This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER

contains notices to the public of the proposed

issuance of rules and regulations. The

purpose of these notices is to give interested

persons an opportunity to participate in the

rule making prior to the adoption of the final

rules.

Proposed Rules Federal Register

80997 

Vol. 88, No. 223 

Tuesday, November 21, 2023 

1Emergency Order of Prohibition, ‘‘Operators and 

Pilots of ‘‘Doors Off’’ Flights for Compensation or 

Hire’’ available at https://www.regulations.gov/ 

document/FAA-2018-0243-0001. 

2The term ‘‘supplemental passenger restraint 

system,’’ as defined in the March 22, 2018, 

Continued 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Parts 91, 135, and 136 

[Docket No. FAA–2023–2250; Notice No. 24– 

02] 

RIN 2120–AL37 

Use of Supplemental Restraint 

Systems 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. 

SUMMARY: This proposed rule would 

prohibit civil aircraft operations 

conducted with supplemental restraint 

systems (SRS) unless operators meet 

certain requirements for ensuring 

passenger safety during all phases of the 

operation. The FAA expects these 

proposed requirements would increase 

the safety of passengers during civil 

aircraft operations conducted with SRS. 

This proposal addresses 

recommendations from the National 

Transportation Safety Board and the 

Department of Transportation Office of 

Inspector General. Additionally, this 

proposed rule would codify, with 

updates, an Emergency Order currently 

in effect addressing safety concerns 

regarding the use of supplemental 

restraints. The proposed rule would 

apply to all civil aircraft operations 

conducted with use of SRS. The rule as 

proposed would not apply to parachute 

operations or rotorcraft external-load 

operations. Additionally, the proposed 

rule would not apply to operations 

conducted as public aircraft operations. 

DATES: Send comments on or before 

January 22, 2024. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number FAA–2023–2250 

using any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

• Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at (202) 493–2251. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

https://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Raymond Plessinger, General Aviation 

and Commercial Division, Flight 

Standards Service, AFS–830, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW, Washington, 

DC 20591; Telephone: (202) 267–1100; 

email Raymond.Plessinger@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

II. Authority for This Proposed Rulemaking 

III. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

B. History 

IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule 

A. Identified Safety Gaps 

B. How This Rule Enhances the Emergency 

Order of Prohibition 

C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and 

Doors Opened or Removed Flight 

Operations (§ 91.108(a) and (b)) 

D. SRS Design Requirements (§ 91.108(c)(1) 

Through (4)) 

E. Who May Provide the SRS (§ 91.108(d)) 

F. SRS Operational Requirements 

(§ 91.108(e)(1) and (2)) 

G. Pilot in Command (§ 91.108(f)(1) 

Through (5)) 

H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and 

Demonstration (§ 91.108(g) and (h)) 

I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS 

(§ 91.108(i)(1) Through (4)) 

J. Lap-Held Child (§ 91.108(j)(1) and (2)) 

K. Excluded Operations (§ 91.108(k)(1) 

Through (3)) 

L. Definition (§ 91.108(l)) 

M. Additional Comments Invited 

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

A. Summary of the Regulatory Evaluation 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

C. International Trade Impact Assessment 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

G. Environmental Analysis 

VI. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation 

VII. Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

B. Electronic Access and Filing 

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 

Frequently Used in This Document 

AAIB—Danish Accident Investigation Board 

FMVSS—Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 

Standards 

FOIA—Freedom of Information Act 

FSOL—Fuel Shutoff Lever 

ICR—Information Collection Request 

InFO—Information for Operators 

IRFA—Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

LOA—Letter of Authorization 

NAICS—North American Industry 

Classification System 

NPRM—Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

NTSB—National Transportation Safety Board 

OMB—Office of Management and Budget 

PIC—Pilot in Command 

RFA—Regulatory Flexibility Act 

SBA—Small Business Administration 

SOPs—Standard Operating Procedures 

SPRS—Supplemental Passenger Restraint 

System(s) 

SRS—Supplemental Restraint System(s) 

I. Executive Summary 

This proposed rule addresses the use 

of supplemental restraint systems (SRS) 

in civil aircraft operations. On March 

22, 2018, the FAA issued an Emergency 

Order of Prohibition titled ‘‘Operators 

and Pilots of ‘Doors Off’ Flights for 

Compensation or Hire’’ 1 to all operators 

and pilots of flights for compensation or 

hire with the doors open or removed in 

the United States or using aircraft 

registered in the United States for doorsoff flights. The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition prohibits the use of 

supplemental passenger restraint 

systems (SPRS) that cannot be released 

quickly in an emergency.2 This was in 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
80998 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 / Proposed Rules 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, means any 

passenger restraint that is not installed on the 

aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval, including 

(but not limited to) restraints approved through a 

Type Certificate, Supplemental Type Certificate, or 

as an approved major alteration using FAA Form 

337. 

3The FAA uses the term supplemental restraint 

system (SRS) to refer to the device in general, but, 

for the purposes of this rulemaking document, uses 

the term supplemental passenger restraint system 

(SPRS) when quoting or referring to documents that 

use the term ‘‘SPRS’’ (e.g., The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition). The FAA considers the two terms to 

be synonymous. 

4NTSB Safety Recommendation A–18–012, 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/ 

A-18-012. 

5The FAA uses two categories to define those 

who travel on airplanes: crewmember and 

passenger. In this proposal, the agency uses that 

distinction when referring specifically to a 

crewmember or passenger. When the distinction 

between a crewmember and a passenger is not 

applicable, the agency uses the word ‘‘individual’’ 

when referring to anyone who occupies an SRS. 

6Under 14 CFR 91.3, the PIC is the final authority 

as to the operation of the aircraft. The PIC may 

determine it is unsafe to allow the use of SRS 

during a phase of flight that would otherwise be 

allowed. 

response to an open door helicopter 

accident on March 11, 2018, in which 

passengers were secured with SPRS and 

were unable to exit the aircraft before 

they drowned. At the time of the 

accident, no rules specifically addressed 

civil aircraft operations conducted with 

the use of SRS,3 including during 

operations with doors opened or 

removed. As a result of preliminary 

information discovered during the 

investigation of this accident, on March 

19, 2018, the National Transportation 

Safety Board (NTSB) issued Urgent 

Safety Recommendation A–18–012, 

which recommended that the FAA 

prohibit all open-door aircraft 

operations using passenger harness 

systems, unless the harness system 

allows passengers to rapidly release the 

harness with minimal difficulty and 

without having to cut or forcefully 

remove the harness.4

An SRS is a device used to secure an 

individual inside an aircraft when that 

person is not properly secured by an 

FAA-approved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness or an approved child 

restraint system. SRS are not installed 

on the aircraft pursuant to a Type 

Certificate, Supplemental Type 

Certificate, approved major alteration 

(FAA Form 337), or other FAA 

approval. An SRS consists of a harness 

secured around the torso of the 

individual using the SRS and a lanyard 

that connects the harness to an 

approved airframe attachment point 

inside the aircraft. 

To mitigate identified risks and 

ultimately prevent future fatalities, the 

FAA proposes to issue regulations 

regarding the use of SRS, including 

during operations with doors opened or 

removed. This proposed rule would 

establish requirements for use of SRS. 

This proposed rule would also prohibit 

flight operations with doors opened or 

removed except under two scenarios. 

The first scenario is when each 

individual 5 occupies an FAA-approved 

seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness properly 

secured about them or an approved 

child restraint system properly secured 

to an approved seat or berth with a 

safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness in accordance with 

§ 91.107(a)(3)(iii) or § 135.128(a)(2), 

during the entire flight. The second 

scenario is if each individual occupies 

an FAA-approved seat or berth with a 

safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness, properly secured about them 

during movement on the surface, 

takeoff, and landing; during other 

phases of flight, if permitted by the pilot 

in command (PIC),6 the passenger may 

use an SRS that meets all requirements 

proposed in this rule. The operator 

generally will provide the SRS to 

individuals who seek to use the SRS 

during the flight, but in some cases, an 

individual may opt to provide their own 

SRS as long as it meets the requirements 

proposed in this rule and the PIC 

approves the SRS. 

This proposed rule would require the 

SRS to have a release mechanism that 

can be operated quickly by the 

passenger using the SRS with minimal 

difficulty. As proposed, the release 

mechanism must be located on the front 

or side of the harness in a place easily 

accessible to and visible by the 

passenger using the SRS and must 

prevent inadvertent release. Also, as 

proposed, the release mechanism cannot 

require the use of a knife to cut the 

restraint, the use of any other additional 

tool, or the assistance of any other 

individual to release the SRS. 

As explained in section IV.E.2 of this 

preamble, the FAA proposes that the 

SRS must be connected to an aircraft 

attaching point or points with a rated 

strength equal to or greater than the 

combined weight of all the passengers 

using an SRS attached to that same 

point, but it cannot be connected to any 

airframe attachment point located in the 

flightdeck. Additionally, as proposed, 

the rule requires the SRS to have a 

lanyard that ensures the torso of the 

passenger using the SRS remains inside 

the aircraft at all times. 

This proposed rule would also require 

operators conducting flight operations 

where passengers use an SRS to provide 

an enhanced passenger safety briefing. 

Further, this proposal would require 

passengers who seek to use an SRS 

during flight operations to demonstrate 

their ability to occupy, secure, and 

release the FAA-approved seat belts 

and, if installed, shoulder harnesses, as 

well as the ability to release quickly the 

SRS with no assistance, and with 

minimal difficulty. A passenger who 

could not meet the demonstration 

requirements of the enhanced safety 

briefing would be prohibited from using 

an SRS; however, they would be 

permitted to participate in the flight if 

they occupy an FAA-approved seat or 

berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, properly secured 

about them during operations when the 

doors are opened or removed or when 

otherwise required by regulations. Only 

those passengers who have reached 

their fifteenth birthday could use an 

SRS during flight operations, and no 

individual using an SRS could occupy 

a seat in the flightdeck. In addition to 

prohibiting individuals who occupy a 

child restraint system from also using an 

SRS, this proposed rule would prohibit 

a child from being held by an adult who 

is using an SRS. This proposed rule 

would also prohibit a child from being 

held when the aircraft doors are opened 

or removed. 

This proposed rule would mitigate 

identified safety risks to passengers who 

use an SRS and would help ensure 

safety of the operation, including when 

the doors of the aircraft are opened or 

removed. 

II. Authority for This Proposed 

Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules on 

aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the 

United States Code (49 U.S.C.). Subtitle 

I of 49 U.S.C., specifically section 106, 

describes the authority of the FAA 

Administrator. Subtitle VII of 49 U.S.C., 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. 

The FAA promulgates this rulemaking 

under the authority described in 49 

U.S.C. 106(f), which establishes the 

authority of the Administrator to 

promulgate regulations and rules, and 

49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5), which requires 

the Administrator to promote safe flight 

of civil aircraft in air commerce by 

prescribing regulations and setting 

minimum standards for other practices, 

methods, and procedures necessary for 

safety in air commerce and national 

security. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 / Proposed Rules 80999 

7 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

8 Id. at ix. 

9 Id. at 19. 

10 Id. at 44. 

11 Ibid. 

12 Id. at ix. 

13 Id. at x. 

14 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

15NTSB Urgent Recommendation, ASR–18–02, 

accessed at https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/ 

sr-details/A-18-012 on February 23, 2021. 

III. Background 

A. Statement of the Problem 

The FAA operational regulations 

pertaining to passenger restraints 

currently address only FAA-approved 

seat belts and, if installed, shoulder 

harnesses and child restraint systems 

approved for use on aircraft. They 

require individuals to be secured during 

movement on the surface, takeoff, and 

landing, or as instructed by the flight 

crew. Current regulations do not address 

passenger safety in operations 

conducted with doors opened or 

removed, except for parachute 

operations and rotorcraft external-load 

operations. 

The proposed rule would mitigate the 

risk of harm to an individual using an 

SRS, including during operations with 

doors opened or removed. Specifically, 

the proposed rule is expected to 

mitigate the risk that an individual 

could fall out of the aircraft when the 

doors are opened or removed if they are 

not occupying an FAA-approved seat or 

berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, properly secured 

about them during the entire flight. It 

also mitigates the risk that a passenger 

cannot quickly egress after an accident 

because the SRS they use is difficult to 

release. By limiting where the passenger 

can sit when using an SRS and where 

the attachment point to which the SRS 

is attached is located, this rule proposes 

to mitigate the risk that a component of 

the SRS may inadvertently move a flight 

control mechanism, which could impact 

the operation of the aircraft. The 

proposed rule would provide minimum 

requirements for all flight operations 

when an SRS is used, including those 

with doors opened or removed. If 

adopted, this proposed rule will result 

in safer flight operations and reduce the 

risk of harm to individuals, whether 

passengers or crewmembers. 

B. History 

1. Liberty Helicopters Accident 

On March 11, 2018, an Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2 lost engine power 

during cruise flight, and the pilot 

performed an autorotative descent and 

ditching on the East River in New York, 

New York. The pilot sustained minor 

injuries, the five passengers drowned, 

and the helicopter was substantially 

damaged. The FlyNYON-branded flight 

was operated by Liberty Helicopters Inc. 

(Liberty), per a contractual agreement 

with NYONair.7

Liberty operated the accident flight as 

a FlyNYON-branded, doors-off 

helicopter flight that allowed the five 

passengers (one in the front seat, four in 

the rear seats) to take photographs of 

various landmarks while extending their 

legs outside the helicopter during 

portions of the flight. For the accident 

flight (and other FlyNYON flights that 

Liberty operated), Liberty configured its 

Airbus AS350 B2 helicopter with the 

two right and the front left doors 

removed and the left sliding door locked 

open. Before departure, each passenger 

was fitted with a NYONair-provided 

harness/tether system that NYONair 

developed with the intent to prevent 

passengers from falling out of the 

helicopter. The harness/tether system 

used on the accident flight consisted of 

a full-body, workplace fall-protection 

harness that was secured (with a locking 

carabiner) to a tether, the other end of 

which was secured (with another 

locking carabiner) to an anchor point in 

the cabin. Each passenger also used the 

helicopter’s installed, FAA-approved 

restraints. The pilot (who was seated in 

the front right seat) used only an 

installed, FAA-approved restraint.8

Under normal circumstances, at the 

conclusion of each flight, operator 

personnel would unscrew a locking 

carabiner located on the back of each 

passenger’s harness so that the 

passenger could exit the helicopter. The 

operator provided each individual 

secured by an SPRS with a cutting tool, 

stored in a pouch attached to the 

harness, for use in freeing themselves 

from the harness/tether system in case 

of an emergency.9 Prior to flight, each 

passenger viewed a passenger safety 

video that addressed general safety 

topics and emergency safety procedures, 

such as cutting-tool use.10 The video 

narrative for releasing from the harness/ 

tether system in the event of an 

emergency stated that ‘‘the harness can 

be released by opening the quick release 

clip in the back of the harness’’ and the 

visual that accompanied the narrative 

showed one person releasing another 

person’s carabiner. The video also 

instructed passengers that ‘‘a cutter 

[cutting tool] is also secured to one of 

your chest straps and will allow you to 

quickly cut through the harness if you 

are unable to reach the quick release 

clip.’’ 11

Consistent with the standard 

operating procedures (SOPs) used for 

FlyNYON flights, the passengers were 

allowed (when instructed by the pilot) 

to position themselves to extend their 

legs outside the helicopter. The two 

passengers who had been seated in the 

rear inboard seats removed their 

installed, FAA-approved restraints and 

sat on the cabin floor, wearing their 

harness/tether systems. The passengers 

seated in the outboard seats were 

allowed to rotate outboard in their seats. 

To enable such freedom of movement, 

the SOPs allowed the passengers to 

wear their installed, FAA-approved 

restraint with the lap belt adjusted 

loosely and the shoulder harness routed 

under the arm.12

During the flight, the aircraft lost 

engine power and the pilot conducted 

an emergency landing on the East River. 

The helicopter’s floats did not fully 

inflate, and the helicopter rolled right in 

the water and became fully inverted and 

submerged about 11 seconds after it 

touched down. Despite receiving a 

briefing on how to self-egress from the 

SPRS using the provided cutting tool, 

none of the passengers were able to 

egress. All five passengers drowned. 

The pilot was able to release his 

installed, FAA-approved restraint after 

he was under water and successfully 

egress from the helicopter.13

2. National Transportation Safety Board 

Reports and Recommendations 

The NTSB investigated the accident.14

On March 19, 2018, the NTSB issued an 

Urgent Safety Recommendation Report, 

Additional Harness Systems that Allow 

for Rapid Egress, ASR–18–02, to 

‘‘prohibit all open-door commercial 

passenger-carrying aircraft flights that 

use passenger harness systems, unless 

the harness system allows passengers to 

rapidly release the harness with 

minimal difficulty, and without having 

to cut or forcefully remove the 

harness.’’ 15

The NTSB published its final accident 

report, Inadvertent Activation of the 

Fuel Shutoff Lever and Subsequent 

Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, 

following a board meeting held on 


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81000 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 / Proposed Rules 

16 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

17Factual Report—Attachment 1, Interview 

Summaries, Operational Factors, accessed at 

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/

docBLOB?ID=40476009&FileExtension=

.PDF&FileName=Operations%20Attachment

%201%20-%20Interview%20SummariesMaster.PDF on February 23, 2021. 

18 Id. at 6. 

19 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https:// 

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

20 Id. at x. 

21 Id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85. 

22Emergency Order of Prohibition, ‘‘Operators 

and Pilots of ‘‘Doors Off’’ Flights for Compensation 

or Hire’’ available at https://www.regulations.gov/ 

document/FAA-2018-0243-0001. 

23 Ibid. 

24https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/ 

orders_notices/index.cfm/go/document.

information/documentID/1032926. 

25 Id. at 2. 

26http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ 

Notice/N_8900.457.pdf. 

27http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/ 

Notice/N_8900.506.pdf. 

28Although FAA orders typically serve as 

guidance material for FAA personnel only, FAA 

Order 8900.4 provides information to individuals, 

pilots, and operators. http://www.faa.gov/

documentLibrary/media/Order/FAA_Order_

8900.4.pdf. 

29https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/other_

visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_

safety/InFO18003.pdf. 

December 10, 2019, in which the Board 

issued additional safety 

recommendations.16 The accident 

docket includes a detailed summary of 

the pilot interview.17 The pilot reported 

that when he reached down for the 

emergency fuel shutoff lever, he realized 

that it was in the off position. He also 

noted that a portion of the front seat 

passenger’s tether was underneath the 

lever.18 A review of radar data and 

onboard video showed that when the 

flight was proceeding northwest over 

Manhattan toward Central Park at an 

altitude of 1,900 feet mean sea level, the 

front passenger, who was facing 

outboard in his seat with his legs 

outside the helicopter, leaned back 

several times to take photographs using 

a smartphone. The onboard video 

showed that each time he leaned back, 

the tail of the tether attached to the back 

of his harness hung down loosely near 

the helicopter’s floor-mounted controls. 

At one point, when he pulled himself 

up to adjust his seating position, the tail 

of his tether remained taut but appeared 

to pop upward. Two seconds later, the 

helicopter’s engine sounds decreased, 

and the helicopter began to descend.19

The NTSB determined the probable 

cause of this accident was Liberty 

Helicopters Inc.’s use of a NYONairprovided passenger harness/tether 

system, which caught on and activated 

the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff 

lever (FSOL) and resulted in the inflight loss of engine power and the 

subsequent ditching.20 NTSB also stated 

that Liberty and NYONair’s use of the 

harness and tether system hindered 

passenger egress and contributed to the 

severity of the accident.21

3. FAA Actions 

The FAA carefully considered the 

information and recommendations from 

the NTSB. Following the issuance of the 

NTSB Urgent Safety Recommendation 

Report ASR–18–02, the FAA concluded 

that the SPRS each passenger wore, 

while intended as a safety measure 

when the aircraft was in flight, might 

have prevented the passengers’ quick 

egress from the aircraft. Although the 

fatalities that occurred on March 11, 

2018, involved an aircraft ditching on 

the water, the FAA determined that 

other situations, such as smoke and fire 

emergencies, might also result in 

injuries and fatalities unless passengers 

can release quickly their SPRS. Under 

49 U.S.C. 46105(c), the Acting 

Administrator of the FAA determined 

that an emergency existed related to 

safety in air commerce based on the 

threat to passenger safety presented by 

the use of SPRS not approved by the 

FAA, which may prevent a passenger 

from exiting the aircraft quickly in an 

emergency. To address this emergency, 

on March 22, 2018, the FAA issued 

Emergency Order of Prohibition No. 

FAA–2018–0243 to all operators and 

pilots of flights for compensation or hire 

with the doors open or removed in the 

United States or using aircraft registered 

in the United States for doors-off 

flights.22 The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition prohibits the use of SPRS 

that cannot be released quickly in an 

emergency in doors-off flight operation. 

The Emergency Order of Prohibition 

provides that persons may operate 

doors-off flights for compensation or 

hire involving SPRS if the 

Administrator has determined that the 

restraints to be used can be quickly 

released by a passenger with minimal 

difficulty and without impeding egress 

from the aircraft in an emergency, and 

provides information for operators to 

apply to seek such approvals. The 

Emergency Order of Prohibition also 

prohibits passenger-carrying doors-off 

flight operations unless the passengers 

are at all times properly secured using 

FAA-approved restraints.23

The FAA also posted to its website 

FAA Notice N 8900.456, Emergency 

Order of Prohibition Pertaining to 

‘‘Doors Off’’ Flight Operations for 

Compensation or Hire, which provides 

guidance to FAA Aviation Safety 

Inspectors (ASIs) and others regarding 

the Emergency Order of Prohibition and 

its implementation.24 Notice N 8900.456 

directed ASIs to coordinate with the 

FAA’s Aircraft Certification Service to 

ensure a restraint system, previously 

granted an approval by an FAA Form 

337, is properly evaluated prior to use.25

That notice was subsequently revised to 

FAA Notice N 8900.457 26 and then 

FAA Notice N 8900.506,27 before finally 

being established as FAA Order 

8900.4.28 That order sets out the 

application process to request a Letter of 

Authorization (LOA) from the FAA’s 

Flight Standards Service to conduct 

operations using an SPRS. As a part of 

that process, the applicant must 

demonstrate that the restraints can be 

released quickly by a passenger with 

minimal difficulty and without 

impeding egress from the aircraft in an 

emergency. In reviewing a request for an 

LOA, the FAA reviews the design, 

manufacture, installation, and 

operations. 

In addition, the Agency published 

Information for Operators (InFO) 18003, 

Supplemental Passenger Restraint 

Systems (SPRS) for ‘‘Doors-Off’’ Flight 

Operations Conducted for 

Compensation or Hire, on May 9, 2018, 

which informs operators of the 

procedure for obtaining an LOA for use 

of an SPRS for ‘‘Doors-Off’’ flight 

operations conducted for compensation 

or hire.29

In evaluating whether to authorize an 

operation with SPRS, the FAA requires 

the applicant to submit to the FAA the 

following items: a completed and signed 

FAA Form 7711–2, Certificate of Waiver 

or Authorization Application; a 

completed Attachment A, Request for 

FAA Letter of Authorization, 

Supplemental Passenger Restraint 

System—Supporting Information; a link 

to a video that shows an occupant 

demonstrating the method of release 

from the device; and, if the operator has 

been issued a Motion Picture and 

Television Filming certificate of waiver, 

a signed FAA Form 7711–1. In 

reviewing the request, the FAA also 

evaluates the applicant’s preflight 


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30For the purposes of this evaluation, the FAA 

considers a certification standard to be credible 

when it ensures that materials, products, processes, 

and services are fit for their purpose. 

31The FAA notes that both the NTSB and OIG 

used the term ‘‘supplemental passenger restraint 

system’’ (SPRS). 

32Weaknesses in FAA’s Supplemental Passenger 

Restraint System Authorization Process Hinder 

Improvements to Open-Door Helicopter Operations, 

Audit Report AV2021010, issued December 8, 2020. 

Available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/ 

38140. 33See id. at x, xii, 67, 83, 85. 

briefing procedures and/or step-by-step 

instructions, which must clearly and 

convincingly demonstrate that the SPRS 

can be released quickly by the SPRS 

user with minimal difficulty and 

without impeding egress from the 

aircraft in an emergency. 

Additionally, the evaluation includes 

confirmation that the components 

(harness and lanyard) were 

manufactured in accordance with 

credible certification standards.30 The 

FAA recognizes that acceptable and 

established minimum standards for 

supplemental restraints already exist 

and are in use in other FAA evaluation 

scenarios and in many occupations. The 

FAA accepts these standards since there 

is no single certification standard that is 

best for every SPRS, due to the unique 

activities in which the applicant seeks 

to engage during doors opened flight 

operations. The FAA considers these 

existing standards when reviewing 

submission packages. Credible 

certification standards include TSO–167 

(for personnel carrying device systems), 

OSHA 1926.502 (fall protection), NFPA 

1983–2017 (life safety rope and 

equipment), and EN 361:2002 (full body 

harness). Further discussion about 

credible certification standards can be 

found in section IV.D. of this proposal. 

Non-certificated individuals may also 

request authorization to use SPRS. For 

example, passengers seeking to use 

SPRS may seek FAA authorization of 

their own equipment. They may include 

but are not limited to net gunners or 

aerial photographers. The FAA issues an 

LOA specific to that individual, the 

identified components of the SPRS, and 

the submitted operational procedures 

when the individual is a passenger on 

a doors opened/removed flight operated 

for compensation or hire. 

The FAA reviews each submission to 

ensure the submitted documentation 

adequately demonstrates the ability of a 

user to release quickly the SPRS with 

minimal difficulty. Consistent with the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, the 

ability for rapid release and egress must 

be inherent in the design of the SPRS. 

Additionally, each SPRS must not 

require the use of a cutting tool, or any 

other additional tool, or the assistance 

of any other person to release the 

restraint. The FAA also considers 

whether a user would have the ability 

to release the SPRS without any 

additional training beyond what would 

be provided in a preflight briefing, as 

discussed in the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition. 

Once issued, the pilot or operator 

must ensure the LOA is available on the 

aircraft whenever any SPRS is used on 

any flight operation with doors opened 

or removed for compensation or hire. If 

issued to a non-certificated individual, 

the LOA requires that individual to 

provide a copy of the LOA to the pilot 

or operator prior to participating in a 

flight operation conducted with doors 

off for compensation or hire using an 

SPRS. The pilot or operator makes the 

final decision as to whether to accept 

the LOA and whether to permit the 

passenger to use the authorized SPRS on 

that flight. 

Between March 26, 2018, and October 

15, 2019, the FAA issued 41 LOAs to 

operators and 13 LOAs to noncertificated individuals. Through the 

application process, the FAA learned 

SPRS could be used on both fixed wing 

and rotorcraft aircraft. 

If this rule is finalized as proposed, it 

would supersede existing processes for 

authorizing SPRS. 

4. Department of Transportation Office 

of Inspector General Report and 

Recommendations 

Following the fatal Liberty 

Helicopters crash, the Department of 

Transportation (DOT) Office of the 

Inspector General (OIG), in consultation 

with the NTSB, reviewed FAA’s 

oversight of helicopter air tours and 

how FAA approved the supplemental 

passenger restraint systems used during 

the crash.31 The OIG objectives were to 

assess FAA’s processes for (1) review 

and approval of supplemental restraints 

for open-door helicopter operations, and 

(2) oversight of company use of 

supplemental restraints.32 The OIG 

findings included that the FAA did not 

maintain effective and consistent 

oversight of open-door helicopter 

operations to maintain the safety of air 

tour passengers. The OIG issued 

recommendations to the FAA to 

improve the SPRS authorization process 

and oversight regarding SPRS use and to 

increase the safety of helicopter air tour 

passengers. Specifically, the OIG 

recommended the FAA issue a notice of 

proposed rulemaking and a final rule, if 

found to be in the public interest, that 

address operations using SPRS. This 

proposed rule addresses the OIG 

recommendation. 

IV. Discussion of the Proposed Rule 

A. Identified Safety Gaps 

Although the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition fills safety gaps that existed 

prior to the Liberty Helicopters 

accident, the FAA identified residual 

safety gaps that still exist and that this 

proposed rule seeks to address. 

Discussed below are the primary 

residual safety gaps the FAA identified. 

1. Limited Regulatory Oversight 

Prior to March 11, 2018, no rules 

specifically addressed civil aircraft 

operations conducted with the use of 

SRS, including during operations with 

doors opened or removed. The 

Emergency Order of Prohibition sought 

to address this issue by imposing SPRS 

requirements; however, it only 

addresses doors-off operations for 

compensation or hire. This proposed 

rule would apply to all civil aircraft 

operations conducted in the U.S. with 

the use of SRS, including during 

operations with doors opened or 

removed and regardless of whether they 

are for compensation or hire. Moreover, 

the Emergency Order of Prohibition did 

not address operations where doors 

remain closed but where individuals 

use SRS. This proposed rule addresses 

those operations as well. 

2. Ability To Release and Inadvertent 

Release of the Supplemental Restraint 

System 

As explained above, the NTSB stated 

that the passengers’ inability to release 

from the SPRS hindered their egress 

from the aircraft and contributed to the 

severity of the accident.33 The 

Emergency Order of Prohibition sought 

to address this concern by imposing 

certain SPRS release mechanism design 

requirements; however, the FAA 

determined after the Emergency Order 

of Prohibition was put into place that 

there is no requirement to prevent 

inadvertent release of the mechanism. 

Although quick release is vital, it is 

equally important to ensure an SRS does 

not inadvertently release, particularly 

during operations where doors are 

opened or removed. This proposed rule 

addresses that concern. 

3. Lap-Held Children 

Current regulations permit a person to 

be held by an adult who is occupying 

an approved seat or berth, provided that 

the person being held has not reached 

his or her second birthday and does not 

occupy or use any restraining device. 


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34 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018 at x. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/ 

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

See 14 CFR 91.107(a)(3)(i) and 

135.128(a)(1). The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition does not address lap-held 

children, leaving an unacceptable risk of 

children falling out of an aircraft with 

doors opened or removed or otherwise 

being injured when an adult is holding 

a lap-held child while using only an 

SRS. This proposed rule seeks to 

eliminate that risk to lap-held children. 

B. How This Rule Enhances the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition 

This proposed rule would enhance 

safety for individuals who use an SRS 

during all flight operations. As 

mentioned above, no regulations existed 

regarding the use of supplemental 

restraints prior to March 22, 2018. After 

the Liberty Helicopters accident, the 

NTSB found ‘‘that minimally trained 

passengers would have great difficulty 

extricating themselves from the harness/ 

tether system, each of which was 

equipped with locking carabiners and 

an ineffective cutting tool, during an 

emergency requiring a rapid egress.’’ 34

The FAA issued Emergency Order of 

Prohibition No. FAA–2018–0243 to all 

operators and pilots of flights for 

compensation or hire with the doors 

open or removed in the United States or 

using aircraft registered in the United 

States for doors-off flights. 

The Emergency Order of Prohibition 

prohibits the use of SPRS that cannot be 

released quickly in an emergency in 

doors-off flight operations. The 

Emergency Order of Prohibition 

provides that persons may operate 

doors-off flights for compensation or 

hire involving SPRS if the 

Administrator has determined that the 

restraints to be used can be quickly 

released by a passenger with minimal 

difficulty and without impeding egress 

from the aircraft in an emergency, and 

provides information for operators to 

apply to seek such authorization. The 

Emergency Order of Prohibition also 

prohibits passenger-carrying doors-off 

flight operations unless the passengers 

are at all times properly secured using 

FAA-approved restraints. 

The term ‘‘supplemental passenger 

restraint system,’’ as defined in the 

March 22, 2018, Emergency Order of 

Prohibition, means any passenger 

restraint that is not installed on the 

aircraft pursuant to an FAA approval, 

including (but not limited to) restraints 

approved through a Type Certificate, 

Supplemental Type Certificate, or as an 

approved major alteration using FAA 

Form 337. For this rulemaking, the FAA 

uses the term supplemental restraint 

system (SRS) instead of supplemental 

passenger restraint system (SPRS) used 

in the Emergency Order of Prohibition. 

The FAA finds the terms ‘‘supplemental 

restraint system’’ (SRS) and 

‘‘supplemental passenger restraint 

system’’ (SPRS) to be synonymous, 

except ‘‘supplemental restraint system’’ 

is more precise as the restraint could be 

worn by either a passenger or a crew 

member. Therefore, for accuracy, the 

FAA uses the term ‘‘supplemental 

restraint system’’ (SRS) throughout this 

document, except when quoting or 

referring to documents that use the term 

‘‘SPRS.’’ 

Below is a table showing (1) the 

regulatory landscape after the FAA 

issued the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition, (2) identified safety gaps 

the Emergency Order did not address, 

and (3) a brief summary of the proposed 

§ 91.108 requirements, including the 

requirements that seek to close the gaps 

identified after the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition was issued. 

TABLE 1—COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS USING SUPPLEMENTAL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS

Emergency order of prohibition 

(current) 

Letter of authorization process 

Identified safety gaps 

Performance-based requirements 

(proposed) 

91.108—Use of supplemental restraint systems 

Emergency Order of Prohibition No. FAA–2018–0243, 

issued March 22, 2018, applies to operations for compensation or hire with doors open or removed. 

It prohibits the use of SPRS that cannot be released quickly and prohibits doors-off operations unless passengers 

are at all times secured using FAA-approved restraints or 

restrained by an authorized SPRS. 

Emergency Order of Prohibition did not address: 

• Flight operations not 

conducted for compensation or hire; or 

• Operations where the 

doors remain closed, 

but passengers use 

an SRS. 

In addition, the Emergency 

Order of Prohibition only 

applies to passengers and 

does not address crew 

members. 

The SRS proposed rule applies to: 

• All operations where the doors are opened or removed, regardless of whether they are for compensation or hire; 

• All operations, regardless of whether the doors are opened or removed, where passengers use an SRS; and 

• Passengers and crew members. 

Proposed Requirement: Flight operations with doors opened or removed 

are prohibited unless each individual either occupies: 

• An FAA-approved seat or berth with a safety belt/shoulder harness or an approved child restraint system during all phases of 

flight; or 

• An approved seat or berth with a safety belt/shoulder harness 

during critical phases of flight and is secured during the cruise 

portion of flight with an SRS. 

The supplemental restraint must have a release mechanism that: 

• Can be released quickly by the person using the 

SPRS with minimal difficulty, without excessive force 

and without impeding egress from the aircraft; 

• Is located on the front or side of the harness, easily 

accessible to and visible by the person using the 

SPRS; 

• Does not require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, any other additional tool, or the assistance of 

any other person to release the SPRS. 

Emergency Order of Prohibition did not address inadvertent release of the 

SRS. 

The SRS proposed rule includes the same design requirements for the 

SRS release mechanism as the Emergency Order of Prohibition but 

adds a requirement about inadvertent release. 

Proposed Requirement: The supplemental restraint must have a release 

mechanism that: 

• Can be quickly operated with minimal difficulty; 

• Is attached to the front or side of the harness in a location easily 

accessible to and visible by the individual using the SRS; 

• Prevents inadvertent release; and 

• Does not require the use of a knife to cut the restraint, any other 

additional tool, or the assistance of any other individual to release 

the SRS. 


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TABLE 1—COMPARISON OF REQUIREMENTS FOR OPERATIONS USING SUPPLEMENTAL RESTRAINT SYSTEMS—Continued 

Emergency order of prohibition 

(current) 

Letter of authorization process 

Identified safety gaps 

Performance-based requirements 

(proposed) 

91.108—Use of supplemental restraint systems 

Operators, pilots, or individuals desiring authorization to 

use an SPRS must submit the following items for evaluation: 

• Completed FAA Form 7711–2, Certificate of Waiver 

or Authorization Application; 

• Completed ATTACHMENT A, Request for FAA Letter of Authorization; and 

• A link to at least one video that shows an occupant 

demonstrating the method of release from the 

SPRS. 

If the submitter seeks to use authorized SPRS for Motion 

Picture and Television Filming (MP/TF) operations, the 

submission must also include a scanned copy of the operators or pilot’s issued FAA Form 7711–1, Certificate of 

Waiver or Authorization. 

Other than addressing the 

release mechanism, the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition did not address 

detailed design or operational requirements. 

The SRS proposed rule adds more detailed design and operational requirements and other requirements/prohibitions not addressed in the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition: 

Proposed Design Requirements: The supplemental restraint system 

must: 

• Have a harness that secures around the individual’s torso; 

• Have a lanyard that connects the harness to the airframe attachment point and that ensures the individual’s torso remains inside 

the aircraft; 

• Not impede egress from the aircraft in an emergency after being 

released; and 

• Identify the sizing criteria for which the SRS is rated. 

Proposed Operational Requirements: 

• A qualified person must: 

Æ Connect the SRS to an attachment point with rated strength 

for the individual using the SRS; and 

Æ Not connect the SRS to an attachment located in the 

flightdeck. 

The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition did not address 

other requirements outlined in the right-hand column, ‘‘additional proposed 

requirements.’’ 

Additional Proposed Requirements: The proposed rule adds requirements for: 

• Individuals providing their own SRS; 

• Pilot in Command’s responsibilities and authority; 

• Passenger briefings; 

• Passengers demonstrating their ability to occupy FAA-approved 

safety belt/shoulder harness and accomplish actions required for 

SRS quick release without assistance. 

The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition did not address 

individuals who are prohibited from using an SRS or 

lap-held children during 

certain operations. 

Proposed Prohibitions: 

• The proposed rule prohibits the following individuals from using 

an SRS: 

Æ Passengers who cannot demonstrate their ability to occupy a 

safety belt/shoulder harness or to release quickly their SRS; 

Æ Individuals under 15 years of age; 

Æ Individuals seated in flightdeck; 

Æ Passengers occupying a CRS; 

• The proposed rule also prohibits lap-held children from being held 

by an adult using an SRS or during doors-open or -removed operations. 

C. Prohibitions Applicable to SRS and 

Doors Opened or Removed Flight 

Operations (§ 91.108(a) and (b)) 

The FAA is proposing to add a new 

§ 91.108 to address the use of 

supplemental restraint systems. 

Proposed § 91.108(a) establishes the 

general prohibition against using SRS. 

Specifically, paragraph (a) would 

prohibit any operations in a registered 

civil aircraft if any individual is secured 

with an SRS except as described in 

§ 91.108. This is a change from the 

status quo. The FAA determined that, 

even after the issuance of the Emergency 

Order of Prohibition following the 

Liberty Helicopters accident, safety gaps 

continue to exist. This proposal intends 

to eliminate these safety gaps for all 

individuals who use an SRS. For 

example, the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition prohibits operations with 

passengers using an SPRS unless certain 

conditions exist, including 

authorization from the FAA. Proposed 

paragraph (a) would apply the 

prohibition to everyone on board, 

including crew members. In addition, 

currently, an individual can use an SRS 

without FAA authorization both during 

operations conducted with doors closed 

and operations conducted not for 

compensation or hire. Proposed 

paragraph (a) would extend the 

prohibition to these additional types of 

operations as well. Proposed § 91.108(b) 

builds on the prohibition in paragraph 

(a). Paragraph (b) would prohibit 

operations with doors opened or 

removed with two exceptions. The first 

exception, under § 91.108(b)(1)(i), is 

when each individual on board is 

properly secured in an approved seat or 

berth or in an approved child restraint 

system during all phases of flight. The 

second exception, under 

§ 91.108(b)(1)(ii), is when an individual 

is properly secured in an approved seat 

or berth during movement on the 

surface, takeoff, and landing, and is 

secured during other phases of flight 

using an SRS in accordance with, and 

that meets the requirements of, § 91.108. 

The FAA proposes these requirements 

to ensure that during operations with 

doors opened or removed, all 

individuals are at all times properly 

secured using restraints that meet the 

requirements of the proposed rule and 

at no time are unrestrained during 

operations. As proposed, all SRS would 

be required to be properly secured on 

each individual and properly secured to 

an FAA-approved airframe attaching 

point prior to the removal of the FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness. The proposed rule 

requires the attachment point(s) to be 

rated at a strength equal to or greater 

than the total combined weight of the 

occupants secured to the attachment 

point to ensure that the attachment 

point has adequate strength. 

To ensure each individual is properly 

secured at all times during flight 

operations in which doors are opened or 

removed, operators may choose to 

require compliance with procedures 

that ensure both the FAA-approved 

aircraft seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness and the SRS are 

secured prior to ground movement or 

that the SRS is secured after takeoff. In 

either case, the proposed rule requires 

each person to be properly secured by 

the SRS before releasing the FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness. The FAA reiterates 

that an individual must be secured by 

an FAA-approved seat belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness during 

movement on the surface, takeoff, and 

landing. Moreover, the FAA proposes 


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35 Design characteristics of some manufactured 

devices might not meet the rigorous and necessary 

safety requirements that would allow for rapid 

egress in an aircraft emergency. For example, a fall 

arrest harness which meets its appropriate standard 

would be able to safely bear the occupant’s weight 

and prevent a fall. However, it still could entangle 

the occupant and would not be permissible under 

this rule. 36 49 CFR 571.213 S8.2. 

that an individual cannot release their 

safety belt and shoulder harness until 

the PIC authorizes them to do so. As 

discussed in more detail in Section 

IV.G., the PIC is the final authority on 

whether SRS may be used during flight 

operations. In addition, the PIC is in the 

best position to know when flight 

conditions are appropriate to authorize 

SRS use. 

Finally, the FAA notes that proposed 

§ 91.108 compliments the safety belt 

provisions in §§ 91.107 and 135.128. 

Each of these regulations requires 

individuals to be properly secured in 

FAA-approved safety belts and, if 

installed, shoulder harnesses during 

critical phases of flight (i.e., movement 

on the surface, takeoff, and landing). 

Section 91.108 simply allows 

individuals to release their safety belts 

and shoulder harnesses during the 

cruise portion of flight if they are 

appropriately harnessed by an SRS and 

as authorized by the PIC. 

D. SRS Design Requirements 

(§ 91.108(c)(1) Through (4)) 

As the FAA determined the possible 

scope of this rulemaking, the FAA 

considered developing certification 

requirements for SRS. Specifically, the 

FAA considered a requirement that the 

SRS be installed pursuant to an FAA 

approval or that the SRS be separately 

approved by the FAA. However, the 

FAA’s development of the current LOA 

review process based on the safety 

concerns identified by the NTSB 

following the Liberty Helicopters’ 

accident has not indicated that a 

physical review of the SRS itself is 

necessary. In the minutes before the 

Liberty Helicopters accident, the 

passengers disconnected their FAAapproved lap belts and shoulder 

harnesses and moved about the 

helicopter’s interior, secured only by 

their SRS, which kept them secured 

within the opened door cabin. The SRS 

does not need to meet restraint 

crashworthiness standards because it is 

intended as a fall protective device, and 

the proposed rule requires the use of 

restraints installed pursuant to an FAA 

approval during critical phases of flight 

only. For these reasons, the FAA 

determined that requiring that the SRS 

be installed pursuant to an FAA 

approval based on a new set of 

certification standards would create an 

unnecessary burden when the approach 

in this proposed rule would achieve the 

safety objectives. 

The SRS is intended as a fall 

protective device and not as a 

crashworthy restraint as mentioned 

previously. The FAA is aware that 

standards currently exist that ensure 

SRS component materials will maintain 

their integrity and efficacy when used 

during cruise phases of flight. For 

instance, the FAA determined that 

components that meet National Fire 

Protection Association, Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration, or 

American Society for Testing and 

Materials standards are adequate to 

prevent an individual using the SRS 

from falling out of an aircraft being 

operated with doors opened or removed. 

Although these standards help ensure 

an SRS provides adequate fall 

protection, they do not address whether 

a particular SRS is designed and 

operated in a way that ensures the 

ability to rapidly egress from an aircraft 

during an emergency. Therefore, this 

proposed rule does not recommend or 

require one standard over another.35

This proposed rule would establish 

minimum requirements for the 

utilization of an SRS to ensure that each 

SRS has an appropriately designed 

harness and lanyard, as well as an 

appropriately designed release 

mechanism that can be released quickly, 

and will not impede egress in an 

emergency. Specifically, these 

minimum requirements include a quick 

release mechanism that must be 

operated without the use of a cutting 

tool, any other tool, or the assistance of 

another person, and require that the 

device, when released, does not impede 

egress from the aircraft as described in 

section IV, D, 2 below. 

This proposed rule would also allow 

operators flexibility in determining 

which make or model of SRS to permit 

for their operations, as long as the SRS 

meets the requirements in the proposed 

rule. Moreover, the proposed 

performance-based design requirements 

would allow innovation in design and 

manufacturing for manufacturers to 

develop new SRS components to meet 

aviation-specific needs. Each SRS 

design requirement is discussed in more 

detail below. 

1. Harness and Lanyard (§ 91.108(c)(1) 

and (2)) 

The FAA proposes that each SRS have 

a harness that secures around the 

individual’s torso and a lanyard that 

connects the harness to an airframe 

attachment point or points, ensuring 

that the individual’s torso remains 

inside the aircraft. An SRS consists of 

two components: a body harness 

secured around a person’s torso; and a 

lanyard that connects to the harness and 

to an airframe attachment point in the 

aircraft that is not within the flightdeck. 

The harness is attached to a lanyard 

through the use of a quick release 

mechanism. As proposed, an SRS 

lanyard would be required to meet 

specific criteria to ensure the safety of 

the occupant using the SRS. This 

proposed rule would require the 

lanyard’s length ensures the person’s 

torso remains inside the aircraft at all 

times to prevent the person from 

becoming human external cargo and, 

thus, an external load. Pursuant to the 

definition in 14 CFR 1.1, an external 

load means a load that is carried, or 

extends, outside of the aircraft fuselage. 

The pertinent regulations for human 

and nonhuman external cargo, which 

pertain to any load that is carried, or 

extends outside a rotorcraft, are found 

in part 133. 

An SRS must comply with the 

provisions of proposed § 91.108 and is 

distinct from child restraints approved 

for use on aircraft, as described in 

§§ 91.107 and 135.128. A child restraint 

system does not have a body harness 

secured around a person’s torso, and it 

is not connected to an airframe 

attachment point in the aircraft by a 

lanyard. In the United States, federal 

regulations for child restraint systems 

use on aircraft are governed by Federal 

Motor Vehicles Safety Standard 

(FMVSS) No. 213, which ensures that 

child restraint systems for aircraft use 

not only are crashworthy in a typical 

motor vehicle frontal crash scenario, but 

also must pass an inversion test to 

ensure the occupant is contained in the 

event an aircraft encounters 

turbulence.36 In contrast to an SRS, the 

characteristics of a child restraint 

system meeting the criteria of FMVSS 

No. 213 include that the child restraint 

system should have a solid back and 

seat, internal restraint straps installed to 

securely hold the child in the device, 

and a label showing approval for 

aviation use. 

2. Impede Egress in an Emergency After 

Being Released (§ 91.108(c)(3)) 

The FAA proposes that an SRS must 

not impede egress from the aircraft 

during an emergency after being 

released. The use of an SRS may 

complicate the emergency egress of 

passengers. This could occur if an SRS 

is used in conjunction with a corded 

headset, for instance, or when multiple 

SRS users’ lanyards are attached to 


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37 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/ 

Reports/AAR1904.pdf at page 18. 

38 Id. at 19. 

39 Id. at 21. 

40See id. at 28–29. 

41 Id. at xii. 

multiple securement points in the cabin. 

It could also occur if an SRS requires 

the user to exit the aircraft while using 

the harness with the lanyard attached to 

it, which could cause a tripping hazard 

or interfere with the ability of any other 

person on the aircraft to evacuate in an 

emergency. Even though the user may 

be able to disconnect themselves from 

the aircraft while still using the harness 

with the lanyard attached, this 

configuration would not meet the 

regulation since the lanyard could 

become entangled and impede egress 

from the aircraft. A retractable lanyard, 

however, that would not become 

entangled or impede egress would 

comply with the proposed requirement. 

3. Quick Release Requirements 

(§ 91.108(c)(4)) 

The FAA proposes to require that 

each SRS have a release mechanism that 

the individual using the SRS can 

operate quickly with minimal difficulty 

and without impeding egress from the 

aircraft in an emergency. This is 

important because emergency 

evacuation conditions may include an 

environment where egress is already 

difficult due to smoke, fire, or water. 

This proposed rule would require the 

quick release mechanism to be located 

on the front or side of the harness, in a 

location easily accessible to, and visible 

by, the individual using the SRS. This 

release could work in several ways. A 

mechanism located on the front or side 

of the harness that releases the harness 

from the lanyard, allowing the 

individual to egress from the aircraft 

while continuing to wear the harness, 

would fulfill this proposed requirement. 

Similarly, a mechanism located on the 

front or side of the harness that releases 

the harness from the individual’s torso, 

allowing the individual to egress the 

aircraft while leaving the entire SRS 

behind, would also comply with the 

proposed requirement. 

Although the release mechanism of 

the SRS must be able to be operated 

quickly with minimal difficulty, it must 

also prevent inadvertent release while 

in use. The proposed term ‘‘inadvertent 

release’’ means unintentional activation 

of the quick release system. Complying 

with this standard could consist of 

having a dual actuation device, which is 

a sequential control that requires two 

distinct actions in series for actuation. 

For example, an operator may use 

protective covers or flaps that a person 

must open or remove prior to operating 

the release mechanism. Another 

example would be a release mechanism 

of the SRS that could include a pressgate carabiner that requires two distinct 

actions. 

Additionally, the FAA is aware of 

certain buckles that cannot be opened 

when under load, such as could occur 

when the user is upside down or 

sideways following an accident. 

Although this feature would prevent 

inadvertent release, this feature would 

not meet the requirement to allow the 

release mechanism to be operated 

quickly with minimal difficulty if rapid 

egress from the aircraft were required. 

Additionally, this proposed rule 

would require that the quick release 

mechanism be capable of release 

without the use of a knife, any 

additional tool, or the assistance of any 

other individual to cut or release the 

SRS. In the Liberty Helicopters accident, 

passengers used harnesses that included 

interconnected shoulder straps and leg 

straps, a chest strap that spanned the 

two front shoulder straps, and a dorsal 

D-ring (used on the accident flight for 

attaching a tether) between the wearer’s 

upper shoulder blades. NYONair 

attached a pouch containing an 

emergency cutting tool on either the 

right or left upper shoulder strap of each 

harness.37 The dorsal D-ring on each 

passenger’s harness was secured with a 

locking carabiner to a tether, which 

consisted of several loops of 11 mm 

webbing of varying lengths 

(manufactured by a climbing-gear 

supplier). The other end of each tether 

was secured to a cabin anchor point 

with a second locking carabiner.38 First 

responders reported that they found the 

passengers strapped in the cabin, and 

they had to cut various straps to free 

them. Part of one passenger’s harness 

was found in the helicopter with the Dring secured to the tether (and the tether 

secured to the cabin floor fitting) with 

locking carabiners. The NTSB inspected 

portions of two harnesses and found 

that one had a pouch attached that 

contained a cutting tool; the other had 

a pouch attached, but no cutting tool 

was present. Post-accident examination 

of a harness removed from another 

passenger revealed a cutting tool 

contained inside a pouch attached to the 

front of the left shoulder strap.39 A 

ceiling-mounted camera in the 

helicopter captured video and audio 

information of emergency egress-related 

events. It showed that, despite receiving 

instruction on how to remove or cut 

their harnesses, the passengers were 

unable to release themselves.40

The NTSB found that minimally 

trained passengers would have great 

difficulty extricating themselves from 

the harness/tether system, each of 

which was equipped with locking 

carabiners and an ineffective cutting 

tool, during an emergency requiring a 

rapid egress. Additionally, the NTSB 

concluded that Liberty’s ‘‘. . . decision 

to use locking carabiners and ineffective 

cutting tools as the primary means for 

passengers to rapidly release from the 

harness/tether system was inappropriate 

and unsafe.’’ 41

In an emergency, rapid egress from 

the aircraft is essential. Passengers who 

have never used a cutting tool, or who 

don’t pay attention to a safety briefing 

or take it seriously, could have difficulty 

using a tool to cut themselves from an 

SRS, especially in an environment that 

may include smoke, fire, or water. They 

could forget where the tool is located on 

the harness or have difficulty in 

removing the tool from the storage 

pouch. Also, they could drop the tool, 

rendering it useless. Relying on another 

person to assist in detachment could 

also be ineffectual if that person 

becomes injured or unresponsive in an 

emergency and cannot help. 

E. Who May Provide the SRS 

(§ 91.108(d)) 

The FAA proposes to allow an 

operator or an individual to provide an 

SRS for use during a flight. In some 

cases, an individual (e.g., professional 

photographer, fire suppression 

technician, wildlife net gunner) may 

own their own SRS and want to use it 

on different operators’ aircraft. In other 

cases, the operator or PIC will provide 

the SRS to individuals who seek to use 

SRS during the flight. For an individual 

providing their own SRS, the FAA 

proposes that they must confirm with 

the PIC, either verbally or in writing, as 

determined by the PIC, the system’s 

continued serviceability and readiness 

for its intended purposes. One way an 

individual providing their own SRS can 

meet this requirement is by ensuring the 

SRS is inspected and maintained in 

accordance with the manufacturer’s 

instructions. 

In addition, the proposed rule would 

require that each individual providing 

their own SRS comply with the sizing 

criteria for which the SRS is rated. This 

requirement would ensure that the SRS 

is properly sized for the individual 

using the SRS. The manufacturer’s 

sizing criteria may include different 


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42For similar requirements imposed on the PIC 

regarding the SRS’s continued serviceability and 

sizing criteria, see section IV.G below. 

43The weight limits for aircraft attachment points 

are placarded within the aircraft, and the aircraft 

weight and center of gravity limitations are outlined 

in the aircraft flight manual. Under § 91.103 

(Preflight action), prior to flight, each pilot is 

responsible for being familiar with pertinent 

information concerning the flight—that typically 

includes information outlined in the aircraft flight 

manual. In addition, § 91.9 (Civil aircraft flight 

manual, marking, and placard requirements) 

requires persons to comply with the operating 

limitations specified in the approved aircraft flight 

manual. Consequently, it is the PIC’s responsibility 

to ensure that all occupants on board meet the 

attachment point limitations outlined for that 

aircraft. 

44 Id. at 6. 

45 Id. at ix. 

46 Id. at xii. 

47 Ibid. 

48Engine Failure, Hard Landing, Turbowest 

Helicopters Limited, Aerospatiale AS350B Astar 

(Helicopter) C=FHBG, High Prairie, Alberta, 62nm 

NE, 04 April 1994, Report Number A94W0037 

(Gatineau, Quebec, Canada: Transportation Safety 

Board of Canada, 1994) accessed at http://www.bsttsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/1994/ 

a94w0037/a94w0037.pdf on June 24, 2021. 

measurements such as height, weight, 

chest circumference, or other specified 

sizing criteria. Requiring that the SRS be 

used within the limitations for which 

the SRS is rated will help ensure safe 

and appropriate use of the system.42

This requirement supplements an SRS 

operational requirement in section 

IV.F.3., below, stating that the SRS must 

fit the individual using it based on the 

sizing criteria for which the SRS is 

rated. 

F. SRS Operational Requirements 

(§ 91.108(e)(1) and (2)) 

As discussed in more detail below, 

the FAA proposes specific SRS 

operational requirements to help ensure 

individuals are using the SRS safely and 

appropriately. 

1. Airframe Attachment Points 

(§ 91.108(e)(1)(i)) 

This proposed rule would require a 

qualified person designated by the 

operator to connect each SRS lanyard to 

an airframe attachment point or points 

with a rated strength equal to or greater 

than the total weight of the occupant (or 

the combined weight if there is more 

than one occupant attached to an 

attachment point).43 There is no 

requirement for a specific number of 

attachment points. The number and 

location vary by each aircraft type 

design. Attachment points in the cabin 

may be existing hard points, with 

weight capabilities documented on 

existing placards or in appropriate 

aircraft flight manuals. If multiple 

harnesses are attached to a single 

location, the proposed rule requires the 

attachment point to be rated at a 

strength equal to or greater than the total 

combined weight of the occupants. 

All aircraft are designed for both 

emergency landing conditions and all 

flight loads. The FAA is not proposing 

that an SRS be designed or intended for 

restraining an occupant in an emergency 

landing condition because the FAA 

expects occupants to be in an FAAapproved seat with the seat belt fastened 

prior to an emergency landing. 

Therefore, the FAA is not proposing that 

SRS be subject to the emergency landing 

load factors applicable to the FAAapproved seats and seatbelts. SRS are 

designed to keep an individual inside 

the aircraft, while approved seats and 

seatbelts are designed for emergency 

landing conditions. The proposed rule 

would require each airframe attachment 

point used for the attachment of SRS to 

have a rated strength equal to or greater 

than the total weight of each occupant 

(or the combined weight if there is more 

than one occupant attached to an 

attachment point). This proposed 

requirement regarding airframe 

attachment point(s) would ensure that 

the attachment point has adequate 

strength under all flight conditions. 

2. SRS Attachment Location 

(§ 91.108(e)(1)(ii)) 

The FAA proposes that no SRS may 

be connected to any airframe attachment 

point located in the flightdeck. During 

the Liberty Helicopters accident flight, 

the front passenger, who was facing 

outboard in his seat with his legs 

outside the helicopter, leaned back 

several times to take photographs using 

a smartphone. The onboard video 

showed that, each time he leaned back, 

the tail of the tether attached to the back 

of his harness hung down loosely near 

the helicopter’s floor-mounted controls. 

At one point, when he pulled himself 

up to adjust his seating position, the tail 

of his tether remained taut but appeared 

to pop upward. Two seconds later, the 

helicopter’s engine sounds decreased, 

and the helicopter began to descend. 

The pilot reported that when he reached 

down for the emergency fuel shutoff 

lever, he realized that it was in the off 

position. He also noted that a portion of 

the front seat passenger’s tether was 

underneath the lever.44

During its investigation of the Liberty 

Helicopters accident, the NTSB 

evaluated the certification basis for the 

accident helicopter’s fuel shutoff lever, 

which did not require protection from 

inadvertent activation due to external 

influences, such as interference from a 

passenger.45 The NTSB found that the 

tail of the front passenger’s tether caught 

on the fuel shutoff lever during the 

flight, which resulted in the inadvertent 

activation of the fuel shutoff lever, 

interruption of fuel flow to the engine, 

and loss of engine power.46 The NTSB 

determined the probable cause of the 

accident was Liberty Helicopters’ use of 

a NYONair-provided passenger harness/ 

tether system, which caught on and 

activated the floor-mounted engine fuel 

shutoff lever and resulted in the inflight loss of engine power and the 

subsequent ditching.47

As the FAA developed this NPRM, it 

considered previous accidents and 

incidents in addition to the Liberty 

Helicopters accident that involved 

inadvertent operation of flight controls. 

Reports from these incidents indicate in 

each that a passenger inadvertently 

manipulated controls (e.g., fuel flow 

control lever) in the flightdeck. For 

example, on April 4, 1994, an 

Ae ́rospatiale AS 350B Ecureuil air 

ambulance crashed in Alberta, Canada, 

following loss of engine power. After an 

investigation, the Transportation Safety 

Board of Canada issued its final report, 

Engine Failure, Hard Landing, 

Turbowest Helicopters Limited, 

Aerospatiale AS350B Astar (Helicopter) 

C=FHBG, High Prairie, Alberta, 62nm 

NE, 04 April 1994.48 The report stated 

that a strap from a knapsack got caught 

on the fuel control lever and moved it 

out of the ‘‘flight’’ position resulting in 

fuel starvation to the engine, a total loss 

of engine power, and low rotor 

revolutions per minute. 

On September 13, 1996, an 

Ae ́rospatiale AS 350B1 Ecureuil, under 

contract to carry out a number of flights 

in connection with the filming of scenes 

for a feature film, crashed in Greenland 

following loss of engine power, killing 

the single passenger/photographer and 

seriously injuring the pilot. Following 

completion of its investigation, the 

Danish Accident Investigation Board 

(AAIB) opined that during movements 

in and around the lefthand seat, while 

troubleshooting problems with his 

photographic equipment, the 

photographer may unintentionally have 

pushed the fuel control lever toward 

idle/shut down. During its investigation, 

the Danish AAIB became aware of an 

almost identical incident that happened 

in 1993. The mission was also 

photography, and the straps of the 

photography equipment became caught 

in the fuel control lever and moved it 

toward the idle position, resulting in the 

loss of engine power. The pilot was able 

to restart the engine and landed the 

helicopter normally. 


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49NTSB Accident Number ANC08FA053, 

released 2/17/2010, available at: https://

data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=67841. 

50The airworthiness standards in parts 23, 25, 27, 

and 29 are organized by aircraft category. Part 23 

applies to normal category airplanes; part 25 

applies to transport category airplanes; part 27 

applies to normal category rotorcraft; and part 29 

applies to transport category rotorcraft. 

51See § 91.9 (Civil aircraft flight manual, 

marking, and placard requirements) requiring 

persons to comply with the operating limitations 

specified in the approved aircraft flight manual; see 

also § 21.5 (Airplane or Rotorcraft Flight Manual) 

requiring the aircraft flight manual to contain the 

operating limitations and other information 

required by applicable regulations. 

52For similar requirements imposed on 

individuals providing their own SRS, regarding the 

SRS’s continued serviceability and use limitations, 

see section IV.E above. 

On April 15, 2008, a Eurocopter 

AS350B2 helicopter crashed 34 miles 

east of Chickaloon, Alaska, killing the 

pilot and three passengers and seriously 

injuring one passenger. The NTSB 

determined that the probable cause of 

the accident was the loss of engine 

power due to an overspeed of the 

helicopter’s turbine engine, precipitated 

by the inadvertent movement of the fuel 

flow control lever by a passenger in the 

front seat. Contributing to the accident 

was the pilot’s failure to properly secure 

or stow the passenger’s backpack. 

During its investigation, the NTSB 

interviewed two large helicopter 

operators, Era and Eurocopter, about 

incidents of passengers interfering with 

floor-mounted engine controls on 

helicopters—specifically, the fuel flow 

control lever. Both operators informed 

the NTSB that they had anecdotal 

information about passengers placing 

items such as purses and camera bags 

on the floor-mounted engine controls. 

The operators also mentioned incidents 

of bag straps snagging on the fuel and 

other control levers.49

The airworthiness standards for 14 

CFR 23.2600, 25.1143(e), 27.1143(d), 

and 29.1143(e) 50 require that flight and 

engine controls not be subject to 

inadvertent operation. This requirement 

is based on the assumption that only 

crewmembers and/or pilots will interact 

with the aircraft controls. When the 

FAA codified these airworthiness 

standards, the FAA did not anticipate 

crewmembers or passengers in the 

flightdeck would be attached to or carry 

equipment that is not part of the 

approved type design that could snag on 

controls. Generally, flight manual 

procedures 51 require that all items be 

secured prior to flight. These procedures 

reinforce the assumptions made when 

the airworthiness standards were 

codified. 

This proposed rule would prohibit 

any person who occupies a seat in the 

flightdeck from using an SRS. In 

addition, this proposed rule would 

require an SRS to be connected to an 

aircraft attaching point or points that are 

not in the flightdeck. These proposed 

limitations would prevent inadvertent 

operation of the flight controls, as was 

experienced by the crew and passengers 

of the Liberty Helicopters accident 

flight. The operator would be 

responsible for ensuring that both of 

these requirements are met. 

3. Sizing Criteria (§ 91.108(e)(2)) 

This proposed rule would also require 

that the SRS fit the individual using it 

based on the sizing criteria for which 

the SRS is rated. As discussed above in 

section IV.E (‘‘Who May Provide the 

SRS’’), sizing criteria may include 

different measurements such as height, 

weight, chest circumference, or other 

specified sizing criteria. For example, 

SRS size requirements may be listed as 

small, medium, and large; however, the 

size may actually be based on a 

combination of height and weight. To 

illustrate, a ‘‘small’’ SRS may have 

minimum criteria of 4 feet 10 inches in 

height and a weight of 100 pounds and 

a maximum of 6 feet in height and 170 

pounds. Requiring that the SRS fit the 

individual using it will help ensure safe 

and appropriate use of the system. This 

requirement is supplemented by the 

additional requirements under 

§ 91.108(d)(2) and (f)(3) found in 

Sections IV.E. and IV.G, respectively. 

G. Pilot in Command (§ 91.108(f)(1) 

Through (5)) 

In accordance with § 91.3(a), the PIC 

of an aircraft is directly responsible for, 

and is the final authority as to, the 

operation of that aircraft. As a result, 

this proposed rule imposes several 

responsibilities on the PIC. 

First, the FAA proposes that 

regardless of who provides the SRS, the 

PIC has the overall responsibility to 

ensure that the SRS meets the 

requirements of proposed § 91.108. As 

the final authority of the aircraft 

operation, the PIC is best suited to make 

this determination. In addition, the FAA 

proposes that if the SRS does not meet 

the requirements outlined in § 91.108, 

the PIC must not permit the individual 

to use the SRS. For example, if the PIC 

determines that an SRS is not safe for 

continued use or that an individual does 

not meet the sizing criteria for which 

the SRS is rated (if the operator or PIC 

provided the SRS), the PIC must not 

permit the individual to use that SRS. 

Second, for any SRS provided by 

either the operator or the PIC, the FAA 

proposes that the PIC must ensure the 

SRS’s continued serviceability and 

readiness for its intended purpose. As 

discussed in the section pertaining to 

individuals providing their own SRS, 

this requirement may be met by 

inspecting and maintaining the SRS in 

accordance with the SRS manufacturer’s 

instructions. Ensuring the SRS is 

serviceable and ready for its intended 

purpose will help ensure the SRS is safe 

for continued use. 

Third, the FAA proposes that the PIC 

may only permit an individual to use an 

SRS that is provided by either the 

operator or the PIC if that individual 

complies with the sizing criteria for 

which the SRS is rated. As discussed in 

sections IV.E (‘‘Who May Provide the 

SRS’’) and IV.F.3 (‘‘Sizing Criteria’’), a 

manufacturer’s sizing criteria may 

include different measurements such as 

height, weight, chest circumference, or 

other specified sizing criteria. This 

requirement would ensure safe and 

appropriate use of the system and that 

the SRS is properly sized for the 

individual using the SRS.52

Fourth, the FAA proposes that the PIC 

has final authority regarding whether 

the SRS may be used during flight 

operations. If the PIC determines an 

individual should not use an SRS 

during an operation, the PIC may 

prohibit use of the SRS. This stipulation 

is in addition to the PIC’s obligation to 

prohibit the use of an SRS if it does not 

meet the requirements in § 91.108. For 

example, the PIC may determine that 

aircraft operations, outside the 

requirements of § 91.108, render 

conditions unsafe to use an SRS. In that 

case, the PIC may prohibit individuals 

from using the SRS during the flight. 

Finally, the FAA proposes that the 

PIC has final authority to authorize an 

individual to release the FAA-approved 

safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness and remain secured only by the 

supplemental restraint system. The PIC 

is in the best position to determine 

when appropriate flight conditions exist 

so as to allow individuals to move about 

the aircraft using only an SRS. 

H. Enhanced Passenger Briefing and 

Demonstration (§ 91.108 (g) and (h)) 

1. Passenger Briefing (§ 91.108(g)(1) and 

(2)) 

The FAA proposes to require a 

passenger briefing on how to use SRS 

during a flight. Existing regulations 

require operators to provide all 

passengers a safety briefing prior to 

departure. When a passenger onboard 

an aircraft will use an SRS, the rule as 

proposed requires that passenger to 

receive additional information in an 

enhanced safety briefing. In addition, 

any passenger using an SRS provided by 


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53See Exit Row Seating, Final Rule, 55 FR 8054, 

8066 (Mar. 6, 1990). 

54 Id. 

55 Id. (discussing various dictionary definitions of 

‘‘child.’’) In the Exit Row Seating NPRM, the FAA 

did not propose a specific age limit, but one 

commenter requested a defined age to facilitate the 

operators’ abilities to establish objective criteria. 

Exit Row Seating, NPRM, 54 FR 10484 (Mar. 13, 

1989). 

either the operator or PIC would have to 

demonstrate the ability to occupy, 

secure, and release the FAA-approved 

seat belts and, if installed, shoulder 

harnesses, as well as the ability to 

release quickly the SRS with no 

assistance and with minimal difficulty. 

Individuals providing their own SRS do 

not have to meet this specific 

requirement, but they must still meet 

the other briefing requirements, and 

they must meet the demonstration 

requirements under § 91.108(h), as 

discussed in Section IV.H.2, below. 

Therefore, under the proposed 

requirements, in addition to the 

standard briefing requirements codified 

at §§ 91.107, 91.519, 91.1035, and 

135.117, an operator or PIC conducting 

operations that involve the use of SRS 

would provide an enhanced briefing 

prior to the flight to all passengers using 

an SRS during the flight. 

This proposed rule would require the 

enhanced safety briefing to include 

information about the proper use, 

securing, and releasing of the SRS and 

the means of direct communication 

among crewmembers and passengers 

during normal and emergency operating 

procedures. This proposed rule would 

require the provision of information 

about use of any headset and intercom 

systems, how a passenger will be 

notified of an event requiring action, 

including emergencies, egress 

procedures, and other unforeseen 

circumstances, and how crewmembers 

would notify the passenger that they can 

release the FAA-approved seat belt and, 

if installed, shoulder harness and move 

within the aircraft using the SRS. The 

briefing would also describe how a 

passenger will be notified when to 

return to their seat and secure the FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, and when to notify 

the pilot of safety concerns. Each such 

aspect of this proposed briefing 

requirement is important because it 

provides the individual with additional 

information specific to the unique 

characteristics of using an SRS during 

normal and emergency flight operations 

that would enhance the individual’s 

safety. The proposed briefing helps 

inform the individual SRS user of the 

behavioral expectations during the flight 

and may provoke clarifying dialogue, if 

necessary, that ensures the individual 

understands these expectations. These 

elements are critical to ensuring the 

safety of the operation. 

Finally, to ensure clarity between the 

existing passenger briefing requirements 

outlined under §§ 135.117 and 136.7 

and the passenger briefing requirements 

in this proposed rule, the FAA proposes 

to add a cross-reference to § 91.108 in 

those sections. Adding this crossreference will help ensure that the 

proposed briefing requirements in 

§ 91.108 are not overlooked when 

considering the other passenger briefing 

requirements in §§ 135.117 and 136.7. 

2. Passenger Demonstration 

(§ 91.108(h)(1) and (2)) 

After receiving this enhanced briefing, 

prior to ground movement of the 

aircraft, this proposed rule would 

require all passengers using an SRS to 

demonstrate their comprehension of the 

information presented in the briefing. 

To this end, the proposed rule requires 

all passengers using an SRS to 

demonstrate to the operator their ability 

to occupy, secure, and release the FAAapproved seat belts and, if installed, 

shoulder harnesses, as well as their 

ability to release the SRS quickly 

without assistance and with minimal 

difficulty. As noted in the proposed 

regulatory requirements, the passenger 

must demonstrate their ability to 

accomplish all actions required for 

quick release of the SRS with no 

assistance, regardless of whether the 

individual will use the individual’s own 

SRS or will use an SRS the operator 

provides. 

The proposed requirement for the 

user of the SRS to demonstrate the 

ability to occupy, secure, and release the 

FAA-approved seat belts and, if 

installed, shoulder harnesses would 

ensure that, in an inflight emergency 

while using SRS at low altitude, the 

individual can quickly re-secure 

themself with the FAA-approved seat 

belt and, if installed, shoulder harness. 

It would also establish that the 

individual can accomplish all actions 

required for quick release of the SRS 

without assistance to egress the aircraft 

in case of an emergency. 

I. Individuals Not Permitted To Use SRS 

(§ 91.108(i)(1) Through (4)) 

During operations when SRS are in 

use, there might be instances when not 

all individuals are using an SRS, either 

by choice or because they do not meet 

the requirements of the proposed rule. 

This would include, but is not limited 

to, any passenger who is unable to 

demonstrate that the individual is able 

to occupy, secure, and release the FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, or release quickly the 

SRS with no assistance and with 

minimal difficulty. Passengers under the 

age of 15, individuals occupying a seat 

in the flightdeck, and passengers 

occupying or using an approved child 

restraint system are not permitted to use 

an SRS. 

1. Individuals Unable To Meet the 

Demonstration Requirements of the 

Enhanced Safety Briefing (§ 91.108(i)(1)) 

If an individual cannot demonstrate 

that they are able to occupy, secure, and 

release the FAA-approved seat belt and, 

if installed, shoulder harness, and able 

to release quickly the SRS with no 

assistance and with minimal difficulty, 

this proposed rule would prohibit the 

individual from occupying or using an 

SRS during the flight. The individual 

must remain secured in their FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness for the entire flight. 

2. Individuals Under the Age of 15 

(§ 91.108(i)(2)) 

The FAA is proposing that an 

individual may not use an SRS during 

operations unless the individual has 

reached their fifteenth birthday. In 

determining this proposal, the FAA 

referred to the ‘‘Exit Row Seating’’ final 

rule,53 which evaluated various criteria 

to determine individuals who are 

capable of performing certain functions 

during an emergency. As explained 

below, limiting the age to 15 or older for 

those who use an SRS helps maximize 

the chances of survival for the user 

should an emergency evacuation occur. 

As discussed in the ‘‘Exit Row 

Seating’’ final rule, many children do 

not have the skills or capabilities 

necessary to perform the required 

functions of an emergency evacuation 

from an aircraft and would likely 

require the assistance of an adult during 

an emergency.54 The same is true for 

children using SRS. It is likely a child 

would need assistance in releasing from 

the SRS in order to egress the aircraft 

safely and quickly during an emergency. 

Similarly, it is likely that some children, 

due to their age and/or size, would not 

have the cognitive or physical ability to 

safely release from an SRS during an 

emergency. 

The FAA has stated that it is difficult 

to establish a clear cut-off point between 

childhood and adolescence when 

individuals may be more capable of 

handling emergency situations.55

Notwithstanding, a number of existing 

laws, regulations, and practices point to 

the age of 15 as a turning point into 

adulthood. For example, in many states 

it is the age when driver’s licenses and 


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56 55 FR 8066. 

57 Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff Lever 

and Subsequent Ditching, Liberty Helicopters Inc., 

Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight, Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH, New York, New 

York, March 11, 2018. Aircraft Accident Report, 

December 10, 2019. Available at https://

www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/ 

Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

58See § 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder 

harnesses, and child restraint systems, § 135.128 

Use of safety belts and child restraint systems. 

work permits become available.56 After 

considering several options for an age 

requirement to use an SRS, the FAA 

determined that the reasoning in the 

‘‘Exit Row Seating’’ final rule applies in 

this proposed rule. Fifteen is an 

objective criterion that will enable 

operators to comply with clear SRS 

requirements. Moreover, most children 

at that age can accomplish the functions 

required to release from an SRS safely 

and quickly during an emergency. The 

FAA has determined that individuals 

who have reached this age are less likely 

to need assistance from an adult during 

an emergency. Consequently, the FAA 

proposes that passengers under the age 

of 15 are prohibited from using an SRS 

and must occupy either an approved 

seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness, or an 

approved child restraint system that 

complies with § 91.107(a)(3)(iii) or 

§ 135.128(a)(2). 

3. Individuals Seated in the Flightdeck 

(§ 91.108(i)(3)) 

This proposed rule would prohibit 

individuals using an SRS from sitting in 

the flightdeck. As discussed in section 

IV.F.3 of this preamble, this proposed 

prohibition is based on a review of past 

accidents and incidents where 

unsecured items, including those with 

straps and lanyards, have a history of 

interfering with flight and engine 

controls. In the Liberty Helicopters 

accident, a tether caught on and 

activated the floor-mounted engine fuel 

shutoff lever, resulting in the in-flight 

loss of engine power and subsequent 

ditching.57

As described above, airworthiness 

standards codified at 14 CFR parts 23, 

25, 27 and 29 require that flight and 

engine controls not be subject to 

inadvertent operation. These standards 

do not address circumstances when 

carry-on objects, tethers, or straps would 

inadvertently move a control. 

Consequently, crewmembers or 

passengers in the flightdeck should not 

be attached to or carry equipment that 

could snag on controls. 

4. Passengers Who Occupy or Use an 

Approved Child Restraint System 

(§ 91.108(i)(4)) 

The FAA proposes to prohibit anyone 

occupying or using a child restraint 

system from also using an SRS. Current 

regulations under 14 CFR parts 91, 121, 

125, and 135 allow a child, who by 

definition is any individual under 18 

years of age, to occupy or use an FAAapproved child restraint system, 

provided certain conditions exist, 

including that the child is accompanied 

by a parent, guardian, or attendant 

designated by the child’s parent or 

guardian to attend to the safety of the 

child during the flight.58 As a result, 

there may be circumstances where an 

individual occupying an approved child 

restraint system is 15 years old or older 

and is otherwise eligible to use an SRS. 

As explained in more detail below, an 

SRS may not be used by an individual 

occupying a child restraint system. 

The use of a child restraint system is 

incompatible with the use of an SRS. As 

described above, this proposed rule 

would require each SRS to consist of a 

body harness secured around the torso 

of the individual using the SRS and a 

lanyard that connects the body harness 

to an airframe attachment point inside 

the aircraft. The SRS would have a 

release mechanism that the individual 

can quickly operate with minimal 

difficulty and without impeding egress 

from the aircraft in an emergency. 

Additionally, the release mechanism 

cannot require the assistance of any 

other individual to release the SRS. It is 

illogical to permit a child who occupies 

a child restraint system, and who must 

be accompanied by a parent, guardian, 

or attendant tasked to attend to the 

safety of the child during the flight, to 

be permitted to also use an SRS. 

Therefore, this proposed rule would 

prohibit all individuals occupying or 

using a child restraint system from also 

using an SRS. The FAA notes that this 

proposed rule permits the use of an 

approved child restraint system on a 

flight where the doors are opened or 

removed as long as the child restraint 

system is properly secured to an 

approved seat or berth with a safety belt 

and, if installed, shoulder harness, and 

complies with § 91.107(a)(3)(iii) (for part 

91 operations) or § 135.128(a)(2) (for 

part 135 operations). 

J. Lap-Held Child (§ 91.108(j)(1) and (2)) 

The proposed rule would prohibit a 

child who has not reached their second 

birthday from being held by an adult 

during civil aircraft operations when the 

adult uses an SRS or during any 

operation in which the doors are opened 

or removed. Specifically, the proposed 

rule would prohibit a child from being 

held by an adult using an SRS during 

civil aircraft operations even when the 

aircraft doors are not opened or 

removed. The intent of using an SRS is 

to provide support to the user when 

they are out of their required safety belt 

and, if installed, shoulder harness. 

Unexpected turbulence can cause an 

airplane to suddenly jolt, possibly 

injuring passengers who are not 

restrained. If turbulence occurs when 

the SRS user is not secured by a safety 

belt, they would require the use of their 

hands to steady themselves or to hold 

onto an aircraft seat or structure to 

prevent themselves from falling, 

particularly if they are out of their seat. 

Holding a lap child would prevent the 

SRS user from being able to use their 

hands to steady themselves or to grasp 

onto something if necessary. Further, in 

the event of an emergency, time is 

critical. Using an SRS requires 

additional steps to release. Holding a 

lap child while trying to quickly release 

the SRS and the required safety belt 

and, if installed, shoulder harness, 

could cause the SRS user additional 

time to evacuate the aircraft. 

In addition, this rule would prohibit 

a lap-held child during operations 

where the aircraft doors are opened or 

removed. As currently permitted by 

§§ 91.107 and 135.128, a child who has 

not reached their second birthday may 

be held by an adult who occupies an 

approved seat or berth. However, it is 

contrary to this proposed rule, the intent 

of which is to mitigate risks to all 

occupants during operations conducted 

anytime an SRS is in use, to permit a 

child to remain unrestrained during all 

phases of flight, including during 

movement on the surface, takeoff, and 

landing, when the aircraft doors are 

opened or removed. During an operation 

with doors opened or removed, a lapheld child would be at high risk of 

falling out of the aircraft—an 

unacceptable risk this rule seeks to 

prevent. 

For the above reasons, the FAA 

proposes that lap-held children may not 

be held by anyone using an SRS, 

regardless of whether the doors are 

opened or removed, and they are not 

permitted on flights where the doors are 

opened or removed. 

Finally, to ensure clarity between the 

lap-held child permissions outlined 

under §§ 91.107 and 135.128 and the 

lap-held child restrictions in this 

proposed rule, the FAA proposes to add 

a cross-reference to § 91.108 in those 

sections. Adding this cross-reference 

will help ensure that proposed § 91.108 

is not overlooked when considering 

whether lap-held children are permitted 

on a flight. 


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59As explained previously, there may be 

circumstances where an individual occupying an 

approved child restraint system is 15 years old or 

older and is otherwise eligible to use an SRS. 

K. Excluded Operations (§ 91.108(k)(1) 

Through (3)) 

The FAA determined that this 

proposed rule should not apply to 

certain other regulations if the rule 

would otherwise conflict with the intent 

of those regulations. As a result, this 

proposed rule would not apply to 

operations conducted under part 105, 

Parachute Operations, nor would it 

apply to the persons described in 

§ 91.107(a)(3)(ii), which allows 

person(s) on board an aircraft for the 

purpose of engaging in sport 

parachuting to use the floor of the 

aircraft as a seat. 

Additionally, this proposed rule 

would not apply to rotorcraft externalload operations conducted under part 

133. Title 14 CFR 1.1 defines external 

load as a load that is carried, or extends, 

outside of the aircraft fuselage. Section 

133.11(a) states that no person subject to 

part 133 may conduct rotorcraft 

external-load operations within the 

United States without, or in violation of 

the terms of, a Rotorcraft External-Load 

Operator Certificate issued by the 

Administrator under § 133.17. 

This proposed rule also would not 

interfere with or contradict the 

requirements of § 91.105, Flight 

crewmembers at stations, or § 135.171, 

Shoulder harness installation at flight 

crewmember stations. As proposed, the 

regulation would allow an operator to 

conduct a flight with doors opened or 

removed under § 91.108(b)(1) even if 

there are flight crewmembers on board 

who are subject to the requirements of 

§§ 91.105 or 135.171 and to the extent 

that the flight crewmembers must 

unfasten their shoulder harnesses in 

accordance with those sections. 

Similarly, the FAA proposes that 

§ 91.108(b)(2) not apply to any flight 

crewmembers subject to §§ 91.105 or 

135.171 to the extent they need to 

unfasten their shoulder harnesses in 

accordance with those sections. 

Sections 91.105 and 135.171 allow a 

flight crewmember to unfasten or not 

use the installed shoulder harness if the 

crewmember cannot perform the 

required duties with the shoulder 

harness fastened. 

The proposed SRS rule could inhibit, 

or otherwise conflict with, the 

aforementioned operations; therefore, 

the FAA proposes the aforementioned 

exclusions under § 91.108. 

L. Definition (§ 91.108(l)) 

This proposed rule would define an 

SRS as a device that is not installed on 

the aircraft pursuant to an FAA 

approval used to secure an individual 

inside an aircraft when that person is 

not properly secured by an FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness or an approved child 

restraint system.59 An SRS consists of a 

harness secured around the torso of the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system and a lanyard that 

connects the harness to an approved 

airframe attachment point inside the 

aircraft. Examples of FAA-approved 

devices include (but are not limited to) 

restraints approved through a Type 

Certificate, Supplemental Type 

Certificate, or as an approved major 

alteration using FAA Form 337. 

M. Additional Comments Invited 

This proposed rule would apply to 

operations conducted under parts 91 

and 135 and does not include an option 

for waiving the proposed requirements 

of § 91.108 in accordance with § 91.905, 

List of rules subject to waivers. The FAA 

cannot envision a scenario in which 

operations conducted with doors 

opened or removed could occur safely 

without complying with the proposed 

requirements of § 91.108. The FAA 

seeks input, however, on its proposal 

that § 91.108 not be listed in the rules 

subject to waivers under § 91.905. 

V. Regulatory Notices and Analyses 

Federal agencies consider impacts of 

regulatory actions under a variety of 

executive orders and other 

requirements. First, Executive Order 

12866 and Executive Order 13563, as 

amended by Executive Order 14094 

(‘‘Modernizing Regulatory Review’’), 

direct that each federal agency shall 

propose or adopt a regulation only upon 

a reasoned determination that the 

benefits of the intended regulation 

justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354) 

requires agencies to analyze the 

economic impact of regulatory changes 

on small entities. Third, the Trade 

Agreements Act (Pub. L. 96–39) 

prohibits agencies from setting 

standards that create unnecessary 

obstacles to the foreign commerce of the 

United States. In developing U.S. 

standards, this Act requires agencies to 

consider international standards and, 

where appropriate, that they be the basis 

of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 

Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 

104–4) requires agencies to prepare a 

written assessment of the costs, benefits, 

and other effects of proposed or final 

rules that include a federal mandate 

likely to result in the expenditure by 

state, local, or tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector, of 

$100 million or more (adjusted annually 

for inflation) in any one year. The 

current threshold after adjustment for 

inflation is $177 million using the most 

current (2022) Implicit Price Deflator for 

the Gross Domestic Product. The FAA 

has provided a detailed Regulatory 

Impact Analysis (RIA) in the docket for 

this rulemaking. This portion of the 

preamble summarizes the FAA’s 

analysis of the economic impacts of this 

proposed rule. 

In conducting these analyses, the FAA 

has determined that this proposed rule: 

(1) has benefits that justify its costs. 

This rule is not a significant regulatory 

action, as defined in section 3(f) of 

Executive Order 12866. The proposed 

rule, if adopted, would not have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities, 

would not create unnecessary obstacles 

to international trade, and would not 

impose an unfunded mandate on state, 

local, or tribal governments, or on the 

private sector. 

A. Summary of the Regulatory 

Evaluation 

The FAA estimates that for safety 

benefits to equal or exceed the costs of 

the proposed rule, based on a 20-year 

analysis, two accidents of the same 

severity as the Liberty Helicopters 

accident would need to be mitigated. 

The estimated safety benefit in present 

value, from mitigating one part 91 and 

one part 135 helicopter accident (i.e., an 

accident in year 10 and an accident in 

year 20 of the analysis period), would 

range from $26.8 million to $40.2 

million, at a 7 percent discount rate, and 

$45.4 million to $68.0 million at a 3 

percent discount rate. 

The cost of the proposed rule to 

operators, pilots, and passengers comes 

from purchasing harnesses and lanyards 

that meet specific requirements as set 

forth in this rule, conducting a pre-flight 

safety briefing on the use of the SRS, 

and requiring passengers to demonstrate 

their ability to remove the SRS in the 

event of an emergency. The FAA would 

also incur costs for periodic surveillance 

of parts 91 and 135 SRS operations. The 

estimated present value cost to the FAA, 

over 20 years, is $1,240 at a 7 percent 

discount rate and $1,263 at a 3 percent 

discount rate. The estimated present 

value total cost to industry and the 

FAA, for these requirements, over 20 

years, is $22.3 million at a 7 percent 

discount rate and $31.7 million at a 3 

percent discount rate. Estimated safety 


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60Assumes a part 91 accident occurs in year 10 

and a part 135 accident occurs in year 20. 61Office of Management and Budget, OMB 

Circular A–4 (2003), guidance for the development 

of regulatory analysis. 

62A sample of harnesses provided for 

consideration of an SRS LOA, such as Yates 363 

and 338, have a maximum life span of 10 years. See 

Product manuals. available at http://yatesgear.com/ 

en/special-forces-full-body-spie-harness and http:// 

yatesgear.com/en/ars-heli-ops-harness. 

63Part 135—Operating Requirements: Commuter 

and on-Demand Operations and Rules Governing 

Persons on Board such Aircraft, Paperwork 

Reduction Act Supporting Statement, (OMB No. 

2120–0039): § at 8 (Apr. 9, 2019) (estimate of time 

and volume of operators and passenger briefings 

pursuant to § 135.117, Briefing of passengers before 

flight), available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/ 

do/DownloadDocument?objectID=86383102. 

64 Id. 

65This estimate is a combination of the time 

identified in the Emergency Order and the FAA’s 

assertion that a passenger will need to release the 

SRS in under a minute to be able to evacuate a 

helicopter in an emergency. 

benefits and costs are shown in the table 

below. 

TABLE 2—TOTAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OVER 20 YEARS

[Millions of USD] * 

Provisions Affected population 

Safety benefits 

Costs 

Safety benefits 

Costs 

Low High Low High 

7 Percent present value 3 Percent present value 

91.108—Use of supplemental restraint systems 60.Part 91 Operations ........

Part 135 Operations ......

$17.8 

9.0 

$26.7 

13.6 

$19.4 

2.9 

$26.0 

19.4 

$39.0 

29.0 

$27.5 

4.1 

Total .............................. ........................................ 26.8 40.2 22.3 45.4 68.0 31.7 

Annualized .................... ........................................ 2.5 3.8 2.1 3.0 4.6 2.1 

* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding. 

In 2018, in response to the Liberty 

Helicopters accident, the FAA issued an 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, which 

prohibited the use of supplemental 

passenger restraint systems (SPRS) that 

cannot be released quickly in an 

emergency in doors-off flight operations. 

The FAA also estimates the cost and 

benefit of the proposed rule using the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition as the 

baseline. The FAA estimates that the 

undiscounted cost of the rule, above the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, is 

$22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent 

present value, or $16.8 million at 3 

percent present value). When 

annualized, at either a 7 percent or 3 

percent discount rate, the cost is 

approximately $1.1 million. The costs 

come entirely from the demonstration 

by passengers of the ability to release 

the device. The FAA considers that a 

passenger demonstrating the ability to 

release themselves from the device adds 

to the efficacy of the rule above the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition. 

However, the FAA is unable to quantify 

the incremental safety benefits gained 

by the passenger demonstration. 

1. Who is potentially affected by this 

rule? 

This proposed rule would affect all 

flights with doors opened or removed 

and all operations with individuals on 

board who choose to use an SRS, except 

for operations conducted under part 

105, Parachute Operations, or 

conducted under part 133, Rotorcraft 

External-Load Operations, and public 

aircraft operations. The FAA identified 

the following, from Flight Standards’ 

Web-based Operations Safety System 

(June 2021), as the population that 

could be affected: 

TABLE 3—POTENTIAL AFFECTED OPERATORS

CFR Number of 

operators 

Number of 

rotorcraft 

Number of 

operators 

Number of 

aircraft 

Rotorcraft Fixed wing 

91 ..................................................................................................................... 405 1,051 716 1,894 

135 ................................................................................................................... 472 2,917 1,728 8,411 

However, based on the number of 

requests for SRS LOAs, the FAA 

narrowed the population to 26 part 91 

operators and 40 part 135 operators over 

the next 20 years. 

General Assumptions: 

• The present value discount rate of 

three and seven percent is used as 

required by the Office of Management 

and Budget.61

• Period of Analysis: 20 years to 

capture replacement of an SRS 

occurring every 10 years.62

• The estimated average number of 

passengers per flight is between 3 to 5 

passengers. The FAA used 4 passengers 

in the analysis. 

• Estimated time to create and update 

content for enhanced passenger safety 

briefing: 63 2 hours per operator. 

Assume updates occur every 10 years to 

align with the replacement cycle of 

harnesses and lanyards. 

• Estimated pilot time to complete 

enhanced safety briefing: 64 0.03 hours 

(2 minutes) 

• Estimated time for passenger 

competency demonstration: 65 0.02 

hours (1 minute) 

Baseline: There were no requirements 

for an SRS prior to 2018 when the FAA 

issued Emergency Order of Prohibition 

No. FAA–2018–0243. Since the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition is 

temporary, the baseline used in this 

analysis is pre-Emergency Order. 

However, the Emergency Order requires 

harnesses and lanyards that fulfill the 

same requirements required in the 


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66National Transportation Safety Board. (March 

11, 2018) Inadvertent Activation of the Fuel Shutoff 

Lever and Subsequent Ditching Liberty Helicopters 

Inc., Operating a FlyNYON Doors-Off Flight Airbus 

Helicopters AS350 B2, N350LH (Report No. NTSB/ 

AAR–19/04 or PB2020–100100). Retrieved from 

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident

Reports/Reports/AAR1904.pdf. 

67 Departmental Guidance on Valuation of a 

Statistical Life in Economic Analysis, Issued Date: 

3/23/2021 https://www.transportation.gov/officepolicy/transportation-policy/revised-departmentalguidance-on-valuation-of-a-statistical-life-ineconomic-analysis. 68Economic Values for FAA Investment and 

Regulatory Decisions, A Guide: 2021 Update, 

Section 5, Table 5–10: General Aviation Restoration 

Costs ($2018). These numbers are adjusted to reflect 

2020 dollars. https://www.faa.gov/regulations_

policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost. 

69 Id. at Appendix A at 61 (stating, High 

effectiveness—The JIMDAT-assigned values in 

which enhancements that are judged to have a 

‘‘low’’ probability of preventing an accident receive 

a numerical value ranging from 0.1 to 0.4, reflecting 

a one in ten chance of preventing the accident to 

a 40% chance. Similarly, ‘‘medium’’ may receive 

numerical ratings of 0.4 to 0.6 and ‘‘high’’ may 

receive up to 0.95). 

proposed rule; therefore, operators 

already incur the cost of the harness and 

lanyard. Operators would primarily 

incur the additional cost of the 

passenger demonstration briefing under 

the proposed rule. This is analyzed as 

a second baseline. The extension of the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition was 

considered as an alternative, and cost 

and benefits are estimated in the 

alternative section below. 

2. Benefits of This Rule 

Benefits of this rule include 

preventing future accidents similar to 

the Liberty Helicopters accident. The 

NTSB final safety report identified the 

probable cause of this accident as 

Liberty Helicopters’ use of an SRS 

system. The SRS caught on and 

activated the engine fuel shutoff lever, 

located in the flightdeck, and resulted in 

the loss of engine power and the 

subsequent ditching. That same SRS, 

worn by passengers on that flight, also 

contributed to the severity of the 

accident by hindering the passengers’ 

quick egress from the aircraft. This 

proposed rule would prohibit use of an 

SRS in the flightdeck, address the 

inadvertent activation of the fuel shutoff 

lever, and propose SRS requirements 

that would reduce the likelihood of 

passengers being unable to remove an 

SRS when needed in an emergency. 

The Liberty Helicopters accident 

resulted in five fatalities, one minor 

injury, and a substantially damaged 

aircraft. The analysis assumes that 

another accident of similar magnitude 

would occur in the 20-year time 

horizon. While the SRS operation 

requirements, passenger briefing, and 

passenger demonstration set forth in the 

proposed rule would have lessened the 

severity of the accident, the NTSB 

determined the probable cause of the 

accident to be the inadvertent activation 

of the floor-mounted engine fuel shutoff 

lever by the passenger harness/tether 

system.66 Prohibiting the use of an SRS 

in the flightdeck would help mitigate 

the risk factor that initiated the 

accident. The benefits include avoided 

casualties and aircraft damage. 

Multiplying the five casualties by a 

value of statistical life (VSL) of $11.6 

million yields a total of $58.0 million as 

the social cost of these fatalities.67 The 

pilot also sustained minor injuries at an 

avoided minor injury rate of $34,800, 

and the helicopter, an Airbus AS350 B2, 

suffered substantial damage valued at 

$210,243.68 Adding the value of avoided 

casualties, including the pilot’s injuries, 

to aircraft damage gives a total potential 

loss of $58.2 million that enhanced 

safety measures could avert. 

The FAA Office of Accident 

Investigation and Prevention evaluated 

how effective the proposed 

requirements would be at addressing the 

NTSB urgent safety recommendation 

and any other factors that may have 

contributed to the Liberty Helicopters 

accident, previously described in 

section III. of this proposed rule. Based 

on that assessment, the FAA used a 

range for the effectiveness rate of 0.6 to 

0.9.69 Multiplying the effectiveness rates 

by the estimated potential loss of $58.2 

million, mentioned above, yields an 

estimated range of $34.9 to $52.4 

million for one averted accident. 

Assuming an accident occurs every 10 

years over a 20-year time horizon (i.e., 

an accident in year 10 and year 20 of the 

analysis period), the present value of 

benefits would range from $26.8 million 

to $40.2 million, at a 7 percent discount 

rate, and $45.4 million to $68.0 million 

at 3 percent discount rate. 

3. Costs Relative to Pre-Emergency 

Order of Prohibition 

This proposed rule would prohibit 

flight operations with an SRS unless the 

SRS meets specific requirements. 

Although these requirements are being 

proposed under part 91, they would 

affect any operation with an SRS except 

for operations conducted under part 

105, parachute operations, and 

operations conducted under part 133, 

Rotorcraft External-Load Operations. 

This subsection examines the costs 

relative to the regulatory environment 

before the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition, when no rules specifically 

addressed civil aircraft operations 

conducted with the use of SRS. 

This proposed rule would require the 

SRS (which would consist of a harness 

and lanyard, at a minimum) to have an 

accessible front or side release 

mechanism that can be quickly operated 

with minimal difficulty during an 

emergency. The rule would require the 

lanyard be connected to an aircraft 

attaching point or points that are not in 

the flightdeck, with a rated strength 

equal to or greater than the weight of the 

occupant (or the combined weight if 

there is more than one occupant 

attached to an attachment point), and 

ensures the torso of the person using the 

SRS remains inside the aircraft at all 

times. Additionally, for operations with 

doors opened or removed, each person 

would need to occupy an approved seat 

or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness, properly 

secured about the individual during all 

phases of flight; or occupy an approved 

seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness, properly 

secured about the individual during 

movement on the surface, takeoff, and 

landing, in accordance with § 91.107 

and during other phases of flight, the 

individual would use an SRS. 

This proposed rule would also require 

operators to provide passengers with an 

enhanced safety briefing that includes a 

passenger’s satisfactory demonstration 

of competency to release quickly the 

SRS with no assistance. The rule also 

proposes certain requirements regarding 

persons who may seek to participate in 

such flights. Passengers unable to 

release quickly from an SRS, passengers 

under 15 years of age, individuals 

seated in the flightdeck, and passengers 

occupying an approved child restraint 

system would be prohibited from using 

the SRS. Furthermore, children may not 

be held in an adult’s lap if the adult uses 

an SRS or the aircraft doors are opened 

or removed. The FAA intends these 

proposed requirements to ensure the 

safety of all aircraft occupants on such 

flights. 

The cost of the proposed rule to 

operators, passengers, and pilots would 

arise out of purchasing harnesses and 

lanyards that meet specific requirements 

as set forth in this rule, a pre-flight 

safety briefing on the use of the SRS, 

and passengers demonstrating their 

ability to remove the SRS in the event 

of an emergency. The cost to the FAA 

comes from approving the addition of 

SRS to part 135 passenger safety briefing 

cards and for periodic surveillance of 

parts 91 and 135 SRS operations. The 

estimated cost of these requirements is 

$22.3 million at 7 percent present value 


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and $31.6 million at 3 percent present 

value, as shown in the table below. 

TABLE 4—PROPOSED RULE TOTAL COST OVER 20 YEARS * 

Requirements Part 91 Part 135 Total 

Harness + Replacement .............................................................................................................. $172,608 $623,616 $796,224 

Lanyard + Replacement .............................................................................................................. 43,152 155,904 199,056 

Create Briefing ............................................................................................................................. 14,572 19,774 34,346 

Passenger Briefing (Pilot + Passenger) ...................................................................................... 16,840,356 2,139,920 18,980,276 

Passenger Demonstration (Pilot + Passenger) ........................................................................... 20,342,887 2,584,989 22,927,876 

FAA costs .................................................................................................................................... 583 898 1,481 

Total Cost .................................................................................................................................... 37,414,159 5,525,101 42,939,259 

Total Cost at 7 Percent Present Value ....................................................................................... 19,361,893 2,933,645 22,295,537 

Total Cost at 3 Percent Present Value ....................................................................................... 27,541,440 4,109,635 31,651,075 

* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding. 

4. Costs Relative to Post-Emergency 

Order of Prohibition 

After the FAA published the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, 

operators were required to comply with 

many of the requirements of this 

proposed rule. This subsection 

measures the costs which are above and 

beyond the costs of complying with the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition. 

There are three main differences 

between this rule and the Emergency 

Order of Prohibition. First, the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition does 

not prohibit passengers using an SRS 

from being seated in the flightdeck, 

while the proposed rule would prohibit 

this. The FAA estimates minimal cost 

from this proposed prohibition. 

Second, the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition applies only to operations 

conducted for compensation or hire. 

The proposed rule would extend this to 

all civil operations. The FAA does not 

have precise data on operations using an 

SRS that are not for compensation or 

hire, and so assumes there would be a 

negligible number. 

Finally, the Emergency Order of 

Prohibition does not require a passenger 

demonstration of the passenger’s ability 

to release the SRS. The FAA estimates 

the undiscounted costs, beyond the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, to be 

$22.9 million ($11.8 million at 7 percent 

present value, or $16.8 million at 3 

percent present value). At either 

discount rate, the annualized cost is 

approximately $1.1 million. These costs 

come entirely from the value of 

passenger and pilot time spent on the 

demonstration. 

5. Alternatives Considered 

The FAA considered proposing the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition as the 

proposed rule but applying it to all civil 

operations. The Emergency Order of 

Prohibition prohibits the use of an SRS 

that cannot be released quickly in an 

emergency during flight operations for 

compensation or hire with the doors 

opened or removed. The Emergency 

Order of Prohibition requires: a 

supplemental harness that meets 

specific safety requirements, an 

application for an LOA to include a link 

to a video (roughly 8 seconds long) 

demonstrating the user’s ability to 

release themselves from the 

supplemental harness without 

assistance, a preflight briefing on the 

release of the SRS, and FAA review and 

approval of the application. The table 

below summarizes the costs of each of 

these requirements. 

TABLE 5—EMERGENCY ORDER OF PROHIBITION TOTAL COST OVER 20 YEARS * 

Requirements Part 91 Part 135 Total 

Cost of Harness + Application + Video + Safety Briefing ................................................................. $4,747,142 $1,225,615 $5,972,757 

FAA Cost ........................................................................................................................................... 2,399 4,107 6,506 

Total Cost .......................................................................................................................................... 4,749,541 1,229,722 5,979,263 

Total Cost at 7 Percent Present Value ............................................................................................. 4,394,485 986,054 5,380,539 

* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding. 

The FAA considered proposing the 

above requirements in this proposed 

rule, but after careful review of the 

NTSB final accident report and the 

information gathered through the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition, the 

FAA determined that it could tailor the 

requirements to increase the likelihood 

that passengers would be able to quickly 

release the supplemental restraint in the 

event of an emergency. For example, the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition does 

not address the use of an SRS in the 

flightdeck. Additionally, the proposed 

rule would require operators to conduct 

an enhanced safety briefing and 

passengers to complete a demonstration. 

Passengers in the Liberty Helicopters 

accident received a briefing on how to 

release their supplemental restraints but 

were unable to release them during the 

accident. Requiring passengers to 

demonstrate successfully their ability to 

release the SRS would ensure 

passengers not only understand how to 

release themselves from the SRS during 

an emergency but also increase the 

likelihood that they would be able to 

release themselves from the SRS during 

an emergency. The proposed passenger 

demonstration requirement would be 

necessary to achieve the effectiveness 

estimate of 0.6 to 0.9 as discussed in the 

main analysis of the proposed rule. 

However, uncertainty exists regarding 

the incremental reduction in the 

effectiveness of a regulatory alternative 

that would not require passengers to 

demonstrate proficiency in using the 

SRS. The FAA requests comments and 

data to help quantify the benefits of this 

alternative relative to the proposed rule. 

B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) 

of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354), as amended by 

the Small Business Regulatory 

Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. 


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70United States Small Business Administration, 

Table of Size Standards (2019), available at https:// 

www.sba.gov/document/support--table-sizestandards. 

71United States Census Bureau, Transportation 

and Warehousing: Geographic Area Series: 

Summary Statistics for the U.S., States, Metro 

Areas, Counties, and Places (2012), available at 

https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/

searchresults.xhtml?refresh=t. 

L. 104–121) and the Small Business Jobs 

Act of 2010 (Pub. L. 111–240), requires 

federal agencies to consider the effects 

of the regulatory action on small 

business and other small entities and to 

minimize any significant economic 

impact. The term ‘‘small entities’’ 

comprises small businesses and not-forprofit organizations that are 

independently owned and operated and 

are not dominant in their fields, and 

governmental jurisdictions with 

populations of less than 50,000. 

The FAA is publishing this Initial 

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 

to aid the public in commenting on the 

potential impacts to small entities from 

this proposal. The FAA invites 

interested parties to submit data and 

information regarding the potential 

economic impact that would result from 

the proposal. The FAA will consider 

comments when making a 

determination or when completing a 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Assessment. 

An IRFA must contain the following: 

(1) A description of the reasons why 

the action by the agency is being 

considered; 

(2) A succinct statement of the 

objective of, and legal basis for, the 

proposed rule; 

(3) A description of and, where 

feasible, an estimate of the number of 

small entities to which the proposed 

rule will apply; 

(4) A description of the projected 

reporting, recordkeeping, and other 

compliance requirements of the 

proposed rule, including an estimate of 

the classes of small entities that will be 

subject to the requirement and the type 

of professional skills necessary for 

preparation of the report or record; 

(5) An identification, to the extent 

practicable, of all relevant federal rules 

that may duplicate, overlap, or conflict 

with the proposed rule; and 

(6) A description of any significant 

alternatives to the proposed rule that 

accomplish the stated objectives of 

applicable statutes and that minimize 

any significant economic impact of the 

proposed rule on small entities. 

1. Reasons the Action Is Being 

Considered 

This proposed rule addresses safety 

issues that contributed to the Liberty 

Helicopters accident to ensure the safety 

of similar operations. The operatorprovided harness/tether system the 

passengers used on that flight, while 

intended as a safety measure when the 

aircraft was in flight, hindered the 

passengers’ egress from the aircraft. This 

proposed rule would address the safety 

issue by proposing specific 

requirements for individuals using an 

SRS or participating in flights with 

doors opened or removed. 

2. Objectives of the Proposed Rule 

For flights with doors opened or 

removed, each person would be 

required to either occupy an approved 

seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness, properly 

secured about the individual during all 

phases of flight; or occupy an approved 

seat or berth with a safety belt and, if 

installed, shoulder harness, properly 

secured about the individual during 

movement on the surface, takeoff, and 

landing, and during other phases of 

flight, the individual uses an SRS. 

For flights using an SRS, this 

proposed rule would require the harness 

and lanyard, at a minimum, to have an 

accessible front or side release 

mechanism that can be operated quickly 

with minimal difficulty during an 

emergency. As proposed, the lanyard 

must be connected to an aircraft 

attaching point or points, not in the 

flightdeck, with a rated strength equal to 

or greater than the weight of the 

occupant (or the combined weight if 

there is more than one occupant 

attached to an attachment point). This 

proposed rule would require the lanyard 

to ensure the torso of the person using 

the SRS remains inside the aircraft. 

Additionally, operators would be 

required to provide passengers with an 

enhanced safety briefing, and 

passengers would demonstrate the 

capability to release quickly the SRS 

with no assistance. Passengers under 15 

years of age, individuals seated in the 

flightdeck, passengers occupying an 

approved child restraint system, or 

passengers unable to release quickly 

from the SRS would be prohibited from 

using the SRS. 

3. All Federal Rules That May 

Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict 

This proposed rule does not 

duplicate, overlap, or conflict with any 

other rule. 

4. Description and Estimate of the 

Number of Small Entities 

This proposed rule would affect 

flights with doors opened or removed 

and all operations with individuals on 

board who choose to use an SRS. A 

search of the Web Based Operations 

Safety System (WebOPSS) database, as 

of June 2021, indicates that the rule 

could affect 1,121 part 91 operators and 

2,200 part 135 operators. These flights 

include sightseeing, motion picture and 

television filming, electronic news 

gathering, power line inspection, game 

management, and fire suppression, for 

example. The Small Business 

Administration (SBA) defines charter 

nonscheduled passenger air transport 

(NAICS 481211) with less than 1,500 

employees or scenic and sightseeing 

transportation (NAICS 487990) with less 

than $8.0 million in revenue as small 

businesses.70 Census data indicates that 

revenue for the scenic and sightseeing 

transportation industry (NAICS 4879), 

which includes airplane and helicopter 

operations, was roughly $502.5 million 

for 220 establishments, and for 

nonscheduled chartered passenger air 

transportation (NAICS 481211), there 

are 28,261 employees for 1,604 firms.71

Based on census data and the SBA 

definition of a small business, a 

substantial number of operators affected 

by this proposed rule would be 

considered small businesses. 

5. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, 

and Other Compliance Requirements 

The cost of the proposed rule would 

include purchasing harnesses and 

lanyards that meet specific requirements 

as set forth in this rule, a preflight safety 

briefing on the use of the SRS, and 

passengers’ satisfactory demonstration 

of their ability to remove the SRS in the 

event of an emergency. The estimated 

cost for these requirements per year for 

a part 91 operator is $71,949 and $6,905 

for a part 135 operator, as shown in the 

table below. 

TABLE 6—ESTIMATED COST PER OPERATOR * 

Provisions Part 91 72 Part 135 73

Harness + Replacement .......................................................................................................................................... $6,639 $15,590 


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72Total cost per requirement is divided by 26 part 

91 operators. 

73Total cost per requirement is divided by 40 part 

135 operators. 

74An A049 is a Letter of Authorization for 

Commercial Air Tour Operations Authorization and 

Drug and Alcohol Testing Program Registration. 

This allows a Part 91 operator to operate 

commercially and allows the FAA to estimate the 

affected population. 

TABLE 6—ESTIMATED COST PER OPERATOR *—Continued 

Provisions Part 91 72 Part 135 73

Lanyard + Replacement .......................................................................................................................................... 1,660 3,898 

Create + Update Briefing ......................................................................................................................................... 560 494 

Passenger Briefing (Pilot + Passenger) .................................................................................................................. 647,706 53,498 

Passenger Demonstration (Pilot + Passenger) ....................................................................................................... 782,419 64,625 

Total Over 20 Years ................................................................................................................................................ 1,438,984 138,105 

Estimated Yearly Cost Per Operator ....................................................................................................................... 71,949 6,905 

* Table values have been rounded. Totals may not add due to rounding. 

6. Significant Alternatives Considered 

The FAA considered proposing to 

codify the requirements of the 

Emergency Order of Prohibition applied 

to all civil operations, but determined to 

propose adding the requirement for 

operators to brief passengers on the SRS 

and verify that passengers could release 

the SRS in an emergency. 

The Emergency Order currently 

prohibits the use of an SRS during 

flights with doors opened or removed 

unless it complies with the process 

referenced in FAA Order 8900.4. FAA 

Order 8900.4 requires harnesses and 

lanyards that fulfill the same 

requirements this proposed rule would 

require; therefore, operators already 

incur the cost of the harness and 

lanyard. Under this proposed rule, 

operators would primarily incur the 

additional cost of the enhanced safety 

briefing. However, the majority of the 

cost comes from the pilot safety briefing 

and the passenger demonstration and is 

directly tied to the passenger count. 

Based on the foregoing, this proposed 

rule would not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. The FAA 

solicits comments regarding this 

proposed determination. 

C. International Trade Impact 

Assessment 

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 

(Pub. L. 96–39), as amended by the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Pub. 

L. 103–465), prohibits federal agencies 

from establishing standards or engaging 

in related activities that create 

unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 

commerce of the United States. 

Pursuant to these Acts, the 

establishment of standards is not 

considered an unnecessary obstacle to 

the foreign commerce of the United 

States, so long as the standard has a 

legitimate domestic objective, such as 

the protection of safety, and does not 

operate in a manner that excludes 

imports that meet this objective. The 

statute also requires consideration of 

international standards and, where 

appropriate, that they be the basis for 

U.S. standards. The FAA has assessed 

the potential effect of this proposed rule 

and determined that it would have only 

a domestic impact and, therefore, no 

effect on international trade. 

D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment 

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 

of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531–1538) governs 

the issuance of federal regulations that 

require unfunded mandates. An 

unfunded mandate is a regulation that 

requires a state, local, or tribal 

government or the private sector to 

incur direct costs without the federal 

government having first provided the 

funds to pay those costs. The FAA 

determined that the proposed rule will 

not result in the expenditure of $177 

million or more by state, local, or tribal 

governments, in the aggregate, or the 

private sector, in any one year. 

Title II of the Unfunded Mandates 

Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4) 

requires each Federal agency to prepare 

a written statement assessing the effects 

of any Federal mandate in a proposed or 

final agency rule that may result in an 

expenditure of $100 million or more (in 

1995 dollars) in any one year by state, 

local, and tribal governments, in the 

aggregate, or by the private sector; such 

a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant 

regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently 

uses an inflation-adjusted value of 

$177.0 million in lieu of $100 million. 

This proposed rule would not contain 

such a mandate. Therefore, the 

requirements of Title II of the Act do not 

apply. 

E. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires the FAA to 

consider the impact of paperwork and 

other information collection burdens 

imposed on the public. According to the 

1995 amendments to the Paperwork 

Reduction Act (5 CFR 1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), 

an agency may not collect or sponsor 

the collection of information, nor may it 

impose an information collection 

requirement, unless it displays a 

currently valid Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) control number. As 

required by the Paperwork Reduction 

Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)), the 

FAA has submitted a new information 

collection to OMB for its review. 

• Summary: The FAA is proposing to 

require operators conducting operations 

using SRS, including during operations 

with doors opened or removed, to 

present updated safety information to 

passengers. 

• Use: Part 91 and 135 operators 

would create and brief an enhanced 

passenger safety briefing. 

• Respondents: As of June 2021, the 

FAA estimates that 26 part 91 operators 

(based on the number of approved Letter 

of Authorization holders and the 

A049 74 population) and 40 part 135 

operators would choose to offer flights 

with use of an SRS over the next 20 

years. 

• Frequency: Operators who choose 

to offer flights using an SRS would 

initially develop and periodically 

update an enhanced passenger safety 

briefing pertaining to the SRS. The FAA 

assumes updates would occur every ten 

years, based on a typical SRS 

replacement period. 

• Annual Burden Estimated: The total 

burden hours are calculated by 

multiplying the number of enhanced 

passenger safety briefings and 

subsequent updates by 2 hours per 

briefing. As shown in the table below, 

this sums to 90 hours for part 91 

operators and 134 hours for part 135 

operators over 3 years. The FAA is 

updating existing Information 

Collection Request (ICR) 2120–0005 

(General Operating and Flight Rules— 

FAR 91 and FAR 107). 


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TABLE 7—INFORMATION COLLECTION BURDENS

Year 

Number of operators Time to develop or 

update briefing 

(hours per briefing) 

Total hour burden 

Part 91 Part 135 Part 91 Part 135 

1 ........................................................................................... 21 31 2 42 62 

2 ........................................................................................... 0 0 2 0 0 

3 ........................................................................................... 0 1 2 0 2 

Total .............................................................................. .................... .................... ........................................ 42 64 

Average Over 3 Years .................................................. .................... .................... ........................................ 14 21 

For part 91 operators, the FAA 

assumes that a pilot, with an hourly 

wage of $75.90, would be the person 

developing and updating the content of 

the briefing. At $75.90 the total cost 

burden is $3,188 ($2,602 at 7 percent 

present value) over a 3-year period. For 

part 135 operators, the Director of 

Operations, at an hourly wage of $68.66, 

could be the person responsible for 

developing the briefing. Total cost 

burden for part 135 operators over a 3- 

year period is $4,394 ($3,578 at 7 

percent present value) for developing 

the content of the briefing. 

Pilots would also brief passengers on 

the content of the enhanced passenger 

briefing prior to each flight. The 

estimated number of flights per year is 

multiplied by 2 minutes per briefing for 

parts 91 and 135 annual burden hours 

to brief passengers. Total burden hours, 

over 3 years, as shown in the table 

below, sums to 8,177 hours for part 91 

operators and 962 hours for part 135 

operators. 

TABLE 8—TOTAL HOUR BURDEN FOR ENHANCED SAFETY BRIEFING

Year 

Number of flights Time to present the 

enhanced safety 

briefing 

(hours per briefing) 

Total hour burden 

Part 91 Part 135 Part 91 Part 135 

1 ........................................................................................... 89,935 10,475 0.03 2,698 314 

2 ........................................................................................... 90,845 10,684 0.03 2,725 321 

3 ........................................................................................... 91,780 10,897 0.03 2,753 327 

Total .............................................................................. .................... .................... ........................................ 8,177 962 

Average Over 3 Years .................................................. .................... .................... ........................................ 2,726 321 

A pilot would be presenting the 

briefing at an hourly wage of $75.90. At 

$75.90 the total cost burden over a 3- 

year period, for part 91 operators, is 

$620,598 ($506,593 at 7 percent present 

value) and $72,989 ($59,581 at 7 percent 

present value) for part 135 operators. 

The agency is soliciting comments 

to— 

(1) Evaluate whether the proposed 

information requirement is necessary for 

the proper performance of the functions 

of the agency, including whether the 

information will have practical utility; 

(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the 

agency’s estimate of the burden; 

(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and 

clarity of the information to be 

collected; and 

(4) Minimize the burden of collecting 

information on those who are to 

respond, including by using appropriate 

automated, electronic, mechanical, or 

other technological collection 

techniques or other forms of information 

technology. 

Individuals and organizations may 

send comments on the information 

collection requirement to the address 

listed in the ADDRESSES section at the 

beginning of this preamble by January 

22, 2024. Comments also should be 

submitted to the Office of Management 

and Budget, Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Desk 

Officer for FAA, New Executive Office 

Building, Room 10202, 725 17th Street 

NW, Washington, DC 20053. 

F. International Compatibility and 

Cooperation 

In keeping with U.S. obligations 

under the Convention on International 

Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to 

conform to International Civil Aviation 

Organization Standards and 

Recommended Practices to the 

maximum extent practicable. The FAA 

has reviewed the ICAO Standards and 

Recommended Practices and has not 

identified any conflicts with these 

proposed regulations. 

G. Environmental Analysis 

FAA Order 1050.1F identifies FAA 

actions that are categorically excluded 

from preparation of an environmental 

assessment or environmental impact 

statement under the National 

Environmental Policy Act in the 

absence of extraordinary circumstances. 

The FAA has determined this 

rulemaking action qualifies for the 

categorical exclusion identified in 

paragraph 5–6.6f for regulations and 

involves no extraordinary 

circumstances. 

This rulemaking action provides a 

framework for civil aircraft operations 

conducted with SRS, including during 

operations with doors opened or 

removed. It does not affect the 

frequency of aircraft operations in the 

airspace of the United States. The FAA 

has reviewed the implementation of the 

rulemaking action and determined it is 

categorically excluded from further 

environmental review. Possible 

extraordinary circumstances that would 

preclude the use of a categorical 

exclusion have been examined, and the 

FAA has determined that no such 

circumstances exist. After careful and 

thorough consideration of the 

rulemaking action, the FAA finds that it 

does not require preparation of an 

Environmental Assessment or 

Environmental Impact Statement in 

accordance with the requirements of 

NEPA, Council on Environmental 

Quality (CEQ) regulations, and FAA 

Order 1050.1F. 


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VI. Executive Order Determinations 

A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism 

The FAA has analyzed this proposed 

rule under the principles and criteria of 

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. The 

agency has determined that this action 

would not have a substantial direct 

effect on the states, or the relationship 

between the federal government and the 

states, or on the distribution of power 

and responsibilities among the various 

levels of government, and, therefore, 

would not have federalism implications. 

B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations 

That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use 

The FAA analyzed this proposed rule 

under Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations that 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use. The agency has 

determined that it would not be a 

‘‘significant energy action’’ under the 

executive order and would not be likely 

to have a significant adverse effect on 

the supply, distribution, or use of 

energy. 

C. Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation 

Executive Order 13609, Promoting 

International Regulatory Cooperation, 

promotes international regulatory 

cooperation to meet shared challenges 

involving health, safety, labor, security, 

environmental, and other issues and to 

reduce, eliminate, or prevent 

unnecessary differences in regulatory 

requirements. The FAA has analyzed 

this action under the policies and 

agency responsibilities of Executive 

Order 13609 and has determined that 

this action would have no effect on 

international regulatory cooperation. 

VII. Additional Information 

A. Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The agency also invites 

comments relating to the economic, 

environmental, energy, or federalism 

impacts that might result from adopting 

the proposals in this document. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the proposal, explain 

the reason for any recommended 

change, and include supporting data. To 

ensure the docket does not contain 

duplicate comments, commenters 

should submit only one time if 

comments are filed electronically, or 

commenters should send only one copy 

of written comments if comments are 

filed in writing. 

The FAA will file in the docket all 

comments it receives, as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

this proposed rulemaking. Before acting 

on this proposal, the FAA will consider 

all comments it receives on or before the 

closing date for comments. The FAA 

will consider comments filed after the 

comment period has closed if it is 

possible to do so without incurring 

expense or delay. The agency may 

change this proposal in light of the 

comments it receives. 

Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

553(c), DOT solicits comments from the 

public to better inform its rulemaking 

process. DOT posts these comments, 

without edit, including any personal 

information the commenter provides, to 

https://www.regulations.gov, as 

described in the system of records 

notice (DOT/ALL–14 FDMS), which can 

be reviewed at https://www.dot.gov/ 

privacy. 

Confidential Business Information: 

Confidential Business Information (CBI) 

is commercial or financial information 

that is both customarily and actually 

treated as private by its owner. Under 

the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 

(5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from 

public disclosure. If your comments 

responsive to this NPRM contain 

commercial or financial information 

that is customarily treated as private, 

that you actually treat as private, and 

that is relevant or responsive to this 

NPRM, it is important that you clearly 

designate the submitted comments as 

CBI. Please mark each page of your 

submission containing CBI as 

‘‘PROPIN.’’ The FAA will treat such 

marked submissions as confidential 

under the FOIA, and they will not be 

placed in the public docket of this 

NPRM. Submissions containing CBI 

should be sent to the person in the FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 

this document. Any commentary that 

the FAA receives that is not specifically 

designated as CBI will be placed in the 

public docket for this rulemaking. 

B. Electronic Access and Filing 

A copy of the notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM), all comments 

received, any final rule, and all 

background material may be viewed 

online at https://www.regulations.gov 

using the docket number listed above. A 

copy of this rule will be placed in the 

docket. Electronic retrieval help and 

guidelines are available on the website. 

It is available 24 hours each day, 365 

days each year. An electronic copy of 

this document may also be downloaded 

from the Office of the Federal Register’s 

website at https://www.federalregister

.gov and the Government Publishing 

Office’s website at https://

www.govinfo.gov. A copy may also be 

found at the FAA’s Regulations and 

Policies website at https://www.faa.gov/ 

regulations_policies. 

Copies may also be obtained by 

sending a request to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, Office of 

Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence 

Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or 

by calling (202) 267–9677. Commenters 

must identify the docket or notice 

number of this rulemaking. 

All documents the FAA considered in 

developing this proposed rule, 

including economic analyses and 

technical reports, may be accessed in 

the electronic docket for this 

rulemaking. 

List of Subjects 

14 CFR Part 91 

Air carrier, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation 

safety, Charter flights, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements. 

14 CFR Part 135 

Air taxis, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation 

safety, Reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements. 

14 CFR Part 136 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, National parks, Recreation and 

recreation areas, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements. 

The Proposed Amendment 

In consideration of the foregoing, the 

Federal Aviation Administration 

proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, 

Code of Federal Regulations as follows: 

PART 91—GENERAL OPERATING AND 

FLIGHT RULES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 91 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40101, 

40103, 40105, 40113, 40120, 44101, 44111, 

44701, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44712, 44715, 

44716, 44717, 44722, 46306, 46315, 46316, 

46504, 46506–46507, 47122, 47508, 47528– 

47531, 47534, Pub. L. 114–190, 130 Stat. 615 

(49 U.S.C. 44703 note); articles 12 and 29 of 

the Convention on International Civil 

Aviation (61 Stat. 1180), (126 Stat. 11). 

■ 2. Amend § 91.107 by revising 

paragraph (a)(3)(i) to read as follows: 

§ 91.107 Use of safety belts, shoulder 

harnesses, and child restraint systems. 

(a) * * * 

(3) * * * 

(i) Be held by an adult, except as 

outlined in § 91.108(j), who is 

occupying an approved seat or berth, 

provided that the person being held has 


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not reached his or her second birthday 

and does not occupy or use any 

restraining device; 

* * * * * 

■ 3. Add § 91.108 to read as follows: 

§ 91.108 Use of supplemental restraint 

systems. 

(a) Use of supplemental restraint 

systems. Except as provided in this 

section, no person may conduct an 

operation in a registered civil aircraft in 

which any individual on board is 

secured with a supplemental restraint 

system. 

(b) Doors opened or removed flight 

operations. Except as provided under 

paragraph (k) of this section: 

(1) No person may operate a registered 

civil aircraft with the doors opened or 

removed unless— 

(i) Each individual on board occupies 

an approved seat or berth with a safety 

belt and, if installed, shoulder harness, 

properly secured about the individual or 

an approved child restraint system 

properly secured to an approved seat or 

berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness in accordance with 

§ 91.107(a)(3)(iii) or § 135.128(a)(2) of 

this chapter, during all phases of flight; 

or 

(ii) Each individual on board— 

(A) Occupies an approved seat or 

berth with a safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, properly secured 

about the individual during movement 

on the surface, takeoff, and landing; and 

(B) Is secured during the remainder of 

the flight using a supplemental restraint 

system in accordance with, and that 

meets the requirements of, this section. 

(2) Prior to releasing an FAAapproved safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness during an operation 

with the doors opened or removed, an 

individual must be properly secured by 

a supplemental restraint system that is 

connected to an airframe attachment 

point. An individual cannot release 

their safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness until the pilot in 

command authorizes them to do so. 

(c) Supplemental restraint system 

design requirements. Each supplemental 

restraint system must: 

(1) Have a harness that secures around 

the torso of the individual using the 

supplemental restraint system; 

(2) Have a lanyard that connects the 

harness to an airframe attachment point 

or points inside the aircraft and that 

ensures the torso of the individual using 

the supplemental restraint system 

remains inside the aircraft at all times; 

(3) Not impede egress from the aircraft 

in an emergency after being released; 

and 

(4) Have a release mechanism that— 

(i) Can be quickly operated by the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system with minimal difficulty; 

(ii) Is attached to the front or side of 

the harness in a location easily 

accessible to and visible by the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system; 

(iii) Prevents inadvertent release; and 

(iv) Does not require the use of a knife 

to cut the restraint, any other additional 

tool, or the assistance of any other 

individual to release the supplemental 

restraint system. 

(d) Who may provide the 

supplemental restraint system. The 

supplemental restraint system may be 

provided by the operator or by the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system. An individual 

providing their own supplemental 

restraint system must: 

(1) Confirm with the pilot in 

command, either verbally or in writing, 

as determined by the pilot in command, 

the system’s continued serviceability 

and readiness for its intended purposes; 

and 

(2) Ensure they are complying with 

the sizing criteria for which the 

supplemental restraint system is rated. 

(e) Supplemental restraint system 

operational requirements. The following 

are supplemental restraint system 

operational requirements: 

(1) A qualified person designated by 

the operator must— 

(i) Connect the supplemental restraint 

system to an airframe attachment point 

or points with a rated strength equal to 

or greater than the weight of the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system (or the combined 

weight if there is more than one 

supplemental restraint system attached 

to an attachment point); and 

(ii) Not connect the supplemental 

restraint system to any airframe 

attachment point located in the 

flightdeck. 

(2) A supplemental restraint system 

must fit the individual using it based on 

the sizing criteria for which the 

supplemental restraint system is rated. 

(f) Pilot in command. The pilot in 

command— 

(1) Has the overall responsibility to 

ensure that the supplemental restraint 

system meets the requirements of this 

section and must not permit an 

individual to use a supplemental 

restraint system that does not meet the 

requirements of this section; 

(2) Must ensure, for any supplemental 

restraint system provided by either the 

operator or the pilot in command, the 

supplemental restraint system’s 

continued serviceability and readiness 

for its intended purpose; 

(3) May only permit an individual to 

use a supplemental restraint system 

provided by the operator or the pilot in 

command if that individual complies 

with the sizing criteria for which the 

supplemental restraint system is rated; 

(4) Has final authority regarding 

whether the supplemental restraint 

system may be used during flight 

operations; and 

(5) Has final authority to authorize an 

individual to release the FAA-approved 

safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness and remain secured only by the 

supplemental restraint system. 

(g) Passenger briefing. Before each 

takeoff, the pilot in command must 

ensure that each passenger who intends 

to use a supplemental restraint system 

has been briefed on: 

(1) How to use, secure, and release the 

supplemental restraint system properly. 

This requirement is not necessary for an 

individual providing their own 

supplemental restraint system, but that 

individual must meet the passenger 

demonstration requirements in 

paragraph (h) of this section. 

(2) Means of direct communication 

between crewmembers and passengers 

during normal and emergency operating 

procedures regarding— 

(i) The use of headset and intercom 

systems, if installed; 

(ii) How passengers will be notified of 

an event requiring action, including 

emergencies, egress procedures, and 

other unforeseen circumstances; 

(iii) How each passenger will be 

notified when the passenger is 

permitted to release the FAA-approved 

safety belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness, and move within the aircraft 

using the supplemental restraint system; 

(iv) How each passenger will be 

notified when the passenger must return 

to their seat and secure the FAAapproved safety belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness; and 

(v) When and how to notify a 

crewmember of safety concerns. 

(h) Passenger demonstration. After 

the briefing required by paragraph (g) of 

this section, prior to ground movement, 

any passenger intending to use a 

supplemental restraint system must 

demonstrate to the pilot in command, a 

crewmember, or other qualified person 

designated by the operator, the 

following: 

(1) The ability to use, secure, and 

release the FAA-approved safety belt 

and, if installed, shoulder harness, and 

(2) The ability to accomplish all 

actions required for quick release of the 

supplemental restraint system, without 

assistance and with minimal difficulty. 

(i) Individuals not permitted to use 

supplemental restraint systems. The 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 223 / Tuesday, November 21, 2023 / Proposed Rules 81019 

following individuals are not permitted 

to use a supplemental restraint system, 

as defined in paragraph (l) of this 

section: 

(1) Any passenger who cannot 

demonstrate— 

(i) That they are able to occupy, 

secure, and release the FAA-approved 

seat belt and, if installed, shoulder 

harness; and 

(ii) That they are able to release 

quickly the supplemental restraint 

system with no assistance and with 

minimal difficulty. 

(2) Any individual who is less than 15 

years of age. 

(3) Any individual seated in the 

flightdeck. 

(4) Any passenger who occupies or 

uses an approved child restraint system. 

(j) Lap-held child. Notwithstanding 

any other requirement of this chapter, a 

child who has not reached their second 

birthday may not be held by an adult 

during civil aircraft operations when: 

(1) The adult uses a supplemental 

restraint system; or 

(2) The aircraft doors are opened or 

removed. 

(k) Excluded operations. Unless 

otherwise stated: 

(1) This section does not apply to 

operations conducted under part 105 or 

133 of this chapter and does not apply 

to the persons described in 

§ 91.107(a)(3)(ii) of this chapter. 

(2) Operators subject to the 

requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this 

section may operate an aircraft with 

doors opened or removed 

notwithstanding any flight 

crewmembers on board who are subject 

to the requirements of §§ 91.105 and 

135.171 of this chapter and who need to 

unfasten their shoulder harnesses in 

accordance with those sections. 

(3) Paragraph (b)(2) of this section 

does not apply to any flight 

crewmembers subject to §§ 91.105 and 

135.171 of this chapter to the extent that 

the flight crewmembers need to 

unfasten their shoulder harnesses in 

accordance with those sections. 

(l) Definition. For purposes of this 

section, a supplemental restraint system 

means any device that is not installed 

on the aircraft pursuant to an FAA 

approval, used to secure an individual 

inside an aircraft when that person is 

not properly secured by an FAAapproved seat belt and, if installed, 

shoulder harness, or an approved child 

restraint system. It consists of a harness 

secured around the torso of the 

individual using the supplemental 

restraint system and a lanyard that 

connects the harness to an approved 

airframe attachment point inside the 

aircraft. 

PART 135—OPERATING 

REQUIREMENTS: COMMUTER AND 

ON DEMAND OPERATIONS AND 

RULES GOVERNING PERSONS ON 

BOARD SUCH AIRCRAFT 

■ 4. The authority citation for part 135 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

41706, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709, 44711– 

44713, 44715–44717, 44722, 44730, 45101– 

45105; Pub. L. 112–95, 126 Stat. 58 (49 U.S.C. 

44730). 

■ 5. Amend § 135.117 by adding 

paragraph (g) to read as follows: 

§ 135.117 Briefing of passengers before 

flight. 

* * * * * 

(g) If any passengers on board a flight 

conducted under this part are secured 

with a supplemental restraint system, 

the pilot in command of that flight must 

ensure those passengers are briefed in 

accordance with § 91.108(g) of this 

chapter. 

■ 6. Amend § 135.128 by revising 

paragraph (a)(1) to read as follows: 

§ 135.128 Use of safety belts and child 

restraint systems. 

(a) * * * 

(1) Be held by an adult, except as 

outlined in § 91.108(j) of this chapter, 

who is occupying an approved seat or 

berth, provided the child has not 

reached his or her second birthday and 

the child does not occupy or use any 

restraining device; or 

* * * * * 

PART 136—COMMERCIAL AIR TOURS 

AND NATIONAL PARKS AIR TOUR 

MANAGEMENT 

■ 7. The authority citation for part 136 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 

40119, 44101, 44701–44702, 44705, 44709– 

44711, 44713, 44716–44717, 44722, 44901, 

44903–44904, 44912, 46105. 

■ 8. Amend § 136.7 by adding paragraph 

(c) to read as follows: 

§ 136.7 Passenger briefings. 

* * * * * 

(c) If any passengers on board a flight 

conducted under this part are secured 

with a supplemental restraint system, 

the pilot in command of that flight must 

ensure those passengers are briefed in 

accordance with § 91.108(g) of this 

chapter. 

Issued in Washington, DC, under the 

authority of 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a)(5). 

Wesley L. Mooty, 

Acting Deputy Executive Director, Flight 

Standards Service. 

[FR Doc. 2023–24936 Filed 11–20–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 

AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 60 

[EPA–HQ–OAR–2023–0358; FRL–10655–03– 

OAR] 

RIN 2060–AV93 

New Source Performance Standards 

Review for Volatile Organic Liquid 

Storage Vessels (Including Petroleum 

Liquid Storage Vessels); Extension of 

Comment Period 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of 

public comment period. 

SUMMARY: On October 4, 2023, the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 

proposed amendments to the 

‘‘Standards of Performance for Volatile 

Organic Liquid Storage Vessels 

(Including Petroleum Liquid Storage 

Vessels).’’ The EPA is extending the 

comment period on this proposed rule 

that currently closes on November 20, 

2023, by 18 days. The comment period 

will now remain open until December 8, 

2023, to allow additional time for 

stakeholders to review and comment on 

the proposal. 

DATES: The public comment period for 

the proposed rule published in the 

Federal Register (FR) on October 4, 

2023 (88 FR 68535), originally ending 

November 20, 2023, is being extended 

by 18 days. Written comments must 

now be received on or before December 

8, 2023. 

ADDRESSES: Submit comments, 

identified by Docket ID No. EPA–HQ– 

OAR–2023–0358, by any of the 

following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: 

https://www.regulations.gov/ (our 

preferred method). Follow the online 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Email: a-and-r-docket@epa.gov. 

Include Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR– 

2023–0358 in the subject line of the 

message. 

• Fax: (202) 566–9744. Attention 

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2023– 

0358. 

• Mail: U.S. Environmental 

Protection Agency, EPA Docket Center, 

Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OAR–2023– 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with PROPOSALS1