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[Congressional Bills 115th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 749 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

115th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. RES. 749

  Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory sanctions 
    authorities under the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act in response to the Government of the Russian Federation's 
continued aggression in Ukraine and forcible and illegal annexation of 
    Crimea and assault on democratic institutions around the world, 
                    including through cyber attacks.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2018

 Mr. Connolly (for himself, Mr. Engel, Ms. Bass, Mr. Bera, Mr. Brendan 
   F. Boyle of Pennsylvania, Mr. Castro of Texas, Mr. Cicilline, Mr. 
 Deutch, Mr. Espaillat, Ms. Frankel of Florida, Mr. Keating, Ms. Kelly 
of Illinois, Mr. Ted Lieu of California, Mr. Meeks, Mr. Schneider, Mr. 
 Sherman, Mr. Sires, Mr. Suozzi, Ms. Titus, and Mrs. Torres) submitted 
   the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
      Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on House 
    Administration, the Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform, 
Financial Services, and Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
  Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory sanctions 
    authorities under the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act in response to the Government of the Russian Federation's 
continued aggression in Ukraine and forcible and illegal annexation of 
    Crimea and assault on democratic institutions around the world, 
                    including through cyber attacks.

Whereas, on January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United States intelligence 
        community entitled, ``Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
        Recent U.S. Elections'' stated, ``Russian President Vladimir Putin 
        ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 
        election'' and warned that ``Moscow will apply lessons learned from its 
        Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the U.S. Presidential election to future 
        influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their 
        election processes'';
Whereas a report of the minority staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
        the Senate released on January 10, 2018, and entitled ``Putin's 
        Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for 
        U.S. National Security'' assessed that the Government of the Russian 
        Federation ``employs an asymmetric arsenal that includes military 
        invasions, cyber attacks, disinformation, support for fringe political 
        groups, and the weaponization of energy resources, organized crime and 
        corruption.'' and that the Government of the Russian Federation ``will 
        continue to develop and refine its arsenal to use on democracies around 
        the world, including against U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020'';
Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to undermine 
        democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine and threatens the 
        peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of 
        Ukraine, including by its forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea and 
        its support for violent separatists in the eastern part of Ukraine;
Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to provide financial, 
        material, and technological support to the Government of Syria, which 
        has enabled the latter to acquire or develop a range of lethal 
        capacities it has deployed against civilians in its territory, including 
        acts that may constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or other 
        violations of international human rights law;
Whereas the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 
        115-44; 131 Stat. 886) passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities in 
        the Senate and the House of Representatives, and title II of that Act 
        was developed to respond to the interference of the Government of the 
        Russian Federation in the United States 2016 election and the aggression 
        of that Government in Ukraine and Syria and to deter such malicious 
        activities in the future;
Whereas the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act was signed by 
        the President and enacted into law on August 2, 2017, thereby codifying 
        a range of mandatory sanctions against the Government of the Russian 
        Federation for its malicious activities against the United States 
        democratic process and in Ukraine and Syria;
Whereas in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on January 29, 
        2018, Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Pompeo said he ``had 
        not seen a significant decrease'' in attempts by the Government of the 
        Russian Federation to subvert democracies in Europe and the United 
        States and, when asked if that Government would try and interfere in the 
        2018 United States election, he said that he had ``every expectation 
        that they will continue to try and do that'';
Whereas, on March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13360 
        (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to blocking property of certain persons 
        contributing to the situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the 
        Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 
        to impose sanctions on persons determined to be undermining democratic 
        processes and institutions in Ukraine or threatening the peace, 
        security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine;
Whereas President Obama subsequently issued Executive Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 
        15535; relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing 
        to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 16169; 
        relating to blocking property of additional persons contributing to the 
        situation in Ukraine), and Executive Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; 
        relating to blocking property of certain persons and prohibiting certain 
        transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine) to expand 
        sanctions on certain persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine;
Whereas, on April 1, 2015, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13694 
        (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to the blocking of property of certain 
        persons engaging in significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), 
        which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the 
        Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on 
        persons determined to be engaged in malicious cyber-hacking;
Whereas, on December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an annex to Executive 
        Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on--

    (1) the Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as Glavnoe 
Razvedyvatel'noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in Moscow, Russian Federation;

    (2) the Federal Security Service (also known as Federalnaya Sluzhba 
Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation;

    (3) the Special Technology Center (also known as STLC, Ltd. Special 
Technology Center St. Petersburg) in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation;

    (4) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian 
Federation;

    (5) the autonomous noncommercial organization known as the Professional 
Association of Designers of Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO 
KSI) in Moscow, Russian Federation;

    (6) Igor Valentinovich Korobov;

    (7) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov;

    (8) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov; and

    (9) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev;

Whereas, on December 20, 2017, the Department of the Treasury imposed targeted 
        sanctions on 5 nationals of the Russian Federation under the Sergei 
        Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public Law 
        112-208; 22 U.S.C. 8511 note) and, on December 21, 2017, the Department 
        imposed targeted sanctions, including against one national of the 
        Russian Federation for significant corruption, under that Act and a 
        derivative Executive order signed by President Donald Trump;
Whereas, on January 26, 2018, sanctions maintenance packages were issued by the 
        Department of the Treasury under Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, 
        and 13685, signed by President Barack Obama, and those packages targeted 
        individuals and entities in connection with the conflict in Ukraine and 
        the forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea by the Government of the 
        Russian Federation;
Whereas no sanctions have been imposed pursuant to mandatory provisions enacted 
        under title II of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 9501 et seq.), including--

    (1) section 224 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; relating to sanctions with 
respect to activities of the Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity);

    (2) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
8923), as amended by section 225 of the Countering America's Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions relating to special Russian 
crude oil products);

    (3) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 
8924), as amended by section 226 of the Countering America's Adversaries 
Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian and 
other foreign financial institutions);

    (4) section 9 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, 
and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908), as amended 
by section 227 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act (relating to sanctions with respect to significant corruption in the 
Russian Federation);

    (5) section 10 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, 
Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8909), 
as added by section 228 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to certain transactions 
with foreign sanctions evaders and serious human rights abusers in the 
Russian Federation);

    (6) section 233 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9527; relating to sanctions with respect to 
investment in or facilitation of privatization of state-owned assets by the 
Russian Federation); and

    (7) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9528; relating to sanctions with 
respect to the transfer of arms and related materiel to Syria);

Whereas in testimony on January 30, 2018, to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
        and Urban Affairs of the Senate, Secretary of the Treasury Steven 
        Mnuchin said ``[i]n the near future, you will see additional sanctions'' 
        based on the list of Russian oligarchs or senior political figures, 
        presumably against those who had engaged in malign activities 
        sanctionable under United States law;
Whereas a statement on January 29, 2018, from the Department of State asserted 
        that ``several billion dollars'' in defense sector transactions with the 
        Government of the Russian Federation or entities affiliated with that 
        Government had been deterred through United States diplomacy and 
        indicated that ``sanctions on specific entities or individuals will not 
        need to be imposed because the [Countering America's Adversaries Through 
        Sanctions Act] legislation is, in fact, serving as a deterrent''; and
Whereas the deterrent value of sanctions is derived from the perception by 
        potential targets that the threat of imposing such sanctions is genuine: 
        Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the House of Representatives--
            (1) strongly urges the President--
                    (A) to examine intelligence information regarding 
                the cyber intrusions and attacks of the Government of 
                the Russian Federation against democratic elections and 
                systems around the world; and
                    (B) to designate for the imposition of sanctions 
                any persons found to have knowingly engaged in conduct 
                that violates section 224 of the Countering America's 
                Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; 
                relating to sanctions with respect to activities of the 
                Russian Federation undermining cybersecurity);
            (2) urges the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary 
        of State to fully implement section 9 of the Support for the 
        Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of 
        Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908), as amended by section 227 
        of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
        (relating to sanctions with respect to significant corruption 
        in the Russian Federation), taking into account information 
        provided in the report mandated under section 241 of the 
        Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Public 
        Law 115-44; 131 Stat. 922) and other credible information 
        available as a basis for potential additional sanction 
        designations;
            (3) calls on the President to immediately exercise 
        sanctions authorities provided for under the Countering 
        America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to impose sanctions 
        on relevant Russian individuals and entities found to have 
        knowingly engaged in sanctionable conduct, including under--
                    (A) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 
                2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923), as amended by section 225 of the 
                Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
                (relating to sanctions relating to special Russian 
                crude oil products);
                    (B) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 
                2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924), as amended by section 226 of the 
                Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
                (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian and 
                other foreign financial institutions);
                    (C) section 10 of the Support for the Sovereignty, 
                Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine 
                Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8909), as added by section 228 
                of the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
                Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to 
                certain transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and 
                serious human rights abusers in the Russian 
                Federation);
                    (D) section 233 of the Countering America's 
                Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9527; 
                relating to sanctions with respect to investment in or 
                facilitation of privatization of state-owned assets by 
                the Russian Federation); and
                    (E) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9528; 
                relating to sanctions with respect to the transfer of 
                arms and related materiel to Syria);
            (4) urges the President--
                    (A) to publicly acknowledge the ongoing threat 
                posed by the Government of the Russian Federation to 
                democratic values and processes in the United States, 
                Europe, and elsewhere;
                    (B) to prioritize the development of a coordinated, 
                whole-of-government response to that urgent threat; and
                    (C) to work with Congress to provide for the 
                funding and implementation of that response as soon as 
                possible before the 2018 elections;
            (5) urges the President--
                    (A) to vigorously implement section 231 of the 
                Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 9525; relating to sanctions with respect to 
                persons engaging in transactions with the intelligence 
                or defense sectors of the Government of the Russian 
                Federation);
                    (B) to continue to work diplomatically to encourage 
                substantial reductions in significant transactions with 
                the intelligence and defense sectors of the Government 
                of the Russian Federation; and
                    (C) to ensure that sanctions are imposed under such 
                section 231 in the event that a significant transaction 
                with a person that is part of, or operates for or on 
                behalf of, the intelligence or defense sectors of the 
                Government of the Russian Federation, as defined in 
                guidance issued by the Department of State, takes 
                place;
            (6) supports efforts to expose and publicize threats posed 
        by the malign influence and disinformation efforts of the 
        Government of the Russian Federation, as the United States 
        intelligence community did in January 2017, including through 
        efforts by social media platforms, independent media, State and 
        local governments primarily responsible for elections 
        management and oversight, and other governmental and civil 
        society actors; and
            (7) calls on the President to take specific measures to 
        ensure the protection of United States democratic institutions 
        in advance of the 2018 elections, including the provision of 
        cybersecurity defensive measures to election administrators at 
        the State and local level that request assistance and to 
        political parties and candidates.
                                 <all>
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