technologies that could 

be used in future systems for detecting and characterizing facilities

producing weapons of mass destruction.”69 The system has 15 discrete 

spectral bands from the visible to the long wavelength infrared. In the 

visible spectrum it has five-meter resolution; in the infrared the resolution 

is as low as 20 meters.70

US Non-governmental HSI System 

US non-governmental organizations are also playing a role in HSI. 

In addition to the cooperative ORBIMAGE/USAF Warfighter-1 noted 

earlier, the Aerospace Corporation has created an airborne sensor called 

the Spectrally Enhanced Broadband Array Spectrograph System 
Hyperspectral Imagery...18

(SEBASS). This HSI sensor is flown in the Central MASINT 

Organization’s Hyperspectral MASINT Support to Military Operations 

project as well as in non-military projects.71 A key aspect of the SEBASS 

system is that like the multi-spectral imagery sensors aboard Landsat 7 

and the Multispectral Thermal Imager, and unlike the bulk of other HSI 

sensors, this system measures in the emissive spectral region. More 

specifically, it senses in two long wavelength infrared bands, 2.42–5.33 

μm and 7.57–13.52 μm.72 Again, the long wavelength infrared aspect of 

the SEBASS gives it both a daylight and nighttime capability. 

Non-US HSI Systems

Non-US organizations are also playing a larger role in HIS. In the 

space arena, by 2005, an HIS sensor on the Australian Resource 

Information and Environment Satellite will image across 105 channels in

the range .4-2.5 μm split between one visible and two short wave infrared 

sensor arrays. The spatial resolution of the sensor will only be 30 meters, 

but as with other sensors reviewed earlier, a ten-meter resolution 

panchromatic sensor will be used simultaneously to produce composite 

images. These uses for these images will include geological mapping, 

mineral exploration, environmental monitoring, forestry, and crop yield 

assessment.73 Canada has also fielded an HSI platform, theirs being an 

airborne system called the Compact Airborne Spectrographic Imager 

(CASI)-2. Like many other HSI systems, it is used to conduct research in 

agriculture, environmental studies, water quality, and forestry. Though it

doesn’t possess the wide wavelength band of many of the HSI sensors 

reviewed above, it is still capable of recording spectral data from .4-1.0 

μm. This range is can be divided into a maximum of 288 bands, and 

depending on the altitude of the aircraft; the resolution can be between

0.6-10 meters.74

Having reviewed several of the major HIS and multi-spectral 

sensor systems from military, U.S. and non-U.S. governmental, and

commercial areas, our attention now focuses on an issue that is just as 

critical as the sensor—ground processing. Just as the onboard processing 

system Optical Real-Time Adaptive Signature Identification System is 

critically important to the success of the Navy’s Naval EarthMap Observer

satellite, so too will the ground processing be vital to any HSI system that 

is used to support a military campaign. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...19

HSI Ground Processing

Although there is no single lead for the hyperspectral sensors

themselves, the ground processing portion of the overall system is being 

worked at a much more integrated level, with results that it should prove 

far more interoperable than other military systems. The overarching

ground processing system that will incorporate and process the data from 

HSI platforms is called the DOD Distributed Common Ground System, or 

DCGS. The DCGS is really a family of systems employed by each service 

to exploit the huge amounts of intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) data produced by a wide array of sensors. Current 

planning appropriately places HSI processing within the DCGS along with 

other types of intelligence data processing. 

Key concepts regarding the Distributed Common Ground System 

are being captured in a much needed capstone requirements document. 

This document plainly lays out the needs and the requirements for all the 

services’ systems within the overall DCGS to interoperate with each other 

to ensure that field commanders do in fact achieve decision superiority.75 

In addition to merely stating that the systems need to be interoperable, the 

document dictates that this family of systems must work together with

surface, airborne and spaceborne assets. This integration will allow the 

DCGS to assist a Joint Force Commander across the entire spectrum of 

conflict, in particular during combat, but in all aspects of campaign 

planning, execution and assessment as well.76 

As an example from just one service, within the DOD DCGS

structure, the Air Force has a program (the Distribution Common Ground 

Station) that attempts to address shortfalls in the ISR arena. The service is

currently circulating a draft plan to list many of the needed attributes of

the Air Force portion of the DOD structure. According to this document 

the Air Force intends to use their system to allocate what is known as

“multi-INT” responsibilities across the service’s intelligence organizations

to take full advantage of information collected by the entire intelligence 

community. The key thought here is that the Air Force system will 

eliminate many current systems that are often proprietary or can operate 

with only one type of intelligence.77 The Air Force ground station 

components are designed to be either fixed or deployable, and they will be 

capable of connecting to a secure Wide Area Network that will allow the 

multi-INT concept to work. The stations will possess tremendous 

processing capability, but it is expected that it could still take up to four 

hours to process a full hypercube. The standard hypercube is defined as 
Hyperspectral Imagery...20

less than or equal to 1024 pixels by 1024 pixels by 318 bands, or at least 

333 million total pixels. However, hypercubes may get as large as 2048 

pixels by 4096 pixels by 512 bands, or more than four billion pixels before 

FY05.78 Recognizing that the warfighter may not be willing to wait up to 

four hours for information, the AF also proposes that their station be able 

to process a subset of the hypercube, called a “chip,” within 20 minutes.79 

Given the size of hypercubes, their analysis is typically very processing 

intensive, which is one reason why HSI has taken so long to come of age. 

It is interesting to note that joint doctrine from as recently as 1996 notes 

that neither Joint Force Commander’s own intelligence center, nor the 

command’s subordinate centers, has the capability for MASINT 

processing.80 Much progress has occurred in the past six years and this is 

no longer true. As a result of this progress, the intelligence community is

at the cusp of being able to use HSI for direct warfighter support. 

As noted earlier, within any ground station program one must

consider the software used to actually process the data. The MASINT 

community seems to have settled on two systems for development. The 

National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) is developing processing 

software called Common Spectral MASINT Exploitation Capability that is 

used to help the intelligence analyst interpret HSI data. The NAIC

software was designed from the start to ensure its algorithms were not 

limited to one layer of data, but instead could process multiple layers of

data such as hypercubes. The software is noted for aiding in defeating 

camouflage, concealment, and deception and is known for its ease of 

use.81 The software currently is used in several HSI applications to

include intelligence preparation of the battlefield, camouflage ID, 

targeting support, change detection, and search and rescue. The software 

developers hope to soon add other features to support facility

characterization, treaty monitoring, and the search for weapons of mass

destruction.82 The second primary software tool under consideration is 

called Environment for Visualizing Imaging, or ENVI. A leading 

commercial product developed by Kodak’s Research Systems, Inc., ENVI 

has capabilities to support both airborne and spaceborne sensors by

enabling terrain analysis, radar analysis, and more. Just as several of the 

platforms discussed earlier combined standard imaging sensors with HSI 

systems, so too does ENVI combine image processing and spectral tools.83 

The preceding discussion of the current status of hyperspectral 

imagery systems highlights the fact that while commercial applications 

abound for HSI, it has still not arrived as a major player within the 
Hyperspectral Imagery...21

military intelligence community. On the other hand, based on the wording 

in the U.S. Senate language, there is still a great deal of interest in what 

HSI can eventually bring to the warfighter. The next section of the paper 

will examine some of the roadblocks that are hampering the effort to fully 

incorporate a robust HSI capability for the U.S. military. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...22
Hyperspectral Imagery...23

III. Challenges: Vision, Doctrine, and the Intelligence 

Cycle 

This section of the paper will review where HSI fits into the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff vision for where the military ought 

to be in 20 years. This discussion will be followed by a lengthier 

introduction of the intelligence community and some first guesses as to

where HSI should fit.84

“Fit” into Joint Vision 2020 

The armed forces of the United States must be capable of helping

the nation achieve its goals across the entire spectrum of military

operations. Forces must be organized, trained, and equipped to create the 

necessary conditions for successful missions across the continuum from 

non-combat operations (e.g., humanitarian operations) all the way up to 

large-scale combat operations.85 The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

published “Joint Vision 2020” (JV 2020) as a roadmap to help guide the 

transformation of the military into such a force. Though HSI is not touted 

as a complete solution to the idea of transformation for information 

dominance, it can certainly play a role in the Chairman’s vision. The idea 

of “full spectrum dominance” is preeminent in the vision. As stated in JV 

2020, this dominance is “the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or

in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any

adversary and control any situation across the full range of military

operations. Achieving full spectrum dominance means the joint force will 

fulfill its primary purpose—victory in war—as well as achieving success

across the full range of operations.”86

The Chairman went on to discuss that the key enabler for the future 

force to achieve full spectrum dominance lies in the area of information

superiority87 or, “the degree of dominance in the information domain 

which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition.”

88 

JV 2020 goes further to say that information superiority is not sufficient, 

but in fact, superior information must be converted into truly superior 

knowledge to achieve superiority in decision-making. The Chairman was 

quick to point out that decision superiority is not an automatic outcome of

information superiority, but in fact it requires a foundation composed of 

sound organization and doctrine, thorough training combined with 

experience, and the right tools.89 This paper proposes that HSI is one of 
Hyperspectral Imagery...24

the “right tools” necessary to achieve information superiority to offer hope

for decision superiority. 

The Chairman did offer an admonition, however, in the area of 

improving technology, and it is one that should be taken seriously and 

applied to HSI. He noted that it is important to not merely focus on new 

technology, but to look beyond the technology to understand the 

importance of organizing properly and to grasp the need for conceptual 

innovation. Technology can be very useful, but it needs to be integrated 

with changes in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and 

education, personnel, and facilities.90 

Another concept relating HSI to JV 2020 is precision engagement. 

Precision engagement is one of the four pillars supporting full spectrum 

dominance, and it is the one most closely aligned to HSI.91 Precision

engagement is defined as, “the ability of joint forces to locate, surveil,

discern, and track objectives or targets; select, organize, and use the

correct systems; generate desired effects; assess results; and reengage with 

decisive speed and overwhelming operational tempo as required, 

throughout the full range of military operations.”92 The potential of HSI 

lies within its ability to affect target selection and assess results. Yet HSI

cannot fulfill the vision of precision engagement alone. The most

important trait of precision engagement is the “family” of sensors, weapon 

systems, and desired effects. It is in this context that HSI is not a standalone technology; it is part of a larger system that leads to the final 

thoughts from JV 2020.93

An idea that is consistent with the preceding discussion and has 

also permeated military thought since Desert Storm is that of 

interoperability. Essentially, interoperability is the ability for systems to 

share information.94 JV 2020 is quick to point out that there is much more 

to interoperability than merely sharing data in the technical realm (e.g., 

bits and bytes). In fact, the document exhorts the services to focus on 

interoperability of procedures and organizations as well as on gaining 

knowledge of one another’s capabilities and limitations.95 Though the 

results of Desert Storm (e.g., difficulty getting the daily Air Tasking Order 

to all units) have led the military to be much more adept at meeting the 

technical requirements of interoperability, the DOD must also be on guard 

to ensure the implementation of this new technology keeps these other 

types of interoperability in mind as well. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...25

“Fit” Into Intelligence World 

Current joint doctrine separates intelligence sources into seven 

types of disciplines, or “INTs:” Technical Intelligence; Signals 

Intelligence (SIGINT); Human Intelligence (HUMINT); Open-source

Intelligence (OSINT); Imagery Intelligence (IMINT); Measurements and 

Signals Intelligence (MASINT); and Counter-Intelligence.96 Of particular 

interest for this paper is whether HSI can best be described as IMINT or 

MASINT. The distinction here may be subtle, but it is important 

nevertheless. It is likely that the owner of the “INT” will get not only the 

funding but also the personnel to implement the new technology (or, 

alternatively, the owner will be tasked to take them out of hide). It is 

reasonable to assume the organization that receives the funding to 

implement HSI carries with it a certain culture and mindset. For instance, 

where will HSI be placed in the priority scheme of the IMINT or

MASINT communities? Is it really a priority or merely an additional 

source of funding for other higher priority systems within that

organization? Equally important to decide is the key question, “Who is in 

charge?” Definitions of each of these two intelligence techniques are a

helpful guide to highlight where controversy in the intelligence

community may arise. IMINT is defined as, “Intelligence derived from

the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, 

lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, 

wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on 

film, electronic display devices, or other media.”97 Because the definition 

of IMINT includes data from both “visual” and “infrared” systems, a 

plausible case can be made that HSI is an IMINT technology. While HSI

products are often not direct representations of the area of interest that are 

easily recognizable to the human eye (as was clearly seen in earlier

figures), certainly the wavelength bands used for HSI fall within the 

definition if IMINT. Still, others believe that HSI falls within the purview 

of the MASINT community. Joint Publication 2.0 defines MASINT in the 

following way: 

Intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative

analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time

dependence, modulation...) derived from specific technical 

sensors for the purpose of identifying any distinctive 

features associated with the emitter or sender, and to 

facilitate subsequent identification and/or measurement of 
Hyperspectral Imagery...26

the same. The detected feature may be either reflected or 

emitted.98

Again, the reader can see the ambiguity between the definitions of the two 

types of intelligence with respect to HSI technology. 

This paper asserts that HSI is part of MASINT, but the reasoning 

for this assertion is qualitative rather than quantitative. While HSI 

certainly uses the tools of IMINT, such as the visual and infrared

spectrum, strictly categorizing HSI as IMINT severely limits the perceived 

usefulness of this technology. If an analogy can be drawn between types 

of intelligence and the senses of the human body, IMINT can be

associated with seeing with the eyes and SIGINT with hearing with the 

ears. MASINT, on the other hand, with HSI as one of its components, can 

be considered a discipline that uses all the senses.99 Because HSI uses 

many wavelengths, does in fact have spatial resolution aspects, and 

certainly facilitates identification of items within the field of view, an even 

stronger case can be made that HSI is actually a MASINT technology. 

MASINT proponents as well as the preponderance of available literature 

suggest HSI should be overseen by an organization responsible for

exploiting these types of data, yet with significant input from the IMINT 

community. 

Current Joint Doctrine Perspective

Having established that HSI clearly has a role in the intelligence 

arena, this portion of the paper will use current joint doctrine to show how 

the Joint Force Commander could best use available processes to exploit 

HSI. This part of the paper also demonstrates that current intelligence 

doctrine is not in bad shape, but some accommodation for HSI is 

necessary. For instance, existing doctrine discusses how intelligence 

agencies are arranged to support a Joint Force Commander, yet this 

discussion shows there are some holes regarding where HSI fits into

intelligence, who is in charge of HSI, the resulting lack of “ownership”

when it comes to funding, and technical issues that need to be resolved 

(such as interoperability and standardized databases) to take full advantage 

of what HSI has to offer. 

According to joint doctrine, a broad network of intelligence 

organizations supports the Joint Force Commander. The support may 

come from the commander’s own organic intelligence organization or

from national level capabilities. The most important roles of these 
Hyperspectral Imagery...27

organizations are to help the commander and his supporting staff to 

understand the battlespace they are facing, to appraise the capabilities and 

will of the opponent, to identify the enemy’s key areas of strength and 

power, and to try to determine the enemy’s intent. Therefore, a key role 

for the commander is to ensure the intelligence networks are brought fully 

into the campaign plan.100 

According to doctrine, organic support takes form in the 

commander’s own intelligence staff as well as the command’s Joint 

Intelligence Center, or in the case of a Joint Task Force, the support of a

Joint Intelligence Support Element. The commander’s intelligence staff 

provides the strategic lynchpin for many aspects of intelligence support to 

the campaign. Some of the functions of the staff include ensuring 

intelligence and operations are synchronized, developing detailed 

intelligence plans, establishing the command’s intelligence architecture, 

and integrating national and theater intelligence support. The intelligence 

staff coordinates both up the chain (e.g., with the National Military Joint 

Intelligence Center) as well as with subordinate agencies (the 

commander’s Joint Intelligence Center and component agencies) to ensure

the commander is provided with well integrated, all source information. 

In times of crisis a Joint Force Commander may also stand up a Joint

Intelligence Support Element to augment the commander’s intelligence 

staff. The intelligence staff directs the Joint Intelligence Support Element 

efforts that would usually consist of collection, production, and 

dissemination of intelligence for the joint force.101

If the intelligence staff provides the strategic intelligence effort, 

then the command’s Joint Intelligence Center, or JIC, is the combatant 

commander’s primary source of intelligence at the operational and tactical 

levels of war. The JIC brings together the supporting services’ capabilities 

into a central location to enhance intelligence support. The JIC is not 

expected to fulfill every request for support, but it is designed to maximize 

the ability to fill requests by coordinating support from all echelons of 

organization: higher, lower, and peer. To complete its duties, the JIC 

carries out many functions that not only have clear implications to HSI but 

also apply generically to all types of intelligence collection as well. These 

functions include coordinating intelligence efforts of subordinate

commands, coordinating the use of sensors assigned to the theater as well 

as supporting sensors, and validating Battle Damage Assessments from 

whichever source (e.g., national, organic) that provides it.102 
Hyperspectral Imagery...28

At the national level, the Joint Force Commander has access to key

organizations that are designed to support the campaign. While there are 

many intelligence players at the national level, this paper will focus only 

on those most closely related to HSI. These are Defense Intelligence 

Agency, the Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, the National Military 

Joint Intelligence Center, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the 

National Reconnaissance Office, and the Central MASINT Organization. 

These will likely be the key organizations in the debate and resolution on

how HSI is eventually implemented. A brief description of each of these 

organizations is included below. 

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has the responsibility to 

plan, direct, collect, process, exploit, analyze, produce disseminate, 

integrate, and evaluate all-source intelligence for the DOD.103 In this role,

the Agency is the peacetime focal point for the Joint Force Commander’s 

JIC to request and receive intelligence information gathered by not only 

this agency but the other intelligence organizations as well.104 Thus, to the 

best of its ability, the JIC is responsible for reviewing, validating, and 

acting upon intelligence requests from the command. Then, if organic 

resources are not available, the JIC would make the intelligence request to 

DIA.105

The Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate provides all-source 

intelligence to many customers including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the 

combatant commands.106 One item of note regarding this staff is that it is

also a directorate of DIA that draws heavily on its parent organization to 

accomplish its myriad roles.107

As noted earlier, DIA is the peacetime direct link between the JIC

and other intelligent agencies. In crisis situations, this link is provided by 

the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), which is operated 

by the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate. The NMJIC not only has 

members representing the Directorate’s own specialists in regional affairs, 

targeting, and operations, but it also has members representing outside 

organizations such as the National Imagery and Mapping Agency and the 

National Security Agency.108 It is conceivable, and perhaps even likely

that based on current intelligence gathering architectures, the Joint Force 

Commander will not control all the HSI assets that can sense the 

commander’s theater of operations. Naturally, the Joint Force

Commander can task the sensors that are under the command’s control, 

but in crisis situations or for sensors outside the Joint Force Commander’s 
Hyperspectral Imagery...29

control, the NMJIC is the point of contact for requests for intelligence

information. Additionally, three of the intelligence agencies are outside

the Joint Force Commander control, yet they will likely have a large role 

in HSI. These agencies—the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the 

National Reconnaissance Office, and the Central MASINT 

Organization—are described in the next two paragraphs. 

As discussed earlier, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

(NIMA) provides intelligence and geospatial information in support of 

national security objectives. To help fulfill this role, NIMA has an

Operations Center at the Pentagon that provides full-time imagery analysis 

support to the Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, the Joint Force 

Commander, components and other joint staff members. Another 

organization very closely related to NIMA that will most likely have a

large role in HSI is the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). This 

organization’s mission is to provide the United States with space-based 

reconnaissance. Though current doctrine indicates that the acquisition 

programs and intelligence operations conducted by the NRO are in 

Imagery and Signals Intelligence, this doctrine could be modified to assign 

duties for HSI procurement to NRO. In fact, once HSI space sensors are 

in orbit, an extension of current doctrine would lead to the national level 

MASINT request process discussed in the following paragraph. 

Unfortunately, one issue that remains is that joint doctrine assigns no

organization with the responsibility of overseeing the procurement of 

airborne systems, thus leaving each service to independently procure its 

own airborne HSI platforms. 

Tying these organizations together for peacetime intelligence 

requests would work as follows: a Joint Force Commander’s request 

would first go through the JIC and then to DIA. Next, the request would 

flow to NIMA, which would then task NRO to obtain the desired data. In 

crisis situations a similar flow would occur except that coordination by the 

NMJIC would be inserted between the JIC and DIA.109

The third national level organization that must be reviewed is the 

Central MASINT Organization. As its name implies, the Central MASINT 

Organization is the MASINT manager for the DOD and other members of 

the intelligence community.110 As a part of DIA’s Directorate for 

Intelligence Operations, the Central MASINT Organization is currently

seen as the frontrunner for leading HSI efforts. Even the Senate 

recognizes the organization’s expertise in that the Central MASINT 

Organization has been tasked by the Senate Committee on Intelligence to 
Hyperspectral Imagery...30

produce a Spectral MASINT Study in 2002 that will focus on issues such

as who should be the lead proponent for HSI.111 Though the 

documentation would indicate that NIMA is particularly interested in

panchromatic types of imagery products, because of the spectral nature of 

HSI, it is understandable that they would like to play a large role. But 

later on in this paper, it will be shown that it could be difficult for NIMA 

to add HSI to its oversight because of difficulties already present in 

disseminating the intelligence they currently produce. 

To best conceptualize how HSI should be employed to bring out 

the potential results described earlier, one needs to look no further than 

existing joint doctrine. Since there is no argument that HSI definitely fits

within the intelligence arena, then it should be viewed in terms of the 

intelligence cycle used by the intelligence community to support the Joint 

Force Commander. 

The Intelligence Cycle 

The intelligence cycle that is shown in Figure 1 is merely a model 

of how intelligence functions are conducted and is composed of six 

phases: “planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; 

analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and 

feedback.” 112 Each of these phases is described below, but one 

overarching concept that deserves mention here is that the cycle may not 

strictly follow the continuum as drawn out in the model. It is not unusual 

for the cycle to sometimes be cut short because interrelationships exist 

between each of the phases. For example, in some cases, the processing

and exploitation phase could be bypassed if data were passed directly from 

the sensor to the user without having been processed or exploited.113 Joint

Publication 2-01, “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” 

describes the intelligence cycle in detail and is summarized in the 

following paragraphs. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...31

Figure 5 The Intelligence Cycle 

The intelligence cycle begins with a user need in the form of an 

intelligence requirement. The requirement sets the direction for the first 

phase of the cycle, Planning and Direction. It is likely this requirement is 

just one of many requirements before the Joint Force Commander’s

intelligence staff, which are all prioritized by that staff. In principle, the 

staff’s prioritization will focus all of the various efforts in line with the

Joint Force Commander’s intent.114 

The second phase, Collection, is where the tasking of appropriate 

collection assets occurs. To acquire the required data, the intelligence

staff will first task the Joint Force Commander’s own intelligence assets.

If organic assets are not available, then intelligence support may get more 

complicated. Working through the JIC, the Joint Force Commander’s 

staff will request support via DIA (or NMJIC during a crisis) for external 

support. In some instances that require use of high value, low-density 

systems such as the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System aircraft 

and associated ground stations, the approval authority may go as high as 

the Secretary of Defense.115 

Once data is obtained that might meet the requirement, the cycle 

enters the Processing and Exploitation phase. During this phase, the raw

data (e.g., a hypercube) is transformed into a product that intelligence

operators can use in the analysis and production of useable intelligence 

(e.g., a picture of a tank partially hidden under trees). Just as the
Hyperspectral Imagery...32

requirements for collection are prioritized, so too must be the processing 

and exploitation of the data be prioritized to ensure that the most critical 

information is delivered to the decision maker.116

The Production phase entails analyzing and evaluating the 

information gathered above to prepare the finished product. Other 

available sources of data can also be brought in to combine with the 

gathered data. For example, the Distributed Common Ground Station, 

discussed earlier, is being designed to be interoperable with a number of 

“INTs.” Therefore, if either radar or standard imagery is available for the 

same scene as an HSI hypercube, then the two could be integrated in the

Production phase to provide the Joint Force Commander with a more 

thorough view of the battlespace. To encourage such synergistic 

processing, a central database of standardized HSI signatures should be 

created and called out explicitly in doctrine. This would encourage 

interoperability between services and also meet the required 

interoperability between “INTs.” Joint doctrine already acknowledges 

that modern constraints on the battlefield are beginning to make the 

Processing and Exploitation phase look “indistinguishable” from the 

Production phase.117 This is not a bad thing. As noted earlier in the

discussion of JV 2020, one main vision for the force of the future is 

decision superiority through overwhelming operational tempo across the 

full range of operations. If HSI systems can help to get finished products 

to the Joint Force Commander faster, then the warfighter is one step closer 

to realizing the vision. 

The fifth phase, Dissemination and Integration, brings the 

intelligence product from out of the “art” of exploitation and returns it to 

the “science” of formatting and transmission. Here the product is 

provided to the requester in the required, standardized format so he can 

use the product to help make appropriate decisions and planning choices. 

As an aside, even though new systems are being created to provide users 

with much greater communication capabilities than in the past, the 

producer of the finished product needs to take care not to overload the 

requester’s capabilities to accept the product.118

The final phase, Evaluation, is of concern to intelligence personnel 

at all levels. As the cycle begins anew, critical eyes must look for 

opportunities to improve any and every phase of the cycle. For example, 

transitions between the various phases are particular points to scrutinize 

for potential gains. In addition, the JIC is a facilitator that may also help 

cut down on the intelligence cycle by approving methods by which the 
Hyperspectral Imagery...33

requestors of intelligence can go directly to the outside producers for

products not typically produced by the JIC. Naturally, it must be the focus 

of all requests to obtain such direct information.119 This could have 

implications to HSI depending on how the overall HSI architecture is

created. It is easy to see that many intelligence agencies that not directly 

under the Joint Force Commander control will have sensing capabilities 

that can be brought to bear in the campaign. 

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination 

In spite of the fact that joint doctrine identifies the conceptual sixphase approach described above as the approved process, the intelligence 

community often combines, or even eliminates, phases into a more

compact model called the Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and 

Dissemination cycle. This cycle is by far the most common model found 

in the intelligence literature. Note that even experts in the intelligence

cycle have difficulty with this model versus the joint doctrine cycle. One 

study noted, “It appears that an acronym for the functions of tasking, 

processing, exploitation, and dissemination has somehow become the

name for an entity without benefit of a common understanding of the 

content.”120 Yet because of the prevalent use of the abbreviated model by 

the intelligence community at large, this paper will also recognize it as the 

model of choice. While joint doctrine phases (or parts of phases) such as 

Production, Collection, and Evaluation may not be explicitly included in 

four-step model, the associated activities are in fact still present in the 

process. 

As discussed earlier in this paper, HSI information is particularly

valuable when it is combined with information from other intelligence 

sources. With any new system, the ultimate goal is to improve

intelligence products, and the benefits gained by leveraging data from

multiple sources must be continually reenergized. One prognosticator is

already looking beyond the technology limitations of HSI to a time when

the multi-INT transition is seamless: 

[T]he next evolutionary step would be to collect and fuse

data from all sensory inputs—optical, olfactory, infrared, 

multispectral, tactile, acoustical, laser radar, millimeter

wave radar, X-ray, DNA patterns, and human

intelligence—to identify objects, people or processes. The

idea would be to compare a sensory signature against a 
Hyperspectral Imagery...34

preloaded database to identify matches or changes in the

signature for identification or comparison. Once again, it’s 

just a matter of time before satellites can be packaged with 

stronger sensors and faster computer packages to 

accomplish this task.121

The lack of such purposeful integration was one major critique

during a recent study on NIMA. The report concluded the Agency’s plans 

for Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination fail to assure

such integration between similar-INT airborne, commercial and space 

systems (another MASINT such as Synthetic Aperture Radar for 

example). In addition, NIMA plans also fail to address multi-INT 

integration.122 This problem is recognized elsewhere such as in the

Capstone Requirements Document for the DOD’s Distributed Common

Ground System. This document elaborates on these woes by stating flatly 

that there isn’t enough Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and 

Dissemination capacity to meet defined requirements, and unfortunately, 

adding new sensors and technology will only worsen the problem.

123

The final major challenge on the way ahead is money. The issue 

of resources is a fight that will continue when it becomes time to find the 

money to pay for HSI. Where doctrine puts HSI will be a critical matter 

when planning for this technology’s future. The National Imagery and 

Mapping Agency commission noted this very topic when addressing their 

findings: 

[T]he Commission suggests that serious, far-reaching 

review is required of evolving US military doctrine and its 

dependence on an ever-expanding definition of information 

superiority, so as to determine the contingent liabilities 

placed on intelligence. These and these alone must define 

the needed level of investment in intelligence resources by

the military services. Anything less is reckless and 

irresponsible.124

To avoid being “reckless and irresponsible,” the intelligence 

community will need to make difficult budgeting decisions. For instance, 

one of the main focuses of the NIMA commission report noted earlier was 

the general belief that the entire intelligence community is too heavily 

focused on the collection aspect of their work rather than on tasking and 
Hyperspectral Imagery...35

dissemination. The problem is that resources are just not available to 

improve tasking and dissemination systems and modernize legacy 

systems, while at the same time integrating multiple INTs. The report 

recognized the important task of merging IMINT and SIGINT is “a bigger, 

more costly, more demanding job than the sum of the two respective 

pieces done separately.”

125 This makes the report’s finding that no one is 

even planning for multi-INT integration even more disheartening. Current 

MASINT literature does not seem to indicate that it will replace any

current systems but will merely be added to existing systems. In light of 

all the other taskings requiring resources, it is no wonder the report noted 

that trying to bring about the needed changes by staffing for multi-INT 

integration in the government’s traditional manner seems to be “a nearly 

insuperable hurdle.” The ability to find and develop the needed personnel 

is not there.126

As has been amply shown above, the DOD continues to devote 

much energy to key efforts for turning the dream of HSI into reality. Still, 

much work remains to fulfill the promise of HSI. The next section

examines several recommendations that should help promote successful 

HSI implementation. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...36
Hyperspectral Imagery...37

IV. Recommendations 

Organizational Recommendations 

First, the question of who is in charge of HSI needs to be resolved. 

It may turn out that no one will be given the lead in HSI, and the services

will be left to develop their own stove-piped systems. This would be a big

mistake. DOD wants to ensure interoperability between the services, at 

least in the Processing phase, and these efforts should be encouraged. 127 

A single organization could bring vital leverage that would be lost if the 

lead for HSI is split among various services. This paper recommends that 

the Central MASINT Organization be given the responsibility as the lead 

organization for all implementing all HSI platforms. The first reason for 

this is that HSI “fits” better into MASINT than into IMINT. Another 

reason is that within the MASINT community, the Central MASINT 

Organization already has the leading role in HSI and has the capability to 

take a broad view across the DOD. Pulling together the airborne, 

spaceborne, theater, and national aspects described earlier into an 

integrated technical architecture will be a huge undertaking, but the effort 

needs to be made if the military is to ensure HSI reaches its full potential. 

The essential requirements for such an integrated architecture can 

already be identified in joint doctrine. Several key points should be kept 

in mind when developing the integrated roadmap for HSI. First, as this

paper has continually stressed, HSI must adapt to the Joint Force

Commander’s needs, supporting the full range of missions. For example, 

the system should support the gamut of operations—from humanitarian 

efforts to major theater wars. Second, the system should avoid single 

points of failure. A robust air, space, and ground architecture would likely 

lead to a very survivable capability. Third, the system must be able to 

accommodate the Joint Force Commander’s decision-making and 

execution cycle. The decreased processing time requirement noted earlier 

for USAF’s Distributed Common Ground Station is merely one example 

of trying to speed up the decision-execution cycle. Fourth, the system 

must allow for operator training during peacetime. Finally, to keep the

HSI system relevant to the warfighter, it must allow for new technologies 

to be incorporated.128
Hyperspectral Imagery...38

The lead organization recommendation espoused here is not to say 

that the Central MASINT Organization must do all the work, merely that 

it should lead the way through the myriad efforts that will bring HSI to 

reality. For organizational purposes, the work should be divided between 

space and air systems with yet another organization to review ground 

station architectures. For example, the Central MASINT Organization 

should give space architecture work to the National Space Security

Architect, and the actual acquisition of any national-level HSI satellite 

program should be given to NRO. According to joint doctrine this agency

is “responsible for the unique and innovative technology, large scale 

systems engineering, development and acquisition, and operations of 

space reconnaissance systems and related intelligence activities needed to

support global information superiority.”129 Though joint doctrine does not 

currently give a MASINT satellite role to NRO (IMINT and SIGINT

only), the doctrine should be formally changed to accommodate the new 

technology. 

The DOD should not limit satellite acquisitions to national-level 

sensors alone. Assets that could be tasked directly by the Joint Force

Commander’s intelligence staff should also be investigated to help fill any 

gaps in coverage or decrease turn-around time. Any satellite of this type 

should be given to the Air Force to procure, because recent direction from 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has directed the Air Force to become the 

DOD’s “Executive Agent for Space.”130 The Air Force Space 

Command/Air Combat Command draft HSI roadmap is a good start down 

that road. This document should be finalized with appropriate resources 

and provided to an acquiring agency to turn the requirements into a 

working system. 

Unfortunately there is no acquisition agency similar to the NRO 

for airborne sensors. The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office was 

designed to be such an agency, but it was disbanded, and each service has 

been left to create its own airborne systems. The Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle concept for airborne reconnaissance is gaining strength 

throughout the DOD, with each service procuring its own vehicles. To

encourage interoperability and reduce redundancy, the Central MASINT 

Organization, or an organization working under the auspices of the Central 

MASINT Organization, should work with the services to integrate HSI 

onto these new platforms. 

The Central MASINT Organization would also be assigned the 

responsibility to oversee development of ground stations that are capable 
Hyperspectral Imagery...39

of processing a wide variety of HSI data, including data not collected by 

the military, as mentioned earlier. The capstone requirements document 

for the DOD Distributed Common Ground System is pursuing such a 

vision. This document should be finalized to ensure the services work 

toward common HSI technical architectures. 

Another organizational challenge that has its roots in the

technology is the issue of a central spectral database. One report noted 

that spectral intelligence such as HSI needs a “thorough catalog of objects 

and surface chemistries to detect the meaning of this or that reflection.”

131 

In order to recognize any type of target in a given scene, the processing 

system must have a standard against which to compare the scene as well 

as a robust methodology to access the growing number of catalogued 

spectral signatures. The catalog would also need to take into account that 

not all spectral signatures have the same resolution because these 

signatures would have been built using a variety of sensors. The HSI 

community is addressing these issues via several forums. One is the 

Spectral Products Users’ Group that is developing the standard formats in

which HSI should be communicated between users. This “common 

language” is a significant first step toward promoting interoperability 

between users.132 

The methodology being developed to access a common database of 

HSI products is also encouraging. A new organization called the National 

Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) Spectral Exploitation Cell (NSEC) is 

being created at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, to provide a 

location from which users can request and process HSI information. At 

first NSEC will provide products to its customers in an off-line mode, with 

products arriving at the customer within twenty-four hours. Later, the 

capability will be placed on-line. The disseminated information will 

follow the approved formats from the Spectral Products Users’ Group and 

will include both graphic and text reports. Additionally, assured 

interoperability will come about because these reports will be mandated 

across all services and systems, including the DOD Distributed Common

Ground System.

133

In his final report to Congress, former Secretary of Defense Cohen 

provided a fitting conclusion to the discussion of organizational needs for 

HSI. He noted some encouraging news for MASINT and HSI by pointing 

out that in FY 2000, the Central MASINT Organization received the first 

increment of a planned six-year resource increase.134 Perhaps to deflect 
Hyperspectral Imagery...40

some of the Senate’s stinging criticism from May 2000, he went on to say 

the following: 

The focus of the first year was on improving support to 

joint military operations through the creation of MASINT 

operations and production coordination elements. DOD is 

placing particular emphasis on strategies and techniques to 

strengthen MASINT [Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, 

and Dissemination] and increase analytical depth, 

particularly in the arenas of...multi/hyperspectral 

information...135

Doctrinal Recommendations 

Despite this good news on the organizational front, it seems that 

even if the technology of HSI is nearly ready for implementation, it is

clear from other evidence in the earlier discussions that other obstacles 

still remain. For instance, doctrine needs to be updated to reflect the 

addition of HSI into the MASINT community under the proposed 

umbrella organization. The doctrine should be explicitly directive to 

ensure that resources can be provided to the appropriate agencies rather 

than risk having these same resources spread across several agencies 

whose primary role is outside the MASINT arena. 

As discussed earlier, the intelligence cycle for Joint Force 

Commander “owned” assets is fairly straightforward. Essentially, the

Tasking, Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination cycle is done within 

the Joint Force Commander’s own intelligence staff structure. This cycle 

becomes somewhat more challenging when the combatant command 

intelligence director needs to request resources outside the command. In 

this case, existing joint doctrine can serve well with only minor changes. 

For example, DIA currently coordinates national level requirements, and 

tasking is currently given through DIA to obtain IMINT data from the 

NRO via NIMA tasking. The link to DIA should be applied to space HSI 

as well.136

It should also not be forgotten that what is valuable for an ally is 

also valuable for the enemy. Doctrine should be reviewed to address the 

implications of adversaries possessing HSI capabilities. Even if other 

nations’ militaries are not developing HSI systems on their own, 

commercial systems are being developed that have the potential to be

exploited by our adversaries. During preparation of the intelligence
Hyperspectral Imagery...41

battlespace, planners must determine what the adversary hopes to achieve

and how HSI can help that adversary. Current joint doctrine already 

provides some guidance in that efforts to prepare such information should 

include, at a minimum, the options available to the adversary, the 

likelihood of these options occurring, and the intelligence needs to

determine more about each option.137 Similarly, planners should look at

any pieces of information that HSI could reveal about allied military 

posture in the theater of operations. 

Other Key Recommendations 

In addition to the organizational and doctrinal issues, other 

challenges also remain. On the technical front, acquirers have a 

continuing task to ensure the station’s MASINT capabilities are 

interoperable with all other national and tactical agencies. Additionally, 

these capabilities are to be integrated to ensure that the multi-INT 

capabilities are likewise preserved.138 Simply said, “it goes both ways.”

All services should coordinate their MASINT activities with the ISR 

community as a whole (i.e., not only the MASINT community) to ensure 

their equipment can transmit their own products while being able to 

receive and process other services’ products. The important thought here 

is that the services will take care to match up with the standards as they

are developed. Likewise, other agencies need to know what is being 

developed to ensure the full multi-INT capability is preserved on their end. 

The long discussion of ground processing systems earlier in the 

paper serves to illustrate the difficulty in bringing together the extensive 

MASINT community in such a way that it can best serve the warfighter. 

Below are five activities whose successful completion is essential to

bringing aboard these types of processing systems.

139

First, and not surprisingly, user-validated requirements and 

concepts of operations must be developed and adhered to. Items listed 

earlier, such as standard formats, interoperability, and multi-INT 

capability, must also be adhered to if the Joint Force Commander is to 

gain the greatest amount of information with the minimum resources. 

Second, resource allocation and management is critical to ensure funding 

and manning are both appropriate to the task. It is reasonable to assume

that incorporating HSI will require more funding for system acquisition 

and sustainment and must be planned and budgeted for as early as 

possible. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...42

Third, systems integration (i.e., new sensors being added to the 

network) is going to be very difficult. Without set standards and databases 

of spectral signatures, it could be very difficult to get the services working 

together. Though as noted earlier, some efforts are already underway to 

develop such standards, the acquiring commands for each service must be 

cautiously vigilant to ensure that the hardware and software of new 

sensors are compatible with the existing baseline. Likewise, the services 

must continue to pay very close attention to the needed communications 

requirements. In fact, the DOD Distributed Common Ground System 

capstone document reminds the readers that DOD instructions require the 

services to prepare the communications support plans to ensure that 

communication requirements are known and accounted for before systems

are introduced to the field.140

Fourth, operational integration (e.g., changes to the processing 

station baseline) is going to be a challenge as well. It is imperative that 

strong change management processes be used to ensure that baseline

capabilities are not degraded. Thorough test and evaluation, attentiveness

to standards (machine and human factors), plus prior use in experiments 

will help ensure these types of changes are successful. 

Fifth, just as those who are responsible for operational integration 

need to pay close attention to human factors, implementers must 

remember the human element of Training and Education. HSI is not 

standard imagery; so standard imagery training alone will not suffice. 

Training should not merely be an afterthought, but it must be integrated 

into development. Training will be of concern at all levels of the joint 

force and should become standardized. As noted earlier in the ground 

processing discussion, training for the analysts will be critically important. 

Also, just as the Central MASINT Organization has contracted for training 

programs based on the level of detail needed for each individual, so too

should the organization overseeing HSI prepare a training plan for 

personnel from the imagery analyst up to, and including, at least the 

director of the Joint Force Commander’s intelligence staff. If the lead

organization does not do the actual training plan, then the services must.141 

The service-based training approach is not the preferred method since it 

could invite redundancies into the training schemes, especially if each 

service prepares their own plans without integrating with other 

intelligence organizations. Though each service may choose to

independently procure training for operators, this does not necessarily 

need to be the case. Because the MASINT community will be growing 
Hyperspectral Imagery...43

and many organizations will be involved, these organizations may be able 

to leverage off of each others’ training programs. 

No matter what the final training plan looks like, as with other 

career specialties, the training for the operators must be continuous, 

advancing methodically from the basic through advanced levels.142 It is

not clear at this point whether or not the Joint Force Commander needs to

receive anything other than the briefest HSI overview because of the

“finished” nature of the HSI products by the time they reach that level of 

command. As shown in the series of photos at the top of the paper, raw 

HSI data reveals little to the human eye; so it seems unlikely that the Joint 

Force Commander will be presented such information. 

In addition to standardized training, HSI capabilities must be 

continuously integrated into wargames, exercises, and demonstrations to 

improve the operators’ performance as well as improve the methods by 

which HSI is incorporated into campaigns. Air Force doctrine is a strong 

proponent for such a proposal, reasoning: 

Exercises provide realistic training that is essential for 

proficiency and readiness. Realistic exercises determine 

possible shortfalls and corrective actions to achieve success

in future operations. Exercises train individuals, units, and 

staffs in the necessary skills and tools for ISR operations 

and ensure that staffs can plan, control, and support such 

operations.143

In fact, HSI has already been incorporated into at least one

experiment, JEFX 2000 (5-15 Sep 00). Using both air and spaceborne

sensors such as MightySat II.1, the HSI portion of the experiment 

attempted to meet many objectives. First, experimenters attempted to

show that one workstation could process hypercubes from multiple

sensors. Second, they evaluated the functionality of four software

programs for processing HSI, including the Common Spectral MASINT 

Exploitation Capability and ENVI discussed earlier. They evaluated Air 

Force Distributed Common Ground Station hardware and software 

requirements against the HSI systems used in the experiment. Next, they 

attempted to get a sense of what is needed in terms of operator training 

requirements.144

The results of the experiment were very positive for HSI. Analysts

and evaluators agreed that HSI is now at a sufficient level of maturity to
Hyperspectral Imagery...44

provide useful information to the Joint Force Commander. In fact, 

operators were able to find targets not detected by the electro-optical or

radar systems. In addition, the use of the Spectrally Enhanced Broadband 

Array Spectrograph System long wavelength infrared sensor showed that 

by using the emissive properties of materials, it can in fact differentiate 

targets, a huge boon when operating at night or through cirrus clouds.145 

On the down side, because this evaluation took place in an experiment

rather than an exercise, the suite of sensors, processors, and people were 

far from standardized in terms of doctrine, organization or training. 

Nevertheless, the exercise clearly showed that such issues could be 

resolved. As might be expected, using systems mixed in an essentially ad 

hoc manner rather than an integrated one, led to some conclusions that the 

“system” is not yet capable of meeting a warfighter’s time critical 

information requirements. Additionally, the issue of the slow processing 

of full hypercubes also arose.146 Yet, this experiment shows the value of

taking advantage of such opportunities on a continuing basis. 

In addition to the JEFX experiment noted above, on 5 March 2002, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

announced that an HSI project has been funded for an Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration, or ACTD.147 ACTDs “emphasize technology 

assessment and integration rather than technology development. The goal 

is to provide a prototype capability to the warfighter and to support him in 

the evaluation of that capability. The warfighters evaluate the capabilities

in real military exercises and at a scale sufficient to fully assess military

utility.”148 The HSI ACTD, called the Hyperspectral Collection and 

Analysis System, will integrate a variety of HSI sensors onto different 

platforms (e.g., manned and unmanned aircraft and satellites). It will be

used to show the utility of an integrated HSI system in such areas as 

search and rescue, counter camouflage, and the search for weapons of 

mass destruction.149

The 11 September 2001 attacks appear to have caused some

dramatic positive shifts in funding priorities in addition to the new ACTD 

noted above. As reported in a December 2001 issue of Defense News, just 

two months after the attacks several information technology units of major 

defense contractors were awarded study contracts worth about $100 

million to develop a computer network named Multi-ISR (for Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance).150 Though no government officials 

would publicly acknowledge the existence of the contracts, the
Hyperspectral Imagery...45

Intelligence Authorization Act 2002 Conference Report highlights 

investment in new technologies for collection processing and analysis.151

The process for funding HSI is not particularly mysterious. The 

intelligence resource process is broken into three major categories used to 

represent the three broad uses of the intelligence—strategic, operational 

and tactical. Strategic intelligence is for use primarily by the President, 

Secretary of Defense and other very high level military and political

leadership. The category name for procuring strategic level systems is 

called the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This procurement level 

is not the focus of this paper, but certainly HSI products could be used at

this level to help decisionmakers with national policy and military 

strategy. As noted earlier, in combination with other intelligence methods, 

HSI could be used for such national level concerns as treaty verification. 

Procurement dollars for an NRO HSI system would come from this 

funding source. Though the focus of an HSI system acquired under the 

National Foreign Intelligence Program would be strategic in nature, it 

should not be assumed that this would exclude its usefulness to a Joint 

Force Commander. Certainly national level systems can be and are used 

to support the commander’s intelligence preparation of the battlespace for

campaign planning or indications and warnings.152 

The resource category for the operational level of intelligence is 

known as the Joint Military Intelligence Program. This level of 

intelligence resource allocation is at the heart of the current discussion on

how HSI can support a Joint Force Commander overseeing multiple DOD 

components. This funding source was established to improve DOD

intelligence efforts when those efforts require resources from more than 

one DOD component or the customers of the produced data come from

more than one component. In addition to supporting the warfighter, this 

funding source also supports policymakers and modernization planners by 

helping bring increased effectiveness to the planning and oversight of this 

level of intelligence activity.153 The Joint Military Intelligence Program

could justifiably fund programs such as a non-NRO space-based HSI 

system. Airborne platforms could likewise receive funding from the Joint 

Military Intelligence Program.

The third level of intelligence resourcing is called Tactical 

Intelligence and Related Activities. This funding is focused on individual 

services or agencies and where the customer is at the operational and 

tactical level. These levels usually include the “corps, wing, naval battle 

group, and Marine expeditionary force level and below.”154 While this
Hyperspectral Imagery...46

level of intelligence funding from this source may be too low for 

procuring an HSI sensor, it may be very applicable to each services for 

acquiring processing stations or their follow-ons (e.g., Distributed 

Common Ground System). However, this particular application does 

reinforce the requirement to appoint a lead HSI organization to ensure HSI 

remains integrated across the services. 

The lead organization concept noted earlier in this section would 

be given the responsibility of negotiating the various methods by which 

each HSI system would be programmed and budgeted. The lead 

organization would also need to work closely with the other “INT” 

agencies to ensure that HSI is properly integrated with the larger

intelligence arena. 

Conclusions 

The time has arrived for Hyperspectral Imagery—theory and 

technology can now intersect. The main question is, does the nation have 

the will to devote the proper effort to HSI to turn it into reality? This 

paper has reviewed the benefits of HSI to the warfighter as well as some

of the current systems that show why HSI has now moved into the art of 

the possible. The view is encouraging on many fronts. Several airborne 

sensors are already in operation and the number of spaceborne sensors 

continues to increase. Ground stations and software programs within 

those stations are maturing, and it is also clear that much thought on the 

military side has been developed to ensure that these ground stations 

maximize interoperability. This interoperability is being further enhanced 

by standardized formats and the proposed central database for data 

products. So too, the funding for HSI appears to be on the rise. The 

MASINT umbrella under which HSI primarily resides has strong support 

in our nation’s legislature. 

Still, other challenges remain. The primary question of “Who’s in 

charge?” remains. This paper recommends that the Central MASINT 

Organization be assigned that role to ensure the services proceed with 

their programs, not only to ensure interoperability but also to avoid 

redundancy and the associated opportunity costs. Just as new 

organizational structures will be required, updates to joint and service

intelligence doctrine will be needed as well. On paper it appears that this 

could be relatively simple, yet doctrine’s impact on funding will likely 

introduce some conflict. Finally, many of the technology issues are being 

solved, but others continue to pose problems. Tasking, Processing, 
Hyperspectral Imagery...47

Exploitation, and Dissemination will continue to be difficult, especially as

HSI is tied into the “multi-INT” arena. To avoid difficulties from stovepiped systems, integration of new systems, and the myriad tasks that go 

along with that integration (e.g., training), will require close scrutiny. Yet 

even with the challenges that await the Hyperspectral Imagery community, 

the future looks bright, in no matter what wavelength you are looking. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...48
Hyperspectral Imagery...49

Notes 

1

 Short, Nicholas M., Sr, “The Remote Sensing Tutorial,” Goddard 

Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, No date, n.p.,

http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Front/tofc.html. 2

 Short, Nicholas M., Sr, “Other Remote Sensing Systems - 

Hyperspectral Imaging,” Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, No 

date, n.p., http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/ Intro/Part2_24.html. 3

 Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, 

“Earth Observation, An Overview of Hyperspectral Remote Sensing,” no 

date, n.p., http://www.eoc.csiro.au/ hswww/Overview.htm. 4

 Short, Nicholas M., Sr, “The Remote Sensing Tutorial,” Goddard 

Space Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, No date, n.p.,

http://rst.gsfc.nasa.gov/Front/tofc.html. 5

 Ibid. 

6

 Lao, N.Y., and F.C Wong, “Hyperspectral Imagery Market Forecast: 

2000-2005,” Systems Engineering Division, Aerospace Corporation, Los 

Angeles Air Force Base, CA, Dec 2000, p.5, 13. 

7

 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, pp 3-4. 

8

 Caudill, Dr Thomas R., Fast Fourier Transform Hyperspectral 

Imagery Program Manager, Space Vehicles Directorate, Air Force 

Research Laboratory, email, 31 Jan 02. 

9

 Caudill, Dr Thomas R., Fast Fourier Transform Hyperspectral 

Imagery Program Manager, Space Vehicles Directorate, Air Force 

Research Laboratory, Interview by author, 17 December 2001. 

10 Lao, N.Y., and F.C Wong, “Hyperspectral Imagery Market 

Forecast: 2000-2005,” Systems Engineering Division, Aerospace 

Corporation, Los Angeles Air Force Base, CA, Dec 2000, p.5. 

11 “Air Force Distributed Common Ground System Measurement And 

Signatures Intelligence Capabilities Integration Plan,” Draft Version 8.0, 

HQ USAF/XOIR, Washington, D.C., 1 Oct 2001, p. 47. 

12 “Information in Hyperspectral Imagery,” Digital Imagery and 

Remote Sensing Laboratory, Chester F. Carlson Center for Imaging 

Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY, 

http://www.cis.rit.edu/research/dirs/research/hyper_spectral.html. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...50

Notes 

13 “Prospecting from Space,” Earth Observatory, Goddard Space 

Flight Center, Greenbelt MD, no date, 

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Newsroom/NewImages/images.php3?img

_id =5038. As noted at the web site, “The image on the left is true color, 

showing how the scene would look to our eyes. The exposed rock is fairly 

uniform in color, with little to distinguish specific types of minerals. The 

central image uses spectra from 2.0 to 2.5 μm, which are sensitive to 

absorption caused by molecular vibration. The image shows Hydroxide 

(OH), Carbonate (CO3), and Sulfate (S04) bearing minerals. The red, 

orange, and mustard colored pixels in the center of the image represent

different types of alunite, a sulfate mineral often associated with gold 

deposits. On the right is a map of minerals derived from electronic 

absorption features in the 0.4 to 1.2 μm spectral regions. This technique 

detects Ferrous (Fe 2+) and Ferric (Fe 3+) minerals—different types of 

iron-rich rock. Red and orange areas to the right of center in this image 

indicate the presence of hematite (an iron oxide) with different grain 

sizes.” 

14 “Science,” Naval EarthMap Observer, Naval Research Laboratory,

Washington D.C., 1998, http://nemo.nrl.navy.mil/science.html. 15 Davis, Dr Kurt, Naval Research Laboratory, Interview by author, 

27 November 2001. 

16 “Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU 31/32,” USAF Fact Sheet, 

May 2001, http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/JDAM.html. 17 Martin, David, Captain (USN), “Hyperspectral Technology 

Overview,” Assistant for Battlespace Environments, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Science and Technology), 18 February 2000, p. 9. 

18 “Hyperspectral Mine Detection,” Technical Research Associates, 

Inc., Camarillo, CA, no date, http://www.tracam.com/hmd.htm. 19 Snyder, Robin A., Lt Col, USAF, “The Chemical Weapons 

Convention Treaty: Present And Future Issues,” Air War College, Air 

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 1998, p. 22. 

20 National Security Space Architect website, Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Washington D.C., no date, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ nssa/. This role is

being modified somewhat due to October 2001 direction from the 

Secretary of Defense. The Secretary’s directive charged the Under 
Hyperspectral Imagery...51

Notes 

Secretary of Defense for Policy to prepare the necessary documentation to 

make the Air Force the military's executive agent for space. This will 

formalize the service’s role as the DOD’s leader for budgeting and 

acquisition of space systems. With that formalized role in mind, the 

Rumsfeld directive also ordered an organizational change for the NSSA. 

Its mission will stay much the same in terms of its responsibility toward 

space architectures but the Rumsfeld directive also indicated that the 

NSSA will assist the Under Secretary of the Air Force in the assessment of 

the “trades between space and non-space solutions to meet user 

requirements as well as appropriate integration of space with land, sea, 

and air forces.” (Rumsfeld, Donald, “National Security and Space 

Management and Organization,” Office of the Secretary of Defense,

Washington D.C., 18 Oct 2001, pp. 3-4.) In fact, as this paper was being 

written, the move to put NSSA organizationally under the Under Secretary 

of the Air Force was completed. 

21 The existence of this report is noted here but is not used as a source 

due to its classification. All sources for this paper are unclassified. 

22 “Dept of Defense Space Technology Guide, FY2000-01,” Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and 

Intelligence) and Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 

Washington, D.C., no date, pp 8-2 and 9-4. 

23 “A Space Roadmap for the 21st Century Aerospace Force Volume

1: Summary,” United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, 

Washington, D.C., November 1998, p. 20. 

24 “Authorizing Appropriations For Fiscal Year 2001 For The 

Intelligence Activities Of The United States Government And The Central 

Intelligence Agency Retirement And Disability System And For Other

Purposes,” Senate Report 106-279, United States Senate Select Committee 

on Intelligence, Washington D.C., 4 May 2000, p. 17. These deficiencies 

include areas such as lack of funding appropriate to Congressional 

priorities and failures in tasking, processing, exploitation and 

dissemination. 

25 “The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial

Information in an Evolving National Security Environment,” Report of the 

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

Dec 2000, p. 99. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...52

Notes 

26 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998, p. 

VIII-1. 

27 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, p. 8. 

28 Rodriguez, Marc, Central MASINT Organization, Interview by 

author, 30 November 2001. 

29 Dunaway, Robert, “Spectral Operations Resource Center,” 

Briefing, U.S. Army Space Command, Remote Sensing Branch, Colorado 

Springs, CO, no date, p. 3. 

30 Ibid., p. 3. 

31 Ibid., p. 6. 

32 “Space Imagery Resource Center 'Virtual Reality' for the Modern

Warfighter,” Naval Space Command, Dahlgren, VA, no date,

http://www.navspace.navy.mil/factsheets/resic.htm. 33 Ibid. 

34 Stout, Angel, Maj, USAF, “AC2ISRC Hyperspectral Imaging (HSI) 

Integrated Product Team (IPT) Charter,” Aerospace, Command and 

Control & Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Langley 

AFB, VA, 10 January 2000, p. 1. 

35 Ibid., p. 1. 

36 Vtipil, Sharon D., Captain, USAF, “AC2ISRC HSI IPT General 

Membership Report,” AC2ISRC, July 2001, p. 1. 

37 Ibid., p. 2. 

38 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, pp. 20-22. 

39 Ibid., p. 20. 

40 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Website,

http://www.darpa.mil

41 Tousley, Brad, Lt Col, USA, “Adaptive Spectral Reconnaissance 

Program,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 20 March 2002, 

http://www.darpa.mil/spo/ Programs/adaptivespectralrecon.htm. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...53

Notes 

42 Tousley, Bradford Lt Col, USA, “Emerging Hyperspectral 

Technologies -New Eyes for the Warfighter” Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency, February 18, 2000, p. 5. 

43 Ibid., p. 12. 

44 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, p. 9. 

45 “Fourier Transform Hyperspectral Imager,” Air Force Research

Laboratory, Space Vehicles Directorate, Kirtland AFB, NM, no date. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Caudill, Dr Thomas R., Fast Fourier Transform Hyperspectral 

Imagery Program Manager, Space Vehicles Directorate, Air Force 

Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, NM, interview by author, 17 

December 2001. 

48 Tira, Dr Nour, “Orbview 3 & 4 Capabilities, PAN, MS, and 

Hyperspectral,” Orbimage, no date, p.5. 

49 Cooley, Dr Thomas, “Modifying a Commercial Satellite for 

Military Applications,” Technology Horizons, Space Vehicles Directorate, 

Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland AFB, NM, 20 March 2002. 

50 Not only did the Air Force lose a valuable sensor, but to highlight 

the other risks associated with such ventures, the loss of the OrbView-4 

seriously hurt the financial prospects of the already troubled ORBIMAGE. 

Three days after the launch failure, ORBIMAGE announced that it was

undergoing financial restructuring to allow it to continue operations and 

on 13 Nov 01 announced a management restructuring as well. (“Recent 

Press Releases,” ORBIMAGE, Dulles, VA, 2001, 

http://www.orbimage.com/news/press/press.html) 

51 Cooley, Dr Thomas, Hyperspectral Exploitation Program Manager, 

Space Vehicles Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Kirtland 

AFB, NM, interview by author, 20 March 2002. 

52 Editors note: Colonel Pabich’s original source is no longer 

available. As of the time of printing, this data is now available at: “Naval 

Earth Map Observer,” Global Security.Org, Alexandria, VA, 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/nemo.htm, 21 February 2003 

53 “Ibid. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...54

Notes 

54 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, p. 14. 

55 “Technology,” Naval EarthMap Observer, Naval Research 

Laboratory, Washington D.C., 1998, 

http://nemo.nrl.navy.mil/technology.html. 56 Ibid. 

57 Davis, Dr Kurt, Naval Research Laboratory, Interview by author, 

27 November 2001. 

58 Baugh, Becky, Naval Research Laboratory, Interview by author, 15 

November 2001. 

59 Airborne Visible/Infrared Imaging Spectrometer Website, Jet 

Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 21 November 

2001, http://makalu.jpl.nasa.gov. 

60 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, p. 9. 

61“Mission Summary,” Earth Observing-1 Website, Goddard Space 

Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, no date, 

http://eo1.gsfc.nasa.gov/miscPages/home.html. 62“Mission Operations,” “Mission Summary,” Earth Observing-1 

Website, Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, no date, 

http://eo1.gsfc.nasa.gov/overview/eo1Overview.html. 63 Dunaway, Robert, “Spectral Operations Resource Center,” 

Briefing, U.S. Army Space Command, Remote Sensing Branch, Colorado 

Springs, CO, no date, p. 5. 

64 “NASA Test Satellite Collects War Imagery,” Early Bird, Armed 

Forces Information Service, 22 January 2002, from Aviation Week and 

Space Technology, 21 Jan 01. 

65 “Landsat 7 Gateway,” Landsat 7 Project Science Office, Goddard 

Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, 8 May 2001, 

http://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov. 

66 “LANDSAT 7 Spacecraft to Join NASA’s Earth Science Team,” 

Landsat 7 Press Kit, Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, April 

1999, p. 3. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...55

Notes 

67 “Landsat 7 Gateway,” Landsat 7 Project Science Office, Goddard 

Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, 8 May 2001, 

http://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov. 

68 “LANDSAT 7 Spacecraft to Join NASA’s Earth Science Team,” 

Landsat 7 Press Kit, Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, April 

1999, p. 4. 

69 “Multispectral Thermal Imager (MTI),” Department of Energy, 6 

March 2001, http://nis-www.lanl.gov/nis-projects/mti/. 70 “MTI Satellite Begins Work, Maps Cerro Grande Fire Damage,” 

News and Public Affairs Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, 

NM, 14 June 2000, http://www.lanl.gov/ 

worldview/news/releases/archive/00-082.shtml. 71 Pirolo, David G., et al., “Hyperspectral Imagery System Roadmap 

(draft),” Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO, no 

date, p. 9. and Kirkland, Laurel, et al., “First Use of an Airborne Thermal 

Infrared Hyperspectral Scanner for Compositional Mapping,” Sept. 2001, 

p.1, http://www.lpi.usra.edu/science/kirkland/Papers/webMesaEarth.pdf

72 Ibid., p.5. 

73 “Hyperspectral Surveys,” Infoterra, no date, http://www.infoterraglobal.com/ hyper_surveys.html. 74“Sensor Systems, ITRES Research, 14 December 2001, 

http://www.itres.com/docs/ casi2.html. 75 “Capstone Requirements Document for Distributed Common 

Ground Systems (DCGS) (Draft),” Department of the Army, Washington 

D.C., 27 June 2001, p. 7. Editors note: As of the time of this printing, the 

Capstone Requirements Document had cleared the Army Requirements

Oversight Council, and was approved. It had not yet reached the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council. However, joint approval is expected in 

the summer of 2003. See: Gourley, Scott R., “Getting the Picture,” 

Military Information Technology Online available at: http://www.mitkmi.com/Archives/6_4_MIT/6_4_Art4.cfm, 3 April 2003. 

76 Ibid., p. 4. 

77 “Air Force Distributed Common Ground System Measurement And 

Signatures Intelligence Capabilities Integration Plan,” Draft Version 8.0, 

HQ USAF/XOIR, Washington, D.C., 1 Oct 2001, p. 5. 

78 Ibid., p. 47. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...56

Notes 

79 Ibid., p. 5. 

80 “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-01, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 20 November 

1996, p. III-28. 

81 Czyzewski, William, “COSMEC - DCGS Update” (Unclassified / 

For Official Use Only), National Air Intelligence Center/DXMS, WrightPatterson AFB, OH, no date, p. 3. 

82 Ibid., p. 4. 

83 “ENVI. From Images to Information,” Research Systems, Inc., 

Boulder, CO, 2001, http://www.rsinc.com/envi/index.asp. 

84 The “intelligence community” includes the: Central Intelligence

Agency; National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; the 

National Imagery and Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the State Department; the 

counterintelligence, cryptologic, and some of the foreign intelligence 

elements of the Military Services; and foreign intelligence and/or 

counterintelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 

the Treasury and Energy Departments. (“National Intelligence Support to 

Joint Operations,” Joint Publication 2-02, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington D.C., 28 September 1998, p. II-2) 

85 “Joint Vision 2020,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington D.C., no date, p. 7. 

86 Ibid., p. 6. 

87 Ibid., p. 7. 

88 “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated

Terms,” Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 12 April 

2001 (As Amended Through 15 October 2001), p. 209. 

89 “Joint Vision 2020,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington D.C., no date, p. 8. 

90 Ibid., p. 10-11. 

91The others being: Dominant Maneuver; Focused Logistics; and Full 

Dimensional Protection. From “Joint Vision 2020,” Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., no date, p. 2. 

92“Joint Vision 2020,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington D.C., no date, p. 22. 

93 Ibid., p. 22. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...57

Notes 

94“Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 

Terms,” Joint Publication 1-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 12 April 

2001 (As Amended Through 15 October 2001), p. 221. 

95 “Joint Vision 2020,” Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Washington D.C., no date, p. 15. 

96 “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-0, Joint Staff, Washington D.C., 9 March 2000, p. II-2. 

97 Ibid., p. GL-4. 

98 Ibid., p. GL-7. 

99 “IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, VII. 

MASINT: Measurement and Signatures Intelligence,” Staff Study 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives 

One Hundred Fourth Congress, 9 April 1996, http://www.access.gpo.gov/ 

congress/house/intel/ic21/ic21007.html 

100 “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-0, Joint Staff, Washington D.C., 9 March 2000, p. I-1, I-9. 

101 Ibid., p. I-8, III-10, IV-5, IV-7. 

102 Ibid., p. I-7, I-9. 

103 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 28 September

1998, p. VI-1. 

104 Ibid., p. II-4. 

105 “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-01, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 20 November 

1996, p. III-15. 

106 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 28 September

1998, p. V-1. 

107 Ibid., p. V-1. 

108 Ibid., p. V-2. 

109 Ibid., p. II-5, II-6, VIII-4, IX-1, IX-9.

110 “This is DIA, Agency Overview,” Defense Intelligence Agency,

Bolling AFB, Washington D.C., 12 February 2002, 

http://www.dia.mil/This/Intro/index.html. 111 Rodriguez, Marc, Central MASINT Organization, Interview by 

author, 30 November 2001. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...58

Notes 

112 “Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-0, Joint Staff, Washington D.C., 9 March 2000, p. II-1, 2. 

113 “Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-01, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington D.C., 20 November 

1996, p. III-1. 

114 Ibid., p. III-1 

115 Ibid., p. III-11, III-12, III-15. 

116 Ibid., p. III-1, III-2. 

117 Ibid., p. III-2. 

118 Ibid., p. III-2, III-41. 

119 Ibid., p. III-4, III-45. For instance, the high bandwidth satellite 

borne Global Broadcast Service communication package and the 

community’s architecture “Intelink” for wide intelligence dissemination

are just two examples of improvements in the Dissemination phase. 

120 “The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial 

Information in an Evolving National Security Environment,” Report of the 

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

Dec 2000, p. 88. 

121 Snyder, Robin A., Lt Col, USAF, “The Chemical Weapons 

Convention Treaty: Present And Future Issues,” Air War College, Air 

University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, April 1998, p. 23. 

122 “The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial 

Information in an Evolving National Security Environment,” Report of the 

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

Dec 2000, p. 89. 

123 “Capstone Requirements Document for Distributed Common 

Ground Systems (DCGS) (Draft),” Department of the Army, Washington 

D.C., 27 June 2001, p. 10. 

124 “The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial 

Information in an Evolving National Security Environment,” Report of the 

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

Dec 2000, p. xiii. 

125 Ibid., p. vii, xi. 

126 Ibid., p. xi, 68. 

127 It is recognized that a similar previous attempt to put all airborne

reconnaissance programs under a single organization, the Defense 
Hyperspectral Imagery...59

Notes 

Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), failed and its duties were then 

split up among various agencies. Apparently, the services’ own airborne 

reconnaissance cultures were too ingrained to allow fruitful oversight from 

a perceived outsider. Thus it would seem the window of opportunity for 

an umbrella organization’s oversight is not open for long. 

128 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998, Fig 

IV-1, p. IV-3. 

129 Ibid., p. IX-1. 

130 Rumsfeld, Donald, “National Security and Space Management and 

Organization,” Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C., 18 

Oct 2001, p. 3. 

131 “The Information Edge: Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial 

Information in an Evolving National Security Environment,” Report of the 

Independent Commission on the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 

Dec 2000, p. 96. 

132 Rodriguez, Marc, Central MASINT Organization, email, 2 January 

2002. 

133 Ibid. 

134 Cohen, William S., “Report of the Secretary of Defense, to the 

President and the Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 

Washington D.C., 2001, p. 120. 

135 Ibid., pp. 120-121. 

136 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998, p. 

IX-2. 

137“Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence 

Preparation of the Battlespace” Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, Washington D.C., May 2000, p II-54. 

138 “Air Force Distributed Common Ground System Measurement 

And Signatures Intelligence Capabilities Integration Plan,” Draft Version 

8.0, HQ USAF/XOIR, Washington, D.C., 1 Oct 2001, p. 6. 

139 Ibid., pp. 12-17. 

140 “Capstone Requirements Document for Distributed Common 

Ground Systems (DCGS) (Draft),” Department of the Army, Washington 

D.C., 27 June 2001, pp. 7-8. 
Hyperspectral Imagery...60

Notes 

141 “Air Force Distributed Common Ground System Measurement 

And Signatures Intelligence Capabilities Integration Plan,” Draft Version 

8.0, HQ USAF/XOIR, Washington, D.C., 1 Oct 2001, p. 8. 

142 “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations,” Air 

Force Doctrine Document 2-5.2, Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell 

AFB, AL, 21 Apr 99, p. 59. 

143 Ibid., p. 60. 

144Dolan, Tim, “Hyperspectral Integration Into DCGS JEFX 2000 – 

HSI into DTS,” Aerospace, Command and Control & Intelligence,

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Langley AFB, VA, no date, p. 4. 

145 Ibid., p. 10. 

146 Ibid., p. 9. 

147 “Fiscal Year 2002 ACTDs Announced,” Department of Defense, 5 

March 2001,

http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/b03052002_bt103-02.html

148 “Introduction to ACTDs,” Office of the Under Secretary of

Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, 20 March 2002, 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/actd/intro.htm. 

149 “Hyperspectral Collection and Analysis System (HyCAS) 

Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration,” National Air Intelligence 

Center, 8 November 2001, p. 1. 

150 “U.S. Intelligence Agencies Would Get Computer Network,”

Early Bird, Armed Forces Information Service, 18 December 2001, from 

Defense News, 17-23 December 2001. 

151 Ibid. 

152 “National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations,” Joint 

Publication 2-02, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., 28 September 1998, p. D1, D-4. 

153 Ibid., p.D-1. 

154 Ibid., p. D-1. 
Center for Strategy and Technology 

The Center for Strategy and Technology was established at the Air 

War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in long-term strategic 

thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national security. 

The Center focuses on education, research, and publications that 

support the integration of technology into national strategy and policy. Its 

charter is to support faculty and student research, publish research through 

books, articles, and occasional papers, fund a regular program of guest

speakers, host conferences and symposia on these issues, and engage in 

collaborative research with U.S. and international academic institutions. 

As an outside funded activity, the Center enjoys the support of institutions 

in the strategic, scientific, and technological worlds. 

An essential part of this program is to establish relationships with

organizations in the Air Force as well as other Department of Defense 

agencies, and identify potential topics for research projects. Research

conducted under the auspices of the Center is published as Occasional 

Papers and disseminated to senior military and political officials, think 

tanks, educational institutions, and other interested parties. Through these 

publications, the Center hopes to promote the integration of technology 

and strategy in support of U.S. national security objectives. 

For further information on the Center for Strategy and Technology, 

please contact: 

Grant T. Hammond, Director 

Theodore C. Hailes, Deputy Director 

John P. Geis II, Director of Operations 

Air War College 

325 Chennault Circle 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112 

(334) 953-6996/2985/5579 

(DSN 493-6996/2985/5579) 

Email: Grant.Hammond@maxwell.af.mil

 Ted.Hailes@maxwell.af.mil

John.Geis@maxwell.af.mil
Titles in the Occasional Papers Series 

1 

Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution 

Scott M. Britten, September 1997 

2 

Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing U.S. Military 

Capabilities

Mark E. Rogers, November 1997 

3 

Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy 

Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998 

4 

Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and the 

American Use of Force Since 1945 

Jeffrey Record, March 1998 

5 

Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and GroundBased Laser Weapons 

William H. Possel, July 1998 

6 

Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological 

Inevitables 

Thomas D. Bell, January 1999 

7 

Legal Constraints or Information Warfare 

Mark Russell Shulmann, March 1999 

8 

Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to Use 

Force 

Jeffrey Record, May 1999 
9 

Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological and 

Operational Compatibility 

Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999 

10 

Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare 

William J. McCarthy, February 2000 

11 

High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for 

Warfare 

Eileen M. Walling, March 2000 

12 

Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations 

John E. Ward, Jr., March 2000 

13 

Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological 

Implications

David J. Nicholls, March 2000 

14 

Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations 

Eric M. Sepp, March 2000 

15 

Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in the 

Twenty-First Century 

William B. McClure, July 2000 

16 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Implications for Military Operations 

David Glade, July 2000 
17 

Computer Networks and Information Warfare: Implications for Military

Operations 

David J. Gruber, July 2000 

18 

Failed States and Casualty Phobia: Implications for Force Structure and 

Technology Choices 

Jeffrey Record, December 2000 

19 

War as We Knew It: The Real Revolution in Military

Affairs/Understanding Paralysis in Military Operations 

Jan S. Breemer, December 2000 

20 

Using Lasers in Space: Laser Orbital Debris Removal and Asteroid 

Deflection 

Jonathan W. Campbell, December 2000 

21 

Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important is Technology? 

Collin S. Gray, January 2001 

22 

U.S. Army Apache Helicopters and U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Forces: 

Implications for Future Military Operations 

Brad Mason, June 2001 

23 

The End of Secrecy? Military Competitiveness in the Age of Transparency 

Beth M. Kaspar, August 2001 

24 

Prompt Global Strike Through Space: What Military Value? 

Larry G. Sills, August 2001 
25 

Precision Engagement at the Strategic Level of War: Guiding Promise or 

Wishful Thinking? 

Timothy J. Sakulich, December 2001 

26 

Infrared Systems for Tactical Aviation: An Evolution in Military Affairs? 

George B. Hept, January 2002 

27 

Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Guided Missile Submarines: 

Technological and Operational Synergies 

Edward A. Johnson, Jr., February 2002 

28 

Attack Operations For Missile Defense 

Merrick E. Krause, May 2002 

29 

Death by a Thousand Cuts: Micro-Air Vehicles in the Service of Air 

Force Missions 

Arthur F. Huber II, June 2002 

30 

Sustained Space Superiority: A National Strategy for the United States 

Larry J. Schaefer, August 2002