United States

Department of

Agriculture

Economic

Research

Service

GFA-9

November 1997

INTERNATIONAL AGRICULTURE AND TRADE REPORTS

FOOD SECURITY

ASSESSMENT

Situation and Outlook Series

Two-thirds of Sub-Saharan Africa's population

is projected to be undernourished in 2007.
United States

Department of

Agriculture

Economic

Research 

Service

GFA-9

November 1997

Contact:

Shahla Shapouri 

Stacey Rosen

Principal Contributors

Munisamy Gopinath

Michael Kurtzig

Birgit Meade

Jay Mitchell

May Peters

Terry Roe

Stacey Rosen

Matthew Shane

Shahla Shapouri

Lloyd Teigen

Michael Trueblood

Keith Wiebe

Editing/Production/Design

Martha Evans

Diane Decker

Wynnice Pointer-Napper

Victor Phillips, Jr.

Cover Photo

CARE

Mali

Approved by the World 

Agricultural Outlook Board.

Summary released 

November 24, 1997.

FOOD SECURITY

ASSESSMENT

Situation and Outlook Series

Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Global Food Security: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4

Regional Summaries:

North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20

New Independent States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22

Special Articles:

World Food Insecurity: A Policy Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Can Regional Policy Initiatives Help Achieve 

Food Security in Southern Africa? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Resources, Sustainability, and Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Income Inequality and Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43

Country Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88
Preface

This report continues the series of food assessments begun in the late 1970’s. Global Food Assessments were done from 1990

to 1992, hence the GFA series. In 1993, the title was changed to Food Aid Needs Assessment to more accurately reflect the

contents of the report, which focuses on selected developing countries with past or continuing food deficits. This year we

widened our analysis beyond the assessment of aggregate food availability to include more aspects of food security. We therefore changed the title to Food Security Assessment .

This report projects food availability for 66 countries during the next decade. The results are also used to project consumption

by income group to analyze the severity of nutritional problems within the countries. The report includes an overview section

that provides a global outlook of food security. That section is followed by five regional writeups (North Africa, Sub-Saharan

Africa, Asia, Latin America, and New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union). The report concludes with four

research papers related to food security. The topics include the institution of outward-oriented policies to achieve efficiency in

resource allocation, regional policy initiatives in Southern Africa, resource use and implications on the environment, and factors to reduce income inequality. The articles review the linkages between these issues and achieving food security. 

Acknowledgments

Appreciation is extended to Kitty Smith, Director of the Market and Trade Economics Division, for her support of the food security project and to Kelley White for valuable comments on the food security articles. We would also like to thank John Dyck for

his contribution to the article on North Korea and the reviewers, especially Mary Bohman, Fred Surls, Ron Trostle, Dave

Stallings, and Gerald Rector for their comments. Special thanks are extended to Vernon Roningen for his VORSIM software and

support and to Martha Evans, Diane Decker, Wynnice Pointer-Napper, and Victor Phillips for editorial and design assistance.

2 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

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The Food Gap Is Projected To Widen 

Over the Next 10 Years

The food gap to maintain consumption is projected to

increase from 8.5 million tons in 1997 to 18 million tons by

2007 for the 66 countries studied here. Many low-income

countries are unable to meet minimum nutritional requirements of their people, and this nutritional food gap is projected to grow from 15 million tons in 1997 to 24 million

tons by 2007. But even within countries that have enough

food available, low-income households often do not have

the means to purchase their minimum requirements. 

Since 1995, global food security has become a high profile

issue as a result of concerns stemming from a spike in grain

prices in 1995 and a decline in world grain stocks. The trends

in policies of major agricultural producers are toward market

orientation and greater awareness of environmental concerns.

The expected implications of these trends together with

strengthening economic growth in many developing countries

are lower stockholdings, primarily in the United States, and a

slowdown in the long-term decline in real commodity prices.

Some are also concerned with the potential for increased

price variability. Food import-dependent developing countries

view the strengthened food import prices and the possibility

of reduced food aid availability as a major threat to their food

security. Responding to these concerns at the declaration of

the World Food Summit in November 1996, participants

pledged “to reduce the number of undernourished people to

half their present level no later than 2015.”

The question that arises from these issues is, are these lowincome countries moving along the necessary path to

improve their nutritional situations in the long term? The

evaluation of future food availability of low-income developing countries, although extended only through 2007, indicates that per capita food consumption in many countries

will decline, leading to growing gaps.

When the total amount of the projected food availability is

allocated among different income groups in each country,

the result shows a slight increase in the number of people

who cannot meet their nutritional requirements—from 1.1

billion in the base year to 1.2 billion by 2007. 

Regional comparisons of projections of food gaps place

Sub-Saharan Africa as the most vulnerable region with

respect to food security. By 2007, this region is projected to

account for about half of the total gap (66 countries) to

maintain consumption and 66 percent of the gap to meet its

nutritional needs while its population comprises only 25

percent of the total. The main problem in the region is high

population growth, which puts pressure on food supplies. 

In addition to inadequate food availability, skewed distribution of purchasing power amplifies the nutritional problem

in the region. The number of people who cannot meet their

nutritional requirements is projected to increase from 303

million in the base year to 526 million by 2007. This means

the region, projected to account for 25 percent of the population of the study countries, will have about 44 percent of

the undernourished people.

Low-income Asian countries, with the second largest food

gap, have made significant gains in increasing food availability over the past three decades. Most Asian countries

may be able to close their food gaps by increasing imports.

The region’s impressive gains, however, mask food problems in large segments of the population, where purchasing

power is insufficient. Although the number of people who

cannot meet their nutritional requirements is projected to

decline 25 percent over the next decade, the region is projected to account for about half of the undernourished people in the study countries.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the most difficult dimension of food security is the distribution of food within each

country. The number of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirements is projected to increase 55 percent between the

base period and 2007. Highly skewed distribution of income

limits purchasing power and access to food for low-income

households which, in turn, intensifies food security problems.

North Africa is the only region with adequate resources to

meet its nutritional needs. However, frequent droughts often

affect each country’s economic growth and welfare. The

current level of food consumption is among the highest in

the world and is projected to increase in all countries except

Egypt. Political instability would be the only threat to food

security in the region and could cause serious problems in a

country such as Algeria.

Food consumption in the New Independent States (formerly

referred to as the former Soviet Union) is projected to

increase because of economic recovery, improved export

performance, and higher food production. Only the war-torn

economy of Tajikistan will likely remain vulnerable to food

insecurity and is projected to have a significant food gap on

a consistent basis.

The second part of Food Security Assessment consists of

four research papers that discuss topics related to food security. The topics include the institution of outward-oriented

policies to achieve efficiency in resource allocation, regional

policy initiatives in Southern Africa, resource use and implications on the environment, and factors to reduce income

inequality. Statistical tables for each of the countries included in the model are also provided.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 3

Summary
Global Food Supply

The world’s resources are adequate to produce enough food

for its population for at least the next few decades. Global

production capacity is important for many developing countries because of their growing dependence on food imports.

Even in low-income countries where foreign exchange is

limited, grain import dependency increased from 8 percent

of consumption in 1980 to 12 percent in 1996. In North

African countries, imports contribute as much as 50 percent

of food consumption and have improved the nutritional status of the region.

Since 1995, global food security has become a high profile

issue because of concerns stemming from a spike in grain

prices in 1995 and a decline in world grain stocks. The

trends in policies of major agricultural producers are toward

market orientation and greater awareness of environmental

concerns. The expected implications of these trends together

with strengthening economic growth in many developing

countries are lower stockholding, primarily in the United

States, and a slowdown in the long-term decline in real commodity prices. Some analysts are also concerned with the

potential for increased price variability. Food import-dependent developing countries view the strengthened food import

prices and the possibility of reduced food aid availability as

a major threat to their food security. Participants at the

World Food Summit in November 1996 pledged “to reduce

the number of undernourished people to half their present

level no later than 2015.”

To evaluate the future food security situation of low-income

developing countries, this report focuses on 66 countries

that have been or are potential food aid recipients. Food

availability is projected through the next decade (see box 1).

Since aggregate measures do not include food consumption

problems within a country, an attempt was made to use a

consumption-income relationship (based on projected food

availability) to estimate food consumption by different

income groups. (It should be noted that consumption distribution results are a rough estimate of reality because of the

lack of data.) 

Food Insecurity Would Remain a Problem...

Although food supplies are projected to increase faster than

population growth in higher income developing countries,

many lower income countries remain vulnerable to food

insecurity. A country will be faced with growing food insecurity when food supplies do not keep pace with population

growth. Many factors adversely affect a country’s food security position, including: low and variable food production,

high population growth, low income and skewed income

distribution, and limited foreign exchange to import food.

Performance of these factors, in turn, depends on the natural

resource endowment of a country, use of technology, domestic policies, employment, export earnings, import prices,

political stability, and the state of the global economy. 

The projected food gaps to maintain per capita consumption

at the base level (1994-96) and to meet minimum nutritional

requirements showed growing needs at the aggregate level

(food is measured as the sum of grains and root crops converted to grain equivalent) (see table 1 and figure 1). The

additional food needed to maintain per capita consumption

is estimated at 8.5 million tons for 1997, growing to 18 million tons by 2007— more than a twofold increase. Fortythree countries cannot maintain consumption by 2007. The

food needed to provide minimum per capita caloric requirements is 15 million tons in 1997, increasing to 24 million

tons by 2007. This is significantly larger than the food gap

to maintain current consumption, but the nutritional gap

increases at a slower rate. By 2007, 39 countries are projected to be unable to meet their nutritional requirement. Some

of the study countries are projected to be able to meet nutritional consumption targets, but their domestic supplies (production plus commercial imports) would fall short of maintaining base consumption levels. In these cases, even if per

capita consumption were to fall, their diets would most likely remain nutritionally adequate due to their historically

high consumption levels. Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan,

Uganda, and Cote d’Ivoire are among them. Egypt, for

example, is one of the largest per capita grain consumers in

the world. With market liberalization and reductions in consumer subsidies, consumption is projected to decline in this

country, but would remain higher than the minimum nutritional requirement.

When the total amount of the projected food availability is

allocated among different income groups in each country,

the results show a slight increase in the number of people

who cannot meet their nutritional requirement—from 1.1

billion in the base year to 1.2 billion by 2007. Given the

high aggregate growth of needs to meet nutritional require4 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Global Food Security: Overview 

The food security position of many developing countries is expected to remain precarious unless special attention is focused on the low-income households in the economic

growth process. For the resource-poor countries, many in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also

those countries such as Haiti and Bangladesh, where poverty and agricultural resource

degradation are intensifying, the situation is projected to deteriorate. [Shahla Shapouri

and Stacey Rosen]
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 5

Table 1--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for 66 Countries

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate Population

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons --- Million

1988 334,437 45,475 33,549 10,263 352,225 1,952

1989 351,020 47,547 33,713 9,420 369,381 1,997

1990 350,408 49,282 30,312 10,136 373,006 2,041

1991 364,460 53,417 29,352 10,638 382,303 2,086

1992 368,012 56,627 42,870 10,189 396,520 2,130

1993 375,646 58,077 43,263 8,224 405,162 2,175

1994 386,961 58,152 47,559 7,682 408,089 2,220

1995 389,683 59,560 56,281 5,388 427,881 2,267

1996 408,845 59,732 55,896 5,140 441,871 2,314

Projections Food gap*

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 404,886 60,838 61,594 8,471 15,117 434,772 2,361

2002 450,702 65,784 65,964 12,891 19,752 478,609 2,606

2007 496,301 71,546 74,917 17,875 23,941 529,566 2,856

*SQ stands for status quo and describes the amount of grain and root crops needed to support 1994-96 levels per capita consumption

and NR stands for nutritional requirements and describes the amount needed to support minimum nutritional standards (see box 1).

1997

2007

0 5 10 15 20 25

1997

2007

0 5 10 15 20 25

Figure 1--Food Gaps:

Million tons grain equivalent

Nutritional Gap in 1997 and 2007

Million tons grain equivalent

SS-Africa

Latin America

NIS

Asia

North Africa

Gap to Maintain Consumption Levels in 1997 and 2007
ments, this implies that nutritional problems will intensify

(see table 2). In other words, according to these estimates,

the nutritional problems will not spread in terms of the number of people, but the problem will become more severe.

...Especially in Many African Countries

Regional comparisons of projections of food gaps by 2007

place Sub-Saharan Africa (37 countries) as the most vulnerable region with respect to food security. By 2007, this

region is projected to have about 50 percent of the total gap

(for 66 study countries) or—8.9 million tons—to maintain

consumption. The region is also expected to have 66 percent

of the total gap—or 15.7 million tons—to meet its nutritional needs. Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa’s population is

only 25 percent of the total of the study countries (see figures 2 and 3). The projected food needs to maintain consumption for the region as a whole are significantly larger

than current total food aid availability for all countries. The

main contributing factor to the food gap in Sub-Saharan

Africa is high population growth, which puts pressure on

food supplies. In fact, production growth is projected to be

greater in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions (2.4 percent per year compared with less than 2 percent in other

regions), but because of high population growth, there is a

declining per capita production trend. 

Another contributor to the food gap is the financial constraints that limit Sub-Saharan Africa’s food imports.

Commercial food imports grew 2.3 percent per year during

1980-96, or less than half the rate of other regions. The lack

of adequate foreign exchange to support food imports is the

reason for the region’s growing reliance on food aid. The

region’s share of global food aid receipts has increased during the last two decades. Food aid’s share of total food

imports ranged from 20 to 50 percent during 1980-96, but

there clearly has been an upward trend.

In addition to inadequate food availability, skewed distribution of purchasing power amplifies the nutritional problem

in the region as scarce food supplies end up being distributed very unevenly among populations. The number of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirement is projected to increase from 303 million in the base year to 526

million by 2007. This means that Sub-Saharan Africa, projected to account for 25 percent of the population of the

study countries, will have about 44 percent of the undernourished people. 

Low-income Asian countries, with the second largest food

gap, have made significant gains in increasing food availability over the past three decades. Most Asian countries

may be able to close their food gaps by increasing imports.

Import dependency has averaged less than 5 percent since

1990. Countries such as India and Pakistan have restricted

imports of food as part of their policy of food self-sufficiency,

but have the capacity to increase their imports. The region’s

impressive gains, however, mask food problems in large segments of the population, where purchasing power is insufficient. Although the number of people who cannot meet their

6 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Box 1

How Food Security Is Assessed

The goal of this report is to project food availability and

access in 66 lower income developing countries—37 in

Sub-Saharan Africa, 4 in North Africa, 11 in Latin

America and the Caribbean, 9 in Asia, and 5 in the NIS

(see appendix table 1 for a list of countries and appendix

2 for a detailed description of the methodology). The

period covered is 1997 (current), 2002 (5 years out), and

2007 (10 years out). Projections of food gaps for the

countries through 2007 are based on differences between

consumption targets and estimates of food availability,

which is domestic supplies (production plus commercial

imports) minus nonfood use. The estimated gaps are

used to evaluate food security of the countries. 

The food gaps are calculated using two consumption

targets: 1) maintaining base per capita consumption or

status quo (SQ), which is the amount of grain and root

crops needed to support 1994-96 levels per capita consumption, and 2) meeting nutritional requirements (NR),

which is the gap between available food and food needed to support minimum per capita nutritional standards

(for definitions of terms used see the Methodology in

appendix 2). Comparison of the two measures either for

countries, regions, or the aggregate, indicates the two

different aspects of food security: consumption stability

and meeting the nutritional standard. 

The aggregate food availability projections fail to take

into account food insecurity problems due to food distribution difficulties within a country. Although lack of

data is a major problem, an attempt was made in this

report to project food consumption by different

income groups based on income distribution data for

each country. The concept of the income-consumption

relationship was used to allocate the projected level of

food availability among different income groups. 

Finally, based on the projected population, the number

of people who cannot meet their nutritional requirements is projected. The reference to food includes

grains and root crops (converted to grain equivalent)

which, in most countries, account for as much as 80 percent of all calories consumed.

The common terms used in the reports are: domestic

food supply which is the sum of domestic production

and commercial imports, food availability which is food

supply minus non-food use such as feed and waste,

import dependency which is the ratio of food imports to

food supply, and food consumption which is equal to

food availability.
nutritional requirement is projected to decline by 25 percent

over the next decade, the region is projected to account for

half of the undernourished people in the study countries.

Latin America’s food import dependency is growing—

increasing from 30 percent in the early 1980’s to about 40

percent in 1995-96. This trend is expected to continue, and

while not alarming, the region’s food import dependency

may not be sustainable over the long term. Foreign

exchange earnings of the countries have improved significantly, but debt service payments continue to be burdensome, particularly in lower income countries such as Haiti,

Honduras, and Nicaragua, where the value of debt exceeded

the value of GNP in 1995. The more difficult dimension of

food security in the region is the distribution of food within

each country. The number of people who cannot meet their

nutritional requirement is projected to increase. Highly

skewed distribution of income limits purchasing power and

access to food for low-income households which, in turn,

intensifies food security problems.

North Africa is the only region with adequate resources to

meet its nutritional needs. However, frequent droughts often

affect this region’s economic performance. The current level

of food consumption is among the highest in the world and

is projected to increase in all countries except Egypt.

Political instability would be the only foreseeable threat to

the food security of the region and could cause serious problems in a country such as Algeria.

In the New Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet

Union, food consumption is projected to increase because of

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 7

Figure 2--Distribution of Population and Food Gaps

Population in 2007

64%

5% 1% 5%

25%

25%

6%

2%

23%

44%

29%

3%

2%

34% 66%

3% 3%

60%

1997--Status Quo Gap 2007--Status Quo Gap

1997--Nutritional Gap 2007--Nutritional Gap

8%

1% 3%

50%

38%

SS-Africa

Latin America

NIS

Asia

North Africa
economic recovery, improved export performance, and higher food production. Only the war-torn economy of Tajikistan

will likely remain vulnerable to food insecurity and is projected to have a significant food gap on a consistent basis. 

Food Aid Remains Vital to Many Countries 

Food aid, which was introduced because of high production

surpluses in donor countries, has become a crucial resource

for the poor countries and countries in need of emergency

support. The decline in grain stocks of major donors, such

as the United States, means that food aid is no longer a relatively “free good” since commodity aid must be purchased

from the open market. The United States and the European

Union (EU) have historically supplied about 75-85 percent

of the world’s grain food aid. However, with growing market liberalization in these countries, falling global stocks,

and shrinking food aid budgets of the major donor countries,

food aid availabilities have declined considerably. Food aid

shipments for 1996/97 are estimated at roughly 7.5-million

tons, the same as the previous year. Food aid donations have

not been this small since the mid-1970’s. The 7.5 million

tons, if not increased, will cover 42 percent of the needs to

maintain consumption and only 31 percent of the nutritional

gap by the year 2007.

This trend in donations is mirrored in the trend of receipts

by the low-income food-deficit countries. In 1992/93, food

aid donations to this group of countries were more than 10

million tons, or about 15 percent of their total grain imports.

In 1996/97, these donations are estimated to drop to 6.5 million tons, or 10.4 percent of their grain imports. This decline

implies that these countries, already facing severe financial

constraints, must allocate more of their foreign exchange to

food imports, thereby squeezing out imports of other essential goods.

8 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 2--Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirements

Region Year 1/ Income quintiles

Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest

North Africa Base 1.22 1.28 1.33 1.38 1.50

2007 1.24 1.31 1.36 1.41 1.53

Sub-S. Africa Base 0.74 0.82 0.88 0.94 1.08

2007 0.70 0.77 0.83 0.88 1.02

Asia Base 0.92 0.98 1.02 1.06 1.18

2007 0.94 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.20

Latin America Base 0.96 1.06 1.13 1.21 1.41

2007 0.93 1.03 1.10 1.17 1.36

NIS 2/ Base 0.91 0.99 1.04 1.09 1.20

2007 0.99 1.07 1.12 1.18 1.29

1/ 1994-1996 average.

2/ Based on average regional income distribution.

Figure 3--Consumption Distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest

Income quintile

kg per capita

Base 2007 Nutritional Requirement

Only the highest 

income quintile is 

projected to meet 

nutritional 

requirements.
As food aid donations have been declining, the type of food

aid being supplied has also changed. Early on, most food

aid was program food aid, which is non-targeted food assistance. This type of aid is provided on a bilateral basis to

support recipient governments’ budgets or reduce balance of

payments deficits. More recently, donors have moved

toward relief and project aid, which is targeted to specific

groups of nutritionally vulnerable people. This trend toward

a more humanitarian approach to food aid is clearly evident

in the appropriations for the U.S. Public Law (PL) 480 program. PL 480’s Title I program provides government-togovernment sales of agricultural commodities to developing

countries under long term credit arrangements. This program was cut roughly 25 percent between fiscal years

(FY)1995 and 1998. Conversely, funding for Title II, the

program under which the United States delivers emergency

food and World Food Program shipments, has remained relatively stable. FY 1998 funding for Title II, $837 million, is

roughly three and a half times larger than Title I. 

Food Security of Lower Income Countries:

Opportunities and Obstacles 

Global market liberalization of agriculture should increase

market access for exports from food importing countries and

generally enhance market efficiency. Clearly, the trade gains

will vary by country. Larger countries with diversified

exports are in a better position to benefit than the small

countries who are dependent on a few export commodities.

Domestic policies of the countries should play a crucial role

in increasing participation in the international market. The

paper entitled “World Food Insecurity: A Policy Dilemma”

in the Special Articles section argues that outward-oriented

policies that allow an economy to be open to world goods

and capital markets will achieve efficiency in allocation of

resources and could improve global food security. Market

liberalization, however, can confront countries with new

challenges. Given that many countries are reducing the role

of government in the agricultural sector, the management of

risk resulting from production shortfalls and import price

hikes will become essential to ensuring food security.

Regional policy initiative proposals (as opposed to national

level proposals) can reduce the impact of supply variability

on food security of the countries. The next paper, entitled

“Can Regional Policy Initiatives Help Achieve Food

Security in Southern Africa?” examines the options that

could be considered in this area such as establishing a

regional strategic grain reserve, implementing an international food import insurance program, and establishing a

free trade zone. The costs and benefits of different options

will vary, but these regional policy initiatives will result in a

food security gain for small countries with limited resources

to cope with high food supply variability.

Even for the countries with adequate food supplies to meet

their consumption requirement, the future food security

challenge depends on the way resources are used and their

linkages to environment and sustainability. As the paper

“Resources, Sustainability, and Food Security” indicates, the

quality and quantity of natural and other resources should be

taken into account for improved analysis of sustainable

resource use and food security.

The resource-poor countries, however, are expected to

remain vulnerable to food insecurity. In these countries, the

problems arising from inadequate food supplies are exacerbated by inadequate purchasing power resulting from skewed

income distribution. In countries such as Tanzania or

Ethiopia, large segments of the population are undernourished. In these countries, reducing income inequality in addition to adopting policies to increase income growth, can

reduce food insecurity. With increases in income, lower

income groups tend to increase their food consumption more

than high income groups. Even in countries with adequate

aggregate food supplies, skewed income distribution limits

access of low income groups to sufficient amounts of food.

For example, if available food were distributed equally in the

countries of India, Pakistan, the Dominican Republic, El

Salvador, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, all residents

would have been able to meet their nutritional requirement.

The last paper on “Income Distribution and Food Security”

examines the impact of factors that can reduce income

inequality and improve food security of the countries. Level

of income, increased agricultural investment, investment in

education to reduce fertility rates, and political freedom are

found to be important contributing factors to reductions in

income inequality.

To summarize, food insecurity among many countries is

expected to continue unless special attention is focused on

low-income households in the economic growth process. A

decline in per capita food consumption is projected for most

Sub-Saharan African countries, as well as some in Latin

America and Asia. If this trend continues, the pledge of the

participants in the World Food Summit cannot be met. For

Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, accepting a decline in per

capita consumption from already low levels could have

severe nutritional consequences. For the resource-poor countries, many in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also countries such as

Haiti and Bangladesh, where poverty and agricultural

resource degradation are growing, the situation is expected

to deteriorate. To reverse this trend, both internal and external political and policy commitments are required.

Historically, increased investment and policy adjustment

have increased purchasing power and food security of many

developing countries. There is no reason to believe that the

historical achievements cannot be repeated in the future. 

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 9
The region’s grain production dropped 33 percent in 1997

due to a severe drought in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia.

Despite this shortfall, all countries in the region—with the

exception of Morocco—will be able to maintain base per

capita consumption levels with domestic supplies (production plus commercial imports). Morocco’s food gap for 1997

is estimated at nearly 2 million tons. For the longer term,

only Egypt shows a food gap near 600,000 tons in 2007.

The region relies on imports for about 50 percent of its grain

consumption needs, a figure likely to become larger as population and incomes rise and as the region becomes more

urbanized. North Africa’s reliance on food imports may further increase as the region’s land and water resources are

limited and future production increases will have to come

primarily from increased input use and higher yields.

The region has frequent droughts, four in the last 7

years — Not only have these droughts caused wide fluctuations in production (18.5 million tons of grain in 1988 and

31.6 million in 1996), they have had major impacts on these

countries’ economic performance. As for the impact on local

economies, the 1995 drought in Morocco caused a 7.6-percent drop in real GDP, a substantial widening of the fiscal

deficit, and declining foreign exchange reserves. Conversely,

the record agricultural output in 1996 generated GDP

growth of nearly 12 percent, recovery in foreign exchange

reserves, and a decline in inflation.

Income distribution is not a major threat to food security

in the region — Income distribution in the region is less

skewed than in others (see tables 4, 6, and 10). The region has

the highest per capita consumption of grains in the world. In

each country, base (1994-96) grain consumption far exceeds

the nutritional requirement, even in the low-income groups.

Egypt, with the lowest per capita income and more than half

of the region’s population, is the only country projected to be

unable to maintain current consumption levels by 2007.

Egypt is dependent on imports for about two-fifths of its

grain requirements. Dependency on imports to meet wheat

requirements is even higher at 55 percent. Between 1988

and 1996, government programs raised procurement prices

to stimulate production, and grain self-sufficiency rose from

53 to 62 percent. In the long run, however, total area planted

to wheat is not expected to increase significantly due to the

limited land and therefore, assuming no major change in

technology, the country’s import dependency will increase.

While Egypt’s current foreign exchange position is sufficient

to cover its food imports, and exports are projected to grow

strongly, foreign capital flows are less certain. In 1995, such

flows comprised 33 percent of the import budget. Egypt’s

ability to import is strongly linked to tourist earnings, oil

exports, worker remittances, and Suez Canal rents.

Unlike Egypt, where all crops are produced on irrigated

land, Morocco and Tunisia are faced with high production

variability, which continues to threaten the food security of

the lower income groups who are highly dependent on agriculture for both income and food. Moroccan grain output

continues to depend heavily on rainfall. However, even with

plentiful rainfall, wheat imports will be essential to meet

increasing demand. Most grain producers are traditional

farmers, with fields of less than 5 hectares. The annual variability in their production increases their vulnerability to

food insecurity. While the private sector—thanks to trade

liberalization—is playing an increasingly important role in

the wheat import market, the government is still involved in

the marketing and pricing of wheat, a staple in the diet, and

continues to subsidize wheat flour at the retail level.

Although the government pursues its stringent policy on

budget deficit control, this subsidy is unlikely to be phased

out in the near future because of social concerns. 

Tunisia has phased out consumer and input subsidies on a

wide range of items, most recently fertilizers and animal

feed. Consumer subsidies remain only on certain basic food

staples, such as cereals, edible oils, sugar, and milk. Efforts

have been made to improve the targeting of subsidies by

limiting them to products that are predominantly consumed

by the poor. The government has pursued two principal

goals in its food subsidy system: 1) to gradually reduce food

subsidies and allow prices to more fully reflect market values, and 2) to ensure that food subsidies help only the most

needy. As a result, the share of people living at the poverty

level, with incomes of less than a dollar per day, averaged

less than 4 percent over the last decade.

Algeria’s future food security depends on political as well as

economic factors. The country’s economy grew at 4.6 percent in 1996, or 2.4 percent per capita. This followed 10

years of declining per capita incomes as the economy was

adversely affected by weaker oil prices. Continued civil

strife, now in its fifth year, portends a poor economic growth

outlook. Algeria suffers from high unemployment, estimated

at 28 percent, a decline in industrial output, and reduced foreign investment outside of the oil sector due to civil strife. In

1997, a devastating drought reduced grain yields 60 percent

from last year. The resulting poor harvest signifies not only

that farmers will earn far less income than they did last year,

but also that political tension could escalate. 

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 10

North Africa

Frequent droughts affect this region’s economic performance but food security is usually not endangered. Food consumption is projected to increase in all countries except

Egypt unless commercial imports grow enough to avoid a decline. [Michael Kurtzig]
11 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 3--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for North Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 18,478 1,019 14,743 2,118 20,679

1989 19,908 984 16,844 1,993 23,598

1990 21,261 984 13,277 2,604 21,234

1991 26,890 1,130 13,219 1,345 23,657

1992 20,765 998 15,013 831 22,712

1993 19,082 981 16,731 418 23,474

1994 24,680 993 19,073 239 25,775

1995 19,207 1,201 19,656 249 30,817

1996 31,599 1,002 19,946 204 32,129

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 21,199 1,077 23,359 1,976 0 30,269

2002 25,975 1,109 24,399 566 0 34,254

2007 27,447 1,142 28,085 606 0 38,084

Table 4--North Africa: Income Distribution

 in 1995

Share of income owned by

poorest 10% richest 10%

Algeria 2.8 31.5

Egypt 3.9 26.7

Morocco 2.8 30.5

Tunisia 2.3 30.7

Source: World Development Report 1997

North Africa: 

121.4 million people

Drought again devastates grain 

output in Algeria, Morocco, and 

Tunisia, but foreign exchange is 

sufficient for commercial grain 

imports to fill the gap. 

Regional grain imports in 1997 

are almost 50 percent higher than 

10 years ago.

Regional grain importdependency is increasing as land 

and water resources are limited 

and populations' incomes are 

rising.

Figure 4--North Africa: Grain Area and Yields

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1990

91929394959697

Million hectares

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Kg/Hectare

Yields

Area

Figure 5--North Africa: Food Supply Sources

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1997 2002 2007

Million metric tons

40

45

50

55

60

Percent

Production Imports Self-sufficiency ratio
Sub-Saharan Africa’s food security position is highly vulnerable due to large variations in domestic food production,

high population growth rates, and limited purchasing power

of large segments of populations. This article examines factors affecting long-term food security and reviews results of

the model for 37 Sub-Saharan countries, including projections of food gaps—to maintain per capita consumption and

meet nutritional requirements—and distribution of food by

income group.

Projections of per capita consumption are a direct reflection

of the trends in domestic supply—production and commercial imports—and population growth. In the absence of food

aid, per capita consumption is projected to decline an average of 0.4 percent per year throughout the projection period.

The decline is steepest in Central Africa, at more than 0.6

percent, driven by trends in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (formerly Zaire). The smallest decline is expected to

be in East Africa. Caloric intake in Sub-Saharan Africa is

currently the lowest in the world and any decline from this

already low level can have severe implications for the health

of the populations of these countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa’s nutritional food gap is projected to be

larger than the region’s food gap to maintain consumption

through the next decade (2007). The base (1994-96) consumption levels of these countries, at the aggregate level, are

far below minimum nutritional requirements, and a much

sharper increase in domestic supplies (from projected levels)

is needed—either from production, commercial imports, or

food aid imports—to improve the well-being of the populations. The countries where the nutritional gap far exceeds

the gap to maintain consumption are Congo, Burundi,

Ethiopia, Somalia, Zambia, and Chad.

No short-term food crisis is foreseen — Sub-Saharan

Africa’s gap between available food supplies and the

amount needed to maintain base consumption levels is estimated at 3.7 million tons for 1997. This is about 60 percent

higher than 1996 actual food aid receipts of 2.3 million tons.

The gap is only 3 percent of regional production, but is

about 40 percent of estimated commercial imports.

Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda have the largest gaps.

Together, these three countries account for more than a third

of the region’s status quo food gap in 1997. Tanzania’s current gap is estimated at more than 500,000 tons. Grain output of less than 3.5 million tons in 1997 falls below the

recent average of roughly 3.8 million tons. A late start to the

rainy season and insufficient rains in some areas depressed

yields. Uganda depends on domestic production to supply

nearly all of the country’s food requirements. Therefore,

with production estimated to fall more than 20 percent in

1997, an unusually large gap of 462,000 tons is the result.

Rebel activity in the western and northern regions of the

country has contributed to insecurity and displaced farmers.

These problems and poorly distributed rainfall have adversely affected the 1997 harvest. In Rwanda, output for 1997 is

estimated considerably higher than last year as the return of

refugees resulted in increased area planted. However, output

remains below pre-strife levels of the early 1990’s. As a

result, the food gap to maintain consumption is estimated at

352,000 tons—very close to last year’s food aid receipts.

In the absence of food aid, a decline in per capita consumption is expected in the long term — The region’s gap

between domestic supplies and base consumption levels is

projected to rise to 5.5 million tons in 5 years (2002) and to

8.9 million tons in 10 years. The largest gaps by the end of

the projection period will be found in Nigeria, Rwanda,

Congo, Angola, and Madagascar. These five countries

account for more than a third of the region’s food gap to

maintain base consumption levels. The countries where the

food gap to maintain consumption is projected to be zero or

relatively small through the projection period are Central

African Republic, Ethiopia, Swaziland, Cote d’Ivoire,

Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau. 

Sub-Saharan Africa’s food gap to satisfy nutritional requirements is projected to rise from 9 million tons in 1997—two

and a half times the status quo gap—to 12.6 million tons in

2002 and 15.7 million tons in 2007. Ethiopia, Congo, and

Somalia account for more than 40 percent of the nutritional

gap in 2007.

Several countries have been selected for discussion based on

either the size of the food gaps, an unstable political environment, which is influencing the food situation, or a unique

transition situation that makes projections difficult. These

countries include Nigeria, Congo, Ethiopia, and Somalia. 

While Nigeria’s gap is large relative to other Sub-Saharan

countries, it is very small relative to available food supplies

in the country. In 2007, Nigeria’s projected gap of 863,000

tons measures less than 3 percent of production.

Historically, Nigeria, unlike most countries in the region,

has not been a food aid recipient as domestic supplies have

been adequate to meet consumption requirements. And,

while Nigeria’s gap to maintain consumption is the largest

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 12

Sub-Saharan Africa

In the absence of food aid, average per capita food consumption is projected to decline

throughout the next decade. To fill the gap, either annual production has to rise 10 percent more than projected rates or commercial imports have to double from projected

levels. [Stacey Rosen]
in the region, the country’s nutritional gap is projected to be

zero through 2007. This means that Nigeria’s domestic supplies will be adequate to meet minimum nutritional standards. Therefore, if meeting the nutritional target were used

as a measure of food security, Nigeria would be considered

one of the least vulnerable countries in the region.

For Congo, production growth needed to fill the gap to

maintain base consumption is projected at nearly 2.6 percent

per year—above the projected rate of 2 percent, but below

historical growth. While grain yields are expected to improve

upon historical rates, area growth is projected to slow considerably. Despite the increase projected for yields, they will

remain among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Production

growth required to fill the nutritional gap is projected at nearly 3.5 percent, well above the growth used in the model.

Obviously, the political situation in Congo and the policies

the new government puts in place will play a large part in

influencing trends. If stability is achieved and incentives are

provided to farmers, future growth may be able to match historical growth. If this scenario proves true, the gap to maintain base consumption levels would fall to zero and the nutritional gap would become negligible by 2007.

Ethiopia’s nutritional gap is projected to be the largest in

Sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that domestic supplies will fall

well short—3 million tons—of meeting minimum nutritional requirements by 2007. To fill the nutritional gap, production will have to grow roughly 5 percent per year through

the next decade. This is roughly one percentage point higher

than the projected growth rate, and much higher than the

historical growth rate of 2 percent. Filling the gap with commercial imports would require an unrealistic growth rate of

more than 17 percent per year. While the nutritional gap will

remain, the country is projected to make progress toward

meeting its basic food needs, however. Projected growth

rates in production and imports provide ample domestic

supplies to maintain base consumption levels in 2007. This

is a significant development for Ethiopia, which had relied

on food aid throughout the 1980’s and early 1990’s to meet

consumption requirements. The combined impact of people

returning to their farms following the end of the war in

1991, favorable weather, and the implementation of policies

designed to provide incentives to farmers stimulated output.

The higher growth rates achieved in the 1990’s are assumed

to continue into the projection period. Area is projected to

expand 2.3 percent per year through 2007, while yields are

assumed to rise almost 2 percent per year. Both of these

growth rates exceed those achieved during 1980-96. Import

growth is projected at a modest annual rate of 1 percent. 

Projections are difficult in Somalia given the precarious state

of the country. Grain output declined between 1980-96. For

the projection period, output is expected to rebound, although

slowly, with grain area increasing only 0.35 percent per year

and yields rising less than 1 percent. Root crop output is projected to increase 1.44 percent annually. This growth falls

short of meeting both consumption targets— maintaining

base levels and meeting nutritional requirements. The growth

needed to fill the nutritional gap—11 percent per year—

appears particularly elusive. Similarly, the growth in imports

needed to fill these gaps far exceeds projected growth of

under 1 percent per year.

Yield growth is the key to larger domestic food supplies in

the future — Historically, most increases in production in

Sub-Saharan Africa have stemmed from area expansion. The

continuation of this trend is unlikely as the region faces many

resource constraints to sustainable agricultural growth, despite

its vast and diverse land area. Much of Sub-Saharan Africa’s

land with crop production potential has poor quality soil. 

Long term regional production growth will depend on adoption of new technology to increase yields. Yields in most

Sub-Saharan countries fall well below world averages and

thus, there is room for improvement, provided there is investment in research and/or extension services. During 1980-96,

grain yields declined or increased marginally in about half of

the Sub-Saharan countries. For the projection period, yields

are expected to rise in all countries and, in most countries,

rise at rates exceeding historical levels under the assumption

of increased fertilizer use and adoption of new technologies.

Therefore, failure to move in this direction may translate into

larger gaps than outlined in this article.

Because production is the principal source of domestic supplies in this region, food gaps and/or deficits will widen if

production growth fails to keep pace with population

growth. For the region as a whole, population growth is projected to outstrip production growth by 0.4 percentage

points per year, on average, which is the primary factor

accounting for the widening food gaps.

Imports are not likely to increase significantly. Many SubSaharan countries face severe financial constraints following

years of excessive government expenditures and stagnating

export earnings that have limited import capacity. Fiscal

mismanagement led to large debt accumulation. For the

region on aggregate, external debt as a percent of GNP rose

from 31 to 81 percent during 1980-95. This debt as a percent of export earnings jumped from 92 to 242 percent during the same period. Exports of goods and services

increased only 2.5 percent per year during 1990-95. This is

quite low compared with other developing regions such as

Latin America, 7 percent, and South Asia, 12 percent.

Because of these developments, the region is highly dependent upon external financial assistance to support imports.

In 1995, external financial flows accounted for 30 percent of

the region’s imports. In some countries such as Mozambique

and Lesotho, 70 to 80 percent of the import bill is financed

by external assistance. Hence, commercial imports in most

countries in the region can expand only marginally and

therefore are projected to contribute little to domestic supplies. For the region, the ratio of commercial imports to production is projected at less than 13 percent in 1997 and 11

percent in 2007. The ratio of commercial imports to aggregate food availability is estimated at less than 10 percent

throughout the projection period.

13 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA
Unequal food distribution within countries intensified

food insecurity — The review of regional and country averages gives an incomplete picture of the food security situation. A review of income distribution provides an insight to

the extent of food shortfalls within a country. 

If consumption in all or nearly all income groups falls short

of the minimum nutritional requirements, a country’s food

security position would be considered at risk. Unfortunately,

this is the case for most countries in the region. At the

aggregate level (all income groups), consumption in 2007

falls below the nutritional target in 27 of the 37 countries in

the region. Consumption in 2007 is projected to equal 93

percent of the nutritional target. 

In Sub-Saharan Africa, on average, consumption in only the

top income group is projected to exceed minimum nutritional requirements in 2007 in the absence of food aid (see figure 6). Consumption in the lowest income group in 2007 is

projected at 74 percent of nutritional targets (see table 2 on

page 8). It is important to remember that this is a regional

average and therefore, individual countries may vary considerably. For example, in Sudan, Uganda, Swaziland, Benin,

Ghana, and Guinea-Bissau, consumption in all or nearly all

of the income groups in 2007 is expected to exceed the

nutritional target. On the other hand, in half of the countries

in the region, consumption in 2007 in all income groups

falls short of the nutritional target.

These shortfalls can also be used to estimate the number of

hungry people (defined as those who cannot meet minimum

nutritional requirements). In 2007, the population of SubSaharan Africa is projected to be nearly 800 million. The

results indicate that 526 million, or 66 percent, will be hungry. Not surprisingly, nearly a third of these people are in

the lowest income groups in these countries.

Given that food aid from donors has fallen during the

1990’s, these countries must find ways to raise their domestic supplies—principally domestic production—as a first

step toward improving the nutritional status of their people.

Some steps taken to achieve this goal have yielded positive

results. Some countries have begun to realize positive effects

of the liberalization policies undertaken in the mid-1980’s.

In addition, resolution of long-standing civil wars in

Ethiopia and Mozambique—which had disrupted agricultural activities for decades—has resulted in increased output.

To remove impediments to production and achieve longterm growth in agriculture that exceeds historical trends,

significant investment is needed to improve infrastructure

and extension services and encourage technology adoption.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 14

El Nino and its impact on Sub-Saharan Food Security

The El Nino weather phenomenon is expected to affect agriculture throughout the world. According to recent satellite data,

the El Nino of 1997/98 is likely to be the most severe ever. In Africa, the impact is expected to be greatest in the southern

region (and could significantly alter the results included in this assessment). During the 1991/92 El Nino event, a severe

drought hit the region, reducing grain output roughly 45 percent, placing millions of people at risk of starvation, increasing

demand for food imports, and straining the already weak economies of the region.

El Nino’s effects have already been felt strongly in Somalia (in East Africa). Heavy rains since mid-October led to flooding, deaths, destruction of infrastructure, displacement of people, and crop losses. Food prices have increased significantly

in the affected areas. In response to the disaster, UN relief organizations air-dropped food. 

The worst effects of El Nino are expected to be felt in early 1998, a critical growing stage for the coarse grain crop in

southern Africa. Corn is a staple crop in this region. A sharp drop in grain output will generate strong demand for imports.

During the 1991/92 drought, commercial grain imports more than doubled while food aid imports tripled from normal levels. Such an increase in demand may spur increased grain prices in 1998 as world coarse grain stocks are very low—about

13 percent below their 1991/92 level.

A positive note for the region is the large exportable surplus in South Africa. Because of a good 1997 harvest, the country has

a surplus estimated at roughly 1 million tons. Due to market liberalization, private traders are now permitted to export any

amount they desire. Therefore, South Africa may be in a position to supply some neighboring countries that have shortfalls.

Reforms in most countries in the region have liberalized transport sectors, which contributed to improved transport channels. Grain marketing boards have been privatized in many countries and international grain trading companies play a larger role than in the past. The marketing boards and trading companies should facilitate the flow of food within and between

countries that is expected to increase as demand for imports grows.

Due to the advanced warning of the onset of this El Nino, many countries in the region have established plans of action.

For example, in Zambia the government and private companies have mounted well-organized information campaigns that

include brochures, televised discussions, and radio programs that deal with ways to cope with drought. In Zimbabwe, the

Grain Marketing Board has set up strategic grain reserves to cover 5 months of consumption and has set up a cash reserve

to allow for imports of 3 months of consumption.
15 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 5--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 52,387 27,720 5,040 3,157 69,261

1989 49,376 29,385 3,922 3,351 69,733

1990 51,790 31,697 4,524 3,586 75,783

1991 57,850 35,384 5,071 4,756 82,098

1992 55,674 37,482 8,065 5,687 83,747

1993 59,449 38,833 8,146 3,485 88,459

1994 62,773 38,830 7,865 3,040 89,657

1995 62,026 39,586 7,140 2,091 87,040

1996 64,409 40,313 8,398 2,254 93,302

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 66,305 41,004 8,568 3,677 9,009 92,264

2002 77,503 44,897 9,007 5,506 12,625 102,927

2007 88,581 49,549 9,826 8,884 15,712 116,017

Table 6--Sub-Saharan Africa: Income 

 Distribution in 1995

Share of income owned by

poorest 10% richest 10%

Guinea-

 Bissau 0.5 42.2

Kenya 1.2 47.7

Nigeria 1.3 31.3

Rwanda 4.2 24.2

Senegal 1.4 42.8

Tanzania 2.9 30.2

Uganda 3.0 33.4

Zambia 1.5 31.3

Zimbabwe 1.8 46.9

Source: World Development Report 1997

Sub-Saharan Africa

568 million people in 1997.

The gap between available food 

supplies and the amount of food 

needed to meet nutritional targets 

jumps 74 percent during 1997-2007.

Twenty-six of the 37 countries face 

gaps to maintain consumption and 

meet nutritional targets.

While Sub-Saharan Africa will have 

only 25 percent of the population of 

the study countries, the region is 

projected to account for 66 percent of 

the total nutritional gap.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region 

where the nutritional situation has 

deteriorated in the last three decades 

and this trend is expected to continue 

during the next decade.

Figure 6--Consumption Distribution by 

Income Group in Sub-Saharan Africa

0

50

100

150

200

Lowest 20% 3rd Highest 20%

kg per capita

114

126 135 145

168

Nutritional target: 164

Base target: 162

Figure 7--Sub-Saharan Africa: Grain and Root 

Supply vs Requirement

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Supply Requirement
This article reports the results of the food security model for

nine historically food aid receiving countries in Asia:

Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam in Southeast Asia;

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri

Lanka in South Asia. It also examines factors influencing

estimated food gaps over the next decade.

Asia’s per capita food availability has increased considerably since the advent of the Green Revolution. Grain production grew over 2 percent a year in six of the nine countries included in the study. As a result, most countries in the

region sustained average annual growth rates in per capita

food consumption (as measured by consumption of grains

and root crops) of over 1 percent during 1980-96. Despite

economic growth and food production gains, South and East

Asia are still home to over half a billion chronically undernourished people — accounting for 63 percent of the total

(66 country studies). Though projections indicate that the

proportion of the population that is undernourished will be

decreasing, the absolute number will remain high because of

the heavy concentration of the population in this region. 

Per capita food availability in the region is projected to stagnate over the next decade (increasing by less than a percent

over the next decade), reflecting slower production growth

than the historical trend. However, given the region’s relatively fast consumption gains in the last three decades, the

projected stagnation in per capita consumption, while disconcerting, does not pose an impending crisis. The largest

increase in per capita availability is projected to occur in

India, 7 percent, while the largest decline is projected to

occur in Pakistan at 7.3 percent followed closely by

Afghanistan at 7.1 percent. Nepal is also forecast to experience a large decline.

In the short run, the region is facing a serious food problem

in North Korea where floods have destroyed the country’s

crops the last 2 years. While North Korea is not covered in

the food security model of this report, information gathered

about the country indicates that the situation has become

chronic and life threatening. International food assistance is

badly needed to avoid widespread famine and death due to

starvation (see box 2). 

For the region as a whole, the gap between available food

supplies and the amount needed to maintain consumption is

projected to be 2.1 million tons in 1997. The region’s total

food gap to maintain consumption is relatively small, less

than 1 percent of its domestic supply (commercial imports

and production). This suggests that the short-term shortfall

is not a major food security threat. Afghanistan, with a gap

of 0.9 million tons, will account for about 41 percent of the

shortfall. Bangladesh also has a large deficit, 0.5 million

tons. These two countries combined account for over 60 percent of the region’s projected deficit. India and Vietnam are

the only countries in the region estimated to be able to

maintain consumption from domestic supplies in 1997. 

The current gap between the amount of food needed to meet

nutritional requirements and domestic supplies is projected at

5.1 million tons in 1997, more than twice the amount needed

to maintain current consumption. Bangladesh accounts for

most of the gap (about 99 percent) in nutritional requirements, as the rest of the countries except Nepal and Sri

Lanka are able to meet their targets from domestic supplies.

The ability to meet nutritional targets from domestic supplies

reflects the region’s relatively high level of consumption. 

Asia’s long run food deficit is expected to increase, as the

gap between domestic supplies (production plus commercial

imports) and current consumption is projected to triple

between 1997 and 2007. This trend holds for most countries

in the region except India, which in the short and the long

run is able to maintain consumption from domestic supplies.

This trend is not alarming, however, because the food gap to

maintain consumption will be a small proportion of domestic

supply over the projection period (1.7 percent). Of the countries studied here, Afghanistan and Bangladesh will remain

vulnerable to food insecurity. Per capita consumption in

these two countries is projected to decline and their food gap

to maintain current consumption is 2.6 million tons in

2007—about 40 percent of the region’s needs. Meanwhile,

per capita consumption in Pakistan is projected to decrease

sharply as the deficit to maintain consumption increases from

50,000 tons in 1997 to 2.2 million tons by 2007. 

The gap between available supply and amounts needed to

meet nutritional requirements is also projected to continue

to increase through 2007, although by a considerably smaller amount. Most countries in the region, despite their inability to maintain consumption levels, will be able to meet

nutritional requirements from domestic supplies. The exceptions are Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan,

with Bangladesh accounting for 90 percent of the region’s

nutritional needs in 2007.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 16

Asia

Asia has made considerable progress in improving food security. The impressive gains

of the region’s low-income countries, however, mask food problems in large segments

of the population. For these groups, undernutrition is primarily the result of insufficient

purchasing power to obtain nutritionally adequate diets. However, the incidence of

undernutrition will decline over the next decade. [May Mercado Peters] 
Can food gaps be eliminated through increased production? — One way to eliminate the projected food gap in

Asia by the end of the projection period is to increase

domestic food production. Most countries would be able to

eliminate the consumption deficit if they could maintain the

same rate of growth in grain production over the projection

period that they experienced during 1980-1996. For example, the Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, Philippines,

and Vietnam could maintain consumption if grain output

during the projection period would grow at the same rate as

during the preceding historical period. In India, if grain production grew at a rate of 2.05 percent per year throughout

the projection period—slightly less than its 2.1 percent

growth between 1980 and 1996—it would be able to maintain consumption from domestic supplies. The largest

exception to this is Pakistan, which would have to increase

its production 2.5 percent per year, nearly one percentage

point more than during 1980-1996, to eliminate its food gap

by the end of the projection period. Historical experience

suggests this is not likely.

The main long-term regional concern is the sustainability of

domestic production. The region as a whole is densely populated and continued population growth will put pressure on

available cropland as urban areas expand. Expansion of cultivated land has stagnated, increasing by less than 1 percent

since 1989. In South Asia, area under cultivation has actually declined. As a result, most of the increase in crop production will have to come through increased yields. Grain

yields have grown substantially in the region in the past, primarily due to increased irrigation and widespread adoption

of improved varieties made available through the Green

Revolution. However, yield growth has been slowing recently, raising concerns that growth in grain production will not

be able to be sustained at the previous rate. Environmental

degradation caused by increased urbanization and industrialization will also make it difficult to maintain current rates of

growth in crop yields. For the region to increase food availability, it will need to either accelerate its growth in exports

to finance food imports or increase investment in its agricultural sector to increase agricultural production.

The possible exceptions to this are in Sri Lanka,

Afghanistan, and Nepal. Nepal has yet to fully exploit all of

its potential for expanding production through adoption of

Green Revolution technologies. It has the lowest percentage

of potentially irrigable land in irrigation and the lowest

level of fertilizer use in the region. In Afghanistan and Sri

Lanka, civil strife and political instability have led to disruptions in input supplies and cultivation, causing production to stagnate.

Can food gaps be eliminated through commercial

imports? — There is a considerable degree of diversity

among countries in terms of relying on food imports to

increase consumption within the region. In Nepal, the food

gap is over 150 percent larger than projected commercial

imports, making it unlikely that Nepal will be able to maintain consumption without food aid. Other countries where

the food deficit is high relative to commercial imports are

Afghanistan, 47 percent of imports, and Bangladesh, 33 percent of imports. Indonesia should be able to eliminate its

deficit, which represents less than 1 percent of its projected

commercial imports.

Increasing commercial imports to reduce food gaps would

require most countries to more than double their food

imports by 2007. It should be noted, however, that of the

five regions studied here, Asia’s projected food import

dependency is the lowest, 6 percent compared to about 50

percent in North Africa in 2007. Nevertheless, for some

countries increases in imports could create a significant budget pressure. In Pakistan, where per capita food availability

is projected to decline 0.6 percent per year, growth in commercial imports would have to be 3.5 percentage points

greater than projected. This would increase the country’s

import dependency to 12 percent by 2007 from 8 percent in

1996. Nepal would have to increase the growth of its food

imports the most, an additional 14 percentage points.

In general, most countries in the region have restricted food

imports as part of their policy of food self-sufficiency. As a

result, they are not traditional food importers, but many, such

as India and Pakistan, have the capacity to do so because the

share of food imports in these countries’ budgets is low.

Whether these countries will be able to increase commercial

imports will depend on whether a change in policy occurs. 

Undernutrition continues in low-income groups — The

food security situation in the region is generally favorable in

that all countries in the region, except Bangladesh, Nepal,

Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka, will be able to maintain consumption above levels needed to meet nutritional targets.

However, the situation facing many households and specific

segments of the population in the region is not as favorable.

If available food supplies were distributed evenly, nearly all

households would be able to maintain nutritionally adequate

diets. However, income is not distributed evenly. The poorest 20 percent of the region’s population have control over

only 8 percent of total income, while the richest 20 percent

account for nearly 43 percent of income.

1

The inequality of income distribution is important to the

extent that it affects the amount of resources people have

available to obtain nutritionally adequate diets. To get a better understanding of the extent of the undernutrition problem in the region, the gap between per capita food consumption and nutritional requirements was estimated by income

group for each country. The estimates indicate that by 2007,

per capita food consumption of the poorest 20 percent of the

population will fall below recommended nutritional standards in all countries except Indonesia. Individuals in the

next income quintile are only slightly better off, with food

consumption still below nutritional requirements in a majority of countries. This shows that even in countries where

17 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

1It should be noted that this income distribution is not as skewed as that in

many Sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries.
food availability is not a problem, 20 to 40 percent of the

population will lack access to nutritionally adequate diets.

Because of the stagnation in per capita food availability and

continued inequality in the distribution of incomes throughout the projection period, household access to food will continue to be a significant problem. By 2007, 570 million people, nearly 30 percent of the region’s population, will still

not be able to meet nutritional requirements. The undernutrition problem at the end of the projection period will be

greatest in India and Bangladesh, which together could have

more than 350 million undernourished people, or nearly 

three-quarters of the people in the region who are unable to

obtain nutritionally adequate diets.

Although pegged at 570 million people in 2007, the incidence of undernutrition in Asia will decline from 760 million in 1997. In contrast, the number of people undernourished in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase from

303 million to 526 million in 2007. Nonetheless, the

absolute number of undernourished people in low-income

Asia will remain higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa at the

end of the projection period. 

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 18

Box 2

North Korea’s Deteriorating Food Situation

The food security situation is grave throughout North

Korea. The country’s cereal deficit for the current marketing year is estimated by the Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations to be about 1.2 million tons. The state-run food distribution system (known

as PDS) is unable to supply minimum amounts of grain

to all of North Korea’s population, forcing millions to

seek other food sources and risk malnutrition. Estimates

of what is being distributed through PDS since the beginning of 1997 range from 100-200 grams per person, substantially less than the recommended daily cereal requirement of about 450 grams. According to a government

estimate, half of the country’s 10 food distribution areas

have ceased operation since June 1997. World Vision

International estimates that about 5 million North

Koreans, especially children less than 5 years old and

adults older than 60 years, are facing possible starvation.

Political changes in the former USSR and in China during

the past decade caused a sharp reduction in North Korea’s

ability to import fuel and food, causing its food supply to

drop. Input supply has dropped sharply because the country’s manufacturing sector does not have enough fuel to

produce chemicals, farm machinery, and other inputs

needed for North Korea’s large-scale, chemical-intensive

agriculture. This situation was exacerbated in the past 2

years by flooding that wiped out some corn and rice fields

and also destroyed some farmers’ household grain stocks.

In 1997, a long summer drought has devastated the important corn crop. With very little grain stocks and a 1997

harvest that will be less than needed to keep the whole

population alive, North Korea will need substantial assistance from the international community in the form of

food aid to avoid disaster. 

The short-run food crisis is indicative of the underlying

problems in the country’s agricultural sector. Failed farming policies have led to stagnant and declining yields, and 

food production growth has lagged behind increases in

population (see figure 8). The lack of essential inputs will

continue to constrain food production. As a result, North

Korea will not only need immediate food aid and assistance to cope with its current food crisis, but also solutions to its chronic food problems so that future crisis can

be avoided. This means that in the medium to long term,

the country will need to address the results of years of

agricultural mismanagement as well as the economic

problems that have led to faltering production. However,

even more serious than North Korea’s faltering agricultural production is its inability to buy food in the international market. Purchasing food imports and the materials

needed for farm input supplies, require that North Korea

develop a trading economy that exports nonagricultural

goods for hard currency. To do this, North Korea will

have to reduce geopolitical animosities that now form a

barrier to its potential trade, restore its credit-worthiness

so that normal commercial transactions become possible,

and become more efficient in order to compete internationally. [May Mercado Peters and John Dyck]

Figure 8-- Grain Production and 

Total Imports, North Korea, 1980-97

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Years

Million tons

Production

Total imports
19 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 7--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Asia

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 249,043 14,093 9,965 3,378 249,107

1989 268,008 14,555 9,582 2,756 263,842

1990 263,185 14,080 8,505 2,522 263,438

1991 266,168 14,429 6,648 2,721 264,433

1992 277,257 15,248 10,942 1,859 272,891

1993 282,451 15,075 10,449 1,792 276,091

1994 285,906 15,011 11,790 1,877 275,204

1995 294,835 15,157 19,664 1,495 291,439

1996 298,494 15,231 17,055 1,328 297,862

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 302,931 15,477 18,180 2,115 5,144 296,635

2002 331,774 16,361 19,942 5,582 6,079 321,628

2007 363,683 17,296 22,847 6,742 6,874 353,730

 Table 8--Asia: Income Distribution

 in 1995

Share of income owned by

poorest 10% richest 10%

Bangladesh 4.1 23.7

India 3.7 28.4

Indonesia 3.9 25.6

Nepal 3.2 29.8

Pakistan 3.4 25.2

Philippines 2.8 32.1

Sri Lanka 3.8 25.2

Vietnam 3.5 29.0

Source: World Development Report 1997

Asia

1,815 million people

By 2007, Asia's population--64

percent of the total--is projected 

to account for 29 percent of the 

nutritional food deficit.

Amidst prosperity and growth in 

the region, some countries such 

as Bangladesh and Afghanistan, 

remain food insecure. Current 

trends indicate a growing number 

of countries unable to maintain 

their recent consumption level.

Growing population, rapid 

urbanization, and industrialization continue to put pressure on 

the region's fragile resource 

base.

1997 2002 2007

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Million metric tons

1997 2002 2007

Figure 9--Asia's Food Gap

Status quo Nutritional requirement

Figure 10--Asia: Grain Area and Yields

0

50

100

150

1990

91929394959697

1,000 Hectares

1.55

1.6

1.65

1.7

1.75

1.8

1.85

1.9

Kg/Hectare

Area Yields
The 11 countries covered in this article have the lowest per

capita income among Latin American and Caribbean countries. They are: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and

Nicaragua in Central America, the Dominican Republic,

Haiti, and Jamaica in the Caribbean, and Bolivia, Colombia,

Ecuador, and Peru in South America. Malnutrition and

hunger are prevalent in a number of these countries and, if

historical trends in food supply continue, average per capita

food consumption is projected to decline about 6 percent in

the next decade. The aggregate food gap to maintain per

capita consumption is projected to more than double for the

11 countries as a whole by the next decade. For 1997, the

food gap of 500,000 tons is about 4 percent of total regional

production and 5 percent of commercial imports. By 2007,

however, a gap of 1.4 million tons or 9 percent of production and 13 percent of commercial imports is projected.

The nutritional gap, 450,000 tons in 1997, is projected to

reach more than 800,000 tons by 2007. Haiti, the poorest

country in the Western Hemisphere, accounts for more than

one-third of the region’s 1997 nutritional gap, which is projected to widen and approach 300,000 tons by 2007.

Food production in the region is not keeping up with population growth. Latin America is a land-rich region, but good

quality arable area is nevertheless threatened by rapid urbanization and environmental hazards such as soil erosion,

salinity, and drainage, usually caused by poor cropping

practices and intensive use. Under these circumstances, if

per capita food availability is to be raised, long term increases in domestic supply will have to result from imports that

are financed by export earnings.

Import dependency will increase—Import dependency

(share of imports in total food supply) of the countries

increased from 30 percent in the early 1980’s to about 40

percent in 1995-96 and it is projected to continue to grow.

This import trend, however, may not be sustainable. Foreign

exchange earnings of the countries have improved significantly since 1990. In fact, with the exception of Haiti and

Honduras, the range of growth in export earnings of the

countries was from 4 to 12 percent annually, well above the

2.5 percent projected annual growth for food imports.

However, debt service payments continue to be burdensome,

particularly in Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Jamaica,

where the value of debt exceeded the value of their GNP in

1995. In Haiti, the trade deficit reached 70 percent of the

total value of imports and in Nicaragua the deficit is almost

50 percent. In 1995, almost half of Haiti’s earnings from

exports of goods and services had to be spent on debt service, while in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua this figure

was about one-third. To maintain per capita food consumption in the region, aggregate food imports will need to grow

3.3 percent per year in the next 10 years—almost 1 percentage point higher than projected.

Food security will worsen in lower income countries—

Five countries—Bolivia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and

Nicaragua, the lowest income countries of the 11 studied

here—face gaps in maintaining consumption and are projected to experience a steady worsening of their food security situation. For Bolivia to maintain its consumption over the next

decade, commercial imports have to triple. In Haiti, commercial imports would have to increase at an annual rate of 4 percent—almost 7 times its recent imports growth rate of 0.6

percent. Guatemala has been leading the group with import

growth of 3 percent, but 5 percent are necessary to fill the

food gap.

Within countries, food distribution remains a major

problem—The more difficult dimension of food security in

the region is the distribution of food within each country.

Highly skewed distribution of income limits purchasing

power and access to food for low-income households which,

in turn, intensifies food security problems. Compared with

other regions of the world, Latin American countries have

the highest income inequality and widespread poverty.

This extremely unequal income distribution translates into an

equally unequal distribution in access to food. In 1997, roughly 40 million people, or one-third of low-income Latin

America and the Caribbean, are estimated to be unable to

meet their nutritional requirements. Assuming no change in

income distribution it is projected that over the next 10 years

food insecurity will expand and threaten also middle income

households in the five lowest income countries (Bolivia,

Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and El Salvador. 

In the long term, external assistance is not likely to be available. As food aid to the region has steadily declined over the

last decade and is likely to continue to do so, further emphasis on increasing and stabilizing export earnings (for example

by diversifying exports) will help to reduce food insecurity

for a country as a whole. Food insecurity within a country

will have to be addressed by targeted assistance and policies

that benefit the income prospects of low-income households.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 20

Latin America and the Caribbean 

The total food gap to maintain per capita consumption for the region’s lower income

countries is projected to increase over the next decade. This could exacerbate the food

security of the low-income population who face inadequate purchasing power. The projections show an increase in the number of people who will not be able to meet their

nutritional requirement. [Birgit Meade]
21 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 9--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 10,181 2,643 3,802 1,611 13,178

1989 10,410 2,623 3,365 1,320 12,208

1990 10,102 2,521 4,005 1,423 12,551

1991 9,725 2,474 4,413 1,817 12,115

1992 10,505 2,372 5,609 1,335 12,776

1993 10,970 2,730 5,727 1,371 12,817

1994 10,579 2,817 7,560 1,002 13,584

1995 10,538 2,970 8,474 434 14,668

1996 10,685 2,902 9,233 294 14,500

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 10,674 2,941 9,301 502 446 14,285

2002 11,495 3,058 10,110 1,050 566 15,248

2007 12,344 3,177 11,336 1,440 827 16,660

Table 10--Latin America & Caribbean: 

 Income Distribution in 1995

Share of income owned by

poorest 10% richest 10%

Bolivia 2.3 31.7

Colombia 1.3 39.5

Dominican R 1.6 39.6

Ecuador 2.3 37.6

Guatemala 0.6 46.6

Honduras 1.5 41.9

Jamaica 2.4 31.9

Nicaragua 1.6 39.8

Peru 1.9 34.3

Source: World Development Report 1997

1997 2002 2007

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

Million tons

1997 2002 2007

Figure 11--Latin America's Food Gap

Status quo Nutritional requirement

Figure 12--Grain and Root Supply in 

Latin America and the Caribbean

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grain imports

Root production (grain equivalent)

Grain production

Latin America and the Caribbean

142 million people

The current El Nino phenomenon is 

expected to have a strong negative 

impact on the agricultural sector in a 

number of countries in the region.

A very unequal income distribution 

continues to be the major threat to 

food security for low-income 

households. 

Economic progress has not 

succeeded in significantly reducing 

the number of poor.

The number of people unable to 

maintain their consumption level by 

2007 is projected to exceed 60 

million.
The aggregate food gap of the five NIS republics

(Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and the Caucasus nations of Armenia,

Azerbaijan, and Georgia)2 is forecast at 200,000 tons in 1997.

The nutritional food gap is projected at 500,000 tons and is

mainly accounted for by Tajikistan. The nutritional gap may

be overstated because of the lack of reliable nutrition data,

overestimating the contribution of grain and root crops in the

diets of the countries. We assume that the composition of

diets will remain unchanged over time. Other sources of

nutrition, such as meat, dairy, fruits, and vegetables are very

important in the diet of NIS countries. In particular, Armenia

and Tajikistan, the two countries showing the largest nutritional gap for 1997, consume more fruits and vegetables per

capita than most NIS countries, including Russia.

Financial improvement supports food security—

Commercial import capacity of the five NIS countries is

expected to increase sharply to 2.2 million tons in 1997 due

to positive economic growth and rising exports, direct budget support by donor nations and international organizations

(such as the IMF and World Bank), and lower per unit costs

of importing grain. Only Armenia and Tajikistan are expected to have a significant food gap in 1997, as Kyrgyzstan

becomes self-sufficient in grain production and Azerbaijan

and Georgia are able to meet any deficit largely through

commercial imports.

Grain output for the five countries in this region is forecast to

rise 9 percent to 4 million tons in 1997, following a 20-percent rise the previous year. Farmers have reacted to higher

domestic grain prices and more attractive sales terms from a

growing private grain market by expanding area sown, especially to wheat. Better moisture conditions from higher winter snowfall in the Caucasus nations should raise yields. Root

production, less than 10 percent of grain output, is estimated

up 17 percent to 300,000 tons (grain equivalent) in 1997.

Long-term food security is projected to improve—The

Caucasus countries are likely to raise grain production moderately in the coming decade as area expands due to reduced

hostilities, and yields increase as fertilizer and pesticide use

rises. Total grain output in the region is projected to rise

about 8 percent to 4.3 million tons in 2007, assuming slow

progress on returning fallow fields to permanent cultivation

in Nagorny-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) and Abkhazia (Georgia).

More rapid return of these traditionally fertile lands could

contribute to steeper rises in grain output in the coming

decade than are forecast here. At the same time, increased

hard-currency export revenues, especially by Azerbaijan’s

growing oil exports, are projected to raise commercial grain

imports nearly 30 percent to 2.8 million tons in 2007.

In graphic illustration of the benefits of macroeconomic and

structural reform, Armenia and Georgia registered GDP

growth in 1996 of 6 and 11 percent, respectively, ranking

them at the top of NIS countries, ahead of even the radically-reforming Baltic nations. Both Caucasus nations are in

their fourth year of positive economic growth, while

Azerbaijan is in its second year of recovery. The food gap to

maintain base consumption levels for Azerbaijan, never a

large food aid recipient except for one particularly bad year

in 1994, is forecast at only 20,000 tons in 1997. Georgia, a

large food aid recipient for the past 5 years, is projected to

have a negligible food gap for 1997 due to larger harvests

and increased commercial import capacity. Armenia, still

suffering from the effects of economic sanctions by Turkey

and Azerbaijan due to political conflicts, is the only significant candidate for food aid among the Caucasus countries.

Its food gap is estimated at about 100,000 tons for 1997,

equivalent to about 45 percent of commercial imports and

just over 30 percent of production.

Economic growth in the three Caucasus nations is expected

to continue for at least 5 years, further boosting import

capacity and thus improving the food supply situation.

While population growth is forecast to accelerate from its

current slow rate, it will likely average only about 0.5 percent annually in the coming decade. Future food gaps of the

three Caucasus countries are expected to drop to negligible

levels by 2007, as Georgia benefits from an end to its civil

war, Armenia gains from a cessation of hostilities with

Azerbaijan and relaxation of the trade blockade by Turkey,

and Azerbaijan’s oil export earnings soar. Azerbaijan’s economy is benefiting from accelerating foreign investment,

mostly in its oil sector, which is likely to total 5-10 percent

of GDP annually in the next decade. While a renewed outbreak of violence in any of the Caucasus nations could raise

the need for future food aid, such a scenario is becoming

less likely as all three nations enter a period of economic

recovery and increased regional integration.

Two consecutive bumper harvests have made Kyrgyzstan

largely self-sufficient in food grains, eliminating the food

gap for 1997. The Kyrgyz economy grew more than 5 percent in 1996 and similar growth is expected for 1997.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 22

New Independent States (NIS)

Tajikistan’s war-torn economy will likely keep it as the only NIS country with a significant food gap on a consistent basis. In other countries in the region, food consumption

is projected to increase because of economic recovery, improved export performance,

and higher grain output. [Jay Mitchell]

2These five countries are vulnerable to food insecurity and have received

food aid in recent years.
23 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table 11--Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for New Independent States

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 4,348 -- -- -- --

1989 3,318 -- -- -- --

1990 4,070 -- -- -- --

1991 3,827 -- -- -- --

1992 3,811 528 3,241 479 4,394

1993 3,694 458 2,211 1,159 4,321

1994 3,023 501 1,271 1,524 3,869

1995 3,077 647 1,346 1,119 3,917

1996 3,658 284 1,264 1,061 4,077

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 3,989 338 2,187 201 519 4,343

2002 3,998 359 2,507 187 482 4,552

2007 4,293 381 2,824 204 529 5,075

Table 12--NIS: Economic (GDP) Growth

1996 1997-2002

Percent

Armenia 2.3 31.7

Azerbaijan 1.3 39.5

Georgia 1.6 39.6

Kyrgyzstan 2.3 37.6

Tajikistan 0.6 46.6

Source: Ecoplan

NIS

27 million people

The food gap is projected to 

decline to negligible levels for all 

NIS countries, except Tajikistan, 

as higher grain production and 

greater commercial import 

capacity easily meet domestic 

food needs.

Tajikistan's war-torn economy will 

be slow to recover, however, as 

modest increases in both grain 

output and commercial imports 

fail to keep pace with a rapidly 

expanding population in the 

coming decade.

Figure 13--Tajikistan's Share in Total NIS 

Food Deficit

0

50

100

150

200

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Tajikistan Other NIS

Figure 14--NIS(5) Grain Production and 

Imports

0

1

2

3

4

5

1992 93 94 95 96 97

Million tons

Food aid receipts Com. imports Grain prod.
Kyrgyz grain output is forecast to increase at about 1 percent annually in the coming decade, which exceeds the projected rate of population increase. This should keep

Kyrgyzstan largely self-sufficient in food grain supplies.

Tajikistan’s food supply situation is projected to remain

precarious—The only NIS country likely to consistently

have a food gap is Tajikistan. The country’s civil war, limited export earnings, and continued economic recession (GDP

fell more than 10 percent in 1996 for the fifth straight year)

have contributed to Tajikistan’s food supply problems. The

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) has identified

more than 10 percent of the population (700,000 persons) as

particularly vulnerable and in need of targeted humanitarian

assistance for 1997, including food aid. While domestic

policies promoting grain self-sufficiency have led to

increased wheat area at the expense of cotton, the ability of

Tajikistan to meet its food gap through increased production

is limited. Multiple factors, including lack of adequate irrigation, insufficient land rotation, lack of land privatization,

and low input use, will contribute to Tajikistan’s food aid 

dependency by keeping yields at barely 1 ton per hectare

over the next 10 years. Rapid population growth of nearly 2

percent annually is likely to contribute to widening gaps

between production and consumption in coming years, with

commercial imports unlikely to match this gap.

Tajikistan’s food gap to maintain base consumption levels is

projected to almost triple to 170,000 tons by 2007; nutritional needs are forecast to reach about 500,000 tons the same

year. While the absolute magnitude of future Tajik food gaps

should not pose a problem based on past food aid levels

(averaging nearly 200,000 tons over the past 2 years and

probably higher once unofficial aid from Russia is included), the key concern is targeting food aid for the most vulnerable population. The current government’s policies of

distributing food aid mainly to cities has left rural regions to

settle their own food supply situations despite a rising number of persons displaced by civil strife, orphans, and

invalids. Thus, future food aid might be more effective in

alleviating hunger if it is increasingly targeted at rural populations and away from the cities, where economic recovery

is likely to begin.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 24
Introduction

There are almost 1 billion people living in a state of food

insecurity, most of them living on less than $2 a day. A

small share of world GDP, less than 1 percent, would go a

long way towards removing this insecurity. Yet transfers of

food, income, or wealth do not appear to provide a permanent solution. Long-term solutions must come from inside

the food-insecure countries and result in increased productivity and income for the food insecure. 

To accomplish this, a fundamental restructuring of the

incentives to save and invest, as well as a reordering of priorities for public investments away from control of markets

toward overcoming inadequacies in physical and social

infrastructure must be undertaken. Given the radical transformation of thinking required on the part of the leadership

of these countries, it is hard to see how this transformation

can take place. That is the dilemma. The problem involving

a small share of world GDP is so difficult to solve because

the root of the problem is not resource availability, but the

approach to development of many officials in less developed

countries (LDC’s).

Public support for agriculture has been declining worldwide.

Public R&D expenditures, which were growing by 7 percent

a year in the 1970’s, have stagnated in the 1990’s. This, in

spite of the fact that it was public R&D expenditures that

caused the productivity growth and led to increased agricultural output over much of the past 25 years. While agricultural output grew more rapidly than population over the past

25 years, the “surplus” was highly precarious. Of the more

than tripling of output over that period, almost 90 percent

went to feeding increasing populations while only slightly

more than 10 percent went to increasing food availability

per capita. A small change in productivity growth or other

factors affecting supply would have led to a different outcome. In fact, since 1985, world agricultural production has

been growing at the same rate as population.

For policy makers, the dilemma rests in a conflict between

humanitarian concerns and scarce aid resources. The OECD

countries want to assist countries in need, but the conventional remedies of food assistance and policy reform in the

most severely affected countries appear inadequate to turn

around this situation. Only new thinking and dramatic policy reform will yield positive results in the longer term. How

then are we to achieve the pledge by the World Food

Summit to reduce the number of food insecure by half?

Food Insecurity and the World 

Income Distribution

The world’s income distribution is highly concentrated at

low income levels. More than 4 billion people have incomes

of less than $16 per day.

2 More than 3 billion live on less

than $8 per day. More than 1 billion live on less than $2 per

day and more than 500 million live on less than $1 per day.

3

25 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

1Shane is a senior Economist at ERS, USDA. Roe is a Professor,

Department of Applied Economics and Director, Center for Political

Economy, University of Minnesota. Teigen is a senior Economist, ERS,

USDA. Gopinath is Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and

Resource Economics, Oregon State University.

2For the purposes of this paper, our international comparisons are conducted in 1994 purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars. A purchasing power dollar is an international currency that was created to compare how much of

the same basket of goods can be purchased in different countries. 3In the

OECD countries, less than 20 percent of the population live on $16 per day

or less.

Special Article

World Food Insecurity: A Policy Dilemma

by

Mathew Shane, Terry Roe, Lloyd Teigen, and Munisamy Gopinath1

Abstract: Almost 1 billion people live in a state of food insecurity. The income earned by

them is only slightly more than 1 percent of world GDP. Even though the resources required

to feed these people adequately are small, their food deficit is persistent and difficult to solve.

Solutions must involve a radical restructuring of government away from interventionist policies and towards being a facilitator of economic growth and development focusing on overcoming market failures. Resources in support of agricultural research and development

(R&D) have been declining worldwide and are undermining the growth in productivity that

is required in order to have further declines in real agricultural prices. These lower prices

would be one important step towards improving food security by increasing purchasing

power of low-income households. Reducing the number of food insecure by half as recommended by the World Food Summit requires serious commitments from both the world food

exporters as well as the food-insecure countries themselves.
Although it is not clear exactly at what income a person

becomes food insecure, few individuals who earn $16 per

day or more are food insecure. On the other hand, individuals living on $1 per day or less are almost certainly food

insecure. Almost 10 percent of the world’s population live

on $1 per day or less and almost 20 percent on $2 per day

or less. FAO’s estimate of the world’s food insecure population, at 860 million (FAO, 1997), puts the income of food

insecure people at almost $2 per day.

While populations are concentrated at low-income levels,

income earned is equally concentrated at the highest income

levels. Thus 70 percent of the world’s GDP is earned by less

than one third of all individuals—those who earn $16 per

day or more. The poorest 1 billion only earn 1.3 percent of

the world’s income and the poorest 500 million only earn

0.3 percent of the world’s income.

Since the poor only spend a part of their income on food, the

food expenditures of the poorest 1 billion represent only 0.8

percent of the world’s GDP while the food spending of the

poorest 500 million represents 0.2 percent of the world’s GDP. 

While the solution to the food insecurity problem appears to

be to transfer food, income, or wealth, we argue that this is

not the correct solution in the long run.

The World Food Situation

Total world food production grew 2.6 percent per year

between 1961 and 1985. On a per capita basis, food production grew only 0.6 percent per year. Between 1985 and

1995, both population and food production growth declined

so that they were in approximate balance at 1.7 percent per

year. This slowdown in production growth, if it continues,

suggests the potential for supply shortages and a worsening

of the food insecurity problem.

Factors Influencing Demand

The United Nations projects that population growth will

decline from the current 1.5 percent per year to 1.25 percent

by 2010. At this rate, total food supplies can keep pace with

population growth at current prices and incomes. However,

it is not sufficient for production to grow at the same rate as

population for the market to equilibrate at constant prices.

Income growth generates additional demand pressures. The

excess of demand growth over supply is likely to place some

upward pressures on real food prices. 

A variety of factors could accelerate the movement toward

higher world food prices: declines in population growth

rates could decline less than projected, income growth in

populous countries with high relative food expenditures

could be faster than expected, and world agricultural production could slow from present rates. 

Of the world’s poorest 1 billion people, about 42 percent

reside in South Asia, about 24 percent in Sub-Saharan

Africa and 16 percent in China, North Korea, and Mongolia.

South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the two regions with

the largest number of people at considerable nutritional risk.

Twenty-five percent of South Asia’s population and 51 percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population live on less than $2

per day. These are also regions with the lowest per capital

income growth and the highest population growth rates.

Food Prices and Capacity To Import Food

Rising incomes, stagnant per capita agricultural production,

and declining stocks would lead us to expect a trend of

increasing real prices. However, price trends have continued to

suggest that food has become relatively less scarce over time

(figure A-1, Borensztein et al., 1994).4 A decline in the real

price of food in world markets is not sufficient to ensure that

food consumption per capita in low-income countries will

increase. An increase in food consumption per capita depends

on a number of factors, including a country’s terms of trade,

population growth, and growth in total factor productivity. All

of these factors contribute to income and the country’s ability

to pay. We discuss the implications of these factors next.

Terms of Trade

Suppose a country is a net importer of food. Then, if the

price of imported food falls relative to the price of a country’s exports (terms of trade), earnings from a constant volume of exports can buy a larger volume of food imports.

Unfortunately, this has not been the case for those countries

that are at the highest nutritional risk. Many low-income

countries rely heavily on exports of primary commodities (if

anything at all). The price of some of these commodities has

fallen even faster than that of food. Given the ultimate price

insensitivity of demand for primary commodities export

earnings decreased.

5

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 26

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05

Wheat

Corn

Soybean

Figure A-1--The pattern of declining real prices

is slowing

1990 dollars per ton

Source: USDA.

4Grilli and Yang (1988) show that the price index of cereals exhibited a

downward trend between 1900 and 1987. 5According to the IMF (1995),

non-fuel exports of primary commodities experienced large negative terms of

trade effects during the early 1990’s. On a regional basis, Sub-Saharan Africa

experienced negative terms of trade during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.
Compounding the problem for countries with the highest

nutritional risk is that growth of exports per capita has not

kept pace with the decline in their terms of trade so that foreign exchange earnings per capita have fallen. Burundi,

Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania are among the countries

in Africa that have experienced a decline, not only in per

capita export earnings, but in total export earnings (IMF,

1995). Thus, not only are the poor growing more dependent

on food imports, their governments are less able to provide

the foreign exchange to import food.

Population

Population growth has been declining worldwide and is projected to continue to decline. Between 1960 and 1977, populations grew almost 2 percent per year. Between 1978 and

1995, the growth rate had declined to 1.5 percent. Projections

are always somewhat harzardous, but the UN and Bureau of

the Census project the world population growth rate will

decline to slightly more than 1.2 percent by 2010.

The decline in population is not uniform throughout the

regions of the world. In Sub-Saharan Africa, population

growth rates increased from 2.5 percent a year between

1960 and 1977 to almost 3 percent between 1978 and 1995.

Projections for the region suggest continuing high population growth rates of 2.5 percent a year through 2010.

Unfortunately, the regions with the highest population

growth rates are also the ones with the largest food insecure

populations. It is also the case that the lowest income groups

within any country are also those with the highest population growth rates.

Growth in Factor Productivity

The decelaration in the growth rate of agriculture’s total factor productivity (TFP) is international in nature, and associated with a decline in public and private R&D and the

decline in real agricultural prices. The declining growth in

TFP will cause agriculture to lose resources to the rest of

the economy and will likely lead to a reduction of output

growth. In the face of rising populations, world agricultural

production per capita will fall, and may lead to rising world

food prices. Increasing real food prices are unlikely to be a

problem for the approximately 1 billion people with the

majority of the world’s income. However, for the remaining

population, a rise in food prices can lead to considerable

nutritional risk. 

Changes in the rate of growth in agriculture’s TFP has contributed to the slowdown in agricultural production growth.

Recent evidence suggests that the productivity advantage of

agriculture in major food exporting countries is declining

relative to nonagricultural sectors (Gopinath, Roe, and

Shane, 1996). Furthermore, the growth rate for total factor

productivity has fallen in recent years. Evidence from the

United States and other OECD countries suggests that agricultural R&D influences agriculture’s total factor productivity growth. Declines in the growth of expenditures on R&D

may thus slow agricultural productivity growth. 

While there is considerable annual variation, annual rates of

growth in TFP in the United States, France, Germany, and

the UK appear to be falling. U.S. agriculture’s TFP grew

rapidly during 1949-1968 (figure A-3). Since then, the rate

of growth in TFP flattened out. If these declining patterns

continue, the long-term decline in real agricultural prices is

likely to turn around. 

U.S. TFP is explained by investments in public and private

R&D, rural infrastructure, and by the embodied technological

advances in material inputs (Gopinath and Roe, 1996, figure

A-2 and A-3). In the 1950’s and 1960’s, investments in rural

infrastructure played a dominant role in TFP growth while

public and private R&D played a larger role in later years. 

While detailed estimates are not available for other exporting countries, it appears likely that they follow a similar pattern. The decline in TFP growth is associated with a decline

in the growth of public R&D expenditures. Alston and

Pardey (1966, p. 47) state: “During the 1980’s, research

expenditures in developed countries grew at only one-quarter the rate experienced during the 1960’s; for developing

countries the rate of growth slowed to around 2.7 percent

per annum during the 1980’s, as compared with 7.0 percent

during the 1960’s.” Private sector R&D spending has

increased in proportion to public sector spending. In the

1990’s, the public sector spent $0.79 for every dollar spent

by the private sector, while in earlier periods the public sector spent $1.06 for every dollar of private R&D (Alston and

Pardey, p. 56).

If the efficiency gains in the non-agriculture sector of the

major food exporting countries do not spill over to the least

developing countries, the rise in real prices of food are

unlikely to be matched by a rise in their real incomes, further exacerbating the nutritional status of the poor.

27 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

1954 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94

*Public expenditure on agricultural R&D is measured in 1992 dollars.

Five-year moving average.

Soure: Alson and Pardey (1996) and USDA.

1954 value represents average during 1950-54

Figure A-2--Growth in U.S. public expenditures on

agricultural R&D has declined since the 1950's*

Percent change for year earlier
What Can Policy Do? 

We can characterize the lowest income countries of Africa

and Asia where food insecurity is concentrated in the following way: overall income and agricultural production have

been growing, but at a slower rate than population growth.

Thus per capita incomes and per capital agricultural production have been falling. Furthermore, these countries have

been highly inward-oriented so that total trade as a share of

GDP has been falling. This pattern is dramatically different

than that of the OECD countries and the fast growing newly

industrialized countries, where per capita incomes and trade

as a share of GDP grew rapidly, and agricultural production

per capita increased. The real issue is what explains these

differences and what can be done in the low-income, food

insecure countries to reverse this long term pattern of

decline. Although no short answer will suffice, there are

some broad characterizations that point at a solution. Indeed,

the economic history of countries such as South Korea,

China, and Chile imply that solutions are possible.

In the short term, providing food, income or wealth transfers

is possible and plausible. However, food insecurity and

poverty are a sign that the economic system is not working

well. Providing transfers can help overcome inadequacies in

the short run, but cannot overcome the fundamental problems

of poor and food insecure economies. Indeed, no externally

imposed solutions can accomplish this. Only radical transformations of these systems can alter the negative path that

these economies have been on for the past 25 years or more.

Let us focus on Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past 25 years,

per capita income and per capita agricultural production

declined at the same time agricultural output and GDP

increased by almost 2 percent per year. Can trade and investment policies raise economic growth rates in Sub-Saharan

Africa enough to affect the individuals at nutritional risk?

Using a dynamic computable general equilibrium framework

for Sub-Saharan Africa, we show that trade liberalization and

removing the bias in investment policies alone are not

enough to turn around the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Based on the simulations, trade liberalization adds 0.6 percent to per capita income growth rates. This policy change

causes resources to move toward export sectors such as

cocoa and nuts. The combination of trade liberalization and

pro-agricultural investment in rural public goods adds 1.0

percent to the base growth rate of real income per capita.

Real per capita income growth of only 1 percent a year

helps the situation from getting worse, but is not sufficient

to significantly reverse the nutritional situation. More fundamental remedies are required. What might these be?

Countries such as South Korea, China, and Chile, which

have gone from low rates of economic growth to high rates,

underwent a fundamental transformation in the approach of

government to economic development. Government policy

went from one of intervening in markets to create rent-seeking opportunities to facilitating development by creating

institutions and reversing market failures. Measures included

formation of specialized financial institutions, organized

commodity and futures markets, and government organizations to provide marketing information to purchasers. These

countries also went through a transformation from being

inward oriented to being outward or even export oriented.

The net effect of this transformation was to dramatically

increase investment opportunities. The response to those

opportunities was an approximate doubling of domestic savings rates from less than 15 percent of GDP to more than 30

percent of GDP (table A-1). In addition, the government’s

change from being a bottleneck to being a facilitator of economic activity opened the domestic economy to large

amounts of direct foreign investments. Thus from both

domestic and foreign sources, there was a huge increase in

investable resources. The opening of the economy to international forces also opened the domestic economy to technological transfer and increasing productivity growth. The

total effect of these changes has created 5 to 10 percent

extra growth in GDP per year. It is this kind of a growth

change that is needed to overcome the food insecurity problem in low-income countries.

Implications for Food Security

Given this perspective, what is the likelihood of dramatic

changes in food insecurity as proposed by the World Food

Summit? Trade liberalization is already a major and complicated step. It necessitates numerous and often politically

unpopular changes in policy: the removal of protection of

inefficient industries, short-run increases in food prices, and

refocusing the tax system on income, value-added, or sales

taxes and away from foreign trade taxes. This places pressure on the wealthy and politically influential. Yet, trade liberalization alone will not provide food security to those

nutritionally deprived in the 1990’s especially if the longterm downward trend in real food prices is reversed.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 28

1949-53 59-63 69-73 79-83

-0.5

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

Materials

Infrastructure

Private R&D

Public R&D

Source: Gopinath and Roe, 1996.

Figure A-3--Contributions to agricultural TFP

growth in the United States

Percent per year
Combining trade liberalization with removing the government policy bias against agriculture will similarly not solve

the problem in spite of the fact that this requires even more

politically unpopular changes in policy.

Changes of the magnitude that will solve the problem

involve a rethinking of the fundamental approach of government. However, the situation that is evolving in many of

these countries is clearly unacceptable. Populations who are

already poor and food insecure are faced with the prospect

of becoming poorer and even more food insecure. Surely

under these circumstances, leadership, in at least some of

these countries, will see the appropriate path to a brighter

future and be willing to make the hard choices necessary to

make it happen. 

References

Alston, Julian and Philip Pardey (1996). Making Science

Pay, AEI Press, Washington D.C.

Borensztein, E., M.S. Khan, C. M. Reinhart, and P.

Wickham (1994). The Behavior of Non-Oil

Commodity Prices, Occasional Paper 112, IMF,

August.

Delgado, Christopher L. and John W. Mellor (1997). “A

Structural View of Policy Issues in African

Agricultural Development: Reply,” American Journal

of Agricultural Economics, 69(2):389-391.

Gopinath, Munisamy, Terry Roe and Mathew Shane (1996).

“Agricultural Competitiveness: The Case of the U.S.

and Major European Countries”, Staff Paper,

USDA/ERS, Commercial Agricultural Division,

Washington, D.C.

Gopinath, Munisamy and Terry Roe (1996). “Sources of

Sectoral Growth in an Economy-Wide Context: The

case of U.S. Agriculture,” Journal of Productivity

Analysis, Forthcoming, 1997.

Gopinath, Munisamy, Terry Roe and Erinc Yeldan. “Level

Versus Rates Effects on Sectoral Growth: A Cross

Country Analysis,” Working Paper, Department of

Applied Economics, University of Minneapolis, St.

Paul, 1996.

Govindan, Kumaresan, Munisamy Gopinath and Terry Roe

(1996). “Growth Accounting, Supply Response and

Factor Returns in General Equilibrium: The Case of

Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Economics, 7(1):77-95.

Grilli, Enzo R. and Maw Cheng Yang (1988). “Primary

Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, and

the Terms of Trade of Developing Countries: What the

Long Run Shows,” The World Bank Economic Review,

2(1):1-48.

International Monetary Fund (1995). World Economic

Outlook, Washington, D.C.

International Food Policy Research Institute (1996). 2020

Vision, Washington, D.C.

Kelley, Allen C. and Robert M. Schmidt (1994).

“Population and Income Change: Recent Evidence,”

IBRD Discussion Paper, No. 249.

Meadows, Dennis L. et al. (1972). The Limits to Growth,

Universe Books, New York.

Rajapatirana, Sarath and Asad Alam (1993). “Trade Policy

Reform in Latin America and the Caribbean in the

1980s”, World Bank Working Paper, WPS 1104,

Washington, D.C.

Teigen, Lloyd (1996). “Estimating Income Distribution

Profiles Using the Gamma Function”, Working Paper,

USDA/ERS, Washington, D.C.

UNDP (1995). Human Development Report 1995, New

York.

World Bank (1996a). World Development Report,

Washington, DC.

World Bank (1996b). Commodity Markets and the

Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.

Yeldan, Erinc, Terry Roe, and Sherman Robinson (1996).

“Trade Liberalization, Accumulation and Growth in

An Archetype Model of Africa, South Asia, East Asia

and Latin America,” Background paper prepared for

the IFPRI 2020 Vision Conference.

Yen, Steven and Terry Roe (1989). “Estimation of a TwoLevel Demand System with Limited Dependent

Variables,” American Journal of Agricultural

Economics, 71(1):85-98.

29 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table A-1--Developing Countries: Trade Orientation and

 Economic Performance (annual percent change)

1974-85 1986-92

Strongly outward-oriented

 Real GDP growth 8.0 7.5

 Real per capita GDP growth 6.1 5.9

 Total savings / GDP 30.3 34.0

 Total fixed investment / GDP 30.1 28.8

 Capital-output ratio 1.3 1.4

 Total factor productivity 2.6 3.8

Stongly inward-oriented

 Real GDP growth 2.3 2.5

 Real per capita GDP growth -0.3 -0.1

 Total savings / GDP 13.7 10.9

 Total fixed investment / GDP 16.3 14.1

 Capital-output ratio 2.0 2.8

 Total factor productivity -0.4 0.3

Note: Developing countries are classified as "strongly 

outward-oriented" if trade controls are nonexistent or minimal,

and "strongly inward-oriented" if overall incentive structure

strongly favors production for domestic market.

Source: World Development Report, 1994, p. 76.
Food security is a high priority issue for nearly all governments around the world. Food security can be defined as

“access by all people at all times to enough food for an

active and healthy life” (World Bank, 1986). This definition

encompasses both the supply (aggregate availability) and the

demand (access) dimensions. Numerous policy instruments

have been proposed to address food insecurity and find

alternatives to relying on food aid. This article examines

some regional policy initiative proposals (as opposed to

national level proposals) for the Southern Africa region that

focus on the supply dimension. The options that are examined include establishing a regional strategic grain reserve,

implementing an international food import insurance program, and establishing a free trade zone.

The Southern Africa region is particularly well-suited to

regional food security initiatives for the following reasons:

1) the countries share in common a staple food commodity,

white maize (which is not widely traded on the world market); 2) grain production tends to be highly volatile at the

national level but not at the regional level; 3) there are fairly

strong regional institutions already established, namely the

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) (created

in 1980) and the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU)

(created in 1910);2 and 4) much of the warfare in the region

has finally ceased (although peace remains fragile in

Angola). Furthermore, with the recent change of government in South Africa, which led to its joining SADC, many

observers now believe that there is much greater hope of

achieving the food security goals set forth by SADC members in the early 1980’s.

This article briefly reviews the root causes of food insecurity in Southern Africa. Then different policy options are

examined that address the problems of food insecurity in the

region. For each option, preliminary economic analysis is

provided when available. Further research needs are identified in the summary.

Assessing the Problem

The countries in the Southern Africa region are among the

most food-insecure countries in the world. Most of these

countries have very low per capita incomes and display low

average nutritional levels.

Generally speaking, food supplies come from two primary

sources, production and trade. Grain production has been

increasing in Southern Africa, but it has not kept pace with

population growth, leading to declining per capita production.

Grain production in this region is also distinguished by its relatively high variability. This means that in a down year many

people are vulnerable to hunger and sometimes even famine.

Many trade-related factors contribute to variable food supplies. These factors include volatile food import prices,

unstable export earnings, and high debt service obligations

from previously accumulated debts. Although real grain

prices have been declining for decades, price variability has

increased in the past 20 years for these commodities. It is

expected that price volatility will increase even more in the

coming years as major grain exporters continue with policy

changes that result in lower stock holdings.

Strategic Regional Grain Reserve Option

One policy option to address food security is the creation of

a regional strategic grain reserve. The option has been considered in previous studies for different geographic regions

(for example, the Sahel by McIntire, 1981) and has the

30 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Special Article

Can Regional Policy Initiatives Help Achieve Food

Security in Southern Africa?

by

Michael A. Trueblood1

Abstract: This article reviews three different regional policy options that might be used to

address food insecurity for the Southern African countries. The options that are explored are

a regional strategic grain reserve, a food import insurance program, and a free trade zone.

Compared with other regions, these options are particularly attractive due to a common staple (white maize), very high national (but not regional) production variability, and strong

regional institutional ties. Some preliminary analysis is provided; questions are highlighted

for future research.

1An agricultural economist with the Marketing and Trade Economics

Division, ERS, USDA. 2The SADC countries now include Angola,

Botwsana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South

Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The SACU countries

are confined to South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland.
appeal of its direct food tangibility. In addition, this proposal has appeal for the Southern African region, whose consumers have in common similar tastes favoring white maize

as a staple crop. As white maize is not widely traded outside

of the region, it would appear to be a good candidate for a

reserve. Furthermore, this buffer stock option has the merit

that regional production variability is proportionally smaller

than country level variability (see table B-1).

Unlike most earlier proposals, this policy proposes that a

regional buffer stock be created as opposed to national level

buffer stocks. There are two mechanisms discussed in the

literature: quantity-based rules and price-based rules that

determine when stocks are bought and sold. Given the

regional dimension of this proposal, it makes more sense to

think in terms of quantity-based trigger rules (that would

avoid problems with exchange rates and inflation).

Precedents for analyses of quantity-based trigger mechanisms include Walker, Sharples, and Holland (1976) and

Reutlinger, Eaton, and Bigman (1976).

At the regional level, it is clear that grain supplies have been

relatively smooth, rarely deviating outside of 5 percent of

the trend use (see figure B-1). This suggests that it should

be possible in principle to better stabilize national level

grain supplies, which have been much more volatile. The

challenge, however, is to devise a grain stocking arrangement for each country that can achieve this objective. 

For the purpose of demonstration, one type of storage rule is

discussed below. Let us first define supply as random production plus a trend level of imports. Now suppose that historically each country had abided by the following interannual grain storage rule:

If supply is:

greater than 120 percent of trend supply, then store

amounts greater than 120 percent of trend supply;

less than 80 percent of trend supply, then release 

grain to reach the 80- percent level of trend supply;

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 31

Table B-1--Cereal Balance Information, Southern African Countries, 1993-1995

Production

Food Per coefficient

Net aid capita of

Production imports * imports Utilization** Population util. variation

---------------------- 1,000 MT -------------------- --Millions-- -- Kg/cap -- 1962-1995

Country

Angola 294 468 247 762 9.80 78 0.257

Botswana 48 148 8 176 1.43 123 0.698

Lesotho 164 188 31 344 1.94 177 0.261

Mauritius 2 230 1 232 1.12 207 0.933

Malawi 1,585 400 154 1,934 9.73 199 0.241

Mozambique 869 435 315 1,302 17.35 75 0.230

Namibia 85 108 0 178 1.58 112 0.310

South Africa 12,160 -1,210 0 11,101 40.29 276 0.309

Swaziland 88 80 9 168 0.94 179 0.918

Tanzania 3,791 170 59 3,932 27.99 141 0.512

Zambia 1,292 203 25 1,512 9.19 165 0.371

Zimbabwe 2,043 49 9 2,229 10.98 203 0.371

 Region 22,420 1,269 858 25,540 132 193 0.243

 * Negative values indicate exports.

 ** Utilization = Production + imports + beginning stocks.

Sources: USDA, FAO for Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia.

Figure B-1--SADC Grain Supply Trend

1,000 tons of grain

Supplies are fairly smooth

at the regional level.

105 percent of trend

95 percent of trend

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1962 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Actual

supply

Source: USDA data base.
between 80-120 percent of trend supply, then do 

nothing.

In this rule it is assumed that each country commits to a trend

level of imports. This is a simple modification of the rule discussed by Newberry and Stiglitz (1981, pp. 406-409), in that

imports are also considered as a source of supply. This means

that production variability is what drives supply variability

and therefore stock decisions. Other scenarios could be considered using other stocking rules, such as allowing wider or

narrower bands to act as trigger mechanisms.

With the benefit of historical data, we can compare the

results of these storage rules with the actual data, thereby

providing important counterfactual analysis.3 Figure B-2

shows how the stocking rules are applied in the case of

Zambia. When grain consumption levels, driven by production levels, exceed the upper bound trend, then a country

contributes to the regional grain reserve. When consumption

levels fall below lower bound trends, then the country withdraws from the regional grain reserve. It is clear that these

stocking rules do lead to smoothed consumption at the

aggregate level, which presumably would lead to less price

volatility and individual consumption variability.

4

Developing a cost-sharing arrangement for such a scheme

has proven to be difficult in the past. To develop a cost-sharing mechanism under the program, the individual country’s

costs and benefits have to be estimated. Previous studies

have compared the welfare effects to producers, consumers,

and governments. In the case of a region, that would entail

making the calculations within and across countries. Earlier

studies (McIntire, 1981; Reutlinger, 1984) have found that

while the buffer stock program is overall beneficial to a

country, it is not as beneficial as other food security programs. Furthermore, benefits can be high if consumers are

very unresponsive to price changes (such as in the case of

staple foods), but costs typically rise sharply at higher levels

of food security (Houck and Ryan, 1979). Buccola and

Sukume (1987), for example, found that holding large grain

stocks was prohibitively expensive for the case of Zimbabwe.

Food Import Insurance Option

An import insurance program is another approach to achieve

food security. The rationale for this program is that international grain prices are subject to wide fluctuations. Food

security is at risk when grain prices reach their upswing

peaks, which inhibits each country’s capacity to import the

necessary grain volumes, and domestic production in a

given year is low. This proposed policy mechanism could be

implemented by a regional or international organization and

is basically a financial program.

Suppose again that a set of policy rules were adopted by

each government for a self-financing program. For the sake

of example, let the rules be as follows:

If import needs:

exceed the threshold of 1 standard deviation above 

trend level imports, then receive reimbursement of 

actual costs exceeding the threshold costs; 

fall below the threshold of 1 standard deviation 

below trend level imports, then pay into a fund the 

actual costs below the threshold costs; 

are between plus or minus one standard deviation, then 

do nothing.

5

An example of this rule is shown for the country of Zambia

in figure B-3. Table B-2 and figure B-4 show the results of

the rule for the region had it been adopted historically. As a

counterfactual exercise, the results suggest that nearly every

country would have saved millions of dollars on its food

import bills, although some more than others. Our analysis

shows that the exporting countries (South Africa and

32 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

3Houck and Ryan (1979) distinguish three categories of stocking models.

The model presented here is in the tradition of Waugh (1967) of identifying

appropriate stock levels based upon historical time series analysis. The

other model categories are simulation models (a good example for three

Southern African countries is Pinckney (1993)) and dynamic programming

optimization models (a thorough treatment can be found in Gardner,

1979).4This implies that some countries would need to absorb to some

extent the peaks and valleys (but less than without the buffer policy

option). In reality, there would need to be more complex policy interaction

between stocks and trade, such as that considered by Reutlinger, Eaton, and

Bigman (1976). This type of interaction will be considered in a later study.

Figure B-2--Zambia's Stocking Rules--

A Hypothetical Scenario

1,000 tons of grain

Supply 80 percent 120 percent

Replenish stocks when supply is

above 120 percent of trend.

Release stocks when supply

is below 80 percent of trend.

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

1962 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Source: USDA data base.

5Recall from statistical theory that about 67 percent of sampling variation of

a normal distribution falls between plus and minus one standard deviation.
Zimbabwe) would gain the most, although Mozambique,

Tanzania, and Zambia would also gain substantially.

Free Trade Area Option

Some analysts have also suggested that a free trade zone

could go a long way towards solving food security. The

rationale is that with a free trade zone, when one country

experiences a production shortfall which leads to high

prices, then a nearby country with a surplus (and low prices)

would export their surplus to the other country, assuming

that it is profitable to do so after considering transportation

and transaction costs. A free trade zone would lower the

trade barriers, which would increase the likelihood of nearby suppliers being able to profitably export their surpluses.

One of the important premises of free trade, though, is profitability after considering transportation and transactions

costs. In the Southern Africa region, transportation infrastructure is weak, making intra-regional trade expensive

(table B-3). Koester (1986) showed that the region’s transportation and handling costs per ton nearly equaled the

value of the bulk grain shipments per ton, making it very

difficult to profitably import grain in many countries. This

continues to be a major problem for the region since it

implies that most countries have to rely on domestic supplies of white maize (which are unstable). Research in South

Africa shows that consumers are unwilling to purchase

blended white and yellow maize—which are available on

the world market—without a substantial price discount

(Missiaen, 1995).

With the advent of peace, many new infrastructural projects

are currently being built (or re-built) (Economist, 1997).

This holds promise that transportation costs will begin to go

down over time. The U.S. Agency for International

Development (AID) is currently sponsoring research that is

estimating some of the transportation costs in the region,

which will be useful for conducting updated studies of trade

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 33

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1961 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

Receive support when

import costs exceed threshold.

+1 standard deviation

Trend

-1 standard deviation

Pay into fund when import

costs fall below threshold.

Source: FAO data base.

Figure B-3--Hypothetical Import Rules to Zambia

$ Million

Table B-2--Comparison of Accumulated Import Cost Savings

 with Insurance Program, SADC Countries 

Share

Actual Hypothetical of regional

imports, imports, Savings, benefits,

1962-1995 * 1962-1995 * 1962-1995 1962-1995

 --------------- $U.S. Million ---------------- Percent 

Country

Angola 845.0 841.2 3.8 0.6

Botswana 304.3 300.0 4.3 0.6

Lesotho 357.5 354.4 3.1 0.5

Mauritius 601.2 600.6 0.6 0.1

Malawi 401.9 376.5 25.4 3.8

Mozambique 1,191.5 1,148.3 43.2 6.5

Namibia 252.1 245.8 6.3 0.0

South Africa -5,366.6 -5,513.8 147.2 22.1

Swaziland 157.3 157.2 0.2 0.0

Tanzania 700.7 634.3 66.4 10.0

Zambia 712.5 635.3 77.2 11.6

Zimbabwe -48.0 -336.2 288.2 43.3

 Region 109.3 -556.5 665.8 100.0

* Negative values in parentheses are exports.

1962 65 70 75 80 85 90 95

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

-0.4

-0.6

Figure B-4--Total Import Costs for SADC Region,

Actual and Hypothetical

Billion U.S. $

Actual Hypothetical

Source: FAO data base and own calculation.
profitability (for an analysis of East African transportation

costs see AID, 1996).

Perhaps more importantly, the SADC countries have, in fact,

signed a trade protocol in the past year. The treaty includes

freer trade in nearly all agricultural commodities (as well as

non-agricultural trade) and honors previously existing bilateral trade treaties. This treaty comes after many countries in

the region recently have undertaken many domestic and

trade reforms (AID, 1996b). South Africa is perhaps the best

example of this, since it has abolished many parastatals

(including the Maize Marketing Board in April 1997) in its

effort to join GATT and the WTO.

Summary and Outlook

This article highlighted three major regional policy proposals

that address food security on the supply (food availability)

side. Each proposal could have numerous variations, which

leaves many possible options for further analysis open.6

Each proposal has numerous logistical and economic questions that will be researched further over the coming year.

Among the factual and logistical questions are:

• What is the grain storage capacity in each country?

• What are the costs of building and maintaining new facilities (if necessary)?

• What are the transportation costs among the countries for

trade?

• What are the current grain policies and trade barriers?

• Who would implement the suggested program(s)? 

• Who would enforce the policy arrangements? 

Among the economic questions are:

• Which policy initiative is most cost-effective, and how do

those costs compare with traditional food aid?

• What are the welfare effects for producers, consumers,

and governments for each country for each proposal?

• Do any of these proposals invite rent-seeking behavior?

• What types of arrangements are likely to entice regional

cooperation (or conversely what arrangements might

induce sabotage)?

• How would the costs and benefits be apportioned?

The last two questions are particularly important. Economic

theory suggests that countries will participate in a new

arrangement if their expected position is at least as good as

the current arrangement (according to the Pareto efficiency

principle). If a particular country expects to be worse off

while the group is better off, then, in principle, it is possible

to compensate the country for its losses. Koester argues,

after surveying the successes and failures of other regional

arrangements, that the successful arrangements were those

that divided the benefits fairly evenly (Koester, 1986).

In summary, each of the regional policy options discussed in

this article—strategic grain reserve, food import insurance,

and a free trade zone—has the potential to contribute significantly to food security in the Southern Africa region.

Which option or combination of options can reach this goal

most effectively will be the subject of future research.

References

Buccola, Steve and Chrispen Sukume. “Optimal Grain

Pricing and Storage Policy in Controlled Agricultural

Economies: Application to Zimbabwe”, Food Security

for Southern Africa (eds. M. Rukuni and C. Eicher).

Harare, UZ/MSU Food Security Project, Department

of Economics and Extension, University of

Zimbabwe, 1987.

Economist. “An African Success Story.” June 14, 1997, p. 47.

Gardner, Bruce. Optimal Stockpiling of Grain. Lexington

Books: Lexington, MA, 1979.

Koester, Ulrich. Regional Cooperation to Improve Food

Security in Southern and Eastern African Countries.

Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research

Institute, Research Report 53, 1986.

Konandreas, P., B. Huddleston, and V. Ramankura. Food

Security: An Insurance Approach. Washington, DC:

International Food Policy Research Institute, Research

Report No. 4, 1978.

34 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

6One could, for example, analyze the effect of different bounds for the

strategic regional reserve option or calculate the costs and benefits of different rules for the import insurance program.

Table B-3--Road Density, Selected Countries

Kilometers

per million

persons,

1992

SADC:

Angola NA

Botswana 1,977

Lesotho 452

Mauritius 1,549

Malawi NA

Mozambique 343

Namibia 2,722

South Africa 1,394

Swaziland NA

Tanzania 142

Zambia 795

Zimababwe 1,406

Others:

Uruguay 2,106

Tunisia 2,080

Turkey 5,514

Portugal 6,130

Hungary 7,756

Greece 10,341

France 13,008

United States 14,453

Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1995, Table 32.
McIntire, John. “Food Security in the Sahel: Variable Import

Levy, Grain Reserves, and Foreign Exchange

Assistance,” Washington, DC: International Food Policy

Research Institute, Research Report #26, 1981.

Missiaen, Margaret. “South Africa: Ag Reforms in the Face

of Drought,” Agricultural Outlook. Washington, DC:

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research

Service, July 1995, pp. 26-29.

Newberry, David and Joseph Stiglitz. The Theory of

Commodity Price Stabilization: A Study in the

Economics of Risk. Oxford, England: Clarendon

Press, 1981.

Pinckney, Thomas C. “Is Market Liberalization Compatible

with Food Security? Storage, Trade, and Price Policies

for Maize in Southern Africa,” Agricultural Policy

Reforms and Regional Market Integration in Malawi,

Zambia, and Zimbabwe (eds. A. Valdes and K. MuirLeresche), Washington, DC: DC: International Food

Policy Research Institute, 1993.

Reutlinger, Shlomo. “Project Food Aid and Equitable

Growth: Income Transfer Efficiency First,” World

Development 9 (1984): 901-911.

Reutlinger, S., D. Eaton, and D. Bigman. “Should

Developing Nations Carry Grain Reserves?” Analyses

of Grain Reserves: A Proceedings (eds. David Eaton

and W. Scott Steele). Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of

Agriculture, Economic Research Service report No.

634, August 1976. 

U.S. Agency of International Development. Comparative

Transportation Cost Analysis in East Africa: Executive

Summary. Washington, DC: AID, Office of

Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa, SD

Publication Series, Technical Paper No. 21, June 1996.

U.S. Agency of International Development. Comparative

Analysis of Structural Adjustment Programs in

Southern Africa. Washington, DC: AID, Office of

Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa, SD

Publication Series, Technical Paper No. 23, June

1996b.

Waugh, Frederick. “Reserve Stocks of Farm Products,”

Selected Writings and Agricultural Policy and

Economic Analysis: Frederick V. Waugh (eds. J.

Houck and M. Abel), reprinted. Minneapolis, MN:

University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Walker, R., J. Sharples, and F. Holland. “Grain Reserves for

Feed Grains and Wheat in the World Grain Market,”

Analyses of Grain Reserves: A Proceedings (eds.

David Eaton and W. Scott Steele). Washington, DC:

U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service

report No. 634, August 1976. 

World Bank. Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for

Food Security in Developing Countries. Baltimore:

Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 35
Resources and Food Security

Food security is generally defined in terms of “access by all

people at all times to sufficient food for an active and

healthy life” (World Bank, 1986; World Food Summit,

1996). This represents a significant advance over earlier definitions that focused on global food availability, yet careful

consideration of food security requires moving beyond even

access to food and recognizing the choices that households

and regions face when incomes fall short (Dasgupta, 1993).

Of special interest are the tradeoffs that low incomes force

between meeting current consumption needs and protecting

the resources needed to meet consumption and other needs

over the longer term.

Resources can be classified in a variety of ways. Natural

resources (e.g. land and water), produced resources (e.g.

roads and factories), and human resources (e.g. skilled and

unskilled labor) are generally recognized, if not always easy

to measure. Social resources are comprised of the institutions and cultural patterns on which functioning societies

are based (Serageldin, 1996). 

Resources are critical to food security because they determine the ways in which individuals, households, and countries gain access to food through production and exchange.

These relationships are illustrated in the right-hand side of

figure C-1. Resources are also related to food security in a

second significant way. Once individuals or groups have

engaged in production and exchange, they can allocate the

resulting income, along with their remaining stock of

resources, to consumption and investment. Consumption and

investment in turn affect the quality and quantity of the

human and other resources that are available in subsequent

periods. These concepts are illustrated in the left-hand side

of figure C-1.

Recognizing the tradeoff between consumption and investment in other resources is particularly important in poor

countries and households, where small increases or decreases in the level of consumption can have large effects on

health and nutritional status. Proximity to a minimum consumption threshold, representing the “sufficiency” component of food security, highlights the tradeoff between alternative forms of investment that poor households may face.

Specifically, households with insufficient income may be

forced to choose which forms of investment will be curtailed, and thus which types of resources will be degraded or

depleted over time. For example, resource-poor households

may be forced to cultivate their land intensively, thereby

degrading it over time, in order to generate enough income

to avoid undernourishment in the short run (Perrings, 1989;

Mink, 1993). Alternatively, they may accept a certain degree

of undernourishment rather than deplete their natural or produced resources. In fact, while simplistic notions of food

security imply that the former strategy would be preferred,

evidence (e.g. Sen, 1981; de Waal, 1989) suggests that many

resource-poor households choose the latter.

This is why it is necessary to incorporate resources into a

full understanding of food security. Consumption that is

maintained at sufficient levels only by irreversible degradation or depletion of natural, produced, and/or social

resources will not be sustainable “at all times,” and can

hardly be described as part of a food-secure livelihood strategy in the long run. Likewise, protection of natural and

other resources that is achieved only at the expense of necessary consumption levels, and thus minimum standards of

human health, will not be sustainable in the long run either.

Trends in Food Availability and Access

As discussed in the Overview of this report, the gap between

the amount of food available (i.e. production plus commercial imports) and the amount of food needed to maintain

either status-quo or nutritionally adequate consumption levels is projected to increase in most of the 67 countries studied in this report over the next 10 years. The total “food gap

to maintain consumption” is projected to grow from 8 million tons in 1997 to 18 million tons in 2007, most of it in

36 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Special Article

Resources, Sustainability, and Food Security

by

Keith D. Wiebe1

The notion of food security has expanded in recent years from a relatively static focus on food

availability to one that recognizes longer term concerns about access and resources. At the same

time, economists have been working to incorporate changes in the quality and quantity of natural and other resources into measures of national income and wealth. A review of recent data suggests the potential for improved analysis of sustainable resource use and food security.

1An agricultural economist with the Resource Economics Division, USDA.
Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. The total “nutritional food

gap” is projected to grow from 15 million tons in 1997 to 24

million tons in 2007, also primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa

and Asia.

Among the factors contributing to these growing food gaps

are low yields for food crops (table C-1), which limit production’s role in meeting food needs. Sub-Saharan African

yields for cereals (1 ton per hectare), roots and tubers (8

tons per hectare), and pulses (0.5 tons per hectare) are well

below world (and even developing-country) averages. While

yields are higher in South Asia, access to food is limited by

lower per-capita incomes (at $350 per year), and a larger

share of the population (43 percent) lives in poverty. Low

incomes limit poor countries’ ability to compensate for production shortfalls through commercial imports. The consequences of the resulting food gaps are evident in indicators

of consumption in developing countries. About 43 percent

of Sub-Saharan Africa’s people are chronically undernourished, compared with 22 percent in South Asia and 12-16

percent in other developing areas. The greatest numbers of

chronically undernourished people live in Asia (PinstrupAndersen and Pandya-Lorch, 1997).

Food production, access, and consumption are important

components of current food security, but it is also essential to

consider the longer term interactions between food security

and sustainable resource use. Recognizing the urgency of

immediate consumption concerns, for example, it is not surprising that gross savings rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are

less than half those in the East Asia and Pacific region. Low

savings rates may reflect the short-term priority of consumption over investment in other resources, but maintenance of

natural and other resources remains critical to food security

over the long term. It is important to note that the gross savings rates reported in table C-1 fail to reflect changes in the

stocks of many natural, human, and other resources that are

associated with sustainability and food security, ranging from

deforestation and carbon dioxide emissions to institutional

decline and malnutrition-related disease.

Economists have begun trying to better incorporate such

changes into measures of national income. For example,

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 37

Figure C-1--The Role of Resources in Food Security

Source: Maxwell and Wiebe (forthcoming).

Resources

natural, produced, 

social, and human

Production

& Exchange

Income

Consumption

& Investment

Table C-1--Selected Indicators of Food Availability and Access

Indicator Low- and Middle-Income Economies HIE World

SSA EAP SA ECA MENA LAC All

Production

Cereals yields (tons/hectare, 1996) 1.0 3.2 2.2 1.7 na 2.5 2.6 3.3 2.9

Roots & tubers yields (tons/hectare, 1996) 8.0 11.0 15.3 12.7 na 11.6 11.6 17.6 13.0

Pulses yields (tons/hectare, 1996) 0.5 0.9 0.6 1.4 na 0.7 0.7 1.6 0.8

Income

GNP per capita ($/capita, 1995) 490 800 350 2,220 1,780 3,320 1,090 24,930 4,880

Poverty (% living on < $1/day, 1993) 39 26 43 na 4 24 29 na na

Consumption & investment

Undernourishment (% chronically undernourished, 1992) 43 16 22 na 12 15 21 na na

Gross savings (% of GDP, 1995) 16 38 20 na na 19 22 21 21

Genuine savings (% of GNP, 1993) -1 21 6 na -2 6 9 14 na

Notes: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; SA = South Asia; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East 

and North Africa; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; HIE = High-Income Economies; na = not available.

Sources: FAO (1997), Pinstrup-Andersen and Pandya-Lorch (1997), World Bank (1997a and 1997b).
adjusting estimates of savings to reflect changes in the value

of natural and human resources yields the “genuine savings”

data presented in table C-1. Genuine savings rates in SubSaharan Africa and the Middle East and North Africa are

negative (as they have been for the past several decades),

while rates in East Asia and the Pacific are high and rising

(World Bank, 1997b). These trends suggest the need to look

beyond short-term indicators of food availability and access

to explore the longer term links between food security and

resource use.

Resource Trends in Developing Economies

In general, resource priorities change as economies evolve.

In low-income economies, priority is typically given to

issues related to the management of natural resources for

poverty alleviation and food security (UNEP, 1997). As

economies grow, priority may shift to include resource problems associated with industrialization and urbanization, such

as air and water quality and the treatment and disposal of

waste. While analysis of local and national resource-use and

food-security decisions requires disaggregated data, broader

patterns are revealed in regional data reported by the World

Bank and other sources. This section presents a brief

overview of selected data from these sources to illustrate

some of the resources and processes depicted in figure C-1.

Natural resources. Selected indicators of natural resources

are presented in table C-2. About 11 percent of global land

area is currently used as cropland, ranging from 6 percent in

the Middle East and North Africa to 45 percent in South

Asia. Cropland per capita ranges from 0.1 hectare in East

Asia and the Pacific to 0.6 hectares in the low- and middleincome economies of Europe and Central Asia. In recent

decades, cropland area has increased at 0.3 percent annually

worldwide, and as high as 1.3 percent annually in Latin

America and the Caribbean. This increase often represents

expansion of cultivation onto marginal lands, such as those

with shallow soils or steep slopes. Permanent pasture has

remained relatively constant in area, indicating that the

majority of the net increase in cropland area has come at the

expense of areas formerly under forest or woodland cover.

Deforestation has occurred most rapidly, in percentage

terms, in East Asia and the Pacific and in Latin America and

the Caribbean. Nationally protected areas have increased

relatively rapidly in recent decades, although it is difficult to

assess the true effectiveness of such protection. In any case,

Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio (1997) argue that land

conversion will slow in the next two decades, and will not

threaten global food supplies in the foreseeable future.

Even if the rate of land conversion for agriculture slows in

the coming decades, land already used for agricultural production is also subject to increasingly intensive production,

which can lead to degradation via nutrient depletion and soil

erosion. For example, Bumb and Baanante (1996) report

that in many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, soil nutrients

are removed at rates 3 to 4 times those of nutrient replenishment, while Lal (1995) estimates that soil erosion has

reduced crop yields in Sub-Saharan Africa, relative to what

they would have been otherwise, by about 6 percent.

Crosson (1997) counters that erosion-induced on-site productivity losses are actually quite low, less than 0.5 percent

per year, although concern may still be justified where soil

erosion has significant off-site effects, as well as in particular areas where soil losses are higher. Scherr and Yadav

(1996) identify a number of such “hot spots” where land

38 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Table C-2--Selected Indicators of Natural and Produced Resources

Indicator Low- and Middle-Income Economies HIE World

SSA EAP SA ECA MENA LAC All

Natural resources

Cropland (hectares/capita, 1994/95) 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.3

Water use (% of annual renewable water, various years) 1 8 12 19 73 2 6 11 7

 for agriculture (% of annual renewable water, various years) 1 7 11 9 65 1 5 4 5

Cropland (% of total land area, 1994) 7 12 45 13 6 7 11 12 11

Permanent pasture (% of total land area, 1994) 34 34 10 16 24 29 27 24 26

Forest (% of total land area, 1990) 24 26 14 35 4 49 29 35 30

Nationally protected areas (% of total land area, 1994) 6 6 4 4 3 7 5 12 7

Cropland (annual % change in area, 1965-89) 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.3

Permanent pasture (annual % change in area, 1965-89) 0.0 -0.2 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.0

Forest (annual % change in area, 1965-89) -0.4 -0.7 0.3 0.2 0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.1 -0.2

Nationally protected areas (annual % change in area, 1972-90) 1.9 14.0 10.7 7.3 6.9 8.0 5.6 7.1 6.3

Produced resources

Irrigation (% of cropland, 1989) 1 10 28 5 6 2 6 3 5

Fertilizer consumption (kg/arable hectare, 1992/93) 15 206 74 57 64 52 79 112 87

Mechanization (tractors/1,000 arable hectares, 1994) 1 14* 18 na 12 8 31 19

Energy use (tons of oil equivalent/capita, 1994) 0.2 0.6 0.2 2.6 1.2 1.0 0.8 5.1 1.4

Fuelwood and charcoal (% of total energy used, 1989) 66 10 25 1 1 13 13 1 5

* Average for Asia as a whole.

Notes: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; SA = South Asia; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East and North Africa;

LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; HIE = High-Income Economies; na = not available.

Sources: FAO (1997), World Bank (1992, 1995, and 1997a).
degradation poses a significant threat due to soil erosion,

nutrient depletion, deforestation, salinization, and other

processes. They report that degradation of agricultural land

and permanent pasture is most extensive in Africa (65 percent and 31 percent, respectively), while degradation of forest and woodland is most extensive in Asia (27 percent).

Water is abundant globally but scarce in many regions

(UNEP, 1997). Only 7 percent of annually renewable freshwater is used worldwide each year. As Rosegrant (1997)

explains, however, increased use is difficult because most of

the remainder is lost to evaporation or flooding, or is distributed unequally relative to population or across seasons. In

contrast to land resources, Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio

(1997) argue that rapid growth in water demand, in combination with the high cost of developing new water sources,

could threaten future growth in food production. Agriculture

currently accounts for the majority of water used in most

low- and middle-income regions.

One final component of natural resources is the earth’s

atmosphere, a global resource that is being modified by

human activities on an unprecedented scale. Most notable

are emissions of carbon dioxide from the combustion of fossil fuels, which are associated with global warming and its

possible effects on the location, productivity, and variability

of agricultural production. Given the potential for farmers to

adapt over time, global warming is not expected to constitute a threat to food production on a global scale, although

some resource-poor regions, particularly those in tropical

latitudes, may suffer reductions in food availability and

access (Darwin et al., 1995; Schimmelpfennig et al., 1996).

Produced resources. Selected indicators of produced

resources are also presented in table C-2. South Asia has the

highest proportion of cropland irrigated (28 percent), while

the East Asia and Pacific region applies fertilizer most intensively (206 kilograms per hectare). Sub-Saharan Africa lags

in irrigation (one percent of cropland), fertilizer use (15

kilograms per arable hectare), and agricultural mechanization (one tractor per 1,000 hectares of arable land). Per-capita energy use varies by a factor of 10 from Sub-Saharan

Africa and South Asia to the Europe and Central Asia

region, which uses energy at about half the level of the highincome economies. Even more dramatic are differences in

the share of energy derived from fuelwood and charcoal,

ranging from 1 percent in the low- and middle-income

economies of Europe and Central Asia and the Middle East

and North Africa to 25 percent in South Asia and 66 percent

in Sub-Saharan Africa. Different patterns of energy use contribute to different forms of resource degradation. Fuelwood

and charcoal burning contribute to deforestation, for example, while fossil fuel combustion releases carbon dioxide

and other gases and solids that may affect climate.

Social resources. Indicators of social resources are important for food security in two basic ways. First, they indicate

the potential for future economic growth and income generation, and thus the ability to command sufficient access to

food. And second, they indicate the ability of society to

compensate its members when they experience shortfalls in

production, availability, or access to food. Table C-3 presents indicators of factors that affect political and economic

activity, as well as indicators associated with public goods

and services such as health and education. Health expenditures (both public and private) are lowest in the East Asia

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 39

Table C-3--Selected Indicators of Social and Human Resources

Indicator Low- and Middle-Income Economies HIE World

SSA EAP SA ECA MENA LAC All

Social resources

Health expenditures ($/capita, 1990) 24 11 21 142 77 105 41 1,860 329

Water supply (% of population with access, 1990) 47 72 74 90 70 76 na 96 73

Sanitation (% of population with access, 1990) 35 85 15 85 59 69 na 86 60

Female primary education* (% of age group enrolled, 1993) 65 116 87 97 91 na 99 103 99

Male primary education* (% of age group enrolled, 1993) 78 120 110 97 103 na 110 103 109

Democracy index (rank, 1994; least democratic = 1) 2 na 3 4 1 5 na 6 na

Obstacles to economic activity (rank, 1997; worst = 1)

 Property rights/corruption 1 na 3 3 2 1 na 5 na

 Taxes 2 na 2 1 3 5 na 1 na

Human resources

Population (millions, mid-1995) 583 1,706 1,243 488 272 478 4,771 902 5,673

Population growth (annual % change, 1990-95) 2.6 1.3 1.9 0.3 2.7 1.7 1.6 0.7 1.5

Urban population growth (annual % change, 1980-95) 5.0 4.2 3.4 1.6 4.2 2.8 3.3 0.7 2.5

Labor force in agriculture (% of total labor force, 1990) 68 70 64 23 36 25 58 5 49

Adult literacy (%, 1995) 57 83 49 na 61 87 70 na na

Life expectancy (years, 1995) 52 68 61 68 66 69 65 77 67

Disease burden (disability-adjusted life years lost due to

 malnutrition-related causes, per 1,000 population, 1990) 87 9 52 2 29 19 na 1 28

* Enrollment may exceed 100% because of the inclusion of students younger or older than the standard primary-school age group.

Notes: SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; EAP = East Asia and Pacific; SA = South Asia; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; MENA = Middle East and North Africa;

LAC = Latin America and Caribbean; HIE = High-Income Economies; na = not available.

Sources: World Bank (1993 and 1997a).
and Pacific region, at $11 per capita. Access to clean water is

lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa, while South Asia suffers the

lowest access to sanitation services. Male enrollment in primary education is near complete everywhere except in SubSaharan Africa, but female enrollment lags in most regions.

Table C-3 also includes data on the State’s performance in

relation to political and economic participation. The democracy index is an ordinal ranking based on a variety of indicators described in the World Bank’s 1997 World

Development Report (1997a, p. 112), and ranges from a low

in the Middle East and North Africa to a high (relative to

other low- and middle-income economies) in Latin America

and the Caribbean. The Report also presents results from a

survey of business people on obstacles to economic activity.

Property rights and corruption were identified as the principal obstacles in Sub-Saharan Africa and in Latin America

and the Caribbean, while taxes were identified as the principal obstacle in Europe and Central Asia. (Infrastructure was

identified as the principal constraint in South Asia and the

Middle East and North Africa.)

Human resources. Selected indicators of human resources

are also presented in table C-3. World population was 5.7

billion in mid-1995, about half of it located in Asia. Annual

population growth rates vary widely across low- and middle-income economies, ranging from 0.3 percent in Europe

and Central Asia to 2.6 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa and

2.7 percent in the Middle East and North Africa. Global

population growth has slowed more than previously expected, to 1.5 percent per year, due to faster than expected fertility declines in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (United

Nations, 1996). Urban populations are growing particularly

rapidly, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia and the

Pacific, and the Middle East and North Africa. Nevertheless

the bulk of the labor force in the most heavily populated

regions (i.e. Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa) remains in agriculture, suggesting the importance of improved agricultural

performance to simultaneously increase rural incomes and

urban food supplies.

In addition to indicators of quantity, table C-3 also presents

crude indicators of the quality of human resources. Poverty

and the burden of malnutrition-related disease are relatively

high in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, while life

expectancy and adult literacy rates are relatively low.

Similar patterns are evident in child stunting (low height for

age) and wasting (low weight for height) (World Bank,

1993). The levels of these indicators are both consequences

and, through their impact on labor productivity, potential

causes of continuing pressure on natural and other resources

in these regions (Dasgupta, 1993; Mink, 1993).

Implications for Sustainability and Food Security

The data presented in the previous section provide only a

general sense of the ways in which resource indicators supplement indicators of food availability and access to provide

a longer-term perspective on food security. Because of the

close and reciprocal links between access to resources and

access to food, it is difficult to devise a uniquely satisfactory

scheme for distinguishing resource categories. Likewise, just

as measures of food availability and access are insufficient

to capture the notion of food security, it is impossible to

equate any one resource indicator (or even any one resource

category) with the notion of food security as a whole. In

fact, food security is indicated not just by the quality of

human resources, but rather by the extent and composition

of all resources to which individuals, households, and countries have access.

The pitfalls of relying too heavily on any single resource

indicator as a measure of food security are readily apparent.

In Asia, for example, India and Bangladesh have the largest

projected status-quo food gaps for 1997 (see statistical

tables 43 and 44) and the highest shares of total land used as

cropland (57 percent and 74 percent, respectively; World

Bank, 1997a). The apparent correlation between these two

indicators weakens in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, and

fails entirely in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ethiopia

and Rwanda have Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest projected

status-quo food gaps for 1997 (see statistical tables 10 and

13), but while Rwanda has the region’s highest cropland-tototal land ratio (47 percent), Ethiopia’s ratio (11 percent) is

about average. Among Latin American and Caribbean countries, Haiti has one of the largest projected status-quo food

gaps for 1997 (see statistical tables 57 and 61) and the second-highest cropland-to-total land ratio (33 percent), but

Peru, where the food gap to maintain consumption is projected to reach half a million tons by 2007, has a cropland

ratio of just 3 percent—less than half the regional average.

Similar contradictions are apparent for other regions and

resource indicators, suggesting the need for more sophisticated measures of the relationship between resources and

food security.

One promising approach is to move beyond conventional

quantity measures of individual resources, such as total land

area (which is subject to wide variations in land quality),

towards measures that reflect both the quality and quantity

of multiple resources simultaneously. As noted previously,

economists have begun trying to better incorporate changes

in resource stocks into measures of national income and

wealth. Table C-4 presents recent World Bank estimates of

the contributions of different resource categories to wealth.

Agricultural land accounts for most of the value of natural

resources in most areas (Dixon and Hamilton, 1996). The

share of total wealth represented by human resources is consistently high across regions, between 60 and 79 percent

everywhere except in the Middle East, although total wealth

varies widely. Estimates of genuine savings rates, which

reflect changes in the value of human and natural resources,

as well as produced resources, also vary widely (table C-1).

Low genuine savings rates indicate the potential for deepening food security problems in some areas, particularly in

Sub-Saharan Africa.

Such estimates are admittedly preliminary, but they offer

interesting parallels between the analysis of resources and

the analysis of food security. Just as the concept of food

40 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA
security has evolved in recent years from a relatively static

focus on food availability to incorporate longer term concerns about access, so has interest grown in developing economic and environmental indicators that move beyond current income to reflect longer term changes in the quality and

quantity of natural and other resources. While these two

processes emerged from different concerns—the former primarily with hunger at the household and local levels, the latter largely with environmental degradation at the national

and global levels—they are closely related.

Specifically, both represent components of an integrated

problem in resource management, in which natural, produced, social, and human resources can be used in various

ways to achieve a variety of objectives, including food security (World Bank, 1997b). At the core of this problem is the

concept of sustainability. Serageldin (1996) distinguishes

degrees of sustainability based on whether resources are

seen as substitutes or complements to one another. “Strong

sustainability” requires that each kind of resource remains

intact, based on the assumption that resource categories are

complements rather than substitutes. By contrast, “weak

sustainability” maintains the total value of resources, regardless of its composition, implying that resource categories are

substitutes rather than complements, and that individual

resources (and even resource categories) can be depleted

without threatening wealth as a whole.

Serageldin (1996) proposes a “sensible” middle approach

that requires both the maintenance of total wealth and concern with the composition of wealth, recognizing that different resource categories are both substitutes and complements, and that critical levels of each category should be

defined and maintained. Such a definition begins to sound

very much like evolving definitions of food (and livelihood)

security, which increasingly recognize the need to meet both

food and non-food requirements in order to sustain human and

other resources over time. In its shared attention to critical

thresholds, tradeoffs, and sustainability over the long term, the

convergence between these areas of research offers promise

for improved understanding of the relationship between sustainable resource use and food security in the future.

References

Bumb, Balu, and Carlos Baanante. 1996. The Role of

Fertilizer in Sustaining Food Security and Protecting

the Environment to 2020. Food, Agriculture, and

Environment Discussion Paper No. 17. Washington,

DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Crosson, Pierre. 1997. “Land Degradation and Food

Security.” Presentation at the International Symposium

on Global Challenges in Ecosystem Management,

Toronto, Canada, 25-26 July 1997.

Darwin, Roy, Marinos Tsigas, Jan Lewandrowski, and

Anton Ranses. 1995. World Agriculture and Climate

Change: Economic Adaptations. Agricultural

Economic Report No. 703, Economic Research

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Dasgupta, Partha. 1993. An Inquiry into Well-Being and

Destitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

de Waal, Alex. 1989. Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan,

1984-85. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Dixon, John A., and Kirk Hamilton. 1996. “Expanding the

Measure of Wealth.” Finance and Development 33(4):

15-18. December.

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 41

Table C-4--Sources of Wealth 

Region Total Natural Produced Human Natural Produced Human

wealth resources resources resources resources resources resources

1,000 dollars per capita, 1994 Percentage of total wealth, 1994

Sub-Saharan Africa

 East and Southern Africa 30 3 7 20 10 25 66

 West Africa 22 5 4 13 21 18 60

East Asia 47 4 7 36 8 15 77

South Asia 22 4 4 14 16 19 65

Europe and Central Asia na na na na na na na

Middle East and North Africa

 Middle East 150 58 27 65 39 18 43

 North Africa 55 3 14 38 5 26 69

Latin America and Caribbean

 South America 95 9 16 70 9 17 74

 Central America 52 3 8 41 6 15 79

 Caribbean 48 5 10 33 11 21 69

High-Income Economies

 North America 326 16 62 249 5 19 76

 Pacific OECD 302 8 90 205 2 30 68

 Western Europe 237 6 55 177 2 23 74

na = not available.

Source: World Bank (1997b).
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United

Nations). 1997. FAOSTAT Database

<http://apps.fao.org>. 27 August.

Lal, Rattan. 1995. “Erosion-Crop Productivity

Relationships for Soils of Africa.” Soil Science Society

of America Journal 59(3): 661-667.

Maxwell, Daniel, and Keith Wiebe. Forthcoming. “Land

Tenure and Food Security: A Conceptual, Empirical,

and Methodological Review.” Land Tenure Center

Research Report, University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Mink, Stephen D. 1993. Poverty, Population, and the

Environment. World Bank Discussion Paper No. 189.

Washington, DC.

Perrings, Charles. 1989. “An Optimal Path to Extinction?

Poverty and Resource Degradation in the Open

Agrarian Economy.” Journal of Development

Economics 30.

Pinstrup-Andersen, Per, and Rajul Pandya-Lorch. 1997.

“Food Security: A Global Perspective.” Plenary paper

prepared for the 23rd International Conference of

Agricultural Economists, Sacramento, California,

August 10-16.

Rosegrant, Mark W. 1997. Water Resources in the TwentyFirst Century: Challenges and Implications for Action.

Food, Agriculture, and Environment Discussion Paper

No. 20. Washington, DC: International Food Policy

Research Institute.

Rosegrant, Mark W., Claudia Ringler, and Roberta V.

Gerpacio. 1997. “Water and Land Resources and

Global Food Supply.” Paper prepared for the 23rd

International Conference of Agricultural Economists,

Sacramento, California, August 10-16.

Scherr, Sara J., and Satya Yadav. 1996. Land Degradation

in the Developing World: Implications for Food,

Agriculture, and the Environment to 2020. Food,

Agriculture, and Environment Discussion Paper No.

14. Washington, DC: International Food Policy

Research Institute.

Schimmelpfennig, David, Jan Lewandrowski, John Reilly,

Marinos Tsigas, and Ian Parry. 1996. Agricultural

Adaptation to Climate Change: Issues of Longrun

Sustainability. Agricultural Economic Report No. 740.

Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of

Agriculture.

Sen, Amartya. 1981. Poverty and Famines. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.

Serageldin, Ismail. 1996. Sustainability and the Wealth of

Nations. Environmentally Sustainable Development

Studies and Monographs Series No. 5. Washington,

DC: The World Bank.

UNEP (United Nations Environment Programme). 1997.

Global Environment Outlook. New York: Oxford

University Press.

United Nations. 1996. “World Population Growing More

Slowly But Could Still Reach 9.4 Billion by 2050.”

Press Release, Population Division, Department for

Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis,

November 13.

World Bank. 1997a, 1995, 1993, and 1992. World

Development Report. Oxford University Press.

World Bank. 1997b. Expanding the Measure of Wealth:

Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable

Development. Environmentally Sustainable

Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 7.

Washington, DC: The World Bank.

World Bank. 1986. Poverty and Hunger: Issues and

Options for Food Security in Developing Countries.

Washington, DC: The World Bank.

World Food Summit. 1996. Rome Declaration on World

Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action.

Rome, 13-17 November.

42 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA
Introduction

Lack of access to food due to inadequate purchasing power

has been identified as the prime cause of food insecurity.

Even in countries where national per capita income is relatively high, including some in Southeast Asia and Latin

America, the inequality in the distribution of income causes

a substantial proportion of their populations to live in poverty

and suffer from problems associated with chronic undernutrition. Projections of food availability and access in lowincome countries, such as India, Pakistan, Cote d’Ivoire,

Nigeria, and El Salvador, show that if food supplies were

distributed evenly, all households would be able to meet their

nutritional requirements. In these countries, a small reduction

in income inequality, even in the absence of growth, can lead

to substantial declines in poverty (Bruno, Ravallion, and

Squire, 1996) and undernutrition. This article will attempt to

measure the degree of income inequality; identify the key

factors affecting income inequality; and link the relationship

between these factors and the food security situation of

developing countries. The findings of this paper can be used

to explain how income inequality within a country evolves

during the growth process. And, by knowing how the distribution of income will change, projections of the demand for

food and the food security outlook can be improved.

Measurement of the Degree of Income Inequality

Income inequality is measured by calculating a Gini coefficient (measure of income inequality) for 82 countries using

1995 data (range of Gini is zero—complete equality—to

one—perfect inequality). Of the 82 countries used in the

analysis, 62 are developing countries from North Africa,

Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the

Caribbean. High-income countries include 17 OECD countries and 3 Asian newly industrialized countries (table D-1).

A broad range of income inequality is observed among the

low-income countries analyzed (table D-2). The Gini coefficients range from a low of 0.27 in countries such as

Bangladesh, Madagascar, Malawi, and Rwanda to a high of

0.54 in Guatemala. The degree of inequality also varies by

region, with Asia having the lowest rate of inequality of

0.31 among low-income regions, while the average for the

13 Latin American and Caribbean countries, at 0.46, is the

highest. The 17 OECD countries, while having significantly

higher per capita incomes than the other countries, also

exhibit significant variation in income inequality, with an

average Gini coefficient of 0.32. Despite this variation, the

Gini coefficients for the high-income countries are generally

lower than the coefficients for the low-income countries. 

Factors Affecting Income Inequality

While the Gini coefficient measures the degree of income

inequality, it provides very little insight into the factors that

determine it and cause it to change. A broad examination of

personal income clearly suggests that income distribution is

determined by the distribution of resources and assets

among people and the prices received for their services. The

change in the distribution of income from the rich to poor

will happen when there is a change in the factors that affect

the quantity, value, and productivity of assets controlled by

the poor (Adelman and Morris). A recent USDA-ERS paper

analyzed the significance of three broad groups of variables

that could fit into this transfer principal: economic development and technology factors, economic growth variables,

and socioeconomic factors. The question is, how can these

factors can influence income inequality?

Economic Development and Technology Factors—Economic

development, which is often measured by per capita income,

is cited in the literature as one of the major determinants of

income inequality. A widely held view is that economic

growth at least in early stages of the development process

causes income inequality to increase to the detriment of the

poorest segments of the population. This is based in large

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 43

Special Article

Income Inequality and Food Security 

by

May Mercado Peters and Shahla Shapouri

1

Income inequality is one of the major contributing factors to poverty and food insecurity in

low-income countries. The objective of this study is to measure income inequality among

countries and discuss the factors that could affect income inequality as they relate to food

security. An improved understanding of these relationships will aid in projections of consumption as well as in the formulation of policies to reduce undernutrition. Income inequalty was measured by calculating the gini coefficient for a cross-section of 82 countries.

1Agricultural economists with the Market and Trade Economics Division,

USDA.
part on a conjecture made by Kuznets. He hypothesized that

when national income was low, economic growth would

cause income inequality to increase, but at some point during the growth process a point would be reached where continued growth would cause income inequality to begin to

decline, forming an inverted U-shape. Inequality is low

when national income is low because nearly everyone is living at or near the subsistence level. In the initial stages of

the growth process, rapid population growth, urbanization,

and industrialization lead to increased income inequality, but

as the process continues, social and political factors emerge

which then act to reduce income inequality. 

Another development indicator is the size of the agriculture

sector in relation to the rest of the economy. This is because

in the early stages of the economic development, the size of

the agricultural sector is large and most of the poor live in

rural areas (as is true for most African countries for example). As the economic growth process progresses, labor,

along with other resources, shift out of agriculture into the

higher growth and higher wage sectors. This shift could

cause the income/wage gap between agriculture and the

high growth sectors to widen and as a consequence, income

inequality to increase. At later stages of the development

process (take the United States for example), agricultural

productivity will converge with that of the high growth sectors, causing income inequality between the two sectors to

decline (Adelman and Robinson). At this point, when the

agriculture sector’s size relative to the rest of the economy is

small, the convergence of incomes is likely to have little

effect on the overall distribution of income in the economy.

As a result, one would expect a negative relationship

between the relative size of the agricultural sector to the rest

of the economy and income inequality.

Another significant variable is productivity of the agriculture sector. The agricultural sector in most low-income

countries employs over half of the labor force. An improvement in agricultural productivity brought about by increased

investment will raise incomes in the agricultural sector,

thereby reducing income inequality.

Economic Growth Variables—The rate of economic growth

also affects income inequality. This is because with more

rapid rates of economic growth, the absorption of labor into

the higher growth sectors occurs at faster rates. Unless a

country is at a very low level of development, one would

expect income inequality to be lower in those countries

which are growing the fastest. 

Another influential variable is the degree of openness to

trade. This is because in developing countries trade protection lowers the return to the most abundant factor of production—labor—and increases it for the less abundant

resource—capital. Therefore, with more open economies,

income inequality will likely be lower. 

Socioeconomic and Political Factors—Socioeconomic and

political factors will have an important effect on the distribution of income in a country. The influence of the degree of

social development on income inequality can be seen by

comparing Sri Lanka to Brazil. Per capita income in Brazil

is five times greater than per capita income in Sri Lanka.

However, the degree of social development in Sri Lanka is

much higher than in Brazil (Geyndt, 1996), and, in turn, the

level of income inequality in Sri Lanka is much lower. 

Political stability, which is closely related to economic

growth and the food security situation in a country, is also

very important. Political instability not only creates econom44 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

The Gini Coefficient as a Measure 

of Income Inequality 

The Gini coefficient has been used in nearly all research

testing the relationship between income inequality and

income (Braun). It is derived from the Lorenz curve,

and represents the area between the diagonal and the

Lorenz curve (figure D1). The Gini coefficient ranges

from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect income inequality.

As a measure of inequality, the Gini index is more sensitive to changes in income shares in the middle of the

distribution than to changes in shares at the upper or

lower ends. Thus relatively small changes in its value

can reflect substantial changes in the share of income

received by the poorest households.

The cross-country income distribution published by the

World Bank (1996) was used to calculate the Gini index

for each country. The formula used was

Go = (2 * cov (Yt, F (Y)) / Y)

where,

Go = Gini index of income inequality 

Yt = mean income in U.S. dollars in tth quintile 

F (Y) = cumulative distribution of income 

Y = mean income in U.S. dollars.

Note: Further information concerning the derivation of the Gini formula used can be

found in the articles by Lerman, et al., 1985.

Figure D-1-- Measuring Degree of Income 

Inequality

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 20 40 60 80 100

Percent of Population

Percent of Income

Lorenz curve Area
ic hardship, but it places a disproportionate share of the burden on the poor—the segment of the population most vulnerable to food insecurity. For example, local wars and

breakdown of law and order have disrupted the economies

of Somalia and Rwanda, leading to impoverishment, famine,

and widespread malnutrition.

Implication of Income Inequality 

On Food Security

Food security is not directly determined by changes in

income, but by the effect a change in income has on people’s access to food. Access to food, and consequently, consumption of food, is more sensitive to changes in income

the higher the income elasticity is for food. The income

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 45

Table D-1--List of Countries Included in the Analysis and their Gini Coefficients 

NORTH AFRICA EAST AFRICA LATIN AMERICA

 Algeria 0.36 Burundi 0.39 Bolivia 0.46

 Egypt 0.36 Ethiopia 0.29 Colombia 0.47

 Morocco 0.36 Kenya 0.51 Costa Rica 0.36

 Tunisia 0.37 Rwanda 0.27 Dominican Rep. 0.46

CENTRAL AFRICA Somalia 0.53 Ecuador 0.46

 Cameroon 0.34 Sudan 0.53 El Salvador 0.46

 Central African Republic 0.40 Tanzania 0.53 Guatemala 0.54

 Congo (fka Zaire) 0.53 Uganda 0.30 Haiti 0.46

WEST AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA Honduras 0.53

 Benin 0.40 Angola 0.40 Jamaica 0.38

 Burkina Faso 0.40 Lesotho 0.51 Nicaragua 0.46

 Cape Verde 0.34 Madagascar 0.27 Panama 0.52

 Chad 0.40 Malawi 0.27 Peru 0.42

 Cote d'Ivoire 0.34 Mozambique 0.51 OECD

 Gambia 0.34 Swaziland 0.51 Australia 0.36

 Ghana 0.34 Zambia 0.40 Belgium 0.27

 Guinea 0.51 Zimbabwe 0.51 Canada 0.33

 Guinea-Bissau 0.51 ASIA Denmark 0.32

 Liberia 0.53 Afghanistan 0.40 Finland 0.30

 Mali 0.39 Bangladesh 0.27 France 0.34

 Mauritania 0.39 India 0.29 Germany 0.31

 Niger 0.39 Indonesia 0.30 Italy 0.32

 Nigeria 0.39 Nepal 0.28 Japan 0.27

 Senegal 0.39 Pakistan 0.29 Netherlands 0.27

 Sierra Leone 0.53 Philippines 0.37 New Zealand 0.37

 Togo 0.39 Sri Lanka 0.28 Norway 0.29

Vietnam 0.33 Spain 0.26

NIC (other) Sweden 0.28

Hong Kong Switzerland 0.36

Korea United Kingdom 0.37

Singapore United States 0.35

Table D-2--Regional Averages

Region Number of Avg Gini Avg Population 1996

countries index GNP/cap in rural area Freedom

1995 1995 House

U.S. dollars Percent Index

North Africa 4 0.36 1,298 49 5.6

Sub-Saharan Africa 36 0.42 393 71 4.9

Asia 9 0.31 439 74 4.8

Latin America 13 0.46 1,221 47 3.3

Developing Countries 62 0.41 656 65 4.6

OECD 17 0.32 22,279 20 1.2

New Industrialized States 3 0.36 15,600 9 3.3

All 82 0.39 6,083 54 3.8

The Freedom House Index (FHI) data came from "Freedom in the World: Annual Survey of Political Rights and Liberties, 1995-1996,"

published by Freedom House, New York. The FHI measures the degree of political freedom in a country. The index takes into account 

political rights and civil liberties in different countries of the world. It ranges from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free.
elasticity for food tends to be highest for the segments of the

population with the lowest incomes. As a result, a change in

the distribution of income that leaves per capita income

unchanged, but causes income inequality to increase, will

cause food consumption of the segments of the population

which are most food insecure to fall. However, as household

incomes increase, the incidence of poverty and undernutrition should fall and the rate at which the demand for food

increases can also be expected to slow down. 

Statistics relating some of the important determinants of

income inequality to poverty and food security for selected

countries are shown in table D-3. The relationship of

income inequality to the incidence of poverty and food security can be seen by comparing the situations in the Latin

American countries of Peru and Costa Rica. Both countries

have similar per capita incomes, but Peru has a much higher

degree of income inequality than Costa Rica. As a result, the

percentage of the population living below the poverty line in

Peru, 49 percent, is much higher than in Costa Rica, 19 percent. A similar result is found by comparing the SubSaharan African countries of Nigeria and Kenya. Both have

similar incomes, but because income inequality in Kenya is

higher, the percentage of the population living below the

poverty line is also much higher than in Nigeria.

Comparing Sri Lanka with Guatemala shows the importance

of human development and investment in the agricultural

sector to the reduction of poverty and food insecurity. Both

countries have similar levels of income in terms of purchasing power parity. In Sri Lanka, investment in agriculture and

education is much higher than in Guatemala (World Bank

Development Report, 1997). The fertility rate in Sri Lanka

is 2.3 births/woman compared to 4.7 in Guatemala; the percentage of the population living below the poverty line is

lower in Sri Lanka, 22 percent versus 53 percent in

Guatemala. Consequently, the food gap is much higher in

Guatemala than in Sri Lanka (figure D-2).

In summary, income inequality compounds the problems of

food insecurity in low-income countries. Various economic,

social, and political factors operating within an economy

influence the distribution of income in that economy. These

factors are important, particularly in developing countries,

which are not only confronted with income distribution

problems, but face very low per capita incomes and declining food consumption. They emphasize the importance of

increasing the rate of economic growth in conjunction with

investing to increase the productivity of the agriculture sector and promoting human capital development. Investing in

these areas should stimulate economic growth and raise the

incomes of the poor relatively faster than other income

groups. It will also lead to the reduction of poverty and

increase access to food, thereby reducing the main cause of

chronic undernutrition.

References

Adelman, Irma and C.T. Morris. 1973. Economic Growth

and Social Equity in Developing Countries. Stanford,

California: Stanford University Press.

Adelman, Irma and Sherman Robinson. 1989. “Income

Distribution and Development” in Handbook of

Development Economics, Volume II. Edited by H.

Chenery and Srinivasan, T.N. _______: Elsevier

Science Publishers B.V.

Bruno, Michael, Martin Ravillion, and Lyn Squire. 1996.

“Equity and Growth in Developing Countries, Old and

New Perspectives on the Policy Issues.” Policy

Research Working Paper, No. 1563. The World Bank.

Washington, D.C.

Braun, Denny. 1988. “Multiple Measurement of U.S.

Income Inequality,” The Review of Economics and

Statistics. Vol. 70, No. 3 

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 1996.

Agrostat computer database. The United Nations FAO,

Rome, Italy. 

Geyndt, Willy de. 1996. “Social Development and Absolute

Poverty in Asia and Latin America.” World Bank

Technical Paper No. 328. The World Bank,

Washington, D.C. 

Lerman, Robert I. and Shlomo Yitzhaki. 1985. “Income

Inequality Effects by Income Source: A New

Approach and Application to the United States,”

Review of Economics and Statistics. Vol. 67, No.1.

___________. 1996 and 1997. The World Development

Report. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

___________. 1996. The World Bank “STARS” computer

database. The World Bank, Washington, D.C.

46 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

1997 2002 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Sri Lanka Guatemala

Figure D-2--Food Gap of Sri Lanka and Guatemala

Food Gap, 1,000 mt

Source: USDA.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 47 Table D-3--Agricultural and Economic Indicators, Selected Countries Per captia income Gini Iliteracy Agricultural Fertilizer Ag share Population Total Food gap** Children GNP PPP index* rate land irrigated use of GDP living below food gap** lowest 20% undern. Country 1995 1995 1995 1994 1994 1995 poverty line (nutritional) of population 1995 $US $US Percent Percent kg/ha Percent Percent 1,000 tons 1,000 tons Percent Asia Bangladesh 240 1,380 0.27 62 33.9 108 30 48 5,456 1,593 67 India 340 1,400 0.29 48 28.3 80 27 53 0 0 63 Sri Lanka 700 3,250 0.30 10 29.2 113 22 22 97 63 48 Indonesia 980 3,800 0.28 16 15.2 85 18 15 0 0 46 Latin America and the Caribbean Peru 2,310 3,770 0.42 11 41.0 51 7 49 466 202 11 Guatemala 1,340 3,340 0.54 44 6.5 96 25 53 483 165 n.a. Costa Rica 2,610 5,850 0.36 5 23.8 38 15 19 n.a. n.a. 2 Dominican Rep. 1,460 3,870 0.46 18 16.9 64 15 20 86 36 10 Sub-Saharan Africa Kenya 280 1,380 0.51 22 1.5 31 24 50 745 304 22 Congo (fka Zaire) 120 490 0.53 n.a. 0.1 0.5 n.a. n.a. 2,211 679 n.a. Tanzania 120 640 0.53 32 4.3 11 52 51 1,028 364 28 Nigeria 260 1,220 0.40 43 0.7 12 33 29 692 672 43 North Africa Egypt 790 3,820 0.36 49 100.0 243 16 8 0 0 10 Tunisia 1,820 5,000 0.37 33 7.8 18 15 4 0 0 8 * Calculated using World Bank data, 1996. ** Results of the 1997 ERS Food Security Assessment Model. Source: World Bank. World Bank Development Indicators, 1997 and World Development Report 1997. 
48 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 2--Egypt (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 9,240 219 6,556 1,477 9,054

1989 9,890 231 6,832 1,211 9,483

1990 11,787 226 6,076 2,003 10,281

1991 12,016 273 6,440 1,026 10,872

1992 12,329 232 6,545 482 10,620

1993 13,205 223 6,717 230 11,248

1994 13,510 262 8,886 180 12,949

1995 14,953 196 7,658 215 13,955

1996 15,155 283 8,981 202 14,790

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 15,335 248 9,357 0 0 15,049

2002 15,257 255 10,430 566 0 15,362

2007 15,936 261 11,911 606 0 16,712

Food subsidies have supported very 

high levels of consumption in Egypt. 

Therefore, despite projections for 

stagnating production, domestic 

supplies will be adequate to meet 

minimum nutritional requirements. 

However, consumption in only the 

highest income group will exceed 

base levels in 2007.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

5

10

15

20

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 1--Algeria ( North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,037 529 5,045 41 3,853

1989 1,993 469 7,764 11 6,526

1990 1,619 470 4,741 26 3,930

1991 3,730 519 4,190 19 4,620

1992 3,348 470 4,688 15 4,706

1993 1,563 476 5,482 18 4,388

1994 994 407 6,939 24 5,616

1995 1,843 737 5,719 17 7,677

1996 3,603 351 5,500 0 6,764

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,128 503 7,909 0 0 7,504

2002 2,513 519 7,630 0 0 8,130

2007 2,619 534 8,805 0 0 9,200

Grain output for 1997 is estimated at 

less than a third of last year's level 

due to unfavorable weather. 

However, commercial imports will 

compensate for the shortfall.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

2

4

6

8

10

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 49

Statistical table 4--Tunisia (North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 284 218 1,757 363 1,957

1989 621 230 1,119 543 1,689

1990 1,601 224 1,070 371 1,888

1991 2,508 272 831 96 2,370

1992 2,155 231 920 100 2,439

1993 1,561 222 1,001 46 1,824

1994 646 261 1,576 22 1,812

1995 611 195 2,678 18 3,126

1996 2,851 282 1,500 0 2,763

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,051 249 2,213 0 0 2,577

2002 1,339 258 2,407 0 0 2,949

2007 1,501 266 2,768 0 0 3,390

Despite a significant drop in grain 

output from last year's record, 

domestic supplies are more than 

adequate to prevent food gaps. The 

nutritional situation remains strong 

throughout the projection period as 

average consumption levels are 

more than 2 times greater than the 

nutritional target.

Food Production and 

Imports

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 3--Morocco ( North Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 7,917 53 1,385 237 5,815

1989 7,404 53 1,130 227 5,901

1990 6,254 64 1,390 204 5,135

1991 8,636 65 1,758 203 5,794

1992 2,933 65 2,860 234 4,948

1993 2,753 59 3,531 124 6,014

1994 9,530 62 1,673 13 5,398

1995 1,800 74 3,602 0 6,059

1996 9,990 86 3,965 2 7,813

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 3,685 75 3,879 1,976 0 5,138

2002 6,867 78 3,933 0 0 7,813

2007 7,391 81 4,600 0 0 8,782

Grain output for 1997--adversely 

affected by poor growing conditions--

is estimated at about a third of the 

1996 bumper crop. Commercial 

imports, while large, do not 

compensate for the shortfall and the 

status quo food gap rises to nearly 2 

million tons. In the longer term, 

domestic supplies are adequate to 

prevent food gaps.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

2

4

6

8

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production
50 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 6--Central African Republic (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 133 237 28 0 366

1989 125 235 22 4 353

1990 123 258 32 4 384

1991 129 270 22 3 389

1992 93 281 25 5 365

1993 93 279 24 6 361

1994 85 271 43 1 360

1995 105 253 28 0 345

1996 100 250 34 0 340

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 109 264 36 0 109 363

2002 108 279 36 27 150 375

2007 119 295 36 49 185 398

Historically, production supplied 

nearly all of the consumption 

requirements. With assumed growth 

rates of 1.3 percent per year in 

production and near zero for imports, 

food supplies will fall well short of 

meeting nutritional targets. 

Production growth would need to rise 

to nearly 4 percent per year--far 

outstripping historical and projected 

rates.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 5--Cameroon (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 855 612 77 8 1,259

1989 880 616 52 0 1,273

1990 826 755 107 10 1,413

1991 950 747 29 13 1,472

1992 868 755 1,478 1 2,829

1993 878 784 600 2 1,983

1994 892 778 89 2 1,481

1995 1,140 749 117 4 1,700

1996 1,240 708 251 4 1,873

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,090 768 205 58 144 1,741

2002 1,245 829 220 134 232 1,929

2007 1,413 894 244 218 331 2,144

The food gap to maintain 

consumption as a share of 

aggregate food availability increases 

from zero to 10 percent between 

1997-2007. Production growth 

required to close the food gaps is 

close to 3 percent per year; this is 

roughly one percentage point higher 

than expected output growth.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 51

Statistical table 8--Burundi (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 318 377 16 6 606

1989 268 375 11 3 545

1990 360 380 19 3 650

1991 385 389 33 1 692

1992 258 399 18 6 562

1993 249 389 0 28 549

1994 185 339 34 78 528

1995 170 356 40 5 457

1996 140 366 52 3 487

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 230 365 42 11 268 503

2002 247 396 43 49 344 540

2007 313 428 43 61 395 604

Output for 1997 is estimated to be 

much improved from recent years 

due to an improved security 

situation, increased supply of 

fertilizer, and favorable weather 

conditions. As a result, domestic 

supplies will be nearly sufficient to 

maintain per capita consumption 

levels. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 7--Congo, Democratic Republic (Central Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,051 6,139 384 57 6,117

1989 1,038 6,345 236 109 6,161

1990 1,011 6,594 318 86 6,412

1991 1,229 6,869 164 129 6,778

1992 1,408 7,113 238 27 7,198

1993 1,567 7,329 246 31 7,511

1994 1,545 6,387 223 86 6,940

1995 1,452 6,208 333 35 6,771

1996 1,565 6,378 252 8 6,930

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,445 6,566 303 205 1,464 6,885

2002 1,912 7,196 319 179 1,613 7,896

2007 2,147 7,876 357 573 2,220 8,697

Domestic food supplies will fall well 

short of meeting nutritional 

requirements. The nutritional gap is 

projected at more than 6 times the 

size of commercial imports in 2007. 

Historically, production growth 

stemmed from area expansion, and 

this is not expected to continue in the

projection period.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
52 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 10--Ethiopia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 4,519 681 608 472 5,721

1989 5,001 707 0 678 5,841

1990 5,052 734 0 808 6,037

1991 4,876 748 0 1,046 6,129

1992 5,342 746 487 543 6,535

1993 5,363 705 0 942 6,451

1994 5,960 725 336 687 7,089

1995 7,075 725 248 403 7,721

1996 6,775 725 16 354 7,169

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 8,515 758 209 0 2,059 8,507

2002 9,334 846 215 75 3,025 9,343

2007 11,489 945 224 0 3,004 11,380

While reliance on external sources to 

maintain per capita consumption 

levels will be negligible throughout 

the projection period, the nutritional 

situation is projected to deteriorate. 

Consumption in all income groups 

falls short of the nutritional target in 

2007. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 9--Eritrea (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 182 23 0 0 204

1989 122 23 0 0 144

1990 72 23 0 100 194

1991 72 23 0 253 346

1992 198 23 0 39 259

1993 73 23 0 235 330

1994 298 23 192 63 575

1995 153 23 29 62 266

1996 132 23 111 72 337

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 184 24 118 95 344 319

2002 244 26 111 115 409 373

2007 278 28 110 138 466 407

Given limited production and import 

capacity, domestic supplies will fall 

short of preventing a decline in per 

capita consumption or meeting 

nutritional targets. While grain 

output is projected to rise much 

faster than it did historically--2.9 

percent per year versus 1 percent--it 

will not be sufficient to fill the 

nutritional gap. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 53

Statistical table 12--Rwanda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 274 553 15 2 710

1989 262 552 13 10 699

1990 269 629 15 15 778

1991 254 739 19 11 871

1992 267 673 0 90 893

1993 188 598 53 90 807

1994 149 499 0 272 829

1995 154 480 0 244 760

1996 124 605 8 326 975

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 184 549 3 352 46 610

2002 280 602 3 630 200 718

2007 354 661 3 662 191 817

While a jump in area stimulated 

production in 1997, output remains 

below pre-strife levels as agricultural 

activity continues to be hindered by 

the slow return of refugees and lack 

of inputs. Despite high projected 

growth rates, output does not 

recover to late 1980-levels until 2004 

and the food gaps widen 

considerably.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

500

1,000

1,500

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 11--Kenya (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 3,453 452 0 86 3,396

1989 3,399 513 71 89 3,625

1990 2,723 485 296 65 3,764

1991 3,033 480 136 186 3,817

1992 3,085 500 359 288 3,809

1993 2,220 524 312 236 2,986

1994 3,520 524 1,080 111 4,307

1995 3,130 541 291 56 3,986

1996 2,730 549 668 32 3,716

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 3,030 555 753 256 245 3,876

2002 3,599 602 788 174 162 4,463

2007 4,025 652 860 316 302 4,951

Kenya's future production gains will 

depend on improvements in yields as

there is little potential for area 

expansion to productive land. Grain 

yields are already among the highest 

in the region and are projected to 

grow around 1.4 percent annually. A 

moderate boost in output will close 

both food gaps.

1997 2002 2007

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
54 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 14--Sudan (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 5,137 67 385 270 4,053

1989 2,467 45 182 360 3,411

1990 2,119 36 120 513 2,961

1991 4,488 50 488 711 4,764

1992 5,307 51 334 286 4,594

1993 3,087 48 427 293 4,181

1994 5,152 50 811 134 5,044

1995 3,307 50 450 64 3,787

1996 5,057 50 399 40 4,968

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 5,257 51 581 0 0 5,126

2002 5,057 54 611 283 0 4,960

2007 5,531 57 645 430 0 5,404

In order to maintain per capita 

consumption, production would need 

to grow 2.2 percent per year, slightly 

above the projected rate of 1.7 

percent. If growth matches the 

historical rate of nearly 3 percent, 

the gap could be closed. With 

Sudan's highly variable production, 

any fall below trend will result in a 

drop in per capita consumption.

1997 2002 2007

0

200

400

600

800

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Status quo gap

Statistical table 13--Somalia (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 639 15 114 81 786

1989 513 16 103 95 662

1990 477 16 97 100 622

1991 257 16 77 132 428

1992 202 14 38 312 507

1993 162 14 125 75 322

1994 228 12 115 13 306

1995 268 14 81 12 310

1996 393 14 153 12 495

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 380 14 119 0 697 415

2002 295 15 128 112 991 352

2007 322 16 133 166 1,190 374

While estimated output for 1997 is 

up from the lowest points of the civil 

war, it remains well below that of the 

late 1980's. Projections of 

production are based on the low 

levels of the mid-1990's; however, if 

the most recent trends hold, the 

status quo gap could fall to negligible 

levels, but the nutritional gap would 

remain significant.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 55

Statistical table 16--Uganda (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,500 1,802 0 24 2,794

1989 1,535 1,906 0 49 2,902

1990 1,520 1,858 0 74 2,848

1991 1,460 1,834 0 30 2,699

1992 1,666 1,765 0 40 2,745

1993 1,794 1,886 36 46 2,949

1994 1,900 1,593 0 60 2,702

1995 2,020 1,826 10 41 3,018

1996 1,950 1,842 27 20 3,007

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,500 1,827 14 462 0 2,584

2002 2,400 2,030 13 103 0 3,382

2007 2,744 2,254 14 241 0 3,804

Poorly distributed rainfall coupled 

with rebel activity is resulting in an 

estimated 20 percent drop in grain 

output in 1997 and a relatively large 

food gap to maintain consumption. 

Uganda remains one of the least 

nutritionally vulnerable countries in 

the region; consumption in all income 

groups is projected to meet 

nutritional targets in 2007.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 15--Tanzania (East Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 3,531 1,616 40 89 3,840

1989 4,470 1,628 24 28 5,107

1990 3,565 1,966 43 34 4,482

1991 3,540 1,736 111 18 4,798

1992 3,390 1,648 154 36 4,569

1993 3,700 1,593 150 47 4,609

1994 3,350 1,681 228 108 4,574

1995 4,323 1,451 194 25 4,776

1996 3,815 1,438 48 22 4,373

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 3,465 1,569 172 508 929 4,268

2002 4,515 1,694 169 187 661 5,195

2007 5,041 1,828 175 444 987 5,726

The late start to the rainy season 

coupled with insufficient rains in 

some areas, resulted in lower yields. 

Consequently, grain output is 

estimated down about 10 percent 

from the 1994-96 average. The food 

gap to maintain consumption is 

estimated at more than 3 times 

commercial imports. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
56 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 18--Lesotho (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 233 11 173 43 313

1989 189 12 138 34 295

1990 214 13 167 36 362

1991 148 14 195 37 329

1992 75 16 169 45 230

1993 151 17 183 32 239

1994 243 17 168 15 382

1995 106 18 155 28 220

1996 233 18 220 30 409

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 183 18 186 4 147 284

2002 173 20 193 49 211 277

2007 193 21 200 76 259 292

The 1997 grain harvest is estimated 

down about 20 percent from last 

year's above average crop. The 

combination of dry weather during a 

critical growing stage and an early 

frost adversely affected the crop. 

Due to relatively large commercial 

import capacity, however, the food 

gap to maintain consumption is not 

large. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

500

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 17--Angola (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 237 587 137 109 1,013

1989 287 618 101 139 1,094

1990 227 617 210 124 1,126

1991 346 633 162 142 1,224

1992 452 714 200 116 1,424

1993 317 707 103 222 1,295

1994 261 887 173 229 1,496

1995 302 897 185 224 1,549

1996 473 934 255 228 1,823

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 488 934 222 237 239 1,559

2002 537 1,008 248 412 415 1,700

2007 628 1,087 281 558 562 1,890

Production has increased since the 

end of the war as NGO's and UN 

agencies have been successful in 

providing seeds and tools. However, 

other vital inputs and machinery limit 

production. Lack of purchasing 

power means that consumption in all 

income groups will fall short of base 

consumption levels in 2007. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 57

Statistical table 20--Malawi ( Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,368 102 0 344 1,642

1989 1,531 108 0 347 1,809

1990 1,373 108 90 65 1,451

1991 1,629 116 0 285 1,902

1992 670 105 0 605 815

1993 2,016 128 493 67 2,777

1994 1,093 118 196 284 1,332

1995 1,628 124 198 105 1,624

1996 1,733 131 8 222 1,990

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,045 129 138 0 0 1,944

2002 2,016 141 141 212 176 1,923

2007 2,261 155 146 277 237 2,142

Despite gains in yields, growth in 

grain output is projected to slow from

historical levels of 3 percent per year 

due to a slowdown in area 

expansion. To maintain 

consumption levels, production 

would need to increase 3.2 percent 

per year, well above the projected 

rates of 2.5 percent.

1997 2002 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 19--Madagascar (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,573 886 2 88 2,195

1989 1,645 919 76 51 2,308

1990 1,700 926 99 38 2,386

1991 1,553 932 28 54 2,200

1992 1,715 916 73 59 2,392

1993 1,812 952 77 34 2,492

1994 1,670 972 123 20 2,411

1995 1,780 970 131 21 2,517

1996 1,830 987 123 28 2,588

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,880 1,006 137 54 365 2,593

2002 2,004 1,079 148 313 676 2,776

2007 2,215 1,158 164 551 973 3,039

The nutritional gap as a share of 

aggregate food availability is 

projected to rise from 14 to 32 

percent between 1997-2007. 

Historically, grain output has been 

characterized by slow growth and 

this is projected to continue. 

Production needs to rise 3.7 percent 

per year to close the nutritional gap--

more than 2 times the projected 

growth.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
58 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 22--Swaziland (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 155 3 80 16 235

1989 115 3 81 7 181

1990 85 2 84 4 160

1991 158 2 89 5 233

1992 59 2 57 40 143

1993 78 2 71 10 140

1994 104 2 100 1 188

1995 81 2 84 12 161

1996 85 2 71 6 145

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 85 2 97 8 0 165

2002 102 2 108 8 0 191

2007 107 2 128 11 0 215

Although grain production growth is 

projected to slow relative to the 

historical period, output and 

commercial imports will be adequate 

to meet nutritional targets and nearly 

sufficient to maintain per capita 

consumption levels.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

50

100

150

200

250

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 21--Mozambique (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 526 1,324 8 615 2,351

1989 568 1,356 0 560 2,351

1990 706 1,674 0 523 2,694

1991 544 1,355 0 664 2,294

1992 278 1,193 123 929 2,426

1993 715 1,292 297 356 2,578

1994 756 1,238 214 304 2,402

1995 1,080 1,322 276 251 2,771

1996 1,163 1,726 133 302 3,266

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,552 1,471 215 54 452 3,061

2002 1,541 1,592 232 307 754 3,197

2007 1,870 1,722 250 321 828 3,647

Grain output continues the post-war 

upward trend. Despite 

improvements, the food gaps are 

projected to grow, particularly the 

nutritional gap. Average per capita 

consumption in 2007 is projected at 

only 80 percent of the nutritional 

target, and for the lowest income 

group, this number falls to 53 

percent.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 59

Statistical table 24--Zimbabwe (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 2,927 42 74 10 2,337

1989 2,487 43 35 17 1,650

1990 2,758 45 64 54 2,794

1991 2,139 47 0 41 1,354

1992 675 52 583 896 1,342

1993 2,249 57 586 16 2,089

1994 2,614 58 86 5 2,977

1995 1,194 64 117 4 443

1996 2,911 65 310 0 2,802

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,685 64 182 0 0 2,260

2002 2,425 67 201 169 321 1,997

2007 2,676 70 220 207 375 2,197

Despite a decline from last year, 

output in 1997 is estimated to be 

sufficient to prevent a decline in per 

capita consumption. For the 

projection period, however, output 

would need to rise 2.5 percent per 

year to maintain per capita 

consumption, significantly higher 

than the projected rate of 1.7 

percent.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 23--Zambia (Southern Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,997 152 55 118 1,990

1989 1,797 198 125 6 2,172

1990 1,195 214 38 110 1,510

1991 1,309 219 1 56 1,243

1992 597 220 8 715 1,006

1993 1,759 222 342 11 2,085

1994 1,195 218 54 12 1,325

1995 929 213 78 74 788

1996 1,563 218 254 58 1,918

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,162 222 142 239 503 1,242

2002 1,600 239 137 72 371 1,604

2007 1,808 256 141 112 451 1,787

Grain production for 1997 is 

estimated down nearly 30 percent 

from last year's above-average 

harvest as a result of excessive 

precipitation and inadequate supply 

of fertilizers. Consequently, both the 

status quo and nutritional gaps are 

larger in 1997 than any time in the 

projection period.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
60 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 26--Burkina Faso (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 2,067 44 86 65 1,967

1989 1,901 28 95 51 1,722

1990 1,547 20 34 124 1,442

1991 2,220 21 184 42 2,138

1992 2,438 25 127 31 2,222

1993 2,515 22 115 27 2,291

1994 2,453 19 104 19 2,191

1995 2,265 23 84 37 2,015

1996 2,402 23 127 26 2,186

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,465 22 114 69 69 2,129

2002 2,705 23 120 198 198 2,329

2007 2,940 24 131 375 375 2,530

A continuation of historical 

production growth--2.7 percent per 

year--would almost eliminate the 

projected food gaps. However, 

output growth is projected to slow as 

gains in yields and area will be 

minimal.

1997 2002 2007

0

100

200

300

400

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 25--Benin (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 551 655 116 19 1,029

1989 557 719 82 13 1,044

1990 522 717 146 9 1,056

1991 524 802 138 7 1,117

1992 602 782 161 19 1,199

1993 635 843 106 26 1,229

1994 635 868 74 15 1,202

1995 776 946 87 18 1,409

1996 941 948 117 9 1,551

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 645 955 110 220 0 1,312

2002 963 1,045 115 135 0 1,630

2007 1,074 1,143 133 238 0 1,806

While domestic supplies will be more 

than adequate to meet nutritional 

requirements, they will not be 

sufficient to prevent a decline in per 

capita consumption. If historical 

production trends continued, the 

status quo gap would be eliminated. 

However, annual output growth is 

projected to slow to 1.9 percent.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 61

Statistical table 28--Chad (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 815 234 30 21 991

1989 716 210 0 36 855

1990 536 240 0 33 710

1991 794 233 0 67 982

1992 836 220 51 0 971

1993 671 187 58 17 806

1994 846 186 23 15 932

1995 779 189 24 11 861

1996 803 189 25 15 896

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 776 195 26 82 313 838

2002 925 211 27 70 333 978

2007 1,022 226 29 102 397 1,075

Production growth is projected to 

slow even from historically low 

levels. Given the country's limited 

import capacity, this translates into 

growing food gaps. By 2007, Chad's 

nutritional gap will equal nearly 40 

percent of aggregate food 

availability.

1997 2002 2007

0

100

200

300

400

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 27--Cape Verde (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 16 5 0 76 94

1989 7 5 0 72 81

1990 10 5 0 76 88

1991 4 3 0 76 80

1992 10 2 88 45 140

1993 12 2 13 58 81

1994 9 1 24 64 95

1995 10 2 27 50 85

1996 10 2 27 46 81

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 10 1 28 56 18 36

2002 18 1 26 65 22 39

2007 20 1 28 74 27 41

A relatively large long run food gap 

also is projected based primarily 

upon limited commercial import 

capacity, the dominant source of 

supply. This country is highly 

dependent upon food aid to maintain 

per capita consumption.

1997 2002 2007

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
62 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 30--Gambia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 96 2 97 12 192

1989 121 2 36 13 157

1990 100 2 77 14 178

1991 108 2 80 10 184

1992 87 2 78 6 155

1993 93 2 66 11 157

1994 101 2 85 2 174

1995 101 2 64 4 156

1996 101 2 94 4 186

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 85 2 93 14 0 165

2002 108 2 98 9 0 189

2007 114 2 111 12 0 208

In the long run, per capita 

consumption will be supported at 

near-base levels as production and 

commercial imports will provide 

adequate food supplies.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 29--Cote d'Ivoire (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,039 1,479 539 19 2,388

1989 1,067 1,541 543 26 2,460

1990 1,036 1,486 495 59 2,412

1991 1,096 1,531 572 36 2,520

1992 1,024 1,707 448 41 2,471

1993 1,072 1,660 594 45 2,615

1994 1,078 1,669 433 56 2,448

1995 1,149 1,669 677 30 2,711

1996 1,155 1,669 540 47 2,637

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,190 1,724 613 16 0 2,670

2002 1,361 1,870 682 4 0 2,971

2007 1,529 2,027 782 38 0 3,303

Despite the fact that production 

growth is projected to slow relative to 

historical rates due to a cut in area 

expansion, the long run food gap will 

be negligible. Growth in production 

and import capacity will provide 

adequate food supplies. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 63

Statistical table 32--Guinea (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 489 150 220 42 772

1989 412 175 237 25 722

1990 475 198 241 12 791

1991 581 232 236 30 933

1992 672 255 284 30 1,094

1993 744 254 251 46 1,141

1994 819 280 324 29 1,316

1995 726 298 375 5 1,260

1996 726 242 348 7 1,196

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 843 283 371 0 0 1,312

2002 902 305 382 0 0 1,403

2007 1,007 328 401 79 0 1,530

A relatively small food gap to 

maintain per capita consumption 

emerges in the long run due to 

declining per capita grain production 

and imports. Historical grain 

production growth of 3.5 percent per 

year was driven by strong area and 

yield gains, both of which are 

projected to slow through 2007. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 31--Ghana (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,095 1,290 213 47 2,079

1989 1,255 1,553 171 73 2,420

1990 813 1,184 244 76 2,033

1991 1,375 1,690 197 215 2,783

1992 1,198 1,799 323 75 2,792

1993 1,582 1,969 252 126 3,182

1994 1,498 2,382 401 101 3,334

1995 1,670 2,817 318 36 3,722

1996 1,670 2,817 325 40 3,807

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,600 2,829 394 191 0 3,947

2002 2,042 3,359 438 0 0 4,752

2007 2,337 4,384 513 0 0 5,866

Per capita consumption is expected 

to grow in the long run mainly due to 

a projected increase in per capita 

production of grains as area and 

yields grow markedly. Food supplies 

will exceed minimum nutritional 

requirements.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
64 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 34--Liberia (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 179 214 70 33 466

1989 168 214 35 118 500

1990 126 170 2 69 337

1991 120 170 31 143 437

1992 61 191 0 142 378

1993 39 209 1 138 374

1994 30 224 0 119 367

1995 30 224 26 104 377

1996 36 224 143 117 507

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 60 231 52 157 87 323

2002 73 249 49 344 243 347

2007 112 269 45 400 284 391

An improvement in the security 

situation has contributed to an 

increase in output for 1997. The 

longer term food gaps, however, are 

based on the prior years' low output. 

If peace continues and normal 

farming activity resumes, output will 

increase at rates higher than the 

projected rates and the food gaps 

would fall commensurately.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 33--Guinea-Bissau (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 133 26 43 10 198

1989 154 24 30 21 217

1990 152 23 38 9 209

1991 172 21 42 21 241

1992 125 22 72 9 215

1993 134 22 60 9 211

1994 154 21 64 2 226

1995 152 21 60 2 218

1996 150 20 54 6 215

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 194 21 61 0 0 254

2002 186 22 64 0 0 250

2007 203 23 68 6 0 269

While food supplies are sufficient, on 

the aggregate level, to meet 

nutritional targets, consumption in 

the lowest income group will fall 

short of the target due to inadequate 

purchasing power.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

50

100

150

200

250

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 65

Statistical table 36--Mauritania (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 158 2 141 85 357

1989 152 2 107 89 321

1990 85 2 62 116 246

1991 96 2 274 50 400

1992 103 1 163 45 294

1993 158 1 187 63 391

1994 204 1 172 22 380

1995 210 1 175 25 395

1996 100 1 214 27 327

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 148 1 210 42 7 339

2002 207 1 207 42 2 389

2007 224 1 221 69 24 418

A moderate long run food gap to 

maintain per capita consumption is 

projected as per capita grain 

production and imports stagnate or 

decline; the nutrition-based food gap 

is negligible. If grain production and 

imports increase slightly above 

projected rates, these gaps could be 

eliminated.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

50

100

150

200

250

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 35--Mali (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 2,076 5 80 78 2,058

1989 1,760 5 68 57 1,676

1990 1,807 7 29 47 1,683

1991 2,245 8 184 51 2,280

1992 1,714 6 63 35 1,608

1993 1,965 9 53 29 1,828

1994 2,234 7 22 16 2,028

1995 2,050 8 83 11 1,918

1996 2,062 8 110 5 1,982

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,250 8 78 0 78 2,035

2002 2,437 9 84 127 219 2,207

2007 2,710 9 94 223 329 2,456

While output in 1997 is estimated to 

be large enough to prevent a decline 

in per capita consumption, this will 

not be the case in the longer term. 

Grain output--projected to grow just 

over 2 percent per year through 2007

--would need to grow nearly 3 

percent per year to close the food 

gaps; between 1980-96, growth was 

less than 2 percent.

1997 2002 2007

0

100

200

300

400

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
66 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 38--Nigeria (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 9,050 7,428 491 0 10,092

1989 8,700 8,147 503 0 10,628

1990 15,045 9,831 423 0 17,609

1991 16,131 12,885 735 1 19,439

1992 16,348 14,684 976 0 20,958

1993 17,278 15,544 1,448 0 22,743

1994 17,747 16,269 922 0 23,218

1995 17,910 16,436 1,062 0 23,427

1996 16,185 16,465 1,475 0 22,676

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 16,490 16,950 1,304 46 0 23,806

2002 21,497 18,428 1,399 299 0 27,128

2007 24,828 20,021 1,581 863 0 30,625

Nigeria's food gap to maintain 

consumption, although large relative 

to other countries in the region, is 

small relative to overall food 

availability--less than 3 percent in 

2007. Therefore, if production grows 

marginally faster than projected 

levels of 2.4 percent, the gap would 

fall to zero.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

10

20

30

40

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 37--Niger (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 2,368 107 25 102 2,230

1989 1,797 106 29 46 1,662

1990 1,596 108 22 91 1,495

1991 2,290 110 88 45 2,165

1992 2,227 111 95 28 2,102

1993 2,119 112 91 31 2,002

1994 2,190 114 92 39 2,039

1995 2,153 114 70 27 1,983

1996 2,196 114 310 6 2,256

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,320 117 167 55 191 2,063

2002 2,502 124 167 268 427 2,226

2007 2,787 133 171 447 634 2,467

Yields are projected to increase 

marginally through 2007, keeping 

them among the lowest in the world 

and holding production growth to 2 

percent per year. To eliminate the 

food gaps, output would need to 

grow at an unprecedented 3.2-3.5 

percent. Consumption in all income 

groups in 2007 falls short of the 

nutritional target.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

1

2

3

4

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 67

Statistical table 40--Sierra Leone (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 342 48 75 42 460

1989 345 48 93 43 480

1990 264 50 135 20 420

1991 268 50 115 66 443

1992 315 48 114 29 394

1993 321 44 116 29 438

1994 270 104 238 30 587

1995 193 93 234 46 549

1996 260 118 143 117 611

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 225 107 221 93 180 499

2002 274 112 212 147 248 534

2007 294 116 215 200 312 557

The food security situation has 

deteriorated in the last couple of 

years due to civil strife. Food 

supplies have tightened and the 

price of rice--the staple crop--has 

risen sharply. While production is 

estimated to rise in 1997, fighting 

and continued insecurity could hinder 

agricultural activities, reduce output, 

and spur an increase in the food 

gap.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 39--Senegal (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 813 25 479 56 1,252

1989 1,015 26 503 71 1,430

1990 912 29 669 47 1,503

1991 900 14 552 65 1,342

1992 817 20 524 71 1,286

1993 1,029 19 558 38 1,440

1994 900 31 564 18 1,404

1995 1,005 23 661 9 1,283

1996 1,000 23 816 11 1,710

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 875 27 759 93 0 1,444

2002 1,080 28 776 130 0 1,626

2007 1,190 29 835 225 69 1,770

Per capita consumption is projected 

to decline as slower yield growth 

holds output growth to 1.8 percent 

per year. Base consumption levels 

could be maintained if production 

growth could rise to 3.1 percent or if 

import growth accelerates from 1.7 

to 2.7 percent.

1997 2002 2007

0

200

400

600

800

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Status quo gap
68 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 42--Afghanistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 3,332 84 1,704 416 5,402

1989 3,218 78 1,489 173 4,850

1990 2,980 86 1,399 41 4,403

1991 2,830 86 871 56 3,741

1992 2,830 91 912 108 3,835

1993 2,930 96 977 71 3,962

1994 2,910 102 1,447 151 4,490

1995 3,170 108 2,568 127 5,849

1996 2,650 90 1,076 194 3,906

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,600 103 1,865 874 0 4,417

2002 3,559 111 1,787 1,277 47 5,261

2007 4,005 120 1,831 1,663 270 5,739

Civil strife continues to hinder 

agricultural production activities in 

Afghanistan. However, in areas 

where fighting has ended, normal 

economic activities have resumed 

and food production is increasing.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

2

4

6

8

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 41--Togo (West Africa)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 492 326 140 11 708

1989 550 363 117 11 775

1990 389 293 109 16 543

1991 427 391 88 14 651

1992 492 420 155 4 826

1993 611 387 55 11 796

1994 405 260 59 8 466

1995 450 435 68 4 703

1996 600 417 137 4 866

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 660 374 89 0 56 786

2002 588 391 93 59 223 738

2007 655 408 95 120 307 789

The nutritional status of the country 

is projected to deteriorate markedly 

by 2007. The nutritional gap, as a 

share of aggregate food availability, 

jumps from 7 to near 40 percent 

between 1997-2007. In 2007, 

consumption is projected to equal 

only 71 percent of the nutritional 

target.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 69

Statistical table 44--India (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 147,987 4,966 2,461 392 143,792

1989 162,242 5,024 458 456 153,684

1990 156,694 5,029 88 217 152,394

1991 155,744 5,248 0 187 152,927

1992 165,337 5,597 1,262 351 159,036

1993 168,530 5,239 67 336 158,825

1994 171,080 5,847 0 271 159,270

1995 174,620 6,009 0 313 164,712

1996 176,170 6,009 0 257 170,159

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 180,700 6,156 0 0 0 167,817

2002 200,592 6,671 0 0 0 186,609

2007 222,495 7,226 0 0 0 207,402

India, the world's second most 

populous country, also has the 

world's highest concentration of 

people living in poverty. If food 

supplies were distributed equally, 

everyone in India would have been 

able to meet their nutritional 

requirements in 1997. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

50

100

150

200

250

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 43--Bangladesh (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 16,617 450 1,555 1,457 19,269

1989 18,797 401 1,001 1,216 20,027

1990 18,903 387 89 1,452 19,863

1991 19,362 422 157 1,469 20,174

1992 19,563 454 777 719 20,606

1993 19,219 446 325 745 19,903

1994 18,125 457 96 858 18,393

1995 19,104 467 1,745 825 20,202

1996 19,847 460 1,857 743 21,706

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 19,899 476 1,382 451 4,853 20,411

2002 21,096 515 1,600 918 5,710 21,791

2007 22,900 557 1,923 899 6,122 23,849

Intense population pressure in 

Bangladesh has led to soil and water 

degradation, and loss of biodiversity 

calling into question sustainability of 

current growth in food production. 

1997 2002 2007

0

2

4

6

8

Million tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
70 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 46--Nepal (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 4,210 164 71 18 3,972

1989 4,541 175 11 8 4,194

1990 4,674 186 20 1 4,314

1991 4,437 201 4 8 4,079

1992 4,003 198 41 18 3,694

1993 4,075 199 15 44 3,775

1994 4,427 210 49 26 4,151

1995 4,445 223 11 43 4,148

1996 4,585 237 57 33 4,295

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 4,685 232 43 69 117 4,288

2002 5,132 254 47 228 283 4,702

2007 5,603 278 53 402 464 5,140

Nepal's economy is dependent on 

agriculture, with almost 90 percent of 

its population living in rural areas. 

As a result, raising agricultural 

productivity is essential for 

increasing incomes and reducing 

food insecurity.

1997 2002 2007

0

100

200

300

400

500

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap

Statistical table 45--Indonesia ( Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 34,272 5,540 1,682 69 34,968

1989 34,366 6,098 2,129 39 37,323

1990 34,042 5,649 1,810 46 36,256

1991 36,750 5,673 2,760 59 37,780

1992 36,968 5,934 3,155 41 39,286

1993 35,715 6,169 3,075 52 38,806

1994 38,433 5,641 5,154 15 38,813

1995 38,874 5,689 8,388 12 44,565

1996 40,100 5,766 6,346 18 43,952

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 39,570 5,757 7,442 186 0 43,904

2002 41,738 5,899 8,088 1,078 0 46,266

2007 44,145 6,042 9,103 976 0 49,307

In Indonesia, sustained economic 

growth (real income increase) since 

1970 has led to a reduction in the 

percentage of its population living in 

poverty from 60 percent to 15 

percent.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 71

Statistical table 48--Philippines (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 10,521 923 1,320 137 10,394

1989 10,197 902 1,763 59 10,035

1990 11,527 913 2,625 109 11,080

1991 10,426 902 1,642 48 10,821

1992 11,000 901 1,956 53 10,253

1993 11,480 924 2,140 52 11,042

1994 11,343 907 2,380 44 11,199

1995 11,587 925 2,786 17 10,690

1996 11,750 930 3,882 11 12,719

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 11,500 933 3,459 263 0 11,827

2002 12,425 965 3,929 451 0 12,863

2007 13,298 998 4,654 387 0 14,116

Recent rice shortages have caused 

the Government of the Philippines to 

rethink its policy of food selfsufficiency. The country is now 

placing greater importance on 

commercial imports to meet its food 

needs.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 47--Pakistan (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 17,669 203 110 498 16,270

1989 19,407 218 1,678 499 18,540

1990 19,445 261 1,673 380 19,972

1991 19,390 248 603 373 18,171

1992 20,458 279 1,813 236 19,194

1993 21,915 301 2,831 67 21,901

1994 20,537 331 1,817 103 20,845

1995 22,773 339 2,679 18 22,646

1996 23,027 337 2,083 15 22,234

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 23,150 344 2,455 51 0 22,112

2002 25,275 367 2,811 1,215 0 24,126

2007 27,717 392 3,337 2,169 0 26,594

Per capita income in Pakistan has 

increased by 70 percent (in real 

terms) over the past two decades. 

This has contributed to the reduction 

of the country's poverty rate from 50 

percent in mid-1980's to 33 percent 

in the early 1990's. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
72 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 50--Vietnam (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 12,859 1,552 403 119 12,421

1989 13,615 1,472 123 75 12,438

1990 13,242 1,394 99 75 12,600

1991 15,538 1,488 190 80 14,177

1992 15,449 1,654 214 84 14,351

1993 16,839 1,561 216 87 15,037

1994 17,146 1,376 256 64 15,086

1995 18,583 1,259 466 21 15,709

1996 18,800 1,264 475 0 16,040

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 19,000 1,335 470 0 0 16,194

2002 20,027 1,430 589 327 0 17,090

2007 21,478 1,530 771 176 0 18,476

While still one of the region's poorest 

countries, the success of Vietnam's 

"doi moi" program has turned its 

economy around and provides a 

reason for optimism about the 

country's future growth. 

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

5

10

15

20

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 49--Sri Lanka (Asia)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,576 212 659 272 2,621

1989 1,625 188 928 231 2,752

1990 1,678 173 700 201 2,555

1991 1,691 162 421 439 2,563

1992 1,649 140 813 249 2,638

1993 1,748 141 803 338 2,839

1994 1,905 140 590 346 2,956

1995 1,679 138 1,022 120 2,919

1996 1,565 138 1,279 57 2,851

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,615 141 1,064 220 174 2,641

2002 1,886 148 1,091 89 40 2,920

2007 1,995 154 1,174 69 18 3,109

Sri Lanka has a strong human 

resource base and is endowed with 

natural resources that are 

increasingly threatened by rapid 

urbanization and environmental 

problems (deforestation and air and 

water pollution).

1997 2002 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

The Food Gap

Status quo gap Nutritional gap
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 73

Statistical table 52--Colombia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 3,256 1,013 926 12 3,917

1989 3,286 1,117 771 7 4,015

1990 3,351 1,150 952 1 4,248

1991 3,035 1,053 791 8 3,472

1992 2,963 1,037 1,590 17 4,206

1993 3,142 1,250 1,694 31 4,178

1994 3,126 1,257 2,373 15 4,533

1995 2,891 1,236 2,572 0 4,928

1996 2,899 1,176 2,740 0 4,636

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,779 1,237 2,935 9 0 4,879

2002 2,996 1,271 3,358 0 0 5,389

2007 3,123 1,306 3,994 0 0 6,042

Aggregate food supply is projected 

to continue to be sufficient. The 

projected 2-percent growth will be 

mainly driven by growth in 

commercial grain imports, which are 

expected to grow 3.5 percent.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

1

2

3

4

5

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 51--Bolivia (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 609 354 103 95 746

1989 703 312 178 96 756

1990 692 288 0 235 711

1991 760 309 143 238 876

1992 780 291 130 243 866

1993 1,055 318 89 205 959

1994 875 268 155 176 833

1995 825 272 274 67 825

1996 935 293 237 75 885

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 945 283 240 90 17 799

2002 1,053 296 252 134 53 861

2007 1,137 310 275 192 102 911

Bolivia's food gap is projected to 

increase steadily during the next 

decade. To eliminate this gap grain 

production has to grow 2.6 percent 

annually or food imports need to 

grow 5.7 percent.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
74 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 54--El Salvador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 787 8 0 199 733

1989 772 10 0 249 722

1990 795 10 72 84 693

1991 699 11 368 86 937

1992 953 15 141 131 825

1993 858 14 212 79 764

1994 690 32 467 7 915

1995 873 30 391 13 856

1996 841 30 420 0 904

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 860 31 463 0 0 955

2002 872 34 504 56 0 973

2007 923 36 562 81 0 1,047

Even though the aggregate food gap 

projected for 2007 is relatively small, 

it may leave 40 percent of the 

population unable to maintain their 

consumption level. Slow grain 

production growth of 1 percent and 

skewed distribution of purchasing 

power are to blame. Imports are not 

expected to grow enough to make up

the difference.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 53--Dominican Republic (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 379 88 405 228 593

1989 357 105 622 9 567

1990 323 101 682 6 596

1991 343 85 731 14 442

1992 390 88 785 7 408

1993 370 68 972 7 576

1994 369 69 924 3 476

1995 396 87 1,018 1 659

1996 370 86 891 0 487

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 340 82 1,066 0 0 601

2002 397 85 1,130 0 0 648

2007 413 87 1,262 0 0 735

Commercial imports of grains and 

roots are three times the domestic 

production, and import capacity is 

projected to increase by 2.4 percent 

per year, enough to ensure sufficient 

food supplies.

Food Production and 

Imports

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Com. imports Production
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 75

Statistical table 56--Guatemala (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,460 13 0 281 1,262

1989 1,342 13 35 163 1,063

1990 1,398 16 185 171 1,195

1991 1,355 14 176 252 1,306

1992 1,454 16 280 109 1,310

1993 1,400 16 275 151 1,276

1994 1,353 17 430 144 1,349

1995 1,443 17 462 30 1,338

1996 1,461 17 484 25 1,242

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,311 18 524 205 187 1,163

2002 1,618 20 578 154 0 1,416

2007 1,767 22 677 225 0 1,563

El Nino is to blame for 1997 

production losses which lead to 

substantial food gaps. 

The long-run food gap is projected to 

remain high unless grain production 

growth accelerates to 2.7 percent to 

fill the status quo gap or imports 

increase at an annual rate of 5.3 

percent. Income distribution is 

among the most eskewed in the 

world.

1997 2002 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

The Food Gap

Status quo gap Nutritional gap

Statistical table 55--Ecuador (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 544 107 483 90 827

1989 593 111 432 38 729

1990 726 116 365 98 748

1991 857 104 416 45 791

1992 932 128 346 14 627

1993 939 113 271 12 557

1994 909 137 321 32 519

1995 914 123 377 1 560

1996 837 120 573 8 737

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 911 129 474 0 2 618

2002 966 135 533 18 26 656

2007 1,054 140 613 0 0 746

Ecuador is expected to be able to 

produce and import enough grain 

and roots to have sufficient supplies 

to avert food gaps. 

El Nino is expected to affect 

Ecuador, which might lead to a food 

gap in the coming year.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
76 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 58--Honduras (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 526 6 94 71 401

1989 619 7 31 134 444

1990 684 8 88 84 437

1991 693 7 100 160 467

1992 710 8 73 64 392

1993 690 8 66 149 413

1994 617 7 250 73 476

1995 780 7 233 42 435

1996 744 8 202 58 404

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 730 8 250 48 23 396

2002 827 8 270 75 46 432

2007 892 9 304 120 87 451

Agricultural production is expected to 

decline this and the coming year as a 

result of the El Nino phonomenon. 

Commercial imports are projected to 

be insufficient to close the food gap. 

The very uneven income distribution 

in Honduras exaccerbates poverty of 

low-income households.

Food Availability Versus 

Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 57--Haiti (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 330 218 149 49 653

1989 350 223 43 195 706

1990 350 224 254 42 778

1991 330 225 218 55 722

1992 320 231 268 75 793

1993 340 223 217 114 804

1994 330 224 159 117 718

1995 345 224 328 81 883

1996 345 224 341 86 895

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 355 231 293 91 176 772

2002 372 250 294 144 238 802

2007 409 270 300 183 285 855

Food production growth would need 

to be twice its projected level to fill 

the food gap and imports would need 

to grow 7 or 8 times faster than 

projected--hard to realize with limited 

foreign exchange and exports 

projected to decline rather than 

increase by 2007.

1997 2002 2007

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

Grain Imports and Gap 

Commercial imports Nutritional gap
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 77

Statistical table 60--Nicaragua (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 396 20 152 54 570

1989 430 20 84 57 450

1990 357 20 33 141 439

1991 409 20 1 145 451

1992 427 20 61 97 451

1993 485 21 85 55 466

1994 290 21 156 34 468

1995 383 21 155 43 517

1996 510 21 175 43 644

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 385 22 175 60 41 485

2002 449 23 174 82 61 535

2007 501 25 179 112 88 582

Grain production is projected to grow 

insufficiently to keep pace with 2.5 

percent population growth and fill the 

food gap by 2007. Commercial 

imports would have to grow more 

than 4 times the projected 0.8 

percent to fill the gap. 

Food Production and 

Imports

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production

Statistical table 59--Jamaica (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 4 69 82 365 345

1989 4 58 200 165 237

1990 2 68 172 163 219

1991 3 72 131 323 364

1992 4 84 251 201 346

1993 5 92 298 157 378

1994 5 97 304 53 262

1995 5 102 268 49 223

1996 5 102 460 0 355

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 5 101 385 0 0 285

2002 5 102 423 0 0 317

2007 5 104 475 0 0 360

Even though food supplies are 

projected to be sufficient in the long 

run, the households making up the 

lowest income quintile will not be 

able to maintain their consumption 

level or reach the nutritional 

requirement.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
78 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 62--Armenia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 331 -- -- -- --

1989 169 -- -- -- --

1990 246 -- -- -- --

1991 295 -- -- -- --

1992 302 62 508 117 575

1993 313 72 223 277 575

1994 238 77 79 366 548

1995 263 87 111 279 555

1996 333 82 135 200 550

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 355 85 232 106 97 456

2002 388 89 245 64 55 506

2007 421 94 269 33 23 557

Higher grain production is projected 

to reduce the food gap to 

insignificant levels by 2007.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 61--Peru (Latin America and the Caribbean)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,890 748 1,407 167 3,130

1989 1,954 647 971 209 2,519

1990 1,424 521 1,202 398 2,488

1991 1,241 574 1,339 492 2,289

1992 1,572 454 1,684 377 2,552

1993 1,686 607 1,549 410 2,446

1994 2,015 686 2,021 348 3,036

1995 1,683 850 2,396 108 3,444

1996 1,738 824 2,710 0 3,311

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 2,053 799 2,497 0 0 3,331

2002 1,941 834 2,594 386 143 3,218

2007 2,122 869 2,694 527 264 3,366

The long-run food gap could be 

closed if domestic grain production 

increased at an annual rate of 2 

percent or imports could grow at 2.3 

percent. This might be possible if 

the assumption of only 1.5 percent 

real export growth per year turns out 

to be overly pessimistic.

1997 2002 2007

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1,000 tons

1997 2002 2007

The Food Gap

Status quo gap Nutritional gap
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 79

Statistical table 64--Georgia (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 676 -- -- -- --

1989 464 -- -- -- --

1990 658 -- -- -- --

1991 567 -- -- -- --

1992 493 41 556 194 971

1993 412 37 325 585 972

1994 482 58 236 569 857

1995 522 69 374 281 871

1996 552 70 299 381 878

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 652 72 606 8 0 861

2002 659 74 613 0 0 908

2007 713 75 636 0 0 978

Rapid economic growth will eliminate 

the food gap in Georgia, the largest 

NIS food aid recipient during 1992-

96.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1997 2002 2007

Million tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 63--Azerbaijan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,335 -- -- -- --

1989 822 -- -- -- --

1990 1,349 -- -- -- --

1991 1,327 -- -- -- --

1992 1,269 30 674 6 1,114

1993 1,084 29 692 58 1,062

1994 1,004 29 111 424 911

1995 1,075 39 368 187 976

1996 1,124 40 363 187 1,049

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,023 42 635 21 79 1,136

2002 1,208 45 928 0 0 1,458

2007 1,260 47 1,170 0 0 1,726

Rising oil exports will allow 

Azerbaijan to easily finance its food 

import requirements in the coming 

decade.

Food Production and 

Imports

0

500

1,000

1,500

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Com. imports Production
80 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

Statistical table 66--Tajikistan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 342 -- -- -- --

1989 270 -- -- -- --

1990 282 -- -- -- --

1991 269 -- -- -- --

1992 237 32 1,124 71 990

1993 285 28 838 82 983

1994 240 27 646 104 862

1995 234 21 409 206 700

1996 241 22 466 139 658

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 251 24 556 66 343 607

2002 277 26 560 123 427 617

2007 303 29 581 171 506 644

With an economy devastated by war 

and rapid population growth, 

Tajikistan's fod gap is expected to 

widen in the coming decade.

Food Availability 

Versus Requirement

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.

Statistical table 65--Kyrgyzstan (New Independent States)

Grain Root Commercial Food aid Aggregate

Year Production Production Imports receipts availability

(grain equiv.) (grains) (grains) of food

---1,000 tons ---

1988 1,664 -- -- -- --

1989 1,593 -- -- -- --

1990 1,535 -- -- -- --

1991 1,369 -- -- -- --

1992 1,510 362 379 91 744

1993 1,600 291 134 156 729

1994 1,059 310 199 61 691

1995 983 431 85 165 814

1996 1,408 70 1 154 941

Projections Food gap

SQ NR (w/o food aid)

1997 1,708 116 158 0 0 1,282

2002 1,466 125 161 0 0 1,062

2007 1,596 136 167 0 0 1,169

Higher wheat production has made 

Kyrgyzstan self-sufficient in food 

grains and have helped to eliminate 

the country's food gap.

Food Availability Versus 

Requirement

0

500

1,000

1,500

1997 2002 2007

1,000 tons

Grains Roots

Nutr. req. St.quo req.
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 81

Appendix 1--Country list, per capita nutritional requirement, share of grain and root crops in diet

Per capita Share of Share of Per capita Share of Share of 

Country nutritional grain in root crops Country nutritional grain in root crops

requirement * diet in diet requirement * diet in diet

 Kg. grain eq Percent Percent Kg. grain eq Percent Percent

Asia East Africa

Afghanistan 194 78.4 1.5 Burundi 120 21.2 27.9

Bangladesh 207 82.6 1.4 Eritrea 194 77.2 4.1

India 169 63.1 1.8 Ethiopia 176 70.8 5.0

Indonesia 181 63.5 6.2 Kenya 145 51.3 7.9

Nepal 195 76.3 3.0 Rwanda 109 17.8 27.6

Pakistan 138 58.3 0.8 Somalia 109 45.4 0.9

Philippines 149 53.2 3.7 Sudan 141 57.2 0.6

Sri Lanka 154 57.9 2.1 Tanzania 165 45.5 23.8

Vietnam 192 71.9 6.9 Uganda 115 18.7 25.4

Latin America

Bolivia 142 42.2 8.3 Southern Africa

Colombia 86 32.3 1.8 Angola 155 32.2 31.4

Dominican Rep. 81 29.4 3.1 Lesotho 202 77.1 3.4

Ecuador 84 33.1 3.4 Madagascar 187 55.4 21.0

El Salvador 132 56.6 1.4 Malawi 181 70.2 3.9

Guatemala 134 60.2 0.4 Mozambique 193 39.2 37.2

Haiti 128 41.0 11.7 Swaziland 130 49.6 1.3

Honduras 112 49.0 0.3 Zambia 206 68.3 10.3

Jamaica 99 30.9 9.9 Zimbabwe 179 64.6 1.9

Nicaragua 121 49.6 1.6

Peru 127 41.4 7.6 West Africa

Former Soviet Union Benin 188 38.2 34.4

Armenia 151 58.4 7.0 Burkina Faso 198 76.1 0.8

Azerbaijan 157 63.9 4.1 Cape Verde 133 51.1 2.2

Georgia 152 63.5 2.0 Chad 172 53.9 12.1

Kyrgyzstan 127 50.3 4.6 Cote d'Ivoire 172 37.1 28.8

Tajikistan 154 64.3 2.4 Gambia 133 50.8 0.9

Ghana 187 29.9 42.9

North Africa Guinea 149 46.0 12.5

Algeria 175 59.1 2.2 Guinea-Bissau 163 59.5 6.6

Egypt 175 66.5 1.8 Liberia 163 37.6 28.9

Morocco 186 55.1 2.1 Mali 185 72.1 0.5

Tunisia 147 50.8 1.5 Mauritania 144 55.9 0.5

Niger 230 71.5 3.7

Central Africa Nigeria 172 42.4 25.4

Cameroon 135 37.0 18.2 Senegal 162 58.0 1.1

Central Afr. Rep. 138 19.6 36.6 Sierra Leone 153 53.6 6.5

Congo (fka Zaire) 174 15.9 56.3 Togo 195 48.5 26.9

 * Based on FAO's minimum caloric requirement and total share of grains and root crops in the diet.
The food security assessment model used in this report

was developed at the USDA-ERS for use in projecting

food availability and access, and the food gap (previously

called food needs) in 66 low-income countries through

2007. The reference to food includes grains and root crops.

These two food commodity groups account for as much as

80 percent of all calories consumed in the study countries.

Root crops are generally not traded, while the bulk of all

food imports of these countries, commercial or food aid, is

in the form of grains.

Food security of a country is evaluated based on the gap

between projected domestic food availability (produced

domestically and imported commercially) and a consumption requirement. Although food aid is expected to be available during the projection period, it is not included in the

projection of food availability. It should be noted that while

projection results will provide a baseline for the food security situation of the countries, they depend on assumptions

and specifications of the model. Since the model is based on

historical data, it implicitly assumes that the historical trend

in key variables will continue in the future.

Food gaps are projected using two consumption criteria:

1) Status quo target, where the objective is to maintain average

per capita consumption of the recent past. The most recent 3-

year average (1994-96) is used for the per capita consumption

target in order to eliminate short-term fluctuations.

2) Nutrition-based target, where the objective is to maintain the minimum daily caloric intake standards recommended by the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO). The caloric requirements (based on total share of

grains and root crops) used in this assessment are those

necessary to sustain life with minimum food-gathering

activities. They are comparable to the activity level for a

refugee—they do not allow for play, work, or any activity

other than food gathering.

The status quo measure embodies a “safety-net” criterion by

providing food consumption stability at recently achieved

levels. The nutrition-based target assists in comparisons of

relative well-being. Comparing the two consumption measures either for countries or regions provides an indicator of

the need depending on whether the objectives are to achieve

consumption stability and/or to meet a nutritional standard.

Large nutrition-based needs relative to status quo needs, for

example, mean additional food must be provided if

improved nutrition levels are the main objective. In cases

where nutrition-based requirements are below status quo

consumption needs, food availability could decline without

risking nutritional adequacy, on average. Both methods,

however, fail to address inequalities of food distribution

within a country.

Structural framework for projecting 

food availability in the aggregate and 

by income group

Projection of Food Availability—The simulation framework used for projecting aggregate food availability is based

on partial equilibrium recursive models of 66 lower income

countries. The country models are synthetic, meaning that

the parameters that are used are either cross country estimates or are estimated by other studies. Each country model

includes two commodity groups, grains and root crops. The

production side of the model is divided into yield and area

response. Crop area is a function of 1-year lag return (real

price times yield), while yield responds to input use.

Commercial imports are assumed to be a function of domestic production, world commodity price, and foreign

exchange availability. Foreign exchange availability is a key

determinant of commercial food imports and is the sum of

the value of export earnings and net flow of credit. Foreign

exchange availability is assumed to be equal to foreign

exchange use, meaning that foreign exchange reserve is

assumed constant during the projection period. Countries are

assumed to be price takers in the international market,

meaning that world prices are exogenous in the model.

However, producer prices are linked to the international

market via commercial food imports.

Food availability is defined as the sum of grains and root

crop availability. For each commodity group (c), food availability (FA) is defined as domestic supply (DS) minus nonfood use (NF). n is country index and t is time index.

FAcnt=DScnt-NFcnt (1)

Nonfood use is the sum of seed use (SD), feed use (FD),

exports (EX), and other uses (OU). 

NFcnt=SDcnt+FDcnt+EXcnt+OUcnt (2)

Domestic supply of a commodity group is the sum of

domestic production (PR) plus commercial imports (CI) and

changes in stocks (CSTK).

DScnt=PRcnt+CIcnt+CSTKcnt (3)

Production is generally determined by the area and yield

response functions:

PRcnt=ARcnt*YLcnt (4)

YLcnt=/(LBcnt , FRcnt , CUcnt , Tcnt) (5)

RPYcnt=YLcnt*DPcnt (6)

RNPYcnt=NYLcnt*NDPcnt (7)

ARcnt=/(ARcnt-1 , RPYcnt-1 , RNPYcnt-1 , Zcnt) (8)

where AR is area, YL is yield, LB is rural labor, FR is fertilizer use, CU is capital use, T is the indicator of technology

change, DP is real domestic producer price, RPY is yield

times real price, NDP is real domestic producer substitute

82 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA

APPENDIX 2—FOOD SECURITY MODEL: DEFINITION AND METHODOLOGY
price, NYL is yield of substitute commodity, RNPY is yield

of substitute commodity times substitute price, and Z is

exogenous policies.

The commercial import demand function is defined as:

CIcnt=/(WPRct , NWPRct , FEXnt , PRcnt , Mnt) (9)

where WPR is real world food price, NWPR is real world substitute price, FEX is real foreign exchange availability, PR is

domestic production, and M is import restriction policies.

The real domestic producer price is defined as:

DPcnt=f(DPcnt-1 , DScnt , NDScnt ,GDnt , EXRnt) (10)

where NDS is supply of substitute commodity, GD is real

income, and EXR is real exchange rate.

Projections of food availability (consumption) by income

group—Inadequate economic access is the most important

cause of chronic undernutrition among developing countries

and is related to the level of income. Estimates of food gaps

at the aggregate or national level fails to take into account

the distribution of food consumption among different

income groups. Lack of consumption distribution data for

the countries is the key factor preventing estimation of food

consumption by income group. An attempt was made to fill

this information gap by using an indirect method of projecting calorie consumption by different income groups based

on income distribution data1. It should be noted that this

approach ignores the consumption substitution of different

food groups by income class (the plan is to improve this

aspect of the model in the future). The procedure uses the

concept of the income/consumption relationship and allocates the total projected amount of available food among

different income groups in each country (income ditributions are assumed constant during the projection period). 

Assuming a declining consumption and income relationship

(semi log functional form):

C = a + b ln Y (11)

C = Co/P (12)

P = P1 +........+ Pi (13)

Y = Yo/P (14)

i = 1 to 5

where C and Y are known average per capita food consumption (calorie consmption) and per capita income (all quintiles), Co is total food consumption, P is the total population, i is income quintile, a is the intercept, b is the consumption income propensity, and b/C is consumption

income elasticity (point estimate elasticity is calculated for

individual country). To estimate per capita consumption by

income group, the parameter of b was estimated based on

cross country (66 low-income countries) data for per capita

calorie consumption and income. The parameter a is estimated for each country based on the known data for average

per capita calorie consumption and per capita income. 

Historical Data 

Historical supply and use data for 1980-96 for most variables are from a USDA database. Data for grain production

in 1997 for most countries are based on a USDA database as

of October 1997. Food aid data are from the UN’s Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), and financial data are from

the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Historical

nonfood-use data, including seed, waste, processing use, and

other use, are estimated from the FAO Food Balance series.

The base year data used for projections are the average for

1994-96, except export earnings that are 1993-95.

Endogenous variables:

Production, area, yield, commercial import, and 

domestic producer price.

Exogenous variables:

Population—data are UN population projections.

World prices—data are USDA/baseline projections. 

Stocks—assumed constant during the projection period. 

Seed use—projections are based on area projections 

using constant base seed/area ratio. 

Industrial use—projections are based on extrapolation 

of historical trends. 

Food exports—projections are either based on the 

population growth rate or extrapolation of historical 

trends. 

Inputs—Fertilizer and capital projections are, in 

general, an extrapolation of historical growth.

Agricultural labor—projections are based on UN 

population projections, accounting for urbanization 

growth.

Net foreign credit—net real flow of foreign credit is

assumed constant during the projection period.

Value of exports—projections are based on World 

Bank (Global Economic Prospects and the Developing

Countries, various issues), IMF (World Economic

Outlook, various issues), or an extrapolation of 

historical growth.

Export deflator or terms of trade—World Bank

(Commodity Markets—Projection of Inflation Indices 

for Developed Countries). 

Income—projected based on World Bank report 

(Global Economic Prospects and the Developing

Countries, various issues) or extrapolation of historical 

growth.

Income distribution—World Bank data. Income distributions are assumed constant during the projection period 

(Shahla Shapouri).

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 83

1The method is similar to the method used by Shlomo Reutlinger and

Marcelo Selowsky in “Malnutrition and Proverty”, World Bank, 1978.
84 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA Appendix 3--Country indicators Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators Region Population Population Growth Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP Export Months of Debt and 1997 growth 1981-96 of variation growth growth in GNP GNP growth earnings import coverage service country rate 1981-95 1981-96 supply 1995 growth 1995 growth in reserves ratio 1995 1995 1995 1995 1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. $ ------ Percent----- Number Percent North Africa Algeria 29,830 2.2 -1.3 43.9 5.6 2.4 1,600 1.2 4.4 -- 5.0 38.7 Egypt 64,792 1.9 5.0 5.3 2.4 1.6 790 0.5 2.4 -0.8 11.8 14.6 Morocco 30,391 2.1 3.9 51.1 5.0 1.9 1,110 -8.7 -6.9 19.7 3.6 32.1 Tunisia 9,183 1.8 2.8 63.2 5.1 2.5 1,820 1.5 2.4 17.5 2.1 17.0 Central Africa Cameroon 14,678 2.9 0.5 8.0 1.6 2.0 650 -0.4 4.2 24.8 0.1 20.1 Central African Rep. 3,342 2.1 1.8 16.7 -1.4 1.2 340 -0.5 4.1 24.7 9.0 6.8 Congo (fka Zaire) 47,440 2.0 3.5 8.3 2.4 2.0 120 -5.9 -- 4.5 -- -- West Africa Benin 5,902 3.4 4.4 10.6 5.4 1.9 370 6.4 -- -- 3.2 8.4 Burkina Faso 10,891 2.5 6.6 13.7 -5.9 1.7 230 1.5 4.5 26.9 7.1 11.1 Cape Verde 462 3.0 11.8 89.1 -0.9 1.9 960 2.4 -- -- -- -- Chad 7,166 2.7 3.8 18.8 1.2 1.9 180 2.3 5.5 -- 4.2 5.9 Cote d'Ivoire 15,150 2.6 3.9 7.4 2.4 2.1 660 17.8 6.6 38.0 1.5 23.1 Gambia 1,248 3.6 3.8 16.9 0.0 1.8 320 -3.6 3.2 -50.0 5.3 14.0 Ghana 18,101 2.3 3.2 22.2 6.7 4.3 390 1.7 4.4 -- 4.3 23.1 Guinea 7,495 1.1 3.5 9.8 1.2 1.8 550 1.9 4.6 13.0 25.3 Guinea-Bissau 1,179 2.4 9.3 16.1 2.6 1.7 250 2.1 1.7 -28.1 2.5 66.9 Liberia 2,257 7.0 -6.0 40.7 9.2 2.7 -- -- -- -- -- -- Mali 9,945 3.0 6.5 13.9 -0.1 2.1 250 3.2 6.4 -- 4.0 12.6 Mauritania 2,411 3.2 12.9 47.1 -0.6 1.7 460 2.2 4.6 -- 1.7 21.5 Niger 9,389 3.0 2.2 16.0 1.7 2.0 220 1.0 3.2 -- 2.6 19.8 Nigeria 107,129 3.1 0.2 18.2 10.3 2.4 260 1.3 2.3 24.4 1.5 12.3 Senegal 9,404 3.4 2.2 20.1 3.3 1.7 600 7.9 10.3 -- 1.9 18.7 Sierra Leone 5,004 4.4 -2.6 11.3 4.6 1.0 180 -2.8 -9.2 -63.5 2.7 60.3 Togo 4,736 3.6 4.8 16.1 0.2 1.6 310 7.5 8.2 29.0 3.6 25.7 East Africa Burundi 6,053 1.8 -1.1 19.6 1.9 2.8 160 -5.9 -3.8 -1.9 8.7 27.7 Eritrea 4,142 5.9 1.0 -- 1.3 2.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- Ethiopia 58,733 2.7 2.0 11.0 1.3 4.0 100 2.7 4.9 13.7 7.0 13.6 Kenya 28,803 2.2 1.1 14.8 2.3 2.0 280 4.2 4.4 16.7 1.2 25.7 Rwanda 7,738 12.9 -2.5 14.6 -1.6 3.2 180 19.7 23.0 36.4 4.7 -- Somalia 9,940 3.1 -1.8 37.1 0.5 1.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- Sudan 32,041 3.1 2.9 39.0 -5.0 1.6 -- -- -- 6.0 -- -- Tanzania 29,461 1.4 1.4 12.6 0.3 2.0 120 1.0 4.0 23.1 1.5 17.4 Uganda 20,605 2.2 2.6 6.0 1.3 2.5 240 8.1 11.2 8.7 3.8 21.3 See note at end of table. Continued--
Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 85

Appendix 3--Country indicators--continued

Grain production Root Macroeconomic indicators

Region Population Population Growth Coefficient production Projected Per capita Per capita GDP Export Months of Debt and 1997 growth 1981-96 of variation growth growth in GNP GNP growth earnings import coverage service country rate 1981-95 1981-96 supply 1995 growth 1995 growth in reserves ratio

1995 1995 1995 1995

1,000 ------Percent------ U.S. $ ------ Percent----- Number Percent

Southern Africa Angola 10,624 2.7 -1.9 19.3 4.5 2.2 410 13.0 6.3 16.9 -- 12.5

 Lesotho 2,008 1.9 1.2 30.2 9.2 1.6 770 7.4 10.0 -- 5.4 6.0

 Madagascar 14,062 2.9 1.4 3.1 2.1 1.8 230 -1.3 1.8 -10.3 1.1 9.2

 Malawi 9,609 1.7 3.0 21.7 0.2 2.4 170 11.3 13.5 -- 1.5 25.9

 Mozambique 18,356 2.7 1.4 24.7 0.4 2.7 80 -0.9 4.3 12.7 -- 35.3

 Swaziland 1,032 3.3 2.5 30.8 0.0 2.4 1,070 0.1

 Zambia 9,350 2.1 2.0 31.7 4.6 2.2 400 -5.5 -3.1 -- -- 174.4 Zimbabwe 11,423 1.4 1.1 37.4 5.4 1.7 540 -2.9 -1.8 -- -- 25.6

Asia Afghanistan 23,738 4.7 -3.6 7.9 -0.5 1.9 -- -- -- -- -- --

 Bangladesh 125,340 1.9 2.2 4.0 0.3 1.8 240 2.7 4.4 19.2 4.2 13.3

 India 967,613 1.6 2.9 5.2 2.9 2.1 340 4.4 6.1 22.7 5.2 27.9

 Indonesia 209,774 1.5 2.0 3.3 1.7 1.2 980 5.7 8.1 13.4 3.0 30.9

 Nepal 22,641 2.5 3.2 8.3 7.2 1.8 200 1.0 3.3 -4.4 4.9 7.8

 Pakistan 132,185 2.3 2.2 4.8 6.0 2.0 460 2.1 4.4 8.4 2.1 35.3

 Philippines 76,104 2.2 2.5 4.5 0.4 1.7 1,050 3.1 4.8 31.6 2.6 16.0

 Sri Lanka 18,762 1.1 0.9 9.1 -4.6 1.3 700 3.6 5.4 18.3 4.2 7.3

 Vietnam 75,124 1.6 0.9 5.0 -1.9 1.5 240 -- 9.5 39.5 0.0 5.2

Latin America Bolivia 7,295 1.8 3.1 15.2 0.6 1.7 800 1.4 3.7 6.7 6.7 28.9

 Colombia 37,418 1.6 -3.5 6.2 0.0 2.0 1,910 1.5 5.3 16.3 5.0 25.2

 Dominican Republic 8,228 1.7 0.1 9.7 2.5 1.9 1,460 3.0 2.5 20.9 0.7 7.8

 Ecuador 11,691 2.0 0.7 0.0 1.8 1,390 -1.0 2.3 12.7 3.4 26.7

 El Salvador 5,935 1.8 2.7 10.4 9.0 1.5 1,610 4.8 6.9 18.2 3.2 8.9

 Guatemala 11,558 2.5 2.0 4.3 1.7 2.2 1,340 3.5 3.0 41.7 2.4 10.6

 Haiti 6,851 1.8 -1.8 8.3 0.4 1.3 250 2.2 4.5 34.1 1.6 45.2

 Honduras 5,751 2.6 3.1 12.0 4.3 1.9 600 0.9 3.9 25.9 1.5 31.0

 Jamaica 2,616 0.8 -6.4 60.2 3.2 2.1 1,510 -0.5 0.5 18.6 2.0 17.9

 Nicaragua 4,386 2.7 1.7 16.1 4.2 1.8 380 17.7 4.2 47.7 1.2 38.7

 Peru 24,950 1.7 2.0 13.9 0.8 1.2 2,310 6.2 7.2 22.4 8.6 15.3

Former Soviet Union Armenia 3,466 0.1 2.0 53.6 0.8 1.9 730 30.8 6.9 25.5 -- 2.9

 Azerbaijan 7,736 0.8 2.0 52.7 0.8 2.7 480 -13.6 -13.0 -10.3 -- --

 Georgia 5,175 -0.9 2.0 52.6 0.8 1.7 440 -5.5 -5.0 -8.9 -- --

 Kyrgystan 4,540 0.2 2.0 51.8 0.8 1.2 700 -7.1 -6.3 20.3 -- 4.8

Tajikistan 6,014 1.7 2.0 51.2 0.8 1.3 340 -15.9 -12.5 34.0 -- --

-- = data unavailable or not applicable due to inconsistent data set.
List of Tables

1. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for 66 Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Ratio of Food Consumption to Nutritional Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

3. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

4. North Africa: Income Distribution in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

5. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Income Distribution in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

7. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

8. Asia: Income Distribution in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

9. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

10. Latin America and the Caribbean: Income Distribution in 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

11. Grain and Root Supply and Food Gaps for New Independent States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

12. NIS: Economic (GDP) Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

SPECIAL ARTICLES

A-1. Developing Countries: Trade Orientation and Economic Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

B-1. Cereal Balance Information, Southern African Countries, 1993-1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

B-2. Comparison of Accumulated Import Cost Savings with Insurance Program, SADC Countries . . . . . .33

B-3. Road Density, Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34

C-1. Selected Indicators of Food Availability and Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

C-2. Selected Indicators of Natural and Produced Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38

C-3. Selected Indicators of Social and Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39

C-4. Sources of Wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41

D-1. List of Countries Included in the Analysis and their Gini Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

D-2. Regional Averages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45

D-3. Agricultural and Economic Indicators, Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

Country Statistical Tables

North Africa (4 countries)

1. Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

2. Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48

3. Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

4. Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Central Africa (3 countries)

5. Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

6. Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

7. Congo, Democratic Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

East Africa (9 countries)

8. Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51

9. Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

10. Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52

11. Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

12. Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53

13. Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

14. Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54

15. Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

16. Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

Southern Africa (8 countries)

17. Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

86 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA
18. Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

19. Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

20. Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57

21. Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

22. Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

23. Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

24. Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

West Africa (17 countries)

25. Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

26. Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60

27. Cape Verde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

28. Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

29. Cote d’Ivoire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

30. Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62

31. Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

32. Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63

33. Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

34. Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64

35. Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

36. Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65

37. Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

38. Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

39. Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

40. Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

41. Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

Asia (9 countries)

42. Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68

43. Bangladesh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

44. India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

45. Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

46. Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

47. Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

48. Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71

49. Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

50. Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

Latin America and the Caribbean (11 countries)

51. Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

52. Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .73

53. Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

54. Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

55. El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

56. Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

57. Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

58. Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76

59. Jamaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

60. Nicaragua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77

61. Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

NIS (5 countries)

62. Armenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

63. Azerbaijan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

64. Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

65. Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

66. Tajikistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

Economic Research Service/USDA Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 87
Appendices

Appendix 1. Country list, per capita nutritional requirement, share of grain and root crops in diet . . . . . . .81

Appendix 2. Food Security Model: Definition and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

Appendix 3. Country Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84

List of Figures

1. Food Gaps in 1997 and 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5

2. Distribution of Population and Food Gaps in 1997 and 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

3. Consumption Distribution in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

4. North Africa: Grain Area and Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

5. North Africa: Food Supply Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

6. Consumption Distribution by Income Group in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

7. Sub-Saharan Africa: Grain and Root Supply vs Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

8. Grain Production and Total Imports, North Korea, 1980-1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

9. Asia’s Food Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

10. Asia: Grain Area and Yields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

11. Latin America’s Food Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

12. Grain and Root Supply in Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

13. Tajikistan’s Share in Total NIS Food Deficit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

14. NIS (5) Grain Production and Imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

SPECIAL ARTICLES

A-1. The pattern of declining real prices is slowing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26

A-2. Growth in U.S. public expenditures on agricultural R&D has declined since the 1950’s . . . . . . . . . . .27

A-3. Contributions to agricultural TFP growth in the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

B-1. SADC Grain Supply Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

B-2. Zambia’s Stocking Rules—A Hypothetical Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

B-3. Hypothetical Import Rules to Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

B-4. Total Import Costs for SADC Region, Actual and Hypothetical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

C-1. The Role of Resources in Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

D-1. Measuring Degree of Income Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

D-2. Food Gap of Sri Lanka and Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

88 Food Security Assessment/GFA-9/November 1997 Economic Research Service/USDA