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87–546PS 2004

U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION

IN SPACE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 11, 2003

Serial No. 108–25

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/science

(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

HON. SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

NICK SMITH, Michigan

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois

MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California

CHRIS BELL, Texas

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD SHERMAN, California

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

JIM MATHESON, Utah

DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California

VACANCY

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania

JOE BARTON, Texas

KEN CALVERT, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.,

Washington

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL BURGESS, Texas

JO BONNER, Alabama

TOM FEENEY, Florida

SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York

BART GORDON, Tennessee

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut

CHRIS BELL, Texas

NICK LAMPSON, Texas

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAVID WU, Oregon

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas

BRAD SHERMAN, California

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York

VACANCY

RALPH M. HALL, Texas

BILL ADKINS Subcommittee Staff Director

ED FEDDEMAN Professional Staff Member

RUBEN VAN MITCHELL Professional Staff Member

KEN MONROE Professional Staff Member

CHRIS SHANK Professional Staff Member

RICHARD OBERMANN Democratic Professional Staff Member

TOM HAMMOND Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

June 11, 2003

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 6

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Dana Rohrabacher, Chairman, Subcommittee

on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House of Representatives ..................................................................................................................... 3

Statement by Representative Bart Gordon, Minority Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 4

Statement by Representative Sherwood Boehlert, Chairman, Committee on

Science, U.S. House of Representatives ............................................................. 5

Prepared Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 52

Prepared Statement by Representative Sheila Jackson Lee, Member, Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Committee on Science, U.S. House

of Representatives ................................................................................................ 55

Panel:

Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 25

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 27

Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space Authority

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 29

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 30

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 34

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 36

Biography .......................................................................................................... 37

Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of

European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 38

Discussion

Iran Nonproliferation Act .................................................................................... 40

Partnerships Between U.S. and Russian Companies ........................................ 41

Russian Support for the International Space Station ....................................... 43

Proliferation Issues .............................................................................................. 47

Reliance on Russia While the Shuttle Fleet Is Grounded ................................ 50

European Participation and Contributions to the ISS ...................................... 51

Status of Russian Economy ................................................................................. 53

Russian Political Changes ................................................................................... 53

Dependence on Russian Support to ISS ............................................................. 54

Russian Commitments to Support the ISS ........................................................ 55

Safety of the Russian Soyuz Vehicle .................................................................. 58

Technology Transfer ............................................................................................ 58

Page

IV

U.S.–Russian Rocket Engine Technology Investment ....................................... 60

Russian Budget Commitments for Progress and Soyuz Vehicles .................... 61

U.S.–Russian Relations ....................................................................................... 63

Clarification on Russia’s Commitment to ISS ................................................... 65

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Mr. John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations ....................................................................................................................... 68

Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space Authority .............. 75

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center .................................................................................................................... 77

Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of

European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department .......................................... 79

(1)

U.S.–RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN SPACE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

2

3

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I apologize for keeping us a little late

here. We have had a little bit of a glitch in terms of who was willing to testify and who is not willing to testify, so—but I hereby call

this meeting of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee to order.

And without objection, the Chair will be granted the authority to

recess this meeting at any time. Hearing no objection.

Last week, in St. Petersburg, President Bush and Russian President Putin issued a joint statement that is the subject of today’s

hearing. Both countries promised to continue to cooperate in the

arena of human space flight and in the ongoing challenge of assembling and operating the International Space Station in light of the

current Space Shuttle situation. They committed themselves to taking ‘‘energetic steps’’ toward greater space cooperation.

Today’s hearing will explore the benefits and risks of U.S.–Russian cooperation in space, particularly in light, as I say, of the tragedy of the Space Shuttle Columbia. These issues, balancing our

nonproliferation concerns against the benefits of space cooperation,

remind me a little bit of that Russian, I think they call it,

matryoshka doll where you can see it on the outside. It sort of

looks like there is—that is what it is all about, but as you go down,

you find layer after layer of different concerns and different things

within the issue. So foreign—U.S. foreign policy vis-a ́-vis Russia is

almost as complicated as rocket science issues, but of course, our

Subcommittee does deal with rocket science issues.

The U.S.–Russian partnership on the Space Station over the

years has been frustrating. And I have followed that very closely

over the years, and that has been frustrating. And that especially

was frustrating when our Russian partners failed to meet their

commitments about a decade ago. But during—but in terms of the

chaotic scene in Russia, that now appears to be stabilizing, as we

would hope it would be, and a new potential may well be on the

horizon.

I am pleased that the United States and Russia are continuing

to combat the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And while there is reason for optimism in terms of this

relationship, let us always remember the words of my former boss,

‘‘Trust but verify.’’

Specifically, this hearing will explore Russia’s ability to meet its

commitments to the Space Station with Soyuz and Progress flights

and our dependence on them. Of particular interest will be to examine calls from the United States industry for Congress and

NASA to clarify the interpretations of the Iran Nonproliferation

Act. Americans and Russians can work together on future space enterprises that will maximize our individual national goals and capabilities. We can do more by working together with the Russians

than we can—than each of us could do working separately. We

could benefit by working together, not just in terms of financial

profit, but by working toward mutual goals.

And when it comes to making the Space Station a success, I believe that the United States companies should work with Russian

companies. But it must be with companies that are not involved

with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. That is clear

that there is a—and it is clear that there is a restriction on working with the Russian Government in terms of as long as there is

4

a proliferation question. I, however, would advocate that we can

work company to company, American company to Russian company, and still be within the bounds of this nonproliferation legislation.

Our relationship with Russia has changed in the past three

years. Significant progress has been made since the days that our

space dollars ended up financing lucky Russian bureaucrats, known

as apparatchiks. But let us not dwell on the mistakes of the 1990’s

nor let us repeat those mistakes. Let us, instead, chart a positive

course for the future, and to me, achieving our space goals, by definition, means working with the Russians to make sure we can accomplish what we can accomplish.

So with that said, I will be happy to now turn to Bart Gordon

for his opening statement.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning everyone. I want to welcome you to today’s hearing. I look forward

to your testimony. I also want to thank Chairman Rohrabacher for

holding this hearing. It is a very timely hearing and a very important hearing.

U.S.–Russian space cooperation has been an important part of

our space program since the early 1990’s. And today, it is critical

to the continued survival of the International Space Station. With

the Space Shuttle fleet grounded, it is no exaggeration to say that

we are just one Progress or Soyuz failure away from having to pull

the crew off of the Space Station. If that happens, the rest of the

Space Station will go up significantly.

It is clear that the Iran Nonproliferation Act has complicated the

situation. However, a discussion of how fast to achieve the Nation’s

nonproliferation goals is not the purpose of this hearing. And Members may have different views on whether linking the Space Station program to nonproliferation is a good idea. The fact of the matter is that the Iran Nonproliferation Act had been public law since

2000. In light of that, Congress needs to hear from the Administration in specific terms how it will protect the considerable taxpayer

investment in the Space Station.

And Mr. Schumacher, in your testimony that you submitted, it

was rather brief. It didn’t really go into these questions. So let me,

since you are going to have some extra time, I would like to pose

these questions so that you could help us in your testimony, if you

don’t mind. The United States is responsible for providing Space

Station crew return support for non-Russian astronauts starting in

the year 2006. How will the Administration meet that commitment

and still comply with the Iran Nonproliferation Act? Secondly, the

Space Shuttle fleet was grounded for more than 2c years after the

Challenger accident. How will the Administration ensure that the

Space Station can continue to operate if the Shuttle fleet is grounded that long again? And whether or not the Administration is expecting the Russians or other Space Station international partners

to pay for the Soyuz and Progress flights until the Shuttle starts

flying again as well as from 2006 onward, and have the partners,

in fact, agreed to pay? And if so, is there a signed agreement?

And I will just point out, I understand, Mr. Schumacher, that

you are going to be Mr. O’Keefe’s new Chief of Staff, and congratulations on that important position. Similar questions were subVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:27 Feb 14, 2004 Jkt 087546 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA03\061103\87546 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
5

mitted to him on February the 27th, so hopefully you could maybe

give us a first installment today and then you can look for those

questions there in the office and help us with this. It is something

that is important. And again, these are not easy questions. I—you

know, and there won’t be easy answers. I don’t intend to say that.

We have to start this process of trying to figure out where we are

going.

NASA is dependent upon Russia’s spacecraft to keep the Space

Station operational until the Shuttle flights resume. Since the Administration canceled the U.S. Space Station Crew Return Vehicle

in 2001, NASA is totally dependent on the Russian Soyuz CRV

until the end of this decade. And finally, the only alternative to the

Space Shuttle for getting crews into the space over the next 10

years is the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. So it is not enough to say

that today there hasn’t been a need for NASA to seek an exemption

or to change the Iran Nonproliferation Act. Given existing commitments and other realities coming over the next 10 years, the Administration needs to tell us or at least start the process of telling

us and trying to figure this out, you know, what to do and what

we can do with these commitments and realities.

Again, we have got a lot of ground to cover. Thank you for being

here. And I look forward to hearing your suggestions.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. Without objection, the opening statement of other Members will be put into the

record, but I would like to now, at this point, extend to the Chairman of Full Committee any—the—if he would like to say a few

words, we would love to have them.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I

want to commend you for having this important oversight hearing.

This is the type of thing we do day after day, week after week. It

is critically important.

I think the International Space Station and the transportation

system now serving it provide a testimony to the benefit derived

from a meaningful working partnership between the United States

and Russia. And I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that you consider inserting in the record at this juncture the statements of President

Bush and Putin arrived at last week. I think they are very important and reassuring, and I thank you for it.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, their statements will be inserted

in the record without objection. And anything further, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. BOEHLERT. That is it, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, we are very, very pleased whenever the Chairman of the Full Committee graces our Subcommittee. And we appreciate your involvement and your guidance.

So without objection, we will include that reference to the statements issued by President Putin and President Bush in the record.

(See Charter, Attachment 1, p. 11.)

As I said, other Members here will have to put their opening

statements in the written record, and I—hearing no objection, so

ordered. I also ask unanimous consent to insert at the appropriate

place in the record the background memorandum prepared by the

Majority Staff for this hearing. Hearing no objection, so ordered.

6

HEARING CHARTER

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE AND AERONAUTICS

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

U.S.–Russian Cooperation

in Space

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 2003

2:00 P.M.–4:00 P.M. 2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

Purpose of Hearing

On Wednesday, June 11, 2003, at 2:00 p.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House

Office Building, the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee will hold a hearing on

U.S.–Russian Cooperation in Space. This hearing will explore the benefits and risks

of U.S.–Russian cooperation on space programs. Specifically, the hearing will review

Russia’s participation in the International Space Station (ISS) program and the

Russian Space Agency’s (RSA) ability to provide near-term and long-term support

for the ISS with Soyuz and Progress space vehicles. Members will examine how

NASA has interpreted Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000, how

the INA has affected U.S.–Russian space collaboration, and how INA policies have

influenced Russian nonproliferation. In addition, the hearing will also review other

areas of technical collaboration in space between the U.S. and Russia and how best

to organize these collaborations between government and industry.

Major Issues for Congress

Joint Statement on U.S.–Russia Cooperation in Space. On June 1st, President

Bush and Russian President Putin issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation in

Space that committed the U.S. to safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight and

Russia to meeting the Space Station crew transport and logistics resupply requirements until the Shuttle returns to flight. The statement also reaffirmed a U.S.–Russia commitment to take ‘‘energetic steps’’ to enhance cooperation in space technologies and techniques. How will Russia fund its commitments for the Space Station?

Reliance on the Russians to Support the Space Station. U.S. human

spaceflight is completely reliant on the Russian Soyuz and Progress space vehicles

for all crew transport and rescue as well as cargo delivery to the Space Station

while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded. Even when the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight, U.S. human spaceflight will still rely on the Russian Soyuz vehicle

for Space Station crew rescue. Several NASA reports call into question the inability

of RSA to support the Space Station over the next several years without additional

funding.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA). Section 6 of the INA prevents the U.S.

Government from providing payments to the Russian Government, including the

RSA, in connection with the ISS unless certain conditions are met. U.S. industry

has raised questions about whether the INA allows U.S. contractors to enter into

relationships with Russian contractors on Space Station work.

Background on Russia’s Participation in the International Space Station.

The history of the Cold War and human spaceflight are closely intertwined with

U.S.–Soviet/Russian foreign relations. In 1993, President Clinton invited Russia into

the international partnership (Europe, Canada, and Japan were already partners)

to build the Space Station. The primary reasons behind this invitation were to promote Russian adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and promote nonproliferation by helping Russia’s aerospace industry shift from military to

civilian work. Between 1994 and 1998, NASA paid the Russian Space Agency approximately $800 million to build the Zarya space station module, support the Shuttle-Mir program, and other spaceflight activities while the RSA agreed to build and

launch the Zvezda Service Module as well as Soyuz and Progress crew and cargo

vehicles to support the Space Station.

7

1 NASA Bimonthly Russian Performance Report with regard to the International Space Station January 1, 2003–February 28, 2003, dated April 14, 2003. 2 NASA Bimonthly Russian Performance Report with regard to the International Space Station July 1–August 31, 2002, dated November 13, 2002.

Throughout the past 10 years, Russia had financial problems and schedule delays

in meeting its commitments to the Space Station program. Also, during the 1990s,

several reports raised concerns that the RSA and Russian aerospace industry were

proliferating weapons technologies to rogue states. In response to these concerns,

the House and Senate unanimously (419–0 in the House and 98–0 in the Senate)

passed the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) that became law on March 14, 2000.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) restricts the U.S. Government from making

payments to the RSA or any organization under its jurisdiction in connection with

the International Space Station unless the President determines that the Russian

Government is not proliferating any weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic

missile technology to Iran. Exceptions to this restriction are allowed in cases of crew

safety, and support for the Russian Zvezda Service Module (See Attachment 3 for

more detailed background on U.S.–Russia Space Cooperation and Attachment 5 for

the relevant portions of the INA). Key issues to consider:

• Has Section 6 of the INA helped stem proliferation between Russia and Iran?

• How has Section 6 of the INA impacted the Space Station program?

Reliance on Russian Support to the Space Station. The Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy and subsequent grounding of the Shuttle fleet has made the U.S.

human spaceflight program completely reliant on the Russian Soyuz and Progress

space vehicles for all crew transport and rescue as well as cargo delivery to the

International Space Station while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded. RSA informed the ISS international partners at the February 26th Multilateral Configuration Board meeting that while RSA agreed to the accelerated production schedule

for Progress cargo vehicles (see Attachment 2) additional funds from the international partners were needed to meet that schedule. Since then, the Space Station

international partners have agreed to a Progress and Soyuz flight schedule while

the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded, but have not yet found the necessary funds for

those Russian flights. NASA described its concern last April:

‘‘The concern was based on the fact that Russian performance appeared to depend on the receipt of ‘off-budget’ funds from the sale of flight opportunities

[space tourist flights] on the Soyuz missions. The European Space Agency (ESA)

had arranged to purchase two of the four available flight opportunities, but

prospects for the other two were unclear. The grounding of the Space Shuttle

fleet and the subsequent Multilateral Coordination Board-agreed upon interim

operations plan have put additional financial strain on Rosaviakosmos [Russian

Space Agency]. To assist during this difficult period, ESA has agreed to defer

the flights of its astronauts, while continuing payments to Rosaviakosmos for

the flights on the original schedule.’’1

Unless the Administration requests a waiver to the Iran Nonproliferation Act, additional funds for Russia’s support to the Space Station will need to come from the

international partners other than the U.S.

Long-Term Viability of Russian Support for the Space Station. Even before

the Columbia tragedy made issues about reliance on Russian Progress and Soyuz

flights more acute, NASA reported ‘‘uncertainties associated with the outlook for

Russia’s future funding’’ 2 for the Space Station in its bimonthly performance reports

to the Committee. The agreement between the international partners called upon

Russia to provide Soyuz capsules to serve as crew rescue vehicles through 2006.

These NASA reports call into question the ability of the Russian Space Agency to

support the Space Station over the next several years without additional funding

from the Russian Government, the Space Station international partners, or the sale

of more space tourist flights.

• How is NASA mitigating the risks to the Space Station and its crew if the

Russian Space Agency is not able to support long-term crew transport/rescue

as well as cargo delivery?

• Due to NASA’s problems in developing a Space Station crew rescue vehicle

and RSA’s financial problems, is continued reliance on the Russian Soyuz a

prudent and viable plan?

8

Safety of the Soyuz Vehicles

The flight of the Russian Soyuz vehicle that returned the Expedition 6 crew last

month raised new questions about the safety of our reliance on Russian vehicles.

This capsule did not re-enter the Earths atmosphere as planned but re-entered the

Earth’s atmosphere in an anomalous ballistic entry, and the capsule landed over

275 miles from its intended landing target in Kazakhstan. The astronauts experienced more than 8 G forces versus the normal 4 Gs during this re-entry. Further,

search and rescue crews took more than two hours to locate the crew. Rescue teams

could not pinpoint the crew until they unfurled a 15-foot auxiliary antenna.

Key issues include:

• What actions have the ISS international partners taken to ensure that the

necessary resources are available for Russian Progress cargo flights to the

Space Station?

• Are the funding shortfalls for Russian Soyuz and Progress missions causing

any undue safety risks to the Space Station or its crew while the Shuttle fleet

is grounded?

The Iran Nonproliferation Act. The INA prohibits the U.S. Government from

making payments to Russia in connection with the ISS and prohibits payments to

any other entity if the U.S. Government anticipates that such payments will be

passed on to an entity proliferating to Iran. Recently, industry bidders for the Space

Station Cargo Mission Request for Proposals (RFP) sought guidance from NASA on

the applicability of INA restrictions to U.S.–Russian company subcontracts. NASA

asked for information from potential bidders on their proposed Russian subcontractor relationships and impact on the bidder’s team if the Russian company could

not participate in the work. Key issues include:

• What impacts have potential bidders to the ISS Cargo Mission RFP identified

to NASA as a result of this guidance?

• To what degree does Section 6 of the INA restrict U.S.–Russian companies

relationships on launch vehicles or cargo carriers to the Space Station?

Collaboration with Russia on Space Programs. The Iran Nonproliferation Act

only covers U.S.–Russian collaboration on the International Space Station, but the

U.S. and Russia collaborate in several other space programs. NASA provided a summary of its cooperation with Russia in Attachment 4.

The joint U.S.–Russia statement says that the two countries ‘‘are prepared to take

energetic steps to enhance our cooperation in the application of space technology

and techniques.’’ Other than the Space Station, space launch is the main area of

collaboration between the U.S. and Russia. These joint ventures are formed between

U.S. and Russian companies rather than through government-to-government collaboration.

Rocket Engines. Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V uses the RD–180 first stage engine

built by Energomash, a Russian company, and Sea Launch is a partnership between

Boeing, Energia, and Yuzhnoye/Yuzhmash using the Ukrainian Zenit rocket and

Russian upper stage engines. Several U.S. commercial satellites are launched from

Russia or Kazakhstan.

Space Nuclear Power. NASA, through the Department of Energy, purchases plutonium fuel from Russia for its in-space nuclear power. During the early 1990s, the

U.S. purchased the Russian Topaz space nuclear reactor in order to analyze its design for future systems. However, further collaboration between the U.S. and Russia

in NASA’s new nuclear systems development appears doubtful.

Russian Collaboration with other Nations. The Russian Space Agency also has a

number of cooperative ventures with other countries in space—France, Germany,

Canada, China, India, Bulgaria, Hungary, Pakistan, Portugal, Israel, and the European Space Agency. Of particular interest, RSA signed agreements to support China’s human spaceflight program. Russia also has ties with India and Pakistan’s

rocket program.

• What are some areas of technical collaboration in space between the U.S. and

Russia that would provide meaningful benefit to the U.S. space program

while also discouraging Russian proliferation of space and missile capabilities

to other countries?

• How best should these cooperative space endeavors be organized, either between U.S.–Russian companies or between the governments?

9

Witnesses

Amb. Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European and

Eurasian Affairs, State Department

Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations

Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California Space Authority

Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education

Center

Witness Questions

The witnesses were asked to address the following questions in their testimony.

Questions for Ambassador Steve Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau

of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department

• How has the INA, along with other factors, influenced the activities and behavior of Russian Government, Russian Space Agency, and other organizations under its jurisdiction to exert more control to stem the proliferation of

space and missile technology from Russia to states such as Iran?

• Is the State Department actively monitoring Russian collaboration in space

and missile technology with the U.S. and other countries and keeping other

Federal agencies informed of these Russian collaborations?

• What is the State Department’s role in working with NASA to ensure that

the INA is interpreted and implemented properly?

Questions for Mr. John Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations

• What have been the benefits and difficulties from NASA–Russian Space

Agency cooperation on the ISS over the past three years?

• What actions have the International Partners taken to ensure that the Russian Space Agency has the necessary resources to accelerate the production

for Progress resupply flights and meet the cargo needs for the ISS while the

Space Shuttle is grounded?

• Given the problems with the Soyuz TMA–1 return flight with the Expedition

6 crew, have NASA and the Russian Space Agency considered any changes

to remedy safety concerns with Soyuz flight operations? If so, what are those

changes?

• Have any potential bidders for NASA procurements identified any adverse

impacts due to NASA’s interpretation of Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act?

• To what degree does NASA believe that Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation

Act restricts U.S. contractor-to-Russian contractor relationships?

Questions for Mr. Robert M. Davis, President and CEO of the California Space Authority

• What are the benefits and risks when U.S. companies collaborate with the

Russian Space Agency or Russian companies on space projects?

• What areas of technical collaboration with Russian space industry would you

recommend that U.S. aerospace companies pursue?

• How has the INA affected U.S. aerospace industry collaboration with Russia?

Questions for Mr. Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy

Education Center

• What areas of collaboration between the U.S. and Russia in space have been

beneficial or difficult over the past three years?

• How reliant is Russia on funding from other countries to maintain its space

and missile capabilities? In what areas is Russia collaborating with other

countries on space capabilities? What are the proliferation concerns of these

collaborations?

• What areas of future collaboration in space would you recommend between

the U.S. and Russia governments and companies?

• How have the behavior and actions of the Russian government and Russian

Space Agency changed over the past three years in order to better stem the

proliferation of space and missile technology from Russia?

10

Attachments:

1. Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin on U.S.–

Russian Cooperation in Space

2. Chart: MCB–Approved Soyuz and Progress Launch Schedule Re-Plan 2003–

2004

3. Congressional Research Service Background Paper

4. NASA Summary on U.S.–Russia Space Cooperation

5. Sections 6 and 7 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000

11

3White House Office of the Press Secretary, June 1, 2003.

Attachment 1

Joint Statement by President Bush and Russian President Putin on U.S.–

Russian Cooperation in Space. On June 1, 2003 during their meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, the U.S. and Russian presidents issued the following joint statement:

The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored the historic role of the

United States and Russia as partners in space exploration, who have persevered

despite tragedy and adversity. During this challenging time, our partnership has

deepened and the International Space Station (ISS) program remains strong.

The extraordinary efforts of our countries continue.

The United States is committed to safely returning the Space Shuttle to flight,

and the Russian Federation is committed to meeting the ISS crew transport and

logistics resupply requirements necessary to maintain our joint American astronaut and Russian cosmonaut teams on board the ISS until the Space Shuttle

returns to flight.

We confirm our mutual aspiration to ensure the continued assembly and viability of the International Space Station as a world-class research facility, relying

on our unprecedented experience of bilateral and multilateral interaction in

space. We reaffirm our commitment to the mission of human space flight and

are prepared to take energetic steps to enhance our cooperation in the application

of space technology and techniques.3

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Attachment 4

United States–Russia Space Cooperation Summary

Background

NASA has been engaged in cooperative activities with Russia for nearly 40 years,

starting with modest contacts in fields such as space biology and medicine, geodesy

and geodynamics. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful

Purposes (Civil Space Agreement), which expanded these contacts into other areas

of study including space science, Earth science, satellite-based search and rescue

and later, human space flight. Cooperation with the USSR reached a high point

with the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975. The Civil Space Agreement was renewed

in 1971, but was allowed to lapse in 1982 as a sign of U.S. dissatisfaction with Soviet behaviors, especially in Afghanistan. In 1987 the Agreement was revived and

it was subsequently re-established as an agreement with the Russian Federation in

1992. This Agreement was renewed for additional five-year terms in 1997 and 2002.

In October 1992, the United States and Russia signed an Implementing Agreement for the Shuttle-Mir Program, under which 9 missions were flown to the Mir

Space Station by the Space Shuttle, including 7 docking missions and 7 long duration visits on orbit by NASA astronauts. Discussions on broadening NASA’s cooperation with Russia took place in 1993 in the context of the Space Station redesign effort. A December 1993 Protocol to the Agreement, laid the foundations for U.S.–Russia cooperation in the development of the ISS. NASA’s cooperation with the newly

formed Russian Space Agency (now known as the Russian Aviation and Agency or

Rosaviakosmos) on the ISS program was formalized in June 1994 with the signing

of an ‘‘Interim Agreement’’ for the Station’s design, development and assembly. In

the following years, the U.S. State Department and NASA worked with the existing

ISS partner countries and Russia to negotiate and conclude an overarching set of

agreements on the ISS. This effort culminated with the signature of a multilateral

Inter-Governmental Agreement (IGA) and bilateral Memoranda of Understanding

(MOU) on the ISS program in January 1998.

Current Human Space Flight Cooperation

International Space Station: In the 1990s, Rosaviakosmos struggled to meet Russia’s commitments to the ISS due to a shortage of Russian Government funding.

These funding deficiencies had a negative impact on the ISS program’s assembly

schedule. The first element of the ISS, the U.S.-funded, Russian-built and launched

FGB (Zarya) was successfully completed under a contract with Boeing. However, the

launch of the first Russian-funded element, the Service Module (Zvezda), was delayed by approximately two years before it was successfully launched in July 2000.

Since that time, Russia has been meeting its obligations under the ISS agreements.

Permanent human presence on ISS began on November 1, 2000, with the arrival

of the Expedition One crew, commanded by U.S. astronaut Bill Shepherd. Russian

and U.S. crew members have alternated command of the joint ISS expedition crews

for the last two and a half years. Following the loss of Space Shuttle Columbia on

February 1, 2003, the ISS partnership has relied on Russian logistics and crew

transportation capabilities to sustain operation of the ISS in accordance with the

partnership-agreed plan for operations. This circumstance has prompted the Russian Government to adjust its funding plans for 2003 and review plans for 2004.

On June 1, 2003, at the U.S.–Russia summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, Presidents

Bush and Putin released a joint statement that emphasized our mutual commitments to International Space Station and our aspiration to complete this world-class

research facility together with our international partners.

Current Earth Science Cooperation

NASA has cooperated with the USSR and Russia for over 30 years in the fields

of Earth science, global change research and environmental monitoring. The overall

goal of this cooperation is to advance our understanding of the Earth’s systems

through the use of space-based sensors, which make quantitative measurements of

the state and behavior of the Earth’s atmosphere, ocean, land surface, biology and

interior.

NASA’s cooperation with Russia is coordinated through the joint U.S.–Russia

Earth Sciences Joint Working Group (ESJWG). NASA and the Russian Academy of

Sciences (RAS) are the co-chairs of the ESJWG, and other representatives participate from various U.S. and Russian Government agencies, universities and instiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:27 Feb 14, 2004 Jkt 087546 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\061103\87546 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tutes, including Rosaviakosmos. In between formal meetings of the ESJWG, scientists continue cooperative activities and initiate ideas for future collaboration to

be brought forward to the next ESJWG meeting. The ESJWG has met twelve times

since 1998, with the next session scheduled for fall 2003, in Washington, D.C. Examples of the activities coordinated through the ESJWG include:

Stratospheric Aerosol and Gas Experiment (SAGE III)/Meteor 3M mission: The

SAGE III/Meteor 3M mission is NASA’s major space flight mission and highest priority cooperation with Russia in the area of Earth science. The mission is providing

long-term, global measurements of key components of the Earth’s atmosphere and

conducts important scientific investigations of the state of the ozone layer. The satellite was launched December 2001 on a Zenit-2 rocket from the Baikonur

Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Several Russian researchers are full members of the

SAGE III Science Team.

High Resolution Picture Transmission (HRPT) Stations and Advanced Very High

Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data: This cooperative research effort is focused on

the study of boreal forests and to provide data to international programs, such as

the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP). In this cooperation, three

NASA-loaned HRPT stations are installed in Siberia for the collection of 1-km image

data from the AVHRR instrument on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) polar orbiting satellites. The raw, processed and analyzed data

is available to the international science community on a full and open basis.

U.S. Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS) program: Russia is participating in the SeaWiFS program, which observes the world’s oceans from space to

measure ocean color (phytoplankton) in efforts to understand the role of the oceans

in the global carbon cycle. A representative from the RAS Shirshov Institute of

Oceanology (SIO) is a principal investigator on NASA’s SeaWiFS mission and a

member of the science team.

Space Geodesy: NASA is currently cooperating with RAS and the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in a trilateral cooperative effort in Very Long Baseline

Interferometry (VLBI) geodetic experiments. This cooperation encompasses the use

of a NASA-loaned data acquisition system installed in St. Petersburg, and of the

radiotelescope of the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory in Simeiz, Ukraine. The

experiments focus on improved accuracy in VLBI measurements required for studies

of Earth orientation, angular momentum and crustal dynamics. In addition, Russia

and the U.S. are cooperating on the laser tracking of satellites of mutual interest,

including U.S., Russian and Italian geodetic satellites, Russian GLONASS satellites,

U.S. Global Positioning Satellites, and the U.S./French TOPEX/Poseidon oceanography satellite.

Aerosol Robotic NETwork (AERONET): NASA has loaned several sun photometers

to various Russian institutions in support of the global AERONET program. The

sun photometers measure vital aerosol optical properties and water vapor, which

contribute to a more detailed understanding of global atmospheric change phenomena with a particular focus on the assessment of air quality.

Current Space Science Cooperation

Mars Exploration: NASA has cooperated with Russian space scientists on Mars exploration since the 1980s. Recent collaboration has centered on the Russian High

Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) instrument, launched on the NASA 2001 Mars

Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars, the REND device has returned

significant data regarding possible water on Mars.

Astrophysics: NASA-Russia astrophysics cooperation has centered on two Russian

missions: Spectrum-X-Gamma (SXG) and Radioastron. SXG is a Russian high-energy astrophysics observatory under development since the late 1980s and originally

conceived with a launch date of 1991. NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU

on SXG cooperation in June 1995. Due to continuing Russian Government funding

constraints, Russia has terminated development on the baseline mission and is currently redesigning the project.

In March 2002, Rosaviakosmos announced that SXG was no longer its top priority

in astrophysics and that Radioastron (a radioastronomy mission) had assumed this

role. Like SXG, this mission was conceived in the 1980s, with a planned launch in

the mid-1990s, but continual shortfalls in financial resources have also left Russian

obligations on this mission incomplete. NASA and Rosaviakosmos signed the MOU

on Radioastron cooperation in February 1997. NASA was originally slated to provide

a series of four ground tracking stations to support this mission, but with

Radioastron far from completion, the stations have been decommissioned.

18

Scientific Balloon Flights: NASA-Russia scientific balloon cooperation began in 1992

with the establishment of a Balloon Implementation Team. Two successful flights

were held in the mid-1990s before over-flight clearance was denied by Russia. The

two sides have negotiated a long-term Scientific Ballooning Implementing Agreement (IA) for future flights over Russia and possible Russian science participation

on NASA missions. It is expected that this new agreement will be finalized later

this summer.

International Living With A Star: Russia is participating in the ongoing Office of

Space Science (OSS) Living With a Star Program, including participation in the

International Living With a Star Executive Steering Committee that held its first

meeting in January 2003. The goal of this endeavor is to stimulate, strengthen and

coordinate space research in order to understand the physical processes that govern

variability in the connected Sun-Earth system.

19

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24

Chairman ROHRABACHER. We have a distinguished panel with us

today to provide their unique perspectives on this issue. Unfortunately, we don’t have all of the members of the distinguished panel

who could provide us a perspective. One was unable to join us, and

we will talk about that later, but we have asked our witnesses to,

if possible, to summarize their testimony to five minutes. And we

will have a robust discussion thereafter.

One of the reasons we have a hearing panel is so that we can

have an interchange of ideas that will benefit the Members of Congress as well as add to the national debate. Unfortunately today,

the Administration, or at least the State Department, has determined that if it has a witness to present to Congress, or at least

to this subcommittee, that it—that that witness must testify independently, not sitting next to or part of a panel of other witnesses.

This was a demand made upon this Chairman by the State Department. And let me note, having worked in the Executive Branch,

and now having been elected to a position in the Legislative

Branch, it is not my reading of the Constitution that the Executive

Branch will dictate to the Legislative Branch the format of our

hearings.

And I think that this is an issue that concerns all of us on both

sides of the aisle. I think that the Administration should think very

thoroughly this issue out before they decide to try to force this policy upon the Congress. It does not speak well of any Administration

that is committed to openness and transparency and an honest discussion of the issues to try to put restrictions on the type of exchange that witnesses—their witnesses before Congress can participate in.

So I would hope that we can work this little issue out, but it

must be worked out with due respect to both the rights of the Executive Branch and the rights of the Legislative Branch. And I find

this format to be the most informative. I have never had objection

from the other side of the aisle on this. I don’t know of any party

who has ever objected to this format. I happen to share the same

party as the person now who heads the Executive Branch. There—

I don’t see why this is an issue, but it will be if we continue to have

this type of——

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, if I may.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Just let me say that I wish to associate myself

with your remarks. It is not clear to me. I think it is somewhat

hazy whether this is an Administration policy or one department

responding in this manner. And I hope we can get some clarification on that.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I will—it will be up to all of us to work

together to get that clarification and to try to work something out

where we respect the rights of both parties and both the Executive

Branch and the Legislative Branch.

So our first witness was to be Ambassador Steve Pifer, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs.

That meant that he oversees our relationship with Russia.

As you see before us today, Ambassador Pifer is not here to answer questions, not here to participate in the discussion and I regret that. And that is unfortunate.

25

Our second witness is John Schumacher, who is in charge of

NASA’s external relations and NASA’s lead negotiator with the

Russian Space Agency. I am glad to welcome him here today, and

you may proceed with your testimony.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I would observe that Mr.

Schumacher is a very valuable member of this Administration. So

that would indicate that this is not an Administration policy, at

least at this juncture, as far as we are aware of, not to let Members

testify in the manner in which you have indicated is most helpful

to the Congress.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Yes, sir. And make sure that the

record is straight on that. There was a serious negotiation as to

whether he would be here and be on the panel. And Administrator

O’Keefe wisely decided to send him and to be part of the regular

format that we have here in the Subcommittee. And I would applaud Administrator O’Keefe for demonstrating that he wants to

take the extra step in order to work in cooperation with this subcommittee.

Mr. Schumacher, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. SCHUMACHER, NASA ASSISTANT

ADMINISTRATOR FOR EXTERNAL RELATIONS

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Mr.

Boehlert. I will make sure that your very clear remarks are conveyed.

Thank you again for having this hearing. I greatly appreciate the

opportunity to testify before the Committee on U.S.–Russia cooperation in space. It is an important topic.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I will submit a copy of my

full testimony for the record and make a brief oral statement to

summarize the testimony.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Without objection.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. First of all, and not exactly a topic of this

hearing, it is great to report to you that Mars Exploration Rover

named ‘‘Spirit’’ just this Sunday launched successfully yesterday

afternoon from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on its way to a

January 4 arrival date at Mars. The second Mars exploration Rover

named ‘‘Opportunity’’ is scheduled for launch on the 24th. They join

an Express mission and a Japanese mission all on the way to Mars

for dates later this year and early next year.

And exactly in line with the subject of this hearing, a Russian

Progress successfully docked with the International Space Station

this morning. I talked to the program office a little while ago. The

hatch is open and they are getting ready to unload cargo, so another good news piece. I will speak to that Progress launch and

what it involved in the relationship to the partnership later in my

remarks.

I think everyone is pretty much aware that during the last decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities with Russia in the

fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science, and human

space flight. The accomplishments have included historic steps forward in human space flight by our astronauts and cosmonauts as

well as important projects such as our joint work on the study of

26

the Earth’s ozone layer, coordination of research on the Sun-Earth

system, and cooperation on the study of Mars.

Building a strong human space flight partnership with our colleagues in Russia has yielded many benefits. This has been particularly evidenced since the loss of Columbia on February 1 of this

year. The redundancy and unique capabilities provided by Russian

spacecraft have made it possible for the International Space Station partnership to maintain a crew aboard the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet. This has also allowed the ISS partnership to continue ISS operations and scientific

research and to prepare for a resumption of construction of the

Space Station once the Space Shuttle fleet returns to flight status.

The concrete results of this unprecedented cooperation with Russia were clearly evident on April 26 when NASA astronaut, Ed Lu,

and Russian cosmonaut Yuri Malenchenko launched aboard a Russian Soyuz spacecraft to begin their ongoing six-month mission.

This success was followed on May 4 with the landing of the ISS Expedition 6 crew, Ken Bowersox, Don Pettit, and Nikolai Budarin,

ending their 5c-month mission.

I am also pleased to be able to report to this committee that the

Progress launch was successful and is proceeding. The vehicle was

launched on June 8 and carried 5,300 pounds of food, fuel, water,

and other supplies to support the Expedition 7 crew and continued

ISS ops. This Progress mission is the eleventh Progress flight to

the International Space Station.

The challenges of the last four months since the tragic loss of Columbia have drawn the ISS partnership, which also includes participation from Japan, 11 European nations, and Canada into an

effective and very integrated team. At the start of 2003, the partnership was well on its way to achieving ISS Core Complete on

schedule in early 2004. In 2003, we had talked about a lot that it

was to be a very demanding year technically and managerially, as

the partnership planned to execute five Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS and closeout multilateral work on selecting an ISS

configuration. Within hours of the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle

Columbia, the ISS partners offered their full support and began

work to address our new challenges. By the end of February, the

partnership had a new plan for interim operations while the Space

Shuttle remain grounded.

The partnership has continued to implement this plan and update it as necessary. In particular, the Russian Aviation and Space

Agency, Rosaviakosmos, has demonstrated a steadfast commitment

to the ISS program by assuming increased responsibility for operational support of ISS. The Progress that just docked is a great example of that and how fast people move when—with the use—the

switch from crew rotation, which was supposed to be on Space Station to two, the Soyuz, that was done in a couple of months. The

crews were retrained. The vehicle was made safe, and launched on

time, and brought another crew home. At the same time, work was

made across the partnership. And Mr. Gordon, in response to your

comments, I will get into that in more detail later, if that is acceptable, a lot of work, very hard work and a lot of hours between U.S.,

Russia, and other partners on these very detailed technical looks

at what was needed to sustain human presence on Station, conduct

27

research, and keep Station safe and operational until a shuttle returns to flight.

On this Progress, the Russians, again, in this short time period,

installed an internal water tank, so water could be carried up. This

was not the configuration of Progress that was to carry water. They

also actually literally strapped in, literally, five gallon cans of

water into there. We had a cooling pump fail on one of the U.S.

cooling systems. The Russians went in and installed the hard components that allowed that cooling pump to be hard-wired, if you

will, you know, locked into the Progress and carried up. The food,

they—the Russians—looked and worked a way where they could

double the amount of food that was brought up on this Progress.

All things at a fast turnaround, we are going to make this work

is the type of great cooperative effort between the two of us. So I

highlight those types of things, because that is not easy to do. That

is a lot of engineering, a lot of work on center of gravity, all types

of things that—to get that Progress and get some—as much backup

on the Station as we can for our two astronauts that are up there.

In summary, our relationship with the Russian space program is

strong and effective. President Bush and President Putin highlighted the importance of this cooperation, the Joint Statement

both Chairmen have referred to. And it is really significant that

both Presidents—I mean, they picked several key issues they wanted to highlight, and one of them was space cooperation and, in particular, the importance of sustaining and moving ahead with the

completion of assembly and the operation and use of the Space Station.

We greatly appreciate the willingness of Russia, as with all of

our ISS partners, to act decisively to address the challenges faced

in the wake of the Columbia tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, this completes my oral statement. Mr. Gordon, I

ask for indulgence, and I will get into those in more detail after

the other gentlemen get to do their opening comments. I would

very much be glad to, and I look forward to any other questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schumacher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN D. SCHUMACHER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Subcommittee today on the subject

of NASA’s cooperation with the Russian Federation in civil space. As highlighted by

President Bush and Russian President Putin during their discussions on the first

of this month in Saint Petersburg, ‘‘The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia has underscored the historic role of the United States and Russia as partners in space exploration, who have persevered despite tragedy and adversity. During this challenging time, our partnership has deepened and the International Space Station

(ISS) Program remains strong.’’

During the last decade, NASA has engaged in cooperative activities with Russia

in the fields of aeronautics, Earth science, space science, and human space flight.

The accomplishments have included the historic steps forward in human space flight

by our astronauts and cosmonauts, as well as important projects such as our joint

work on the study of the Earth’s ozone layer, coordination of research on the SunEarth system, and cooperation on the study of Mars. For example, the Russian High

Energy Neutron Detector (HEND) is an instrument on the NASA 2001 Mars Odyssey spacecraft. Since Odyssey arrived at Mars in October 2001, the HEND device

has returned significant data regarding possible water on Mars.

Building a strong human space flight partnership with our colleagues in Russia

has yielded many benefits. This has been particularly evident since the loss of Columbia on February 1, 2003. The redundancy and unique capabilities provided by

28

Russian spacecraft have made it possible for the ISS partnership to maintain a crew

aboard the Space Station despite the grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet. This has

also allowed the ISS partnership to continue ISS operations and scientific research,

and to prepare for a resumption of construction of the ISS, once the Space Shuttle

fleet returns to flight status.

The challenges of the last four months have drawn the ISS partnership, which

also includes participation from Japan, Europe and Canada, into an even more effective integrated team. At the start of 2003, the ISS partnership was well on its way

to achieving ISS Core Complete on schedule in early 2004. 2003 promised to be a

demanding year technically and managerially, as the partnership planned to execute five Russian and five U.S. missions to the ISS, and close out multilateral work

on selecting an ISS configuration. Within hours of the tragic loss of Space Shuttle

Columbia, the ISS partners offered their full support and began work to address our

new challenges. By the end of February, the partnership had a new plan for interim

operations while the Space Shuttle remained grounded. The partnership has continued to implement this plan and update it as necessary. In particular, the Russian

Aviation and Space Agency (Rosaviakosmos) has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming increased responsibility for operational support of the ISS.

In early May, the partnership executed the first ISS expedition crew exchange

using Soyuz vehicles. Despite the necessity to re-train the crew for launch on Soyuz

instead of on the Space Shuttle, the launch of Soyuz TMA–2 (ISS Flight 6S) was

successfully accomplished on schedule. A week later the Expedition 6 crew executed

the first return of U.S. astronauts on a Soyuz vehicle. During reentry the Soyuz

TMA–1 executed a back-up reentry profile. Rosaviakosmos appointed a Commission

to investigate this anomaly. The Commission reported on May 26, 2003, that the

guidance system on the vehicle erroneously detected a malfunction and, in accordance with safety protocols, the system ‘‘failed safe’’ to the back-up re-entry profile.

As another indication of our close partnership with Rosaviakosmos, NASA has been

regularly briefed on the progress of the Soyuz investigation. Later this summer, a

joint Russian-American team, led by Thomas Stafford, Lt. Gen. USAF (Ret.) and his

Russian counterpart Nikolai Anfimov, will review the findings of the Russian Commission and report to the NASA Administrator and the General Director of

Rosaviakosmos on the implications for ISS operational readiness. We are continuing

to work closely with Russia in preparation for the next Soyuz crew exchange

planned for October 2003.

The unwavering support of the ISS partners has reaffirmed the strength and

depth of our partnership. NASA has conducted frequent consultations with its Partners as the Columbia accident investigation proceeds. These consultations are being

held at all levels, including at the programmatic and technical level, through the

Space Station Control Board; at the program management level, through the Multilateral Coordination Board; and at the Heads of Agency level. The ISS partners

have scheduled a Multilateral Coordination Board and Heads of Agency meeting for

the end of July.

To date, near-term ISS operational plans and decisions taken by the partnership

have not resulted in a need for NASA to seek an exception to, or request an amendment of, the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000.

Mr. Chairman, NASA has conducted a broad range of cooperative civil space programs with Russia over the last decade. At present, our relationship with the Russian space program is strong and effective. We greatly appreciate the willingness

of Russia, as with all of our ISS partners, to act decisively to address the challenges

faced in the wake of the Columbia tragedy. Moreover, we look forward to resuming

Space Shuttle operations so that we can continue the construction of the ISS and

make full use of its remarkable capabilities.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, we appreciate you being here to

present that to us. Thank you very much.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. My pleasure, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Our next witness is Bob Davis, who

will represent the United States industry perspective on cooperative ventures with the Russians in space. And while Mr. Davis is

the President and CEO of the California Space Authority, his testimony before the Committee today is based on his own experience

in working U.S. industry deals with the Russians. And the opinions

he expresses are his own today, but he is a man whose opinions

have been shaped by his own experience.

29

So with those caveats, Mr. Davis, you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT M. DAVIS, PRESIDENT AND CEO

OF THE CALIFORNIA SPACE AUTHORITY

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, honorable

Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for addressing this matter of considerable importance to the future of our U.S. space enterprise community.

As you have heard, my name is Robert M. Davis. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer of the California Space Authority,

a member-supported, California-based, non-profit corporation that

exists to retain, grow, and create U.S. space enterprise in an intensively competitive global market that is highly coveted by all spacefaring nations, current and future. Our constituents have little

choice but to compete sometimes on unequal footing in these tough

markets.

As you have heard, the comments and viewpoints expressed

today are my own. They do reflect extensive experience gained

throughout the 1990’s for the number of U.S.–Russian company-tocompany and company-to-Russian government dealings and ongoing monitoring of these projects, most of which continue today.

With several provisos, I support U.S.–Russian cooperative space

enterprise initiatives and strongly encourage U.S. Government support of company-to-company projects, particularly when they contribute to a strong U.S. industrial base. Overall, aerospace projects

performed with Russian entities have been a positive experience for

U.S. companies.

Many companies view the Russians as good, positive partners.

Strong and positive relationships have developed in a number of instances, and a number of these business ventures have become

very successful over time. Tangible, specific benefits occur to those

companies who enter these arrangements, from which the United

States Government also benefits significantly, including ostensibly

from reductions of Russian missile technology proliferation elsewhere. Cooperative aerospace projects gainfully employ Russian

companies and individuals, thereby creating positive behavioral incentives.

U.S. companies have gained highly productive access to Russian

technology and know-how. The opportunity to leverage technology,

particularly in propulsion, metallurgy, ceramics, optics, and other

select areas has significantly advanced U.S. interests.

Aerospace endeavors have helped bring about Russia’s transition

toward a true market economy. A number of early U.S.–Russian

company-to-company dealings broke new ground in adoption of

western business approaches, financial thinking, and judicial practices. Projects with Russian aerospace entities expose and teach

market-oriented Western economic philosophy, practices, and operations to Russian entities and citizens. In kind, we have gained far

better understanding of Russian interests, viewpoints, and objectives.

On the subject of undesirable technology proliferation, it is difficult to know what else a Russian partner company may be doing.

The Russians are very proud, by their nature, can be very suspicious, even of one another, and secretive. Their cultural behaviors

30

and motives can create uncertainty as to what they are doing, as

to whether what they are doing is or not in the interest of the U.S.,

particularly as interpreted by U.S. citizens doing project work.

That said, Russians can be quite trustworthy. After a failed first

deal, my second undertaking built first on gaining each other’s

trust and thereafter enacting a relatively simple contract that became a true, enduring partnership, even when subjected to extreme

Russian Government pressures to abandon it. That partnership endures and every tenet of the agreement has been upheld to date.

That said, the Russians are tough, able competitors who have their

own needs to satisfy and will invariably do so.

There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides that result

from U.S.–Russian space cooperative endeavors. Given the weak,

worldwide commercial launch demand, U.S. companies, particularly in propulsion, are working at 50 percent of capacity and far

worse. A real tangible downside is the loss of work done in Russia

that could be done here. Comparatively meager and unsustained

United States Government space propulsion investment, as one

case in point, is what stimulated, originally, strategic alliances

with Russian propulsion entities at the probable cost of some U.S.

jobs. While not their preference, perhaps, U.S. company employment and investment losses are somewhat offset by access to and

selective use of Russian technology, know-how, and U.S. development projects. Projects such as Sea Launch, Orbital Space Plane

potentially launched on an EELV, or other known ISS access concepts, do or could make highly productive use of said Russian capabilities, albeit at some U.S. employment cost.

Absent U.S.–Russian cooperative aerospace endeavors, Russia

will fill the vacuum. If projects are stopped or slowed, Russia will

likely turn to China or increase its dealing with Russian—excuse

me, with European interests. The U.S. would also lose access and

insight into Russian aerospace plans and technological capabilities,

which we may later come to regret. The U.S. Government should

clearly articulate and steadfastly support policy that enables U.S.

Government—excuse me, U.S.–Russian company to company transactions. I urge the policies, laws, and regulations be implemented

in a fashion that minimize business disruption.

Mr. Chairman, honorable Members of the Committee, thank you

again for the opportunity to speak with you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. DAVIS

Mr. Chairman, and Honorable Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to

thank you for taking time from your busy schedules to look into a matter that is

of considerable importance to and impact on the future of our U.S. space enterprise

community.

My name is Robert M. Davis. I currently serve as the President and Chief Executive Officer of the California Space Authority, a member-supported California-based

non-profit corporation, whose purpose is to Retain, Grow and Create California

Space Enterprise. Our membership is comprised of individuals and entities from industry, academia, labor and workforce developers, and local government. Our membership includes a number of companies, large and small, from whom you hear frequently in behalf of their and our nations’ aerospace interests. The name of my corporation implies that we are interested only in the well being of California Space

Enterprise. However, Space Enterprise is an intensely competitive, internationally

coveted industry, and many of our constituents compete in tough global markets.

The California Space Authority is therefore keenly attentive to policy positions

31

taken by the U.S. Government that bear on the future competitiveness of our industry and nation and therefore do not limit our interests and voice solely to the confines of the borders of the State of California.

While I appear before you today as an employee of the California Space Authority,

the comments and viewpoints today are my own. They are drawn from and reflect

extensive earlier experience that I gained throughout the 1990s with a number of

U.S.–Russian company to company and company to Russian government dealings

and to which I continue to pay ongoing attention. I am flattered to have been invited to appear before you today, and thank you for the opportunity to offer and

share my views as a U.S. space enterprise industrialist.

With several provisos that I will define in my subsequent remarks, I support U.S.–Russian Space Cooperation and initiatives, and strongly encourage that our policy-makers and policies support company to company cooperative pursuits, in particular where they contribute to a strong U.S. industrial space enterprise base, and compliment our National Security interests.

In support of the aforementioned statement, I offer the following points for the

Committee’s consideration:

• Overall, U.S. industry dealings with Russian space entities have been

a positive experience for U.S. companies. Many U.S. entities have found

their Russian partners to be good partners. It is fair to say that strong and

positive relationships have developed over the years in a variety of areas. A

number of these business ventures have grown to be very successful and they

have gained use of technologies that are beneficial to U.S. space enterprise

companies’ interests. Later in my remarks, I will underscore what my own

experiences have taught me as to how Russians become good partners, which

is quite different than how such relationships occur and grow in a U.S. to

U.S. business framework.

• Those with whom I speak from across industry for the most part endorse company-to-company engagements with Russian aerospace industries. There are tangible and specific benefits that accrue to the companies who enter into these engagements, from which the USG also benefits significantly. It appears that these dealings have reduced the likelihood of missile technology proliferation. Whether they have wholly stopped proliferation

is not known. Company to company aerospace projects do keep Russians

(companies and individuals) gainfully employed, thereby creating incentives

to behave in ways that comply with U.S. ITAR and export/import requirements, which is beneficial to the interests of the U.S. and USG’s objectives.

• Dealing with Russian entities on development and production of

aerospace products achieves other outcomes that are beneficial to

the interests of the U.S. Government. These dealings expose and demonstrate market-oriented/western economic operations and philosophies to

Russian entities and citizens. Presuming the USG finds it desirable for the

Russian Republic to continue in the direction of becoming a true market

versus command economy, these relationships and ongoing business dealings

do help in achieving the transition of Russia toward that end.

• Aerospace endeavors appear to have been helpful in bringing about

Russia’s transition in the direction of a true market economy. A number of early U.S.–Russian company to company dealings broke new ground in

Russian adoption of western business approaches, financial thinking and juridical practices that did not broadly exist during the Cold War. Last year the

USG recognized Russia as a Market Economy, which can only be helpful to

U.S. global economic interests in the future.

• Another real plus is the access U.S. companies have gained to Russian technology and know how through conduct of company to company projects. The opportunity we thereby have to leverage technology, particularly in propulsion, which is selectively more highly performing and a

high quality product, has been of specific benefit to U.S. propulsion interests,

and thereby the USG and other U.S. companies that buy products that incorporate these technologies.

• I do not have a specific answer to the question ‘‘How do U.S. companies ensure that Russian partner companies not proliferate?’’ In my

experience, which admittedly is somewhat dated, I think it very difficult to

detect what a Russian partner may or not also be doing that is not in the

32

interests of the U.S. As professional relationships grow, particularly when

U.S. people are operating in situ, it is reasonable to expect that if one has

his or her eyes open and ears attuned, one might coincidentally witness circumstances that would give rise to suspicions about undesirable dealings the

Russian partner may be conducting. In my own case and those of my past

and current colleagues who have ongoing dealings with Russians, none with

whom I have worked would allow business interests to cloud their view of

U.S. interests and let some concern, if it were to arise, go ignored.

• Cultural behaviors and motives can create an air of uncertainty

about whether a Russian entity is conducting ancillary activities that

are not in the interests of the U.S. national security and diplomatic

interests elsewhere in the world. The Russians are very proud, by their

nature very suspicious even of one another, and secretive. They are deservedly proud of their aerospace accomplishments, highly protective of their technology, and behave diligently to ensure that their intellectual property remains theirs, and is not exploited, at least without specific offsetting gain.

These behaviors can create concern over their underlying motives, which may

not be warranted.

• Russians can become very Trustworthy. My personal experiences speak

volumes about dealing with Russians. My and my earlier company’s first

‘‘deal’’ with a Russian design bureau came apart in August 1991, after some

months of joint activity, probably the result of a collision of expectations, and

more importantly due to fundamental failures in communications borne out

of vast initially indiscernible cultural differences. My second undertaking,

which became a true, enduring partnership, even when the leaders of the

Russian partner were subjected to extreme Russian government pressures to

abandon it, have stayed the course. The fundamental difference between the

two was the presence or absence of one-to-one trust on the part of the two

leaders of the two entities. In the first case, we went at it as a standard business to business transaction, wrapped in typical Letters of Agreement, Contracts, payments, etc., which in the outcome didn’t endure at the first moment

of any pressure. The second was a partnership that was built first on gaining

each other’s trust, then jointly resolving how to meet our mutual business interests and objectives, and finally entering into a relatively simple ‘‘contract’’.

That partnership endures yet today, and in the case of the Russian partner,

has upheld every tenet of the agreements, even when it has been very financially painful for both partners to do so. I can also report that this has been

the experience with many of my industrial colleagues who have entered into

and continue to conduct business to business dealings with Russians and Russian entities today. That said, neither I, nor my many colleagues who have

worked closely with Russian counterparts hold a Pollyanna view of the Russians—they are tough, able competitors, who have their own national and

international needs to satisfy, and they will invariably seek to do so.

• There are significant U.S. industrial base downsides that result from

U.S.–Russian Space Cooperative Endeavors. U.S.–Russian company to

company (and government to government) dealings has and does displace

U.S. company workers. Propulsion and other aerospace work that could be

done by employees and U.S. companies is being done by Russian companies

and workers. Given the recent and dramatic decline in demand worldwide for

commercial launches, U.S. propulsion companies, in particular, are suffering,

probably all working at something less than 50 percent of capacity, and

worse. From first hand experience, our nation has not had an enduring space

launch propulsion investment program, which is what compelled me, one of

my former employers and other propulsion companies to look toward Russia

as a means of expediently gaining a better domestic competitive position. Essentially, our nation’s only enduring space propulsion investment has been in

the Shuttle’s main engine, which generally powers but a fraction of our national launch program needs and capabilities. The expense of large engine development, as a general rule, exceeds the financial capacity of essentially any

of the U.S. propulsion companies or corporations. While not necessarily the

choice or preference of U.S. propulsion companies, the comparatively meager

USG investment in space propulsion is what has helped create the gradient

or incentives that stimulated strategic alliances with Russian propulsion developers and producers. In order to achieve the access and workable alliances,

a number of those U.S. companies have heavily invested private capital in

order to achieve productive agreements; in some cases those agreements have

33

not been particularly lucrative, especially in light of the downturn in the

worldwide commercial launch market. To somewhat offset their losses (and

domestic technology investments) in propulsion base, those same alliances

have gained access to and use of technology and know how developed by the

Russians in the course of their space program. The Russians took different

technology and production routes than those of the U.S., and produced, selectively, more highly performing, very durable rocket engines; several of those

different approaches are being incorporated into future U.S. engine technology development. In fact, in the era of a future Orbital Space Plane, potentially launched on a US EELV, powered by an engine of Russian technology

origin, U.S. ISS access interests are likely to be served. Other such projects

such as Sea Launch, arrangements and possibilities exist that could enable

routine ISS access in yet different beneficial ways, again selectively using

Russian aerospace technologies and capabilities.

• On the subject of U.S.–Russian cooperative interests, nature abhors a

vacuum, which absent U.S.–Russian cooperative aerospace endeavors,

Russia will seek to fill. If the U.S. were to take the route that future dealing with Russian aerospace developers and producers is undesirable, and

cause their discontinuation, several things will or could occur. First, a part

of our current expendable launch stable will be disrupted for a period of time.

That will result in a loss of competition and in the long run, quite possibly

a loss of technological innovation and progress. Absent competition, the flow

of innovative juices is eventually stunted. Absent government to government,

company to company dealings, Russia will be forced to seek new markets for

its capabilities and products. China appears headed in a direction that some

U.S. aerospace leaders feel could seriously threaten U.S. space enterprise

leadership. Russia may well be induced to turn to dealing with China in order

to keep its aerospace community productively employed and earning, something that the U.S. may not find in its longer-term best interests. The same

outcome may occur between European and Russian interests. The U.S. would

also lose access to and insight into the ongoing evolution of Russian aerospace

interests and capabilities, which we might later come to regret.

In closing, it is therefore my viewpoint that the U.S. should clearly articulate and steadfastly support policy that enables U.S.–Russian company

to company (and government to government) undertakings. I urge that these

and our Administration’s deliberations produce policies and accompanying laws and

regulations that are implemented in a fashion that minimizes the potential for business disruption. Many U.S. companies have invested considerable sums of private

capital in joint U.S.–Russian aerospace endeavors. From time to time they find their

partnership and financial expectations disrupted, or relations with their investors

imperiled because of a temporary diplomatic position taken by the USG in order to

produce a behavioral modification on the part of Russia. Most companies enter into

these business partnerships with a prudent appreciation of the potential for instability and possibility of disruption. However, whatever actions the USG can take to

insulate these U.S. companies, particularly those that are entrepreneurial, and often

thinly capitalized, from contemporary diplomatic issues, should be further explored

and implemented.

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be delighted to answer any questions

that you may in regards to my remarks.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Davis.

Our final witness is Henry, and it looks like Skoloski.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Now say that again. Let me

hear it.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski. Sokolski.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. There it is.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. There it is.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. I mean, with a name like Rohrabacher,

I——

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Yeah.

Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Shouldn’t ever complain.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I know. We are afflicted with this.

34

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But he is the Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has testified before our

committee when we were considering the Iran Nonproliferation

Act. And just last week, you testified before the International Relations Committee. And I welcome you. I understand that you are a

witness who is a little bit more cautious about this, and we are

very interested in these relations with the Russians, and we are

very interested in your opinion. So you may proceed.

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE

DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Thank you for letting me testify here today, Mr.

Chairman.

Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies cooperate with Russia on civil space projects and show them that we

can profit from peaceful trade—show them that they could profit

from peaceful trade, the less they will be inclined or need to sell

this sensitive technology to nations that would use it for military

purposes. According to this view, the more U.S.–Russian civil space

cooperation and commerce one has, the more the cause of nonproliferation will be served. Unfortunately, I don’t think things are

quite that simple.

In fact, two of Russia’s most important incentives to proliferate

have nothing at all to do with profit. The first of these is the foreign political access and influence Russia gains when it sells militarily useful space technology to others. It isn’t just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous technologies that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China, to

name two, it is also the leverage it affords Russia with these nations on a host of other diplomatic, trade, and security issues. Second, for cultural and political reasons, Russia is still anxious to

maintain its outmoded military-related industries, including its

oversized space and missile sectors. Because this infrastructure is

still—despite downsizing—too large to be either profitable or fully

employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to maintain it continue to drive Russia toward risky exports in the mistaken belief

that cornering this illegitimate market might keep it from having

to further downsize its space and missile sectors.

These proliferation motivations are really quite important. As

long as they are in play, U.S.–Russian space cooperation and even

commerce and our efforts to curb dangerous missile proliferation,

will be at odds on at least three counts.

First there is an immediate tension, which I am sure this committee is seized with, between the U.S. funding work on the International Space Station and our desire not to have U.S. taxpayers

support Russian entities that are proliferating missile technology to

Iran and others. The original idea behind the U.S.–Russian cooperation on Space Station, an idea, I might add, that I first remember raising with our delegation in 1992 when we visited Russia, was to get Moscow to fully comply with the Missile Technology

Control Regime. This deal was subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became clear that Russia was not living up

to this understanding, the nonproliferation requirements, however,

the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was finally enacted. Its aim

35

was to assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers would not pay

to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation.

Now one of the issues is whether or not President Bush should

invoke the Act’s safety waiver. Invoking the waiver would require

stretching the law quite a bit. The Act reads that one can only invoke the waiver to prevent the imminent loss of life or grievous injury to those aboard the Station. So long as the Station’s current

crew can be returned to Earth, and it can, this condition is not

present. Then, there are the politics of making such a waiver,

which again are awkward. Making the waiver certainly would set

quite a precedent. What parts of the Space Station aren’t important

to safety? There aren’t many. Yet if you waive for one without

meeting the law’s clear language, why or where would you ever

stop? More important, nobody really thinks our intelligence agencies can give Russia a clean bill of health on Iranian missile proliferation.

This, in turn, raises a host of difficult questions. Is keeping the

Space Station’s schedule on track, even though we have already let

it slip year after year after year, and on budget, even though we

have already paid billions and billions and billions over the

project’s original cost estimate, a priority that should now trump

our security and that of millions of people who will live downrange

from Iran’s missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can

get a clean bill of health from our intelligence agencies, or until we

can develop an alternative to the Soyuz, more than we can afford?

The President certainly spoke up in support of the Space Station,

but he and Putin also warned the world about Tehran’s worrisome

development of strategic weapons, and it was this announcement,

not Bush’s statement on the Station, that got the world’s attention.

Second, there is a tension between U.S. civilian Russian space

commerce and cooperation and peaceful Russian space-related

transfers that Moscow knows are being diverted for military purposes in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China—nations either

primed to proliferate or that already have a track record of doing

so. President Bush only increased this tension with his announced

desire recently to work with friendly states, including Russia, to

interdict the export of weapons of mass destruction, including illicit

missiles and the means to make them. If Russia fails to cooperate

fully in this effort, including Russian space and nuclear help to

Iran’s suspect nuclear weapons program, this failure will only work

to expose U.S.–Russian space cooperation and commerce to increased political scrutiny and skepticism.

Let me conclude, I would ask that the entire statement be placed

in the record, by stating that until Russia’s space industry is

downsized to accord with legitimate private and domestic military

demand, continued space cooperation and commerce with Moscow

at current or higher levels, I am afraid, is doomed to encourage at

least as much Russian missile and space proliferation as it might

prevent.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]

36

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HENRY D. SOKOLSKI

Conventional wisdom has it that the more we and our allies cooperate with Russia

on civilian space projects and show them that they can profit from peaceful trade,

the less they will be inclined or need to sell this sensitive technology to nations that

would use it for military purposes. According to this view, the more U.S.–Russian

civilian space cooperation and commerce one has, the more the cause of nonproliferation will be served. Unfortunately, things are not so simple.

In fact, two of Russia’s most important incentives to proliferate have nothing at

all to do with earning a profit. The first of these is the foreign political access and

influence Russia gains when it sells militarily useful space technology to others. It

isn’t just the few hundreds of millions of dollars a year in sales in dangerous technologies that keeps Moscow cooperating with Iran and China; it’s also the leverage

it affords Russia with them on a host of other diplomatic, trade, and security issues.

Second, for cultural and political reasons, Russia is anxious to maintain its outmoded military-related industries—including its oversized space and missile sector.

Because this infrastructure is still too large ever to be either profitable or fully employed supplying legitimate demand, efforts to maintain it continue to drive Russia

toward risky exports in the mistaken belief that cornering this illegitimate market

might keep it from having to further downsize its space and missile sector.

These proliferation motivations are important: As long as they are in play, U.S.–

Russian space cooperation and our efforts to curb dangerous missile proliferation

will be at odds on at least three counts.

First, there is an immediate tension between U.S. funding work on the International Space Station (ISS) and our desire not to have U.S. taxpayers support Russian entities that are proliferating missile technology to Iran and others. The original

idea behind U.S.–Russian cooperation on the Space Station—an idea I remember

first raising as an option in talks with the Russians in l992—was to get Moscow

fully to comply with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This deal was

subsequently struck under President Clinton. When it became clear that Russia was

not living up to this deal’s nonproliferation requirements, the Iran Nonproliferation

Act of 2000 was finally enacted. Its aim was assure that, at the very least, U.S. taxpayers would not pay to have Russian entities engage in such proliferation. Now,

one of the issues is whether or not President Bush should invoke the act’s safety

waiver. Invoking the waiver would require stretching the law quite a bit. The act

reads that one can only invoke the waiver ‘‘to prevent the imminent loss of life or

grievous injury’’ to those aboard the Station. So long as the Station’s current crew

can be returned to Earth—and it can—this condition is simply not present. Then,

there are the politics of making such a waiver, which, at best, are awkward. Making

the waiver certainly would set quite a precedent. What parts of the Space Station

aren’t important to safety? There aren’t many. Yet, if you waive for one without

meeting the law’s clear language, why or where would you ever stop? More important, nobody really thinks our intelligence agencies can give Russia a clean bill of

health on Iranian missile proliferation. This, in turn, raises a host of difficult questions. Is keeping the Space Station’s schedule on track (even though we’ve already

let it slip year after year) and on budget (even though we’ve already paid billions

and billions over the project’s original cost estimate) a priority that should now

trump our security and that of millions of people who live down range from Iran’s

missiles? Is slowing the project down until Moscow can get a clean bill of health

from our intelligence agencies or until we can develop an alternative to the Soyuz

more than we can afford? The President certainly spoke up in support of the Space

Station in Moscow. But he and Putin also warned the world about Tehran’s worrisome development of strategic weapons and it was this announcement, not Bush’s

statement on the station, that got the world’s attention.

Second, there is a tension between civilian U.S.–Russian space commerce and cooperation and ‘‘peaceful’’ Russian space-related transfers that Moscow knows are

being diverted for military uses in Iran, Pakistan, Libya, India, and China—nations

either primed to proliferate or that already have a track record of doing so. President

Bush only increased this tension with his announced desire to work with friendly

states, including Russia, to interdict the export of weapons of mass destruction including illicit missiles and the means to make them. If Russia fails to cooperate

fully in this effort, this failure will only work to expose U.S.–Russian space cooperation and commerce to increased political scrutiny and skepticism. Russia is helping

to build missiles for India; India has just signed a military cooperation agreement

with Iran and is talking about exporting its own missile technology. Iran, meanwhile, is not just getting covert missile assistance from Moscow. It is also overtly

buying Russian satellites and earth tracking stations that could help it and others

37

target their missiles against our friends and forces abroad. Moscow knows this but

continues to claim that all of its space commerce is peaceful.

Finally, there is a tension between the lack of domestic military and civilian call

for Russian space related goods and services and U.S.–Russian space transfers,

which tend to keep Russia’s space infrastructure larger than legitimate demand can

support. U.S. and European cooperative space efforts and commerce with Russia are

too modest to keep all of Russia’s oversized space and missile industry fully employed. But they are not small enough to force Russia to make the painful political

decisions to further downsize their industry so it will not be so prone to proliferate.

In the U.S., whatever surplus of space-related capabilities we have is maintained

with the federal funding of space related projects. Russian government funding of

its space industry, however, is much smaller. As such, there is constant pressure

on many of its space enterprises to sell militarily useful technology to foreign customers who might use or sell this technology to proliferate. Until Russia’s space industry is downsized to accord with legitimate private and domestic military demand,

continued U.S. space cooperation and commerce with Moscow at current or higher

levels is doomed to encourage at least as much Russian missile and space proliferation as it might prevent.

BIOGRAPHY FOR HENRY D. SOKOLSKI

Henry D. Sokolski is the Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a Washington-based nonprofit organization founded in 1994 to promote a better understanding of strategic weapons proliferation issues for academics,

policy-makers, and the media.

He served from 1989 to 1993 as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office

of the Secretary of Defense under Paul Wolfowitz and received the Secretary of Defense’s Medal for Outstanding Public Service. Prior to his appointment to this post,

Mr. Sokolski worked in the Secretary’s Office of Net Assessment on proliferation

issues.

In addition to his Executive Branch service, Mr. Sokolski served from 1984

through 1988 as Senior Military Legislative Aide to Senator Dan Quayle and as

Special Assistant on Nuclear Energy Matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey from

1982 through 1983. Mr. Sokolski also served as a consultant on proliferation issues

to the intelligence community’s National Intelligence Council. After his work in the

Pentagon, Mr. Sokolski received a Congressional appointment to the Deutch Proliferation Commission, which completed its report in July of 1999. He also served

as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Panel from 1995

to 1996.

Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited a number of works on proliferation related

issues including, Best of Intentions: America’s Campaign Against Strategic Weapons

Proliferation (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), Beyond Nunn-Lugar: Curbing the Next

Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies

Institute, 2002); 21st Century Weapons Proliferation: Are We Ready? (London: Frank

Cass, 2001); Planning for a Peaceful Korea (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

2001); Prevailing in A Well Armed World (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,

2000) and Fighting Proliferation (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996).

Mr. Sokolski has been a resident fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy,

the Heritage Foundation, and the Hoover Institution. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the Institute of World Politics in Washington and has taught

courses at the University of Chicago, Rosary College, and Loyola University. Mr.

Sokolski attended the U. of Southern California and Pomona College and received

his graduate education at the University of Chicago.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN

AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, STATE DEPARTMENT

While not appearing before the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, Deputy Assistant Secretary Steven Pifer provided the

following written testimony and agreed to answer questions for the

record.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pifer follows:]

38

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEVEN PIFER

Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of this committee. It is an honor to appear before

you with my colleague from NASA. We at the State Department consider it a privilege to work together with John Schumacher and his colleagues at NASA to further

one of America’s loftiest goals—the mission of human space flight. At State, our contribution to this mission is to facilitate relations with our international partners in

space exploration while safeguarding our broader national security interests. Although we cooperate closely with many space agencies around the world, any conversation about the U.S. space program would be incomplete if it did not note the

unique and historic partnership we share with Russia in the field of human space

flight. Space cooperation between the United States and Russia remains one of the

most visibly successful elements of the U.S.–Russian bilateral relationship.

U.S.–Russian Space Cooperation

In recent months, this partnership has had to face tragic and unforeseen challenges. In the wake of the loss of the Shuttle Columbia, we have turned to our Russian colleagues for their assistance in sustaining the operations of the International

Space Station (ISS). Considering our mutual experience in space exploration, Russia

has undertaken important additional efforts to maintain the viability of the ISS.

With the Shuttle fleet grounded, the Russian Aviation and Space Agency

(Rosaviakosmos) readily accepted its role as provider of the world’s only physical

link to the Station.

When the International Partners became concerned about the supply of water and

other critical provisions to the Station, Russia made every effort to ensure that its

Progress resupply vehicle would be available to provide support for the Station. The

unmanned Progress vehicles are critical workhorses for delivering supplies to the

Station. When the International Partners were faced with the possibility of

mothballing the Station, Russia utilized a previously planned Soyuz launch to ferry

a fresh crew to the Station, a mission that had been slated to be carried out by the

Shuttle. This kind of cooperation, in the aftermath of the loss of the Columbia, has

strengthened further our space partnership.

Underscoring the depth of this partnership, President Bush and President Putin

reaffirmed U.S.–Russian cooperation in space at their June 1 meeting in St. Petersburg. In their joint statement, the Presidents extolled the role our two countries

have played in the field of human space flight and confirmed their mutual aspiration to ensure the continued assembly and viability of the International Space Station as a world-class research facility. Looking to the future, the Presidents agreed

to explore ways to enhance our cooperation in the field of space technology and techniques.

The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000

As our space partnership proceeds and explores new areas of cooperation, both the

State Department and NASA have been rigorous in enforcing the legislative requirements of the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) of 2000. With the International Partners and separately with Russian officials, the Administration has consistently

made clear that all activity with Russia must be conducted within the bounds of

U.S. law and our nonproliferation policy.

Bolstering nonproliferation remains a core issue on the U.S.–Russia security agenda. The State Department and other U.S. officials in the Administration have engaged the Russian government at the most senior levels to seek an end to sensitive

cooperation between Russian entities and state sponsors of terrorism, such as Iran.

In the context of our diplomatic engagement, Russia has taken steps, though not

yet sufficient, to implement stronger export controls and improve oversight at Russian facilities. In the case of Iran, we have made clear our very strong concern that

Russian cooperation with Iran not facilitate Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons

or long-range ballistic missiles. While we cannot go into great detail in an unclassified forum, we can affirm that Russia has taken actions in response to specific cases

related to the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technology in the course of our dialogue on nonproliferation. We continue to monitor the issue of ballistic missile technology assistance, and continue to be committed to Russia’s cessation of any assistance that could help Iran with the delivery of WMD.

Iran’s nuclear program was a key issue addressed by Secretary Powell with President Putin in their May meeting in Moscow and by President Bush with President

Putin in St. Petersburg on June 1. We have stressed our concerns about the recent

revelations of hidden Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear fuel cycle capable of supporting a nuclear weapons program, such as the centrifuge facility at Natanz. Given

39

what this new information says about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, we have again

urged the Russians to reconsider their nuclear cooperation with Iran and believe

they are actively doing so.

President Putin made clear at the G–8 Summit in Evian that all Iranian nuclear

programs must be under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA Director General is conducting

an investigation of the Iranian nuclear program, and his report will soon be taken

up by the IAEA Board of Governors. Until Iran has fully satisfied the IAEA’s examination and fully addressed the international community’s concerns and questions,

including full implementation of the Additional Protocol, no country should be engaging in nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Administration will continue to press

the Russian government not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran until Iran

signs an Additional Protocol and verifiably abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Although it would be difficult to quantify the INA’s impact on the Russian government’s export control policy, I assure you that the pressure applied by the INA is

palpable in any dialogue with Russia on space. Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General Director

of Rosaviakosmos, has been particularly active in promoting reform throughout the

Russian government, and frequently notes the constraints imposed by the INA on

U.S.–Russian space cooperation. Other Russian officials also regularly express their

concern about the INA constraints. While the Administration acknowledges

Rosaviakosmos’ sincere efforts to reform and to maintain a good record on nonproliferation, we remain concerned about Russia’s broader nonproliferation record.

We will continue our high-level diplomatic dialogue with Rosaviakosmos and other

relevant Russian agencies to address this issue.

The U.S. Export Control Process

Domestically, State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs ensures that our own export control policy is sound and is implemented effectively, including in our space cooperation with Russia. The Directorate is charged with controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services covered by the United States Munitions List (USML). The

Directorate’s mission is to advance national strategic objectives and U.S. foreign policy goals through timely enforcement of defense trade controls and the formulation

of defense trade policy. It carries out its mission by enforcing the law and reviewing

export license applications for defense articles and services, ensuring that exports

approved are consistent with this mission and that companies comply with defense

trade laws and regulations. Through the licensing process, relevant U.S. Government agencies have the opportunity to review individual export license applications

and advise whether proposed exports would be consistent with our national security

and foreign policy. The State Department makes licensing decisions accordingly.

This extensive procedure applies not only to exports to Russia, but to all U.S. exports, and helps ensure that federal agencies such as NASA and U.S. aerospace

firms do not, even inadvertently, contribute to the proliferation of sensitive technology around the globe.

U.S.–Russia Relations

A word about our overall bilateral relationship with Russia. Our two countries are

working hard to move past our recent disagreement over Iraq. In St. Petersburg,

Presidents Bush and Putin made clear their determination to reinvigorate the partnership. Expanding cooperation in the security dimension remains at the top of the

agenda, and this includes pressing the Russians to improve their performance on

key nonproliferation issues. Likewise, the Administration will persist in its efforts

to enhance U.S.–Russian cooperation in counterterrorism, strategic stability, and

missile defense. We also hope to broaden our cooperation in space and expand the

economic component of our relations, particularly in the energy field. We intend to

continue working closely with our colleagues at NASA to implement the Presidents’

commitment to enhance our cooperation in space, while remaining fully consistent

with our security and nonproliferation goals for the bilateral relationship.

DISCUSSION

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you for your words of caution.

And before we get into the question and answers, I would ask a

Member of my Staff, we happened to find a little matryoshka doll

here. We were talking about not knowing what is inside and not

being able to ask any questions, so we just have this little

matryoshka doll to remind us that Ambassador Pifer is not here to

40

answer any questions and to let us get any deeper insight into this

issue. So he will just sit there like a little wooden dummy instead

of being here to answer questions and to express—explain to us the

policies of the Administration.

Thank you.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, apparently the State Department—the Administration is represented by Mr. Schumacher.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well said, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

With that said, I would like to start the questions and answers off

with just—I think we need to go to Mr. Schumacher first. Right.

IRAN NONPROLIFERATION ACT

To what degree does NASA believe that the—and of course, this

is the crux—one of the major issues here today is whether the Iran

Nonproliferation Act restricts U.S. contractor to Russian contractor

relationship. And is a congressional clarification needed on that account?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. I can tell you for the Iran Nonproliferation Act, and specifically Section 6 with—which is titled

International Space Station, but in the definitions talks about all

human space flight-related goods or purchases in kind transfers.

We have worked closely with State on that. I can tell you the view

from State to us is that they express serious concern about any

contemplation of a contract—what—in short version, contractor to

contractor meaning U.S. funds to a U.S. contractor. U.S. contractor

goes out and buys from a Russian contractor.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Um-hum.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Any entity under the Russian Aviation and

Space Agency that that might well be violative of the Act, and if

it is not violative of the black letter law of the Act, it is, at a minimum frustrates and deemed violative of the intent and the spirit

of the Act. So the short version would be——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. I have the law in front of me

here, and it doesn’t seem to mention private companies. It talks

about the Russian Government.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, in the definition, it defines any entity

under the jurisdiction or control of Rosaviakosmos. And then it

even says even an entity where the Russian Rosaviakosmos had a

joint stock ownership and then got rid of that.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, it says here neither the Russian

Aviation and Space Industry nor any other organization or entity

under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation Space

Agency. Now that seems to be pretty definitive in terms of if you

have an American company, would you say that—and that same

restriction was placed on NASA, would you say that that applied

and that that then related to all American companies?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, sir; I sure wouldn’t.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. I am sorry that the—as you

are relaying the position of the State Department, I am just sorry

the State Department couldn’t come here and express that to us

themselves. And Mr. Woodenhead here isn’t going to tell us, so we

will just have to have this discussion based on what we have here

today. So but you believe that then if we are going to be in compliance with nonproliferation, you—it is your reading, and for what

41

you know, the Administration’s position that that also relates to

private companies?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. And if I could take you in the—in

Section 7 of the definitions of the Act, it is a sub—let me see. It

is number 5, organization or entities under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation Space Agency. And then in there, it

goes through a whole bunch of subsets, but it—any entity—basically, it is any entity that was under the jurisdiction or control of

Rosaviakosmos, which covers, the way the Russians are structured,

some 450 aerospace enterprises. And then a little later on, it even

says that—let us see, any entity that the Russian Aviation and

Space Agency or Russian Space Agency had a holding or controlling

interest and then divested it, it would still be subject to the Act.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Now I—it seems to me, now I was

around when this happened, in fact, I was one of the supporters.

And I still support the concept of this. We should make sure that

we keep the pressure on. And I know that Mr. Sokolski, no, whatever it is, anyway, sorry about that, what—I understand the concerns that you have, and we cannot just ignore the fact that the

Russians are building a nuclear power plant for the Iranians and

Iran happens to be a—you know, an oil and gas rich country. So,

is this a threat to our national security along with missile development? The answer is yes, it is. How we can, perhaps, instead of

using a punitive attempt, and maybe I should open this up to the

panel, would not a more carrot rather than a stick be more appropriate in getting the Russians to have their—to judge their decisions in something—in a more positive way?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Mr. Rohrabacher, I can tell you we, as we

have talked with you and with the Committee over these years

about this, certainly nonproliferation issues are the threshold. That

is where we start. And the people we work with, and we look to

State in their interaction in the other parts of the government, to

certify that people do meet those nonproliferation orders before we

can work with them. We think that is a very positive and high

standard to set, and then we get into a cooperative relationship

with them. So, in particular, if you are trying to work with a nation

or work with companies, it is an encouragement for them to have

to adhere to these laws.

PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN U.S. AND RUSSIAN COMPANIES

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, if we show—Mr. Davis, if we

could show them that they are going to make hundreds of millions

if not billions of dollars in doing partnerships with American companies doing something positive, isn’t this something that you

think that would lead them to use their resources in the right direction rather than building missiles and nuclear weapons?

Mr. DAVIS. It has been my experience that—that the possibility

and the prospects for them, indeed, being engaged by former companies prevent—potentially resulting in millions of dollars of work

certainly moderated or modified their behavior. Yes.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Here you go, Mr. Sokolski.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Sokolski.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Got it. And you have to speak

a little into the mike.

42

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I forgot to turn it on.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. There you go.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I hope my job isn’t to be ogre, but let me suggest

something. I can remember quite well why the Iran Nonproliferation Act laid off the U.S. vendors that were doing space launches,

because if you remember correctly, the first charge up to the Hill

was, ‘‘Let us go after the space quota.’’ Remember that? Boy, did

I get called in by an awful lot of people in that business asking for

advice. I suggested, ‘‘Well, maybe we should just all agree that the

U.S. Government should not use taxpayer money to make progress

payments to entities that are in the Russian press being identified

as proliferaters.’’ And everyone said, ‘‘Oh, what a relief. Let us do

that.’’

Now if what you do is say, ‘‘Well, but we have got a problem.

They are still proliferating, and we want to do business with Russian companies that we think are cleaner, or perhaps totally clean.’’

If you shift all of the contracting from the dirty entities to the clean

ones, you do two things. You get around the law, in a sense, without breaking it, because you can interpret this thing differently,

quite clearly. You have seen that. But I think you are going to do

something else that you may not intend, and that is when Russia’s

continued cooperation on Iranian rockets and nuclear activities gets

to be really bad, and it is going to get bad, and we don’t do something much more dramatic with our European allies than we are

doing. There is going to be a spotlight turned right on the contractors that you focused on, much like we wanted to avoid when we

originally focused on the Space Station. So there is no free lunch

here. If there is proliferation, getting around the legal issues won’t

get you around the political ones is my hunch.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And so you are suggesting that if we

are going to have a more expanded cooperative effort with the Russians on—in these space efforts, that we do have to come down and

face this hard decision and not try to hedge, just face it head on?

Unless there is an agreement made, we just cannot expand our cooperation any further with the Russians in space?

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I guess I am Shrek here. Yes.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. I—let me just note before we

go on to Mr. Gordon, we are not talking about a country, when we

talk about Russia, as the same being that we are talking about

Communist China. In Communist China, there has not been one

inch of political reform. They have no opposition parties. It is a totally totalitarian state. I believe that the people who run Communist China still harbor some evil designs on the United States

of America and other Western democracies.

However, in Russia, in contrast, over the last 10 years, there has

been tremendous reform. And while there are still undercurrents

that we are talking about today that are very serious and we—and

affect our national security, the Russians have opposition in newspapers. They have got opposition parties. They are well on a way

toward an evolution, toward a more democratic and free country.

They haven’t reached it yet, and we owe it to them, you know, it

is a tough-love type of thing, to be very solid and serious about

what they must do.

43

Mr. SOKOLSKI. I think this was the reason why we made a distinction originally when we tried to pass this law between commerce—between companies that aren’t government-funded indirectly, which is—you know, you could get a contract from NASA

and then give it to an American firm. And then an American firm

could then do a bankshot to a Russian firm. That is not really private industry to private industry. That is a Federal Government

contract to a private firm to a Russian company.

We made a distinction between what was going on between entities that wanted to try to make a go at making a profit and those

that, like those that are underneath the agency of the Government

of Russia, that really are still too large in number and not really

up to making a profit yet.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Mr. Gordon, you may proceed.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you.

First let me concur with Chairman Rohrabacher and Chairman

Boehlert in their concerns with State. Assured goodness, this is

going to get worked out and we can move forward. We all need to

do our job.

Mr. Schumacher, thank you for being here today. As I said earlier, I had submitted some questions to Administrator O’Keefe at

our NASA posture hearing in February and haven’t heard from

them yet. And but I also—my staff put your staff on notice that we

would be talking about some of that today, so I would hope that

you would be able to get us started.

RUSSIAN SUPPORT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION

So let me start with you. What specific financial arrangements

are in place to ensure that all needed Soyuz and Progress vehicles

will be available to support the International Space Station for a

period up to 32 months that the Shuttle fleet was grounded after

the Challenger accident? And specifically, how much will it cost to

provide the necessary Soyuz and Progress vehicles and who will be

paying that expense?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. And I did not pass off lightly on your

first issue. Part of my first action as Chief of Staff is to make sure

your questions get answered and up here very quickly.

So with regard to your questions, a couple things. First, the partnership has really responded to the tragedy of Columbia in a way

that really emphasized how strong it is. And we went to the partners, and we said this will really be a test of the partnership, no

doubt about it. Yes, we have had a tragedy. We need to go and take

care of that. And we are going after it, you know, as hard as we

can. In the meantime, we hope we can look across partnership solutions to resupply and maintain human presence on the Station,

keep the ops and the science going. And as a matter of fact, that

was one of the strengths in the partnership we always talked about

was the redundancy and that type of thing.

We went into the partnership, and we have, through the partnership, as I talked about, late February, early March, laid out a plan.

It is really—and it is approved at the—through the SSCB, which

is a technical Space Station Control Board level to multilateral control, which is really the heads of the program. It is endorsed by the

heads of agency. So a long winded way of saying the—all of the

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space agencies in the partnership have signed up to this. What it

is is a plan for Soyuz and Progress coverage, both human and cargo

resupply of the Station through 2003 and 2004. That plan is being

iterated. You might have seen some comments this morning from

Mike Kostelnik, the ISS program head here in Washington, where

he said the Progress we were looking to accelerate from the beginning of 2004 into 2003, it looks like we may well be able to back

off that, because watching six weeks of consumables with a two

partner crew has allowed us to start looking at pushing back. Both

teams are working that really hard and keep a very careful watch

on that. And that is looking good.

In—so in response to your question about do we have a plan and

do we have a schedule, yes, we have a partnership——

Mr. GORDON. Do you have any commitments?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir, I will get to that, if I could. We have

a partnership plan for those vehicles in that sequence. And the

sense of commitments to the Station, I think first and foremost,

you have seen the strong support of both Presidents to make the

Station fly, remain crewed, and move forward to assembly and

completion. You see the commitment from the Russian President,

himself, that Russia will do what it takes to sustain Station until

we return to flight.

Mr. GORDON. Excuse me. What it takes or what it can?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well——

Mr. GORDON. They are two different matters.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. And I will be glad to get into that.

The Russian Government itself, and I will through each of the parties, but Russia itself, Russia has taken the funding for

Rosaviakosmos for the full year——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah, I understand that. I mean—if I could—you

have—answer the question that way you don’t have to repeat it——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON [continuing]. I mean, because we have got a short

time here. I know it is really that the Russians want to help. I

know that they have moved their next year’s funding to this year’s

funding. I also know that our—some of our partners have taken up

some of the additional slots, but that was done before the accident.

And so where I think we are now is that NASA has finally admitted what we have all known and that is the Shuttle, in all likelihood, is not going to fly this year. And we are pretty much, I think,

hopeful covered this year by virtue of the Russians taking next

year’s funds and moving them here and by commitments that our

partners had already made. The question is what—you know, the

Challenger, we were down for 32 months, so what happens next

year?

Now my concern is that it is just—I have to say—I mean, it is

inconceivable to think that our partners, who think that they are

less wealthy and have tough budget problems like we do, are going

to say, ‘‘Sure, we are going to pay for NASA’s responsibilities next

year.’’ Maybe they will, but I think that is going to be a hard sell,

and it would be irresponsible for us not to think that they might

think that the U.S. has more money than they do and maybe the—

you know, and the U.S. should go forward. So I think if really, you

know, we—they think about this.

45

Now obviously one concern is just the mechanical aspect; can the

Russians—how long can they do this? Let us assume that they can

continue to. I would like to know that question, but I still don’t see

what the funding is for next year, other than maybe goodwill. Have

any of the partners agreed for next year? Who and give me specifically, and for how much?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. With regard to the Russians,

Rosaviakosmos, first, their funding for this year has been phased

forward six months.

Mr. GORDON. Yeah. Right.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. They will have a government level meeting

again early in the fall to decide on the increased funding for their

budget for this year. They will also decide on an augment to next

year’s budget.

Mr. GORDON. And when will that be?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. In the September timeframe. They are looking

at that. They are—again, they are assessing, like we are, over the

summer looking at the Progress and all of that type of thing. The

Soyuz vehicle flow remains, as before, to a year. This is really

about the increase and the acceleration of Progress. Originally, we

were operating very conservatively right after the loss of Columbia

looking at a Progress this year and another next year.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Let me—because my time is——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. In case the Russians, in September, say, ‘‘We can’t

afford to do this next year,’’ are we going to wait until September

to come up with our plan or are we going to come up with an alternative before that?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, sir. Well, two parts. First, they have said

just the opposite. They have said they will do—they are not—when

they say they will do it, it takes—it is not just a wishful—the government level administrative finance, the President said they are

looking at what the budget increases are necessary to cover their

part.

Mr. GORDON. I don’t mean to be—and I have really got a joint

statement.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. And it is still a little loosey goosey to me and that

they want to—they hope to—it is important, but I could read you

a number, if you want me to, examples in past years where they

said they were going to do things and they didn’t do it. So again,

I just don’t think that it is the responsible thing, looking at their

past history and looking at the lack of real definitive statement

here, for us not to plan for an alternative.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GORDON. But don’t we—are we planning for an alternative,

if they say they can’t do it?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Certainly. First of all, we watched, obviously

the statements and the discussions as well as vehicle flowing. I

know you are aware, we have people on the ground that—we have

people that interact with these folks every day. As you talked about

for crew slots, that also plays into next year. Japan has stepped

forward. Canada is talking to Russia about a crew opportunity. So

there are a number of different activities that are going forward in

46

the partnership to look at additional support in this area. But I

would say, first and foremost, the Russian Government has stepped

up to this. And I think you are certainly right, and I just——

Mr. GORDON. Are we not worried about it? So should we just—

I mean, you know, the Members of this committee just not worry?

You are going to take responsibility to say this is going to be paid

for. We don’t have it on the dotted line, but it is for us not to worry

about it, not to be asking for alternatives and just worry—we

should worry about other things?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. We worry about these things everyday, Mr.

Gordon. I can assure you. And it is something we have to watch,

and we will be the first to——

Mr. GORDON. Are you going to do any planning? Besides watching, are you going to make any plans, alternative plans?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, the alternative plans would be we know

the Europeans are going to come on line with ATV in the fall of

next year. Other than that, it is Russian vehicles in the near-term

and the alternatives would have to be alternative funding mechanisms if we got to that.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So are you going to present any of those to

us?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, it is not, because this time we don’t think

we need to. I mean, we can move forward quickly if we have to.

Mr. GORDON. How quickly can you—how quickly then?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. How quickly?

Mr. GORDON. How quickly will you have a plan after they say

they are not going to be able to pay for this?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. I think that would be very fast, because it is

a pretty straight forward issue of watching if they——

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So how fast can you be then? Would it be

a day? Would it be a week? Would it be a month?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. It would certainly——

Mr. GORDON. Would it be a day?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. I would say within a week of knowing.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Well, then if that is the case, it must be

pretty easy if you can do it that quickly. So you can just go ahead

and tell us what it is.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. The alternative?

Mr. GORDON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. It would be some form of funding other—with

other partner contributions or us. And we would have to come forward to you for relief on the Act, should that ever be the case.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So the—so you would feel like—would that—

I mean, that is a pretty simple, sane suggestion.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Thank you. Thank you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Gordon.

And with the Chairman’s prerogative here, that would be, that type

of cooperation and expanded cooperation would be within keeping

of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, correct?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. It would have—to start on, it would have to

be.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. We could do it one or two ways.

47

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Sokolski, I am sorry. Mr. Sokolski,

there it is. Mr. Sokolski is nodding his head yes, and he is the

skeptic here, so I would take it that that means that it probably

is well within the definition of the Russian Nonproliferation Act

and the Iranian Nonproliferation Act. Let me note that there are

many other areas of cooperation that we could do, but that you are

suggesting now that would be limited by the Nonproliferation Act.

And we will discuss that in the second round of questions.

And then I will turn to distinguished Co-Chairman in the National Security Committee, who is probably one of the greatest—

well, not probably, one of the—he is the foremost expert on Russian-American relations in the United States Congress, Curt

Weldon.

Mr. WELDON. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the

compliment. Thank you for the foresight to hold this hearing.

Thank you all for coming.

And I want to take a little different tact here, and I would ask

my colleagues to listen to this, because it is important as we discuss violations of arms control agreements and proliferation. First

of all, we do have some other successful programs with the Russians involving space. There was a brief allusion, I believe by Mr.

Davis, to the Lockheed Martin-Khrunichev Initiative. That has

been an extremely successful initiative involving billions of dollars

that has benefited both the Russians through the Khrunichev organization and Lockheed Martin and—as an example of how the private sector can work together in developing space launch opportunities.

There has also been a very successful effort funded by the Department of Defense on the RAMOS program, which is fostered

in—on the U.S. side, the Utah Russian Institute, and on the Russian side where we are building two joint satellites to build some

confidence in the area of understanding when launches occur

around the country.

We are also, at the—again, at the suggestion of President Bush

and President Putin, moving forward on missile defense. And there

is currently a study by our Missile Defense Agency looking at the

parameters of missile defense cooperation.

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

But I am going to talk for a moment about proliferation. And I

want to remind my colleagues of some facts. We talk about the Iran

Missile Sanctions Bill. I would remind my colleagues, the first time

that bill passed the House and the Senate with veto-proof margins

in both bodies, the President vetoed the bill. We had 398 votes in

the Senate, 98 votes in the—398 votes in the House, 98 votes in

the Senate, and President Clinton vetoed the bill. In fact, I got

called down to the White House twice by Vice President Gore, both

before the House voted and before the Senate voted. And with Senate and House colleagues from both parties, we were lectured that

we shouldn’t pass the bill, and we did.

Unfortunately, the blame doesn’t all lie with the President, because Newt Gingrich wouldn’t let us override the veto. We had the

votes. We had the votes in the House and the Senate, and for reasons as yet unknown, in the fall of the year that Newt Gingrich

48

went down, we could not issue the veto override, and we had the

votes to do it. And Henry Sokolski knows that. So the bill was vetoed the first time by the President. And we came back the following year and President Clinton said, ‘‘Okay, I will support it.’’

And he came out at the beginning. In fact, the bill passed a second

time.

But I want to make the case that some of our own actions have

caused the very proliferation that we rail about. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I did a—had a Congressional Research Service do a study in

1998, which I have put in the record probably five times. And I

would be glad to put it in the record here. From 1991 to 1998,

there were 38 violations of arms control agreements by China and

by Russia: 38 times, 20 by Russia and 18 by China. Of the 38 times

that we had evidence, according to the Congressional Research

Service, of violations of arms control agreements, and our responsibility as a signatory is to let that country know that they are in

violation and take action. We imposed the required sanctions less

than 10 times. Now Mr. Sokolski knows this, because his group did

a study looking at some possible options, less than the full requirements of treaty compliance or treaty requirements that could, in

fact, be considered, but the Administration didn’t want to hear

that.

So by our very inaction of not enforcing arms control agreements,

when we knew there were violations, we encourage the problem. In

fact, I carry around an accelerometer and gyroscope when I give

speeches that we caught being transferred from Russia to Iraq

three times. We had the evidence. The Administration knew about

it and never imposed the required sanctions under the MTCR. So

I would make the case that we, by our own actions, and in my

opinion is it because we were trying to reinforce the status of Boris

Yeltsin as President. And we didn’t want to publicly acknowledge

violations of arms control agreements in the ’90’s, because the Administration’s overriding policy was to keep Yeltsin in. Even

though we had evidence, time and again, of violations, we pretended that we didn’t see it. We pretended we didn’t see it with the

missile—with the gyroscopes and accelerometers, which I have examples of and which I asked Tom Pickering about when he was the

Ambassador of Moscow. And he said, ‘‘Congressman, you have got

to go ask the President.’’ And I did. And the President wrote me

in March of that year, and he said, ‘‘We have no evidence.’’ And at

the same time he wrote me, one of our intelligence agencies had

over 100 sets of accelerometers and gyroscopes that we intercepted

three times going from Russia to Iraq.

So before we criticize, I think we have to understand that some

of our own actions have, in fact, caused the problem. And the second example, I was on the Cox Committee, and I would ask Mr.

Sokolski if he wants to respond to this. What about our own companies? I sat through seven months of closed briefings where I saw

our own companies, again because the Administration lowered

thresholds, sold technology to China. What kind of technology?

Stage separation technology, technology for launching missiles.

Now we are quick to blame Russia for all of the problems, and I

am, too. I am Russia’s toughest critic, but I also think we have to

acknowledge that sometimes our own actions have sent very wrong

49

mixed signals. In the case of China, we had instance after instance

where—and Boeing just paid a big fine, where those companies

from California were illegally transferring sensitive technology or

got special exceptions made by the Administration to lower thresholds that allowed technology to go to China.

So if you are in Russia and you see us not calling into play the

violations that they know are taking place, and you see us on the

other hand sending technology to China because our companies

want to do that, even though that technology was, up until that

time, prohibited, then I think we—certainly think you send a

mixed signal. And talking about nuclear technology, Mr. Chairman,

which you did, you are right. The Russians should not have helped

Iran build the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but every time I raise

that issue with the Russians, do you know what they say? ‘‘Well,

wait a minute, aren’t you building one for North Korea?’’ And what

is the answer? The answer is yes.

So the point is, when it comes to proliferation, yes, we ought to

be critical of the Russians, and I am and will continue to be. And

you are also, Mr. Chairman, but we are—also need to be willing

to look at ourselves squarely in the mirror and say, ‘‘Maybe the

problem is that we have a double standard ourselves.’’ And then we

ought to take that into consideration in all of our dealings with

Russia and other agencies involving space.

Thank you.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. You might want to just comment on

Mr. Weldon’s eloquent statement, I might add.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. If I could, Mr. Chairman, what I would offer

is that whole—about how we push on compliance. You know, we

talked a little bit earlier about for space cooperation, the threshold

that—it is very important. We have—every time we go into one of

these agreements, the Space Station is a great example of it, a very

rigorous export control regime put in place. Our partners understand that when you put the lines in place and people understand

that, they respond. And you really—you can get into even some

very involved and high-tech cooperatives as long as you have clean

lines and people are watching what they are doing and you enforce

those.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Davis, did you—Sokolski—Mr.

Sokolski, Mr. Davis.

Mr. DAVIS. The only thing I would comment on but in the early

days circa 1990 and through the 1997 time frame, I think both

sides of this were learning. I can tell you that it was exceedingly

difficult as an industrialist to stay abreast of the law and our approach to interpretation of the law. My company went to extraordinary lengths, as do I know another of other—a number of other

companies go to extraordinary lengths to place some technology

transfer control regimes for their own companies so as to protect

our employees first and our company second from being—becoming

violators of all of the export control issues under ITAR and so

forth. Sometimes it is a little hard to tell whether or not you are

being completely compliant because those regulations are subject to

some level of interpretation.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Sokolski.

50

Mr. SOKOLSKI. We work together, though what I am going to say

is just going to amplify what was said. First, two wrongs make two

wrongs. The only difference now is the price of two wrongs is getting much steeper. I think this country honestly is going to be facing some security problems, the likes of which are actually going

to be making me very, very worried. I was a happy camper for a

long time, because things were getting better. But they are not getting better. And they are about to get a lot worse. So one thing we

could do is listen to Congressman Weldon and stop simply being

hypocritical and start taking these things seriously. I, and others,

have recommended that Congress follow through on the MarkeyCox bill and unplug those damn reactors and ask the President to

do it without legislation. Let us get on with that.

In addition, I think it is very important that we set a good example with sanctions. And I am happy to say that most recently there

is a tougher line. I have to speak on behalf of the State Department. They are taking a tougher line. It is very important that

they not over-interpret or be malicious in how they interpret the

law, but in some cases, they are right on target, and they are sanctioning even China now.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you very much, Mr.

Sokolski. I got it right this time. Let me note that Curt Weldon has

been just personally involved and so focused on this relationship

that he really makes a major contribution. When he talks about

sending the wrong signals, we probably did send wrong signals.

There is no doubt about that. We now face decisions that—of how

to proceed from here. And we have got—there are ways that we

can benefit greatly by cooperating with the Russians. And the question is can we do that in space and still remain consistent with our

law? And if—and is that law still important for us to enforce? And

that—so far, we are not necessarily saying that that law isn’t important for us to enforce.

And with that, there is a very active Member of this subcommittee who even has some legislation dealing with the particular issue of the day. And Mr. Lampson, you may proceed.

RELIANCE ON RUSSIA WHILE THE SHUTTLE FLEET IS

GROUNDED

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We know that while the Shuttle fleet is grounded that, obviously,

we are dependent—the United States is dependent on the Russian

Soyuz and Progress spacecraft operating with a crew on board. And

we believe that NASA needs to have as much flexibility as it possibly can have while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded to ensure

astronaut safety, and that is why I introduced H.R. 1001. And my

bill amends the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 to allow NASA

to purchase additional Soyuz and Progress vehicles if the President

notifies Congress that they are needed to ensure the safety of the

crew aboard the International Space Station and to maintain its

operational viability while the Space Shuttle fleet is grounded.

With that being said, we will very likely talk about that some

more. I still don’t know what extent there is going to be support

elsewhere, particularly among NASA. But let me go back to what

Mr. Gordon was asking a few minutes ago and help me with some

51

of my assumptions right now. Is NASA assuming, what I am getting out of this, that you and the other international partners will

subsidize NASA and pay for Soyuz vehicles on their own? They are

going to do this and we are not?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. I wouldn’t call it subsidizing, Mr. Lampson. It

is getting pretty involved, but I will try and make it as simple as

I can, because it—we get into all of these agreements and it gets

very, you know, bounded. So please—I am in the weeds on this a

lot, so pull me back out if you need to.

Basically, if you start with the intergovernmental agreement between the nations and you get all the way down through the space

agencies to the implementing agreements, there is an implementing agreement between us and Rosaviakosmos that deal—we

call it the balance agreement for shorthand. And what this is that

between we and Rosaviakosmos at the end of the day, at the end

of the program, what we cross between us in propellant, in power,

take your pick, should be equal. And we went forward with some

assumptions for the first five years of that program about what

that arrangement would be, what—how much we would bring up

on Shuttle, what they would bring up on Soyuz, how many

Progress, and that type of thing. We work to keep things in balance.

And so right now, we had been bringing up more than the Russians had using Shuttle. While we are on hiatus of Shuttle flights,

we are counting on Progress. So the Russian side on that balance

will start increasing. So at the end of the day, we are working

across the balance over a several year period. They are not subsidizing us. They are meeting their commitment to that balance arrangement, as we will—as we go forward with the program.

Mr. LAMPSON. Well, you are at—hold on a second. That is over

time, and paying right now, paying between now and next year or

the year after, they are going to carry that cost?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LAMPSON. And we are not going to be putting anything in

it in—between Europe and Russia, the dollars necessary to perform

those services will come from them, period?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. Rosaviakosmos, the Russian Government phase their—we, in December of last year, in Tokyo, the partners met and decided on the plan for Space Station assembly for

the coming year. Russia was committed to a certain number of

Soyuz and Progress, and they had actually gotten a governmental

budget to do that. Their budget for that whole year has now been

phased forward to the first six months of the year. The government

will meet again in the fall to decide on an increase for that budget

in ’03, and then they will look at an increase for ’04 that is necessary. They are certainly waiting to see what happens with us

when the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reports out and

what it looks like for us to return to flight, as——

EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ISS

Mr. LAMPSON. The agreement—or there is agreement that precludes Europe participating in that is not necessary?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, it is not. No. That is—forgive me if I am

more opaque than usual. Europe, the way Europe comes in, Europe

52

is committed to providing a laboratory and a number of other

things. What they have done to actually help overall and to get

more astronauts, their astronauts flying, they have actually purchased two seats at present, they may purchase more, from the

Russians. One of those seats was to fly in this last Soyuz and another in the fall. What the Europeans have committed to, they

stepped up and said, ‘‘We will keep the money on track as if our

astronauts were flying on—right now and in the fall. We will keep

the money on track for that, but we will slip them six months.’’ So

Pedro Duque will now fly in October, and then a second astronaut

will fly next spring. So the Europeans are keeping that money

phased.

Likewise, the Canadians are talking about a Soyuz flight opportunity, purchasing one from Russia in ’04 or ’05.

Mr. LAMPSON. But is there a signed agreement that says how

much Europe, Japan, Russia will pay?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, the Europeans have signed agreements

with Russia for those flights. The Canadians are in the initial discussion phase on that.

Mr. LAMPSON. Old money or is that a new agreement? Old

money? The old—is that something past or is that——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No, this is——

Mr. LAMPSON. Are those new agreements?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, again, it is a bilateral agreement between the European Space Agency and Rosaviakosmos. These are

agreements that are—have been signed this year, though. They are

new agreements.

Mr. LAMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And we have with us Ms. Bernice

Johnson, who would like to join us. You may proceed.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize

for being late. I was on the Floor with the bill. And I would like

to ask unanimous consent to have my opening statement put in the

record.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. So ordered.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Thank you, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. I would also like to

thank our other invited guests for agreeing to testify here today on exploring the

benefits and risk of U.S.–Russian cooperation on space programs.

In years past, cooperation and competition between the United States and the

former Soviet Union attracted much attention. In 1993, President Clinton made an

historic decision to merge NASA’s Space Station program with the Russian space

programs.

This symbolic change in policy had the potential to revolutionize the space program.

The Columbia Shuttle disaster has handed Russia a crucial role as the sole nation

capable of providing needed supplies to the International Space Station. But cash

strapped Russian space officials say additional funding is needed to build new rockets. They also warn astronauts they may have to stay in space longer because of

a lack of ships ready to fly.

Because of the Columbia tragedy, many are concerned that NASA might choose

to leave the Space Station unoccupied once the current crew comes down—a move

that could possibly doom the 16-nation project.

With prospects for future shuttle flights unclear pending the outcome of the investigation into the Columbia Shuttle disaster, Russia’s Soyuz crew capsules and

53

Progress cargo ships are now the only link to the Space Station and the three-man

crew currently in space.

Research and analysis has revealed that at current levels of support, Russia cannot sustain its space program in its present form. Since the dissolution of the Soviet

Union in 1991, the Russian space effort has been coasting on strategic reserves,

winding down from the higher energy levels of former times and cannibalizing the

last pieces of redundant equipment. Yet Russian space officials hope that such

measures can bridge the gap until the country’s current political, social, and economic crises pass and funding becomes healthier.

Russian officials and cosmonauts say leaving the International Space Station

empty could doom the celestial outpost.

With Russia’s economic problems and the future of their space program left in

doubt, the operation our multinational program is threatened. The present and longterm stability of the Nation’s space program has profound implications for the future health of the American space program.

The space exploration research program has been one of the most successful research programs in the history of this country. Because of what we have learned

through this research, many lives have been saved, weather catastrophes have been

averted, businesses have flourished and economies have boomed. I am hopeful that

we will have the foresight to continue this type of research and continue to support

the international space program.

STATUS OF RUSSIAN ECONOMY

Ms. JOHNSON. Many years ago, I traveled to Russia to talk about

this very issue with the Russians and members of the Duma with

Mr. Sensenbrenner. And at that time, the economy was so bad, as

a matter of fact, they were having demonstrations from scientists

who had not been paid in this program. The economy was supposed

to be so bad until they were asking us to fill in until the economy

got better. What is the situation now? Mr. Schumacher.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, ma’am. I will be glad to answer.

There are two parts. Understanding first on the economy, there

are still problems and issues with the economy, but I think it certainly better than when you were there with Chairman Sensenbrenner. With regard to funding for the agency and through the

government, they have established a track record of a very lean

budget for Rosaviakosmos and other Russian organizations under

the government, but they have met those budgets. And so we’ve

seen when they—what President Putin, when they say, ‘‘Here is

the Russian Space Agency budget for 2003, they get that money.

And that is why we have a—obviously, as always, will wait and see

that it really occurs, but the money is being phased forward. They

are talking about an increased budget for this year, and the President has committed to that. So those are all pretty sound indicators of where they are going.

RUSSIAN POLITICAL CHANGES

Ms. JOHNSON. It was my understanding that one of the reasons

why it was important to keep Mr. Yeltsin in office is that he was

strongly for democracy, and they were teetering on whether they

wanted to go forward or go backward. What is your opinion of that?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. On democracy? I certainly vote democracy. I

certainly always defer to State for the official answer. I can tell

you, though, as we watch, we can—we watch a continual evolution

of people that get more and more vibrant about contracting, about

wanting to do contracts with, especially, American companies, with

people that want to interact on a scientific level. I mean, the push

54

just seems to continue, and it is a very gratifying thing to watch.

Are there stumbling blocks? Are there problems? Sure, there are.

But it is a great thing, and I have been fortunate to watch. It is

the first—really, the first cooperative steps in a while in the ’91/

’92 time frame that we have had. And sure, we have had some

tough times in different places, but it is a very gratifying thing to

see everything from, you know, demonstrations to different religious groups out there, to people coming and saying, ‘‘Why do you

do a contract like that? We think this is a better way to do one.’’

Where before they would just nod because you handed them all of

your contract clauses and that type of thing. A long way to go, but

it—you know, I think the signs are positive.

Ms. JOHNSON. Do you think—in your opinion, is there a relationship between Saddam Hussein and Russia since his family was

supposed to go to Russia just before Baghdad was bombed?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, I have my own opinion on that, but——

Ms. JOHNSON. I have mine, too.

Mr. SCHUMACHER [continuing]. I can certainly provide that to

State, though, and get you an answer.

DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIAN SUPPORT TO ISS

Ms. JOHNSON. Um-hum. I do have some security concerns. And

I wonder about the opinion of any of you as to whether—not whether it is wise, I think it is wise to continue the program. But how

far do we go into our dependence with the Russian Government

while we are waiting to get all of the answers over the Columbia

crash?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, the redundancy we always claim for

Space Station was we were there if Russian Soyuz and Progress

couldn’t go, and likewise, they were there if we couldn’t. So right

now, we are dependent on the Russian Soyuz and Progress until

we return to flight.

Ms. JOHNSON. But we have enough safeguards in place that we

are not too worried about any security?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, ma’am. We—yes, ma’am, I thank you for

that question, because there were a lot of concerns expressed early

on, and we actually got an interagency group together to say, ‘‘Here

is an interactive program with 15 and 16 nations building, many

more countries are going to do research. We need to put in place

a rigorous export control tech transfer regime force for Station on

the U.S. side.’’ And we have done that. And we continually monitor

that, and we bring in other folks to look at it. So I think we are

good there.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And we are joined by Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee and who is always very articulate and involved, and we

would welcome you to proceed with your questions.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, I cannot thank you enough for

holding this important hearing and of course to the Ranking Member for collaborating on the important points.

Might I ask the unanimous consent to include my statement, my

opening statement, into the record?

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson Lee follows:]

55

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE SHEILA JACKSON LEE

Mr. Chairman,

Thank you for calling this hearing. Obviously, we all are anxious to hear the

Gehman Report on the Columbia disaster and what the Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommends for the future of the Space Shuttle program. It is tempting to just wait for the report, and maybe start making decisions after we read it.

But that could be a grave mistake. I applaud you and Ranking Member Hall for

keeping the dialogue active—for seeking alternatives and contingency plans, so that

no matter what the Gehman Report reveals—we can ensure that the U.S. vital investment and progress in space exploration can continue.

Since the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft docked in 1975, the United States and Russia have had a wonderful collaboration in space that has been a great benefit to

both nations and to the world. Although that initial collaboration was mostly an act

of diplomacy between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union, today’s interactions

have much broader significance for the advancements of science, our economy, and

even our health care. The most obvious symbol of our great collaborative effort is

the International Space Station. We have invested decades in planning, and billions

of dollars to make this great dream a reality. Now we are poised to start harvesting

the great potential of that facility.

But, unfortunately, the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy has put the future of the

ISS at risk. The Space Shuttle serves as an agile craft for delivering delicate instruments and crew to the ISS, and also a powerful device for lifting heavy equipment

and components into orbit. I hope that the Gehman Board will give us some definite

answers, and quick-fixes for getting the shuttles up and running. However, we cannot

bet the future of the International Space Station on that hope. If the Shuttle fleet

is grounded for 32 months, as it was after the Challenger accident—or indefinitely—

we must be ready to step up with all the creativity and ingenuity that NASA and

the world have to offer to keep the mission going.

The Soyuz craft seems to be the most likely choice for filling the potential void

in the near future. As I, and many of my colleagues here, have been saying consistently—we need to see a thoughtful vision for the future of the NASA mission, from

the NASA Administrator. Once that vision is articulated, I feel that the technology

and innovation, projects, and funding will fall into line. But until they develop the

big picture for the future, we need to use the tools we have at hand to keep critical

programs moving forward. The Soyuz may be one of our most important tools for

the next decade.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel today to learn about the

U.S.–Russian collaboration in space. Specifically, I hope to hear about how NASA

is working with Russia and our other international partners to ensure that if we

need a Soyuz craft or its services, that we can get it. Maybe this is not a crisis

today, but we should have agreements and understandings in place, so that we can

avoid a crisis in the future.

My greatest concern is that if we put off making contingency plans now, that we

may be rushed to do so later. If we are in a rush to get a Soyuz funded and manufactured, after we become faced with the prospect of abandoning the ISS—we may

not have enough time to give due attention to safety issues. If there is a chance that

we are going to end up counting on the Russians exclusively to provide transportation

to and from the Space Station, I believe we should have agreements in place that

would allow us to collaborate on monitoring the quality and safety of the product

we are purchasing. Our Russian colleagues have done an admirable job in the past,

but ultimately it is we that are responsible for American astronauts and their safety.

That is why I feel we should be laying the groundwork for that collaborative work

now. We should be exploring funding mechanisms, purchasing agreements, and the

implications for the Iran Nonproliferation Act, now. We must cover our bases, so that

if we do not get the answer we hope for from Admiral Gehman, we can move forward

expeditiously to get a safe Soyuz craft ready, if deemed appropriate.

I hope progress is already being made on this front, since we have been inquiring

for months now. I look forward to the testimony. Thank you.

RUSSIAN COMMITMENTS TO SUPPORT THE ISS

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me also acknowledge, Mr. Chairman, that

I was in some additional meetings in my office and on the Floor,

and I accept the fact that I have had the opportunity to review the

testimony. I apologize for not hearing the testimony.

56

I think that we have sort of mountains to climb. And one of

them, of course, is that we hope we can impress upon the State Department the importance of their witnesses being present in hearings that have a lot to do with the International Space Station and

our relationships with our neighbors and our partners. And so I

hope between the Ranking Member and the Chairman that we can

impress upon them the importance of that fact.

We are all waiting on the Admiral Gehman’s Report on the Columbia investigation. And I think, learning through newspaper releases, of course, more than we thought we might learn, but more

importantly, we are probably learning a lot on what many Members had suspected, that we have some very serious problems as it

relates to safety, serious problems as it relates to funding, serious

problems as it relates to analyzing what, in fact, the Shuttle’s capacity happens to be and how we can ensure the safety of our astronauts.

But let me focus on the U.S.–Russian cooperation, which I think

partly goes to the question of safety, because it certainly has a lot

to do with resources and a lot to do with the stability of the space

program. Might I acknowledge, of course, the help that Russia has

given us in the past? Might I also acknowledge that we realize the

economic conditions in Russia and some of the problems that they

have had?

But let me bring to your attention, Mr. Schumacher, a quote by

the President and President Putin just recently. ‘‘The Russian Federation is committed to meeting the U.S. crew transport and logistics resupplying requirements necessary to maintain our joint

American and Russian cosmonaut teams on board the ISS until the

Space Shuttle returns to flight.’’ My question to you, does that

statement mean that Russia has formally agreed to pay for all of

the Soyuz and Progress flights needed to support the International

Space Station while the Shuttle fleet is grounded? Has Russia

agreed that it will not seek compensation from NASA, or any of the

other international partners, for those Progress and Soyuz flights?

And if not, what, in specific terms, does the release mean?

We have challenges before us, so we certainly—I know you have

already offered your appreciation for the last return that was assisted by Russia, but exactly what does that statement mean? And

is the Administration prepared to make good on that commitment,

meaning are they prepared to press the Russians to make good on

that and to remain engaged so that we can have that assistance?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, ma’am. Thank you very much for that

question. If I could start with your last point. Certainly, to us, we,

at NASA, were very impressed that both Presidents, when they

look at a limited number of issues that they are going to address

in joint statements, the civil space and in particular, the commitment to Space Station is something to be highlighted at the summit. So that was impressive to both of us.

I can tell you with regard to Russia’s plans, what will Russia do

and how does it work out with cost and that type of thing, we have

a balance arrangement with Russia as part of the Space Station

agreements, all of the implemented agreements. We looked

throughout the overall program that we and Russia will balance

what we provide in the sense of logistics, electricity on board the

57

Station, all of the types of things that make the Station operate,

up-mass, downmass, all of those types of things. While we are in

a hiatus of Shuttle flights, Russia will supply using Soyuz and

Progress both crew and robotically, you know, crew and then other

supplies.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So that is a yes that they will provide that

in the interim?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, ma’am. They are planning that, and we

have a partnership-approved plan through the rest of ’03 and into

’04 that lays out Soyuz and Progress. Now they, like we, await the

results of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and the planning for return to flight to look at how long we will be in hiatus

with Shuttle. Certainly, we could get well to the point where Russia is supplying and supplying so their side of the balance goes beyond what we have provided. But we would look to work that out

in the overall context of the whole program, not by near-term funding.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Well, they have a deficit to us at this point,

don’t they? I imagine that we could utilize their services for quite

a period of time without having to pay them. Is that what you are

telling me that you are going to be balancing out?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, in the sense of logistics and crew, the balance is, if you did a scale, our scale is heavy right now. That is correct.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. And I see my light is on. It says you are going

to be working out the specific terms of the agreement, and so I can

assume this will go forward?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. We keep on looking at how much we are consuming on Station and what that Progress flow needs to be in the

time when the Shuttle is down.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, this is to you and the Ranking

Member. I say this at every Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee

is safety, safety, safety. And I assume we are trying to follow protocol with respect to the Gehman Report. But I believe that it is

long overdue for this committee and the Science Committee to investigate thoroughly what occurred to Columbia’s seven crew

quickly and to not be fearful of citing those and the procedures that

may be at fault in that tragedy.

I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully we will have

that hearing very soon.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. I might also

add that you not only talk about safety, safety, safety, but inclusion, inclusion, inclusion. So that is another one of your battle

cries. So we appreciate that.

Now we have—for a question—or for a period of time, Mr. Burgess, who is a new Member who actually heard the sonic boom of

the Shuttle when it was coming down, the Space Shuttle Columbia.

Also, he was active in trying to work with those people who were

putting together the wreckage after this catastrophe. And he now

is a Member of our committee. We are very happy to have him with

us.

58

SAFETY OF THE RUSSIAN SOYUZ VEHICLE

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today.

Mr. Schumacher, if I could go back, perhaps, to Ms. Jackson

Lee’s concern about safety, and of course, with the loss of the Columbia, we have had our astronauts from the Space Station return

to Earth via the Soyuz capsule. And it didn’t get a lot of press here,

but as I understand it, there was a fairly harrowing return to

Earth, and they did land somewhat off the mark and it took awhile

to locate them. Are we putting any procedures in place for the contingency of that maybe having to happen again and perhaps providing some type of locating beacon, satellite telephone, GPS receiver, any of that technology that may facilitate the location of our

astronauts when they land?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. I can tell you I was over there with

the Administrator and other Members of the NASA delegation, and

it certainly was a very tense period until we were really clear that

the crew was there and safe and they were returned and we met

with them. To your point, several things, and I think this speaks

to—on the cooperative aspects and how close we have become in

the way we operate. The Russians have done an internal review on

what anomalies occurred on that Soyuz return. And it—you are exactly right. It did not come in on exactly the path they had. They

had three, pick your term, of off-nominal loads, and it came in on

one of those. They have identified what they think is the source of

that. Now they are going to a review group on that, and then they

will share those results with a U.S. task force led by Lieutenant

General Tom Stafford. And he works—he has a U.S. task force set

up that works closely with it. A task force set up by, on the Russian side, by Anfimov, and they will review those results, both for

what went wrong to understand it, corrective action, as well as the

very types of things you are talking about. What other things we—

should we need giving to the crew so they are easily located, improve safety, that type of thing. And General Stafford will be over

there at the end of this month.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Chairman ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, thank you very much.

I am going to have a final round of questions here, because we—

several of us have a couple more questions to ask, and then we will

bring this to a conclusion.

I would like to just focus a little bit on—we know now that there

is a hurdle that we must jump over in order to expand the type

of cooperation that we have with Russia. Let me note, especially in

regard to some of the comments that Mr. Weldon made, yes, our

companies did a great disservice to our country. And I believe that

they—some of our major corporate leaders—betrayed our country’s

national security interests when we transferred rocket technology

to the Communist Chinese. That was wrong. But as I mentioned

earlier, let us note that the Communist Chinese, there has not

been one inch of political reform in China. And the Chinese Government is still controlled by a hard core clique of authoritarians.

And in Russia, Russia has been going through a very—a time of

59

uncertainty. And to the degree—and also let me note, there is very

little reason, and you might—and I might throw this to the panel.

In terms of the transfer of American technology to the Russians,

our cooperation, actually, opens up the door for us to receive more

technology from them than they do from us. Is that not the case?

Mr. Davis or whoever wants to——

Mr. DAVIS. I would be happy to address that one, and I will

speak in the realm of propulsion.

If you go back in ’93, we were reluctant after the power plant fire

to entertain engine cycles that had anything to do with an oxidizer

rich—I don’t want to get too technical here.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. That is very technical.

Mr. DAVIS. The consequence of that is, however, that the Russians, who had different experiences, developed engine cycles that

selectively provide about 15 percent better performance than what

has been enjoyed by the United States. To that extent, it was a scientific, technical, philosophical different of approach—different approaches. And as a result of the work that was undertaken beginning back in 1990 were the United States have technologically benefited by having gained a lot of insight into what the Russians did.

Their engines are, in certain cases, more highly performing.

Now the consequence, or the consequential benefit to us today is

we, having now gained the insight into some of their approaches,

system approaches, and the ways in which they accomplished those

outcomes and have then thereby built fairly reliable, meaning quite

reliable, safe engines, has been, in fact, a benefit to us. And we see,

routinely, the incorporation of some of those viewpoints and technologies being incorporated into our own engine aspirations.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, that is my reading. And Mr.

Sokolski, maybe you have a different reading of that.

Mr. SOKOLSKI. No, I think that is true. Unfortunately, there are

other things that are true, too. That is the problem. Russia is helping build missiles for India. India just signed a military cooperation

agreement with Iran and is talking about exporting its missile

technology. Iran, meanwhile, is not just getting covert missile assistance from Moscow, it is also overtly buying Russian satellites

and Earth tracking stations that could help it and others target

their missiles against our friends and forces abroad. Moscow knows

this but continues to claim that all of its space commerce is peaceful. So I mean, the problem is that we don’t gain, it is that others

gain.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Okay. Let us note, then, that what we

are talking about here is fundamentally different than the tech

transfer problem with China. Transferring technology—we—with

the China relationship, we are concerned about an American gyroscope, for example, that we spent hundreds of millions of dollars

in developing, ending up in the hands of the Communist Chinese

for almost nothing. We are worried about, for example, the other

stage separation technology and the multiple payload technology

that we have now in the possession of the Communist Chinese.

They didn’t pay a cent to develop it.

60

U.S.–RUSSIAN ROCKET ENGINE TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT

However, with the Russians, what we are really talking about is

technology that they invested a great deal in back during the Cold

War and it is helping us whether or not we are going to be taking

advantage of that, considering that they have some policies and

some other trade policies that are detrimental to us. So it is a—

that is—it is not an exactly juxtaposed national security issue. I

would suggest—and let me ask Mr. Schumacher this, NASA is, for

example, planning to spend, is it not, up to $350 million over the

next five years in developing a new rocket engine that is arguably

less efficient than a rocket engine already available and available

to us at a very cheap price from the Russians. And why is it that

we should be spending $350 million of our development money to

develop what the Russians already have? Should we be using that

money on newer technology?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. If I could

clarify. First, if I could just touch real quickly on your other question, because——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Right.

Mr. SCHUMACHER [continuing]. I think it feeds right into it.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Go right ahead.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. We have got a tremendous amount of benefit

from the cooperation with Russia. One of the key things I would

highlight, there are a lot of things like the Universal Docking

Adapter that we use on Station now for the different vehicles and

the Europeans are using. We got it from the Russians. One of the

most important things is the—very much what you talked about.

They developed on a whole different path, and they have a lot of

dissimilar systems for safety, for propulsion, for ops. They just

come at it a different way. And so it provides redundancy, but redundancy for a function in a different manner than we would have.

And I can give you a bunch of examples, but I won’t eat up the

time now. But it is a great add to the program.

Also, a lot of experience in human long duration space flight.

And there are other things, like—that we think and we will come

forward and work very carefully through. But there are other parts

of our program that we don’t think are precluded under Section 6,

because they are non-human space flight related. For example, in

response to an RFP, for Project Prometheus, our nuclear systems

initiative, Stanford has come forward with a proposal to buy

thrusters from a Russian entity that they think can help in that

program. We think we have to vet it through the interagency process. We think that may well be allowable and in accord with the

INA, both the letter and the spirit of the law. Again, something

Russia has that we think will be of benefit to our program in technology.

With regard to the rocket program, though, it is a great question,

because it shows all of this push and tug we are talking about. The

Russians have some tremendous capabilities in rocket engine propulsion, and I think Mr. Davis has talked a lot about that.

And certainly, there have been some great marriages of joint

venture types of things with American companies to make those

work. Rosaviakosmos has really worked with some of the Russian

61

agent manufacturers, such as those teaming with American companies to try and come forward and successfully compete for contracts, including NASA contracts. The one in particular you are

talking about, I believe, and I will double check when I go back,

but there are a series of contracts. And a Russian-American joint

venture competed in two of those and was unsuccessful. The third

phase of this actually comes this fall. When the—these were technology looks and technology developments. The actual development

of the engine contract will come later this fall. And they are welcome to bid, as is any other joint venture or American company

that meets all of the other criteria for export——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. But would they be precluded because

of the nonproliferation legislation?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Again, sir, we would have to—on the facts of

the contract, go forth, but because it doesn’t appear to be human

space flight related, we would think they could compete and go

forth. And it would be—but I am working with——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. That is fascinating. That is interesting.

All right. I—let me just note that, again, the Chinese and that

whole scenario were the recipients of American technology, and

thus, we upgraded their ability to hurt the United States. In this

case, we are talking about limiting the United States of our ability

to take or partake of Russian technology for our financial benefit

and our ability to get the job done.

I would now like to turn to Mr. Gordon and Mr. Lampson, if they

have some other things to finish this off with.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RUSSIAN BUDGET COMMITMENTS FOR PROGRESS AND SOYUZ

VEHICLES

First, let me say I think that NASA has done a good job of cobbling together a Soyuz/Progress program for the rest of this year.

Everything has to go perfectly, but, you know, at least you have got

a plan there. And hopefully it will go perfectly. Once again, I am

concerned about next year. And I want to try to get some clarification on our earlier conversation.

Now as I understand it, in September, the Russians will make

a—their budget decision as to whether or not they are going to allocate funds for this next year. I am just going to go ahead, just for

brevity, go through it. And Mr. Schumacher, if you think I am off

somewhere, then just let me know, otherwise, I am assuming you

are concurring.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, it is—that is—the objective is for—we understand, is for increased funding for this year and then what increase would be made on top of the budget already planned for

2004.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Now come September, I think it would be

reasonable, or not unreasonable, to look at history and see where

the Russians have reneged on past promises. It would not be unreasonable for them to come forward and say, ‘‘We want to help.

We think it is important to help, but we have a lot of hungry people at home, and I may lose my, you know, constituency here if I

don’t give them food rather than a spacecraft.’’ So I think that is,

62

you know—hopefully that won’t happen, but that is not an unreasonable thing to consider.

Now as I understand, if that occurred—earlier, you stated that—

if that were to happen, you would seek relief.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. What I believe NASA would do is go first and

foremost to the partnership, because we have had great success

with solving these things within the partnership.

Mr. GORDON. You say great success. All I know is they have

bought some additional seats, but they already did that before this

accident occurred. So I am not seeing a lot of great success here.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, again, certainly it might be the perspective we have on it, but for the Russian Government to step in and

forward fund—increase funding coming next year——

Mr. GORDON. All right. Well, that is being done, but again——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. For the Canadians to come forward

and look to buy a seat that they had not planned or seats, Europe

to look at—to sign——

Mr. GORDON. But they would not have done anything.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, they have signed the contracts, and then

they are looking at additional seats beyond——

Mr. GORDON. But the ones they have done, though, weren’t they

before the accident, so this is nothing new?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. The two European seats, it is correct that they

were contemplated before the accident. But what they have done

is they have signed the contracts and kept the funding on track as

if the people were flying in April and in October when they are flying in October and——

Mr. GORDON. Right. Right. But it is no new money. So you know,

again, if you don’t want to look at this, then just don’t. But I mean,

we—somewhere, we have got to be responsible here. I mean, it

may—sure, the goodness you recognize that there is a—you know,

a fairly good chance that this fall the Russians are going to say,

‘‘We can’t afford to do this.’’ The Europeans are saying—well, could

say, ‘‘We have stepped up already. We don’t feel like that we can

subsidize NASA any longer.’’ Now if that occurs, then, as you said,

you are going to have to seek some kind of relief. Now again, that

relief may be trying to get the partners to do even more, but if they

choose not to, then you are stuck with the situation of the Iran

Nonproliferation Act in terms of us having to help the Russians

pay for this.

Now either the President has to certify that there is no proliferation, which I think could be tough, not necessarily because there

would be, but it might be hard to have the intelligence to say that,

or you are going to have to come to Congress for, as you said, relief.

Now I just want to sort of—you know, hopefully you know these

things, but let us get them out on the table. If these decisions are

going to be made in September, even in September, they may say

they are going to do it, but wind up not having the money next

year, then by our calendar, we are supposed to be out of here October the 3rd.

Now we were also supposed to have been out October the 4th last

year. Nobody really thinks that we are going to get out on October

3. So I mean, I have about as much confidence of getting out on

October 3 as I have confidence that the Russians and the EuroVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:27 Feb 14, 2004 Jkt 087546 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\WORKD\SA03\061103\87546 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
63

peans, you know, are going to pay or underwrite NASA. So I mean,

I think that we all need to think of these contingencies. So you

know, the deadline really isn’t October the 3rd, but hopefully we

are going to be out of here, you know, by the end of October. So

you really get a pretty narrow window. And somewhere, you have

to—you know, and I don’t think Congress is going to be too happy

with you coming up here and saying that you have got to go

through the full legislative process and—in a week or something to

give us this waiver. So there really has to be, I think, some type

of a contingency plan put in place.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. First, it is not government meeting

in September to watch. I mean, the flow on these vehicles starts

20 to 24 months out. So we can see the Progress is in flow. We can

see the Soyuz is in flow. And the Progress and Soyuz, to meet that

plan, are in flow. Now if they need—if we need——

Mr. GORDON. For this year?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. And——

Mr. GORDON. I am talking about next year.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. No. Yes, sir, and ’04, too, because their flow

is there now. If they need to add those additional Progress in ’04

like we are talking about, you are going to have to start to see that

flow start, too. And we will watch for that. So if there is a funding—if they don’t come through with the funding they are talking

about in September, that is the first thing we would watch, and

then we would have to go forth with that. But it is——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah. What would you do? Okay. I mean, what is

your plan? What would you do?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. What would be the plan? Normally, we would

have the time, because we are talking almost——

Mr. GORDON. You plan to do what? I mean, you tell them to do

what?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Again, I would go to the partnership first.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. Then if that——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Talk to the partnership, and then if—the last

resort, and we would look at different operational things, again,

when do we return to flight. We would then, the last step or the

last thought we would have is come to the Congress and ask for

relief on INA. And I think that would be a judgment we would

have to really consider before we do.

Mr. GORDON. Yeah. I don’t think that is unreasonable. I just

want you to think about it. And I will quickly close by this saying

that once this crisis is over with, then we get to the fact that in

19—whether—in 2006, we have to do the whole works. And at

which time, we, once again, get to the situation of either changing

the nonproliferation pact or we are going to have to hope that our

partners are going to subsidize NASA, you know, for four or five

years. You know, I just don’t think that is reasonable to assume.

And I just want all of this on the record. I want it all, you know,

there so that we don’t play in kind of, you know, games. You know,

at home—well, I won’t get—I guess——

U.S.–RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Mr. Gordon, I would suggest that there

is another alternative. And that is if we send the Russians the

64

right kind of signals that they will change their behavior. And

that—as Mr. Weldon suggested, maybe some of these agreements

that they got into could have been either because of economic necessity, they were really starving when they got into some of these

agreements with Iran, or it could be mixed signals that we sent

them in policies for the last 10 years where our own people were

upgrading Chinese missiles, et cetera, et cetera. And the other alternative that would make this happen and would make it work

and really launch this—a great relationship that would be beneficial to both, if the Russians could change their basic behavior and

not be proliferaters and decide that they are going to make more

profit from dealing with the United States and our Western allies

as partners in a space enterprise rather than trying to build rockets for the Indians or the Iranians.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. But Mr. Chairman, are we going to say,

then, that we are prepared to let the Space Station not have any

Russian support, which means that the Space Station, then, would

be unmanned if they don’t act right?

Chairman ROHRABACHER. That is a very tough challenge, isn’t it?

And you are right. No, no. This is something we have got to pay

absolute attention to, and it is not something that we can take for

granted. But it is something that we all have to work together on.

And I am just sorry that our State Department representative was

not here to participate in this discussion.

Mr. Lampson is, again——

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Could I have just a moment just to respond

to that——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Sure, go right ahead.

Mr. SCHUMACHER [continuing]. Just very quickly? And I know we

are at a rush for time.

First of all, when we talk about subsidizing the United States

program, I can tell you, it is a welcome change from talking about

subsidizing the Russian program, but still, it is just as worrisome.

Because again, we do this a lot. We get into this whole conversation, and then when we step back, we say, ‘‘Look at how much

America is putting into this Space Station program.’’ We are a

huge player. We are the biggest partner in this program, and we

don’t trump around and push that around, but the fact of the matter is——

Mr. GORDON. But are we doing more than we said we would?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Are we doing—in different areas we are, and

in different areas——

Mr. GORDON. Right now, are we doing more than we said we

would?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. In—overall, in the agreements? You mean the

overall——

Mr. GORDON. Yeah. I mean, you say we were doing so much, but

are we doing more than we said we would?

Mr. SCHUMACHER. I think we are doing what we contemplated.

Mr. GORDON. Okay. So we are not really doing more than we

said we would. You know, if we are doing that much, then I guess

that means we have more to lose than anyone if the Space Station

is not manned. And so it would seem that our negotiating position,

then, is less with everyone else, if we have the most to lose.

65

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Well, I want to be the—but what I would say,

though, on that is, again, I would not underestimate this partnership and—for example, crew—in 2006, crew beyond three. There is

no reason that we can not adjust what each partner is bringing.

Russian—Russia could step up and provide the second Soyuz, if

they wish. We could provide more up-mass or downmass——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, let me know, Mr. Schumacher.

You are looking at the number one Cold Warrior that you will ever

meet. I mean, I was the speech writer for Ronald Reagan, and I

am not going to go into any details about which speeches I wrote,

but they were pretty raw meat compared to what most people put

out at the time.

The bottom line is, however, times have changed. And we have

tremendous opportunity to work with the Russians and—but we

have to do it realistically. And we cannot hedge, Mr. Sokolski, I am

sorry. I have a, you know, road block right in your name there, a

block about your name. But no, you have been very—you have

been—what you are saying is very reasonable. We have got to be

responsible, and we have got to be realistic, but the potential is

tremendous——

Mr. SOKOLSKI. Right.

Chairman ROHRABACHER [continuing]. If we can convince the

Russians to live in a responsible way.

I have to go to Mr. Lampson now.

CLARIFICATION ON RUSSIA’S COMMITMENT TO ISS

Mr. LAMPSON. I feel like I am sort of getting the impression that

we are not getting everything. And we are having a terrible perception that, in my opinion, is being left through this kind of discussion. Somehow, you all have to find a way to help, at least people

like myself, clearly and easily understand where the money is coming from and where it is going. I believe the people of this country

want to support programs like this. We—you have heard it a thousand times from the folks that sit on this panel up here how much

we want to support NASA, how much we want to do because we

believe in what we can learn by being in space. It is almost as if

somebody is trying to play a game, use artful words, cheat, lie to

us. And that is very angering and frustrating. And there is no need

for it. We are on the same team. But let us play. So come to us

with simple answers. And tell us that the dollars are coming.

How can you explain this statement that came out in the NASA

bimonthly Russian performance report that got here on June the

10th? It says, ‘‘Although European, Japanese, and Canadian partners have proposed new limited commercial arrangements,’’ those

flights, ‘‘Russian Aviation and Space Agency officials have said that

the funding is not sufficient to address all of the proposed resupply

activities.’’ You didn’t answer the question of where those dollars

are going to come from for Russia. You didn’t answer Ms. Jackson

Lee’s question: has Russia agreed that it will not seek compensation from NASA or any of the other international partners for those

flights while Shuttle is grounded? Give us the simple answers so

that we can understand, and we don’t have to try to fight or sit

here and look stupid or silly.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. I am not communicating well.

66

Mr. GORDON. You can come out in the audience to do it, too.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Not a problem. I guess I am trying to think

of the way to describe this, because I think I understand it, but I

am not saying it very well. Maybe if I start with there is a baseline

of the Soyuz and Progress for this year and next. There is an approved plan of what the upper limit might be, of what we might

need. When I see a statement—when you see a statement like that,

that is a conservative statement that says if we have got to go to

an upper end, additional resources may be needed. Now we would

look to Russia to provide those, and we would look to the assurances of the Presidents and that type of thing. But there is a baseline program, which we are on path which we think meets the

needs to keep the Station manned and operating. That is a partnership-agreed plan——

Mr. LAMPSON. You think that. But if it doesn’t happen, you are

going to have to come here and take a long period of time for this

body to go through a process to get you the permission, the okay,

to do it. And that is why we asked for a simple support for our legislation that would give the flexibility for our government to be

able to do what was necessary to keep those people safe.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. And it would be on you, that legislation?

Mr. LAMPSON. I just happen to——

Chairman ROHRABACHER. He just happens to——

Mr. LAMPSON. It is not hard to see whose names are on it.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Schumacher, some of the questions we have

asked are in the ones that I have presented to Mr. O’Keefe earlier,

and once we get these, maybe we—a lot of this is—it will be less

complicated and maybe we can better understand it. And that will

be a good way to start this—or continue the dialogue.

Mr. SCHUMACHER. Yes, sir. We would be glad to come up and

talk.

Chairman ROHRABACHER. Well, let me congratulate everyone

here and thank you, Sokolski—Mr. Sokolski. I have had a block all

day about that name. And thank you very much, Mr. Davis. Thank

you, Mr. Schumacher. And Ambassador Pifer, there you are. I am

sorry you didn’t make it, because this was a wonderful discussion.

And let me note, just in final for everyone is that everything

isn’t—reality isn’t cement right now. There are a lot of creative

new ideas that could come up, a lot of new alternatives that could

come up. And we would be—we just need the flexibility to be able

to take advantage of new alternatives and creative approaches.

And the Russians, a good relationship with the Russians give us—

gives us those things that we can’t even perceive right now, but tomorrow we might come up with an idea that will solve some of the

financial challenges that we face ahead.

And with that said, I would like to thank the witnesses, yes, and

please be advised that Subcommittee Members may request additional information, for the record. And I would ask other Members

who are going to submit questions to do so within one week of this

date of the hearing.

That concludes this hearing. The hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

(67)

Appendix 1:

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

68

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by John D. Schumacher, NASA Assistant Administrator for External Relations

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. Under NASA’s interpretation of the Iran Nonproliferation Act, would NASA be

allowed to purchase or enter into a contract with a U.S. company for a good

or service for the Space Station that the U.S. company had jointly developed

with a Russian company?

A1. NASA has not had a baselined ISS requirement that would necessitate procurement of jointly developed ISS goods or services; the agency has not directly addressed this question and is reluctant to do so in a hypothetical context. To some

extent, the answer may depend upon the nature of the good or service and the degree of Russian involvement. However, an important policy consideration bearing

upon any such determination is the fact that the Iran Nonproliferation Act has been

a source of pressure on Russia to improve the proliferation record of companies in

the aerospace sector. NASA is concerned that its procurement activities not diminish this pressure. The agency would need to ensure full consistency with the legal

and policy objectives of the INA before authorizing any such transaction.

Q2. Would your response to (1) above differ if the good or service would also be marketed for other applications not specific to the Space Station?

A2. Again, while NASA has not addressed this issue directly and is reluctant to do

so in a hypothetical context, the policy background noted in the response to Question 1 above must be considered.

Q3. Would your response to (1) or (2) above differ if the good or service was jointly

developed with a Russian company not under the jurisdiction or control of the

Russian Aviation and Space Agency defined in Section 7 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act and the State Department determined that the company has

not been involved in any proliferation activities with Iran?

A3. Please see the response to questions 1 and 2 above.

Q4. During your response to questions during the hearing, you referred to ‘‘the black

letter of the Act’’ and ‘‘the intent and spirit of the Act.’’ Is each of your responses

to the case situations in questions 1–3 above based on ‘‘the black letter of the

Act’’ or based on the ‘‘intent and spirit of the Act’’?

A4. NASA has sought to comply with both the ‘‘letter’’ and ‘‘spirit’’ of the Act in

transactions involving Russian entities.

Q5. Is NASA concerned about the long-term viability of the Russian’s Soyuz and

Progress production capability, given U.S. reliance on Soyuz and Progress vehicles until U.S. Orbital Space Plane and Alternate Access capabilities are developed?

A5. Since the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, Russia has demonstrated a steadfast commitment to the ISS program by assuming increased responsibility for operational support of the ISS. President Putin reaffirmed this commitment in a joint

statement with President Bush on June 1, 2003. At the ISS Heads of Agency meeting held in California on July 29, 2003, the ISS Partnership noted Russia’s commitment to continuing critical support for general ISS operations, logistics and crew

transportation and rescue capability until the Space Shuttle returns to flight and

beyond.

NASA recognizes that Rosaviakosmos’ ability to continue to fulfill its ISS obligations are dependent upon sustained adequate funding from the Russian Government, as well as Rosaviakosmos’s ability to continue to secure adequate ‘‘off-budget’’

funding, such as the funding it receives from customers who pay for seats on Soyuz

flights. NASA will continue to monitor this situation and will continue to work

closely with Rosaviakosmos and the other International Partners to address and resolve in advance any issues that arise that could affect ISS operations.

Q6. Are the Russians obligated to provide Soyuz support for American astronauts

past 2006?

A6. Under the ISS Agreements, the Rosaviakosmos has committed to provide crew

rescue capability for the entire international crew after its initial obligation if the

NASA crew rescue capability is available later than planned, for agreed compensaVerDate 11-MAY-2000 21:27 Feb 14, 2004 Jkt 087546 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\WORKD\SA03\061103\87546 SCIENCE1 PsN: SCIENCE1
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tion from NASA. The ISS Partnership is addressing the requirements for accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as part of the ISS Program Action Plan,

which was established at the Tokyo 2002 Heads of Agency meeting and is currently

being updated. All Partners recognize that any solution related to ISS crew rescue

must be consistent with U.S. law.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. The June 11, 1996 Space Station Protocol between NASA and the Russian

Space Agency states that:

‘‘NASA will provide crew rescue capability following completion of assembly. In

the event the NASA crew rescue capability becomes later than is currently

planned. . .RSA [the Russian Space Agency] agrees to provide the capability to

rescue the entire international crew using the Soyuz for agreed upon compensation from NASA’’ [Emphasis Added].

NASA’s responsibility to provide Space Station crew return starts in 2006.

Under NASA’s own proposal, the Orbital Space Plane would not be available

as a crew return vehicle until about 2010. Since OMB canceled the U.S. crew

return vehicle in 2001, the Soyuz is the only crew return vehicle that will be

available as of 2006.

Q1a. Given the Iran Nonproliferation Act’s prohibition against NASA purchasing

Soyuz vehicles or services, how is NASA planning to meet its crew return commitment in 2006 and beyond?

Q1b. Is NASA assuming that the Europe and the other International Partners will

assume NASA’s responsibility and pay for the Soyuz vehicles on their own?

Q1c. If not, who will pay for the Soyuz, and have they agreed to do so?

A1a,b,c. NASA been working closely with its International Partners to fully assess

the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS operations and to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan of action. The ISS Partnership is also addressing the requirements for accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as

part of the ISS Program Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration. This Program Action Plan was established by the ISS Heads of Agency during their meeting

in Tokyo in December 2002. The implementation of the Program Action Plan was

delayed by the loss of Columbia. A revised implementation schedule is now under

development by the ISS Partners. All of the ISS Partners recognize that any solution related to ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law. Meanwhile, NASA

is working with its contractors to create an option to accelerate acquisition of the

Orbital Space Plane (OSP) with the goal of initial operational capability of a crew

return vehicle as early as 2008.

Q1d. Alternatively, are you planning to seek a change in the Iran Nonproliferation

Act to allow such purchases by NASA?

A1d. NASA currently has no plans to request any changes to the Iran Nonproliferation Act in order to meet ISS crew rescue responsibilities. The INA clearly outlines

the responsibilities and procedures upon which NASA can act should circumstances

change in the future.

Q1e. Does NASA believe that the ‘‘in-kind’’ and ‘‘third party’’ transaction prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would prohibit one or more of the other

Space Station International Partners from purchasing Soyuz spacecraft or crew

return services from Russia in exchange for some compensation from the United

States? Why or why not?

A1e. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has been a source of pressure on Russia to improve its proliferation record. If NASA provided compensation to another ISS International Partner ‘‘in exchange for’’ that partner purchasing spacecraft or services

that NASA could not purchase directly from Russia due to the restrictions in Section

6 of the INA, this pressure would be diminished or eliminated altogether. Such arrangements would raise legal questions under Section 6 of the INA and would likely

be viewed by many as an evasion of the law.

Q2. Even if NASA is allowed to proceed with the Orbital Space Plane project, the

only means other than the Shuttle of getting U.S. astronauts into space for the

next ten years will be the Russian Soyuz spacecraft.

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Q2a. In light of the Columbia accident, what specific steps is the Administration taking to ensure that the U.S. will be able to make use of the Soyuz as a backup

to the Space Shuttle for the next ten years?

Q2b. Will any modification to the Iran Nonproliferation Act be required to ensure

that the U.S. can make use of the Soyuz if needed?

Q2c. If the Administration is not taking any particular steps to ensure that the

Soyuz is available as a backup to the Shuttle, why not?

A2a,b,c. NASA has been working closely with its International Partners to assess

fully the implications of the loss of Columbia on ISS operations and to develop and

implement an appropriate near-term plan of action. The ISS Partnership is addressing the requirements for accommodation of crew rescue capabilities after 2006 as

part of the ISS Program Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration. This Program Action Plan was established by the ISS Heads of Agency during their meeting

in Tokyo in December 2002. The implementation of the Program Action Plan was

delayed by the loss of Columbia. A revised implementation schedule is now under

development by the ISS Partners. All of the ISS Partners recognize that any solution related to ISS crew rescue must be consistent with U.S. law. The ISS Program

Action Plan for Selection of an ISS Configuration does not depend on the modification of the INA, use of an exemption, or its repeal. NASA currently has no plans

to seek an exception to, or request an amendment of, the INA. Meanwhile, NASA

is working with its contractors to create an option to accelerate acquisition of the

Orbital Space Plane (OSP) with the goal of initial operational capability of a crew

return vehicle as early as 2008 and a system for crew transfer approximately two

years later.

Q3. In NASA’s April 2003 bimonthly status report on Russian participation in the

Space Station program, concern was expressed over the ability of the Russians

to continue to provide Soyuz and Progress vehicles, stating that ‘‘Russian performance appeared to depend on the receipt of ‘off budget’ funds from the sale

of flight opportunities on the Soyuz missions. . .’’ and going on to conclude that

‘‘The grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet and the subsequent Multilateral Coordination Board-agreed-upon interim operations plan have put additional financial strain on Rosviakosmos.’’ In addition, the head of the Russian Space

Agency has stated in recent months that the Russian Space Agency did not have

sufficient funding to provide the needed Soyuz and Progress vehicles beyond this

year. And a recent edition of Aerospace Daily reported that the vice president

of the company that builds the Soyuz and Progress vehicles said that the company had to borrow money to begin building an extra Progress vehicle to support

the Space Station while the Shuttle fleet is grounded.

Q3a. How much money do the Russian Space Agency and contractors need to build

the necessary Soyuz and Progress vehicles?

Q3b. Do you or anyone at NASA knows what fraction of the needed funds is actually

being provided to the Russian contractors?

A3a,b. Specific cost figures and contractual allocations for Russian-provided elements are not available. Earlier in the year, however, Rosaviakosmos officials asserted that Rosaviakosmos required approximately $100 million USD to successfully

implement a near-term operations plan adopted by the ISS Multilateral Coordination Board in February 2002. To date, without significant additional funding from

the other ISS international partners, the Russian Government has continued to implement the agreed near-term operations plan. The Russian government has recently indicated that it is also moving ahead with plans to increase its funding of

the ISS program in 2004 and is continuing to assess a potential augmentation to

the Rosaviakosmos 2003 budget to support ISS operations.

Q3c. From the time a decision is made to proceed, how long does it take to build

and ready a Soyuz vehicle for launch? What is the time required for a Progress

vehicle?

A3c. Officials from Rosaviakosmos and Energia, the company which builds the

Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, have indicated that it takes approximately two years

to build a Soyuz or Progress spacecraft and ready them for launch.

Q4. One of my questions to NASA Administrator O’Keefe for the record of the February 27, 2003 NASA Posture hearing was ‘‘Have you ever discussed either

using one of the exemptions permitted under the Iran Nonproliferation Act

(INA), modifying the INA, or seeking repeal of the INA with any White House

officials up to and including the President? If so, when, with whom, what was

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the nature of the discussion, and what was the response by the White House officials)?’’ The response from NASA, which was received on June 18, 2003, stated:

‘‘NASA has discussed various aspects of INA with other Agencies and Departments within the Administration.’’ Unfortunately, that answer does not respond

to the specific questions asked for the record of the February 27th hearing.

Therefore,

Q4a. Has NASA Administrator O’Keefe ever discussed either using one of the exemptions permitted under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), modifying the INA,

or seeking repeal of the INA with any White House officials up to and including the President?

Q4b. If so, when, with whom, what was the nature of the discussion, and what was

the response by the White House official(s)?

A4a,b. It would not be appropriate for NASA to disclose the specific nature or content of the Administrator’s discussions with the White House. As previously indicated, NASA officials, including the Administrator, have consulted a variety of experts within the Executive Branch, including the White House, concerning the Act’s

application to ongoing and potential NASA actions relating to the ISS.

Questions submitted by Representative Curt Weldon

Q1. NASA has begun a new space nuclear power system program that is estimated to cost approximately $9 billion over the next 10 years. The Russian Space Agency has a great deal of experience in space nuclear power systems, and in the

early 1990s, the Department of Defense purchased a Russian Topaz space nuclear reactor. Cooperation presents an opportunity for NASA to build on the

progress already made and lessons-learned in Russia and save billions of dollars by not having to develop its own space nuclear power program.

A1. Project Prometheus, the nuclear systems program (formerly the Nuclear Systems Initiative), is comprised of three major components: 1) the development of radioisotope power systems; 2) the development of nuclear fission power and electric

propulsion systems; and 3) the first mission to use nuclear-electric power and propulsion, the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO).

The President’s FY 2004 budget request runout through FY 2008 includes roughly $3 billion for Project Prometheus, of which just over $2 billion would be for JIMO.

Because NASA is in the early stages of planning key aspects of Project Prometheus,

we are not in a position to establish a definitive cost projection over the next 10

years for the entire program. Such projections are particularly dependent on the

mission approaches and costs for JIMO, which are being studied in-depth by industry (three teams are participating) and the government. When these mission studies

are concluded, JIMO life cycle cost estimates will be developed and finalized.

Q1a. To what extent does NASA plan to utilize Russia’s nuclear experience? If not,

under what circumstances would the United States be willing to take advantage of this opportunity?

A1a. The two areas for potential international participation in Project Prometheus

are the development of science instrumentation and spacecraft system technology

development. At this time, NASA envisions potential partnerships in developing

science instruments for JIMO and future Prometheus missions. Regarding the second area of possible interaction, which would include the development of nuclearrelated technologies, NASA does not have any definitive plans for such collaborations at this time. At this early stage of the program, we believe our efforts to establish the most appropriate technologies for near-term development can be best-managed and implemented via U.S. Government, industry, and academia.

NASA recognizes the significant experience the Russians have in developing the

TOPAZ and TOPAZ II (Enisy) space reactors. However, after conducting an in-depth

analysis of technologies applicable to JIN40 and other similar space science missions, we determined that the Russian space reactor technologies were not suited

to NASA’s current needs. In particular, the technologies employed by the Russians

(specifically the power conversion system and fuel) have significant lifetime limitations that make them incompatible with the longer-term missions of interest to

NASA.

It is worth noting, however, that foreign entities do have the opportunity to participate in Project Prometheus, as permissible by law, by cooperatively contracting

with proposers for NASA grants. As future opportunities present themselves, within

the context of competitively awarded contracts, we will evaluate each on a case-bycase basis for their applicability to the program.

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Q1b. What has been the funding history of space nuclear power since the purchase

of the Russian Topaz? What funding level is necessary to sufficiently develop

a U.S. space nuclear program?

A1b. NASA is not in a position to quantify the funding history of space nuclear

power, or for that matter any specific space nuclear reactor work prior to the proposal of the Nuclear Systems Initiative in FY 2003, because several agencies other

than NASA were involved in the various programs, including the TOPAZ II-related

work. As for the second question, please see our response to the opening statement

accompanying the questions for the record.

Q1c. Have there been cooperative efforts to work with the Russians on further space

power development since the Topaz reactor?

A1c. NASA has not been involved in any cooperative activities with the Russians

involving space nuclear power during this time period.

Q1d. What is the timeline for development, testing, and deployment of NASA’s space

nuclear power systems? What mission is driving this schedule?

A1d. Project Prometheus’ two space nuclear power system development efforts—radioisotope power systems and fission reactors—are on separate development schedules, which are driven by very different applications.

Project Prometheus’s radioisotope power system program is supporting two nearterm missions: the New Horizons mission to Pluto, scheduled for 2006, and the

Mars Science Laboratory, planned for 2009. The New Horizons mission is to be powered by the last Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) in our inventory.

Because of the need expressed by mission planners for radioisotope power systems, NASA has begun development of the next generation of systems that will operate not only in space (as is the case with the most recent RTG systems) but also

within an atmosphere, such as on the surface of Mars. Two technologies are under

development—the Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG)

and the Stirling Radioisotope Generator (SRG)—for possible use on the 2009 Mars

mission. The MMRTG is a smaller, more advanced version of the RTG. The SRG

produces a comparable amount of electricity as the MMRTG by converting the heat

from radioisotope decay to electricity through a dynamic power conversion system

(the Stirling free-piston engine). The SRG system is more complex than the

MMRTG, but this technology promises to be up to four times more efficient in converting heat to electricity than the MMRTG, requiring less fuel per watt of power

produced.

The nuclear fission electric power and propulsion components of Project Prometheus are supporting the development of technologies for science missions that

would be uniquely enabled by these technologies—in the near-term the Jupiter Icy

Moons Orbiter (JIMO). Initial planning estimates call for launch of the JIMO spacecraft no earlier than 2011.

Q1e. What missions need space nuclear power to be successful? When are these missions scheduled? What funding will be necessary to achieve this schedule?

A1e. NASA is making a strategic investment in both radioisotope and fission space

power systems because they can uniquely enable a range of near- and long-term

NASA missions. Such missions would take advantage of these systems’ ability to

provide NASA mission planners ‘‘all weather, anytime, anywhere’’ capabilities. That

is, they are capable of providing continuous power, from milliwatts to 100s of kilowatts, in hostile environments, irrespective of the availability of the sun (generally

speaking, once further out into the solar system than Mars, the Sun is not a very

effective source of power with today’s solar power technologies). Thirty years of experience in the design and use of radioisotope power sources have also demonstrated

the ruggedness and reliability of these systems, some of which have now operated

for well over 20 years. While we cannot identify specific missions beyond JIMO at

this point, we do envision follow-ons in the next decade.

Beyond these inherent benefits of both space radioisotope and fission power systems, space nuclear fission systems offer NASA space science mission planners unprecedented levels of power for use in space or on the surfaces of planetary bodies.

Access to power levels up to 1,000 times greater than those available today would

enable revolutionary capabilities in the areas of spacecraft maneuverability and scientific exploration.

In the area of radioisotope power systems, the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL)

science return would be significantly enhanced by a power system that would enable

increased observation time on the planet, and a greater range of potential destinations that could be explored. Rather than being limited to the equatorial sector of

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Mars (to optimize solar power), MSL could be sent, independent of seasonal variations, to those areas that hold some of the greatest potential for scientific return,

i.e., high latitude areas where water has been detected. Also, the MSL would function for an extended period of time—one to two years, rather than several weeks—

and this would not be possible with solar power.

Making use of this power, NASA can now begin to plan close-range, months-long

orbits of multiple destinations for optimal science observation. Throughout such a

mission, power could be directed to an entirely new class of scientific instruments

the likes of which are currently only available to satellites in near-Earth orbit. Even

at great distances (e.g., the orbit of Jupiter and beyond), the increased power from

a space nuclear reactor would enable transmission of more data to Earth daily than

would be returned by the Pioneer, Voyager, Galileo, and Cassini over their entire

mission lifetimes combined. Moreover, this power would also enable the highly efficient propulsion systems under development (similar to that used on Deep Space1) to transport significantly larger payloads to any final destination.

Taken in total, the benefits outlined above could open up a whole new range of

missions, both robotic and human, in space and on the surfaces of planets and

moons, to NASA and the scientific community. Because this is a new initiative for

NASA, we are going to great lengths to identify, hand-in-hand with the science community, future missions, instruments, and technologies that can leverage the unique

capabilities enabled by Project Prometheus technologies.

The first mission to make use of nuclear electric power and propulsion technologies from Project Prometheus is the JIN40 mission that would orbit three of Jupiter’s moons—Callisto, Ganymede, and Europa—that are believed to have subsurface watery oceans; where there is water, there is the possibility for life. Exploration of Europa is the leading large mission candidate identified by the National

Research Council in its Decadal Solar System Exploration Survey. JIMO’s nuclearpowered electric propulsion system would enable it to orbit all three moons at close

range for several months at a time, while its high-powered, active science instruments (e.g., ice penetrating radar) and high-powered communications equipment

would enable unprecedented scientific return.

Q1f. How do other power systems compare with space nuclear power on the basis

of safety, cost, or availability?

A1f. Non-nuclear power and propulsion systems currently available or under development will generally not be appropriate for the types of missions on which Project

Prometheus technologies would be employed. Such considerations as safety, cost,

and availability are balanced with the specific mission science objectives prior to the

development of any NASA mission. Only when the science objectives are best

achieved by the use of space nuclear power, and requirements for cost, safety, and

availability are met, will these technologies be baselined into mission planning.

Q2. Is the technology for space nuclear power systems mature enough for testing or

use at this time?

A2. The technologies under development by Project Prometheus are in various

stages of development, ranging from research and development of high-temperature

materials to life-testing of Stirling Radioisotope Generators. In the area of radioisotope power sources, we are confident that both near-term systems (MMRTG and

SRG) will be ready for use on the 2009 Mars Science Laboratory. We are also confident that a fully tested nuclear fission power system will be ready for flight by

the early part of the next decade in support of the JIMO mission.

Q3. What efforts are necessary to further develop the technology?

A3. Because the radioisotope power source technology is well established or very

near demonstration, we will only address nuclear fission related space systems. Significant work was carried out during the 1980s and 1990s on technologies related

to space nuclear reactors under the SP–100 program, and we intend to leverage

these efforts in our work. It will be challenging to develop and test the various

power generation and conversion technologies to the point of being flight ready, but

many of the individual components under consideration have been tested in one

form or another over the years, which is why we are confident in our ability to fly

the JIMO mission in the early part of the next decade.

Q3a. Who has this task?

A3a. The Department of Energy (DOE), as mandated by U.S. law, is responsible for

all nuclear materials-related tasks under Project Prometheus. Such activities will be

carried out via a Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies. As in

the past, NASA will fund the RPS work, but DOE will maintain responsibility for

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all RPS development. In addition, DOE will have responsibility for the fission reactor system. These activities will be supported by industry and academia as necessary or appropriate. The remaining, i.e., non-nuclear, systems and components of

the program will be managed directly by NASA and will also involve industry, academia, and NASA and DOE laboratories.

Q3b. What are their current plans?

A3b. Plans for the RPS are well established, and we are on schedule to have systems ready for possible use on the Mars 2009 mission. Regarding the nuclear fission

power system, NASA is currently funding internal government and external industry studies to determine the best configuration for the JIMO spacecraft and its primary systems, which will drive future development activities. This detailed mission

and technology analysis should be completed in 2005. Once the final systems have

been selected, detailed system development plans will be formulated. In parallel,

NASA would continue to fund development work on a range of technologies applicable to the mission.

Q3c. What is the Russian involvement in these plans?

A3c. There is currently no Russian involvement in Project Prometheus activities.

Q3d. What is the private sector involvement?

A3d. Currently, there are over 60 private sector participants (including industry

and academia from 20 states) participating in Project Prometheus-funded work,

with between 60–70 percent of all program work competitively awarded. In addition,

the final spacecraft integrator contract for JIMO will go to industry.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. What would be the consequences if the International Space Station had to be

abandoned [uncrewed] for an indefinite period of time (from months to years)

because the Shuttle fleet was grounded and none of the Space Station partners

could pay to provide the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft needed to keep it operating?

A1. The ISS is built to be human-tended and cannot be used to conduct meaningful

science without human interaction. Without the crew to perform routine maintenance on the ISS, systems would begin to degrade, complicating the process of reactivation.

In the event that a de-crewing is necessary for any reason NASA has a plan in

place for such a contingency. The ISS program has defined the best operational vehicle configuration (hardware, software and orientation) that will maximize the

chances of vehicle survivability while operating without a crew.

Q2. If the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA) would force abandonment of the International Space Station for an indefinite period, would NASA seek relief from the

INA? If not, why not?

A2. Since the loss of Columbia, NASA has looked to the ISS Partnership to assist

in sustaining human presence on orbit while NASA concentrates on the necessary

actions to return the Shuttle safely to flight. NASA has been working closely with

its International Partners to fully assess the implications of the loss of Columbia

on ISS operations and to develop and implement an appropriate near-term plan of

action. This plan of action does not depend on the modification of the INA, use of

an exemption, or its repeal. Therefore, NASA currently has no plans to seek an exception to or request an amendment of the INA. The provisions contained within

the INA clearly outline the responsibilities and procedures upon which NASA can

act should circumstances change in the future.

Q3. Does NASA see the need to renegotiate the multilateral Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) or any of the Space Station bilateral Memoranda of Agreement? If

so, why? And if so, when would NASA like to have those negotiations begin?

A3. No, NASA has no plans at this time to seek to renegotiate the multilateral ISS

IGA or bilateral MOUs.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Robert M. Davis, President and CEO, California Space Authority

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. Is this shift in work from the U.S. to Russia a large contributing factor to the

decline of the U.S. aerospace industrial base over the past 10 years?

A1. The shift primarily affects the U.S. commercial launch industry base, and does

so in two ways, and has selectively contributed to U.S. aerospace industrial declines.

First, it can be qualitatively argued that launches of U.S. origin commercial satellites on Russian vehicles reduce the number of vehicles produced and flown by

U.S. manufacturers. However, competition for provision of commercial launch services went global ten or more years ago, and of late has been greatly intensified by

the reduction of satellite launches in this era of the telecom glut. The degree, then,

to which the U.S. commercial launch industry has declined uniquely due to Russian

launches of U.S. and foreign commercial satellites is difficult to enumerate. Unquestionably, however, as the number of U.S. vehicles produced and launched declines,

it becomes increasingly difficult to avoid worker complacency, which leads to declines in flight reliability, and looking to the future, increasingly difficult to attract

new entrants to the community as older workers retire. In the nearer-term,

unreliability as measured in flight failures of all types, poses adverse economic consequence in a host of industry sectors (manufacturing, services, insurance, investment, satellite services, etc.). In the longer-term, a loss of industrial vigor will be

experienced as the launch industry increasingly operates as a commodity market.

Second, the U.S. propulsion industry has been adversely affected by the use of engines of Russian origin on U.S. vehicles, and jobs have been lost that would have

otherwise been performed by U.S. workers. As one example, in recent testimony before a Senate Science, Technology, and Space subcommittee hearing, Mr. Bryon

Woods of Boeing Rocketdyne, cited that during 2002 the U.S. propulsion community

provided a mere 14 percent of required launch engines, while the Russians provided

over 60 percent, and Europe providing the remainder.

Q2. Do you have any analyses about how many U.S. jobs have been affected by this

shift in aerospace work to Russia?

A2. As a consequence of the shift in supply of rocket engines, Rocketdyne has experienced a decline in the engine production workers, and of equal importance, a significant decline in its design and development staff (from a peak of slightly more

than 800 in 1999 to about 260 in 2002). Aerojet and Pratt & Whitney reflect similar,

if not significantly greater losses of production and design/development personnel for

many of the same reasons.

Q3. Do you have any concerns about U.S. reliance on Russian aerospace industry to

supply critical aerospace technologies rather than the U.S. developing its own

capabilities?

A3. The world is less stable now than it has been for a number of decades. Orbits

near the earth provide the high ground in terms of sensing and communications (as

well as precise navigation), and if the U.S. intends to sustain its dominance in the

realm, it is important that the U.S. also maintain its aerospace technological leadership. Within its borders, Russia still retains all strategically key natural resources;

the U.S. does not, and therefore must rely on other nations for some of its strategically critical resources. Therefore, it remains of critical importance to the future welfare and well being of the U.S. to maintain its space enterprise leadership so as to

be able to ensure ready sources of supply in this volatile era across the globe.

Q4. Do you have any recommendations to remedy these concerns [about reliance on

Russian aerospace]?

A4. The U.S. Government and taxpayers need to recognize and accept that our

aerospace industry is itself a critical strategic resource that must be sustained, including ensuring that it will have the workforce that is needed throughout the future. The answer to this question should address current investments by NASA and

other agencies in the future of the U.S. aerospace community, including development of a sustainable workforce, and should be the exclusive subject of a separate

hearing. These investments should stimulate early to advanced education, worker

development, technology development, and operating proficiency needs across the

board if this community is to be sustained at a level that will serve preservation

of our national security and defense interests.

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Q5. Are U.S. aerospace companies seeking to do business with Russian companies

informed beforehand by the State Department about any proliferation concerns

with certain Russian companies?

A5. I do not have any recent first hand experience on which to base an answer to

this question.

Q6. Would such information be useful to U.S. industry before a U.S. company seeks

a Technical Assistance Agreement from the State Department to work with certain Russian companies on particular programs?

A6. Some 450 aerospace entities in Russia have or in the past have had ties in one

form or another with the Russian government. From time to time the U.S. evidences

concerns about proliferation by various Russian entities, including some of these 450

companies. Developing an operable and productive relationship with a Russian aerospace entity is expensive, uncertain, and time consuming. Availability of information

from the Department of State about select Russian entities that pose concerns for

the interests of U.S. national security before making the investment to apply for a

TAA would be highly beneficial to companies large and small. A second interest to

be addressed is that from time to time U.S. Company to Russian Company commerce is put into limbo as contemporary U.S. Government to Russian Government

issues play themselves out on the world stage. Companies that do not have a lot

of cash to weather business disruptions would benefit by knowing beforehand which

Russian companies are more likely than not to incur business delays so that they

might be avoided if other choices exist with whom business might be undertaken.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. Your testimony highlights the need to stem Russian proliferation of all aerospace

capabilities by shrinking the Russian aerospace industrial base. The Iran Nonproliferation Act stops all U.S. payments to Russia for any support they might

provide for the International Space Station in order to induce the Russian Government to stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology to Iran. Would you recommend restricting or embargoing other

U.S.–Russia aerospace trade and collaboration in other areas, such as launch

vehicle engines and other capabilities, in order to stop Russian proliferation to

Iran and other countries?

A1. If there was a way to leverage Russian behavior that would effectively stop

Russia from proliferating illicit strategic technology to hostile states such as Iran

I would favor it. I support simple notion that the U.S. taxpayer should not be asked

to support Russian entities that do such proliferation because the U.S. loses moral

authority to complain about Russian proliferation generally if it does not show this

minimum of self-restraint itself. On the other hand, I am, like many other experts,

skeptical about how much more can be done with new sanctions that would effectively stop Russian proliferation.

Q2. Why not simply restrict our trade and collaboration to those entities in Russia

that the State Department deems as proliferators?

A2. This is what the current law effectively does by requiring the President to certify that the Russian Space Agency no longer has entities under its purview that

do proliferate. Once the President certifies, it is my understanding that NASA is

free to make progress payments to RSA.

Q3. Why are Russian companies that are not proliferators made to suffer from an

embargo on U.S. trade and collaboration on the Space Station when they cannot

control the actions of a few Russian companies despite the Russian Government

making some efforts toward improved export control/nonproliferation?

A3. Russian entities working under the control of RSA benefit from this association

through subsidies and so must be held accountable when entities under the RSA’s

authority misbehave. As I noted in my testimony, the best and perhaps only solution to this problem is to right-size the number of RSA space entities to smaller

number that would include only the most responsible and profitable entities.

Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. In your testimony, you appear not to favor granting any waivers to the Iran

Nonproliferation Act. Would you oppose any exception to or modification of the

terms of the INA even if the result was that the Space Station had to be abandoned on orbit for an indefinite period, with an increased risk that the entire

Station might be lost?

A1. I think the current waiver for safety—i.e., to prevent the imminent loss of life

or grievous injury to those aboard the Station—is entirely reasonable and should not

be changed. The U.S. should fund the Station in such a fashion that the U.S. would

not have to exercise this waiver. If that means funding an alternative means to rescue crews other than Soyuz, I would do this. Modifying the existing waiver on these

points, I believe would only undermine the law’s original intent, which was to keep

U.S. taxpayers from paying money unnecessarily to entities the President believed

were still proliferating strategic rocket related technologies to Iran. Forced to choose

between making the Space Station’s success less dependent on contracting taxpayers’ dollars to proliferating Russian entities and being complicit in such commerce, I would prefer making the station less dependent every time.

Q2. Your testimony highlights the need to stem Russian proliferation of all aerospace

capabilities by shrinking the Russian aerospace industrial base. The Iran Nonproliferation Act stops all U.S. payments to Russia for any support they might

provide for the International Space Station in order to induce the Russian Government to stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology to Iran. Would you recommend restricting or embargoing other

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U.S.–Russia aerospace trade and collaboration in other areas, such as launch

vehicle engines and other capabilities, in order to stop Russian proliferation to

Iran and other countries?

A2. If there was a way to leverage Russian behavior that would effectively stop

Russia from proliferating illicit strategic technology to hostile states such as Iran

I would favor it. I support simple notion that the U.S. taxpayer should not be asked

to support Russian entities that do such proliferation because the U.S. loses moral

authority to complain about Russian proliferation generally if it does not show this

minimum of self-restraint itself. On the other hand, I am, like many other experts,

skeptical about how much more can be done with new sanctions that would effectively stop Russian proliferation.

Q3. Why not simply restrict our trade and collaboration to those entities in Russia

that the State Department deems as proliferators?

A3. This is what the current law effectively does by requiring the President to certify that the Russian Space Agency no longer has entities under its purview that

do proliferate. Once the President certifies, it is my understanding that NASA is

free to make progress payments to RSA.

Q4. Why are Russian companies that are not proliferators made to suffer from an

embargo on U.S. trade and collaboration on the Space Station when they cannot

control the actions of a few Russian companies despite the Russian Government

making some efforts toward improved export control/nonproliferation?

A4. Russian entities working under the control of RSA benefit from this association

through subsidies and so must be held accountable when entities under the RSA’s

authority misbehave. As I noted in my testimony, the best and perhaps only solution to this problem is to right-size the number of RSA space entities to smaller

number that would include only the most responsible and profitable entities.

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ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Ambassador Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau

of European and Eurasian Affairs, State Department

Questions submitted by Chairman Dana Rohrabacher

Q1. According to several news reports, the Russians are helping to train Chinese astronauts. When Chinese President Hu Jintao toured the Khrunichev Space Center recently, the Russians reportedly offered to build them a Space Station out

of spare parts of the Zarya control module that the U.S. paid for during the

1990s.

• Did Russia offer to help the Chinese build a space station?

• Would any U.S. owned parts or equipment be used to help build a space station for China?

• Will the U.S. Government be reimbursed for the re-sale of any parts or equipment?

• Is the State Department closely monitoring this exchange between Russia and

China?

• Does the State Department have any proliferation concerns with this exchange

of technical capabilities and knowledge from Russia to China?

A1. Based on past history, Russia would likely be involved in Chinese space efforts.

But China is still attempting to launch its first manned space flight, and China’s

own estimates place the launching of any space station ten years into the future.

The intergovermental agreement on the ISS, to which both the United States and

Russia are parties, provides that each government’s space agency shall mark with

a notice technical data or goods that are to be protected for export control purposes,

and that this notice shall indicate that (1) such technical data or goods shall be used

only for the purposes of fulfilling the obligations of the receiving space agency and

its contractors and subcontractors; and (2) that such technical data or goods shall

not be used by persons or entities other than the receiving space agency, its contractors or subcontractors, or for any other purposes, without the prior written permission of the furnishing government.

The State Department would be concerned with any unauthorized Russian transfer of U.S.-developed space technology. The level of concern would depend upon the

specific technology transferred, the potential military utility, and any relevant export licenses. The State Department monitors space issues that may involve the use

or transfer of U.S. technologies.

Q2. Your written testimony states, ‘‘Russia has taken steps, though not yet sufficient,

to implement stronger export controls and improve oversight at Russian facilities.’’

• What steps have been taken to implement stronger export controls?

• What additional steps for stronger export controls would Russia need to make?

• Has the State Department communicated to the Russian Government the steps

that it thinks are necessary and sufficient for export controls?

A1. U.S. bilateral cooperation with Russia has contributed to improvements in Russia’s export control laws and implementing regulations over the past few years; it

also supports Russia’s outreach and internal compliance programs aimed at educating its industry on export controls.

Since the enactment of Russia’s Federal Law on Export Control in July 1999, the

Russian Federation has adopted new regulations to implement the law and create

a more functional export control system. Russia’s export control law now extends to

intangible transfers of technology and includes provisions for catch-all controls. The

Government of Russia has updated its seven control lists to bring them in closer

harmony with the standardized EU international control lists and all of the international nonproliferation regimes. President Putin established the Export Control

Commission in January 2001 to provide policy oversight on key export control and

licensing issues. Russia’s Administrative Code was revised in July 2002 to provide

the Department for Export Control (DEK) under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade with significant administrative enforcement authority. The DEK is

now responsible for drafting export control regulations, processing export license applications, conducting industry compliance outreach programs, and administrative

prosecution of export control violations.

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Increased focus should be placed on the enforcement of Russian export control legislation and regulations. The Russian Government has not prosecuted enough export

control violations to effectively demonstrate serious political will in enforcing its law

or to establish the effectiveness of the catch-all provisions of the law. Industry outreach efforts are also seriously limited by scarce resources, including personnel.

The State Department maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Russian Government on export control issues and continues to communicate to the Russian Government the steps that it thinks are necessary and sufficient for an effective export control system.

Q3. Your written testimony states, ‘‘Mr. Yuriy Koptev, General Director of

Rosaviakosmos, has been particularly active in promoting reform throughout the

Russian Government, and frequently notes the constraints imposed by the Iran

Nonproliferation Act on U.S.–Russian space cooperation.’’

• What proliferation reforms have been promoted or taken by Rosaviakosmos?

• Are these proliferation reforms only between Russia and Iran or between Russia and other countries?

• Does the State Department advise other U.S. Government agencies like NASA

through reports, briefings, and communication about which Russian Government agencies, companies, and individuals are known proliferators?

• Does the State Department advise U.S. aerospace companies to any degree

about U.S. Government proliferation concerns with particular Russian Government agencies, companies, and individuals?

A3. In recent years, senior USG officials have had an open and productive dialogue

on nonproliferation with Rosaviakosmos’ General Director Koptev. Under Mr.

Koptev’s stewardship, Rosaviakosmos has implemented a number of reforms that

safeguard against transfers and assistance to missile programs of concern, in Iran

and elsewhere. These include:

• A Federal Security Service (FSB) representative is permanently positioned on

the security staff at various Rosaviakosmos’ organizations;

• Security staff holds foreign passports and restricts travel of particular

Rosaviakosmos’ employees;

• All foreign visitors must submit requests for visits to Rosaviakosmos facilities

two weeks in advance; all visitors must be pre-approved and must state their

agenda/reason for visit;

• All data to be used and presented to visitors (both domestic and foreign) must

be cleared through security, and a security representative must be present at

all meetings to ensure that data and discussions are consistent with what had

been approved for release;

• Key Rosaviakosmos firms have Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs)—internal export control units—installed with U.S. assistance to help vet transactions against export control requirements;

• Russia’s Export Control Law outlines provisions against intangible transfers

of technology, and key Rosaviakosmos personnel and presentations that attend international conferences and symposia are vetted to ensure these provisions are met.

We support these efforts and continue to work with the Russian Government to

strengthen existing controls and related mechanisms. The State Department will

also continue its close partnership with other agencies such as NASA. With respect

to working with our executive branch colleagues, the State Department works with

a wide array of agencies to identify and impede proliferators of missile technology

through the Missile Transfer Analysis Group (MTAG). Many items used for space

systems, especially spacelift, are controlled by the MTAG and are therefore identified and discussed by the USG agencies. Russia is a signatory to the MTAG. The

State Department does not identify proliferators of space-unique equipment.

With respect to advising U.S. aerospace companies about U.S. Government proliferation concerns with particular Russian Government agencies, companies, and

individuals, space technology that does not have a secondary military use is not a

proliferation concern. Space technology is controlled through the standard export licensing process.

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Questions submitted by Representative Bart Gordon

Q1. The June 1st Bush-Putin joint release states that: ‘‘. . .the Russian Federation

is committed to meeting the U.S. crew transport and logistics resupply requirements necessary to maintain our joint American and Russian cosmonaut teams

on board the ISS until the Space Shuttle returns to flight.’’

Q1a. Does that statement mean that Russia has formally agreed to pay for all of the

Soyuz and Progress flights needed to support the International Space Station

while the Shuttle fleet is grounded?

Q1b. Has Russia agreed that it will not seek compensation from NASA or any of the

other International Partners for those Progress and Soyuz flights?

Q1c. If not, what in specific terms does the release mean?

A1a,b,c. The ISS Multilateral Coordination Board (MCB), chaired by NASA Deputy

Administrator Fred Gregory, on February 26, 2003, approved an option to maintain

a continued crew presence on ISS until the Space Shuttle is able to return to flight.

This option required that the ISS crew size be reduced from three to two, that the

April 2003 Soyuz flight be used for crew exchange, and that the Russian Progress

flight schedule be accelerated to support crew and ISS consumable needs until the

Space Shuttle returns to flight. This option also required the addition of two Russian Progress logistics vehicles to the ISS manifest (one in 2003 and one in 2004)

and assumes that the Space Shuttle and the European Space Agency’s (ESA’s) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) will be flying in 2004. This option was adopted by

the ISS Partnership contingent upon the ability of the Russian Aviation and Space

Agency (Rosaviakosmos) to receive additional funding.

Rosaviakosmos has informed NASA that the Russian Government has advanced

Rosaviakosmos all of its 2003 ISS funding to assist in the acceleration of logistics

vehicles. Similarly, each of the other space agencies has made modest proposals to

Rosaviakosmos that are currently being evaluated. These activities are taking place

within the framework of the international agreements that govern the relationship

among the ISS Partners.

The June 1st joint statement issued following the meeting of Presidents Bush and

Putin does not mean—and was not intended to mean—that Russia has agreed to

pay for all costs related to provision of Soyuz and Progress vehicles needed to support the ISS while the Shuttle fleet is grounded. Nor does it mean that Russia will

not seek compensation from the United States for this purpose. What the joint

statement means is that Russia is committed to working with the United States and

other ISS partners to find a solution to the current problem of sustaining an operational ISS.

Q2. Even if NASA is allowed to proceed with the Orbital Space Plane project, the

only means other than the Shuttle of getting U.S. astronauts into space for the

next ten years will be the Russian Soyuz spacecraft.

Q2a. In light of the Columbia accident, what specific steps is the Administration taking to ensure that the U.S. will be able to make use of the Soyuz as a backup

to the Space Shuttle for the next ten years?

Q2b. Will any modification to the Iran Nonproliferation Act be required to ensure

that the U.S. can make use of the Soyuz if needed?

A2a,b. The Administration does not plan to seek an exception to, or request an

amendment of, the Iran Nonproliferation Act. We are continuing to urge the Russian Government to cease the kinds of proliferation activities that have caused Congress to pass the INA with the objective of influencing Russia in this regard such

that we will no longer require the INA.

Questions submitted by Representative Nick Lampson

Q1. From a foreign policy perspective, is having to take the crew off of the International Space Station for an indefinite period an acceptable alternative to loosening the restrictions of the Iran Nonproliferation Act if the ISS had to be abandoned because the Shuttle fleet was grounded and none of the Space Station

partners could pay to provide the Soyuz and Progress spacecraft needed to keep

it operating?

A1. From a foreign policy perspective, neither loosening the restrictions imposed by

Iran Nonproliferation Act nor abandoning the ISS would be acceptable alternatives.

While NASA is working on issues related to returning the Shuttle to flight, it is also

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consulting with the Russian Aviation and Space Agency to develop options that will

support continuing ISS crew presence on orbit without resorting to measures that

would be inconsistent with the INA.

Q2. Does the Administration believe that the ‘‘in-kind’’ and ‘‘third-party’’ transaction

prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would prohibit the U.S. companies

from purchasing Space Station related goods and services from Russian companies? Why or why not? If not, are there other provisions in the INA that would

prevent such company-to-company contracts?

A2. The Iran Nonproliferation Act was intended as a source of leverage on Russia

to improve the proliferation record of Russian companies in the space sector. If U.S.

companies under contract with NASA were to subcontract with these same Russian

companies for space station-related goods or services, this leverage would be diminished or lost altogether. We believe such arrangements would raise legal questions

under Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation Act and would likely be viewed by

many as an evasion of the law.

Q3. Khrunichev and RSC Energia are the two main Russian Space Station contractors. Does the Administration believe that they are ‘‘organizations or entities

under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Aviation and Space Agency’’

under the terms of the Iran Nonproliferation Act? Why or why not?

A3. As referenced in the answer to the preceding question, payments by NASA to

Russian companies, either directly or through NASA contractors, would diminish

pressure on Russian aerospace companies to improve their nonproliferation record

or would also raise legal questions. If procurement from Russian sources to support

the ISS or NASA’s human space flight programs became necessary, NASA would

need to conduct the specific inquiry required to make a formal determination of

whether companies like Energia or Krunichev meet the Act’s detailed definition of

jurisdiction and control of Rosaviakosmos. This inquiry could require significant research and analysis of Russian records to verify the firm’s creation, legal structure,

corporate governance, transactions in its equities and other factors. To date, neither

State nor NASA has had occasion to make such a determination.

Q4. Does the Administration believe that the ‘‘in-kind’’ and ‘‘third-party’’ transaction

prohibitions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act would prohibit one or more of the

other Space Station International Partners from purchasing Soyuz or Progress

spacecraft or services from Russia in exchange for some compensation from the

Untied States? Why or why not?

A4. The Iran Nonproliferation Act has been a source of pressure on Russia to improve the proliferation record of companies in the space sector. If the U.S. Government provided compensation to another Space Station International Partner ‘‘in exchange for’’ that partner purchasing spacecraft or services that the U.S. could not

purchase directly due to the restrictions in Section 6 of the Iran Nonproliferation

Act, this pressure would be diminished or eliminated altogether. We believe such

arrangements would raise legal questions under Section 6 and would likely be

viewed by many as an evasion of the law.