1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, :

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL TRUST, and :

BARNETT INTERNATIONAL, :

:

Plaintiffs and : CIVIL ACTION

Counterclaim Defendants, :

: No. 04-cv-3798

v. :

:

OSWALDO FELICIANO and INNOVATIVE :

MEDIA MACHINE, INC., :

:

Defendants and :

Counterclaim Plaintiffs. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joyner, J. December 3, 2008

Presently before the Court are Counterclaim Defendants’

(“Defendants”) Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or,

in the Alternative, for a New Trial on the Sarbanes-Oxley claim,

Defendants’ Motion for Remittitur of the Punitive Damages Award

or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial (Doc. No. 176),

Counterclaim Plaintiffs’ (“Plaintiffs”) Response thereto (Doc.

No. 179), Defendants’ Reply (Doc. No. 188), Defendants’

Supplement to Their Memoranda of Law in Support of Their PostTrial Motions (Doc. No. 200), and Plaintiff’s Response to

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 1 of 22
 Barnett became a division of Parexel International Corporation 1

during the course of Feliciano’s employment.

2

Parexel’s Supplement to its Post-Trial Motions (Doc. No. 201). 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motions are DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

In August of 2004, Parexel brought suit against former

employee Oswaldo Feliciano and Innovative Media Machine, Inc.

(“IMM”) for tortious interference with contract relations,

commercial disparagement, misappropriation of confidential or

proprietary information, breach of contract and defamation. 

Feliciano, who worked as a Managing Systems Architect for

Barnett, brought counter-claims alleging that he was terminated 1

for refusing to engage in illegal activity in violation of

Pennsylvania public policy when requested to do so by his

supervisor and in retaliation, in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley

Act of 2002 (“SOX”), for reporting his supervisor’s allegedly

illegal activities. Specifically, Feliciano claimed that Ann

Carraher, Vice President of Barnett Educational Systems,

wrongfully obtained the membership records of various private

organizations and authorized the incorporation of these records

into a Parexel marketing database. Between July of 2003 and

October of 2003, Feliciano made complaints regarding the

allegedly unlawful use of the database to various Barnett

employees, including Ms. Carraher herself and Lisa Roth, head of

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 2 of 22
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Human Resources. Upon Ms. Roth’s request, Lorrie Ferraro, Human

Resources Director at Parexel, commenced an investigation of the

matter which resulted in Ms. Carraher’s termination in April of

2004. On June 21, 2004, Feliciano himself was terminated. 

Counter-claim Defendants (“Defendants”) contended that

Feliciano was terminated because he had an undisclosed ownership

interest in an outside company, in violation of the terms of his

employment agreement. The company in question, IMM, provided

services to Parexel during the course of Feliciano’s employment,

and it was alleged that Feliciano was involved in approving

payments to IMM, but never disclosed his conflict of interest.

In an Order dated June 30, 2008, this Court granted summary

judgment in favor of Counter-claim Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”) on

Defendants’ claims of tortious interference, commercial

disparagement, breach of contract and misappropriation of

proprietary information. On September 4, 2008, the parties

filed, and the Court signed, a Stipulation and Joint Motion for

Entry of a Permanent Order that fully and finally resolved all

claims asserted by Defendants against Plaintiffs. A trial

commenced on the remaining claims on September 9, 2008. At the

conclusion of trial, the jury found that Parexel had retaliated

against Feliciano in violation of SOX and had terminated

Feliciano’s employment because he refused to engage in illegal

conduct in violation of Pennsylvania public policy. The jury

awarded Feliciano $94,000 in back pay and compensatory damages

and $1.7 million in punitive damages on the wrongful termination

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 3 of 22
Prior to trial, Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s 2

request for a jury trial on the Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”) claim. Rather than

deciding this motion, the Court empaneled an advisory jury. Upon review of

the relevant authorities, the Court finds that the SOX claim was appropriately

placed with the jury. Were it to be found, however, that the Court should

have independently decided the claim, the Court’s findings on the SOX issues

would be consistent with those of the jury. 

4

claim. The jury also awarded IMM $45,000 for its breach of

contract claim against Parexel. 

At the conclusion of trial, Defendants moved for judgment as

a matter of law on the SOX claim. Defendants have now renewed

their motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the

alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)

and have moved for remittitur of the punitive damages award or,

in the alternative, for a new trial on the wrongful termination

claim.2

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants’ Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in

the Alternative, for a New Trial

A. Rule 50 Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Upon the renewed motion of a party, a trial court may enter

judgment as a matter of law after the conclusion of a jury trial

if there was no “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” for the

jury reasonably to have found for the opposing party. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50(a), (b). Such judgment may be entered “only if, as a

matter of law, the record is critically deficient of that minimum

quantity of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 4 of 22
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relief.” Trabal v. Wells Fargo Armored Serv. Corp., 269 F.3d

243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001). Judgment as a matter of law should be

granted sparingly and the Court may not weigh the evidence,

determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its own

version of the facts for that of the jury. Marra v. Phila.

Housing Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 (3d Cir. 2007); Lightning Lube

v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993). Rather, we

must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and, “giving it the advantage of every favorable

inference,” determine if “there is insufficient evidence from

which a jury reasonably could find liability.” Marra, 497 F.3d

at 300. 

Defendants have moved for the Court to enter judgment as a

matter of law on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim brought under

Section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), codified

at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. Section 1514A provides protection for an

employee of a publicly traded company who reports information

that the employee reasonably believes constitutes mail fraud,

wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities fraud, any rule or

regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any

provision of Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 5 of 22
Section 1514A specifically provides, inter alia, that a publicly 3

traded company or “any officer, employer, contractor, subcontractor, or agent

of such company,” may not

[D]ischarge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other

manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and

conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the

employee–

(1) to provide information, cause information to be

provided, or otherwise assist in an investigation regarding

any conduct which the employee reasonably believes

constitutes a violation of section 1341, 1343, 1344, or

1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to

fraud against shareholders . . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(2000 & Supp. 2008). 

6

18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1). To establish a retaliation claim under 3 

SOX, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that (1) he engaged in protected activity or conduct, (2) his

employer knew or suspected, actually or constructively, that he

engaged in the protected activity, (3) he suffered an unfavorable

personnel action, and (4) the circumstances were sufficient to

raise the inference that the protected activity was a

contributing factor in the unfavorable action. 29 C.F.R. §

1980.104 (2004). To be protected, an employee’s belief that the

reported conduct violates one of the six enumerated categories

must be both objectively and subjectively reasonable, however it

need not be correct. Allen v. Administrative Review Bd., 514

F.3d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 2008). A mistaken but reasonable belief

is still protected under SOX. Id. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 6 of 22
Defendants quote Black’s Law Dictionary 670 (7th ed. 1999), to support 4

their assertion that fraud is “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or

concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her

detriment.” Defendants also cite to cases enunciating the elements of common

law fraud under Pennsylvania law and the elements of mail or wire fraud under

federal law. 

7

Defendants assert that Plaintiff failed to introduce legally

sufficient evidence to support his claim that he objectively

reasonably believed that Defendants’ theft of marketing contacts

and continued use of the stolen marketing contacts violated any

of the enumerated categories in Section 1514A. Defendants argue

that to be protected under Section 1514A, Plaintiff must have

reasonably believed that Defendants’ conduct constituted the

Black’s Law Dictionary definition of fraud. Specifically, 4

Defendants claim that Plaintiff failed to present evidence that

Defendants used the stolen marketing database to deceptively

“induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Defs.’ Br. 9.

Defendants claim that the misconduct reported by Plaintiff and

presented to the jury “was at worst theft” and that Plaintiff

never tried to prove that he reasonably believed that defendants

used the stolen marketing contacts deceptively to “induce another

to act to his or her detriment.” Defs.’ Br. 9. Thus, they

conclude, there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding

that Plaintiff reasonably believed the Defendants were engaged in

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 7 of 22
Defendants also assert that they sent “wholly truthful marketing 5

information” to induce individuals into doing business with them, as opposed

to sending “dishonest or misleading marketing materials,” and thus there was

no deception, and hence no fraud, regardless that Defendants procured the

names of these contacts from a proprietary list that they had stolen from a

third-party. To the extent that Defendants are asserting that a Section 1514A

violation cannot be established without a showing of actual fraud, the

argument must fail. As previously stated, a mistaken but reasonable belief

that an employer’s conduct violated one of the categories in section 1514A is

still protected under SOX, regardless that the conduct did not actually

constitute fraud. Allen v. Administrative Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 477 (5th

Cir. 2008). 

8

fraud and judgment as a matter of law should, therefore, be

entered in Defendants’ favor. 

5 

The Court previously denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment on this same issue, albeit with a different argument,

and found that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding

that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by reporting

information which he reasonably believed constituted wire fraud. 

Plaintiff presented at trial evidence similar to that which the

Court considered in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment and the jury found that Plaintiff did indeed objectively

reasonably believe that Defendants conduct constituted mail

fraud, wire fraud or fraud against Defendants’ shareholders. 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiffs, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ argument that a

reasonable jury could not have found that Plaintiff’s belief was

objectively reasonable. Plaintiff testified, inter alia, that

while working to ensure that Barnett Educational Services (“BES”)

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 8 of 22
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complied with SOX, he discovered that a significant portion of

the company’s marketing database was illegally obtained from

third-parties. See N.T., Sept. 9, 2008, at 156-72. He also

testified that he subsequently reported the illegally obtained

database to several representatives of Parexel, including his

supervisor, and voiced his concern about Parexel’s use of the

database and its effect on the business. See N.T., Sept. 9,

2008, at 172-74, 214-15. Testimony was provided at trial that

Parexel knew about the illegally obtained database, Parexel used

the database to solicit business through spam emails and direct

mailings, the marketing database was the backbone of Parexel’s

sales process and was a significant source of revenue for

Parexel. See N.T., Sept. 9, 2008, at 204-08; N.T., Sept. 10,

2008, at 182-87, 210, 230. Plaintiff also testified that one of

Parexel’s representatives told him that removing the illegally

obtained records from the database would kill the BES business

and exhibited to him an intent not to purge the system of the

illegal obtained information. See N.T. Sept. 9, 2008, at 212-14;

N.T. Sept. 10, 2008, at 240. Thus the record is not “critically

deficient of that minimum quantity of evidence from which a jury

might reasonably” find that Plaintiff’s belief was objectively

reasonable, regardless that Defendants’ conduct ultimately may

not have constituted actual fraud. Trabal v. Wells Fargo

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 9 of 22
 In addition, the objective reasonableness of an employee’s belief “is 6

evaluated based on the knowledge available to a reasonable person in the same

factual circumstances with the same training and experience as the aggrieved

employee.” Allen, 514 F.3d at 477. Were Plaintiff a legal expert,

Defendants’ argument that an objectively reasonable belief that conduct

constituted fraud can only be established after introducing evidence of actual

fraud would be more persuasive. Cf. id. at 479 (finding that although

violation of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (“SAB”) could fall within fifth

enumerated category in §1514A, employee’s belief that employer violated SEC

rule or regulation was not objectively reasonable where employee was a

licensed CPA, and thus an accounting expert, and therefore knew violating a

SAB was not an actual violation of an SEC rule or regulation). Under the

present circumstances, however, this is not the case. 

10

ArmoredServ. Corp., 269 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2001).6

Defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law is, therefore,

denied. 

B. Rule 59 Motion for New Trial

A district court has discretion to order a new trial

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Wagner v. Fair

Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 F.3d 1002, 1017 (3d Cir. 1995). Under

Rule 59(a), a court may grant a new trial “for any of the reasons

which new trials have heretofore been granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(a). A court may grant a new trial if doing so is required to

prevent injustice or to correct a verdict that was against the

weight of the evidence. Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 234 F.

Supp. 2d 494, 498 (E.D. Pa. 2002). A court may also grant a new

trial if the verdict was the result of erroneous jury

instructions, was excessive or clearly unsupported by the

evidence, or was influenced by extraneous matters such as

passion, prejudice, sympathy or speculation. Id. Granting a new

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 10 of 22
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trial requires meeting a “high threshold,” Grazier v. City of

Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 2003), and “[a]bsent a

showing of substantial injustice or prejudicial error, a new

trial is not warranted and it is the court’s duty to respect a

plausible jury verdict.” Montgomery Cty. v. MicroVote Corp., 152

F. Supp. 2d 784, 795 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 

In the alternative to judgment as a matter of law,

Defendants have moved for a new trial. In support of their

motion, Defendants argue that there is no evidence to support the

jury’s determination and that the evidence “so clearly” does not

support the verdict that allowing it to stand would be a “blatant

miscarriage of justice.” Defs.’ Br. 9-10. Defendants also

assert that the verdict was “clearly the product of jury passion

and prejudice” and that Defendants alleged theft so inflamed the

jury that they punished Defendants for the theft rather than the

wrongful termination at issue. Defs.’ Br. 10. Defendants

support this assertion by pointing to the punitive damages award

and arguing that the same alleged passion that motivated the

allegedly grossly disproportionate punitive damages award must

have also affected the jury’s determination on the SOX claim. 

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of the

evidence adduced at trial. As discussed above, the trial was not

devoid of evidence to support the jury’s determination. On the

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 11 of 22
 The size of a punitive damages award also does not in and of itself 7

evidence jury passion and prejudice, see Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. Ebi Med.

Sys., 181 F.3d 446, 464 (3d Cir. 1999); Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1383 (3d

Cir. 1993)(en banc), particularly in light of the evidence presented at trial

to support the jury’s finding that Plaintiff was fired from his job because he

refused to engage in illegal activity. 

12

contrary, the Court finds more than enough evidence upon which

the jury could have reasonably found that Defendants’ conduct

violated Section 1514A and thus allowing the verdict to stand is

not a “blatant miscarriage of justice.” 

The Defendants’ additional assertion that the jury’s finding

against them could only be the product of passion is

unpersuasive. That the jury chose an amount of punitive damages

based on a number that was related to the trial — the amount of

revenue allegedly generated from the marketing database — does

not, as Defendants insist, show that the Defendants’ theft “so

inflamed” the jury that its decision was “clearly the product of

jury passion and prejudice.” Defs.’ Br. 10. On the contrary, it

shows that rather than choosing an arbitrary number, the jury

chose an amount it reasonably and rationally believed was

appropriate under the circumstances. Defendants’ alternative 7

motion for a new trial is denied. 

II. Defendants’ Motion for Remittitur of the Punitive Damages

Award or, in the Alternative, for a New Trial 

Punitive damage awards serve “to further a State’s

legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 12 of 22
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its repetition.” BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S.

559, 569 (1996); see also State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.

Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (stating punitive damages are “aimed

at deterrence and retribution”). Awards that are grossly

excessive in relation to these interests, however, become

arbitrary and thus violate the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Gore, 517 U.S. at 569; Campbell, 538 U.S.

at 417. The Supreme Court has provided three guideposts to

consider when evaluating whether a punitive damages award is

unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the reprehensibility of the

defendant’s misconduct; (2) the ratio of the punitive damages

award to the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff;

and (3) the difference between the punitive damages award and the

civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. 

Campbell, 538 U.S. 418 (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). 

Additionally, a court may consider a defendant’s wealth

because “what ‘may be awesome punishment for an impecunious

individual defendant . . . [may be] wholly insufficient to

influence the behavior of a prosperous corporation.’” CGB

Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Services, Inc., 499 F.3d

184, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Continental Trend Resources,

Inc. v. OXY USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 641 (10th Cir. 1996)). 

Wealth of the defendant, however, “cannot justify an otherwise

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 13 of 22
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unconstitutional punitive damages award.” Campbell, 538 U.S.

428. 

To prevent judicial overreaching, trial courts must give a

measure of deference to a jury’s determination when evaluating

the appropriateness of a punitive damages award. Willow Inn,

Inc. v. Public Service Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.

2005). If a court finds the punitive damages award is

unconstitutionally excessive, it should “decrease the award to an

amount the evidence will bear . . . .” Id. Where the jury’s

punitive damages award “is free of irrationality, passion, and

prejudice,” however, “and falls within the ‘broad discretion in

authorizing and limiting permissible punitive damages awards’

lodged with state legislatures,” the Court should not substitute

its own judgment for that of the jury’s. Id. (quoting Cooper

Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433

(2001)). 

A. Reprehensibility of Defendants’ Conduct

The degree of reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct is

“‘[t]he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a

punitive damages award . . . .’” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419

(quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). To determine the defendants

degree of reprehensibility, courts should consider whether the

conduct caused physical or economic harm, evidenced an

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 14 of 22
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indifference to or reckless disregard of the health or safety of

others, targeted someone who was financially vulnerable, involved

repeated actions or an isolated incident, or involved intentional

malice, trickery, or deceit rather than mere accident. Campbell,

538 U.S. at 419. 

 In the instant case, the Defendants conduct caused economic

and not physical harm. The economic harm, however, did not

result merely from a contractual relationship where the parties

could have and should have protected themselves in case of

breach. See Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. Ebi Med. Sys., 181 F.3d

446, 467 (3d Cir. 1999). The jury found that Defendants fired

Plaintiff from his job because he refused to engage in illegal

conduct. The harm was thus not just a simple economic loss, but

rather went to the source of his livelihood. The Court does

agree with the Defendants that the conduct did not involve the

health or safety of others, nor did it involve repeated actions. 

Firing the Plaintiff was, however, an intentional act and not an

accident, and firing the Plaintiff in and of itself made him

financially vulnerable. “To be sure, infliction of economic

injury, especially when done intentionally through affirmative

acts of misconduct . . . can warrant substantial penalty.” Gore,

517 U.S. at 576. The Court finds that this is such a case. 

B. Ratio of Punitive Damages to Actual or Potential Harm

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 15 of 22
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There is no bright-line ratio over which a punitive damages

award will exceed the constitutional limit; however, the measure

of punishment must be “both reasonable and proportionate to the

amount of harm to the plaintiff and to the general damages

recovered.” Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 426. Though compliance

with due process is not “‘marked by a simple mathematical

formula,’” single-digit ratios between punitive damages awards

and actual or potential harm are more likely to comport with due

process than awards with significantly higher ratios. Id. at 425

(quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 582). A higher ratio may nevertheless

comport with due process where particularly egregious conduct

causes only a small amount of economic damages. Id. 

Defendants’ assert that the ratio of punitive damages to

actual harm in this case is 35 to 1, well outside the realm of

single-digit ratios generally accepted. They reach this

conclusion by comparing the punitive damages award to the amount

of compensatory damages awarded to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff

offers several alternative ratios by including the amount of back

pay Plaintiff initially sought or the amount of attorney’s fees

Plaintiff incurred. 

Although the Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s use of

attorney’s fees, we agree that the potential harm to Plaintiff

was more than merely what the jury awarded as compensation after

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 16 of 22
Calculating the ratio of punitive damages to actual harm had Plaintiff 8

not been able to mitigate his damages—i.e. $1.7 million to $350,000—would have

resulted in roughly a 5 to 1 ratio, well within the single digit ratios

generally found to be within constitutional limits. Adding on the potential

harm had Plaintiff been branded a pirator in his profession makes the ratio

that much more reasonable. Moreover, even if the compensatory damages award

were the proper amount to use in calculating the ratio, unlawfully obtaining

marketing contacts and then terminating an employee after he refused to engage

in such illegal conduct seems particularly egregious to this Court. 

17

they took into account the fact that Plaintiff was able to

mitigate his own damages. Had Plaintiff not been able to

generate income through other means, his potential harm from

losing his job could have been significantly higher than the

compensatory damages and back pay awards. Moreover, had

Defendants succeeded in their attempts to illicit Plaintiff’s

help in stealing marketing contacts or had Plaintiff acquiesced

to such illegal activity, Plaintiff testified that being branded

as someone who pirates proprietary information in his profession

would have ruined him. Thus, the potential harm to Plaintiff was

well beyond merely the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory

damages, as Defendants argue. The proper ratio in this case,

therefore, takes into account the back pay and compensatory

damages the jury awarded as well as the potential harm to

Plaintiff had he not been able to mitigate his damages or had he

been branded as a pirator as a result of Parexel’s illegal

conduct. Thus the punitive damages award is well within

Constitutional limits. 

8

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 17 of 22
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C. Comparable Cases

The final guidepost for evaluating whether a punitive

damages award is excessive requires comparing the punitive

damages award with the civil penalties imposed or authorized in

comparable cases when evaluating whether the award is excessive. 

Campbell, 538 U.S. 428. This ensures proper deference is given

to legislative judgments regarding the appropriate sanctions for

similar conduct. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. The Supreme Court,

however, “has not declared how courts are to measure civil

penalties against punitive damages, and many courts have noted

the difficulty in doing so.” Willow Inn, 399 F.3d at 237. 

Defendants assert that there is no exact analog in the

Pennsylvania Consolidated Statues and that the closest basis for

comparison is Pennsylvania’s Whistleblower Law, which prohibits

termination for reporting certain conduct but not for refusing to

engage in illegal activity. Thus, they conclude, this guidepost

is not helpful and should be excluded from the excessiveness

analysis. Plaintiff argues that the Court should use as a

comparison, cases in which the SEC has disgorged profits from

publicly-traded companies that improperly benefitted by engaging

in illegal and fraudulent conduct. 

The Court agrees with the Defendant that this guidepost is

of little assistance to the Court in this instance. In light of

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 18 of 22
19

the lack of comparable analogs in the Pennsylvania Consolidated

Statutes to a claim for wrongful termination in violation of

Pennsylvania public policy and in light of our findings on the

first two guideposts, we find the third guidepost unhelpful in

our analysis. See CGB Occupational Therapy, 499 F.3d at 190

(considering only first two guideposts where comparison between

punitive damages); Inter Med. Supplies, 181 F.3d at 468 (not

considering third guidepost where first guidepost alone

sufficiently supported Court’s decision regarding punitive

damages). 

Finally, the Court notes that Defendants are a prosperous,

multi-million dollar corporation and, as such, a lesser punitive

damages award “[may be] wholly insufficient to influence the[ir]

behavior . . . .” CGB Occupational Therapy, 499 F.3d at 193

(quoting Continental Trend Resources, 101 F.3d at 641). Although

wealth of the defendant “cannot justify an otherwise

unconstitutional punitive damages award,” Campbell, 538 U.S. 428,

it is properly considered here as further justification for an

already constitutional award. Defendants’ motion for remittitur

of the punitive damages award is, therefore, denied. 

In light of the Court’s finding on the punitive damages

award, we need not address Defendants’ alternative motion for a

new trial. 

CONCLUSION

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 19 of 22
20

In light of the foregoing discussion, Defendants’ Renewed

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative,

for a New Trial on the Sarbanes-Oxley claim and Defendants’

Motion for Remittitur of the Punitive Damages Award or, in the

Alternative, for a New Trial are DENIED. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 20 of 22
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, :

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL TRUST, and :

BARNETT INTERNATIONAL, :

:

Plaintiffs and : CIVIL ACTION

Counterclaim Defendants, :

: No. 04-cv-3798

v. :

:

OSWALDO FELICIANO and INNOVATIVE :

MEDIA MACHINE, INC., :

:

Defendants and :

Counterclaim Plaintiffs. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of December, 2008, upon

consideration of Counterclaim Defendants’ (“Defendants”) Renewed

Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or, in the Alternative,

for a New Trial on the Sarbanes-Oxley claim, Defendants’ Motion

for Remittitur of the Punitive Damages Award or, in the

Alternative, for a New Trial (Docket No. 176), Counterclaim

Plaintiffs’ (“Plaintiffs”) Response thereto (Docket No. 179),

Defendants’ Reply (Docket No. 188), Defendants’ Supplement to

Their Memoranda of Law in Support of Their Post-Trial Motions

(Doc. No. 200), and Plaintiff’s Response to Parexel’s Supplement

to its Post-Trial Motions (Doc. No. 201), for the reasons set

forth in the accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that

the Motions are DENIED.

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 21 of 22
BY THE COURT:

s/J. Curtis Joyner 

J. CURTIS JOYNER, J. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 202 Filed 12/04/08 Page 22 of 22