Organizational Structure for Air

National Guard Tactical Aircraft

Maintenance

by

RUDOLPH VENTRESCA, Colonel, ANG

Research Fellow

Airpower Research Institute

Winner ofthe Air Force Historical Foundation's

1990 Colonel James CannellMemorialA ward

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

October 1991
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ventresca, Rudolph

Organizational structure for Air National Guard tactical aircraft maintenance/by Rudolph

Ventresca.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1 . United States . National Guard Bureau-Equipment-Maintenance and repair. 2.

Airplanes, Military-United States-Maintenance and repair 3. United States . National Guard

Bureau-Aviation. 4. United States . National Guard Bureau-Organization. 5 United States .

National Guard Bureau-Management. 1 . Title.

UG1243. V46 1991

358.4' 38-dc20 91-25676

CIP

DISCLAIMER

This publication was produced in the Department of Defense school

environment in the interest of academic freedom and the advancement of

national defense-related concepts . The views expressed in this publication

are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of Defense or the United States government.

This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review

authorities and is cleared for public release.
To The Forgotten Mechanic

Through the history ofwor<d aviation

Many names have come to the fore .

Great deeds ofthe past in our memory with cast

As they'rejoined by more andmore .

When manfirst startedhis tabor

In his quest to conquer the sky.

He was designer, mechanic, andpicot,

Andhe built a machine that wouldfly.

But somehow the ordergot twisted

Andthen in the public's eye,

The only man that couldbe seen

Was the man who knew how to fly.

The pilot was everyone's hero .

He was brave, he was bold, he wasgrand

As he stoodby his battered oldbiplane

With hisgoggles and helmet in hand.

To be sure, these pilots all earned it .

Tofly you have to haveguts,

And they blazed their names in the HaltofFame

On wings with baiting wire struts .

Butfor each of theseflying heroes

There were thousands oflittle renown .

Andthese were the men who workedon the planes

But kept theirfeet on theground

We allknow the name ofLindbergh

Andwe've read ofhisflight into fame.

But thinkifyou can of his maintenance man

Can you remember his name?
And think, ofour wartime heroes:

Gabreski, Yabara, andScott .

Can you tell me the names oftheir crew chiefs?

.A thousand to one you cannot .

Nowpilots are highly trainedpeople

and wings are not easily won.

But without the workofthe maintenace man

Ourpilots would march with agun.

So when you see mighty jet aircraft

As they mark their way through the air,

The grease-stained man with the wrench in his hand

Is the man who put them there.

Anonymous
Contents

Chapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii

1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE:

PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . . . . . 8

Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Current Organization Structure Theory :

A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Air Force and Major Command

Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE

ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBATORIENTED MAINTENANCE

ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter Page

The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Maintenance Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Ancillary Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Project Rivet Workforce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

ANG Maintenance Organization and

Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

The USAF Combat-Oriented Maintenance

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Ancillary and Rivet Workforce Training . . . 38

Organization and Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

What's the Difference? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3 ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Monetary Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Acquisition Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Basic Skill Level Training Costs . . . . . . . . . . 48

Total Acquisition and Training Costs . . . . . . . . . . 48

Pay and Allowance Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

Overall Operating Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Nonmonetary Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Sortie Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

4 RESTRUCTURED AIR NATIONAL

GUARD COMBAT ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 59

Force Structure and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Management and Leadership Initiatives . . . . . . . . 61

Alternative Maintenance Concepts . . . . . . . . 66

Defense Management Review . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Total Quality Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter

Illustrations

Page

Reliability and Maintainability . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

Principal Objections to the Adoption of COMO . 78

Manpower and Recruiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

On-Equipment versus Off-Equipment

Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

The Restructured Maintenance Organization :

What Should It Look Like? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Figure

1 Pre-1917 Aircraft Maintenance Organization . . . . . 3

2 Post-1918 Aircraft Maintenance Organization . . . . 3

3 Post-World War 11 Aircraft Maintenance

Organization (1955) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

4 Deputy Commander for Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

5 Squadron-Sized Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

6 The Centralized Organization

(Functional Type) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

7 The Decentralized Organization

(Hybrid Type) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
8 Air National Guard Wartime and Peacetime

Command Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

9 Typical Centralized Air National Guard

Maintenance Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

10 Air National Guard Maintenance Manpower

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

11 Air Force Maintenance Manpower

Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

12 Combat-Oriented Maintenance Organization

of the TAF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

13 Aircraft Maintenance Unit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

14 Percentage of DOD Budget AuthorityAir Force and Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

15 The McKinsey 7-S Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

16 Centralized Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

17 COSO Aircraft Parts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

18 The Common View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

19 Reparable Asset Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

20 Avionics Shop Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

21 Factors for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

22 Current Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

23 Proposal for Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

24 Reliability (Combat Rate : Mean Consecutive

Sorties between Major MaintenanceActive Duty TAF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

25 Maintainability (Fix Rate: Aircraft Breaks

Fixed within Eight Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

viii
26 Manpower Spaces per Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

27 R&M/Dyna-Metric Improvements : Squadron

Wartime Spares Kits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

28 Air Force Reserve TAF Maintenance

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

29 Restructured ANG Maintenance Organization :

Staff Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

30 Restructured ANG Maintenance Organization :

Production Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Table

1 Peacetime Maintenance Manpower

Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2 Costs per Graduate by AFSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

3 Total Monetary Costs :

Acquisition and Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

4 Total Monetary Costs :

Pay and Allowances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

5 ANG Aviation Contribution to

USAF Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Foreword

In the past, the Air National Guard (ANG) has been capable of

assuming additional missions and training even while operating

during times oftight operational and maintenance (O&M) budgets .

We have been able to accomplish this because of an increased

conversion rate to more reliable modern fighter aircraft, the high

experience level of our personnel, and the stability of our forces

due to low turnover . The dramatic changes that are taking place all

around us, coupled with severely constrained budgets, make it

imperative that we find ways to perform our mission more

efficiently in order to maintain the high level of readiness for which

the ANG has become recognized .

The maintenance organization of tactical air forces (TAF)

throughout the Guard has operated under the concept of centralized

control and authority delineated in Air Force Manual 66-1,

Maintenance Management Policy, and Air National Guard

Regulation 66-14, Maintenance Management, Air National

Guard, the aircraft maintenance "bible ." This concept has worked

well in the past considering the relatively stable environment in

which we operated. In today's rapidly changing environment,

however, this might not be the most efficient way to continue

operating.

Colonel Ventresca provides insight into the Air National Guard

TAF maintenance organization . He chronicles the past, reviews

the present, and projects the reader into the future, taking into

account those things that will likely affect the way we are

organized and operate.
The entire maintenance organization must be modernized at

one-third the Guard's total strength to put the skilled technician at

the right pl ace, with the right part, at the right time for a fix ac soon

as possible after the aircraft malfunctions . This must be done if we

are to keep pace with a dynamic environment and to improve our

ability to meet future needs efficiently and effectively .

PHILIP G. KILLEY

Major General, USAF

Director, Air National Guard
About the

Author

Col Rudolph Ventresea

Col Rudolph Ventresca graduated from Clarion State College

with a bachelor's degree in secondary education in the teaching

fields of chemistry, physics, and mathematics. In 1962 he joined

the Air Force and entered Officer Training School at Lackland Air

Force Base (AFB), Texas. After being commissioned in March

1963, he was assigned to the Lowry Technical Training Center for

nuclear weapons officer training at Lowry AFB, Colorado, and

subsequently to West Germany in November 1963 . In 1966 he

began serving as the maintenance supervisor in the 51st Munitions

Maintenance Squadron of the Strategic Air Command (SAC),

Vandenberg AFB, California . He attended the Explosive

Ordnance Disposal School at Indian Head, Maryland, in June 1967

and a year later was assigned to Bien Hoa Air Base (AB), South

Vietnam, as the base explosive ordnance disposal officer. After

serving a one-year tour, he returned to Wurtsmith AFB, Michigan,

as the maintenance supervisor and commander of the 67th

Munitions Maintenance Squadron (SAC).

In 1971 he was again sent overseas, this time to Headquarters

Thirteenth Air Force, Clark AB, the Philippines, as the operations

division chief within the Directorate of Munitions . In 1973 he was

assigned as chief of the Reentry Vehicle Branch of the 351st

Strategic Missile Maintenance Squadron (SAC) at Whiteman

AFB, Missouri . He left active service in June 1975 and joined the

Air National Guard (ANG) at Selfridge ANG Base, Michigan,

where he progressed from the nuclear weapons officer in the 191 st
Fighter Interceptor Group (FIG) of the Air Defense Command

(ADC) to avionics officer in the 127th Tactical Fighter Wing

(TFW) of the Tactical Air Command (TAC), to maintenance

control officer in the 127th Consolidated Aircraft Maintenance

Squadron (CAMS), and finally to deputy commander for

maintenance, the position he currently holds . In 1989 the ANG

selected Colonel Ventresca to be its command-sponsored research

fellow and to attend Air War College .

Colonel Ventresca earned a master's degree in business from

Central Michigan University in December 1981 while assigned to

Selfridge ANG Base. His professional military education includes

Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College,

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Air War College.

Colonel Ventresca and his wife, Rebecca, have two sons, Ricky

and Ralph .
Preface

Over the past 25 to 30 years, the active Air Force has made

dramatic changes in the organization and structure of fighter

aircraft maintenance units, while Air National Guard (ANG)

maintenance units have remained substantially the same. The

acceptance of the gaining-command concept in 1960 effectively

bound the ANG to abide by the training and policy guidelines of

the active Air Force. According to this concept each Air National

Guard unit is aligned by mission with an active Air Force major

command. During peacetime each major command is responsible

for providing policy guidelines and monitoring the training ofeach

of its designated units to include conducting operational readiness

inspections (ORI) . Upon mobilization the various Guard units are

integrated with their gaining command to complete a total force

structure capable of meeting wartime contingencies . The Vietnam

experience taught us some lessons about organizing for combat

and training the way we plan to fight. The active tactical air forces

(TAF) responded to those lessons learned and to a changing

environment by changing the structure of their maintenance

organization . The changes that were made could affect the ANG's

ability to integrate with the active forces when mobilized and to

interact with them during peacetime training, exercises, and

deployments .

This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization

and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance

units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component

in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the

active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance

unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years

and the reason for the changes, to the present-day organization . It

then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization .

Chapter l reviews current theory on organizational structure,

Air Force and ANG doctrine, and the policy guidance from each

major command and the ANG. It shows what theorists say about

how an organization should be structured and what organizational

philosophy has emerged from past learning and experience .
Chapter 2 evaluates the current ANG fighter maintenance

structure by comparing it with the active TAF structure from the

perspective of centralization and decentralization . It describes the

organization of active and ANG TAF maintenance units and

reviews their structure and their strengths and weaknesses based

on current theory, philosophy, and mission. It explains why the

ANG and active TAF maintenance units are organized the way

they are by reviewing and comparing the use of personnel,

ANG-unique capabilities, procedures for establishing manpower

requirements, and the impact of ancillary training and Rivet

Workforce.

Reorganizing to mirror the TAF combat-oriented maintenance

organization (COMO) potentially will require the expenditure of

additional funds. Chapter 3 assesses only the cost ofacquiring and

training additional maintenance personnel, and it compares the

ANG's operating and support costs to those ofthe active Air Force

in terms of overall percentage of the budget

Chapter 4 first examines those factors that will affect the ANG

maintenance organization and structure . It then identifies and

refutes principal objections often heard about adopting COMO.

Finally, it describes an enhanced ANG fighter maintenance

organization structured to embody all the principles of good

organization. Such an organization would have improved repair

capabilities using high technology, reliability and maintainability

(R&M), and new management and leadership initiatives ; and it

would be compatible with the active TAF maintenance

organization.

RUDOLPH VENTRESCA, Col, ANG

Research Fellow

Airpower Research Institute
Acknowledgments

My heartfelt thanks to all those at the Airpower Research

Institute (ARI), Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine,

Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, who

contributed to my progress and success from the beginning of my

research to the publication ofthis work: Dr David MacIsaac, senior

research adviser; Dr Bynum Weathers, reading group chairman ;

Hugh Richardson, editor; and all the others who worked behind

the scenes .

I also want to specifically mention and personally thank the

others who played a major role in assisting and supporting me

during this same period of time . First, I want to thank Brig Gen

David T. Arendts, the 127th Tactical Fighter Wing commander,

for his support and confidence in me. He encouraged me to become

a command-sponsored research fellow at ARI and to attend Air

WarCollege despite my reservations and the fact that our unit was

scheduled for an operational readiness inspection and had received

extremely short notice of its conversion to the F-16 fighter during

my absence . A special thanks goes to Col Greg Maciolek, 191 st

Fighter Interceptor Group commander, for his strong support. He

took a special interest in securing my acceptance at ARI and Air

War College by writing a very complimentary letter of

recommendation and making phone calls on my behalf . Thanks

also to Col Paul Pochmara, director of operations at the Air

National Guard Support Center (ANGSC), who likewise

supported the recommendations made for me and encouraged me

to accept the ARI challenge. I want to thank Lt Col Manfred

Koczur for his efforts as "counselor" in giving his time to raise my

spirits and help me go on during the many occasions when I felt

overburdened.

Most important, I want to express my sincere and loving

appreciation to my wife for managing our teenage children and our

home during my assignment at ARI. Herfrequent contact with me,

continual encouragement, and strong moral support was a primary

factor in ensuring my success in completing both ARI and Air War

College .

Xvii

Chapter 1

Aircraft Maintenance :

Past and Present

Since the establishment of the air arm within the Signal Corps

in 1907, aircraft have evolved from simple systems to today's

highly specialized weapon systems . The simplicity of the early

aircraft made it possible for one person (a "generalist") to work on

all systems. Sometimes the pilot himself maintained the aircraft .

If he did have a mechanic, the pilot simply discussed the problem

with the mechanic and later made a check flight to determine if the

problem had been corrected. Aircraft maintenance has undergone

drastic changes since those days . Today it cannot depend on one

person to have expertise in all systems but must rely on many

technical experts with specialized knowledge to maintain every

subsystem of the aircraft .'

The roots of Air National Guard aircraft maintenance date back

to the formation of the First Aero Company of the New York

National Guard in 1908 . At that time the organization consisted of

various and sundry units in several states formed by aviation

enthusiasts who were interested in balloons and aircraft .'

For a period of eight years, from 1912 to 1920, National Guard

aviation stagnated due to little state or federal support for further

development. After World War I, National Guard aviation units

became known as aero units and subsequently as air observation

squadrons .

During these early years there was no formal tie between the Air

National Guard maintenance organization and that of the active air

forces . However, when Headquarters USAF standardized the

organization after World WarII, the ANG logically and voluntarily

matched its maintenance organization with the active air forces .

Not until the acceptance of the gaining-command concept in 1960
ORO STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

did the ties between the active and ANG components become

formal ized .

The advances in technology over the past eight decades have

led to changes in the organizational structure of the aircraft

maintenance function, with each change being designed to

improve the combat readiness of the aircraft . Prior to 1911, there

were no published rules or procedures related to the care and

maintenance of aircraft . Nor was there a need prior to that time to

establish any maintenance organization below division level . In

that year, however, Lt Benjamin Foulois was assigned the task of

developing a document to cover such matters . The result was

"Provisional Airplane Regulations for the Signal Corps, United

States Army, 1911 ." This document contained information on the

care, repair, and maintenance of aircraft; the responsibilities of

crew chiefs and mechanics; inspection duties and responsibilities

of pilots, crew chiefs, and mechanics; and the initial provisional

organization of an aero company, including the personnel required

to repair and maintain the aircraft .

By 1917 the aero squadron had developed as the basic tactical

unit . Commanded by a major, it was divided into three companies,

each having four airplanes . Each company was further divided into

four sections, headed by lieutenants who were responsible for

supervising repairs to the aircraft assigned to their particular

section . In addition to the lieutenant, whose primary duties were

as pilot or observer, each section had a number of enlisted aviation

mechanics. Although the squadron commander was responsible

for the upkeep and repair of all aircraft, engines, and equipment

assigned to the squadron, each section was responsible for

maintaining the aircraft assigned to it (fig . 1) .

By the time the war ended in 1918, the aero squadron organization consisted of four sections : Headquarters, Engineering,

Supply, and Flying . The Engineering Section was responsible for

repairing airplanes, motorcycles, trucks, and automobiles . A crew

chief, whose crew consisted of an assistant and three mechanics,

was responsible for the condition, care, and preservation of the

aircraft in and out of the hangar (fig . 2).~
AERO

SQUADRON

COMMANDER

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE'

AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Figure 1 . Pre-1917 Aircraft Maintenance Organization

Figure 2 . Post-1918 Aircraft Maintenance Organization

'Total aircraft maintenance effort by the crew chief and his crew in and out of the

hangar.

AIRCRAFT

COMPANYA

AIRCRAFT

COMPANY B

AIRCRAFT

COMPANY C

SECTION A SECTION A SECTION A

SECTION B SECTION B SECTION B

SECTION C SECTION C SECTION C

SECTION D SECTION D SECTION D
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Centralized Control, 1930-45

During the interwar period, there were significant advances in

aircraft technology. Aeronautical engineering developed and

tested the all-metal airplane of monocoque construction . It also

made advancements in radios, instruments, and armament. The

addition of new avionics and armament systems ushered in the age

of specialization . The crew chief was now a master mechanic

heading a crew that was trained in all aircraft systems except

avionics and armament. Specialists who were not part of the crew

maintained these systems . They belonged to collocated service

squadrons that had been established to perform maintenance

outside the expertise of crew chiefs and their crew. 7

The advent of modern aircraft necessitated revolutionary

changes in aircraft maintenance. The all-metal construction of

aircraft spawned a new class of skilled technicians who performed

welding and riveting tasks. The arrival of "modern" aircraft as well

as the beginning of World War II marked a significant change in

Army Air Corps maintenance. The maintenance course at Chanute

Field, Illinois, was shortened, and the crew chief method of

training was replaced by shortened courses that trained specialists

in every aircraft subsystem . The result was a change in the crew

chief system and the introduction of specialists into every facet of

aircraft maintenance . At the same time, draftees and enlistees who

were qualified welders, sheet metal workers, and other kinds of

craftsmen in civilian life were assigned directly to the appropriate

maintenance shop without any formal training. These requirements and actions caused a modified crew chief system to come

into being. This system included a crew chief with a crew of

mechanics. Some mechanics worked on the overall aircraft frame,

and some were aircraft engine specialists. These mechanics were

responsible for flight-line and periodic maintenance; there was

also a pool of specialists located within the squadron to help the

ground crew.

Limited numbers of aircraft, limited supplies, inexperienced

maintenance personnel, plus extensive flying time requirements
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

further prompted specialization to enable trainees to become

proficient more quickly. A "dock system" of maintenance was

established, wherein functional teams accomplished scheduled

inspections in accordance with jobs that were sequenced for each

task . Maintenance personnel were trained to do only those specific

tasks that enabled them to be proficient in a short time . This dock

system--coupled with specially trained crews who performed

engine, carburetor, cylinder, and other changes-improved

production and quality and therefore increased the number of

aircraft available for training. 9

An Army Air Forces circular issued in 1944 summarized the

impact of specialization on aircraft maintenance:

The increased size and increased number of units, gauges, and mechanical

devices on modern aircraft has reached such proportion that no one

individual can possibly personally supervise and direct the detailed

procedure in the operation, repair, and maintenance ofthat aircraft and its

accessories . It is doubtful if there is any one man existent who could

identify all of the different items requiring maintenance in the average

combat aircraft. . . . It appears feasible that maintenance personnel as

assigned to those groups should be pooled and then broken down into

numerous specialized units, in order that there may be within each group

sufficient specialist and available manpower to quickly accomplish any

of the many specialist repair and maintenance functions required .

10

Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55

The wartime need for specialization, coupled with the

ever-increasing complexity of aircraft, made the move to

specialization inevitable after World War 11 . This move spelled the

end of the old "master mechanic crew chief system ." There was a

need for a new set of maintenance procedures and an organization

that could better respond to training and wartime needs . US Army

Strategic Air Forces Regulation 65-1, Combat Maintenance

Procedures, filled that need in August 1945 . It established a

centralized maintenance section with strong central control of

specialized maintenance organizations .''
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

In 1947 Headquarters USAF standardized the wing/base

organization according to what was called the "Hobson Plan."

Under this plan, the base structure was centered around the wing

headquarters, which was the highest level of authority on the base.

Under the wing were four groups : the combat group, the

maintenance and supply group, the airdrome group, and the

medical group . Inherent in this organization was a three-echelon

maintenance concept that evolved in the postwar Air Force. The

three echelons were organizational-, field-, and depot-level

maintenance-all of which exist today . The maintenance and

supply group consisted of a supply squadron and a maintenance

squadron . The maintenance capability was located in two places :

the combat group, which had maintenance responsibility for firstand second-echelon maintenance on base and transient aircraft and

for engine changes; and the maintenance squadron, which was

responsible for all third-echelon maintenance (fig . 3). 12

`Third-echelon maintenance was equivalent to depot level during this period .

Figure 3 . Post-World War 11 Aircraft Maintenance Organization (1955)
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

TheStrategic Air Commandthen followed up in 1949 with SAC

Regulation 66-12, Maintenance Management, which established

a functional organization with maintenance control at wing level

and three maintenance organizations on the base: organizational

maintenance, field maintenance, and base and transient

maintenance.

Maintenance structures changed during the postwar period from

1945 to 1955, with each command instituting its own system, but

the concept of the crew chief with specialized support prevailed

within the organizational maintenance structure of the operational

squadron .' 4

Return to Centralization, 1955-70

"A Resume of a Study of the USAF Concept of Maintenance,"

an unpublished report by Headquarters USAF in 1950, formed the

basis for the US Air Force's guidance to the major commands on

aircraft maintenance and was published in 1953 as Air Force

Regulation (AFR) 66-1, Maintenance Engineering : Policy

Objectives and Regulations, and in 1956 as Air Force Manual

(AFM) 66-1, Maintenance Engineering: Policies, Objectives, and

Responsibilities . 1 5 Its adoption was initially optional for the major

commands but became mandatory throughout the Air Force two

years later. In 1960 the gaining-command concept was adopted by

the Air National Guard to form closer ties to the active Air Force

in terms of participating in joint exercises, reconnaissance

missions, and firepower demonstrations . Gen Joseph H. Atkinson,

the commander of Air Defense Command, asserted that so far as

possible, ANG squadrons should be trained to the same level of

proficiency as their active Air Force counterparts . The gainingcommand concept required standardization of the Air National

Guard's organizational training and operational readiness in

accordance with the directives of the Air Force.

16 Consequently,

the ANG's maintenance organization structure was modified to

mirror the gaining-command structure. Furthermore, because of

the increasing complexity and need for control, the centralized
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANC TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

organization delineated in AFM 66-1 was formed and called a

consolidated aircraft maintenance squadron (CAMS) ."

Thenew maintenance management concept grew out ofthe need

to keep pace with the rapid new technological developments in

weapon systems. Specialization and centralized control were

established along functional lines with a single maintenance

manager who had a staff to assist in the centralized control . This

single maintenance manager was called the chief of maintenance

and was responsible to the wing commander for all aircraft

maintenance on the base.

18

In Southeast Asia, the structure of the maintenance organization

was changed again because Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) exercised

the command option authorized in AFM 66-1 by publishing

PACAFR 66-12, Maintenance Management. The tactical flying

squadron absorbed the organizational maintenance squadron and

loading crews . The Air National Guard was organized under the

provisions of AFM 66-1, which had been the case since the

gaining-command concept was adopted in 1960. The Tactical Air

Command had become aware in the meantime that some

organizational changes would have to occur if it was to meet its

tactical mobility requirements . The "TAC Enhancement" program

was instituted and provided for on-equipment maintenance and for

support personnel to augment the flying squadron to create an

independent operating entity . During the demobilization that

followed the Vietnam War, both PACAF and TAC reverted to an

AFM 66-1 structure because of the consolidation of resources to

reduce redundancy and costs. 19

Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present

After the Vietnam War, the Air Staff initiated a maintenance

posture improvement program in search of new ways to perform

aircraft maintenance more efficiently and effectively. Tactical Air

Command's response was the production-oriented maintenance

organization (POMO). Underthis concept, maintenance resources

were categorized into two functions and three new squadrons were
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

created-the aircraft generation squadron (AGS), the component

repair squadron (CRS), and the equipment maintenance squadron

(EMS). All on-equipment maintenance was assigned to the AGS.

Those tasks accomplished on the aircraft weapon system itself are

categorized as on-equipment maintenance and include servicing;

performing preflight and postflight inspections ; launching and

recovering ; and lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts,

assemblies, and subassemblies. All off-equipment maintenance

was assigned to the CRS. Off-equipment tasks include testing,

troubleshooting, repairing, and modifying line replaceable units

and shop replaceable units and are usually performed off the

weapon system in the shop. The EMS performed aerospace ground

equipment (AGE) maintenance, corrosion control, and transient

maintenance. Centralized control of the maintenance effort was

retained in maintenance control and the chief of maintenance and

staff organization remained as specified in AFM 66-1 .'`° The Air

National Guard elected not to reorganize its maintenance functions

and has continued to operate within the purview of AFM 66-I

under the centralized maintenance structure. Both the Air National

Guardand the Tactical Air Command exercised the option of using

either the formally recognized POMO AFR 66-5,

Communications Secin-ity (COMSEC) Equlpment Maintenance

and Training-or the standard maintenance organization in AFM

66-1 . 2I With the POMO structure came the reappearance of the

term generalist like a ghost out ofthe past because specialists were

again assigned to the organizational maintenance unit and trained

to do other jobs that were not directly related to their primary

specialty .

22

In the early 1970s, the Tactical Air Command, followed by the

other tactical air forces, transitioned to yet another maintenance

organization called the combat-oriented maintenance organization

(COMO) . The main purpose of COMO is to "provide a tactical

aircraft maintenance support structure with the mobility and

flexibility to survive in a dispersed environment and sustain

combat operations ." 23 The emphasis is on decentralization of the

maintenance function, which, when combined with a tactical
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

fighter squadron, provides to the small unit the autonomy that is

necessary during dispersed operations . The COMO is designed to

be flexible enough to meet tasking in any mode whether by wing,

squadron, or detachment. The Air National Guard again chose not

to reorganize but instead published Air National GuardRegulation

(ANGR) 66-14, Maintenance Management, Air National Guard,

which contained the ANC's maintenance management policy of

centralized control . Other major commands again opted to utilize

AFM 66-1 or some other organizational form to meet their mission

needs .

Lessons Learned

The TAF maintenance organization throughout the Air Guard

has operated for the past 30 years under the concept of centralized

control and authority delineated in AFM 66-1 and more recently

in ANGR 66-14 . This maintenance management concept has been

adequate in peacetime given our authorized manning levels and

unique ANG capabilities . However, opinions are mixed as to how

well the AFM 66-1 system worked in the past during mobilizations

and deployments for both active and ANG forces . In 1968

Headquarters PACAF's director of maintenance and logistics

(DML) included in the Corona Harvest report a letter that stated :

The entire success of this combat effort can be laid to the continuance of

the sound maintenance management principles utilized in the 1960-1965

era. The system of organization allowed for rapid expansion of

maintenance capability, enabled the addition of manpower to existing

structures in large quantities, merging of numerous extraneous activities

under a single manager and still produce quantity without sacrificing

quality. The obvious result was proof that the AFM 66-1 system could

"go to war, produce and survive." 24

Others who were involved intimately with various aspects ofthe

AFM 66-1 system during that same period do not share the same

views . The Corona Harvest report goes on to say that the TAC

squadron maintenance concept developed for mobility was

adopted by PACAF. There were four squadrons-organizational

1 0
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

maintenance squadron (OMS), field maintenance squadron

(FMS), armament and electronics maintenance squadron (AEMS),

and munitions maintenance squadron (MMS)-in the PACAF

structure, which was changed to place flight-line personnel and

weapon loaders under the tactical squadrons. Asingle maintenance

manager, the chief of maintenance, was responsible to the wing

commander for overall wing aircraft maintenance although the

flight-line personnel and weapon loaders were assigned to the

fighter squadron. This structure caused problems. "The entire

wing/squadron maintenance situation as prescribed by AFM

66-1 /PACAF Supplement 1-1, dated 20 September 1966, left

much to be desired. It was a compromise between two systems that

satisfied neither operations nor maintenance." 25

The Air National Guard Corona Harvest report submitted for

the period 1 April 1968-31 December 1969 reflected some

underlying problems as well : "During the active duty period, it

became obvious that USAF was not aware of the basic difference

in prefederalization structure between those of Air Force units and

ANG groups ." 26 This statement was made by a Security Police

superintendent who said that the Air Force was not aware that the

ANGwas organized with a small tactical fighter squadron because

they were always surprised when strengths of 35 were reported and

they expected hundreds. "It indicated a nonawareness between

USAF and ANG of manning structures ." 27 Although these

statements were not related directly to the maintenance structure

per se, they were an indication that similar problems probably

existed throughout the ANG organization . Further evidence of

organizational structure problems became apparent as a result of a

questionnaire completed at MacDill AFB, Florida, for the ANG

Corona Harvest report . TAC had decentralized base maintenance,

which caused some problems in obtaining necessary AGE and

equipment authorizations . "The base field maintenance squadron

had recently been reorganized under the TAC Manual (TACM)

65-2 concept. The result was a `quasi-TACM 65-2/66-1

arrangement' which was totally unsatisfactory ." zs
OR(; S'T'RUCTURE FORANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Finally, the ANG Corona Harvest report's recommendation was

that the "maintenance organization and policy of TAC, PACAF,

and USAFE should be monitored at USAF level and made as

similar as possible .,,29 In retrospect, this was a foretelling of the

changes in the TAF maintenance organization that would occur in

the next decade.

What becomes clear through all of this is a preponderance of

evidence pointing toward a need to review ourcurrent organization

to determine if change is needed. The first reason for concern is

the evolution of the active gaining command over this period from

an AFM 66-1 organization to POMO to COMO while the Air

National Guard has not made any parallel changes. Second, the

frequency and extent of ANG tasking by the Air Force has grown

at a rapid rate over the past few years with more to come. Forced

personnel strength and budget reductions have caused drastic

measures to be taken by the active services to reduce the authorized

wings and some mission tasking. Members of the Air National

Guard have been willing and able to accept much ofthe additional

tasking created by the reductions but must now evaluate our

capability to continue to accept future missions with current and

projected manning and funding . It becomes apparent, then, that

our organizational structure must also be evaluated to determine if

we have the best posture possible to maximize our combat

capability .

Current Organization Structure

Theory : A Review

To put all this information in perspective, we need to answer

some questions. First, What does organizational development

research tell us about how organizations should be structured, and

What do the theorists propose? Second, What is the current

USAF/ANG guidance on organizational structure? Areview of the

material available is revealing. Management expert Peter F.

Drucker says, "The right structure does not guarantee results. But

1 2
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

the wrong structure aborts results and smothers even the best

directed efforts." 3° Another organizational theorist, Mark S.

Plovmck, states, "Organization structure . . . represents the context

within which organizational life takes place. If the structure does

not support necessary behaviors among organizational members,

organizational effectiveness is diminished." 31

Cyrus F. Gibson argues that organizational structure is a

dependent variable that accounts for the variety in organizations

when influenced by four independent variables : outer environment, strategy, internal capabilities, and external social forces .'`

Furthermore, he says that research and theory on organizational

structure in relationship to external environment "has led to the

basic recognition that the appropriate organizational structure is

largely a function of aspects of the organization's environmental

context. That is, there is no one structure best for all organizations,

and not all structures are equally good." To be appropriate, the

organization's structure should be tailored to the characteristics of

the particular environment in which it is operating rather than fitted

to a standard or popular form, approach, or style. This is referred

to as the "contingency theory" used in reference to organizational

design and strategy for implementing change.

33

Richard L. Daft and Richard M. Steers, like Cyrus Gibson,

discuss contingency theory . They suggest that strategies and

structure that are appropriate for an organization can be determined

through understanding the contingencies among organizational

variables and the external environment.

34 Still further research by

Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., indicates that a

good, sound approach to organizing must include more than just a

rearrangement of the boxes on the chart. They contend that it must

take into consideration at least seven variables : "structure,

strategy, people, management style, systems and procedures,

guiding concepts and shared values (i .e ., culture), and the present

and hoped-for corporate strengths or skills ." 35 As Gibson points

out, formal organization structure is one of the most visible and

recognized characteristics of organizations affecting its members'

perspectives and behavior. "It is one of the key inputs available for

1 3
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANC, TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

the exercise of indirect influence on perspective and behavior." He

refers to the organizational structure as "a kind of skeleton of

formal relationships among departments and individuals."

Although the structure does not tell the whole story, nor is it

necessarily the most important performance determinant, it is a

starting point in the process of design and change .

In order to effect organizational change, or any other kind of

change for that matter, we need to know where we have been,

where we are, and where we want to go. The organizational

theorists like Gibson describe organizations to help us determine

the answers to these issues and begin the process of evaluating the

need for design or change . In an attempt to describe the ANG

maintenance organization to address the issue of where we are, we

have elected to use Gibson's Managing Organizational Behavior.

His work parallels and documents the work of many other theorists

and researchers in the field of organizational development. He

describes four basic forms of organizations : functional

(centralized), divisional (decentralized), overlay, and matrix .

These are ideal forms, and very few organizations take the pure

form. The Air Force tends to use the functional form, which is

considered to be centralized, specialized, and capable of a high

level of efficiency by taking advantage of economies of scale . The

advantages and principles seem to be just as applicable today as

they have been for thousands of years. By itself or in combination

with other forms, the functional form is used by the majority of

large and successful organizations.'

The functional form does have its disadvantages, including

higher overhead costs and the need for increased manpower at staff

level to facilitate the integration of the subunits . Another disadvantage is that because of the high level of specialization

characterized by this form, the personnel tend to develop a narrow

perspective of the organization, sometimes losing sight of the

overall goals and mission and not seeing the forest for the trees. In

a simple, stable environment where change is slow, the functional

form can be the most effective and efficient. If the organization

grows in size or if it experiences more rapid change, the adaptation

1 4
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

can be effected by further subdivision and simplification of

subtasks by increasing skills and competence so that uncertainty

can be handled at the employee level, and by allowing goal setting

at the subunit level rather than imposing close control of routine

work. 3s

Air Force and Major Command

Policy Guidance

Air Force maintenance management philosophy and policy are

aligned with the current theory of organizational development and

structure. AFR 26-2, Of-ganization Policy andGuidance, describes

the principles and policies of Air Force organization, explains

various organization units, shows standard structures, and gives

procedures for establishing organizations and making changes . It

identifies the overall objectives of Air Force organization : to

maintain, within resource constraints and feasibility, a structure

that avoids turbulence in the organization when transitioning from

peace to war and to operate it effectively with the least amount of

resource expenditure; to standardize as much as possible to

promote stability and to facilitate management improvements Air

Force-wide ; and to measure and compare performance. Other

objectives of Air Force policy are to keep pace with technological

advances, changes, and concepts of operation; to streamline

decision making by minimizing levels of review and having the

simplest vertical organization possible ; to ensure that organizational improvements are shared Air Force-wide ; and to develop

standard organizational nomenclature throughout the Air Force.

The emphasis on wartime tasks, with the operational squadron as

the basic deployment unit, has been the major determinant in

achieving rapid reaction, mobility, and flexibility . As already

mentioned, the Air Force takes the functional approach to

organization rather than the process, self-sufficiency, or geographical approach . These organizational forms directly

correspond to the types that Gibson describes .

1 5
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

AFR 66-14, The US Air Force Equipment Maintenance

Program, comprises the Air Force's philosophical approach to

equipment maintenance. It outlines policies and fixes responsibilities . The basic tenet ofthe philosophy is that there be assurance

that weapon systems and equipment be maintained in a serviceable

condition, be safe to operate, and be mission ready for use on a

long-term basis for peacetime, wartime, and contingency

operations. The regulation further defines maintenance production, maintenance engineering, and maintenance managementall functions of the equipment maintenance production program .

Our organizations manage these basic functions and are impacted

either directly or indirectly by them . They prescribe where

maintenance is to be performed; who is to perform it ; and when,

and basically how, maintenance is to be performed. They also

describe the levels of maintenance, maintenance tasks, and

categories of maintenance.

Preventive maintenance is the key concept of the Air Force

philosophy. It is contrasted with the other services' "fly-untilfailure" philosophy, which allows systems to operate until they

malfunction without regard to performing periodic scheduled

maintenance based on hours of operation or flying hours.

Preventive maintenance tasks are performed to avoid premature

equipment failure by sustaining the designed and manufactured

reliability inherent in reliability and maintainability (R&M) and

reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) programs . The maintenance tasks are categorized as to where they are performed in

relation to the end item of equipment or weapon system . This

concept is the genesis of the terms on-equipment and off

equipment maintenance and is a major factor in the determination

of organizational structure and use of personnel within that

structure.

Maintenance engineering is the other major function that

determines organizational structure and use of personnel within

the maintenance organization . The purpose of the maintenance

engineering function is to improve R&M of existing equipment

1 6
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

and to ensure optimum reliability during design and acquisition of

new equipment.

The equipment maintenance philosophy prescribed in AFR

66-14 is also the basis for operating and supporting the command's

policies on life-cycle management, especially in relation to past

and future maintenance concepts. In the past, life-cycle concepts

were derived from low mean-time-between-repair (MTBR) rates,

high could-not-duplicate (CND) rates, and expensive line

replaceable units (LRU) . Therefore, an extensive Intermediatelevel maintenance support structure at the operating level was

established because it was considered less costly . In the future,

however, maintenance life-cycle concepts will focus on high

state-of-the-art technology, mechanical design techniques, and

human factors engineering. These considerations will, according

to the philosophy, reduce frequency of component repair, which

is a reliability factor . They will also reduce MTBR actions through

effective design engineering, with the emphasis being placed on

eliminating costly use of large built-in diagnostic systems to

determine CND actions and whymalfunctioning systems continue

to test "OK." This is another factor in manpower and

organizational structure at the operating level.

Future maintenance concepts will also affect our organizational

structure because the requirement for an extensive off-equipment

maintenance infrastructure will be minimized to include special

facilities as well as less manpower-intensive maintenance

organizations and less complex support equipment. Such concepts

will reduce nonstandard1zation and the number and variety of

maintenance skills, develop on- and off-equipment maintenance

categories, take environmental factors into consideration, and

minimize the need for large amounts of tools and equipment.

AFR66-14 continues with other life-cycle management policies

like reliability and maintainability and logistics support analyses

that indirectly affect the organization . The readiness and

sustainability policies outlined in the regulation affect organization

from the standpoint ofestablishing overall criteria to be met, which

1 7
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

then affect how we would or should be organized to accomplish

the required tasks.

Maintenance organizational policies form the broad basis for the

types of organization identified in each maintenance management

directive. Organizations must be structured for readiness through

effectiveness and efficiency to emphasize maximum production

with a standardized structure based on size ; mission ; and mission,

design, and series (MDS), which should only include those

functions required by mission and equipment. The manpower,

personnel, and training policies address adequacy of authorizations and numbers of personnel . They require that the

maintenance specialties to be developed for new weapon systems

be system-specific rather than subsystem-specific . Equipment

repair policies encourage the use of local manufactured equipment

in order to improve self-sufficiency, and they develop scheduled

maintenance requirements to include reliability-centered

maintenance.

Air Force Regulation 66-1 establishes and implements the

maintenance management system for the Air Force and Air

Reserve Forces within the purview of the equipment maintenance

program . The key tenets of AFR 66-1 policy stress that

maintenance functions be organized and that personnel be assigned

duties that will maximize production by eliminating nonproductive elements of the organization and emphasizing only those

that are wartime essential; that peacetime and wartime tasks be

balanced ; that flexibility be designed into the organization to meet

changing contingency requirements ; that we look to the future in

terms of policy, organization, procedures, and skills to ensure

accommodation of missions, weapon systems, technology, and

demographics ; and that we ensure that all maintenance resources

be adequate to meet mission requirements . These guidelines are

intentionally broad so that the major commands will have the

authority to implement and tailor the policies to meet their

individual needs. The regulation also specifies that unit-level

maintenance organizations be standardized within each major

command based on size, mission, and weapon system .

1 8
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Furthermore, maintenance activities must take into account their

primary wartime mission and train in peacetime to meet that

mission.

The vertical structure of the maintenance organization is

specified to be in elements of the squadron, division, branch, and

section, depending on the organization's mission, weapon system,

and size. The regulation requires maintenance organization

structures to be developed so that the wartime orpeacetime mission

tasking is the primary consideration ; similar functions are grouped

together, with span of control being a major consideration . Subject

to the approval of Headquarters USAF, the National Guard

Bureau, as a direct reporting agency, determines the Guard's

organizational structure and the designations and sizes of its units .

Multicommand Regulation (MCR) 66-5, Combat Oriented

Maintenance Organization (COMO), establishes the policy and

procedures for the TAF and concurrently implements the

provisions of AFR 66-14 and AFR 66-1 . The policies are

command-unique, which allows local deputy commanders for

maintenance (DCM) the flexibility to make adjustments required

due to differences in mission, facilities, or geography. Specific

implementing procedures are included as chapters by each major

command's TAF. The organizational structure specified for the

TAF is shown in figure 4 for wing-sized units and in figure 5 for

squadron-sized units. The organization is required to be structured

according to size, mission, and weapon systems in descending

order from wing to division to squadron to branch to section.

Consolidation of sections within branches is allowed to promote

efficiency and reduce costs. The squadron-sized units are to be

designated by the major command, and their organizational

elements must correspond to the wing-sized organization ; that is,

squadron to wing, branch to squadron, and section to branch .

ANGR 66-14 constitutes the maintenance management system

of the Air National Guard. It establishes the maintenance

responsibilities for the DCM and staff as well as for the four

maintenance branches-organizational, field, avionics, and

munitions . This regulation, which incorporates and implements

1 9
ORG STRUCTURE FORANCTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

WEAPON STANDARDIZATION DIVISION

MAINTENANCE

OPERATIONS

MAINTENANCE

OPERATIONS CENTER

PLANS BCHEDUUNG.AND

DGCUMENTATN)N

MATERIELCONTROL

AIRCRAFT GENERATION

SQUADRON

Source: MCR 66-5, Combat Oriented Maintenance Organization, 31 May 1985, 1-6.

Figure 4. Deputy Commander for Maintenance

PROGRAMS

AND

MOBILITY

DEPUTY COMMANDER FOR

MAINTENANCE

EQUIPMENTMAINTENANCE

SQUADRON

TRAINING

MANAGEMENT

CHIEF

OF

MAINTENANCE

" ~~-CHIEEGEWINTENAHCE " NAINTENANCESOPERWIENDENT

QUALITY

ASSURANCE

NOTE MAJCOMs may organize the functions shown to meet command requirements

Source: MCR 66-5, 1-11 .

Figure 5. Squadron-Sized Units

20

MAINTENANCE

SYSTEMS

ANALYSIS

ADMINISTRATION/

TECHNICAL

ADMINISTRATION

MAINTENANCEOPERATIONS DIVISION

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS CENTER

PLANS

PLANS, SCHEDULING, & DOCUMENTATION

COMBAT PLANS d MOBILITY

ENGINE MANAGEMENT

MATERIEL CONTROL

QUALITY ASSURANCE DIVISION

INSPECTION

FUNCTIONAL CHECKFLIGHT (FC"EIGHT

6 BALANCE

TECHNICAL ORDERDISTRIBUTION

OFFICE (TODD)

PRODUCT IMPROVEMFNT

MAINTENANCEMANAGEMENT DIVISION

MAINTENANCE SYSTEMSANALYSIS

PROGRAMS

ADMINISTRATION

TRAINING MANAGEMENT DIVISION

TRAINING ADMINISI RATION

DEVELOPMENT& APPLICATION

F

AIRCRAFT

MAINTENANCE

UNIT/ SUPPORT COMPONENT ENGINE

AIRCRAFT REPAIR MAIN7ENANCE LGENERATION BRANCH BRANCH

BRANCH
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

the provisions of AFR 66-1, recognizes the uniqueness of the

ANG. It gives latitude to the DCM to meet the maintenance

requirements of the unit while complying with the broad, general

guidelines of AFR 66-1 . ANGR 66-14 policy recognizes the need

for compatibility with the gaining command and tasks the DCM

to ensure that personnel are aware of any differences in the

maintenance management programs so that problems may be

minimized when their unit is mobilized. The policy is that during

nonmobilized operations, the ANG maintenance units are not

manned or structured to adopt all the policies and procedures of

the gaining command. The organization is squadron-sized and

similar in structure to what is shown in figure 5 in the relationship

of squadron to wing, branch to squadron, and section to branch.

Notes

1 . James N . Townsend, "A History of Aircraft Maintenance in the Army Air

Force and the United States Air Force," research study (Maxwell AFB, Ala.

Air Command and Staff College, 1978), ii-4.

2 . Charles Joseph Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: TheAirNational Guard,

1943-1969 (Washington, D.C . : Office of Air Force History, 1985), 1 .

3 . Ibid .

4. Ibid ., 2.

5 . Townsend, 7.

6 . Ibid ., 12-13 .

7 . Ibid ., 17-18 .

8 . Ibid ., 20-21 .

9. Ibid ., 23 .

10. Ibid ., 24.

11 . Ibid ., 26.

12. Ibid ., 27-29.

13 . Ibid .

14. Ibid ., 32.

15 . Ibid ., 37 .

16. Gross, 119-20 .

17 . Lt Col John Gordon Doty, USAF, Retired, telephone interview with

author, 3 August 1989 .

2 1
ORGSTRUCTURE FORANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

18 . David C. Rutenberg and Jane S . Allen, eds., The Logistics of Waging

War: American Logistics, 1774-1985 (Gunter AFS, Ala. : Air Force Logistics

Management Center, 1986), 150-51 .

19. Ibid ., 159-60.

20. Townsend, 44.

21 . Rutenberg and Allen, 182.

22 . Ibid .

23 . Multicommand Regulation (MCR) 66-5, Combat Oriented Maintenance

Organization (COMO), 31 May 1985, 1-1 .

24. Air National Guard (Working paper for Project Corona Harvest report

on USAF Logistics Activities in Support of Operations in Southeast Asia, 1

January 1965-31 March 1968, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August

1970),2 .

25 . Ibid ., 243.

26. Air National Guard (Working paper for Project Corona Harvest report

on USAF Logistics Activities in Support of Operations in Southeast Asia, 1

April 1968-31 December 1969, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Ala., August

1970), 5-99.

27. Ibid .

28. Ibid ., 5, 113-14.

29. Ibid .

30. Quoted in Cyrus F. Gibson, Managing Organizational Behavior :

Achieving Results through Understanding and Action (Homewood, Ill . : R. D .

Irwin, 1980), 97 .

31 . Mark S Plovnick et al ., Organization Development (Boston : Little,

Brown and Co., 1982), 75 .

32. Gibson, 104 .

33. Ibid ., 101-2.

34. Richard L. Daft and Richard M. Steers, Organizations : A Micro-Macro

Approach (Glenview, Ill . : Scott, Foresman and Co., 1986), 217-18.

35. Thomas J . Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., In Search ofExcellence :

Lessons,fi -om America's Best-Run Companies (New York : Harper and Row

Pubs., Inc., 1982), 9.

36. Gibson, 97.

37 . Ibid ., 106-9 .

38. Ibid ., 107-8 .
Chapter 2

The Air National Guard Maintenance

Organization and the Combat-Oriented

Maintenance Organization

Over the past half-century there has been a rising tide of

information, research, and theory on organizational development .

In fact, this rising tide has swelled to tidal-wave proportions . Much

of the debate about what is the right organizational structure

centers around the functional and divisional organization ; or, in

broader terms, around centralized and decentralized organizations,

respectively .' Robert I. McLaren relates the issue to a dilemma in

which one structure is selected at the expense of the other.

Furthermore, he goes on to say that centralized and decentralized

organizations in their pure form can be thought of as being at

extreme ends of a continuum . 2 There is no fully centralized or

decentralized organization . Each is located on the continuum

according to the degree that it embodies one of the two extremes .

Whichever form is selected as the better one for an organization is

a compromise between the two. Management must make the

choice realizing this and then go about its business while

constantly monitoring the external and internal environment for

indicators of the need for change.

The Centralized Organization

ivnCtiona~ structure 'is one that is considered to be mostly

centralized in decision-making authority because of the

convergence of functions at the top . This is the most widely used

type oforganization . Its main feature is departmentalism according

to tasks. Those who perform the same kind of tasks are grouped

23
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

together; like groups are placed in the same department, and like

departments are placed under the same supervisor or manager (fig .

6) . If problems develop between departments that involve more

than one functional area, top managers make the decisions to

resolve them .

QUALITY

CONTROL

Strengths

Source: Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 3d ed. (St . Paul : West

Publishing Co ., cl989), 234.

Figure 6. The Centralized Organization (Functional Type)

The best type of structure depends on the organization's size,

technology, environment, and goals. Thefunctional-type structure

is most appropriate for small- to medium-sized organizations that

only deal with one or a very few products or services; that have

good lateral communication; that have routine technology; that

have a stable environment; and that have goals that include

efficiency, quality, and technical specialization .

The centralized organization can use resources efficiently and

economically because common tasks are grouped together . No

duplication of resources occurs because all experts are in a single

24

SALES

GENERAL

MANAGER

ASSISTANT ACCOUNTING

MANAGER

PRODUCTION MAINTENANCE) DISTRIBUTION

RESEARCH
ANG AND COMO

location. In-depth skill development is possible because specialists

are exposed to training and task performance in their area of

expertise within their own department . The organization achieves

unity of direction through centralized decision making. Top

managers provide central coordination and control and major

decision making. Finally, there is excellent coordination within the

functional groupings when shared facilities, similar training, and

experience help people to identify with functional goals and to

exchange information necessary to accomplish functional tasks. 5

Weaknesses

While communication and coordination within departments in

centralized organizations is considered a strength, it is a weakness

when applied across departments . There is a reluctance to

compromise with other departments to reach established goals of

the organization since employees identify with their own

functional area. Integration mechanisms, such as task forces or

committees, are necessary to achieve cross-functional coordination . The fact that senior managers make the major decisions

causes overload and a "piling up" of decisions at the top, resulting

in slow or bad decisions. 6

The first two weaknesses mentioned combine to cause a third

weakness. Since employees within the functional structure tend to

be concerned with the goals and activities of their own functional

area, response to changes in the external environment is slow and

innovation is infrequent.

Responsibility for success or failure is difficult to discern in

functional organizations . Activities that determine overall

performance are conducted in individual functional areas, making

it difficult to ascertain the contribution of each area to the success

or failure of the organization . It is also difficult to determine the

cause of each failure.'

Probably the most significant weakness inherent in the

functional organization is the limited capability to develop general

managers. The very nature of the functional structure inhibits

25
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

cross-training into other areas or departments because employees

generally move up the hierarchy through performance of

specialized activities within their functional area. 9

The Decentralized Organization

The decentralized organization structure-sometimes referred

to as divisional, self-contained, or hybrid-groups functions into

autonomous departments or divisions that produce a product or

provide a service (fig . 7). Departmentalization is based on output

rather than on task, as in the functional structure. Decision-making

responsibility is assigned to at least the next lower level of the

Source: Daft, 240.

Figure 7 . The Decentralized Organization (Hybrid Type)

26
hierarchy to improve response time and coordination among

functions. As you might expect, the decentralized structure is

suited to large and complex organizations having enough resources

to be subdivided into several self-contained units . This structure is

very responsive to changes and is appropriate when each selfcontained division depends on another for successful accomplishment of tasks that are consistent with product or service

specialization rather than functional specialization .

10

Strengths

ANG ANDCOMO

The self-contained unit structure is capable of fast change in an

unstable environment because each division is small and flexible

and independent of the others . Client or customer satisfaction is

high because each division specializes in a specific service or

product. Customers therefore know which division to contact to

resolve problems. Thus both success or failure can be pinpointed

to a specific division. 1

There is a high degree of coordination across functions . Identification with unit goals rather than with functional goals helps each

department to compromise with others to reduce conflict .

The strength of the decentralized organization is one of the

major weaknesses of the centralized one. General management

training is readily accomplished because lower-level managers are

trained to make decisions and to operate in an environment in

which coordination across functions is emphasized .

12

Weaknesses

Probably the major weakness of the self-contained unit structure

is the duplication of resources . Instead of sharing common

equipment and facilities, specialists may be divided and assigned

to several different functional areas or departments where each

might not be fully utilized . Other weaknesses include less in-depth

technical specialization and expertise because people are

concerned with the general skills needed to provide overall service

27
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

or to deliver a product, and there is less top management control

because decision making is the responsibility of lower-level

managers.'

The Congress of the United States is empowered by our

Constitution to organize and arm a militia composed of citizensoldiers under control of the governor of each state but subject to

employment in federal service as might be required . As a modern

component of that constitutionally established militia, the Air

National Guard (ANG) is composed of part-time and full-time

citizen-airmen organized and equipped to accomplish its state and

federal mission . Under peacetime control of the governor of the

state, the Air Guard's mission is to protect life and property and to

preserve peace and order and the public safety (fig . 8). Its federal

mission is to provide mission-ready combat flying units and

combat support units capable of rapidly mobilizing as the primary

e

e

LEGEND:

The Air National Guard

-COMMAND

mnOFFICIAL DIRECTIVES AND MONITORING

Source: Air Reservist Magazine, December 1975-,January 1976, 3.

28

llawunnunnuunuunnuuuunnnuunuuuu{ ANG UNITS

Figure 8. Air National Guard Wartime and Peacetime Command Structure

ESTABLISHES STATE GOVERNORS STANDARDS, MONITORS &

INSPECTS G

C

ADJUTANTS GENERAL Imnre
ANG AND COMO

component in support of the Air Force in the event of war or

national emergency .

The current ANG force structure consists of 91 flying units that

have a total of 1,730 combat aircraft distributed among all the

states, with each state having at least one unit . In fiscal year 1988

there were 115,200 personnel assigned to the ANG, of which

approximately 27 percent were specifically assigned to aircraft

maintenance . The other 73 percent makes up the operations,

supply, and support units.' 4 These flying units are organized as

one-squadron groups or wings rather than three-squadron wings

as in the USAF. Although certain Guard units carry wing

designations and have groups administratively assigned in the

same state or other states, they do not have operational control of

their groups . The major distinction is that ANG wings usually have

one flying squadron assigned with 24 primary authorized aircraft

(PAA), and the groups have one flying squadron assigned with 18

PAA. Both organizations have an associated aircraft maintenance

squadron. The wings and groups are not located together at one

base .

The ANG has certain unique capabilities that serve as

advantages to the total force and the Department of Defense

(DOD). Of these, three relate specifically to force structure . First,

economically threatened programs needed by the active Air Force

are often preserved by transferring them to the ANG either

permanently or until budgetary constraints and priorities are

shifted. Second, and directly related to the first advantage, is the

economic savings that are realized by the ANG's capability to

perform certain missions and to maintain combat readiness at less

cost than that of full-time standing armed forces . These cost

savings are due to the full-time/part-time nature of the Guard's

structure. Third, ANG members enhance their experience and job

knowledge through close association with each other in the same

organization over extended periods of time. The performance of

the same mission with the same equipment and personnel develops

skills, experience, and job knowledge that promote a high degree

of efficiency.

29
ORG STRUCTURE FORANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Maintenance Training

The ANG maintains readiness through the use of full-time and

part-time forces to conduct effective training on a continuous basis .

The authorized maintenance personnel are divided between these

forces in the ratio of one full-time technician to a little more than

three part-time Guard members. Following induction into the

ANG, new recruits receive the same initial training as their active

duty counterparts . However, unlike active duty servicemen, the

traditional Guard members return to their civilian occupations after

initial training and are thereafter required to perform two days of

inactive duty training (IDT) per month during unit training

assemblies (UTA). An annual field training (AFT) period of 13 to

15 days of active duty training (ADT) per authorized position is

allowed for Guard members to perform consecutive days of

additional training with their units . These training periods provide

a minimum level of proficiency to enable each individual to

perform his or her wartime tasks.

Thepart played by the full-time force of military air technicians

in maintaining combat readiness is critical. Much like their active

duty counterparts, technicians receive training that provides the

unit with the capability to maintain and fly aircraft on a daily basis .

More important, though, the military air technician is the expert

who must provide the vital training to the traditional Guard

members during UTA, AFT, and other training periods to keep

them proficient in their wartime skills . Clearly the division of the

force in this manner not only maintains combat readiness to

augment the active force but also makes maximum use ofeconomy

of scale and is therefore more cost-effective .

Ancillary Training

With limited time available to maintain minimum levels of

primary skills training, it is of paramount importance to the Air

National Guard that other requirements do not infringe on that

time . Ever-increasing ancillary training is one type of requirement

that tends to erode the critically limited time available for

30
ANG AND COMO

maintenance training. Although necessary, training in numerous

related subjects such as phase I and phase II security, operations

security, communications security, buddy care, small arms

qualification, and protection ofthe president has become a monster

that slowly threatens to devour the time that is the lifeblood of our

maintenance training program in the ANG. For example, the total

time available to train the traditional Guard member is 312 hours

per year. 1 5 The estimated time currently required to conduct

ancillary training is 277 hours per year, or 88 percent of the total

time available.

16 This requirement for ancillary training will have

to be lessened to minimize its negative impact on primary skills

training.

Project Rivet Workforce

Rivet Workforce (RWF) is a USAF initiative to consolidate

maintenance Air Force specialty codes (AFSC). Although it is not

implicitly a training program, it will initially have a major impact

on the training time available to the ANG member. The overall

goal of this program is to create a more flexible, mobile, and

survivable force that can meet future employment concepts . We

will address the Rivet Workforce program objectives that affect

ANG maintenance training here and later those that affect the way

maintenance operates .

The purpose of combining similar maintenance tasks to reduce

the total number of specialists required is to expand the scope of

responsibilities of each technician . The full-time military air

technician will not be affected significantly by the transition to

Rivet Workforce since many already have been trained in

cross-utilization tasks. However, the initial on-the-job-training

work load is increased, placing heavier demands on the time ofthe

technician . Unlike ancillary training, the Rivet Workforce

requirements apply directly to the primary duty task training that

is needed to maintain war-fighting skills . Since the time available

for training each technician is constant, training in other than

wartime tasks will have to be reduced or modified in order to create

3 1
ORG STRUCTURE FORANC) TACTICAI, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

the desired outcome of a more highly trained and experienced

force .

ANG Maintenance Organization and Operation

Upon mobilization in the event of war or national emergency,

ANG units would be integrated with the active forces . The concern

is whether or not ANG forces are organized and managed in

peacetime in a way that they can be easily integrated with the

gaining command during wartime. Otherwise, the ANGmight find

it difficult to learn the new system, which might create management problems initially . A detailed review of how a typical ANG

maintenance unit is organized and operates will help clarify this

concern and will provide a basis for comparison with the gaining

command later in this chapter.

The structure of the ANG maintenance organization can be

identified with the functional or centralized organization described

by Richard L. Daft and Richard M. Steers, Cyrus Gibson, and other

organizational development experts. It is the most basic type and

is characterized by subunits, each of which has different technical

specialties and clearly different tasks to perform. These subunits

are the organizational maintenance branch (OMB), the field

maintenance branch (FMB) or intermediate level maintenance

branch, the avionics maintenance branch (AMB), and the

munitions maintenance branch (MMB). A general management

staff function integrates these subunits through the process of

directing, planning, and controlling. Direct parallels can be drawn

between the ANG maintenance management concept in ANGR

66-14, Maintenance Management, Aif- National Guard, and the

way a functional or centralized organization operates as described

by these theorists . The organizational structure depicted in figure

9 reflects the current physical form of the ANG maintenance

organization as it would be upon mobilization . The commander is

the senior manager at the squadron level . Staff membersare pooled

in the various functional areas shown to provide centralized

support to the four different maintenance departments or branches

32
ANG AND COMO

Figure 9. Typical Centralized Air National Guard Maintenance Organization

that are functionally grouped by the type of tasks they perform .

Specialists are assigned to the field maintenance branch, avionics

maintenance branch, or munitions maintenance branch and further

subdivided into sections and shops that are responsible for

maintaining specific systems on the aircraft . They are centrally

directed and controlled by the authority vested in maintenance

control.

The organizational maintenance branch performs tasks that are

accomplished on the aircraft weapon system itself. These types of

tasks are categorized as on-equipment maintenance . The

organizational-level maintenance personnel are considered

airplane general (APG) mechanics because their tasks are

performed on the weapon system as a whole rather than on a

specific subsystem .

During aircraft launches or recoveries, or any other time when

repair actions are necessary, specialists with expertise in the

affected system or subsystem are dispatched by maintenance

control to the aircraft to perform on-equipment maintenance on

that particular system. These specialists are capable of performing

both on- and off-equipment maintenance . Off-equipment

33
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

maintenance is usually accomplished in a common facility (in

shop) shared by other specialists and includes testing, troubleshooting, repairing, and modifying line replaceable units and shop

replaceable units .

On- and off-equipment maintenance can be further categorized

as scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. Scheduled maintenance is preventive in nature and consists ofthose type tasks that

must be accomplished at periodic hourly or calendar intervals.

Unscheduled maintenance consists of work on malfunctions

discovered during flight or during inspections or other maintenance actions that require repair either prior to the next flight or

some time in the future .

A typical but very simplified scenario will illustrate how an

ANG maintenance organization operates . During a routine

mission, the pilot's radio becomes inoperative . Upon landing, after

being debriefed by maintenance at a centralized location, the pilot

notes the radio problem in the aircraft forms . At the debriefing, the

responsible functional area is tentatively identified and a job

control number is assigned. Maintenance control receives the

written discrepancy, verifies the responsible shop, and then

dispatches a specialist to troubleshoot and to repair or replace the

radio. If the radio were actually inoperative, the specialist would

obtain a replacement item and take the faulty one back to the shop

to perform the off-equipment maintenance authorized.

In this example, the direction and decision making was

centralized in maintenance control and the action carried out by a

specialized functional area. There are others in the hierarchy, such

as the branch chief, who have some input into the decision made,

but maintenance control has the ultimate authority. Consider now

the situation in which there are maybe 10 aircraft flying during any

particular period and multiple discrepancies occur on each one of

them . Maintenance control might quickly become overloaded

since it must make a decision about each discrepancy. Individual

functional areas are concerned about repairing discrepancies

identified as their responsibility ; consequently, if a discrepancy is

a result of integrated system or subsystem problems, repair actions

34
ANG AND COMO

can sometimes be delayed until there has been cross coordination

by maintenance control or until a specially formed committee

communicates and coordinates across functional lines.

The implementation of Rivet Workforce will somewhat modify

the ANG maintenance organization's structure as well as the way

it operates . The 109 separate skills that previously existed will be

consolidated into 96 . The specialist that was dispatched by

maintenance control in the example will not only be a communications expert but under Rivet Workforce will be trained in

maintaining instruments used in navigation, flight, and maybe

electronic countermeasures . This same kind of combination of

skills occurs in every aircraft maintenance specialty . That is why

the initial abundance of cross-training will have a significant

impact on the ANG. Once the initial training is completed,

however, follow-on training should not be a factor . In fact, training

in some related skills will be reduced. Equally important to the way

the ANG maintenance unit operates is the fact that the

consolidation of skills mandated by RWF will lead to further

separation of on- and off-equipment maintenance functions.

Manpower

The ANG has accepted the validity of the logistics composite

model (L-COM) as the standard for determining manpower

requirements in the aircraft maintenance area as applied to the

centralized organization . L-COM is a computer-based model that

simulates the various flight, maintenance, and supply activities that

take place in ANG units. By using L-CONI, we find that the

maintenance manpower standard for a typical F-16 fighter unit

with 24 primary authorized aircraft (PAA) is 553 ." When applied

across the spectrum of ANG flying units, the maintenance

community consists of almost 33,000 officers and enlisted

personnel . The average age of the ANG maintenance officer

is 38 .5 with 16 .4 years of experience and the average age of

the enlisted maintenance person is 34 .5 with 11 .4 years of

experience (fig . 10) . 18

35
ORG STRUCTl1RE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Y

E

A

R

S

AGE EXPERIENCE AGE EXPERIENCE

ENLISTED OFFICER

Source: Mary Phillips, ANGSC/DPD, telephone interview with author, 21 November 1989.

Figure 10. Air National Guard Maintenance Manpower Demographics

The manpower standard for the full-time maintenance

organization authorizes approximately one-third of the positions

of the part-time standard . As explained earlier, this full-time/

part-time force structure is cost-effective, but its very nature limits

the number of working hours and shifts with which maintenance

can operate. The military air technician is governed by US Code,

Title 32, National Guard, which puts the person in a noncompetitive civil service category subject to federal personnel

regulations. He or she is required to retain qualification and to

maintain affiliation with the assigned military organization in

order to remain employed.

Each aircraft maintenance unit in the ANG is organized and

functions under the provisions of this centralized concept and

manpower standard while the Air Force aircraft maintenance units

are organized and operate significantly differently, at least on the

surface .

3 6
The USAF currently consists of 244 flying squadrons that have

a total of 5,481 combat aircraft distributed throughout the United

States and overseas . There are almost 572,000 personnel in the Air

Force today, approximately 20 percent of which are specifically

assigned to aircraft maintenance. l y The flying units are organized

as three-squadron wings with 72 PAA. Each wing has an

associated combat-oriented maintenance organization (COMO)

that is operationally and administratively controlled by the wing

and located at the same base. A look at the Air Force aircraft

maintenance demographics reveals that the maintenance officer

averages 34 years of age and 12 years of experience . The enlisted

person, whose average age is 26, has 7 years of experience (fig .

11). 2

°

v

E

A

R

S

The USAF Combat-Oriented

Maintenance Organization

ENLISTED OFFICER

37

ANG ANDCOMO

AGE EXPERIENCE AGE EXPERIENCE

Source : George Larry Jones, "Decentralization versus Centralization of the Aircraft

Maintenance Management System within the Air National Guard" (Master's

thesis, Central Michigan University, 1986), 24.

Figure 11 . Air Force Maintenance Manpower Demographics
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Ancillary and Rivet Workforce Training

Since the full complement of Air Force personnel is essentially

available on a daily basis, the ancillary training and RWF crosstraining requirements for the COMO can be accomplished over a

large number of hours throughout the year. Although the training

requirements are sizable, spreading them out over a longer period

with more available hours has a negligible impact on primary skills

training .

Organization and Operation

Along the continuum between centralization and decentralization that McLaren talks about, the Air Force maintenance

organization falls closer to a decentralized structure than a

functional one but is less decentralized than the self-contained

structure . The COMO of the tactical air forces (TAF) closely

approximates the description that Daft and Steers classify as a

hybrid : "The hybrid structure contains elements of both functional

and self-contained divisions, but a few functions are maintained

as centralized functional departments ." zI The current structure of

the TAF COMO is depicted in figure 12. The deputy commander

for maintenance is the senior maintenance manager with a

centralized staff that supports three maintenance squadrons, each

having a squadron commander and each functionally grouped by

the type of maintenance performance. The aircraft generation

squadron (AGS) accomplishes on-aircraft (on-equipment)

maintenance, while the component repair squadron (CRS) and the

equipment maintenance squadron (EMS) accomplish off-aircraft

(off-equipment) maintenance . The AGS is further subdivided into

three aircraft maintenance units (AMU), each of which has all the

necessary equipment and personnel to operate autonomously when

deployed. The AMUis the linchpin of the COMO and is organized

as shown in figure 13 ."`

To illustrate how the COMO operates, we can use the same

typical scenario in which the pilot's radio becomes inoperative

during flight . Upon landing, the pilot is debriefed on the flight line

3 8
Source: MCR 66-5, ix .

~ AIRCRAFT

(MAINTENANCE

UNIT

AIRCRAFT

AINTENANCE

UNIT

39

AIRCRAFT

MAINTENANCE;

UNIT

Source: MCR 66-5.

Figure 12 . Combat-Oriented Maintenance Organization of the TAF

Figure 13 . Aircraft Maintenance Unit

ANG AND COMO
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

by the aircraft crew chief and system specialists assigned to the

AMU. These specialists can then diagnose and repair or replace

system components on the aircraft . The malfunction is entered on

the aircraft forms, a job control number is assigned, and production

control immediately identifies and directs the specialist to correct

the problem .

In this situation, the Maintenance Operations Center (MOC), a

coordinating function, is not involved in the decision-making

process. The individual at the lowest level of the hierarchy who

was at the scene and who knows exactly what the malfunction is

makes the decision . There is very little time wasted in determining

what has to be done to fix the airplane and put it back in service .

If the radio were found to be inoperative, the specialist assigned to

the AMU would replace it with another radio and send the faulty

one to the "back shop" off the flight line in the component repair

squadron for other assigned specialists to perform off-equipment

maintenance on it .

The COMO structure shares the advantages and disadvantages

of the functional and self-contained structures . Probably the

biggest advantage, though, especially in the AGS, is the excellent

coordination and communication within and between the

divisions.

What's the Difference?

When compared to the ANG's specialized, centrally controlled

maintenance concept, the COMO provides twomajor and radically

different approaches to aircraft maintenance.

First, the decision-making process in the COMO is

decentralized to the lowest feasible level, where the responsibility

is assigned and the authority is delegated to those people in the unit

who have the expertise and the facts to make the proper decision

about any malfunction . The aircraft production control

responsibility is located at the organizational level in the AMU.

Flight-line specialists are also assigned to the AMU so production

control has the authority to direct all on-equipment work. The

40
ANGANDCOMO

ANG maintenance organization retains centralized control at the

squadron level in the central body of maintenance control.

Specialists are assigned to their respective shops within the

appropriate maintenance branch and are dispatched by maintenance control to the aircraft needing maintenance.

Second, the COMO separates the on- and off-equipment

functions. The AMU in the aircraft generation squadron performs

only on-equipment maintenance while the "back shops" in the

component repair squadron and equipment maintenance squadron

perform off-equipment work. In the ANG centralized organization, all crew chiefs and other airplane general mechanics are

assigned to the organizational maintenance branch, avionics

specialists to the avionics maintenance branch, mechanical and

heavy equipment specialists to the field maintenance branch, and

all the munitions-related experts to the munitions maintenance

branch . Theoretically, the aircraft belong to their crew chiefs while

the other specialists perform maintenance on removed components

or are dispatched to perform maintenance on the aircraft .

Ironically, ANG units do not operate under a centralized

maintenance concept during certain situations, such as during

deployments and sortie-surge exercises. Specialists are often

prepositioned in mobile vans with equipment spares to quickly

save a ground abort. During recovery, the same thing happens.

Specialists are standing by on the flight line when aircraft return

and are parked . Debriefing occurs at the aircraft, or in proximity

to the flight line, between these specialists and the aircrews in order

to minimize the time spent in putting the aircraft back into service.

During these same deployment periods and sortie-surge

exercises, the ANG unit also might operate in an on-equipment

mode, taking only remove-and-replace actions. A mission support

kit (MSK), which consists of component spares extracted from a

larger warreadiness spares kit (WRSK) left at the home base, helps

support sorties in those situations . Components that require repair

are removed from the aircraft and either placed back in the MSK

in an unserviceable condition to be returned on redeployment or

4 1
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

are ferried back to home base for repair, and a serviceable

replacement component for the aircraft is returned .

These examples clearly demonstrate that under conditions that

limit resources and require high sortie rates, the ANGmaintenance

units modify the centralized, on- and off-equipment method of

operation and revert to one that approximates the COMO

operation. Multicommand Regulation (MCR) 66-5, Combat

Oriented Maintenance Organization, states that COMO "was

designed to meet the particular combat operational needs of the

TAF.

, 24 These needs are focused on high sortie rate production,

which requires the timely launch, recovery, repair, and relaunch

of combat sorties, especially during the sustainability phase of a

war.

Another difference between the ANG organization and the

COMO is the rate of implementation of Rivet Workforce and its

effect on how the two organizations operate. The Air Force has

instituted the program while the ANG is still in the process of

implementing it . RWF's consolidation of skills reduces the total

number of skill specialties required to support a weapon system .

Some of the technicians who hold the newly designated aircraft

maintenance AFSC will perform only on-equipment maintenance,

but cross-utilization training will expand the scope of their

responsibility to include other skills . Technicians with other

AFSCs will perform the repair of system components only in the

back shops and will likewise see their area of responsibility

increased.

The final major difference between an Air Force maintenance

organization and the ANG unit is size . It typically requires

approximately three times as many people to support three

24-PAA squadrons of like mission, design, and series (MDS)

versus one of the ANG; thus, there is a significant differential in

size and complexity in the USAF structure . The typical Air Force

F-16 wing has 1,642 people assigned within the maintenance

organization, whereas an ANG F-16 wing has only 553 . 25 The

organizational theorists have noted that as organizations grow in

size and complexity, the centralized or functional ones become

42
ANG AND COMO

more cumbersome and inefficient. The tendency is to decentralize

into smaller, more manageable units, which the Air Force chose to

do when it changed from the AFM 66-1 centralized structure to

the COMO structure .

In the ANG, the consolidated aircraft maintenance squadron is

a downsized organization comparable to the Air Force wing

maintenance structure, and the organizational maintenance branch

is downsized and is comparable to the aircraft maintenance unit in

the COMO, less the specialist and weapons flights. Although the

ANG maintains essentially a centralized organization, it operates

very much like the AMU under certain conditions (as mentioned

earlier), but it does not have the duplication of skills found in the

COMO.

In contrast to the active Air Force, a change in organizational

structure in the ANG could have a major impact on the full-time

and part-time force and could lead to substantial increases in

manpower and cost.

Notes

1 . David A . Nadler et al ., Managing Organizations (Boston : Little, Brown

and Co., 1982), 312 .

2. Robert I . McLaren,OrganizationalDilemmas (New York: John Wiley and

Sons, Inc., 1982), 8-13.

3 . Richard L. Daft and Richard M. Steers, Organizations : A Micro-Macro

Approach (Glenview, Ill . : Scott, Foresman and Co ., 1986), 366-67 .

4. Ibid .

5 . Ibid., 368-69.

6. Ibid .

7. Ibid ., 369 .

8. Ibid .

9. Ibid .

10. Ibid ., 370-73 .

11 . Ibid ., 374.

12. Ibid .

13. Ibid .

14. National Guard Bureau, Chic, ;National Guard Bureau Annrtal Review.

Fiscal Year 1988, report to the secretaries of the Army and Air Force

(Washington, D.C. : National Guard Bureau, 1989), 12.

43
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

15 . Theamount of hours available to the traditional Guard member normally

is based on two days of inactive duty training per month and 15 days of active

duty training per year.

16 . The 277 hours per year estimate for ancillary training requirements was

taken from the minutes of the ANG Maintenance Council's meeting,

ANGSC/LGM, Andrews AFB, Md ., 12-13 July 1989.

17 . Bob Baggstrom, Air National Guard Support Center/8200 MES,

telephone interview with author, 22 November 1989.

18 . Mary Phillips, Air National Guard Support Center/DPD, telephone

interview with author, 21 November 1989.

19 . "An Air Force Almanac: US Air Force Personnel Strength-1907

through 1990," Air Force Magazine, May 1989, 45 .

20. George Larry Jones, "Decentralization versus Centralization of the

Aircraft Maintenance Management System within the Air National Guard"

(master's thesis, Central Michigan University), 24. The ages and years of

experience shownfor the Air Force officer and enlisted maintenance person are

approximate, since their purpose is only to show the relative differences in age

and experience levels of ANG and USAF maintenance personnel .

21 . Daft and Steers, 376.

22 . Multicommand Regulation (MCR)66-5,Conihatorientcd Maintenance

Organization, 31 May 1985 .

23 . Ibid .

24. Ibid .

25 . Steve Mills, Headquarters TAC/XPMS, and Bob Baggstrom, Air

National Guard Support Center/8200 MES, telephone interviews with author,

15 and 22 November 1989, respectively . The Air Force figure is the number of

maintenance personnel in a three-squadron wing versus the ANG figure for a

one-squadron wing.
Chapter 3

Analysis and Assessment

Chapter 2 examined and compared the organizational and

operational differences and similarities of the ANG centralized

maintenance organization and the Air Force decentralized

organization . In order to properly evaluate these two different

types oforganizations, we must consider another dimension within

the boundaries of the organizational structure variable. The

subjective evaluation of ANG and active Air Force organizational

structure and operation becomes more cogent when there is a

quantitative assessment of the changes required to mirror the

organization ofthe gaining command. What are the economic costs

in terms of increased manpower, training, and salaries? What are

the potential organizational and operational benefits of each?

Answers to these questions, complemented by the comparison in

chapter 2, will help us make a value judgment about the two

different organizations .

During the force buildup in Southeast Asia in 1964, it became

apparent that weaknesses existed in the organizational structure of

the Air Force's tactical fighter wings . The Air Force Scientific

Advisory Board was tasked later that year to identify the problems

and to propose solutions. Out of this came the Tactical Air

Capability Task Force, an element of which was a logistics

working group. The conclusions reached in 1965 support the

following statement in a Rand study about predeployment

planning lessons learned:

Combat organizations should be structured to minimize the difference in

organization and operating procedures between a peacetime training

mode and a deployed combat posture.

45
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Although its conclusions supported this statement, the report did

not address the major question of how much restructuring would

cost.

Tactical Air Command (TAC) was directed by Headquarters

USAF to study the problem further after most of the conclusions

of the Scientific Advisory Board were accepted. The TAC

enhancement study that followed examined a variety of possible

tactical fighter wing organizational postures at different levels of

combat activity with the objective of placing a price on each type.

One of the findings of this study was that "the cost of structuring

a force with significant independent squadron deployment

capability would be substantial, but not unacceptably so." 2The

bulk of the increased cost was accounted for in the areas of

additional people, field maintenance equipment, war readiness

spares, motor vehicles, and mobile facilities . This study addresses

the cost implications of only the potential additional manpower

requirements to restructure the ANG maintenance organization .

Monetary Costs

When we recognize the fact that restructuring to mirror the

gaining command's organization would result in additional

people, two questions immediately come to mind. First, how many

additional people would be required? Second, what are the

organizational, economic, and operational costs versus benefits

derived?

To help answer the first question about additional personnel

requirements, table 1 shows the differences between the peacetime

manpower requirements of selected ANG flying units with

centralized management and like Air Force flying units with

decentralized management. 3 The ANG flying units are TAF

fighter units that are gained by TAC. They are all one-squadron

wings with 24 primary authorized aircraft and a consolidated

aircraft maintenance squadron, whereas the Air Force units are

three-squadron wings with a COMO. Manpower requirements of

the Guard's consolidated aircraft maintenance squadrons are

46
ANALYSIS ANDASSESSMENT

compared to one-third of the Air Force wing maintenance

manpower requirements since 1 :3 is the approximate ratio of the

total number of aircraft maintenance personnel in the ANGto those

in the Air Force . The percentage difference in personnel of each

TAF unit is computed and the average percent increase derived

from that data. The anticipated overall increase of 10.9 percent in

manpower is applied across the Guard's TAF maintenance

community of approximately 12,216 personnel, which equates to

a need for 1,099 additional people that the ANG would have to

acquire, train, and pay. 4 AFR 173-13, US Air Force Cost and

Planning Factors, October 1989, estimates the costs of acquiring,

training, and paying Air Force military personnel.

TABLE 1

Peacetime Maintenance Manpower Comparisons

ANG Centralized (Functional) versus

Air Force Decentralized (Hybrid)

47

Source : Mary Phillips, ANG Support Center/DPD, telephone interview with author, 21

November 1989 .

Mission

Design

Series PAA

No. ofANG

CAMS

Personnel

No. of'AF

Wing

Personnel

Percent

Difference

F-4 24 563 499 11 .4

A-10 24 396 539 26.5

F-15 24 567 539 4.9

F-16 24 553 547 1 .1

Average 10.9
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Acquisition Costs

Counting both fixed and variable costs, the typical average cost

to acquire and train a basic recruit in fiscal year 1989 was $7,178 .

The costs for acquisition include recruiting, initial travel and

clothing, and basic military training at the Air Force Military

Training Center . The costs do not include technical skills training

to attain an Air Force specialty code (AFSC). 5

Basic Skill Level Training Costs

Technical skills training cost factors are based on variable costs

only and include cost per graduate to attain a specific AFSC at the

basic skill level, acquisition costs, basic pay and allowances,

permanent change of station (PCS) costs, and pay and allowances

for accrued leave . This cost is typical of a no-prior-service

individual who is recruited into an ANG unit, sent off to basic

military training (BMT), and then to formal technical training. The

enlisted member acquisition costs per aircraft maintenance

graduate by Air Force specialty code are listed in table 2 . 6

Total Acquisition and Training Costs

The cost for the ANG to acquire each additional person is

dependent on whether the individual has hadprior military service.

For each no-prior-service inductee, the cost to acquire and train

the individual to the basic skill level is $17,336. No-prior-service

personnel comprise approximately 37 percent of the total annual

acquisition of personnel ; therefore, the total training cost to the

ANG for these people is the total number of additional newrecruits

multiplied by the percentage of no-prior-service accession

multiplied by the composite average cost to acquire and train each

one. For each prior-service acquisition, the composite average cost

is equal to the acquisition cost less the cost of BMT, or

approximately equivalent to the recruiting cost of $4,457 .

Likewise, the total cost for a prior-service inductee is computed at

48
approximately 63 percent of accessions . Table 3 depicts the

computations and re sults. s

TABLE 2

Costs per Graduate by AFSC

(Fiscal Year 1989)

Source : AFR 173-13, US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors, 31 October 1989 .

ANALYSIS ANDASSESSMENT

AFSC Cost AFSC Cost

30231 $16,697 40431 $16,964

32130 23,837 42330 14,454

32131 22,805 42331 14,250

32132 24,000 42332 10,584

32232 23,450 42333 10,411

32430 25,254 42334 11,922

32530 21,578 42335 15,766

32531 20,526 42632 11,238

32630 28,412 42730 33,107

32633 28,882 42731 9,446

32634 29,624 42732 12,487

32635 26,745 42733 13,305

32636 9,968 42734 13,275

32637 10,452 42735 12,160

32638 10,181 43130 12,616

32830 21,804 43131 9,913

32831 23,477 46130 12,794

32833 29,622 46230 13,457

32834 23,847 46430 34,219

32835 22,707

39130 12,912

39230 12,376
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

*Constant fiscal year 1989 dollars.

Pay and Allowance Costs

TABLE 3

Total Monetary Costs :

Acquisition and Training

Source : Robert Mertens, NGB/DRR, telephone interview with author, 20 November

1989 .

Once the additional personnel acquisitions are made and paid

for, the recurring expense of military and civilian pay and

allowances must be considered . At this point a differentiation must

be made between military and civilian pay. The reference to

military in the ANG includes the traditional Guard members and

the full-time US Code, Title 32, employees when in military status .

Since the full-time force comprises 27 percent ofthe ANG and the

part-time force 73 percent, we may logically assume that the

increases in manpower to convert to a decentralized structure will

reflect proportional increases in each part of the force .9 Using the

previously computed percentage increase in manpower of 9

percent, the full-time force would increase by 27 percent of 1,099

50

Cate~oi_v

of

Recruit

Basic Skill

Level

Training

Percentage

of

Acquisitions

Additional

Manpower @

9 Percent

Total Cost

to

ANG*

No Prior

Service $17,336 37 1,099 $7,049,338

Prior

Service $4,457 63 1,099 $3,085,893

Total $21,793 100 1,099 $10,135,231
people for a total of 297 and the part-time force would increase by

73 percent of 1,099 people for a total of 802 .

The average salary of a full-time military technician in fiscal

year 1989 was $34,119, including benefits, while the average

salary of the part-time Guard member was $4,097 . These figures

are based on the performance of48 unit training assemblies (UTA)

and 15 days of annual field training (AFT), including benefits.

10

The total recurring annual costs required to provide pay and

allowances for the additional people in fiscal year 1989 dollars is

estimated to be $13,419,137, as reflected in table 4.

*Constant fiscal year 1989 dollars .

TABLE 4

Total Monetary Costs:

Pay and Allowances

5 1

ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

Source: Michael E . Dubeau, NGB, telephone interview with author, 30 November

1989.

These costs do not represent expenditures for a particular year.

They would have to be considered as life-cycle costs ; that is, costs

over the length of time that it would take to acquire and train the

1,099 additional people at 1989 dollars.

Type of

Employee

Increased

Manpower

Required

Average Salary

per Person

per Year

Total Cost

per Year

to ANC*

Part-time

Guardsman 802 $4,097 $3,285,794

Full-time

Technician 297 $34,119 $10,133,343

Total 1,099 $38,216 $13,419,137
OR(i STRUCTURE FOR ANCTACTICAL. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Overall Operating Costs

The part-time nature of the ANG force allows certain tasks to

be performed and combat readiness to be maintained at a reduced

cost over that of a full-time armed force. Such cost savings can be

perpetuated as long as missions assigned to the ANG can be

performed by a part-time force . These cost savings are reflected in

the appropriations for the ANG and the active Air Force over the

past five fiscal years .'' Figure 14 portrays the differences in the

cost to the Department of Defense in terms ofpercentage of budget

authority (BA) to operate the ANG and the Air Force. Although it

is funded at only 1 percent of the DOD budget authority, the ANG

provides a significant portion of the overall aviation capability of

the US Air Force, as shown in table 5. ''`

FY 87

$2 .66

FY 88 FY 88

$3 .09 1 .06%

52

FY 88 FY 88

$66.3 31 .1%

AIR FORCE BUDGET PERCENT OF DOD BUDGET

($ IN BILLIONS)

ANG BUDGET PERCENT OF DOD BUDGET ($ IN BILLIONS)

Source: "An Air Force Almanac: The United States Air Force in Facts and Figures," Air

Force Magazine, May 1989, 51 .

Figure 14 . Percentage of DOD Budget Authority-Air Force and Air National

Guard
TABLE 5

ANG Aviation Contribution to USAF Capability

Source: Air Force Magazine, May 1989, 52 .

Nonmonetary Costs and Benefits

We have seen that mirroring the gaining command organizationally would require manpower increases. This larger pool of

maintenance personnel would also create an increased demand for

training, both technical skills training and on-the-job training

(OJT) . For at least the last five years, the ANG has been allocated

over 400,000 flying hours per year.' 3 These flying hours are based

on the training needs of aircrews and the maintenance personnel

since every flight generates some form of aircraft maintenance

activity . Although the increased number of maintenance personnel

would increase training demands, it is unlikely that the flying hour

allocation would also be increased; consequently, there would be

no increased maintenance activity . It follows, then, that the

maintenance requirements would remain constant and would be

accomplished by more people, allowing less actual hands-on

training to be conducted. The impact on the quality of maintenance

could be significant.

5 3

ANALYSIS ANDASSESSMENT

Tactical Fighters 25%

Air Defense Interceptors 86%

Tactical Reconnaissance 50%

Tactical Air Support 36°In

Strategic Airlift 5(I'o

Tactical Airlift 34(Yc

Air Refueling 18%
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

With the implementation of Rivet Workforce in the ANG, the

training benefits of reorganizing to mirror the gaining command

could also be significant. Since the maintenance concept would be

changed to the performance of on- and off-equipment tasks, the

training work load would eventually be less . There would be no

requirement to be proficient in both on- and off-equipment

maintenance any longer, thereby reducing the overall practical

training work load. The realization of reliability and maintainability initiatives would reinforce the trend toward a reduced

training work load, further counterbalancing the effects of the

increased manpower.

A reorganization to the COMO would require a sacrifice in

efficiency and economy of scale . The decentralization of our

maintenance work force to an on- and off-equipment concept

results in duplication of some resources . The specialists who

perform on-aircraft maintenance in AGS might find themselves

idle during any particular time of the day because aircraft are flying

and other aircraft have no problems within their field of expertise

that have to be corrected before the next flight . However, their

counterparts performing off-equipment maintenance in the back

shop might have several days' backlog of line replaceable units to

repair and test . On the other hand, the ANG technician specialists

would return to their shop after aircraft are launched and

supplement the work of their counterparts while waiting for

aircraft to return from flight.

Decision Making

Decentralized maintenance enables maintenance personnel to

make speedy decisions about the condition of an aircraft . Aircraft

discrepancies no longer have to be up-channeled to maintenance

control to await a decision about who is responsible to correct them

or when they should be corrected . That decision is made at the

lowest possible level in the aircraft generation squadron where the

system specialist is assigned and located directly on the flight line .

The need for repeated or redundant communications between the

54
ANALYSIS ANDASSESSMENT

flight line, maintenance control, and the specialist shops is

eliminated along with the time it would take specialists in a

centralized organization to get their tools and report to the flight

line .

Sortie Production

The combat-oriented maintenance organization provides the

capability to make speedy decisions about aircraft condition and

repairs with the objective of meeting combat operational needs.

The focus is on high sortie production, which requires timely

launch of initial combat sorties and subsequent rapid recovery,

repair, and relaunch ofaircraft . Although this concept has not been

proved in combat, where sustained flying operations are necessary,

simulations have validated its effectiveness.

For example, the first such exercise, Coronet Warrior, was

conducted by TAC in August 1987 to validate and improve the

Dyna-Metric computer model used to evaluate the readiness of

combat units. Coronet Warrior was a 30-day flying exercise

involving the 94th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Langley AFB,

Virginia . Wartime conditions were simulated by isolating the

flying unit at home station in a simulated deployed environment.

Only those people, spares, and equipment authorized in the unit's

aviation package unit type code (UTC) were involved . The

24-PAA unit flew at the designed operational capability sortie rate

for 30 consecutive days . At the end of the exercise, comparisons

of actual-versus-predicted performance indicated that the unit

actually flew 98 percent of its tasked sorties versus the predicted

91 percent and was able to maintain 17 aircraft fully mission

capable (FMC) at the end of the 30 days versus the fourpredicted.

14

Under the simulated wartime conditions of Coronet Warrior,

COMO seems to have met its objectives; however, there is no hard

evidence to determine its benefits under actual combat conditions .

When considering the sortie-production benefits under

centralized maintenance, there is some actual combat experience

that can be drawn upon to assess its capability . Four ANG fighter

55
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

squadrons were mobilized in 1968 to deploy to the Republic of

Vietnam (RVN) for one year. During that time these units flew

30,000 sorties for a total of 50,000 flying hours, a noteworthy

accomplishment.

15 Active Air Force units were also under

centralized maintenance at that time, so there is no real basis for

comparing the actual wartime benefits of the centralized

organization versus the decentralized one. There is only the

peacetime performance during sortie-surge exercises, deployments, and combat simulations-all of which indicate the high

sortie production expected to meet combat operational needs-to

use as the basis for determining the capability of the COMO.

Flexibility

The manpower demographics depicted in figures 10 and 11 in

chapter 2 reveal a more mature and technically qualified ANG

force as compared to the active force . The enhanced skill,

expertise, experience, and job knowledge of the ANG provide the

maintenance manager much flexibility . Under the centralized

maintenance organization, the technician is required to perform

both on- and off-equipment maintenance. He or she can diagnose

problems, perform repair actions on the aircraft, and then return to

the shop to perform repair actions on components .

The experience level and the flexibility of its force raise the

value of the ANG to the Air Force when mobilization occurs . The

active duty unit to which the Guard member is assigned can utilize

him or her on the flight line or in the back shop, wherever the skills

are most needed .

Over the five-year period FY 1984-FY 1988, the number of

aircraft, flying hours, and personnel increased. The number of

ANG aircraft increased by .48 percent per year (from 1,688 to

1,730) ; total flying hours increased by 1 .36 percent per year (to

29,000) ; 1' and the number of ANG personnel by 1 .8 percent per

year (to 10,000). 1

The average increase in personnel that occurred during fiscal

years 1984-88 would have to be doubled to 3 .6 percent per year

56
ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT

over the next five years to accommodate the additional manpower

requirements identified in this study to restructure the ANG

tactical air forces alone. If the additional people were to be realized,

the number of available man-hours assigned would increase

correspondingly as would the capability to fly more hours, which

would increase the need for more aircrews, and so on.

Severe budget reductions, coupled with a widespread perception

of reduced threat to our national security, will more than likely

create an austere environment where little, if any, growth will

occur over the next half decade . It is with this prospect in mind

that I propose a structure of a modern ANG maintenance

organization for the 1990s that will have to continue to function

efficiently and effectively within this changing environment.

Notes

1 . James R Hickey, "Logistics Lessons Learned from the Vietnamese Era,"

in The Logistics of Waging War (Gunter AFS, Ala. : Air Force Logistics

Management Center, 1986), 161 .

2 . Ibid .

3. Steve Mills, Headquarters TAC/XPMS, and Bob Baggstrom, Air National

Guard Support Center/8200 MES, telephone interviews with author, 15 and 22

November 1989, respectively .

4 . Mary Phillips, Air National Guard Support Center/DPD, telephone

interview with author, 21 November 1989.

5 . AFR 173-13, US Air Force Cost and Planning Factors, 31 October 1989,

14 .

6 . Ibid ., 29-30.

7 . Ibid ., 32-33. The average cost to train one recruit was computed by totaling

all the costs of the Air Force specialty codes listed and dividing by the total

number of 41 .

8. Robert Mertens, National Guard Bureau/DRR, telephone interview with

author, 20 November 1989. Basic skill-level training costs for no-prior-service

personnel include recruiting and BMT costs . For prior-service personnel, costs

shown are recruiting costs only .

9. National Guard Bureau, Chief; National Guard Bureau Annual Retie"':

Fiscal Year 1988, report to the secretaries of the Army and Air Force

(Washington, D.C . : National Guard Bureau, 1989), 103-5.

57
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

10. Andrew Zeck, National Guard Bureau, Office of the Comptroller/AC,

telephone interview with author, 17 November 1989.

11 . Michael E . Dubeau, National Guard Bureau, Office of the

Comptroller/ACB, telephone interview with author, 30 November 1989.

12. "An Air Force Almanac: The United States Air Force in Facts and

Figures," Air Force Maga:ine, May 1989, 51 .

13 . Zeck interview .

14. Donald C. Pipp, "Coronet Warrior-A WRSK Flyout," Air Force

Journal ofLogistics, Summer 1988, 1-4.

15. National Guard Almanac /989 (Falls Church, Va. : Uniformed Services

Almanac, Inc., 1989)

16. "An Air Force Almanac," 54. Percentages shown were derived from

computation .

17. Ibid ., 53 . Percentages shown were derived from computation .
Chapter 4

Restructured Air National Guard

Combat Organization

According to the theories of the organizational behaviorists and

research results of management consultants like Thomas J . Peters

and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., there are other interdependent

variables that affect the functioning and structure of the

organization besides its wiring diagram. The effects of these other

variables must be considered before envisioning what the future

ANG maintenance organization should look like . In their book In

Search of Excellence, Peters and Waterman defined these

interdependent variables in terms of what they called the

McKinsey 7-S Framework (fig . 15) . I Harold Leavitt similarly

Source Thomas J Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr ., In Search of Excellence :

Lessons from America's Best-Run Companies (New York: Harper and Row

Pubs., Inc ., 1982), 10.

Figure 15. The McKinsey 7-S Framework

59
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

defined the multivariable framework as "Leavitt's Diamond,"

which encompasses task, structure, information and control, and

environment.' Both of these conceptual frameworks help to

encourage thinking about the hardware (strategy and structure) of

an organization as well as the software : style, systems, staff

(people), skills, and shared values (culture) . The organizational

structure, therefore, is only one variable in the total framework,

the fluidity of which makes it imperative that the organizational

structure be flexible enough to respond continually to any sort of

change in the environment.

What, then, should be the structural form of the Air National

Guard TAF maintenance organization in the 1990s? Should the

organization be modified to mirror the active gaining-command

structure? In the process offurther addressing these questions, this

study assesses the effects that certain major factors are likely to

have on the future Air Guard maintenance structure .

Force Structure and Equipment

The perception of a diminishing threat to our national security

and the prospect of dwindling budgets will certainly change the

active/reserve force mix. As the active services withdraw forces

from Europe and Asia and draw down units and equipment, the

ANG force structure is not likely to change. This should mean

assumption of additional missions appropriate to the part-time

nature of the ANG, missions that are no longer cost-effective for

the Air Force . The change in the force mix will entail

reorganization, activating some units and strengthening others . For

example, the Air National Guard has experienced a 42-percent

mission conversion rate of units over the past five years and is

expected to convert or reorganize at a rate of an additional 34

percent of our units over the next five years . 4

Concurrently, the planned continual modernization of ANG

units from older aircraft and equipment to newer, more modern

types will likewise necessitate the restructuring of our

organizations. The number of man-hours per flying hour required

60
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

to maintain older weapon systems such as the F-4, A-7, and OA-37

is substantially larger than what is required to maintain newer

systems such as the F-16, A-10, and F-15 . This modernization

translates into fewer personnel requirements and a different

organizational structure.

Management and Leadership Initiatives

Perhaps the most dramatic example of the effect that

management and leadership style has had on organizational

structure is the set of initiatives that Gen W. L. Creech instituted

in the Tactical Air Command (TAC) during his tenure as

commander in the late 1970s to mid-1980s. Although these were

wide-ranging and multifaceted initiatives that permeated the entire

organization, this study addresses only the maintenance and supply

initiatives and their effect on the organization . During the decade

of the 1970s, TAC experienced a steady decline in sortie

productivity, combat capability, and morale with a resultant

decrease in pilot proficiency and readiness . 5 Aircraft maintenance

was centralized at the time and was characterized as follows:

" Wing resources were directed at producing wing sorties.

" There was no tie between operations and maintenance below the wing

planning and coordination level .

" The control of all specialists, "back shop" personnel, and plans and

scheduling was at wing level.

Any wing pilot flew any wing aircraft .

Any crew chief and any specialist worked on any aircraft .

Only the crew chiefs were on the flight line ; all others were behind/off

the flight line

" There were lots of coordination and paperwork-lots of clerks .

" Statistics were aggregated by the wing; the strong carried the weak.

" The flying squadron had to be "assembled" from various parts to go

to work. 6

61
ORGSTRUCTURE FORANCTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

The approach that was initiated to reverse the negative trend was

a fundamental change in maintenance management philosophy

with concurrent structural change. The change to a combatoriented maintenance organization structure reflected the change

in philosophy and resulted in a complete reorganization of

maintenance from a centralized, vertical structure to a

decentralized, somewhat flatter structure. The key tenets of the

COMO philosophy can be summed up as follows :

" Focus on self-sufficient squadrons.

" Organize and train as we intend to fight.

" Assign responsibility and delegate authority to the lowest feasible

level-trust the troops .

" Getspecialists and NCOs of all skills back on the flight line .

Closely associated with the initiative in the aircraft maintenance

organization was a follow-on initiative that affected the supply

organization structure primarily. The inseparable nature of

maintenance and supply necessitated some variations in the supply

structure to complement those which the maintenance organization

made. Likewise, changes were made in maintenance to

accommodate supply .

Like maintenance, supply had previously been highly

centralized. All the aircraft parts, equipment, tools, and supply

personnel were located in one central base supply area away from

the flight line-in some cases, considerable distances . The aircraft

wasjust one supply customer and fit into the overall organizational

picture as shown in figure 16 . After TAC decentralized supply, the

aircraft became the customer instead ofjust another customer and

the organization took on the appearance shown in figure 17 . E

The high degree of centralization required a large number of

people to perform each supply transaction with numerous

scorekeepers . 9 For example, if a needed part could be repaired with

bits and pieces, it took 43 steps, 243 entries on 13 forms, 22 people,

and 16 hours of administrative and records-keeping time. The

typical flow in repairing and returning a reparable part is shown in

figure 18 . 1° With the decentralization of the supply organization

62
.CUSTOMER

Source: Briefing, Lt Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr ., subject: Senior Leaders Maintenance

Course, Langley AFB, Va., May 1989 .

Source : Viccellio briefing .

ALLOI HER

CUSTOMERS

Figure 16 . Centralized Supply

SERVICE

CENTER

63

RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

PARTS

FIXERS

FLIGHT LINE

Figure 17 . COSO Aircraft Parts

MAINTENANCE SUPPLY LIAISON

REPAIR CYCLEMONITOR

MAINTENANCE CONTRACTOR

AWAITING PARTS MONITOR

PARTSSTORE
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

STOCK

CONTROL

EXCEPTIONTYPICAL FLOW FOR

REPAIR & RETURN

Source: Viccellio briefing .

64

Figure 18. The Common View

under the combat-oriented supply organization (COSO), if a part

can be repaired with assorted items on hand, the reparable asset

flow now takes 10 basic steps, reduced entries on 12 forms, 10

people, and an expedited response as shown in figure 19. 11

Other organizational changes in the maintenance structure

resulted from the implementation of COSO. The reparable asset

management structure was changed within the avionics shop. The

old centralized structure required the shop chief to make priority

work decisions . The new structure decentralized the decision

making to a team leader who has developed leadership skills

necessary for supervisory duties, which makes the whole reparable

process more efficient and effective. Figure 20 shows how the

avionics shop was reshaped from a centralized to a decentralized

structure.' 2
MISSION

CAPABILITY

BASE SUPPLY

RECEIVING

FLIGHT LINE

1* 10

AIRCRAFT

MAWfENANCE

UNR

SUPPpgTSECTpN

Source : Viccellio briefing .

Figure 19. Reparable Asset Flow

Source : Viccellio briefing.

Figure 20. Avionics Shop Reorganization

65

RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

9

i SYSTEM SUPPORT

CONTRACTOR

AVIONICS

REPAIR

SHOP

OLD STRUCTURE

SHOPCHIEF I NEW STRUCTURE

DLIE IN FROM

MAINTENANCE SHOP CHIEF

MONITOR

SHIT T SHIT-I SHIFT

CHIEF CHIEF CHIEF

WORKERS

;;HOP CIPFF MADE PRIORITY WORK

DECISION I N CONJUNCTION WITH

DIEM MONITOR I

" TEAM LEADER NOWMAKES PRIORITY WORK

DECISIONS

" IS BEING GROOMED FOR PRODUCTION SUPERVISOH

DUTIES

REPAIR MONITOR

PRODUCTION PRODUCTION PRODUCTION

SUPERVISOR SUPERVISOR SIIPFRVISOR

1

TEAM LEADERS TEAM LEADERS

I

TEAM LEADERS

REPAIR TEAMS REPAIR TEAMS REPAIR TEAMS
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

Alternative Maintenance Concepts

At the periodic meeting of Corona Fall 89, the Air Force senior

leadership decided to implement a field-level test to determine

alternative maintenance concepts that might feasibly meet Air

Force support structure needs in the future . About a dozen factors

specified in figure 21 were developed as considerations to provide

guidance and direction for the tests . Many of these factors have a

bearing on a potential organizational structure that could be quite

different from what we have today . From a macroperspective, in

accordance with AFR 66-14, we currently have three levels of

maintenance (fig . 22): organizational maintenance, intermediatelevel maintenance, and depot maintenance . Organizational

maintenance and intermediate-level maintenance areperformed by

the unit for the unit at each base; and depot maintenance is

performed by AFLC/contract for systems at the Air Logistics

Center (ALC), at the contractor facility, or by depot field teams at

various locations . The figure indicates the types of maintenance

generally performed at each level .

13

The proposed change to the current structure reflects a flexible

maintenance concept that will essentially eliminate the

intermediate level of maintenance as we know it today (fig. 23).

Source:

" GOAL: MAINTAIN PEACETIME READINESS

AND WARTIME EFFECTIVENESS AT THE

LOWEST PRACTICAL COST

Briefing, Lt Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr ., subject : Combat Support and the Air

Force Logistics Conflict of Operations, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala .,

March 1990.

Figure 21 . Factors for Consideration

66

" FORCE COMPOSITION/SIZE " RELIABILITY

" OPERATIONS TEMPO " MAINTAINABILITY

" DEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS " SURVIVABILITY

" EMPLOYMENT SCENARIO " TRANSPORTATION CAPABILITY

" PRODUCTIVITY " PIPELINES

" SKILL MIX " SUPPORT EQUIPMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL

BY UNIT

FOR UNIT

AT UNIT

ON-EQUIPMENT REPAIR

REMOVE/REPLACE

BY UNIT

FOR UNIT

AT UNIT

ON/OFF-EQUIPMENT

REPAIR

REMOVE/REPLACE/

REPAIR

Source: Viccellio 1990 briefing .

ORGANIZATIONAL

Source: Viccellio 1990 briefing .

INTERMEDIATE

BY UNIT BY AFLC/CONTRACT

FOR UNIT FOR SYSTEM(S)

AT UNIT AT DEPOT/CONTRACTOR

OFF-EQUIPMENT REPAIR OFF-EQUIPMENT REPAIR/OVERHAUL

ON-EQUIPMENT OVERHAUL

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS DIVISION FIELD TEAMS

"THREE-LEVEL MAINTENANCE"

(AFR 66-10)

Figure 22. Current Concepts

67

RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

BY SUPPORTED COMMAND BY AFLC/CONTRACT

FOR UNIT(S) FOR SYSTEM(S)

AT RIGHT LOCATION(S) AT DEPOT/CONTRACTOR

OFF-EQUIPMENT REPAIR OFF-EQUIPMENT REPAIR/OVERHAUL

ON-EQUIPMENT OVERHAUL

MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS DIVISION

FIELD TEAMS

- FLEXIBLE MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

-- TAILORED TO EACH MISSION, DESIGN, AND SERIES

BY COMPONENT

- FOCUSED ON UNIT READINESS

- CONSOLIDATED WHERE APPROPRIATE

-- WITHOUT LOSS OF EFFECTIVENESS

- APPLICABLE TO AIRCRAFT, MISSILES,

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

Figure 23. Proposal for Change
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

The new structure would have an organizational level of

maintenance performed at the unit, by unit personnel, for the unit .

However, both on- and off-equipment maintenance and an

increased emphasis on repair would be placed at the organizational

level . Instead of retaining an intermediate level of maintenance at

each base, a supporting level would be formed consisting of

dedicated and depot sublevels . The supported command would

perform the supporting level of maintenance for designated units

at locations for best support. Because current-generation aircraft

with varying manpower and materiel needs will be the backbone

of our fleet for years to come, the dedicated support structure

would have to be tailored to each mission design series by

component and would be consolidated only where it makes the

most sense in terms of combat-support effectiveness .' 4

Defense Management Review

To date, the Defense Management Review (DMR) is probably

the highest-level, widest-ranging management and leadership

initiative that will affect organization and structure in the future .

It was initiated by President George Bush in his February 1989

address to the joint session of Congress when he announced that

he was directing the secretary of defense to "develop a plan to

accomplish full implementation of the recommendations of the

Packard Commission and to realize substantial improvements . . .

in defense management overall ." 15

Among the other actions identified by the president to be taken

to achieve the stated purpose of DMR was the improvement in the

broad area of personnel and organization . The review included an

examination of some of the largest successful private corporations

in order to gain insight into the experience of the private sector in

relation to comparable problems facing DOD. Some of the factors

examined were management structures, staffing levels, impediments to decision making, stifled innovation, obscured

accountability for success and failure, and excessive overhead

68
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

costs. The actions taken by these corporations to overcome

problems demonstrated the usefulness of

" identifying and eliminating unnecessary functions and management

layers ;

" concentrating on core functions performed at appropriate

organizational levels ;

" consolidating related functions where doing so will occasion greater

effectiveness or efficiency ;

" lowering overall costs, particularly through sizeable reductions in

management and other white collar personnel; and

" employing a variety of innovative techniques proven to motivate

employees and suppliers and to achieve steady improvements in quality

and overall performance.

16

Although the main thrust of DMR is related to the defense

acquisition system, the lessons learned from the corporate review

of organizational "hardware" and "software" 17 teach that it is

possible to achieve maximum efficiency over the long term and

that "this should be a paramount objective of all . . . who play a

role in U.S . defense efforts ." is The key to overall efficiency is the

small efficiencies realized at each management level from the

bottom of our hierarchy to the top . This will involve structural

changes (hardware) as well as changes in the other organization

variables (software), all of which take time to evolve.

Total Quality Management

Total quality management (TQM) is a philosophy as well as a

set of principles that form the pillars of a continuously improving

organization . TQM did not receive much emphasis when first

applied in DOD in the early 1980s. Its use expanded rapidly after

the Office ofthe Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and

Logistics-DASD (P&L)-announced its support. Today it is one

of DOD's primary initiatives for future change.'`' TQM is one of

the stated purposes of DMR because it is expected to lower the

cost of doing business while continuously improving quality in

69
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

products and process . In his article "The Quality Professional's

Role in the New Economic Age," Edward M. Baker reiterates W.

Edwards Deming's new set of principles for operating in the "new

economic age" : The enterprise of the 1990s has to develop the

capability to

" simultaneously maintain consistent, repeatable production processes

to prevent change.

" continually transform its processes, systems, and structures to take

competitive advantage of ever-diminishing periods of environment

stability.

20

Baker asserts that extinction is the fate of those highly specialized

organisms in nature that do not change when their purpose and

environment change. He says that "the successful enterprise will

develop a capability . . . to manage its own change without

throwing itself into a state of chaos." 21

The vertically structured, functionally oriented organization is

rigid, presents obstacles to quality, and inhibits the process of

change. In conjunction with the rigidity of the organizational

structure, consider the meaning of the oft-quoted phrase, "If it ain't

broke, don't fix it ." The implication is that change for change's

sake is notiustificationforreorganization . I agree with this implicit

meaning; however, another implication of this phrase is that there

is resistance or even unwillingness to change despite the changing

internal and external environment. Baker suggests that the future

quality professional will think, believe, and act as if managing

means maintaining a balance between preventing change and

creating positive change. He says that management should be

structured to anticipate and meet changing environments and new

situations rather than to apply mechanistic and rigid management

principles for control and avoidance of change .

23

Reliability and Maintainability

In 1984, the USAF Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) 2000

Program was initiated by a joint Air Force chief of staff/secretary

of the Air Force memorandum to all major air commanders that

70
institutionalized a commitment to reliability and maintainability .

To achieve the objectives of the program, it developed five goals

that were underlying factors of the overall R&M policy of

"Double-R/Half-M": 24

Increase war-fighting capability .

Decrease vulnerability of the combat support structure.

Decrease mobility requirements .

Decrease manpower requirements .

Decrease costs.

RESTRUCTURED ANC. COMBAT ORG

The abbreviated goal statement means that next-generation

systems should be twice as reliable and require half as much

maintenance as the generation they replace .

25

Reliability affects the need for spare parts, levels of maintenance, and operational accuracy. Maintainability affects system

turnaround times, system training needs, support equipment,

supply pipelines, maintenance force size, and location of repairs .

Reliability is generally associated with performing an assigned

task over time, cycle, or event and can be expressed in terms of

mean time between failures (MTBF), mean time between repair

(MTBR), or mean consecutive sorties between major maintenance

26 (combat rate)

Figure 24 is a comparison ofthe combat rate ofthe current active

TAF fighters (not tracked by ANG) to the projected rate of the

advanced tactical fighter (ATF). 27 The increase in performance

over time, indicated for progressively newer systems, is directly

proportional to combat capability, which interrelates to the other

stated goals of R&M.

Upgrades and retrofits using improved R&M can have a

significant effect on the combat capability of existing systems as

well . The programmable signal processor for the F-16 is being

upgraded from a 200-hour to a 2,000-hour MTBF. ZS User feedback

provides fertile ground for R&M improvements and should be

cultivated to the maximum extent through emphasis on such things

as the suggestion program, product improvement working group

(PIWG), system safety groups (SSG), and the Blue Two program.

7 1
ORG STRUCTURE FORANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

F-4E

COMBAT RATE COMBAT RATE

F-16

COMBAT RATE COMBAT RATE

0PAST

PRESENT

GOAL

Source: Viccellio 1990 briefing .

Figure 24 Reliability (Combat Rate: Mean Consecutive Sorties

between Major Maintenance-Active Duty TAF)

A suggestion by an Air National Guard maintenance member

involved a modification to the aircraft liquid oxygen servicing

panel . Here is the story:

This servicing panel had twenty-one fasteners to be removed and replaced

in order to service liquid oxygen on the aircraft . It took approximately

twenty minutes to accomplish this remove-and-replace task during the

servicing procedure. Liquid oxygen servicing is a task that must be

performed before each A-10 flight . . . . He suggested that a smaller panel

with only two fasteners and a hinge be installed on the original liquid

oxygen servicing panel . His suggestion was adopted and now the panel

can be removed and replaced in about one minute. During the course of

one year, this single modification will save the United States Air Force

approximately 63,000 maintenance manhours in removing and replacing

just this one panel.

29

72

F-15

ADVANCED

TACTICAL FIGHTER
RESTRUCTURED ANGCOMBAT ORG

There are many other success stories like this that can be told

about ideas that save manpower and time . We must continually

emphasize their importance through encouraging participation and

involvement by our users in appropriate programs . The less time

an aircraft spends on the ground the more time it is available to

spend over targets. A combat rate of9 .5 sorties or more for fighters

and 30 days of operating time without critical failure for ground

radars should be attainable in the future . The Air Force special

assistant for reliability and maintainability, Brig Gen William

Collins, put it this way: "If you double reliability, you only need

half as many planes to do the same job." 3° The same kind of logic

can be applied to the levels of maintenance required and the

maintenance force size .

Maintainability, which is usually associated with cost and with

the effort of sustaining the assigned performance, can be expressed

in terms of the number of aircraft that can be repaired within a

designated period of time (the fix rate) and the maintenance

man-hours per flying hour (MMH/FH) . For example, more than

85 percent of ATFmaintenance problems should be fixable within

eight hours as opposed to the current fix rate of the F-16 at 82

percent, the F-15 at 76 percent, and the F-4 at 73 percent (fig . 25) ."

From another perspective, the ATF system requirements call for

an 8- to 10-percent break rate compared to 15 percent for the

F-15 . 32 Correspondingly, the ATFmaintenance personnel requirement is anticipated to be 16 manpower spaces per aircraft, as

opposed to approximately 23 for the F-16, 24 for the F-15, and 26

for the F-4 (fig . 26) . 33

Reliability and maintainability achievements have become one

of the driving factors in reviewing the way we are structured to do

business in the future . Other driving factors that are outside the

scope of this research work are fiscal constraints and growth in

productivity .

The key to cutting the logistics tail and restoring flexibility to

our forces is to reduce the complex, vulnerable, intermediate-level

combat support structure. In his address at the 1985 Aeronautical

7 3
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

G7 PAST

( PRESENT

GOAL

Source: Viccellio 1990 briefing

Figure 25. Maintainability (Fix Rate: Aircraft Breaks Fixed within

Eight Hours)

26.0

f

F-16

FIX RATE FIX RATE

ADVANCED

TACTICAL FIGHTER

FIX RATE FIX RATE

24.1 22.8

16.0

fI

F-4E F-15 F-16 ADVANCED

TACTICAL

FIGHTER

Source: Viccellio 1990 briefing .

Figure 26 . Manpower Spaces per Aircraft

74
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

Systems Division Program Manager Awards banquet, Lt Gen Leo

Marquez, Headquarters USAF/LE, put it this way:

The hallmark of airpower in every war since airpower's emergence has

been mission flexibility-and that flexibility is being eroded away by

dependence on highly trained specialists and complex intermediate shops.

You must reckon with this as you bring on board the systems ofthe future .

People and expensive equipment are no longer easily replenished

resources.

34

The best method of achieving the R&M goal of reduced

vulnerability of airfield maintenance shops along with their

infrastructure is to eliminate the need for them . "If support

structures don't have to be in place, they are not vulnerable ." 35

R&Mprovides a means to attain this objective.

Onboard oxygen generating systems (OBOGS) eliminate the

current requirement for liquid oxygen (LOX) plants, reducing the

number of personnel and changing the structure required for

storage, delivery, and servicing of aircraft and associated

equipment.

36

The KC-135 reengining program involving the new F108

engine has already saved 50 manpower spaces in the Strategic Air

Command, with an additional savings of 40 more spaces expected

by 1991 . 3'

Defense industry contractors developing the engine prototypes

for the ATF are greatly simplifying designs that reduce required

maintenance actions. Pratt and Whitney's entry in the competition

is designed to have 40 percent fewer parts, require 60 percent fewer

depot- and support-level tools than current engines, and contain

main engine components that can be replaced within 20 minutes .

38

Manpower requirements are saved through improving both

reliability and maintainability . In fact, the USAF is expected to be

able to maintain its new systems with one-third to one-half the

personnel required to maintain current systems . Furthermore, the

fighter electronics reliability goal, whether a new or upgraded line

replaceable unit, is 2,000 hours MTBF. According to an Air Force

R&M overview report, many operating commands believe

75
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

meeting this projected goal "would eliminate the requirement for

intermediate-level maintenance." 39

Technology

As force multipliers, R&M and technology advancements

combined can have a significant impact on the organizational

picture of the future . Figure 27 illustrates their effects on the cost

and number of spares required to support the F-111 of the 1960s,

the F-15 of the 1970s, and the F-16 of the 1980s. During those

three decades there was a 60-percent reduction in the number of

spares and a 78-percent reduction in the cost of the war readiness

spares kit (WRSK) . 4o

R&M achievements are central to the issue of reduced spares,

costs, and intermediate-level maintenance requirements on one

side of the equation . On the other side is improved combat

capability and force structure efficiency .

Emerging technology applications have been the linchpin of

R&M success stories in the past. High technology improvements

will become even more important in the austere operating

1980s, 1960s' 1970s'

TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY TECHNOLOGY

$82M $25.5M $17.7M

2,776 UNITS 2,092 UNITS 1,113 UNITS

Source : Viccellio 1990 briefing .

Figure 27. R&M/Dyna-Metric Improvements : Squadron Wartime

Spares Kits

76
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

environment of the future as they are applied to systems that have

a direct impact on the support structure.

Besides being the key to R&M improvements, technological

developments support the emphasis on reviewing the need and

form of intermediate-level maintenance in the future . Newweapon

systems are being designed, and existing ones modified, to

incorporate the use ofvery high speed integrated circuits (VHSIC),

for example. This new technology not only dramatically improves

reliability but directly affects how we need to be structured to

maintain the improved systems . The on-aircraft avionics

intermediate shop (AIS), using VHSIC technology, has the

capability to monitor and make diagnostic tests of aircraft systems

during flight. It can store this data and make it immediately

available to maintenance personnel after the flight . This

technology can thus eliminate the need for components to be

removed and delivered to an intermediate-level shop for offequipment troubleshooting and repair . Underthese circumstances,

the technician at the organizational level could determine the

problem by retrieving the stored data and making a decision to

either remove and replace the component(s) or perform on-aircraft

repair .

The Air Force is also studying robotics technology for possible

use in combat and logistics support to include such tasks as

preparation of aircraft for flight, missile maintenance and

readiness, ground radar and communication systems maintenance,

space activities, and depot maintenance. The Air Force Studies

Board, a division of the National Research Council' 41 initiated a

study in January 1987, the results of which were released in June

1989 . The report concluded:

The introduction of widespread use ofrobots into the existing Air Force

environment will require understanding, persistence, and a willingness to

change . The single most important conclusion drawn from this study is

that there must be an organizational focus at both the individual facility

level and at higher levels nz

Furthermore, the report cited examples of robotic applications that

could be aimed at easing manpower-intensive or extremely

77
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

hazardous tasks . Aircraft deicing, a time-consuming and

hazardous task, could be accomplished by using a robotic spray

arm and television camera, which would eliminate the need for a

human operator. External aircraft fuel tank assembly is a

man-hour-intensive operation. "A squadron of 24 aircraft flying

50 sorties a day would require 100 man-hours to do nothing but

assemble drop tanks. Redesign of drop tanks to use robotic

assembly would save most of the manpower ." 43

Robots designed to operate in conjunction with the new

neutron-ray technology could eliminate the need for man-hourintensive procedures to perform foreign object damage (FOD) and

nondestructive inspections of fighter aircraft . Currently, major

disassembly of aircraft flaps, landing gear, engine, and seats has

to be accomplished to perform required inspections for corrosion,

foreign object damage, or cracks . Robots could change these

time-consuming procedures . Only if a problem is found after the

aircraft is inspected intact would disassembly have to be

accomplished for further study.

4

Principal Objections to the

Adoption of COMO

It becomes readily obvious that future changes in organizational

structure must be made in the context of the effect those changes

have on the other variables that form the framework of an

organization and the external environmental situation .

Reorganization of ANG TAF maintenance units is not without its

critics . Those who believe that "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" are

apparently content with the status quo and are determined to resist

any progressive effort to continuously improve their organization

if such change violates their comfort zone. The four principal

objections to moving in the direction of changing the TAF

maintenance organization to mirror the gaining-command

structure are (1) it will require large numbers of additional

personnel and place an unacceptable burden on recruiting, (2) it

78
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

will result in excessive training requirements, (3) on- versus

off-equipment work will result in a loss of expertise, and (4) ANG

maintenance units are already organized to mobilize as tasked .

Manpower and Recruiting

I agree that the manpower requirements to support a reorganization of the COMO in the early 1980s would have involved

increased numbers of personnel. At that time, all ANGunit military

manning documents were based on man-hour per flying hour

requirements . A standard number of flying hours was allocated to

a flying unit based on aircrew training requirements and PAA

numbers . The authorized direct labor man-year positions

(ADLMP) for the maintenance unit were determined by dividing

the direct labor maintenance man-hours per flying hour by a

man-hour adjustment factor with additions made to account for the

indirect labor production and special support activities such as the

DCM staff, engine tracking, munitions, AGE, and electronic

countermeasures equipment.

45 The active TAF maintenance

manpower standard was determined by a computer modeling

technique called the logistics composite model (L-COM), which

simulated a variety of flying, maintenance, and other related

aircraft activities ofa flying unit by using operations, maintenance,

and supply data.

The MMH/FH method was cumbersome, complex, and less

indicative of realistic manpower needs than L-COM, and it

produced a substantial disparity in the number of manpower

positions between the ANG and active TAF. The MMH/FH

method, for example, set the maintenance manning authorization

for an ANG flying unit with 18 A-7 PAA and 310 personnel . In

contrast, the L-COM method determined the maintenance

manning authorization for the same unit to be 513 . Similar

differences existed between other ANG and active TAF flying

units. 46

The L-COM process has been validated over the last ten years

and is now accepted by the ANG for a centralized peacetime and

79
ORG STRUCTURE FOR ANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

wartime scenario . L-COM standards for all weapon systems have

not yet been developed, but ANG manpower modeling has been

modified and updated during this same time period . The Guard

must transition completely to L-COM techniques as soon as they

are developed because the MMH/FH method is no longer valid or

supportable of the Air Force Studies Board process.

The peacetime maintenance manpower comparison depicted in

table 1, chapter 3, reflects the results of improved modeling

techniques currently used by the ANG while the active TAF

figures were determined by L-COM in every case. In the future,

however, application of L-COM modeling to all ANG TAF units

should nearly equalize manpower requirements when like weapon

systems are compared. Note that with the newer weapon systems

like the F-15 and F-16, ownedby both ANG and active TAF, there

is only a 3-percent average difference in manpower requirements

of like mission, design, and series (MDS), with the advantage to

ANG units . The significant differences in manpower requirements

are in the F-4 and A-10 MDS. As the F-4 is phased out and replaced

by F- 16s, those differences will disappear.

The A-10 manpower disparity can be rationalized by examining

the difference in how the ANG uses the aircraft compared to the

active TAF. In the active TAF, the A-10 is utilized as a

close-air-support (CAS) aircraft . In the ANG it is used in both the

CAS and tactical air control roles. The tactical air control mission

requires fewer maintenance manpower spaces than the CAS

mission, thereby accounting for the current disparity. Future plans

to entirely convert A-10 use to only the tactical air control role

should make this a moot point.

With all else being equal, the gradual transition of current ANG

manpower modeling techniques to the use of L-COM standards

and the continued conversion of ANG TAF units to newer weapon

systems should negate any significant burden on recruiting as a

result of structural changes to the maintenance organization .
Training

RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBATORG

It is true that increased numbers of personnel acquired by the

ANG would increase the acquisition and training costs. An

assessment of a sampling of those costs is contained in chapter 3.

Our senior leadership would have to make a decision as to whether

the costs are acceptable in light of fiscal constraints and in terms

of our capability to maintain readiness.

Another objection to the adoption of a COMO-type structure is

cross-utilization training. The synergistic effects of R&Machievements, technology, and management and leadership initiatives

have made it possible to go to Rivet Workforce because with fewer

breakdowns in equipment the technician will have much more time

between maintenance actions. This additional time can be better

utilized if the technician is not highly specialized and can work on

other related systems. Under the COMO, and with the integration

of Rivet Workforce, aircraft maintenance has been separated into

on- and off-equipment functions, which means that technicians

must broaden their skills to be capable of being cross-utilized in

more than one system .

Initially, cross-utilization training will increase the OJT work

load because all E-6s and below will have to complete additional

career development courses. In the long run, however, upgrade

training requirements remain about the same and actually decrease

in some cases . The integration of avionics and consolidation of

skills reduced career development course requirements from I l to

nine volumes . 47 Additionally, the full-time military technician,

who constitutes one-third of the ANG maintenance force, will be

capable of a relatively quick transition since most are already

trained/skilled in cross-utilization tasks performed routinely on a

day-to-day basis .

To overcome the disadvantage of an increased and more

complex training work load attendant to RWF, we need to train

smarter. "In many areas the business oftraining hasn't changed for

20 years," says Maj Mike Meyer, another RWF planner. "We are

still using the old method of having an instructor stand in front of

a class and lecture, which ties up someone who could better be

8 1
ORG STRUCTURE FORANCTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

used on the flight line and does not recognize individual student

abilities.

,,48 Major Meyer further stipulates that we have saturated

the system by teaching OJT in some areas that formal training

should cover. A companion program that parallels RWF, called

Rivet Train, was launched by the Air Staff to review training in

the aircraft maintenance career field to determine the realistic,

baseline training requirements generated by RWF and all other

maintenance training. Existing training technology is being

explored for its application to maintenance training requirements .

Among these are the interactive videodisc, computer-assisted

instruction, and computer-based instruction . Intelligent

exploitation of these and other more advanced techniques should

help us train more efficiently to ensure maintenance personnel

have the skills to do their job in the future .

49

On-Equipment versus Off-Equipment Work

The division of work into on- and off-equipment functions will

definitely reduce specialization but not necessarily overall

expertise. Technicians will learn practical related skills on aircraft

assigned to the unit contrasted with their previous study of the same

skill for various aircraft through career development course

material .

We can no longer afford the large, complicated infrastructure

required to support highly specialized maintenance activities .

There has to be a trade-off between the degree of specialization

and the utility of consolidating skills in order to enhance combat

capability, reduce costs, and reduce vulnerability of the support

structures .

Mobilization

Air National Guard flying units are organized as autonomous

squadron-sized units that are tasked to mobilize and deploy as an

aviation package according to the unit type code. Under current

war plans, the majority of ANG units gained by the TAF deploy

82
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

to bases where they either operate alone or are hosted by NATO,

Air Force Reserve (AFRES), or other ANG forces . Very few such

units deploy to a forward operating location or main operating base

having regular USAF forces . On the surface it appears that we are

organized in peacetime as we would have to be in wartime.

However, the current tasking is based on the needs of the past. The

world situation is changing almost on a daily basis and in ways no

one ever imagined. Withdrawal of hundreds of US troops from

Europe and Asia has created the perception of an entirely different

and reduced threat to our national security. NATO is changing to

a different form as a result of this perception and members are

reducing the percentage of their budgets spent on national defense

and the military. These stunning changes will result in drastically

different tasking for which we must be prepared to adjust . The

ability to maintain constant readiness with the capability to deploy

rapidly and fight immediately when we get there will be even more

important in future conflicts .

Other considerations are the president's authority to order ANG

units to active duty after declaring a national emergency, or to

exercise the limited call-up of a maximum of 200,000 members to

serve in the event of a war or national emergency or for other

purposes such as a demonstration of rapid-response capability . In

either of these situations it is possible that a unit could be mobilized

but deployed within the United States to be collocated with active

USAF forces . This happened in mobilizations and deployments

during the Korean conflict, Berlin airlift, and Vietnam War.

During the Korean conflict, 22 ANG wings consisting offighter,

light bomber, and tactical reconnaissance units were mobilized .

Three deployed to Europe, two to Korea; the 17 remaining wings

provided support and replacements from the continental United

States (CONUS). In response to the war in Vietnam and the USS

Pueblo crisis, 14 ANG fighter, tactical reconnaissance, and

support units were mobilized, 35 percent of which deployed to

Vietnam, 60 percent to Korea and Japan, and the remaining 5

percent provided support and replacements from CONUS bases . 5

83
ORGSTRUCTURE FORANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

It is also possible, if not highly likely, that current tasking will

be revised, resulting in many more ANG TAF units deploying to

overseas locations . This would require efficient and effective

integration with USAF forces .

Finally, day-to-day training requirements call for organizational

similarities to facilitate effective training. On 21 August 1970,

when Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced the Total

Force concept, training became an Air Reserve Forces mission by

regulation . AFR 45-1, Purpose, Policy, and Responsibilities,for

Air National Guard andAir Force Reserve, 2 January 1987, states

that the ANG and the United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR)

mission is

to train and provide combat flying units, combat support units, and

qualified personnel for active duty in the Air Force :

a To support wartime requirements .

b. To perform such peacetime missions as are compatible with Guard

and Reserve training requirements and the maintenance of mobilization

readiness.

c To conduct training in support of Total Force capabilities .

52

A recent example of ANG peacetime requirements to integrate

with active forces was Creek Klaxon. While collocated with an

active fighter unit for one year, ANG TAF units performed air

defense alert and trained daily with the Air Force.

During wartime contingencies, the time required to integrate

dissimilar organizations and handle associated management

problems wouldinterfere with a flying unit's capabilities to rapidly

and effectively engage in war fighting immediately after arrival at

the deployed location.

Our combat capability can be maximized by organizing and

training in peacetime like we intend to fight. An organizational

structure similar to the active TAF structure will facilitate a smooth

integration upon mobilization, enhance peacetime training, and

fully comply with the intent of the gaining command concept.

84
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

The Restructured Maintenance Organization :

What Should It Look Like?

The transition of the ANG maintenance organization to a

COMO-type organization must be evolutionary rather than

revolutionary. R&M, new technology, and management and

leadership initiatives are rapidly changing the environment and the

way we do business . A different organization and structure will

have to evolve from the rapidly changing environment and organizational framework variables.

To start the evolutionary process, I believe the ANG has to

investigate three options to determine the feasibility forimplementation . First is to change the structure and organization now to

exactly match COMO. The second option is to change nothing.

Leave the organization as it is . The third option is to make phased

incremental enhancements to the organization, each phase

designed to continually move the organization toward a more

decentralized COMO-like structure.

The option to make an exact change to COMO would be

inadvisable. Thesudden action to reorganize and restructure would

be too drastic a shock to the organization and would cause

confusion and havoc . Thecurrent full-time work force is probably

too small to adequately man all areas in a COMO organization .

Unless the organization is given time to adjust, the reorganization

attempt would be doomed. A direct conversion would adversely

impact the military technicians by position downgrades, reduction

in force, reduced efficiency, union intervention, and lower morale .

The option to maintain the status quo would be a serious

mistake. It is the direct opposite ofimmediate change . The rigidity

in our current organizational structure would cause problems and

prevent necessary change at the very time when phenomenal

changes are occurring in the environment. Theorganization would

become unresponsive, inefficient, and incapable of meeting

redefined mission requirements in the future .

The third option, to make phased incremental enhancements to

the organization, is the only valid one. Since the immediate

85
ORG STRUCTURE FORANGTACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

post-Vietnam era, the tactical air forces, which include those of

TAC, SAC, PACAF, USAFE, the Eleventh Air Force, and the Air

Force Reserve, have all reorganized aircraft maintenance and

supply to various degrees with the intent of decentralizing

authority. Theresult has been improved unit efficiency, teamwork,

decision making, leadership development, and resource

availability on the flight line .

TheAir Force Reserve has been reorganized along COMO lines

with certain exceptions . Figure 28 illustrates its current TAF

organization structure. Assigning civilian specialists to their

respective shops during day-to-day operations and dispatching

them from the maintenance operations center continues to reflect

their use as both on- and off-equipment technicians . During

extended exercises and annual field training with the entire

military organization, orelements thereof, they revert to the formal

MCR 66-5 (COMO) organization .

The Strategic Air Command has also followed the trend to

decentralize aircraft maintenance along the same lines as TAC but

COMPONENT

REPAIR

WS-17

Source: MCR 66-5, 1-6 through 1-11 .

COMMANDER

GW14

AIRCRAFT

GENERATION

WS-15

86

EQUIPMENT

MAINTENANCE

WS-14

Figure 28. Air Force Reserve TAF Maintenance Organization

MAINTENANCE TRAINING PROGRAMS& ADMINISTRATION ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT MOBILIZATION

GS9 GS-7 GS-7 GS-5

QUALITY MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS OPERATIONS ASSURANCE OFFICER CENTER

WS-11 GS-12 GS-11
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

tailored to their unique mission requirements . The ReadinessOriented Logistics System (ROLS) was tested in 1985 at a SAC

base as a part of the model installation program (MIP) and was

approved later in 1986 for implementation. SAC's Office of

Manpower and Organization (XPM) explained the ROLS concept

this way:

The overall objective of ROLS is to combine "on-aircraft" specialists and

dedicated crew chiefs into the Organizational Maintenance Squadron, and

to affix authority and responsibility for aircraft production with a "line

chief' on theflightline . . . . . . Off-equipment" maintenance specialists will

be combined into two other squadrons, the Field Maintenance Squadron

and the Avionics Maintenance Squadron .

53

The SAC action office proposing the reorganization further

states in its staff summary sheet, "The ROLS reorganization is

structured to improve aircraft readiness through increased

efficiency on the flightline. This concept reduces decision making

authority to the lowest level possible ." The proposal to adopt

ROLS was made with no changes in total grades or skills but in

some cases required new construction of buildings or modules

under the military construction program (MCP). 54

I recommend that ANG aircraft maintenance also be

reorganized for the same reasons stated here with the added

purpose ofimproving integrated training and mobilization with the

active gaining commands . To begin the transformation, the ANG

should first designate several maintenance organizations to

conduct a controlled one-year test of the adequacy and feasibility

of a restructured organization, to include COSO, possibly like the

ones depicted in figures 29 and 30. The test organizations should

incorporate the basic tenets of COMO/ROLS allowing for

decentralized responsibility and authority and an on-/offequipment structure that consolidates the sortie production effort

into the aircraft generation function . Consolidation of skills/

AFSCs and the consolidation of the overall work force into onand off-equipment functions should be major test parameters .

The categories of the various functional elements of the test

organization structure should be designated the same as those of

87
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

COMPONENT

REPAIR

BRANCH

AIRCRAF T

GFNFRATION

BRANCH

EQUIPMENT

MAINTENANCE

BRANCH

Figure 29 . Restructured ANG Maintenance Organization : Staff Functions

TECHNICAL ORDER

DISTRIBUTION

OFFICE

PROGRAMS AND MOBILITY

STANDARDIZATION L- MAINIENANCI ANALYSIS

CHIEFOF

MAINTENANCE/

ASSISTANT

CHIEF OF

MAINTENANCE

88

Figure 30 . Restructured ANG Maintenance Organization : Production

Functions

AIRCRAFT

GENERATION

COMPONENT BRANCH EQUIPMENT

REPAIR PLANS AND

SCHEDULING/ MAINTENANCE

BRANCH EXPEDITER/ BRANCI4 DEDICATED

CREW CT IIEF

C' SCHEDULED

MAINTENANCE

WEAPONS

SFRVICFS

INTEGRATED B NONPOWFRED/POWERED

AVIONICS FLIGHT - AEROSPACE GROUND EQUIPMENT

L_ SPECIALIST WEAPONS L_ EQUIPMENT BACKSHOPS FLIGHT MAINTENANCE

L_ SPECIALIST

FLIGHT
RESTRUCTURF'D ANG COMI3A h ORG

COMO/ROLS and consolidated as indicated in figure 29 into the

component repair branch (CRB), the aircraft generation branch

(AGB), and the equipment maintenance branch (EMB). The

centralized authority that maintenance control has now should be

decentralized to allow decision making at the dedicated crew chief

level on the flight line with a redesignated maintenance operations

center monitoring and coordinating maintenance actions .

Concurrently with this decentralization in maintenance control,

two people from job control and one person from plans and

scheduling should be relocated to the AGB to perform scheduling

and expediting duties .

After the test is concluded, the next step should be to conduct a

thorough evaluation of the results to determine if the decentralized

organization is considered feasible after appropriate course

corrections . Finally, determine whether to initiate a planned,

phased transition to convert all applicable TAF and possibly SAC

maintenance units to the restructured organization . H. Edwards

Deming says that the organization of the 1990s must develop the

capability to maintain consistent, repeatable production

processes to prevent change-and, at the same time, to

"continually transform its processes, systems, and structures to

take competitive advantage of ever-diminishing periods of

environment stability.""

I can envision evolving out of this turmoil and dynamic

environment at the turn of the century an ANG maintenance

organization that has modern equipment and that exploits

achievements of R&M, advances in technology, and improved

management techniques from TQM and other initiatives to

produce a flatter skeletal framework with a leaner staff. I can see

a greater degree of decentralization that would allow for quick

decisions and would develop leaders. I can see action teams that

provide for enhanced lateral communications and that give people

a stake in the organization . And I can see the use of alternative

maintenance concepts taking advantage of Rivet Workforce

consolidation and eliminating intermediate-level maintenance to

produce a smaller and more efficient maintenance organization,

89
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

the structure of which matches that of the active gaining commands

to the greatest extent possible .

Notes

1 . Thomas J . Peters and Robert H . Waterman, Jr ., In Search of Excellence :

Lessons,f - om America's Best-Run Companies (New York: Harper and Row,

Inc ., 1982), 9-11 .

2 . Ibid ., 11 .

3 . Ibid ., 10.

4. Department of Defense, Reserve Component Programs, Fiscal Year 1988,

report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Washington, D.C., 1989, 24.

5 . James M. Hurley et al ., "USAF Executive Leadership and Management

Initiatives," research report (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1985), 12 .

6. Briefing, LtGen Henry Viccellio, Jr ., SeniorLeaders Maintenance Course,

Langley AFB, Va., May 1989.

7. Hurley, 35 .

8. Viccellio briefing .

9. Hurley, 35-36.

10. Viccellio briefing .

11 . Ibid .

12. Ibid .

13. Briefing, Lt Gen Henry Viccellio, Jr ., subject: Combat Support and the

Air Force Logistics Conflict of Operations, Air War College, Maxwell AFB,

Ala., March 1990.

14. Ibid .

15. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, Defense Management: A Report to

the President (Washington, D.C. : Department of Defense, July 1989), 1 .

16. Ibid ., 15-16.

17. The actions taken by the successful organizations involved in the DOD

corporate review relate directly to what Peters and Waterman define as

organizational hardware (strategy and structure) and software (style, systems,

staff [people], skills, shared values [culture]) . All of these variables are

interdependent ; therefore, a change in one affects the others. See Peters and

Waterman, 11 .

18. Cheney, 16

19 . Jack Katzen, "Total Quality Management Implementation," in Total

Quality Management Implementation : Selected Readings (San Diego, Calif :

Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, April 1989), iii .

20 . Edward M . Baker, "The Quality Professional's Role in the New

Economic Age," Quality Progress, November 1987, 20.

90
RESTRUCTURED ANG COMBAT ORG

21 . Ibid .

22. Ibid., 22-24. Baker has a detailed explanation of how the functional

hierarchy inhibits quality and the proliferation of complexity with vertical

height in an organization .

23 . Ibid ., 21 .

24 . Jerry C. Crane, "The Impact of Reliability on Life Cycle Cost"

(Unpublished paper presented by the deputy assistant for reliability and

maintainability, AFLC, at the Fifth Symposium on Quality and Its Assurance,

Madrid, Spain, 29 May-2 June 1989), 5.

25 . Peter Grier, "R&M Is Serious Stuff," Air Force Maga:ine, November

1989, 96.

26. Crane, 2.

27 . Viccellio 1990 briefing

28 . Grier, 98.

29. Crane, 6.

30. Quoted in Grier, 98 .

31 . Viccellio 1990 briefing, B-6.

32. Grier, 96-98 .

33. Viccellio 1990 briefing, B-1 I .

34. Quoted in The Logistics (#'Waging War: American Logistics, 1774-

1985, ed. Lt Col David C. Rutenberg and Jane S . Allen (Gunter AFS, Ala. : Air

Force Logistics Management Center, 1986), 195.

35. Grier, 98.

36. Ibid .

37 . Ibid .

38 . Ibid .

39. Ibid.

40. Viccelli o 1990 briefing .

41 . The National Research Council is a private, nonprofit research

organization chartered by Congress to advise the government on scientific and

technical matters . Air Force Systems Command contracted the council, which

in turn had the Air Force Studies Board perform the study of Air Force use and

need for robotics . See John Ginovsky, "Robotics," Air Force Times, 18

December 1989, 15 .

42 . Ibid .

43 . Ibid ., 16.

44. Ibid .

45 . Minutes of the 2d Semiannual A-7 Maintenance Council Meeting,

Manpower Committee Report at OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, Okla., 2-3 December

1985 .

46. Extracted from an ANG/LGM position paper on COMO, undated.

47 . Lt Col Larry Jones, NGB/LGM point paper on Project Rivet Workforce,

14 October 1987.

9 1
ORGSTRUCTURE FOR ANG TACTICAL AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCF:

48. Quoted in Jim Garamore, "Rivet Workforce: Program to Review Aircraft

Maintenance Training," Air Force Times, 31 March 1986, F-1, F-2.

49. Ibid .

50. Peter B . Cascio et al ., "Organizing the Air Force: Reserve Components,"

research report (Maxwell AFB, Ala. : Air War College, 1989), 14-15.

51 . Ibid ., 3.

52. Ibid .

53. Staff Summary Sheet, Headquarters SAC/XPM, Request for Waiver to

AFR 26-2, 1986.

54. Ibid .

55. Quoted in Baker, 20.
Glossary

ADLMP authorized direct labor man-year position

ADT active duty training

AEMS armament and electronics maintenance squadron

AFLC Air Force Logistics Command

AFT annual field training

AFRES Air Force Reserve

AFSC Air Force specialty code

AGB aircraft generation branch

AGE aerospace ground equipment

AGS aircraft generation squadron

AIS avionics intermediate shop

ALC Air Logistics Center

AMB avionics maintenance branch

AMU aircraft maintenance unit

AMUSS aircraft maintenance unit support section

ANG Air National Guard

ANGSC Air National Guard Support Center

APG airplane general

ARI Airpower Research Institute

ATF advanced tactical fighter

BA budget authority

BMT basic military training

93
CAMS consolidated aircraft maintenance squadron

CAS close air support

CND could not duplicate

COMO combat-oriented maintenance organization

COSO combat-oriented supply organization

CRB component repair branch

CRS component repair squadron

DCC dedicated crew chief

DCM deputy commander for maintenance

DIFM due-in from maintenance

DML director of maintenance and logistics

DMR Defense Management Review

EMB equipment maintenance branch

EMS equipment maintenance squadron

FCF functional check flight

FMB field maintenance branch

FMC fully mission capable

FMS field maintenance squadron

FOD foreign object damage

IDT inactive duty training

L-COM logistics composite model

LME local manufactured equipment

LOX liquid oxygen

94
LRU line replaceable unit

MCP military construction program

MDS mission, design, and series

MICAP mission capability

MIP model installation program

MMB munitions maintenance branch

MMH/FH maintenance man-hours per flying hour

MMS munitions maintenance squadron

MOC Maintenance Operations Center

MOD maintenance operations division

MS&D materiel storage and distribution

MSK mission support kit

MTBF mean time between failures

MTBR mean time between repair

OBOGS onboard oxygen generating system

OJT on-the-job training

OMB organizational maintenance branch

OMS organizational maintenance squadron

ORI operational readiness inspection

PAA primary authorized aircraft

PACAF Pacific Air Forces

PCs permanent change of station

PIWG product improvement working group

POMO production-oriented maintenance organization

95
P&S plans and scheduling

R&D research and development

R&M reliability and maintainability

RCM reliability-centered maintenance, or repair cycle

monitor

RCSU repair cycle support unit

ROLS Readiness-Oriented Logistics System

RVN Republic of Vietnam

RWF Rivet Workforce

SAC Strategic Air Command

SRU shop replaceable unit

SSC system support contractor

SSG system safety group

TAC Tactical Air Command

TAF tactical air forces

TODD technical order distribution office

TQM total duality management

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

UTA unit training assemblies

UTC unit type code

VHSIC very high speed integrated circuit

WRSK war readiness spares kit

96
Advanced tactical fighter (ATF): 71,

73,75

Aerospace ground equipment

(AGE) : 9

Aero squadron: 2, 3

Aircraft generation branch (AGB):

89

Aircraft generation squadron (AGS):

9, 38, 40, 54

Aircraft maintenance units (AMU):

38,40-41

Air Force maintenance management

organization

divisional (decentralized): 14,

26-27, 45, 54, 64

functional (centralized) : 14,

23-25,42,45,56

policy and philosophy : 15-21

vertical organization : 19-21

Air Force Manual 66-1,

Maintenance Engine erin,~

Policies, Objectives, and

Responsibilities: 7-10, 12, 43

Air Force Reserve: 83, 86

Air Force Studies Board: 77, 80

Air Logistics Center (ALC) : 66

Air National Guard

ancillary training : 30-31, 38

maintenance acquisition and

training costs: 48, 50--51

maintenance organization : 32,

34-36,41-43,46,52-53,

57,59,79-81,85,89

maintenance training : 4, 30

Armament and electronics

maintenance squadron (AEMS):

11

Index

97

Atkinson, Joseph : 7

Avionics maintenance branch

(AMB): 32-33, 41

Blue Two program: 71

Chanute Field, Illinois : 4

Combat-oriented maintenance

organization (COMO): 9, 10, 12,

19,37-38,40-43,46,54-56,62,

78-79,81,85-87,89

Combat-oriented supply

organization (COSO) : 64, 87

Component repair branch (CRB): 89

Component repair squadron (CRS) :

9,38

Consolidated aircraft maintenance

squadron (CAMS) : 8

Corona Fall 89: 66

Corona Harvest: 10-12

Coronet Warrior: 55

Creech, W. L. : 61

Creek Klaxon : 84

Crew chief method/system : 2, 4

Defense Management Review

(DMR): 68-69

Dock system : 5

Dyna-Metric computer model: 55

Eleventh Air Force: 86

Equipment maintenance branch

(EMB) : 89

Equipment maintenance squadron

(EMS): 9, 38
MacDill AFB, Florida: I 1

Maintenance Operations Center

(MOC) : 40

Master mechanic . See Crew chief

method/system

McKinsey 7-S Framework : 59

Mean time between failures

(MTBF): 71

Mean-time-between-repair (MTBR)

rates : 17, 71

Military construction program

(MCP): 87

Model installation program (MIP): 87

Munitions maintenance branch

(MMB): 32-33,41

Munitions maintenance squadron

(MMS): 1 1

National Research Council : 77

Onboard oxygen generating systems

(OBOGS): 75

On-aircraft avionics intermediate

shop (AIS): 77

Off-equipment maintenance : 9,

16-17,33-34,38,40-42,54,56,

68,82

Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Production and

Logistics-OASD (P&L): 69

98

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) : 8, 12,

86

Product improvement working group

(PIWG): 71

Production-oriented maintenance

organization (POMO): 8-9, 12

"Provisional Airplane Regulations

for the Signal Corps, United

States Army, 1911 ": 2

Readiness-Oriented Logistics

System (ROLS): 87, 89

Regulations

Air Force

26-2, Organization Policy

and Guidance : 15

45-1, Purpose, Policy, and

Responsibilities forAir

National Guard and Air

Force Reserve: 84

66-1, Maintenance

Engineering : Policy

Objectives and

Regulations: 7, 18-19, 21

66-5, Communications

Security (COMSEC)

Equipment Maintenance

and Training : 9

66-12 (PACAFR),

Maintenance

Management: 8

Field maintenance branch: 32-33, 41 On-equipment maintenance : 9,

Field maintenance squadron : 1 1 16-17,33-34,38,41-42,54,56,

First Aero Company: 1 68,82

Foulois, Benjamin : 2 Operating costs

Air Force: 52

Generalist : 1, 9 Air National Guard: 52

Organizational maintenance branch

Hobson Plan: 6 (OMB): 32-33,41,43

Organizational maintenance

Laird, Melvin: 84 squadron (OMS): 1 1

Leavitt's Diamond: 60 Organizational structures

Line replaceable units (LRU): 17 Air Force : 43

Logistics composite model Air National Guard : 28-29, 43

(L-COM): 35,79-80
66-12 (SACR),

Maintenance

Management: 7

66-14, The USAir Force

Equipment Maintenance

Program : 16-17, 19, 66

173-13, US Air Force Cost

and Planning Factors: 47

Air National Guard

66-14, Maintenance

Management, Air

National Guard: 32

Army

US Army Strategic Air

Forces Regulation

65-1, Combat

Maintenance

Procedures: 5

Multicommand Regulation

(MCR) 66-5, Combat

Oriented Maintenance

Organization : 42, 86

Reliability and maintainability

(R&M) program: 16, 75-77, 89

Reliability-centered maintenance

(RCM) program: 16

"A Resume of a Study of the USAF

Concept of Maintenance" : 7

Rivet Train : 82

Rivet Workforce: 31, 35, 38, 42, 54,

81-82,89

Robotics: 77-78

Signal Corps: 1, 2

Strategic Air Command (SAC): 75,

86-87,89

System safety groups (SSG): 71

"TAC Enhancement" program: 8

TAC squadron maintenance model :

10-11

Tactical Air Capability Task Force:

45

Tactical Air Command (TAC): 12,

46,55,61-62,86

Tactical air forces (TAF): 38, 47, 57,

60, 71, 78-79, 84

Tactical Force concept: 84

TAFmaintenance organization,

problems : 10-12

Total quality management (TQM):

69,89

United States Air Forces in Europe

(USAFE): 12, 86

USAF Reliability and

Maintainability (R&M) 2000

Program: 70-71

US Code, Title 32, National Guard:

36,50

USS Pueblo: 83

Very high speed integrated circuit

(VHSIC): 77