NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HARNEK SINGH,
Petitioner,

v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent. No. 22

- 981 Agency No. A205

- 935

- 145

MEMORANDUM *

HARNEK SINGH,
Petitioner,

v.
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,
Respondent. No. 22

- 1850 Agency No. A205

- 935

- 145

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 8, 2023 ** San Francisco , California

Before: CHRISTEN and BRESS, Circuit Judges, and ANTOON, District

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

MAY 10 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 Judge

. ***

Harnek Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of a
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal of an
Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying his applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under t he Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh
also petitions for review of the BIA’s later denial of his motion to reopen his
removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the
petition s

.
1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of asylum and
withholding of removal based on the IJ’s adverse credibility determination

. See

Sharma v. Garland , 9 F.4th 1052 , 1060 (9th Cir. 2021) ( standard of review for
asylum and withholding of removal ) ; Garcia v. Holder , 749 F.3d 785, 789 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“We review factual findings, including adverse credibility
determinations, for substantial evidence.”). Under the substantial evidence
standard, the agency’s “ findings of fact are conclusive unless a ny reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B).
To support an adverse credibility finding, “ [ t ] he [agency] must have a
legitimate articulable basis to question the petitioner ’ s credibility, and must off er

*** The Honorable John Antoon II, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida , sitting by designation.3 a specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Martinez v. Holder , 557 F.3d
1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2009) ( quoting Valderrama v. INS , 260 F.3d 1083, 1 085 (9th
Cir. 2001) ). “There is no bright

- line rule under which some number of
inconsistencies requires sustaining or rejecting an adverse credibility

determination

. . . .” Alam v. Garland , 11 F.4th 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2021) (en
banc). Instead, “ we must look to the ‘ totality of the circumstances[ ] and all

relevant factors. ’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii i ) ). One such factor is “the consistency between the
[ petitioner’s ] written and oral statements.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
Credibility determinations may be made “without regard to wheth er an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the [petitioner ’s ]

claim.” Id.
Here, the BIA found that Singh’s testimony was not credible because it was

inconsistent with his prior sworn statement and declaration. In particular, Si ngh
was inconsistent about whether he had been beaten by members of the Congress

P arty ; whether his injuries required professional medical attention ; and whether
his political involvement with the Mann Party went beyond just voting for its

candidates . Dur ing cross

- examination, Singh acknowledged all of these

inconsistencies

. The record does not compel the conclusion that Singh’s testimony was

credible. Singh’s “ inability to consistently describe the underlying events that
gave rise to his fear was an imp ortant factor that could be relied upon by the IJ in4 making an adverse credibility determination. ” Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d
1034, 104 7 (9th Cir. 2010). And his embellishment of his account of persecution
further undermined his credibility. See Silva

- Pereir a v. Lynch , 827 F.3d 1176,
1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that adverse credibility determinations can be
supported based on the petitioner offering new allegations that “tell a much

different

— and more com pelling

— story of persecution than [the] initial
application” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted) ) . Although Singh tried
to explain the inconsistencies, the BIA could conclude that his explanations were
not persuasive. A nd a bsent credible testim ony, substantial evidence supports the
denial of asylum and withholding of removal.

2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. See

Sharma , 9 F.4 th at 1066 (standard of review). Singh’s evidentiary support for his

claim that he would likely be tortured in India consisted of his discredited
testimony and general background country condition information, which the BIA

considered. This generalized evidence d oes not compel the conclusion that Singh
will more likely than not be tortured i f he is removed to India. See Delgado

- Ortiz

v. Holder , 600 F.3d 1148, 11 52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ( finding that
“generalized evidence of violence and crime” in the country of origin was “ not
particular to Petitioners” and was thus “insufficient to m eet” the standard for CAT
relief); Almaghzar v. Gonzales , 457 F.3d 915, 922

– 23 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that discredited testimony and general country reports of torture d id not compel
a grant of CAT protection).5 3. The BIA did not abuse its discretion by denying Singh’s motion to

reopen to pursue adjustment of status following his marriage to a U.S. citizen and

his related filing of a visa application

. See Hernandez

- Ortiz v. Garland , 32 F.4th
794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022) (standard of review). S ingh offered no evidence that his
visa application was approved. And “ [w] hen an alien enters into a marriage
following the completion of removal proceedings, it is presumed that the purpose
is to ‘procur[e] the alien’s admission as an immigrant.’” Sharma v. Holder , 633
F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255(e)(3)). “To overcome this presumption, an applicant filing a motion with
the Board to reopen removal proceedings must ‘present[ ] clear and convincing

e vidence indicating a strong likelihood that the [petitioner’s] marriage is bona

fide.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Malhi v. INS , 336 F.3d 989, 994 (9th
Cir. 2003)).
Here, a s the BIA noted, there was no “direct evidence showing joint

tenancy of a common residence,” no evidence “as to when this couple met, how
they met, or the exact nature of their relationship,” and “no affidavits from third
parties having knowledge of the bona fides of the relationship.” Because Singh

has not demonstrated th at his “ motivation for marriage” was “based on an actual
and legitimate relationship,” Malhi , 336 F.3d at 994 , the BIA did not abuse its
discretion by denying the motion to reopen. Nor has Singh demonstrated any6 other error in the BIA’s decision. 1

PETITIONS DENIED.

1 Singh’s motion for stay of removal is denied as moot.