1 Although the late Mr. Neal is no longer par t of this litigation, we continue to use a caption that reflects his prior status in this case owing to our practice of following the format of the capt ion used in

the notic e of appe al. SIXTH DI VISI ON January 12, 2007 No. 1-03-1307

ALEX R. SEI TH, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court Plaintiff -Appella nt, ) of Co ok Co un ty. ) v. ) No. 02 L 5830 ) CHICAGO SUN-TI

MES, INC., and ) ST EVE NEA L, ) Honorable ) Michael J. Hogan, Defend ants-App ellees. ) Judge Presi ding.

JUSTICE O’MAL LEY d elivere d the opini on of the c ourt: On May 7, 2002, plaintiff Alex R. Seith filed a two-count complaint alleg ing that an article written by

the late Steve Neal and published by Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., c ontained statements which constituted per se libel and false-light invasion of privacy . Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 I LCS 5/2-615 (West 2004 ). The c ircuit co urt of Cook

County grante d defend

ants’ moti on to dismiss

. Plaintiff filed timely notice of appe al. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that his complaint stated a claim upon which r

elief co uld be g ranted. After th e partie s fully briefe d these is sues, plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal as to defe ndant Steve Neal. That motion also state d plaintif

f’s inten tion to con

tinue the matter a gainst Ch icago S un-Times , Inc . This court granted plaintiff’s motion and a mandate issued pursua nt to that order. 1 After a period of1-03-1307

2

time without a decision, plaintiff filed a motion requesting that this court grant ora l argument on this case. The remaining defendant f iled an objection to plaintiff’s motion alleging, inter alia , that this court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case. For the rea sons stated below, we assert our jurisdict ion over t his case and aff irm the jud

gment of the circ uit court. Contempor

aneously with this order we deny

plaintiff’s motion requesting oral argument.

BACKGROUND Alex Seith sued Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., and columnist Steve Neal for libel and falselight invas ion o f priv acy for a col umn p ubli shed i n the “ Comm entary” se ction of the Chica go Sun-Times

newspap er of Fe

bruary 18, 2002. I

n parag raphs 4, 5 , and 6 of

the first count of h

is complaint, Mr. Seith alleged that Neal authored a libelous article , subsequently published by Chicag o Sun-Time s, Inc., in its d aily paper, e ntitled “U nderdog Wood Goes f

or Rose” (the Rose column). Seith attached a copy of the article to his complaint as an exhibit. The article describes how then-Lieutenant Gover nor Corrine Wood, a hopeful for the Republican nomination for the gube rnat oria l rac e, ha d hire d poli

tica l stra teg ist Don Rose

to ass ist he

r in he r cam paig n. We quote the entire article and italicize the portion of the article that Mr. Seith alleg es was de fa ma to ry: “UNDERD OG WOOD GO ES FOR ROSE Steve Neal Can he do it again? Independent Don Rose, the stra tegist behind Jane Byrne ’s great upset of 1979, is taking on another r ace that looks unwinnable. Rose, 71, w

ho has a w ell-ear

ned repu tation for turning lost caus es into1-03-1307

3

victories, is joining Corinne Wood’s GOP campaign for gover nor. Accord ing to the most rece

nt polls, Woo d is trailin

g Attorney

Genera l Jim Ryan by more than 30 percentage points. Rose acknow ledges that Wood is the

un de rd og . B ut he ar gu es th at sh e h as th e p ot en ti al to wi n t he Ma rc h 1 9 p ri ma ry. The Wood campaign wasn’t Rose’s only option. At least two of the three Democra tic gube rnatoria l hopeful s also wan

ted his he lp. But Woo d made the most compelling pitch for his involvement. Rose will be shaping her messag e in the campaign’s final weeks and also will seek to e xpand her political base. To make a serious run for the GOP nomination, the socially liberal Wood knows that she must attract independent and Democratic cr ossover votes. Wood focused on Rose be cause of

his track record in forg ing bipa

rtisan, mu

ltiethnic coalition s for Repu

blican c andidate s. It has been 30 y

ears since Rose managed Republican B ernard Carey ’s victory over D emocratic Cook County State’s Attorne y Edward H anrahan. The predominant issue was Hanrahan’s involvement in the infamous police ra id on the Black Panthers in which Fred Hampton was g unned down in his sleep. Rose cre ated a st

rateg y th at took ad

vantag e of Han

rahan’ s vulnera

bilities. Lakefront independe

nts, liberal Democrats, and African America ns voted for Carey in larg e numbers, which resulted in the GOP’s first victory for this office since the 1950s. Und

er Rose’ s directi on, Care

y in 1976 bec ame the f

irst Republica

n state’s attorne y to win re-e lection si

nce the 1 920s.1-03-1307

4 Wood is hoping that Rose can build a similar coalition for the March 19 GOP primary. More

than 50,000 Democrats and independents have alre ady bee n contact ed by the Wood ca

mpaign a s part of

an effort to win crossover votes. Ros e notes tha t John McCain

won the 20 00 Michig an GOP pr esidentia l primary with Democra tic and independe

nt crosso ver vote s. Under Illinois election law, there is no party reg

istration, and voters have the option of casting either a Republican or Democr atic ballot. Rose said that pro-choice voters may

rally behind Wood to assure that the state’ s next governor will support a woman’s right to reproductive choice. GOP fr ont-runner Rya

n and gubernatorial contender Patrick O’ Malley oppose abor tion, even in cases of rape or incest. O’Malley

and Ryan would allow abor tions to save the mother’s life. Rose, who will hit Ryan hardest on the abor tion issue, also will tout Wood’s accomplishments as a state legislator and as lieutenant g overnor. Just as he made h

istory in helping

to elect B yr

ne the fi rst fema le may or of Chic ago, Ros e wants to break the glass ceiling again by making Wood the first woman governor of Il linois. Among the other Republicans for whom Rose has worked are former Sen. Charles H. Percy and former Gov. Jim Edgar. In 1978, Rose helped Perc y win a tough re-election contest over conservative Dem ocrat Alex Seith. Rose bought ads throughout the state that reprinted the late Sun-Times columnist Mike Royko’s column about Seith’s ties to the mob-linked 1st Ward. Rose and Royko1-03-1307

5

contributed significantly

to Percy’s come -from-behind win over Seith. After Edgar was appointed sec retary of state in 1980 to fill out an unexpired term, Rose became his media strategist. I t was because of Rose that Edgar gained the endor

sements of most independent and good-gover nment organizations in his 1982 bid for a full term against Democratic Ma chine stalwart Jerry Cosentino. Edgar’s first commercial, produce d by Rose, touched on themes that attract ed Democ

ratic an d indepen dent vote s. Even though 198 2 was a De mocratic year na tionally, Edgar

easily won that ra

ce with Rose’s help. Rose, who

has spent much of hi s politica

l caree r battling the Democ

ratic Machine, can do more with less resources than a ny strategist I’ve known. That’s why Wood signed up the mira cle worker.” S. Neal, Underdog Wood Goes For Rose , Chicago Sun-Times, February 18, 2002. In pa ragra ph 7 of his c omplaint, S eith alle ges tha t the abov e-indic ated por

tion of the

Rose article was false “in that: a. Seith does not now have, and has ne ver had, any

‘ties to the moblinked 1 st Ward[,] and b. [t]he Royko column to which the 2/18/02 Neal column referred did not assert that Seith had ‘ties to the mob-linked 1 st Ward.’ ” In parag raphs 8 and 9 of his complaint, Seith alleges that he is a public official, an attorne y, a nd a lobby

ist, and th at the Rose

article “impute[s] to

the plain tiff a wa nt of integ

rity in the discharge of his public office and a lso prejudice[s] him in his profession.” In parag raph 10, Seith alleged that the defendants published the purpor tedly defama

tory1-03-1307

6

statements “of and concerning Seith with knowledg e of their falsity or with a reckless disregard for the truth.” Seith alleged that on October 30, 1996, anothe r Neal column, entitled “Blind Ambition”

(the Ambi

tion column

) contai ned simila

r nega tive comme

nts. I n parag raph 11, Seith allege d that he had refu

ted the a ssertions

in that co lumn throu

gh a let ter to the editor. Se ith attached an imp erfe ct co

py of the Ambit ion c olumn

and his re spons e let

ter t o the comp laint . We quote both exhibits in full here: “BLI ND AMBITION Alex Seith a

nd Al Salvi a

re runni ng 18 y ears ap art for t

he same Se

nate sea t. Their approaches are remarka

bly similar. By Steve Ne al They have

more than their initials in common. Al Salvi and Alex Seith are men of ambition. Neither is a believer in climbing up the political ladder. In the ir first r

uns for st atewide office , 18 y

ears ap art, the

y so ught the same seat in the U.S. Senate. Democrat Seith narrowly missed in 1978. Republican Salvi might do better next week. Their pr ofiles ar e hauntin gly similar. If you liked Se ith, chan ces are you ’ll love Salvi

. Both are wealthy

lawyers f rom the suburbs. Each spent more than $1 million of their family money in their first Senate campaigns. Candidates of more modest means are restricted to accepting contributions of no more than $1,000.1-03-1307

7

But si nce th ere are n o lim its o n self -cont ribut ions , Sal vi and Seit h too k adva ntage of the loophole in federal election law. Who sent the se candi dates? They essentia lly n ominated themselve s. Party loy alty isn’t their thing. One began as a Democrat (Salvi) a nd ran for office as a Republican. The other ( Seith) ran for office as a Democr at and now dabbles in GOP politics. Both supported Jimmy Carter for pre sident in 1980. This year, Seith bac

ked Republican Phil Gramm for president. Salvi has annoy ed some of his fellow Republicans by distanc ing himself from GOP presidential candidate Bob Dole. The Illinois Dole cam-[the article cuts off here and resumes mid-sentence] * * * and Salvi have pledged allegiance to themselves, but not to a pa rt y. Their campaign sty les are remarkably

alike. In & 78, Seith aired a commercial on black radio stations that accused his opponent Sen. Charles H. Percy (R.-I

ll.) of being an apologist for former Agriculture Secretary

Earl Butz. The commercial then noted the racial slur that had prompted B utz’s resignation from the Cabinet. Seith didn’t mention that Percy [the article a gain cuts off here and resumes mid-sentence] * * * to call for Butz to resign. The misleading ad backfired. Salvi has also resorted to trickery . His new television commercial is using fake newspaper headlines that asser t, “Durbin rated one of the most wasteful1-03-1307

8

spenders in Congress” and “Durbin ca ught in congressional check-w riting scandal.” The ad is a sham. Salvi is even tougher on the truth than Seith. Political c andidate s should be judged by t he compa ny t hey keep. I n [date cut off], S eith was c

hairman of the Coo k County

Zoning Board o f appea

ls. His top aide was Paul Marcy , who had been recently convicted of taking a $55,000 bribe from a builder with business before the board. Seith was among the character witnesses at Marcy ’s trial. Seith’s top aide was the brother of Pat Marcy, a member of the Chicago crime sy ndicate and longtime secretary of the corrupt 1 st Ward Democratic organization. Seith claimed that his ties to the Marcy broth ers wer en’t r elevan t to t he vot ers. H e was j ust wr ong. Like Seith in & 78, Salvi also has a close associate of dubious character

. Former juice loan collector Nick Keller , Jr., who was convicted in 1980 of collecting loans for mob boss James Inendino, is play ing an active role in Salvi’s campaign. Keller is Salvi’s father-in-law [cut off] * * * has worked hard in the Se[nate?] race. Keller’s involvement in [cut off] * * * campaign raises serious quest[ions] a

bout Salvi’ s judgme

nt. Ethical questions have [been?] raised about Salvi’s solicitation [cut off] * * * year of

special-interest money

[cut off] * * * trial lawyers. He c ollected [cut off] * * * th an $70,00 0 from law ye rs and [cu t off] * * * the only

GOP state legislator [who?] didn’t vote for tort reform. [Cut off] * * * recently was entwined an a n[asty?] legal dispute with a longtime [asso]ciate over the manipulatio[n cut1-03-1307

9

off] * * * stock in a radio station. Ne ith er Sal vi nor Sei th vio[ la te d?] t hela w. Bu t th ey aren ’t e x[a ct ly?] straight shooters.” S. Neal, Blind Ambition , Chicago Sun-Times, October 3, 1996. Seith responded to this column with a letter dated November 4, 1996, addressed to Nig el Wade, edi

tor of the Chicag o Sun-Time s, which r eads as f ollows: “Dear Mr. Wade: Instead of using his poison pen to smear me with misleading innuendoes and false statements, Steve Neal (column Oct. 30, 1996) should have r e-read the Sun-Times

and got ten his fa cts strai ght. The last time I ran for public off ice - in March 1984 - was in the four-way Democra tic Primar y f or U.S. Sen

ate with Ph

il Rock, the

n Preside nt of the I llinois Senate; Ro land Bur

ris, then Illinois Comptro ller, lat

er I llinois Attorney

Genera l; and Paul Simon, then U.S. Congressman, now U.S. Senator. With these outstanding competitors, the Sun-Times, in an Editorial of March 16, 1984, endorsed me. ‘Democr atic vote rs face a list of f our stron g cand idates who . . . are

all professional, all are men of ideas, are a ll electable”, [ sic ] the Sun-Times wrote. ‘But , Ale x Seith

offe rs pr ogr ams that mos t fit t

he co untry ’s ne eds. We recommend him”. [ sic ]. ‘In S eith’, [sic ] the Sun-Ti mes contin

ued, ‘the Democra ts have a candida te1-03-1307

10

with a lawyer ’s training, a diplomat’s experience, a banker’ s fiscal knowledge, an executive’s firmness, a realist’s practicality – and a politician’s ability to enac t sound laws’. [ sic ] That does not sound at all like the person in Neal’s column. Because the Alex Seith pr

esented in that co lumn is a fa

brication of Steve

Neal. Neal say s that whe

n I fi rst ran f or U.S. Sen

ate in 197 8 I ‘e ssentiall

y nominated’ myself. F ALSE. I wa s endorse d unanimou sly by the State Central Committed [ sic ] of the Illinois Democ

ratic Pa rty which he lped cir

culate nominating

petitions t

o get me on the bal lot. Neal says ‘ Seith’s top aide’ at the Cook County Z oning Board in 1978 was Paul Marcy. F ALSE. Marcy was not my aide, top or bottom. He wa s county a employ ee [ sic ] hired by the President of

the Cook County Board long before the President appointed me Chairman of the Zoning Boa rd. Neal says I

was ‘among the characte r witnesses at Marcy ’s trial’ for alleged bribe taking. FAL SE. I was summoned to testify about Marcy ’s duties at the Zoning Board. The trial transcript shows I did not in any way vouch f

or his character. Neal suggests that I

admitted having ‘ties’ not only with Paul Marcy, but also his brother, Pat (both now deceased) whom Neal desc ribes as ‘a member of1-03-1307

11

the Chicago crime sy

ndicate’. FALSE AGA

IN. Neal does not - and cannot - cite any ‘ties’ whatsoever between me and Paul Marc

y. T here we re no ‘tie s betwee

n’ me and the Marc y br others -except in Steve Neal’s poison pen. I could go on and on disproving each of Neal’s misleading innuendoes a nd false sta tements. But cons ider: Why

is there n o resemb lance be

tween the Alex Seith in Neal’s c olumn and t

he Alex Seit

h endorse d by

the Sun-T imes in Mar

ch 1984 a s a man with ‘foreign policy

. . . expertise” as well as “a lawy er’s training, a diplomat’s experience, a banker’s fiscal knowledg e, an executive’s firmness, a realist’s practicality

– and a politician’s ability to enac t sound laws.’ That Sun-Times endorsement was six yea rs after my

1978 campaign which is distorted beyond rec ognition by Steve Ne al. That 1984 endorsement portray ed the rea l Alex Seith. Steve Ne al’s rec ent colum n did not. Co rd ia ll y, Alex Seith” In parag raph 11 of his complaint, Seith alleged that despite the fact that his letter of November of 1996 notified Neal and the Chicag o Sun-Times, Inc., “of the true f acts,” they “repeated the false and def amatory asse

rtions regarding Seith” in the Rose column. In parag raph 12 of his complaint, Seith alleged that by February of 2002, his “reputation had largely

recovered from the defamator y falsehoods” in the A

mbition column. He further1-03-1307

12

allege d that “a s a direct and proxima te result of the pub lication o f the 2/18 /02 Neal c olumn, Seit h [had] been severely da

maged in his reputation and [had] suffered emotional distress.” He then requested $1 million each in compensatory and punitive damages as well as costs of his action. In count II, Seith alleged that Ne al and the Sun-Times had engage d in false-light invasion of priva cy . He rea

lleged all of the claims in c ount I , then fur ther alle ged tha

t the pre viously identified portion of the Rose column had placed Seith in a “false light bef ore the public,” that this “fal se light

* * * would b e highly

offensi ve to a re asonable

person,” and that t he “def endants had knowledge of or acted in re ckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the fa ls e l ig ht in wh ic h S ei th wo ul d b y [ sic ] placed. ” He the n again request ed $1 million each in compensatory a

nd punitive damages, plus costs of the action. De fe nd an ts fi le d a “S ec ti on 2- 61 5 M ot io n t o D is mi ss Co mp la in t, ” s up po rt ed by a memorandum of law. Plaintiff responded to this motion to dismiss with a memo of his own. The abov e-ref

erence d Mike Roy

ko column was not par

t of the pla

intiff’s complain t, though in plaintiff’s first request for admissions, the plaintiff attached, as exhibit A, a copy of the Mike Royko column. The circuit court granted defe ndants’ section 2-615 motion to dismiss on April 7, 2003. The plain tiff file d a timely

notice of appeal. This appe al follow s. ANA LYSIS I. Jurisdiction On April 7, 2003, the circuit court dismissed Seith’s case pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of

Civil Proce dure. On

May 2, 2003, pl aintiff f

iled a time ly notice of

appeal. This1-03-1307

13

court thus had jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a). 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a). In its response to plaintiff’s motion to set this case for oral argument, the defendant Chicago SunTimes, I nc., asse rted tha t this cour t lacked jurisdict ion to dec ide this ca se beca use a man

date issued on this case on March 17, 2004. Defendant cites I llinois Supreme Court Rule 369(b) (134 Ill. 2 d 369(b))

for the proposition

that once a case i s decide d and a ma ndate is f iled in the circuit court, the appellate court no longer has jurisdiction over the case. See Pecora v. Szabo , 109 I ll. App. 3d 824, 827 (1982) (citing Rule 369(b), noting that “afte r the mandate was filed, jurisdiction was once again vested in the circuit cour t”). We note, however, that the order and mandate that issued in this case made it clear that the case would be continued against defendant Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., a nd was voluntarily dismissed only as to defendant Steve Neal. There was no fin

al disposit

ion as to Chi cago Su

n-Times, Inc . There

is no quest

ion that thi s court sti ll has jurisd iction ove r this matte

r pursua nt to I llinois Supr

eme Court

Rule 303( a). 210 I

ll. 2d R. 303(a). Defendant also asserts that, because over two years pa ssed from the time the final briefs were filed in the instant case and the plaintiff’s reque st for oral argument, the plaintiff had forgone consideration of this appeal due to the doc trines of laches and estoppel and plaintiff’s purporte d failure

to exercis e due dili gence . We reje ct this ar gument. It ap

pears that the de lay

in the disposition of this case owes to an administrative error whereupon the instant appe al was temporarily re

moved from the active case list sometime after the mandate issued in Ma rch of 2004. This internal administrative situation has subsequently bee n corrected. The plaintiff is not to blame for the delay

in the disposition of this appeal. We will not avoid consideration of the1-03-1307

14

merits of this appe al predi cated up on delay caused b y th is court. II . Plaintiff

’s Lib el Claim The tria l court dismissed pla

intiff’s complain t pursuan t to section 2-615 of

the I llinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 IL CS 5/2-615 (West 2004). On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the circuit court erred because his c omplaint adequately a lleges a cause of action for libel. A. Standard of Review We note that a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency

of a plaintiff’s complaint. Bryson v. Ne ws America Publications, Inc. , 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86 (1996). Our analy sis is thus limited only to those facts and allegations conta ined within the complaint and its attachments. See Krueg er v. L ewis , 342 Ill. App. 3d 467, 471-72 (2003) (noting the difference betwe en a motion to dismiss filed under section 2-615 “where we look at only the four cor

ners of the complaint,” and a motion to dismiss filed under section 2-619 “where evidentiary mate

rial may be submitted”). B ecause we consider only the assertions in plaintiff’s complaint and the documents appended to that complaint (including the Rose column), we cannot a nd will not c onsider t

he 1978 Roy

ko column or the var

ious other document s attach ed to the subsequent pleadings or the appellate brief s, which include excerpts from the May 29, 2003, edition of the Chicago Tribune, the May 6, 2003, edition of the Chicago Tribune, the Cook County zoning ordinance, the Chicago zoning ordinance, and the January 25, 2004, edition of the Chicag o Sun-Time s. When examin

ing a se ction 2-6 15 motion to dismiss, a c ourt must a

ccept a s true all well-pleaded facts and interpret the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the1-03-1307

15

plaintiff. Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 86. We will not dismiss a cause of action unless it appears that no set of facts could be proved which would entitle the plaintiff to rec over. Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 86-87. Ul

timately , “[t]he que stion to be

determined is whether suf ficient f acts ar e contai ned in the pleadings which, if established, may entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Stroger v. Regional Transportation A

uthority , 201 Ill. 2d 508, 516 (2002). We note that because this inquiry concerns a question of law, we revie w the cir cuit cour t’s orde r gran ting the section 2 -615 motion to dismiss de novo

. Stroger , 201 Ill. 2d at 516. We further note that even thoug h the reasoning for the circuit court’s order is not contained in the record, this is immaterial. Even if the trial court’s judgement was in error, this court can af firm a trial court’s judgment on any grounds that are called for by

the record. See City of Chicago v. Holland , 206 Ill. 2d 480, 492 (2003). B. Defamation Per Se and the I nnocent C onstruct

ion Rule In his complain t, the pla intiff al leges t

hat cer tain state ments in the

Rose colu

mn would purportedly link him to orga nized crime in the mind of an average re ader and thus are defamatory per se in that the

y imp uted wan t of integ rity and his ab ility

to perform his prof

essional duties as a lawy er, lobby ist, and pu

blic servant. According to our supreme court, a state ment is defamatory if

it “tends to cause such harm to the reputation of another that it lowers that person in the ey es of the community or dete rs third persons from associating with [him].” Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 87. To state a defama tion claim, a plaintiff must present facts that a defendant made a f alse statement about a plaintiff, the defenda nt made a n unprivil eged p

ublication of that s tatement to a third p arty , and that

this publication caused damages. See Solaia Technology , LL C v. Specialty Publishing Co. , 221 I ll.1-03-1307

16

2d 558, 579(2006). A

lthough t he plaint iff in the instant ca se does not plead sp ecial da mages, it is we ll es ta bl is he d t ha t i f a pl ai nt if f a ll eg es th at a s ta te me nt is de fa ma to ry per se , he need not pl ea d o r p ro ve ac tu al da ma ge s t o h is re pu ta ti on ; s ta te me nt s t ha t a re de fa ma to ry per se “are thought to be so obviously and mater ially harmful to the plaintiff that injury to [his] reputation may be pre sumed.” Bryson , 174 I ll. 2d at 87 . Illi nois rec ognizes f

ive cate gories

of statements th at ar e d ef

am at or y per se : (1) those

imputing the commis sion of a c

riminal of

fense; (2) those imputing infection with a loa

thsome co mmunicab le disea se; (3) those imputin g an ina bility to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment; (4) those that prejudice a party

or impute lack of ability in the par ty's tra de, profession or business; and (5) those imputing adultery or fornication. Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 88-89. I n our view, the plaintiff’s complaint alleges the statements in the Rose column fall into the third and fourth categories of per se defamation. Even if a statemen t falls into

one or mor

e of thes e categories, however, a stateme nt will

no t b e d ee me d d ef

am at or y per se if it is reasonably ca pable of an “innocent construction.” Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 90. The so-called “innoc ent construction rule,” as first adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in John v. Tribune Co. , 24 I ll. 2d 437 ( 1962), pr ovided tha

t words use d in an allegedly

defamatory

statement must be understood given their natural and obvious meaning

. John , 24 I ll. 2d at 44 2. If the word s were “ capable of being read inn ocently [the state ment] must be so read and declared nonac tionable as a matter of law.” John , 24 Ill. 2d at 442. The innoc ent const

ruction r ule was la ter modif ied beca use cour ts tended to apply the rule inconsistently and often strained to f ind “unnatural” but possibly innocent mea nings of words.1-03-1307

17

See Chapski v. Copley

Press , 92 Ill. 2d 344, 350-51 (1982) (providing e xamples of the inconsistent application of the innocent construction rule). As modified, the rule still requires the statement to be reasonably viewed, to be considered in context with the other words in the statement, and that the implications therefrom be given their natura l and obvious meaning. Chapski , 92 I ll. 2d at 35 1. If the compl ained-o f stateme nt may reasona bly be innoce

ntly interpre ted, it ca nnot be ac

tionable as per se defamation. Chapski , 92 Ill. 2d at 351. The innocent construction rule has been deemed a prope r ground for dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615. See Tuite v. Corbitt , 358 Ill. App. 3d 889, 900 (2005) (affirming the circuit court’s order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss; libel complaint was nonactionable because the complained-of lang uage was subject to an innocent construction). When apply

ing the i nnocent c onstruct

ion rule to

a story or column

in a news

paper, c ourts consider the text of the entire article and the headline as one document when considering the context and meaning of the purported article. See Harrison v. Chicago Sun-Times, I nc. , 341 I ll. App. 3 d 555, 570 (2 003), citi ng American Interna tional Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co. , 136 I ll. App. 3d 1019, 1025 (1985), Antonelli v. Field Enterprises, Inc. , 115 Ill. App. 3d 432, 435 (1983); and Naked City, I

nc. v. Chicago Sun-Times , 77 Ill. App. 3d 188, 190 (1979). The “import of the entire article” must be considered in reac hing a determination of reasonable innoce nt construction. See Owen v. Carr , 134 Ill. App. 3d 855, 860 (1985), aff’d , 113 Ill. 2d 273 (1986). A court should avoid straining “to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for words where the defamatory

meaning is far more reasonable .” Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 94. I nstead, we are to interpret the words of the statement as they appear to have been used and ac cording to the1-03-1307

18

idea they we

re intended to convey

to a reader of reasonable intellig ence. Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 93. “Whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to an innocent interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide.” Bryson , 174 Ill. 2d at 90. In the instant ca se, the pl aintiff c omplains that statements in Ste ve Neal ’s 2002 Ros e column were defamatory . Although Mr. Seith attached a copy of another column authored by Neal in 19 96, he all eges that the libe l arose f rom the fo llowing l angua ge in the 2002 Rose column: “Among the other Republicans for whom Rose has worke d are former Sen. Charles H. Percy

and former Gov. Jim Edgar. I n 1978, Rose helped Percy win a toug

h re-el ection c ontest ove

r conser vative De mocrat Alex Seith. Ros e bought ads throughout the state that reprinted the late Sun-Times c olumnist Mike Roy ko’s colu mn about Se ith’s ties

to the mob- linked 1st

Ward.” S. N eal, Underdo g Wood Goe s For Rose , Chicago Sun-Times, February 18, 2002. Specifically, Mr. Seith asser ts that these words accuse him of being in or tied to org anized crime. Plaintiff’s argument, however, does not c onsider the statement in the context of the entire column. The article itself was not about Alex Seith, his 1978 race for the United States Senate, his conne ctions to Ch

icago’ s First War

d politica l organ ization, or

that org anization’ s links to organized crime. I

nstead, from the title to the closing words, the article is about Don Rose, a wily and resourc eful political advisor. Neal is describing Rose as a political “mirac le worker.” The single paragra

ph where Mr. Seith is mentioned is provided merely as an example of the kinds of po litical ta

ctics tha t Rose had

employ ed in the p ast aga

inst the po litical op

ponents of

his1-03-1307

19

clients. Another anecdote in the article explains how Rose helped Republican B ernard Carey defeat Democra t Edward Hanrahan in a ra

ce for Co ok County

State’s A ttorney , where Rose helped e mphasize “Hanrahan’s invo lvement in the infa mous polic e raid on

the Blac k Panthers in which Fred Hampton was gunned down in his sleep.” S. Neal, Underdo g Wood Goe s For Rose , Chicag o Sun-Time s, Febr uary 18, 2002. I

n short, N eal was p

roviding examples o f the har

dball attack-style politics that Rose re adily employ ed on behalf of his clients. The article did not vouch for the val idity

of any claims tha

t Rose made

about any

of these politicia ns. Further, the most p ejorativ e parts o f the com plained- of statements are not aimed

directly at Mr. Sei th. In stead, th e articl e merely describ es Rose’s

dissemina

tion of Mike

Roy ko’s colu mn “about Seith’s ties to the mob-linked First Ward.” S. Neal, Underdo g Wood Goe s For Rose , Chicag o Sun-Time s, Febr uary 18, 2002. T o the exten

t the state ment coul d be unde

rstood as a comment directly about Mr. Seith, it is not necessa rily defama

tory. The statement doe s not directly link Alex Sei

th to org anized cr

ime. I nstead, t he artic le imputes

those link s to the Fi

rst Ward. This

distingu ishes the instant ca se from ma

ny o f the def

amation c ases cite d by

Mr. Seith where the allegations of “mob links” were aimed more directly

at the plaintiffs themselves. See Locricchio v. Evening

News Association , 438 Mich 84, 130, 476 N.W.2d 112,132 (1991) (noting that the defendants made the “inescapable implication” tha t the plaintiffs had “numerous financial and social connections with reputed org anized crime figures and [those] associations contribu ted in the financi ng” of the plain tiffs’ bu siness ve

nture); Ly nch v. New Jersey E ducation Association , 161 N.J. 152, 163, 735 A.2d 1129, 1134 (1999) (statements at issue directly a ccused the plaint iff of being “CO NNECTED to t he UNDERWOR LD” and being a “MOB-1-03-1307

20

CONNECTED POLI

TICI AN”); Bufalin

o v. Assoc iated Pre ss , 692 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1982) (plaintiff accused of having “a lleged mob ties”). Also, in each of those case s, virtually the entire art icl e or new st ory i n qu est io n wa s ab out th ese all ege d di rec t co nne cti ons to org ani ze d cr im e. In the instan t case, i n contra st, the sta

tement ab out Mr. Sei

th and his l inks to the

First War

d was a brief a necdote intended to demonst

rate Rose ’s politic al tactic s. Also, the word “ties,” which Neal employ ed to describe Mr. Seith’s connections to the First War d, is rath er ambig

uous. As us ed in the i

nstant ca se, the w ord “tie s” was ob viously meant to communicate some sort of connection. A leading dictionar y give s various definitions of “tie;” the defini

tion that r efers to a “connecting

link” re veals tha t the word

“tie” c an refe

r to either “a moral or legal obliga tion to someone or something typica lly constituting a restra

ining power, i nfluenc e, or duty

,” or alt ernativ ely as a mer e “a bond of kinshi

p or aff ection.” Merraim

Webster’ s Collegi ate Dict ionary 1233 (10th

ed. 1998). These definitions, though not dispositive of the meaning ascribed to the word “ties” as used in the Rose column, give one insight into the various meanings of the word. See Harte v. Chicago Council of L awyers , 220 Ill. App. 3d 255, 262-63 (1 991) (in a

ffirming the circ uit court’ s order g

ranting defenda nt’s sec tion 2-615 motion to dismiss pla

intiff’s libel cla im, the co urt used a dictiona ry to conside

r the mea ning of p urporte dly defamatory

words; noting that although these definitions are not nece ssarily dispositive, they provide p ersuasi

ve author ity w hen ana lyzin g whether a sta

tement is s

ubject o a reasona ble innocent construction). Obviously “ ties” can communicate either a close conne ction, such as an allegiance owed, or a loose c onnection, such as a social connection or an “af fection.” The word does not ne cessar

ily r eflect a coordina tion of ef fort or a n extreme c loseness . The Rose column1-03-1307

21

certainly doe s not state that the First Ward sponsored Mr. Seith or that he was part of or the beneficiary

of the First Ward’s machinery or the First Ward’s “links to organized crime.” The article simply states that Roy ko authored and Rose circulated a column stating that Seith had “ties” to that organization and that the organization itself had “links” to org anized crime. In the context of

the full a rticle, t he compla

ined-of langua ge is not defama tory because it is, in our view, reasonably subject to an innocent construction. The column’s passing comment about Mr. Seith’s “ties” to the First Ward was merely an anecdote explaining the tactics of Rose, not the pr ofessional or personal cha racter of Mr. Sei

th. Moreover, Stev e Neal’ s 2002 Rose column did

not vouch

for the tr uth of Mike

Roy ko’s 1978 column; nor did the 2 002 column assert the depth or strength of Mr. Seith’s “ties” to the F irst Ward. It is also worth noting that Ne al ’s 20 02 Ro se co lu mn de sc ri be d a co lu mn wr it te n b y Mi ke Ro yko an d d is se mi na te d b y a political strategist who is described as having eng aged in similar attacks on other candidates. Althoug h the fact that a sta

tement is made as pa

rt of a po litical c ampaig

n is not an a

bsolute defense against libel (see Proesel v. Myers Publishing Co. , 24 Ill. Ap p. 2d 5 01, 51 5 (19 60) ( “We know of no case holding that a statement otherwise libelous would not be so bec ause it was ‘political in nature’”)), we note that when construing the meaning and value of a comment, one must consi der th e cont ext, inclu ding t he pub lic an d soci al con text of rhet oric u ttere d duri ng a political campaign. See Brennan v. Kadner , 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 970 (2004) (noting that “litera ry , public, a

nd social contexts a

re a major deter

minant of w

hether a n ordinar y r eader would view an a lleged defama tory statemen t as const ituting f act or op inion”; fu

rther no ting tha

t “ ‘where potentially

defamatory

statements are published in a public debate, a heated labor dispute,1-03-1307

22

or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by

the parties to persuade others to their pos itions by

use of ep ithets, fi ery

rhetoric or hy perbole , language wh

ich gen erally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opin ion’ ” ), cit ing Moriarty v. Gre ene , 315 Ill . App. 3d 225 , 235 ( 2000) , quot ing Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. , 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 552 P.2d 425, 428, 131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976). It thus stands to reason that in 2002, as today , a reasonable reader would likely be skeptical of statements made or repeated by representatives of one campaig n that attack a political opponent. In short, we do not believe that any reasonable person could read Steve Neal’s 2 002 Rose c olumn and b ased on that column ’s passin g state ment abou

t Alex Seith w alk away w ith a belief that Mr. Seith had close associations with organized crime, either in 1978 or to da y. In our view, the instant case is much c loser to a series of Illinois cases a pplying the inno cent co nstru ction rule t o upho ld th e dism issal of a def amati on sui t, in cludi ng Salamone v. Hollinger Interna

tional, Inc. , 347 Ill. App. 3d 837, 840-41 (2004). I n that case, this court found that a newspaper article entitled “Mob links hurt Rosemont casino bid” that stated that a pe rson was a “reputed organized cr ime figure” could be innocently construed. As the Salamone court stated, a reader who consi dered the headli ne in the c ontext of the

text of the e

ntire ar ticle cou ld understa nd it as characte

rizing the plaintiff , “not as a mobster, but as a pe

rson who i s believe d to be, possibly errone ously, an org anized crime figure.” Salamone , 347 Ill. App. 3d at 841. See also Harte v. Chicago Council of L awyers , 220 I ll. App. 3d 255, 261- 62 (1991)(reasonable to construe a statement that plaintiff was “implicated” in a corr uption scandal to mean he was1-03-1307

23

involved b

ut not that he was inc

riminate d or eng aged in

a crimina

l act); Tuite v. Corbitt , 358 I ll. App. 3d 88 9, 898 (20 05) (sta tements that a lawy

er who to ok a $1 milli on retai ner “ha d it all handled” and that a client viewed his acquittal as a “done deal” did not necessarily impute that the plaintiff knowingly

received illegally

obtained funds for the purpose of doling out bribes and payoffs; in the conte

xt of the work, the comments were capable of an innocent c onstruction that the attorney wa s smart to get his retainer up front, the mafia members were happy because they knew the attorney

was a good one, and the evidence won out even in the face of a good la wyer)

. Similar to the stateme

nts in those

cases, t he compla

ined-of comments i

n the insta

nt case c ould be, in context, reasonably unde rstood as having an innocent construction. Bec ause Mr. Seith’s libel cla im was not a

ctionabl e, the tr

ial cour t corre ctly

dismissed h

is complai

nt. II I. Pla intiff’s False- Lig

ht Invasion of Pr

ivacy Claim The plaintiff also argues that the statements in the Rose Column support a cause of action for false-light invasion of privacy . To sustain this cause of action, a plaintiff must plead: (1) he was placed in a false light before the public by the defe

ndant; (2) the false light would be offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice. Salamone , 347 Ill. App. 3d at 844. However, be cause the plaintiff’s unsuccessful defamation per se claim is the basis of his false-light claim, plaintiff’s false-light invasion of priva cy claim fa

ils as well. See Tuite , 358 Ill. App. 3d at 899 (“beca use the plaintiff's defamation per se claim fa ils, his fa lse light invas ion o f priv acy claim f ails a s well ”), cit ing Harte , 220 Ill. App. 3d at 263. CONCLUSIO

N For the r easons st ated above, we affirm the order of the circ uit court o f Cook Coun

ty1-03-1307

24

dismissing plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Affirmed. FITZG ERALD-SMI TH, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.