UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

VIDYA SAGAR, )

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 14-1058 (RDM)

)

JACOB LEW, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s request, pursuant to Rule 56(d), to take discovery prior to 

responding to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment. See Dkt. 34 (Rule 

56(d) declaration); Dkt. 20 (Defendant’s dispositive motion). For the reasons stated below, the 

request pursuant to Rule 56(d) is GRANTED and the currently effective stay of discovery in this 

action is lifted. Additionally, to clarify the scope of the issues in this case and to facilitate 

efficient resolution of Defendant’s dispositive motion, Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Amend 

is GRANTED. These rulings moot several pending procedural motions, which are DENIED as 

stated at the conclusion of this Order.

I. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Request

Plaintiff’s lawsuit, which he is pursuing pro se, alleges that he was discriminated against 

on the basis of age and unlawfully terminated by the Treasury Department, where he worked as a 

senior information technology specialist from 2010 to 2011. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff has moved for 

leave to file an amended complaint that alleges age discrimination; “violation of Department and 
Federal” rules in connection with Plaintiff’s termination; retaliation; and harassment. Dkt. 13-3 

¶ 90. Defendant moved to dismiss under Rule 12 and for summary judgment under Rule 56. 

Dkt. 20. That motion attaches a statement of undisputed facts (Dkt. 20-12) and ten evidentiary 

exhibits. According to Defendant’s representations at the February 20, 2015 status conference, 

the Court can resolve all but one of the defenses raised in the dispositive motion on the 

pleadings; at this juncture, Defendant seeks summary judgment only on Plaintiff’s age 

discrimination claim. 

Pursuant to the scheduling order entered by Judge Cooper on November 19, 2014, 

discovery began on December 12, 2014, and the close of discovery was scheduled for May 18, 

2015. Plaintiff propounded discovery requests during this period; however, rather than respond 

to those requests, Defendant moved to vacate the scheduling order and for a stay discovery 

pending resolution of the dispositive motion. See Dkt. 16; Dkt. 27. In light of the fact that 

Defendant sought partial summary judgment, the Court provided Plaintiff with the opportunity to

file an affidavit documenting any need for discovery in order to respond to Defendant’s 

dispositive motion. See Feb. 20, 2015 Minute Order. It also stayed discovery until Plaintiff’s 

request pursuant to Rule 56(d) was adjudicated.

The parties have completed briefing on Plaintiff’s request pursuant to Rule 56(d), and the 

Court will grant the request. As the Court of Appeals for this Circuit has stated, a “motion 

requesting time for additional discovery [under Rule 56(d)] should be granted ‘almost as a matter 

of course unless the non-moving party has not diligently pursued discovery of the evidence.’” 

Convertino v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 684 F.3d 93, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Berkeley v. Home 

Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1409, 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). This is because “summary judgment is 

premature unless all parties have ‘had a full opportunity to conduct discovery.’” Convertino, 684 

F.3d at 99 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986)). Here, by 

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moving for summary judgment on at least one of Plaintiff’s claims and attaching evidence 

concerning Plaintiff’s job performance and the process through which he was terminated,

Defendant has put a broad range of factual questions in issue. See Dkt. 20 at 20-21 (arguing that 

Plaintiff was terminated because he “would not acknowledge his shortcomings” and did not 

“believe[] that it was necessary to make changes in his approach to his job at his and his coworkers,” and citing instances of allegedly unprofessional conduct). It would be unfair to require 

Plaintiff to oppose Defendant’s summary judgment motion without any opportunity for 

discovery. Had Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests when they were first 

propounded, moreover, additional time to prepare Plaintiff’s response to the summary judgment 

motion may not have been necessary.

Defendant’s critiques of Plaintiff’s request for relief under Rule 56(d) do not justify 

denial of an opportunity to conduct discovery. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has failed to 

“identify the specific discovery responses he requires in order to respond” to Defendant’s 

summary judgment motion. Dkt. 37 at 2. Although Plaintiff’s submission may not satisfy the 

standards of clarity and precision to which represented parties are normally held, the Court 

concludes that he has reasonably identified factual issues on which discovery may aid his effort 

to withstand summary judgment. For example, Plaintiff appears to seek some information to 

clarify which employees at the Treasury Department had supervisory authority over Plaintiff at 

different points during his tenure there, as well an information relating to “performance appraisal 

reports” that may bear on the propriety of his termination. Dkt. 34-1 at 3-4.1

 And Plaintiff 

attached to his Rule 56(d) declaration the discovery requests he has already propounded, which 

1 Even if Plaintiff had not satisfied the formal requirements for relief under Rule 56(d), it would 

be within the Court’s discretion to extend his time to respond to the motion for summary 

judgment as an exercise of the district court’s “power to control its own docket.” Clinton v. 

Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 707 (1997).

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specifically identify at least some of the discovery he will seek. See Dkt. 34, Exs. 5-13. 

Although Rule 56(d) itself does not limit the scope of discovery, under some 

circumstances it is appropriate to stay discovery on claims that a defendant has moved to dismiss 

under Rule 12, see, e.g., Chavous v. D.C. Fin. Responsibility & Mgmt. Assistance Auth., 201 

F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2001), or to permit only limited discovery targeted at the specific facts that 

are material to the motion for summary judgment, see, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Folliard v. Gov’t 

Acquisitions, Inc., 880 F. Supp. 2d 36, 47 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting relief under Rule 56(d) in part 

and authorizing “focused discovery” on issue relevant to summary judgment motion). Here, 

Defendant has moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims other than his age discrimination count, 

and the Court has therefore considered whether limiting the scope of discovery to information 

relevant to that count would be appropriate. It concludes that no limitation on the scope of 

discovery would serve the interest of efficiency, for three reasons. First, the subject matter of 

Plaintiff’s claims overlaps significantly—it is unlikely that there is a great deal of discovery that 

would be inappropriate if the scope of discovery were limited by the Court to issues potentially 

raised by Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Second, and relatedly, limiting the scope 

of discovery now would create the potential for duplicative discovery should Plaintiff’s 

additional claims survive the motion to dismiss. Finally, the Court does not anticipate that full 

discovery in this case will be especially substantial. In particular, the Court finds it is 

appropriate to set a presumptive limit to the number of depositions to five (5) per party. Any 

party that wishes to conduct depositions in excess of that limit shall meet and confer with the 

opposing party and, if they are unable to agree, schedule a conference call with the Court 

pursuant to the procedure set out in the Court’s March 23, 2015 Minute Order. The parties might 

also discuss whether depositions taken in the administrative proceeding may be used in this case, 

thus obviating the need for duplicative discovery.

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The Court will therefore lift the current stay of discovery in this Order. As a result, both 

Plaintiff and Defendant will be free to propound and entitled to responses to discovery requests. 

Of course, Defendant’s responses to the requests Plaintiff has already propounded may raise 

legitimate objections to some or all of those requests, in which case the parties must meet and 

confer in an effort to resolve any disagreements in good faith.2

 

II. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on November 25, 2014. Dkt. 13. 

Defendant consolidated his opposition to the motion for leave to amend with his dispositive 

motion. See Dkt. 20 at 11. Under Rule 15, “the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is 

within the discretion of the District Court,” but “leave to amend ‘shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.’” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15). 

Here, because Defendant’s dispositive motion is combined with his opposition to Plaintiff’s 

motion for leave to amend and seeks dismissal of claims in the proposed amended complaint as 

though it has already been filed, the Court will grant leave to amend and “afford[] Plaintiff an 

opportunity to test his claim[s] on the merits.” Id.; see Dkt. 20 at 5 (seeking dismissal “under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)”). The Court concludes that addressing these merits 

arguments in a single order resolving Defendant’s dispositive motion will promote the efficient

and orderly management of this litigation. Therefore, without expressing an opinion on the 

defenses raised in the dispositive motion, the Court will grant the motion for leave to amend.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s request pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) 

and motion for leave to amend are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Dkt. 13-3) is 

2 The parties shall address any discovery disputes according to the procedures set out in the 

Court’s March 23, 2015 Minute Order.

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deemed FILED. The pending stay of discovery is lifted. Plaintiff’s time to respond to 

Defendant’s dispositive motion is extended to July 16, 2015. Defendant shall file his reply in 

support of the dispositive motion on or before July 30, 2015. All fact discovery shall conclude 

on or before July 16, 2015. In light of these rulings, Defendant’s motion to vacate scheduling 

order (Dkt. 16) and motion for extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery (Dkt. 27) are 

DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time to respond to Defendant’s dispositive motion 

(Dkt. 23) is DENIED as moot. Defendant’s motion for extension of time to respond to 

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend (Dkt. 15) is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s motion for leave 

to file sur-replies regarding the motion for an extension of time to respond to Plaintiff’s motion 

for leave to amend and the motion for stay of discovery (Dkt. 22) is DENIED as moot. 

SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Randolph D. Moss 

 RANDOLPH D. MOSS 

United States District Judge 

Date: April 17, 2015 

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