Volume 3, Issue 2 August 1999

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues,

Written and Produced by

From the Chairman...

Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

Communiqués and Treaties

are Poor Shields:

Nuclear Deterrence:

The Cornerstone of

U.S. National Security

– continued on page 4 – – continued on page 2 –

On June 20, 1999, PresidentClinton and Russian

President Boris Yeltsin agreed to

the “Joint Statement Between the

United States and the Russian

Federation Concerning Strategic

Offensive and Defensive Arms

and Further Strengthening of

Stability” that called for

discussions later this summer on

a third Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START III) treaty and on

strengthening the Anti-Ballistic

Missile (ABM) Treaty.

According to Administration

officials, these discussions will

begin in Moscow on August

17th. However, serious

questions remain over whether the

Administration’s commitment to

continued reductions in nuclear

arsenals and past treaties – in particular,

the 1972 ABM Treaty – will serve to

increase or decrease American security in

a rapidly changing and increasingly

dangerous international environment.

The Administration has hailed the

Joint Statement as a major achievement.

According to National Security Adviser

Sandy Berger, this is “the first time the

Russians have agreed to discuss

changes in the ABM Treaty that may be

necessitated by a national missile

defense (NMD) system were we to decide

to deploy one.” The Joint Statement also

moves the United States and Russia

closer to a third round of nuclear

weapons reductions under the Strategic

Arms Reduction Talks (START) despite

the fact that the Russian Duma, or

parliament, has yet to ratify the START

II treaty. The fundamental question is

whether these two negotiations will leave

the United States more or less secure in

a world marked by the rapid proliferation

of missile technology and weapons of

mass destruction. Has the traditional

arms control “theology” been rendered

obsolete by the variety of post-Cold War

threats and challenges facing the United

States? Understanding the origins of the

ABM and START treaties and their

evolution since the demise of the Soviet

Union sheds light on this question.

The ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty, concluded between

the United States and the USSR in 1972,

prohibits the deployment of a ballistic

missile defense system to defend the

Nuclear deter- rence continues to be a cornerstone of U.S. national security. As

such, a robust

nuclear deterrent

capable of maintaining strategic stability is indispensable. The emerging post-Cold War

world threat environment, characterized by an unstable and unpredictable

Russia that retains thousands of

nuclear weapons, China’s rapid modernization of its nuclear forces, and

the proliferation of nuclear weapons

and technology to rogue states and

Third World nations, makes maintaining a nuclear deterrent both more imperative and complicated than during

the Cold War.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

Treaty – negotiated during the Cold

War, signed with a country that no

longer exists, and consciously

intended to perpetuate vulnerability

to ballistic missile attack, is a relic of

a bygone era. Indeed, the ABM

Treaty was controversial 27 years ago

and, in the face of today’s emerging

missile threat from rogue states like

Iran and North Korea, makes little

sense today.

Indeed, it seems that continuing to

abide by the Treaty today appears to

be more a matter of Administration

policy than of international law. Not

only does the United States have the

Credit: The Fallout Shelter

Background

Brief

Background

Brief

Implications of the U.S. – Russian Joint

Statement on the ABM and START III Treaties
2 National Security Report

– continued from page 1 –

territory of the United States. It was

intended to prevent deployment of

missile defenses that could undermine

the Cold War theory of mutual security

being best preserved if all parties leave

themselves vulnerable to nuclear attack.

This Cold War strategy was referred to

as Mutual Assured Destruction, with the

appropriate acronym of MAD.

After the treaty entered into force in

1972, the United States scaled back its

missile defense efforts. The treaty had

an even more far-reaching effect,

however, as it inhibited the development

by the United States of many of the

required building blocks for a national

missile defense system by banning the

development, testing, and deployment

of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or

mobile land-based ABM systems and

ABM system components (including

interceptor missiles, launchers, and

radars or other sensors that can

substitute for radars). In stark contrast

to U.S. inaction, Russia built and today

maintains and continues to modernize a

sophisticated strategic missile defense

system – the world’s only such antiballistic missile defense system. Some

estimates indicate Russia’s missile

defense system could protect nearly 80

percent of Russia’s population from a

limited nuclear attack.

Much has changed, both strategically

and technologically, since the ABM

Treaty was first conceived. Most

strikingly, the Soviet Union no longer

exists, and the proliferation of missiles

and weapons of mass destruction has

radically altered the strategic

environment. The threats posed by

rogue regimes such as North Korea differ

greatly from threats posed by the Soviet

Union, and Russia’s increasing reliance

on nuclear weaponry to preserve its

declining status as a great power

complicates the relatively simple

calculus that underpinned the ABM

Treaty. Moreover, as U.S. investments

in missile defense technology mature,

the feasibility of deploying an effective

national missile defense system becomes

increasingly apparent.

In reaction to these strategic and technological

changes, U.S. policy and adherence to the ABM Treaty

has become increasingly

hard to understand and consequential for the future of

U.S. missile defenses. In

1993, the Clinton Administration sought to reach an

agreement with Russia on a

“demarcation line” to distinguish between strategic missile defense systems and

less capable Theater Missile

Defense (TMD) systems.

The demarcation agreement,

concluded on September 26,

1997, imposed limits on the

capabilities of U.S. theater

missile defenses – capabilities that the ABM Treaty

never intended to restrict.

The Administration also

began negotiations in 1993

on an agreement to

determine which states of

the former USSR would be successors to

the Soviet Union with regard to the ABM

Treaty. The resulting and highly

controversial September 1997 agreement

named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and

Kazakhstan as treaty successors to the

Soviet Union. Remarkably, this

agreement is so controversial that, two

years later, the President still has not

submitted it to the U.S. Senate for advice

and consent. Regardless, the most

significant effect of adding parties to the

ABM Treaty is that it will be significantly

more difficult for the United States to

negotiate changes to the treaty to permit

deployment of effective national missile

defenses.

Even as the Administration continues

its efforts to preserve the viability of the

ABM Treaty, two recent studies have

challenged the legal status and validity

of the treaty. One of these studies, The

Collapse of the Soviet Union and the

End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty: A Memorandum of Law, by

specialists in constitutional and public

law at the firm Hunton and Williams,

concludes: “The ABM Treaty no longer

binds the United States as a matter of

international or domestic law. This is

because the Soviet Union has

disappeared, and there is no state, or

group of states, capable of implementing

the Soviet Union’s obligations under the

ABM Treaty in accordance with that

agreement’s terms.” Despite such

assessments, the Administration

continues to view the treaty as the

“cornerstone of strategic stability.”

Though Administration officials have

portrayed impending negotiations with

Russia as an opportunity to renegotiate

the ABM Treaty to allow U.S.

development of national missile

defenses, the Joint Statement seems to

indicate that the negotiation’s primary

purpose may be to preserve the ABM

Treaty.

The START Negotiations

The first Strategic Arms Reduction

Talks (START I) treaty was signed in

Moscow on July 31, 1991. The treaty,

approved by the U.S. Senate in October

1992 and by the Russian Duma one month

Advances in missile technologies, including “hitto-kill” technology demonstrated by this successful

THAAD intercept, have made the feasibility of

effective missile defenses increasingly apparent.

Credit: Department of Defense
National Security Report 3

An artist’s depiction of a Russian SS-25 ICBM launch.

later, required Russia and the United

States to reduce their strategic nuclear

forces to 6,000 deployed warheads on

each side, a limit both parties have nearly

achieved today.

The START process produced a

second treaty (START II) between the

United States and Russia on January 3,

1993, that limits each side to 3,000-3,500

deployed warheads and bans all multiplewarhead intercontinental ballistic

missiles (MIRVed ICBMs). The ban on

MIRVed ICBMs is considered one of the

most important provisions of START II.

MIRVed ICBMs – in which Russia

maintains a substantial advantage – are

considered to be the most destabilizing

weapons. The ability to deploy as many

as 10 warheads on a single missile makes

them lucrative targets and in the minds

of some, a “use it or lose it” weapon.

Although the White House and the

Kremlin quickly reached agreement on

START II, the Russian Duma has still not

approved the treaty. The majority of the

Duma is made up of Communists and

hard-liners who generally consider

START II disadvantageous to Russia and

who view nuclear weapons as Russia’s

only remaining claim to great power

status. Indeed, most Duma members

advocate “skipping” START II and

negotiating START III to correct the

“errors” of START II that hard-liners

perceive as “unfair” to Russia.

Nonetheless, Presidents Clinton and

Yeltsin agreed at the Helsinki Summit in

March 1997 that the United States and

Russia would only begin negotiations on

START III after START II enters into force.

Despite the 1997 agreement not to

negotiate START III until START II is

approved by the Russian Duma, Russia

and the United States almost immediately

began unofficial negotiations over “what

a START III package might look like.”

Thus far, this “picture” of START III

would limit deployed warheads to

between 2,000 and 2,500 by December 31,

2007, and include measures to increase

transparency of strategic nuclear

warhead inventories and in the

destruction of strategic nuclear

warheads. Unfortunately, as the United

States further reduces its nuclear arsenal

in conformity with bilateral START

agreements, the impact of other nations’

growing nuclear arsenals not bounded

by START – such as China – take on

greater significance.

Of particular concern, the 1997 Helsinki

Summit foreshadowed what may happen

to the START II treaty during upcoming

START III discussions. At Helsinki, the

United States agreed to extend the

elimination period for nuclear weapons

from 2003 until the end of 2007. Although

all missiles and warheads originally

scheduled to be eliminated in 2003 are to

be “deactivated” while awaiting

elimination in 2007, the term

“deactivated” is undefined in any

agreement and is yet to be negotiated.

Critics charge that extending the

elimination period allows

Russia to retain its

destabilizing MIRVed

ICBMs for an additional

four years, effectively

canceling one of the most

important and stabilizing

achievements of START

II. This interpretation

appears to be shared by

senior Russian military

officers who, after

Helsinki, flight-tested the

SS-18 and other MIRVed

ICBMs for the stated

purpose of extending their

useful service life until

2007.

The Implications of the Joint

Statement

As the bipartisan Rumsfeld

Commission unanimously concluded last

July, the threat to the United States

posed by ballistic missiles and the

weapons of mass destruction they can

carry is, “broader, more mature and

evolving more rapidly than has been

reported in estimates and reports by the

intelligence community.” As a

consequence, the commission noted that

the United States could have, “little or

no warning” of a ballistic missile threat.

Despite assertions to the contrary, the

June 20 Joint Statement does not bode

well for the development of U.S. missile

defenses, as there is a fundamental

disagreement over the statement’s intent.

Russia did not agree to accommodate

changes to allow the United States to

deploy effective missile defenses, but

only to discuss possible amendments to

the ABM Treaty. More substantively,

the Joint Statement reasserts the

centrality of the ABM Treaty to U.S.-

Russian relations, and has “the Parties

reaffirm their commitment to that Treaty.”

According to the statement, the purpose

of talks on the ABM Treaty is, “to

strengthen the Treaty, to enhance its

viability and effectiveness in the future.”

Thus, it appears that a higher priority is

being placed on adhering to the 27-year

old treaty than on allowing the

development of effective missile

defenses.

Indeed, the Joint Statement itself

nowhere explicitly mentions developing

effective missile defenses as a purpose

or focus of future talks. Rather, it includes

ambiguous language stating that talks

may, “consider possible changes in the

strategic situation that have a bearing on

the ABM Treaty.” The statement does,

however, explicitly recognize past

agreements to restrict missile defense

development and deployment: “The

Parties emphasize that the package of

agreements signed on September 26, 1997,

in New York is important...for the

effectiveness of the ABM Treaty, and

they will facilitate the earliest possible

– continued on page 4 –

Credit: The Federation of American Scientists
4 National Security Report

The National Security Report is archived on the House Armed Services Committee website at: http://www.house.gov/hasc/. Additional background

information may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372) or David Trachtenberg (x60532) on the committee staff.

– continued from page 3 –

ratification and entry into force of those

agreements.”

In stark contrast to Administration

policy, Congress has long recognized the

importance of effective missile defenses

to America’s future security. In May

1999, the Congress passed H.R. 4,

declaring it to be the policy of the

United States to deploy national

missile defenses. Although the

President signed H.R. 4 on July 22,

1999, President Clinton simultaneously

declared, “No decision on deployment

has been made... In making our

determination [on deployment in the

future], we will also review progress in

achieving our arms control objectives,

including negotiating any amendments

to the ABM Treaty that may be required

to accommodate a possible NMD

deployment.”

The Administration’s reluctance to

commit to a national missile defense

system is difficult to comprehend

considering that, since release of the

Rumsfeld Commission’s report,

Administration officials have

increasingly acknowledged the

seriousness of the ballistic missile

threat. Recently, Secretary of Defense

William Cohen stated that ballistic

missiles, “will soon pose a danger not

only to our troops overseas but also to

Americans here at home.” Despite this

recognition, the Administration

continues to link development and

deployment of U.S. missile defense

programs to what can be negotiated

with the Russians under the ABM

Treaty – a treaty that does not even

address the ballistic missile threat from

China, North Korea, Iran, or other

nations developing and deploying

such weapons.

The implications of the June 20 Joint

Statement for the strategic nuclear

balance also remain uncertain.

Discussions on START III, as agreed

to in the Joint Statement, present

Russia with the opportunity to undo

the most important provisions of

START II and impede U.S. plans for

deployment of a national missile

defense system. For example, public

statements by Russian officials and

defense experts advocate using START

III to reverse the ban on MIRVed

ICBMs, impose a ban on more stabilizing

MIRVed SLBMs (where the U.S. has an

advantage), establish prohibitive

technical restrictions on U.S. national

missile defenses, and preserve the

Russian advantage in tactical nuclear

weapons.

In the post-Cold War era, the nuclear

balance has become a more complex

calculation, and much of the equation lies

outside the framework of U.S.-Russian

relations. The ABM Treaty and START

negotiations do not take into account the

volatile developments in southern Asia,

where both India and Pakistan have

recently tested nuclear devices and

increased the pace of their missile

development programs. Furthermore,

neither of these bilateral treaties can

account for potential increases in

China’s nuclear arsenal, North Korea’s

expanding missile and nuclear

capabilities, and the clear ambitions of

Iraq, Iran and other rogue nations to

develop such systems. Under such

circumstances, it is questionable

whether current and future U.S. security

needs are well served by a Cold War

strategy that subordinates missile

defenses to the preservation of nuclear

parity in strategic offensive forces with

a weakened Russia, to the exclusion of

these other growing threats.

– continued from page 1 –

legal right to withdraw from the

treaty, but two recent legal analyses

conclude that the ABM Treaty is no

longer legally binding, as one of the

two original parties to the Treaty (the

Soviet Union) no longer exists.

More fundamentally, our nation

should not be negotiating with the

Russians to amend any treaty if it

means “dumbing down” U.S. missile

defense technology or if it results in

artificial constraints on the

effectiveness or timeliness of a

defense for the American public.

The threat of ballistic missile attack

is real and it is here today. The

bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission

report of July 1998, identified in stark

terms the growing ballistic missile

threat to the United States and

formed the backdrop for the

Congress’ approval earlier this year

– with overwhelming majorities in

both the House and Senate – of H.R.

4, a bill making it the policy of the

United States to deploy a national

missile defense.

However, the Administration’s

recent joint statement with Russia

announcing agreement to explore

renegotiation of the ABM Treaty and

the initiation of discussions on a

third Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

treaty, before the Russian Duma has

even approved START II, may bode

ill for making deployment of effective

missile defenses a reality in the near

future. In the past, the

Administration and Russia have both

used ABM Treaty discussions,

alleged to be necessary to secure

Russian approval of START II, to

impose delays and technological

restrictions on U.S. theater missile

defense programs. Now, joint

discussions could result in U.S.

national missile defenses being

hamstrung, while ABM Treaty and

START III discussions provide

Russia with an opportunity to rewrite

START II, which was ratified by the

U.S. Senate three years ago.

Nuclear deterrence will remain a

cornerstone of our nation’s security

in the coming decades. But while

future strategic arms reductions are

possible, they ought not to be

considered until Russia complies

with its current arms control

obligations. In the end, our ability

to defend Americans from the

growing threat of ballistic missile

attack will not be a matter of arms

control but instead will be tied to our

ability to deploy an effective missile

defense system. Any “agreement”

with Russia must reflect this priority

– U.S. security is and must remain

non-negotiable.