SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3766-17T1

VOADV PROPERTY, INC.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JACQUELINE WARREN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________

Submitted March 4, 2019 – Decided March 21, 2019

Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-001177-18.

South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys for 

appellant (Michael G. Perez and Kenneth M. Goldman,

on the briefs).

Kaplin Stewart Meloff Reiter & Stein, PC, attorneys for 

respondent (Amy L. SantaMaria, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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Defendant Jacqueline Warren appeals from the trial court's April 18, 2018,

order denying defendant's motion to vacate a consent judgment and its April 25, 

2018, order denying her motion for reconsideration. The matter arises from a 

summary dispossess action in which plaintiff VOADV Property, Inc. 

("VOADV")1sought to evict defendant for non-payment of rent. On the date of 

trial, the parties through counsel negotiated and entered into a consent judgment

for possession. On appeal, defendant contends that the consent judgment should 

be vacated pursuant to Rule 4:50-1 because VOADV's counsel misrepresented 

to both defendant and her attorney that her housing subsidy could be transferred 

to other housing. Having reviewed the record and in light of the applicable law, 

we find that it was a mistaken exercise of the court's discretion to deny 

defendant's application to vacate the consent judgment. 

Plaintiff VOADV operates Moving Forward, a program that subsidizes 

housing for homeless individuals. As part of Moving Forward, VOADV enters 

into a master lease agreement with the landlords of various residences and sub-

 

1 Volunteers of America Delaware Valley is a non-profit faith-based 

organization that sponsors local human service programs. FAQ, Volunteers of 

America Delaware Valley, https://www.voadv.org/faq (last visited Mar. 5, 

2019). 
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leases units, with a rental subsidy attached, to program participants who then 

pay thirty percent of their income toward rent. 

In May 2014, defendant and VOADV entered into a sub-lease agreement 

for defendant's apartment in Blackwood, New Jersey (the "leased premises"). 

Defendant was a participant in VOADV's Moving Forward program and was 

required to pay $127.28 monthly for her unit. She lived in the apartment with 

her disabled daughter until her daughter moved out and she could no longer 

afford the rent payments. 

Defendant failed to pay her rent from June 2017 through March 2018, 

which resulted in the instant eviction action. 

On March 1, 2018, the trial date, defendant, VOADV, and both parties' 

counsel met to discuss the possibility of entering into a consent agreement. 

Defendant's counsel certified that VOADV's counsel represented during 

negotiations that defendant's subsidy "would not be terminated" as an 

inducement for defendant to move out voluntarily. After negotiations, counsel 

for both parties reached agreement on the following facts:

1. Tenant entered into a written Lease Agreement dated 

May 1, 2016, for the lease of the property known as 

1501 Little Gloucester Road, Blackwood, New Jersey 

08102, Apartment B-33 ("the Leased Premises").
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2. The Lease Agreement terminated on April 30, 2017 

and has not been extended. 

3. Tenant breached the Lease Agreement by her failure 

to pay rent to the Landlord when due. Tenant is in 

arrears for the period June 1, 2017 through and 

including March, 2018.

4. The parties have amicably resolved the matter with 

the terms of resolution placed on the record before the 

[judge] on March l, 2018.

It was then ordered that judgment for possession be entered in favor of VOADV;

that VOADV immediately apply for issuance of a warrant for removal; and that 

defendant and all family members vacate the leased premises on or before April 

15, 2018. The terms were placed on the record before the trial court on March 

1, 2018 and memorialized in a consent judgment for possession entered on 

March 6, 2018. 

During the course of the hearing at which the terms of the settlement were 

placed on the record, the trial judge asked defendant on the record whether she 

was "going to transfer to subsidized housing." Defendant's counsel answered in 

the affirmative. Defendant stated that she had no choice because she was "out 

on disability." The judge then stated: "In my experience representing housing 

authorities from there, the possession does not really affect your right to have 

that waiver or the voucher to go forward." VOADV's counsel did nothing to 
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disabuse the court, defendant or her attorney of their common understanding 

that the voucher was transferable to other housing. 

It was only after the consent judgment was entered that defendant's 

counsel was advised that the subsidy attached to the specific unit, and not to 

defendant. Between March 2, 2018 and April 12, 2018, defendant's counsel and 

VOADV's counsel exchanged emails regarding the nature of defendant's subsidy 

and status with Moving Forward. VOADV's counsel initially indicated 

there is no subsidy for [defendant]. She was never 

awarded a voucher and therefore there is nothing in her 

name to transfer. The subsidy VOADV was applying 

for the majority of her rent was not in her name. 

[Defendant] refused to meet with case workers to try to 

apply for and obtain Section 8 benefits.

When asked to explain the nature of defendant's tenancy, VOADV's counsel 

indicated 

[Defendant] never qualified for participation in the 

program and the tenancy. VOA permitted her to occupy 

the property because of her daughter's disability. She 

never qualified for a subsidy. She never complied with 

any program requirements and never showed up for any 

of the requisite meetings. That is why there is no 

information that VOADV can provide her with. 

VOADV's counsel further indicated that it was her "understanding . . . that 

[VOADV] made numerous 'exceptions' for [defendant] because of her daughter. 

[Defendant] never complied with the program requirements and also failed to 
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make her minimal rent payments. The subsidy was not 'hers' and does not follow 

her." In a follow-up email, VOADV's counsel's indicated that "the actual 

voucher is attached to the unit and not the tenant." Counsel further indicated, 

contrary to an earlier email, that defendant initially qualified for the program 

because she had been homeless for twelve months and she had a documented 

disability. 

On April 13, 2018, defendant filed an application by way of order to show 

cause to vacate the consent agreement. Defendant certified that "[w]hen 

[VOADV] offered me the apartment they told me it was a voucher and that I 

could move with it to anywhere I would want." She further certified that she 

agreed to move "because I thought I wouldn't lose my voucher and I was seeking 

a house that would be accessible to me due to my disability in ways my current 

one isn't." She certified that she "would not have agreed to move had [she] 

known that [she] would lose [her] voucher" and that she "never received any 

notices prior to the eviction proceeding that [her] voucher was being terminated 

or that [she] was terminated from [VOADV's] subsidy program." The court 

denied defendant's motion to vacate.

On April 23, 2018, defendant filed an application for reconsideration by 

way of order to show cause. Defendant's counsel's certification in support of 
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the motion for reconsideration details the email exchange that took place from 

March through April 2018 between defendant's and VOADV's counsel. Counsel 

further certified that VOADV's counsel "represented that the subsidy for Ms. 

Warren's apartment . . . would not be terminated. She further advised that the 

VOADV would help [defendant] transition into a new tenancy." The trial court 

denied defendant's motion. The instant appeal followed. 

Appellate courts review denials of motions for reconsideration for abuse 

of discretion. Guido v. Duane Morris L.L.P., 202 N.J. 79, 87 (2010). Motions 

for reconsideration "shall state with specificity the basis on which it is made, 

including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel 

believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred[.]" R. 4:49-2. 

Reconsideration should be utilized only for 

those cases which fall into that narrow 

corridor in which either 1) the Court has 

expressed its decision based upon a 

palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) 

it is obvious that the Court either did not 

consider, or failed to appreciate the 

significance of probative, competent 

evidence[.]

[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 

384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. 

D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401-02 (Ch. 

Div. 1990)).] 
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Furthermore, "if a litigant wishes to bring new or additional information to the 

Court's attention which it could not have provided on the first application, the 

Court should, in the interest of justice (and in the exercise of sound discretion), 

consider the evidence." Ibid. However, as New Jersey courts have recognized, 

"motion practice must come to an end at some point, and if repetitive bites at 

the apple are allowed, the core will swiftly sour. Thus, the Court must be 

sensitive and scrupulous in its analysis of the issues in a motion for 

reconsideration." Ibid. 

Defendant argues that this court should reverse the trial court's orders 

denying her motion to vacate the consent judgment and denying her motion for 

reconsideration because VOADV misrepresented a material fact during its 

negotiation of the terms of the consent judgment in violation of Rule 4:50-1(c). 

Specifically, defendant argues that she would not have agreed to vacate the 

leased premises if VOADV's counsel had not stated during negotiations that 

defendant would be able to keep her housing subsidy after vacating the 

apartment. Defendant's position is amply borne out by the record, and requires 

reversal of the court's orders.

Consent judgments are authorized by Rule 4:42-1, Midland Funding, 

L.L.C. v. Giambanco, 422 N.J. Super. 301, 310-11 (App. Div. 2011), and "ha[ve] 
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been characterized as being 'both a contract and a judgment[;] it is not strictly a 

judicial decree, but rather in the nature of a contract entered into with the solemn 

sanction of the court.'" Cmty. Realty Mgmt., Inc. for Wrightstown Arms 

Apartments v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 226 (1998) (quoting Stonehurst at Freehold 

v. Twp. Comm. of Freehold, 139 N.J. Super. 311, 313 (Law Div. 1976)) 

(citations omitted). "[A] consent judgment may only be vacated in accordance 

with R. 4:50-1." Ibid.; see also DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 

261 (2009) ("The rule does not distinguish between consent judgments and those 

issued after trial. So long as the judgment is final, the rule is applicable."). 

"The decision whether to grant [a motion under Rule 4:50-1] is left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of 

discretion." Mancini v. EDS ex rel N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 132 

N.J. 330, 334 (1993) (citing Ct. Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)). 

"That discretion is a broad one to be exercised according to equitable principles, 

and the decision reached by the trial court will be accepted by an appellate 

tribunal in the absence of an abuse of its discretion." Perillo, 48 N.J. at 341. 

Parties may move to vacate 

a final judgment or order for the following reasons: (a) 

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(b) newly discovered evidence which would probably 

alter the judgment or order and which by due diligence 
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could not have been discovered in time to move for a 

new trial under R. 4:49; (c) fraud (whether heretofore 

denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 

or other misconduct of an adverse party; (d) the 

judgment or order is void; (e) the judgment or order has 

been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior 

judgment or order upon which it is based has been 

reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 

equitable that the judgment or order should have 

prospective application; or (f) any other reason 

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment or 

order. 

[R. 4:50-1.] 

To vacate an order under Rule 4:50-1(c), a party must prove "fraud . . . , 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party." "Every fraud in its 

most general and fundamental conception consists of the obtaining of an undue 

advantage by means of some act or omission that is unconscientious or a 

violation of good faith." Jewish Ctr. of Sussex Cty. v. Whale, 86 N.J. 619, 624

(1981) (citing 3 J. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, 421 (5th ed. 

1941)). When a party is not seeking damages, she "need establish only equitable 

fraud[.] . . . In order to prove equitable fraud, a party must demonstrate a 

material misrepresentation made with intent that it be relied on, coupled with 

actual detrimental reliance." Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J. 465, 472 (1990) (citing 

Jewish Ctr., 86 N.J. at 625).
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As stated, the record supports defendant's assertion that counsel for 

VOADV misrepresented the status of her voucher as an inducement to have 

defendant sign the consent order and agree to vacate the premises. This was 

clearly material to her decision to leave voluntarily. That the misrepresentation 

was made is borne out by the certification of defendant's counsel, and the 

comments by the judge on the record that he believed her voucher would be 

transferrable, comments that went unchallenged by VOADV's counsel. Under 

the factual circumstances presented here, the trial court's exercise of discretion 

was mistaken as defendant's "agreement" was based on that misrepresentation.2

Having determined that the denial of defendant's motion to vacate must 

be reversed pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(c), we find it unnecessary to address 

defendant's alternative argument that Rule 4:50-1(b) provides an independent 

basis to grant her relief. 

To the extent any remaining arguments are not addressed herein, we find 

them to be without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

 

2

 This decision is without prejudice to VOADV's ability to file a new action for 

possession, if the present circumstances warrant it.