IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX JAMIL PETERSON, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 03-5368

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JULIE KNAUER et al., :

:

Defendants. :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. February 25, 2008

Before this Court are Alex Peterson’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and Pennsylvania state law claims against defendants Julie Knauer

and the Graterford Medical Health Department. He avers that both

defendants violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and

unusual punishment, specifically alleging that he was

misdiagnosed as having a heart condition, that the medication

prescribed for this misdiagnosis caused him to suffer injury, and

that the defendants did nothing to remedy the situation despite

his numerous requests for help. Defendants now move for summary

judgment.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Peterson is currently serving a prison sentence at the

State Correctional Facility (“SCI”) at Graterford in Pennsylvania

on charges of rape and kidnapping. Convicted in 1989, plaintiff

was originally assigned to SCI Graterford, reassigned to SCI

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 1 of 17
 Also called Digoxin. 1

 Compl. ¶ 22. 2

 From 1990 until 2001, Peterson was also prescribed 3

nitroglycerin patches and had been issued two medical-alert

bracelets, one indicating that he was a heart patient, and one

stating that he had dysrhythmia. 

 It appears as though there were two prison health 4

administrators, Julie Knauer and Donna Hale, who shared in the

duties of the position. Only Knauer is named as a defendant in

2

Dallas and then reassigned again, in May of 1993, back to SCI

Graterford. It was during his initial stint at SCI Graterford

where he was originally diagnosed with having an enlarged heart. 

Pl.’s Dep. 18:6, Feb. 17, 2007. In 1990, while imprisoned at SCI

Dallas, he began to complain of swollen legs, left arm numbness

and that he could “feel his heartbeat.” Pl.’s Dep. 26:9-17. He

was prescribed, by the prison medical staff, Lanoxin, Lasix and 1

Slow-K, medications which he continued to take up until October 2

21, 2001, when he first met with Graterford prison physician, Dr.

Iccarino. Peterson requested from Dr. Iccarino an explanation 3

of why he had been diagnosed as a “heart patient.” Allegedly,

Dr. Iaccarino then told Peterson that he “did not need [heart

medicine].” Compl. ¶ 19. 

On December 1, 2001, April 18, 2002, and November 8,

2002, Peterson filed administrative grievances with the prison

authorities for failing to correct the alleged misinformation in

his medical files. Pl.’s Dep., Exs. 2, 9, 15. The prison health

administrator was responsible for responding to these grievances 4

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 2 of 17
this case. 

 Dr. Smith was one of the physicians at SCI Graterford. 5

 A town meeting is a question-and-answer session at which 6

prisoners can direct their questions directly toward prison

officials.

 This case was placed in suspense in February, 2005, to 7

allow the Clerk’s office to find plaintiff counsel from the

prisoner civil rights panel. In December, 2005, the Court denied

plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel because at least

two attorneys rejected appointment after reviewing the case. 

Plaintiff was instructed to proceed pro se or to retain private

counsel and chose the former.

 In addition to the Knauer and Graterford, Peterson’s 8

initial complaint listed doctors Smith, Kubayat and Robinson as

well Wexford Health Care Services Inc. as defendants. The claims

3

and in Peterson’s case, each grievance was in fact responded to

in a timely fashion. Pl.’s Dep. Exs. 3, 10, 16. On January 21,

2002, Peterson wrote a letter directly to Knauer, “bringing her

attention to [the findings of Dr. Smith ].” Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 4. 5

On January 27, 2003, Peterson approached Knauer at a “town

meeting” and asked her to remove the “erroneous data in his 6

medical files.” Compl. ¶ 33. Lastly, Peterson alleges that on

March 3, 2003, he contacted Knauer directly to express his

discontent with the diagnoses of the prison physicians and that

she failed to respond. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Peterson filed his initial complaint, pro se, on 7

August 27, 2003. On September 24, 2003, defendants removed the 8

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 3 of 17
against Doctors Smith and Kubayat were severed from this

proceeding on February 2, 2005 and the claims against Doctor

Robinson and Wexford Health Care Services Inc. were dismissed on

May 21, 2007.

 At this stage of the proceeding the Court determined that 9

Peterson has been afforded every opportunity to develop his case

and that any further discovery permitted would not affect the

Court’s adjudication of the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. See Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511

(3d Cir. 1994) (a party seeking to reopen discovery in response

to a summary judgment motion must demonstrate: (1) the particular

information sought; (2) how the information would preclude

summary judgment; and (3) why it has not previously been

obtained). Peterson has made vague demands for the “cardiac

doctors’ data” which, even if produced, would not allow Peterson

to create a genuine issue of material fact or dispute the

defendants’ entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as to the

federal claims. 

4

case to this Court. The Court denied the defendants’ motion to

dismiss in a December 15, 2003, order. In an attempt to

streamline the issue, the defendants were ordered to depose the

plaintiff and then, if necessary, file a motion for summary

judgment. After the plaintiff was deposed on February 17, 2007,

the defendants did file a summary judgment motion on May 4, 2007. 

The plaintiff moved to extend the time within which to respond

and to take discovery. The Court granted plaintiff’s motion and

ordered the discovery to be provided. The Court then set October

17, 2007, as the deadline for the plaintiff to respond to

defendants’ motion. On October 16, 2007, plaintiff asked for

additional discovery and another extension of time within which

to respond to defendants’ summary judgment motion. On December 9

27, 2007, the Court denied plaintiff’s request for further

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 4 of 17
5

discovery, but granted him an enlargement of time within which to

respond to defendants’ motion. After yet another request for an

extension of time to respond, which the Court granted on January

17, 2008, the plaintiff filed his response on February 8, 2008. 

The Court will now grant the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment

A court may grant summary judgment when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A fact is “material” if its existence or non-existence

would affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An

issue of fact is “genuine” when there is sufficient evidence from

which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving

party regarding the existence of that fact. Id. at 248-49. “In

considering the evidence, the court should draw all reasonable

inferences against the moving party.” El v. Se. Pa. Transp.

Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007). “[S]ummary judgment is

essentially ‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party:

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 5 of 17
6

the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the

record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the

pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv.

Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).

B. Federal Claims

42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for an

individual whose constitutional rights are violated by those

acting under the color of state law. It states;

“every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

1. SCI Graterford Medical Health Department

As the Supreme Court has often reiterated, the “person”

requirement embodied in the first sentence of the statute is

rarely negotiable. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991)

(holding that neither a state nor its agencies are to be

considered “persons” for § 1983 purposes and are therefore not

subject to suit under the statute); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 6 of 17
 Defendants concede that Eleventh Amendment immunity is 10

waived in this case as the defendants removed it to federal

court. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 

535 U.S. 613 (2002) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity is

waived when government party removes the case to federal court). 

This, however, does not affect the application of Will. 

 Plaintiff concedes as much in his complaint. (Compl. ¶ 11

68).

7

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (an entity with Eleventh Amendment10

Immunity is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). 

Departments of correction have consistently been regarded as

having no existence apart from the state. Lavia v. Penn. Dept.

of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2000); Bey v. Penn. Dept. of

Corr., 98 F. Supp. 2d 650, 657 (E.D. Pa. 2000). And, because it

is agreed that the Greaterford Medical Health Department is a

subdivision of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, it 11

too has no existence apart from the state and is not a “person”

for purposes of § 1983 claims. Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991,

992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that a prison medical department

cannot be sued under § 1983 as it is not a person); see also Bey,

98 F. Supp. 2d at 657 (holding that correctional program review

committees are arms of the state since they are run by and

through the DOC).

Here, summary judgment must be granted to defendant

Graterford Medical Health Department with regard to Peterson’s §

1983 claims as it is not a “person” under the statute. See

Independent Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 7 of 17
8

F.3d 1165, 1173 (3d Cir. 1997).

2. Julie Knauer

a. Official Capacity

Julie Knauer was at all relevant times, one of two

health care administrators at SCI Graterford. Like the

Graterford Medical Health Department, to the extent that Knauer

is being sued in her official capacity, she is not subject to

liability under § 1983. The Supreme Court has held that “[a]

suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is

not a suit against the official, but rather a suit against the

official’s office ... As such, it is no different than a suit

against the state itself.” Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

Peterson is seeking only monetary damages, as opposed

to injunctive relief, thus his claims § 1983 claims against

Knauer in her official capacity must fail. Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 654

(1974).

b. Individual Capacity

By contrast, Knauer can be held liable in her

individual capacity for any violations of the plaintiff’s civil

rights which she caused while acting under the color of state

law.

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 8 of 17
 A medical need is serious “where denial or delay [of 12

treatment] causes the inmate to suffer life-long handicap or

permanent loss,” or “is so obvious that a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” King v.

Leftridge-Byrd, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 645, *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14,

2005) (quoting Monomouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro,

834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). In this unusual scenario, the

Court is confronted with a case in which there is no demonstrated

serious medical need; Peterson alleges that he did not have a

heart condition and, in relation to the defendants' conduct,

Peterson was under the impression that he did not require the

prescribed medication at all times. He does not allege that he

ever took the heart medication after his 2001 consultation with

Dr. Iccarino or that his taking of medication after that date led

to serious medical injury. See Pennsylvania ex rel. Gatewood v

Hendrick, 368 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1966) (state prisoner who gave no

indication that he sustained serious physical injury as result of

alleged inadequate treatment, failed to state claim for which

relief could be granted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

 Green v Branson, 108 F.3d 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) 13

 White v Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990). 14

9

The state has an obligation to provide medical care to

those it imprisons and deliberate indifference to the serious

medical needs of a prisoner constitutes the “unnecessary and 12

wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citing Gregg v.

Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). The deliberate indifference

standard can be met in a variety of circumstances such as the

doctoring of medical records to reflect that a treatment was

ordered when in fact it was not prescribed, refusing to divulge 13

the ingredients in a medication after a prisoner states that he

is allergic to penicillin , or the refusal to administer pain 14

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 9 of 17
 Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1971). 15

 However, the facts in this case are far less damning for 16

defendant Knauer; three out of the four complaints made by

Peterson to Knauer were met with at least some response. 

10

medication contrary to a surgeon’s orders. Deliberate 15

indifference can also manifest when an official "knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837,(1994). But, only deliberate

conduct merits constitutional protection; inadvertent failure to

provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute and

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Id. at 105; see also

Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that

in a § 1983 action, a prisoner must show more than mere

negligence); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d at 992 (holding that a

simple misdiagnoses do not meet the deliberate indifference

standard).

However, “if a prisoner is under the care of medical

experts ... a non-medical prison official will generally be

justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” 

Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). The Third

Circuit has held that even when a non-physician completely

ignores a prisoner’s complaints, the fact that the non-physician

is aware of the prisoner’s on-going treatment by the prison

doctor will preclude liability for the non-physician. Durmer,

991 F.2d at 69.16

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 10 of 17
 Prior to this date, the misdiagnosis would have amounted 17

to negligence, not deliberate indifference. Fisher, 474 F.2d at

992.

 See supra note 5. 18

11

At issue in this case are six instances in which

Peterson could potentially claim that Knauer exhibited deliberate

indifference toward his serious medical needs. These events all

postdate October 21, 2001, when Peterson was evaluated by Dr.

Iccarino, the first physician to indicate that Peterson did not

have a heart condition. The Court will address each potential 17

claim seriatim. 

Peterson’s initial grievance was filed on December 1,

2001. Knauer responded by scheduling a meeting with Peterson and

with one of Peterson’s doctors, Ralph Smith. On January 11,

2002, Knauer wrote up a summary of this meeting, Pl.’s Dep. Ex.

3, including a note that an EKG and an x-ray were ordered. 

Plaintiff concedes that he did in fact receive these tests. 

Pl.’s Dep. 75:4-9. 

Peterson’s second grievance was filed on April 18,

2002. Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 9. He received a response from Donna Hale,

Knauer’s counterpart, on May 9, 2002, which detailed Peterson’s 18

medical history and instructed him to report to the dispensary if

he experienced any pain or discomfort. Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 10.

Peterson’s third grievance was filed on November 8,

2002. Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 15. On December 13, 2002, Knauer responded

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 11 of 17
 An echocardiogram was in fact administered shortly 19

thereafter. Pl.’s Dep. 99:24.

 Alternatively, Knauer, in her position as Health Care 20

Administrator at Graterford, cannot be held liable under § 1983

simply by virtue of her supervisory role. Hussmann v. Knauer,

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2779, *10 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 22, 2005);

Thomas, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 414 (holding that Knauer cannot be

held liable in a § 1983 claim by virtue of her supervisory role). 

12

to Peterson in writing, stating that a heart murmur and

congestive heart disease may be totally unrelated, and that an

echocardiogram would be ordered. Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 16. These 19

were the only grievances filed by Peterson. 

Peterson’s December 1, 2001, and November 8, 2002,

grievances and Knauer’s answers thereto show that (1) Knauer knew

that Peterson was being treated by a prison physician and (2)

Knauer did in fact respond, scheduling a meeting in one instance

with the “head medical man” (Dr. Smith), Pl.’s Dep. 70:16, and by

discussing a physician’s evaluation of Peterson in the other. As

for the grievance filed on April 22, 2002, Knauer had no

involvement in responding to it. This grievance was assigned to

Donna Hale. Assuming that any failure to respond by Hale would

rise to deliberate indifference (a doubtful assumption), Knauer

would not be subject to § 1983 liability in this instance as “a

defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement

to be liable.” Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir.

2003). Any liability for failing to respond to the April 22,

2002, grievance would attach to Hale, not Knauer.20

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 12 of 17
 At Peterson’s deposition, when asked whether he had ever 21

received a response to this letter he replied, “I believe I did,

I’m not sure, I might have.” Pl.’s Dep. 81:25.

13

On January 21, 2002, Peterson wrote a letter to Knauer

and cannot recall now whether he received a response. However, 21

this letter made no demands, requests or inquiries. In fact, the

letter concluded, “this letter is to bring your attention that

[sic] the findings of grievance No. 8881, by Dr. Smith are

incorrect false, fraudulent, erroneous and at all times not to be

believed.” Pl.’s Dep. Ex. 4. Regardless of whether Knauer

responded to this letter, she cannot be held to be deliberately

indifferent for failing to respond to Peterson’s expressed

unhappiness with Dr. Smith’s medical judgment. Ascenzi v. Diaz,

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23475, *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2007) (health

care administrator at a prison, was held not to be liable under

the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim because he “[could not] be

considered deliberately indifferent for failing to second-guess

[plaintiff’s] treating physician’s assessment of his medical

needs”).

Peterson also alleges that he approached Knauer at the

“town meeting” held on January 27, 2003, and complained that the

“erroneous data” still had not been removed from his file. Pl.’s

Dep. 110:1-7. Knauer responded that she did not have the

authority to correct data added to his file by a treating

physician, and that he should direct such a complaint to his

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 13 of 17
 The Court in Hussman did state that liability may have 22

manifested had Knauer had reason to believe that the physicians

were refusing to treat the plaintiff. However, both in that case

and the case at present, the evidence suggests that the plaintiff

was receiving extensive treatment.

14

physician, Dr. Robinson. Id. Knauer’s response, that she was

not permitted to perform the acts requested by Peterson and

directing Peterson to the physician she knew to be treating him

at the time, does not rise to deliberate indifference.

Finally, Peterson claims that in one instance, March 3,

2003, Knauer purportedly ignored "pleading for help on this

outstanding matter of [Peterson's] alleged heart condition." 

Compl. ¶ 39. But, there has been no documentation of this

communication, nor any mention of it outside of a single

paragraph in the plaintiff’s statement of the facts. Assuming,

without deciding, that such a complaint was in fact made, it

necessarily would have mirrored Peterson’s previous five

complaints, all within 16 months of one another and all identical

in scope and to which Knauer had responded. And, even if this

complaint were made, given that Knauer knew Peterson was being

treated by the prison physician, a claim that Knauer never

responded to the complaint does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Hussman v. Knauer, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 2779, *10 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2005) (knowledge that the

defendant was being treated by prison physicians absolved prison

health administrator (Julie Knauer) from liability) ; Thomas v. 22

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 14 of 17
 The defendant in this case was also Julie Knauer, serving 23

in the same capacity as she does at present.

 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides: 24

§ 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction

15

Zinkel, 155 F. Supp. 2d 408, 413-14 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (granting

defendant health care administrator's motion to dismiss because 23

officials in administrative capacities cannot be held liable

under § 1983 when the prisoner is being treated by a physician). 

The bulk of the plaintiff’s response to defendants’

motion for summary judgment is devoted to a detailed review of

the evidence indicating that he no longer, or never had, heart

problems. This argument misses the mark. Even if the Court were

to concede the fact that the plaintiff was misdiagnosed by the

prison physician, Kanuer did everything that was required in her

position as prison health administrator. Summary judgment in

favor Knauer will be granted as to plaintiff’s federal claims. 

 C. State law claims

In addition to his federal claims, Peterson alleges

state law claims of negligence against Knauer and the Health

Department in that because of said negligence, he received

inadequate medical care. However, as there are no federal claims

remaining against either defendant, the Court will exercise its

discretion and dismiss the supplemental state law claims.24

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 15 of 17
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under

subsection

(a) if

...

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction. 

 It is noted that Peterson has not shown that he has been 25

injured by the alleged violations and he conceded as much at his

deposition. Pl.’s Dep. 130:2-3. However, given the resolution

of the case stated above, the Court need not consider the

applicability of summary judgment on this alternate basis.

16

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment will be granted as to all federal claims. All 25

of plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed without

prejudice. 

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 16 of 17
17

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ALEX JAMIL PETERSON, : CIVIL ACTION

: NO. 03-5368

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

JULIE KNAUER et al., :

:

Defendants. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 25th day of February, 2008, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. no.

49) with regard to plaintiff's federal claims is GRANTED. The

plaintiff's state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to obtain

non-defendant subpoenas (doc. no. 58) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to be

furnished discovery subpoenas (doc. no. 62) is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED

S/Eduardo C. Robreno 

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J 

Case 2:03-cv-05368-ER Document 76 Filed 02/26/08 Page 17 of 17