1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. 

XANG SACKSITH

CRIMINAL ACTION

NO. 04-390-01 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 In December 2004, Xang Sacksith pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute MDMA, 21 

U.S.C. § 846; possession with intent to distribute MDMA and methamphetamine and aiding and 

abetting, 21 U.S.C. § 846(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and possession with intent to distribute 

MDMA and methamphetamine and aiding and abetting the same within a protected area, 21 

U.S.C. § 860(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Because he had two prior felony drug convictions, the law at 

that time required a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without release for these 

charges. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2002). Sacksith was so sentenced, and he has now spent 

approximately 20 years behind bars. 

In the years since, Congress has rolled back the mandatory minimum sentences on some 

drug offenses, including the offenses to which Sacksith pled guilty. As applicable here, the First 

Step Act, Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5222 (2018), reduced the mandatory minimum sentence 

under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) from life imprisonment to a term of 25 years, and the 

government agrees that this lower sentence would apply to Sacksith if he was sentenced today. 

But, Congress did not make that amendment retroactive, and so the First Step Act itself does not 

affect the sentences of a defendant sentenced under the old regime. See United States v. Aviles, 

939 F.3d 503, 510 (3d Cir. 2019). 

Sacksith, proceeding pro se, now moves for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to the 

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compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). That statute authorizes district

courts to modify an imposed term of imprisonment upon a finding that “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Id. Congress did not define “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons,” instead instructing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to do so. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 994(t). Consistent with this direction, the Sentencing Commission recently promulgated a 

revised policy statement which states that a defendant’s “unusually long sentence” that is grossly 

disproportionate to a “sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed” is a basis for 

compassionate release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). Sacksith seeks application of this policy 

statement to his case, arguing that his sentence of life imprisonment is both unusually long and 

disproportionately to the sentence that would be imposed on a similarly situated defendant today. 

Binding precedent forecloses application of the Sentencing Commission policy statement 

to Sacksith’s case. Specifically, in United States v. Andrews, the Third Circuit held that “[t]he 

duration of a lawfully imposed sentence does not create an extraordinary or compelling 

circumstance” warranting compassionate release. 12 F.4th 255, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2021). As this 

Court recently explained, this decision “remains binding law in this circuit, and it forecloses [the 

defendant’s] argument that he is eligible for compassionate release pursuant to Section 

1B1.13(b)(6) of the Sentencing Commission’s revised policy statement.” United States v. 

Carter, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2024 WL 136777, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2024) (Beetlestone, J.). 

As explained, Section 1B1.13(b)(6) states that an “unusually long 

sentence” may be deemed an “extraordinary and compelling reason” 

warranting compassionate release, provided that the defendant has served 

at least 10 years of their term of incarceration, and that a non-retroactive 

change in the law has produced a “gross disparity” between the sentences 

of otherwise similarly situated individuals. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). That 

provision—which indisputably covers [the defendant] and others in his 

position—is incompatible with Andrews’s interpretation of the 

compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and its 

holding that “the duration of [a defendant’s] sentence and the 

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nonretroactive changes to mandatory minimums” is not one of the 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” described by the statute. 

Andrews, 12 F.4th at 260. 

Id. “Unless and until any reconsideration of Andrews takes place or it is abrogated by a 

Supreme Court decision,” id. at *5, Section 1B1.13(b)(6) may not serve as the basis for 

the sort of compassionate release requested here. 

Sacksith further argues that the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weigh in 

favor of reducing his sentence. But even if true, those factors are only relevant once a 

defendant has satisfied the “threshold question” of whether there are “‘extraordinary and 

compelling’ reasons for release.” United States v. Stewart, 86 F.4th 532, 535 (3d Cir. 

2023). Here, where “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release—

at least as defined by Third Circuit precedent—do not exist, Sacksith is not entitled to 

relief.1

 

An appropriate order follows. 

 BY THE COURT:

 

 /s/ Wendy Beetlestone 

 _______________________________ 

 WENDY BEETLESTONE, J.

 

1 In addition to his motion for compassionate release, Sacksith also moves for reconsideration of the Court’s prior 

order denying his motion for a reduced sentence, see United States v. Sacksith, 2022 WL 4542109 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 

28, 2022), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). This motion presses the same arguments has his 

motion for compassionate release, and for the same reason will be denied. 

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