1

Filed 3/10/23 P. v. Manago CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEWART MANAGO,

Defendant and Appellant.

E076611

(Super.Ct.No. FVI17003315)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Tony Raphael, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Charles C. Ragland , Assistant Attorney General, Andrew Mestman and James 

H. Flaherty III, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Stewart Manago was sentenced to 25 years to life in prison under the “Three 

Strikes” law after a jury convicted him of one felony count of reckless evasion and one 

felony count of evasion against traffic and found he’d suffered three prior strike 

convictions. On appeal, Manago argues the court abused its discretion in revoking his 

right to represent himself before trial. He also asks us to review the sealed transcript of 

the court’s in-camera Pitchess1proceedings to determine whether it erred in denying his

request to disclose the personnel records of various law enforcement officers. We find no 

error on either issue and affirm the judgment.2

I

FACTS

A. The Incident, Trial, and Verdict

On December 4, 2017, Barstow police received a call reporting Manago was 

driving while armed with a gun. Soon after, an officer located him driving southbound on 

the 15 freeway with two female passengers and tried to pull him over. Manago refused 

and led the officer on a 25-mile pursuit that ultimately required the assistance of 

additional police units and a CHP helicopter. Manago drove dangerously during the 

chase—speeding, running a stop sign, straddling lanes, and driving on the wrong side of 

the road—and finally surrendered after driving into an apartment complex with a dead 

end. On the way to jail, he said he would have surrendered earlier but wanted to get to a 

1 Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess).

2

In a separate order filed concurrently with this opinion we summarily deny the 

habeas petition Manago filed while this appeal was pending.
3

place where his family could record his interaction with the police because he didn’t feel 

safe.

At trial, Manago claimed he hadn’t realized the police were chasing him because, 

when the pursuit began, he was already being followed by a member of the Mexican 

Mafia who had threatened him with a gun earlier in the day. As a result, he figured the 

police were after his pursuer, not him. On cross-examination, he admitted he told police

after his arrest that he’d assumed they were after him because he had removed his GPS 

tracking device while on parole. One of Manago’s passengers testified that someone had 

pulled a gun on them earlier in the day but also said she hadn’t noticed anyone else 

following them on the freeway besides the police.

The jury found Manago guilty of one count of recklessly evading an officer (Veh. 

Code, § 2800.2, count 1) and one count of evading an officer against traffic (Veh. Code, 

§ 2800.4, count 2). In a separate trial, they also found he had suffered three serious and 

violent strike convictions for forcible rape, first degree residential burglary, and 

residential robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)-(i) & 1170.12, subd. (a)-(d).) Although 

the evasion offenses were not serious or violent felonies, Manago was still subject to 

sentencing under the Three Strikes law due to the fact his rape conviction was a super 

strike. As a result, the court sentenced him to 25 years to life on count 1 and stayed 

punishment on count 2 under Penal Code section 654.
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B. Manago’s Pretrial Self-Representation

This case was one of two the prosecution filed against Manago in late 2017; the 

other was a domestic violence case involving allegations Manago had beaten and stabbed

his wife, Lillian. The two cases were never consolidated, but the trial court handled them 

together for pretrial purposes. In November 2019, after Manago had been representing 

himself in both cases for nearly two years, and after receiving two separate warnings 

from the court that his right to self-representation was in peril, the court found he was 

intentionally being obstructionist so as to delay his trials and revoked his pro per status in 

both cases.

It’s beyond dispute that Manago was an extremely difficult litigant. During the 19 

months he represented himself, he filed over 50 motions in each case and frequently tried 

to have both the court and the prosecution sanctioned, disqualified, and arrested. As 

points of reference, the transcripts of the period he represented himself span more than 

five volumes, and the People’s summary of his conduct consumes 34 pages of their 

appellate brief. For our purposes, though, we think the following summary suffices to 

address his claim of error.

1. Proceedings before Judge Stodghill

On February 9, 2018, about a week after the information in this case was filed, 

Riverside County Superior Court Judge John Tomberlin granted Manago’s Faretta

motion to represent himself.3He was, at the time, already representing himself in the 

3 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
5

domestic violence case. At that same hearing, Manago exercised his peremptory 

challenge against Judge Tomberlin after the judge rejected his claim that the prosecution 

shouldn’t be allowed to call Lillian as a witness in the domestic violence case. He 

accused the judge of not taking his case “seriously” and being unable to be “fair and 

impartial.”

On February 13, his cases were transferred to Judge Bryan Stodghill. At his first 

hearing before Judge Stodghill two days later, he moved to disqualify the district 

attorney’s office. He argued the prosecutor was conspiring against him by falsely 

claiming in a motion to consolidate the two cases that his current charges involved three 

counts of child molestation. The prosecutor said the mistake was inadvertent, that he’d 

been working off a document in a different case and failed to delete the irrelevant 

charges. Manago said he planned to sue both the prosecutor and the public defender who 

had represented him before his Faretta motion was granted for conspiring to have him

“assassinated” in custody by slandering him as a child molester.

The court ordered all references to the irrelevant charges stricken from the motion 

but rejected Manago’s claim of bad faith. Manago told the court it was wrong but was 

“entitled to [its] opinion.” He requested appointment of new counsel on the evasion case, 

and the court reappointed the public defender.

By the next hearing on March 9, Manago had filed on his own behalf two

additional motions to disqualify the district attorney, one for each case. At the start of the 

hearing, he said he refused to recognize the public defender as his counsel because he 
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was the same attorney who’d represented him before and had failed to protect him from 

the false molestation charges. Judge Stodghill granted Manago’s Faretta motion, and 

Manago raised an issue that would prove to be his main focus over the next 18 months—

discrediting Lillian’s prior statement to the police in which she’d identified him as her 

assailant in the domestic violence case.

Manago told the court he’d been talking and corresponding with his wife from jail

and she’d made it very clear she didn’t want to testify against him at trial. He also 

claimed the officer who interviewed her and testified at the preliminary hearing, Officer 

Helms, was lying and had in fact coerced her to blame him for her injuries. When the 

court denied his request for an order allowing him to interview Lillian from jail, he

became argumentative and made frequent interruptions, prompting the court to issue two 

separate warnings about his conduct. Judge Stodghill warned him he was “going to have 

problems being pro per if you keep cutting me off,” and, minutes later, warned, “[i]f you 

keep interrupting me I’m going to shut you down, Mr. Manago. You have a habit of

continually doing that.”

Manago moved to dismiss the domestic violence case, arguing his Sixth 

Amendment confrontation rights had been violated because Lillian had been allowed to 

assert her Fifth Amendment right to refuse to testify during his preliminary hearing. 

Judge Stodghill denied the motion, and Manago replied he would be seeking a change of 

venue and moving to disqualify the judge at the next hearing.
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The next 14 months continued in much the same fashion, with Manago filing

dozens of frivolous motions and repeatedly trying to relitigate the court’s rulings. His 

conduct caused Judge Stodghill to warn him on multiple occasions that he was being 

obstructive and disrespectful.

On April 6, Manago filed several motions including a motion to enforce his 

speedy trial rights, for discovery violations by the prosecution, to allow him to appear in 

court free of physical restraints, to suppress evidence, as well as one for certified copies 

of reporter’s transcripts to support his “complaint with the commission on judicial 

performance.” Unable to address all of them, Judge Stodghill told Manago that his 

motions were not only overly voluminous but also frivolous. “The Court has reviewed 

numbers and scores of your motions. I can tell you the Court reviewed just yesterday 

until 3:00 in the morning, approximately 15 motions filed by you, Mr. Manago, and in 

there you made lots of allegations. You made lots of assertions; however, the Court did 

not find any support for those assertions or allegations.”

Ignoring the court’s concern, Manago filed several motions in advance of the next 

hearing on April 24, including multiple motions for reconsideration, a motion to dismiss

for prosecutorial perjury and misconduct, and motions to sanction the prosecutor. The 

court rejected Manago’s claims of illegal government conduct and repeatedly tried to 

explain to him the nature of the proceedings.

During the same hearing, Judge Stodghill gave Manago another warning about his 

disorderly and disrespectful conduct. “You know what? If you’re not going to limit 
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yourself to the arguments we’re going to be done. I’m spending my whole morning doing 

this. I’ve cleared my calendar to listen to all of your motions. One thing I’m not going to 

tolerate is you being inappropriate or making little smart remarks about how I am 

handling the calendar. I told you, I’m hearing your motion but you have a ton of motions 

here. I’m going to try to go through them. I’m not going to tolerate you being 

disrespectful when I’m trying to accommodate you. . . . I spent hours reading through 

these motions, and set my calendar. You see there’s nobody here? You know why? 

Because I set this day special for you.” Manago responded to the court’s remarks by 

claiming he wasn’t “getting a fair shake.”

At the same hearing, Manago returned to the issue of his wife’s testimony, 

repeating his claim that his confrontation rights had been violated and demanding the 

court give Lillian immunity to testify. When the court explained that only the prosecution 

had the authority to issue immunity, Manago became argumentative, saying he knew the 

issue better because, unlike Judge Stodghill, he’d attended the preliminary hearing. “I 

was there. You weren’t there, okay.” He told the judge to go back and read the 

preliminary hearing record, saying, “I’m not misreading anything. And if you believe that 

I’m misreading something, you need to conduct a 1368, 1369, see that I’m competent to 

stand trial.” Judge Stodghill interrupted Manago to issue another warning. “[T]he one 

thing I’m not going to do, Mr. Manago, is I’m not going to have you be disrespectful to 

this Court. I’ve been respectful to you. I’ve given you a chance to talk. . . . If you can’t be

respectful, we’re going to do this a different way. . . . I’m going to respect you, and 
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you’re going to respect this Court. You’re not going tell me what I mean. . . . I read the 

transcript, and I made a finding that’s different than yours, period.”

Manago said that because Officer Helms was going to lie on the stand he planned 

to “instruct the bailiff” to arrest him for perjury, as well as anyone else who lied during 

his trial. The judge responded, “no one is going to follow your order.”

In late July 2018, Manago filed another motion to disqualify Judge Stodghill for 

bias. In denying the motion, the judge explained his rulings had been based on the law

and that he had “taken great pains” to address all of Manago’s issues and review all of his 

motions even though many of them were “repetitive and duplicative.” “I am not biased,

Mr. Manago. I’m trying to get this case to trial. I’m trying to get you what you need to 

get you to trial. You continually file motions in this case.”

On August 2, Manago moved for a citizens arrest of Judge Stodghill, arguing he 

“obstructed justice” by accepting the prosecutor’s lie about Lillian and Officer Helms. He 

claimed the prosecutor had bribed Officer Helms to testify against him at the preliminary 

hearing by offering the officer immunity for prior acts of misconduct in the line of duty.

The court stopped Manago, explaining, “I’ve ruled on that, Mr. Manago. I understand 

that you think that I’m obstructing justice because . . . you claim [the prosecutor] was 

somehow underhanded and that he was going to give one of the deputies immunity, and 

that’s not what this Court believes. The Court read the transcripts. The Court does not 

believe for a second that that’s what [the prosecutor] was intending when he was talking 

about immunity. He was talking about it for [Lillian].” Manago told the court it was 
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wrong, and the court issued another warning about tone. “Mr. Manago, I’m not going to 

argue with you. We’re done. . . . I’m going to tell you again, and I’m not going to 

tolerate, I’m not going to tolerate the arguing. . . . I had a full calendar today that I had to 

stop early so I could give you time to present your motions. [N]ormally motions take 10 

to 15 minutes. Yours take hours. . . . I’m not going to let you continue to argue the same 

thing over and over and over again”

On August 30, Manago moved for a citizen’s arrest of Officer Helms, arguing he 

lied in his report and at the preliminary hearing by saying Lillian had been stabbed. “She 

never had a stab wound on her body. Still don’t got one today. So he falsified his police 

report.” Judge Stodghill denied the motion and several others, including another motion 

to grant Lillian immunity and to sanction and arrest the prosecutor.

On February 7, 2019, Manago raised another issue that would end up being a 

recurring concern of his in both cases. He argued the prosecutor had directed jail staff to

remove his work product from his cell. He said after the removal he was transferred to a 

different facility and he hadn’t been able to access the materials since. The court 

promised to look into the whereabouts of his materials. Later in the hearing, as Manago 

was presenting a lengthy and meandering argument about why he needed to subpoena an 

array of records from the Department of Corrections and the Barstow Police Department 

to prove the agencies were involved in a conspiracy with the district attorney’s office, 

Judge Stodghill told Manago he needed to limit his arguments to relevant topics. 

“[W]e’re never going to get through all of your motions. . . . I have a stack of motions 
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and I know you want to make your record and I’m going to let you but if you could be as 

efficient as possible so that I don’t get too far behind. You keep continuing motions and 

we’re never going to get you to trial.”

On March 21, the court addressed and denied a number of successive motions 

from Manago (including a fifth Pitchess motion, a motion to reconsider the ruling on a 

prior Pitchess motion, and a motion for sanctions against Barstow and its city attorney for 

obstruction of justice), and admonished Manago for bringing renewed motions on issues

that had been fully litigated. Manago responded, “If the court may recall I’m contending 

that I was framed [and that Officer Helms] engaged in serious misconduct, falsification of 

records, et cetera.” Judge Stodghill told Manago he’d already reviewed Officer Helms’s

file and hadn’t found anything relevant to his claims of misconduct. He said if Manago 

kept trying to relitigate his rulings “again and again” they were “never going to get to a 

place where we’re ready for trial.”

On April 11, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the whereabouts of 

Manago’s work product. Sergeant Cahow, who was stationed at High Desert Detention 

Center (High Desert), said staff had confiscated some of Manago’s paperwork because he 

had exceeded the maximum amount allowed by jail policy. Manago then damaged the 

remaining paperwork by setting off the sprinkler in his cell. When he set the sprinkler off

a second time, they transferred him to West Valley Detention Center. Sergeant Cahow 

said Manago could have access to the confiscated paperwork upon request—“[it’s] 

somewhere in the system . . . we can find it.”
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On May 6, 2019, Judge Stodghill addressed another motion Manago had filed to 

disqualify him. He denied the motion as frivolous but explained he was nevertheless 

exercising his discretion to recuse himself from both cases because “circumstances . . .

have arisen and come to this Court’s mind that make me believe that I can’t be fair to you 

and give you a fair trial.”

2. Proceedings Before Judge Camber

Manago’s cases were reassigned to Judge Michael Camber, who held his first 

hearing on May 10, 2019. At the start of the hearing, advisory counsel (who’d been 

appointed in both cases several months earlier) asked to be relieved, explaining, “[t]he 

documents that have been filed and letters that I have received make me believe that Mr. 

Manago would be better served by better counsel” who would be “interested in taking on 

the challenge.”4Judge Camber granted counsel’s motion, and continued the cases for two 

weeks to “read all of [Manago’s] motions.”

a. The court orders this case tried first

When he recalled the matter on May 24, Judge Camber informed the parties that 

he’d gotten up to speed on the evasion case and ordered that it would be tried first. After 

the prosecutor represented he could be ready to go to trial within a month, by July 7, 

Manago said he wasn’t ready for trial because the prosecutor was withholding discovery 

and he needed a new investigator. After discussing discovery with the parties, Judge 

4 Advisory counsel “is appointed to assist the self-represented defendant if and 

when the defendant requests help.” (People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 725.)
13

Camber found the prosecutor had fulfilled his obligations and ruled that discovery was 

closed.

At the beginning of the next hearing, Judge Camber denied Manago’s motion to 

have the domestic violence case tried before this case, explaining he had already made 

his decision. The judge then held an ex parte conference with Manago to inform him his

investigator had sent the court an email saying she refused to work for him anymore “due 

to the way he has treated me.” Manago agreed to prepare a list of pending investigation 

areas so the judge could decide whether to appoint a new investigator.

Back in the presence of the prosecutor, the judge reiterated the importance of 

handling the two cases separately, beginning with the evasion case. “So everything I am 

talking about now is the [evasion] case. After we do [that] case, we can talk about all the 

issues on the other one.” Later in the hearing, Manago became angry when the judge 

denied his request for advisory counsel. He threatened to file a motion to disqualify the 

judge and refused to answer whether he’d be ready to discuss his investigation at the next 

hearing.

On June 21, Manago agreed to waive time on the evasion case, but refused to do 

so on the domestic violence case. Noting they were still far from the 60th day on the 

domestic violence case, the court put the issue off for another time.

By the next hearing on July 12, Manago had filed another Pitchess motion, a 

motion to disqualify Judge Camber, another motion to recuse the district attorney’s 

office, a motion to report the prosecutor to the State Bar, and another motion to dismiss 
14

the case. At the start of the hearing, the judge informed Manago that the investigator who 

was refusing to work with him was also refusing to send him her file. The judge 

appointed Manago a new investigator and “signed an order authorizing payment for [the 

former investigator] to make copies of everything that she has on [the] case and to deliver 

to the Court as soon as possible.”

In advance of the hearing on August 30, Manago filed several more motions, 

including another motion for sanctions against the prosecution and another motion to 

dismiss premised on prosecutorial misconduct. At the hearing, Manago refused to waive 

time on the domestic violence case. He said the “only thing” he needed was his lost work 

product and if that was returned to him he’d be ready to go to trial on that case

immediately. The court asked if he would be willing to waive time so they could try to 

locate them, and Manago said no.

The court held another hearing on Manago’s missing work product on September 

6. Sergeant Cahow said the documents had either been delivered to Manago (and he was 

denying that fact) or had been lost during his transfer from High Desert to West Valley, 

but he emphasized that staff would not have intentionally destroyed them or thrown them 

out. Judge Camber found Manago’s materials were missing but declined to find bad faith 

on the part of the sheriff’s department. Manago said he needed more discovery and 

witness examinations to prove Sergeant Cahow was lying and they did in fact have his 

work product. The judge directed Manago to focus instead on the effect the loss had on 

his ability to present a defense. “The fact is they looked for your work product. It’s not
15

there. And you’re not going to be able to get it back. The only way to proceed is what 

effect does that have on your case. One effect is it gives you another basis for a 

continuance. But another effect is based on that, have you been so damaged in your 

ability to represent yourself that you can’t get a fair trial.” (Italics added.)

On September 13, the court heard Manago’s motion to dismiss based on the loss 

of his work product. Manago argued the prosecutor had orchestrated the removal of the 

documents from his cell because he knew how damaging the materials were to law 

enforcement and the district attorney’s office. The court repeatedly and unsuccessfully 

tried to redirect Manago to instead demonstrate how the loss impacted his ability to 

prepare a defense. The judge denied the motion, explaining that while he took the matter

seriously, Manago had failed to demonstrate how the loss of his materials affected his 

ability to present a defense.

The judge told Manago the last day to start trial on the evasion case was 

September 24 unless he was willing to waive time. He said if Manago waived time, he’d 

be able to continue his investigation and try to recreate his lost materials. Manago

initially refused to discuss trial readiness and instead tried to argue with the judge over 

his ruling on the motion to dismiss. Eventually, Manago refused to waive time, and the

judge set this case for a trial readiness conference.

b. The court agrees to switch the order of the cases

At the conference on September 17, Manago said he wasn’t ready for trial but also 

wasn’t willing to waive time. Judge Camber explained how the right to a speedy trial 
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worked and told Manago that if he wasn’t willing to waive time, he would have to keep 

bringing him back to court every few days to see if he was ready. Noting he wasn’t 

advising him on how to proceed, the judge said he understood if Manago needed more 

time to prepare for his case, given the work product and new investigator, and explained 

that entering a waiver was the most effective way to do so. “Do you understand that? I’m 

not forcing you. I’m not telling you you have to answer ready. In fact, if I was you, I 

wouldn’t answer ready until I was ready. . . . But you’re the one that has to [keep] 

com[ing] back.” The judge reminded Manago that the 60 days from his previous waiver 

was up the following week, on September 24, “[a]nd unless [you] answer[] ready that 

day, we’re going to have to figure out when we’re coming back. Potentially we could go 

day to day.”

In response, Manago again tried to convince the judge to try the domestic violence 

case first. He promised he could be ready on that case much sooner than he could on this 

one. He claimed there was a lot of investigation left to do on this case, whereas he’d 

finished the investigation on the domestic violence case and could “take that case to trial 

ASAP.” He said that all his first investigator had done “was interview the two females

that was in my vehicle on the day of the alleged vehicle pursuit,” and a lot more work 

needed to be done on this case, including “a lot of interviews of the CHP” regarding their 

involvement in the pursuit.

Unmoved, Judge Camber told Manago to focus on the evasion case, saying they 

would reconvene on September 24, the last of the 60 days, to see if he was ready. He
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reiterated that he understood if Manago wasn’t ready to go to trial on the 24th and would 

find good cause if he asked for a continuance.

Changing his approach, Manago said he would agree to waive time on this case

but was unwilling to do so on the domestic violence case. Reiterating the point that his 

investigation was essentially finished on the domestic violence case, he claimed he was 

nearly certain he’d be ready to go to trial on that case on September 24. He claimed he 

was in possession of strong exculpatory evidence in that case. After much discussion—

and based on Manago’s repeated representations that he wasn’t “playing games” and 

would be ready to go to trial on the domestic violence case by the next hearing—Judge 

Camber agreed to switch the order and try that case first.

But on September 24 Manago said he wasn’t ready for trial in the domestic 

violence case. Despite having just said the file from his first investigator was relevant to 

this case only, he now claimed to need it for the domestic violence case. He also said he 

wasn’t ready because, “[a]s the Court know, my work product, has been in the 

prosecution team hands [for nearly a year].” Judge Camber responded he didn’t “know” 

that, and Manago retorted, “I think you do know that. We had a hearing about it. It was 

on the record. Judge Stodghill was conducting an evidentiary hearing dating back to April

11th. Of course you know about that.” Ignoring Manago’s combative comments, the 

judge asked if he was willing to waive time on the domestic violence case since he was 

essentially saying he needed to conduct more investigation. Manago refused, quipping, 

“[j]ust bring me back.”
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The following day, Manago again said he wasn’t ready for trial and wouldn’t 

waive time, but he claimed he would be ready “as soon as my investigator serve all the 

witnesses.”

On September 27, Manago gave the same response—that he wasn’t ready because 

he was waiting for his investigator to finish serving subpoenas on his trial witnesses. The 

court replied, “Just so the record is clear, if you ask for a continuance, I’ll give it to you. 

But you haven’t asked for one so there’s nothing for me to give,” and Manago told the 

court to bring him back the next court day.

Before concluding the hearing, the court heard the City of Barstow’s motion to 

quash 19 subpoenas Manago had served in the domestic violence case. The city attorney 

argued Manago’s requests were overbroad and irrelevant, and that Manago had recently 

indicated he planned to subpoena the entire police department. He argued Manago was 

abusing the subpoena process and asked the court to quash the subpoenas and “appoint a 

public defender to help him with the procedural aspects of this case.” Judge Camber

quashed the majority of the subpoenas on the ground Manago failed to show the 

witnesses were material to his case (the domestic violence case), and the parties 

stipulated that all of the material witnesses would be on call for trial.

On September 30, Manago said he was still waiting for the investigator to finish 

serving the subpoenas but would likely be ready on October 11. When the prosecutor said 

he could be ready for trial within a week of that date, Manago changed course, claiming 

he wasn’t ready because he was still waiting for his first investigator to send her files. 
19

Judge Camber responded, “I’ll call that investigator and say where is Mr. Manago’s 

discovery because I signed an order giving her payment for that, and we haven’t heard a 

thing. I’ll call her myself.” Manago agreed to come back on October 10 to discuss trial 

readiness and indicated he’d be ready after the ruling on his motion to suppress Lillian’s 

statement to the police.

On October 10, Judge Camber continued the matter to October 18 to hear motions 

to quash subpoenas Manago had served on three San Bernardino County Superior Court 

judges and various employees of the district attorney’s office and the San Bernardino 

Sheriff’s Department.

On October 18, Judge Camber granted all of the motions to quash except for 

Sergeant Cahow, a deputy involved in the removal of Manago’s work product, and one

police officer (who was already on the prosecution’s witness list). Manago told the court 

he wasn’t ready for trial because his investigator hadn’t finished serving his subpoenas, 

and Judge Camber explained why subpoena service wasn’t a reason to answer not ready, 

that he should subpoena his trial witnesses after answering ready.

On October 22, Judge Camber told Manago his first investigator wanted to know

whether she should send the file to the court or directly to him, and Manago agreed she 

could send them to him indirectly via the court. Manago then claimed he’d be ready for 

trial in the domestic violence case as soon as the court ruled on his motion to suppress 

Lillian’s statement to the police and his motion to dismiss. He explained, “I just want the 

motions ruled on so that if I do have to go to the Court of Appeals, everything is properly 
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documented. After additional discussion, Manago reiterated that all he needed to be ready 

to go to trial was a ruling on those two motions. “[L]ike I am just basically trying to get 

the Court to commit, you know, on ruling on my motions. Because, like I say, that’s 

pretty much the holdup is I want to secure the record and make sure I am not waiving 

none of my constitutional rights.” The court agreed to hear the motions on October 25

with the understanding Manago would then answer ready.

c. Hearing on the motion to suppress

On October 25, the court held a hearing on the motion to suppress Lillian’s 

statement to Officer Helms. On direct examination by the prosecutor, Officer Helms

denied using any coercive tactics during his interview. He said on August 29, 2017, he’d

responded to a report of a male-on-female assault at a park in Barstow and found bloody 

scissors on the ground next to a car that had been vandalized and was registered to 

Lillian. When he found and interviewed Lillian about two hours later she was injured and 

bleeding from a laceration on her lip and what appeared to be a stab wound on her arm. 

She told him Manago had gotten physical with her during an argument.

At the continued hearing on October 31, the prosecutor offered Lillian immunity 

to testify in support of Manago’s suppression motion. Lillian rejected the offer, but Judge 

Camber accepted the prosecutor’s representation of immunity and ordered her to testify.

Manago objected. He asked the judge to continue the hearing to give him time to review 

the immunity agreement. Judge Camber told Manago he lacked standing to challenge the 

agreement. He invited Manago to examine Lillian, reminding him that she was his 
21

witness and that he’d been trying to present her testimony for months. Manago replied, “I 

have questions, but I’m not going ask her questions when the [prosecutor] is doing 

underhanded things.” Judge Camber said he was taking that comment to mean Manago

had no questions for his own witness, and Manago retorted, “No. I didn’t say that. You 

said that.”

d. Warning and revocation of pro per status

At that point, Judge Camber warned Manago he was in danger of losing his right 

to represent himself, that his conduct was “obstructionist and delaying” and would no 

longer be tolerated. “From the time that you became a pro per, . . . you have filed at least 

one motion a week [on both cases]. I would say in each of your cases, there’s probably 50 

motions that have been filed. [¶] This case has dragged on for over two years and here we 

are. Now you file a motion, and you don’t want to ask any questions of the witness 

because you claim you’re being mistreated by the District Attorney. I disagree.” Judge 

Camber warned Manago that if he continued his dilatory behavior and was unwilling to

answer ready for trial, he would revoke his propria persona (pro per) status and appoint 

an attorney to represent him.

When Manago indicated he understood the warning, Judge Camber resumed the 

suppression hearing. Manago refused to call Lillian as a witness. He tried to call other 

witnesses but failed to convince the judge of their relevance. After hearing argument, the 

judge denied the motion, heard and denied Manago’s remaining motions to dismiss, and 
22

asked Manago if he was ready for trial. Manago replied, “Not at this time, your Honor. I 

would like to file a [motion to disqualify you] for cause.”

Judge Camber said he’d rule on that motion when Manago filed it and proceeded 

to issue a second Faretta warning. “[A]t this point, I’m very close to revoking your pro 

per status, but I think you have to have notice of that. I’m going to bring you back next 

Friday. If you continue to say that you’re not ready and you’re not going to waive time, 

I’m going to revoke your pro per status.” (Italics added.) After Judge Camber concluded 

the hearing, Manago tried to argue with him, saying “Do you remember you told me on 

the record you said that if I’m not ready don’t answer ready prematurely?”

On November 8, 2019, Judge Camber asked Manago if he was ready and he

replied, “No, your Honor.” Judge Camber revoked Manago’s pro per status on the ground 

he was engaging in intentionally dilatory and obstructive conduct by inundating the court 

with motions and manipulating the right to speedy trial. He observed that during his 

nearly two years of self-representation, Manago had “filed in excess of fifty motions in 

each case,” the vast majority of which were frivolous and which “consumed numerous

hours of court time and require responses from attorneys representing three law 

enforcement agencies, the District Attorney’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office, and 

the Superior Court.”

In addition, Judge Camber found Manago was playing games with the timing of 

his two cases by agreeing to a continuance in one but not the other, then forcing the court 

to recall the domestic violence case “every few days.” He concluded Manago’s conduct 
23

had “led to a serious disruption in the Court’s ability to conduct other business and the 

People’s ability to be ready for trial” and that “allowing [him] to continue to represent 

himself in these two matters would threaten the core integrity of the trial process.”

After trial and entry of judgment in this case, Manago filed this timely appeal.

II

ANALYSIS

A. Revocation of Self-Represented Status

Manago argues the court revoked his right to represent himself without sufficient 

justification. We disagree.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give criminal defendants the right to 

represent themselves, but the right is not absolute. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 807; People 

v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 252 (Williams).) At times, the “government’s interest 

in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial . . . outweighs the defendant’s interest 

in acting as his own lawyer.” (Williams, at p. 253.) For example, a prerequisite of selfrepresentation is a willingness and ability “to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom 

protocol.” (McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 173.)

“The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the 

courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and 

substantive law. Thus, a trial court must undertake the task of deciding whether a 

defendant is and will remain so disruptive, obstreperous, disobedient, disrespectful or 

obstructionist in his or her actions or words as to preclude the exercise of the right to self-
24

representation.” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 253, [cleaned up].) As Faretta itself 

made clear, a court is justified revoking a defendant’s pro per status when they have

“deliberately engage[d] in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” (Faretta, supra, 422 

U.S. at p. 834, fn. 46.) “This rule is obviously critical to the viable functioning of the 

courtroom. A constantly disruptive defendant who represents himself . . . would have the 

capacity to bring his trial to a standstill.” (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 734

(Welch).)

“The trial court possesses much discretion when it comes to terminating a 

defendant’s right to self-representation,” and we will not overturn that decision “‘in the 

absence of a strong showing of clear abuse.’” (Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 735.) We

accord great deference to the trial court’s “assessment of the defendant’s motives and 

sincerity as well as the nature and context of his misconduct and its impact on the 

integrity of the trial.” (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 12.) This is because “the 

extent of a defendant’s disruptive behavior may not be fully evident from the cold 

record,” and the trial judge “is in the best position to judge [their] demeanor.” (Welch, at 

p. 735.)

Having carefully reviewed the record, we find ample support for the court’s

determination that Manago was deliberately engaging in disruptive conduct to delay trial 

in both his cases. As is obvious from the trial evidence summarized above, this was a 

straightforward evasion case with uncomplicated facts. Where it would likely have taken 

the average attorney less than a year to prepare for trial, Manago spent nearly two years 
25

inundating the court with frivolous and repetitive motions in lieu of conducting a relevant

investigation. (See, e.g., People v. Elliott (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [pro per 

defendants are held to the same rules and standards as counsel].) On that basis alone, the 

court would have been justified in finding he was trying to delay trial. (See, e.g., 

(Williams, 58 Cal.4th at p. 255 [revocation for dilatory conduct justified where defendant 

“missed the ready-for-trial deadline by five months” during which time he failed to

“conduct any meaningful investigation”].) As the People aptly point out, the amount of 

court and agency resources that Manago’s pretrial motions consumed rivals that of a 

death penalty case.

Describing his motions as merely indicative of “vigorous advocacy,” Manago 

relies on People v. Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511 (Becerra) to argue the judge was 

wrong to revoke his pro per status because discovery was incomplete. Specifically, he 

argues he was justified in refusing to answer ready on the domestic violence case until he 

received the file from his first investigator.

The problem with this argument is that it’s at odds with the record. The missing 

file was not the reason Manago refused to answer ready for trial in the domestic violence 

case. In fact, far from being a reason to delay trial, Manago cited the file as one of the 

reason’s the judge should switch the order of the cases and try the domestic violence case 

first. At the hearing on September 17, he told the judge he needed the file only for the 

evasion case and had finished his investigation in the domestic violence case. He claimed 
26

the only thing the first investigator had done was interview the two women who had been 

in the car with him during the pursuit.

We think the record shows that Manago’s actual reason for refusing to answer 

ready or waive time in the domestic violence case was his dissatisfaction over the 

outcome of his motion to suppress Lillian’s statement to the police, not any concern over 

incomplete discovery. Though he never gave the judge consistent or reasonable answers 

as to why he wouldn’t answer ready or waive time, his conduct got worse during the 

suppression hearing when it became clear he wasn’t going to be able to control its 

outcome. First, he refused to ask questions of his own witness (despite asking for months 

to be able to examine her) when the judge didn’t allow him to challenge Lillian’s 

immunity agreement. Then, he essentially shut down after the judge denied the motion,

refusing to answer ready but also refusing to explain why. Given this was the trial he had 

pushed so hard to have go first, one he claimed to be ready for, the judge could 

reasonably conclude Manago was engaged in gamesmanship and had no intention of 

actually preparing for or going to trial.

But even if the missing file had been his reason for refusing to answer ready for 

trial on the domestic violence case, Becerra still wouldn’t help his case. In that case, the 

trial court terminated Becerra’s pro per status in response to his request for a continuance, 

without any prior warning, based on its finding that he was “stalling” and “everything 

[he’d] done [was] dilatory.” (Becerra, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 516.) Our Supreme Court 

concluded that finding was “bereft” of support because the record revealed that Becerra 
27

was justifiably waiting for discovery the prosecutor had acknowledged was outstanding. 

(Id. at pp. 515-516, 520.) The Court acknowledged that while “a mere desire for more 

time, a need to study the law in detail, or alleged inadequacies in the jail library will 

seldom be sufficient to entitle [a pro per defendant] to a continuance,” incomplete 

discovery is a valid reason to seek a continuance. (Id. at p. 519.) The Court reversed 

Becerra’s death sentence based on the error, explaining that “[t]erminating a defendant’s 

self-representation status should be considered a last resort, not a first impulse.” (Id. at 

p. 520.)

That case is readily distinguishable on the ground that what Becerra had requested 

there is precisely what the court kept offering Manago—a continuance to prepare for 

trial. Unlike Becerra, Manago refused a continuance even though the court repeatedly 

told him he had good reason to ask for one. As we’ve seen, Judge Camber went to great 

lengths to help Manago obtain the missing file and offered on numerous occasions to 

grant him a continuance to complete his investigation, but Manago repeatedly refused 

that option. Instead, when the case he claimed to be ready on didn’t go the way he’d 

planned, he changed course and claimed he was no longer ready. That’s gamesmanship

and dilatory conduct, and it’s grounds for revocation. (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 

Cal.4th 41, 115 [“Trial courts are not required to engage in game playing with cunning 

defendants who would present Hobson’s choices”].)

Finally, unlike in Becerra, revocation was not the court’s “first impulse.” Both 

Judge Stodghill and Judge Camber were extremely respectful of and patient with 
28

Manago. They gave him multiple warnings about his excessive frivolous motions and 

disruptive behavior, and Judge Camber warned him twice that his pro per status was in 

peril and why. On this record, revocation was entirely avoidable and justified.

B. Pitchess Hearings

The court conducted two in-camera Pitchess hearings—one on May 11, 2018 and 

one on November 29, 2018—and found no records subject to disclosure. At Manago’s

request, which the People do not oppose, we have reviewed the sealed transcripts of those 

hearings for an abuse of discretion and found none. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

1216, 1228.)

III

DISPOSITION

We affirm the judgment.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

SLOUGH

J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ

P. J.

CODRINGTON

J.