Filed 10/5/23 P. v. Ottley CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WILLIAM OTTLEY and 

MAURICE WILLIAMS,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B320336

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA391952)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.

Matthew Alger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant William Ottley.

Verna Wefald, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant Maurice Williams.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, 

Charles S. Lee and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

A jury convicted defendants and appellants William Patrick Ottley 

(Ottley) and Maurice Miguel Williams (Williams)1 in 2012 of first degree 

murder. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction in 2015. (People v. 

Crosby, et al. (Jan. 27, 2015, B251779) [nonpub. opn.].) In 2019, Ottley filed a 

petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now 

section 1172.6),

2 which permits persons convicted of murder under the

natural and probable consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court 

to vacate their convictions and resentence them. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) 

Williams filed his resentencing petition in 2020. On April 28, 2022, the trial 

court denied both petitions after conducting a joint evidentiary hearing.

In arguing for reversal of the orders denying their resentencing 

petitions, appellants contend: (1) they were improperly convicted of murder 

based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine because the 

prosecutor argued that theory of culpability to the jury during their 2012 

trial; (2) they were improperly convicted of imputed-malice murder based on 

the gang experts’ testimony during the 2012 trial; (3) the trial court 

improperly relied on imputed malice as a basis for denying appellants’ 

resentencing petitions; and (4) the trial court erred by not suppressing at the 

petition hearing evidence obtained during a warrantless search of Williams’ 

cell phone incident to his 2010 arrest for robbery and admitted without 

objection during appellants’ 2012 trial. Appellants claim the cell phone

evidence is not “admissible under current law” within the meaning of section 

1 Ottley and Williams are referred to collectively as appellants.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was renumbered 

section 1172.6, with no significant change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) 

We will refer to the section by its new numbering only. All further statutory 

references are to the Penal Code.
3

1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)3 because the United States Supreme Court, in Riley 

v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373 (Riley), held that a warrant is required to 

search a cell phone seized incident to an arrest, abrogating previous 

California law on that issue. (Id. at pp. 401–402, abrogating People v. Diaz 

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (People v. Diaz).) Appellants further contend the trial 

court’s erroneous consideration of the purportedly inadmissible evidence was 

prejudicial and requires reversal of the orders denying their petitions.

We affirm the trial court’s orders. The record shows that appellants 

were not convicted under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or 

of imputed-malice murder. Denial of appellants’ request to suppress evidence 

is not a ground for reversal because appellants fail to establish any prejudice 

from the admission of that evidence. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

The Robbery

At 11 p.m. on June 4, 2010, Williams and two other males approached 

Walter Yates, pointed a gun at him, and ordered him to hand over “all [his] 

stuff.” The assailants took Yates’ belongings, including a computer, and fled. 

Police recovered the computer when a woman tried to sell it back to Yates. 

3 The statutory language on which appellants rely states: “The 

admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, 

except that the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior 

hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness 

testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (d)(3).)

4 The relevant facts are taken from the reporter’s transcript of 

appellants’ 2012 trial.
4

The Murder

At 2:30 a.m. on June 13, 2010, appellants and Demetrius Crosby were 

seated in Williams’ Chevrolet Camaro, parked outside an apartment building 

in Los Angeles. Marlon Usher was seated in the backseat of Loralyn 

Aguilar’s car, parked nearby. Usher was intoxicated and arguing with 

Aguilar while refusing to leave the car. Usher yelled, “Mind your [own]

business” to one of the three men in the Camaro. That man looked at Usher 

in an unfriendly manner and gestured toward Aguilar’s car while talking to 

the other occupants of the Camaro. 

Aguilar began to drive away, with Usher still seated in the back seat. 

The Camaro followed and then overtook Aguilar’s car and blocked it from 

proceeding further. Williams, the driver of the Camaro, exited the car and 

walked toward Aguilar’s vehicle. Usher exited Aguilar’s car and walked 

toward the side of the road. Williams’ two companions exited the Camaro 

and ran toward Usher. The passenger who exited from the Camaro’s back 

seat was carrying a revolver. Aguilar was afraid. She reversed her car, made 

a U-turn, and returned to the apartment building. When Aguilar reached the 

apartment building, she heard gunshots. As she called 911, Aguilar heard a 

second set of gunshots. 

Several witnesses in the area heard someone pleading, “Please don’t 

shoot me. Don’t do this to me. Don’t do me this way.” A voice responded, 

“Not this time, Blood.” A series of gunshots followed, and another voice said, 

“Let’s go.” A car then drove away rapidly. 

The police arrived soon thereafter and found Usher lying in the street. 

He had four gunshot wounds, one to the head and the others through his

back. Usher died from the multiple gunshot wounds. 
5

On June 13, 2010, Williams reported to police that his 1995 Chevrolet 

Camaro had been stolen sometime between 9 p.m. on June 11 and 8 p.m. on 

June 12, 2010. In his police report, Williams identified Ottley as his nearest 

relative and provided Ottley’s address.

Williams was arrested on June 4, 2010 for the Yates robbery. After 

Williams’ arrest, Summer Bonner, who identified herself as Williams’ 

girlfriend, contacted Detective David Vinton and asked for the keys to 

Williams’ car. Incident to Williams’ arrest, Detective Vinton searched 

Williams’ cell phone and found photographs of Williams’ Camaro and 

photographs and texts indicating Williams was a gang member. The 

photographs and texts on Williams’ phone prompted Detective Vinton to 

contact the South Homicide Bureau to inquire whether any murders had 

occurred over the weekend involving a gray or green Camaro. Detective

Linda Heitzman, who was investigating Usher’s murder, contacted Detective 

Vinton, who informed her of Summer Bonner’s identity and relationship with

Williams. Detective Heitzman went to Bonner’s residence, where she found 

Williams’ Camaro concealed under a tarp.

Four witnesses identified Williams’ Camaro as the one they had seen 

on the night of the murder. A forensic examination revealed Ottley’s 

fingerprints and DNA inside the Camaro. Cell phone data analysis showed 

Williams’ and Ottley’s phones near the crime scene at the time of the murder

and departing thereafter from that location. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Relevant Trial Proceedings

Appellants and their codefendant Crosby were tried together. During 

the trial, the jury heard recordings of phone calls intercepted between Crosby 
6

and a woman named Diamond, implicating Crosby as the person who shot 

Usher. A gang expert testified at trial that Ottley and Crosby were both selfadmitted members of the Five Deuce Broadway Crips gang, and Williams 

was a self-admitted member of the Rollin 20’s gang of Long Beach. Based on 

a hypothetical reflecting the circumstances of the murder, the expert opined 

the crime was committed for the benefit of the gangs because gang members 

were compelled to retaliate against disrespectful behavior to maintain 

stature in the community. The expert further opined gang members would 

gain respect as a result of the killing. 

The trial court denied the prosecutor’s request for a jury instruction on 

the natural and probable consequences doctrine, finding insufficient evidence 

of any “target” crime other than murder, and instructed the jury on aiding 

and abetting as the sole theory of appellants’ culpability. The trial court also 

instructed the jury on express and implied malice pursuant to CALJIC No. 

8.11,

5 second degree murder (CALJIC No. 8.30), and manslaughter (CALJIC 

Nos. 8.37, 8.42, and 8.43). The trial court further instructed that in case of 

5 The jury was instructed on express and implied malice as follows: 

“‘Malice’ may be either express or implied. [¶] Malice is express when there 

is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being. Malice is 

implied when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶] 

2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and [¶] 

3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and 

with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When it is shown that a killing 

resulted from the intentional doing of an act with express or implied malice, 

no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice 

aforethought. [¶] The mental state constituting malice aforethought does 

not necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed. [¶] The 

word ‘aforethought’ does not imply deliberation or the lapse of considerable 

time. It only means that the required mental state must precede rather than 

follow the act.” 
7

uncertainty, whether murder was of the first or second degree, the jury was 

to find second degree murder. (CALJIC 8.71). 

On August 17, 2012, the jury found appellants and Crosby guilty of 

first degree premeditated murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and Williams guilty of 

second degree robbery. (§ 211.) The jury further found a principal personally 

and intentionally discharged a firearm during the murder (§ 12022.53, subds. 

(b), (d), (e)), and the murder was committed for the benefit of, at the direction 

of, and in association with a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).) 

The trial court found Williams had two prior “strikes,” or serious felony 

convictions, and sentenced him to 75 years to life (50 years to life on the 

murder count, plus 25 years to life on the robbery count). The court 

sentenced Ottley to 50 years to life (25 years to life on the murder count plus 

25 years to life for the firearm enhancement). 

Petition Proceedings

Ottley filed a petition for resentencing on March 15, 2019, and 

Williams filed his resentencing petition on April 16, 2020. The trial court 

issued an order to show cause as to both petitions and conducted a joint 

evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the court denied Williams’ request to 

suppress evidence from his cell phone that had been admitted into evidence

without objection at the 2012 trial. 

In separate written rulings filed on April 28, 2022, the trial court 

denied appellants’ petitions, finding the jury had not convicted appellants 

under the felony murder, imputed malice, or natural and probable 

consequences doctrines. The court further found the record established 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants would be convicted of aiding and 

abetting first degree murder.
8

This appeal followed. 

DISCUSSION

I. Resentencing Under Section 1172.6

The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437), which became 

effective on January 1, 2019, “to amend the felony murder rule and the 

natural and probable consequences doctrine,

[6] as it relates to murder, to 

ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the 

underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 

2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) SB 1437 amended section 188, which defines 

malice, and section 189, which defines the degrees of murder, to address 

felony-murder liability. Section 188 now requires, when the felony-murder 

rule does not apply, that a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with 

malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based 

solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v.

Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) With one exception not 

applicable here,

7 SB 1437 effectively eliminated murder convictions premised 

on a theory of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be 

convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such as felony 

murder or the natural and probable consequences doctrine—unless the 

6 Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and 

abettor of criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime, but also 

“‘“for any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the 

crime aided and abetted.”’” (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 158

(Chiu).)

7 That exception is set forth in section 189, subdivision (f), which applies 

to the killing of a police officer.
9

prosecutor also proves that the nonkiller defendant personally acted with the 

intent to kill or was a major participant who acted with reckless disregard to 

human life. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) 

SB 1437 also added section 1172.6, providing a procedure by which 

defendants whose cases are final can seek retroactive relief by petitioning the 

sentencing court to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining 

counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute permits persons convicted of felony 

murder or murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to 

petition for relief. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4, subd. (a).) Effective January 1, 

2022, the Legislature expanded the scope of the petitioning procedure to 

allow persons convicted of attempted murder under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine also to petition for relief. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; 

§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 747.)

If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the 

trial court must issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If the 

trial court determines the petitioner has made a prima facie showing for 

relief and issues an order to show cause, the court must hold a hearing “to 

determine whether to vacate the murder . . . conviction and to recall the 

sentence and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same 

manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced, provided that 

the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, 

subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, the parties may rely on the record of conviction 

or present “new or additional evidence” to support their positions, and “the 

burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under 

California law as amended.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
10

II. Aider and Abettor Culpability for Murder

“A person who aids and abets the commission of a crime is culpable as a 

principal in that crime. (§ 31.) Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense 

but a form of derivative liability for the underlying crime.” (Gentile, supra, 

10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Such derivative liability results from an act by the 

perpetrator to which the aider and abettor contributed. (People v. Prettyman

(1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 259.)

“[A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, 

acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and 

(2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the 

commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or 

instigates, the commission of the crime.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 

547, 561 (Beeman).) “[A]ider and abettor liability requires proof in three 

distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by 

the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea—knowledge of the 

direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those 

unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the 

aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (People 

v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) As to the mens rea element, the 

defendant must not only know the direct perpetrator’s intent, they must 

share that intent. (Beeman, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 560.)

Aiding and abetting may be shown by circumstantial evidence. It is 

well-settled that a defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime and failure 

to prevent it, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense, 

including flight, are relevant to determining whether the defendant aided 

and abetted in the commission of the crime. (People v. Lara (2017) 9 

Cal.App.5th 296, 322; People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409.)
11

First degree murder, as defined in section 189, includes any willful, 

deliberate, and premeditated killing. (§ 189, subd. (a).) Murder requires 

malice aforethought, which can be express or implied. (Gentile, supra, 10 

Cal.5th at p. 844.) Malice is express when there is a manifest intent to kill. 

(§ 188, subd. (a)(1).) Express malice is shown when the assailant either 

desires the death or knows to a substantial certainty that death will occur. 

(§ 188, subd. (a)(1); People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) Malice is 

implied when someone kills with “no considerable provocation . . . or when 

the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant 

heart.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(2).) Implied malice murder requires knowledge that 

conduct endangers the life of another and a conscious disregard for life. 

(People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1181.)

SB 1437 “did not . . . alter the law regarding the criminal liability of 

direct aiders and abettors of murder because such persons necessarily ‘know 

and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.’” (People v. Offley

(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595–596.) “One who directly aids and abets 

another who commits murder is thus liable for murder under the new law 

just as he or she was liable under the old law.” (Id. at p. 596.) For a 

defendant to be liable for first degree murder as a direct aider and abettor, 

“the prosecution must show that the defendant aided or encouraged the 

commission of the murder with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the 

perpetrator and with the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or 

facilitating its commission.” (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 167.)

“[W]hen a person, with the mental state necessary for an aider and 

abettor, helps or induces another to kill, that person’s guilt is determined by 

the combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own mens 

rea.” (People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1122.) This is because “the 
12

dividing line between the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor is 

often blurred. It is often an oversimplification to describe one person as the 

actual perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor.” (Id. at p. 1120.)

III. Appellants Were Not Convicted Under the Natural and Probable 

Consequences Doctrine

Although the jury was not instructed on the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine at their 2012 trial, appellants nevertheless contend 

they were improperly convicted under that theory because the prosecutor 

argued the natural and probable consequences doctrine to the jury. They cite 

several statements by the prosecutor during closing argument and rebuttal.

For example, during closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury: 

“There are two types of malice aforethought. There is something we call 

express malice and something we call implied malice. Express malice is easy. 

It’s when you pull out a gun and pull the trigger and you are pointing it at a 

human five times. That shows you are clearly trying to kill the person. [¶] 

Implied malice is when the killing resulted from an intentional act, in this 

case helping Mr. Crosby, and this applies to Mr. Ottley and Mr. Williams, 

and the natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life. [¶] 

What were they planning on doing? What was the natural and probable 

consequence here? Remember what Detective Franson told you when he 

testified about gang members. He said—and it’s hard to understand. It’s 

hard to understand because none of you are gang members, but you have to 

consider this.” (Italics added.) 

Appellants focus on the prosecutor’s reference to the “natural and 

probable consequences” of appellants’ conduct. It is evident however, from 

the context of the prosecutor’s statements, that he was referring to the theory 
13

of implied malice as set forth in CALJIC No. 8.11 when a killing results from 

an intentional act, and the “natural consequences” of the act are dangerous to 

human life, and not the natural and probable consequences doctrine. As the 

trial court noted in its written ruling, “[t]he doctrine of natural consequences 

is a sanctioned legal precept entirely different from—and not to be confused 

with—the doctrine of natural and probable consequences.” Use of the term 

“natural consequences” in the definition of implied malice “does not import 

into the crime of murder the case law relating to the distinct ‘natural and 

probable consequences’ doctrine developed in the context of aiding and 

abetting liability.” (People v. Martinez (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334

(Martinez).)

Appellants also cite the following statements by the prosecutor during 

rebuttal: “When Mr. Ottley decided to go join this confrontation, get out of 

the car and run up, what do you think he was thinking in his head? I submit 

there is only one reasonable interpretation. He is thinking: I am going to 

help. That is aiding and abetting when you decide to help. [¶] When you do 

acts and conduct like open the door and get out of the car and run towards 

the victim who is unarmed and by himself, then you are aiding and abetting 

that crime, and that in itself here, ladies and gentlemen, that instruction on 

implied malice covers what is natural—the natural consequences. The target 

offense here, what he knew was going to happen, was a violent confrontation

because they had been disrespected, the natural consequence of which is 

dangerous to human life.” (Italics added.)

Appellants again focus on specific words in isolation, in this case, 

“target offense,” as the basis for contending the prosecutor argued the natural 
14

and probable consequences doctrine to the jury.8 Viewed in context, it is 

evident the prosecutor was explaining the doctrine of implied malice to the 

jury, not the natural and probable consequences doctrine. “Unlike a case 

based upon the ‘natural and probable consequences’ theory of accomplice 

liability, . . . the facts of this case did not require the jury to analyze two 

distinct transactions—a target crime, such as robbery, and a nontarget crime, 

such as murder—and determine whether a murder by a confederate was the 

natural and probable consequence of a robbery the defendant accomplice had 

agreed to aid and abet.” (Martinez, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 333.) 

Appellants here were charged with and convicted of first degree premeditated 

murder based upon a single transaction—the shooting of Usher. The trial 

court did not err by concluding there was no target offense as there would be 

in a case based upon the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

Finally, appellants cite the following statements during the 

prosecutor’s rebuttal argument: “As far as Mr. Williams and Mr. Ottley are 

concerned, as far as implied malice is concerned for the two of them, I don’t 

have to prove that they intended to pull the trigger. I don’t have to put the 

gun in their hand. I don’t have to show fingerprints. I don’t have to show 

DNA. I have to show they were down to participate in a violent contributive 

act for being disrespected and not even individually. Just as a group they 

were disrespected and they all decided let’s go discipline this fool.” (Italics 

added.)

8 Under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, an aider and 

abettor “‘is guilty of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of 

any other crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a 

natural and probable consequence of the crime.’” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 913, 920.)
15

We reject appellants’ argument that the prosecutor’s use of the terms

“violent confrontation” and “violent contributive act” “were thinly veiled 

references to an assault that could naturally and probably result in a 

murder.” The context in which the prosecutor used those terms makes clear 

he was discussing implied malice and not the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine.

Contrary to appellants’ claim, the trial court did not rely solely on the 

jury instructions and the verdict convicting them of first degree murder as 

the bases for concluding “it [was] not possible” for the jurors to have convicted 

them without finding appellants acted with the requisite intent to kill. The 

trial court’s written ruling lists in detail the evidence supporting that 

conclusion—the shooting occurred seconds after appellants intercepted 

Aguilar’s vehicle; there was no evidence of a fight or beating preceding the 

shooting; Usher begged for his life before he was summarily executed. 

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that appellants 

were properly convicted as aiders and abettors of first degree premeditated 

murder, and not as accomplices under the natural and probable consequences 

doctrine.

IV. Appellants Were Not Convicted of Imputed-Malice Murder

We reject appellants’ claim they were convicted of murder based on 

imputed malice as the result of the prosecution’s gang expert testimony. As 

appellants note, gang experts testified at the trial that gang members must 

respond to acts of disrespect, must support fellow gang members by 

committing crimes to benefit the gang, and gain respect by participating in 

acts of violence on behalf of the gang. Appellants’ claim that the prosecutor 

used gang expert testimony to persuade the jury that appellants, as gang 
16

members, shared the same knowledge and intent to shoot Usher, however, is 

unsupported by the record. The selected portions of the prosecutor’s 

argument cited by appellants do not concern imputed malice. The

prosecutor’s statements, read in context, concern accomplice culpability based 

on express and implied malice. The prosecutor argued, for example, that 

Ottley’s decision to exit the Camaro and assist Williams was an intentional 

act to join in what he knew would be a violent confrontation, given 

appellants’ gang affiliation and gang culture. The prosecutor also argued, in 

the context of explaining principal culpability pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.00, 

that appellants aided and abetted Crosby’s shooting of Usher by intercepting 

and blocking Aguilar’s car and by running out of the Camaro to assist Crosby. 

Accordingly, appellants’ guilt as aider and abettors was based on “the 

combined acts of all of the participants as well as [each] person’s own mental 

state.” 

The trial court did not, as appellants claim, rely on imputed malice to 

find they were guilty of murder. There is ample evidence in the record, 

independent of gang expert testimony, that appellants shared Crosby’s intent 

to kill Usher. Appellants knew Crosby had a gun when he exited the 

Camaro. Their combined presence prevented Usher from fleeing. Appellants 

were present when Usher pleaded for his life; they did not intervene; instead, 

someone responded, “Not this time, Blood” and Crosby shot Usher multiple 

times. Appellants and Crosby then fled from the crime scene together. 

Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that appellants 

were guilty as aiders and abettors of murder. (See People v. Lara, supra, 9 

Cal.App.5th at p. 322; People v. Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.)

None of the gang experts opined on appellants’ specific intent 

concerning the crime. (See People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1049 
17

[emphasizing the “critical difference between an expert expressing an opinion 

in response to a hypothetical question and the expert expressing an opinion 

about the defendants themselves”].) The gang evidence, moreover, was both 

relevant and admissible to bolster other evidence concerning appellants’

culpability as aiders and abettors of murder. (See People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 

Cal.4th 1015, 1055 [expert’s testimony concerning gang culture and rivalries, 

together with the defendant’s presence and conduct at the time of shooting, 

bolstered evidence of the defendant’s involvement in the crime].) The trial 

court did not rely on imputed malice in finding appellants culpable for 

Usher’s murder.9

V. Denial of Request to Suppress Evidence Harmless Error

The trial court’s denial of appellants’ request to suppress evidence is 

not a ground for reversal. The evidence appellants sought to suppress was 

information obtained from Williams’ cell phone during a warrantless search 

incident to his 2010 arrest and trial testimony concerning the cell phone 

information. Their evidentiary challenge is based on the following language 

in section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3): “The admission of evidence in the 

hearing shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may 

consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is 

9 On September 1, 2023, Ottley filed a notice of new authority in which 

he advised this court of a recent decision, People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th

981, that he claimed was relevant to the issues on appeal. That case is 

inapposite, as defendants were not convicted under the natural and probable 

consequences doctrine or of imputed-malice murder. The record does not 

support Ottley’s claim that the trial court in the petition proceedings relied 

on imputed malice to find defendants guilty of murder, based solely or 

principally on gang expert testimony at the 2012 trial.
18

admissible under current law, including witness testimony, stipulated 

evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

10 

Appellants claim that section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3)’s limitation on

evidence a petition court may consider to evidence “that is admissible under 

current law” bars admission of the cell phone evidence because in 2014 the 

United States Supreme Court held in Riley that law enforcement officers 

must obtain a warrant before searching a cell phone seized incident to an 

arrest, abrogating previous California law on that issue. (Riley, supra, 573 

U.S. at pp. 401–402.) Appellants further contend the trial court’s reliance on 

inadmissible evidence when denying their petitions requires reversal of the 

trial court’s orders. 

10 Subdivision (d)(3) of section 1172.6 states in its entirety: “At the 

hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief, the burden of 

proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under California law 

as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 

2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be governed by the 

Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously 

admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, 

including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially 

noticed. The court may also consider the procedural history of the case 

recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay evidence that was 

admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 872 

shall be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is 

admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor 

and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their 

respective burdens. A finding that there is substantial evidence to support a 

conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to 

prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for 

resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior 

conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, 

shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining 

charges.” 
19

Appellants fail to establish prejudice resulting from any allegedly 

erroneous admission of evidence; accordingly, denial of the motion to 

suppress, even if error, was harmless. The harmless error standard 

articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, applies to the 

erroneous admission of evidence in a section 1172.6 hearing. (People v. Myles

(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 688, 706.) Under that standard, appellants bore the 

burden of showing a reasonable probability they would have received a more 

favorable result had the error not occurred. (Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 

Cal.App.5th 440, 447.) Although appellants are permitted to join in the 

arguments in each other’s briefs, they each individually must show prejudice 

resulting from any trial court error. (People v. Nilsson (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 1, 12, fn. 2.) 

Williams fails to establish prejudice from admission of cell phone 

evidence concerning his gang affiliation. There is ample evidence in the 

record, independent of texts and photographs on Williams’ cell phone, that he 

was a self-admitted member of the Rollin Crips 20 gang. 

Ottley similarly fails to sustain his burden of establishing prejudice. 

He claims Williams’ cell phone information led the police to Summer 

Bonner’s residence, where they found the Camaro containing Ottley’s 

fingerprints and DNA. Absent this evidence, Ottley maintains, he would not 

be implicated in the murder, and the prosecution would have been unable to 

establish he was not entitled to relief under section 1172.6. Ottley ignores 

other evidence, independent of the cell phone information, leading to the 

discovery of Williams’ Camaro, linking Ottley to Williams, and implicating 

Ottley in the murder. Williams’ girlfriend, Summer Bonner, asked the police 

shortly after Williams’ arrest to give her Williams’ car keys, even though 

Williams had previously reported the car stolen. Police subsequently found 
20

Williams’ Camaro at Bonner’s residence. Intercepted telephone 

conversations obtained from Crosby’s cell phone implicated Ottley in the 

murder and indicated that Crosby suspected Ottley of “snitching” to the 

police about the murder. Data obtained from Ottley’s own cell phone showed 

he was present near the crime scene at the time of the murder. There was 

ample evidence, independent of his DNA and fingerprints in the Camaro, of 

Ottley’s participation in the murder.

Because we conclude any purported error was harmless, we need not 

consider whether the denial of appellants’ motion to suppress was grounds for 

reversal.

DISPOSITION

The orders denying appellants’ petitions for recall of sentence and 

resentencing under section 1172.6 are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ZUKIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

CURREY, P. J.

COLLINS, J.