Filed 8/29/13 Conservatorship of Clara P. CA5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Conservatorship of the Estate and Person of 

CLARA P. 

MANUEL JIMENEZ, as Public Conservator, 

etc., 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

 v. 

CLARA P., 

Objector and Appellant. 

F065812 

(Super. Ct. No. P26560) 

OPINION

THE COURT* 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Brian L. 

McCabe, Judge. 

 Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and 

Appellant. 

 James N. Fincher, County Counsel, David A. Olsen, Deputy County Counsel, for 

Petitioner and Respondent. 

-ooOoo- 

 

* Before Gomes, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Detjen, J. 
2 

Appellant, Clara P., challenges an order reappointing respondent Merced County 

Public Conservator (Public Conservator) as conservator of her person and estate under 

the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.)1 Appellant 

contends (1) insufficient evidence supports the finding that she suffers from the sort of 

“grave disability” required for an LPS conservatorship (§ 5350); and (2) the trial court 

erred in restricting her from possessing firearms, holding a driver’s license, entering into 

contracts, entering into transactions over $50, and refusing or consenting to medical 

treatment. 

We affirm the order reappointing the Public Conservator and imposing the special 

disabilities set forth above. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Physician Declarations 

 Evidence submitted included two form declarations executed by Isabel Manuel, 

M.D. and Edward Benton, M.D. In her declaration, Dr. Manuel stated she had 

“determined that [appellant] is gravely disabled within the meaning of [section] 5008 (h), 

as a result of a mental disorder.” She gave as the reasons for this determination the 

following: “[Appellant] is delusional. Paranoid. Believes she still has an apartment. 

Has no viable plan for self-care.” 

 In his declaration, Dr. Benton stated he had made the same determination and gave 

the following reasons: “Due to residual symptoms of schizophrenia she is unable to 

formulate a viable plan to provide for her basic needs.” 

 In their declarations, each physician, for the same reasons given to support the 

opinion that appellant was gravely disabled, also opined that appellant should be 

prohibited from possessing a firearm, is not able to give informed consent to both 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
3 

psychiatric and non-psychiatric medical treatment, is not competent to enter into a 

contract, and should not be permitted to operate a motor vehicle. 

Testimony of Dr. Manuel2 

 Appellant has been under conservatorship “for several years.” She lived “in her 

own residence several years ago,” but for the last two years “she has been in a 

placement[.]” Her current placement is a board and care home. She is “not happy” with 

her current placement because she is under the delusion “that the board and care is 

running a prostitution ring.” 

Appellant “is diagnosed with schizophrenia ....” Dr. Manuel, who is a psychiatrist, 

opined that appellant “at this time ... remain[s] gravely disabled.” Dr. Manuel gave as the 

basis for this opinion the following: “[Appellant] remains delusional. She has no 

adequate plan for self-care.” “She continues” to be under the “fixed delusion” that “she 

[has] an apartment that currently is being paid for by her attorneys and is located ... 

somewhere on Loughborough.” Appellant “would rather go there at this time.” 

Dr. Manuel was “[h]opeful[]” that “we can step [appellant] down to a room and 

board and then eventually get her to her own apartment,” but appellant was “opposed” to 

that plan because she is under the delusion that she already has her own apartment. 

Appellant’s medications “won’t have any affect” on this delusion. 

Dr. Manuel further opined: Appellant would not be “a danger to herself or others 

at this time.” It was “possible” that at some point she could live “on her own” again. 

However, at present she would not be able to “function adequately” “on her own.” Dr. 

Manuel based this latter opinion, in part, on appellant’s belief that she has an apartment 

that her attorneys are paying for. 

 

2 Information in this section is taken from Dr. Manuel’s testimony at the 

reappointment hearing. The parties stipulated to her “expertise for the purposes of this 

hearing[.]” 
4 

Appellant is “currently on a long-acting intramuscular injection” of Haldol 

Decanoate (Haldol). She receives these injections once per month. This medication 

regimen, which appellant has been on for two years, “stabilized” her and is currently 

“keeping her adequately stabilized.” The program of Haldol injections was instituted “in 

part, because of her non-compliance with the medications.” She “had to [be] switch[ed] 

to Haldol ... to ensure that the medication [was] in her system.” 

When asked why appellant “has been compliant with the Haldol injections,” Dr. 

Manuel responded, “Because we bring her to her appointments. We make sure that she 

gets to her appointments.” 

There had not been any “problem administering the Haldol to [appellant].” Dr. 

Manuel “[had not] heard [of] any resistance on [appellant’s] part to come to her 

appointments.” Appellant had not “expressed ... that she will stop [her Haldol regimen] if 

she were to go and live on her own somewhere.” Appellant has “been taking 

medications” for “maybe a decade or more.” 

Appellant’s Testimony 

 Appellant testified to the following: She does not have “problems with the 

facilities they put [her] in in the beginning, but ... after the beginning is over ... things 

start happening.” She “discovered a prostitution ring” at her current placement, “And 

now all they are trying to do is ... get rid of me.” “[T]hey use their cell phones to mark 

my clothes .... They ... are just trying to chase me out of there for some reason.” The 

night prior to the hearing “for no reason at all,” in her room, “they did surgery through 

[the] brainwave on my back. So I don’t know what their next move is.” 

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence-Gravely Disabled 

 Appellant argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove that 

she requires a conservatorship. We disagree. 
5 

Legal Background – “Gravely Disabled”

Section 5350 provides for the establishment of a conservatorship of the person and 

estate of “any person who is gravely disabled as a result of mental disorder or impairment 

by chronic alcoholism.” Section 5361 allows a conservator to petition the superior court 

at the end of a one-year LPS conservatorship for the reestablishment of the 

conservatorship where two physicians or licensed psychologists agree the conservatee 

remains gravely disabled. The conservatee is then entitled to a court or jury trial to 

determine whether he or she is gravely disabled. (§ 5350, subd. (d).) To establish or 

renew a conservatorship, grave disability must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Conservatorship of Pollock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1406, 1411.) 

As pertinent to this case, subdivision (h)(1)(A) of section 5008 defines the term 

“gravely disabled” to mean “[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental 

disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing, or 

shelter.” Thus, “in order to establish that a person is ‘gravely disabled,’ the evidence 

adduced must support an objective finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is 

incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or 

otherwise provide for her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.” (Conservatorship of 

Smith (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 903, 909.) “Bizarre or eccentric behavior, even if it 

interferes with a person’s normal intercourse with society, does not rise to a level 

warranting conservatorship except where such behavior renders the individual helpless to 

fend for herself or destroys her ability to meet those basic needs for survival. Only then 

does the interest of the state override her individual liberty interests.” (Ibid.) 

Legal Background – Standard of Review

 “In reviewing a conservatorship, we apply the substantial evidence standard to 

determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability.” (Conservatorship of 

Carol K. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 123, 134 (Carol K.).) In applying this standard, we 

adhere to the following principles: 
6 

“We review the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the trial court 

judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence. Substantial evidence ... 

is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value ....” (Carol K., supra, 188 

Cal.App.4th at p. 134.) “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and the 

reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” (Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 

Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577 (Walker).) 

 “The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every 

fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “‘“If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, 

the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be 

reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. 

[Citation.]”’” (Id. at p. 1054.) 

We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Zamudio

(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) “Reversal on this ground [i.e., insufficiency of the 

evidence] is unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there 

sufficient substantial evidence to support [the challenged order].’” (People v. Bolin

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) “Even when there is a significant amount of countervailing 

evidence, the testimony of a single witness that satisfies the standard is sufficient to 

uphold the finding.” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052.) 

Analysis

 Evidence adduced at the reappointment hearing included the following: Appellant 

has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. She wants to leave her current placement in a 

board and care home because she is under the delusion that the home is running a 

prostitution ring. She is opposed to a gradual “step down” plan that would keep her in a 

restricted placement for the present but would work toward the goal of allowing her to 

live on her own in an apartment at some point in the future. Her plan for providing for 
7 

her own housing is to move, at this time, to an apartment that her attorneys are paying 

for. The existence of this apartment, however, is a delusion. 

From this evidence, the court reasonably could have inferred appellant suffers 

from a mental disorder, as a result of which she had rejected reasonable plans for housing 

herself in favor of the obviously unfeasible plan, which she wants to put into operation at 

this time, of moving into a non-existent apartment. Under the principles of judicial 

review summarized above, the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from it support 

the conclusion that appellant, due to a mental disorder, is unable to provide for her basic 

shelter needs and is therefore gravely disabled. 

 In addition, evidence of the following was adduced at the hearing: Appellant is 

currently receiving monthly injections of Haldol. She was prescribed this long-acting 

medication in part because she was not complying with the medication regimen in effect 

previously. The Haldol injections stabilized her, and it is this medication that is currently 

keeping her “adequately stabilized.” When asked why appellant has been able to comply 

with the Haldol regimen, Dr. Manuel testified that “we”—presumably her conservator 

and/or Merced County mental health personnel—have made sure appellant gets to her 

appointments by transporting her there. 

 From this evidence the court reasonably could conclude that appellant stopped 

taking her medication in the past; compliance with the current regimen of monthly Haldol 

injections is keeping her condition stabilized; she has remained in compliance because 

her conservator and/or others make sure she gets to her appointments; and without this 

help she would not comply with the Haldol regimen. 

These inferences, in turn, support the conclusion that appellant needed Haldol to 

remain “stabilized,” i.e., in a condition in which she is able to provide for her basic needs, 

and that without supervision she would not receive this critical medication. This 

circumstance provides further support for the conclusion that at the time of the hearing, 

appellant, because of a mental disorder, was unable to provide for her basic needs and 
8 

was therefore gravely disabled. (See Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 

Cal.App.4th 442, 447 [“but for the medication, which [the conservatee] would not take 

without supervision, [the conservatee] was presently gravely disabled”].) 

 Appellant argues there was no “specific evidence” that she “has been 

uncooperative with medication or is unwilling to continue taking medication.” We 

disagree. As indicated earlier, Dr. Manuel testified that appellant had been “noncomplian[t] with the medications,” and it was for this reason, in part, that the Haldol 

regimen was instituted. Appellant also argues, “Nor is there any evidence that appellant 

would not cooperate with services to help her obtain independent housing, even if she has 

a bizarre belief that she already has an apartment.” This circumstance, at most, creates a 

conflict which, under the principles of appellate review summarized above, we resolve in 

favor of the judgment. When we consider the record as a whole, as we are required to do, 

we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that appellant was gravely 

disabled. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence-Special Disabilities 

Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

imposition of special disabilities on her driving privilege, her right to enter into contracts 

and transactions over $50, her right to possess firearms, and her right to consent or refuse 

to consent to medical treatment. 

Section 5357 provides that the court may impose certain special disabilities on a 

conservatee, including those imposed by the court in the present case. (§ 5357, subds. 

(a), (b), (d)-(f).) That appellant is gravely disabled does not by itself satisfy the 

evidentiary requirements for the imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. 

(Walker, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d 1572 at p. 1578; Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 157, 165 (George H.).) “A conservatee does not forfeit any legal right 

nor suffer legal disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone.” (Walker, at p. 1578.) 
9 

Substantial evidence must support the imposition of any disability. (See Conservatorship 

of Amanda B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1382.) 

Appellant contends the imposition of the disabilities in the instant case was not 

supported by substantial evidence. She asserts that no evidence specifically relating to 

her ability to enter into contracts or transactions over $50, her ability to drive, or her right 

to possess firearms was adduced at the hearing, and “The only evidence related to 

appellant’s ability to give consent to medical treatment was that appellant was completely 

cooperative with her medication.” This last point is incorrect. As discussed earlier, 

although there was evidence that appellant cooperated with her Haldol regimen, there 

was also evidence that regimen was instituted because she had failed to take prescribed 

medication. And there is no requirement that the imposition of disabilities may be 

supported only by evidence specifically relating to those disabilities. Rather, we apply 

“the usual rules” of appellate review and “‘presume in favor of the judgment every 

finding of fact necessary to support it warranted by the evidence’ [citation].” (George H., 

supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 165.) For the reasons set forth below, we find that 

substantial evidence supported the court’s imposition of the disabilities. 

Possession of Firearms

 To support a limitation on a conservatee’s ability to possess a firearm, the court 

must find, and the court here found, “that possession of a firearm or any other deadly 

weapon by the person would present a danger to the safety of the person or to others.” (§ 

8103, subd. (e)(1).) There was evidence in the instant case that appellant held the 

paranoid delusional belief that persons at the board and care home conducted unwanted 

“brainwave” surgery on her, and that she was unhappy with the board and care home 

based on the delusional belief that the home was operating a prostitution ring. These 

delusional beliefs, and the resulting antipathy they caused appellant to feel toward others, 

supports the finding that appellant would present a danger to others and therefore should 

be prohibited from possessing firearms. 
10 

Holding a Driver’s License

 The evidence of appellant’s paranoid delusions also supports the restriction on her 

right to drive. The trial court reasonably could conclude that as a result of these 

delusions, appellant would be a danger to herself or others if she were allowed to operate 

a motor vehicle upon public roads. 

Entering into Contracts and Transactions Over $50 

 Appellant was also under the delusion that her attorneys were paying for an 

apartment for her. This unsupported belief that she had resources she did not actually 

have indicates appellant did not understand her financial situation, leaving her vulnerable 

to financial exploitation by others, and supported the restrictions on appellant’s right to 

enter into contracts and transactions over $50. 

Consenting and Refusing Consent to Medical Care

 As demonstrated earlier, the court reasonably could conclude that appellant had 

refused to take medication in the past, medication was necessary to keep her stabilized, 

and she was currently complying with the Haldol regimen and remaining stabilized only 

because others were ensuring that she kept her Haldol injection appointments. This 

evidence supports a finding that appellant was not competent to make intelligent 

decisions regarding medical treatment. 

DISPOSITION 

 The order reappointing the conservator and the order imposing special disabilities 

are affirmed.