THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

________________________________________________________________

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE

UNTIL DELIVERY

THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 2004

As Prepared for Delivery

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE

OPENING REMARKS

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS

UPON THE UNITED STATES

Hart Senate Office Building

Washington, DC

April 8, 2004

I thank the Commission for arranging this special session. 

Thank you for helping to find a way to meet the Nation’s need to 

learn all we can about the September 11th attacks, while 

preserving important Constitutional principles.

This Commission, and those who appear before it, have a 

vital charge. We owe it to those we lost, and to their loved 

ones, and to our country, to learn all we can about that tragic 

day, and the events that led to it. Many families of the 

victims are here today, and I thank them for their contributions 

to the Commission’s work.

The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on 

September 11th, 2001. Long before that day, radical, freedomhating terrorists declared war on America and on the civilized 

world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, 

the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida 

and the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks 

on American installations in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the 

East Africa embassy bombings of 1998, the attack on the USS Cole 

in 2000, these and other atrocities were part of a sustained, 

systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to 

murder innocent Americans.
2

The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at 

war with them. For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat 

gathered, and America’s response across several administrations 

of both parties was insufficient. Historically, democratic 

societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending 

instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous 

to ignore or until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the 

Lusitania in 1915 and continued German harassment of American 

shipping, the United States did not enter the First World War 

until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany’s repeated 

violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of 

provocations throughout the mid-1930s, the Western democracies 

did not take action until 1939. The U.S. Government did not act 

against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the threat 

became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for 

all the language of war spoken before September 11th, this 

country simply was not on a war footing.

Since then, America has been at war. And under President 

Bush’s leadership, we will remain at war until the terrorist 

threat to our Nation is ended. The world has changed so much 

that it is hard to remember what our lives were like before that 

day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration 

was taking to fight terrorism before September 11th, 2001.

After President Bush was elected, we were briefed by the 

Clinton Administration on many national security issues during 

the transition. The President-elect and I were briefed by 

George Tenet on terrorism and on the al-Qaida network. Members 

of Sandy Berger’s NSC staff briefed me, along with other members 

of the new national security team, on counterterrorism and 

al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour, and it reviewed 

the Clinton Administration’s counterterrorism approach and the 

various counterterrorism activities then underway. Sandy and I 

personally discussed a variety of other topics, including North 

Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, and the Balkans.

Because of these briefings and because we had watched the 

rise of al-Qaida over the years, we understood that the network 

posed a serious threat to the United States. We wanted to 

ensure there was no respite in the fight against al-Qaida. On 

an operational level, we decided immediately to continue 

pursuing the Clinton Administration’s covert action authorities 

and other efforts to fight the network. President Bush retained 

George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence, and Louis 

Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the unusual step 

of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration’s 

counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an 
3

expert in his field, as well as an experienced crisis manager. 

Our goal was to ensure continuity of operations while we 

developed new and more aggressive policies.

At the beginning of the Administration, President Bush 

revived the practice of meeting with the Director of Central 

Intelligence almost every day in the Oval Office -– meetings 

which I attended, along with the Vice President and the Chief of 

Staff. At these meetings, the President received up-to-date 

intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence 

officials. From January 20 through September 10, the President 

received at these daily meetings more than 40 briefing items on 

al-Qaida, and 13 of these were in response to questions he or 

his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet 

almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone every 

morning at 7:15 with Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also 

met and spoke regularly with the DCI about al-Qaida and 

terrorism.

Of course, we also had other responsibilities. President 

Bush had set a broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined 

to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

We were improving America’s relations with the world’s great 

powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no 

progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. 

planes enforcing U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had 

to deal with the occasional crisis, for instance, when the crew 

of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11 days.

We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy 

to eliminate the al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush 

understood the threat, and he understood its importance. He 

made clear to us that he did not want to respond to al-Qaida one 

attack at a time. He told me he was “tired of swatting flies.”

This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer 

of 2001, and was approved by the President’s senior national 

security officials on September 4. It was the very first major 

national security policy directive of the Bush Administration -–

not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination 

of al-Qaida.

Although this National Security Presidential Directive was 

originally a highly classified document, we arranged for 

portions to be declassified to help the Commission in its work, 

and I will describe some of those today. The strategy set as 

its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered 

the leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make 
4

the elimination of al-Qaida a high priority and to use all 

aspects of our national power -– intelligence, financial, 

diplomatic, and military –- to meet this goal. And it gave 

Cabinet Secretaries and department heads specific 

responsibilities. For instance:

• It directed the Secretary of State to work with other 

countries to end all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida.

• It directed the Secretaries of the Treasury and State to 

work with foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and 

holdings of al-Qaida and its benefactors.

• It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare 

an aggressive program of covert activities to disrupt 

al-Qaida and provide assistance to anti-Taliban groups 

operating against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

• It tasked the Director of OMB with ensuring that sufficient 

funds were available in the budgets over the next five 

years to meet the goals laid out in the strategy.

• And it directed the Secretary of Defense to -– and I quote 

–- “ensure that the contingency planning process include 

plans: against al-Qaida and associated terrorist 

facilities in Afghanistan, including leadership, commandcontrol-communications, training, and logistics facilities; 

against Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including 

leadership, command-control, air and air defense, ground 

forces, and logistics; to eliminate weapons of mass

destruction which al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups 

may acquire or manufacture, including those stored in 

underground bunkers.” This was a change from the prior 

strategy -- Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed in 

1998 -– which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide 

transportation to bring individual terrorists to the U.S.

for trial, to protect DOD forces overseas, and to be 

prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass 

destruction incidents.

More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism 

strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the 

Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made 

available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was 

part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the 

complexities of the region.
5

Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies 

was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new 

strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron 

to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those 

relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of 

protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.

Not that we hadn’t tried. Within a month of taking office, 

President Bush sent a strong, private message to President 

Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to 

bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training 

camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, 

including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban. 

I met with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister in my office in June of 

2001. I delivered a very tough message, which was met with a 

rote, expressionless response.

America’s al-Qaida policy wasn’t working because our 

Afghanistan policy wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan policy 

wasn’t working because our Pakistan policy wasn’t working. We 

recognized that America’s counterterrorism policy had to be 

connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign 

policy.

To address these problems, I made sure to involve key 

regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on 

Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had worked 

closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to turn back 

the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the 

NSC experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and 

his regional specialists. Together, we developed a new 

strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus 

on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the importance of the 

south -– the social and political heartland of the country. Our 

new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks 

to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And 

we began to change our approach to India, to preserve stability 

on the subcontinent.

While we were developing this new strategy to deal with 

al-Qaida, we also made decisions on a number of specific antial-Qaida initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke. 

Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last 

Administration, and some had been on the table since 1998. We 

increased counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan; we bolstered 

the Treasury Department’s activities to track and seize 

terrorist assets; we increased funding for counterterrorism 

activities across several agencies; and we moved quickly to arm 
6

Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against 

al-Qaida.

When threat reporting increased during the Spring and 

Summer of 2001, we moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a 

high state of alert and activity. Let me clear up any confusion 

about the relationship between the development of our new 

strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that 

summer. Policy development and crisis management require

different approaches. Throughout this period, we did both

simultaneously.

For the essential crisis management task, we depended on 

the Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be 

the interagency nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior 

counterterrorism experts from CIA, the FBI, the Department of 

Justice, the Defense Department (including the Joint Chiefs), 

the State Department, and the Secret Service. The CSG had met 

regularly for many years, and its members had worked through 

numerous periods of heightened threat activity. As threat 

information increased, the CSG met more frequently, sometimes 

daily, to review and analyze the threat reporting and to 

coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready 

access to their Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns 

they had at the highest levels.

The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and 

Summer of 2001 was not specific as to time, nor place, nor 

manner of attack. Almost all of the reports focused on al-Qaida 

activities outside the United States, especially in the Middle 

East and North Africa. In fact, the information that was 

specific enough to be actionable referred to terrorist 

operations overseas. More often, it was frustratingly vague. 

Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we picked up 

that Spring and Summer:

• “Unbelievable news in coming weeks”

• “Big event ... there will be a very, very, very, very big 

uproar”

• “There will be attacks in the near future”

Troubling, yes. But they don’t tell us when; they don’t 

tell us where; they don’t tell us who; and they don’t tell us 

how.

In this context, I want to address in some detail one of 

the briefing items we received, since its content has frequently 
7

been mischaracterized. On August 6, 2001, the President’s 

intelligence briefing included a response to questions he had 

earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our 

homeland. The briefing item reviewed past intelligence 

reporting, mostly dating from the 1990s, regarding possible 

al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It referred 

to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might 

attempt to hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the 

government into releasing U.S.-held terrorists who had 

participated in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. This 

briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat 

information. And it did not raise the possibility that 

terrorists might use airplanes as missiles.

Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat 

information we received was focused overseas, I was also 

concerned about possible threats inside the United States. On 

July 5, Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with Dick Clarke, and 

I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of 

the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps 

to respond, even though we did not have specific threats to the 

homeland. Later that same day, Clarke convened a special 

meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from the FAA, the 

INS, Customs, and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these 

agencies were asked to take additional measures to increase 

security and surveillance.

Throughout this period of heightened threat information, we 

worked hard on multiple fronts to detect, protect against, and 

disrupt any terrorist plans or operations that might lead to an 

attack. For instance:

• The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent 

warnings to U.S. military forces that al-Qaida might be 

planning a near-term attack, and placed our military forces 

in certain regions on heightened alert.

• The State Department issued at least four urgent security 

advisories and public worldwide cautions on terrorist 

threats, enhanced security measures at certain embassies, 

and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible 

for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.

• The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to 

Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, and 

specifically stated that, although the vast majority of the 

information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the 
8

homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 

56 of its U.S. Field Offices to increase surveillance of 

known or suspected terrorists and reach out to known 

informants who might have information on terrorist 

activities.

• The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security 

Information Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport 

security personnel, including specific warnings about the 

possibility of hijackings.

• The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats 

worldwide. Agency officials launched a wide-ranging 

disruption effort against al-Qaida in more than 20 

countries.

• During this period, the Vice President, DCI Tenet, and the 

NSC's Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign 

officials requesting that they increase their intelligence 

assistance and report to us any relevant threat 

information.

This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer 

of 2001.

Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver 

bullet that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In 

hindsight, if anything might have helped stop 9/11, it would 

have been better information about threats inside the United 

States, something made difficult by structural and legal 

impediments that prevented the collection and sharing of 

information by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies.

So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to 

decapitate our government, destroy our financial system, and 

break the spirit of America. As an officer of government on 

duty that day, I will never forget the sorrow and the anger I 

felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the 

American people and the leadership of the President that day.

Now, we have an opportunity and an obligation to move 

forward together. Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes 

only possible in the wake of catastrophic events -– events which 

create a new consensus that allows us to transcend old ways of 

thinking and acting. Just as World War II led to a fundamental 

reorganization of our national defense structure and to the 

creation of the National Security Council, so has September 11th
9

made possible sweeping changes in the ways we protect our 

homeland.

President Bush is leading the country during this time of 

crisis and change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts 

to secure the American Homeland by creating the Department of 

Homeland Security, established a new center to integrate and 

analyze terrorist threat information, directed the 

transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting

terror, broken down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers 

that prevented the sharing of vital threat information between 

our domestic law enforcement and our foreign intelligence 

agencies, and, working with the Congress, given officials new 

tools, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, to find and stop terrorists. 

And he has done all of this in a way that is consistent with 

protecting America’s cherished civil liberties and with 

preserving our character as a free and open society.

But the President also recognizes that our work is far from 

complete. More structural reform will likely be necessary. Our 

intelligence gathering and analysis have improved dramatically 

in the last two years, but they must be stronger still. The 

President and all of us in his Administration welcome new ideas 

and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to 

protect the American people. And we look forward to receiving 

the recommendations of this Commission.

We are at war and our security as a nation depends on 

winning that war. We must and we will do everything we can to 

harden terrorist targets within the United States. Dedicated 

law enforcement and security professionals continue to risk 

their lives every day to make us all safer, and we owe them a 

debt of gratitude. And, let’s remember, those charged with 

protecting us from attack have to succeed 100 percent of the 

time. To inflict devastation on a massive scale, the terrorists 

only have to succeed once, and we know they are trying every 

day.

That is why we must address the source of the problem. We 

must stay on offense, to find and defeat the terrorists wherever 

they live, hide, and plot around the world. If we learned 

anything on September 11th, 2001, it is that we cannot wait while 

dangers gather.

After the September 11th attacks, our Nation faced hard 

choices. We could fight a narrow war against al-Qaida and the 

Taliban or we could fight a broad war against a global menace. 

We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for a lasting 
10

peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder 

course.

He recognizes that the War on Terror is a broad war. Under 

his leadership, the United States and our allies are disrupting 

terrorist operations, cutting off their funding, and hunting 

down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is getting smaller. 

The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in 

Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now 

pursue them with energy and force.

We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of 

mass destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly 

weapons and prevent then from getting into the hands of 

terrorists, seizing dangerous materials in transit, where 

necessary. Because we acted in Iraq, Saddam Hussein will never 

again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his 

neighbors. And we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMDrelated programs and materials.

And as we attack the threat at its sources, we are also 

addressing its roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our 

men and women in uniform, we removed from power two of the 

world’s most brutal regimes -- sources of violence, and fear, 

and instability in the region. Today, along with many allies, 

we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free

societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle 

East to spread the blessings of liberty and democracy as the 

alternatives to instability, hatred, and terror. This work is 

hard and dangerous, yet it is worthy of our effort and our 

sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in 

those nations will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire 

hope and encourage reform throughout the greater Middle East.

In the aftermath of September 11th, those were the right 

choices for America to make -- the only choices that can ensure 

the safety of our Nation in the decades to come.

Thank you. Now I am happy to answer your questions.

# # #