IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 21–1676

Submitted October 11, 2023—Filed January 26, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

NELSON CARLOS FLORES,

Appellant.

On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Crawford County, Zachary 

Hindman, Judge.

The defendant seeks further review of a court of appeals decision affirming 

his convictions for sexual abuse of a child. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT 

AFFIRMED.

Waterman, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all justices 

joined.

Tyler D. McIntosh (argued) and Christopher J. Roth of Roth 

Weinstein, LLC, Omaha, Nebraska, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott (argued), Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee.
2

WATERMAN, Justice.

In this appeal, we revisit the recurring issue of the admissibility of video

recordings of forensic interviews of child sex abuse victims. Our recent decisions 

have addressed the admissibility of such videos under several exceptions to the 

hearsay rule.

1 But in today’s case, the district court admitted the video under 

the rule of completeness, Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106. The defendant was 

charged with eleven counts of sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s daughter, 

beginning when she was age nine. The State called the child as a witness at the 

jury trial and mentioned her forensic interview during its direct examination. 

Defense counsel cross-examined the child about inconsistencies between her 

trial testimony and select portions of her prior statements in the recorded 

forensic interview. The State on redirect offered the video into evidence. Over the 

defendant’s hearsay objection, the district court admitted the video for the 

limited purpose of deciding whether the interview statements “were inconsistent 

with the testimony given at trial” in evaluating the child’s credibility. The district 

court relied on State v. Austin, 585 N.W.2d 241, 243–44 (Iowa 1998) (allowing 

forensic interview video into evidence under prior version of the rule of 

completeness after defense counsel “opened the door” by using “very specific 

points” from a summary of the interview which, if “[t]aken out of the context of 

the entire interview,” would have allowed the jury to “conclude[] that [the child’s] 

statements at the interview were inconsistent with her testimony at trial”). The 

jury found the defendant guilty on all sexual abuse counts. 

1See, e.g., State v. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d 1, 8–15 (Iowa 2021) (addressing the admissibility 

of the child victim’s forensic interview videos under the medical diagnosis and residual exceptions 

to the hearsay rule); State v. Fontenot, 958 N.W.2d 549, 561–564 (Iowa 2021) (addressing the 

admissibility of the child victim’s forensic interview video under the hearsay exception for prior 

consistent statements); State v. Veverka, 938 N.W.2d 197, 200–04 (Iowa 2020) (addressing the 

admissibility of the child victim’s forensic interview video under the residual exception to the 

hearsay rule).
3

The defendant appealed, raising multiple issues, and we transferred the 

case to the court of appeals, which affirmed his convictions. The court of appeals 

distinguished Austin because “the State rather than the defense opened the 

door.” Without deciding whether the video was correctly admitted under 

rule 5.106, the court of appeals determined that any error in admitting the video 

was harmless because the State established overwhelming evidence of the 

defendant’s guilt. We granted the defendant’s application for further review.

On our review, we affirm the district court under Austin and rule 5.106. 

The rule of completeness applies regardless of which party opens the door. The 

defense extensively cross-examined the child by asking her about specific 

statements she made during her forensic interview, highlighted inconsistencies 

with her trial testimony, and implied that the defendant had touched her only 

once and only in a certain manner. Yet, other portions of the interview—not 

asked about during cross-examination—were more consistent with her trial 

testimony about other incidents. The defendant objected to allowing the video

into evidence, but he did not challenge the court’s ruling that the entire video 

would be allowed if he opened the door under rule 5.106. On this record, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the jury 

to view the video to put into context the statements from the interview elicited 

during cross-examination as part of evaluating the child’s credibility. We let the 

court of appeals decision stand as final on the other issues raised in the 

defendant’s appeal and affirm his convictions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In 2016, Nelson Carlos Flores lived with his girlfriend Wendy H., their son 

E.H., and Wendy’s nine-year-old daughter W.R. Flores is not W.R.’s biological 

father. One morning after her mother left for work, W.R. awoke to find Flores 

touching her vagina over her clothes. Flores moved his hand under her clothes 
4

before he raped W.R. vaginally and anally. She screamed while this was 

happening. W.R. later told her mother and grandmother, who disbelieved her 

after Flores denied raping her. But Wendy took W.R. to a hospital in Denison,

where the child told a nurse that Flores raped her; the nurse called the police. 

W.R. was taken to Omaha for a forensic interview at Project Harmony, a child 

advocacy center. This 2016 interview was videotaped and later became the focus 

of this appeal.

Flores was questioned by the police, and a no-contact order was entered.

Flores was arrested in June 2016 and charged with sexual abuse in the second 

degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.1, 709.3(1)(b), and 903B.1 (2016); 

lascivious acts with a child, in violation of sections 709.1, 709.8(1)(a), 

709.8(2)(a), and 903B.1; and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, in 

violation of sections 709.11 and 903B.2. Flores was released on bond and waived 

his right to a speedy trial. His criminal case was delayed at his request a dozen 

times over the next several years.

Meanwhile, W.R. moved in with her grandmother, but frequently stayed 

with her mother, half brother, and Flores despite the no-contact order. The adult 

family members began pressuring W.R. to deny the rape and say she made it all 

up. They threatened W.R. to recant her story, telling her that otherwise she 

would be sent to foster care, someone (or Flores) would hurt her, and she would 

never see her family again. W.R. recanted. In 2019, Flores reached a tentative 

plea agreement with the State, but further proceedings were continued several 

more times before Flores rejected the State’s plea offer.

Flores’s no-contact order remained in effect. Yet W.R. returned to living at 

her mother’s home with Flores, and he raped her multiple times in 2020 when 

she was age fifteen. In September of that year, W.R. reported the abuse at school

and moved in with a great-aunt. The State brought additional charges against 
5

Flores in 2021, and his cases were consolidated for trial. Proceedings were 

delayed several more times while Flores was in federal custody for immigration 

violations and changed lawyers, and a final time on the State’s motion, over his 

objection after he had withdrawn his waiver of his right to a speedy trial. The 

jury trial finally commenced on August 17, 2021, on eleven charges of sexual 

abuse.

Before trial, the State filed a motion for an advance ruling that the 2016 

forensic interview was admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay 

rule. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.807. The district court initially granted the motion, 

concluding the child’s prior recantation made her video-recorded statements 

“necessary” within the meaning of that rule and as “a prior consistent statement 

necessary to rebut any claim of newly fabricated evidence.” See Iowa R. 

Evid. 5.801(d)(1)(B). Flores then moved in limine to exclude the 2016 interview 

as hearsay and outside the foregoing exceptions. The district court changed its 

prior ruling to find the video inadmissible under rule 5.807 and deferred ruling 

under rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). During trial, the court informed the parties that it 

would focus on whether the video was admissible under the rule of completeness 

if the defense used portions of the recorded statements for impeachment. The 

court stated it would “wait to see what the cross-examination show[ed]” before 

ruling on the video’s admissibility.

The State called W.R., now age sixteen, to testify in person. She testified 

that she was in court because Flores raped her. She described his sexual abuse 

from age nine to fifteen. As the court of appeals later observed, W.R. “provided a 

detailed, anatomically-specific description of multiple sex acts.” The prosecutor’s 

direct examination elicited W.R.’s testimony about Flores pressuring her to 

recant and to remain silent after later sexual assaults, and her Project Harmony

2016 interview at age nine. On cross-examination, defense counsel vigorously 
6

probed inconsistencies between W.R.’s 2016 statements and her trial testimony

on a variety of topics, including where, when, and how often he abused her, and 

specifics of what he did to her. At the conclusion of W.R.’s testimony, the court 

ruled that the 2016 video was not admissible “as substantive evidence” under 

rule 5.801(d)(1)(B). But the court, relying on Austin, allowed the video into 

evidence under rule 5.106 “for purposes of assessing [W.R.’s] credibility” and 

instructed the jury accordingly. The hour-long video was played for the jury, 

except for a four-minute gap.2

The jury also heard testimony from family members, several law 

enforcement witnesses, and Amy Cirian—the forensic interview program 

manager at Project Harmony. Cirian reviewed the 2016 forensic interview of W.R. 

and two later interviews, and she testified that the interviewers followed proper 

procedures. She observed no “red flags” for coaching or other problems with the 

interviews. The defense called a medical expert who examined W.R. and found 

no physical signs that W.R. had been sexually abused. 

Following the five-day trial, the jury found Flores guilty on all eleven 

counts of sexual abuse. The district court denied Flores’s posttrial motions for 

acquittal or new trial. He was sentenced to prison for up to thirty-five years, with 

a 70% mandatory minimum on several of the convictions. Flores appealed, 

raising six grounds for reversal: (1) the district court erred in finding good cause 

to grant the State’s motion for a continuance beyond the speedy trial deadline,

(2) the court erred by admitting the 2016 forensic interview video under 

rule 5.106, (3) the court erred in admitting hearsay statements of family 

members as coconspirators, (4) there was insufficient evidence to convict him 

based on the testimony of W.R. alone, (5) the verdict was contrary to the weight 

2The omitted portion is irrelevant to our analysis.
7

of the evidence, and (6) his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object 

to witness vouching by the State’s expert forensic interviewer. We transferred the 

case to the court of appeals, which affirmed his convictions.

As to the 2016 video, the court of appeals questioned the State’s reliance 

on Austin, where the defense opened the door to introduction of the video by 

cross-examining the child victim using a summary of her forensic interview. The 

appellate panel distinguished Austin, bypassed the admissibility issue, and 

found any error in playing the video was harmless:

The posture was reversed here. The State presented the 

evidence first and the defense cross-examined without using or 

seeking the admission of the recordings. Because the State[,] rather 

than the defense[,] opened the door, we question its reliance on 

Austin for admission of the recordings. We elect to bypass that issue 

and proceed to a harmless-error analysis. 

“The State overcomes the presumption of prejudice if it can 

establish that there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s 

guilt.” As noted, the child provided detailed trial testimony. Her 

testimony together with other record evidence was overwhelming.

Accordingly, any error in admitting the recordings was harmless.

(Citations omitted) (quoting State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 661 (Iowa 

2021)). The court of appeals rejected Flores’s other grounds for reversal. Flores 

applied for further review, and we granted his application.

II. Standard of Review.

“When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion to let the 

court of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular issues.”

State v. Booker, 989 N.W.2d 621, 626 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Farnsworth v. State, 

982 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Iowa 2022)). We do so here with respect to all of Flores’s

challenges except the admissibility of the 2016 forensic interview video.

We review rulings allowing evidence under the rule of completeness for 

abuse of discretion. Austin, 585 N.W.2d at 243; see also State v. Tucker, 982 
8

N.W.2d 645, 652, 659 (Iowa 2022); cf. United States v. Farrington, 42 F.4th 895, 

900 (8th Cir 2022) (“We review a district court’s decision about the admissibility 

of evidence under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 106 for a clear abuse of 

discretion.”). We review rulings on hearsay objections for correction of errors at 

law. State v. Skahill, 966 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2021). We review rulings “implicating 

the interpretation of a rule of evidence for correction of errors at law.” Hawkins v.

Grinnell Reg’l Med. Ctr., 929 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Iowa 2019).

III. Analysis.

Flores argues the district court erred by playing the video of W.R.’s 2016 

Project Harmony interview for the jury. The State argued, and the district court 

ruled, that the video was admissible under rule 5.106 and Austin after Flores’s

defense counsel extensively cross-examined W.R. by using selected excerpts of 

what she said at age nine in that recorded interview. The district court, in its 

discretion, determined that the jury should watch the entire video so that they 

had a complete picture of the specific statements W.R. made during that 

interview and identified during cross-examination for purposes of evaluating her

credibility. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 

the jury to watch the video for that purpose.

Rule 5.106 is titled, “Remainder of related acts, declarations, 

conversations, writings, or recorded statements.” The rule provides:

a. If a party introduces all or part of an act, declaration, 

conversation, writing, or recorded statement, an adverse party may 

require the introduction, at that time, of any other part or any other 

act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement that 

in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.

b. Upon an adverse party’s request, the court may require the 

offering party to introduce at the same time with all or part of the 

act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, any 

other part or any other act, declaration, conversation, writing, or 

recorded statement that is admissible under rule 5.106(a). 

Rule 5.106(b), however, does not limit the right of any party to 
9

develop further on cross-examination or in the party’s case in chief 

matters admissible under rule 5.106(a).

Iowa R. Evid. 5.106. This rule “codified the common law doctrine of 

completeness.” Tucker, 982 N.W.2d at 658. “Unlike most evidence rules, 

rule 5.106 is a rule of inclusion, not exclusion.” Id. We have characterized the 

rule “as posing an open-the-door concept.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 507 

(Iowa 2017); see also Austin, 585 N.W.2d at 243 (affirming the district court 

ruling admitting the forensic interview video “on the ground that the defendant 

had ‘opened the door’ by cross-examining the victim, using a summary of the 

videotape”).

In State v. Tucker, we described the rule’s operation as follows:

Fundamentally, rule 5.106’s purpose is to prevent a party—

particularly the party that presents evidence first—from misleading 

juries with partial or incomplete evidence. That evidence may take 

the form of actions, declarations, conversations, writings, or 

recorded statements. [Iowa R. Evid.] 5.106(a). . . . More specifically, 

rule 5.106 allows a second litigant to introduce alongside 

supposedly partial or incomplete evidence some additional evidence 

“that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” Id.

Otherwise, the jury would be unable to hear the additional evidence 

until either cross-examination or the second litigant’s case-in-chief, 

which would be unfair to the second litigant.

982 N.W.2d at 658–59; see also 7 Laurie Kratky Doré, Iowa Practice Series

Evidence § 5.106:1, at 100 (2023–2024 ed. 2023) [hereinafter Doré] 

(“[A]pplication of the rule prevents unfairness by protecting against the 

misleading impression which might result when all or part of written or oral 

evidence is read or heard out of context.”). We favorably cited Austin, where we 

“emphasized [that] the district court wields significant discretion in deciding 

whether rule 5.106 applies in a particular circumstance.” Tucker, 982 N.W.2d at 

659. In Tucker, we held that the district court did not abuse its discretion under 

rule 5.106 by denying the defendant’s request to play an additional police 
10

bodycam video referring to an irrelevant prior shooting when it was not offered 

to cure any misleading impression left by the video that was played for the jury. 

Id. at 660 (also affirming exclusion under Iowa R. Evid. 5.403).

We have not adjudicated a challenge to the admissibility of forensic 

interview videos of child witnesses under rule 5.106 since Austin, where we held 

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the entire video 

after defense counsel opened the door by cross-examining the victim with a 

summary of her interview. 585 N.W.2d at 243–44.

3 Flores does not ask us to 

overrule Austin. “Stare decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our 

precedent absent a compelling reason to change the law.” Book v. Doublestar 

Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015). 

Flores argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that Austin is 

distinguishable because the State introduced the subject of the 2016 interview

in the prosecutor’s direct exam of the child. We disagree that this sequence 

requires a different outcome. The State did not play any excerpts of the 2016 

video during W.R.’s direct testimony. Rather, the prosecutor merely showed W.R.

a two-page summary of the interview to refresh her recollection that the interview 

occurred and asked her several questions about it to establish that (1) W.R. was 

truthful during the interview, (2) she told the interviewer Flores sexually 

assaulted her, (3) her mother and grandmother did not believe her after Flores 

3Austin applied Iowa Rule of Evidence 106(a) (1998), before the 2016 amendments moved 

the rules of evidence to chapter 5 of the Iowa Court Rules, renumbered them, and made 

nonsubstantive, stylistic changes consistent with stylistic amendments to the counterpart 

Federal Rules of Evidence. The former rule stated:

When an act, declaration, conversation, writing, or recorded statement, or part 

thereof, is introduced by a party, any other part or any other act, declaration, 

conversation, writing, or recorded statement is admissible when necessary in the 

interest of fairness, a clear understanding, or an adequate explanation.

Austin, 585 N.W.2d at 243 (quoting Iowa R. Evid. 106(a) (1998)). Flores does not argue the change

in wording in the current rule 5.106(a) alters our analysis.
11

denied sexually assaulting her, and (4) Flores told her before the interview, “Don’t 

tell them what I did.” Defense counsel then cross-examined W.R. with numerous 

specific statements she made throughout that interview to probe inconsistencies 

with her direct testimony. Rule 5.106 does not give Flores the green light to 

introduce only select portions of a prior statement with impunity just because 

the State mentioned the interview first. The rule does not work in only one 

direction; by its terms, it applies to any party. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.106. Either 

the prosecution or the defense can trigger the rule by offering part of a statement

in a way that is misleading absent context provided by the rest of the statement,

with the opposing party then able to request the introduction of the rest of the 

recording at the court’s discretion.

On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

overruled Flores’s hearsay objection to the video. The district court instructed 

the jury that the video was played only for the purpose of evaluating W.R.’s 

credibility and not as substantive evidence for the truth of the statements in it. 

Federal courts are divided on whether Federal Rule of Evidence 106 “trump[s] 

other applicable evidence rules and make[s] related information admissible, even 

if it would otherwise be excluded, if ‘fairness’ requires that it be considered along 

with the primary evidence.” Doré § 5.106:1, at 104; see also id. § 5.106:1, at 105

n.21 (surveying federal cases). A pending amendment to the federal rule will 

resolve the issue in favor of allowing admissibility. See id. § 5.106:1, at 105–06 

& nn.22–24. In Tucker, we found it unnecessary “to settle the precise contours 

of rule 5.106’s potential power to authorize the admission of otherwise 

inadmissible evidence.” 982 N.W.2d at 659. We reach the same conclusion here. 

Given the district court’s limiting instruction, we need not decide whether the 

2016 video would have been admissible as substantive evidence under rule 

5.106.
12

We caution that impeaching a witness at trial with statements from a prior 

recorded interview in a way that supports the application of rule 5.106 for 

completeness purposes will not necessarily open the door to the introduction of 

the entire video. In Austin, we affirmed the introduction of the entire forensic 

interview video under rule 5.106, concluding:

In this case, [the defendant] chose very specific points from 

the interview about which to cross-examine [the child]. Taken out of 

the context of the entire interview, the jury might have concluded 

that [the child’s] statements at the interview were inconsistent with 

her testimony at trial concerning such matters as whether [the 

defendant] beat her before or after the assault or both times. The 

videotaped interview also helped to clear up apparent 

inconsistencies pointed out on cross-examination on such matters 

as whether [the child] was standing or prone during the assault.

The court was well within its discretion in allowing [the]

introduction of the videotaped interview. Under similar evidence 

rules, other jurisdictions have agreed.

585 N.W.2d at 244. For similar reasons, we conclude that the district court acted 

within its discretion in playing W.R.’s entire interview video to assist the jury in 

evaluating whether the child’s interview really was inconsistent with her trial 

testimony for purposes of assessing her credibility. Flores did not argue that any 

specific excerpts of the video were beyond the scope of his cross-examination or 

rule 5.106, or that any excerpt should have been excluded under rule 5.403.

Other courts have noted that the entire prior statement or video should

not be introduced, but only that part that furthers the purposes of the rule of 

completeness. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 83 F.4th 696, 704 (8th Cir. 2023) 

(affirming the trial court’s ruling declining to play the complete interview video

of defendant’s statement to the police, and explaining that “[t]his ‘rule of 

completeness’ is designed ‘to avoid misleading impressions created by taking 

matters out of context’ ” and so the “party urging admission must thus specify 

any portion of the writing or recording that is relevant and ‘that qualifies or 
13

explains portions already admitted’ ” (quoting United States v. Ramos-Caraballo, 

375 F.3d 797, 802–03 (8th Cir. 2004))); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 

1258–59 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that “the trial judge need only admit the 

remaining portions of the statement which are needed to clarify or explain the 

portion already received”); United States v. Soures, 736 F.2d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1984) 

(allowing additional evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 106 when 

“necessary to (1) explain the admitted portion, (2) place the admitted portion in 

context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, or (4) insure a fair and impartial 

understanding”).

In our view, parties should be prepared to limit video played under rule 

5.106 to those portions necessary for context, fairness, or to otherwise clear up 

misleading impressions. The Kentucky Supreme Court recently offered this 

guidance when remanding a case for a new trial where the defendant likely would 

try to impeach the child victims with their prior forensic interview videos: 

We acknowledge it may be more difficult to easily assert which 

portions of a video should be presented contemporaneously for 

completeness in such circumstances. Videos may need to be 

reviewed in real time to make such a determination, while a 

transcript or statement could quickly be skimmed. However, that 

does not provide a valid basis for simply admitting the entirety of 

these videos. The solution in such a situation, while cumbersome, 

is to allow the party seeking to admit additional portions of the 

videos to review the videos and then mark and explain what portions 

of necessity should also be admitted, thus allowing for discussion 

and resolution.

Alderson v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.3d 884, 902 n.3 (Ky. 2023). We agree with 

that guidance.

With those admonitions, we affirm the district court’s discretionary ruling

under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.106 that allowed W.R.’s 2016 Project Harmony 

video to be played for the jury for purposes of assessing the child’s credibility by

providing a complete picture of the statements made in the interview that were 
14

challenged during cross-examination. We do not reach the State’s alternative 

argument that the video was admissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 

5.801(d)(1)(B). See Austin, 585 N.W.2d at 243–44 (affirming admissibility of a 

video under rule of completeness without deciding its admissibility as a prior 

consistent statement).

IV. Disposition.

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the court of appeals decision on the 

admissibility of the 2016 Project Harmony video and affirm the court of appeals’

resolution of the remaining issues. We affirm the district court judgment and 

sentence.

DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN 

PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.