[Cite as State v. Warner, 2021-Ohio-4182.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MARION COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-21-15 

 v. 

JASON D. WARNER, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 2020CR0346 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: November 29, 2021 

 

APPEARANCES: 

 

Samuel H. Shamansky for Appellant 

 Andrea K. Boyd for Appellee 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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PER CURIAM.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Warner (“Jason”), brings this appeal from 

the April 16, 2021, judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court sentencing 

him to twenty-four months in prison after he was convicted in a bench trial of 

“Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) 

and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b),1 a fourth degree felony, and “Tampering with 

Evidence/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), 

a third degree felony. On appeal, Warner argues that there was insufficient evidence 

presented to convict him, that his convictions were against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, that the trial court’s general findings of guilt constituted a legal 

impossibility, that the trial court committed repeated misconduct depriving him of 

a fair trial, and that if no single error was prejudicial, the cumulative effect of the 

trial court’s errors was prejudicial. 

Background 

{¶2} On June 4, 2020, just after midnight, the record indicates that Jason’s 

wife, Julia Warner (“Julia”), was driving a black Jeep Wrangler southbound on SR 

203 with Jason in the passenger seat. At the same time, Colton G. was driving 

1

 Pursuant to R.C. 4549.02(B)(1), a person who violates R.C. 4549.02(A) is guilty of “failure to stop after an 

accident.” However, in the indictment the State titled the crime “Complicity to Leaving the Scene of an 

Accident.” In addition, the trial court used the terminology “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity” 

in its final judgment entry. Notably, the Supreme Court of Ohio has colloquially called a violation of R.C. 

4549.02 “leaving the scene of an accident.” State v. Bryant, 160 Ohio St.3d 113, 2020-Ohio-1041, ¶ 2. We 

will use the terms interchangeably in this opinion. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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northbound on SR 203 in a BMW X3. As both vehicles approached CR 106, also 

known as Somerlot Hoffman Road, Julia attempted to make a left turn onto CR 106 

without yielding to Colton’s vehicle. The Warners’ Jeep Wrangler struck the left 

front of Colton’s BMW, causing the BMW to travel off the right side of the road 

and strike a utility pole. The wreck resulted in serious damage to Colton’s vehicle 

and trapped him, semi-conscious, inside. 

{¶3} Some nearby residents in the rural area heard the crash and saw a male 

and female—the Warners, who were not known to the witnesses—walking around 

the crash site and looking into the damaged BMW. Julia was observed to have her 

hand over her mouth by one witness. Shortly thereafter, the witnesses saw the black 

Jeep Wrangler drive away from the scene of the accident prior to the arrival of law 

enforcement. 

{¶4} One of the nearby witnesses approached the scene after the Jeep

Wrangler left and saw that Colton’s vehicle was smoking and noisy. Colton himself 

was trapped in his vehicle, bloody, and semi-conscious. One witness called 911 and 

emergency services responded. Colton had to be extracted from his vehicle with a 

“hydraulic spreader,” also known as the “jaws of life,” before being taken to the 

hospital. 

{¶5} Meanwhile, the Warners went home, leaving marks in the roadway and 

their driveway where the vehicle’s rim was scraping the pavement through a 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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deflated tire. A neighbor of the Warners was out walking and heard their vehicle 

making a lot of noise coming up the street. He saw the Warners’ Jeep pull into their 

garage and close the door, though the neighbor did not see who was driving. 

{¶6} The Warners did not contact anyone regarding the accident until

approximately nine hours later, when they approached law enforcement together to 

accept responsibility for the accident. At that time, and over the ensuing weeks, 

Julia made multiple statements indicating that she was driving during the accident, 

that she thought there was a stop sign in the other direction, and that she misjudged 

the turn in the dark and the rain. When law enforcement investigated the matter, 

virtually all of the evidence pointed to Julia driving at the time of the crash, such as 

the bruising on her body consistent with the driver’s-side seatbelt, her DNA on the 

driver’s-side airbag, and Jason’s DNA on the passenger’s-side airbag. As for his 

part, Jason initially told a coworker that he had basically been “passed out” or 

“asleep” through the whole incident, though he later acknowledged to the same 

coworker that he had gotten out of the Jeep Wrangler at the scene, as other witnesses 

had claimed. 

{¶7} On September 9, 2020, a joint indictment was filed against Jason and 

Julia alleging that they had each individually committed Complicity to Vehicular 

Assault in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a felony of 

the fourth degree (Count 1); Complicity to Vehicular Assault in violation of R.C. 
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2923.03(A)(2), R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)/(b), and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1), a felony of the 

third degree (Count 2); Complicity to “Leaving the Scene of an Accident” in 

violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1), a felony of the fourth 

degree (Count 3); and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence in violation of R.C. 

2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree (Count 4).2

 

Jason and Julia pled not guilty to the charges. They also waived a jury trial and 

elected to proceed to a bench trial, with a visiting judge assigned to preside over the 

matter. 

{¶8} Prior to trial, the parties entered into a number of stipulations, which 

included the authenticity of various lab reports, photographs, medical records, 

phone records, etc.3

 In addition, the Warners also agreed to stipulate that Colton

suffered serious physical harm as a result of the accident, obviating the need for 

testimony from a significant number of medical professionals. 

{¶9} The Warners’ bench trial was held March 8-10, 2021. Importantly, the 

two charges for Complicity to Vehicular Assault against Jason were dismissed, 

though Vehicular Assault charges remained pending against Julia as the driver of 

the vehicle at the time of the accident.4

 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court 

2

 The indictment was amended to correct typos and incorrect numbers in portions of code sections. 

3

 The Warners also waived any objections to proceeding to trial together after the issue was raised by the 

State. 

4

 The State requested the dismissal of Complicity to Vehicular Assault charges against Jason after a review 

of the evidence and after speaking with the witnesses in preparation for trial. The State was satisfied that 

Julia was driving at the time of the crash, thus the State also requested the removal of “Complicity” language 

from her Vehicular Assault charges. The State’s requests were not opposed and they were granted. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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noted that it did not have to provide any reasoning to support its general findings; 

nevertheless, the trial court made some statements regarding the evidence on the 

record. Ultimately, the trial court found Julia and Jason guilty of Count 3 of the 

indictment, “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 

2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b), a fourth degree felony, and Count 

4 of the indictment, “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 

2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third degree felony. 

{¶10} As for the remaining charges pending against Julia, the trial court 

found Julia not guilty of both counts of Vehicular Assault, reasoning that while she 

may have been negligent in causing the accident, she was not reckless, as exhibited 

by her speed at the time of the crash (roughly 12 or 13 mph). Nevertheless, the trial 

court initially stated that Julia was guilty of the “lesser-included offense” of 

Negligent Assault, despite no requests for any lesser-included offenses to be 

considered by either party. Although the trial court made this initial “finding” 

regarding lesser-included offenses, at sentencing the trial court subsequently 

withdrew the findings of guilt regarding-lesser included offenses and did not convict 

Julia of Negligent Assault, reasoning that an additional element was actually 

required to establish Negligent Assault. Thus Julia was entirely acquitted of the 

Vehicular Assault charges and no convictions were ever journalized regarding any 

purported lesser-included offenses. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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{¶11} Following the findings of guilt against the Warners, but prior to 

sentencing, the Warners filed written, renewed motions for acquittal. They had 

previously made motions for acquittal during the trial. The Warners took issue with 

many of the trial court’s factual “findings” and legal conclusions that led to the 

general findings of guilt. 

{¶12} On April 14, 2021, the matter proceeded to sentencing; however, prior 

to sentencing the Warners, the trial court addressed the Warners’ renewed motions 

for acquittal finding that defense counsel was mischaracterizing the evidence and/or 

the trial court’s statements related to the evidence. The trial court further analyzed 

the evidence, explained its general findings, and overruled the Warners’ motions for 

acquittal. The trial court also filed a written entry denying the renewed motions for 

acquittal for the reasons stated on the record. 

{¶13} The trial court then proceeded to sentencing solely on Counts 3 and 4 

of the indictment, ordering Jason and Julia to both serve eighteen months in prison 

for “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity,” and twenty-four months in 

prison for “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity.” Those prison terms were 

ordered to be served concurrently, so Jason and Julia Warner each received a 

twenty-four-month prison term. A judgment entry memorializing Jason’s sentence 

was filed April 16, 2021. It is from this judgment that Jason now appeals, asserting 

the following assignments of error for our review. 
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Assignment of Error No. 1 

Appellant was convicted in the absence of evidence sufficient to 

support findings of guilty in violation of his rights as guaranteed 

by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 

Assignment of Error No. 2 

Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the

evidence in violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by 

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 

Assignment of Error No. 3 

The trial court’s guilty verdicts constituted a legal impossibility, 

were contrary to law, and violated Appellant’s rights to due 

process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions and 

comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 

Assignment of Error No. 4 

The trial court’s repeated misconduct throughout its 

deliberations and Appellant’s sentencing violated his rights to due 

process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable 

provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 

Assignment of Error No. 5 

Appellant was deprived of a fair trial by the cumulative errors of 

the trial court in violation of his right to due process as 

guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 

United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio 

Constitution.

First Assignment of Error

{¶14} In his first assignment of error, Jason argues that there was insufficient 

evidence presented to convict him of “Leaving the Scene of an 

Accident/Complicity” and “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity.” 
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Standard of Review 

{¶15} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a 

question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. Groce, 

163 Ohio St.3d 387, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7. Therefore, our review is de novo. In re 

J.V., 134 Ohio St.3d 1, 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence 

inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio 

St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by constitutional 

amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89, 102, 

(1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). 

“In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386. 

Controlling Statutes 

{¶16} In this case, Jason was convicted of a violation of R.C. 

4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b), and a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), both by means of 

being Complicit pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). 

{¶17} Revised Code 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b) (Failure to Stop After an 

Accident or, as styled here, “Leaving the Scene of an Accident”) reads as follows: 

(A)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with 

persons or property on a public road or highway, the operator of 

the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the accident or collision, 

immediately shall stop the operator's motor vehicle at the scene 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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of the accident or collision. The operator shall remain at the scene 

of the accident or collision until the operator has given the 

operator's name and address and, if the operator is not the owner, 

the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together 

with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the

following: 

(a) Any person injured in the accident or collision; 

(b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor 

vehicle damaged in the accident or collision; 

(c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision. 

* * * 

(B)(1) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of 

failure to stop after an accident. Except as otherwise provided in 

division (B)(2) or (3) of this section, failure to stop after an 

accident is a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

(2) If the accident or collision results in serious physical harm to 

a person, failure to stop after an accident is whichever of the

following is applicable: 

* * * 

(b) If the offender knew that the accident or collision resulted in 

serious physical harm to a person, a felony of the fourth degree. 

Revised Code 2921.12(A)(1) (Tampering with Evidence) reads as follows: 

(A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or 

investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be

instituted, shall do any of the following: 

(1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or 

thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence 

in such proceeding or investigation[.] 
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Jason was alleged to commit the above crimes via Complicity, which as charged in 

this case is codified in R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). This provision, and other relevant 

provisions of the statute read: 

(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for

the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: 

* * * 

(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense[.] 

* * * 

(B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person 

with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a

principal offender. 

* * * 

(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the 

commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished 

as if he were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be 

stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense. 

Evidence Presented 

{¶18} The record indicates that on the evening of June 3, 2020, Jason and his 

wife, Julia, went to the residence of Todd and Kimberly Anderson for a social 

gathering. The Warners and the Andersons were very close friends, and had been 

for years. Kimberly Anderson was having a female friend visit from out-of-town, 

so she was hosting a gathering that Julia was attending. Jason was planning on 

attending a separate social gathering with Todd that evening. 
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{¶19} The Warners arrived at the Andersons’ residence around 6:00 p.m. At 

that time, Todd Anderson was not home. However, shortly after Todd arrived home 

around 6:30 p.m., Todd and Jason left the Andersons’ residence and went to their 

own social gathering at the home of Rob Lust. Todd, Jason, Robb, and others were 

part of a group planning a “cigar smoker,” a cigar-related event. (Tr. at 223). While 

at Rob Lust’s home, Todd had a few drinks and he thought Jason might have had a 

drink but Todd was unsure. Regardless, Todd and Jason returned to the Andersons’ 

residence between 11:30 and 11:45 p.m. 

{¶20} Meanwhile, at the Andersons’ residence, Julia and Kimberly were

drinking wine and snacking. Julia admitted to having three drinks throughout the 

evening, claiming that her last drink was at 9:30 or 10 p.m. Kimberly’s guests at 

the social gathering, other than Julia, left around 10-10:30 p.m. Julia stayed at the 

Andersons’ residence until Jason returned with Todd. At that time, the Warners left 

together, with Julia driving the black Jeep Wrangler they owned. The Warners’ 

home was approximately a 15-20 minute drive. 

{¶21} On the ride home, Julia was driving south on SR 203 approaching an 

intersection with CR 106, also known as Somerlot Hoffman Road. The area was 

relatively rural. Julia slowed down to make the turn onto Somerlot Hoffman Road 

from 25 mph to 12 or 13 mph. However, she failed to yield to a driver coming north 

on SR 203 before she made her turn. Julia would later claim that she thought there 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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was a stop sign in the opposite direction, and, alternatively, that she misjudged the 

turn. Regardless of the reason, the Warners’ vehicle struck a BMW X3 being driven 

by Colton G. The collision caused Colton to veer off the road into a telephone pole. 

Colton’s vehicle was seriously damaged to the point that the engine compartment 

on the left side was shifted toward the passenger compartment. (State’s Ex. 23). 

Colton was trapped inside the vehicle. 

{¶22} Jennifer Mehaffey resided at 2815 Larue Prospect Road South 

approximately 185 yards south of the crash intersection. At the time of the crash, 

Jennifer’s daughter, Ashtan, and her boyfriend, Marquis, were on the front porch of 

the residence. Marquis saw Colton’s silver vehicle drive past the residence, then he 

heard the crash at the intersection. Marquis stated he did not have a clear view of 

the intersection from the porch due to the angle. 

{¶23} When he heard the crash, Marquis stepped off the porch and moved 

toward the intersection. As he did, he saw two people outside of the damaged 

vehicles: a woman who had her hands to her face looking into the silver crashed 

vehicle, and a man. Ashtan testified that she also saw a male and a female outside 

of the crashed vehicles. 

{¶24} Ashtan notified her mother Jennifer of the incident, who was upstairs 

when it happened, and Ashtan called 911. Jennifer came outside and saw someone 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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circling the damaged vehicle, although she thought she saw a male get out of the 

driver’s side of the Jeep and get into the passenger side of the Jeep Wrangler. 

{¶25} Seeing the male and female together at the crash site from a distance, 

Marquis thought that the two must be exchanging information from the accident, 

and that they had the situation handled, so he changed direction and began walking 

back toward the porch. However, shortly thereafter, the Jeep Wrangler left the scene 

of the accident and the individuals were gone. When Marquis realized that both 

individuals from the scene were gone, yet one vehicle was still present, he ran to the 

damaged vehicle. 

{¶26} Another individual, Keith Bentley, lived slightly closer to the rural 

intersection where the accident occurred, but to the north of it, and he also heard the 

crash. At the time of the crash, Keith was sitting in his living room watching 

television when he heard a “loud pop.” (Tr. at 64). He went to his door and saw 

two vehicles, one of which had struck the pole on his property. The pole was 

approximately 85 yards away from Keith at that time. 

{¶27} Keith walked out of his house to the southern portion of his driveway 

and he saw a male figure walking around the crashed vehicle. Keith went back into 

his house to get flashlights and a raincoat, but as he did, the Jeep Wrangler left the 

scene. Keith did not see a second person at the crash site, and he did not see who 

was driving when the Jeep Wrangler departed. 
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{¶28} After the Jeep Wrangler left the scene of the accident, Marquis, 

Jennifer and Keith went to the area of the crash to check on the other vehicle. When 

Marquis arrived, he saw the driver of the crashed vehicle bleeding, with the airbags 

deployed. Marquis indicated that the vehicle was noisy and smoking from the front. 

Marquis and Keith both asked the driver some questions, but according to them, the 

driver was not making sense. Keith described Colton as “very disoriented.” (Tr. at 

70). 

{¶29} Jennifer was a nurse, so she got into Colton’s vehicle and helped 

stabilize Colton’s head/neck until emergency services responded. Upon arrival, 

emergency services noted that Colton was trapped in the vehicle, that he was semiconscious, had a large “goose egg” on his head, and that Colton did not know the 

place and time. (Tr. at 123). Firefighters employed a “hydraulic spreader” to 

extricate Colton from the vehicle. He was taken to Marion General Hospital, but he 

had to be transferred to another hospital because Marion General was not a trauma 

hospital. 

{¶30} Shortly after the crash, after midnight on June 4, 2020, David Bailey 

was walking around his cul-de-sac to deal with medical issues. He lived near the 

Warners. Despite the fact that he was wearing headphones and listening to music, 

he heard a very loud noise approaching and saw a black Jeep Wrangler coming up 

his road. According to him, the vehicle was making “all kinds of noise.” (Tr. at 
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126). He stressed that it was “[r]eal loud[.]” (Id.) David watched the Jeep Wrangler 

pull into the Warners’ garage and the garage door closed behind it. David did not 

see who was driving the vehicle. 

{¶31} According to testimony, the Warners’ residence was approximately 

5.5 miles from the crash site. The Warners made no calls and sent no text messages 

regarding the accident over the next 8 hours. 

{¶32} At 8:06 a.m. on June 4, 2020, Jason sent a text message to an employee 

at the Marion County Common Pleas Court stating that he had a personal issue that 

he had to deal with and that he would not be at work. Jason was an elected common 

pleas court judge. He asked if another judge could cover his docket for the day. 

{¶33} Around 9:30 a.m. on June 4, 2020, Jason and Julia willingly went to 

the police to report the accident and were transferred to the Ohio State Highway 

Patrol, which was handling the crash investigation. Jason and Julia met with Marion 

Post Commander Troy Sexton of the State Highway Patrol. At that time, Julia 

admitted she was driving the vehicle during the crash. She filled out a written 

statement indicating that she thought there was a stop sign in the other direction and 

that after the crash she panicked and drove away. When questioned by Commander 

Sexton, Julia denied being impaired at the time of the crash, though she admitted to 

having three drinks that night, ending as late as 10 p.m. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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{¶34} Commander Sexton testified that he did not give Julia a field sobriety 

test during the interview because he did not feel she was impaired at the time of the 

interview. He also did not administer a blood test because there was a time 

restriction on law enforcement wherein they were expected to get any alcohol or 

drug results after a crash and they were past the time limit. (Tr. at 198). However, 

the Warners gave law enforcement permission to go to their residence and inspect 

the Jeep, collect evidence, and take DNA samples. 

{¶35} At 12:47 p.m. that same day, Jason sent a text message to the other 

elected judge of the Marion County Common Pleas Court, and to some of the staff 

members of the court. The text stated that Jason and Julia had been in a “pretty 

serious car accident.” (State’s Ex. 46). Jason stated that Julia failed to yield and hit 

another vehicle, and that, “in a hysterical panic, [she] drove away from the scene of 

the accident. After a long discussion that went on throughout the night, we agreed 

that we needed to go in and report it, which we did this morning.” (Id.) 

{¶36} On the same day that the Warners reported the accident, law 

enforcement officers went to the Warners’ residence to take pictures of their 

damaged Jeep Wrangler. The Jeep was in the garage when officers arrived, and 

after they took initial photographs, they asked Jason to back the Jeep out of the 

garage. Jason did so, with some difficulty.5

 One officer noted that the damage to 

5

 Officers on the scene did not notice if Jason moved the seat or not prior to backing the vehicle out of the 

garage. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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the driver’s-side front tire would have made the vehicle extremely difficult to drive. 

Testimony indicated that the “rim ha[d] been separated from the tie rod end 

underneath the fender well.” (Tr. at 205). Photographs of the Warners’ Jeep showed 

extensive damage to the left front wheel, including a deflated tire. There was also 

“buckling * * * on the left front fender above the wheel well.” (State’s Ex. 23). 

Due to the deflated tire, there were marks in the road and in the driveway leading to 

the Warners’ garage from where the rim had scraped the asphalt. There were 

additional marks made when the vehicle was pulled out of the garage. 

{¶37} With the Warners’ permission, law enforcement officers collected the 

airbags that had deployed from the vehicle. DNA samples were taken from each 

airbag. DNA consistent with Julia’s was found on the driver’s-side airbag, and 

DNA consistent with Jason’s was found on the passenger’s-side airbag. Julia also 

had bruising consistent with the driver’s-side seatbelt. Once officers were done with 

the vehicle, it was towed to Buckeye Collision. 

{¶38} The next day, June 5, 2020, Jason returned to work. That day, he had 

a meeting scheduled with the other Marion County Common Pleas Court Judge, 

Judge Edwards, about court matters unrelated to the crash. Following the meeting, 

Judge Edwards asked to speak with Jason privately about the accident, because the 

local chief of police had indicated that Jason might have been the driver of the 
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vehicle in the crash, which was contrary to what Jason had said in his text message 

to Judge Edwards. 

{¶39} Jason denied being the driver, and told Judge Edwards that he was 

“passed out” when the collision occurred. (Tr. at 433). According to Judge 

Edwards, after Jason said the words “passed out,” it “was almost like his tongue 

came out of his mouth and tried to grab the words and pull them back in. And 

[Jason] said instead that he was asleep. [Jason] said: Well, you know, asleep.” (Id.) 

{¶40} Jason told Judge Edwards that he was awakened by the impact, that he 

recalled looking up and seeing his wife bleeding from her nose, and that he then 

remembered the sound of the Jeep Wrangler pulling off. Judge Edwards indicated 

that it left him with the impression that Jason was sleeping through most of the 

incident. Further, Judge Edwards testified that he felt that was the impression Jason 

wanted him to have from the conversation. 

{¶41} Later that same day, Judge Edwards went to Buckeye Collision to

check on a vehicle he was having restored there. While there, he saw the Warners’ 

Jeep Wrangler in the parking lot, which he was familiar with. Judge Edwards was 

“shocked” at the damage, especially to the driver’s side front wheel. (Tr. at 437). 

It caused him to question how Jason could have been asleep. He also noticed the 

airbags had been removed from the vehicle, and he sent Jason a text message to ask 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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who had removed them, thinking that it could be tampering with evidence if Jason 

had done it, but the airbags had been removed by law enforcement. 

{¶42} In the week following the accident, Colton was released from the 

hospital. However, he was having significant memory issues that required him to 

stay with his family. While Colton was staying with his family, and not present at 

the apartment he rented, a letter was dropped off that was written by Julia 

apologizing for the accident. She stated she was very sorry, that she did not want 

Colton to think she was “crazy, or drunk, or insensitive.” (State’s Ex. 41). She 

stated that it was not like her to misjudge a turn in the dark and the rain, and that it 

was not like her to “freak out” and “panic and leave[.]” (Id.) 

{¶43} From June 9, 2020, to June 17, 2020, Julia and Jason went on a prescheduled vacation with the Andersons to Texas. According to the Andersons, the 

accident was never discussed. 

{¶44} On June 19, 2020, just over two weeks after the accident, a televised 

news story aired about the crash. The story contained information that witnesses in 

the area of the accident saw a man exit the Jeep Wrangler at the crash site. Judge 

Edwards saw the news story and sent a text message to Jason about it because Jason 

had not indicated he had gotten out of the Jeep at the scene previously. Rather, 

Jason had left Judge Edwards with the impression that he had been sleeping. When 

asked by Judge Edwards, Jason acknowledged getting out of the Jeep. Judge 
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Edwards asked Jason if Jason had informed disciplinary counsel about the incident, 

and Jason responded that he did not think he had done anything wrong. 

{¶45} Over the ensuing months, Colton went through physical therapy and 

had various medical issues including memory problems, a concussion, a kidney tear, 

cellulitis, knee/walking problems, and bell’s palsy. The parties stipulated at trial 

that he suffered serious physical harm as a result of the accident. 

Analysis 

{¶46} At the outset of our review of sufficiency of the evidence, we note that 

many of Jason’s arguments in his brief related to sufficiency of the evidence 

challenge specific statements the trial court made on the record explaining its 

“reasoning” before entering its general finding that Jason and Julia were guilty of 

Counts 3 and 4 and the indictment. Importantly, and as the trial court noted before 

making those statements, there is no obligation whatsoever for the trial court to 

make factual findings or to express its reasoning that led to the general finding. 

State v. Ham, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-01, 2009-Ohio-3822, ¶ 37. 

{¶47} Rather, pursuant to Crim.R. 23(C), in a trial without a jury, the court 

“shall make a general finding.” This Court has repeatedly expressed, in varying 

circumstances, that anything stated beyond the required “general finding” of guilt 

or innocence in a criminal bench trial is “ ‘mere surplusage without legal 

significance.’ ” State v. Ham, 2009-Ohio-3822 at ¶ 37, citing State v. Crawford, 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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10th Dist. Franklin No. 85AP-324, 1986 WL 1715 at *7 (“Therefore, sub judice, the 

trial court should only have entered findings of guilty based upon the evidence. 

Separate findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither countenanced nor 

permitted. Therefore, we find the trial court’s reasoning as mere surplusage without 

legal significance sufficient to impeach the general findings of guilt.”); see also 

State v. Fisher, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-10-09, 2010-Ohio-5192, at fn 2 (“We note 

that the trial court issued written findings of fact in this case, which is contrary to 

the directive contained in Crim.R. 23. When a bench trial is held, the court is to 

make a general finding; i.e. guilty or not guilty.”); State v. Kalonji, 3d Dist. Paulding 

No. 11-15-07, 2016-Ohio-991 at fn. 3 (“Because the trial court’s purported findings 

of fact are mere surplusage, the trial court’s use of an erroneous date—August 26, 

2015 rather than July 4, 2015—has no bearing on our disposition of this appeal.”). 

{¶48} Other Ohio Appellate Courts have also indicated that anything beyond 

a trial court’s general finding in a criminal bench trial constitutes “surplusage” 

without legal significance. See State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25287, 2011-

Ohio-1041, ¶¶ 41-42; Crawford, supra; State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

10AP-105, 2010-Ohio-4953, ¶ 26; State v. Singleton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 

27916, 2019-Ohio-1477, ¶ 18; but see State v. Ndiaye, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

19AP-10, 2020-Ohio-1008, ¶ 30, appeal not allowed, 159 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2020-

Ohio-3634 (indicating that a trial court’s comments made after a general finding of 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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guilt were surplusage, but if the comments or statements were made before a general 

finding of guilt the comments may not be surplusage). 

{¶49} Thus based on the authority cited, we could overrule Jason’s 

challenges to the trial court’s statements as those challenges are mere surplusage 

without legal significance whatsoever. However, notwithstanding this point, we 

review the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution to examine whether the evidence would allow any rational trier of fact 

to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 

61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by 

constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 

89, 102, (1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 

(1979). We are not tasked with reviewing any specific statements of the trial court 

in a sufficiency review, regardless of whether the statements are categorized as 

“findings” or “surplusage.” Rather, we must look at the evidence. 

{¶50} Thus, turning to the evidence presented in this matter, we must

determine whether the evidence supports Jason’s convictions for Complicity to 

Failure to Stop After an Accident and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence. 

{¶51} Importantly, Jason was convicted of Complicity through “aiding and 

abetting.” “To support a conviction for Complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant 

to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the 

commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the 

principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the 

crime.” State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 245 (2001). Furthermore, 

“‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship 

and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’” Id. quoting State v. Pruett, 

28 Ohio App.2d 29, 34, 57 O.O.2d 38, 41 (1971). 

{¶52} Regarding his convictions for Complicity to Failure to Stop After an 

Accident and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence, Jason contends that the 

evidence never established that he was a principal actor in this case, and that he did 

nothing that would constitute aiding and abetting Julia. Essentially, he contends 

that he was simply present for the incident that occurred, and he argues that, legally, 

presence or acquiescence alone is not enough to support aiding and abetting. State 

v. Law, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950651, 1996 WL 539792. 

{¶53} However, Jason’s argument that he was merely “present” for the 

incident ignores several key facts. First, and most importantly, once the crash 

occurred, Jason got out of the vehicle and was observed walking around the accident 

scene. He was observed looking into Colton’s vehicle, wherein Colton was, at best, 

semi-conscious, trapped, bleeding, and had his airbags deployed. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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{¶54} After seeing the significant damage to Colton’s vehicle, and 

presumably to the driver himself, Jason got back into his own damaged vehicle with 

his wife and left the scene. Their own vehicle was extremely noisy, by all accounts 

likely difficult to control, and riding on a rim that was scraping the road. Still they 

did not stop. Then, when the Warners got home, Jason and Julia, by Jason’s own 

statement, talked about the matter throughout the night for over 8 hours before 

deciding to come forward and admit that they had been in the vehicle that caused 

Colton serious physical harm. 

{¶55} While Jason’s decision to get back into the vehicle after seeing the 

damage that had been caused from the crash might not alone have been 

overwhelming evidence to show that he was aiding and abetting, there is also 

evidence of his conduct after-the-fact to consider. When asked about the incident, 

Jason initially told Judge Edwards that he was “passed out” or asleep when 

everything occurred. It was only when confronted with statements from other 

witnesses that Jason admitted to getting out of his vehicle. This is evidence that a 

factfinder could utilize to determine that Jason was aware he was aiding and abetting 

his wife by leaving the scene of the accident. 

{¶56} Based on our review of the record in its entirety, we find that a rational 

trier-of-fact could determine from all the evidence presented that the elements of 

Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident were established here. In sum, it is 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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essentially undisputed that the accident was caused by Julia, that Jason and Julia got 

out of their vehicle, looked into Colton’s vehicle, that Colton suffered serious 

physical harm, and that the Warners drove off anyway after viewing the scene. The 

primary issue is simply whether there was sufficient evidence to find that Jason 

aided and abetted his wife, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, we 

find that a rational trier of fact could determine as much beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Thus Jason’s arguments related to Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident 

are not well-taken. 

{¶57} Turning to the conviction for Complicity to Tampering with Evidence, 

it was undisputed that the Warners left the scene and it is a readily permissible 

inference that they knew an investigation of the crash was likely to begin. Despite 

this, even after viewing Colton trapped in his vehicle, they left the scene making 

what would have been a difficult 5 mile drive in their damaged jeep in order to place 

it in their enclosed garage. Law enforcement testified that this hindered their 

investigation. 

{¶58} Again, based on Jason’s own statements and actions, and his decision 

to get back into the vehicle after viewing the scene, we cannot find that there was 

insufficient evidence presented to convict him of Complicity to Tampering with 

Evidence.6

 A rational trier-of-fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that this 

6

 In his brief, Jason challenges numerous statements made by the trial court, arguing that the trial court was 

“confused” as to what crimes were indicted in this matter due to the way the trial court worded or phrased 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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was not a situation where Jason was merely “present” for the incident. For all of 

these reasons, Jason’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

Second Assignment of Error

{¶59} In his second assignment of error, Jason argues that even if there was 

sufficient evidence presented to convict him, his convictions were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. 

Standard of Review 

{¶60} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of 

the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “ ‘weigh[ ] the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and 

determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier-of-fact] clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A 

reviewing court must, however, allow the trier-of-fact appropriate discretion on 

matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the 

witnesses. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the 

the crimes at times. At best, Jason’s arguments are not persuasive given that the trial court found the Warners 

guilty of “Count 3 and Count 4” at the trial, then referenced the counts in the indictment at the sentencing 

hearing and in the final judgment entry. There is no confusion expressed by the trial court and Jason never 

objected to how the trial court worded matters at the time they were spoken. The Warners were ultimately 

convicted of the specific counts they were charged with in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs 

heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s 

judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, 

quoting State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119. 

Analysis 

{¶61} In his second assignment of error, Jason contends that even if there 

was sufficient evidence to convict him, his convictions were against the manifest 

weight of the evidence. He summarily refers to arguments he made in his first 

assignment of error and then contends that the greater weight of the credible 

evidence demonstrated that Jason did not aid or abet Julia in any manner. Further, 

he claims that none of the witnesses observed Jason speaking with Julia, providing 

advice, guiding her to the Jeep, or assisting with its operation. He again maintains 

he was merely present for what happened. 

{¶62} However, as we stated in the previous assignment of error, Jason was 

not merely in the Jeep as a passenger while this event occurred. He got out of the 

Jeep, viewed the wreckage, then decided to get back into the vehicle. Then, in the 

days after the incident, he lied about the fact that he was asleep during the crash, 

minimizing his conduct, and he only admitted to getting out of the vehicle when 

confronted with statements of witnesses at the scene. Jason further acknowledged 

in his text messages that he and his wife went home and discussed the matter for 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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hours before deciding to report the accident to law enforcement. As noted 

previously, “ ‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, 

companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” State v. 

Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 245 (2001). A factfinder could find that these incidents 

were circumstantial evidence of Jason’s Complicity in this matter to Failure to Stop 

After an Accident and Tampering with Evidence. 

{¶63} We note that we are aware of Jason’s repeated challenges in his brief 

to the trial court’s statements made prior to announcing the general finding of guilt. 

Initially, we again refer to the “surplusage” law of the previous assignment of error. 

Completely notwithstanding the surplusage point, however, we note that Jason’s 

arguments often cherry-pick statements of the trial court or read them out of context 

to suit his claims. For example, Jason strongly challenges the trial court’s statement 

that “there was conflicting testimony – and I think perhaps maybe this is the State’s 

theory, I don’t know, in charging aiding and abetting. There is evidence that Jason 

warner was driving [after the accident].” (Tr. at 529). The trial court also later 

stated, “I think it’s more likely that Jason Warner drove away” because the vehicle 

would be “extremely difficult for a woman to control the operation of that [damaged 

Jeep.]” (Tr. at 532). 

{¶64} Jason argues that these statements are unsupported by the evidence, 

and that the latter is simply sexist. However, taking these statements alone and out-
Case No. 9-21-15 

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of-context ignores other more definite statements wherein the trial court states: 

“Now, whether – whichever one drove it, it doesn’t matter for aiding and abetting 

purposes, because you can be charged as the principal offender, or as an aider and 

abettor.” (Tr. at 530). Further, the trial court found, after discussing who may have 

driven the vehicle, “In any event, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that 

they aided or abetted in the commission of the offense of leaving the scene of the 

accident.” (Tr. at 533). Finally, the trial court stated, “For all these reasons, and all 

of the other reasons in the record, the Court finds both Defendants guilty of Count 

3 and Count 4.”7

 (Tr. at 538). 

{¶65} Notably, because of the Warners’ challenges to the trial court’s 

statements made prior to the general findings of guilt, and because of the Warners’ 

renewed motions for acquittal prior to sentencing in this matter, the trial court again 

addressed its statements from the trial at the sentencing hearing. At that time, the 

trial court said, inter alia, “The Court does not know – and as I said – for sure, who 

was driving [after the accident]. All the Court can say is that based on the law and 

the evidence, they acted in concert with one another.” (Sent. Tr. at 28). Thus Jason’s 

references in his brief to isolated statements such as the one that it was “more likely” 

that Jason was driving ignore the fact that the trial court stated it was ultimately 

7

 Notably, the State did argue in closing that reasonable minds could differ as to who drove the Jeep from the 

crash site. The State questioned whether Julia was strong enough, noted that Jason quickly volunteered to 

move the Jeep when law enforcement asked, and law enforcement testified the vehicle would be very difficult 

to move/direct. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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irrelevant who was driving based on the finding the trial court made.8

 Further 

explanations like this establish that Jason’s attempt to randomly pick statements 

made by the trial court, without viewing everything in its entirety, is problematic. 

Thus even if the comments were not “surplusage”, the trial court clarified its 

findings and we see no prejudicial error here because the appropriate general 

findings were made and they were supported by the evidence. 

{¶66} After reviewing the record, giving deference to credibility findings of 

the trial court, we cannot find that the trial court clearly lost its way by convicting 

Jason of Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident and Complicity to 

Tampering with Evidence. Therefore, Jason’s second assignment of error is 

overruled. 

Third Assignment of Error

{¶67} In Jason’s third assignment of error, he contends that the trial court’s 

determination that both of the Warners were guilty of Failure to Stop After an 

Accident and Tampering with Evidence via Complicity constituted a legal 

impossibility. He argues that there were only two individuals who could have been 

the principal offenders and that by convicting each defendant of Complicity, the 

trial court effectively found that both individuals were principal actors and both 

8

 Jason states that “more than likely” is a preponderance finding and does not equate to beyond a reasonable 

doubt. While this may have been true if the trial court rested solely on this point, as we have stated, the trial 

court made numerous statements that, if we were to consider them anything other than surplusage, must be 

viewed in their entirety. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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were aiders and abettors. Jason argues that this leads to the impossibility of Jason 

being guilty of Complicity in his indicted crimes, and effectively “guilty” as the 

“primary offender” in Julia’s indicted crimes. In his brief, he argues: “No single 

person is capable of being two separate people at the same time. Similarly, no 

person can simultaneously be guilty and not guilty of the same offense as asserted 

in a single count of an indictment.” (Appt.’s Br. at 22). 

{¶68} First, we note that Jason’s argument hinges largely on challenging not 

only his conviction, but also Julia’s conviction. It is unclear, at best, to what extent 

he would have standing to do so. “The issue at trial was not the absent principal’s 

guilt, but rather the appellant’s guilt.” State v. Graven, 52 Ohio St.2d 112, 116 

(1977). 

{¶69} Second, and notwithstanding the first point, the Complicity statute 

itself directly addresses the situation where there is no convicted principal. As 

noted earlier, pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(B), “It is no defense to a charge under this 

section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted 

as a principal offender.” 

{¶70} Essentially Jason is arguing that he cannot be convicted of Complicity 

if his wife is not the principal offender. However, the trial court could have found 

that she was the principal offender or that she was not; regardless, the trial court 

could readily have found that Jason aided and abetted her in committing those 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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offenses. Julia’s status as principal or not a principal does not create a defense in 

this matter per the Complicity statute itself. In fact, even if Julia had been acquitted 

of either being a principal or being complicit, Jason still could have been convicted 

of Complicity. See Graven, supra. 

{¶71} Given the plain statement in the Complicity statute, and Jason’s failure 

to cite any legal authority that would compel us otherwise, we cannot find that his 

convictions constituted a legal impossibility. Therefore, Jason’s third assignment 

of error is overruled. 

Fourth Assignment of Error

{¶72} In his fourth assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court 

committed “repeated misconduct” during its “deliberations” and at Jason’s 

sentencing hearing. Jason argues that the same standard that would apply to juror 

misconduct should apply in a bench trial. 

{¶73} As support for his statement that the trial court committed misconduct, 

Jason cites the trial court’s statements in what he characterizes as the trial court’s 

“findings.” He argues that the trial court made “findings” to support the convictions 

that were directly contradicted by the record “and or consisted of impermissible, 

baseless, and sexist stereotypes.” (Appt.’s Br. at 23). Further, Jason brings up the 

fact that the trial court initially stated Julia was guilty of the lesser-included offenses 

of Negligent Assault, before concluding that Negligent Assault actually contained 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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an additional element and thus was not actually a lesser-included offense. In 

addition, Jason takes issues with the trial court’s statement at sentencing that it had 

pulled out his docket, and [in] 2019 and 2020, he handled at least 

eight cases or more involving drunk driving. So he knows exactly 

what the time frame is. You have three hours, three hours to take 

a breath test from the time of the accident. There is even case law 

saying that because the test has substantial compliance, it can be 

even later, up to six hours. 

(Sent. Tr. at 24-25). Jason contends that this constituted improper judicial 

investigation into the matter. Finally, Jason argues that the trial court’s statement 

that it was not unusual for an elected official to have a nonexistent criminal history, 

and thus a low “ORAS” score, showed that the trial court failed to conduct a 

meaningful review of Ohio’s sentencing factors. 

{¶74} Dealing first with Jason’s arguments regarding the trial court’s 

statements prior to its general finding of guilt, again these could be viewed as 

surplusage, but even if they were not, the trial court further explained its findings. 

Thus while the trial court might have found it hard to believe that Julia could have 

driven the severely damaged vehicle after the accident, the trial court also stated that 

it was irrelevant who was driving because the Warners aided and abetted each other. 

Thus any of the trial court’s comments regarding Julia or gender are really irrelevant 

to the final determination. Similarly, we find that the trial court’s over-arching 

finding was that the evidence supported the crimes. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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{¶75} Next, as to Jason’s claims regarding the lesser-included offenses, the 

lesser-included offenses were not charges even levied against him, thus he has no 

standing to contest them. They do not impact his case. Moreover, there are no 

convictions for Negligent Assault against anyone in this case for us to actually 

review. Thus even if there was any improper comment by the trial court, the trial 

court corrected the matter itself and there is no resulting prejudice. This argument 

is not well-taken. 

{¶76} Regarding the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that it 

had pulled Jason’s docket related to drunk-driving offenses, there was actual 

testimony from law enforcement in this case about how the time for alcohol testing 

had passed, juxtaposed with Jason’s admitted decision to wait approximately eight 

hours after the accident to report it, so it carried some relevance. Regardless, the 

rules of evidence do not even apply at sentencing hearings. Evid.R. 101. 

Furthermore, the trial court’s statement only emphasized what was already 

presumed—that Jason was familiar with drinking and driving-related cases. In fact, 

the State argued in its closing argument that as a Judge, Jason would be aware that 

the Warners needed to stop after the accident and that there was a limited amount 

of time that the Warners could be tested for alcohol or drugs. Given that the rules 

of evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings, and given that the handling of any 

cases would likely be a matter of public record, we can find no error here. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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{¶77} Finally, as to Jason’s claim that the trial court erred at sentencing and 

failed to conduct a meaningful review of the sentencing factors by stating it was not 

unusual that Jason had no criminal history as a public official, the trial court did 

what it was supposed to do and considered the fact that Jason had led a law-abiding 

life, and balanced that against him being a public official along with the nature of 

the crimes committed. Moreover, the trial court explicitly stated it had considered 

the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and it did not have to do any more 

than that. State v. Osting, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-18-09, 2019-Ohio-1278, ¶ 9. 

Furthermore, in State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, the Supreme 

Court of Ohio conclusively held that there is no basis for an appellate court to 

modify or vacate a sentence even if the appellate court concludes that the record 

does not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. 

{¶78} In sum, we cannot find under the facts and circumstances of this case 

that the trial court failed to conduct a meaningful review of the sentencing factors 

where the trial court explicitly stated it had reviewed the sentencing factors. 

Moreover, under Jones we could also find no basis for reversal. For all of these 

reasons, Jason’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

Fifth Assignment of Error

{¶79} In his fifth assignment of error, Jason argues that even if there was no 

single error prejudicial enough to reverse his convictions, the cumulative errors in 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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this case combined were prejudicial. As support for his argument, he reasserts 

numerous claims referenced in the previous assignments of error. 

Standard of Review 

{¶80} “Under [the] doctrine of cumulative error, a conviction will be

reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair 

trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not 

individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Spencer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-

13-50, 2015-Ohio-52, ¶ 83, citing State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio2577, ¶¶ 222-224 and State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 64 (1995). “ ‘To find 

cumulative error, a court must first find multiple errors committed at trial and 

determine that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have 

been different but for the combination of the harmless errors.’ ” State v. Stober, 3d 

Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-13, 2014-Ohio-5629, ¶ 15, quoting In re J.M., 3d Dist. 

Putnam No. 12-11-06, 2012-Ohio-1467, ¶ 36. 

Analysis 

{¶81} Because we have not found multiple errors in this matter, the doctrine 

of cumulative error does not apply. State v. Carpenter, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-18-

16, 2019-Ohio-58, ¶ 104, citing State v. Bertuzzi, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-12, 

2014-Ohio-5093, ¶ 110. Therefore, Jason’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. 
Case No. 9-21-15 

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Conclusion

{¶82} For the foregoing reasons, Jason’s assignments of error are overruled 

and the judgment and sentence of the Marion County Common Pleas Court is 

affirmed. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ZIMMERMAN, J., MILLER, J., and SHAW, J., concur. 

/jlr