accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly 

suspect evidence." Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 

(1976). Regardless of its severity, a sentence within the statutory limits is 

not "cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment 

is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to 

the offense as to shock the conscience." Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 

915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting CuIverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 

P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 

1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion). Moreover, "sentencing is an 

individualized process; therefore, no rule of law requires a court to 

sentence codefendants to identical terms." Nobles v. Warden, 106 Nev. 67, 

68, 787 P.2d 390, 391 (1990). 

Here, the district court was presented with evidence that 

Krieger goaded the victim into a confrontation, knocked him unconscious, 

and beat his unconscious body, causing his death. Krieger's consecutive 

prison terms of 48-120 months and 72-180 months and fine of $10,000 fall 

within the parameters imposed by the relevant statutes, see NRS 200.080; 

NRS 200.340(2), and Krieger fails to demonstrate that these statutes are 

unconstitutional or that the district court relied solely upon impalpable or 

highly suspect evidence when imposing sentence. We conclude that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Second, Krieger contends that the State erroneously crossexamined his mother at sentencing regarding her knowledge of offenses he 

committed as a juvenile without following the proper procedure to unseal 

his juvenile records, and that the district court erroneously considered his 

juvenile offenses when imposing sentence. We disagree with these 

contentions. Krieger does not demonstrate that the information regarding 

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his juvenile offenses was obtained from sealed records. See generally Zana 

v. State, 125 Nev. 541, 546, 216 P.3d 244, 247 (2009) (the act of sealing a 

juvenile's records only erases the official record of his involvement with 

the criminal justice system, "not his actual conduct and certainly not his 

conduct's effect on others"). Moreover, Krieger did not object to the 

inclusion of the juvenile offenses in the presentence investigation report, 

the district court's consideration of the offenses, or the cross-examination 

of his mother, and we conclude that he fails to demonstrate plain error 

affecting his substantial rights. See Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 

634, 644, 218 P.3d 501, 507 (2009) (reviewing unobjected to errors at 

sentencing for plain error). 

Third, Krieger contends that (1) the district court's order that 

he pay $5,000 in attorney's fees violates his right to equal protection, (2) 

NRS 178.3975 is unconstitutionally vague, and (3) the $5,000 attorney fee 

demand was excessive and constituted an impermissible fine because the 

district court failed to consider the burden that paying the fees would 

place on him and his family. We disagree with these contentions. 

Krieger's equal protection challenge fails because MRS 178.3975 does not 

burden a suspect class and is reasonably related to a legitimate 

government interest. See Rico v. Rodriguez, 121 Nev. 695, 703, 120 P.3d 

812, 817 (2005). Moreover, the statute is not penal, see State v. Webster, 

102 Nev. 450, 454, 726 P.2d 831, 833-34 (1986), and therefore does not 

implicate the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 

1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). Finally, Krieger did not object to the 

imposition of attorney's fees and he fails to demonstrate that the district 

court did not consider all relevant factors when imposing them. See NRS 

178.3975(2). 

3 
Having considered Krieger's contentions and concluded that 

they lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

PC*4.ALCLir, 

Parraguirre 

Saitta 

PICKERING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 

I agree that Krieger's claims lack merit and concur with the 

denial of these claims. I write separately to address respondent's counsel's 

failure to file a fast track response. 

When a party fails to file a brief on appeal, this court can 

impose any number of meaningful sanctions. See NRAP 3C(n); NRAP 

31(d). By rule, this court may dismiss an appeal where the appellant fails 

to file an opening brief, NRAP 31(d), but when the appellant has a 

constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel, the court 

typically imposes sanctions other than dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., 

Burke v. State, 110 Nev. 1366, 887 P.2d 267 (1994) (imposing monetary 

and other sanctions against appellant's counsel, rather than dismissing 

the appeal, for counsel's failure to brief the appeal). In contrast, the 

respondent's failure to file a brief can be treated as a confession of error. 

NRAP 31(d); Polk v. State, 126 Nev. „ 233 P.3d 357, 359-60 (2010). 

This court, however, will not impose this sanction if the claims raised by 

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appellant clearly lack merit. See Hewitt v. State, 113 Nev. 387, 392, 936 

P.2d 330, 333 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Martinez v. State, 115 

Nev. 9, 11-12 & n.4, 974 P.2d 133, 134-35 & n.4 (1999). Because Krieger's 

claims clearly lack merit, I agree that treating respondent's failure to file a 

fast track statement as a confession of error is not appropriate. 

Nevertheless, respondent's counsel's complete failure to file a fast track 

response was a material violation of our procedural rules, see NRAP 

3C(f)(1)(A) ("Within 20 days from the date a fast track statement is served, 

the respondent shall serve and file a fast track response." (emphasis 

added)), and for that reason I would impose a monetary sanction against 

respondent's counsel, see NRAP 3C(n) (identifying the failure to file a fast 

track response as a sanctionable action). 

J. 

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Michael Montero, District Judge 

Karla K. Butko 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Humboldt County District Attorney 

Humboldt County Clerk 

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