REVISED December 7, 2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-31247

DERRICK ALLEN, 

 Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

ENVIROGREEN LANDSCAPE PROFESSIONALS, INCORPORATED, 

 Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:14-CV-506

Before JONES, SMITH, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Derrick Allen appeals the summary judgment dismissal of his retaliation 

claim based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e et seq., and the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the judgment. 

For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 28, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff–Appellant Derrick Allen, an African-American male, was hired 

by Defendant–Appellee Envirogreen Landscape Professionals, Inc. 

(“Envirogreen”) on September 17, 2010. Envirogreen is a landscaping company 

that provides services in Baton Rouge and other cities. Allen left his supervisor 

job that paid $15 per hour at another landscaping company, White Oak 

Plantation, for a position at Envirogreen. Allen interviewed with Envirogreen’s 

owner, Mark Willie, and landscape architect, Todd Griffin. He was given the 

title of “supervisor” but never explicitly told the scope of his duties. According 

to Allen, he and Willie were supposed to review an employment agreement to 

set his exact duties and terms of employment, but Willie “continued to put that 

off.” Allen claims that Willie agreed to pay him $15 per hour. 

Allen describes his work as “doing pretty much a little bit of everything, 

not just -- little to none if so supervising but mainly just routine labor.” Despite 

the agreed upon pay rate of $15 per hour, Allen’s first paycheck reflected a rate 

of $14 per hour. At the time, Allen did not know whether other employees were 

being paid $14 or $15 per hour. After receiving his paycheck, Allen complained 

to both Willie and Griffin regarding his pay rate. He also complained to them 

about Envirogreen’s failure to pay overtime. 

After he complained about his pay, Allen believes that Envirogreen 

retaliated against him by placing him in “inappropriate working conditions.”

According to Allen, he was sent to jobs where he was not familiar with the 

work, and check on jobs that he didn’t initiate. Altogether, Allen reports 

working between six and eight jobs for Envirogreen, and he alleges that all of 

them involved inappropriate working conditions since he complained to Willie. 

Allen inferred that Envirogreen’s motive in assigning him to inappropriate 

working conditions was based on his wage and overtime complaint, not his 

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race. When asked if race had something to do with his adverse treatment by 

Envirogreen, Allen responded that race was a factor, because the field workers 

were predominantly black, but his case was based “on retaliation, not race.” 

Griffin terminated Allen on December 31, 2010, soon after his 90-day 

evaluation. According to Allen, he requested an evaluation so he could 

potentially request a pay increase, but he was fired instead. Griffin told him 

that “it was apparent that . . . Allen was not satisfied with the way things were 

going on the job.” Willie justified Allen’s termination because Allen’s 

employment was “not working out,” Allen had poor job performance, and Allen 

“did not have skills originally agreed upon.” Allen reported that he never 

received a complaint from his employer regarding his performance, nor did he 

receive any verbal or written warning before he was terminated. Allen thought

that he was terminated as retaliation for complaining about his wages, not his 

race. Envirogreen eventually compensated Allen for “back wages” as a result 

of a payroll audit. 

B. Procedural History

On May 27, 2011, Allen filed a charge of discrimination with the 

Louisiana Commission on Human Rights (“LCHR”) and the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Allen’s complaint alleged 

that he was discriminated against based on race, and retaliated against in 

violation of LSA R.S. 23:301 et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 

Specifically, he complained that “as a supervisor . . . he was not render[ed] the 

opportunities and training that was agreed upon, he did not get paid the agreed 

upon wage of $15 an hour, and he worked over 40 hours a week on several 

occasions and did not get paid overtime wages because of his Race, and he was 

assigned revolting assignments and fired because of his race and opposition to 

his employers unlawful practices.” 

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After exhausting his administrative remedies,1 Allen sued Envirogreen 

pro se alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964. Allen’s complaint argues that he informed Envirogreen of its 

discriminatory employment practices, such as “wages paid, hours of work, and 

working conditions.” Allen claims that as a result, Envirogreen took adverse 

action by withdrawing his initial salary agreement, not paying overtime, 

placing Allen in “inappropriate working conditions,” and terminating him. 

Allen did not mention race in his complaint. Since filing his complaint, he 

repeatedly maintained that his case is “based on [r]etaliation not race, but race 

surely is a component.” 

Envirogreen filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Allen 

failed to establish a prima facie case for his retaliation claim under Title VII. 

Allen filed a sur-reply in response, arguing that “he was discriminated against 

based on race” and that he was treated differently than a similarly situated 

white employee, Rick, with respect to job assignment, wages, and hours. No 

details are provided about Rick other than the fact he is a white supervisor at 

Envirogreen. After a review of the record, the district court found that no 

reasonable juror could conclude from the uncontested facts that Allen engaged 

in activity protected by Title VII. The court reasoned that Allen’s legal 

arguments were unsupported, and his factual assertions were conclusory. The 

district court granted Envirogreen’s motion for summary judgment and 

dismissed Allen’s claims with prejudice on May 3, 2016. 

 

1 The LCHR issued a finding that the evidence did not support Allen’s allegations of 

employment discrimination. After conducting a substantial weight review of the finding, the 

EEOC concurred, and “determined that no appropriate evidence was overlooked or 

misinterpreted in evaluating [Allen’s] charge.” The EEOC issued a determination letter on 

May 29, 2014, notifying Allen of his right to bring a private lawsuit within 90 days of 

receiving the letter. 

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On May 16, 2016, Allen filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

judgment invoking Rule 59. He first asserted that the court made a mistake of 

law in holding that Title VII does not protect “wage issues.” He also argued 

that the court disregarded evidence that supported his claim of discrimination, 

specifically his charge of discrimination filed with the EEOC. And Allen 

contended that Envirogreen provided no support for its claim that its actions 

were not racially motivated. The district court denied Allen’s motion on 

November 21, 2016. Allen timely appealed both the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Envirogreen and the court’s denial of his motion 

for reconsideration. 

II. DISCUSSION

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in a light most favorable to the 

non-moving party.” Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 425–26 (5th

Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when there is “no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact 

exists if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

“Where, as here, ‘the burden at trial rests on the non-movant, the movant must 

merely demonstrate an absence of evidentiary support in the record for the 

non-movant’s case.’” Alkhawaldeh, 851 F.3d at 425–26 (quoting Byers v. Dall.

Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Once a party meets 

the initial burden of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue of 

material fact for trial, the burden shifts to the non-movant to produce evidence 

of the existence of such an issue for trial.” Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 

350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). 

“Summary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional allegations, 

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unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McFaul 

v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 

507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)). “On appeal we may affirm a grant of 

summary judgment on any legal ground raised below, even if it was not the 

basis for the district court’s decision.” Alkhawaldeh, 851 F.3d at 426 (quoting 

Bayle, 615 F.3d at 355).

A. Summary Judgment

Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who 

oppose an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. EEOC v. Rite Way 

Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). 

Unlawful employment practices under Title VII include “fail[ing] or refus[ing] 

to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 

individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation

under Title VII, “a plaintiff must show that (1) she participated in an activity 

protected under the statute; (2) her employer took an adverse employment 

action against her; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected 

activity and the adverse action.” Feist v. La. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the 

Attorney Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing McCoy v. City of 

Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 2007)). “If the employee establishes 

a prima facie case [of retaliation], the burden shifts to the employer to state a 

legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision.” LeMaire v. Louisiana, 480 

F.3d 383, 388–89 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Baker v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 430 F.3d 

750, 754–55 (5th Cir. 2005)). Once an employer does so, the burden shifts back 

to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s reason is pretext for 

retaliation. Id. “In order to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff must show 

‘a conflict in substantial evidence’ on the question of whether the employer 

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would not have taken the action ‘but for’ the protected activity.” Feist, 730 F.3d 

at 454 (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 308 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Allen argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment 

on his Title VII retaliation claim. The district court concluded that before he 

was retaliated against, Allen only complained about his wages and had not 

complained to Envirogreen about racially discriminatory employment 

practices. Thus, Allen failed to establish a prima facie case for retaliation 

under Title VII because he did not show that he engaged in activity protected 

under Title VII. This Circuit has defined protected activity to include

“opposition to any practice rendered unlawful by Title VII, including making a 

charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any investigation, proceeding, 

or hearing under Title VII.” Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Hous. Health Sci. Ctr., 261 

F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2001); Evans v. 

City of Hous., 246 F.3d 344, 352–53 (5th Cir. 2001)). On appeal, Allen offers 

two sources of proof for his claim that he engaged in activity protected under 

Title VII: his written LHCR and EEOC complaint and his verbal complaints to 

Willie and Griffin. After reviewing these sources, neither is sufficient to 

establish a prima facie case for retaliation. We therefore conclude that Allen 

has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that he engaged in 

protected activity under Title VII.

First, Allen argues that his LHCR and EEOC complaint regarding

Envirogreen’s employment practices supports finding that he engaged in 

activity protected under Title VII. There is no question that Allen engaged in 

a protected activity when he filed his complaint on May 27, 2011. See 42 U.S.C. 

2000e-3(a). In his EEOC charge, Allen specifically alleged that “he worked over 

40 hours a week on several occasions and did not get paid overtime wages 

because of his [r]ace, and he was assigned revolting assignments and fired 

because of his race and opposition to his employer’s unlawful practices.” 

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Making a charge that he was discharged or otherwise discriminated against 

with respect to compensation or conditions of employment because of his race 

is protected under Title VII. See Feist, 730 F.3d at 454. However, this complaint 

cannot prove that Envirogreen retaliated against him; Allen submitted his 

complaint with the LHCR and EEOC months after he was fired. Any alleged 

workplace retaliation necessarily pre-dated his submission of the complaint.

Therefore, the LHCR and EEOC complaint cannot support his retaliation 

claim. 

Second, Allen contends that his verbal complaints to Willie and Griffin 

about the “wages paid, hours of work, and working conditions” constituted 

“opposition to [Envirogreen’s] discriminatory employment practices” and thus 

he engaged in activity protected under Title VII. In a claim of protected 

opposition, an employee must at least have referred to conduct that could 

plausibly be considered discriminatory in intent or effect, thereby alerting the 

employer of its discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Turner v. Baylor Richardson 

Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 2007). A vague complaint or general 

allegation of unfair treatment, without any reference to an unlawful 

employment practice under Title VII, does not constitute protected activity. 

See Davis v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2011)

(unpublished) (per curiam) (finding that a statement complaining about a 

“hostile work environment” did not constitute protected activity under Title 

VII because it “lacked a racial or gender basis”); Tratree v. BP N. Am. Pipelines, 

Inc., 277 F. App’x 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (per curiam) 

(“Complaining about unfair treatment without specifying why the treatment 

is unfair, however, is not a protected activity”); Harris-Childs v. Medco Health 

Sols., Inc., 169 F. App’x 913, 916 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that an

employee did not engage in protected activity when she complained of 

harassment but did not mention race or sex). Complaints about wages, hours 

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of work, and working conditions are protected under § 15(a)(3) of the Fair 

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3), but protected 

activity under Title VII must relate to discriminatory practices based on race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

When his pro se complaint is liberally construed,2 Allen claims that he 

complained to Willie and Griffin about a wage disparity based on race. He then

argues that he was retaliated against after complaining about this pay

disparity, and that he was paid less because of his race. On appeal, Allen 

maintains that “the true basis of the case” was his race. In support of his 

assertion, Allen points to interrogatories where he attributed his incorrect pay 

rate to “race and my opposition to their discriminatory action.” Taken at face 

value, Allen has consistently argued that race was an underlying factor in his 

complaint, and he appears to have engaged in protected activity under Title 

VII.

On the other hand, Envirogreen demonstrates that Allen has

consistently downplayed the role that race played in his complaint to Willie 

and Griffin. When Allen describes his opposition to “discriminatory 

employment practices,” he refers only to his complaint to Willie regarding

“wages paid, hours of work, and working conditions.” On appeal, he describes 

his opposition as “first, explicitly confronting Mark Willie . . . about the 

contract agreement, pay rate, failure to pay overtime, and supervisor position.” 

In his deposition, Allen testified that he complained about his wages, a breach 

of what he believed to be a salary agreement between him and Willie, and a 

lack of overtime pay. Allen believed that he and Willie agreed that Allen would 

be paid $15 per hour, but Allen was instead paid $14 per hour and denied 

 

2 This court liberally construes pro se litigant briefs, but pro se litigants must still 

argue issues to preserve them for appeal. Thomas v. La., Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App’x 

890, 894 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 901 (5th Cir. 2007)).

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overtime pay. Importantly, Allen did not know what other employees were 

paid. Thus, he could not have complained about unfair treatment by comparing 

his wages to a similarly situated white employee. When asked if Envirogreen’s 

wage practices had anything to do with race, Allen responded that he thought 

“mostly [Willie] was doing it because he was greedy.” Instead of explicitly 

describing that his complaint was about racial discrimination, he only 

surmises that Envirogreen’s motives in originally failing to pay him overtime 

pay and at the agreed upon rate “were a result of the appellant’s RACE.” In 

pointing to these responses, Envirogreen, as movant, has shown that the 

record does not support Allen’s claim that he engaged in protected activity

under Title VII.

In response, Allen does not provide evidence suggesting a dispute of

material fact. Allen describes many of Envirogreen’s actions as discriminatory, 

but these allegedly discriminatory actions provide little support for a finding 

that Allen complained to Willie and Griffin about discriminatory practices 

based on race. For example, Allen argued that Envirogreen engaged in wage 

discrimination based on race, and Envirogreen “reneged on all his verbal 

agreements” because Allen was blackHe supports this assertion by offering a 

comparator, arguing that “[a] white supervisor by the name of Rick Steele was 

paid accordingly.” Allen similarly testified that he believed he was terminated 

due to his complaint because “all the blacks was working on this level and the 

whites, but my reason I think it was retaliation because I complained.” These 

examples appear to describe unlawful employment practices under Title VII, 

see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and perhaps would suffice to support a claim of 

discrimination, but they do little to clarify the nature of Allen’s complaint to 

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Willie and Griffin.3 In describing that conversation, Allen only asserts that he 

complained about Envirogreen’s “discriminatory employment practices” and

that Envirogreen’s took discriminatory action “because of his race.” However, 

Allen does not provide supporting evidence for these statements by reference 

to the record. “Summary judgment may not be thwarted by conclusional

allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of 

evidence.” McFaul, 684 F.3d at 571. Allen thus has not demonstrated that his 

complaint was made in opposition to discrimination based on race. 

Although we review the summary judgment record in the light most 

favorable to the non-movant, we do not believe that Allen has demonstrated 

that he complained to Envirogreen about racial discrimination. A party 

contesting summary judgment by asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed

must support the assertion by citing particular materials in the record. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(c). Because Allen has not shown that he engaged in an activity

protected under Title VII by reference to specific facts in the record, he has not 

established a prima facie case for retaliation. Thus, the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment was proper.

B. Motion for Reconsideration

We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 59 motion to reconsider 

for abuse of discretion. In re La. Crawfish Producers, 852 F.3d 456, 462 (5th 

Cir. 2017). “Under this standard of review, the district court’s decision and 

 

3 Allen cites to EEOC filings in support of his claim, but these cases address the issue 

of wage discrimination based on race, not retaliation for opposing unlawful practices under 

Title VII. See EEOC v. Corp. Express Office Prods., No. 3:09-cv-00516, 2009 BL 251569 (M.D. 

La. Nov. 23, 2009); EEOC v. Orkin, Inc., No. 05-2657-Ma/P (W.D. Tenn. May 26, 2006); 

EEOC, United Air Temp / Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. Sued by EEOC for Race 

Discrimination, 2011 WL 970470 (Mar. 21, 2011). As mentioned above, Allen’s argument 

could perhaps support a claim of retaliation under the FLSA or discrimination under Title 

VII, but Allen brought neither of those claims in district court. Although pro se complaints 

are liberally construed, issues still must be briefed to be considered. See Thomas, 406 F. App’x 

at 894. 

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decision-making process need only be reasonable.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 

367 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Bright, 34 

F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1994)). But to the extent that a ruling involved a 

reconsideration of a question of law, “the standard of review is de novo.” Ross 

v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Because 

Allen’s motion “calls into question the correctness” of the judgment, we 

consider it under Rule 59(e). See Templet, 367 F.3d at 478 (quoting In re 

Transtexas Gas Corp., 303 F.3d 571, 581 (5th Cir. 2002)). Rule 59(e) motions 

serve “the narrow purpose of allowing a party to correct manifest errors of law 

or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Id. (quoting Waltman v. Int’l 

Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1989)). “Reconsideration of a judgment 

after its entry is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.” Id.

at 479 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a motion for reconsideration “is not the 

proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legal theories, or arguments that could 

have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment.” Id. (citation omitted). 

A party’s “unexcused failure to present evidence available at the time of 

summary judgment provides a valid basis for denying a subsequent motion for 

reconsideration.” ICEE Distribs., Inc. v. J&J Snack Foods Corp., 445 F.3d 841, 

847 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Templet, 367 F.3d at 479). As a result, a Rule 59(e) 

motion “should only be granted where there is new evidence that (1) probably 

changes the outcome of the case; (2) could not have been discovered earlier by 

proper diligence; and (3) is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Molina v. 

Equistar Chems. L.P., 261 F. App’x 729, 733 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished).

Allen argues that the court erred in denying his Rule 59 motion to 

reconsider the judgment. Allen raised three issues in his motion: (1) the court 

made a mistake of law in regard to Title VII not protecting wage issues; (2) the 

court overlooked record evidence; and (3) Envirogreen never offered 

evidentiary support that it did not discriminate against Allen. The district 

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court rejected all three arguments. On appeal, Allen argues that the court did 

not apply the appropriate law in ruling on his Motion for Reconsideration in 

light of new evidence, specifically his Review of Action letter to the EEOC, and 

showed clear error based on false statements made by Envirogreen in its 

motion for summary judgment. We conclude that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion when it refused to reconsider the judgment. 

First, Allen argued that the court made a mistake of law in regard to 

Title VII not protecting wage issues. The district court rejected this argument, 

reasoning that Allen cited no authority in support of his argument that Title 

VII protects wage issues. Unlawful activities under Title VII are limited to 

“fail[ing] or refus[ing] to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Although Title 

VII prohibits racial discrimination with respect to compensation, 

compensation issues are not protected by Title VII when they do not allege 

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The district 

court’s conclusion was thus not a “manifest error of law.” Waltman, 875 F.2d 

at 473. The district court therefore did not commit legal error.

Next, the district court noted that the evidence Allen presented in his

motion was available and considered by the court in its ruling on the summary 

judgment motion. We find the district court’s approach reasonable. Allen did 

not present new evidence in his motion for reconsideration. Allen cannot use 

his motion for reconsideration to rehash evidence, legal theories, or arguments 

that could have been offered or raised before the entry of judgment. Templet, 

367 F.3d at 479. Thus, Allen’s motion for reconsideration did not serve the 

narrow purpose of Rule 59, and the district court did not act improperly when 

it denied his motion.

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On appeal, Allen raises a different issue by presenting “new” evidence in 

the form of an EEOC review letter dated May 10, 2014. The district court, 

however, granted summary judgment on May 3, 2016. Allen offers no excuse 

for his failure to timely present this letter as evidence. Thus, this new evidence 

cannot justify granting his motion for reconsideration. See Templet, 367 F.3d 

at 479. We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Allen’s Rule 

59 Motion for Reconsideration of the judgment.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment and denial of Allen’s motion for reconsideration of the 

judgment under Rule 59.

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