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SEVENTH PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 

ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES - DAY TWO 

SUBJECT: BORDERS, TRANSPORTATION, AND MANAGING RISK

CHAIRED BY: THOMAS H. KEAN

WITNESSES PANEL I:

JANE F. GARVEY, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION 

ADMINISTRATION;

CATHAL L. "IRISH" FLYNN, FORMER ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR OF CIVIL 

AVIATION SECURITY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION;

CLAUDIO MANNO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;

PANEL II:

EDMOND L. SOLIDAY, FORMER VICE PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, QUALITY 

ASSURANCE, AND SECURITY, UNITED AIRLINES;

ANDREW P. STUDDERT, FORMER CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, UNITED 

AIRLINES;

GERARD J. ARPEY, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN AIRLINES;

TIMOTHY J. AHERN, VICE PRESIDENT - DFW HUB, AND FORMER VICE 

PRESIDENT OF SAFETY, SECURITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL, AMERICAN 

AIRLINES;

PANEL III:

NYDIA GONZALEZ, MANAGER, SOUTHEAST RESERVATION CENTER, AMERICAN 

AIRLINES;

PANEL IV:

JAMES M. LOY, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

LOCATION: 216 HART SENATE OFFICE BUILDING, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TIME: 9:00 A.M. EST

DATE: TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2004
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MR. THOMAS H. KEAN: I'd like to call the hearing to order. 

First I would like to enter into the record a statement on 

aviation security by Carol Ashley. Ms. Ashley is a member of the 

Family Steering Committee and if there's no objection, so 

ordered. 

Yesterday we heard testimony about how the 9/11 terrorists 

were able to circumvent the border controls the United States had 

in place at the time. Today, we will look at what confronted 

them in the final stage of their mission of mass murder: the 

American civil aviation security system as it existed in early 

September 2001.

Both yesterday and today we looked at the system's 

vulnerabilities. We will start by examining two of the most 

important components of that system, the Federal Aviation 

Administration that regulated it and the airlines which had the 

responsibility of implementing some of its key elements. Our 

witnesses will be expected to shed some light not only on the 

systematic issues but on specifics of the 9/11 hijackings 

themselves.

After these panels, we'll hear about one of the real heroes 

of Flight 11, Flight 11 attendant Betty Ong, from who's work on 

that day reflects well on her professionalism -- from another, 

rather, who's work on that day reflects well on her 

professionalism and her humanity, Ms. Nydia Gonzales. We will 

conclude with testimony from Admiral James Loy, deputy secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security and formerly head of the 

Transportation Security Administration as well as commandant of 

the Coast Guard. We will focus on one key question with Admiral 

Loy, how do we, or should we, determine our priorities for 

homeland security, especially in the transportation sector. 

In order to provide commissioners and the listening public 

with context for the testimony we are about to receive, we will 

once again begin by hearing from the 9/11 Commission staff and 

what it has learned to date relevant to today's proceedings. I 

would caution our listeners to bear in mind that this statement 

is still a work in progress. It addresses the various civil 

aviation defense layers and how the hijackers beat them in 

gaining entry to the aircraft.

The Commission staff will present a second staff statement 

immediately preceding Ms. Gonzales’ testimony. That statement 

will take up the story of the four hijacked flights. It too is a 

preliminary report, making public what our staff has learned to 

the present time. I want to caution our audience, especially the 

families and friends of the victims of 9/11, that today we will 
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be presenting a number of the harrowing facts, sights, and sounds 

of that particular day.

On another note, today's session will not focus on the 

situational awareness of air traffic control system and the 

Department of Defense including NORAD. The Commission will deal 

with that important topic in another public hearing, this spring. 

I would like to call on Mr. Zelikow, executive director of the 

Commission, Mr. John Raidt and Mr. William Johnstone, who will 

present the statement of the Commission staff.

MR. PHILIP D. ZELIKOW: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members of the Commission, working with you, your staff has 

developed initial findings on how the individuals who carried out 

the 9/11 attacks defeated the civil aviation security system of 

the United States. We continue our investigation into the status 

of civil aviation security today and for the future. These 

findings and judgments may help your conduct of today's public 

hearing and will inform the development of your recommendations. 

The findings and judgments we report today are the results 

of the work so far. We remain ready to revise our understanding 

of these topics as our work continues. This staff statement 

represents the collective effort of the staff team on aviation 

and transportation security. Our staff was able to build upon 

investigative work that has been conducted by various agencies, 

including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

The Department of Homeland Security's Transportation 

Security Administration is fully cooperating with our 

investigators, as are the relevant airlines and the Federal 

Aviation Administration. 

I'd now like to turn to John Raidt to continue.

MR. JOHN RAIDT: Thank you, Philip. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Commission, before September 

11th, 2001 the aviation security system had been enjoying a 

period of relative peace. No U.S. flagged aircraft had been 

bombed or hijacked in over a decade. Domestic hijacking in 

particular seemed like a thing of the past, something that could 

only happen to foreign airlines that were less well protected. 

The public's own threat assessment before September 11th was 

sanguine about commercial aviation safety and security. 

In a Fox News opinion dynamic survey conducted at the end of 

the 1990s, 78 percent cited poor maintenance as a greater threat 
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to airline safety than terrorism. The demand for airline service 

was strong and was beginning to exceed the capacity of the 

system. Heeding constituents calls for improved air service and 

increased capacity, Congress focused its legislative and 

oversight attention on measures to address these problems 

including a passenger bill of rights to ensure a more efficient 

and convenient passenger experience. 

The leadership of the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, 

also focused on safety, customer service, capacity and economic 

issues. The agency's security agenda was focused on efforts to 

implement a three-year-old congressional mandate to deploy 

explosive detection equipment at all major airports and complete 

a nearly five-year-old rule-making effort to improve checkpoint 

screening. This staff statement will not address certain 

security performance issues leading up to 9/11 at the airports 

from which the hijackers' planes departed. Such work is still 

ongoing. 

It should be noted that the airports themselves did not have 

operational or enforcement jurisdiction over checkpoint screening 

operations, passenger pre-screening and checkpoint screening, 

based on regulations from the FAA these were the responsibility 

of the air carriers. Nevertheless, airport authorities do play a 

key role in the overall civil aviation security system. 

Before September 11th, federal law required the FAA to set 

and enforce aviation security policies and regulations that would 

quote, "Protect passengers and property on an aircraft operating 

an air transportation or intrastate air transportation against an 

act of criminal violence or aircraft piracy." This layered 

system, one that recognized that no single security measure was 

flawless or impenetrable, was designed to provide a greater 

number of opportunities to foil those intending to do such 

violence.

The civil aviation security system in place on September 

11th was composed of seven layers of defense including: 

Intelligence, passenger pre-screening, airport access control, 

passenger checkpoint screening, passenger check baggage 

screening, cargo screening and onboard security. The civil 

aviation security system in place on September 11th no longer 

exists. We will document serious shortcomings in that system's 

design and implementation that made the 9/11 hijackings possible. 

We want to make clear that our findings of specific 

vulnerabilities and shortcomings do not necessarily apply to the 

current system. Two of the layers of defense, checked baggage 

screening and cargo screening are not relevant to the 9/11 plot, 
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they are not addressed in this statement. A third layer, airport 

access control is still under investigation and also will not be 

addressed in detail here. 

Compelling evidence, including video tape of hijackers 

entering through checkpoint screening stations, suggest that the 

hijackers gained access to the aircraft on September 11th through 

passenger checkpoints. What we do know is that the hijackers 

successfully evaded or defeated the remaining four layers of the 

security system. We approached the question of how the aviation 

security system failed on September 11th by starting from the 

perspective of the enemy, asking: What did al Qaeda have to do to 

complete its mission? 

Sometime during the late 1990s the al Qaeda leadership made 

the decision to hijack large commercial multi-engine aircraft and 

use them as a devastating weapon, as opposed to hijacking a 

commercial aircraft for use as a bargaining tool. To carry out 

that decision required unique skill sets. Among them, terrorists 

trained as pilots with specialized skill and confidence to 

successfully fly a large multi-engine aircraft already airborne 

into selected targets; tactics, techniques and procedures to 

successfully conduct in-flight hijacking; and three, operatives 

willing to die. 

To our knowledge, 9/11 was the first time in history that 

terrorists actually piloted a commercial jetliner in a terrorist 

operation. This was new. This could not happen overnight and 

would require long term planning and sequenced operational 

training. The terrorists had to determine the tactics and 

techniques needed to succeed and hijack an aircraft within the 

United States. The vulnerabilities of the U.S. domestic 

commercial aviation security system were well advertised through 

numerous unclassified reports from agencies such as the General 

Accounting Office and the Department of Transportation's 

inspector general. The news media had publicized those findings.

The al Qaeda leadership recognized the need for more 

specific information though. Its agents observed the system 

first hand and conducted surveillance flights both 

internationally and within the United States. Over time, this 

information allowed them to revise and refine their operational 

plan. By the spring of 2001, the September 11 operation had 

combined intent with capabilities to present a real and present 

threat to the civil aviation system. As long as operational 

security was maintained the plan had a high probability of 

success in conducting multiple near simultaneous attacks on New 

York City and Washington, DC. 
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Let us turn now to a more specific look at the security 

system in place on September 11th, related to anti-hijacking. 

We'll begin with intelligence. The first layer of defense in 

aviation security was intelligence. While the FAA was not a 

member of the U.S. Intelligence Committee per se, the agency 

maintained a civil aviation intelligence division that operated 

24 hours per day. The intelligence watch was the collection 

point for a flow of threat related information from federal 

agencies, particularly the FBI, CIA and State Department. 

FAA intelligence personnel were assigned as liaisons to work 

within these three agencies to facilitate the flow of aviation 

related information to the FAA and to promote inter-departmental 

cooperation. The FAA did not assign liaisons to either the 

National Security Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency but 

maintained intelligence requirements with those agencies.

Intelligence data received by the FAA went into preparing 

intelligence case files. These files tracked and assessed the 

significance of aviation security incidents, threats and emerging 

issues. The FAA's analysis of this data informed its security 

policies, including the issuance of FAA information circulars, 

security directives and emergency amendments to the industry. 

Such security directives and emergency amendments are how the FAA 

ordered air carriers and/or airports to undertake certain 

extraordinary security measures that were needed immediately 

above the established base line.

While the staff has not completed its review and analysis as 

to what the FAA knew about the threat posed by al Qaeda to civil 

aviation, including the potential use of aircraft as weapons, we 

can say the following. First, no documentary evidence reviewed 

by the Commission or testimony we have received to this point has 

revealed that any level of the FAA possessed any credible and 

specific intelligence indicating that Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda, 

al Qaeda affiliates or any other group were actually plotting to 

hijack commercial planes in the United States and use them as 

weapons of mass destruction.

Second, the threat posed by Usama bin Laden, al Qaeda and al 

Qaeda affiliates, including their interest in civil aviation, was 

well known to key civil aviation security officials. The 

potential threat of Middle Eastern terrorist groups to civil 

aviation security was acknowledged in many different official FAA 

documents. The FAA possessed information claiming that 

associates with Usama bin Laden in the 1990s were interested in 

hijackings and the use of an aircraft as a weapon.
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Third, the potential for terrorist suicide hijacking in the 

United States was officially considered by the FAA's Office of 

Civil Aviation Security, dating back to at least March 1998. 

However, in a presentation the agency made to air carriers and 

airports in 2000 and early 2001, the FAA discounted that threat 

because, quote, "Fortunately we have no indication that any group 

is currently thinking in that direction." It wasn't until well 

after the 9/11 attacks that the FAA learned of the Phoenix EC. 

This was an internal FBI memo written in July of 2001 by an FBI 

agent in the Phoenix field office suggesting steps that should be 

taken by the Bureau to look more closely at civil aviation 

education schools around the country and the use of such programs 

by individuals who may be affiliated with terrorist 

organizations.

Fourth, the FAA was aware prior to September 11th, 2001 of 

the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui in Minnesota, a man arrested by 

the INS in August of 2001, following reports of suspicious 

behavior in flight school and the determination that he had 

overstayed his visa waiver period. Several key issues remain 

regarding what the FAA knew about Moussaoui, when they knew it, 

and how they responded to the information supplied by the FBI, 

which we are continuing to pursue.

Fifth, the FAA did react to the heightened security threat 

identified by the intelligence community during the summer of 

2001, including issuing alerts to air carriers about the 

potential for terrorist acts against civil aviation. In July 

2001, the FAA alerted the aviation community to reports of 

possible near-term terrorist operations, particular in the 

Arabian Peninsula and/or Israel. The FAA informed the airports 

and air carriers that it had no credible evidence of specific 

plans to attack U.S. civil aviation.

The agency said that some of the currently active groups 

were known to plan and train for hijackings, and had the 

capability to construct sophisticated improvised explosive 

devices concealed inside luggage and consumer products. The FAA 

encouraged all U.S. carriers to exercise prudence and demonstrate 

a high degree of alertness. Although civil aviation security 

officials testified that the FAA felt blind when it came to 

assessing the domestic threat, because of the lack of 

intelligence on what was going on in the American homeland as 

opposed to overseas, FAA security analysts did perceive an 

increasing terrorist threat to the U.S. civil aviation system at 

home.

FAA documents including agency accounts published in the 

Federal Register on July 17th, 2001 expressed the FAA's 
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understanding that terrorist groups were active in the United 

States and maintained an historic interest in targeting aviation, 

including hijacking. While the agency was engaged in an effort 

to pass important new regulations to improve checkpoint screener 

performance, implement anti-sabotage measures and conduct ongoing 

assessments of the system, no major increases in anti-hijacking 

security measures were implemented in response to the heightened 

threat levels in the spring and summer of 2001, other than 

general warnings to the industry to be more vigilant and 

cautious. 

Sixth, the civil aviation security system in the United 

States during the summer of 2001 stood as it had for quite some 

time, at an intermediate aviation security alert level, 

tantamount to a permanent code yellow. This level and its 

corresponding security measures was required when “information 

indicates that a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a 

known capability of attacking civil aviation is likely to carry 

out attacks against U.S. targets, or civil disturbances with a 

direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are imminent.” 

Without actionable intelligence information to uncover and 

interdict a terrorist plot in the planning stages or prior to the 

perpetrator gaining access to the aircraft in the lead-up to 

September 11, 2001, it was up to the other layers of aviation 

security to counter the threat.

We conclude this section with a final observation. The last 

major terrorist attack on a U.S. flagged airliner had been with 

smuggled explosives in 1988 in the case of Pan Am 103. The 

famous Bojinka plot, broken up in Manila in 1995, had principally 

been a plot to smuggle explosives on airliners. The Commission 

on Aviation Safety and Security, created by President Clinton in 

1996, named the Gore Commission for its chairman, the Vice 

President, had focused overwhelmingly on the danger of explosives 

on aircraft. Historically, explosives on aircraft had taken a 

heavy death toll, hijackings had not. So despite continued 

foreign hijackings leading up to 9/11, the U.S. aviation security 

system worried most about explosives.

After intelligence the next level is pre-screening. If 

intelligence fails to interdict the terrorist threat, passenger 

pre-screening is the next layer of defense. Passenger prescreening encompasses measures applied prior to the passenger's 

arrival at the security checkpoint. Pre-screening starts with 

the ticketing process and generally concluded with passenger 

check-in at the airport ticket counter. The hijackers purchased 

their tickets for the 9/11 flights in a short period of time at 

the end of August 2001, using credit cards, debit cards or cash. 
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The ticket record provided the FAA and the air carrier with 

passenger information for the pre-screening process.

The first major pre-screening element in place on 9/11 was 

the FAA listing of individuals known to pose a threat to 

commercial aviation. Based on information provided by the 

intelligence community, the FAA required air carriers to 

prohibited listed individuals from boarding aircraft, or in 

designated cases, to assure that the passenger received enhanced 

screening before boarding. None of the names of the 9/11 

hijackers were identified by the FAA to the airlines in order to 

bar them from flying or subject them to extra security measures. 

In fact, the number of individuals subject to such security 

instructions issued by the FAA was less than 20 people, compared 

to the tens of thousands of names identified in the State 

Department's TIPOFF watchlist, which the Commission discussed 

yesterday.

The second component of pre-screening was a program to 

identify those passengers on each flight who may pose a threat to 

aviation. In 1998, the FAA required air carriers to implement an 

FAA-approved computer assisted passenger pre-screening program 

known as CAPPS, designed to identify the pool of passengers most 

likely in need of additional security scrutiny. The program 

employed customized FAA approved criteria derived from a limited 

set of information about each ticketed passengers in order to 

identify selectees.

FAA rules require that the air carrier only screen each 

selectee's checked baggage for explosives using various approved

methods. However, under the system in place on 9/11, selectees, 

those who were regarded as a risk to the aircraft, were not 

required to undergo any additional screening of their person or 

carry-on baggage at the checkpoint. The consequences of 

selection reflected FAA's view that non-suicide bombing was the 

most substantial risk to domestic aircraft.

Since the system in place on 9/11 confined the consequences 

of selection to the screening of checked bags for explosives, the 

application of CAPPS did not provide any defense against the 

weapons and tactics employed by the 9/11 hijackers. On American 

Airlines Flight 11, CAPPS chose three of the five hijackers as 

selectees. Since Waleed al Shehri checked no bags, his selection 

had no consequences. Waleed al Shehri and Satam al Suqami had 

their checked bags scanned for explosives before they were loaded 

onto the plane. None of the Flight 175 hijackers were selected 

by CAPPS. 
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All five of the American Airlines Flight 77 hijackers were 

selected for security scrutiny. Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar 

and Majed Moqed were chosen via the CAPPS criteria, while Nawaf 

al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi were made selectees because they 

provided inadequate identification information. Their bags were 

held until it was confirmed that they had boarded the aircraft. 

Thus for hijacker selectees Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al Hazmi and 

Khalid al Mihdhar, who checked no bags on September 11th, there 

were no consequences for their selection by the CAPPS system.

For Salem al Hazmi, who checked two bags, and Majed Moqed 

who checked one bag, the sole consequence was that their baggage 

was held until after their boarding on Flight 77 was confirmed. 

Ahmad al Haznawi was the sole CAPPS selectee among the Flight 93 

hijackers. He checked his bag, was screened for explosives, and 

then loaded the plane.

I'd now like to turn it over to my colleague, Bill 

Johnstone.

MR. BILL JOHNSTONE: Next we come to checkpoint screening. 

With respect to checkpoint screening, federal rules required the 

air carriers to conduct screening to prevent or deter the 

carriage aboard airplanes of any explosive, incendiary, or a 

deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each individual's person 

or accessible property, and the carriage of any explosive or 

incendiary in checked baggage.

Passenger checkpoint screening is the most obvious element 

of aviation security. At the checkpoint, metal detectors were 

calibrated to detect guns and large knives. Government-certified 

X-ray machines capable of imaging the shapes of items, possessing 

a particular level of acuity were used to screen carry-on items. 

In most instances, these screening operations were conducted by 

security companies under contract with the responsible air 

carrier. 

As of 2001, any confidence that checkpoint screening was 

operating effectively was belied by numerous publicized studies 

by the General Accounting Office, the Department of 

Transportation, the Office of the Inspector General. Over the 

previous 20 years, they had documented repeatedly serious chronic 

weaknesses in the systems deployed to screen passengers and 

baggage for weapons and bombs. Shortcomings with the screening 

process had also been identified internally by the FAA's own 

assessment process. 

Despite these documented shortcomings of the screening 

system, the fact that neither a hijacking nor a bombing had 
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occurred domestically in over a decade was perceived by many 

within the system as confirmation that it was working. This 

explains in part the view of one Transportation Security official 

who testified to the Commission that the agency thought that it 

had won the battle against hijacking. In fact, the Commission 

received testimony that one of the primary reasons that the CAPPS 

consequences were restricted was because officials thought that 

checkpoint screening was working.

The evolution of checkpoint screening illustrates many of 

the systemic problems that faced the civil aviation security 

system in place on 9/11. The executive and legislative branches 

of government and the civil aviation industry were highly 

reactive on aviation security matters. Most of the aviation 

security systems features had developed in response to specific 

incidents rather than anticipation. Civil aviation security was 

primarily accomplished through a slow and cumbersome rule-making 

process, a reflection of the agency's conflicting missions of 

both regulating and promoting the industry. 

A number of FAA witnesses told the Commission that this 

rule-making process was the bane of civil aviation security. For 

example, the FAA had attempted to set up a requirement that it 

would certify screening contractors. The FAA re-authorization of 

1996, in fact, had directed the FAA to take such action. The 

1997 Gore Commission endorsed it but the process of implementing 

screener certification had still not been completed by September 

11th, 2001. 

Those are systemic observations, but to analyze the 9/11 

attack, we had to focus on which items were prohibited and which 

were allowed to be carried into the cabin of an aircraft as of 

that date. FAA guidelines were used to determine what objects 

should not be allowed into the cabin of an aircraft. And I 

stress again that this is the system that was in place on 9/11, 

not the system that is in place today. Included in the listing 

of items not allowed into the cabin of an aircraft were knives 

with blades four inches long or longer and/or knives considered 

illegal by local law as well as tear gas, mace and similar 

chemicals.

These guidelines, developed by FAA, were to be used by 

screeners to make a reasonable determination of what items in the 

possession of a person should be considered a deadly or dangerous 

weapon. The FAA in implementing it told the air carriers that 

common sense should prevail. Hence the standards that 

constituted a deadly or dangerous weapon were somewhat vague. 

Other than for guns, large knives, explosives and incendiaries, 
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determining what was allowable was up to the common sense of the 

carriers and their screening contractors. 

To write out what common sense meant to them, the air 

carriers developed, through their trade associations, a 

checkpoint operations guide. This document was approved by the 

FAA. The edition of the guide in place on September 11th, 2001, 

for example, classified box cutters as restricted items which 

were those that were not to be permitted in the passenger cabin 

of an aircraft. In those cases, the checkpoint supervisor was 

required to be notified if a box cutter as an item in that 

category was encountered by a screener. 

Passengers would be given the option of having the box 

cutter or similar items transported as checked baggage. Mace, 

pepper spray and tear gas were categorized in the operations 

guide as hazardous materials and passengers were not allowed to 

take items in this category onto an airplane without the express 

permission of the airline. On the other hand, pocket utility 

knives which were defined as those with less than a 4-inch blade 

were expressly allowed onto the aircraft. 

The checkpoint operations guide provided no further guidance 

on how to distinguish between box cutters and pocket utility 

knives. One of the checkpoint supervisors working at Logan 

International Airport on September 11th, 2001 recalled that it 

was her understanding as of that day that while box cutters were 

not permitted to pass through the checkpoint without the removal 

of the blade, any knife with a blade of less than four inches was 

permitted to pass through security. 

In practice, we believe the FAA's approach of admonishing 

air carriers to use common sense about what items should not be 

allowed on an aircraft or also approving the air carriers' 

checkpoint operation guidelines that define the industry's common 

sense, in practice, created an environment where both parties 

could deny responsibility for making choices that were in the 

tenor of the times likely to be hard and most likely unpopular. 

What happened at the checkpoints on 9/11 under these 

guidelines? Of the checkpoints used to screen the passengers on 

Flights 11, 77, 93 and 175 on September 11th, only Washington 

Dulles International Airport had videotaping equipment in place. 

Therefore, the most specific information that exists about the 

processing of the 9/11 hijackers is information about American 

Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon. The staff 

has reviewed those videotapes as well as testing results for all 

of the checkpoints in question and have reviewed scores of 

interviews with checkpoint screeners and supervisors who might 
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have processed the 9/11 hijackers on that day and reviewed FAA 

and FBI evaluations of all available information about the 9/11 

screening. From what we have seen to date, there is no reason to 

believe that the screening on 9/11 was fundamentally different at 

any of the relevant airports. 

We turn again to the perspective of the enemy. The plan 

required all of the hijackers to successfully board the besieged 

aircraft -- I'm sorry, the assigned aircraft. If several of 

their number failed to board, their operational plan would fall 

apart or their operational security might be breached. To have 

this kind of confidence that had they developed a plan they felt 

would work anywhere they were screened regardless of the quality 

of the individual screener. We believe they developed such a plan 

and practiced in the months before the attacks, including in test 

flights to be sure their tactics would work. In other words, we 

believe the hijackers did not count on a sloppy screener. All 19 

hijackers were able to pass successfully through checkpoint 

screening to board their flights. They were 19 for 19, 100 

percent. They counted on beating a weak system.

Turning to the specifics of Flight 77 checkpoint screening, 

at 7:18 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time on the morning of September 

11th, 2001, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar entered one of the 

security screening checkpoints at Dulles International Airport. 

They placed their carry-on bags on the X-ray machine belt and 

proceeded through the first magnetometer. Both set off the alarm 

and were subsequently directed to a second magnetometer at 

Dulles. While al Mihdhar did not alarm the second magnetometer 

and was permitted through the checkpoint, Moqed failed once more 

and was then subjected to a personal screening with a metal 

detection hand wand. He passed this inspection and then was 

permitted to pass through the checkpoint. 

At 7:35 a.m. that morning, Hani Hanjour, believed to be the 

pilot of the 727, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt at 

the checkpoint and proceeded without alarm through the 

magnetometer. He picked up his carry-on bags and passed through 

the checkpoint. One minute later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi 

entered the same checkpoint. Salem al Hazmi successfully cleared 

the magnetometer and was permitted through the checkpoint. Nawaf 

al Hazmi set off the alarms for both the first and second 

magnetometers and he then also was hand-wanded before being 

passed. In addition, his shoulder strap carry-on bag was swiped 

by an explosive trace detector and then passed and he too was 

admitted through the checkpoint. 

Our best working hypothesis is that a number of the 

hijackers were carrying -- permissible under the regulations in 
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place at the time -- permissible utility knives or pocket knives. 

One example of such a utility knife is displayed by Mr. Brinkley 

here, this so-called Leatherman item. We know that at least two 

knives like this were actually purchased by the hijackers and 

have not been found in the belongings the hijackers left behind. 

We are passing this around now. Please be careful, the blade is 

open. It locks into position. It is very sharp.

According to the guidelines as we understand them that 

existed on 9/11, if such a knife were discovered in the 

possession of an individual who alarmed either the walk through 

metal detector or the hand wand, the item would be returned to 

the owner and permitted to be carried on the aircraft. Once the 

hijackers were able to get through the checkpoints and board the 

plane, the last layer of defense was on board security. That 

layer was comprised of two main elements on 9/11, the presence of 

law enforcement on the flights and the so called Common Strategy 

for responding to in-flight security emergencies, including 

hijacking, which had been devised by the FAA in consultation with 

industry and law enforcement officials. 

However, on the day of September 11th, 2001, after the 

hijackers boarded, they faced no remaining significant security 

obstacles. The Federal Air Marshal program was almost 

exclusively directed as of that date to international flights. 

Cockpit doors were not hardened and gaining access to the cockpit 

was not a particularly difficult challenge. Flight crews were 

trained not to attempt to thwart or fight the hijackers. The 

object was to get the plane to land safely. Crews were trained 

in fact to dissuade passengers from taking precipitous or heroic 

actions against hijackers. We'll have more to say about the 

Common Strategy in the staff statement that will come later 

today.

Philip.

MR. ZELIKOW: In conclusion, from all of the evidence the 

staff has reviewed to date, we have come to the conclusion that, 

on September 11, 2001, would-be hijackers of domestic flights of 

U.S. civil aviation faced these challenges: avoiding prior notice 

by the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities; 

carrying items that could be used as weapons that were either 

permissible or not detectable by the screening systems in place; 

and understanding and taking advantage of the in-flight hijacking 

protocol of the Common Strategy. 

A review of publicly available literature and/or the use of 

test runs would likely have improved the odds of achieving those 

tasks. The no fly list offered an opportunity to stop the 
15

hijackers, but the FAA had not been provided any of their names,

even though two of them were already watchlisted in TIPOFF. The 

pre-screening process was effectively irrelevant to them. The 

on-board security efforts like the Federal Air Marshal program 

had eroded to the vanishing point.

So the hijackers really had to beat just one layer of 

security, the security checkpoint process. Plotters who were 

determined, highly motivated individuals, who escaped notice on 

no-fly lists, who studied publicly available vulnerabilities of 

the aviation security system, who used items with a metal content 

less than a handgun and most likely permissible, and who knew how 

to exploit training received by aircraft personnel to be nonconfrontational were likely to be successful in hijacking a 

domestic U.S. aircraft. 

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.

I'd now like our first panel please to take their seats. 

For our first panel, our first witness will be Ms. Jane Garvey. 

Ms. Garvey was administrator of the Federal Aviation 

Administration on September 11th, 2001. She first assumed that 

post in 1997. Ms. Garvey previously testified before this 

commission last May and we certainly appreciate the fact she has 

come back to join us again.

Following Ms. Garvey will be Rear Admiral Cathal "Irish" 

Flynn. Admiral Flynn served as head of the FAA Security Division 

from 1993 through the end of 2000. His successor in that 

position, Lieutenant Mike Canavan also testified at our May 2003 

hearings. Welcome to Admiral Flynn.

Finally, we'll hear from the former head of FAA's 

Intelligence Division, Claudio Manno. Mr. Manno was in that 

capacity on 9/11 and he currently has a similar role at the 

Transportation Security Administration where he is deputy to the 

associate administrator for Intelligence. Thank you, Mr. Manno, 

for taking time away from your important current duties to be 

with us today.

Would you please stand and raise your right hand? Do you 

swear or affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 

but the truth? Thank you very much.

(Witnesses sworn.)

Ms. Garvey.
16

MS. JANE F. GARVEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of 

the Commission. 

Good morning. I have submitted to the Commission for 

inclusion in the record a written testimony supplementing my 

previous testimony on May 22nd, 2003. I hope my participation 

here will contribute to the recommendation which, in the 

Chairman's words, will assist the Commission in doing everything 

it can to make the American people safer. Before I begin, I 

would like to acknowledge the many families and the friends of 

those who were killed or injured on September 11th. Their 

suffering is unimaginable and perhaps more than any other single 

group of Americans, they have a vested interest in the Commission 

accomplishing its mandate.

Let me address one area that has been the subject of both 

prior questioning and testimony by several witnesses, 

specifically the pre-September 11th relationship among the 

airlines, the airports and the Federal Aviation Administration. 

In 2001, it was these three entities that, by statute, shared 

responsibility for civil aviation security in the United States. 

Air carriers had primary responsibility for screening passengers 

and baggage and for applying security measures to everything that 

went into their planes. Airports were responsible for 

maintaining a secure ground environment and providing local law 

enforcement support. Government's role, the FAA's role, was 

regulatory.

Within the regulatory framework established by Congress, the 

FAA set security standards for 424 airports, for United States 

airlines worldwide, and for foreign air carriers flying to the 

United States from approximately 250 foreign airports. This 

division of responsibility among the airports, the airlines and 

the FAA was, in large measure, a reflection of the fact that the 

airports owned the land and were best able to provide local law 

enforcement. The airlines operated the aircraft and were in the 

best position to manage passenger and cargo, and government had 

the regulatory authority.

The priorities of the FAA were safety, security and the 

capacity of the air traffic control system. Specific targets, 

specific objectives were established in each area and progress 

towards those objectives was monitored continually. Given the 

dynamic nature of the aviation system, those objectives were also 

subject to ongoing evaluation and modification. 

In the months preceding September 11th, while greater public 

attention was focused on aviation delays and the passenger bill 

of rights, internally the agency was very much focused on safety 
17

and security. On September 10th, 2001, aviation security in this 

country was on a peacetime footing. The FAA had worked hard to 

make changes in the aviation security baseline, changes supported 

by specific credible threat information and analysis. The Office 

of Civil Aviation Security, based on information received from 

the intelligence communities, had the primary responsibility of 

assessing the threat to civil aviation.

As this work was underway, daily evaluation of the system 

and assessment of incoming intelligence information led the FAA 

to issue security directives and information circulars to address 

developments and threats. Prior to September 11th, 2001, we had 

a security system based on certain assumptions. These included 

the fact that politically motivated hijackers would release 

passengers after landing at a safe haven, and that together with 

such hijackings, explosives presented the greatest threat to the 

system. The events of September 11th certainly challenged those 

assumptions. A system which had proven effective for the 

preceding 10 years could no longer be relied upon. 

In the summer of 2001, while there was a growing concern 

regarding a domestic threat, the FAA did not have any credible or 

any specific information which indicated the type of attack we 

saw on September 11th was planned or even possible within the 

United States. The greater concern regarding a threat was 

internationally. 

Admiral Loy, deputy secretary of Homeland Security, in his 

testimony will describe a broad range of activities in which the 

Transportation Security Administration is engaged. It's building 

on many of the components of the aviation security system 

established by the FAA: CAPPS, the layered approach to security, 

intelligence assessments, testing, research and development, but 

perhaps most importantly, redirecting them to a changed threat.

The world has changed in its entirety since September 11th. 

We are a nation at war, a war which has crossed our borders and 

entered our cities. Americans have long known that eternal 

vigilance is the price of liberty. Now we know that in the age 

of uncertainty, it is the price of mobility.

Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any of your questions, 

Mr. Chairman.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much.

Mr. Flynn.
18

MR. CATHAL L. "IRISH" FLYNN: Mr. Chairman, members of the 

Commission, I -- and the staff -- have had a long interview, and 

I have submitted a written statement. I don't have a verbal 

statement to make now, but if you don't mind, there are three or 

four items in the statement that I just heard from the staff that 

I think might be worthwhile for me to comment on.

The paragraph that said before, September 11th, 2001, the 

aviation system had been enjoying a period of relative peace. 

That isn't quite so. We'd had a very serious threat against 

aviation in the Pacific. We had numerous indications of -- and 

actual hard intelligence to which we reacted and imposed 

additional measures at stations overseas -- with regard to 

several vectors of attack. And, of course, even though TWA 800 

turned out not to be a bomb, it was a -- there was a considerable 

period where that was a major concern.

So to the extent that that paragraph might indicate that we 

had been lulled into any sense of complacency, that is certainly 

not the case for FAA and FAA security. Then the paragraph at the 

end said that -- at the end of the first page talks about our 

efforts to complete a five-year process to bring in a rule for --

it was actually the rule to certify screening companies. And it 

does give the impression that that rule-making was the only thing 

that we were doing, and that's far from the case. Rule-making 

was important but it's far from the only thing that we were 

doing.

With regard to rings and layers, I think it's a mistake to 

look upon the set of rings that begin at the airport as being the 

only rings that apply to protecting the aircraft and all who fly 

on them, and indeed to protecting people in the airport. It is 

important that there be interaction between those rings and the 

further outer rings or layers of our national security system. 

And one of the items of that from a strategic sense is to make 

the defense of any of our installations, and in the case of civil 

aviation to make the aircraft and the people -- to have defenses 

there that will require the attackers to do extraordinary things 

that would then come to the attention of the intelligence and law 

enforcement authority in the outer layers.

Then there's a further statement that we were reactive. 

Well, we haven't had a bomb in cargo and we haven't had an attack 

by surface-to-air missiles, and we have measures with regard to 

cargo and a program with regard to cargo and we're working -- and 

indeed in the case of a specific threat overseas, work with the 

airlines and the nations concerned and with the National Security 

Council staff in order to put in and develop a range of things 

that we would do in certain circumstances. I hasten to say that 
19

a lot of those circumstances would have -- circumstance would 

have required cancellation of the flights. But it isn't that we 

had to wait for something to happen -- and indeed there are more 

difficult things to deal with to which we are paying attention, 

for example, the introduction of nerve agent gas onto an 

aircraft.

With regard to CAPPS, I hope that there will be questions 

about it because its role -- I think I would like to say some 

things about its function.

Thank you. 

MR. KEAN: Mr. Manno.

MR. CLAUDIO MANNO: Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton 

and commission members, I appreciate the opportunity to 

participate in your inquiry into the facts and circumstances 

surrounding the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks against 

the United States. My written statement addresses the questions 

posed in your letter of invitation and I would respectfully 

request that it be entered into the record. This morning I will 

summarize some of the key points about how the FAA Office of 

Intelligence received, assessed and disseminated intelligence 

prior to the fall of 2001 and also highlight some of the process 

improvements.

Before beginning, however, I would like to express my 

deepest sympathies to the families, friends and co-workers of 

those who perished on September 11th, 2001. As a tribute to 

them, a wreath hangs on the door of our intelligence watch as a 

silent reminder of the importance of our mission in keeping the 

nation's transportation infrastructure and its travelers secure.

On September 11th, 2001, I was a director of the Office of 

Intelligence, which was part of the Civil Aviation Security 

Organization of the FAA. The office was tasked with 

identification, analysis and dissemination of intelligence 

information focusing on terrorism and other threats to U.S. civil 

aviation. Although the magnitude of the events of September 

11th, 2001 had not previously been seen, FAA's 24-hour 

intelligence watch had managed multiple crises prior to the 

tragic suicide hijackings. The expertise of our analysts and a 

well-established set of standard operating procedures enabled the 

office to quickly realign and provide extended round the clock 

coverage of the incident and its aftermath. This cadre of 

analysts, although small, worked feverishly to provide senior FAA 

and DOT decision makers with an immediate assessment of the 

events and possible additional near-term threats. 
20

As a consumer of intelligence, FAA identified its 

information needs in detailed statements of intelligence interest 

to those agencies responsible for producing most of the 

intelligence on terrorism, namely CIA, the Department of State, 

FBI, NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The newly created 

Terrorist Threat Integration Center now plays a role in that 

effort. FAA received a daily stream of threat reporting and 

finished intelligence from these agencies and identified on 

average 100 to 200 classified reports each day that merited 

closer review. 

To enhance access to relevant intelligence reporting, FAA 

assigned liaison officers to CIA, FBI and State Department. 

Their primary duties were to identify and pursue information 

regarding actual or potential threats to civil aviation. 

Occasionally, they would review information that provided insight 

about a terrorist threat or incident, but may not have been 

disseminated to the FAA. In these cases, the liaison officers 

requested release of the information and would educate the 

agencies as to why such information was of importance to the FAA. 

In some cases, they were successful in getting release for FAA. 

In other situations, due to the sensitivity of sources and 

methods, the information was not approved for release.

When analysts working in the 24-hour intelligence watch 

identified current or future threats to aviation, a preliminary 

evaluation of its validity was made in coordination with the 

originator and other relevant agencies. FAA intelligence 

analysts examined the plausibility of the information based on 

their expertise regarding the known intent and capability of the 

alleged hijackers, the method of attack, as well as a 

characterization of the reliability of the source made by the 

agency supplying the information. The characterization of the 

source is a significant factor as decision-makers depend on 

threat assessments based on credible information from reliable 

sources.

Once a report was identified as an actual or potential 

threat, FAA analysts opened an intelligence case file, an ICF, to 

isolate and follow up on the threat to its logical conclusion, 

adding any new information to either validate or discount the 

threat. And there were several hundred of these ICFs that were 

opened at any one time and that we were working on. FAA analysts 

prepared threat assessments based on analyses of these reports 

and coordinated these assessments with FBI and CIA to ensure 

factual accuracy and analytic logic. 
21

Intelligence is only useful, however, if it reaches the 

operators and policymakers in an actionable format and timely 

manner. Prior to September 11th, 2001, FAA intelligence analysts 

worked closely with specialists in the offices of civil aviation 

security operations and aviation policy who view the intelligence 

information against the vulnerability of the target in an attempt 

to establish the level of risk of a successful attack. These 

offices promulgated security countermeasures to reduce the level 

of risk as appropriate. This threat and risk assessment process 

was applied to both current and strategic threats and was used to 

determine the long-term baseline aviation security posture for a 

region or a country.

Potential aviation threat information was communicated to 

those that needed it at the operational level primarily through 

the preparation and issuance of information circulars which 

alerted recipients to possible threats and security directives 

which required air carriers and airports to implement specific 

security measures to counter a threat. Regulated entities, such 

as the air carriers and airports, received the notices directly 

from FAA while airport law enforcement elements had access to 

them through the Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network. When 

declassification of information was not possible, the 24-hour 

intelligence watch verbally alerted cleared aviation security 

representatives to threats or events that were of a potential 

interest through secure telephone calls.

Now that I have explained how the FAA received and processed 

threat information prior to the events of 2001, I would like to 

highlight intelligence support that the FAA Office of 

Intelligence provided to the transportation industry stakeholders 

and other government agencies as it transitioned to TSA. Prior 

to September 11th, the FAA had published security directives that 

required air carriers not to transport certain individuals that 

were known or suspected threats to aviation security. 

Immediately following September 11th, the FAA began to administer 

a watchlist for the FBI as part of the investigation of the 

hijackings. By the end of 2001, the FAA had assumed 

responsibility for this watchlist which now includes individuals 

known to pose, or suspected of posing, a threat to aviation or 

national security. This mechanism enables the notification of 

law enforcement and the application of defensive measures. 

We also stood up a new division with analysts whose primary 

duty was to provide support to the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

Also, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of November 

2001 tasked TSA to receive, assess and distribute intelligence 

information related to transportation security. Thus, the new 

Transportation Security Intelligence Service became responsible 
22

for assessing threats to all modes of transportation: aviation, 

maritime and land, and now provides threat warning products to 

stakeholders in all modes of transportation.

As a result of the steps taken to improve operations in the 

aftermath of September 11th, 2001 attacks, the TSIS, the 

successor to the FAA's Office of Intelligence now enjoys 

increased access to intelligence and law enforcement information 

which has undoubtedly had a positive impact on the security of 

U.S. transportation assets both in the homeland and abroad. More 

information is being shared among more agencies than ever before 

thus improving situational awareness of potential threats to U.S. 

transportation assets in the U.S. and abroad.

I would like to provide briefly some additional granularity 

on some of the beneficial developments and a word or two 

regarding the areas that we are continuing to seek improvement. 

Regarding intelligence from the FBI, prior to September 11th, 

2001, FAA did not receive a daily flow of raw reports and 

finished intelligence from the FBI. The Bureau did not consider 

itself an intelligence production agency, perhaps because of the 

statutory restrictions on the dissemination of information it 

collected in its investigative role. 

Recently, however, the flow of reporting from FBI has 

significantly increased. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 amended 

previous laws that had prevented the FBI from sharing grand jury 

and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act information, FISA 

information. The creation of the National Joint Terrorism Task 

Force, the NJTTF, has also expanded the flow of information from 

the FBI. TSIS has assigned a full-time liaison officer to the 

NJTTF in recognition of the value of tapping into the information 

reported up from local JTFs throughout the country. TSIS's 

NJTTF's representatives also provide operational information that 

supports FBI operations and investigations.

Regarding information sharing and coordination among 

agencies, TSIS receives a copy of the daily matrix that

highlights current critical threats to U.S. interests. Agencies 

also more frequently coordinate finished intelligence products 

and CIA, TTIC and FBI more routinely solicit input and comment 

from TSA on threat assessments. To build on a new spirit of 

sharing and coordination, TSIS has assigned liaison officers to 

TTIC and to NSA.

The consolidation of TSA, Customs and Immigration within the 

Department of Homeland Security has also led to enhanced 

information sharing and coordination of not only intelligence but 

operations as well. TSIS has also contributed to the stand-up 
23

of the TSC, which as you know, was created to provide information 

on known or suspected terrorists from various U.S. government 

databases to federal screening operations, border patrol and 

state and local law enforcement. Two TSIS intelligence analysts 

provide direct support to the TSC leadership on matters regarding 

the TSA Watchlist program. 

The intelligence and law enforcement communities have always 

provided TSA with reporting regarding specific threats and since 

late 2001, there has been a sizeable increase in the volume of 

intelligence reporting being disseminated to TSA. Nevertheless, 

more information about terrorist infrastructures both in the 

United States and abroad would assist TSIS intelligence analysts 

in forecasting potential threats in areas where U.S. 

transportation assets are located or provide service. Such 

information would allow TSIS to provide better situational 

awareness to TSA executives, field operators and industry 

stakeholders.

Despite some remaining obstacles, the intelligence and law 

enforcement communities have made great strides in information 

sharing and coordination since the tragic events of September 

11th, 2001. TSIS will continue to review our analytic skill 

sets and dissemination mechanisms, improving them where possible 

and will remain focused on providing TSA and DHS executives, 

operators and industry stakeholders with an accurate assessment 

of current and future threats to the U.S. infrastructure.

Chairman Kean, Vice Chairman Hamilton and members of the 

Commission, I recognize the importance of your task on behalf of 

the American people and appreciate the opportunity to participate 

in these proceedings. I would be happy to address any questions 

that you may have for me.

Thank you. 

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much, sir.

As we start the questioning, I might remind people that 

yesterday and today we are looking at the system's 

vulnerabilities as they existed on 9/11. We are not talking 

about present vulnerabilities. We've got to communicate our 

views about those vulnerabilities perhaps in our public report or 

certainly through the appropriate channels.

The questioning will be lead by Senator Gorton.

MR. SLADE GORTON: First, for Ms. Garvey and for Mr. Manno, 

knowing that you're fully aware of your oath, our first question 
24

is, to your knowledge, did the FAA possess any information 

regarding a terrorist plot to hijack aircraft and to use them as 

weapons and targets in the United States, or any other plot that 

resembled such an operation prior to 9/11?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, in my knowledge, from my 

perspective, we had no knowledge of that.

MR. GORTON: Mr. Manno?

MR. MANNO: No specific knowledge. Certainly not in the way 

that the events were carried out on 9/11.

MR. GORTON: Ms. Garvey, as you know, we had a long 

relationship between 1997 and the year 2000 when I was chairman 

of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation and you headed the FAA. 

There were a significant number of hearings during that period of 

time. Would you characterize those hearings as primarily related 

to competitive issues to airport capacity, you know, slots and 

landing slots and rights and the like to aircraft safety from the 

point of view of the rules that you adopted with respect to 

aircraft safety, and to the extent that they dealt with security 

exclusively or almost exclusively on the subject of explosives on 

aircraft?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, I think that's a fair 

characterization. I would add one caveat, and that is the 

economic issues really was the domain of the Department of 

Transportation. But certainly capacity, explosives, safety 

issues, those were FAA and certainly had a number of hearings.

MR. GORTON: Demands for a passengers' bill of rights, for 

example.

MS. GARVEY: That's correct. That, of course, would have 

been more DOT as well.

MR. GORTON: And those subjects were also the primary 

subjects of the Gore Commission, whose recommendations set many 

of the boundaries for concerns during the years at least that I 

was there, up until the year 2000. Is that not correct?

MS. GARVEY: I would agree with that assessment, 

Commissioner, yes.

MR. GORTON: Is it fair to say with respect to security 

issues as well as to -- security issues. Is it fair to say that 

there were more pressures on the Federal Aviation Administration 
25

to relax security measures during that period than there were to 

strengthen them?

MS. GARVEY: I'm not sure I would fully characterize it that 

way. If you're asking me, was I aware that industry or others, 

for example, had concerns about some of the security measures, 

absolutely. We certainly --

MR. GORTON: That's exactly my question.

MS. GARVEY: We certainly heard it through the rule-making 

process. We certainly heard it in public meetings that were 

held. You know, I do want to go back, though, to a point I made 

in my opening statement, and that is while the public and 

certainly Congress as well was very focused on the capacity 

issues, which were very real at the time in 2000 and 2001, we 

still had a security office with very experienced, very welltrained professionals who were focused on those issues as well.

MR. GORTON: But outside pressures on you and your office 

were primarily focused on those other subjects, were they not?

MS. GARVEY: That is correct, Commissioner.

MR. GORTON: One example of these security matters, you saw 

the knife that was circulated during the course of your 

testimony, which now at least we all can draw a breath at how 

lethal it was. Can you say why it was that a knife of that size 

and potency was universally considered to be something which 

could regularly be carried onto aircraft? Was there a great deal 

of pressure, for example, that anyone should be able to take a 

Swiss Army knife with him or with her on an aircraft? Were any 

of the rules -- were any of the suggestions in this five-year 

rule-making that had not been completed directed at weapons of 

that nature?

MS. GARVEY: I don't remember that discussion when I was the 

administrator. I can give you a little bit of perspective, at 

least from my perspective. As you indicated, that policy was in 

place on 9/11. It was a policy that had been in place, that is 

prohibiting knives larger than 4 inches. It is a policy that

it's my understanding had been in my place since the 1970s. 

But, again, if you go back to 9/11 and you think about the 

atmosphere in an airport, there were -- knives were very 

commonplace. Knives were used as part of the meal service in the 

airlines. If you were to stop at a security -- or a souvenir 

shop, even beyond the secure area, it is possible that you could 

purchase, say, a pocketknife and so forth. And from the security 
26

intelligence experts, from the law enforcement people, the 

greater threats -- as has been indicated even by the staff 

report, the greater threats were from larger, more lethal weapons 

and from explosives.

Clearly with the benefit of hindsight, as you pointed out, 

we have a different view. I do think it is important to remind 

ourselves, as the staff statement reminded us, that we are and 

were dealing with an incredibly intelligent, well-trained, 

disciplined terrorists who may have used any other number of 

common household items as a lethal weapon as well.

MR. GORTON: And who just flat out beat us.

MS. GARVEY: That's right, Commissioner.

MR. GORTON: At our May hearing, you testified, and I quote, 

that, "Perhaps the greatest lesson of September 11th is that the 

terrorist threat is just as real here at home as it is for our 

embassies in East Africa, a Naval destroyer in Yemen or the 

Marine barracks in Beirut," end quote. At least in retrospect, 

should not that have been the lesson of the 1993 World Trade 

Center bombing?

MS. GARVEY: You know, I think with the clarity of hindsight 

you can look at a number of those facts and come to those 

conclusions. And again, I do want to go back to a point that has 

been made earlier. There was a growing domestic concern and I 

think that was reflected in some of the intelligence circulars, 

some of the SDs that the FAA issued. So there was a growing 

concern. But I think the greatest thrust, the greater concern 

was still international. Should we have learned more from the 

World Trade Center? Boy, again, I think with the clarity of 

hindsight there, there are certainly questions there.

MR. GORTON: With respect to intelligence, and Mr. Manno can 

comment on this question as well, explain to us how it was that 

you had a no-fly directive that applied to only 20 or so people, 

while there was a terrorist -- a TIPOFF list that included 

hundreds or thousands of people? Were you, Ms. Garvey, aware 

that there was such a TIPOFF list?

Mr. Manno, did your section have that list available to it? 

Did it even know that it existed? And if you did know that it 

existed and had it available, why weren't those names on a no-fly 

list?

MR. MANNO: I think I can answer that by explaining the way 

that the process worked. As I indicated earlier, the way that we 
27

received intelligence or information from the intelligence 

community was by identifying our statement of intelligence needs. 

Based on that, the intelligence community provided us information 

that was relevant to aviation security. So based on the 

information we received, our analysts reviewed it and in the case 

where there was specific and credible information that people 

were actually targeting, making plans to target civil aviation, 

if we had identifying data, they were put on a security directive 

which directed the air carriers not to transport these people.

MR. GORTON: All right, but neither of you have answered my 

question. You know, let's break it down and ask it again. Were 

either of you aware of the existence of the TIPOFF roster? 

MR. MANNO: Yes.

MR. GORTON: Were you, Ms. Garvey?

MS. GARVEY: I may have been aware. I can't tell you with 

certainty that I was aware pre-9/11 that the list --

MR. GORTON: Well, were the names on that list then 

available to you and not requested? Or available to you and 

discarded as not important?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, if I could -- I'll give you my 

perspective and then turn it over to Mr. Manno. But from my 

perspective, the names that I saw, and we'd see them in the 

security directive, they would be included in the security 

directive. From my perspective, those names were the names that 

the intelligence community believed had some implication with 

aviation. So, for example, while other intelligence agencies may 

have had other names, those names pre-9/11 if they did not have a 

specific aviation --

MR. GORTON: I -- you know, I fully understand that, but my 

question still is were those names not supplied to you, and I 

guess this is for Mr. Manno, or were they supplied to you and 

discarded as not having a relationship with aircraft?

MR. MANNO: TIPOFF at that time included about 61,000 

names. We had access to TIPOFF, but the way that it worked is if 

you had a name, you had to have a name, you could then go against 

TIPOFF and do a search and it would provide you information. But 

the way that the system worked at the time, unless we received 

the intelligence reporting that identified to us names of 

interest and then to go into TIPOFF and search against that, it 

was not -- it was simply not used that way. So TIPOFF was there, 

TIPOFF was available, TIPOFF was 61,000 names that included 
28

information not only of, you know, terrorists involved in all 

sorts of things and others --

MR. LEHMAN: It was perfectly all right to have them fly 

because they were terrorists in other things, there was no reason 

to put them on your watchlist, right? I mean, I don't understand 

the logic of this.

MR. MANNO: Well, the way that the process worked with the 

security directive is names were identified to an airline who 

then bumped those up against their reservation list to determine 

if somebody was actually going to fly.

MR. GORTON: Yeah, that's right, but you only had 20 names 

that fell into that category and there were thousands of names on 

a TIPOFF list, all of whom were suspected terrorists. And so I 

gather the decision at some place or another was that a suspected 

terrorist who had not specifically been linked to aircraft was 

okay to fly?

MR. MANNO: The names -- including the 20 names were names 

that were specifically identified to us in intelligence 

reporting. The process was for the intelligence reporting to 

indicate to us those that we ought to be concerned about. 

MR. GORTON: And you made no further inquiry beyond that? 

You didn't ask for a list of suspected terrorists? 

MR. MANNO: You mean through TIPOFF?

MR. GORTON: Yes.

MR. MANNO: No, we did not go to the State Department and 

ask them to give us all 61,000 names so that they could be put on 

the watchlist. For one thing, the airlines would not have been 

able to handle such a list.

MR. GORTON: Well, they weren't given the opportunity, were 

they?

MR. MANNO: Well, we know that today, sir, because today we 

are managing a similar list which is of about 3,500 names which 

requires the carriers to check against a reservation system, and 

they're struggling just even with those.

MR. JOHN F. LEHMAN: But they sure had no trouble handling 

their frequent flyer lists -- I mean that's ridiculous. Your 

whole testimony is -- it talks about process. You described to
29

us -- it sounded like an indoctrination course for your new 

employees describing the process. What about common sense?

Didn't anybody ever -- did you ever step back and say, now 

look, my job is not to wait until the intelligence community 

gives me finished product, but to look at this and say, does it 

pass the commonsense test? Does it pass the commonsense test to 

let young Arabs on with four-inch blades? Didn't any of you --

leadership is about not taking the process which you hide behind, 

but about saying this is not sufficient. Of course they can 

handle thousands of questionable people. Of course a young Arab 

should not be allowed on airplanes with four-inch blades, yet 

none of you applied common sense. 

MR. GORTON: Secretary Lehman just said that's right, you 

know. Every time I fly, every time I make a reservation I get a 

frequent flyer credit. The airline has no difficulty in doing 

that for me, to check my name against its list every time. I 

can't see how it has a problem with 3,000 or 60,000 suspected 

terrorists. But let's leave -- you know, you answered my first 

question I think accurately, that as of 9/11 you did not 

anticipate or expect, you did not imagine the kind of hijacking 

that actually took place with suicide and the killing of many 

people in mind. Let's accept that. 

But certainly with respect to all of the hijackings that 

have ever taken place before, you were anticipating and were 

working against the kind of hijacking that went to Havana or that 

asked for the release of prisoners and, you know, or the like. 

And yet you never, either of you and I guess this would apply to 

Admiral Flynn as well, decided to have an expanded no-fly list of 

suspected terrorists, is that correct?

MR. MANNO: The list at that time was based on specific and 

credible information that we had. 

MR. GORTON: Other two? Any answer beyond that?

MR. FLYNN: I regret to say that I was unaware of the 

TIPOFF list and was unaware of it until yesterday.

MR. GORTON: Now, one other thing. Are you saying you, who 

are current today, that there are only 3,500 people on a no-fly 

list today?

MR. MANNO: There's actually two lists. A selectee and a 

no-fly list, and actually the number is greater than that.
30

MR. GORTON: What is the relationship between the FAA at 

the present time and the TIPOFF program?

MR. MANNO: The -- well, as you know TIPOFF has now been 

rolled into the TSC process --

MR. GORTON: Okay, and?

MR. MANNO: So the way that the system works is that we 

obtain information from that list and people are put on the nofly list based again on indications that they pose a threat to 

aviation.

MR. GORTON: But merely being a suspected terrorist doesn't 

get you on that list?

MR. MANNO: Pardon, sir?

MR. GORTON: Merely being a suspected terrorist doesn't get 

you on that no-fly list?

MR. MANNO: It can, it depends what group you're associated 

with and what other information there is.

MR. GORTON: Wow, I find that to be an incredible answer.

MR. MANNO: As an example, there is a lot of information 

that came out of the war on Afghanistan when the camps were 

discovered there, lists and things like that and those names, 

because of their ties to al Qaeda, are put on our no-fly list.

MR. GORTON: Well, I must say I would strongly suggest that 

when the intelligence agencies of the United States have a name 

that they expect or suspect to be a terrorist, that that name 

ought to be on the no-fly list. And I think, in my view at 

least, that's a no-brainer. 

Back to you, Ms. Garvey. Does the FAA or did the FAA have 

any kind of supervision over flight training schools? Obviously 

to license a pilot requires a certain degree of education, but is 

there any monitoring of the schools at which young men and women 

receive that flight training?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, for the flight schools there are 

standards and requirements that a flight school would have to 

attain in order to get an FAA certificate, and depending on the 

level of training they are providing, those certificates would 

vary. 
31

MR. GORTON: But that certificate just goes to the school? 

That just says you do a competent job.

MS. GARVEY: That's exactly right, Commissioner, that's 

exactly right. 

MR. GORTON: But there's no connection -- the school 

doesn't have to report the names of the people who are taking the 

training or the degree of training that they've received to you 

to check against any kind of license application?

MS. GARVEY: Pre-9/11 there was no vetting of the 

individual students who signed up in the schools.

MR. GORTON: Is there now?

MS. GARVEY: Yes there is, Commissioner. Post-9/11 there -

- and as part of a legislation even before that as an emergency 

action, there is vetting of the student and an actual 

verification that the school must receive and submit to the FAA 

from the country, from the student's country.

MR. GORTON: Ms. Garvey, as the administrator, how much of 

your time did you spend on security matters? How often were you 

briefed, for example, by people like the Admiral or Mr. Manno? 

How did you get performance ratings of civil aviation security 

policies through the airlines and the airports and the like? 

What share of your time did it take and what was your function in 

connection with it?

MS. GARVEY: Let me divide it, if I could, Commissioner, 

into two parts. One is how did I receive the sort of security 

information, and number two is how did we monitor sort of the day 

to day progress being made by security and I'll start with the 

second part. Security, like safety and efficiency, was 

responsible for establishing goals and objectives, and in this 

case it centered very much as has been indicated around some of 

the rule-making, some of the explosive detection machines and so 

forth. That monitoring and oversight of that really occurred as 

part of management board meetings that were held on Monday and 

Friday. 

As to the security information, how did I receive it and so 

forth? As Mr. Manno indicated, there were on any given day there 

could be as high as 200 intelligence faxes received by the 

Intelligence Office. I would certainly not receive every one of 

those but anything that the Intelligence Office deemed important 

would come up to my office. If there was a particular urgency 

around an issue or something that the associate administrator was 
32

particularly concerned about that I would receive that briefing 

in person, or if I was not in the office at the time I would 

receive it perhaps later in the day by the -- from perhaps the 

deputy secretary. So I would receive security briefings either 

through a written document that would come directly to my office 

or through an oral direct briefing from the associate 

administrator.

MR. GORTON: The staff reported on the checkpoint 

operations guide that was developed by the air carriers and 

approved by you as the head of the FAA. To your knowledge was 

there any airline that ever was restless or objected that that 

operations guide was too lax and wanted or imposed itself a more 

stringent regulations on incoming -- on passengers?

MS. GARVEY: I'm not aware of that, Commissioner.

MR. GORTON: Finally, I think it's someone else's turn 

here, but the 9/11 families submitted what I consider to be a 

very important question to us to which I'd like your answer. How 

is it that when you went through your various proceedings dealing 

with violations of federal law on the part of airlines and 

imposed fines that in fact, on average, the fines were reduced to 

10 cents on the dollar? Why is it that when you go through an 

entire system and say a fine ought to be so many thousands of 

dollars that that just isn't the end of it?

MS. GARVEY: Well, if I could, Commissioner, I'll answer 

and certainly if other panel members want to contribute to this. 

First of all, I'd like to check the number. I'd heard that 

before and I've not had an opportunity -- I'm not sure that 

number is correct. But I'd like to check it and I can certainly 

tell you that from the FAA's perspective, from my perspective, 

the civil penalties that we imposed were not as effective as we 

wanted them to be. We went back repeatedly to get those fines 

raised and they were raised incrementally.

I think we were far more effective when it was levied 

against individuals then when it was levied against a company. 

Frankly, I think sometimes we found the best way to -- or sort of 

the best -- the more effective way was to publicize that and we 

did that. But there's also the due process. The inspector or 

the special agent who first brings the action forward submits 

that and there is also, of course, the due process where the 

lawyers from -- for either the individual or the lawyers for the 

airline goes through the process with the FAA and a determination 

is made. I don't know if its 10 cents on the dollar. It was 

never as high as we liked.
33

MR. GORTON: Well, that's a lot of due process to go to 10 

cents on a dollar, and I guess we would appreciate it if you have 

the ability to do so, since you question whether or not that 

figure is accurate, to the extent of your ability to answer that 

question more precisely in writing later, we would very much 

appreciate it. I think I do have some more questions, but the 

red light has been on for some time and it's Congressman Roemer's 

turn in this connection.

MR. KEAN: Okay, we'll come back to you.

Congressman Roemer?

MR. TIMOTHY J. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank the panel and thank Senator Gorton for 

starting a very thorough round, a very fair round of questions. 

I want to start with just the larger policy question and the 

security system that we had in place on September 11, 2001. It 

just seems to me from a common sense point of view that in 

medicine, when a doctor looks at a patient, they just don't look 

at one disease. If there's a low probability but high 

consequence possibility for that patient, we're going to look at 

a host of different scenarios. 

The military does the same thing. There may be a low 

probability but a high consequence attack. We get ready for it. 

Sports, the Superbowl coming up, there may be a low probability 

that the first play's going to be the bomb down the field, but 

there's a defense set up for it. In our aviation security 

system, leading up to and on September 11, 2001, it seems to me 

there's only one system in place, even though the clues and the 

threats are flowing in through this entire decade. Let me 

briefly bring up some of the overall policy clues and objectives. 

In January '95 a Philippine National Police raid turns up 

materials in Manila where there is a proposed plot, among other 

things, to possibly crash an airplane into CIA headquarters. In 

1998, August, the intelligence community obtains information that 

a group of unidentified Arabs plans to fly an explosive laden 

plane into a foreign country -- from a foreign country into the 

World Trade Center. September 1998 the intelligence community 

obtains information that Usama bin Laden's next operation could 

involve flying aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. 

airport.

November '98 the intelligence community obtains information 

that a Turkish Islamic extremist group has planned a suicide 

attack, in part involving a plane and crashing that with 
34

explosives into Ataturk's tomb. The list, March 1999, August 

2001, goes on. With respect to what we're doing here at home to 

protect our passengers and our planes, here's the information 

that we have at the FAA. Here's the internal document, developed 

in the summer of 2000, delivered in 2001 prior to 9/11 and here's 

a quote from this document that's warning about terrorist 

hijackings. 

"A domestic hijacking would likely result in a greater 

number of American hostages but would be operationally more 

difficult to accomplish. We don't rule it out." And it 

continues, "If, however, the intent of the hijackers is not to 

exchange hostages for prisoners but to commit suicide in a 

spectacular explosion, a domestic hijacking would probably be 

preferable," unquote. Directly to the point of 9/11. 

And then finally published in July 17, 2001, the Federal 

Register, quote, "Terrorism can occur anytime, anywhere in the 

United States. Members of foreign terrorist groups, 

representatives from state sponsors of terrorism and radical 

fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the 

United States. Thus an increasing threat to civil aviation from 

both foreign sources and potential domestic ones exist and needs 

to be prevented and countered." Needs to be prevented and 

countered. So my question is, with all this evidence coming in -

- it's not a specific date, granted, but the dots are connected 

and they're large and they're looming and they're big. Why 

doesn't this result in a change in terrorism policy at our 

airports to try to expand the list of things that we're going to 

try to go after beyond the possibility of explosive devices on 

airplanes? 

Mr. Flynn, can you take the first crack at that?

MR. FLYNN: Yeah, if I had to do it again, I would get up 

over the fierce amount of activity that was going on with regard 

to commissions, with regard to acquisition, certification of 

equipment, R&D programs, human factors, inspections, 

modifications of rules, additions to rules, working with the 

intelligence community, working with the NSC, to ask ourselves, 

indeed to ask myself: How will they attack us again? I mean, 

those things were there and it isn't that we disregarded them. 

It isn't that I disregarded them. I didn't see -- there were 

contra-indications on a number of them. 

For example, the Manila one was perpetrated by people who 

went to very considerable extent not to be suicidal in the way 

that they conducted their attack. The French one, you didn't 

mention it, but I spoke to the French inspector of police from 
35

the headquarters of the French police who came over to brief 

people in Washington, including me, about it. And I said, well, 

what about this business of going after the Eiffel Tower. And 

again, there were disconnects. How were they going to do that? 

How were they going to coerce pilots to do that? And she said, 

furthermore, rather than them wanting to kill everybody on board, 

there's a strong indication that Stockholm syndrome was going on 

at Marseille where the aircraft was. 

Then with regard to the other things of how do you bring 

about taking an airliner and turning it into a missile? How 

would you coerce the pilot to fly into a building that's got 

people into it rather than in extremis, put it into a field or a 

woods or into the -- in the case of the CIA, into the Potomac? 

How would you do that? And the notion of a fully-fledged member 

of al Qaeda being a pilot, at the same time with the intention of 

pulling people out of the cockpit and taking over, did not occur 

to me. Now, my point, when I go back to it, why didn't I spend 

more time? Why didn't I get more people around the table and 

say, how would they do this? And come up with a plan, that's my 

regret. 

MR. ROEMER: Mr. Flynn, you mentioned that we didn't 

develop policy and the big picture connecting the dots to change 

policy to proactively go after what terrorists might do given the 

threats that were out there --

MR. FLYNN: I didn't mention that, I may not have said it -

-

MR. ROEMER: You said you regret that we did not --

MR. FLYNN: We didn't deal with that particular scenario. 

That isn't to say that we didn't look at a host of other things.

MR. ROEMER: Well, let's talk about -- did you push with 

Mrs. Garvey, other people, the administrator, did you push for a 

policy change? Did you try to get meetings with other policy 

makers to address this growing concern that's mentioned in the 

FAA, Federal Register, that's mentioned in your slide 

presentation that you're presenting to people as you're traveling 

across the country in 2000 and 2001?

MR. FLYNN: Well, I think that -- it's more than a footnote 

that that particular presentation, 2001, I was no longer in FAA. 

But the --

MR. ROEMER: Leading up to that point.
36

MR. FLYNN: Yeah, that's my -- it's a funny thing. In that 

same time, the head of anti-terrorism for the FBI and I came to 

this building, into the secure place of the Committee on 

Intelligence and in it these staff -- there may be some people 

from that staff who happen to be coincidentally members of your 

staff -- the staff asked what are the indications or what are the 

threats to aviation? And John O'Neill said there are none. Now, 

that seemed to me to -- because there was particular indication 

of something going on in an airport, I wrote him a note. John, 

how about the -- and he looked at the note, still didn't say 

anything, didn't change what he had said. And we came out of the 

meeting and I said, what about the -- that specific thing, and he 

said there's nothing to it. 

We're also being told that those groups that are there were 

-- they're essentially connected with Hezbollah or fundraisers 

rather than actual terrorist people plotting terrorism, and we're 

-- was told because pushed on it frequently, "Don't worry about 

it, we're not going to give you raw intelligence, we're not going 

to give you processed intelligence. If there is a threat to 

aviation, we will tell you."

MR. ROEMER: And this is who?

MR. FLYNN: Robert Blitzer.

MR. ROEMER: With respect to --

MR. FLYNN: No.

MR. ROEMER: Acting on --

MR. FLYNN: No, no.

MR. ROEMER: Okay.

MR. FLYNN: At the same time, there was an element of 

common sense in this. You have 1993, the World Trade Center, you 

have these groups that may or may not be associated with al Qaeda 

because nobody knew what al Qaeda was. Nobody knew, and to this 

day I'm not sure how much people understand the full motivations, 

capabilities, connections, et cetera of the al Qaeda 

organization.

MR. ROEMER: Mr. Flynn, I just read an example as far back 

as September 1998 that the intelligence community obtained an 

information specific to Usama bin Laden that his next operation 

could involve flying aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. 

airport.
37

MR. FLYNN: I don't recall that. I mean, that's such a 

startling thing --

MR. ROEMER: Well, we can talk about your liaisons to the 

FBI and to the CIA and to the National Security Council, the 

point is -- go ahead, sir.

MR. FLYNN: Let me get back on my train of thought, is that 

despite saying there are no indications of it happening, the 

commonsense of it is that it could happen, that where there are 

terrorists one of their likely targets will be aviation. 

MR. ROEMER: Let's talk about that being a likely target. 

There is a TIPOFF list at the State Department that you don't 

know about until yesterday, that you don't know about that exists 

prior to September 11. Mr. Manno, this list has approximately 

61,000 names of people around the world that are prevented from 

flying, that are picked out by the State Department at that point 

and they're picked out because they're dangerous and they 

shouldn't be on airplanes, 61,000 names. 

Your list, according to what you just said, or what our 

staff has told me, is 12 people. So there's a difference of 

60,988 names, a difference of 60,988 names between what's been 

accumulated at the State Department as dangerous people, 

shouldn't be flying, and what you have with your 12 people. Now, 

I can't understand why there are not more efforts in liaison 

activities to reach out to State Department and start to bring 

some of those names over and prevent those people from flying. 

MR. MANNO: Well, again the process at the time was to 

include in the security directive names of people where there was 

specific and credible information that they posed a threat. Part 

of that process required, because a lot of times the information 

was classified, that it be declassified because the information 

circulars in the security directives were not classified 

documents that went out to the industry. And it was simply very 

difficult to get clearance from the community in cases where 

there wasn't a direct connection to civil aviation for them to 

get the release information. We had to justify that in each 

case. Now, did we do it? Did we go in and say we want all 

61,000 of these names? No, that was not -- we didn't do that. 

We focused on the information, again, that was specific to 

aviation at the time.

MR. ROEMER: Let's talk about the pre-screening program, 

affirm that. The CAPPS program, Mr. Flynn, the pre-screening 

program, the computer assisted passenger pre-screening program, 
38

picked out nine of the 19 hijackers, terrorists, on September the 

11th. It didn't do anything to -- what did it do to try to 

prevent and use common sense and provide a higher standard of 

keeping these people off the plane? The CAPPS system was 

designed with -- you know, factoring algorithms and weights and 

other things to say these people are a significant or a 

heightened threat to U.S. aircraft. Yet all nine that were 

picked out made it through the system. Why is that?

MR. FLYNN: The CAPPS system and you -- I commend to you 

for reading the report of the White House Commission on Aviation 

Safety and Security, was intended to ration or to allocate the 

measures for checked baggage on flights within the United States. 

That commission, who took their responsibilities I'm sure just as 

seriously as all of you do, and included in it the DCI and the 

director of the FBI, looked at CAPPS and said what we ought to do 

with regards checked baggage in the United States, is to use 

CAPPS as the process for determining the checked baggage process. 

With regard to the checkpoint you don't need it because it is a 

100 percent application. 

I remind you with regard to explosive detection systems, 

they cost $1 million a piece. Their installation costs vary from

on up -- the installation can result in the total cost of --

multiply three times the cost of the equipment for installation. 

The recommendation of that commission was have a capital budget 

of $100 million a year. A very low estimate of the number of 

checked baggage EDS that you would need in the United States is 

1,000. Of that $100 million a considerable amount was to be used 

for other things, checkpoint equipment for example. So one would 

have a budget on average of $50 million a year for EDS. So we're 

looking at a 20-year program in order to install that equipment 

at best, so you needed to have some way of narrowing its 

application and that's what CAPPS was for.

MR. ROEMER: How did it narrow the application for anybody 

-- outside of intending to use explosive devices? How did it go 

at somebody that might hijack a plane? Especially given that 

these hijackers on September 11th may have had four-inch knives 

on them, walked through security, been detected with the knives 

and probably handed the knives back? Why did CAPPS pick these 

people out, allow them through and probably even allow them 

through with knives?

MR. FLYNN: It would have required the security measures 

for their checked baggage.

MR. ROEMER: Nothing else? Other than -- see, they could 

have had a knife on them, made the CAPPS weight and rhythm 
39

standard, been picked out as somebody with a substantially higher 

security risk, and still be handed back a four-inch knife to get 

on a plane?

MR. FLYNN: The checkpoint would not have even been aware 

of it. It was a process --

MR. ROEMER: Why would we not try to anticipate that given 

all the information coming in --

MR. FLYNN: There was no information in it --

MR. ROEMER: There's no information that I just went 

through, Mr. Flynn, about people that might be interested in 

hijacking planes or using planes as weapons?

MR. FLYNN: Oh, sure, in CAPPS the information is drawn 

from the passenger name record, has to do with behavior that is 

indicative of and then contra-indications of the behavior that 

indicates that you're not involved in any acts of crime towards 

the aircraft. Again --

MR. ROEMER: Excuse me? Can you repeat that?

MR. FLYNN: Well, there are two things in it. There are 

positives and negatives in CAPPS. 

MR. ROEMER: Well, we don't need to get into the giving 

potential terrorist information as to why they're picked out.

MR. FLYNN: But doesn't lead to any identification of 

people as terrorists.

MR. ROEMER: Let me ask you about your relationship with 

some of the other security intelligence agencies that you're 

supposedly working with leading up to September 11th.

MR. FLYNN: Yeah, I'd like to but let me deal with your 

previous point --

MR. ROEMER: I've only got a couple of minutes left, Mr. 

Flynn, and I want to get Mr. Manno in here as well, too. Your 

relationship with the FBI.

MR. FLYNN: Yes.

MR. ROEMER: You and Mr. Manno have both indicated that --

I think one of Mr. Manno's quotes is, quote, "You guys can tell 

us, the FBI, you can tell us what's happening on a street in 
40

Kabul but you can't tell us what's going on in Atlanta." I think 

your comment is you know more about what is happening in Beirut 

than what may be happening in Detroit. Why isn't the FBI able to 

pass on more actionable information, more helpful information? 

Why aren't you querying them more when all this more general 

information is coming in about terrorism and a U.S. presence of 

these terrorists and the threat to domestic airlines? Why aren't 

we seeing a better relationship and more information exchanged 

here? Why is there this so-called blind spot?

MR. FLYNN: The FBI has to do with protection of 

information in investigations and protection of grand jury 

information and various other things. But the point is that 

while I admire the people of the FBI and personally have 

excellent relations with them, we're friends and everything. 

That it was -- and I did insist and I got to the point where I 

decided that I was running the risk of making them angry and 

thought I'd better back off and ask Mr. Manno's predecessor, Mr. 

McDonald, to keep on the pressure because I was clearly 

irritating them by saying we need to know more, there's got to be 

more.

MR. ROEMER: So you kept querying the FBI to get more, to 

get more, to do more and they did not?

MR. FLYNN: Well, they probably did but they just weren't -

- you know --

MR. ROEMER: Did they pass it on to you?

MR. FLYNN: Didn't pass it on to me.

MR. ROEMER: You were not getting the adequate cooperation 

from the FBI for actionable intelligence about threats in the 

United States, is that correct?

MR. FLYNN: Yeah, and then when it turned out to it and 

other people asked them, it turned out that there wasn't an awful 

lot other than the United States being used as an R&R base for 

terrorists.

MR. ROEMER: Mr. Manno, how would you characterize your 

relationship with the FBI?

MR. FLYNN: Well, we clearly got a lot more information 

from elements of the government that collected it overseas. 

Domestically we had a lot less information and we recognized 

that. That was one of the reasons why we started discussions 

with FBI and in 1996 actually assigned somebody to be our liaison 
41

over there and to try to place them in the right place in the FBI 

where we would get the most benefit. 

As you know, it's a very big bureaucracy, very 

compartmented, and so our person over there basically had to make 

the rounds to try to get, you know, to get information. But I 

always had to do -- I mean the approach of the FBI at that time, 

it was an investigative agency. Everything was approached as an 

investigation and I think their view was if there was credible 

and specific information of interest to you we will provide it to 

you, and I think that they did.

They also cooperated with us. For example, earlier you had 

mentioned these two threats about crashing an airplane into the 

World Trade Center and another one about crashing a plane into an 

airport in the United States which we had factored those two 

things in some of the assessments that we had written about that 

potential threat. Well, the FBI actually ran those two threats 

to ground and discredited them.

MR. ROEMER: Did they share the files, the paperwork, the 

information with you?

MR. MANNO: They told us that it was not credible.

MR. ROEMER: Did they share the information, the paperwork 

and the background documents with you?

MR. MANNO: No. I don't think so beyond that, beyond 

telling us that there was nothing to --

MR. ROEMER: They verbally told you, "Here was what we found 

and we dismissed it?" They didn't exchange any kind of paperwork 

with you?

MR. MANNO: No because again they had assessed it as not 

credible. 

MR. ROEMER: So you're saying the FBI, there was a blind 

spot there that you did not get as much information on the 

domestic situation in Atlanta as you might have been getting on 

Kabul. The TIPOFF program, you were not getting the names from 

the TIPOFF program in the State Department. There was a gap of 

about, you know, 60,988 names. Where were you getting your 

actual intelligence?

MR. MANNO: We did get some from the FBI. We got a lot of 

it from CIA. We also had a liaison officer assigned to the 

Counterterrorism Center at CIA and another one at the State 
42

Department in the threat analysis shop. So there was a lot of 

State Department reporting, a lot of CIA reporting, some FBI 

information, but not a daily from the FBI, not a daily flow as to 

what was going on in the United States in regards to their 

investigations. If they came across something specific, 

something that they assessed to be specific and credible in their 

investigations and we were fairly confident that they would 

provide that to us either directly or through our liaison 

officer. But we don't know what we don't know. 

MR. ROEMER: Why didn't you have a liaison to NSA or to DIA?

MR. MANNO: At that time, we were a very small staff. In 

fact, our total shop was about 24 analysts and it was a matter of 

resources. Subsequent to that, of course, we now have a liaison 

officer at NSA, at TTIC and other places, some of which didn't 

even exist back then. But in trying to decide where we would 

assign people, again limited resources, it's where we thought we 

would get the most information, where it was most valuable. We 

did have a customer service representative from NSA that visited 

our office and couriered information to us. So there was a 

relationship with NSA. We just did not have someone there at 

that time.

MR. ROEMER: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

MR. KEAN: Senator Kerrey.

MR. BOB KERREY: Commissioner Garvey, I'd like to ask you a 

couple of questions. You had your first five-year term, I 

believe --

MS. GARVEY: That's correct, Commissioner.

MR. KERREY: So you were appointed in '97 and you served all 

the way to 2002.

MS. GARVEY: That is correct.

MR. KERREY: During that five-year period, did you ever get 

any complaints about the airlines?

MS. GARVEY: Complaints about the airlines or complaints 

from the airlines, I'm sorry?

MR. KERREY: I presume you got complaints from the airlines 

but did you ever get any complaints from passengers about the 

airlines?
43

MS. GARVEY: The passenger complaints would go into the 

Department of Transportation into the chief counsel's office. We 

didn't specifically get complaints in that way.

MR. KERREY: Are you alert to any complaints about excessive 

applications of Title 49 of the U.S. Code, the section 44902 that 

gives the airlines the authority -- and their language is to 

refuse to transport a passenger or property which carriage is or 

might be inimical to safety?

MS. GARVEY: We might have gotten some complaints. In fact, 

I'm sure we did in the Safety Office regarding -- from passengers 

about perhaps being mistreated or not treated correctly, at least 

in their view.

MR. KERREY: That's not the same thing as --

MS. GARVEY: No, no. I'm not recalling any and I'm sorry.

MR. KERREY: I'd just like to know because one of the things 

that I keep hearing is, gee, we don't want to put anybody on the 

list because we'd be harassing people and I've --

MS. GARVEY: Well, I see what you're saying.

MR. KERREY: I've stood in lots of security lines and heard 

lots of complaints but I've never heard that somebody has been 

removed from the airlines that was unsafe. I've heard a lot more 

complaints about people who have been prevented from getting on 

airlines than just because of the -- what I consider at the 

moment to be largely reactive as security measure but that's 

another point.

The no-fly list has been referenced a couple of times. Are 

you familiar with the no-fly list?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, absolutely, Commissioner and you know, 

again from my perspective and I know there has been a number of 

questions on this, but from the administrator's perspective, the 

no-fly list, as Mr. Manno indicated, was created based on 

information we received from others with a specific aviation --

MR. KERREY: You got Security Directive 95 of 02H, updated 

April 24th, 2000. Six people who are associates of Ramzi Yousef, 

including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed that are on the list. That's 

six. I presume the airlines have no difficulty handling six.

Mr. Manno, you wouldn't defend the airlines if they 

complained about trying to keep six people off? It may be 
44

difficult for all I know. I don't know. Is it harder than it 

looks?

MR. MANNO: No, not with a list that small. 

MR. KERREY: What was the judgment that was made in April 

2000 to put these six on the list? On what basis was Khalid 

Shaikh Mohammed, Ibrahim, all these guys -- there was six people 

on the list and then there's six more that come on the list on 

August 28, '01. They're also added on the list and, by the way, 

they all -- every single one are associated with some Islamic 

extremist group.

And I really think part of the problem that we're having 

today is we continue to tread lightly on this fact. And we keep 

calling them all terrorists, you know, as if there's a worldwide 

network of terrorists of all different stripes, of all different 

genders, all different kinds. I mean, the only one that makes 

the list -- there's actually a couple of people lower down the 

list that appear on there that may not be associated with this 

Islamic extremist effort -- are people who are associated with 

some Islamist extremist network. Is that your understanding of 

it? Is that how they made the list? I mean, they're making the 

list because --

MR. MANNO: The way that those individuals made the list is 

that it came out of the investigation being conducted by the FBI 

and by the Philippine authority.

MR. KERREY: So did the FBI recommend they be put on the 

list?

MR. MANNO: We received information that actually had 

originated in a cooperative effort between FBI and CIA. So we 

receive intelligence reporting that these individuals were tied 

to --

MR. KERREY: You receive intelligence reporting from CIA and 

FBI?

MR. MANNO: Yes, sir.

MR. KERREY: Saying that these six should be on the list? 

Did you --

MR. MANNO: No, sir. That they were associated with Ramzi 

Yousef who, as you well know, had been involved in the Bojinka 

plot and that they were in some way tied to that plot. So we had 
45

a concern, a specific concern about these individuals, not 

knowing what else they might have been up to and therefore --

MR. KERREY: Did you consider putting other people on the 

list at the time that might have some association with Ramzi 

Yousef?

MR. MANNO: These were the names that came to us in the 

intelligence reporting. Again it was tied back to the specific 

plot.

MR. KERREY: You're confusing me, Mr. Manno. At one point 

you're saying you're making the decision. Now it's somebody else 

that's making the decision. You're making the decision who to 

put on the list and I'm asking you, did you consider putting 

other people on the list beside these six?

MR. MANNO: As far as I know, at that time, those were the 

only names that we had tied to that plot. 

MR. KERREY: Did you put out an inquiry as to whether or not 

there might be some additional names that should be put on the 

list?

MR. MANNO: Absolutely. It's part of our standard --

MR. KERREY: Who did you put the inquiry to?

MR. MANNO: With CIA.

MR. KERREY: Do you remember the response?

MR. MANNO: No, sir.

MR. KERREY: You now remember you presume that they didn't 

respond?

MR. MANNO: Part of the process for us, whenever we open one 

of the intelligence case files that I mentioned earlier, is to 

follow up on that and to continue to ask questions for additional 

information. So it's just part of the process. It's not 

something that was done only in this case. It's done in all 

cases where --

MR. KERREY: I just score the point that a number of other 

commissioners have made. Given the specificity of U.S. Code 49, 

what it requires the airlines to do, it seems to me, particularly 

with what was going on at the time, that some effort would have 

been made to make -- to produce a larger list than that. And 
46

again, I score the point, to call them terrorists as opposed to 

saying this is a part of a worldwide network of Islamic 

extremists, I think, makes it exceptionally difficult to do what 

you need to do, which is to identify those who are extremists and 

keep them on the no-fly list and keep them watchlisted as opposed 

to having a sort of a broad blanket screen that might produce 

harassment of people who just look like they might be Muslim 

extremists. I think there is a paradox here. Not saying what it 

actually is, you end up harassing people who may not actually be 

terrorists. But that's a longer point.

Let me ask you, Mr. Manno. You were the deputy -- was it 

Pat McDonald who was your predecessor?

MR. MANNO: Yes.

MR. KERREY: Were you present when he did the CD-ROM 

briefing on April 2000?

MR. MANNO: When it was produced, yes.

MR. KERREY: Were you present in April 2000 when he 

presented it? 

Administrator Garvey, were you present when this --

MS. GARVEY: No, I was not.

MR. KERREY: Have you seen the details of it?

MS. GARVEY: I have not. It has only been reported to me.

MR. KERREY: When was it reported to you?

MS. GARVEY: Post-9/11.

MR. KERREY: Have you seen it, Mr. Manno?

MR. MANNO: The CD-ROM was actually produced in about 700 

copies and disseminated to the aviation industry, airports, FAA 

field offices. So it was actually quite widespread.

MR. KERREY: I have here the rebuttal that you all have sent 

up for Eleanor Hill's statements that she made to the Joint 

Inquiry. She was, I think, the staff director for the Joint 

Inquiry. Things that she said about the FAA, didn't do this, 

didn't do this, didn't do this, and your rebuttals are basically, 

we didn't know, we didn't get the intel, nobody told us, right 

down the list. The CIA didn't tell us, FBI didn't tell us.
47

And I've got to say just honestly, if it had been two or 

three of them, I would have been on your side, but when it 

accumulates like 15 or 20 of them, at some point you say, geez, 

why didn't you push back and ask? I mean, I just tell you, my 

reaction to your rebuttals does not bring glory to the agency. 

It's quite the opposite. It causes me to say, I don't understand 

how there could be so many situations where you simply say, they 

didn't tell us.

This, by the way, is not they didn't tell us. You go 

through the 29 slides I think we've got here, 29 slides. Mr. 

Manno --

MR. MANNO: Yes, sir, I'm familiar with it.

MR. KERREY: -- you've gone through them?

MR. MANNO: Pardon?

MR. KERREY: You've gone through the slides?

MR. MANNO: Yes, sir.

MR. KERREY: Well, this is your own agency making an 

assessment of Islamic extremist and the dangers and the threat 

that they pose to the United States of America. It's not 

terrorists again. I hope I don't offend too much some of my 

Muslim friends who think that I'm being nasty in this regard. 

But there's nobody on this list except UBL and people that are 

associated with UBL or other Islamic extremist groups. I mean, 

that's basically what this is a presentation of. I mean, 

Hezbollah's identified as a threat, but you're talking about UBL 

all the way through this thing. You're talking about Usama bin 

Laden and al Qaeda and the threat that they present to the United 

States of America.

MR. MANNO: Well, historically the groups that have targeted 

aviation have been Islamic extremists, yes.

MR. KERREY: Historically?

MR. MANNO: Hezbollah. Pardon, sir?

MR. KERREY: Historically?

MR. MANNO: Historically. Going back to Hezbollah, for 

example, is one of the other groups.
48

MR. KERREY: Give me historically. What are you talking 

about historically? Last 10 years?

MR. MANNO: Since 1985, with the hijacking of TWA 847 by 

Hezbollah.

MR. KERREY: Did any change occur in 1998?

MR. MANNO: No.

MR. KERREY: So you're saying that basically you've got a --

I mean, are you saying that there's no increase and concern about 

the danger to the United States from Islamic extremists in 1998?

MR. MANNO: No. There was. And we wrote several 

assessments, sent out information circulars and --

MR. KERREY: But if you -- let me just pull up one of these 

slides. I think it was the one that Commissioner Roemer quoted 

from. I've got to get the exact -- no, I've got it right here 

unfortunately. It's slide 24. When the conclusion is -- and I 

guess, Irish, I'm asking you on this one, which is when the 

conclusion is reached in slide 24, that fortunately we have no 

indication any group is currently thinking in that direction. 

That's the statement that's made. And there's a lot in that 

statement. We have no indication that any group is currently 

thinking in that direction. 

I mean, the first question I would ask is, so, do I need an 

indication that somebody is thinking in that direction? I mean, 

take the Ressam plot. We've got the details of the Ressam plot 

not ahead of time. We didn't have the Ressam plot prior to 

arresting Ressam in Seattle, did we? I mean, even the threat to 

LAX. We didn't knock that threat down as a consequence of 

security at LAX. We didn't discover the details of the plot. So 

when you say, Administrator Garvey, we had -- your language is we 

had no credible and specific intelligence indicator that UBL and 

all the rest of them were actually plotting to hijack commercial 

planes, I'd say do you have to have a specific plot? Do you need 

a memo from them saying, this is what we're going to do? And the 

answer's no.

And so when you say, we have no indication any group is 

currently thinking in that direction, I wondered, did you -- was 

there a conversation? Is that challenged internally? I don't 

know what the process is. Do you have a conversation with 

anybody from the National Security Council? How do you get that 

double-checked, because as it turns out, it wasn't true?
49

MR. MANNO: That was an analytical judgment. There was no 

specific and credible information that al Qaeda or anybody else -

-

MR. KERREY: No, no. Believe me, I know it's an analytical 

judgment. I recognize it as an analytical judgment. The 

question is, was Jim or Mary or Dick sitting there saying their 

analytical judgment was completely different. And, in fact, 

looking at some of the previous slides, some of the previous 

slides state just the opposite, seem to indicate just the 

opposite. I mean, the possibility of a suicide bombing attack 

was mentioned in one of the previous slides. I mean, I do this -

- I mean, it's not like I don't have internal contradictions that 

I don't need my wife or somebody else to point out, but did 

anybody else disagree at that presentation? Did anybody internal 

to FAA security disagree with that conclusion?

MR. MANNO: No. But, again, the hijacking threat was not 

discounted. But in the grand scheme of things, looking at the 

variety of threats that we were looking at, it was considered 

less of a threat at the time than --

MR. KERREY: Okay. So it's less of a threat. You say it's 

a low probability. That's not very comforting to passengers to 

hear that if it's a low probability, don't do anything with it. 

I mean, God, how high probability is it I'm going to do any 

damage with my fingernail clippers on an airplane, but you take 

those every damn time I get on the plane. So you've got a low 

probability for hijacking and therefore we're not going to put 

much energy into it. Is that what you're saying?

MR. FLYNN: May I --

MR. KERREY: Yes, sir.

MR. FLYNN: We were working hard on the anti-hijacking. And 

the improvement of the pre-board screening was an important 

aspect of it. I did not see, and as I said earlier, should have 

worked at it harder to see how is it that they'd bring it about.

MR. KERREY: Well, let me -- can I --

MR. FLYNN: Sure.

MR. KERREY: I'll just make the declaratory, because I want 

to --

MR. FLYNN: And with regard to the thing you were reading, 

that happens to be after I left FAA. But the --
50

MR. KERREY: In May of 2000?

MR. FLYNN: Was that in May of 2000?

MR. KERREY: May of 2000.

MR. FLYNN: No, no. That was before. That was when I was 

there.

MR. KERREY: I mean, I just tell you, I asked staff to give 

this to me and I just read it this morning and you can't blame 

the CIA and the FBI on that one. I mean, you've got enough 

information already internal to FAA that said you be -- it's not 

-- again, it's Usama bin Laden and Muslim extremists. I mean, 

there was one incident of a hijacking with the possibility of a 

suicide where they were actually saying they wanted Ramzi Yousef 

released. I mean, the whole story line as presented just by that 

single narrative from that presentation in May says we better be 

careful about hijacking. We better move the possibility even of 

a suicide hijacking up on our list. 

And, by the way, the declaratory that I wanted to make to 

all of you is that I know it's a very sensitive document, but 

among the concerns that I had pre-9/11 and I've really got it 

still today, are the details of what's called the -- what do you 

call it, the Air Carrier Standard Security Program. Are you all 

familiar with the air carrier? Administrator Garvey, are you --

MS. GARVEY: Yes. Yes, sir.

MR. KERREY: I mean, that's basically -- you know, what do 

people do on the plane if they're facing a hijacker. And I think 

those procedures were wrong. On the morning of the 11th of 

September, I think those procedures made it almost impossible for 

these guys not to fail. They would need these -- the Leatherman 

knives that were being passed around. I think the procedures 

were flawed then and my concern is they may still be flawed. I 

mean, are they reviewed? 

I mean, Irish, as a special ops guy, do you look at these 

things and say, okay, now you've got four guys on an airplane, a 

relatively confined piece of real estate. And you've followed 

what Congress has done. My God, the pilots have guns now. You 

know, and my experience is people have become pilots because they 

don't know how to use guns, now they got guns. And, by the way, 

they're going to be shooting in the wrong direction as far as I'm 

concerned.
51

So, I mean, have we reviewed this? Was it on the list of 

things in May of 2000 as you're evaluating what you're going to 

do to carry out U.S. Code 49? Who are you going to deny on 

there? Who's going to be dangerous on there? Is that part of 

the evaluation that was going on? If so, why was it not changed? 

Yes, sir.

MR. FLYNN: With regard to keeping -- preventing of 

hijacking, the program for it was indeed to keep determined 

hijackers off. And the hijacking scenario that one had in mind 

was taking the aircraft, taking it on the ground, taking it on 

the air, but bringing it to ground and asking for the release of 

people, for example.

MR. KERREY: How many flights a day in the United States of 

America?

MR. FLYNN: Forty thousand.

MR. KERREY: Commercial flights.

MS. GARVEY: I was going to say 35,000 to 40,000.

MR. KERREY: One of -- I mean, I understand that I -- I've 

got obviously some sharp questions of all of you what was going 

on pre-9/11. I'm also very much aware what I was being told by 

Sandy Berger, George Tenet and others about bin Laden and I know 

that it was in a presidential directive written after 1998 and I 

said it before and I'll say it again. After the attack on Dar es 

Salaam in Nairobi -- and I say it with great respect, 

Administrator Garvey -- you said that after 9/11, there was a 

war, before 9/11, there was a war. There was a war before 9/11. 

It didn't start with 9/11. That was one of the military actions 

against us. 

There was a war going on before that and I'm not blaming you 

for this because it seems to me at some point the President's 

national security advisor, whether it was President Clinton or 

President Bush or Burger or Rice, they got to drive this thing 

all the way down to the FAA or it's not going to work. You're 

the only -- with all kinds of other problems, whether it's CIA or 

the FBI simply saying, "We're not going to tell you what's going 

on." But at the time, in 1998, there was no question that bin 

Laden was public enemy number one and that he had declared on us 

and that, by the way, he was enormously sophisticated.

It was not like World Trade Center I where somebody was 

trying to get a refund on a Ryder truck. They were very 

sophisticated to be able to hit Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in the 
52

way that they did and it should have, I think, then driven all 

the way down to the FAA so that you modified and changed the 

procedures on that airplane -- on those airplanes. I 

passionately believe that's the case. 

MR. ROEMER: If I could just jump in --

MR. KERREY: You can take over.

MR. ROEMER: -- it wasn't just a one-trick pony. We did not 

have other mechanisms to go after things other than explosives. 

In testimony to Senator McCain's committee, Administrator Garvey, 

you said and I quote, "All of our security directives, all of our 

security recommendations in the past have been geared toward 

explosives. This was a whole new world for us." 

MS. GARVEY: That is correct, sir. I mean, the assumptions 

were -- as you all have indicated, as the staff indicated in 

their report -- the assumptions were turned on its head and 

that's correct.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KEAN: Commissioner Gorelick.

MS. JAMIE S. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

These are questions for Admiral Flynn and Director Manno. You 

were both present, in your respective positions, in the run-up to 

the millennium. My first question for you is this, did you have 

procedures in place for enhancing the security measures at 

airports or otherwise when there would be a security alert? Did 

you have the ability to ratchet up the policies and procedures 

for security before people boarded aircraft?

MR. FLYNN: Yes. 

MS. GORELICK: In the period just before the millennium, 

when the entire government was on alert about the possibility of 

a terrorist act in the United States, did you take any steps to 

increase security measures or enhance security measure in our 

airports or pre-boarding?

MR. FLYNN: We had and the entire baseline effort was 

directed towards that.

MS. GORELICK: I don't understand the answer. In the period 

--
53

MR. FLYNN: I'm sorry. From the period of '96 through 2000, 

we were working all the time to improve the effectiveness of preboard screenings?

MS. GORELICK: But you just said you had the capacity to 

ratchet up security measures --

MR. FLYNN: Yes.

MS. GORELICK: -- and I'm asking, in the period prior to the 

millennium when the entire government was on alert, did you put 

in place those enhanced measures?

MR. FLYNN: They were in place. We did not, that I recall, 

other than when Ressam was caught -- then we did some additional 

specific information. But I don't recall SDs that we did in that 

period because we were strengthening the basic program to deal 

with that.

MS. GORELICK: So, just so I understand it, after Ressam was 

caught and we knew that there was an attempt to infiltrate this 

country, that specifically airports were being targeted, did you 

or did you not take additional measures beyond the measures that 

had been in place before he was caught to strengthen security in 

aviation?

MR. FLYNN: I don't recall putting on SDs at that time. I 

recall very definitely that what we did with regards to Ressam is 

make everyone aware of what a bomb made with the materials that 

he had would look like and we did that even before I was aware 

that LAX was on his mind.

MS. GORELICK: So, in other words, your response was to 

disseminate specific information but not to do things like look 

at carry-ons, inspect carry-ons, which you weren't routinely 

doing or look for additional names to put on a no-fly list or 

anything else that might relate to aviation security.

MR. FLYNN: We were routinely and with increased emphasis 

looking at carry-ons.

MS. GORELICK: You were inspecting the insides of carry-ons 

or you were screening carry-ons?

MR. FLYNN: Both.

MS. GORELICK: On a routine basis, you were looking on the 

inside of carry-ons prior --
54

MR. FLYNN: We had a continuous opening and search routine. 

In effect, it was at random and then additionally, when there was 

any indication in an X-ray requiring that there was something 

dangerous that required opening, all electronic items and on a 

random basis additionally, there was trace explosive detection 

that had been done at that point.

MS. GORELICK: When someone set off a magnetometer, was 

their bag routinely opened? Their carry-on bag?

MR. FLYNN: No.

MS. GORELICK: When they set off a magnetometer twice, was 

their bag opened?

MR. FLYNN: Not unless there was some indication in the bag 

or if something dangerous was determined -- was taken off the 

person, then there had to be additional scrutiny of the bag. If 

there was cause to suspect this person.

MS. GORELICK: You answered my question a minute ago. I 

asked you whether there were enhanced procedures that you could 

utilize when there was a specific security alert, you said yes. 

What were those procedures? What would you do when there was a 

security alert, when you were essentially going to orange from 

yellow, although we didn't have color coding at the time?

MR. FLYNN: One could require, for example, searches of 

vehicles at the front of the terminal. One could require the 

stopping of parking within a certain range of the terminal. We 

could require additional searches of people on the basis of some 

indication that would come to you that they would be naval 

aviators from Philadelphia or whatever.

MS. GORELICK: In the spring and summer of 2001 -- I guess 

this would be a question for Mr. Manno -- you were aware, were 

you not, of the heightened security warnings that were going out 

through the government?

MR. MANNO: We put out warnings during that timeframe as 

well for our customers. 

MS. GORELICK: Did you consider, at that time, increasing 

the security measures in the way that Admiral Flynn has just 

described to meet this enhanced security threat?

MR. MANNO: It was not the role of the Office of 

Intelligence to direct security measures. Our role was to try, 

to the extent that we could, to identify the threats and then 
55

provide that information to the aviation policy and operations 

folks to determine whether or not measures should be increased. 

There were efforts that were made. Going back to the Ressam 

example, there was a mad effort to try to figure out what he was 

actually up to. 

In fact, one of the things that was done was that our bomb 

explosives -- our explosives unit looked at what was actually 

seized and tried to figure out, okay, with these types of 

explosives, these types of timers, what sort of device could be 

constructed to target civil aviation. And then, based on that 

information, the possibility that having those components, what 

could be done. We sent out an information circular to sensitize 

screeners and the airlines to that potential threat.

MS. GORELICK: But you had in the – turning back to the 

summer, spring and summer of 2001, we have heard testimony and we 

have ample evidence that across the intelligence community, 

literally hair was on fire through June through the summer and 

even going back a little bit before June but through the spring 

and the summer, a high, high state of alert --

MR. FLYNN: Let me try again. It started with the World 

Trade Center. It continued with Yousef’s efforts out in the 

Pacific and it continued with the information that we've been 

talking about, the various interests of the UBL in attacking us. 

And in '96-'97 we hammered out an elevated baseline. We had been 

going back and forth with security directives with occasional 

spikes in security and then bringing them down. We said, no, we 

get it up to this level.

And our effort in those times of undetermined but probably 

higher threat, what's happening with the millennium? Well, we 

don't really know what's going to happen at the millennium, but 

something is going to happen. What you do in those -- what they 

did in those circumstances was to increase surveillance on all 

the inspection activities and to increase awareness in the form 

of putting out ICs and meetings with the security directors and 

meetings with the airlines and meetings with the airports to say, 

we need to be on our toes.

MS. GORELICK: So the additional measures -- you could and 

did take additional measures when there was a high level of 

security alert. Is that correct?

MR. FLYNN: No. The baseline was meant to deal with an 

elevated level of security.
56

MS. GORELICK: So you did not have additional -- I am 

terribly confused here. Now --

MR. FLYNN: I'm sorry.

MS. GORELICK: -- please excuse me. I asked you the 

question whether you had additional measures that you could take 

that you had. I understand you were -- you feel that you were 

operating from a high baseline.

MR. FLYNN: Right.

MS. GORELICK: I asked you did you have additional measures 

that you could take? And the measures could be anything from 

sending out directives, to engaging with airport security 

personnel, to engaging directly with the airlines, to changing 

the modalities like searching and getting additional names for 

the no-fly list. There's a panoply of things that you could do 

above the baseline. I'm asking a pretty straight forward 

question. Did you have measures that you could use when there 

was a heightened period of alert, yes or no?

MR. FLYNN: Yes.

MS. GORELICK: In the period prior to the millennium, after 

Ressam was apprehended and it was clear in what is already public 

and certainly in what we know from classified briefings that the 

entire government was on alert, that there was tracking of people 

who meant to do harm in this country and that some of that harm 

was focused on our airlines and our aircraft, did you take 

additional measures at that time to secure the airlines?

MR. FLYNN: I did not impose, that I recall, additional 

specific measures.

MS. GORELICK: You did not?

MR. FLYNN: Not that I recall. I may be wrong about that.

MS. GORELICK: In the spring and summer of 2001 when, as our 

briefings and testimony to us have indicated, the hair of the 

intelligence community was on fire given the nature of the 

warnings that we were getting, not specific as to what would 

happen, but that something was about to happen, (a) were you 

aware of those warnings? And I guess you were gone by then, is 

that right, Admiral Flynn? So I'll put that question to Director 

Manno.

Were you aware of that state of affairs?
57

MR. MANNO: Yes. And, as I said, we also issued information 

circulars regarding those to --

MS. GORELICK: Did you advise or advocate any further steps 

than issuing the directives or security circulars that you 

issued?

MR. MANNO: Again, the role of intelligence is to provide 

the intelligence and not to direct or make specific security 

recommendations.

MS. GORELICK: I'm limited here because I don't have in 

front of me Admiral Flynn's successor, so I'll turn to Ms. 

Garvey.

Did you consider taking any additional security steps in the 

spring and summer of 2001 in response to the heightened security 

warnings?

MS. GARVEY: I know we put out additional security 

directives, and I'd have to go back and look and see specifically 

if there were additional measures that were included, and we can 

do that and provide that for the record. But you're absolutely 

right. We were aware of increased activity, had been briefed 

directly by Admiral Flynn's successor on the concern and that is 

reflected both in the security directives and in the information 

circulars.

If I also could, just to go back to Y2K for a moment or to 

the millennium, while -- and again I'll provide for the record or 

ask the FAA and TSA to provide for the record specifically if any 

directives went out or intelligence circulars went out at that 

time. I can tell you that there were any number of meetings 

across the Administration, across DOT that involved the FAA and 

the industry about concerns related both to safety and security. 

The Department of Transportation had a couple of tabletop 

exercises that I participated in, and the principal focus 

obviously was to make sure that we had the measures in place that 

we had, that we were doing everything we possibly could.

MS. GORELICK: And this occurred in the run-up to the 

millennium. Is that correct?

MS. GARVEY: This occurred in the run up to the millennium.

MS. GORELICK: And was there analogous -- were there 

analogous meetings across the government at a very high level 
58

with industry tabletops, as you were describing, in the spring 

and summer of 2001?

MS. GARVEY: I can't say for certainty that there were. My 

understanding is that there were. I know that at the Department 

of Transportation we certainly were engaged in that, as well as 

the very direct communication on -- I don't want to say a daily 

basis, but certainly a weekly basis with members of the industry.

MS. GORELICK: But you were the administrator at both times. 

Correct?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, that's correct, Commissioner.

MS. GORELICK: Okay. And you remember doing what you just 

described in the run up to the millennium. Is that correct?

MS. GARVEY: That's correct.

MS. GORELICK: Do you have a similar specific recollection 

of your involvement in the spring and summer of 2001?

MS. GARVEY: No, I do not, Commissioner. No, no tabletop 

exercises. 2000 and 2001 what I remember more specifically would 

be the intelligence briefings I would get from my own internal 

intelligence people.

MS. GORELICK: Can you compare the intensity of your 

agency's response to the intelligence that you were getting in 

the end of 1999 with the intensity of your agency's response in 

the spring and summer of 2001?

MS. GARVEY: Well, certainly Y2K there was an intensity 

because it was a deadline that we knew was looming. It was a 

deadline that was there and it had enormous implications even 

from a safety perspective, or at least we were concerned that it 

might. I think the intensity that you describe was probably in 

the summer of 2000 and 2001, particularly 2001. Certainly I had 

a concern based on what I was hearing.

I think the great frustration -- and I understand the 

Commissioners’ frustration with the statement credible and 

reliable, and I always -- I don't want to -- I understand the 

frustration with that phrase. But on the other hand, I think --

and I think to some degree the security people are feeling the 

same thing today. You want to do the right thing, but you want 

to have enough information so that you're acting appropriately. 

You're not either putting measures in place that are 
59

inappropriate, beyond or may not be dealing with the real threat 

at hand.

MS. GORELICK: Rather than rely then on your impressionistic 

recollections of what you did, I would request for the record 

that we receive from you and from your former colleagues at the 

FAA a detailed description of the actions that were taken at the 

end of 1999 and a detailed description of the actions that were 

taken in the spring and summer of 2001. Thank you.

MR. KEAN: Commissioner Ben-Veniste.

MR. RICHRD BEN-VENISTE: Well, I think I'll start by simply 

observing from my own personal view that this war on terrorism 

may or may not be the right way to describe our efforts to combat 

a vicious, murderous gang which did and continues to mean us 

harm. I don't know whether elevating it to a war, in my own 

view, gives undue deference to these bloodthirsty individuals and 

their methods and motivations. But let me ask this question with 

respect to the important information that has been developed this 

morning by my colleagues. 

We're looking at a situation, at least as of July of 2001, 

where the FAA itself has gone to the trouble of communicating a 

statement which is put in the Federal Register. So that means 

that there was prior planning and discussion until you get to the 

point of actually putting it in the Federal Register, and that 

says on July 17, 2001, "Terrorism can occur anytime and anywhere 

in the United States. Members of foreign terrorist groups, 

representatives from state sponsors of terrorism, and radical 

fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the 

United States."

You recognize that. "The activities of some of these 

individuals and groups now include recruiting other persons for 

terrorist activities and training them to use weapons and make 

bombs." And then you conclude, "Thus, an increasing threat to 

civil aviation from both foreign sources and potential domestic 

ones exists and needs to be prevented and/or countered."

So that's the set as we move toward the 9/11 catastrophe. 

At the same time, as we have pointed out and as Commissioner 

Gorelick has just very eloquently pointed out, the point people 

in our intelligence community have received and are reacting very 

strongly to a great deal of intelligence information which is 

suggesting that some major event is about to happen. While the 

primary focus was on the possibility of striking U.S. interests 

overseas, they could not and did not rule out the potential for 

activity in the United States of a terrorist nature.
60

So, you send out directives, but the question is who 

receives the directives? What happens to the people on the line 

making the day-to-day decisions that will implement these

security measures? That's what I find so hard to understand 

because nine of the hijackers are pulled out for secondary 

screening.

Now, Admiral Flynn, you said that additional attention would 

be paid to them if in fact they were found to be in possession of 

something dangerous. Now, we've seen this morning this 

Leatherman tool which contains blades of four inches and which 

has the ability to lock into place. And the heft of this device 

is extremely heavy and provides something other than a penknife 

and a lightweight handle for someone to grasp. It's extremely 

sharp, it's just under four inches and the fact that it locks 

into place is significant in terms of its utility as a weapon, I 

think you'll concede that.

So when we are on such high alert, when there are 

advisories, when there is a recognition that the potential for a 

domestic hijacking exists and may be carried out by 

fundamentalist elements who have been tracked and described and 

whose motivations have been categorized for years and years, and 

then an individual in the screening process, seeing a young Arab 

male carrying such a device, is not interviewed: What are you 

doing with this? Where are you going? Who are you? How long 

have you been here? The sort of common sense that we heard 

yesterday from an INS officer, Jose Melendez.

But that was not done not once, not twice, nine times as 

people set off magnetometers, which of course was the case we 

know with respect to at least some of the hijackers. I don't 

understand how you could have all of these directives and taking 

additional security measures when the individuals who are 

conducting the security measures are not themselves told to be 

alert and specifically for the type of people who you know, on 

the basis of what you are saying yourselves, might be the ones to 

carry out such terrorist acts. Admiral Flynn?

MR. FLYNN: With regard to people, we were under very strict 

guidelines not to select people on the basis of ethnicity or 

national origin.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: But somebody of ethnicity who fits the 

description of what you yourself regard as the principal threat 

domestically to airline security, carrying a knife like this, 

does that not -- did that not at that time at least warrant the 
61

individual conducting that security measure to ask some 

questions?

MR. FLYNN: No.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, when you say that an individual 

carrying something dangerous would in fact trigger a response, 

you would think, for the collection of at least more information, 

what more could you mean? That if he was carrying a hand grenade 

or an automatic weapon certainly such a person would be placed 

immediately under arrest. But isn't this a dangerous weapon?

MR. FLYNN: Yes, and there are other things that are 

dangerous. But the menace that's conveyed by them is less than 

the innocent reasons for having them in people's possession.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: But let me stop you there. When you say 

that the possession of a dangerous article would warrant further 

scrutiny, if it is a dangerous article that is prohibited, that's 

end of case. You're under arrest, good-bye, good luck, off the 

plane. So --

MR. FLYNN: Well, not necessarily. By the way, not 

necessarily.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: A gun?

MR. FLYNN: Well, a gun, yes. By the way --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: An explosive device?

MR. FLYNN: Well, to be accurate, guns did not necessarily 

end in arrest. Two thousand of them per year were taken away; 

the number of arrests was in the hundreds.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: So that if --

MR. FLYNN: If I --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: If a young Arab male on 9/11 was found to 

be in the possession of a handgun, you might suspect that that 

gun would be confiscated but the individual allowed to proceed on 

his way?

MR. FLYNN: Unlikely. I mean, there would be a police 

interview. The police would respond, and unlikely. But, for 

example, when congressmen carry pistols through screening 

checkpoints, it may or may not lead to their arrest.
62

MR. BEN-VENISTE: To the best of my knowledge none of these 

individuals were members of Congress.

MR. FLYNN: No. But, Commissioner --

MR. BEN-VENISTE: I'm trying to understand what seems to me 

to be a disconnect between your statement that an individual who 

is found in possession of something dangerous and referred to 

secondary would be subjected to greater scrutiny. We have no 

information as to whether these individuals were in fact 

interviewed and the information seems to point to the fact that 

they were not.

MR. FLYNN: No, the secondary screening is the secondary 

search of them and their bags for objects. And in certain 

instances the -- in certain positive indications of explosives, 

for example, is there an indication that accounts for that? 

Interviews to that extent.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Would you not agree that the human factor 

could well have played a role at these points of security, 

beginning to question somebody about just the basics of where 

you're going, what are you doing, what do you need this for, how 

long have you been here, and watch for indications of erratic 

behavior or anomalies in the answers?

Commissioner Garvey?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, as I listen to you and consider 

the situation as you have outlined it, it is discouraging and 

certainly heartbreaking to think that the security directives 

went out, the information circulars and perhaps, as you've 

indicated, the human element came into play. Certainly the 

testimony that you heard, that this commission heard yesterday, 

of the border guard and the real, I think, thoughtfulness and 

carefulness with which he approached his job, you would certainly 

hope that we could have had that same outcome on the aviation 

side. So I think you're right in saying that and I would agree.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Thank you. With respect to, Mr. Manno, 

your statement that, in a sense, the classification of 

information, the security sensitive information, was a bar to the 

dissemination of the information to you and your colleagues is, 

again, very troubling to us. The idea that we spend all the time 

and effort and treasure to acquire information that may be 

useful, and yet that information is not provided to the 

individuals -- or was not then provided to the individuals and 

agencies who would be in a position to utilize that information 

is extremely distressing. 
63

And I'll finish with making an observation about a point 

that, Admiral Flynn, you mentioned, and that is the restrictions 

on the FBI dissemination of material because it may be grand jury 

material. Now, this has always bugged me because I have quite a 

bit of personal experience with grand jury material and with the 

rule 6E of the Federal Rules that requires that such information 

be held confidential. The purpose for that rule is to assure the 

confidentiality of witness testimony and that individuals who are 

called before a grand jury can feel confident that their 

testimony will not, other than through the appropriate legal 

means, make its way into the public arena. 

However, it seems to me the exception, in my experience --

and I feel pretty strongly about this -- that information is 

generated only by the grand jury when there is a grand jury 

investigation. In the normal course of events, the FBI has that 

information through interviews and is in possession of that 

information entirely apart from the grand jury process. And the 

utilization of such information which is acquired perhaps through 

dual means, once through investigation and secondarily through 

testimony in a grand jury, does not somehow then take that 

information out of the public realm simply because it has been 

repeated in a grand jury. That is, if the FBI has valuable 

information which it has uncovered in the course of an 

investigation, rule 6E does not somehow provide an amulet for the 

refusal to disseminate that information to those who are entitled 

to get it. Do you have any comment on that, Admiral?

MR. FLYNN: Yes. Not being a lawyer, I am -- I probably put 

far too much emphasis on the protection of grand jury information 

as the reason for not giving us more detailed information.

MR. BEN-VENISTE: Well, we have heard that explanation from 

time-to-time and I felt that your reference to it perhaps 

entitled us to comment with respect to it.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

MR. KEAN: Thank you, commissioner.

Commissioner Fielding and then our last questioner will be 

Senator Gorton.

MR. FRED F. FIELDING: I guess I will address this to the 

entire panel. We obviously have to draw our conclusions as to 

the adequacy of the baseline security, the adequacy of 

intelligence and the adequacy of intelligence that's been shared 

and how it was shared, and basically the adequacy of the FAA's 
64

actions, your performance. But when we're doing our total 

evaluation of all this, I want you to help us to be sure that we 

have reviewed all the elements that are extant. And in that 

regard, and I'm sure certainly dealing with pre-9/11 at this 

point, if you ever felt you needed to add to your baseline of 

security, did you have to deal with or was there reaction from 

either the airline industry or Congress or both? And I'd 

appreciate any comments you have.

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, I'll begin and obviously other 

panel members will contribute as well. In the five years that I 

was there as commissioner from '97 to 2001, if the question is 

was there sort of direct lobbying either by the airlines or by 

Congress on any specific -- either safety or security, the answer 

would be no. But was I aware of great differences that, for 

example, the airlines may have had to an approach to an issue? 

Absolutely, and I knew that from the rule-making process and the 

public docket and the number of comments that we would get on 

rules.

I knew that from individual conversations with people within 

the industry. And certainly before my time I know that there had 

been attempts, for example on criminal background checks and 

legislation had been restrictive in that area to the FAA. So 

very much aware of the differences and conscious of them, but 

still I hope having the ability to listen to those respectfully 

but to make what we thought was the right decision.

I would like to go back, if I could, to the July 17 citing 

because it has been mentioned a couple of times on the rulemaking for 107 and 108. And I mention this because this really 

is a good example; 107 and 108 really provided the framework for

both the airports and the airlines to develop a security program 

and it reflected what we believed were new threats and so forth. 

It was a very important rule from the FAA's perspective. It had 

taken far too long, and part of that is I think probably somewhat 

legitimate because you have a public process, and we had many, 

many comments, all of which we felt we had to respond to.

And the comment that has been -- or the language -- and it's 

absolutely accurate and I remember it well because I was there. 

The language that refers to the domestic threat was put in, in 

part, because (a) we did recognize it. Doesn't mean we had 

specific -- any specific information, but we recognized it. And 

we were so eager to get that rule out we felt we needed to put 

the best case forward. But certainly if you look at the history 

of 107 or 108, it is illustrative I think of the concerns that 

sometimes industry would raise and some may be legitimate, but it 

certainly slows down the process.
65

MR. FIELDING: Mr. Flynn?

MR. FLYNN: Specific interventions by the Congress, don't do 

this, or something -- a rider in an appropriation saying, we will 

not fund you if you do this, did not happen in my time. With 

regard to the air carriers and the airports requiring additional 

measures, I do not recall a specific one where we put forward a 

rule and they flat refused to do it. Rule-making was the process 

under which those things had to be brought into consideration and 

they -- and we were not the only arbiters of that. Other 

agencies, particularly the OMB, took into consideration the --

that which the agency wanted to do and that which took other 

matters into consideration.

MR. FIELDING: Mr. Manno?

MR. MANNO: I really can't comment on -- in terms of 

possible pressure from the Congress. But as far as the airlines, 

from an intelligence perspective, sometimes there was some 

skepticism about whether or not there really was a threat and was 

it really the way that we were telling it to them. But all in 

all, when we brought them in -- and as an example of that, in the 

mid '90s we invited in all the corporate security directors, 

airport directors and they got a classified briefing by CIA and 

FBI on the threat in the United States and went away believers 

that after 1994 things had changed, that terrorism had actually 

come to this country, it wasn't just something overseas. And I 

think that after that time there was a little bit more acceptance 

by the airlines that, you know, what we were telling them was 

right and it was the best assessment that we could provide them.

MR. FIELDING: Okay. But I gather from that then that your 

collective answer is that if we find fault in any way -- and I 

say "if" -- with the FAA, there is no other person that's going 

to take the blame for it? You're not going to say, I was forced 

to do it for this or for that or for some other reason? Thank 

you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. KEAN: Senator Gorton. And we're running a little close 

on time.

MR. GORTON: Not very long.

Ms. Garvey, one of the first and most dramatic physical 

security changes that you made after 9/11 was to -- not only to 

lock the doors to where the pilots are, but to see to it that 
66

they were secure and couldn't be broken down. Was that measure 

ever seriously considered before 9/11?

MS. GARVEY: The issue of the hardened doors, commissioner, 

is a good example where the agency and safety and intelligence 

experts manage risks. In the case of the hardened doors, the 

greater concern had always been historically that there was an 

issue of decompression. So in fact the agency had looked at the 

issue of hardened doors and it pre-dated me and I won't give the 

exact -- we can certainly provide it, the exact timeline but it 

had looked at it. But the overriding concern was decompression, 

which was the safety issue, and it was not at that time a door 

that dealt both with decompression and with security. At the 

same time, though, there was tremendous discussion and work going 

on between the FAA and the manufacturers to try to figure out 

could we do a door.

MR. GORTON: Well, to be perfectly candid with you, I find 

that a dubious explanation. Wasn't the reason that the overall 

policy with respect to hijacking was that you would cooperate and 

even --

MS. GARVEY: That was the --

MR. GORTON: -- if you had had a secure door, if they'd 

taken a flight attendant up to that door with a knife to her 

throat, you would have opened the door anyway? So isn't that 

really the reason?

MS. GARVEY: Well, that's a very good point and that was 

certainly part of it, that the whole -- and I think this was 

mentioned earlier, the strategy was negotiation so it wasn't --

MR. GORTON: So that it wouldn't have stopped the 

traditional form of hijacking. All right. Now, the rule on 

hardened doors took place while you were still administrator, did 

it not?

MS. GARVEY: Yes, it did.

MR. GORTON: What is today the rule with respect to such a 

hijacking? Let's assume that someone gets onboard with a knife, 

you know, they manage to get through security, they take a flight 

attendant, get up to the door and put a knife to her neck and 

say, open the door or I'm going to slit her throat. What is the 

present requirement of the pilots and the crew in the cockpit?

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, I'm a little hesitant to answer 

that because it may be some security issue.
67

MR. KEAN: Yes, I think that's the area we'd planned not to 

get into, Senator.

MR. GORTON: All right. Okay, I will withdraw that 

question.

MS. GARVEY: Thank you.

MR. KEAN: Last quick question, Commissioner Lehman, and 

then we'll --

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you. I can only shake my head in 

disbelief at the naiveté of many of the statements that have been 

made here this morning. 

And, Ms. Garvey, when you say you're unaware of any lobbying 

that the industry has done against these measures, I find that 

astounding because our record is very different. Our information 

is that there was very active airline lobbying against not only -

- not only against specific rule-making but OMB, against the 

implementation and funding of certain safety measures they 

disagreed with, that they played a very significant part in the 

disappearance of the marshal program that was instituted during 

the Reagan administration, that they played a very significant 

role in the eroding of the locked cockpit doors and the single 

key, that they played a very significant role in the disbanding 

or at least diminution of the Red Teams which repeatedly showed 

that their security, their implementation of screening was a 

farce. Every Red Team got through nearly 100 percent of the 

measures and these reports were very embarrassing, led to fines.

The efforts that they made to see that there were no teeth 

allowed in FAA enforcement, that the fines were enforced at an 

average 10 percent. How can you sit there and say that the 

airlines were not lobbying? What are they paying these high 

priced lobbyists for, if not to do exactly that? I'm just 

amazed.

But I'd like to hear Admiral Flynn, who has a very 

significant reputation for not being a yes man and not being a 

pushover. He's a Navy Seal and he's accomplished a great deal 

inside of bureaucracy. What happened to the Red Teams? The 

records that we have show that a lot of these problems were 

identified 10 years ago by Red Teams and reports were sent. Now, 

earlier, Ms. Garvey, you said you never saw a direct Red Team 

report while you were in the job. What happened to them? 
68

Admiral Flynn, could you respond both to the lobbying issue 

and the Red Team issue?

MR. FLYNN: Yeah. Doubtless, there was a lot of lobbying 

going on. I'm here to tell you the truth as I see it and I took 

the tenor of the question to be, do you know of an instance where 

you wanted to do something where the airlines fixed it so you 

couldn't? And I don't know. And, similarly, do you know one 

where the Congress fixed it so you couldn't? And I don't know of 

that either. That deals with the first.

With regard to the Red Team, the Red Team is an enormously 

valuable asset to the FAA and to aviation security in totality 

and they did a whole lot of great work and were an invaluable 

part of my organization. What happened to them? They were still 

in existence when I left and were still doing good work when I 

left, and the members of the Red Team were appreciated, promoted, 

rewarded, and I think that had it not been for them, a lot of the 

things that we implemented would not have been because we 

wouldn't have known with the specificity necessary to approach 

rule-making or really to understand the problem.

MS. GARVEY: Commissioner, if I could, just to be very 

clear, was I aware that lobbying was going on? Of course, and 

your statement in that regard is correct. I think the question 

was: Was I directly lobbied to do something that I didn't feel 

was appropriate? And I want to be clear that that was not the 

case. And in terms of the Red Team, Commissioner, Admiral Flynn 

is absolutely right. The Red Team made invaluable contributions, 

as did the I.G., as did the GAO, to changes in protocols, to 

changes in training. The purpose of the Red Team was to take us 

to the next level. And while I may not have received or read in 

detail a Red Team report, I was certainly briefed on it. 

I think the IG's criticism of the FAA, and one which we 

agreed with, was that we as an agency and perhaps as a management 

team had not been giving the Red Team enough feedback as to the 

specific results of the work that they had done: What protocols 

had been changed, what training requirements had been changed. 

And to his credit, General Canavan and the deputy in the summer 

of 2001 held what I'm sure would have, but for 9/11, been the 

first in a series of debriefs, if you will, to the Red Team. 

That was a legitimate issue raised by the IG and one we took 

seriously. Thank you, sir.

MR. KEAN: Okay. Thank you all very much. We appreciate 

very much your attendance here and your helpfulness to our panel 

and the country. Thank you all very, very much.
69

I'd like members of the Commission -- we're going to have a 

very important meeting now and we'll convene again here at 1:00.

(Lunch recess.)

MR. KEAN: At this point we're going to reconvene the 

hearing. The events of 9/11 were a great tragedy for the nation, 

taking the lives of nearly 3,000 innocent civilians and forever 

changing the lives, of course, of those who they left behind. 

The events of that day were also a catastrophe for the airlines. 

The planes were used in the attack and many of their employees 

perished, along with the passengers that they served. Air travel 

remains an absolutely vital part of American life and of our 

economy. The airline industry is a tough business with many 

operational challenges. It functions in a high-profile public 

environment in a dangerous world and has many responsibilities.

The first and foremost of these responsibilities is the 

safety and security of the passengers and the aircraft. Secure 

air travel is a matter of law. Air carriers are legally 

responsible for implementing specific security functions 

according to standards and procedures established and enforced by 

the federal government. Means by which the airlines are required 

to carry out their duties are detailed in an FAA approved Air 

Carrier Standard Security Program. The airlines were responsible 

for the safety of their passengers, and for implementing key 

aspects of the civil aviation security system. On September 

11th, that system failed, and we are charged by statute to find 

out why.

Our next panel represents key executives representing United 

and American Airlines. From United Airlines we have Mr. Andy 

Studdert. Is that right?

MR. ANDREW P. STUDDERT: Studdert.

MR. KEAN: Studdert -- who is chief operating officer, and 

Mr. Ed Soliday, vice president of safety, quality assurance and 

security. With us from American Airlines are Gerard Arpey, who 

on 9/11 was the airline's executive vice president of operations, 

and Mr. Timothy Ahern, who served as the airline's vice president 

of safety, security and environmental affairs. 

We thank you very much for taking the time to be with us 

today and to help us with our inquiry. And, Mr. Arpey, we'll 

begin with you.

MR. GERARD J. ARPEY: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice 

Chairman and members of the Commission. My name is Gerard Arpey 
70

and I am president and chief executive officer of AMR Corporation 

and American Airlines.

MR. KEAN: Wait, wait. I'm sorry. Counsel reminds me what 

I didn't do is ask you to stand and raise your right hand.

(Witnesses sworn.)

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Arpey, I apologize.

MR. ARPEY: Yes, sir. I am also a member of AMR's board of 

directors. I am joined here today by Tim Ahern, who is currently 

the vice president in charge of our Dallas-Fort Worth hub. On 

September 11th, 2001, Tim was the vice president of safety, 

security and environmental for American Airlines. In that 

capacity, he was responsible for American security department and 

reported directly to Robert Baker, now deceased, who was the Vice 

Chairman of the company at that time. Tim and I both thank the 

Commission for this opportunity to represent AMR and American 

Airlines.

September 11th was, without a doubt, the worst day in the 

long storied history of American Airlines, and one of the worst 

in the history of the United States. While the horror and shock 

of that day may have abated somewhat during the past two and a 

half years, the sadness endures. Twenty-three members of the 

American Airlines family died that day, as well as 18 members of 

the United Airlines family. We continue to grieve their loss and 

our hearts continue to go out to their families and to the 

families of the passengers and individuals on the ground who were 

killed or inured that day. We also grieve with the families of 

the fire-fighters, police officers, rescue workers and military 

personnel who made the ultimate sacrifice to keep our country 

safe. 

September 11th was a day of horror but it was also a day of 

heroes. Later today you will hear from one of our reservation 

specialists, Nydia Gonzalez, who will tell you about her 

telephone call with Betty Ong, an American Airlines flight 

attendant on Flight 11. The courage summoned by Betty, Nydia and 

so many others that day has both inspired us and strengthened our 

resolve to do whatever it takes to ensure that nothing like 9/11 

ever happens again. We commend the work of the Commission and we 

have been assisting in your investigation. We have furnished the 

Commission with thousands of pages of documents, provided 

briefings to the Commission staff members about ground security 

and in-flight security training and procedures, and made numerous 
71

company employees available for interviews. American Airlines 

stands ready to further assist the Commission as it completes its 

investigation.

At American Airlines, the security of our passengers and 

crew is first and foremost in any decision we make. It is the 

foundation of our success and a core value of our airline. This 

commission has already heard a considerable amount of testimony 

about the roles of the government and industry in the aviation 

security system in the pre-9/11 environment. So I will not 

belabor the point here. Suffice to say that, at that time, the 

FAA set the security standards for U.S. airports, U.S. airlines 

and foreign carriers flying into the United States. 

The FAA also ensured compliance with those standards and 

through its Office of Civil Aviation Security conducted aviation 

threat and risk analysis in collaboration with U.S. intelligence 

and law enforcement agencies. We, at American, along with other 

U.S. carriers, were responsible for implementing the system that 

the FAA designed and enforced. Today we continue to rely on the 

FAA, the TSA and other U.S. government agencies for threat 

assessments and the formulation of industry security strategy as 

well as the design of countermeasures to meet those threats.

The civil aviation industry did not foresee the type of 

attacks that took place on September 11th. It is clear that the 

security system was not designed to deal with coordinated, 

suicidal hijack teams with the ability to use commercial aircraft 

as weapons of mass destruction. 

On September 11th, 2001, I was the executive vice president 

of operations for American Airlines. In that role, I was 

responsible for American's worldwide flight operations in 

addition to having responsibility for several of our business 

units, including our cargo division and American Eagle Airlines, 

AMR's wholly-owned commuter carrier. Accordingly, I was directly 

involved in American's emergency response efforts and other 

operational decisions made at American Airlines as the terrible 

events of September 11th unfolded. 

On September 11th, I arrived at my office at company 

headquarters in Fort Worth at about 7:15 a.m. Central Time. 

Because of another pressing business matter, at approximately 

7:30 a.m. Central Time, I called our systems operation control 

center, also known as SOC to advise them that I would not be able 

to participate in our system-wide operations conference call, 

which is held at 7:45 a.m. each day. Joe Burdepelly, one of our 

SOC managers, answered the phone. Joe told me that he had just 
72

tried to page me because we had a possible hijacking on Flight 

11, one of our transcontinental flights.

Flight 11 was a Boeing 767 that was scheduled to fly nonstop from Boston to Los Angeles and which had taken off from 

Logan Airport at about 7:00 a.m. Central Time. Joe told me that 

the SOC manager on duty, Craig Marquis was in contact with Betty 

Ong, one of our flight attendants on Flight 11. Betty Ong's 

courage and professionalism that day made her one of the first 

real heroes of September 11th and you will hear more about Betty 

later today. Betty's family is represented today by her brother, 

Harry Ong, and her sister, Cathy Ong-Herrera. We are proud that 

Betty was also a member of our family at American Airlines and we 

will always remember her.

Betty was located in the rear of the aircraft and she had 

called our Raleigh North Carolina Reservations Center. After the 

aircraft was hijacked, Nydia Gonzalez, an operations specialist, 

answered the call. She then called the company emergency line, 

which rings into the SOC in Fort Worth. Nydia was relaying 

information about Flight 11 from Betty Ong to our SOC manager on 

duty, Craig Marquis. As I said, you will meet Nydia this 

afternoon and learn about the important role she played that day. 

I understand that you will hear a portion of the telephone call 

between Betty and Nydia. I am sure you will be moved by Betty's 

remarkable poise and by how calm and reassuring Nydia was 

throughout this most difficult call.

From Betty we leaned that two of our flight attendants had 

been stabbed, one of them with serious wounds, that two or three 

passengers were in the cockpit and that our pilots were not 

responding to intercom calls from the flight attendants. After 

talking with the SOC, I then called Don Carty, the president and 

chief executive officer of American Airlines at that time. He 

had not arrived at his office yet and I left a message for him to 

call me as soon as possible. I briefed my executive assistant of 

what I had just learnt and then I headed to our SOC facility 

located about a mile from our company headquarters.

I arrived at the SOC between approximately 7:35 and 7:40 

a.m. Central Time. Our SOC managers told me that they were now 

treating Flight 11 as a confirmed hijacking. I was told that the 

flight deck was still not responding to calls by our flight 

attendants. Betty Ong had also told us that one of the 

passengers in first class had been stabbed, possibly fatally. We 

also were receiving information from the FAA that instead of 

heading west on its intended flight path, Flight 11 was headed 

south. Also our pilots were not responding to air traffic 
73

control or company radio calls and the aircraft transponder had 

been turned off.

In accordance with our emergency response plan, our SOC 

managers were activating American's command center which is a 

dedicated crisis response facility located on the floor above and 

overlooking our SOC floor. From the reports we were receiving, 

we believed that Flight 11 might be headed for the New York area, 

possibly to land at Kennedy or Newark Airport. Craig Marquis and 

Nydia Gonzalez maintained telephone contact with Betty Ong and we 

also attempted to monitor the progress of the flight via 

communications with the FAA and their traffic control officials.

In the command center, we focused on trying to gather as 

much information about Flight 11 as we could. As far as we knew, 

the rest of our airline was operating normally at this point. At 

approximately 7:48 Central Time, we learned that an aircraft had 

crashed into one of the towers of the World Trade Center. We 

furiously attempted to learn if that aircraft was Flight 11. As 

you may recall, some earlier media reports indicated that the 

plane that had struck the building may have been a smaller 

aircraft but we, nonetheless, feared the worst. 

By this time, we had lost telephone contact with Betty Ong 

and the contact had not been reestablished. During this time, 

Don Carty called me in the command center and asked if our 

aircraft was the one that had hit the World Trade Center. I told 

him what information we had and I said I didn't know for sure if 

the airplane was ours. While trying to confirm whether the 

aircraft that had hit the World Trade Center was Flight 11, we 

learned from air traffic control officials that another one of 

our flights, Flight 77, was not responding to radio calls and not 

emitting a transponder signal, and that air traffic control could 

not determine its location.

Flight 77 had taken off from Dulles Airport at approximately 

7:20 a.m. Central Time and was a Boeing 757 scheduled to fly to 

Los Angeles. Having learned this and while still trying to 

determine the fate of Flight 11, at approximately 8:00 a.m. 

Central Time, we issued an order to ground stop, all American and 

American Eagle flights in the northeast quarter of the United 

States that had not yet taken off. A few minutes later, at 

approximately 8:05 Central Time, we learned that United Airlines 

had lost communication with one of their aircraft. 

Upon hearing this, we immediately made the decision to 

ground stop the entire American Airlines and American Eagle 

system. There would be no more American or American Eagle 

takeoffs until we could sort out everything that was happening. 
74

Shortly thereafter, we learned that a second aircraft had hit the 

World Trade Center. At that time, we believed that the second 

aircraft to crash into the center may have been Flight 77. I 

continued to confer with our SOC and other operational managers 

and we agreed that we ought to get every -- all of our aircraft 

on the deck immediately. 

At this point, Don Carty arrived at the command center. I 

explained the situation to Don and without hesitation, he agreed 

that we should divert all airborne American and American Eagle 

flights to the nearest suitable airports. This occurred at about 

8:15 a.m. Central Time. A short time later, we received word 

that the FAA had shut down the entire airspace over the United 

States to all traffic except military aircraft. We then received 

word in the command center that an aircraft had crashed into the 

Pentagon. It was not until some time later that we learned that 

it was our Flight 77. 

American employees spent the next several hours successfully 

landing the remainder of our flights and trying to learn as much 

as we could about Flights 11 and 77. By about 10:50 a.m. Central 

Time, the remainder of American's domestic aircraft were 

accounted for and on the ground. Of course, it took longer to 

land our international and trans-Pacific flights. Many of our 

international flights returned to their points of departure while 

other American aircraft landed in Canada and various airports 

around the world. 

For the remainder of the day, our employees worked to 

respond to the monumental logistical challenges that arose from 

the decision to shut down the entire U.S. civil aviation system. 

Our efforts in the command center also focused on providing 

assistance to the FBI and other law enforcement officials who 

were investigating the attacks. Our next scheduled flights did 

not take place until several days after September 11th, and we 

did not have a full flight schedule for several more days. Our 

command center remained open 24 hours a day for the next two 

weeks, until September 24th.

It was only weeks later, as we returned to some normal level 

of activity, that we were able to step back and try to comprehend 

the impact that these horrific events had on our country, our 

company and on our families. We continue to grieve for our brave 

employees, our passengers, and all of the families who were 

victims of these horrendous attacks.

As we continue to pursue our mission of providing safe, 

secure air travel to our passengers, the events of September 11th 

are a constant reminder of the need for vigilance and resolve. 
75

All of us at American Airlines applaud this commission and the 

work it is doing to examine what happened on 9/11, what we can 

learn from it, and how we can apply the lessons of that day to 

make air travel in our country ever safer and more secure. This 

concludes my opening remarks. Thank you very much and we'll be 

happy to answer your questions at the appropriate point.

MR. KEAN: Thank you.

Mr. Studdert.

MR. ANDY STUDDERT: Mr. Chairman, distinguished panel 

members, I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you today. 

I'm very proud to be joined by Captain Ed Soliday, who is 

United's vice president of safety, security and quality assurance 

from 1991 through 2002. 

The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks against the 

United States were first and foremost personal tragedies. My 

heart and the hearts of all of us at United go out to the victims 

and their families. This was also a profoundly personal loss for 

all of us at United, as I know it was for our colleagues at 

American. Eighteen of those who died that day were our coworkers, friends and family members, and 76 of them were our 

innocent passengers. All of us who were affected applaud and 

support the work of this commission. I know that United will do 

its part to clarify the events of September 11th and to help 

improve our nation's security system.

I would like to cover three main areas today. First, the 

roles of government and airlines in our security system and 

United's commitment to security. Second, a review of the events 

of 9/11 as we experienced them at United. And third, some brief 

recommendations that the Commission might consider.

Both the United States government and the aviation industry 

play vital roles in aviation security. As the Commission knows, 

the United States government has been and must be the central 

player in aviation security. The airlines in turn must work hard 

to implement government directives as quickly as possible and to 

provide the government our feedback on the practicalities and 

effectiveness of those measures. We at United strive to be a 

constructive, active and innovative participant in the system.

United's commitment to security is an integral part of the 

company's culture. The foundation of our work is anchored in the 

safety of those who put their trust when they choose to fly 

United. The central importance of safety and security is 

reflected in our corporate structure and organization. United 
76

has a high level executive vice president of safety, security and 

quality assurance, with true independence from the operating 

units of the company. This VP has direct access to the chief 

executive officer, the head of operations, and very importantly, 

to United's board of directors. 

Since its inception, this position has always been filled by 

a highly experienced senior captain. We take pride in the fact 

that our safety and security staff have been asked to serve on a 

broad spectrum of safety advisory boards -- security advisory 

boards. Fundamentally, United's approach is to be part of the 

security solution. With United's commitments to security as 

background, let me recount what happened at United, September 

11th, 2001.

Started as a normal day -- by the way, all my times are in 

Eastern times, from a confusion standpoint, so I'll make it a 

point up front. We had more than 120 domestic planes and 27 

international aircraft in the air and more than 40 flights 

waiting to take off. At 8:14, United Flight 175, Boston to Los 

Angeles, under the command of Captain Victor Saracini, was 

wheeled up. United Flight 93, Newark to San Francisco, under the 

command of Captain Jason Dahl, was wheeled up at 8:42. 

Shortly before 9:00, I was having my usual morning meeting 

with Jim Goodwin, then United's CEO, when my secretary burst into 

the room with a report from our operations center that a plane 

had hit the World Trade Center. I immediately left Goodwin's 

office and ran to our operations center in our world 

headquarters. What follows is a timeline of the events that 

happened that day at United.

At around 8:50, a call came into our San Francisco 

maintenance center from a flight attendant on Flight 175 saying 

that the flight had been hijacked. This information was quickly 

relayed to our Chicago operations center. At approximately 9:00, 

a United dispatcher reported that he had lost contact with Flight 

175. At 9:03, a second plane hit the World Trade Center. 

American reported that they believed it was another one of their 

aircraft. We later learned it was United Flight 175, with 60 

people on board.

As detailed in our emergency response plan, our SOC managers 

activated our crisis center. This action triggered the 

mobilization of more than 3,000 United employees, who serve as or 

support our “Go” teams, which assist victims' families and the 

authorities. We contacted the local FBI. They responded 

immediately with a team who had been trained in the use of 

United's computer systems and had practiced emergency response 
77

with United on several occasions. Throughout the morning, we 

were in constant contact via hotlines with the government 

agencies and other airlines.

At 9:21, United dispatchers were told to advise their 

flights to secure cockpit doors. At 9:24, a United dispatcher 

sent a message to Flight 93 reading "Beware of cockpit intrusion. 

Two aircraft in New York hit Trade Center buildings." Flight 93 

responded to this message at 9:26, requesting that the dispatcher 

confirm the message. Despite numerous attempts to reach it, that 

was the last time we heard from the cockpit of Flight 93. At 

approximately 9:30, after discussions with our operating 

managers, the decision was made to ground United's fleet. At 

9:35, San Francisco maintenance center received another call from 

flight attendant on Flight 93 saying that the flight had been 

hijacked. Again, this information was passed quickly to our ops 

center.

At approximately 9:45, the order to ground the fleet went to 

all the aircraft in the air. And even before this, some of our 

individual dispatchers had already started grounding flights 

under their control. Again at 9:45, we received a report that an 

aircraft had crashed into the Pentagon. We later learned that it 

was Flight 77, American. We tracked Flight 93's flight path on 

the large operations center -- operations monitor in our crisis 

center. At 10:00 the blip stopped. At around 10:00 we lost 

contact with United's Flights 641, 415 and 399. After persistent 

attempts, communications to these missing flights was 

reestablished.

At approximately 10:06, United Flight 93 crashed in 

Pennsylvania, killing all 41 on board. At 10:20, we received 

confirmation from the airport manager in Johnstown, Pennsylvania 

that Flight 93 had indeed crashed. Throughout that morning, we 

were dealing with a flood of information and issues. We were 

unable to establish contact with nearly a dozen flights. There 

were torrents of bomb reports, reports of two explosions at 

airports, reports of other threats and other hijackings. The 

threats fortunately turned out to be misunderstandings or hoaxes, 

and we eventually reached the flights. But nothing could be 

dismissed or ignored in the high uncertainty of the moment.

United's crisis center remained in operations 24 hours a 

day, seven days a week for nearly three weeks, until we returned 

to more or less a normal operation. During those days and 

beyond, United's people all around the country devoted their 

energies to assisting the victims' families and working with the 

FBI and other government agencies to assist in the investigation.
78

In the wake of these attacks and all that has transpired, 

the question rightly is: What changes should be made to enhance 

aviation security? First we must recognize that great progress 

has been made since September 11th, 2001, some of which can be 

seen, and much I know cannot be seen, and we commend the FAA, the 

TSA and other bodies for all their efforts. We believe that 

national aviation security system can and should evolve further. 

Most fundamentally, there needs to be a vision, a goal, for what 

the security system in this country should ultimately look like. 

We believe there are several key aspects of that vision some 

of which we know are already underway. First, customer 

disruption should be kept to a minimum. The security system 

should be as transparent as possible to them. Second, the system 

should be fully integrated with the overall aviation structure in 

the country. It must be dynamic, flexible and unpredictable to 

our enemies and must improve continuously. The system must not 

depend on any single element. Its strength must come from a 

combination of integrated elements. 

There must be full participation from, and communications 

among, all the different entities in aviation security. No one 

organization has a monopoly on good ideas. Lastly, the system 

should focus on a risk-based approach, in addition to today's 

threat based emphasis. Under a risk based approach, root cause 

analysis is used to identify the factors underlying multiple 

risks, and then they are cut off even if they don't pose an 

immediate threat. 

Mr. Chairman, in closing I return to where I began, to the 

victims and their families. Let us work together to learn as 

much as possible about the events of September 11th. We must 

then apply those lessons to make our nation's security system 

continually better and stronger so that our enemies do not ever 

attack our country and its people though the aviation system. I 

thank the Commission again for all it's doing to advance this 

cause and Captain Soliday and I will welcome any questions you 

may have. 

Thank you.

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much. 

Senator Kerrey?

MR. KERREY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I apologize in 

the interest of time. We started late and there's a very 

important issue alluded to a moment ago that this commission will 

have an opportunity to participate in at 3:30, so I will try to 
79

go as quickly as I can and I'll have some additional questions, 

if you don't mind, that you could perhaps answer in writing. 

First of all, I want to thank you for coming. You didn't 

have to and I suspect, especially in your case, Mr. Arpey, that 

your lawyers may have advised you not to, so I appreciate very 

much your coming here and trying to help us to get the full and 

complete accounting that we are tasked as a consequence of the 

legislation that created this commission.

It's also important to say that you weren't just selected by 

us because you can help us. From the standpoint of American and 

United as a company you suffered in a personal way but you also 

suffered in an economic way and you can help us, because you 

perhaps in America no companies -- no two companies have a 

greater sense of urgency to understand both what happened and 

what do we need today to make sure it doesn't happen again. 

But you were selected by the conspirators, and one of the 

things -- and I'm going to try to make this point slightly 

different than I've made before. The people who perpetrated 

these acts on the 11th September, they don't feel remorse, they 

don't feel shame. They didn't target the pilot, they weren't 

going after somebody and then accidentally killed some additional 

people as a consequence. They were trying to kill as many as 

possible. It's a religious beginning. I don't believe all 

Muslims by any extent believe this. I don't see all Muslims this 

way at all, this is an extreme form of Islam. But it does -- it 

is a religious belief and it's not new, it didn't spring at us in 

2001, although the risk grew considerably in 2001.

Usama bin Laden had began with a relationship actually with 

us in Afghanistan, but he declared in 1998 a fatwa and my guess 

is 19 participants responded to that fatwa and participated as a 

consequence. And I think it's very important to understand that 

because we continue to put this word terrorism over the top of 

this for some reason that's beyond my reach, and I think it makes 

it difficult for us both to understand the why and more 

importantly the what do we need to do. 

And I would like to begin by asking you, perhaps if you, Mr. 

Arpey, first and you, Mr. Ahern, because you had some significant 

response in this area, what's your understanding of the law, of 

the 44902 section of U.S. Code Title 49. Seems to be very 

specific that you have the responsibility as well as the 

authority to refuse to transport people that you consider to be 

at risk to the passengers on the airline. I mean, do you believe 

you have under that law a responsibility to prevent or do you 

believe your responsibility is merely to deter?
80

MR. ARPEY: Maybe I could start and Tim could jump in. I 

think, Senator, the important thing to remember in both a pre9/11 and even in a post-9/11 world is that the airlines are 

responsible for implementing the security procedures that are 

given to us by the federal government who have the ability to 

make the threat assessments, take all of this intelligence data, 

take that information, put it through whatever intelligence 

sources are necessary and turn it into a security paradigm on 

which we can implement. 

And in the pre-9/11 environment that's what we had done. 

And I think we were good stewards in the pre-9/11 environment in 

terms of doing what we were asked to do, but as I said in my 

introductory remarks, nobody anticipated that the type of threat 

that we encountered on the morning of September 11th. 

MR. KERREY: Let me press that a bit because National 

Security Advisor Rice made a very famous statement in which she 

said nobody could have predicted this. I disagree with that. I 

mean I absolutely disagree with that. I mean you're talking and 

I presume that you've got safety precautions dealing with a plane 

that's fully loaded of 70,000 pounds of jet fuel that you 

consider it to be dangerous, all but itself as a consequence of 

having the flammable material on it. I presume that you've got 

procedures to deal with a pilot or two pilots that might wig out 

and I presume you've got procedures to screen your own pilots to 

make sure that something terrible doesn't happen. 

And you may not have been able to say, oh my God, maybe 

suicide is going to be a part of this thing, but it -- even 

there, I must say given what was going on again and the Islamic 

extremist groups they were using suicide technology. I mean, 

they were using the technology of suicide to accomplish their 

objectives increasingly. So, I mean, even there I must say I 

have a difficult time with an argument, gee, nobody could have 

predicted this, because I think if we're thinking about you know, 

trying to prevent all instances like this, it seems to me that 

that would have been on the list.

MR. ARPEY: Well again, Senator, I'll just be candid with 

you. If you go back to the morning of 9/11, the entire security 

paradigm that was in place given to us by the FAA did not 

anticipate this type of threat.

MR. KERREY: You keep saying that it's the FAA that's 

telling you about it. I must tell you that the law doesn't 

mention the FAA. The law says, quote, "An air carrier may refuse 

to transport a passenger or property the carrier decides is or 
81

might be inimical to safety." End of quote. It doesn't mention 

the FAA at all. And it -- I mean, let me -- I presume that 

you're familiar with the list of prohibited passengers --

MR. ARPEY: Yes, sir.

MR. KERREY: And that you have to implement that?

MR. ARPEY: Yes.

MR. KERREY: And do you have any -- do you participate in 

that? Do you say, gee, the list is too small, the list is too 

big -- I mean, I'm down on talking about pre-911, there were --

wait a minute, we've been given a list of 15 people at least by -

- at least on the surface it looks like 13 of them were in some 

way connected with Islamic extremism.

MR. ARPEY: Well, I think -- and Tim, jump in here -- but 

that list I think came out of the FAA's own threat assessment of 

what the industry should be trying to protect itself against, and 

they came up with that list and on the basis of that list we put 

in procedures to screen.

MR. KERREY: Any of you at the -- I think it was April or 

May 2000 briefing that the FAA security people did with airline 

officials? I don't --

MR. SOLIDAY: My staff was.

MR. KERREY: Were you there, Ed?

MR. SOLIDAY: No, I wasn't but my staff was.

MR. KERREY: And what did they report back to you? Have 

you seen that CD-ROM presentation?

MR. SOLIDAY: Yes. Yes, I have.

MR. KERREY: Did you see it prior to 9/11?

MR. SOLIDAY: Probably, I'm very familiar with it, yes. 

Could I build --

MR. KERREY: Sure.

MR. SOLIDAY: -- Senator Kerrey, on your question? The law 

that you talk about, quite frankly when you read it as you do, it 

would presume that the burden is upon the carrier. But if I 

could share some history with you, how that law has been applied 
82

to us is that when we have tried to deny boarding -- most 

recently after 9/11, 38 of our captains denied boarding to people 

they thought were a threat. Those people filed complaints with 

the DOT, we were sued, and we were asked not to do it again. 

So the burden upon us was to only take those people off of 

the flight who we knew posed a threat and the only way we can 

know that they pose a threat is through those who identify them. 

Quite frankly, at United and I know at American, in the mid-'90s 

there were customers who assaulted our passengers. We created 

our own list of those people who committed violent acts on our 

airplanes to keep them off the airplane. We were reminded quite 

frequently that unless they posed an immediate threat we were 

disobeying the common carrier rules.

MR. KERREY: If you just take the first and -- in April of 

2000, April 24, 2000, Security Directive 95 comes up. I presume 

you're familiar with this, if not I can show you the list as 

well, have you seen this list?

MR. SOLIDAY: Yes, I'm familiar with the list.

MR. KERREY: So you've got six guys on here --

MR. SOLIDAY: Right.

MR. KERREY: -- all of whom have some relationship with 

Ramzi Yousef.

MR. SOLIDAY: Right.

MR. KERREY: So you get the list, what do you do about 

that?

MR. SOLIDAY: There are a number of things we do with it, 

some of them I think I would prefer to discuss in a private 

session because those are part of the procedures today, but those 

lists were distributed not only to the field as a list, because 

six names is pretty easy to manage, I might -- you probably know 

already, Senator, that that list grew to over 1,800 within a 

week. Managing that becomes much more complex. 

Those names are fairly easy. Many, many people have common 

names in, and what becomes very, very complex is if we have 

someone who's name -- to use a generic name is John Smith, and we 

have a list that says deny boarding to John Smith, and quite 

frankly, the Arab names are repeated very, very frequently, then 

we may have 500 or 600 people with that name on any given day. 
83

Now, we have to be able to, in a very short timeframe, 

identify which one is the one on the list. And so as the list 

grows, the handling of that -- you can do some of it with 

computer services, but much of it has to be done with hand phone 

lines and so forth. Now, there are contingencies in place at the 

present time that have helped that --

MR. KERREY: Why didn't we modify the -- what do you call 

the on-flight security procedures, the Common Strategy? Why 

didn't we modify that common strategy to accommodate the 

possibility that suicide could be something that the pilot --

that a hijacker would select?

MR. SOLIDAY: Well, first of all, Senator Kerrey, the 

Common Strategy -- I'm glad you said modified because if you look 

at history the Common Strategy has saved a lot of lives. To 

react in a violent way in the past to many of the hijackers would 

have cost many, many lives. And so the Common Strategy as with 

regard to how it interfaced with government agencies did change 

over time. What we ask the folks on board to do -- again I would 

say to you that while the emphasis -- in fact at a noted 

government hearing, after the Gore Commission, the Rand 

Corporation produced a witness that said these people are not 

suicidal. He happened to be an Israeli consultant.

So when we looked at the possibility of hijacking -- we at 

United practiced hijacking four times after 1999, various forms 

of hijacking to include an anthrax on the airplane. We practiced 

with the FBI, with other government agencies, to ascertain how we 

could react, but the idea that they would be able to train people 

to fly complex airliners and navigate them was something that 

none of us contemplated. 

MR. KERREY: Why? 

MR. SOLIDAY: I would assume that the type of training we 

give to pilots is very, very sophisticated. These were all glass 

cockpit airplanes --

MR. KERREY: No, but the why comes from you were training 

for the possibility of hijacking --

MR. SOLIDAY: Yes.

MR. KERREY: And, by the way, the procedures in this 

particular case would seem to be seriously flawed at the 

passenger screening level. We heard earlier, this commission has 

heard that if I'm carrying a blade that's smaller than four 

inches that I can -- and you know, I've been screened and it's 
84

fine and they give it back to me, pre-9/11. I mean it seems to 

be even there there's vulnerabilities that were rather 

substantial to be able to take a plane over, but given all the --

again, even in this presentation that was done in 2000, but all 

the threat assessments that were being done in '98,'99, 2000, 

2001, they had to include some discussion of suicide. As I 

mentioned -- the word I used earlier was suicide has become a 

technology. Suicide attacks have become a technology that 

increasingly is being used by, again, largely people that are 

motivated by religion against us.

MR. SOLIDAY: I think first of all that is a fact that 

today we are very, very aware after what's been happening in 

Israel that suicide is something that they will do. But the 

thought that they would be able to have the technical skill to 

fly an airplane, that level of education -- Senator Kerrey, in 

honesty with you, you are a trained spec ops person. You know as 

well as I, sir, that these people could have gotten on that 

airplane stark naked and done what they did.

MR. KERREY: Yes, they could have.

MR. SOLIDAY: So all of this discussion, you and I both 

know if we were taking knives away, they would have planned the 

spec op around those knives not being there.

MR. KERREY: This is why we'll send some written questions 

to you, because I've got serious questions about the current 

strategy on the airlines today. A lot of it, it seems to me, is 

reactive. A lot of, it seems to me, to be politically motivated 

more than it is by motivated by real security concerns, and I'd 

very much like -- I'll do it in writing to you because I'd very 

much like to get feedback from you all because I'd like very much 

for our -- part of our recommendations to be to say, quit being 

motivated by politics here. 

Let's figure out what the right solution is and do it, 

whether it's the FAA's responsibility or your responsibility. 

These 19 guys who knocked us over just as easy as could be, they 

exploited every visible weakness. And you're exactly right, once 

they were on that plane their chances of failure were practically 

zero. And I think we've got -- you've got to help us, especially 

I think on the intel side, though it's -- I think it's unarguable 

if you look at the presentation that was done in May of 2000 by 

the FAA. The FAA can't just say as they've done, they've given 

us five or six pages of rebuttal to the Joint Committee saying we 

didn't know, we didn't know, we didn't know, we didn't know, we 

didn't know. It's like you know how many times can you say we 

didn't know before somebody says, Jesus, you should have? 
85

It was your responsibility. You should have asked if you 

didn't know. You know, I didn't want to make the FBI mad, I 

didn't want to make the CIA mad. I mean, given all the things 

that were going on, again the background of '98, '99 and 2000, 

2001, I mean I think you all can help us a lot, not just to 

understand what happened that day, which I'm sure makes you feel 

worse than it makes me in many ways. They were your employees. 

You were associated with them in a very active and upfront way. 

You've got to help us by being very frank. Not right now because 

this commission's got to -- a lot of the Commissioners ask 

questions, but you've got to in writing tell us what aren't we 

doing that we should be doing, that we're -- whether -- I don't 

know if it's a national identification card, if you think that's 

what it ought to be, tell us. 

I don't have to worry about the National Rifle Association, 

I don't have to worry about civil libertarians, I only have to 

worry about what you tell me that should be done. And by the 

way, I'm a customer, and when this commission finishes this work 

today, I'm taking the train back to New York and no small measure 

because I find the security procedures not only to be a nuisance, 

but I think they're largely ineffective. 

I mean, you're exactly right, buck naked I sit on that plane 

and I say, well, I hope they've got this thing figured out 

because -- well, first of all, they'd never let me on, that would 

really be obnoxious, let me on buck naked, but you -- yeah, 

you're not anxious to see that. I mean, I hope that you'll help 

us by being as honest as you possibly can and as frank and as 

detailed as you possibly can about what we aren't doing that we 

ought to be doing to prevent this in the future. 

MR. SOLIDAY: Senator Kerrey, I would look forward to that. 

I think I agree with the things you have said and have 

participated at the National Academy and other places. I think 

it's very, very important that we focus on the future but we also 

recognize that these people were highly skilled military 

professionals and the only way we stay ahead of them is to have 

an iterative process continuously that grows continuously and 

that we understand there is no one pill or no amount of blame 

that will solve the problem. We need to have a system that 

continuously improves itself.

MR. KERREY: The last thing I'll say is I hope that you --

I'm asking you, don't call this terrorism. It is terrorism but 

it's coming from a relatively small group of Muslims who 

religiously believe in killing infidels. That's the pathway to 

heaven and everybody in this room is an infidel. And it's 
86

enormously important that we begin with that. Otherwise, we, in 

the first instance, are unable to identify what the risk is but, 

in the second instance, there is a tendency to have the wrong 

policies and procedures that make it very difficult for us to be 

very discriminating and to identify people who are genuinely a 

risk to us.

I'm through.

MR. LEE HAMILTON: The chair is in a rather astounding 

position here of not having any other commissioners who want to 

ask questions. 

All right. 

Mr. Lehman.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you and I too applaud your willingness to 

come up here and be beat up a little bit and also to really give 

us your recommendations for the future. And again I would echo 

Senator Kerrey that we would very much like your continuing 

participation and recommendations. The record that has emerged 

from our staff's research is one in which the weight of the 

industry has been continuously against tightening up 

restrictions. 

Now, you've articulated well the reasons why you didn't 

expect the threat that came, but it's like so many of the 

arguments we've heard earlier. It's not very persuasive that 

nobody told us, it's not our job to decide what the threat is. 

And, of course, quite apart from what the regulation that was 

cited stipulates, of course it's your job. I mean, I would be 

willing to bet, if I could overhear some of your conversations in 

a bar somewhere, that you're not full of praise and confidence 

for the government's brilliance in handling all of your tax 

issues and your inspection issues and what possible reason would 

you have to think that you don't have to participate in 

intelligence assessment, threat assessment?

The FAA was saying that it was perfectly all right for young 

Arabs to come on to your airplanes with 4-inch knives and, you 

know, the industry's attitude was, "Hey, it's not our business. 

The FAA says it's okay, it's got to be okay." What's been 

missing from a lot of the witnesses that we've had these last two 

days is an application at the leadership level of the common 

sense test to some of these things. The record that our staff 

has produced is one of the industry continuously eroding and 

blocking and defunding initiatives like the first air marshal 

initiative, the locked cockpit door initiative, the single key 
87

initiative and one of the things that we've heard constant 

complaints about from the immigration people is the industry's 

successful thwarting of their efforts to fix the "transit without 

waiver" loophole, which the industry has known has been used by 

terrorists, has been used heavily by smugglers and could be 

relatively easily fixed with the building of secure transit 

lounges and the kind of measures that most large countries in the 

world, if not all of them, have. 

Yet, as I understand it, even today, the industry is 

whinging and whining because the President suspended this huge 

loophole. I would like to hear how you, without, you don’t 

necessarily have to respond to my indictment of the pre-9/11 era, 

but how do you see your roles going forward as an active 

challenger of the bureaucratic inertia that's inevitably part of 

many of these government regulatory initiatives? Why do we not 

have a single instance in our research of the industry saying, 

"We've got to tighten up in screening. We're only paying minimum 

wage and we have a 100 percent turnover of our people. We should 

be hiring higher quality people. Why are you letting 4-inch 

blades aboard our airplanes?" 

We don't have any record of that and somehow, you guys have 

to change the whole paradigm of the way you approach these safety 

issues. You've got to be proactive and not a drag on the system 

which, historically, you have been, unless you can provide us 

evidence that challenges the overwhelming weight of evidence that 

we have so far.

MR. SOLIDAY: Commissioner Lehman, if I could begin the 

response and then maybe others would like to join me. I 

understand your frustration and I understand your comments. As 

you know, by my biography, I hold several major trophies for 

development of enhanced ground proximity warnings, FOQA systems, 

so forth, all of which happen to be on the aviation side. We are 

not mandated by the government. 

Quite frankly, if you look at the record, we tested numerous 

things long before they were mandated. Immediately after TWA 

800, we, as a company, talked with the FAA and said we are 

prepared to move forward with some security measures to ramp up 

because we don't know what caused this. The problem is -- and 

you can make light of it, if you like -- a citizen does not have 

the right to search and seize. There are privacy issues and, for 

example, as a company who was prepared to roll CAPPS out and did 

roll it out long before any other company, a visitor from the 

Justice Department who told me that if I had more than three 

people of the same ethnic origin in line for additional 

screening, our system would be shut down as discriminatory. 
88

MR. LEHMAN: That is an important point.

MR. SOLIDAY: Tell me about common sense.

MR. LEHMAN: I agree with you totally. What I'm suggesting 

is that your childlike faith, in your earlier testimony, in the 

ability of the government to provide you threat warnings, you 

should be equally skeptical about. These are all good points. I 

think you're right.

MR. SOLIDAY: Again, I hope I did not come across as making 

excuses. We have a clear role. There are more people in the 

intelligence community in the United States than we have in our 

airline, or had in our airline.

MR. LEHMAN: That's the problem.

MR. SOLIDAY: Number two is that when we have an inkling, 

there is a limit to what we can do without the authority of 

government. No matter how cooperative we try to be, there are 

limits and quite frankly, a number -- we have the first CTX 

machine ever made on our property long before it was certified. 

We went out and looked at Quadrupole, quite frankly used it, not 

in a certified way, because of the human factors issues that are 

in X-ray screening. 

A number of us were advocating we needed research and 

development in systems that were red-light, green-light as 

opposed to interpretive. We went out and worked with the FAA to 

put those into practice. We couldn't use them as official 

systems because they were not approved systems. But we used them 

in San Diego to demonstrate their effectiveness, but could not 

get funding for further research in those types of technologies.

So, again, all of us know that I don't think there's anybody 

at the table -- I know them all quite well -- that doesn't do a 

lot of self-examination, but I think it is a bit unfair that we 

did not go the extra mile.

MR. ARPEY: Commissioner Lehman, let me just add a follow-on 

to his point. You know, Ed, you're talking really CAPPS I in the 

pre-9/11 environment and I think coming back to what Senator 

Kerrey was saying earlier, some of this does defy common sense. 

In a post-9/11 environment, we had situations where our crew 

members were uncomfortable with passengers on board the airplane, 

they hauled them off the airplane and I think -- there was 10 or 

11 of them -- and today we're being sued by the DOT over each one 

of those cases.
89

MR. LEHMAN: That's something we should definitely follow up 

on because if DOT is still pursuing that policy that we will get 

involved. 

MR. STUDDERT: I think last month United was actually fined. 

We should follow up for you on that.

MR. LEHMAN: Is that right? Could you get us data? We'd be 

happy to take up your cause.

MR. ARPEY: You know, despite that kind of situation that 

does I think lack some common sense, we continue -- and I suspect 

United is the same way -- to advocate to our crew members, if 

anyone is on the airplane that makes you uncomfortable or in any 

way you think compromises safety, get them off the airplane. The 

captain is the in-flight security coordinator for every flight 

and is the final authority on everything. So despite some of the 

stuff that we deal with, we do make a lot of commonsense 

decisions and give our crew members a lot of commonsense advice 

and we tell them, you don't worry about lawsuits and that kind of 

stuff. We'll take care of that.

MR. STUDDERT: Yeah, we back them up on their decisions.

MR. LEHMAN: By the way, to follow up on that, we put a 

great deal of faith and have got a great deal of benefit in the 

Navy, for instance, out of Red Teams. And we just heard 

testimony this morning that there is a continuing emphasis --

although this might be a little controversial -- on using the Red 

Teams in FAA again. Do you get direct access to these Red Team 

reports? When they come through, when they send a team of Spec 

Ops type people through your security system and find big holes 

in it, do you hear about that directly or not?

MR. AHERN: There's a lot of data about the Red Teams. 

Initially we did not. Under General Canavan's leadership we did, 

in the summer of 2001 there was a review of the Red Team audits. 

I won't -- again, I can't speak of industry but I certainly can 

tell you that the audits that were conducted at American actually 

showed that we were quite effective, with one error in a 

particular city. There were three audits that I'm familiar with 

that we did receive in the summer of 2001 from the Red Team. But 

General Canavan invited all the security directors. My 

subordinate went to the session and they reviewed some of the Red 

Team audits and provided us data on airline-specific data.

MR. LEHMAN: But not since?
90

MR. AHERN: I don't know. Again, I changed jobs in 2002. I 

haven't seen any since 2002. I certainly can get the data from 

our security folks.

MR. LEHMAN: Would you agree you ought to get them on a 

regular basis?

MR. AHERN: Absolutely. Absolutely.

MR. LEHMAN: That's good. We'd appreciate it if you'd give 

us the follow up data on that.

MR. SOLIDAY: Mr. Lehman, just a thought on the Red Teams. 

There is a difference between the Red Teams and the regulators 

who audit. The Red Teams are supposed to find vulnerabilities in 

the system. And while I'm not disagreeing with Mr. Ahern, there 

are things that they find that really do need to be kept -- we 

need to know the solution. But transmitting vulnerabilities to 

large volumes of people does not always serve the best interest.

MR. LEHMAN: How about just like the people at your table 

here?

MR. SOLIDAY: If we do that, there are 195 carriers in the 

United States. That would be two per carrier, that's 400 people. 

One of the great problems we've had with security is that almost 

any procedure we implement is leaked and it's vetted in the 

media. And quite frankly, in some of the discussion we have had 

there are things that we shouldn't know because they compromise 

the ability to gather the information. So I think --

MR. LEHMAN: But I think that's a tiny --

MR. SOLIDAY: -- that balance --

MR. LEHMAN: I understand your point, but I think it's 

largely inapplicable because many of the things that the 

hijackers found in their -- as they did their intel work and 

casing, their own Red Teaming, before they decided which airports 

to hit, so forth, had already been identified in Red Team reports 

and had not been passed on to you. Wouldn't you have rather 

known about those vulnerabilities directly, even if other people

learned about them too, because the terrorists are going to find 

out about them anyway likely?

MR. SOLIDAY: I would want to know about the vulnerabilities 

and I would want the ability and the power to deal with them. 

But, again, there are some limits.
91

MR. LEHMAN: Could I get each of your airlines' views on how 

we solve this "transit without visa" issue?

MR. STUDDERT: Both Ed and I have left United in the last 

year, over a year ago, so it's hard for me to speak for the 

current situation. Ed might want to give you a general overview 

of what was going on in the past.

MR. LEHMAN: Well, now we'll get a better answer from both 

of you.

MR. SOLIDAY: I think there are -- I think the TSA acted 

appropriately. I don't work for United anymore so I would say 

that there are vulnerabilities. We have identified them. We did 

offer -- as I understand, United offered some alternatives. 

Building terminals takes time. When there is a threat you want 

to deal with it in some way in the short term and then some of 

the solutions I see are -- sound like wonderful ideas but they 

don't work for seven years. So --

MR. LEHMAN: Yes, but I would point out that the ATA's 

argument 28 years ago when this temporary "transit without visa" 

was put in -- Mr. Ahern?

MR. AHERN: Yeah, I'll just add a comment that in many of 

our locations we already have a situation where we can control 

the individual. That doesn't mean that we have in all our 

international gateways, and that's certainly an issue that we 

would have to address. But I think from an operational 

standpoint, the key to this process is making sure that as the 

individual comes into the country they stay in a separate area 

and they leave the country in a separate area as well, and we 

already have that in place in many of our larger cities. So I 

think that that's the number one thing that needs to get done and 

then again we'll work with the intelligence community to decide 

what else needs to get done.

MR. ARPEY: I think the key is you just -- you need to 

remain in control of the passengers throughout the journey.

MR. LEHMAN: Yeah, I -- and I mean in other countries they 

don't officially enter the country because there's a secure 

Customs/Immigration area, transit lounge, that they stay in. 

What has not worked is the airlines saying, trust us, we'll have 

somebody hold the person's hand for 24 hours while they go in and 

have dinner in Harlem. It doesn't work. 

Thank you.
92

MR. KEAN: Congressman Roemer.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm interested -- Mr. Soliday, you're straight shooting with 

us. You don't work at United anymore and hopefully you can give 

us very candid and honest answers, as you've been doing here. 

You have said to our staff that you used to work pretty closely 

with Irish Flynn, who was before our commission a little bit 

earlier, and I think you've also said that you frequently talked 

with the FAA security, sometimes three or four times a day. I'm 

interested in what you conveyed back and forth. Did Mr. Flynn 

tell you about the specific instances? For instance, we have a 

host of different occasions when there were FAA individuals 

involved in intelligence briefings, that gathered information on 

specific threats to U.S. carriers, such as the Bojinka plot. We 

have FAA intelligence individuals that attended a number of 

meetings throughout '98 and '99 and 2000 where they also picked 

up this information, and in 2001. What kinds of information did 

Mr. Flynn pass on to you in these three or four conversations 

that you had per day?

MR. SOLIDAY: I certainly did not talk to the associate 

administrator three or four times a day. Our staff talked to the 

FAA principal security inspector three or four times a day. 

There were issues of interpretation, there were issues of things 

just in applying the system. You have seen the manuals, you have 

--

MR. ROEMER: Was any of it informational intelligence 

oriented, either general terrorist threat or specific terrorist 

threat information? Or was this all on --

MR. SOLIDAY: No.

MR. ROEMER: -- implementing general --

MR. SOLIDAY: This was implementing -- if I were to talk to 

Associate Administrator Flynn, it would be about -- generally it 

would be about advanced technologies. He would ask me what our 

experience was with CTX implementation because he wanted to hear 

it firsthand.

MR. ROEMER: So there was no intelligence exchange ever 

between the two of you?

MR. SOLIDAY: I can think that -- any time we say 

ever/never, that's --
93

MR. ROEMER: Rarely.

MR. SOLIDAY: I can think of one instance --

MR. ROEMER: Hardly ever.

MR. SOLIDAY: -- in particular that I came into Washington 

for a briefing, very similar to the --

MR. ROEMER: Did this concern you at all that you were not 

getting any kind of intelligence passed on, either in a general 

sense about a threat, an evolving threat that you might be 

reading about in the paper but not getting more specific 

information from the agency?

MR. SOLIDAY: I think things that I'm reading about in the 

paper, those were being briefed regularly. The issue I would --

MR. ROEMER: By who, though? That's what I'm trying to 

figure out. Who briefed --

MR. SOLIDAY: By the intel group from FAA, by -- like I say, 

on one occasion Irish Flynn didn't do the briefing, but the 

associate administrator was in the room to give emphasis to the 

importance. Again, what -- if I'm hearing your question 

correctly, and correct me if I'm wrong, it is one thing to get a 

briefing in which maybe 300 or 400 potential threats are listed, 

and another to have a prioritized briefing that says, these are 

the things. There is X amount of resource that can be devoted. 

So the discussion of threats out there is a part of every day 

conversation: every day between myself and my staff; every day 

between us and the FAA.

MR. ROEMER: Let me commend you. I think you also told our 

staff that post-9/11 you hired an Israeli firm to perform an 

outside audit of United's airport stations from the standpoint of 

risk. Can you give us information as to what kinds of things 

were recommended to you in ramping up security, and what 

obstacles you might have run into in order to implement those?

MR. SOLIDAY: Yes, we used them after the OSAF threat in the 

Pacific. Immediately when the threat became apparent to us, I 

had at that time an Israeli consultant and consulting firm 

through the time I left. We asked them to go out into the 

Pacific, look at our stations, look at them specifically. Those 

things that we corrected -- I believe we have records of what 

they were. I'm not certain we're not into some issues that 

should be in private as opposed to -- but that is true. Then in 

the 9/11 instance -- post-9/11, as I shared with the staff, I 
94

brought him in in the first flight that I could get him here, 

asked him to share with me additional things that we could do.

MR. ROEMER: Without being specific about what those are --

I agree with you, maybe we can share that in writing or in a 

closed session -- would you have difficulties with the airline 

today implementing those or with the FAA?

MR. SOLIDAY: I would have difficulty with the government in 

general. His -- I can give you his high-level assessment. His 

exact words were, "You Americans are obsessed with the means. 

The only way you will stop them is by keeping them off the 

airplanes, and to do that you must do aggressive profiling.” One 

carrier shared their data and you know the results of that.

MR. ROEMER: In your view, you also said to our staff, that 

today we have more consistent training of screeners but no 

significant improvement in technology and no apparent improvement 

in performance. Do you stick by that? Do you modify that?

MR. SOLIDAY: The issue was -- when one talks about 

performance, the context of that conversation, as I recall it, 

was in regard to one particular element. One of the issues that 

has been alive since 1981, a number of studies, is the human 

factors of screeners' interaction with the technology. The 

popular view was that it was solely economic. That was 

reinforced by a number of government auditing agencies that if 

you just change the pay, then screening will get better. But, 

quite frankly, if you look at the National Academy of Science 

panel study in 1996, it said specifically there was very little 

evidence that pay would change anything. There were significant 

human factors issues. 

The FAA applied a number of times for grants to do the kind 

of human factor studies that we did with pilots, being part of 

the crew resource management. I know I don't look like I'm old 

enough to have been part of the beginning, but I was. We spent 

millions in the government to understand why pilots error. We 

have just scratched the surface of understanding why screeners 

fail to detect.

I believe Mr. Lehman or one of the previous people who 

testified talked about probability of detection. So when I 

shared with them that not -- I think that it would be wrong to 

say that the overall security has not improved. It certainly 

has. But in certain areas if you look at the rate of detection, 

it is not significantly better than before. Now, we've added 

layers on both sides to take -- just like we do in an airplane. 

If we know a system has a 10 to the minus 9th probability of 
95

failure, then we say that is safe to fly. But if we have a 10 to 

the minus 7th, I'm required -- or the manufacturer is -- to build 

redundancy to get to 10 to the minus 9th.

One of the things that Senator Kerrey talked about was we've 

done a number of things that are emotional, instead of looking at 

a risk level that we are comfortable with. And if you look at 

security in a true risk assessment way, you start looking at the 

human factors. Why do people fail? It's not because they don't 

care. It's because there are failure modes in the technology and 

how the humans interface with that technology that we don't 

understand.

MR. ROEMER: I appreciate your very helpful answers. I know 

we're running out of time and I think Senator Kerrey has one 

final question.

MR. KEAN: Yes, Senator Kerrey for the final question.

MR. KERREY: Well, I'm going to try to be as brief as I can. 

I would very much like to provide you gentlemen with a number of 

documents. The one is the response of the FAA to a series of 

statements that are actually made by the Joint Committee. This 

is the FAA coming back and defending themselves against 

statements that were made by the Joint Committee that did their 

earlier evaluation. 

And the reason I'd like to have you look at it is these are 

very precise intelligence assessments that are being made by 

various people in national security organizations, most generally 

coming out of the CIA. And it causes me -- as I read this and as 

I look at the PowerPoint presentation that was done in 2000, I 

look at this and say, had this information gotten to the people 

that were in charge of security, I think they would have 

immediately said suicide is a real possibility. So I mean I 

don't -- I honestly do not buy this idea that it's unimaginable. 

That what happened on 11 September was unimaginable. We should 

have been able to imagine it. We should have been able to 

imagine it and defend it.

And I very much agree with you, Mr. Soliday, there's two big 

ways I think you get the job done. One is by preventing them 

from getting on the plane in the first place, and I think there's 

a couple of -- personally, I think there's a couple of relatively 

simple things that could have been done and still could be done 

that could eliminate all these long lines and all this harassment 

and all this difficulty getting on the airplane and making it 

difficult to fly and causing people to wonder what in the heck is 

going on. 
96

There's a couple of relatively simple things that could be 

done prior to people getting on the airplane and I think, for 

political reasons, we don't want to do it. And I think the 

American people want you to tell us what are those simple things. 

And if the politicians are afraid -- the elected politicians are 

afraid, we need to give them some room and give them permission 

to do it because I mean I see a lot of the stuff being done. I 

mean, we heard Mr. Bonner yesterday in here talking about what 

he's doing to make his agency work. I've got to tell you it'll 

be four or five years before the INS and Customs start working 

together as a family. And in the meantime if you're relying on 

them to make certain that they screen these people out, you're 

relying on the wrong agency. You've got to figure it out on your 

own. You've got to figure out how to keep people off planes that 

are willing to die in the act of killing passengers and killing 

other people on the ground, because I think -- I personally feel 

that unless you provide us with that information, it's not likely 

to come from anybody else.

MR. KEAN: I want to thank you all very, very much. We 

appreciate your testimony and appreciate your help.

Okay, we're ready to recommence. We now come to our second 

staff statement and, together with Mr. Zelikow, I would like to 

recognize Sam Brinkley of our commission staff.

MR. PHILIP ZELIKOW: Mr. Chairman, members of the 

Commission, this statement continues our presentation of initial 

findings on how the individuals who carried out the 9/11 attacks 

defeated the civil aviation security system of the United States. 

We continue our investigation into the status of civil aviation 

security today and for the future. These findings and judgments 

may help your conduct of today's public hearing and will inform 

the development of your recommendations.

The findings and judgments we report today are the results 

of our work working with you so far. We remain ready to revise 

our understanding of these topics as our work continues. Our 

staff was able to build upon investigative work that has been 

conducted by various agencies, including the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation. The Department of Homeland Security's 

Transportation Security Administration is fully cooperating with 

our investigators, as are the relevant airlines and the Federal 

Aviation Administration.

We spoke earlier today about how the hijackers defeated all 

of the pre-boarding defense layers; the U.S. civil aviation 

security mounted on September 11, 2001. We will return now to 
97

the last line of defense: the Common Strategy in response to 

hijackings as implemented onboard the aircraft by the flight crew 

on the four flights. 

Bill Johnstone will begin.

MR. WILLIAM JOHNSTONE: Thank you. 

As you've heard earlier today, the anti-hijacking training 

for civil aviation aircraft crews in place on 9/11 was based on 

previous experiences with domestic and international hijackings 

and other hostage situations. It was aimed at getting 

passengers, crew and hijackers safely landed, and it offered 

little guidance for confronting a suicide hijacking. Air carrier 

responsibilities for security and anti-hijacking training for 

flight crews were set forth in the Air Carrier Standard Security 

Program. In addition to specifying the number of hours of 

required security training, it provided an outline of in-flight 

hijacking tactics for both the cockpit and crews. Among other 

things, the outline advised air crews to refrain from trying to 

overpower or negotiate with hijackers, to land the aircraft as 

soon as possible, to communicate with authorities, and to try 

delaying tactics.

One of the FAA officials that we've spoken to, who was most 

involved with the Common Strategy in the period leading up to 

9/11, described it as an approach dating back to the early 1980s 

which was developed in consultation with the industry and the FBI 

and based on the historical record of hijackings. The point of 

the strategy was to optimize actions taken by flight crew to 

resolve hijackings peacefully through systematic delay and, if 

necessary, accommodation of the hijackers. The record had shown 

that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to 

have a peaceful resolution. The strategy operated on the 

fundamental assumptions that hijackers issue negotiable demands 

most often for asylum or the release of prisoners, and that 

suicide -- as we got a quote, “Suicide wasn't in the game plan of 

hijackers.”

Thus, on September 11, 2001, Common Strategy, which was the 

last line of defense against these hijackers, offered no defense 

against the tactics employed by the hijackers of Flights 11, 77, 

93 and 175.

Mr. Zelikow. I'm sorry, my mistake. The day of Tuesday, 

September 11, 2001, began for the U.S. civil aviation system as 

one marked by exceptionally fine weather across the country and 

the absence of any significant overnight problems in the system 

which required the attention of the workday shifts at the FAA and 
98

at the airlines as they took over across the country. We wish at 

this point again to advise the family members of victims who may 

be viewing this statement or listening to it that the details we 

will be recounting may be especially painful for you to hear. 

Please consider whether you wish to continue viewing, at least at 

this time.

Before we proceed with the details, we first wish to pay 

tribute to all of the brave men and women who were the source for 

most of what we know about what transpired on-board American 

Airlines Flight 11, United Airlines Flight 175, American Airlines 

Flight 77 and United Airlines Flight 93. In just a few short 

minutes we will be hearing about one of those heroes, flight 

attendant Betty Ong who perished on Flight 11, from another 

individual, American Airlines reservations manager, Nydia 

Gonzales. Ms. Gonzales spoke with Ms. Ong on that tragic morning 

and made sure that her voice was heard then and continues to be 

heard to this day.

There are many others who we wish to recognize, both 

passengers and crew, who were able to reach out to let their 

companies, their friends or their families know what had befallen 

then, and in so doing they enabled us to tell their story here 

today. Among them -- and this is not meant to be an exhaustive 

list -- also from Flight 11, Betty Ong's fellow flight attendant 

Madeline “Amy” Sweeney; from Flight 175, flight attendant Robert 

Fangman, passengers Peter Burton Hanson and Brian David Sweeney; 

from Flight 77, flight attendant Renee May and passenger Barbara 

Olson; from Flight 93, flight attendants CeeCee Lyles and Sandy 

Bradshaw, passengers Todd Beamer and Jeremy Glick. 

There is every indication that all members of the flight 

crews did their duty on that day with dedication and 

professionalism. 

Thank you.

MR. ZELIKOW: To continue the discussion of hijacker tactics 

and beyond, I want to turn the floor over to Sam Brinkley, but 

first mention that Sam's background for the Commission includes 

the fact that not only was he a battalion commander in the U.S. 

Marine Corps, but Sam has also served as a federal air marshal.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you very much, Philip. 

The question is what do we know about the tactics used in 

the takeover of the four flights. The hijackers strategically 

planned the flights they chose: Early morning departures from 

East Coast airports of large Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft fueled 
99

for a transcontinental flight to maximize the destructive power 

of the impact on their selected targets.

One fact that I want to point out. There is no evidence at 

this time to suggest that the 9/11 hijackers or their associates 

purchased unused tickets for the hijacked flights. And with the 

Chairman's permission I would like to move to the charts. 

The seat selection on the two type aircraft are indicative 

of the planning of the hijackers in being able to conduct their 

operation. First of the two charts on the 757. In both 

instances you will notice that the pilot -- Jarrah on Flight 93 

and Hanjour on Flight 77 -- were sitting in the very front row of 

these aircraft. This single-aisled airplane gives less 

maneuverability and access to the cockpit than a double-aisled 

airplane. This was carefully chosen. These are not random seat 

selections. You will also notice that the remaining members of 

the hijack team were placed in a position to better have them be 

able to seal off the front cabin of the aircraft from the 

passenger cabin crew.

In contrast, the 767 aircraft of Flight 11 and Flight 175 

show a significantly different arrangement of the hijack teams. 

In both these cases two members of the hijack team were sitting 

well forward and guarding the front end of the aircraft. In 

fact, in both of these the pilot, designated pilot, was sitting 

in the center between members of the hijack team, two in front 

and two behind, which allows the hijack team to better off seal 

and move forward and to the rear, and to then also control both 

aisles as the maneuverability capability to seal off the front of 

the aircraft. These indicators show that the test flights they 

took and the process they did in their planning demonstrated in 

their seat selections which could not have been at random.

The question has been raised about whether one or more of 

the hijackers may have used pilot's credentials in order to sit 

in the cockpit with the pilots during the flight to facilitate 

the takeover. In view of the requisite paperwork and other 

procedures which must be followed to permit a jumpseat privilege, 

there is no evidence that such a tactic was used by the 

hijackers. They actually had reservations and sat in the seats 

that they were assigned.

We do know that the seating arrangement chosen by the 

hijackers facilitated the isolation of the front of the aircraft 

and the terrorist pilots' entry into the cockpit. The exact 

method of entry into the cockpit is not known. However, the 

strength of the cockpit doors in use on 9/11 would not have 

precluded forced entry. Cockpit keys were widely available on 
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that day. Also the Common Strategy did authorize flight crews to 

allow entry into the cockpit under certain circumstances. There 

is no way to know whether the terrorist had an access to a key, 

but if not, access to the cockpit could readily be gained by 

luring the flight deck crew out of the cockpit or forcing the 

door open.

From what we have learned so far, the hijackers successfully 

gained control of the forward section of the cabin after the 

aircraft seatbelt sign was turned off. The flight attendants 

began cabin service and the passengers were allowed to begin to 

move around the cabin. This was followed by the hijackers 

gaining access to the cockpit. There is scattered and 

conflicting evidence about what happened to the cockpit crew 

during the takeover, but what we do know is that at some point 

the pilots were displaced and no longer in command of the 

aircraft.

The evidence we have examined to date indicates that the 

terrorists' tactics and techniques initially resembled the 

traditional hijacking scenarios. The hijackers took over the 

aircraft by force or threat of force. This was reported on all 

four flights. The hijackers gained access to the cockpit and 

sealed off the front of the aircraft from the passengers and the 

remaining cabin crew. This was reported with slight variation on 

all four flights.

Some of these reports included the presence of mace and/or 

pepper spray in the cabin and indications that passengers had 

difficulty breathing. We believe this indicates that the 

terrorists created a sterile area around the cockpit by isolating 

the passengers and attempting to keep them away from the forward 

cabin, in part by using mace or pepper spray. Pepper spray was 

found in Atta's checked luggage that was recovered at Logan 

Airport.

The hijackers used the threat of bombs. This was reported 

for all but Flight 77. They also used announcements, reported 

for Flights 11, 77 and 93, to control the passengers as the 

aircraft supposedly flew to an airport destination. These 

longstanding tactics for terrorist hijackings were consistent 

with the paradigm of the Common Strategy developed for flight 

crew response to hijackings. There were no reasons for flight 

crew to respond outside the training they had received at the 

time their respective flight was hijacked. 

Even so, as the hijackings progressed, there is evidence of 

growing awareness aboard the aircraft that something 

extraordinary was unfolding. Callers from both Flights 11 and 
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175 noted early in the process very erratic flying patterns and 

talked about the possibility that the hijackers were piloting the 

aircraft. Reports from Flight 175 included one passenger 

predicting the hijackers intended to fly the aircraft into the 

building. Another said the passengers were considering storming 

the cockpit. 

Later on Flight 77 at least one passenger was explicitly 

informed about what had happened to Flights 11 and 175, And, as 

widely know in the case of Flight 93, a growing awareness among 

the passengers of what had already occurred with the other 

flights spurred a heroic attempt to take over the plane from the 

hijackers. The nation owes an eternal debt of gratitude to those 

who took action to ensure that Flight 93 never reached its 

target.

Let's turn to pilot training. To successfully complete the 

9/11 plot aboard the aircraft, at least one member of the team 

had to be able to pilot the plane, navigate it to the desired 

location, and direct it to the intended target. These tasks 

required extensive training and preparation. FAA records show 

that four of the 19 hijackers, one aboard each flight, possessed 

FAA certificates as qualified pilots. FAA certification required 

that a candidate complete a requisite amount of flight training 

and pass both a written exam and a practical skills test. Each 

of the four pilots received flight training in the United States, 

which is recognized as having one of the world's most advanced 

pilot training, education and certification in the world, and 

trains many pilots from many nations. 

Among the five hijackers on American Flight 11, only Mohamed 

Atta held a certificate from the FAA as a qualified private and 

commercial pilot, including proficiency rating in multi-engine 

aircraft operation. Atta received his commercial pilot 

certificate in December of 2000. Records indicate that Atta 

received Boeing flight simulator training sessions. According to 

the experts questioned by commission staff, simulator training 

was critical for the hijacker to familiarize himself with the 

cockpit controls and the proper operation of the Boeing 757 and 

767, the type hijacked on 9/11, and to gain the operational 

proficiency of feel and confidence necessary to fly the aircraft 

into an intended target. 

Among the five hijackers aboard United Airlines Flight 175, 

only Marwan al-Shehhi is known to have completed flight training 

and possessed an FAA pilot certificate. Al-Shehhi received his 

commercial pilot certificate in December 2000 on the same day and 

at the same facility as Atta received his. He also had Boeing 

flight simulator training.
102

Among the five hijackers aboard American Airlines Flight 77, 

Hani Hanjour was the sole individual who FAA records show 

completed flight training and received FAA pilot certification. 

Hanjour received his commercial multi-engine pilot certificate 

from the FAA in March 1999. He received extensive flight 

training in the United States including flight simulator training 

and was perhaps the most experienced and highly trained pilot 

among the 9/11 hijackers.

Among the four hijackers aboard United Airlines Flight 93, 

Ziad Jarrah was the lone individual who is recorded as having 

received flight training and FAA pilot certification. Jarrah 

received his private pilot certificate from the FAA in November 

2000 and was recorded as having received Boeing flight simulator 

training. Staff would note that Jarrah had logged only 100 

flight hours and did not possess a commercial pilot certificate 

or multi-engine rating. 

The staff would note the existence of computer-based 

software programs that provides cockpit simulation available on 

the open market to the general public. According to the experts 

at FAA, such computer based-training packages, including products 

that simulate cockpit controls of the Boeing 757 and 767, 

provided effective training opportunities. The terrorists were 

known to use computers and there is no reason to believe they did 

not have the computer literacy necessary to take advantage of 

computer-based training aids.

Although the investigation is still ongoing into what 

methods the hijackers employed to navigate and direct the 

aircraft toward their target, the following information is 

offered in regard to this analysis. Boeing 757, 767 aircraft are 

outfitted with highly capable flight management systems and 

autopilot features. Knowledge of these systems could be gained 

through simulator training, readily available operational 

manuals, and perhaps PC-based simulator software. 

Information from the flight recorder recovered from Flight 

77 indicated that the pilot had input autopilot instructions for 

a route to Reagan National Airport. It should be noted the 

flight management computer could be programmed in such a manner 

that it would navigate the aircraft automatically to a location 

of the hijacker's choosing, not merely a commercial airport, at a 

speed and altitude they desired, provided the hijackers possessed 

the precise positioning data necessary.

By using the sequence waypoints dialed into the computer, 

the hijackers could also approach the target from the direction 
103

they wanted. Financial records indicate that one of the 

hijackers had purchased a global positioning system, perhaps for 

the purpose of acquiring precise positioning data on al Qaeda's 

9/11 targets. They had also purchased a Boeing flight deck video 

and flight simulator software program. Flight manuals were also 

found among their belongings.

The Commission continues to acquire and analyze data on 

pilot training, operational requirements, flight information and 

other relevant evidence that will provide the most informed 

theory of what means the hijackers used to fly the aircraft to 

their targets. Whether the hijackers flew the aircraft manually, 

engaged the flight management computer to take them to a 

programmed destination, or employed some combination of the two, 

experts consulted by the Commission believe it quite credible 

that given the certificates held by the hijackers, the training 

and educational opportunities available to them through the 

publicly available flight operations manual and computer-based 

flight training software, the hijackers, particularly Atta, 

Hanjour and al Shehri, had the know-how to complete the mission.

Let's turn to weapons. Records of purchases by the 

hijackers and other evidence indicate that the knives with blades 

of less than 4 inches long were the primary weapons of choice We 

demonstrated one sample of that this morning. With regard to 

reports from crew, passengers, knives were sighted on all four 

flights. The threat of a bomb was reported in Flights 11, 175 

and 93. Box cutters were specifically indicated in only one 

report, from Flight 77. Staff specifically notes reports from 

callers aboard at least two of the hijacked aircraft, 11 and 177, 

suggesting that the terrorists used mace or pepper spray aboard 

the flight.

As mentioned previously, the evidence suggests that one of 

the tactics employed by the hijackers on all the flights was to 

move the passengers to the back of the aircraft, away from the 

cockpit. Mace, pepper spray or a similar substance would have 

aided the terrorists in that effort and assisted them in 

maintaining a controlled area around the flight deck. Both mace 

and pepper spray were specifically prohibited items under the Air 

Carrier Standard Security Program. The questions of how these 

items were carried on board remains an issue under investigation.

One is left to consider the following. Had the consequences 

of being a selectee under the passenger pre-screening program, as 

nine of the terrorists were, required a more intense screening of 

the selectee, as had been the case before the pre-screening 

system was computerized in 1998, the system would have stood a 

better chance of detecting the prohibited item, possibly 
104

depriving the terrorist of an important weapon. Staff notes this 

is in order to highlight a major policy question arising from the 

Commission's investigation. Was it wise to ease the consequences 

of being a pre-screening selectee at a time when the U.S. 

government perceived a rising terrorist threat, including 

domestically and when the limits of detection technology and 

shortcomings of checkpoint screening efficiency were well-known?

Moreover, we believe that in practice, the FAA's approach to 

admonishing air carriers to use common sense about what items 

should not be allowed on an aircraft, while also approving the 

air carrier's checkpoint guidelines that define the industry's 

common sense, created an environment where both parties could 

deny responsibility for making hard and most likely unpopular 

decisions.

The question remains about a gun. We continue to 

investigate the allegations that a gun was used aboard American 

Airlines Flight 11. This allegation arose from a notation in an 

executive summary produced on September the 11th, 2001 by FAA 

staff, indicating that the FAA headquarters had received a report 

of a shooting aboard the plane, reportedly from an American 

Airlines employee at the company's operation center. The 

individual alleged to have made that report to the FAA denies 

having done so. While staff continues to investigate the origins 

and accuracy of the report, we note, regardless of what reports 

were received in the chaotic environment of various operation 

centers at the FAA, the airports and the airlines -- the only 

authoritative information about whether a shooting occurred on 

Flight 11 had to have come from individuals on the aircraft who 

were reporting what was taking place to contacts on the ground.

Two flight attendants aboard American Airlines Flight 11 

placed calls to ground contacts to report what was happening to 

the aircraft, and as indicated above, the Commission will receive 

testimony shortly about Mrs. Ong's call. Staff notes that the 

flight attendants did their duty with remarkable courage. The 

evidence shows that the flight attendants remained in phone 

contact with authorities for an extended period of time, 

providing valuable information with extraordinary 

professionalism. Their actions were nothing short of heroic.

Neither the tape recordings of the call from flight 

attendant Betty Ong, nor the accounts by at least seven separate 

witnesses to the calls placed by Ms. Ong or Ms. Madeline Sweeney 

reported the presence of a gun or the occurrence of a shooting. 

The witnesses' accounts of the phone calls were consistent and 

are quite specific about the kind of weapons that were reported 

present, knives, mace and a bomb, as well as the nature of the 
105

assaults on board, the stabbing of flight crew members and a 

passenger.

In order to accept the accuracy of the initial FAA executive 

summary with regard to a shooting, disregarding the evidence by 

eyewitnesses to the contrary, one would have to believe that the 

American Airlines systems operation center, the SOC, relayed to 

the FAA the account of a shooting that no witness recalls, while 

neglecting to include the account of a stabbing that was widely 

reported, including the personnel in the SOC. This seems highly 

implausible.

Finally, staff notes that the alleged victim of the shooting 

was seated in 9B. Both the seat and its occupant are described 

by several of the witnesses' accounts from the aircraft as the 

place where the stabbing occurred. At this point in the 

investigation it seems evident that the form of attack on the 

business class passenger, the only attack upon a passenger 

reported by the eyewitnesses, became garbled in the account of 

the assault as it was relayed between the airline and the FAA 

authorities in the fog and confusion of the rapidly unfolding 

events of that day.

Other relevant evidence bears mentioning. While 

investigators have uncovered evidence of numerous knife purchases 

by the 19 hijackers leading up to September the 11th, 2001, no 

firearm purchases or possession are in evidence. Further, the 

tactics of all four hijacking teams involved in the plot were 

similar. No evidence has been uncovered to suggest that the 

hijackers on any of the other flights used firearms, and none 

were found in evidence at any of the crash sites, notably the 

crash site of United Airlines Flight 93, where items from the 

aircraft were collected as evidence.

To the contrary, the common tactic among the four teams of 

employing knives and mace, the wielding of a bomb, either real or 

simulated, is indicated by all other evidence. It seems unlikely 

that one of the teams would depart from the tactical discipline 

of the plotters' mutual strategy.

Finally, though it appears erroneous at this point in the 

investigation, staff continues to develop information on how the 

gun story may have come to be reported. Again, we stress our 

investigative work, including on the issues we have discussed 

today, is by no means complete. Our investigation continues.

MR. ZELIKOW: In conclusion, we started today by asking us 

all to try to remember the world before 9/11 and the factors and 

pressures that influenced the civil aviation security system 
106

prior to that day. We cannot and will not forget the events of 

9/11. The lessons of that tragedy continue to inform our work, 

especially our effort to develop recommendations to make America 

safer and more secure.

MR. KEAN: Thank you all very much. I want to say on behalf 

of the Commission how much we appreciate the work of this staff, 

how professional you are and how we recognize the fact that many 

of you are working seven days a week at this point. 

Thank you all very much.

September 11 will also be remembered for the countless acts 

of duty, courage, selflessness and love. So many of those who 

lived them or witnessed them are no longer with us. We are only 

left to imagine and to contemplate. Many we do know about. 

Fire-fighters and police officers who ran up the stairs of 

burning buildings to save others. Emergency responders who 

rushed to the aid of the injured. Passengers and crew who fought 

to assure that the terrorists never made it to their target. 

Countless instances, people from all walks of life who reached 

out to help. The multiple acts of courage that day are too 

numerous to recount, but they live on as part of the story of 

September 11. They give testimony to the resilience of the human 

spirit in the face of unspeakable horror.

We are now going to hear one remarkable story of such 

courage. Aboard American Airlines Flight 11 flight attendants 

Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney were able to contact people on the 

ground and in the midst of dire circumstances were able to relay 

critical information about what was happening on the plane to the 

outside world. It so happens that a portion of Ms. Ong's call to 

an American Airlines customer service facility was recorded. We 

will listen shortly to that recording. Ms. Ong was able to make 

contact with Ms. Nydia Gonzalez, an employee at the American 

Airlines facility, via air phone after the terrorists had taken 

over the aircraft. Ms. Gonzalez is with us today. Nydia herself 

is an example of the great courage destroyed on that day --

displayed on that day of 9/11. With extraordinary composure, she 

talked with and comforted Ms. Ong. She received and handled the 

vital information Ms. Ong provided with remarkable 

professionalism and with compassion. 

Also recorded was a call placed by Ms. Gonzalez to American 

Airlines headquarters in Forth Worth, Texas. Without the 

capability of transferring the call from Betty Ong to American 

Systems Operating Center or to patch Operation Center personnel 

into the call from the flight attendant, Ms. Gonzalez handled 

calls from both Ms. Ong and the American Operations Center at 
107

once. She took the information she received from Betty Ong on 

one line and immediately relayed it to American Airlines 

operation personnel on the other. We will hear these recordings 

of those calls after her testimony. Much of what we know about 

the events of 9/11 are because of Ms. Ong and Ms. Sweeney and 

other passengers and crew aboard the four aircraft who were able 

to contact people by phone and relay vital information. There is 

every indication that all members of the flight crews did their 

duty with dedication and with professionalism.

I'd like at this point if I could to acknowledge Ms. Ong's 

sister and brother who are with us today: Ms. Cathie Ong-Herrera 

and Mr. Harry Ong. Would they please stand and on behalf of the 

Commission I'd like to address our deepest sympathies to you upon 

your loss, and the appreciation of a very grateful country for 

Betty Ong's heroism. Would you like to stand and be recognized, 

please.

(Applause.)

Ms. Gonzalez.

MS. NYDIA GONZALEZ: On Tuesday, September 11 --

MR. KEAN: I'm sorry, go ahead.

MS. GONZALEZ: Do you need to swear me in?

MR. KEAN: Do you want to be sworn? I don't think we really 

need to with you.

MS. GONZALEZ: Okay. On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, a day 

that forever will be remembered as one of pain and anguish for 

our nation, I was the operations specialist on duty at American 

Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North 

Carolina. As an operations specialist, one of my 

responsibilities includes monitoring emergency situations and 

forwarding information to American System Operations Control. I 

am here to share and describe an emergency call that will be 

etched in my memory for the rest of my life. 

At approximately 8:20 in the morning on Tuesday, September 

11, Betty Ong, an American Airlines flight attendant, called our 

reservations office requesting assistance with a situation on 

American Airlines Flight 11. Before I describe her call, let me 

tell you about this brave and courageous individual. Betty Ong, 

affectionately known by her family and friends as “Bee,” was a 

flight attendant with American Airlines for 14 years. She was a 

very caring, warm and loving person. Her zest for life, her 
108

passion for her job, her ability to make people laugh; and her 

concern for mankind is what truly made her, along with her fellow 

crew members, our first heroes of September 11th.

In a very calm, professional and poised demeanor, Betty Ong 

relayed to us detailed information of the events unfolding on 

Flight 11. With the assistance of her fellow crew members she 

was able to provide us with vital information that would later 

prove crucial to the investigation. Betty's selfless act of 

courage and determination may have saved the lives of many 

others. She provided some important information which ultimately 

led to the closing of our nation's air space for the first time 

in its history. For approximately 23 minutes, Betty patiently 

told us that she thought they were being hijacked because two or 

three men had gained access to the cockpit and the cabin crew 

couldn't communicate with the pilot. She informed us that two 

flight attendants had been injured and a passenger might have 

been fatally stabbed. She indicated that there wasn't a doctor 

onboard, but that they were able to administer oxygen to one 

flight attendant and that she was able to breathe. 

Although she wasn't able to give us a description of the 

attackers, she told us the seat locations of these individuals, 

which helped law enforcement authorities identify the terrorist 

attackers. The teamwork displayed by Betty and her fellow flight 

attendants, combined with their extensive training in safety and 

security, enabled them to relocate the passengers to an area of 

the cabin out of harm's way.

Several media accounts of what occurred on Flight 11 claimed 

that Betty was hysterical with fear, shrieking and gasping for 

air. I am here to tell this commission that those accounts are 

wrong. As I previously stated, Betty was calm, professional and 

in control throughout the call. I honestly believe after my 

conversation with Betty that the 81 passengers and nine crew 

members on Flight 11 had no idea of the fate that they were to 

encounter that day. 

Betty, we're here to commemorate you. Your acts of courage 

on September 11 will never be forgotten. On that day not only 

did you have a team of fellow employees in the air, you also had 

a team pulling together on the ground in reservations and 

security. Your loving family, your American Airlines family, and 

your friends are extremely proud of your selfless actions, and I 

for one will forever be grateful and honored to have had the 

opportunity to know such a truly remarkable person. On that day 

you asked, “Pray for us.” As I assured you then I will assure 

you today, we are. Absolutely. 
109

MR. KEAN: We will now hear the recordings from the two 

phone calls. The first phone call was placed from Betty Ong 

aboard the Flight 11 to Ms. Gonzalez. We'll hear the entire four 

and a half minutes that was recorded on that call. The second 

phone call was placed by Nydia Gonzalez to the American Airlines 

operations center to report the call from Mrs. Ong and to relay 

the Center information Mrs. Ong was providing. 

You may hear a momentary blank on the tape. The Commission 

edited a very small portion in order to protect one family member 

from unnecessary pain. The second phone call we will hear was 

approximately 20 minutes in duration. Due to time constraints 

the Commission has selected four minutes from that particular 

call. 

(Phone calls played.)

BETTY ONG: Number 3 in the back. The cockpit’s not 

answering. Somebody’s stabbed in business class and . . . I 

think there’s mace . . . that we can’t breathe. I don’t know, I 

think we’re getting hijacked.

MALE VOICE: Which flight are you on?

BETTY ONG: Flight 12.

OPERATOR: And what seat are you in? . . . Ma’am, are you 

there? . . . 

BETTY ONG: Yes.

MALE VOICE: What seat are you in?

FEMALE VOICE: Ma’am, what seat are you in?

BETTY ONG: We’re . . . just left Boston, we’re up in the 

air. 

FEMALE VOICE: I know, what . . .

BETTY ONG: We’re supposed to go to LA and the cockpit’s not 

answering their phone. 

FEMALE VOICE: Okay, but what seat are you sitting in? 

What’s the number of your seat?

BETTY ONG: Okay, I’m in my jump seat right now. 

FEMALE VOICE: Okay.
110

BETTY ONG: At 3R.

FEMALE VOICE: Okay.

MALE VOICE: Okay, you’re the flight attendant? I’m sorry, 

did you say you’re the flight attendant?

BETTY ONG: Hello?

FEMALE VOICE: Yes, hello.

MALE VOICE: What is your name?

BETTY ONG: Hi, you’re going to have to speak up, I can’t 

hear you.

MALE VOICE: Sure. What is your name?

BETTY ONG: Okay, my name is Betty Ong. I’m number 3 on 

Flight 11.

MALE VOICE: Okay.

BETTY ONG: And the cockpit is not answering their phone. 

And there’s somebody stabbed in business class. And there’s . . 

. we can’t breathe in business class. Somebody’s got mace or 

something.

MALE VOICE: Can you describe the person that you said --

someone is what in business class?

BETTY ONG: I’m sitting in the back. Somebody’s coming 

back from business. If you can hold on for one second, they’re 

coming back.

BETTY ONG: Okay. Our number 1 got stabbed. Our purser

is stabbed. Nobody knows who is stabbed who, and we can’t even 

get up to business class right now cause nobody can breathe. 

Our number 1 is stabbed right now. And who else is . . .

MALE VOICE: Okay, and do we . . .

 BETTY ONG: and our number 5 -- our first class passengers 

are -- galley flight attendant and our purser has been stabbed. 

And we can’t get into the cockpit, the door won’t open. Hello?
111

MALE VOICE: Yeah, I’m taking it down. All the information. 

We’re also, you know, of course, recording this. At this point 

. . .

FEMALE VOICE: This is Operations. What flight number are 

we talking about?

MALE VOICE: Flight 12.

FEMALE VOICE: Flight 12? Okay. I’m getting . . .

BETTY ONG: No. We’re on Flight 11 right now. This is 

Flight 11.

MALE VOICE: It’s Flight 11, I’m sorry Nydia.

BETTY ONG: Boston to Los Angeles.

MALE VOICE: Yes.

BETTY ONG: Our number 1 has been stabbed and our 5 has 

been stabbed. Can anybody get up to the cockpit? Can anybody 

get up to the cockpit? Okay. We can’t even get into the 

cockpit. We don’t know who’s up there.

MALE VOICE: Well, if they were shrewd they would keep the 

door closed and --

BETTY ONG: I’m sorry?

MALE VOICE: Would they not maintain a sterile cockpit?

BETTY ONG: I think the guys are up there. They might 

have gone there -- jammed the way up there, or something. 

Nobody can call the cockpit. We can’t even get inside. Is 

anybody still there?

MALE VOICE: Yes, we’re still here. 

FEMALE VOICE: Okay. 

BETTY ONG: I’m staying on the line as well.

MALE VOICE: Okay. 

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Hi, who is calling reservations? Is this 

one of the flight attendants, or who? Who are you, hun?

MALE VOICE: She gave her name as Betty Ong.
112

BETTY ONG: Yeah, I’m number 3. I’m number 3 on this 

flight – And we’re the first . . .

NYDIA GONZALEZ: You’re number 3 on this flight?

BETTY ONG: Yes and I have. . .

NYDIA GONZALEZ: And this is Flight 11? From where to 

where?

BETTY ONG: Flight 11.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Have you guys called anyone else?

BETTY ONG: No. Somebody’s calling medical and we can’t 

get a doc --

(Beep)

MALE VOICE: American Airlines emergency line, please state 

your emergency.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Hey, this is Nydia at American Airlines 

calling. I am monitoring a call in which Flight 11 -- the 

flight attendant is advising our reps that the pilot, everyone’s 

been stabbed.

MALE VOICE: Flight 11?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Yep. They can’t get into the cockpit is 

what I’m hearing.

MALE VOICE: Okay. Who is this I’m talking to?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Excuse me. This is Nydia, American 

Airlines at the Raleigh Reservation Center. I’m the operations 

specialist on duty.

MALE VOICE: And I’m sorry, what was your name again?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Nydia . . .

MALE VOICE: Nydia. And what’s your last name?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Gonzalez -- G-o-n-z-a-l-e-z.

MALE VOICE: (Inaudible) -- Raleigh Reservations. Okay, 

now when you --
113

NYDIA GONZALEZ: I’ve got the flight attendant on the line 

with one of our agents.

MALE VOICE: Okay. And she’s calling how?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Through reservations. I can go in on the 

line and ask the flight attendant questions.

MALE VOICE: Okay . . . I’m assuming they’ve declared an 

emergency. Let me get ATC on here. Stand by.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Have you guys gotten any contact with 

anybody? Okay, I’m still on with security, okay, Betty? You’re 

doing a great job, just stay calm. Okay? We are, absolutely.

MALE VOICE: Okay, we’re contacting the flight crew now and 

we’re . . . we’re also contacting ATC.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay. It seems like the passengers in 

coach might not be aware of what’s going right now.

MALE VOICE: These two passengers were from first class?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay, hold on. Hey Betty, do you know any 

information as far as the gents . . . the men that are in the 

cockpit with the pilots, were they from first class? They were 

sitting in 2A and B.

MALE VOICE: Okay.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: They are in the cockpit with the pilots.

MALE VOICE: Who’s helping them, is there a doctor on 

board?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Is there a doctor on board, Betty, that’s 

assisting you guys? You don’t have any doctors on board. Okay. 

So you’ve gotten all the first class passengers out of first 

class? 

MALE VOICE: Have they taken anyone out of first class?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Yeah, she’s just saying that they have. 

They’re in coach. What’s going on, honey? Okay, the aircraft 

is erratic again. Flying very erratically. She did say that 

all the first class passengers have been moved back to coach, so 

the first class cabin is empty. What’s going on on your end?
114

MALE VOICE: We contacted Air Traffic Control, they are 

going to handle this as a confirmed hijacking. So they’re moving 

all the traffic out of this aircraft’s way.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay.

MALE VOICE: He turned his transponder off, so we don’t 

have a definitive altitude for him. We’re just going by -- They 

seem to think that they have him on a primary radar. They seem 

to think that he is descending.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay.

MALE VOICE: Okay, Nydia?

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Yes dear, I’m here. 

MALE VOICE: Okay, I have a dispatcher currently taking the 

current fuel on board.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Uh, huh.

MALE VOICE: And we’re going to run some profiles . . .

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay.

MALE VOICE: To see exactly what his endurance is.

NYDIA GONZALEZ: Okay. 

MALE VOICE: Did she . . .

NYDIA GONZALEZ: She doesn’t have any idea who the other 

passenger might be in first. Apparently they might have spread 

something so it’s -- they’re having a hard time breathing or 

getting in that area. 

What’s going on, Betty? Betty, talk to me. Betty, are you 

there? Betty? (Inaudible.) 

Okay, so we’ll like . . . we’ll stay open. We, I think we might 

have lost her.

MALE VOICE: Okay.

END
115

MR. KEAN: Talk about it all you want, this brings it to 

life. Any of the Commissioners have any questions they would 

like to ask? If not, Ms. Gonzalez thank you, so very, very much 

for bringing yourself and this to us today, thank you for your 

calmness, your heroism and thank members of the Ong family for 

their courage in coming here today and for listening to this. 

Thank you all very much, we have nothing but admiration for your 

sister

Thank you.

MS. GONZALEZ: Thank you.

MR. KEAN: If I could ask Mr. Loy to take the stand please? 

Is Mr. Loy here yet? 

(Off mike.)

Our last witness of the day will be James M. Loy, deputy 

director of the Department of Homeland Security. 

Mr. Loy, thank you for coming today. Will you raise your 

right hand?

(Witness sworn.)

Thank you very much. You can begin your testimony, Mr. Loy.

MR. JAMES M. LOY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to 

just submit my written testimony for the record if I may, sir, 

and just make a couple of points orally and then ask or answer 

your questions. First of all, I wanted to apologize for my 

absence in May. It was an opportunity scheduling-wise that I had 

other engagements that just simply had to be dealt with. I trust 

that my deputy at the time, Steve McHale was providing good 

answers to the Commission but I realize how important this work 

is. I've spent several hours on several occasions with the 

private interviews and look forward to the testimony today, sir.

Just a couple of things that I think are very important for 

all of us to keep in perspective as we proceed from the emotion 

of the panel you just went through and move on to methodical day 

after day improvements in the aviation security system of our 

country, and our homeland security system in general. First of 

all, sir, I think it is enormously important that we find a way 

to hold a sense of urgency, to sort of keep the edge. 

Complacency is a fascinating thing, it finds its way to the 

surface in people and in organizations and in even nations from 

time-to-time, and this business that we're in, when we have an 
116

opportunity like you just had to listen to those folks, we must 

find a way in our business to hold that urgency. 

I have a photo in my office that I took from a helicopter 

that was over the Ground Zero site three days afterwards. And 

it's just there for the principal reason of reminding me as I get 

up and leave the office, as I go back into the office, day after 

day after day, that the work that we are about is enormously 

important and noble work and that we have to find a way to hold 

onto that edge. That is not to suggest that I see us losing that 

edge from time to time, but there are certainly pressures that 

would suggest this notion of a return to normalcy, whatever that 

phrase means to people, but when it means returning to something 

in the 9/10/01 window, we're just not going there, and the idea 

for all of us is to hold on to this sense of urgency as we move 

forward. 

Secondly, sir, I think there's an awful lot of opportunities 

for us to cite then and now, circumstances to reflect an enormous 

amount of work that has been undertaken by the people in 

government, in the private sector, at the state and local level, 

to grapple as successfully as we can with the issues that are in 

front of us. Whether in this instance it's about airports and 

airlines, whether it's about a difference in terms of an 

instinct, in terms of whether or not we will use civil penalties 

for the value they may induce in terms of behavior that we'd like 

to see, whether it's about the construct of security directives 

and emergency amendments that can, in a window of time, direct 

and encourage the kind of behavior that makes a difference 

between whether or not we're going to be grappling with the same 

kind of aftermath as we all experienced in 9/11. I think there 

has to be an ethic of continuous improvement in everything that 

we're doing. The very nature of what we're about suggests that 

the enemy, the bad guys, are out there gaming everything we're 

doing as we're doing it. And our challenge is to never accept 

the notion that that project we just finished today or just put 

online yesterday is that final puzzle piece that's going to make 

us "secure", quote, unquote.

I believe this to be a journey -- it's not a destination. 

And at the other end of the day our challenge is to demand as a 

part of the ethos of the Department of Homeland Security and 

certainly the Transportation Security Administration that 

continuous improvement is what they wake up and drink and eat day 

after day after day, and never gaining contentment with whatever 

level they've achieved, or we have achieved.

Another point that I think is important is this idea that 

it's an all-hands evolution, to put it in military terms that I'm 
117

familiar with. The idea that every citizen of this country, every 

trade association, every sector of that economy that we often 

take for granted as the underpinning of our quality of life, must 

find their way to contribute to the well-being of this security 

paradigm, this environment which is dramatically different after 

9/11 than it was on 9/10/01. 

I spoke this morning at a marine law conference, a gathering 

of elements from the maritime industry and encouraged them and 

challenged them to recognize that the contribution that each of 

them has to make is going to be fundamentally different in this 

global war on terrorism. And I don't use that term lightly, war, 

because in the days before 9/11 the idea of anything that rose to 

the word war in our country meant that the federal government 

basically picked up the tab for that. And the whole notion of 

armies looking at each other across the falter gap or across the 

demilitarized zone, it was the federal government that dealt with 

whatever the issue was that in this war nature of our national 

challenge. The global war on terrorism is something very 

different than that and we must all rise to the occasion when it 

is our turn. 

Another notion is that many of the agencies in our federal 

government establishment and even down through state, locals and 

tribal have had this notion of a prevention, response, 

consequence management paradigm as a means by which they 

structured their thinking. And I think there are, in the wake of 

9/11, a requirement to break out the front end of that thing we 

call prevention and concentrate on something that I have at least 

termed awareness, or domain awareness, or situational awareness, 

with the idea in mind that it deserves the intellectual energy 

and investment that we make in so many of the things at the same 

time. 

To be truly focused on learning everything we can learn 

about what's going on in the domain in which we work so as to be 

more productive when we do get to things about prevention or 

response or consequence management at the other end of the day. 

Our work must go forward as threat-based risk-managed work. In 

learning what the terms are internal to that notion are 

enormously important for all of us who are in the business to get 

at. We must understand that risk is about, in its simplest 

terms, the likelihood of something happening in times and 

consequences if it occurs and in there are a couple of notions:

Criticality assessments, vulnerability assessments, likelihood 

assessments and all of that as it plays out requires us to 

develop new tools of the trade so as to truly have a means by 

which we can go forward. 
118

Technology is absolutely something that we must invest in. 

I am absolutely of the mind that the means by which we can 

displace human intensive elements of our system today deserve the 

investment of energy and dollars necessary to make that happen. 

So, in the Department of Homeland Security and in TSA, for 

example, sir, we are working very hard with concentrating on 

those things that can either improve systems we have in place or 

replace them with systems coming on line that will be far fewer -

- far less intensive as it relates to people and far more 

intensive as it relates to efficiency and effectiveness. I think 

we owe that not only as a good steward of the taxpayers' dollar 

but in the interest of getting the job done at the other end of 

the day.

Going forward, sir, I think there are probably a handful of 

things that I would ask the Commission to look at very, very 

carefully. CAPPS 2, the program is one of those opportunities 

that, when we put it on line, we'll have a dramatic increase in 

both the customer service dimension and the security dimension of 

what it's intended to do. It will replace a system that is 

currently compromised, broken, if you will, and the sooner we can 

sort through the eight descriptive elements that have been 

identified by the appropriations this year to answer the 

questions adequately for the Congress so that we can press on 

with this program. Meeting every privacy concern that must be 

articulated along the way, we will be able to make one of those 

infrequent step function improvements in the security of 

passenger aviation.

We must be concentrating on the well-being of this workforce 

that we've assembled. We have put together a workforce at the 

federal level and the workplace that they deserve to go along 

with the efforts that they are putting out for us must be dealt 

with as constructively as we can. As you know, sir, in November 

of this year, every airport director in the country will have the 

opportunity to reconsider whether or not they would like to reprivatize the workforce that we have federalized along the way. 

And we must have the answers in hand, the information and the 

data face up on the table to help us make good judgments there.

Cargo is an issue that we must spend an awful lot more time 

on than we have so far and I look forward to doing that. This 

Congress has exhibited an interest in aviation cargo and we will 

press forward with getting better at how we deal with it. And I 

think we should be not only willing but obliged to revisit 

decisions taken as early as six months ago, let alone a year ago, 

with again the idea in mind that judgments that were taken then 

simply did not have all the cards face up on the table often. 
119

And if we can make better judgments today based on 

reconsideration, we should be about the business of doing that.

And I'll close, sir, with where I opened. This sense of 

urgency, this almost attitudinal approach to the work that we are 

undertaking, I know it has been very evident in your 

deliberations and we, at the federal government level, and at 

the state and local level, in the private sector, must recognize 

the urgency of the business that we are working about and make 

the commitments necessary to hold the edge with the decisions 

that we are taking, with the investments that we are making so 

that, at the other end of the day, we never find ourselves trying 

to review one more time the horrible aftermath of a tragedy like 

9/11.

Thank you very much, sir, and I'll be glad to answer your 

questions. 

MR. KEAN: Thank you very much, sir.

Commissioner Fielding.

MR. FIELDING: Thank you very much, Admiral Loy, and thank 

you for coming here today. I also should congratulate you for 

successfully being the first administrator of the TSA. I was 

amused when I read some time ago that you would -- you had said -

- I think it was to the Aviation Security Summit that you 

described you'd gone from an organization with over 200 years of 

infrastructure to an organization which was a piece of paper. 

Sometimes, that's not bad in Washington, you understand.

MR. LOY: It is a wonderful opportunity as well as a 

challenge, yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: But, in any event, as you know, we're seeking 

to determine what took place in this horrible tragedy and what 

were the failures and what were the flaws, what are the solutions 

and the fixes --

MR. LOY: Yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: -- and what has been done and what needs to 

be done. We understand that there is a risk and especially in 

situations and discussions with you because, although we seek to 

find out in a public session to reassure people and educate 

people, nonetheless we do understand that there are certain 

things that should be better discussed in closed sessions. So I 

am mindful of that. We'll understand that if that's part of the 
120

responses you feel you should give. But we would seek your 

cooperation in all regards.

MR. LOY: Yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: There are several areas of interest that --

I really liked your comment about these hijackers that gamed the 

system because anyone who clings to any vestige of a thought that 

they did game our system is wrong and that thinking will not be 

helpful and productive to fixing this problem. So I appreciate 

your comment in that regard. I guess the most important thing 

that is of immediate concern is risk management process and the 

priorities. You had said in your testimony before the Senate 

Approps Committee that TSA and the department as well were 

committed -- I think you used the same phrase today -- to the 

threat-based risk management plan. And that concerned me 

originally, quite frankly because there is much more than threat 

analysis. There has to be a consequence analysis. There has to 

be prioritization over vulnerability and by vulnerability, it's 

got to be more than you find a bad screener, you fire them. I 

mean -- so I understand from your testimony that it is much more 

complete than just the threat based.

MR. LOY: Absolutely. 

But I would ask if you could detail for us in a little more 

than you gave us, how it is working right now and the status of 

the plan as you see it and also I'd be interested to know how 

you're currently setting your budgets and your policy priorities, 

as you're developing the plan. 

MR. LOY: Yes, sir. Let me see if I can explain that. The 

notion of threat-based and risk-managed, I believe, has to begin 

with the secretary, continue with the undersecretaries and those 

that are in leadership positions to make good decisions about how 

we are making investments, and end with the on line workforce 

personnel that truly will make a difference in terms of actually 

carrying it out. While I was at TSA, we had a staff that we 

referred to as our strategic assessment staff. They were in the 

business, first of all, of reaching to the private sector. There 

was no illusion that some group of feds inside the building known 

as TSA headquarters had some kind of a corner on the market of 

good ideas about how we would move forward. I, for one, spent 

the last six years of my time in uniform developing a publicprivate partnership notion that I believe in deeply. I know 

there are kids alive on the river systems of this country because 

of the partnerships that the Coast Guard entered into with the 

American Waterways Operators. And I tried to bring that notion 

to the TSA with the idea that we would bring the aviation 
121

industry to the table, whether it was through our advisory 

council, or whether it was through individual challenges 

associated with understanding what this threat-based risk 

management notion was all about.

To take them as two phrases, one at a time, on the threatbased end, sir, it's not like it's about Cold War national 

security intelligence community only information that is of value 

to us. I am absolutely certain that information is part of the 

keys to the security locks of the future, but it's going to be 

data elements and information pieces used differently than we've 

ever used them before. I can see mixing of traditional national 

security intelligence data with proprietary private sector data 

on manifests and bills of lading that can really give us as good 

a clue as possible as to what is in that container, that one of 

17 million containers coming at us this year, or the one of seven 

million containers coming through our ports this year. 

How do we optimize the notion of not finding the needle in 

the haystack, because that's counterintuitive to what I think we 

need to do? If the notion is one of those containers out of 

those 17 million, we've got to find the one, that's virtually an 

impossible job. But what we can do is take the haystack off the 

needle to the point where we then can concentrate the resources 

that we do have on those few remaining containers that we can't 

put in the fast lane, so to speak, and speed on through the 

system.

So the notion of understanding likelihood, criticality and 

vulnerability, I think those three notions really are what risk 

management is all about. We have spent hours and hours 

developing what I think are very good self-assessment tools for 

industry elements to use, assessment tools that we would use if 

we went to those same places and assessed the industry elements, 

and our challenge is to put the two together as complete an 

information flow, analyzed as thoroughly as possible, and 

translate it into tactically actionable information products on 

one hand, and critical infrastructure notions about risk 

management that takes into account very hard priorities that we 

have to make between -- you know, is the bridge in San Francisco 

more important than the bridge in New York Harbor? The kinds of 

judgments that are very difficult to come by and need a thorough, 

methodical approach to making those kind of things happen. That 

calls for tools and we're in a business of developing all of 

those kinds of things, sir.

MR. FIELDING: Let me jump away from that, but thank you. 

And I may come back on another line here, but I want to talk a 

little about CAPPS, because we've had some testimony at our last 
122

hearing, a Professor Marc Rotenberg, who is the president of 

Electronic Privacy Information Center. He voiced his 

organization's objections to the CAPPS II system. His objection 

included that a substantial number of passengers had been 

misidentified because of the agency's selectee or no-fly lists, 

and that the TSA had failed to conduct the privacy impact 

assessment that was mandated by federal law, and that the CAPPS 

system therefore in his mind and probably for more other reasons 

violated the Privacy Act.

Now, you've discussed with us, as you said -- you mentioned 

one of the things you feel strongly about is the CAPPS project 

and how valuable it is in securing our airlines. So would you 

give us a sense of where you are in the balance of these 

interests and how's it working at this point?

MR. LOY: Yes, sir. We are -- we find ourselves at a point 

in the development of the system where the Congress, through the 

appropriations bill for '04 has stipulated eight areas of concern 

that they would want GAO to come back and help them understand 

before they would license us to go beyond the testing phase of 

the system. They allowed that the testing phase could continue 

but that we could not throw the switch, so to speak, and turn the 

system on until they were satisfied with these eight areas.

These are things like an adequate due process system so that 

an appeal could take place if you, as an individual, were kept 

from boarding an aircraft and you had no idea why and you truly 

were innocent of anything in the wrongdoing side. They want to 

make certain that the system is effective, that it works, that 

the false positive end of the system is going to be such that it 

is well within the bounds that we would have it be. They wanted 

to have demonstrated its efficacy as a system. They want to make 

sure there was an internal oversight board to hold us accountable 

for all the privacy elements that are very important.

Sir, I attended and arranged off-sites with Fortune 500 and 

small company privacy officers from around the country to truly 

get an understanding of what their concerns would be and how we 

could address them through the course of the development of our 

system. We had off-sites with representatives of EPIC and ACLU 

and all those organizations that are concentrated on Fourth 

Amendment protections and truly at their heart are trying to make 

absolutely certain that people and citizens of the country are 

not wronged by a system that we would be developing. 

We absorbed all of their commentary and designed two privacy 

notices, and I think it's another one of those then and now 

notions. If you look at the privacy notice for CAPPS II that 
123

went out in January of last year and then at the one that went 

out in late July of this year, there are just dramatic 

improvements along the lines of what we as a body learned from 

all the outreach that we had conducted with the people 

representing privacy interests. We narrowed, for example, where 

there was an inference that we might keep data for as long as 50 

years in the January announcement, in July, it will never be for 

more than a couple of days, and then only on those who had 

registered as actual terrorists or those who supported 

terrorists.

So we learned along the way in the development process, and 

we have clarified to the public in public notices the seven or 

eight basic parameters of concern that the privacy community 

always brings to the table. I think we have probably done as 

good a job researching and reaching to privacy interests with 

respect to CAPPS II as has been done on any project that I've 

ever been associated with. So I'm very, very proud with that 

outreach. The department has actually hired the first privacy 

officer in the federal establishment and she has spent virtually 

all of her time working with us on CAPPS II as the initial 

challenge that she has taken on.

So as I say, sir, we're very confident that we have 

developed the kind of a program that respects the privacy 

interests of our citizens, and I for one would never turn it on 

until that was, in fact, the case. Old Franklin way back when 

said, "He who would trade a moment of liberty for safety, 

deserves neither." And I think here we are, you know, a couple 

of hundred years later discussing the same basic -- having the 

same basic discussion. And the honor that we have is to make 

certain that we can live up to what was prescribed by the 

founding fathers.

MR. FIELDING: Well, we appreciate that because obviously 

we're in a position to try to -- and under an obligation to try 

to make recommendations and so your input into that is valued not 

only today but hopefully in the future.

MR. LOY: Yes, sir. Is there anything --

MR. FIELDING: If I can stay with CAPPS II for a minute. 

You issued an interim final Privacy Act notice. I'm trying to --

yeah, here it is. It says, "After the CAPPS II system became 

operational, it is contemplated that information regarding 

persons with outstanding state or federal arrest warrants for 

crimes of violence may also be analyzed in the context of this 

system." Now, that's classic mission creep, and I'd love your 

comments on that.
124

MR. LOY: Yes, sir. I think -- I mean, mission creep 

usually is not associated with two data points, it may be 

associated with something that is really a trend line going 

somewhere. The secretary and those of us who were reviewing the 

baseline for CAPPS II had the opportunity on the occasion of 

producing that privacy notice to make a judgment as to just what 

it was that we were trying very hard to, (a) keep off airplanes 

terrorists, those who associate with terrorists, foreign or 

domestic, and felons with significant warrants against them with 

a very prescribed list of offences. That was the judgment call 

that was taken by the secretary that those are very, very 

important things for us to put our -- you know, to plant our flag 

around.

I suppose, easily, there could have been a third or fourth 

or fifth data point on that trend line that would have suggested 

it would have been okay to go all the way to the other end, you 

know, and deadbeat dads would also be identified by the process. 

And we chose to be very conservative in the alignment that was 

taken with respect to where those lines would be drawn. And, of 

course, that notice, sir, invited additional commentary and 

before the -- again, before the system would be turned on there 

is a requirement for a final privacy notice to acknowledge what 

we have learned and listened to over the course of the time 

between the beginning of August, the end of July, this past year 

and whenever we would be actually turning it on. In fact, I 

suppose there's even conceivably the requirement for more than 

one: another interim and a final before we get there, in this 

ongoing dialogue of learning what we need to learn.

MR. FIELDING: Right. Well, I just think it's so important. 

We've discussed this amongst ourselves that, as important as 

CAPPS is, that it not be and its vitality be obscured by other 

issues.

MR. LOY: Absolutely. It should be as pristine as we can 

make it, focused on exactly what we want to use it for.

MR. FIELDING: Just to stay on CAPPS II for another minute, 

there is the theory that you're going after and identifying the 

bad guys and wouldn't it be better if you tried to figure out a 

way to identify the good guys?

MR. LOY: And frankly, sir, CAPPS II in large measure does 

that. I mean, the fact that --

MR. FIELDING: That's what I wanted to know your comment on, 

thank you.
125

MR. LOY: You know, my guess is today, one of the weaknesses 

of CAPPS I, in addition to being gameable and compromised, it 

produces about 14.5 percent selectees. So the challenge of 

getting through the airport from a customer service perspective 

is attendant to 14 or 15 percent of the people walking into the 

airport going through secondary screening as a result of being 

labeled a selectee by CAPPS I. I am very confident that CAPPS II 

will get that percentage down to around 3 or 4 percent and an 

infinitesimally small number -- smaller than that ever finding 

themselves in the so-called red category. What that really says 

is 97 or 96 percent of the folks walking through that airport 

portal will be in the green category and ushered aboard with the 

"have a nice flight" sign as CAPPS II works its magic. 

MR. FIELDING: If I can switch gears for just a second, and 

this may be one of these areas that we should discuss offline, 

but can you tell us where TSA or the department's efforts stand 

in respect to addressing the MANPAD or civilian aircraft threat 

from surface to air?

MR. LOY: I can -- I think I can give you an adequate 

answer, sir. And obviously if there is more that you would care 

to have me provide in a private setting, I'd be happy to do that. 

The federal -- or the government's approach is sort of a threepronged approach: two that we're very familiar with from 

nonproliferation days of the past and one that everyone sees on 

the front page and is looking at very carefully. The first is 

what I'd call the nonproliferation leg of the stool, which is to 

say great effort being undertaken in multilateral and bilateral 

means by which we can do whatever is possible to gain control of 

the inventory of the 700,000 plus MANPADs that are out there, 

quote/unquote, the vast number of which of course are inside 

military arsenals and being identified and contained as we speak. 

But the gray market/black market reality is that there are 

thousands that are unaccounted for in that system and we must be 

about the business of trying to gain as much of a handle on those 

as we can. So whether those are buy-back programs or destruction 

programs mutually agreed upon between two nations; that is one of 

the elements of the stool that is very important for us to 

continue. We're trying to work those down from the top, if you 

will, through G8 summit agenda items on down into all the rest of 

the nations of the world.

The second stool is basically what I'd call tactical 

countermeasures, and that's the identity of doing very good 

vulnerability assessments at all the major airports of our 

country, doing the footprint if you will that identifies 
126

carefully from where could a MANPAD be launched in the flight, 

approach and departure path of the aircraft that we're talking 

about. And then once that assessment is done, working with the 

state and local police officers and law enforcement community to 

understand that at different alert condition levels we will 

require different kinds of activities associated with being 

concerned about the MANPAD threat as one of the many threats to 

aviation today. We are also assessing a considerable number of 

foreign airports for the same reason. 

We cannot, I don't believe, take comfort in the fact that 

virtually all MANPAD attacks have been in some area where it was 

war torn, where it was tribally disruptive, where there was a --

not a very nice place to live and work, so to speak.

MR. FIELDING: I think we've all learned you can't assume 

since it hasn't happened once it would never happen.

MR. LOY: Absolutely, sir. And then the third piece is --

the other pieces of tactical are things like what can the pilot 

do on the approach or on the takeoff to make a difference? 

Should he turn his lights off, should he do this, should he do 

that? And there's been a very good interchange with the aviation 

community, the airlines and the pilots' associations to help us 

sort our way through those and offer those back as an educational 

package to the airlines and to the pilots. And then lastly 

technical countermeasures, which is what is always on the front 

page. 

We have just let three contracts to three different elements 

from the S&T, the Science and Technology Directorate at the 

Department of Homeland Security, whose purpose it is to identify 

what the "it" could be. Total ability to look inside some black 

box programs in the Pentagon and see what the potential for 

retrofitting a version of this counter-MANPAD technology might be 

on the aircraft that we have in the United States. Seven 

thousand, by the way, airframes roughly. And so once we figure 

out what the "it" is, then the subsequent judgment is, okay, all 

7,000? Just the craft fleet? Just those that go to bad places? 

How do we sort our way through the one to 7,000 issue that is 

also on the table? And, of course, should the per airframe cost 

sort out to be a quarter of a million dollars instead of $3 

million each, that would obviously have a bearing on the judgment 

process as well.

MR. FIELDING: Let me get down in the weeds a little on you, 

sir --
127

MR. LOY: More specifically, by the way, on the three 

contracts and other aspects of that, I'd be happy to come back in 

a private setting.

MR. FIELDING: Well, I think we should come back in a 

private session on that.

MR. LOY: Yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: But, as I say, let me get into the weeds a 

little and ask a question that probably everybody in this room 

would like the answer to because this morning in the paper we see 

that a woman passed through the security screening at LaGuardia 

and she had a stun gun and a knife in her purse and she didn't 

discover it. She got on the plane and she discovered it on the 

plane and then alerted authorities. And it's not the first time 

anybody has read these kind of things --

MR. LOY: Sure.

MR. FIELDING: -- and you say, gee, if we're so darned good, 

how can that happen? We have all these rings of protection, we 

have threat evaluations. How does this happen? And obviously I 

don't want you to answer how it happens and tell somebody how to 

get by it the next time.

MR. LOY: Yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: But in fact are records kept of all these 

such incidents?

MR. LOY: Obviously when we know about them. There are 

records kept so as to provide the training appropriate to the 

team or the individual that perhaps was responsible for that 

person going by. But let's back up if I may, sir, just for a 

moment and help all of us understand that we looked very hard. 

When TSA was stood up, Secretary Mineta -- it was interesting, 

from the time ATSA was passed -- the Aviation Transportation 

Security Act was passed, until a year later when the mandated 

congressional requirement was to have federalized that workforce. 

Secretary Mineta made I thought an enormously courageous 

decision. He said, we're going to take six months and figure out 

how to do this and then we're going to take six months to do it. 

He didn't plunge off into some array of things that people might 

have been calling for to be done. He demanded of us that we try 

as thoughtfully as possible to build -- to figure out what to 

build and then to build it. So we looked for the silver bullet. 

You know, we looked hard for what the technological protocol or 
128

people related silver bullet might be and frankly, sir, we never 

found it. So the default position became the rings of security 

notion that you alluded to. Over the course then of the ensuing 

design period, and even up to today when we continued to add 

rings to the array, we simply tried to take advantage of what 

might be five or six or seven or eight, 60 or 70 percent kind of 

tools and array them in such a fashion that we took advantage of

the law of aggregate numbers. 

And if in the law of aggregate numbers one is able to get 

closer to the 94, five, six, seven kind of notion that we would 

like to see in our system for the dollars invested and for the 

intellectual energy invested, then that became our default 

position: to array those obstacles in a path that the bad guy 

would have to take in order to get to the cockpit. So it begins 

with better perimeter security at the airport, it begins with 

better curb security at the terminal building, it goes on to the 

checkpoint and tens of thousands of much, much better trained 

people on the job at both the checkpoints and in the baggage 

rooms.

It includes 100 percent baggage instead of 4 percent baggage 

in terms of what it was on 9/11. It includes federal air 

marshals now flying tens of thousands of flights each month, when 

we started this process we had 33 federal air marshals to this 

country's name. It goes on to hardened cockpit doors, it goes on 

to now a training program for volunteer pilots, popularly known 

as guns in the cockpit, that is yet another sort of final notion 

of defense actually in the cockpit itself.

And it also includes, I would hope, this sense of urgency 

that I mentioned in my comments at the beginning. I just -- I am 

very concerned as a human being in an organization and a country, 

we have demonstrated unfortunately often enough in our past when 

we can let that surface and become an unfortunately dominant 

influence on where we're going. One way or the other I've got a 

coin in my pocket that is a little TSA thing and I'll have in my 

pocket for the rest of my life. 

And I encourage every person that came to work for TSA to 

find something that they hang on the kitchen door on their way 

out every morning that reminds them of why they have to what they 

have to do. So it's the array of that concentric set of rings 

that is the default position from the silver bullet that we 

simply could not find. And again, I point out this is a journey 

not a destination, there will never be a day when I can sit here 

and tell you with 100 percent certainty the last thing fell into 

place yesterday, Mr. Commissioner, and we are good to go. That 

day will never come.
129

MR. FIELDING: But you do keep records of these? 

MR. LOY: Oh, yes, sir.

MR. FIELDING: Would those records be available for us to 

get some sense of progress of TSA in that sort of thing?

MR. LOY: Of course, sir.

MR. FIELDING: And let me just hit you with one other 

similar issue. I guess it was in October when the box cutters 

were found on the Southwest Airlines.

MR. LOY: Sure.

MR. FIELDING: At first it appeared as though, gee, this is 

great, you know, they got the -- they found them and there was 

quick coordination between the FBI and TSA. But then there were 

enough reports about the incident that indicated that there may 

have been some delay between the time that TSA found out about it 

and the time the FBI got it. Could you --

MR. LOY: Yes, sir, a dark day for us. Largely the 

reporting process on that one was on us, as it turns out of 

course, the young man was not a terrorist, was not a security 

threat, he was simply trying to demonstrate that it's possible to 

get a box cutter on an airplane. The checkpoints associated with 

getting passengers and their carry on baggage on board, that is -

- if that was the silver bullet we wouldn't have needed all those 

others, so that too is one of the elements of a system that is 

going to have its percentage of success associated with that is 

other than 100. 

But in the specific time orientation associated with the 

report, our call center, which had been stood up rather recently, 

simply had not had the adequate guidance to it to make certain 

that a report like that that looked out of the ordinary got into 

the right operational hands, if you will, so something could have 

been done about it immediately, and that's exactly what should 

have happened and it didn't and we fixed it and it's behind us 

and if you call the call center today they will recognize the out 

of the ordinary call and get it into the right hands immediately.

MR. FIELDING: Thank you, I'm being very greedy with your 

time so, Mr. Chairman, I'll turn this over to -- thank you, sir.

MR. KEAN: Thank you, Mr. Fielding. 
130

Commissioner Gorelick?

MS. GORELICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Loy, thank you for being here, particularly on this 

snowy day when almost everybody seems to have abandoned 

Washington.

MR. LOY: Everyone else has gone home.

MS. GORELICK: I got to know you when you were commandant of 

the Coast Guard. You did superb work outside of your narrow job 

description, in counter-narcotics, in dealing with waves of 

Haitians and Cubans coming our way, and I saw leadership there 

that I'm very pleased to know is in the Department of Homeland 

Security today.

MR. LOY: Thank you, ma'am. 

MS. GORELICK: You remind me of that when you begin your 

testimony talking about the need to ensure that we are not 

complacent. We need leaders who step up to the plate, who see 

the whole field and do not narrowly define their jobs and that's 

the first topic I want to talk to you about. Over the last two 

days and in previous hearings as well I have been struck by how 

many people in government narrowly define their jobs, and in fact 

define the hard parts out of their jobs, and that include some 

agencies that now report to you.

We saw -- well, we saw some heroic behavior in INS and 

Customs and we also saw people who shrugged when they saw things 

that didn't comport with common sense, which when they saw things 

that were not in line with the regulations, and their view was it 

was not their job to think about the larger picture. We saw the 

same thing, frankly, with FAA, they took a very narrow job of 

their security role: That is that their job was to act when 

someone told them that there was a specific person who might do 

harm to an airplane as opposed to looking at the fact that they 

were in charge of security for the airline industry. And there 

was a wealth of information out there about bad actors who might 

like to go on our aircraft, and I find it frankly very shocking 

and very disturbing. We saw it in FBI and CIA, in headquarters 

who saw their job as proving a service to the field but not to 

make a whole strategy and make sure that the field was doing what 

it needed to be doing against that strategy -- the lack of common 

sense, the lack of the ability to evaluate the mission and say 

what can I do?
131

So my first question to you is you have inherited a lot of 

people and you have inherited a lot of people who -- many of whom 

have exhibited these behaviors and you are responsible for our 

homeland security. So my question to you is how are you going to 

change behaviors in an institution that big and that important?

MR. LOY: It's a -- it is an enormous undertaking. We are 

-- not to humor is a way of coping every once in a while and I 

tell the secretary it's like walking into the Borders bookstore 

and going to the management section and finding thousands of 

books on mergers and picking one, but he's got to pick 22. And 

then he's got to go the other section on startups and pick the 

very best book on startups and he's got to read all those and at 

the other end of the day be in the business of a 22 agency merger 

and a startup of 200,000 people and there's no book in Borders on 

that. He is writing it as we go. 

I believe you have to start with the vision thing. I truly 

believe that in order to take, in this instance, agencies like 

Customs and Coast Guard with 200 years of service to this 

country, and I accept your commentary with respect to any given 

one of them and their cultural approach to things, and there are 

other brand new organizations like TSA literally wet behind the 

ears in terms of trying to get something established. I am of 

the mind that the President's national strategy for homeland 

security is a good solid document, presidential in nature, for us 

to begin with. 

But our responsibility at the department is to take that 

challenge notion that's in that document and interpret it 

adequately for our workforce and for the public at large, such 

that the vision thing is truly available to all of us to 

understand. A bit of it is going to be like the classic 

instructor who stands in the front of the room and goes through 

the notion of telling them what he's got to tell them and then 

telling them and then telling them what he told them and then 

hoping one out of three, they got the message. 

I think a simple core message that is replete with values, 

replete with guiding principles that will be crystal clear to 

every leader and every workforce member in that department is in 

order, and the secretary is about the business of challenging us 

to produce exactly that. And I believe somewhere around the 

occasion of the first anniversary here coming up, that 

embarkation on a journey that has associated with it the right 

kind of values, the right kind of principles and the absolute 

accountability associated with each and every leader and member 

of the organization being held to task for his or her portion of 

that path forward.
132

MS. GORELICK: I think that's an excellent segue, if I can 

interrupt, into my next question, because you have described and 

we among us have described the war we're in against al Qaeda as 

one that requires a strategy and accountability and 

responsibility for carrying it out.

MR. LOY: Yes, ma'am.

MS. GORELICK: I have asked and I will continue to ask every 

relevant witness before this commission, who is responsible for 

establishing strategy against al Qaeda, long term and day-to-day 

and directing and managing all the assets of our government 

against it? To deprive it of the means that it needs to 

undertake to do us harm?

MR. LOY: Well, if you're asking me for a single person, if 

you're asking for the last advisor to the President, the 

president is the guy. The last advisor to the President is the 

national security advisor, with respect to the kind of challenge 

that you put on the table, and the pieces that comprise that game 

plan, that offers its nexus through the national security advisor 

to the President, are many of us who are responsible for various 

corners of it along the way. 

If you're asking me where I fit in and where Secretary Ridge 

fits into that, the charter for the Department of Homeland 

Security is very clear. I believe that the strategy as exhibited 

publicly by the President for that department to do its work is 

very clear. So getting on with that is simply the challenge that 

we all have day in and day out, but if ultimately you're asking 

me for one person responsible for this nation's well-being in 

that regard, it literally goes to the Oval Office.

MS. GORELICK: Well, that is really too broad. It's both 

too broad and too narrow. Let's drill down a little bit.

MR. LOY: Sure.

MS. GORELICK: One of the responsibilities of the Department 

of Homeland Security is gathering all of the information about al 

Qaeda, so that you know who the enemy is, what its methodology 

is, and so that you act against it. That function has been, as I 

can see it, outsourced to TTIC. I don't see that function in the 

Department of Homeland Security. Is my assessment correct? 

MR. LOY: I think your assessment is correct in terms of 

the TTIC being established specifically for the responsibility of 

-- with the responsibility of gathering all the elements of that 
133

threat and making it available to those that need it. That is 

absolutely correct. Now, the connectivity between the 

information analysis portion of one of our directorates in the 

department, we helped to people TTIC, the number two person at 

TTIC is from DHS, so the notion associated with what TTIC's 

responsibility is, is all about what it does with the product 

when it has it completed. And providing that finished product to 

those agencies that need it as a basis from which their 

operations are to ensue, if I may, just let me continue for just 

a second.

During the recent orange period, this is a maturing process 

for all of us as we go through this and get better and better at 

it as time goes by. But through the recent orange alert period, 

I watched day after day as TTIC articulated the smallest variants 

in the threat stream that was going by from yesterday's analysis 

and offered that to all of us in the action oriented departments 

and agencies to take on the challenges that would be necessary in 

our case to secure the homeland and in the case of others to 

aggressively follow things overseas.

MS. GORELICK: I was struck though when the deputy director 

of TTIC appeared before us yesterday when he said -- and he has 

told our staff and it's quite clear he has no operational or 

collection responsibility, he is a recipient of stuff gathered by 

other people. So, again, I'm looking for who is setting the 

strategy. You have described the war against al Qaeda as one in 

which it's not a cat and mouse game, it is a serious enterprise 

and on the last round they beat us.

MR. LOY: Absolutely.

MS. GORELICK: Because they were more focused than we were. 

And my concern here actually is in the org chart. You come out 

of a highly disciplined organization in the Coast Guard. I saw 

you in action and I saw that institution in action. I don't 

think that we are set up right now to be highly disciplined 

because we have the enterprise that is supposed to be pulling 

together everything, taking again a very narrow, in my personal 

view, view of their job, which is to passively receive and 

albeit, you know, aggressively integrate, but receive what is 

given to them. It then passes that on to a directorate in the 

Department of Homeland Security, which has various tools at its 

disposal. Some of the tools in the government are at the CIA, 

some are at the FBI and I'm not saying we should amalgamate them 

in one place, but I want to know who, on a day to day basis, is 

saying we got to do this, we've got to do that, we've got to go 

here. It can't be the President and it can't be the national 

security advisor. I am looking for who that person is.
134

MR. LOY: And it's not TTIC. What is maybe the -- a bit of 

the missing link there is that it is also incumbent on we 

operators to define requirements that will enable us to do our 

job well. I can remember vividly as -- sometimes it helps to take 

it to another venue. In the drug business, in the counterdrug 

business, before Barry McCaffrey sat in his chair the notion was 

always from us, from we operators, finger pointing in the 

direction of the intelligence establishment that if only they 

gave us what we needed, we would be able to do a much better job 

operationally in terms of productivity and the counterdrug 

effort.

MS. GORELICK: It sounds very familiar.

MR. LOY: Yes, ma'am. And when Barry held us for long hours 

over long days and helped us understand that it was only when we 

had articulated our requirements well enough to the intelligence 

community that they could really adjust themselves to produce 

things that we declared that we needed, could we then see 

dramatic success or improvements in what we were doing, and 

that's exactly what we did. So the requirements articulation 

piece associated with not only DHS but anyone else outside of the 

intelligence community that is feeding TTIC, must be about the 

business of articulating the requirements well. 

For us it is the requirement set associated with securing 

the homeland. That is about predominately a before and after the 

event notion where now that we have drafted a national response 

plan and a national incident management system that is associated 

in an all hazards environment, we must be about the business of 

articulating carefully the requirements that we have to do our 

jobs better. To prevent things from occurring that we don't want 

to occur, to protect critical infrastructure throughout this land 

in all 14 sectors, in all the key assets lists that we are 

inheriting and then in the aftermath, God forbid, of an actual 

event, to deal with the response, the recovery and the 

consequence management end of what we do for a living. Our 

challenge is to integrate that requirement set and articulate it 

clearly to those who can give us the wherewithal to do our jobs 

better.

MS. GORELICK: I appreciate that, and I think that that's an 

important step. I know I -- there are fellow commissioners who 

would like to get in a question here. I would just leave you 

with this thought, that the counternarcotics analogue in some 

respects falls apart because the counternarcotics effort 

operationally, in terms of integration of information and 

operations against narcotics organizations and collection against 
135

narcotics operations were consolidated in the Counternarcotics 

Center, which merged law enforcement and intelligence gathering 

and operations in one place. And what I'm saying to you is, so 

far, I haven't seen that with regard to our counterterrorism 

effort and it is an open question, at least for this 

commissioner. 

Thank you.

MR. KEAN: Thank you, Ma'am. 

Commissioner Roemer.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Loy, you have a lot of people that greatly admire 

you for your bluntness and candor in where I used to serve in the 

House of Representatives and I can see why today we appreciate 

that honesty. Let me ask you a quick question about the Homeland 

Security Council. As something that many people think is 

duplicative and not sure what the purpose is, what do you think? 

Should this evolve away? Should it be replaced by something 

else? What's your opinion on the Homeland Security Council?

MR. LOY: I guess I have two. The first is --

MR. ROEMER: As long as it's not pro and con.

MR. LOY: No, it's not. Maybe sequenced in time. It seems 

to me that we may unnecessarily bifurcate the council to the 

President by having more than one council associated with that 

advisory process. But, on the occasion of 9/11 and its 

aftermath, I believe it made very good sense to concentrate on 

this notion of homeland security and really sort through it for 

whatever length of time it might take to get us to a point that 

the thinking powers that be, inside the Executive Branch, would 

find the requirement to continue with multiple council to no 

longer be necessary.

So, at the moment, they serve a very, very good purpose. 

They are sort of a challenging element, a filtering element, a 

sounding board for ideas that may be forthcoming from any of a 

variety of places, from state and local levels, from private 

sector levels, from within our department and to this particular 

point in time, I believe they have served us as a nation very 

well. But I can also see x number of years --

MR. ROEMER: So your recommendation might be that their time

has come. They've served and gone and now it's time to --
136

MR. LOY: No, I didn't say that now is the time. I said 

that at the moment they continue to serve us very well in that 

regard but that there may be a time in the future where a rebonding or a regeneration into a single conduit of councils to 

the President would be in order.

MR. ROEMER: You talked in your opening testimony about 

trying to develop new tools for the trade, which I strongly agree 

with. How do you feel specifically about new tools such as a 

national identification card or state ID cards? Identity seems 

to be such an important part, an integral part of how we move 

forward in many of these efforts.

MR. LOY: It truly is. All of CAPPS 2 is associated with 

doing two things for us, validating identity on one hand and then 

making a judgment as to whether that person now that we think we 

know that they are who they claim to be should be allowed on the 

airplane for whatever risk score they might develop in the 

system. Many of the things that we're about. We are working 

very hard on a transportation worker's identification credential 

which has practical value. 

Our star is a trucker with 33 different things hanging on 

his neck or whatever to get him from point A to point B to do the 

business of his rounds. And so, the notion of a biometrically 

based -- there we go again with identity authentication -- and 

access control which are the two fundamental functions that we 

are groping with, grappling with day after day after day can be 

accommodated with a card that could be provided with all the 

means by which he can get to those places he needs to get to with 

only one card.

I think there is sort of a national aversion to the general 

notion of a national ID card for all that represents in the minds 

of many. But I am also very concerned that the things that we 

now use as a basis for identity, state drivers' licenses, for 

example, the myriad means by which they are dealt out in the 50 

different states across the country and the holes, if you will, 

that are in there as it relates to identity authentication, 

suggest to me that standards associated with the issuance of 

identification documents may be the right way for the federal 

government to get involved in that process rather than sort of 

trying to think our way through all the pits and valleys of a 

national identification card.

MR. ROEMER: That's helpful. Commissioner Gorelick asked 

very artfully your opinion about how we try to organize this 

massive lash-up of various organizations called the Department of 
137

Homeland Security. Let me put it a different way. Don't you 

think that Congress went too far and made a mistake in lashing up 

too many different cultures, too many different organizations, 

that it's too big, it's too bureaucratic, it's too political, it 

can't get the job done quick enough going against such a dynamic 

enemy as al Qaeda and how al Qaeda is going to work against the 

United States for the next five years? 

And before you answer because I'm sure your answer -- you 

have to go to work tomorrow or tonight -- before you answer, just 

put this in the context of somebody who still believes that the 

Department of Energy which is 26 years old still has real 

problems functioning as an organization and a Cabinet-level 

agency in this town. How in the world is this Department of 

Homeland Security going to take on this commensurate threat? You 

have this huge bureaucratic organization on the one hand and this 

dynamic, agile, fluid organization that moves from Afghanistan to 

Pakistan to Indonesia, cells of four people in Berlin, another 

cell of six in the Sudan. Are you going to recommend at some 

point certain reforms to make this organization work more 

efficiently?

MR. LOY: There's no doubt, sir, that I think this is a work 

in progress. The organizational structure of the department, I 

think, is relatively sound. The idea of the four major 

directorates with a director associated predominantly with 

operating agencies and the work that they are doing, one 

associated with the science and technology, associated with an 

investment in R&D and technological improvement, that is a very 

sound organizational element, I believe. One that is associated 

principally with the response side of the post-event challenge in 

EP&R and one that's associated with predominantly the information 

and prevention or the pre-event side of this notion of when the 

event may trigger before and after. 

I don't know that I'm smart enough, as I sit here today, to 

have reached fundamental conclusions as to whether or not it 

should have been only 16 agencies instead of 22 or 14 or 21 --

MR. ROEMER: You artfully suggested, I think -- you 

diplomatically suggested that maybe the Homeland Security Council 

could evolve, go away eventually. Is there a part of this that 

could be merged with a different department that has a better 

synergy with a different agency, that, in retrospect, some of us 

thought this could have been smaller and more agile like 

Secretary Ridge's first assignment in the White House? How might 

you help us think this through?
138

MR. LOY: Well, I think there's probably two things. One 

would be to understand the difference between one who is 

responsible and armed only with collaborative, coordinative kind 

of influence as opposed to one who has direct line authority over 

the engaged agencies that he is trying to get to do something. 

The homeland security advisor is just that, one who makes an 

effort to use the bully pulpit of the White House to influence 

things one way or the other. The secretary of the department in 

which there are these agencies has the direct authority to, as 

necessary, direct traffic with respect to what they do. That's 

one array of thought that suggests that a Cabinet level 

department has perhaps a better ultimate way of having things get 

accomplished because they have the line authority to make it 

happen.

The second thing is to -- I believe goes back again to 

Commissioner Gorelick's question about culture, and it has to do 

with what are those things that we must value in this brand new 

department, things like adaptability and agility and those that 

you were just describing, and make absolutely certain that in 

this white sheet of paper that we have, you know, in kicking off 

this new department in this new century, we design into the 

development of leadership programs in the department, in the dayto-day life of executing policy and things in the department, 

that those are the things that are valued. We incentivize the 

process such that we reward behavior that goes that direction and 

we don't reward -- in fact we punish if appropriate behavior that 

goes the wrong way. 

The enormity of the challenge on one hand to me is offset by 

the enormity of the opportunity on the other. And we are 

literally -- those of us who have been given this responsibility 

have a chance to take that white sheet of paper and create, if 

you will, a model agency for cabinet level functionality in the 

21st century. And if we do that well, armed with the authorities 

that were provided by the Congress -- including those, for 

example, that were provided in TSA -- I can tell you that there 

is no way, absolutely no way we could have gotten accomplished 

what we got accomplished in TSA in two years if it had not been 

for the authorities the Congress offered to us in ATSA. I'm 

talking about sole-source acquisitions. I'm talking about an 

H.R. program where pay banding offered us an opportunity to 

attract the very best in the public service because we could give 

them a couple of more bucks to do the job we were asking them to 

do. 

It was more than a patriotic zeal that brought people to the 

department. They could have gone lots of different places and 

done their service to America after 9/11. If they came to TSA it 
139

was not only because of that zeal, it was because we could 

attract them with a couple of more dollars associated with the 

pay banding system that was licensed for us to use. So in those 

kind of areas of design where we design the culture of this 

organization for the ensuing future, there is enormous 

opportunity for us to do that well and we should be held 

accountable if we don't get that job done.

MR. ROEMER: Thank you, Admiral, I appreciate that. Are you 

a baseball fan?

MR. LOY: I enjoy all sports, sir.

MR. ROEMER: You enjoy all sports. I'm a Cub fan and I'm 

proud of it. I've seen my Cubs humiliated --

MR. LOY: You're not the guy that was in the left field 

stands --

MR. ROEMER: If I was, I sure wouldn't be up here. They 

would have chased me off a long time ago. And in 1969 the Cubs

lost the pennant to the Mets, one of our many losses and 

humiliations. From what I've heard of that CAPPS program today, 

I think you said it's been gamed, it's been compromised, it 

hasn't worked well --

MR. LOY: CAPPS I.

MR. ROEMER: CAPPS I. I would not name anything CAPPS II. 

I think I'd --

MR. LOY: (Laughs.) Good point.

MR. ROEMER: -- work on a new name and be like exhorting the 

children of this country, in a coaching experience, to play like 

the Cubs of 1969. Let's think of something different. 

Thank you again, Admiral.

MR. LOY: Great point, sir.

MR. KEAN: Senator Kerrey.

MR. KERREY: Well, take heart, Commissioner Roemer. Every 

team has a bad century. (Laughter.) 

I don't have -- actually, there's not enough time to go into 

a lot of questions so I'm not going to do any questions. I'm 

just going to add a declaratory to your own thinking, in addition 
140

to having a great deal of admiration for your career, and I mean 

nothing that will follow here is made in a disrespectful fashion, 

but I'm a skeptic on all this stuff. I really am. I mean, put 

me in the ranks of -- just as a citizen, not as a commissioner 

here at the moment. I mean, my view is a lot of this new money 

we'd have been better off converting into $1,000 bills and 

throwing it out the window.

Secondly, I mean I've never been more frightened in the last 

18 months. I mean, every time some new alert comes out about 

some damned thing, my wife tells me we ought to move out of New 

York City. And, look, we made some terrible mistakes, and 

actually I'm becoming even more skeptical about the Department of 

Homeland Security, although from the standpoint of good 

government maybe at some point with all the new authorities 

you're talking about, it might make sense. I mean, maybe five 

years from now, just from a good government analysis, we'll look 

at it and we'll say this was a good thing to do.

But, I mean, all the witnesses that I've heard thus far in 

my short time on this commission, I mean, there's just too many 

of them that are saying, god, if I'd just had the intel from the 

CIA, as you were referencing, Barry. 

If the FBI had just told me, or the FBI and the (ECM ?) and 

-- you know, I just didn't know what was going on. I had no idea 

that maybe terrorists would commit suicide. You know, I had no 

idea that something like this could happen. It was unimaginable. 

It wasn't unimaginable. We had an Islamic terrorist 

organization that was operating right in the United States of 

America and we allowed it to happen. They were training in 

Afghanistan, we let it happen. And once we stopped doing all 

that stuff and going after people with a vengeance, it seems to 

me that the world has gotten an awful lot safer.

I mean, I tell you, I mean I travel a fair amount, and going 

to the airport is no fun. You know, you do have to add to your 

concentric circles the one that Commissioner Fielding was talking 

about, which is that law abiding passengers like us when we get 

on the plane, the last circle is we say, oops, here's the stun 

gun, Mr. Attendant. Here's the knife that I got on that I 

realize I shouldn't have had on. I mean, all the -- I take my 

shoes off. 

I've got a prosthesis from the Vietnam War. You know, 

they've got to -- now they practically strip search me to check 

me out and do all that. I mean, go fly commercial. I've got 

friends today that won't fly commercial any more. 
141

I mean, I hope that TSA doesn't do to Amtrak what it's done 

to the airlines. I mean, that's the way I feel, let me just tell 

you. I just -- from the standpoint of a single individual, I 

don't feel safer and I don't feel like -- in part because I don't 

think we're walking up to the microphones and saying, all of us 

made a terrible mistake. We miscalculated here. 

I mean, I heard in earlier panels they said, well, we just 

didn't realize these guys were this sophisticated. I mean, get 

the hell out of here. They beat the Soviet Union, for god's 

sakes, in Afghanistan. That's no small accomplishment. 

I didn't realize they could fly a plane. Get the hell out 

of here. 

We sell them fighters and train them how to be a pilot, for 

god's sakes. But we don't know -- we didn't realize they could 

learn how to fly a plane. 

What is that all about, other than denial? 

So when I hear this -- I hear people seem sort of chirpy 

that we've got it all figured out and it's all going to be 

better, I just say Jesus. I mean, you've got to start by saying 

every single one of us made a huge miscalculation and it got us 

into a hell of a lot of trouble. And we've stopped making that 

kind of miscalculation and we've stopped blaming it on somebody 

else. It's not somebody else's fault. 

We made a terrible mistake and we paid a hell of a price for 

it. And I just -- I mean, my whole -- I wish you well. I mean, 

I hope that you and Tom Ridge are very successful and that you 

win distinguished service medals for great service in organizing 

this department, but I'm still a skeptic. I'm still skeptical 

that the whole thing has added much value to the security of the 

American people.

MR. LOY: Sir, I thank you for your candor. I could not 

agree with you more about the huge mistake. I mean, I'm one who 

is of the mind that this complacency thing does manifest itself 

in organizations and in fact can manifest itself in nations, and 

we took a decade off. 

We took 12 years off. From the 1989 fall of the Wall and 

the implosion of the Soviet Empire, I am of the mind that we, the 

collective we, took a big deep breath, found no other superpower 

across the falter gap to worry about any more and tended to 

relax. And strangely enough, we woke up on the morning of 9/11 
142

not only to get that cold pail of water in the face very 

directly, but also to realize that all that stuff that we had 

built over the course of the Cold War largely was no longer very 

meaningful in this new war that we had to encounter on -- you 

know, in this global war on terrorism. 

It's not about, you know, the weapon systems, the protocols, 

the diplomatic engagements, all the things that were so 

dramatically effective for us to outlast the Soviet Union in the 

Cold War. A whole new ball game. I mean, a whole new ball game 

that we have to understand and build from scratch. 

That is our challenge. That is our generation's challenge 

for this country.

MR. KERREY: Well, thank you for accepting the challenge and 

for your service and -- (off mike.)

MR. LOY: Thank you, sir.

MR. KEAN: Secretary Lehman.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you, Admiral. You may recall there were 

hearings a long time ago when I was secretary of the Navy where 

there was a push to put the Coastguard under the Navy, and the 

Department of Defense put out a very strong statement that they 

didn't want that ball. And so I was called to testify and asked, 

now, we understand, Mr. Secretary, you really want the Coastguard 

and could you give us your frank personal view on whether the 

Coastguard should be part of the Navy Department. And I said, 

well, I do have a strong personal view on that, Senator, but I 

don't agree with it. 

And with that caveat, I'd like to ask you -- as you know, 

there was quite a strong push up here -- when I say here I mean 

the Hill -- to push to have the domestic intelligence function as 

part of Homeland Security. In fact, the original authors of that 

concept had that as the number one function to organize the 

department around. Where do you think domestic intelligence 

should reside?

MR. LOY: Sir, I think we are learning at the moment. My 

thought is that eventually, in a perfect system, domestic 

intelligence probably ought to be internalized in the department. 

That may be a while coming.

MR. KERREY: The Department of Homeland Security?
143

MR. LOY: Yes, sir. That may be a while coming. But, for 

example, one of the things that we have had to do in the stopgap 

measure business is both TTIC and TSC, the whole notion of trying 

to get our arms around a single watchlist for all of us who have 

to check things against such a watchlist and make very difficult 

decisions, I think it is a proper weigh point on the way to where 

it eventually might be housed. To single it out, stand it up, 

make it right and then, once it has proven itself functionally, 

to consider where the ultimate resting place might be for 

something like TSC, for example.

MR. KERREY: Thank you for that surprising frankness. 

MR. LOY: Now, that is not to say that for the moment -- and 

again I go back to this last month of orange alert condition --

and I must say I was just enormously pleased with what I saw day 

after day after day several times a day where principals were 

modifying stands from the morning and the afternoon because of 

new pieces of information going by. A new piece of analytical 

product that had come out of TTIC or had come out of the agency 

or had come out of the Bureau, or had come out of our shop in the 

I.A. side of IIAP. What was enormously gratifying was the 

sharing process that took place several times a day to enable us 

to get on to where we needed to go.

And that was the key, to me, to license the operators to

take those products and go do something about them. And we did, 

of course, have more -- as you know, we always look for 

credibility and specificity in intel streams going by and in 

those instances we had plenty of both. And so the opportunity 

for us to reach to international partners, to reach to the 

private sector of international partners, airlines, for example, 

all of that activity was happening of the moment, of the moment, 

and it was a very gratifying process to be part of.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you. 

I've one last question. I was quite surprised to hear from 

an earlier panel of airline officials, former and current, to 

learn that political correctness is still very much being 

enforced. And they said that, for instance, after 9/11 when some 

35-38 people were -- pilots declined to fly them because they 

suspected they were of a dangerous profile, that Department of 

Transportation is now suing them over that ethnic profiling. 

And further, one witness said that current regulations for 

governing TSA are that if there are three ethnic persons more of 

three ethnic -- the same ethnic profile, selected out for 

examination, that the carrier will be fined. And I find after 
144

the experience of 9/11 that to continue that kind of political 

correctness, that they can't focus their attention on people that 

fit the profile when we're in a war against Muslim 

fundamentalism, that you look for Muslim fundamentalists, to be 

idiotic. Tell me it ain't true.

MR. LOY: It ain't true, sir. I just don't -- having stood

the agency up and operated it for two years, I do not remember 

any such guidance being provided. We are -- you know, this 

profiling thing to me is all about capital "P" and little "p" and 

the capital "P" profiling that all of us have been against, for 

all the right reasons, in our culture is not to be confused with 

profiling with a small p" where we are using a tool to do 

whatever is necessary to be safe in terms of putting American 

citizens on airplanes flying from Point A to Point B. 

I have no recollection of that guidance. I certainly will 

go back and take a hard look because I have no recollection.

MR. LEHMAN: Could you run that to ground? I'd appreciate 

it because they said categorically that they were being both 

fined and sued because of such profiling.

MR. LOY: Yes, sir, I will sure check it out.

MR. LEHMAN: Thank you. Thank you very much, Admiral, for 

your --

MR. LOY: Yes, sir, Mr. Secretary.

MR. KEAN: Admiral, thank you very, very much. You have 

lived up to your reputation and it's a good reputation. Thank 

you, sir, for being with us today and this concludes our hearing. 

The Chair and the Vice Chair will be available to any members of 

the press who have questions in room 902 in this building. 

MR. LOY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

END