GLOBAL WAR GAME
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES

Newport Paper #4

June 1993

“The Newport Papers” series is a vehicle for distribution of substan

by members of the Naval War College’s teaching and research facult

dents. Papers are drawn generally from manuscripts not scheduled fo

tion either as articles in the Naval War College Review or as books 

Naval War College Press but that nonetheless merit extensive dis

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of Naval Warfare Studies.

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necessarily those of the Naval War College or the Department of th

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nent distribution should be directed to the President, Code 32A, N

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Second printing July 1993.
GLOBAL WAR GAME

The First Five Years

Bud Hay and Bob Gile

Contents

Note to the Reader ............................. 

Executive Summary............................. 

Series Development ............................. 

Game Scenarios ............................... 

1979 ................................. 

1980 ................................. 

1981 ................................. 

1982 ................................. 

1983 ................................. 

Overview .............................. 

Objectives and Strategy ........................... 

Blue Objectives ........................... 

Blue Strategy ............................ 

Red Objectives ........................... 

Red Strategy............................. 

Geographic Theaters ............................ 

Europe................................ 

Central Front ............................ 

Norwegian Sea/North Atlantic/GIUK................ 

Mediterranean ............................ 

Southwest Asia ........................... 

Western Pacific ........................... 

Employment of Naval Forces ........................ 

ASW/SSN Operations ........................ 

Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) .................. 

Anti-SSBN Campaign ........................ 

CVBG Employment ......................... 

Mine Warfare ............................ 

Tomahawk Employment ...................... 

Marine Corps ............................ 

Chemical and Nuclear Warfare ....................... 

Political and Military Considerations.................... 

War Initiation ............................ 

Long/Short-Term War ....................... 

Horizontal Escalation ........................ 

War Termination .......................... 

Epilogue ................................... 

Glossary ................................... 

The Authors ................................. 
Fundamentally, this type of worldwide tabletop game has o

ous potential for further development. Such a summer project c

evolve into a productive and popular annual exercise.

Hugh Nott, with reference to the 1979 Global War Gam
Note to the Reader

This report deals with practical issues and major themes as identifi

the first Global War Game (GWG) Series. Its focus is on various gene

specific force employment issues, and game histories. Because of the 

among many themes and issues, some repetition is included to provi

complete discussion.

The GWG series was conceived in 1978 to build a structure t

warfighting issues and to provide a larger perspective than the tactical 

was prevalent in the Navy at that time. The domain of research for th

ranges from policy through strategy to operations (campaigns). It wa

opportunity to investigate ideas and concepts that may vary from cur

egy or policy wisdom. With the understanding that these simulations 

an approximation of the behavior of governments facing global war, t

ios should be considered as a context for issues to be explored. The 

had a specifically Navy focus, but the series quickly evolved, by obvio

sity, into a much broader military and political forum. Throughout th

ries, GWG was utilized as a test bed or crucible for an emerging 

strategy. Both developments were smiled upon by then Chief of Nav

tions (CNO) Admiral Thomas B. Hayward.

Effort has been made throughout this paper to preserve the termin

was in use when the games were conducted. This report endeavors als

faithfully actual strategies and operations as well as the rationale beh

Thus, while some of the terms may seem archaic and some of the o

ill-advised, it is necessary to look at these early efforts as a learning e

that reflects where we were when the games started and how far we h

since then.

The second Global War Game series, 1984–1988, was conducted 

ral continuum of the first series. Its purpose was to explore issues in

waging protracted warfare in the decade of the 1990s. The third seri

ning in 1989 and finishing in 1993, has focused on the changing world 

military, and economic relationships. It is anticipated that unclassifi

similar to this one will be published covering the second and third Glo

A fourth volume is planned that will deal with game organization, m

and administration.
Executive Summary

Global War Game 1979 was the start of the first five-year series 

games that explored conflict in a worldwide setting. These games fo

developing insights into how maritime campaigns might be condu

global scale. Consequently, the emphasis in this first series was larg

However, as the series progressed, it became clear that naval play cou

ist in isolation and that political actions and the activities of other ser

pacted heavily on the decisions for maritime force employment. T

both interservice and intraservice participation, as well as civilian re

tion, were increased in order to provide a broader perspective. Initial

and assistance were solicited from the Army and Air Force regarding 

to make the game more realistic. Both services provided full coopera

ticularly the respective war colleges at Carlisle and Maxwell and the 

Command and Staff at Leavenworth. By the end of the first series, th

the military play was clearly joint, with the Army and the Air Forc

large delegations, which were fully integrated into the play of the gam

aspects. The second five-year Global series, building on this fo

stressed all aspects of military operations.

The first year of play saw a Blue defensive mind-set with a doctri

who was aggressive and determined. Each year following produced a 

gressive Blue and a more interactive Red. By the end of this series the 

game play had progressed to a level that was more representative of th

processes to be expected in a superpower confrontation.

Blue’s initial defensive mind-set resulted in part from a combinatio

miliarity with a global scale of conflict and an alignment with a

(NATO) whose objectives were purely defensive. The shifting to the 

began to occur as players discovered that maritime force survivabi

forward areas was in fact much higher than originally envisioned. A 

gressive strategy in support of a Eurocentric war produced more su

proved the clear choice for optimized employment.

As the series developed, escalation dominance was at the for

thought. Players explored it in terms of both the vertical (increased 

of conflict) and the horizontal (war-widening). From a maritime pe

the dimension that related most directly to naval employment was h
escalation, where commanders searched for ways of applying pressu

away from the central area of battle. Although limited success was rea

short duration of game play precluded measurement of successes.

The players’ thinking shifted over time to the opinion that Blue/NA

do better in a longer, conventional war. As the comparative advan

tween Blue and Red became more fully understood, conventional w

tended duration appeared to offer Blue the best prospects for victory

escalation seemed to work to Blue’s disadvantage. Thus, if Blue/NA

weather the storm of the short and medium period of conflict, the 

might of the Western production capacity could be brought to bear.

The fundamental hypothesis that evolved early in the series and th

shape the underpinnings of Blue strategy can be stated as follows:

• Blue/NATO appeared unlikely to win a short, conventional war i

tral region, and

• There was a strong possibility that nuclear escalation would be 

tageous to all involved.

• Therefore, a strategy that provided a better chance for Blue/N

cess was that of protracted, conventional war.

Issues of particular focus included the following:

• The absolute necessity for the prompt use of strategic warning

• The requirement to examine military strategies for protracted

tional war.

• The need to explore the longer term effects of horizontal escal

• The central importance of preplanning for resource manageme

dustrial mobilization.

• The benefits of early identification of technological needs and th

zation of the scientific community to support initiatives of “Manhatta

stature.

In the realm of warfighting, the Global War Game series demonst

while the Blue/NATO alliance has a defensive political orientation, 

campaign options within the strategic defense may be effective in d

Red timelines and thus causing Red to revise prewar military object

ix

Series Development

GLOBAL WAR GAME ‘79 began the first of three five-game seri

introduced a concept largely neglected since the 1930s, when th

war plans were gamed at the Naval War College (NWC). The first ser

games played out five Blue/Red scenarios with force levels and equip

tulated for Blue and Red in the year 1985. Each game was a separate 

rather than a continuation of the previous year. Although the scenari

tie directly to each other, as issues were identified, they were incorpo

each follow-on game, forming a series. The combined effect was to e

longitudinal approach which examined problems over time and allow

vening study to address specific issues.

This “game-study-game” concept, which evolved during the first 

ries, was to become a most important aspect of the second series. Iss

in one year’s game could be studied and researched during the in

eleven months and the results incorporated into the succeeding yea

This process was greatly facilitated by the presence of Army and Air F

cers at the Naval War College. Their work, along with that of their 

Marine Corps contemporaries, often in interservice combinations, co

importantly to both game development and the attainment of game obj

The first game was held in the summer of 1979 at the Naval War C

der the sponsorship of the Center for Advanced Research. It was stru

an experimental concept with limited personnel and material resou

narios and strategies appropriate to worldwide conflict were develo

because of the experimental nature of the undertaking, a manual c

game format was selected. Some fifty officers (mostly Naval War Co

dents) and a half-dozen senior defense officials participated. Initially 

concern as to whether this level of participation was sufficient to exec

erly a game of global scope. Global War Game ‘79 was in fact more s

than expected. However, it was also evident that a more thorough ex

of global conflict was required and that the effort needed to be pop

more senior players and experts.
The objectives of the series were expressed during the first gam

mained constant throughout. The overriding objective was to gain ins

how naval campaigns might be conducted on a global scale in the eve

flict between the United States (Blue) and allies and the Soviet Union 

satellites. Other specific objectives included the derivation of insigh

• The priorities of sequential operations.

• The adequacy and form of logistics systems to support exte

longed and diverse naval operations.

• The impact of strategy and maneuver on force effectiveness.

• The impact of political/economic factors in developing strategie

nerabilities of such strategies to international and regional constrain

• Loci of various nuclear thresholds in various theaters including 

and concepts for escalation/de-escalation.

• Pattern and processes for control of military forces at national 

ters and tactical levels when combat activity is intensive and widesp

From these modest beginnings, the Global War Game experienced 

tial growth both in terms of personnel participation and in the level o

cation. Midway through the first series, GWG had grown into a 

operation involving over two hundred participants from all the service

intelligence agencies, and numerous government departments and 

and also officials and representatives of academia and industry. Exp

employed to ensure game fidelity in areas such as logistics, advance

ogy, and command, control, and communications (C3

).

Each game of this first series stressed strategy and maneuver. Stan

values and models of weapons systems and sensors were utilized to 

the outcome of specific interactions.

As its name suggests, the Global War Game is a large game, requir

players and controllers. These participants are organized into six prim

and several supporting tables. Primary cells are:

Blue and Red NCAs (National Command Authority);

Blue and Red CINCs (commanders-in-chief); and,

Blue and Red players on the game floor.

Supporting tables covered such areas as logistics, weather, intelligenc

litical/military decisions by nations not belonging to either the Blu

camp.

The Global War Game is a hybrid. It includes aspects of a researc

logistics game, and an operational game. Both manual and automate

systems have been used in the Global War Games. As later games g

2
complex, there was a shift toward increasing reliance on computer

b

tems. Whereas GWG-79 was essentially a manual game, GWG-83 inc

new Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS), the U.S. Army War 

Theater and Corps Operations and Planning Simulation (TACOPS) m

a number of smaller models used to perform several functions, particu

tle damage assessment. Some inputs for the GWG are themselves gen

computer model runs made prior to game start, e.g., logistics plans.

3
Game Scenarios 1979–1983

1979 The scenario for the first Global War Game was set in 1985

tent with the concerns over the security of oil supplies prevalent in 

area of initial conflict between Blue and Red was Southwest Asia. 

gency was in progress in Saudi Arabia, and international tension 

along that nation’s northern border. Blue supported Saudi Arabia by 

brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division along with a contingent of 

warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and an F-15 squadron

craft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) were transferred from the Indian 

proceed around Africa to join the Atlantic Fleet. Worldwide defen

sures included the forward positioning of additional maritime pa

squadrons and the movement of two CVBGs from the East Coast to 

in the North Atlantic. As tension mounted, Red mobilized on 11 July

sponded with a mobilization on 18 July. Red increased naval deplo

both the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. Concerns over the su

ity of the CVBGs led to their withdrawal from the Mediterranean to 

the two CVBGs that had recently left the East Coast and were now in 

north of the Azores.

Hostilities began with the invasion of Saudi Arabia by four Iraqi 

and one Soviet airborne division. Simultaneously, an attack was lau

the Warsaw Pact on the Central Front. Worldwide, Blue and Red na

engaged in a series of intense battles. Red sought to isolate Blue and 

with a diplomatic offensive. France, Japan, Pakistan, and Algeria we

incentives to remain neutral. Israel was guaranteed security from 

neighbors and an uninterrupted supply of oil in return for neutrality

invasion of Saudi Arabia could not be contained by indigenous f

in-area Blue reinforcements. Blue was compelled, therefore, to with

forces to Israel.

Withdrawal of the CVBGs from the Mediterranean proved to be 

and military disaster. Without the power of the CVBGs, Red was abl

whelm the regional Blue forces. Deployed Red Soviet naval aviation/l

aviation (SNA/LRA) aircraft struck Blue bases throughout the Med
with deadly effectiveness. The U.S. naval air station at Sigonella, struc

Red surface units and air attacks, was rendered totally unusable. Malta 

evening of the war’s first day. Red land-based air superiority had turne

tral and eastern Mediterranean into a veritable Red lake. Politically, 

southern flank unraveled as Greece and Turkey were forced out of the w

aly lay open to attack.

Convoy operations were implemented, with two French CVBGs to 

the Blue forces that escorted shipping to Europe. A two-CVBG force 

sea control of the Norwegian Sea, although the effort resulted in the l

USS Vinson.

An anti-SSBN campaign grew out of an overall Blue ASW effort. R

need to respond to the depletion of part of its strategic reserve caus

Blue anti-SSBN campaign and did so by launching tactical nucle

against Blue’s CVBGs. An SNA/LRA raid was launched from Luand

Blue forces in the Atlantic and a second strike was directed against 

CVBGs in the Pacific from Vladivostok. This resulted in the loss o

Kitty Hawk battle group (BG) in the South Atlantic and the USSNimitz 

Pacific. Blue had some difficulty in determining a suitable Red targe

ate against, finally selecting a Red anti-carrier warfare (ACW) group i

wegian Sea. No other use of nuclear weapons occurred.

Due to the heavy commitment of Red forces to the Mediterranea

Blue chose to divert the four-carrier CVBF (aircraft carrier battle forc

planned Mediterranean re-entry to support the Central Front. The la

Europe was notionalized (prescripted) rather than played out in d

script postulated that NATO had managed to halt at least temporaril

advance and by game’s end was successfully conducting counteratta

allowed the players to extend their timelines beyond the first few days 

As GWG ‘79 ended, Red sought a cease-fire that recognized territo

in Southwest Asia and in the eastern Mediterranean. Blue, while also 

cease-fire, was unwilling to recognize Red gains and believed it held t

tage due to favorable momentum on the Central Front.

1980 The 1980 game delved into a broad range of unexplor

Forces were hard-pressed throughout as a result of a strong Red strat

tion combined with an aggressive employment of forces. However, 

participant stated: “If the objective of the game was to try out strateg

tify key issues, undergo a concentrated learning experience, and, in t

come away with a much sharper focus on what global war might be 

GWG ‘80 was a resounding success.”

5
Largely because Red set Eurasia as its objective and discrimina

nuclear and chemical weapons at the outset, this game was funda

about escalation control rather than ships at sea. By its demonstrat

use nuclear weapons coupled with Blue pessimism about the strategi

Red was able to force Blue to choose between surrender and major esc

each level.

The 1980 game was based on an extensive, detailed scenario whic

multiple problem areas worldwide. Once again the setting was the y

and the scenario postulated serious unrest in Eastern Europe with the 

both East Germany and Poland to the Warsaw Pact increasingly in d

Oil was a major factor in the 1980 scenario, which cast Red as a ne

of oil. The combination of this and the emerging crisis drove the pric

line in Blue to $4.00 per gallon. Further impacting the oil situation w

currence of a coup in Nigeria, which then aligned itself with Red.

In the Far East, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Vietna

war, while in Southwest Asia, Red, still involved in Afghanistan, was 

sharp border attacks against Pakistan in reprisal for that nation’s pro

sanctuary for Afghan “rebels.” India had also begun to mobilize aga

stan. Blue responded by sending five tactical air (TACAIR) squadrons

Airborne Division, and a Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) to Paki

ing this game, a bright spot for Blue was that relations with Israel, Eg

Arabia, and Iraq had improved to the point that Blue could establish a 

base in the Sinai without disastrous political consequences.

As the crisis became more acute, Blue withdrew the forces previ

patched to Pakistan and repositioned them in southern Iran and northe

Arabia with the aim of reducing the threat of confrontation with Indi

proving Blue’s ability to defend the Gulf oil fields.

In this scenario, war resulted from a deliberate, planned decision o

of Red. It was both opportunistic and conservative. Red leaders felt th

a favorable military position vis-à-vis Blue, and this, coupled with i

Warsaw Pact dissidence on the one hand, and the growing need for 

other, was sufficient to provide motivation for the seizure of Eurasia

these games, a primary tenet of Red strategy was to avoid risking the h

Therefore, Red did not open with nuclear weapons against Blue. In

war began with a massive conventional attack on the Central Front, Th

through Austria. Smaller attacks were mounted in Norway and Iran

plan also was to intimidate Japan and talk France into neutrality, while 

enough pressure in Southwest Asia to divert Blue. After victory in E

plan went on; Red could then turn to the Persian Gulf and Far East.

6
The Blue/NATO political objective was restoration of the 

status 

bellum.” During this particular game, Blue strategy was essentially 

The preservation of peace was attempted as long as possible, and t

the war began, Blue moves were mainly in response to Red actions

Blue was not confident of success on the Central Front, the minim

military objective was to hold on the northern and southern flanks, 

(Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) gap, and in the eastern Medi

and Persian Gulf.

Red launched the conventional offensive only two days after Blu

gun mobilization. In addition to extensive conventional attacks, th

fensive was augmented by the use of chemical weapons against Icelan

and the Azores. In an unusual but very effective move, Red exploded 

clear air bursts off the east coast of Japan in an effort to intimidate t

into neutrality.

Once nuclear weapons were used, the Blue National Command 

(NCA) focus shifted from the tactical level to nuclear linkage. In th

details such as the sensitivities of third parties, mobility problems, 

outcomes in specific theaters quickly became secondary.

GWG 1980 became, almost immediately, an exercise in control o

escalation. Blue, in response to an SNA/LRA strike from Aden that de

resupply convoy of SL-7s (high-speed container ships) in the Indian O

also to the Red nuclear salvo east of Japan, elected to launch a B-52 ra

Aden with nuclear weapons. Blue was also influenced by erroneo

gence that Blue forces had been destroyed by the Red nuclear demons

Japan. The Red response was immediate and devastating. Red air ut

clear weapons to destroy three CVBGs in the Indian Ocean while a fou

was lost to a nuclear attack in the Pacific. After searching for a suitabl

respond to the loss of the CVBGs, Blue attempted to destroy two Ki

action groups (SAGs) in the Sea of Japan with nuclear weapons. All t

ing aircraft were lost before they could drop their weapons. An anti-S

paign was more successful, as all forward deployed Yankees were 

conventional weapons.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the situation on the Central Front was not g

for Blue. Cracks had begun to show in the battle line of the northe

France had not transferred full control of its army to SACEUR (Supre

Commander Europe). Arrival of Blue reinforcements was slowing 

forces could no longer be flown directly into the Federal Republic of 

(FRG). Damage to numerous NATO airfields further hampered the 

the provision of TACAIR support.

7
Blue sought a 

second frontto take the pressure off Central Eu

lacking any readily available threats with which to challenge Red from 

rections, Blue recognized that it would only be “robbing Peter to p

Even aggressive PRC military operations, it appeared, would not pu

pressure on Red soon enough to make a difference.

The nuclear escalatory process entered a new dimension as the 

volved in a conventional war with Vietnam, sided with Blue and ord

nam to cease assisting Red. Vietnam refused, and the PRC resp

exploding a nuclear weapon over Haiphong harbor. Vietnam replied w

tack using Red-supplied nuclear weapons against four targets in the P

taliation, the PRC struck six Red targets with nuclear weapons. Red r

with a major nuclear strike against the PRC.

The game reached a temporary termination when Blue, desperatel

options, utilized the “hot line” to threaten an attack on Red at the SIO

Integrated Operations Plan) level. This induced Red to cease host

though Red calculated this was but a temporary pause in hostilities. 

had reached D+5 at this point.

1981 Probably the most intriguing aspect of GWG ‘81 was the a

combat on the Central Front. The primary Red objective at game start 

torical goal of seizing the Turkish Straits. Secondarily, Red sought 

the Gulf and Mideast oil. While NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliance

tact, their enthusiasm for joining a superpower conflict was minima

As with the two preceding games, the scenario setting was 1985. T

pal crisis governing events involved a conflict between Red and Tu

the terms of the Montreux Convention, which regulates maritim

through the Turkish Straits. A specific game objective was to exami

involved in nuclear escalation.

In Turkey, Red and its surrogates conducted a coordinated cam

weaken and disrupt the Turkish government. This took the form o

ganda campaign and demonstrations aimed at separating Turkey fro

In addition, Syria attempted to agitate Turkey’s Sunni Moslem popul

Turkish government retaliated by threatening strict interpretation of 

of the Montreux Convention. Red “escalated” with overflights of Tu

phibious exercises in Libya, and Warsaw Pact force movements in 

Sea, Bulgaria, and Romania.

Southwest Asia was important in this scenario. Iraq moved to

Red camp, leading to Blue concerns for the security of both Kuwait 

8
Arabia. As the crisis developed, tensions were raised with the disco

plan for a joint invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by Iraq and Re

Red commenced the war with an offensive against the secondary 

Iran. Long-range aviation also struck targets in Saudi Arabia. Only 

campaign was well advanced did Red attempt to capture the Turki

with an advance through Thrace, supported by an invasion of eastern T

Blue struck back against Red air facilities in the Balkans and the Cr

conventional air strikes from bases at Cairo and Izmir, aided by carrie

retaliation, still at the conventional level, was effective. Two CVs in 

terranean were sunk.

Blue, perceiving that the military situation was deteriorating and i

reduced to strategic withdrawal or nuclear escalation, chose the l

Tomahawk land attack missile-nuclear (TLAM-N) attacks against Re

the Trans-Caucasus, Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk, and Petropavlovsk

sponded immediately, as inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM

Diego Garcia and Guam, and the Nimitz battle group was lost to a n

tack. Blue NCA released nuclear weapons to Turkey, which wer

against advancing Red forces. Red responded with nuclear attack

Turkish positions.

Shortly afterwards, a nuclear cease-fire was agreed upon, though 

tional war continued in Turkey. All this occurred in five days.

The situation on the Central Front, though tense, never escalated 

ties. Blue and Turkey were essentially alone in fighting Red. Indeed, 

a degree of resentment by other NATO nations over the military force

ted by Blue to this crisis.

1982 GWG ‘82 saw two modifications from previous games. 

game commenced with war already in progress. The prehostility pha

tion to war, and initial hostilities were gamed at the National Defens

sity in Globex-82, allowing GWG ‘82 to explore even further into th

Second, 1982 was the year that saw Army and Air Force personnel 

grated as players in the game. This adjustment to joint play provide

context in which to conduct military operations and develop issues.

Set in 1985, the scenario had now shifted decisively to a Europe

As in previous games, unrest among the satellites was a problem for 

ticularly in Poland, where increased food prices, food shortages, an

down by members of Solidarity precipitated a crisis. In addit

concerns about the Blue relationship with Norway emerged as an imp

tor. Among points at issue in this relationship were prepositioning of B

9
deployment force (RDF) equipment, fishing and territorial claims in th

Sea, mineral rights on the Svalbard continental shelf, and joint Blue, C

Norwegian, and United Kingdom exercises in northern Norway.

Southwest Asia remained unsettled and a potential problem are

Blue and Red. Relations between Israel and Syria continued to deter

sulting in open warfare in 1985. Red forces had intervened in Iran, at t

of a post-Khomeini government (that leader having been assassinate

down civil strife. Red retained a presence in Iran through a subsequen

port facilities in the south of that country. Saudi Arabia felt threatene

developments, particularly so following an Iranian attack on an Iraq

line section. A Saudi request for deployment of the RDF was grante

Events in the Far East centered upon an agreement between the Peo

public of China and Japan for joint development of a large oil field in 

Bay area. North Korea remained a threat that could divert Blue from 

jectives.

The Red primary strategic objective was the elimination of Blue 

and military influence in Europe through a successful invasion of th

Republic of Germany and the consequent dismantling of NATO. The 

ward this end were to be an offensive in the northern area of the fron

military objective of crossing the north German plain to cut off the 

countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and seize th

ports. Red forces would hold in the center and south, while diploma

tives were used to convince France to remain neutral. Red also plan

vance into northern Norway to gain the strategic advantage of a sec

and improve the tactical situation in the event of a Blue naval initia

Norwegian Sea. A subsidiary ground-thrust by Red into Thrace had s

jectives: to anchor the southern flank and to increase options for ope

the eastern and central Mediterranean.

The Red initial offensive in Europe commenced as planned, but was s

at the Rhine. The northern thrust was checked by Norwegian forces, aug

a USMC MAB, at the Skibotn line. In reaction, Red responded with a ch

tack on the Norwegian air bases at Bodo, Evenes, and Andoya, though 

avoiding any penetration of neutral Finnish and Swedish territory.

On the southern flank, Red did succeed in establishing a narrow co

tween Greece and Turkey, where substantial gains were achieved

Blue CVBGs were withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean but sub

returned as the situation stabilized. An amphibious landing was con

provide reinforcement to NATO defenders in Thrace. Overall, B

forces in the Mediterranean suffered some losses, but the exchange ra

their favor.

10
In the Atlantic, Blue established and maintained submarine barr

Greenland to Norway to protect the SLOCs (sea lines of communicat

in turn, placed SSBNs in “havens” at sea or under the ice in the north N

and Barents Seas. The Norwegian Sea became an area of intense ASW 

with Blue submarines doing well against Red. In an attempt to help 

Red advance on the Central Front, two CVBGs were sent into the N

In the Far East and Pacific theater of operations, Red was on the po

military defensive. Red SSBNs were hidden west of Kamchatka in the 

Sea of Japan and in the Sea of Okhotsk. Blue concentrated on findin

stroying the SSBNs and major surface combatants. While somewhat s

attacking Blue suffered heavy losses, particularly in the Sea of 

Players assessed that Japan would permit Blue to use their bases fo

sive” ASW operations, but not for “offensive” operations. Blue CVBG

moved back into the central Pacific in a maneuver similar to the initi

vers in the Mediterranean. Subsequently the CVBGs moved forward 

Red surface ships. In the Indian Ocean, a Red combined forces attack 

to damage severely both Blue carriers.

Blue adopted a forward offensive strategy to sink the Red navy, an

itime campaign was successful. Red surface forces were virtually el

and the submarine force severely depleted. However, the extent to 

successful Blue anti-SSBN campaign altered the strategic nuclear ba

unknown and did not play a significant role in the respective NCA di

on nuclear weapons use. The ground war on the Central Front was the 

nificant theater for Blue. While Blue was able to upset the Red time

deny Red a quick victory, Red was still able to occupy significant p

the FRG.

No nuclear weapons were used in GWG ‘82, though Red did make 

use of chemical weapons, especially in northern Norway and agains

The heavy use of chemicals in the absence of any nuclear use was an a

set the 1982 game apart from the previous games.

As the game progressed, Red sought to negotiate a cease-fire and 

nate the war. However, as in previous games, Blue maintained the po

the “status quo ante bellum” in Europe was a prerequisite to any cease

refused to negotiate on this basis, and at game’s end, it appeared that a 

was in prospect.

1983 The scenario for the 1983 Global War Game postulated a 

crises in geographically separated parts of the world. As in 1982, how

11
focus remained the Central Front and deteriorating relationships bet

and the satellites.

One of the Red difficulties lay in East Germany and Poland. Wor

was escalated by government crackdowns. Riots occurred, mobs att

lice headquarters, and indigenous troops sent to suppress the incipient 

mutinied. Red, confused and taken by surprise, pulled troops back t

leaving a power vacuum on the eastern side of the frontier between th

the German Democratic Republic (GDR). With the insurrectionists in 

this area, talk of reunification became rampant and rumors of Wes

military movement toward the east circulated.

Trends in the Middle East and Southwest Asia remained little chan

previous games. Israel, nearly isolated politically, due to a continuin

tion of Lebanon, faced a possible invasion from Arab states led by S

had been involved in a massive military buildup in Syria and had se

troops to that country. Although hostilities between Iran and Iraq had 

minated, potential instability in the Gulf continued as Iran maintained 

of fostering Shiite agitation throughout the region.

In the Far East, a major war was in progress in Southwest Asia. Vie

invaded Thailand with success. In response, and after warning Vietn

consequences of continuing, the PRC launched an invasion of Laos 

nam. Although resistance was stiff, PRC troops were at the gates of H

Haiphong when GWG ‘83 commenced.

The Central Front, was the Red major area of concern. Events in th

Democratic Republic and Poland posed a threat to the satellites and th

Pact that Red could not tolerate. Yet, the circumstances left Red with 

sity of initiating hostilities prior to full mobilization. Red military o

were, quite possibly, the most limited of any game thus far. The esse

was to capture a significant amount of FRG territory and thereby lesse

fluence on the Continent by demonstrating NATO‘s inability to defend 

ful continental member, and then negotiating a permanent soluti

“German Problem.” While an offensive in northern Norway was inte

Red plan, Red had no other aspirations on D-Day. As in previous y

was anxious to avoid involvement in the Far East.

Blue sought to defend conventionally on the Central Front to ga

with maritime superiority obtained through a forward, aggressive 

against all Red naval assets and to shift the strategic balance th

anti-SSBN campaign. The Blue campaign for maritime superiority 

coordinated than in previous games, and part of this strategy involved 

ous landings in the Kuriles.

12
The Red offensive on the Central Front was hampered by the s

that Red had allowed for mobilization. Once launched, the o

progress wasrelatively slow and a stalemate developed. Red soug

ations virtually from the onset. However, Blue conditioned agree

cease-fire on a territorial “status quo ante bellum” in Europe—ter

ceptable to Red.

For a variety of reasons, Red chose to escalate the war horizont

method was to induce North Korea to move south, in which Red w

successful. Blue responded by utilizing the forces previously invol

Kuriles to bolster the defense of South Korea.

In Southwest Asia, Red mounted an attack into Iran and toward 

This decision resulted from complex factors, including failur

ceed in political initiatives with the Arabs. Red, however, reas

control of the region’s oil supplies could be used as further leverag

Blue. Blue had no effective counter in Southwest Asia, as the CV

eastern Mediterranean had been pulled west to add to Blue TACA

Central Front.

For the first time in the GWG series, Blue air strikes against 

and military targets inside Red territory were met with attack

North America. Red lost over twenty bombers while knocking 

distant early warning (DEW) line sites and damaging an SSBN in

in Washington state. Red also employed anti-satellite (ASAT) 

to destroy Blue navigational satellites. Blue responded wit

hawk land attack missiles-conventional (TLAM-C) strikes aga

space facilities.

Consistent with previous games, Blue launched an offensive again

SSBN force. This effort was relatively successful; nearly half of the R

were sunk by game’s end.

Neither nuclear nor chemical weapons were used in GWG ‘83. Alth

clear use was discussed by both NCAs, Red saw no need for them, 

could not find any employment that would be beneficial.

GWG ‘83 saw the concept of a prolonged war further developed. As 

ended on D+30, the prospect was for continued hostilities as the sta

the Central Front had the potential to continue well into the future. In t

an economics panel was involved for the first time in a GWG, evaluat

trial/mobilization issues pertaining to general war. There was a con

amount of war termination negotiation. However, Red insistence on 

its Central Front gains, and Blue/NATO demands for a return to the “

ante bellum,” left negotiations deadlocked.

13
Overview

The first five-year Global War Game series explored a broad range 

icant issues. A number of new concepts and ideas evolved, many of 

fluenced theater strategies for the Blue and NATO forces. Oth

reexamined or modified, based on the lessons learned in the games.

Fully understanding the key issues requires the reader to be awa

game dynamics interacted with scenario events and game analysis. T

view discusses the interplay between these issues and their impact o

development. While this section does provide a capsule examinati

games, the emphasis is on highlighting a selected number of the mo

cant themes and discussing how they were analyzed and affected by d

A complete analysis of these and other issues is presented in the sec

follow.

The first year, the heaviest emphasis was on naval play, and the r

Army and Air Force was largely prescripted. Very early in the series, 

it became evident that events, particularly in Europe, could not be ga

quately or the issues assessed properly without the full integration of 

and Air Force representatives, both in the play of the game and in th

part of the “game-study-game” cycle alluded to above. The use of bo

nel and the models these services developed to replicate outcomes o

were critical to the realism of the game and analytical process.

As the sister services became more involved in the game, Blue fo

more effective. Efforts to improve coordination between the Navy and 

services were continually emphasized. A number of experiments w

ducted to see how the forces of each service could work together t

common objectives. At the same time, the number of participants, in

and intraservice, and civilians increased. Both factors combined to 

quality and sophistication of the game play.

Blue began with a defensive mentality. The ability of forward-dep

erating forces to survive in the face of intense Red air and naval atta

major concern. However, as the series progressed, Blue found not on

val forces could operate in those forward positions, but also that the 

gressive posture produced greater success. True to the charter of th

Blue experimented with a number of concepts in the naval area. Th

naval forces were employed innovatively and naval strategy was cha

by a willingness to explore different ideas.

Red gaming approach also evolved. Initially, Red operated tacti

rigid, deterministic style, while at the policy/strategy level, several qu

operations were attempted. This was due in part to a combination of 

14
number of players representing the Red side and their limited level 

edge and background for realistically representing Red. An accurate s

of Red strategic thought process was also hampered by the use of U. S

personnel who tended to “worst-case” by concentrating on known B

nesses and ignoring the limitations of Red.

In order to better simulate Red, members of the intelligence commu

brought into the game to replicate Red thought processes and worl

more accurately. These new participants defined Red objectives and s

terms of actual intelligence estimates rather than in terms of worst-c

Additionally, as the contingent of Red players expanded, sufficient 

became available to allow the cell to interact fully with the game org

as opposed to being a more traditional and limited opposition-force 

result, Red play became less dogmatic. These factors led to the form

goals that were less ambitious but probably more representative of rea

policy. For example, the scope of Red military objectives diminished 

“control of Western Europe” to a more attainable “neutralization of th

Republic of Germany,” and the propensity to escalate across the nucle

old diminished.

This change in Red caused a shift to occur in the way hostilities be

ing the first games, Red purposefully embarked on a planned war of 

Red initiated and used the conflict as a tool to gain predetermined po

jectives. And this, in the 1980 and 1981 games, contributed to rapid 

and transition to war. While both these games involved relatively sho

of actual diplomatic and military activity, Blue players endeavored to 

their way out of crisis, on the one hand, while trying to position forc

advantage should war break out, on the other. Blue, in addition to man

confrontation with Red, had other complex problems. Blue had to g

tion to a NATO alliance whose members did not always concur on the 

ate response to the situation. Allies in other parts of the world h

separate concerns. Both camps had to deal with various neutrals world

were important. While participants found these problems difficult 

sionally frustrating, a great many insights were gained into factors t

war.

Both Blue and Red learned that a nation did not simply decide to 

both saw that war was difficult to start and often occurred as the result 

ber of events often outside the control of the eventual belligerents. The

the later games, the cause of hostilities changed. Red, though still 

the war, did so as a result of a chain of events that pushed Red be

ability to avoid war. In the ‘82 and ‘83 games, Red faced the prospe

bellious Eastern Europe and felt compelled to act before events g

15
out of control. This supports the premise that few rational leaders wo

erately start World War III.

Nonetheless, Red, as the initiator of hostilities, gained substantia

This role allowed Red to choose the theater or region that best fit its 

then mass the required units. Elsewhere, Red practiced economy of fo

in turn, had to concentrate forces in the geographic area of Red att

maining forces were hard-pressed to mount an attack strong enoug

ously distract Red.

Europe acted as a magnet for both Blue and Red. To Red, as a c

power, Western Europe was a logical area for political and territori

sion. A Red offensive into this theater represented a means toward t

weakening or destroying Red’s primary global foe, the Blue/NATO 

Even the early offensives into Southwest Asia supported this objec

ture of Europe’s energy supplies could severely cripple NATO.

Blue focus was also on Europe. The NATO alliance was the most 

Blue political/military link, and the maintenance of that coalition 

mount to Blue strategy. Hence, Red offensives against NATO had to 

tered at all costs.

The Blue relationship to NATO impacted war policy in several ot

NATO was essentially a defensive alliance with the goal of maintaini

litical and territorial integrity of its members. It did not seek to seiz

from, or to overthrow the national governments of, the Warsaw Pact

its link to NATO, adopted a like policy in Europe. This led Blue/NATO 

late objectives in terms of “restoration of the territorial status quo ante 

Operations elsewhere did exhibit some level of aggressive intentions

limited by force availability.

The alliance also affected Blue in another aspect. As a maritime po

was allied with an essentially continental coalition (NATO) facing a c

foe (Red). As Blue forces sought to support the European battle, the

enced the traditional problems a maritime nation encounters fightin

nental power. Most notably, Blue had to find the most effective way 

its naval power. However, commanders realized that to use this streng

Blue in a classic predicament; naval force could not win the war, but a

time a major naval defeat would significantly reduce Blue strategic f

This situation was to affect profoundly Blue strategy and was largely 

ble for the early conservative mode of force employment. Once Blue 

forces could successfully defend themselves, its naval efforts becam

ingly aggressive.

Though this more aggressive role produced some measure of 

success, the fundamental problem of how best to use a naval force 

16
continental foe remained. While no definitive solution came out of t

the participants gained a far better understanding of the role and valu

time power in a global conflict.

The maritime/continental relationship presented Blue with yet a

lemma. Blue, as a maritime power, had to operate globally, if only to 

its interests. This caused a considerable dispersal of forces which w

Red advantage. Thus, not only was Red able, as noted above, to m

point of the offensive, but the very orientation of Blue power work

perse its force further.

Red was actually conducting two distinctly different wars in one

Blue/Red context, Red was fighting a limited conflict. Red did not s

stroy Blue. Within the context of the European theater—Western T

Military Operations (TVD)—however, Red was waging an absolute 

the objective of total victory. If it could achieve the neutralization of 

this would, in the Red estimate, lead to the emasculation and eventua

tion of NATO and the significant reduction or actual elimination of B

ence on the Continent.

Escalation, both vertical and horizontal, was a topic which receive

erable attention during the Global War Game series. Though the esc

sue had been studied in great detail elsewhere, these games exp

process within a global environment through interactive techniques. 

phistication of the scenario grew each year, knowledge and the lesson

increased proportionately. By the end of the five years, a number of va

sights into the range of complexities associated with the escalation p

veloped.

During the series, vertical escalation passed through the conven

mension and into the nuclear and chemical arenas. Of these two, the n

pect attracted the most attention, especially in the first three games. In

players found that nuclear weapons overshadowed all other events a

the game into an exercise of escalation control.

Through experience in the game, both sides came to the realizatio

clear weapons produced little tactical advantage. Blue, while essenti

at the strategic nuclear level, suffered from a perceived inferiority at t

and theater levels. (Note: Both Blue and Red views of the nuclear situa

based on estimated 1985 force balances.)

Red also came to this realization, though for different reasons. U

clear arms, in spite of Red tactical/theater advantages, proved to be 

productive. Red had gone to considerable effort to build a supe

conventional arms. That advantage might be negated if the conflict es

the theater nuclear level, which could destroy the value of the 

17
gained as well as major Red forces. Additionally, such a move put the 

at risk, an outcome contrary to Red objectives.

Blue faced a further escalation disadvantage in nuclear targeting. Th

jority of targets for Blue were located inside the Red continental hom

strike on any target in the homeland was perceived to make escalation t

tegic nuclear level more likely. Thus, Blue found it difficult to select 

isolation that did not run the risk of causing dramatic escalation. A con

weapons strike into the homeland also had considerable strategic imp

especially when considering Red paranoia on the homeland defense i

ther, the problem of determining the nature—nuclear or conventional—

bound raid increased the risk of triggering a Red “launch on warning.” 

factors combined to make a graduated Blue response difficult.

In contrast, Blue as a maritime power offered Red a number of attr

isolated targets, such as aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and isla

Given the player perception that the theater nuclear balance was in 

Red, Blue was constrained in its response options. To “counter in kin

be to accept a theater nuclear conflict that, in Blue eyes, it would los

deavored to use this perceived advantage in the first three games. Re

without difficulties, however. Throughout the series, formulating an 

response to Blue anti-SSBN campaigns was a problem. After severa

successful efforts, Red reluctantly accepted the losses as inevitable.

Chemical warfare was an area where Red was perceived to enjoy 

advantage. Red resources were thought to be superior, outnumberin

Blue. When Red chose to employ chemical weapons, Blue felt it ha

quate, symmetrical response. In fact, despite an avowed policy of ret

chemical attacks with nuclear weapons, Red usage of chemicals m

Blue nuclear reply only one out of three times.

Horizontal escalation represented another dimension in the escal

cess. Blue experimented with a number of approaches in an effort to d

from its primary focus or to discover a major Red vulnerability. Red, 

remained largely tied to its European focus and refused to be diverted 

Central Front. Even geography played against Blue in this effort, as ar

tential vulnerability were difficult to reach effectively.

However, a danger for Blue in employing a strategy of horizontal 

was the risk of diverting or diluting valuable resources that were ne

where. If Blue chose to mass sufficient forces to be effective, the avai

resources to support the primary theater might be adversely affec

versely, if Blue mounted an attack with a less favorable force ratio, t

were marginal.

18
While Blue did not achieve major success employing horizontal 

strategies, analysis did show useful trends not readily apparent at f

hoping for a response which would produce an immediate advanta

looked in the wrong area or missed the initial indicators of what could 

icant, long-term benefits. Some of the more important aspects of hori

calation were seen in the actions Red did not take. Blue, by position

that had a potential to harm Red, caused Red to maintain higher forc

defensive positions. This was seen frequently in the maritime and 

where Red maintained sizeable forces in regions away from the prima

combat to counter possible Blue offensive actions. As these Red fo

not diverted, value for Blue ensued from their commitment to defen

poses and the resulting nonavailability for offensive efforts. Of equ

cance were the instances where Red began a redeployment of forces 

Blue. These actions showed the potential of achieving the desired dis

Red resources. However, many such redeployments were still in th

stages and did not become evident due to the short time span of the gam

long-war issue emerged, a link to horizontal escalation appeared to o

attractive prospects.

Red found an opportunity to use this same strategy. By launchin

into Southwest Asia, Red caused Blue to divert sizeable forces away f

theaters. Additionally, through the use or threatened use of surrogat

North Korea, Red was able to tie down additional Blue resources.

Initially, both sides had envisioned a conflict of relatively short 

However, over the course of the series, a number of factors became 

indicate that Blue gained certain advantages from a long-war policy. 

table was the opportunity to redirect superior Blue industrial, econ

agricultural resources to the battle. Once mobilized, these sectors pl

in a much more favorable position. Red, in contrast, with a larger pro

these resources in a smaller economy already oriented to the defen

achieved less through full mobilization.

A key issue for Blue was the ability to continue through the early 

mediate stages of conflict to reach a long war. Blue forces must figh

ger Red conventional force during these stages using only “

resources. Red not only had a larger standing military force but also 

considerable advantage due to its greater arms stockpiles and “warm

tion base.

However, from another aspect, Blue policy made a long war almo

Blue doggedly maintained a position that accepted no compromise to 

tion of a territorial “status quo ante bellum.” However, the Red s

tial conventional superiority made sizeable early gains virtually in

19
Relinquishing these territorial victories would have been unpalatabl

Tactical and theater nuclear options did not appear to redress this prob

result, Blue was, from a policy standpoint, virtually locked into a lo

For Blue, linking horizontal escalation to a long war appeared to o

very tangible benefits. Over a longer period, many Red vulnerabilitie

exploited effectively. Red appeared particularly exposed to action

food supplies. Red’s ability to produce and distribute food, even du

times, was marginal. During wartime, much of the agricultural sec

power and equipment especially) would be mobilized. As the war le

food availability would eventually drop. Food imports as a substitute 

longer be an option. The extensive fishing fleet was vulnerable and w

its freedom to operate. Blockade, combined with selective attacks ag

cultural production and distribution systems and commercial fishin

could exacerbate the problem. These actions, tied with efforts to exp

Red nationality problems, had the potential to be an effective weapon

the Red industrial complex was also vulnerable, and the effects of it

would be cumulative with the agricultural shortages.

The longer war would also give Blue an opportunity to exploit fr

the cohesiveness of the Red/Warsaw Pact coalition. Red ability to mai

ance support appeared to vary with the political and military situation

campaign with the objective of splintering the Warsaw Pact nations c

duce favorable results.

The war termination issue presented a difficult problem that was n

pletely resolved. Neither side was willing to budge from its respectiv

in order to complete negotiations. As noted, Blue insisted on a ret

forces to a territorial “status quo ante bellum” as a precondition to pe

Red, on the other hand, offered an immediate cease-fire in place with 

tions to follow.

Blue would not accept such an offer, feeling that once a cease-fire 

Red would achieve a de facto legitimization of military gains, as NA

find it difficult to reinitiate hostilities. Red, perceiving the situation to 

in its favor, found it difficult to believe that Blue refused to enter neg

The result was a deadlock, as neither side was willing to move from its 

20
Objectives and Strategy

Blue Objectives

THE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES of Blue during these games were 

its perceived national interest, the nature of alliances, and force 

ties. The Blue position as the leading member of the NATO alliance w

in all policy determinations. The concentration of both Blue and Re

and economic resources in Europe exerted a pressure that tended t

weigh the influence of other theaters. Additionally, Blue political an

ties to Europe were a strong bond. Even in the games where the sce

constructed to emphasize Southwest Asia, the players, as the game pr

had a tendency to shift focus toward the European theater.

This relationship is important, as the NATO alliance is essentiall

sive one, with the objective of maintaining the political and territoria

of its member states. Consequently, the Blue policy in this theater wa

the NATO alliance. Objectives in Europe, the North Atlantic, and the 

ranean were constructed to mirror closely those of NATO. Those o

were defined by words such as “preserve,” “maintain,” “hold,” and “

these theaters, the ultimate measure of success for NATO (hence also 

the preservation or restoration of the territorial and political “status 

bellum.”

Some criticized Blue for a lack of clearly defined political objectiv

ever, both in the Global War Game series and in the “real world,” mili

are tailored to policy objectives. In this instance, policy was to preser

ritory and interests of the NATO member nations and the alliance itse

gressive, offensive objectives to seize Red or Warsaw Pact terri

envisioned. Such actions would have been contrary to the defined all

icy. However, these limited objectives did not preclude the employm

gressive strategies toward their accomplishment. Maintenance o

essentially the “same situation” may seem a bland objective in global 

was fully in consonance with stated policy. Thus, criticism of Blue f

or inadequate, objectives failed to consider that these objectives are 
limitedand tailored to fit an alliance policy that seeks no more than 

tenance of its integrity.

Further, success in attaining this objective, when combined with 

cess in other theaters, particularly at sea, would make the postwar wo

different place. Red would still be a powerful nation, but the status of 

saw Pact as a whole would certainly be in doubt, politically and 

Red’s overseas reach would be amputated and overseas “satellites” 

support. Thus, the achievement of Blue objectives, however bland the

pear, would have a significant effect on the postwar environment an

tive positions of Blue and Red.

In non-NATO theaters, Blue objectives were influenced by force 

ties. With a large dedication of resources to NATO, the supporting o

had to be consistent with the capabilities of available forces. Additi

the series progressed, one of the early areas of concern, Southw

steadily declined in emphasis as the impact of the “real world” energy 

creased. Even when, in the two early games, Southwest Asia was con

central concern, Blue players felt uncomfortable with the military fo

had to support the objective of defending the oil supplies and friendly 

tions. The combined effects of both distance and the strength of Red 

proximity to Blue put Blue at an immediate disadvantage. At best, B

defend those interests, but at worst, suffer heavy losses to forces tha

needed elsewhere. Also, Red had few vulnerabilities that the forces i

ater could exploit. Further, Blue’s NATO allies tended to raise con

forces deployed to this theater represented a decrease in Blue ability 

against Red in Europe. In the Pacific, while Blue military capabilities 

quate to meet the political objectives of defense of allies and reassura

PRC, force levels did constrain offensive options. Additionally, geo

constraints were a factor. In-theater forces could strike and “hurt” se

emy targets but were not adequate to mount a sustained offensive of 

required to damage Red substantially. While Blue was unable to lau

fensive of sufficient size to cause major Red adjustments, Blue forc

cure vital political objectives in the area. This, combined with the s

destruction of Red maritime assets and the severing of the Red Fa

SLOC, laid the foundation for a firm Blue position in postwar Asia.

The defense of Western Europe was an objective that appeare

tently in the series. However, at various times there were other ob

For example, the defense of the oil supplies and the Gulf states was 

objective in 1979 and 1980, and a secondary objective in 1981. This 

sponse to the direct threat that Red was mounting against these reso

22
both the 

real worldand game threats eroded, so did the zeal to formu

tary strategies to counter possible Red initiatives in Southwest Asia

One issue which grew steadily in emphasis as the series progresse

“long-war” objective. Blue concluded that Red held the advantage i

tional arms and that escalation to the nuclear level either achieve

worked to Blue’s disadvantage. Consequently, Blue began to percei

objective of a long conventional war offered significant promise

could hold on past the initial stage and through the intermediate pe

its superior industrial and economic power could be mustered agains

Blue experienced significant difficulties in the early stages of all th

this course evolved as an alternative to nuclear escalation or apparen

tional defeat.

Overall, Blue political objectives could be characterized as limit

defensive, and supportive of the restoration of the political and territ

tus quo ante bellum.” While the principal focus of this effort was in 

Europe, the sovereignty and independence of the Persian Gulf states 

tenance of Far Eastern alliances were also of vital importance to Blu

series proceeded, it became an objective of Blue to keep the war con

and this policy, coupled with the goal of “status quo ante,” led Blue t

terms of longer term conventional strategies.

Blue Strategy

During the course of the first five years of Global War Games, Bl

mented with a diversity of strategies. Unlike objectives, which rema

tively constant due to their link to national policy and alliance relation

range of strategies employed to achieve these ends varied considerab

ever, such a variation was totally in keeping with the charter of the seri

avowed purpose was to be an “experimental” game creating precisely 

rum to explore new strategic directions.

Much of the strategic development was evolutionary and occurre

course of several games. Perhaps most significant was the attitude shi

essentially defensive strategic focus to one that, while still supporting 

overall objectives, supported the employment of aggressive offensi

tions. For Blue commanders, the defense of the “status quo” did not m

passive operational posture.

Many early indicators of current strategies were also evident during 

The Global War Games saw the early use of CVBGs in the aggressive

employments that became central to the Maritime Strategy. Antec

23
some of today

s military thoughts were evident as commanders dir

Blue technological advantages be used to exploit Red weaknesses. 

aimed at supporting the “long war” began to appear. Linked to this, B

to de-emphasize early resort to nuclear weapons use and to concentra

ventional military operations.

Perhaps the most progress can be seen in the strategy directed to

support of the objectives of maritime superiority and, to a lesser exte

protection. When the series began in 1979, Blue was extremely conce

the ability of CVBGs to operate in areas threatened by Red air power. 

cern led to a conservative strategy that entailed the withdrawal of th

from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic and the pullback of Pacif

from forward positions to more defensible locations in the Central P

heavy defensive line was erected on the Greenland-Iceland-United 

gap to defend the SLOCs to Europe. However, as the game progressed

gan to realize that through proper tactics, deception, and coordinate

the CVBGs could survive in the face of Red long-range aviation. 

point, Blue went still further in the 1982 and 1983 games to institute ag

forward strategies which utilized the CVBGs to strike targets on the K

sula and the Belkin coast, that is, the Soviet Pacific littoral from Vlad

Petropavlovsk. (Specifics are discussed in greater detail in the Emplo

Naval Forces section.)

An important point to realize in this evolution is that military ope

either end of the offensive-defensive spectrum were directed towa

ment of the same overall objective. The difference was the strategy. In 

games, maritime superiority and SLOCdefense were sought through t

vation of forces. Naval formations were positioned away from are

from attack. “Cordon sanitaire” conventions were employed. This w

tent with the then-prevalent concept of maintaining maritime superi

only those areas necessary for protection of the SLOCs to Europe.

However, as the series progressed, Blue realized that attainment of 

jectives could be more effectively pursued through an aggressive str

kept Red on the defensive. Both strategies supported the overall objec

were just different steps in the evolutionary process.

Defense of the SLOCs is a case in point. Given the large amount of m

be moved to Europe, the focus on SLOC protection was invariably a 

ority. As noted, the early concept was essentially a passive defen

“line” constructed across the GIUK gap. However, as a general for

ployment strategy for NATO maritime forces was implemented and 

nerabilities were exploited, Red was forced into a more defensive 

and the interdiction of SLOCs was made more difficult. This was pa

24
relevant in the anti

SSBN campaign. As protection of the homelan

maintenance of the SSBN strategic reserve was a higher priority for 

SLOC interdiction, the threat posed by Blue forward deployments, pa

of Blue SSNs to Red SSBNs, played a key role in reinforcing Red’s 

naval strategy.

Defense of Europe was steadily characterized by a strategy of fo

fense. Militarily, this was, perhaps, difficult, as it placed a large num

lied forces close to the inter-German border (IGB) with less than 

defense in depth. Such a placement adversely impacted mobility and 

force vulnerability. However, this strategy was fully in line 

NATO/Blue overall objective of the preservation of the territorial integ

member nations. Once hostilities commenced, Blue ground forces 

Red by employing a conventional strategy in ground combat. Comb

play was emphasized and maneuver tactics utilized when the situation 

During the early games, CVBGs were often utilized to support th

Front. However, Blue soon decided that given the Blue/NATO over

vantage after the first shock of battle, the unique characteristics of th

were considered more effectively employed in attacks against Red fl

ward deployment was used in the Norwegian Sea and in the eastern M

nean and complemented NATO efforts to bolster land defense in b

Norway and the Balkans.

Employment of nuclear weapons invariably resulted in a signific

sideration of all aspects of the war. Due largely to the overwhelming 

nuclear conflict, all other issues became secondary. While the war co

the various theaters, NCAs focused on the nuclear issue. Ongoing con

strategies were submerged as both Blue and Red concurrently sough

cise control of escalation—while attempting to position themselves 

nate the war in a favorable position.

Nuclear weapons employment was the one area where objectives 

egy were not mutually supportive, and it is significant that neither sid

to nuclear use in Europe. For Blue, nuclear use was essentially react

two instances (1980 and 1981) where Blue initiated nuclear warfare, t

was primarily to respond to a significant Red escalation—use of 

weapons in Europe in one instance and use of nuclear weapons off Ja

other. However, in both cases Blue found Red willing to press for 

dominance and only with great difficulty was “central systems e

averted. Strategic advantages of position, maritime superiority, and 

were quickly negated as the spiral turned into the single process of “to

opponent” and not “backing down.” As a result, in the 1982 and 19

25
both Blue and Red maintained, as a limited war policy, the objective 

below the nuclear threshold.

Away from Europe, Blue strategy demonstrated considerable va

line with both the changing “real world” situations and insights tha

from game play. As previously noted, the 1979 and 1980 games em

the Red threat to Southwest Asia. Blue strategy during this period 

heavy commitment of resources to defending there. In 1981, Blue 

defend a multitude of axes against possible Red attacks, which res

significant diffusion of forces. However, by the 1982 game, this str

shifted to emphasize the defense of Europe and operations in the P

the “real world” energy crisis began to subside, there developed a r

that unless the Central Front could be held, the preservation of its o

was less meaningful than had been assumed. Thus, forces commit

defense of Southwest Asia in a global war were better utilized in s

the early NATO battles. Europe’s existing energy stocks and oil en 

peared sufficient to carry it through the critical initial battle on th

Front. Availability of forces otherwise committed to the Gulf mig

critical difference. However, it was realized that if the “long war” d

this situation could change.

A further factor in this strategic realignment came from the games

that the forces available to commit to Southwest Asia and the distanc

port them usually resulted in a force too small to counter Red advanta

Blue gained little while either losing or malpositioning valuable force

quently, by 1982 and 1983, the forces previously dedicated to South

were moved largely to Europe or the Pacific.

In the Pacific, Blue sought to formulate a more aggressive strategy

forces were limited, the lessening of Persian Gulf commitment

CINCPAC to concentrate his assets in sufficient quantity to initiate offe

erations against eastern Red. The geographical scale and the numb

forces precluded major offensives against Red territory. However,CIN

able to attack selected vital Red points. Most noteworthy was the maj

flicted on Red SNA/LRA in the 1983 game. Additionally, this game saw 

mencement of amphibious operations in the Kuriles. Thus, by 198

strategy had evolved from a primarily defensive posture to one where 

on the offensive against Red targets, consistent with the forces a

The Pacific SLOCs and countries friendly to Blue were being defended 

sive operations which limited Red capability to be opportunistic.

Blue attempted various tactics to implement the overall strategy of 

escalation. However, Blue learned throughout the series the difficul

cessfully accomplishing anything of further offensive significance. A 

26
of attempts were made to pressure Red. While the theory seemed to h

ise, execution proved difficult, as Red did not shift focus from Central 

jectives or divert major forces to meet the peripheral threats Blue mou

and geography played to Red advantage. Few Red vulnerabilities wer

ble and susceptible to damage that mattered in the short term. Thos

matter possessed such sufficiently strong defenses that attacking fo

subjected to substantial attrition. Blue achieved the most success with 

tal escalation in 1983 when Red, stalemated on the Central Front, 

CVBG attacks on its northern and southern flanks. This, in concert wit

dications, appeared to show an unrealized potential for the employme

zontal escalation in conventional war.

Red Objectives

Red political objectives in the 1979–1983 Global War Game serie

from early concerns with Southwest Asia and the Turkish Straits—and 

at essentially total Eurasian conquest—to a focus on Eastern Europe. 

tion of the security of the Red homeland and continued control of R

CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) were always the prim

tives. In the 1982 and 1983 games, however, the principal threat to Red 

as unrest in the Eastern Bloc, the nations comprising the non-Red Wa

Red rationalized a solution to this problem in the destruction of NATO a

duction or elimination of Blue influence on the Continent. Red belie

conventional military offensive that seized all or a large part of West 

would achieve these goals by demonstrating the inability of the NATO 

protect a powerful continental member. Two points are worth noting

• The objective of Red was limited in the sense that it did not en

destruction of Blue or follow-on attacks against Blue vital interests e

and,

• The attainment of even modest military objectives would have v

cal ramifications.

These objectives remained essentially consistent through the series

displaying little inclination to vary the agenda. In four of the five iter

primary objective was centered on Europe, where the Red goal was t

dominance of this critical theater. The specific definition of this object

from “control of Eurasia” in 1980 to the “neutralization of the Federal 

27
of Germany

in 1983. Of interest, as the series progressed, Red militar

Europe became steadily less ambitious.

The one year that Red did not initiate action on the Central Front (

objective was to exploit a perceived opportunity to gain a traditi

goal—an avenue to the warm waters of the Mediterranean. As the sce

sis developed, Red noted the general lack of NATO response to Turke

and expanded its objectives to attempt to isolate Blue and Turkey fro

of NATO.

A corollary to the objective of the security of the homeland was to s

the nuclear level. Red believed that use of nuclear weapons created 

risk of escalation, with inevitable of serious damage to the homeland

tional weapons were deemed adequate to achieve the desired ends

weapons use was viewed as dangerous and counterproductive. Inde

the territorial objectives appeared out of reach by conventional mean

ten scaled back objectives rather than escalate to the nuclear level t

them.

Red objectives in theaters outside Central Europe were essentiall

ary and were viewed from the perspective of passive opportunities. 

notable exception was the acquisition of the Gulf oil supplies due to “

energy shortages in the 1979 game. In later games, Red assessed that 

the Central Front would translate into a de facto victory in the Persian 

lowing the seizure of those oil resources at its leisure. In the Far 

sought to keep the situation quiet, avoiding the need to commit resour

used in Europe. Another Red objective was to bring the conflict to a n

stage at an early point. Red saw that its initial conventional advantag

in significant early victories which translated into a strong negotiating 

From the Red viewpoint, successful negotiations could legitimize 

with minimal losses. However, Red efforts were confounded by Bl

which was not to accept any outcome except a return to the territor

quo ante.”Blue rejection of negotiations left the conclusion of the g

certain, as Red wanted to terminate hostilities and was frustrated o

ability to do so.

In summary, Red sought to achieve important political objective

the attainment of limited military goals. The longer term issues of 

homeland security and unrest in Eastern Europe led to a strategy to fr

NATO alliance and eliminate Blue influence from the Continent. Nucl

ons usage was generally eschewed, although Red was prepared to 

promptly against any Blue use. Overall, Red remained committed to 

jectives and displayed little inclination to change.

28
Red Strategy

Red strategies were consistent with and supported their stated o

As Western Europe played such a major role in Red plans, this the

considerable attention. Though the objectives in this TVD ranged 

control of Europe to the neutralization of West Germany, individ

strategies employed toward the realization of these ends were s

massive conventional blitzkrieg–style attack against West Germ

NATO forces, with full support of Red and Warsaw Pact air arms. In 

instances did the initial assault include chemical weapons (1980 a

and in no case were theater or tactical nuclear weapons used agains

Europe. Red efforts were carefully structured toward the achieve

two-part objective: dominance in Europe and the dissolution of N

tainment of these ends was sought through outright military victory 

neutralization of the alliance’s strongest European member, West G

The collateral goal, and one which would result from the realizat

first, was to end the role of Blue in European affairs. The year (1981

hostilities developed on the Central Front, Red employed a like 

against Turkey and in Southwest Asia. A conventional offen

launched through Thrace with the military goal of seizing the Turki

and a corridor to the Mediterranean. Red was reluctant to use nuclear 

in circumstances other than direct retaliation. In 1980, Red emplo

initially only as a demonstration off Japan—a ploy to keep that coun

the war. In 1979, Red use was limited to a strike against Blue CVB

sponse to the anti-SSBN campaign. This latter instance was a Red c

what was perceived as a threat to major strategic resources. Indeed, 

Red tendency to view Blue carriers as a nuclear threat, the response 

dual goal by eliminating a threat to the homeland and attempting 

Blue to close its anti-SSBN campaign. Overall, Red viewed the ini

nuclear warfare, with the ensuing possibility of retaliation by Blue, 

sistent with the continuing Red strategy of protecting the homelan

Red naval forces contributed to the defense of the homeland. Dep

of air, surface, and subsurface maritime assets acted to protect the 

their bastions. These employments also served to provide a depth of d

the seaward flank of the land forces. Of concern for Red was the in

loss of the SSBN strategic nuclear reserves. This problem was never a

resolved.

Concurrent with the protection of the SSBNs was the maintenance 

rity of the Red borders and important installations from Blue attack. A 

example was seen in Red efforts in the northwest TVD. Geography in 

29
reveals little opportunity for defense in depth in front of the vital ins

on the Kola. Therefore, Red naval assets were deployed forward n

protect the SSBNs but also as a counter to B-52 strikes and possible Bl

air assaults from CVBGs in the Norwegian Sea.

These circumstances led to another consistency in Red strategy. 

games involving the Central Front, Red made some form of attack into 

Norway. Given the importance of defense of the SSBNs in the bastio

the Kola, dominance of the northern Norwegian Sea became a strateg

tive for Red. Consequently, in a global war where Blue employed an a

offensive strategy combined with a war on the flanks, possession o

Norway was important for Red. This not only expanded the Red defen

eter but served to deny Blue a staging point for Norwegian Sea opera

could threaten the Red homeland.

Red maritime strategy was described in almost every game as con

What appeared to be a cautious mode of deployment in terms of an a

Blue strategy was, as has been indicated above, a strategy closely lin

preservation of the Red strategic nuclear reserve and defense of the h

Initially, Blue did not fully appreciate Red priorities and devoted subs

sets to SLOC protection, when in fact SLOC interdiction was low on th

of maritime goals. Offensive strikes against Blue CVBGs were prim

planned, based on anticipated Blue actions.

Diplomatically, Red displayed an aggressive strategy aimed at s

multiple objectives. One aim was to fragment NATO. Therefore, Re

various NATO member states incentives to remain uninvolved. A 

theme was to portray the war as essentially a German issue for which 

were being called on to sacrifice their treasures and lives. Another eff

induce France to remain neutral and not commit forces to NATO.

Perhaps the most effective Red effort in the political arena was 

when multiple initiatives helped keep most of NATO uninvolved wh

its members, Turkey, was attacked. In this instance, Red propaganda 

matic maneuvers depicted Blue strategy as aggressive and provoc

thereby helped cause NATO to withhold timely support.

Outside of the NATO realm, Red’s political offensive sought to iso

and NATO from the rest of the world. As with the efforts against NAT

proach was to combine the “stick and the carrot.” Israel, in one gam

fered a steady oil supply as an incentive to remain neutral. On the opp

of the spectrum, Red utilized three nuclear weapons, exploded off th

Japan, as a blatant attempt to intimidate that nation into neutrality. Jap

important target of Red diplomatic pressure as attainment of its 

would constitute a significant blow to Blue in the western Pacific. 

30
Red was always very concerned with the People

s Republic of Ch

where, Red employed similar approaches and methods to a large n

nonaligned states with the overall goal of hindering Blue’s ability t

and support forces.

Red also employed various strategies to support objectives in seco

aters. In these instances, the purpose was to distract and divert Blue 

from Red in an area of primary concern—Western Europe. In fact, 

appeared that Red used horizontal escalation more effectively than B

held true not only from a military but also from a political perspectiv

sion of Blue assets from the Central Front had political repercussions 

Such a strategy had potential for Red, as NATO cohesion was suspect 

emphasis was other than on the Central Front.

Although action in other theaters—except for 1981—usually origi

diversion, Red in 1983 used horizontal escalation much to Blue’s di

Southwest Asia had no place in Red initial planning, but Red’s frustr

Blue’s failure to recognize the “inevitable” on the Central Front, whe

a perceived opportunity to improve the postwar balance, led Red to 

ward the Persian Gulf. Blue, totally committed to the Central Front, w

to dedicate considerable attention, and the few available resources it h

respond. Red also persuaded North Korea to move south to divert Blu

amphibious operation in the Kuriles and attacks upon the Red homela

series progressed, Red realized that gains in secondary theaters coul

velop into opportunities to acquire valuable assets, such as Gulf oil, fo

tion during the war termination phase.

A recurring Red action was to initiate negotiations early in the gam

derlying strategy was to capitalize on the success of Red’s conventio

krieg, which usually achieved fairly sizable gains, often a significant 

West Germany. Red would then offer a “cease-fire in place,” with ne

to follow. Getting Blue to accept such an offer would constitute, Red 

tacit agreement that would tend to legitimize Red gains. The magnitu

man territory lost would cause the FRG to collapse, for whatever 

would be too small to be viable. Thus, through a combination of mi

political initiatives, Red would achieve the “neutralization of the FRG

such a major member of NATO would have tremendous conseque

would seriously threaten the alliance’s existence. Blue, however, refu

low what seemed to Red to be the logical course and “bow out” after 

reverses in Europe. This Blue determination was a consistent source 

tion for Red and resulted in a significant disruption of its plans.

31
Geographic Theaters

THE RESUMPTION OF GLOBAL WAR-GAMING at the Naval Wa

was due largely to the recognition that any war between the sup

could not be geographically constrained. Over the course of the Gl

Game series, shifts have taken place in the thinking about the use 

forces in various geographic areas. In general, these changes can be 

to the evolution of a more aggressive Blue maritime strategy. The 

discusses some of these changes and their impacts on global strateg

Europe

Although Europe is but one theater, it exerted tremendous influen

entire conduct of a global war. Even when the focus of the conflict 

posely constructed to emphasize another area, such as Southwest Asia

tral Front still drew primary attention. The reason was obvious; this re

the largest concentration of military forces of both superpowers and th

Any victory here caused a substantial political, military, and econom

everywhere. A post-game memorandum concerning the 1980 game 

this best: “For the second front to be viable, the first must hold.”

A primary goal of Red was to overrun the FRG, which was expecte

the disintegration of NATO and the retreat of Blue from Europe. Red 

an offensive on the Central Front in four of the five games. In each o

stances, the Warsaw Pact was able to push back the NATO forces. Ho

the series progressed, the degree of success Red was able to achieve 

Successively, Red advances were slower and less impressive. In fa

1983 game, the initial Red offensive was essentially stalemated.

Several games saw the commitment of carrier aircraft to Europea

sometimes to the detriment of other theaters. As the series ended, em

of naval tactical air remained a subject requiring study. The issue o

was how, given the large number of tactical aircraft engaged in 
comparatively small number of carrier

based aircraft could be employ

ater to maximize their impact and unique capabilities.

Central Front

The Central Front was the theater where Blue and Red armies, wit

lies, came together in the largest and most prolonged period of com

erally, Red strategy in this campaign was to launch a massive, con

“blitzkrieg” against NATO. Red counted on a substantial conventi

advantage in conjunction with a more fully mobilized force to a

early breakthrough. Once the NATO battle line on the Central Front 

tered, Red believed this would mean the end of the alliance and Blue 

in Europe.

In turn, NATO sought to protect itself with a conventional defense 

to meet the attack on the inter-German border. This resulted in a larg

of NATO forces being in forward positions committed to immedia

and not often able to use maneuver to their advantage. NATO also cou

strong air effort to make up the difference in numbers between their f

those of the Warsaw Pact. Equally vital to NATO was a timely reinfor

Europe with forces from Blue. To achieve this, it was essential tha

navy maintain maritime superiority in the North Atlantic to insure the 

tion of the SLOCs.

Actual combat on the Central Front occurred in four of the five 

1979, as noted previously, the land war was largely scripted. Red atta

the combined Blue/NATO forces managed to counter their advanc

game’s end had even developed counterattacks that appeared to pus

ward edge of the battle area east.

In 1980 actual combat on this front was only three days old when r

lation of the conflict to the nuclear level occurred in other theaters. Re

heavy pressure against the Blue/NATO defenders, and though som

were heavily stressed, NATO did hold. Blue/NATO concern over th

role in the war effort prompted alliance deliberations aimed at ins

French military participation. Blue air did well in both air-to-air co

air-to-ground operations, but the depth and scale of Red armies made 

to slow the attack significantly. In turn, the Red air counteroffensiv

NATO airfields caused substantial damage to ten of the twenty-th

NATO fields.

Though Blue did initiate the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP

force Europe, no combat occurred on the Central Front in 1981. Th

33
significant in that it demonstrated a situation where Red could attack 

member (Turkey) without initiating a Central Front war.

By 1982, activity had returned to the Central Front. On D-D

launched a massive, coordinated attack against Europe, northern 

and Thrace. By the end of the second day, France had committed her 

NATO. Red maintained the attack and succeeded in achieving s

gains in the FRG and Denmark. On D+13 Red sought a cease-fire 

which Blue refused. Three Blue CVBGs moved into the Irish Sea t

additional support to the battle. Red continued the attack, advanci

end of the third week (game end) to the banks of the Rhine, where N

veloped a holding position. In NORTHAG, the NATO line was unb

withdrawing under heavy pressure, and Red air had achieved supe

this sector. Further to the south, NATO forces were better off and 

managed a corps-level counterattack. Red allies were less than stalw

numerous desertions occurring among Polish troops. Both Poland 

garia threatened to leave the war by game’s end. The 1982 game saw 

use of chemical weapons on the Central Front by Red. Blue retaliator

for this and other chemical attacks were limited and consisted o

chemical attack in the Transcaucasus.

In 1983, the Red offensive got off to a slow start and never really g

momentum required. Red offered to enter negotiations virtually from 

set, but Blue refused to consider any conditions other than a return to 

nal borders. In an effort to achieve a breakthrough, Red built up a s

concentration of forces and launched a major offensive during the th

Blue/NATO ground forces were heavily pressured and Blue redep

CVBGs from the eastern Mediterranean and the northern Norwegian 

sist the defenders. When the dust settled, Red had managed to drive 

into the Blue lines on the North German plain, but overall, the NATO 

holding. As the game ended, the situation had settled into a tempor

mate, with neither side able to obtain an advantage.

Norwegian Sea/North Atlantic/GIUK

During the initial games of the series, SLOC protection was em

Typical of this tendency was the utilization of SSNs in barriers along 

gap to interdict and attrite Red forces seeking egress to the Atlantic. 

study of these first games revealed two factors. SLOC interdiction w

high a priority for Red as initially believed. Further, there was eviden

aggressive, forward strategy might be more effective than a passive 

34
if Blue SLOCs were targeted by Red. Indeed, this strategy addressed o

cerns of Blue. Among those was Red SNA/LRA, which, if allowed 

freely, could seriously threaten Blue maritime flexibility. A passive 

the GIUK gap would be relatively ineffective against this threat. M

such a passive strategy did not facilitate the use of Blue maritime a

threatened to leave NATO land forces in Norway without support. A

quence, thinking evolved to support a forward, aggressive strategy. W

were used throughout to attrite Red SSBNs in their bastions, in later g

were also used to attack Red SSNs and Red surface forces, particul

with AAW capability. Accomplishment of the latter two tasks perm

movement of CVBGs into the Norwegian Sea to continue the destructi

naval units to support Norway and to pose a threat to the Red home

Mediterranean

While the Central Front was the most significant theater, unless 

sufficient attention to the Mediterranean, the potential existed for s

problems with Blue overall strategy. During Global War Game 1979

stantial concern, prevalent at the time, over the inability of Blue 

forces to survive in the Mediterranean, let alone the eastern Medi

caused the CVBGs to withdraw from that sea and to mass in the Atlan

SNA range. The result was military and political disaster. Sigonella w

and rendered unusable. Red SNA and LRA deployed at every possible 

the Mediterranean became a “Red lake,” and, as Greece and Tur

driven out of the war, NATO‘s southern flank was virtually a total lo

Such a debacle was clearly unsatisfactory, and henceforth CVBGs 

in the Mediterranean, though the 1980 and 1981 games demonstrate

ger of Red SNA/LRA and TACAIR. Nevertheless, strategic thinking s

ward not only keeping the fleet in the Mediterranean but emp

aggressively in the eastern Mediterranean. Blue became increasingly 

that, with the proper tactics, naval forces supported by land-based air 

erate effectively in the eastern Mediterranean and provide vital s

NATO allies facing a Red attack.

A consistent facet of Red strategy in this theater was to go on the 

through Thrace with the objective of splitting apart Greece and Tu

gaining a corridor to the Mediterranean Sea. In fact, the major cause 

in 1981 was Red frustration with the constraints Turkey was imposin

a strict implementation of the Montreux Convention. Despite years o

35
one of the games (1979) saw a Red client state (Libya) take an active 

fighting, and that was in response to NATO attacks.

Southwest Asia

Considerable attention was paid to Southwest Asia during the 

games of the series. It was there that war was then thought likely to 

However, as real world and game events evolved, the perceived imp

Southwest Asia as a potential source of global conflict declined. The 

focus shifted to the Central Front as Blue realized that maintaining 

the oil supplies meant little if the primary recipient, Europe, were to fa

Even if Red had been able to gain control of the Gulf oil, the time 

these games was short enough that sufficient oil would have been in 

sustain NATO forces while the critical battles on the Central Front w

fought. However, as the GWG began to explore the “long war,” supp

“pipeline” as well as the national oil reserves came into question and 

received renewed interest.

A second factor of military importance was the potential for malde

if considerable Blue assets were committed to this area of the world

ployment problems would arise from Southwest Asia’s geographi

ness. Forces committed to that area would become difficult to reposit

Central Front were the critical area, then any assets diverted to the Pe

or Indian Ocean might require much time to be employed usefully. 

concern was the considerable demand that operations in the region 

the logistics infrastructure. Support for Southwest Asian forces co

disproportionate number of assets, making them unavailable to mo

theaters. Moreover, if the games reflected reality accurately, it appear

ful that Blue, in the context of global war, could deter or defeat Red 

gion with available conventional forces. Several games saw Red for

from Iraq into Saudi Arabia. Iran also was the subject of several Re

Though elements of Blue rapid deployment force were deployed in 

they were unable to muster sufficient force to halt these offensives.

Although Southwest Asia was an area in which horizontal escalat

be employed against Blue, Red experienced many of the same conc

had on this issue about diversion of resources away from the critical 

the Central Front. One value Red discovered in Southwest Asia w

tential to use gains in that region as negotiating points during a war 

tion phase.

36
Western Pacific

A major theme developed from the games was the difficulty Blue 

formulating an adequate strategy for the western Pacific theater. Thou

operations grew progressively bolder, striking enemy surface ship

and selected shore installations, his in-theater forces were not powerf

to mount a major offensive that could directly affect the overall war 

time frame Blue commanders considered vital. As the battle raged on 

tral Front and in the Atlantic, Blue experimented with means to allo

cific forces to contribute to victory. Red refused to be distracted 

Central Front, and Blue was unable to muster a threat sufficient to cau

cus to shift. Consequently, in the short term, Pacific forces were 

achieve the noticeable gains desired. However, over the long term

forced to keep valuable resources dedicated to the Pacific defenses, a

mulative pressure over a prolonged period had the potential for lon

ploitation. Further, the attrition inflicted on Red Far Eastern forces ha

begun to diminish Red’s is ability to influence postwar events.

The apparent inability of Blue to formulate an offensive strategy to 

tional objectives quickly in the western Pacific almost inevitably led 

mand that the Pacific CVBGs be “swung” west to aid in the Euro

battle. Blue CINCPAC saw himself faced with the “use them or lose 

tion. In response to this situation, GWG 1983 featured an aggress

against Red SNA/SAF in the Far East. Other aspects of this more activ

entailed the seizure of several of the Kurile Islands. North Korea’s in

South Korea resulted in part from Red reaction to this aggressive po

Some general political patterns in the Pacific did emerge. Blue co

worked toward persuading Japan to be a firm ally and to maximize 

support to the Blue war effort. Red meanwhile sought the opposite—

that Japan take a neutral stance. The most spectacular effort in this r

Red’s explosion of three nuclear weapons over the ocean in GWG ‘8

tempt to intimidate Japan into neutrality.

Other countries in the region receiving major attention were the P

Korea, and Vietnam. Blue invariably worked to bring in the PRC o

Neither Blue nor Red found a way to play the China card. Howev

GWG 1980, the PRC-Vietnam conflict ended in a nuclear exchange t

in Red. Vietnam consistently acted as a Red surrogate. North Korea w

to Red as a “threat in being,” forcing Blue to keep substantial resou

cated to the defense of South Korea. In only one game, GWG ‘83, did 

Korean threat materialize into an actual invasion. It was inconclusiv

this was a benefit to Red.

37
In summary, the first Global War Game series saw Blue and Red 

gaged in combat in widely diverse areas around the world. Consist

geographic focus fell on Europe and the Central Front. Concurrently, 

conducted operations of varying intensity in other theaters that pursu

objectives or supported certain regional-specific strategic goals.

38
Employment of Naval Forces

BLUE NAVAL FORCESwere actively employed throughout the se

their role becoming more focused and assertive as the participan

experience and confidence. Blue concerns over survivability lessened

phasis shifted toward offensive operations against the enemy in his 

ters. Eventually, Blue achievement of maritime superiority permitted 

the Kola and the conduct of amphibious operations against Red territ

northwest Pacific (Kuriles).

Concerns over the vulnerability of forces to SNA/SAF in the 1979 

games heavily influenced naval employments. When these concerns w

bined with the objective of SLOC defense, a principally defensive st

sulted. However, by 1982, the Blue concept of maritime strategy had 

due to two factors. First, confidence had increased in the ability of the 

survive in the face of enemy threats. Second, it became clear that SL

diction was a lower priority for Red than earlier envisioned. These la

saw a shift in the forces driving Blue naval strategy. A much more re

coherent philosophy developed, which was oriented toward both e

Blue strengths and targeting Red vulnerabilities.

ASW/SSN Operations

As with many other aspects of naval warfare, the employment of B

evolved over the first GWG series. Initially, many Blue SSNs were u

barrier operations at choke points that restricted Red access to the op

such as the GIUK gap and the several exits from the Seas of Japan and 

Also, some SSNs were forward deployed as part of an overall ASW 

that included attacks on Red SSBNs.

Among the factors that prompted a change to more offensive 

were the requirement to control the Norwegian Sea and the some

foreseen result of the anti-SSBN campaign. Control of the Norwegia

came important in the context of SLOC protection, as noted in the “g
theater

section. Blue SSNs operating in conjunction with Blue/NA

time patrol aircraft and other Blue/NATO ASW assets were required 

Red surface units and submarines prior to the introduction of Blue C

addition to their own direct ASW role, Blue SSNs, by eliminating 

face-to-air missile (SAM) platforms, became a key element for the s

conduct of this task.

Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA)

Due to the scale of the game, individual interactions were num

too diverse to list in detail. Generally, the primary role for MPA co

ASW and surveillance operations, with their employment in an an

warfare (ASUW) role increasing as the series progressed. MPA depen

shore bases affected their operational use, especially in early gam

Red was able to inflict heavy damage to the Mediterranean bases. Ic

a key location to support MPA coverage of the GIUK gap and porti

SLOCs to Europe.

Anti-SSBN Campaign

In each of the five GWGs, Blue employed an anti-SSBN campa

against Red submarines deployed out of area and those in their Atlant

cific bastions. These originated as part of a general ASW campaign, bu

cific emphasis on SSBNs increased as the series progressed. These c

resulted in two advantages for Blue. The first resulted from Red’s d

SSNs to SSBN protection, thus making the former unavailable for offe

erations against the SLOCs. The second benefit was in the gradual a

theater nuclear reserve weapons. Although Blue anti-SSBN campa

successful, however, their significance in shifting the strategic nucle

was not clear.

In 1979, Red retaliated against Blue for these SSBN losses by laun

clear attacks on Blue CVBGs in the Atlantic and Pacific, which resu

sinking of two carriers (CVs). The only other response to these SSBN 

curred in the 1981 political arena, when Red used the SSBN campaign 

ample of Blue’s “unduly provocative” behavior aimed at “nuclear wa

for the nuclear attacks in 1979, Red could not find a military response 

these losses.

40
CVBG Employment

The strategy for the employment of the carrier battle groups cha

the series. In the 1979 game, the CVBGs were withdrawn from the M

nean because of concerns over their survivability in the face of Red a

As a result, the eastern Mediterranean became a Red lake. A Red cruis

the Blue air station at Sigonella, rendering it unusable. Greece and Tu

driven out of the war, and NATO‘s southern flank was in total dis

game’s end, Blue was trying to devise a campaign to re-enter the M

nean. Blue employed the Pacific Fleet CVBGs in a similar manner. T

withdrawn to the safety of the Central Pacific, although in this instanc

not act as effectively as in the Mediterranean.

In the 1979 game, the twoCVBGs withdrawn from the Mediterrane

at a position south of the Azores, with two CVBGs sortied from Blue. 

position, out of SNA range, they provided support to the naval forces 

the SLOCs to Europe. Two additional CVBGs were sent from the Indi

around Africa, to join the Atlantic forces.

Once hostilities began, Red air, using nuclear weapons, sank 

CVBGs in retaliation for Blue attacks against SSBNs. Later, offensive 

were foreshadowed when an aircraft carrier battle force (CVBF) move

Norwegian Sea. This group was able to gain sea control, though th

cluded the loss of a CV. As the game ended, Blue was considering h

the CVBGs effectively to support the Central Front.

CVBG employment in 1980 was largely overshadowed by the nucl

Within a short period, four CVBGs were lost to Red nuclear SNA/SA

with a fifth loss following shortly afterwards.

By 1981, Blue CVBGs were being used more aggressively. Blue he

the eastern Mediterranean. Though two CVs were lost there to con

(non-nuclear) attacks, Blue reflecting on the debacle of 1979, assesse

loss was still better than the consequences of a withdrawal. The loss o

happened at least in part because the battle force (BF) expected and pr

a nuclear attack, which reduced its ability to defend against a conven

tack. When Blue began using nuclear weapons against Red bas

Transcaucasus, Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk, and Petropavlovsk, C

ployment again lost emphasis as the focus shifted to controlling and e

stopping the nuclear spiral. As part of the series of exchanges, SNA s

CVs in the Pacific, using nuclear weapons. In this case the three CVBG

gether and were well prepared. Nevertheless they were overwhelmed 

sive Red air attack in which Red sent every airplane which could fly, w

not it carried weapons.

41
Blue adopted a forward offensive maritime strategy in 1982 with 

sinking the Red navy and exerting pressure against the enemy’s home 

Yet the effort began conservatively. Mediterranean CVBGs initially 

to the west while Pacific Fleet CVBGs fell back to the Central Pacific

initial situation stabilized, the CVBGs moved forward and initiated 

operations. In the Mediterranean, the CVBGs assisted in countering 

vances in Thrace and supported the Blue amphibious response. In bo

lantic and Pacific, CVBGs struck at Red surface forces, resulting in th

elimination. Indian Ocean CVBGs supported forces resisting Red lan

but suffered heavily from a combined forces attack. After establishin

trol, three Atlantic Fleet CVBGs began supporting NATO forces on th

Front from a position in the Irish Sea. These Central Front TACAI

however, were assessed as generally less effective than expected du

small numbers as compared to the overall theater air assets.

The 1983 game saw CVBGs more fully utilized in an offensive pos

riers supported NATO/Blue forces in North Norway and struck Red 

tions in the Kola. These maneuvers caused enemy forces to conce

defensive operations to the detriment of efforts against Allied force

way. In the Pacific, CVBGs mounted an offensive that struck Red forc

stallations. The SNA/SAF was severely mauled and the CVBG attack 

cover for an amphibious assault in the Kuriles. Mediterranean CVBG

conducted strikes against targets on the southern flank but were with

the west to increase Blue air on the Central Front. This withdrawal m

were unavailable to provide support to forces countering a late-develo

thrust into Southwest Asia. However, their air power, in conjunction w

CVBGs that moved south from the Norwegian Sea, served to supplem

NATO air to stop a massive Red attack on the Central Front. In this effo

TACAIR combined to play an important role in tipping the balance t

Red effort to achieve a breakthrough. At game’s end, this Red drive 

halted.

Consistent with the experimentation at the strategic level, Blue C

ployment demonstrated a wide range of flexibility. Using insights 

lier games, Blue worked throughout the series to refine CVBG op

employment. A primary reason for change was the shift from an in

fensive orientation to a more offensive role. This was a result of the 

appreciation of the greater benefits a more aggressive stance achie

principal factors that allowed the CVBGs to survive forward operat

improvements in tactics, electronic warfare (EW), cover and decep

resource coordination.

42
Blue made several attempts to support the battle on the Central Fron

rier air. While additional air support was invariably welcomed by the 

commanders, there was significant controversy over the effect on the o

ater balance. All-weather, low-altitude attack aircraft were much sou

and at certain times, particularly in the COMBALTAP/2 ATAF region, 

craft did positively affect the area balance. However, on the whole, 

ferred the carrier to be used in a mobile striking role on the flanks.

CINCPAC was continually under threat of losing his CVBGs to the 

theater to support the campaign there. Therefore, thinking tended tow

them or lose them” approach, and an aggressive strategy resulted. GW

this trend reach its zenith as PACFLT‘s aggressive attack decimated 

persed SNA/SAF in the Far East and supported an amphibious invasi

eral of the Kurile Islands.

Sustainability of carrier air wings was a matter of some concern. H

age resulted in steady losses which became significant over an extend

Reserve forces, in conjunction with the consolidation of air wings f

aged CVs, provided some help, but not in numbers sufficient to me

mands. As a result, in the “mid-term” period of D+30 to D+180, attac

were likely to be scarce. One solution offered as a possibility for a

some losses was greater use of TLAM-Cs against air defenses and h

fended targets.

Use of CVBGs in horizontal escalation against the Red surrogate

option that was deemed secondary unless Red SNA/SAF were deplo

Blue quickly realized that these surrogates could be dispatched later 

wither.

Conceptually, the employment of CVBGs provided one of the best 

of maritime strategy. From an initial, essentially defensive role, t

moved into more offensive roles that carried the battle to the enemy

Mine Warfare

Both sides routinely used both offensive and defensive mine warfa

port of maritime operations. Red tended to utilize mines to a greater e

Blue, consistent with their larger stocks and doctrine. Aside from con

minelaying, Red also used clandestine methods, such as fishing boats 

chant ships, to mine NATO ports prior to D-Day.

Red frequently utilized mines against key choke points, including 

of Gibraltar, the Strait of Messina, and the Strait of Sicily. During 

game, Red mined the Blue re-entry points to the Mediterranean in 

43
prevent the return of the CVBGs. Later, in the 1982 game, Red mined 

of Sicily and Messina in an attempt to confine the Sixth Fleet CVB

western Mediterranean after they had been moved into this area to su

battle on the Central Front. The following year, Red attempted a sim

by sowing aerial mines at the entrances to the Norwegian fjord w

forces were operating. In various instances, Red used mines offensiv

eas such as the Strait of Florida, Strait of Hormuz, and the English Cha

fensively, Red employed mines to assist in the protection of its SSBN 

and home ports.

Blue also utilized mines, though on a smaller scale than Red. One 

focus was an effort to confine the Red Baltic Fleet by mining the exit

Baltic. Additionally, Blue dedicated considerable resources to the 

parts of the GIUK gap. Offensively, Blue’s most significant effort w

1981, when Red Pacific Fleet ports were mined in order to confine t

fleet and to relieve the CVBGs from “guard duty.”

Tomahawk Employment

The requirement for a long-range attack weapon was noted in the 

report (1979). Such a weapon would be a vital component of any earl

sive campaign against Red maritime assets, particularly SNA/SAF. As 

ahawk land attack missile( TLAM) moved from concept to reality, it

GWG also developed.

The first significant use of the TLAM was during the 1981 game

was utilized in both the conventional and nuclear variants. In th

mode, it was used against Red SNA/SAF bases in the eastern Mediterr

Black Sea regions. As the conflict escalated to the nuclear level, the nu

sion was employed against Red bases in the Transcaucasus and on t

coast.

Both the 1982 and 1983 games saw increased use of the conventi

ant, and its value against heavily defended targets became increasing

ent. An important aspect was its capability to be employed during 

stages of an air campaign in order to reduce losses among attack s

Tomahawk strikes against enemy surface-to-air missiles and radar an

controlled intercept (GCI) sites immediately prior to an air strike prov

particularly effective tactic. This had considerable value, as attrition 

and aircrews was identified as a serious problem in the period D+30 to 

44
In 1983, a subsidiary (

offline) game was conducted with the ob

rigorously studying the potential and application of both the conven

nuclear Tomahawk configurations. The significant insights were:

TLAM-N

• Produced an additional deterrent consideration during the pr

phase.

• Surface and sub-surface platforms equipped with the weapon 

around the periphery of Red created a serious targeting problem for th

• In the event of a nuclear war, TLAM-N provided escalatory op

otherwise did not exist.

TLAM-C

• As noted above, this variant was a valuable aid in strikes again

defended targets and also reduced friendly losses.

• Early attacks on Red SNA/SAF bases were highlighted as areas 

weapon’s capabilities were particularly useful.

From experience in the 1981 game and the 1983 off-line game, nuc

ahawk variants [Tomahawk land-attack missile-nuclear (TLAM-N

ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)] offered valuable but less th

nuclear employment options. Instead of a ballistic missile with an 

number of warheads approaching a target in the Red homeland, a sl

threatening vehicle was delivering the weapon.

Marine Corps

Concurrent with trends in other areas, Marine Corps employmen

derwent evolutionary change. Early games saw the Marines exten

volved with the RDF and operations in Southwest Asia. However, 

Marines committed to this effort constituted a valuable resource, they 

same problems the RDF as a whole faced—Red forces in theater wer

cally superior and possessed short, well-defended supply lines. In co

RDF started out with a significant numerical disadvantage and was at 

an extended and vulnerable supply train. Reinforcements were limite

theaters had equally pressing demands. Additionally, the lift assets av

deliver reinforcements and logistic support were also limited.

Thus, the Marines were part of a force that faced a battle in a r

gion of the world, in a disadvantageous position with little prospec

45
Consequently, Marine involvement in this area entailed primarily wi

or defensive operations, roles which did not fully utilize their capabil

result, Blue began to emphasize their use in other theaters where the

talents could be better exploited.

A primary region for such use was northern Norway. Though Ma

been committed to the defense of Norway throughout the series, init

role was to bolster defense. Marines deployed to ground positions in N

well as to Iceland with aircraft and SAM batteries. However, in lin

overall shift in Blue thought, Marine employment changed to a more 

fensive campaign of amphibious assaults against the advancing R

Such operations contributed directly to enhancing the security of t

northern flank and threatening Red base areas. Marine air was pa

valuable in these operations. Shore-based aircraft directly support

ground forces, aided the defense of CVBGs, and were a significant c

of the air campaign against Red installations in the Kola.

Marine activity in the Far East underwent a pronounced change. A

Marines were engaged in static defense or acted as a force in reserve. 

roles included the reinforcement of Korea and the Aleutians. By 

Marines were actively engaged in offensive amphibious operation

Red-occupied islands in the Kuriles. These operations were significa

strategic perspective in that they infringed on the flank of Red Pac

SSBN bastions.

Marines were also active in the Mediterranean. During several ga

rine forces were landed in Thrace to support Greece and Turkey. Th

were important components of the Blue reaction to the Red 1981 of

seize the Turkish Straits and a corridor to the Mediterranean. Marine 

both GWG 1982 and GWG 1983 against the Red southern flank caus

emy to focus additional attention on this area. The 1983 operation d

Red attention because of the stalemated conditions on the Central F

46
Chemical and Nuclear Warfare

CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS received varying degre

during this series. During the five games, a gradual evolution in 

was evident regarding the use of nuclear and chemical weapons. From 

perspective, a conviction developed that neither Blue nor Red appear

from escalation to nuclear warfare. Red saw nuclear use as negatin

conventional advantage; Blue operated from a perceived position of i

in tactical and theater capability. Thus, any venture into the nuclear ar

to be seen as undesirable by both sides. Thinking about chemical wea

changed over time to a point where an almost total decoupling deve

tween chemical and nuclear employment. Blue did not believe that 

chemical weapons to match Red and feared the escalatory possibiliti

a limited nuclear response. Overall, both Blue and Red realized th

tion-control considerations became governing factors for retaliatory 

A Blue potential for nuclear advantage emerged early in the se

Blue discovered that its SSNs could aggressively seek and destroy Re

while Red had little apparent conventional counter to these losses. Re

to locate Blue SSBNs, had no obvious options for retaliation other than 

volving nuclear use, but such options went against the resolve fo

avoidance. Red reluctantly accepted the SSBN attrition and a slight s

nuclear balance, as any other alternative entailed the possibility of nuc

In 1979, Red utilized nuclear weapons to destroy two CVBGs. Th

nounced by Red as a one-time strike in retaliation for Blue attritio

SSBNs. Blue responded with a one-shot retaliation against a Red for

the Norwegian Sea. Blue had a difficult time settling on an appropr

for retaliation. Finally, a Red surface action group (SAG) dedicated to 

rier warfare tasks was selected. No chemical weapons were employ

1979 GWG.

In the 1980 game, Red commenced with a “go for broke” objective 

ing control over the Eurasian landmass. This involved early use 

chemical attacks focused on Iceland, the Azores, and Guam, and th

tion of three nuclear weapons east of Japan to intimidate that govern
neutrality. Blue retaliated by using a nuclear weapon against Red SNA

ployed to Aden, partially because of resource limitations and partly 

Red into realizing the seriousness of Blue resolve. Red struck back, d

three CVBGs by air-launched nuclear weapons and another by 

rine-launched nuclear missiles. A Blue attempt to destroy two Kiev S

nuclear-armed A-6s failed as the attacking aircraft were lost. Blue r

considered countering Red chemical use by a nuclear attack on a tar

land but was dissuaded by the other members of NATO. Both sides pro

clear weapons to their allies and a number of exchanges occurred, cu

in a massive exchange between Red and the People’s Republic of Chi

tiation for war termination began when Blue, via the “hot line,” threate

release.

Nuclear forces were utilized in the 1981 Game, with Blue the first t

them. Blue was confronted with a rapidly deteriorating situation in ea

key and Southwest Asia. Believing that options were limited to strat

drawal or escalation across a nuclear threshold, Blue chose to ex

consequences of nuclear escalation with the new TLAM-N weapo

against Red bases in the Transcaucasus and at Petropavlo

Alexandrovsk. (The latter is on Sakhalin’s west coast.) Red retaliate

tacks against a CVBG and against Diego Garcia and Guam. Blue pro

clear weapons to Turkey, which promptly used them against Red in T

which Red countered with nuclear strikes in eastern Turkey. No chem

fare was involved in this game.

No nuclear weapons were used by either side in the 1982 and 1983 

though the 1983 game did involve an off-line game to explore the po

the TLAM-N. In contrast, chemical warfare was widely utilized by R

1982 game, particularly on the northern flank. Blue and Norwegian f

bases in northern Norway were attacked on more than one occasion, a

land. Chemical weapons were also employed by Red against other se

cations, including Adak, Izmir, and bases in Italy. Blue retaliated wit

chemical strike upon Red divisions in the Transcaucasus.

It appeared that Blue perception of the nuclear balance had much 

the decisions on nuclear weapons use. In the 1980 GWG, Blue threate

lation to the SIOP level to bring about a cease-fire of sorts. In 1981, B

first use of theater/tactical nuclear weapons to try to retrieve losing sit

Turkey and Southwest Asia. In the 1982 and 1983 games, both sides 

from using nuclear weapons; Red, because of the belief that their lim

could be attained without them, and Blue, because of the perception t

change at any level would work to Blue’s disadvantage.

48
The history of the games seemed to favor Red insofar as escalat

nance at the theater/tactical level was concerned. This was not only th

having more weapons of more different types and capabilities, but a

fact that Red had more targeting flexibility than Blue. Indeed, through 

insular bases, Diego Garcia and Guam for example, and at high-value 

gets such as CVBGs, Red had a range of targets apparently not availab

Strikes against targets of these types produced limited collateral dam

Red, in the early games, appeared to have the potential to escalate and 

ple nuclear use at sea from the conventional war on the Central Front, 

that Blue seemed to lack without risking massive nuclear preemption 

tion by Red at either the theater or strategic level.

Red, in later games, sought to avoid initial use of nuclear weapons

mary factors shaped this policy. One was a reluctance to risk the hom

any nuclear use could start a dangerous escalation. Second, Red perc

its conventional forces were more than adequate to perform the task 

and saw nuclear employment as counterproductive.

Blue/NATO‘s response to Red chemical initiatives was another is

not appear advantageous to the Blue NCA players to respond to ch

tacks by selecting the nuclear option. A nuclear reply, while demons

solve, was not an option utilized, as Blue not only feared escalatio

perceived that it had neither the weapons nor the range of targets su

employment.

A related issue that evolved from the 1980 and 1982 Global War G

whether or not chemical weapons could be used by Red without pro

nuclear response. Some analysts suggested that Red perceived both nu

chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction, both to be eschew

Blue were the initiator. Further, if Red were pushed to first use, it wa

that chemical weapons would not be employed alone but would be 

nuclear weapons. If this proved to be true, then the Blue response 

would be clarified, as nuclear initiation must be followed by nuclear 

targeting problems notwithstanding. However, if chemical use alone 

gun by Red, and Blue saw no advantage to nuclear initiation, then Blu

limited chemical capability, would be hard-pressed for a sufficient d

alone an adequate counter. If in fact Red considered chemical weapo

ventional weapons, as Red doctrine, exercises, and training suggeste

analysts, Blue would have difficulty in developing an appropriate re

49
Political/Military Considerations

War Initiation

RED INITIATED HOSTILITIES in all five Global War Game

many factors influenced the Red decision to go to war, the prim

vation was a perceived threat to Red security or, less often, a wind

portunity. One of the threats which affected Red was the specter of 

in the Warsaw Pact. Faced with unrest and the possibility of open rev

or more Pact countries, Red saw the elimination of Western influen

lution to the problem. A significant transition occurred in the Red ap

the war initiation process as the series evolved. In the early games

tered with the clear game objective of launching a war. However, as 

progressed, war initiation became less driven by design and more in

by events. This evolution continued until, in 1983, as the situation in 

many and Poland deteriorated, Red believed it had no alternative but 

fore it was fully prepared. (A primary factor in this evolution was th

in the composition of Red game players. The replacement of office

vilians with intelligence professionals, whose focus as Red player

marily on U.S. policy and strategy, undoubtedly resulted in a more 

portrayal of actual Red thinking.)

One participant in the 1979 game discussed the events leading 

initiation in some depth. He highlighted significant disadvantages 

would face in a scenario where Red started the war. As the initia

“first salvo,” Red realized a major advantage that could result in a 

force ratio which would carry over into subsequent battles. The dile

ing the Blue president and his advisors was how to maintain an opt

gree of military readiness without crossing the line to provocation. 

the participant pointed out, Red could “exploit [a Blue] pressure fo

up to the last minute,” offering deceptive proposals and other ince

Washington to avoid any incident. Avoiding incidents means tigh

rules of engagement that would delay the release orders for the na

its weapons—delay them well past the first Soviet salvo. “Thus, in 
situation, where those involved do not see war as inevitable, there 

strong pressure not to institute measures that could further increase 

Methods such as a cordon sanitaire, a protected area of defense in whi

ligerent passage is tolerated, while they produce some tactical advant

evaluated as not being worth the “cost” in increased tensions during s

sitive period.

However, an interesting avenue for exploration was how Blue cou

crisis situation to best advantage. A predetermined war plan requir

tively strict adherence to a schedule to ensure that critical massing of 

curred at the proper time. Because of this inflexibility, Red was virtua

to tolerate a number of Blue actions and maneuvers in order that war 

before Red forces were fully mobilized or at least in an advantageous 

The obvious critical variable was Blue’s ability to assess the Red situa

found it could exercise more tactical authority early in the mobilizatio

Red was not yet ready to go to war.

As the series progressed, and war began less as a result of Red aggre

more as a result of events unsought by Red, Blue initial force de

changed. During the 1979 game, Blue CVBGs were withdrawn from 

positions with the aim of reducing their vulnerability to a preplanned f

As the perception changed and events took a greater role, Blue became 

cerned with maneuvering and positioning his forces against the Red f

Instead, Blue, in accordance with a more aggressive strategy, placed 

further forward to be in position to commence early offensive tacti

tions.

Managing the situation during the prehostilities phase became a v

for both governments. Each sought to advance its perceived interes

disaster, while working to salvage a worsening situation. The game 

ment was purposely designed to be ambiguous and reflect with increa

racy the confusion that would actually exist during such a period. 

behind this rationale was the philosophical position that generally g

are not deliberately started on the basis of reason. The triggers that co

bly start a superpower war over or in Western Europe were recogni

tremely difficult to identify. However, it was generally agreed that 

war would require a series of events or miscalculations of catastroph

tion—some, if not all, of which would have to be considered by b

belligerents as critical to their own survival. This approach was cha

of the later games only and reflected the increased realism that the in

intelligence and other professionals provided to the game. Perceived 

vital interests and miscalculation, working together, were assessed 

most likely ingredients that would result in such a war.

51
Long/Short

Term War

Considerable development of the long-war concept occurred as a 

the Global War Game series. Initially, both sides envisioned a short w

initial conventional advantage in Europe usually meant Red was abl

significant advances into NATO territory on the Central Front. Blu

“in place” forces on D-Day were hard-pressed to maintain a cohes

much less push back Red. In line with stated objectives, Blue refuse

sider any war termination other than a return to the “status quo ante 

The preference for a long war accrued from the experience of the 

five GWGs showed that Blue was placed under considerable pressure 

first thirty days of the war, particularly in Europe. After the 1980 g

lished game insights stated that Blue could not expect to win a short 

following year, GWG ‘81, Blue listed as one of its military game obje

avoidance of an early defeat. GWG ‘82 continued this evolution furthe

the first to question the validity of any “short-war” strategy and m

tempt to explore the transition period from short to medium or long 

yond thirty days). By 1983 the game, though still extending only th

short-war period, was actively seeking to explore the implications 

war, particularly the logistical aspects.

Avoidance of nuclear weapons use was a major factor in the shift t

concept of a long war. Since neither side perceived escalation to th

level to be advantageous, the quick resolution of the conflict throug

employment seemed no longer practicable. The consequences, the

perceptions—Blue’s inability to successfully terminate a short con

war and a reluctance to risk nuclear escalation—drove Blue to inves

option of a prolonged conventional war.

Combining the Central Front aspect with a global perspective, Blu

see advantages to a long war. Most significant was that an extended ti

allowed Blue to bring the full weight of its industrial capacity to bear. 

benefited from the resources existing in its allies and friendly nations

which are well removed from the immediate battle area. In contrast, 

mary allies were in Eastern Europe, close to or in the battle area, and 

likely to be able to add much additional capacity; instead, they wo

suffer a decreased output.

As the potential for a longer conflict developed, Blue appeared to r

other advantage, regarding the availability of food. When Red mobili

nificant portion of its agricultural work force and transportation reso

to be diverted from food production and distribution. Additionally

imports ended. Blue, with a more productive and less manpower-

52
agriculture, particularly when augmented by supplies from Canada 

America, enjoyed a steadily growing advantage. Should Blue target 

distribution and production systems, Red could face a significant 

problem. Food shortages also offered a means of creating disconte

Red internal nationalities and satellites.

Red satellite countries remained predominantly loyal during all f

games. However, there were several instances toward the end of the 

1983 games where rumblings of dissent were evident, and the conti

participation of at least two Eastern Bloc countries was in questio

longed war, combined with food shortages, would further stress th

Pact and could result in significant benefits for Blue.

A major advantage Blue enjoyed as the war lengthened was its abil

ness global resources. Horizontal escalation strategies, which seem

duce limited results in a short war, would offer the potential of 

greater benefits. Some of the losses that Red could afford to ig

thirty-day war could severely impact Red in a long-term war effo

against economic and transportation targets could result in cumulati

dations to Red infrastructure. Continued Blue naval attacks against th

cific coast and northern flank resulted in lessened Red naval capabi

mobility and striking power of the CVBGs during such an extended 

conflict could become increasingly significant.

Although long war was considered one of the more promising Blu

the concept had not been studied sufficiently to determine its valid

variables had to be considered, the most important of which were logi

piles, war production, and consumption rates. A key question was whe

forces could hold until their industrial and economic advantages wer

into play.

Another problem facing Blue was the political aspect of prolon

war. The transition phase is critical. Should Red advance and occup

portion of the FRG and then declare its desire for a cease-fire with 

forward movement, would Blue be able to maintain the required dete

among its people and allies to continue hostilities? An important facto

beyond the art of war-gaming to explore effectively during this serie

notion of national will. During a global war, the public would be subje

unrelenting chain of major shocks. This process would begin with 

tension of the crisis period preceding the outbreak of hostilities. Exp

would rise and fall as both sides sought a solution to the root problem

war continued, large combat losses would be bound to affect publi

on both sides. Few in the public at large fully understand modern 

consequently there could be considerable confusion and rumor.Con

53
the natural urge of a nation to unite in the face of a threat would be man

central issue relating to “national will” faced by both Blue and Red le

long war becomes whether the “negative” factors (heavy and extend

ties) can overcome the “positive” factors (patriotism and national d

tion).

While Blue transitioned to a preference for long war, Red was perf

tent with a short and limited war. In fact, in GWG ‘83, Red considered 

lems of limited manpower for harvests and the stoppage of foodstuf

but did not become overly concerned; it still pressed for a short war 

Red was convinced the war would end when its forces reached and s

the western border of the FRG—at the most a forty-five-day war by th

culation. The Red assessment was that ample war reserves and war p

capacity existed to achieve these immediate war aims. Such a conf

Red purposes well. Ideally, Blue would accept the “inevitable” and 

Red gains in return for peace.

Horizontal Escalation

A major theme in this series was the issue of horizontal esc

war-widening. The term described a means that Blue might employ 

military force against Red off the main axis of attack. Ideally, such 

would have a high probability of success and result in an adversary’s 

initiative that threatened a vulnerable flank. Red would then have the 

diverting forces from the primary offensive or suffering heavy los

flank attack succeeded. Blue intended to use this as a strategy to bring 

against Red away from the Central Front. Horizontal escalation was u

varying conditions of crises, transition to war, and war.

The use of this strategy both during and before hostilities is of par

terest. This series explored the extent to which it might be possible 

threaten, or act in ways that would inhibit the worsening of crises or 

war, and looking ahead to war termination, horizontal escalation was 

provide players with leverage to reverse earlier adverse actions, off

gains, or make gains that advanced their own policies and objective

Complicating Blue efforts at horizontal escalation was geography. 

potential Red vulnerabilities was difficult. The West, with its Central 

ready involved considerable forces. Arctic conditions and inaccessi

cluded a northern attack, although the Norwegian Sea did offer som

tial. Actions against the Red southern flank entailed transiting no

countries, and the sheer distances involved to support such an ac

54
staggering. Additionally, the forces Red had stationed in that area 

mally sufficient to counter any attacks. The final direction, the east

sented difficulties, but was the area with most promise.

Blue did mount some attacks against eastern Red, with the 1983 g

onstrating the greatest success. However, the overall effectiveness of 

tions was constrained by several factors. First, commitments 

elsewhere limited the assets Blue could employ in pursuit of its strate

tive in this theater. Again, geography exerted an influence; the Re

coast is sizeable. While strike operations could achieve results agains

targets, efforts on a scale necessary to cause major national concern 

Red focus from Western Europe appeared to require far larger of fo

Blue possessed in theater.

During the GWG series, in spite of the geographic difficulties

tempted to find a Red vulnerability in four major geographic areas: N

way, the eastern Mediterranean, Southwest Asia, and the northwe

Examples of these actions included:

• In GWG ‘82 and ‘83, Blue augmented its fighting forces early 

Norway. Red, on these occasions, did feel a threat to its northern fla

verted a limited number of forces from formations that otherwise w

supported the Central Front. Indeed, Red used chemical weapons in 

to attempt to avoid shifting conventional forces. Red concern was no

Blue land forces in Norway but also the success Blue had achieved in 

battles for the Barents and Norwegian Seas and the consequent den

fense in depth against Blue TACAIR or the potential for B-52s comin

pole to threaten the Kola and the interior.

• In GWG ‘82, the CVBGs in the eastern Mediterranean and Blue o

in Thrace caused Red to realign and divert additional forces to s

planned attack in Southwest Asia and Thrace. As the game played 

proved unable to win quickly and decisively in Thrace. It took appr

eight days for Red to reinforce the campaign. Meanwhile, the stalled R

in the Southwest Asia attack remained static. Red TACAIR and LRA u

required to reinforce the Thracian campaign. Although not catastroph

fort did reduce the capability of Red to reinforce the Central Front.

• In the Indian Ocean, Red perceived that Blue could not seriously 

or support any land campaign. This was also a Blue perception. Blue 

tent to destroy the Red Indian Ocean eskadra. This did not appear to c

major strategic problems.

• In the Pacific, Blue aggressiveness with naval forces progre

the series in an attempt to cause Red to divert or withhold assets 

Central Front. The search for a worthwhile and attainable campaign 

55
culminated in GWG 

83 with an attack that decimated Red SNA/LRA 

East. Other aspects of this more aggressive strategy involved invadin

of the Kurile Islands. North Korea’s invasion (GWG ‘83) of South 

sulted in part from Red reaction to this aggressive posture. While Re

made to shift his focus from Germany, which was what Blue was lo

Red probably retained forces in the Far East that might otherwise h

shifted west.

Game play throughout the series demonstrated little Red desire 

from the narrowly focused objective of “Europe first,” after defen

homeland. Finding a tactical lever or strategic handle that could be use

to alter dramatically the course of the war was difficult. Blue realized 

attempts could actually be counterproductive. Rather than creating 

for Red on his flanks and causing the diversion of forces, a conseque

be instead that Blue forces would be diverted from areas of greater 

A factor which did affect this situation was the short time-span 

Blue actions caused a Red reaction, but these reactions were often no

ately obvious. In terms of warfighting, two games were only five day

tion, and the longest was thirty days. Evidence indicated that some Bl

would cause the beginning of a reaction, full implications of which w

be felt as the game ended. Evidence on this point was seen in the 1

when the stalemate on the Central Front did change the equation s

The situation then approximated that likely to occur in a long war. R

ceptions of operations on his flanks (northern Norway and eastern M

nean) were magnified, and events he previously considered mere 

became threats that caused Red to begin a reallocation of selected f

counter.

The threat of horizontal escalation had an effect from the beginning

forces threatened Red flanks, Red was required to keep a number of as

tioned to defend them. While each individual response did not seem si

the cumulative effect was sizeable and denied Red the use of those fo

where.

Red too was able to use horizontal escalation. In GWG ‘83, Red w

persuade North Korea to attack South Korea, thus diverting Blue as

the Kuriles and attacks on Siberia. Further, Red made a move into S

Asia relatively late in the game that found Blue too thinly spread to 

However, though Red realized advantages in these situations, overall 

perienced a number of situations where its forces were diverted by its 

of horizontal escalation. It also should be noted that most Red 

war-widening were results of failure to terminate favorably the war 

mary theater of action.

56
Horizontal escalation by Blue evolved as an endeavor to obtain 

against Red to compensate for Central Front deficiencies. This leve

ally, would force Red to reconsider war objectives, divert forces, or s

nation on terms more agreeable to Blue. An additional aspect was th

on the flanks would give Blue more useful options in a longer war. 

war, the concept did not cause a major problem for Red. However, the 

for horizontal escalation appeared to increase with the length of the 

Actions which Red could afford to ignore in the short term might beg

him over time. When progress was halted in Central Europe, the 

sumed increased importance for both Blue and Red.

War Termination

Termination of hostilities usually centered around the situation i

Red would often achieve a significant penetration into the FRG and 

negotiations. The hope was that Blue/NATO would agree to a “cea

place.” Once such an agreement was reached, Red estimated that t

constitute a de facto recognition of its gains and that Blue/NATO wo

willing to recommence hostilities. Blue foiled this effort by refusin

into substantive negotiations without return to a territorial “status 

bellum.” Neither side was willing to accommodate the other’s pos

thus no real progress toward termination was achieved. As a result, th

ing option appeared to be a “long war.”

The only instance where negotiations were effective was in the 19

where nuclear exchange had progressed considerably up the escalat

Blue was at a disadvantage and saw events getting out of control. As 

threatened SIOP release unless an immediate cease-fire occurred. Re

and both sides terminated hostilities, although Red viewed this as bu

rary suspension of the war.

In 1983, Blue determination to accept nothing but a full “status 

bellum” resulted in a lost opportunity to obtain a relatively acceptable 

war. The Red initial attack stalled only a short distance into German 

and Red offered a “cease-fire in place.” Blue refused, and Red brou

second strategic echelon and achieved greater penetration into 

Blue’s insistence on the “status quo ante” resulted in a substantially l

able negotiating position.

It should be noted that sentiment for “status quo ante bellum” was 

tion of the NATO Alliance. This was particularly true in GWG ‘82, al

that game at least one of the smaller allies was contemplating a separat

57
War termination considerations created major difficulties for both 

Red. Blue was confronted with situations such as that of the 1983 gam

potentially acceptable end to the war was achievable with only a sm

German territory. For Blue, however, it was both a political and a mor

tive to reject any agreement that would forsake any part of Europe. F

was next to unthinkable to give up that for which so much blood an

had been expended. While detailed examination of these kinds of wa

tion issues was a noteworthy objective, the games of this series did n

to the level where the political, military, and popular pressures nec

override such a stand could be played, communicated, and felt by th

pants.

The inability to work out an acceptable negotiated settlement, 

with the determination of both Blue and Red to avoid nuclear use, we

tant series insights.

58
Epilogue

With the second Global War Game series (1984–1988) complet

third ongoing, the significance of the first series is apparent. It is onl

perspective time provides that the importance of some of the trends e

in the 1979–1983 games becomes clear. Insights derived from those g

be broadly divided into those associated with the game process and t

nected with issues raised.

The expansion of the game in terms of military participants has 

cussed at some length in previous pages and seems obvious, given th

stances of the first game. However the increase in civilian involve

ongoing and substantial. From the outset, there was an appreciation t

civilians would have a different and more realistic appreciation of th

process than would senior military officers, and efforts began with 

game to obtain the best qualified civilians available to play major ro

Blue National Command Authority (NCA) and the Red Supreme H

mand (VGK). Further, as the Global War Game gained stature, the ac

the results became crucial. Without realistic policy decisions to guid

tary aspects of the game, issues raised and insights gained could well 

or irrelevant.

Additional civilian participation was required as the emphasis of 

shifted from that of a short war, terminated possibly by the launching 

weapons, to that of a protracted conventional conflict. This increase

portance of studying industrial mobilization and that involved the par

of a number of government agencies to share in the planning process. 

regarding priority of force reconstitution were raised, as well as th

concerns of lead time and cost. The impact of a long conventional g

on national and international economies required study as well. Mo

tant, however, was the question of resource mobilization to overcom

ceived initial Red numerical and logistical advantages so that B

maintain its alliances and finally prevail. The “game-study-game” 

luded to for the military became a fixture in some government agenci

as they used the period between games to develop solutions to economic 
raised in previous games. In retrospect, the Global War Game series c

to have been the motivator for significant “real world” planning for th

zation of resources and industry.

The trend for increasing involvement of both military services an

agencies of government developed in the first series of the Global Gam

most significant. Not only have the games stimulated both military an

participants to explore real world problems in depth and to develop solu

they have done so in a common forum. It is through this means that G

been able to make significant contributions to national policy and prepa

From a military perspective, one of the most valuable results o

Global War Game series was that it forced game participants to test 

truths” in a realistic simulation. The consequent modifying or disc

what had been accepted as “gospel” permitted a new appraisal of how 

tween the superpowers might better be waged. In this, Global served 

purpose of longitudinal study as did the Orange Plan games of 1930s. 

amples of what had been the conventional wisdom and that lost c

when tested in the series are:

• War between Blue and Red would “automatically” become nu

• Blue defense of Europe was impossible without recourse o

weapons.

• A barrier across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap wa

tive to preserve Blue SLOCs in the Atlantic.

• Blue CVBGs could not survive in the eastern Mediterranean or N

Seas.

• Amphibious warfare and, therefore, the U.S. Marine Corps, had 

play in superpower conflict.

Much of the importance of the first Global series, then, was not so m

it tended to prove but in what it led people to question. The questionin

developed in that series provided a far sounder foundation on which th

pants in the second series could build. Indeed, strategic initiatives p

the beginning of the second Global series were, in some instances, op

had been rejected out of hand in the early games.

Finally, the results of the first Global War Game series helped l

players to focus on the right issues. Some of the most important of th

were:

• What strategies should Blue and its allies develop in waging p

conventional war?

60
• What Red targets that would 

make a differencecould be at

Blue land and carrier-based air power?

• Would offensive operations by Blue in the Norwegian and Bar

particularly by SSNs, forestall Red interdiction of Blue SLOCs?

• What Red vulnerabilities were subject to amphibious attack?

The insights gained from the second Global War Game series are v

a matter of the answers to these and similar questions that had their 

the first Global War Game series, 1979–1983.

61

Glossary

AAW Anti-Air Warfare

ACW Anti-Carrier Warfare

ASAT Anti-Satellite

ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System

Benelux Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxem

BF Battle Force

BG Battle Group

Blue United States

CINC Commander in Chief

CINCPAC Commander in Chief Pacific

CNO Chief of Naval Operations

COMBALTAP/2 ATAF Commander Baltic Approaches/Secon

Tactical Air Force

CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CV Aircraft Carrier

CVBF Aircraft Carrier Battle Force

CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group

C3 Command, Control, and Communicat

DEW Distant Early Warning

Eskadra Squadron (Russian)

EW Electronic Warfare

FRG Federal Republic of Germany

GCI Ground Controlled Intercept

GDR German Democratic Republic

GIUK Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom

GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

GWG Global War Game

ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile

IGB Inter-German Border

LRA Long-Range Aviation

MAB Marine Amphibious Brigade

MPA Maritime Patrol Air

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Command Authority

NORTHAG Northern Army Group

NWC Naval War College
NWGS Naval Warfare Gaming System

PACFLT Pacific Fleet

Pact Warsaw Pact

PRC People’s Republic of China

RDF Rapid Deployment Force

Red Soviet Union

RRP Rapid Reinforcement Plan

SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAG Surface Action Group

SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

SIOP Single Integrated Operations Plan

SLOC Sea Line of Communication

SAF Soviet Air Force

SNA Soviet Naval Aviation

SSBN Ballistic Missile Submarine (Nuclear)

TACAIR Tactical Air

TACOPS Theater and Corps Operations and Pla

Simulation

TLAM-C Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Con

TLAM-N Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuc

TVD Theater of Military Operations

(Russian: Teatr voennykh del)

USMC U.S. Marine Corps

VGK Supreme High Command

VP Maritime patrol aviation (i.e., VP squ

64
The Authors

Bud Hay is the Director of the Advanced Concepts Department, C

Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College. In 1978–79 he was a mem

original team that designed and directed the first Global War Game. S

he has directed the design, execution, and analysis of the Global ser

tired Marine, Professor Hay has an extensive research background, 

flight test, advanced technology, and futuristic studies.

Captain Bob Gile, USNR (Ret.) has participated in games of all thr

War Game series. His association with Global began in the early 1980

established the Reserve Strategic Studies Group as part of VTU-0

group performed the preliminary analysis of the first series and has co

be deeply involved in the reporting and analysis of the Global series

Naval Reserve officer, Captain Gile has also been a member of the Ne

shire House of Representatives and is the Vice President for Inves

A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.