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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 48082

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KENNETH M. SANDBERG,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: April 15, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Boundary County. Hon. Lansing Haynes, District Judge; Hon. Justin Julian, 

Magistrate.

Decision of district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court, 

affirming judgment of conviction for exceeding the speed limit, affirmed.

Kenneth M. Sandberg, Simi Valley, California, pro se appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 

Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge

Kenneth M. Sandberg appeals pro se from the district court’s decision on intermediate 

appeal affirming the magistrate court’s judgment for exceeding the speed limit, Idaho Code § 49-

654. We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Officer Trujillo of the Bonners Ferry Police Department pulled Sandberg over and issued 

him a traffic citation for exceeding the posted speed limit. The citation indicates Sandberg was 

driving 50 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour zone. The appellate record indicates that 

Sanders paid the citation under protest. This payment was apparently construed as a guilty plea, 

but the magistrate court later set aside the judgment at Sandberg’s request and scheduled the case 

for trial. Before trial, the parties exchanged numerous discovery requests and responses.
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On January 16, 2020, the case proceeded to a bench trial before the magistrate court, and 

Sandberg appeared in person and represented himself pro se. Before the trial began, Sandberg 

requested that the magistrate court address his motion to dismiss. Although the magistrate court 

was unable to locate Sandberg’s motion in the record, it allowed him to argue the motion. 

Sandberg argued the case should be dismissed as a sanction for the State’s discovery violations,

including its purported failure to disclose certain information and to provide timely discovery 

responses. The State conceded one of its responses was untimely but represented it had 

produced all the requested information that existed. The magistrate court denied Sandberg’s

motion, concluding the State had substantially complied with its discovery obligation.

During the trial, Officer Trujillo and Sandberg both testified. At the conclusion of the 

trial, the magistrate court found “reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the radar reading.” It

also found, however, that the State had met its burden of proving Sandberg was speeding based 

on Officer Trujillo’s “trained visual estimate” of Sandberg’s speed. Based on this finding, the 

magistrate court entered judgment against Sandberg.

Sandberg appealed to the district court. After Sandberg filed his appellate brief, he 

requested that the State produce the dispatch log and the report to which Officer Trujillo referred 

during trial, and Sandberg filed with the district court, among numerous other motions, a motion 

to compel these documents. In response, the State filed a “discovery response,” indicating it was 

producing a copy of the dispatch log and that no other written reports not already produced 

existed.1

 

After the State produced the dispatch log, the district court held a hearing on Sandberg’s 

objections to the trial transcript for purposes of appeal. According to the minutes of that hearing, 

Sandberg raised the issue of the State’s post-trial production of the dispatch log, but the district 

court declined to address the issue, explaining that the court’s intermediate appellate decision 

would be “based purely on [the magistrate court] record and transcript.”

After oral argument, the district court issued a written decision. It construed Sandberg’s 

appeal as raising three issues: (1) whether the magistrate court erred by denying Sandberg’s 

motion to dismiss; (2) whether the magistrate court improperly shifted the burden of proof to 

Sandberg; and (3) whether the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove Sandberg 

 1 The appellate record includes the State’s discovery response, indicating it was producing 

the dispatch log, but does not include the dispatch log.
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exceeded the speed limit. Addressing these issues, the district court affirmed the magistrate 

court’s judgment. The district court ruled that Sandberg failed to meet his burden of showing the 

State’s late discovery responses prejudiced him; the magistrate court did not improperly shift the 

burden of proof to Sandberg; and the evidence was sufficient to prove Sandberg was guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

Sandberg timely appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the 

magistrate division, we review the magistrate court record to determine whether there is 

substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether 

the magistrate court’s conclusions of law follow from those findings. State v. Korn, 148 Idaho 

413, 415, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (2009). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our 

disposition of the appeal will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. State v. 

Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus, we review the 

magistrate court’s findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the 

magistrate court and the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court. Where a 

party appeals the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the appellant may not raise issues 

that are different from those presented to the intermediate court. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 

267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 (2003).

III.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss as Sanction for Discovery Violations

On appeal, Sandberg challenges the magistrate court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the 

case as a discovery sanction for the State’s purported violations of Idaho Criminal Rule 16. He 

contends the magistrate court failed to apply the correct standard under I.C.R. 16. Specifically, 

he argues the magistrate court “held that there was ‘substantial compliance,’ but the requirement 

is complete compliance.” Sandberg cites no authority in support of this argument, which 

misconstrues the applicable standard. See State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 

970 (1996) (ruling party waives appellate issue if either authority or argument is lacking).
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When a party fails to comply with discovery, the trial court may impose sanctions

including entering an order “as it deems just in the circumstances.” I.C.R. 16(k). Whether to 

impose a sanction and the appropriate sanction is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. 

Wilson, 158 Idaho 585, 588, 349 P.3d 439, 442 (Ct. App. 2015). “To determine whether a 

sanction will be imposed and what it will be, the trial court must weigh the equities, balancing 

the culpability of the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party.” Id. 

Demonstrating prejudice ordinarily requires showing the discovery violation hampers a party’s 

ability to meet the evidence at trial, has a deleterious effect on a party’s trial strategy, or deprives 

a party of the opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence. Allen, 145 

Idaho at 186, 177 P.3d at 400. The choice of an appropriate sanction--or whether to impose a 

sanction at all--for a party’s failure to comply with a discovery request or order is within the trial 

court’s discretion. State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 207-08, 899 P.2d 416, 420-21 (1995); State 

v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 405, 958 P.2d 22, 31 (Ct. App. 1998).

On appeal, Sandberg continues to complain, among other things, that the State’s 

discovery responses were untimely and that the State failed to include Officer Trujillo’s address 

in the responses but, rather, only included his employer’s identity. Sandberg, however, fails to 

assert any argument as to how these or other purported discovery violations prejudiced his right 

to a fair trial by hampering his ability to meet the evidence at trial, affecting his trial strategy, or 

depriving him of the opportunity to raise a valid challenge to the admissibility of evidence. State 

v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 186, 177 P.3d 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2008). Accordingly, the district court 

correctly ruled that Sandberg failed to show prejudice. See Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d 

at 970 (1996) (ruling party waives appellate issue if either authority or argument is lacking).

Sandberg also challenges on appeal the State’s failure to produce in discovery the report 

and the dispatch log to which Officer Trujillo referred during his testimony. As the district court 

correctly noted, however, these issues are not properly on appeal. Korn, 148 Idaho at 415, 224 

P.3d at 482 (ruling court reviews magistrate court record on intermediate appeal). Neither the 

State’s post-trial production of the dispatch log nor Sandberg’s continued complaint that the 

State has not produced Officer Trujillo’s report are part of the magistrate court record on appeal 

to the district court.

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 Because Sandberg failed to raise these issues below under the proper, post-

 2 In support of his argument that the State failed to produce Officer Trujillo’s “report,”

Sandberg cites Officer Trujillo’s testimony on cross-examination that the time at which he wrote 
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trial procedure, he failed to preserve them for appeal. See State v. Hooley, 166 Idaho 417, 420, 

460 P.3d 341, 344 (2020) (ruling pro se litigants are held to same standards and rules as those 

represented by licensed attorney); see also State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 

126 (1992) (ruling issues not raised below may not be considered for first time on appeal).

B. Burden of Proof

Sandberg also challenges the magistrate court’s application of the burden of proof,

arguing that the magistrate court “didn’t adhere to innocent until proven guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt” standard. In Idaho, a traffic infraction is denominated a “civil public offense”

and provides no right to a jury trial. I.C. § 49-1502(1). The courts, however, treat an infraction 

like a criminal offense for purposes of trial, and the State must prove the elements of an 

infraction beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; see also Idaho Infraction Rule 7(a) (“The burden of 

proof and the rules of evidence in a trial of an infraction citation or complaint shall be those 

provided for a trial of a criminal action.”).

In support of Sandberg’s argument that the magistrate court did not require the State to 

prove the elements of the infraction beyond a reasonable doubt, Sandberg argues that “the

Magistrate Court proves that the standard wasn’t adhered to when it was said ‘[Sandberg] has 

not preven [sic]--presented any evidence or testimony that it was not his vehicle that Officer 

Trujillo made his visual estimation on.’” This quoted statement on which Sandberg relies, 

however, was actually made by the prosecutor in closing argument. 

Addressing this argument in its ruling, the magistrate court stated:

I’m confident that the vehicle in question was going well over the thirtyfive. The only other issue now that’s raised is whether or not [Officer Trujillo] 

pulled over the right vehicle. And there is some-- hypothetical speculation here, 

basically that there could have been another vehicle that, presumably, would have 

had to have been about the same shape and color as yours to confuse the officer. 

There’s no testimony that anybody saw any such second vehicle matching that 

description. You [Sandberg] didn’t even testify that you saw any such vehicle, 

you just basically surmised that that had to have been what happened because you 

don’t believe the-- speeding vehicle was you. But again it’s not every possible or 

 

the citation is “documented in my report.” In response, Sandberg inquired whether “the citation 

[was] entered in the record,” and the magistrate court responded “it is on file in the case” and 

that it could “take judicial notice” of the citation. Sandberg did not object to the court taking 

judicial notice of the citation, and the record does not support Sandberg’s assertion that Officer 

Trujillo’s testimony related to some other “report” that the State failed to produce.
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imaginary doubt that the State must prove its case beyond, it’s beyond a 

reasonable doubt. And looking at what’s reasonable here, I don’t have any 

reasonable doubt that it was in fact your vehicle that [Officer Trujillo] visually 

estimated at fifty in a thirty-five, that was then pulled over.

We agree with the district court that the magistrate court did not improperly shift the 

burden of proof to Sandberg. The magistrate court made the comments about Sandberg’s failure 

to prove a different vehicle was speeding in the context of explaining his failure to rebut the 

State’s prima facie proof. Namely, once the State met its burden of proof that Sandberg’s 

vehicle was speeding, Sandberg failed to refute this proof by offering evidence that a different 

vehicle was speeding. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the magistrate court 

did not improperly shift the burden of proof to Sandberg.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

Finally, Sandberg challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that “there is no 

evidence to prove that [he] was exceeding the posted speed limit.” When a criminal action has 

been tried to a court sitting without a jury, appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is 

limited to ascertaining whether there is substantial evidence upon which the court could have 

found that the prosecution met its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. State v. Stark, 157 Idaho 29, 31, 333 P.3d 844, 846 (Ct. App. 2013). “We are 

precluded from substituting our judgment for that of the fact finder as to the credibility of 

witnesses, the weight of evidence, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” 

Id.

In this case, Officer Trujillo testified that nothing blocked or interfered with his view of 

Sandberg’s vehicle; Sandberg’s car was “in the slow lane overtaking a tractor trailer and a [sic] 

pretty high rate compared to the tractor trailer’s speed”; and Officer Trujillo “visually estimated 

it was going fifty miles an hour.” Further, regarding his training and certification to make a 

visual estimate of a vehicle’s speed, Officer Trujillo testified:

Q: Can you please explain what your training in regard to speeding violations 

is?

A: As far as speed estimation goes, in the academy we’re given 

approximately sixteen hours of training, which includes visual estimation 

followed by verification with radar. And then the field training program 

once the academy is over, we have to accomplish forty hours of the same.

Q. . . . [W]hat kind of threshold do you have to accomplish in order to 

become POST certified? What do they require of you?

A. Our margin of error is plus or minus two miles an hour.
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Based on this testimony, the magistrate court found:

I’ve got his trained visual estimate at fifty, which he went through POST and it’s 

within two miles of an hour is basically the certification standard and he passed 

that, he had another vehicle that you were passing at the time, and that’s what 

drew his attention to your vehicle going fast and he estimates the fifty. It’s in a 

thirty-five, it’s not like this is a fifty in a forty-five, you know would be a closer 

question of thirty-five. So I’m--I’m confident the vehicle in question was going 

well over the thirty-five.

The district court affirmed this ruling, concluding that Officer Trujillo’s visual estimate of 

Sandberg’s speed “was sufficient to meet the State’s burden to prove [Sandberg] guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” We agree that substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate 

court’s conclusion that Sandberg was guilty of speeding. 

Related to his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, Sandberg argues the 

prosecutor and Officer Trujillo were not truthful about Officer Trujillo’s training to visually 

estimate a vehicle’s speed. Sandberg premises this argument primarily on an apparent postverdict investigation he conducted about what type of training officers generally receive. The 

information Sandberg offers on appeal from this investigation, however, was not before the 

magistrate court. For that reason, we decline to consider the merits of the argument. See Fodge, 

121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126 (ruling issues not raised below may not be considered for first 

time on appeal). 

Further, we reject Sandberg’s numerous arguments that Officer Trujillo’s testimony was 

not credible and that he committed perjury and fraud on the court. This Court will not substitute 

its view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to 

the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Flowers, 

131 Idaho 205, 207, 953 P.2d 645, 647 (Ct. App. 1998). We also reject Sandberg’s numerous 

other arguments that the prosecutor committed perjury or fraud on the court and that the 

magistrate court was biased. Sandberg did not raise these issues before the magistrate court, and 

as a result, he failed to preserve them for appeal. See Fodge, 121 Idaho at 195, 824 P.2d at 126 

(ruling issues not raised below may not be considered for first time on appeal). 

Finally, we conclude this Court’s decision in State v. Estes, 148 Idaho 345, 223 P.3d 287 

(Ct. App. 2009), on which Sandberg relies, is distinguishable from this case. In Estes, the officer 

cited Estes “for driving 65 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone” and the magistrate court 

found Estes guilty of speeding based only on the officer’s visual estimate of Estes’s speed. After 
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the district court affirmed the magistrate court’s judgment on intermediate appeal, Estes appealed 

to this Court, which addressed the issue of whether an officer’s “testimony concerning his visual 

estimate of the speed of [a vehicle], standing alone, was insufficient to prove the speeding 

violation beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 346, 223 P.3d at 288. The Court held that the 

evidence was not sufficient to meet the State’s burden of Estes’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. at 348, 223 P.3d at 290. In support of this holding, the Court noted:

Although the officer implied that he met a certification standard requiring that he 

be able to make estimations falling within 5 miles per hour of the actual speed, he 

did not testify as to the required accuracy rate. That is, he did not disclose 

whether certification required that he be able to meet the 5-mile-per-hour variance 

standard 65 percent of the time or 99 percent of the time, nor what his actual rate 

was.

Id. The Court, however, did not rule that an officer’s visual estimation alone “can never be 

sufficient to prove a speeding infraction.” Id. at 349, 223 P.3d at 291. Rather, the Court limited 

its holding, stating:

We hold only that on this evidentiary record, and given that the difference 

between the estimated speed and the speed limit in this case was not great, the 

State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Estes’ vehicle was travelling 

above the speed limit. 

Id.

Unlike Estes, Officer Trujillo testified and the magistrate court found that he was 

certified to visually estimate the speed of a vehicle with an accuracy of 2 miles per hour. 

Further, the magistrate court specifically noted that the disparity between the estimated speed of 

50 miles per hour and 35 miles per hour was not a close question. Accordingly, Officer 

Trujillo’s visual estimate of Sandberg’s speed alone was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Sandberg was speeding.

IV.

CONCLUSION

We hold that the district court did not err in affirming the magistrate court’s judgment. 

The magistrate court did not abuse its discretion by denying Sandberg’s motion to dismiss and 

did not apply the incorrect burden of proof. Further, substantial and competent evidence 

supports the magistrate court’s judgment. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision on 

intermediate appeal affirming the magistrate court’s judgment. 

Chief Judge HUSKEY and Judge LORELLO CONCUR.