UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 90 FERC ¶ 61,201

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket No. RM99-2-001; Order No. 2000-A ]

Regional Transmission Organizations

(Issued February 25, 2000)

AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

ACTION: Final Rule; Order on Rehearing

SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) reaffirms its

basic determinations in Order No. 2000 and clarifies certain terms. Order No. 2000

requires that each public utility that owns, operates, or controls facilities for the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce make certain filings with respect to

forming and participating in an Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). Order No.

2000 also codifies minimum characteristics and functions that a transmission entity must

satisfy in order to be considered an RTO. The Commission's goal is to promote

efficiency in wholesale electricity markets and to ensure that electricity consumers pay

the lowest price possible for reliable service. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 - 2 - 

EFFECTIVE DATE: Changes to Order No. 2000 made in this order on rehearing will

become effective on [insert date 30 days after date of publication in the Federal Register].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Alan Haymes (Technical Information)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 219-2919

Brian R. Gish (Legal Information)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 208-0996

James Apperson (Collaborative Process)

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

888 First Street, N.E.

Washington, D.C. 20426

(202) 219-2962

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:
Docket No. RM99-2-001 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 1

II. SUMMARY .................................................... 4

 

III. DISCUSSION .................................................. 6

A. Commission's Approach to RTO Formation ....................... 6

1. Voluntary Approach ................................... 6

2. Legal Authority ...................................... 10

B. Minimum Characteristics of an RTO ........................... 15

1. Independence ....................................... 15

a. Definition of Market Participant .................... 16

b. Ownership Issues .............................. 24

c. Section 205 Filing Rights ........................ 36

2. Scope and Regional Configuration ....................... 46

3. Short-Term Reliability ................................ 47

C. Minimum Functions of an RTO ............................... 50

1. Tariff Administration and Design ........................ 50

2. Congestion Management ............................... 58

3. Ancillary Services .................................... 60

4. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and Available

Transmission Capability (ATC) ......................... 63
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -ii5. Market Monitoring ................................... 65

6. Planning and Expansion ............................... 69

7. Interregional Coordination ............................. 72

D. Open Architecture ......................................... 74

E. Transmission Ratemaking Policy for RTOs ...................... 76

1. Pancaked Rates ...................................... 76

2. Uniform Access Charges ............................... 77

3. Service to Transmission-Owning Utilities That Do Not 

Participate in an RTO ................................. 79

4. Performance-Based Rate Regulation ...................... 81

5. Other RTO Transmission Ratemaking Reforms .............. 83

a. Levelized Rates ................................ 83

b. Return on Equity ............................... 85

c. Accelerated Depreciation and Incremental Pricing for 

New Transmission Investments .................... 87

d. Other Innovative Rate Issues ...................... 89

6. Additional Ratemaking Issues ........................... 92

7. Filing Procedures for Innovative Rate Proposals ............. 94

F. Other Issues .............................................. 96

1. Public Power and Cooperative Participation in RTOs ......... 96

2. Existing Transmission Contracts ......................... 98
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -iii3. Lighter Handed Regulation ............................. 99

G. Implementation Issues ..................................... 101

1. Filing Requirements ................................. 101

2. Deadline for RTO Operation ........................... 102

IV. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION ............... 104

V. PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

STATEMENT ................................................ 105

VI. EFFECTIVE DATE ........................................... 106

VII. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY ................................... 106

REGULATORY TEXT ......................................... 108

APPENDIX .................................................. 127
1Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 FR 809 (January 6,

2000), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 (2000).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: James J. Hoecker, Chairman;

 William L. Massey, Linda Breathitt, 

 and Curt Hébert, Jr.

Regional Transmission Organizations Docket No. RM99-2-001

Order No. 2000-A 

ORDER ON REHEARING

(Issued February 25, 2000)

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 20, 1999, the Commission issued a Final Rule (Order No. 2000) to

advance the formation of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs). 1 Our objective

in promulgating Order No. 2000 was to have all transmission-owning entities in the

Nation, including non-public utility entities, place their transmission facilities under the

control of appropriate RTOs in a timely manner.

In Order No. 2000, the Commission concluded that regional institutions could

address the operational and reliability issues confronting the industry, and eliminate

undue discrimination in transmission services that can occur when the operation of the

transmission system remains in the control of a vertically integrated utility. Furthermore,
Docket No. RM99-2-001 - 2- 

we found that appropriate regional transmission institutions could: (1) improve

efficiencies in transmission grid management; (2) improve grid reliability; (3) remove

remaining opportunities for discriminatory transmission practices; (4) improve market

performance; and (5) facilitate lighter handed regulation. We stated our belief that

appropriate RTOs can successfully address the existing impediments to efficient grid

operation and competition and can consequently benefit consumers through lower

electricity rates and a wider choice of services and service providers. In addition,

substantial cost savings are likely to result from the formation of RTOs.

Order No. 2000 established minimum characteristics and functions that an RTO

must satisfy in the following areas: 

Minimum Characteristics:

1. Independence

2. Scope and Regional Configuration

3. Operational Authority

4. Short-term Reliability

Minimum Functions:

1. Tariff Administration and Design

2. Congestion Management

3. Parallel Path Flow

4. Ancillary Services

5. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) 

and Available Transmission Capability (ATC)

6. Market Monitoring

7. Planning and Expansion

8. Interregional Coordination
Docket No. RM99-2-001 - 3- 

In the Final Rule, we noted that the characteristics and functions could be satisfied

by different organizational forms, such as ISOs, transcos, combinations of the two, or

even new organizational forms not yet discussed in the industry or proposed to the

Commission. Likewise, the Commission did not propose a "cookie cutter" organizational

format for regional transmission institutions or the establishment of fixed or specific

regional boundaries under section 202(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA). 

We also established an "open architecture" policy regarding RTOs, whereby all

RTO proposals must allow the RTO and its members the flexibility to improve their

organizations in the future in terms of structure, operations, market support and

geographic scope to meet market needs. 

In addition, the Commission provided guidance on flexible transmission

ratemaking that may be proposed by RTOs, including ratemaking treatments that address

congestion pricing and performance-based regulation. The Commission stated that it

would consider, on a case-by-case basis, innovative rates that may be appropriate for

transmission facilities under RTO control. 

Furthermore, to facilitate RTO formation in all regions of the Nation, the Final

Rule outlined a collaborative process to take place in the Spring of 2000. Under this

process, we expect that public utilities and non-public utilities, in coordination with state

officials, Commission staff, and all affected interest groups, will actively work toward the

voluntary development of RTOs. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 - 4- 

2A public utility that is a member of an existing transmission entity that has been

approved by the Commission as in conformance with the eleven ISO principles set forth

in Order No. 888 must make a filing no later than January 15, 2001.

3

The requesters and abbreviations for them as used herein, are listed in an

appendix to this order. PECO's request was filed one day beyond the thirty days allowed

for rehearing requests, so we will consider its request to be for clarification. We note that

TransConnect, Inc. filed a motion to intervene on January 27, 2000 raising no issues that

warrant discussion herein. 

 Lastly, under Order No. 2000, all public utilities that own, operate or control

interstate transmission facilities must file with the Commission by October 15, 2000 (or

January 15, 2001 2 ) a proposal to participate in an RTO with the minimum

characteristics and functions to be operational by December 15, 2001, or, alternatively, a

description of efforts to participate in an RTO, any existing obstacles to RTO

participation, and any plans to work toward RTO participation. That filing must explain

the extent to which the transmission entity in which it proposes to participate meets the

minimum characteristics and functions for an RTO, and either propose to modify the

existing institution to the extent necessary to become an RTO, or explain the efforts,

obstacles and plans with respect to conforming to these characteristics and functions.

II. SUMMARY

Thirty-eight petitioners filed requests for rehearing and/or clarification of Order

No. 2000. 3 These entities raise a variety of issues, including legal, policy and technical

arguments. We respond herein to the arguments made to us in the requests for rehearing

and clarification. To the extent not specifically addressed herein, the requests are denied.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 - 5- 

Many of the parties requesting rehearing or clarification of Order No. 2000

express their agreement with the majority of the rule. Indeed, most petitions are

relatively short in length and focus on only a few discrete issues, indicating that most

parties are generally comfortable with the remaining substance of the Final Rule. We

attribute this to the unprecedented outreach effort that the Commission undertook before

and during the rulemaking process. Because we expect similar significant results from

the post-rule collaborative process which we are initiating with our first regional

workshop in Cincinnati on March 1, 2000, the Commission concluded that it was

important to issue this order on rehearing before that date. Our order on rehearing

focuses on the discrete issues that were raised on rehearing. However, the extensive

background for this rulemaking and a comprehensive discussion of our goals and

principles can be found in Order No. 2000. 

 On rehearing, we reaffirm the core elements and basic framework of Order No.

2000. However, we have provided clarification with respect to a number of issues,

including concerns raised about our requirement that the RTO must have exclusive and

independent authority under section 205 of the FPA to propose rates, terms and

conditions of transmission service provided over the facilities it operates. While we have

maintained the requirement without modification, we have carefully and comprehensively

addressed the concerns that were raised and provided further clarification. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -6- 

4

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,033-34.

We have amended the regulatory text in three areas. First, we have revised the

definition of market participant in section 35.34(b)(2) to remove specific references to

entities that provide transmission service to an RTO. Second, we have added section

35.34(j)(1)(iv) to codify the requirement for audits with respect to the independence

characteristic. Third, we have revised section 35.34(d)(4) to require RTO proposals to

include an explanation of efforts made to include cooperatively-owned entities, in

addition to public power entities, in the proposed RTO. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Commission's Approach to RTO Formation

1. Voluntary Approach

In the Final Rule, the Commission adopted as a matter of policy a voluntary

approach to RTO formation. In other words, Order No. 2000 does not mandate RTO

participation. We concluded that a voluntary approach, with guidance and

encouragement from the Commission, was the most appropriate to achieving RTO

formation at this time. 4

Rehearing Requests

The Pennsylvania Commission argues that RTO membership must be mandatory

for all participants in the wholesale market and should be a condition of participating in
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -7- 

the competitive market. It claims that failing to mandate participation undercuts the

coordination of generation additions. It states that the Commission clearly perceived the

problems, but stopped short of the solution.

TDU Systems asserts that the Commission did not give adequate consideration to

the advantages of mandatory RTO participation and the disadvantages of the voluntary

approach. It cites the potential costs associated with the innovative rates discussed in the

Final Rule, and asserts that the Commission should perform a fuller evaluation of the

potential costs and benefits associated with each approach.

TAPS argues that the Commission erred by relying on voluntary action for RTO

formation rather than exercising its statutory authority to mandate RTOs. It states that the

Commission violated its statutory obligations to remedy undue discrimination. It believes

that past experience and common sense demonstrate that voluntary action, coupled with

incentives, does not work.

CFA argues that the resistence of the vertically integrated incumbent network

owners will be so vigorous that the voluntary approach will fail to solve the problem, and

urges the Commission to mandate participation in RTOs. 

In addition to the arguments in favor of a direct mandate, TDU Systems, TAPS,

CFA, and Industrial Consumers argue that the Commission must generically condition the

granting of all market-based rate authorizations and merger authorizations on
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -8- 

5

See id. at 31,033.

participation in an RTO. CFA states, for example, that without participation in an RTO,

allowing mergers or market-based rates is not in the public interest.

Commission Conclusion

We deny rehearing with respect to our adoption of a voluntary approach to RTO

formation. We agree with those advocating a mandatory approach that the objective is to

have all transmission-owning entities place their transmission facilities under the control

of RTOs in a timely manner, and we stated this in the Final Rule. 5 There are, however,

different possible means of attaining that objective. The Commission has made a

judgment that the most efficient and effective means is one that involves establishing

clear standards, removing obstacles, and fostering cooperation and creativity, rather than

one that imposes strict mandates that could polarize parties and generate resistance. That

we have not chosen to mandate RTO participation does not mean that we have avoided

our obligations to address the impediments to competition that we identified; it merely

means that we have chosen a method to address those impediments that we believe will

efficiently achieve the result we desire.

We explained in the Final Rule that the voluntary approach as we structured it will

allow the industry the opportunity and the flexibility to develop mutually agreeable

regional arrangements, and will permit the industry to focus its efforts on the potential

benefits of RTO formation rather than on a non-productive challenge to our legal
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -9- 

6

Id.

7

Id. at 31,034.

authority to mandate RTO participation. 6 We also stated a number of reasons why we

believe this voluntary approach will be successful: the pace of restructuring is

accelerating, industry participants are recognizing the strategic benefits of focusing on

one segment of the utility business, the Final Rule provides clear guidance on what is

necessary to form RTOs, the Commission is facilitating a collaborative process, and

certain favorable ratemaking treatments are offered to at least eliminate economic

disincentives to RTO formation. 7

Contrary to TDU Systems' assertion, the Commission gave careful consideration to

the advantages and disadvantages of the voluntary and mandatory approaches. 

Specifically, TDU Systems faults the Commission for not quantifying the impact of the

favorable ratemaking treatments that are offered, which, allegedly, would not be required

under a mandatory approach. We do not believe it is appropriate to think of the

innovative ratemaking treatments discussed in the Final Rule as a cost of the voluntary

approach. As discussed in the Final Rule, the innovative ratemaking treatments are

intended, among other things, to eliminate disincentives to the efficient use and expansion

of regional transmission grids, and to allow transmission-owning utilities to capture some
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -10- 

8

Id. at 31,171-73, 31,191-92.

9

FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,196.

of the benefits of more efficient system operation. 8 We are requiring as a part of any

proposal for innovative ratemaking treatments that the applicant demonstrate how the

proposal would help achieve the goals of RTOs, to submit a cost-benefit analysis

including rate impacts, and to demonstrate that the rate is just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 9

In response to those who argue that the Commission should state generically that

all market-based rates and mergers must be conditioned on RTO participation, we

continue to believe that this is best addressed on a case-by-case basis. We see no need to

decide at this time that no merger or market-based rate proposal could satisfy our

applicable standards without RTO participation. There will be sufficient opportunity to

consider this in the context of individual cases. 

2. Legal Authority

The Commission discussed in the Final Rule its legal authority with respect to

RTO formation. We concluded that we possessed both general and specific authorities to

advance voluntary RTO formation, and concluded that we possessed the authority to

order RTO participation on a case-by-case basis if necessary to remedy undue
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -11- 

10Id. at 31,043.

11See id. at 31,043-46.

discrimination or anticompetitive effects where supported by the record. 10 We discussed

our authority and responsibility under sections 202(a), 203, 205, and 206 of the FPA. 11

Rehearing Requests

TAPS argues that the Commission violated its statutory obligation to remedy

undue discrimination by relying upon a voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, approach to

RTO participation. CCEM argues that the Commission committed legal error by not

adopting CCEM's proposal – operational unbundling of vertically integrated utilities that

places all uses of the transmission system under the same tariff – as a remedy for undue

discrimination. CCEM asserts that the Commission must provide a reasoned explanation

why simply encouraging jurisdictional transmission owners to join RTOs is an effective

remedy for undue discrimination.

Duke argues that the Commission should not make findings that it possesses the

legal authority to mandate RTO participation on a case-by-case basis, and asks for

rehearing of this conclusion, or, alternatively, requests clarification that no party will be

deemed to have waived its right to challenge this conclusion in an individual proceeding. 

Similarly, EEI and Puget Sound ask for clarification that a public utility retains the right

to challenge the Commission's legal authority should the Commission seek to impose a
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -12- 

12Id. at 31,015, 31,043.

requirement for RTO participation in the future. If the Commission does not so clarify,

they seek rehearing.

ISO Participants argue that the Commission erred in finding that the formation of

an RTO that involves transfer of operational control without a transfer of ownership is a

transaction that requires approval under section 203 of the FPA. They assert that the

assignment of operational responsibilities to an ISO, by itself, is not a disposition of

facilities within the meaning of section 203.

Commission Conclusion

We found in the Final Rule that continuing opportunities for undue discrimination

exist in the electric transmission industry and that they may not be remedied adequately

by functional unbundling. 12 TAPS and CCEM believe that this finding requires a

remedy different from the voluntary approach to RTO formation adopted in the Final

Rule. TAPS asserts the remedy must be an RTO mandate, and CCEM asserts the remedy

must be a total unbundling of transmission, including, apparently, retail unbundling. We

do not agree that either of these remedies is required by law. While it is true that the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -13- 

13See, e.g., Southern California Edison Company, 40 FERC ¶ 61,371 at 62,151-52

(1987), order on reh'g, 50 FERC ¶ 61,275 at 61,873 (1990), modified sub nom., Cities of

Anaheim v. FERC, 941 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Delmarva Power and Light

Company, 24 FERC ¶ 61,199 at 61,466, order on reh'g, 24 FERC ¶ 61,380 (1983).

14FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,024.

15See id. at 31,028.

16Id. at 31,043.

Commission has a legal obligation to remedy undue discrimination it finds, 13 the

Commission retains discretion as to what remedy to pursue.

As we said in the Final Rule, we believe that the use of RTOs throughout the

country, with the required independence from market participants, can reduce

opportunities for unduly discriminatory conduct. 14 The Commission has taken a large

step in Order No. 2000 to encourage and advance the formation of RTOs. As discussed

above with respect to the Commission's voluntary approach, the fact that the approach is

not mandatory does not undermine the ultimate objective of widespread RTO formation.

We believe that the approach we have taken is a measured and appropriate response at

this time to the lingering discrimination concerns that have been raised. 15

In response to those asking clarification of our conclusion in the Final Rule that

the Commission possesses the authority to order RTO participation on a case-by-case

basis to remedy undue discrimination or anticompetitive effects where supported by the

record, 16 we note that this is a statement of our remedial authorities. It is well
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -14- 

17See Order 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,676 (1996); Niagara

Mohawk Power Corp. v. FPC, 379 F.2d 153, 159 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Tapoco, Inc., et al.,

39 FERC ¶ 61,363 at 62,169 (1987).

18Tenneco Gas Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1187, 1198, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

19FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,045.

established that the Commission's discretion is at its zenith when fashioning remedies for

undue discrimination. 17 The Commission is given substantial deference with respect to

such remedies as long as they are reasonably tailored to meet the Commission's goals. 18

It is our view that, pursuant to sections 206 and 309 of the FPA, the Commission could

order a public utility to participate in an RTO upon finding that the public utility was

engaging in unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or anticompetitive practices, and

that participation in an RTO was a reasonable remedy for that unlawful behavior. If we

were to impose such a remedy in a particular case, any aggrieved party would have the

right to challenge the lawfulness and reasonableness of that remedy to the extent

permitted by law.

ISO Participants' argument that the Commission erred in its discussion of section

203 of the FPA is misplaced. Although they do not specify the particular language in the

order that they object to, they apparently refer to our statement that "public utilities'

transfers of control of jurisdictional transmission facilities to entities such as RTOs would

require section 203 approval." 19 ISO Participants argue that a public utility's assignment

of limited operating responsibilities to an ISO, while retaining physical control and
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -15- 

20FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,061-63.

21Id. at 31,064-68.

22Id. at 31,068-73.

ownership, is not a disposition within the meaning of section 203. The language in Order

No. 2000 was a general summary statement of how the Commission has interpreted

section 203 in its case precedent. Indeed, the Commission has invoked its section 203

authority over the transfers of control of transmission facilities for all five of the ISOs

that have been approved thus far. Thus, our statement in Order No. 2000 was not

intended as a new, changed, or amplified interpretation. Those questioning whether

specific fact situations invoke our jurisdiction have appropriate avenues, such as requests

for declaratory order, to have those questions resolved. 

B. Minimum Characteristics of an RTO

1. Independence

In the Final Rule, we discussed how to ensure that an RTO would be able to

operate independently from market participants. We defined who was a market

participant. 20 We also discussed the extent to which ownership of a transmission

company by market participants would be permitted. We stated that a truly passive form

of ownership would be acceptable, 21 but that active ownership by market participants

would be limited. 22 Another aspect of independence discussed in Order No. 2000 was

how to ensure that the RTO could have independence with respect to its tariff. In
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -16- 

23Id. at 31,075-76.

response to comments on the NOPR, we clarified that the transmission owners retained

rights to make section 205 filings to establish their revenue requirements for payments

from the RTO, but that otherwise the RTO must have the authority to file any changes to

its transmission tariff. 23

a. Definition of Market Participant

We discuss below several distinct categories of rehearing requests with respect to

our definition of market participant.

Rehearing Requests

Several requests for rehearing argue against our inclusion in the definition of

market participant entities that provide transmission or ancillary services to the RTO. 

With respect to the inclusion of entities that provide transmission services, EEI,

Independent Companies, Southern Company, United Illuminating and Conectiv are

concerned that this could preclude the development of transcos and other for-profit

RTOs. For example, Conectiv argues that the definition is circular when applied to RTOs

that both own transmission facilities and provide transmission service. Conectiv requests

the Commission clarify that the definition of market participant does not include transcos

and other for-profit RTOs. Southern Company states that in the situation where an

independent transmission company is an RTO, some might argue that the transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -17- 

company is providing transmission services to the RTO and would thus be a market

participant. Southern Company also argues that an independent transmission company

should not be a market participant where it participates in a larger RTO with other

transmission owners and might be considered to be providing transmission services to the

RTO. 

EEI requests that the Commission clarify that an RTO is not a market participant

with respect to transmission services it provides within the RTO's boundaries, and that an

independent transco should not be deemed a market participant where it joins with others

to form a larger RTO. Independent Companies ask the Commission to clarify that the

market participant definition was not intended to include a transmission owner that is

making its transmission facilities available through an RTO in which it holds active

ownership and is not otherwise engaged in electric generation or marketing activities. 

United Illuminating asserts that pure transmission owners do not have the

incentive or ability to favor their power marketing activities, and they do not participate

in the energy or ancillary services markets. United Illuminating also states that there

appears to be no reason to include in the definition of market participant a transmission

owner that provides transmission service to an RTO, because that service would be

provided according to the protections of a regulated tariff. United Illuminating also

claims that the part of the market participant definition that includes any entity whose

economic or commercial interests that would be significantly affected by the RTO's
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -18- 

24Section 35.34(b)(2)(i).

25We use the term "pure transmission company" to refer to a transmission

company that owns transmission facilities but has no interests in or affiliation with sellers

or brokers of electric energy.

actions or decisions would automatically preclude a transco as an RTO. United

Illuminating asks that we confirm that pure transmission owners are not market

participants.

Commission Conclusion

We will grant rehearing in part, and clarification, with respect to the definition of

market participant. As noted in the Final Rule, we use the definition of market

participant as a reference point for establishing limits on ownership (i.e., an RTO's

ownership of market participants and market participants' ownership of an RTO) and

standards for independent decisionmaking or governance, when governance arrangements

are being relied upon to ensure independence. With respect to the inclusion in the

definition of any entity that "provides transmission . . . services to the Regional

Transmission Organization," 24 there is some confusion in what we intended. We did not

intend that a "pure transmission company" 25 that qualified to be an RTO would be

thought to be providing transmission services to the RTO within our definition of market

participant. Additional issues may arise as to the fairness of an RTO's governance,

however, where a pure transmission company is only one of several entities providing

transmission services to or making transmission facilities available to the RTO. We now
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -19- 

realize that our attempt to address these additional issues through the definition of market

participant has caused unnecessary confusion. Accordingly, we will revise the definition

of market participant at section 35.34(b)(2)(i) to delete specific references to entities that

provide transmission services to the RTO. 

While we are revising section 35.34(b)(2)(i) to drop specific references to entities

that provide transmission services to the RTO in the definition of market participant, the

involvement of a pure transmission company in RTO decisionmaking processes may be

relevant to our independence criterion, and we cannot conclude that such involvement

would never be problematic. For example, in the ISO context, we have set out the

general principle that decisionmaking processes should be independent of any market

participant or class of participants. The fact that a pure transmission company is no

longer included in the definition of market participant does not mean that the governance

of an ISO would be unaffected by the voting rights attributed to pure transmission

companies (or, indeed, pure distribution companies who are also not included in the

definition of market participants). Accordingly, we emphasize that our revision to the

definition of market participant is not intended to prejudge the issues or considerations

that may be raised with respect to governance arrangements involving, in part, pure

transmission companies.

We note that pursuant to section 35.34(b)(2)(ii), the Commission can find on a

case-by-case basis that an entity that has economic or commercial interests that would be
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -20- 

26FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,062-63.

significantly affected by the RTO is a market participant. As we stated in the Final Rule

with respect to power buyers and with respect to pure distribution entities, there may be

circumstances where a transmission entity that obtained a controlling interest in an RTO

could manipulate access and curtailment decisions, or planning and expansion decisions,

in a way that would advantage itself and disadvantage other users. 26 We can and will

deal with those potential situations on a case-by-case basis.

United Illuminating makes the point that a pure transmission company that either

is an RTO, or is part of an RTO, would likely have economic or commercial interests that

would be significantly affected by the RTO's actions or decisions, thus making it fall

within the definition of market participant under section 35.34(b)(2)(ii). We clarify that

pure transmission companies will not be within the scope of section 35.34(b)(2)(ii) solely

because of their ownership of transmission facilities.

Rehearing Requests

Several requests for rehearing also ask for clarification and/or rehearing with

respect to the inclusion in the definition of market participant of entities that provide

ancillary services to the RTO. EEI argues that there is a conflict between requiring the

RTO to be the provider of last resort of ancillary services and including ancillary service

providers in the definition of market participant. EEI states that this is a problem not only

with RTOs that are transcos, but also where an ISO requires a transmission-owning
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -21- 

member to provide ancillary services. EEI also asserts that the definition will interfere

with an RTO's ability to run or administer an energy market. Independent Companies

assert that the definition of market participant appropriately includes those entities

providing generation-related ancillary services to the RTO, but should not be interpreted

to include a transmission owner's provision of scheduling and dispatch services to the

RTO.

Southern Company argues that an independent transmission company may find it

beneficial to own limited amounts of generation to operate an effective and efficient

transmission system, and that it should be allowed to own such "non-competitive"

generation without being considered a market participant. 

Commission Conclusion

With respect to the part of the market participant definition that encompasses an

entity that provides ancillary services to the RTO, we offer a clarification. Order No.

2000 requires under Function 4 that an RTO serve as a provider of last resort of all

ancillary services required by Order No. 888 and subsequent orders. As the provider of

last resort for ancillary services, the RTO must ensure that adequate arrangements are in

place for the provision of ancillary services to transmission customers. We recognize that

there are many different ways that ancillary services can be made available, e.g. through

contractual arrangements and market mechanisms. We did not intend that an RTO that

was fulfilling its obligation to be a provider of last resort of ancillary services would be
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -22- 

27Id. at 31,062-63.

considered to be providing ancillary services to the RTO. Rather, that obligation is to

provide ancillary services to the transmission customers. Accordingly, we clarify that an

RTO that provides ancillary services within its region pursuant to its obligation under

Function 4 will not itself be considered to be within the definition of market participant

because of its performance of that function.

In addition, we clarify that our concern with the provision of ancillary services to

the RTO is focused on generation-related ancillary services. Our concern, as we stated it

in Order No. 2000, is that the RTO will likely have considerable discretion in defining

the types and quantities of ancillary services needed and how they will be procured, and

we did not want the suppliers of ancillary services to be able to influence the RTO's

decisions on these issues. 27 We continue to believe this is a valid concern and will not

delete this component of the market participant definition with respect to any generationrelated ancillary service. However, we clarify that a pure transmission company that

performs the "Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service" as described in Order

No. 888 will not be considered to be within the section 35.34(b)(2)(i) definition of market

participant because it performs that service.

In response to Southern Company's request that we allow independent transcos to

own "non-competitive" generation that "essentially" provides a transmission function, we

note that the definition of market participant is not framed in terms of generation
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -23- 

ownership, but includes entities that sell or broker electric energy, or that provide

ancillary services to the RTO. Any entity that sells or brokers electric energy, directly or

through an affiliate, is a market participant. Also, as just discussed, any entity that

provides generation-related ancillary services to the RTO or its customers is also a market

participant.

Rehearing Requests

TDU Systems objects to the Commission's statement in Order No. 2000 that retail

suppliers of last resort may request to be excluded from the definition of market

participant. TDU Systems argues that this should not be encouraged, because suppliers

of last resort can retain substantial market share for a substantial period of time even if it

does not overtly compete for retail sales business, and the pendency of waiver petitions at

this time could be a source of disruption and confusion.

Commission Conclusion

We did not intend to encourage such requests for waivers, but at the same time, we

feel compelled to recognize the possible situation where a distribution company may

desire to exit the sales business and become a pure distribution company, but cannot due

to an obligation to be the supplier of last resort under a state retail access program. We

concluded that these entities would be within the definition of market participant, unless

they could show us special factors as to why they should not (e.g. its sole electric sales
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -24- 

28Id. at 31,063.

29FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,064-73.

are to satisfy a state requirement and it does not compete for retail load). 28 Certainly,

any seller of electric energy will carry a substantial burden to prove to us that it should

not be considered to be a market participant. We expect that this will apply to a relatively

narrow class, and we should not be overwhelmed by waiver requests. Accordingly, we

will not accept TDU Systems' request that we withdraw our statements in the Final Rule.

b. Ownership Issues

In the Final Rule, we discussed at some length the requirements we believed were

necessary to ensure that ownership interests in RTOs would not jeopardize the

independence of RTOs from market participants. 29 We concluded: that truly passive

ownership interests by market participants would not be restricted; that active ownership

by market participants would have to cease after five years (with an extension possible in

certain circumstances); that during the time active ownership is permitted, up to five

percent ownership by a single market participant was deemed a safe harbor and 15

percent ownership by a class of market participants was a benchmark; and that there

would have to be periodic independent audits conducted to ensure independence.

We discuss below the requests for rehearing and clarification that we received on

the issues of our limits on ownership generally, passive ownership, active ownership, and

auditing requirements.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -25- 

Rehearing Requests

Duke objects generally to the Commission's focus on ownership, asserting that the

Commission's approach is overly rigid and that the Commission has not examined

whether there are less restrictive means to meet the independence criterion. Duke first

asks the Commission to reconsider the structure allowed for the natural gas industry,

where affiliated production and marketing companies are permitted. Duke does not

challenge the Commission's observation that the electric industry evidences a much

higher level of vertical integration, but argues that there is no reason to require separation

of control of transmission and merchant activities to a greater extent than is permitted in

the gas industry. Duke also suggests that the Commission could allow affiliated transcos

subject to a requirement that they retain an independent auditor to review the activities

and decisions of the affiliated transco from the standpoint of potential discrimination and

compliance with codes of conduct and file regular reports of its findings. 

Conectiv asks that the Commission clarify that the ownership requirements do not

apply to the non-profit ISO form of RTO, but would only apply to transcos and other forprofit entities with voting securities. It asserts that the record does not support ownership

restrictions for non-profit RTOs.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -26- 

Commission Conclusion

We do not agree that the structure currently in place for the gas industry would

adequately support independent RTOs. As Duke itself notes, it would allow the senior

management of an entity that operates in both the transmission and generation arenas to

participate in decisions involving the transmission business. These decisions would, as a

matter of course, have a significant effect on that same entity's generation business. We

also disagree that independent auditing alone can substitute for the independence

requirement. As we noted in the Final Rule, we have found that in the electric industry, it

is difficult to monitor compliance with codes of conduct. Moreover, it is a very intrusive

form of regulation and ultimately requires us to be "chasing after conduct." As we noted

in the Final Rule, this is not the light-handed regulation that is essential to support

emerging competitive markets.

Conectiv's concern, which focuses at times on the distinction between for-profit

and not-for-profit entities and at other times on the distinction between the transco and

ISO form of RTO, is not entirely clear. We clarify that our concerns about ownership

and control of an RTO are not a function of the for-profit or not-for-profit approach. The

limits on ownership by market participants apply whenever the RTO intends to own and

operate the transmission assets itself, either directly or indirectly through other entities. 

The fact that a market participant owner of an RTO operated on a non-profit basis would
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -27- 

not, for example, preclude the possibility that the RTO could operate to benefit its

generation business. Accordingly, ownership restrictions are appropriate in that case.

Rehearing Requests

With respect to passive ownership, NRECA, TDU Systems, and Dairyland argue

that passive ownership should be disallowed completely after five years, except in

extraordinary circumstances. NRECA, for example, recognizes the desirability of a

transition period to phase out passive ownership, but asserts that the maintenance of a

passive ownership threatens RTO independence and imposes heavy regulatory burdens

on the Commission to police. TDU Systems argue also that passive ownership should be

subject to the same benchmark individual and class limits that apply to active ownership. 

New Orleans also challenges the allowance of passive ownership by market

participants. New Orleans argues that the sale/leaseback cases and the Securities and

Exchange Commission Rule cited in Order No. 2000 in support of allowing passive

ownership are in fact much narrower than what the Commission is allowing, in that the

passive owners there were not primarily in the business of selling electric power. By

permitting passive ownership by market participants, New Orleans asserts, the

Commission has not provided the safeguards that exist in other passive ownership

situations. New Orleans claims that the Commission erred by not limiting passive the

same way it limited active ownership. Finally, New Orleans asks that the Commission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -28- 

clarify that where there is clear evidence that an RTO proposal would not be perceived as

independent by a majority of potentially affected entities, the proposal will be rejected.

Duke argues that if passive ownership restrictions are retained, the definition of

passive ownership should not be so narrow as to leave the board and management of the

passive owner without the capability to ensure that the transmission assets will be

operated responsibly and in accordance with legitimate business objectives. Duke states

that if it places its transmission into an affiliated transco, Duke's management should be

able to participate in decisions that significantly affect the value of the transmission

business, such as mergers, asset divestitures and acquisitions, and the choice of

individuals to manage the transmission business.

EEI asks that the Commission clarify what types of passive ownership would be

acceptable. Specifically, EEI requests that the Commission clarify that: (1) a fiduciary

duty to maximize the value of the RTO's transmission assets will not defeat

independence; and (2) passive owners may reserve certain rights to protect themselves

against abuse by the holders of voting rights. EEI argues that a fiduciary duty to

maximize transmission service revenues is similar to what the Commission has approved

in the ISO context, and that there is no duty owed under corporate law that would require

an RTO to maximize a passive owner's outside interests. EEI states that a duty to

maximize the value of transmission assets will not create a bias toward transmission-only

solutions, because of the RTO's obligations with respect to market mechanisms under the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -29- 

30FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,064.

planning and congestion management functions. EEI argues further that passive owners

should be able to reserve rights to participate in certain limited but major decisions that

affect their ownership status, such as mergers and bankruptcy filings.

Commission Conclusion

We deny rehearing of the requests to phase-out or limit passive ownership beyond

what we stated in the Final Rule. NRECA is correct that a phase-out of passive

ownership, or limits on the percentage interests of passive ownership, would reduce the

regulatory burdens of ensuring that the passive ownership arrangement does not threaten

the RTO's independence. However, as we noted in the Final Rule, passive ownership

arrangements can help resolve some significant impediments to the transition to the type

of RTO that would both own and operate the transmission assets. 30 Permitting flexibility

on these arrangements could enhance significantly our goal of accelerated formation of

RTOs. Limits on passive ownership interests or required phase-outs would not further

this goal. We are not convinced that the careful balance we reached on this issue in the

Final Rule is in error.

New Orleans' concern that we should guard against passive ownership

arrangements where there is clear evidence that an RTO proposal would not be perceived
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -30- 

31Id. at 31,065.

as independent echoes the concerns we expressed in the Final Rule. 31 We explained in

the Final Rule that this requires assurances to all market participants that any passive

ownership arrangement is truly passive and will not interfere with the independent

operation and decisionmaking of the RTO. It is also one of the reasons we said that it

was important to require a system of independent compliance auditing to ensure that

passive ownership arrangements remain passive over time and to provide assurances to

other market participants that the RTO is truly independent. We appreciate New Orleans'

concerns that there are differences in the passive ownership arrangements that may be

submitted as compared to those we may have evaluated before in the context of

sale/leasebacks or those permitted under the SEC rule we referenced in the Final Rule. 

However, we referenced these only to make the point that there are different ways of

structuring passive ownership arrangements and it may be possible to structure them in

such a way to demonstrate that they are truly financial arrangements. 

Duke's and EEI's concerns about the need of passive owners to protect the value of

their assets and investments are valid. However, the Commission must balance these

concerns against the need for an independent RTO. We expect that proponents of passive

ownership arrangements will explore methods for protecting the value of their assets and

investments while also maintaining the true independence of RTO decisionmaking. We

recognize that this may require some creativity and innovation to meld the regulatory
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -31- 

32See, e.g., the statement of investment analyst Steven Fetter, who said, "The wide

spectrum of permissible outcomes should be welcomed by Wall Street. What investment

bankers do best is create innovative structures to meet legal and market requirements." 

FERC's RTO Rule Should Cheer Investors, www.fitchibca.com (January 13, 2000).

needs with those of the markets, but it is necessary if we are to ensure independent RTOs

and accommodate passive ownership arrangements. 32

In response to EEI's concerns, we do not expect that a fiduciary responsibility of

the RTO to its passive owners to maximize the value of the RTO's transmission assets

would, by itself, be problematic with respect to the RTO's independence. 

Rehearing Requests

On the issue of active ownership, Conectiv, CTA, EEI, Southern Company, and

Alliance all argue that the Commission was wrong to sunset all active ownership after

five years. EEI, representative of the others challenging the sunset requirement, states

that it is aware of no other context where a complete ban on active ownership has been

imposed to prevent control; that the sunset requirement conflicts with the Commission's

finding that five percent active or lower does not raise control concerns; that five years is

an arbitrary and capricious transition period; that limits on active ownership would

reduce the numbers of bidders for a transco's stock and would limit investment

opportunities for market participants; that a complete ban on active would be difficult to

monitor since there is no existing requirement to disclose ownership less than five

percent; and that the Commission does not have the legal authority to order divestiture of
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -32- 

ownership by electric utilities. CTA adds that a five-percent active ownership should be

indefinite, because other holders of active interests would prevent a five-percent minority

holder from acting in its own interests. CTA states further that the five-year transition is

too short and should be extended so as to avoid a "fire sale" in the event of an economic

slowdown.

TDU Systems argue that the five-percent safe harbor for individual active

ownership should be an absolute ceiling, and that the Commission should refuse to permit

a market participant to propose a higher level. TDU Systems and NRECA both contend

that intervenors should be allowed to challenge whether even a five-percent active

ownership is too high. CTA asserts that passive ownership interests held by market

participants should not be a factor in whether a market participant would be allowed to

hold more than five-percent active ownership. It states that if the Commission is vigilant

to assure that passive ownership cannot exercise control, there is no reason why passive

ownership should be a factor in determining appropriate active ownership.

With respect to the 15 percent benchmark established in Order No. 2000 for a

class of market participants, Conectiv, CTA, Alliance, and EEI argue that there should be

no such benchmark. They assert that it is unlikely that class members would collude with

their competitors, that there are existing laws to prohibit collusion, and that keeping track

of the classes would be administratively difficult. EEI states further that such aggregation

of interests is not a factor in any other regulatory context. Contrary to these parties'
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -33- 

arguments, TDU Systems argues that a 15 percent benchmark for classes of active owners

is too high, and that class ownership should be limited to 10 percent. 

Commission Conclusion

We deny rehearing on the active ownership issues and reaffirm our decision that

active ownership by market participants will have to cease after five years (with an

extension possible in certain circumstances), and that during the time active ownership is

permitted, up to five percent ownership by a single market participant will be deemed a

safe harbor and 15 percent ownership by a class of market participants will be a

benchmark. We carefully considered all of the extensive arguments made in the

comments on the NOPR on the active ownership issue, and reached a solution in the

Final Rule that we continue to believe appropriately balances the interests of all parties

and our policy objective.

Many commenters argue that our willingness to allow active ownership for five

years undermines our policy against active ownership after a five-year period. We

disagree. Our decision reflects our belief that over the long term independence may be

adequately assured only if there are no active ownership interests, but that a transition

period during which active ownership in limited amounts may be proposed, together with

auditing requirements, is a reasonable interim measure to assist RTO formation. With

respect to the 15 percent benchmark for classes of active ownership, we explained fully in
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -34- 

33FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,072.

the Final Rule what are concerns are, 33 and we are not persuaded that our concerns are

invalid. Moreover, we have permitted sufficient flexibility for parties to argue on a caseby-case basis that the 15 percent class benchmark is too high or too low. 

Rehearing Requests

With respect to the independence audits required by Order No. 2000, Dynegy

argues that the audits should commence immediately at RTO start-up, not be delayed for

two years, and should be ongoing. Dynegy states that it has concerns about whether an

audit performed two years after start-up is sufficient to guard against ownership abuses. 

Dynegy asks additionally that the Commission either place the audit and ownership

requirements in the regulation or provide clarification as to why they do not appear in the

regulations. TAPS expressly endorses the audit requirements as essential.

Commission Conclusion

No party has objected to having independent audit requirements for passive

interests, active interests, and ISO governance, and we continue to believe they are

essential. In response to Dynegy, it is of course a judgment as to how often to have them

and how soon to start them. We note that the Final Rule provides for the first audit two

years after our approval of the RTO, not after RTO start-up. We believe we have struck

an appropriate balance among the goals of having a sufficient check on independence,

allowing time for some initial operational shake-out, and not imposing overly
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -35- 

34Id. at 31,067, 31,072.

burdensome procedures. We agree with Dynegy that it would be useful to state the

auditing requirements in the text of the regulations, and we have therefore added a new

sub-paragraph (iv) to section 35.34(j)(1) for this purpose. The new regulatory text we

added reads as follows:

(iv)(A) The Regional Transmission Organization must provide:

(1) With respect to any Regional Transmission Organization in which

market participants have an ownership interest, a compliance audit of the

independence of the Regional Transmission Organization's decision making

process under paragraph (j)(1)(ii) of this section, to be performed two years

after approval of the Regional Transmission Organization, and every three

years thereafter, unless otherwise provided by the Commission.

(2) With respect to any Regional Transmission Organization in which

market participants have a role in the Regional Transmission Organization's

decision making process but do not have an ownership interest, a

compliance audit of the independence of the Regional Transmission

Organization's decision making process under paragraph (j)(1)(ii) of this

section, to be performed two years after its approval as a Regional

Transmission Organization.

(B) The compliance audits under paragraph (j)(1)(iv)(A) of this section

must be performed by auditors who are not affiliated with the Regional

Transmission Organization or transmission facility owners that are

members of the Regional Transmission Organization.

We also note that we stated in Order No. 2000 that applicants have a continuing

obligation to inform the Commission of any changed circumstances regarding

ownership. 34
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -36- 

35See id. at 31,075-76.

36Conectiv, Duke, Southern Company, EEI, ISO Participants, United Illuminating,

Transmission Owners of NY, AEP, PECO and Alliance.

c. Section 205 Filing Rights

In the Final Rule, we attempted to balance our desire to ensure that the RTO have

exclusive and independent authority over changes to its transmission tariff with the FPA

section 205 rights of public utility transmission owners to seek rate changes. 35 We

affirmed that RTOs, in order to ensure their independence from market participants, must

have the independent and exclusive right to make section 205 filings that apply to the

rates, terms, and conditions of transmission services over the facilities operated by the

RTO. However, we also clarified that the transmission-owning public utilities whose

facilities are used by the RTO have the right to make section 205 filings to establish their

revenue requirement and the level of payments for use of their facilities. We also stated

that we would also entertain other approaches as long as they ensured the independent

authority of the RTO and the ability of transmission owners to protect the level of the

revenue needed to recover the costs of their facilities.

Rehearing Requests

A number of parties requested rehearing or clarification challenging our division

of section 205 filing rights between the RTO and transmission-owning members of the

RTO. 36 For example, EEI reflects most of the rehearing requests on this issue in arguing
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -37- 

that the division violates the transmission owners' section 205 rights. EEI claims that it

will jeopardize cost recovery for the transmission owners because it breaks the link

between establishing the revenue requirement and establishing rate design, and it further

breaks the link between the party responsible for establishing the revenue requirement

and the party responsible for recovering it. EEI argues that the RTO might not have the

same incentive to design rates to recover costs as the transmission owner would, and that

the division is inconsistent with court and Commission precedent. EEI states that this

division will discourage the voluntary participation in RTOs, and is in fact inconsistent

with at least some of the ISOs approved to date.

Alliance contends that the Commission erred in determining that the RTO must

have exclusive authority to propose changes in rates. In addition to similar arguments

that EEI made about this unlawfully depriving public utilities of section 205 rights and

increasing the risks for transmission owners, Alliance argues that it is a false premise that

the RTO needs exclusive authority over rates. It states that Commission oversight of

rates will provide a complete check on the ability of transmission owners to implement

rate changes that would place them at a competitive advantage vis-a-vis other market

participants. 

Conectiv argues that the division of filing rights is inconsistent with the law (and

could result in an unconstitutional taking of property), that the Commission has provided

insufficient factual basis in the record to support its assertion that RTOs must have the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -38- 

authority to file rate changes in order to ensure independence from market participants,

and that it does not provide sound economic and transmission policy. Conectiv states that

a disinterested RTO might not make decisions based on the revenue recovery needs of the

transmission owner, and that non-profit RTOs do not have incentives to file innovative

rate design proposals to protect and encourage transmission investment. ISO Participants

also assert that the division of authority is inconsistent with the Commission's

endorsement of innovative rates.

Midwest ISO Participants ask the Commission to clarify that it need not modify its

Commission-approved ISO documents on the issue of section 205 filing rights in order to

qualify as an RTO. They state that the Midwest ISO Agreement carefully delineated the

rights of the ISO and transmission owners, with the owners controlling the pricing

structure and revenue distribution methodology. They assert that this was a critical

element of the ISO Agreement, and the Commission explicitly stated in its order that it

would honor the transmission owner's rights during the six-year transition period after

start-up. Midwest ISO Participants contend that Order No. 2000's requirement that the

RTO make section 205 filings to recover costs from transmission customers is at odds

with the Midwest ISO owners' rights to control filings to change the ISO's rates. They

claim further that Order No. 2000's division of authority makes no sense in the context of

the Midwest ISO's tariff, which contains a rate formula. They request that the

Commission make clear that the owners can continue to control the rate formula.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -39- 

PECO asks for clarification of how the proposed division of filing authority would

apply to situations like the PJM tariff, which is a combined ISO and transmission owner

tariff. They claim that Order No. 2000 would effectively bar the PJM transmission

owners from making changes to the tariff sheets that contain their individual revenue

requirements. They ask the Commission to clarify that in such a case the transmission

owners can still make section 205 filings to propose a change to the tariff pages that cover

their revenue requirements. PECO also asks the Commission to clarify that any section

205 filing by an ISO type of RTO would be subject to the established ISO governance

process.

SRP asks the Commission to clarify that its discussion of section 205 filing rights

was not intended to broaden the applicability of section 205 to non-jurisdictional public

power entities, and to clarify the ability of such non-jurisdictional entities to set the level

of their revenue requirements. SRP wants the Commission to clarify that it intends to

allow flexibility for non-jurisdictional entities to be able to set their revenue requirements

through means other than making section 205 filings, which would mean in SRP's case,

that its independent board could continue to set its revenue requirement.

Commission Conclusion

The Commission will deny rehearing of its decision that an RTO, in order to

ensure its independence, must have the independent and exclusive right to make section

205 filings with respect to the transmission services the RTO provides to third parties. As
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -40- 

discussed below, we reject arguments that this decision is inconsistent with law and

precedent. However, in light of the concerns and misunderstandings raised, we also will

further clarify our requirement.

As noted in Order No. 2000, and as evidenced by the comments of the parties

seeking rehearing, unique issues arise with respect to tariff filing rights in the situation

where the RTO operates and provides transmission service over transmission facilities

owned by another entity, e.g., in the context of an ISO. There are two legitimate

concerns here that need to be balanced. One is the concern that for the RTO to provide

transmission service independent from market participants, it must have independent

control over its tariff, and not have a tariff that is subject to the control of particular

participants in the RTO. The other concern is that of transmission owners who will turn

the operation of their transmission facilities over to the RTO and need some assurance

that they will continue to receive a fair return on their transmission investments. We

reconciled those concerns in the Final Rule by stating that in the ISO type of situation,

the RTO had to have the independent and exclusive right to make section 205 filings that

apply to the rates, terms, and conditions of transmission services over the facilities

operated by the RTO, but that transmission owners have the right to make section 205

filings to determine the appropriate payments for the RTO's use of their facilities.

As an initial matter, some parties question whether, to ensure independence, it is

necessary for the RTO to have exclusive and independent authority with respect to filing
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -41- 

changes to its tariff. We find the need to be clear. The tariff establishes the rates, terms,

and conditions under which the RTO will provide transmission service to transmission

customers. If the RTO does not have the independent right to seek appropriate changes to

its tariff, it is difficult to see how that RTO could be viewed as providing a transmission

service that is independent from market participants.

All of the objections to the division of authority we adopted in the Final Rule are

based on the false premise that we are restricting the rights of transmission owners to

protect their transmission investments and therefore jeopardizing their asserted right to

recover their legitimate costs. This is not the case. Under our formulation, transmission

owners may make section 205 filings at any time to establish their revenue requirements

and the just and reasonable payments they may charge the RTO for use of their facilities. 

This gives them the full opportunity to recover their cost of service.

Those requesting rehearing, however, insist that transmission owners will be at

risk for not recovering their allowed payments from the RTO, because the RTO either

will not have an appropriate rate design or will not have the incentive to collect revenues

from transmission customers sufficient to cover the payments to transmission owners. 

These arguments have no merit. There is nothing in the Final Rule that precludes

transmission owners from seeking to assure recovery of their allowed payments from the

RTO through appropriate mechanisms in the agreement establishing the RTO. For

example, they may provide for a contractually enforceable obligation for the RTO to pay
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -42- 

37In this situation, parties may also consider providing for mutually agreeable rules

regarding the timing of the revenue requirement and rate design filings.

the owners their full revenue requirement as determined by the Commission, and they

may even provide for some sort of true-up mechanism if an RTO fails to recover the costs

it owes to the owners in a particular period.

In addition, nothing in the Final Rule precludes the transmission owners from

participating in the RTO's designing of rates to transmission customers, as long as they

are not given veto authority over, or otherwise control, what the RTO ultimately seeks to

file under section 205. The Commission did not intend to preclude transmission owners

from being involved in rate design proposals prior to the RTO filing them. If, in

designing rules to establish a new RTO (or to justify rules of an existing ISO for which an

RTO determination is sought), parties can establish an approach or process for involving

the transmission owners in advance in the determination of the rate design proposals that

the RTO will file, and can demonstrate that the approach or process does not compromise

the independence of the RTO, the Commission will be open to such proposals. 37 

In addition, when the RTO proposes a rate design to recover the costs the RTO

owes to the transmission owners as well as other costs that the RTO may incur, the

Commission will exercise its responsibilities to approve a rate that is designed to recover

all RTO costs, including the cost of payments that the RTO must make to the

transmission owners. Transmission owners will be able to participate in that proceeding
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -43- 

and to make whatever arguments they wish regarding appropriate rate design and the

effect on their recovery of costs. 

Most of the parties asserting legal challenges on this issue, including EEI, spend

considerable effort reciting the basic rate changing mechanisms of section 205 of the

FPA, and claim an inalienable right of a transmission owner to make rate changes even in

the situation in which they no longer control the transmission facilities and are no longer

the parties providing service over the facilities. They claim they are owed a "guarantee"

of recovering the costs of the facilities which have been turned over to the RTO.

We reject the legal arguments made by those on rehearing. The Commission's

holding in Order No. 2000 did nothing contrary to the fundamental tenets of section 205

of the FPA and nothing inconsistent with the rights of utilities to have the opportunity (as

opposed to a "guarantee") to recover costs associated with facilities used to provide

jurisdictional service. What the rehearing petitioners ignore, and what the Commission

pointed out in Order No. 2000, is that in the context of an ISO, both the transmission

owners and the RTO are public utilities under the FPA with respect to the same facilities. 

Further, it is the RTO, and not the transmission owners, that in this context is the provider

(seller) of jurisdictional service. Because the RTO is providing the jurisdictional service,

it is clearly within the parameters of section 205 for the RTO to have on file a rate
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -44- 

38This is analogous to the situation in which there is a sale and leaseback of public

utility property for financing purposes. In such a case, it is the lessee operator, not the

owner, that files tariffs.

39Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1967). The Supreme Court

in this case also rejected the notion that there is an unrestricted right to file rate changes

under section 4(d) of the Natural Gas Act, which is parallel to section 205(d) of the FPA. 

Id. at 779-80.

schedule for the services it provides, and that it have the exclusive authority to propose

changes to that rate schedule. 38

Given that it deprives no public utility of the opportunity to recover its costs and

earn a fair return on its investments, the section 205 filing procedure adopted in Order

No. 2000 is well within the Commission's authority. The Supreme Court has stated that

the Commission "must be free, within the limitations imposed by pertinent constitutional

and statutory commands, to devise methods of regulation capable of equitably reconciling

diverse and conflicting interests." 39 That is what we have done here.

Several existing ISOs seek in their rehearings to have the Commission make

specific findings with respect to their current division of section 205 filing rights. We do

not believe it is appropriate to make such findings in this generic proceeding and instead

will do so when those entities make their filings under this rule. We note that we stated

in the Final Rule that we would entertain other approaches to the division of filing

authority "as long as they ensure the independent authority of the RTO to seek changes in

rates, terms or conditions of transmission service and the ability of transmission owners
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -45- 

40FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,076.

to protect the level of the revenue needed to recover the costs of their transmission

facilities." 40

In response to SRP's request for clarification of the applicability of our finding to

non-public utilities, we clarify that our discussion of filing rights pertained to public

utilities under section 205 of the FPA and that it was not intended to broaden the

applicability of section 205 to non-public utilities. 

In response to arguments that the Commission's decision will discourage the

voluntary formation of RTOs or will result in favoring transcos over ISOs, the intent of

this rule is to be neutral as to corporate form. As we stated above, we have left sufficient

flexibility for transmission owners to protect their revenues, obligations to shareholders,

and ability to attract capital whether they form an ISO, transco, or other form of

institution.

Some parties have argued that our decision undermines the incentive to use

performance based rates in the ISO context because it takes the development of such

mechanisms out of the hands of the transmission owners. We do not think this is a

necessary result. As we noted in the Final Rule, when activities that contribute to

performance are shared between the RTO and the transmission owners, the RTO design
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -46- 

41Id. at 31,184.

may ensure that the rewards and penalties associated with activities performed by

transmission owners flow through to the owners to achieve the desired result. 41

2. Scope and Regional Configuration

Order No. 2000 set forth as the second minimum characteristic of an RTO that the

RTO must serve a region of sufficient scope and configuration to permit it to maintain

reliability, effectively perform its required functions, and support efficient and nondiscriminatory power markets.

Rehearing Requests

The Pennsylvania Commission asks that the Commission ensure that RTOs are

large enough to support an open and transparent market in reactive power and other

ancillary services. It states that RTO applicants should be able to demonstrate that the

geographic area and diversity of ownership of generation and transmission facilities is

sufficient to support such a market.

Commission Conclusion

We agree with the Pennsylvania Commission that one of the considerations in

evaluating scope and regional configuration is whether the RTO can support open and

transparent markets, including ancillary service markets. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -47- 

42FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,103-05.

3. Short-term Reliability

The Final Rule required as the fourth minimum characteristic of an RTO that the

RTO have exclusive authority for maintaining the short-term reliability of the grid. As

part of this characteristic, the Commission stated that the RTO must have exclusive

authority for receiving, confirming, and implementing interchange schedules; must have

the right to order redispatch of generation for reliability purposes; must have authority to

approve transmission maintenance schedules; and must report to us if any reliability

standards it operates under hinder it from providing reliable, non-discriminatory and

efficiently priced transmission service. We did not require that the RTO have authority

over generation maintenance schedules or that the RTO be required to establish

transmission facility ratings. We also stated that on the issue of the extent of RTO

liability relating to its reliability activities, we would address that on a case-by-case

basis. 42

Rehearing Requests

Dynegy and TAPS are concerned with the information received by control area

operators who are market participants when they are directed to implement interchange

schedules by the RTO. Dynegy agrees with the protections provided in the rule for

separation of reliability personnel and wholesale merchant personnel, but asks the

Commission to clarify that it will actively monitor compliance and enforce appropriate
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -48- 

penalties for violations. TAPS objects to limiting the shield from sensitive interchange

information to the control operator's wholesale merchant personnel. It states that this

would allow for a market participant control area operator to share with its retail

merchant function to take improper advantage of the commercially sensitive information. 

It asks that the Commission make clear that such information must be kept from all

personnel involved with making purchases on the wholesale market, whether on behalf of

wholesale or bundled retail customers.

Dynegy asks that the Commission clarify that to the extent a generator is

redispatched by an RTO, it will be fully compensated for the redispatch order, which may

include lost opportunity costs. Metropolitan asks that the Commission clarify that if an

RTO reschedules or cancels planned transmission maintenance, the compensation will be

limited to direct costs, and will not include indirect costs such as opportunity costs,

because they are too speculative. 

TAPS argues that certain functions that Order No. 2000 does not require the RTO

to have for reliability purposes in fact should be required. TAPS contends that the RTO

should be required to have a greater voice in transmission facility ratings in order to have

control over ATC and TTC calculations. TAPS also contends that the RTO should have,

at least for reliability reasons, control over generation maintenance schedules.

Duke calls the Commission's decision to decide liability responsibility on a caseby-case basis arbitrary and capricious. It states that transmission owners cannot be
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -49- 

expected to transfer control of their facilities to what could be a non-profit RTO with

limited assets without resolving the issue of the RTO's liability for its errors. Duke asks

that the Commission clarify that it will not permit RTO operations to begin without a

final resolution of liability issues, and that the RTO would not be given unilateral

authority to alter the liability provisions of its tariff.

Commission Conclusion

We agree with Dynegy that it may be necessary to monitor and enforce

compliance with the requirement for separation of reliability and merchant personnel. 

We expect that any RTO proposal would address this issue and propose appropriate and

specific procedures concerning monitoring and enforcing compliance with all RTO rules,

including these. 

We share TAPS concerns that, when the retail merchant function is purchasing

wholesale power, it is participating in the wholesale market and should not be privy to

commercially sensitive information that would give it a competitive advantage over other

purchasers of wholesale power. We expect that any RTO proposal will reflect these

concerns to the extent it involves a control area operator affiliated with a market

participant who could obtain access to commercially sensitive information.

We agree with Dynegy that generators that are redispatched by an RTO should be

fully compensated and that the compensation would consider, among other things, lost

opportunity costs. We also agree with Metropolitan that, when the RTO reschedules or
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -50- 

43See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,108.

cancels planned transmission maintenance, compensation to the transmission owners

would be limited to the actual, verifiable out-of-pocket transmission-related costs

incurred (e.g., additional labor costs caused by the rescheduling). 

In the Final Rule, we explained why we believe it is appropriate not to require, as

an initial matter, that the RTO have authority over equipment ratings and generation

maintenance schedules. While we expect that some RTO proposals may initially exceed

our requirements or may evolve over time to place greater responsibility with the RTO,

we will not impose the additional requirements proposed by TAPS. 

We continue to believe that liability issues should be addressed on a case-by-case

basis. We agree with Duke that it is important that issues concerning liability and how

liability provisions can or cannot be changed over time should be addressed during the

collaboration process and resolved before the RTO begins operation. In this regard, a

public utility can seek a declaratory order or make an RTO filing and have the liability

issues resolved before the commencement of operations.

C. Minimum Functions of an RTO

1. Tariff Administration and Design

In the Final Rule, we adopted the requirement that the RTO must be the sole

provider of transmission services and the sole administrator of its open access tariff. 43

Included in this function is the requirement that the RTO have the sole authority for the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -51- 

evaluation and approval of all requests for transmission service including requests for

new interconnections.

Rehearing Requests 

Duke and EEI request clarification that the requirement that the RTO be the sole

provider of all transmission service is not intended to require unbundling of nonjurisdictional transmission service. Duke argues that given the Commission's lack of

jurisdiction over bundled retail transmission, the Commission has no power to indirectly

require the unbundling of retail energy sales through a rulemaking. Duke proposes the

following change to section 35.34(k)(1)(i): "The Regional Transmission Organization

must have the sole authority to receive, evaluate, and approve or deny all requests for

wholesale transmission service."

Dynegy also seeks clarification from the Commission as to the requirement that

the RTO be the provider of transmission service. Dynegy requests guidance as to the

level of flexibility contemplated by the Commission for this requirement in situations

where an umbrella RTO-transco structure is adopted. Dynegy envisions a paradigm

where an interconnection-wide entity determines and/or arbitrates questions of system

capacity and acts a scheduler, but the RTO actually owns and maintains the facilities and

performs the dispatch. Under this scenario, Dynegy points out that depending on the

perspective, either entity can be the provider of transmission service. In addition, SoCal

Edison requests clarification that a two-tariff model (e.g., RTO/ISO tariff and
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -52- 

transmission owner tariff), whereby transmission owners continue to sell transmission

service that is provided by an RTO, is an acceptable option for RTOs. 

In addition, a number of entities requested rehearing or clarification on an RTO's

authority over interconnections to the grid. For example, Metropolitan and SoCal Edison

request that the Commission modify Order No. 2000 to clarify that an RTO has no

interconnection authority over transmission facilities it does not own or have operational

control of. Metropolitan is concerned that some systems within an RTO region that are

not under the operational control of the RTO are already subject to arrangements with

adjoining control areas and transmission owners. In addition, Metropolitan notes that

public power systems may not be able to resolve legal or tax concerns in order to permit

their facilities to be controlled by an RTO.

SoCal Edison also argues that the Commission erred to the extent it provided

RTOs sole authority to approve requests for interconnections. SoCal Edison notes that

FERC, not RTOs, has the authority to approve and evaluate interconnections, pursuant to

sections 202(a) and 210 of the FPA. SoCal Edison asserts that transmission owners must

remain an integral part of the interconnection process. According to SoCal Edison, the

text of the Final Rule should be amended as follows: "The Regional Transmission

Organization must have the authority to establish interconnection policies and to

coordinate the interconnection process for new interconnections." 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -53- 

EPSA asserts that the Commission failed to expound upon the role of RTOs vis-avis other transmission owners in facilitating new interconnections. According to EPSA,

in order to ensure non-discriminatory interconnection processes for all generators, the

Commission should establish the RTO as the lead agency for new interconnections, with

individual transmission owners' roles limited to performing studies on behalf of the RTO. 

EPSA contends that the RTO must be capable, within a reasonable time frame, of

performing the necessary transmission studies and analyses that are required with respect

to requests for new interconnections. EPSA also argues that new generators should not

be required to commit to a particular level or type of transmission service in order to

obtain interconnection service. In addition, EPSA proposes the development of a

standardized interconnection agreement that would hasten the development of new

generation and streamline the interconnection process. EPSA argues that this application

process for evaluating interconnection requests and for processing the requests must be

applied in a consistent and non-discriminatory manner.

Dynegy supports the positions set forth by EPSA in its request for rehearing on

this issue. Dynegy urges the Commission to require, at a minimum, that any RTO

proposal clearly address the nature and scope of the RTO's responsibility for the

interconnection of new generators to the transmission grid, and clarify that new

generators will not be required to negotiate separately with both the RTO and individual

transmission owners. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -54- 

Finally, EEI requests that the Commission clarify that any RTO authority over

new interconnections does not interfere with the right to recovery of costs of new

interconnections under section 205 of the FPA. 

Commission Conclusion

We will not revise section 35.34(k)(1)(i) as proposed by Duke to limit it to

wholesale transmission service. The proposed revision would disable the RTO from

performing those retail transmission services that are already included in our pro forma

tariff, i.e., unbundled retail transmission that may occur, voluntarily or as the result of

state action, on the system of the historical bundled retail supplier, or unbundled retail

transmission service provided by other transmission providers that constitute more remote

segments of a multi-system transmission transaction. 

However, we clarify that the Final Rule is not intended to require the unbundling

of non-jurisdictional transmission service (i.e., the transmission component of bundled

retail sales of energy). That is, the requirement does not interfere in any way with

whether retail open access and retail choice are provided, or with the pricing of retail

bundled power sales which is a decision for appropriate state authorities. However, the

requirement is intended to require that the RTO control all transmission facilities in the

region. This is consistent with what the Commission has done with respect to ISOs in the

past. As Duke notes, the Commission has addressed in the context of existing ISOs,

issues surrounding the fact that a transmission owner's assets continue to be used to
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -55- 

44Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, L.L.C., 81 FERC ¶ 61,257

at 62,281-82 (1997).

45See Initial Comments of Edison Electric Institute on the RTO NOPR, at

Appendix B.

provide bundled retail power sales. For example, in PJM, the Commission noted that,

when transmission owners engaged in transactions under the PJM Tariff to meet retail

load, they would be, at the same time, using their transmission system to make bundled

retail sales and using the transmission system of the other transmission owners, e.g., to

import power to their system for the purpose of making bundled retail sales. 44 We note

that, to date, according to one analysis, 45 approximately 40 percent of the nation's

electricity sales to ultimate customers utilize transmission systems that are participating

or have agreed to participate in Commission-approved ISOs without implicating the

continuing jurisdiction of state commissions over bundled retail power sales. In short, we

have accommodated ISOs that provide service at wholesale as well as at retail, and in

states that have retail choice as well as states that do not have retail choice, and we have

done so without a conflict between state and Federal authority. 

In response to Dynegy's concerns, we do not see any inconsistency in our

requirement that the RTO be the provider of transmission service and our flexibility to

allow various RTO structures. We believe that some of this concern arises from the

meaning of the term "provider of transmission service." When we use the term provider

of transmission service in this context, we are referring to the entity (i.e., the RTO) that
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -56- 

has the primary obligation to ensure that transmission service is provided, not the entity

that may be operating the switches at the direction of the RTO.

In response to SoCal Edison's request for a clarification on the "two-tariff" model,

it would be inappropriate to consider in the Final Rule the specifics of whether a

particular aspect of an existing ISO arrangement would satisfy the RTO requirements. 

We emphasize, however, that we have created a Final Rule that provides clear guidance

as to the RTO requirements and extensive flexibility in how to satisfy those requirements.

The concerns raised by Metropolitan and SoCal Edison with respect to an RTO's

authority over interconnections to the grid have two facets. First, some facilities may not

be under the control of the RTO because they are owned by an entity that has not placed

any facilities under the control of the RTO, e.g., a public power entity. We agree that the

RTO would not have authority over interconnections to that portion of the grid. Second,

some facilities may not be under the control of the RTO even though they are owned by

an entity that has placed other facilities under the control of the RTO. For example, in

the NEPOOL region, only Pool Transmission Facilities (PTF) were placed under the

control of ISO-NE. However, ISO-NE nonetheless has authority over interconnections to

non-PTF transmission facilities. We would expect similar arrangements to be part of any

RTO proposal.

We disagree with SoCal Edison's point that RTOs can exercise no authority over

interconnections because that authority resides only with the Commission under sections
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -57- 

46PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 87 FERC ¶ 61,299 (1999), reh'g denied, 89 FERC

¶ 61,186 (1999).

47See Ameren Operating Companies, 89 FERC ¶ 61,041 (1999), order on reh'g, 89

FERC ¶ 61,208 (1999); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, et al., 88 FERC ¶

61,138 (1999).

48See id.; New England Power Pool, et al., 87 FERC ¶ 61,043 (1999).

202 and 210 of the FPA. An interconnection obligation is an element of transmission

service and is already required to be provided under our pro forma tariff that will be

administered by the RTO. 46 As EPSA notes, this is true, whether the interconnection

request is tendered concurrently with a request for transmission service or in advance of a

request for a specific transmission service. 47 It is therefore appropriate for the RTO to

be the entity that reviews and approves interconnection requests. However, we agree

with SoCal Edison that transmission owners must remain an integral part of the

interconnection process. We also agree with Dynegy that new generators should not have

to negotiate separately with the RTO and individual transmission owners. We expect

one-stop shopping under any RTO. 48 Finally, we agree with EEI that the RTO's

authority over new interconnections does not suggest that entities incurring costs to

provide those interconnections will not be compensated.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -58- 

49FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,126.

2. Congestion Management

In the Final Rule, the Commission concluded that an RTO must ensure the

development and operation of market mechanisms to manage congestion. 49 The market

mechanisms must provide transmission customers with efficient price signals regarding

the consequences of transmission use decisions. We asserted that these pricing proposals

should ensure that (1) the generators dispatched in the presence of transmission

constraints are those that can serve system loads at least cost and (2) limited transmission

capacity is used by market participants that value that use most highly. The Final Rule

did not prescribe a specific congestion pricing mechanism; instead, RTOs have

considerable flexibility to propose a congestion pricing method that is bested suited to

their circumstances.

Rehearing Requests

Dynegy argues that because congestion management is a "hot" topic, the

Commission should hold a technical conference on issues surrounding congestion

management and RTOs. 

TDU Systems requests clarification that the Commission has not mandated or

approved the auction of limited transmission capacity to the highest bidder in all

circumstances. TDU Systems asks whether the market participant who can pay the most

for the capacity is necessarily the one who will maximize the overall societal benefits of
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -59- 

obtaining it and whether the entity that can afford to pay the most on that day is the

supplier who can pay the going rate specifically because it has decided to avoid serving

loads of poorer residential consumers. TDU Systems state that, while they do not expect

the Commission to have immediate answers to these questions, they urge the Commission

to make clear that the subject remains open for discussion. TDU Systems contends that,

otherwise, unfettered reliance on market mechanisms in transmission pricing may become

a recipe for new forms of undue discrimination. 

Commission Conclusion

We deny Dynegy's request, as part of this rehearing order, to direct a technical

conference on congestion management issues. We agree that congestion management

issues may be significant and controversial and expect that parties will use the

collaboration process to tackle these issues. 

As requested by TDU Systems, we confirm that Order No. 2000 does not mandate

or pre-approve any particular form of market mechanism for congestion management. 

Furthermore, we agree that congestion pricing must satisfy the same standards as any

other rate, term or condition of service, i.e., just, reasonable, and not unduly

discriminatory or preferential. We encourage that parties use the collaborative process to

identify their concerns about congestion pricing. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -60- 

50See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,140.

3. Ancillary Services

In the Final Rule, the Commission concluded that an RTO must serve as the

provider of last resort of all ancillary services required by Order No. 888 and subsequent

orders. 50 The Commission also allowed RTOs to propose other ancillary services in

recognition of local or regional conditions. Moreover, the Commission concluded that

real-time balancing markets are essential for the development of competitive power

markets and an RTO must ensure that its transmission customers have access to a realtime balancing market that is developed and operated by either the RTO itself or another

entity that is not affiliated with any market participant. 

Rehearing Requests

Steel Dynamics requests rehearing of the Commission's decision not to establish

standard definitions for energy imbalance services, and requests a determination that an

hourly assessment of such imbalances is the proper standard for FERC-approved

ancillary services. In the alternative, Steel Dynamics requests that the Commission

establish a generic proceeding to provide guidance on the development of real-time

energy imbalance markets and energy imbalance services.

On rehearing, TDU Systems argues that backup and hour-to-hour load following

service should be added to the mandatory ancillary services menu. In the alternative,

TDU Systems requests that the Commission: (1) clarify that proposals to augment the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -61- 

Order No. 888 menu of ancillary services offerings are appropriate subjects for

negotiation during the collaborative process; (2) clarify that the Commission will

entertain proposals by market participants as well as RTOs to augment the menu of RTO

ancillary services, whatever the outcome of the regional process; and (3) clarify that

additional ancillary services may be proposed on bases other than local or regional

conditions.

Duke seeks clarification that in the discussion of balancing the Commission was

not referring to inadvertent interchange. Duke notes that inadvertent interchange is the

integration of all of the mismatches within a control area over a time period, typically a

single hour, while energy and generation imbalances are the integration of a particular

transmission customer's load mismatches for any particular scheduled transmission.

EEI requests that the Commission provide congruence in the deadlines for the

deployment of both congestion management and real-time balancing markets, a year after

an RTO commences initial operation. EEI argues that real-time information is needed to

operate a real-time balancing market and this information requires investment and

installation of metering equipment. In addition, EEI notes that operating a real-time

balancing market encompasses full coordination across interconnections.

Commission Conclusion

We deny the request to establish a generic proceeding to provide guidance on the

development of real-time energy imbalance markets and energy imbalance services. We
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -62- 

51We note that NERC is currently evaluating issues related to inadvertent

interchange practices and the economic incentives of operating a control area as a source

(continued...)

agree with Steel Dynamics that these issues may be significant and controversial and

expect parties to use the collaboration process to address these issues.

We also decline to mandate additional ancillary services as part of this Final Rule,

but we clarify that proposals for the RTO to offer additional services is an appropriate

topic for discussion during the collaborative process. We expect that one of the benefits

of RTOs is that they will be responsive to the needs of transmission users and consider

additional services beyond those mandated in Order No. 888 for service on an individual

system basis. While market participants are free to propose revisions to RTO proposals

that are ultimately filed with the Commission, it is preferable that these issues be

thoroughly raised and considered during the collaborative process. 

We clarify that the RTO's responsibility for operating a balancing market is

intended to address the energy and generation imbalances that are associated with

customers' transactions. However, we did express our concern that transmission users

had unequal access to balancing options depending on whether they also operate a control

area. We recognize that inadvertent interchange among control areas is intended to

address different operational matters, but there is some concern among industry

participants that control area operators have the ability to use inadvertent interchange as a

low cost source of energy imbalance service. 51
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -63- 

51(...continued)

of low cost balancing options. See Report to Board of Trustees (Feb. 7-8, 2000).

We are not persuaded by EEI that we should extend the deadline for real-time

balancing markets. We understand that such markets may require technological support

and investment in metering equipment, but we believe that these issues can be resolved

within the current deadline. 

4. OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and Available 

Transmission Capability (ATC)

The Final Rule provides that the RTO must independently calculate ATC and TTC

values based on data developed partially or totally by the RTO. When data are supplied

by others, the Final Rule stated that the RTO must create a system of checks and tests to

ensure unbiased data and coordination. Also, the Commission concluded that issues

relating to capacity benefit margin (CBM) were outside the scope of this proceeding and

we noted that CBM issues can be addressed in Docket No. EL99-46-000.

Rehearing Requests

Conectiv requests clarification that a non-profit ISO, which is an RTO, shall

accept equipment ratings and other verifiable transmission data from member

transmission owners to be used in the calculation of ATC and TTC values. Conectiv is

concerned that an RTO may deny the use of verifiable data such as equipment ratings and

impose its own different standard. According to Conectiv, the non-use of transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -64- 

owners' verifiable data, such as equipment ratings by an RTO, may influence

transmission investment and levels of reliability on the transmission owners' systems. 

TAPS argues that the Commission should clarify that RTOs have the authority to

independently review, verify and modify CBM in setting ATC and TTC with the RTO's

CBM values controlling pending ADR. TAPS asserts that CBM is a key component that

goes into the computation of ATC and failure to include CBM within RTO authority will

make RTO authority over ATC meaningless. 

Commission Conclusion

 In the Final Rule, we concluded that the RTO should calculate ATC/TTC values

based on data developed partially or totally by the RTO. In addition, the Commission

required that RTOs independently verify data supplied by transmission owners for the

calculation of ATC/TTC. Accordingly, we agree with Conectiv that an RTO can rely on

data provided by the transmission owner provided that the data is verifiable by the RTO. 

In response to TAPS, we recognize that CBM is an important component in

calculating ATC. However, as noted in the Final Rule, issues relating to CBM are too

detailed to be addressed at this time and should be addressed when RTO proposals are

filed. We agree that these issues need to be resolved because the RTO cannot accurately

compute ATC without also resolving CBM issues. 

 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -65- 

52FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,064 and 31,156.

5. Market Monitoring

In the Final Rule, the Commission concluded that market monitoring is an

important tool for ensuring that markets within RTOs do not result in transactions or

operations that are unduly discriminatory or preferential or provide opportunity for the

exercise of market power. In section 35.34(k)(6) of the regulatory text, we outlined the

minimum standards that RTOs' market monitoring plans must satisfy. We also provided

latitude to the RTO and market participants to design a market monitoring plan that best

fits the circumstances of the RTO and the structure and design of its power markets. In

addition, the Final Rule requires than an RTO propose an objective market monitoring

plan to assess whether the RTO's involvement in markets favors its own economic

interest. 52

Rehearing Requests

PSE&G reiterates the concerns it raised in its NOPR comments about the need for

and extent of a market-monitoring function for RTOs, and asks that it be eliminated as

one of the RTO's functions. PSE&G also notes that, while the Final Rule declined to

sunset the market monitoring function as PSE&G had proposed, it noted that as bulk

power markets evolve and become more competitive, we may revisit the need for the type

of monitoring the Rule requires. Pointing to this observation, PSE&G proposes that the

Commission at least amend the regulation to allow the market participants the flexibility
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -66- 

to evolve to a more competitive state where the intrusion of a market monitor is no longer

necessary. To this end, PSE&G proposes the following language to section 35.34(k)(6): 

"(iv) The market monitoring plan may provide for its automatic expiration within a fixed

period of time, provided that the Commission finds that the markets administered by the

RTO are operating competitively without regulatory supervision." 

Conectiv argues that the Commission erred in giving the authority to remedy

market power abuses to RTOs. Instead, Conectiv asserts that RTOs should be limited to

investigating and reporting market power abuses. Conectiv is concerned that if an RTO is

permitted to take an enforcement role in punishing market power abuses, the RTO might

create anticompetitive effects in the market by discriminating in punishments. Duke

expresses the same concerns as Conectiv and argues that the monitoring arm of RTOs

should not be provided policing authority over market participants. Duke contends that

an RTO should only be permitted to administer penalties and sanctions to which parties

have voluntarily agreed by contract with the RTO. 

Dynegy continues to be concerned that RTOs are market participants and

therefore, Dynegy requests that the Commission clarify that the market monitoring plans

proposed by RTOs must include a plan to assess whether the RTO is able to favor its own

interests over those of its customers or members via its involvement in markets in which

it participates. Furthermore, Dynegy requests clarification that an objective market
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -67- 

monitoring plan to assess an RTO's own involvement must be performed by an

independent auditor. 

PP&L requests rehearing of the Commission's decision to expand the role of RTO

market monitoring to the investigation and determination of individual market participant

behavior. PP&L argues that the Commission's responsibility to identify and address the

existence and exercise of market power and other anticompetitive activity may not be

delegated to private parties such as RTOs. PP&L asserts that the FPA contains no

authority for the Commission to delegate to private parties the enforcement of

Commission's obligations to prevent discrimination and to regulate the public interest,

and furthermore, the delegation of investigatory and regulatory authority to private parties

is disfavored under Federal law.

EEI requests that the Commission require that market monitoring plans evolve as

market structures evolve and mature. EEI recommends that the Commission reconsider

the need for a process through which each RTO and its market participants can regularly

assess the scope of market monitoring, the responsibilities of the monitoring unit and the

types of data and information that are necessary to effectively monitor. 

Commission Conclusion

For the reasons given in the Final Rule, we reject PSE&G's request to eliminate

the market monitoring function completely. We also reject PSE&G's proposed

modification to the market monitoring requirement. While we agree with PSE&G that
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -68- 

53See New York Independent System Operator, Inc., et al., 89 FERC ¶ 61,196

(1999); New England Power Pool, 85 FERC ¶ 61,379 (1998).

54FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,156.

the market monitoring function may change over time, it would be premature to assume,

as PSE&G proposes, that parties can now predict that, by a date certain, all market

monitoring functions should terminate. The Commission will periodically assess the

need and degree of market monitoring that should be done by the RTOs. Accordingly,

we agree with EEI that an important element of any market monitoring plan may be a

process that provides for the periodic evaluation of the plan's design and effectiveness. 

We believe that this is an issue that should be raised during the collaborative process.

We believe that Conectiv's, Duke's, and PP&L's concerns about enforcement are

premature and should be addressed when specific RTO proposals are developed and filed

with the Commission. 53 We are not delegating our statutory authority and responsibility;

however, we believe RTOs can help us understand and identify market problems. RTOs

will be permitted to take actions only within specified parameters that are contained in a

Commission-approved tariff. 

We provide the clarification requested by Dynegy that the requirement referenced

in the Final Rule 54 concerning a monitoring plan to assess the RTO's involvement in

markets would be proposed at the same time as the market monitoring plan related to the

markets the RTO operates and administers.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -69- 

6. Planning and Expansion

The Commission concluded that the RTO must have ultimate responsibility for

planning, and for directing or arranging, necessary transmission expansions, additions and

upgrades within its region that will enable the RTO to provide efficient, reliable and nondiscriminatory service. The Final Rule recognized the statutory authority of the states to

regulate siting of transmission facilities and we concluded that the RTO's planning and

expansion process must be designed to be consistent with state and local responsibilities. 

In addition, the Commission encouraged the development of multi-state agreements or

compacts to review and approve new transmission facilities. Moreover, the Commission

recognized that the planning and expansion function may require coordination among

multiple parties and regulatory jurisdictions and established a three year deadline for

satisfying this function. 

Rehearing Requests

TDU Systems agree that transmission planning and expansion is a vital function

for RTOs to perform, and on rehearing, TDU Systems argue that RTOs should be

required to be capable of performing its planning and expansion responsibilities on the

first day of RTO operation.

NY Transmission Owners seek three clarifications on planning and expansion

issues: (1) clarify that Order No. 2000 does not displace the legal rights of owners of the

transmission assets, including the right to propose and build expansions to transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -70- 

systems to meet obligations under state law; (2) clarify that the Commission intends to

require RTOs to adhere to the statutory requirements under FPA sections 210, 211 and

212 concerning any mandated interconnections or expansions, including statutory

provisions respecting cost recovery; and (3) clarify that, if an RTO directs the

construction of potentially uneconomic facilities, the transmission owners will not be

required to bear the risk of any such facilities. 

Duke notes that there may be situations where, regardless of the planning process

used, and despite the best efforts of the RTO, transmission expansion cannot be

effectuated. For example, Duke states that a state commission could choose not to

participate in the multi-state process, or decide not to grant permission to construct. In

these situations, Duke asserts that neither the Commission nor the RTO have legal or

regulatory authority to compel the state commission to act in a different manner. 

Therefore, on rehearing, Duke asks that the Commission provide that in a situation in

which, despite good-faith efforts by the RTO, certain transmission facilities cannot be

built, the RTO consequently is relieved of the responsibility placed on it for directing or

arranging necessary transmission additions and upgrades. Likewise, EEI asks that the

Commission clarify that any obligation to upgrade or expand transmission is subject to

good faith efforts to obtain the necessary approvals under federal, state or local law.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -71- 

55See, e.g., pro forma tariff provisions at sections 15.4, 19.6, 20, and 28.2.

Commission Conclusion

We agree with TDU Systems that transmission planning and expansion are vital

functions, but disagree that we can expect RTOs to be capable of performing these

functions on the first day of RTO operation. 

As we understand it, NY Transmission Owners are concerned on the one hand that

they might not be compensated for any expansion that they undertake at the direction of

the RTO, and on the other hand, that they might be precluded from expanding their

systems on their own initiative without a directive by the RTO. We agree that a

transmission owner is entitled to compensation for construction undertaken at the

directive of an RTO, and we expect that these issues will be resolved systematically by

the RTO. We also clarify that our Final Rule does not preclude a transmission owner

from expanding its system on its own initiative; however, it would be prudent for the

transmission owner in that case to resolve compensation issues in advance with the RTO.

In response to Duke, we clarify that the transmission expansion obligations are no

greater than we established in the pro forma tariff. 55 States, of course, retain siting

authority. However, among the benefits of an RTO is that expansion will reflect the

result of a regional process that can involve regional regulatory authorities, and since the

transmission system will be operated regionally, there may be more than one expansion
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -72- 

56FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,166-68.

alternative that could resolve the situation. We expect utilities to make good faith efforts

to achieve the RTO's desired transmission expansion.

7. Interregional Coordination

In the Final Rule, the Commission added a general interregional coordination

requirement as one of the minimum RTO functions. 56 Under this requirement, the RTO

must ensure the integration of reliability practices within an interconnection and market

interface practices among regions. The Final Rule envisioned some level of

standardization and practices, including coordination and sharing of reliability data and

data for TTC and ATC calculation, transmission reservation practices and congestion

management.

Rehearing Requests

Dynegy requests expedited implementation of the interregional coordination

function and proposes the creation of an interregional transmission system coordinator

(ITSC) to accomplish the following functions:

(1) Resolving "physics" issues over broad geographic regions using flow-based 

modeling, thereby " internalizing" loop flow. This can be accomplished by:

• Expanding use of NERC's interchange distribution calculator (IDC) to 

determine and verify ATC calculations of existing transmission providers,

whether they are individual utilities, ISOs or transcos and to determine and
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -73- 

57See Dynegy Request for Clarification and Rehearing at 13.

verify transfer capabilities at interfaces.

(2) Serving as a grid operations manager (similar to an air traffic controller). 

The interregional transmission system coordinator could:

• Monitor and oversee the grid;

• Act as a seams coordinator;

• Serve as the Security Coordinator;

• Coordinate consistency of operating rules, e.g., schedule deadline for 

submitting nominations;

• Oversee low-level market monitoring; and

• Enforce ATC and reliability rules

(3) Performing regional reliability functions on behalf of a Self-Regulatory

Organization. 57

Dynegy points out that the ITSC would not impinge on the majority of functions

the Commission has assigned RTOs. Instead, Dynegy argues that the ITSC would

complement RTOs by ensuring that ATC is calculated in a consistent manner or by

ensuring tariffs and protocols do not conflict or cause unwanted market or reliability

impacts. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -74- 

58See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,170.

Commission Conclusion

We will deny Dynegy's request for expedited implementation of the interregional

coordination function. However, we continue to believe that the coordination of

activities among regions is an important element in maintaining a reliable and efficient

transmission system. We expect that the parties will use the collaborative process to

discuss issues relating to interregional coordination and Dynegy's suggestions. 

D. Open Architecture

In the Final Rule, we adopted the principle of open architecture in order that the

RTO and its members have the flexibility to improve their organizations in the future. 

The Commission stated that an RTO must have the flexibility to unilaterally propose

changes to its enabling agreements to meet changing market organization and policy

needs. 58 We noted, however, that open architecture should not be interpreted to mean

the unfettered ability for an RTO to modify its structure or processes. Under the Final

Rule, proposed changes to the RTO's jurisdictional rate schedules and contracts will be

subject to Commission review and approval under the FPA on a case-by-case basis.

Rehearing Requests

EEI states that transmission owners should have fundamental rights, such as the

right to terminate their participation in the RTO, the right to switch to another RTO, the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -75- 

59FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,170.

right to merge RTOs, the right to recover their costs and a return on investment, and the

right to protect their assets and employees from damages and injuries. EEI asks the

Commission to clarify that these existing rights and obligations are recognizable and

enforceable, and that the RTO should not be able to unilaterally abrogate these rights. 

NY Transmission Owners also request clarification that transmission owners'

fundamental rights cannot be altered under the Final Rule's open architecture

requirements. NY Transmission Owners are concerned that an RTO may be allowed to

change the essential terms of the RTOs enabling agreements under the Final Rule's open

architecture policy.

Commission Conclusion

On rehearing, some transmission owners restate their concern that open

architecture places them at risk for being bound to an arrangement that is fundamentally

different from the one they agreed to join. We believe that this is a legitimate concern

that must be addressed in any RTO proposal. In addition, in the Final Rule we agreed

that "the flexibility implied by open architecture should not be interpreted to mean

unfettered ability on the part of the RTO to modify its structures or processes." 59

Accordingly, any RTO proposals or changes to existing agreements, which will be

changes to the RTO's jurisdictional rate schedule(s) and contracts, will be subject to

Commission review and approval under the FPA. All changes to an approved RTO will
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -76- 

60FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,174.

be examined on a case-by-case basis with interested parties having an opportunity to

comment on any proposal. Open architecture is aimed at removing barriers to ongoing

market improvements and is not intended to allow unilateral changes without a full airing

of issues by all affected parties and review by the Commission.

E. Transmission Ratemaking

1. Pancaked Rates

The Final Rule noted that the elimination of pancaked rates within a region is a

central goal of our RTO policy. 60 While it is acceptable to assess an access charge to

recover capital costs, we stated that transmission customers should not be required to pay

multiple access charges for crossing corporate utility boundaries in an RTO region.

Rehearing Requests

EEI contends that the Final Rule provides no analysis of the impact of the

elimination of rate pancaking on wheeling rates and revenue. It argues that the policy

ignores the impact of loop flows on transmission owners' property rights and infringes on

state authority over service territory boundary setting. EEI goes on to suggest that the

policy against pancaked rates be modified to allow an RTO to justify that its pancaked

rates are just and reasonable.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -77- 

61Id. at 31,177.

Commission Conclusion

We deny rehearing of the Final Rule's policy prohibiting pancaked rates. Nonpancaked rates are a central attribute of RTO formation. We have found that pancaking

of access charges acts as a major detriment to competition in the bulk power market. We

believe that the allowance of transitional use of license plate rates and certain innovative

rate provisions of the Final Rule will serve to protect transmission owners' property

rights.

2. Uniform Access Charges

The Final Rule recognized that the pancaked rate prohibition can present problems

for RTOs whose participants have divergent transmission cost structures. 61 An

immediate move to a uniform access charge across the entire RTO could cause disruptive

cost shifting among owners. We decided to apply flexibility in the use of license plate

rates, echoing our approach in the ISO approvals to date. The Final Rule allowed RTO

applicants to propose license plate rates for a fixed term of the applicant's choosing. 

Under Order No. 2000, license plate rates could be extended beyond the initial period if

supported by the facts at that time.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -78- 

62See Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection, 81 FERC ¶ 61,257

(1997).

Rehearing Requests

PSE&G complains that the Final Rule's policy on license plate rates is unfair to

members of existing ISOs who will have to face uniform rates at a date certain

established in the orders approving those ISOs. In light of the Final Rule's policy on

license plate rates, PSE&G argues that PJM should be relieved of the requirement to file

uniform access rates by July 1, 2002. 62

TAPS contends that the policy on license plate rates should be amended to include

an explicit requirement that all transmission owners be compensated for the use of their

facilities.

Commission Conclusion

 We deny rehearing of our policy on license plate rates. We shall not address in

this rehearing order PSE&G's request that PJM be relieved of its obligation to file a

uniform access charge by 2002. PJM's RTO compliance filing will be tendered well

before that date and the Commission will consider any proposal to continue license plate

rates proposed by the RTO as a whole in the context of the overall RTO proposal. 

As to TAPS' request that we modify the Final Rule's license plate policy, we agree

with TAPS that all transmission owners should be compensated for the use of their

facilities, although we cannot conclude in this rehearing order what types of
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -79- 

63FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,177.

64See id. at 31,180.

compensation methods should be used in a particular circumstance. As we stated in the

Final Rule, a certain level of detail in ratemaking matters is beyond the Final Rule's

scope, including issues such as TAPS' concern, and we will decide these issues on a caseby-case basis. 63

3. Service to Transmission-Owning Utilities That Do Not

Participate in an RTO

In the Final Rule, we stated that where a transmission customer of an RTO or the

customer's affiliate owns, controls or operates transmission in the RTO's region, and is

not participating in that particular RTO, we intend to permit that RTO to propose rates,

terms, and conditions of transmission service that recognize the participatory status of the

customer. 64 The Commission concluded that each proposal will be examined on a caseby-case basis. In addition, we noted that some transmission owners may face legal

obstacles to RTO participation that need to be taken into account in the proposals.

Rehearing Requests

NRECA argues that the Commission should not unjustly reward RTOs by

allowing them to charge higher rates to non-participants where such non-participation

results from the RTOs' failure to reasonably accommodate the needs of non-participation

during the RTO formation process. NRECA requests that the Commission clarify that
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -80- 

proposals to charge individual system rates to a transmission customer who is a nonparticipant of the RTO may not be made unconditionally and must account for the

reasons underlying non-participation. Dairyland also asserts that the Commission must

make clear that non-public utilities will not be penalized through the imposition of

disadvantageous pricing, terms and conditions for transmission service from an RTO if

solutions to the barriers non-public utilities face in joining RTOs cannot be developed

through the collaborative process.

Metropolitan, EEI, SMUD and NY Transmission Owners argue that the

Commission erred in permitting RTOs to charge individual rates to a transmission

customer who is a non-participating transmission owner in the RTO region and that this

provision should be deleted. These entities assert that this aspect of the Final Rule

violates prohibitions against undue discrimination embodied in the Commission's

comparability pricing principles requiring that differences in rates be based on differences

in costs incurred to provide service. In addition, EEI asserts that this provision

contravenes the Commission's determination to pursue a voluntary approach for RTO

formation. South Carolina Authority and TANC/MID also argue that the Commission

should grant rehearing and amend the Final Rule to prohibit discriminatory rates for

utilities that do not join RTOs. South Carolina Authority asserts that because the

Commission lacks the authority to require RTO participation directly, subjecting parties

who do not participate in an RTO to less favorable rates, terms and conditions of service
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -81- 

65FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,183.

would be unlawfully discriminatory. TANC/MID contends that the Commission failed to

adequately explain its decision to permit RTOs to propose rates that penalize nonparticipants. 

Commission Conclusion

As we noted in the Final Rule, proposals to charge different rates to non-RTO

participants must be demonstrated to be just and reasonable. We agree that such

demonstration must account for the reasons underlying non-participation including,

among other things, impediments to participation that could not be overcome through the

collaborative process. We do not agree with the premise of some of the petitioners who

conclude that rate differences of any type constitute undue discrimination. Finally, we

disagree that the fact that we will entertain such proposals is inconsistent with our

voluntary approach to RTO formation. The Final Rule neither requires nor pre-approves

this type of rate treatment. Rather, we simply declined to prohibit these types of rate

proposals entirely. 

4. Performance-Based Rate Regulation

The Final Rule invited RTO applicants to file voluntary performance-based

regulation (PBR) proposals. 65 We provided guidance as to what constitutes a good PBR

design in the RTO context. Under Order No. 2000, PBR plans can be filed subsequent to

the filing or approval of the RTO proposal. The Commission concluded that proposals
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -82- 

66Id. at 31,173.

for PBR should be fully documented with the necessary information to evaluate costs and

benefits.

Rehearing Requests

Industrial Consumers argue that the Commission does not have sufficient basis to

abandon traditional cost-of-service principles in favor of PBR. They contend that the

Commission may not have met legal requirements to enact such a policy shift. Further,

Industrial Consumers complain that the Commission has not inquired sufficiently into the

impact of PBR on customers of transmission service.

Commission Conclusion

As we noted in the Final Rule, we are not abandoning the fundamental

underpinnings of our traditional transmission pricing policies, i.e., that transmission

prices must reflect costs of transmission service. 66 The fact that performance-based

pricing mechanisms rely, in part, on benchmarks other than the transmission provider's

own costs (e.g., industry performance indices or normative goals) does not constitute a

departure from cost-of-service principles. Moreover, we have not in the Final Rule

approved any specific PBR. Any entity proposing a PBR mechanism would have to

include in its request, as required by section 35.34(e)(1), explanations of how the rate

would help achieve the goals of RTOs, including efficient use of and investment in the

transmission system and reliability benefits to consumers; a cost-benefit analysis
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -83- 

67Id. at 31,185.

68See id. at 31,193-94.

including rate impacts, and why the rate treatment is appropriate for the RTO. The Final

Rule also discussed a number of principles relating to PBR design. 67 We will analyze

the merits of specific PBR mechanisms when they are proposed.

5. Other RTO Transmission Ratemaking Reforms

a. Levelized Rates

One of the innovative rate options we discussed in the Final Rule is flexibility in

the use of levelized rates to recover the cost of transmission assets. Commission policy

does not normally allow changes from non-levelized to levelized rates when customer

rates are impacted. The Final Rule allowed more flexibility in the use of levelized rates

in RTO tariffs. 68 We believed that this flexibility is reasonable because the rates will be

offered in a restructured market and will represent a new service in many ways.

Rehearing Requests

Metropolitan, TANC/MID, NRECA and Dairyland argue that the Commission's

policy on levelized rates for RTOs will double charge existing transmission customers

who have been paying depreciation charges in existing rates. These entities take issue

with Order No. 2000's determination that an RTO's transmission tariff would be for a new

service to new customers. They claim that many existing customers would be forced to

pay twice for the same facility.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -84- 

6985 FERC ¶ 61,274 (1998).

EPSA suggests that the double charging of existing customers may be largely

avoided by allowing levelized rates only on the net, depreciated plant costs.

TDU Systems argues that the policy in Order No. 2000 on levelized rates is

arbitrary and capricious because the need for flexibility does not justify a policy change

that would require existing customers to pay twice for the same investment. TDU

Systems says that the Commission's policy in Kentucky Utilities 69 should be applied to

RTO transmission rates.

Commission Conclusion

We deny rehearing of our use of increased flexibility in considering rates based on

levelized recovery of capital costs. We disagree that our decision on levelized rates

reflects a policy change. Our prior cases dealt with rates charged by a single utility for

service over its system. The customers did not change and the service did not change

materially over time. Under an RTO, customers will receive service over multiple

systems at a single, non-pancaked rate. Different customers will be served by the

multiple systems and different services will be provided. This is a material change that

warrants appropriate transmission ratemaking reform.

Finally, we do not agree that allowing levelized rates constitutes the payment for

the same facilities twice. We reaffirm the explanation for considering levelized rates set
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -85- 

70FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,193-94.

71Id. at 31,192-93.

out in Order No. 2000. 70 Customers do not buy facilities; they buy service. Moreover,

the notion that any RTO customer who paid rates for past services based on the cost of

facilities that now comprise a portion of the RTO grid is somehow entitled to RTO rates

based on the same ratemaking treatments is not only unjustified, but also unworkable. 

Going forward, customers will be paying rates for expanded and more flexible

services at rates that, in total, are significantly lower than the rates offered under

individual tariffs. Moreover, going forward, levelized rates have the beneficial effect of

charging customers the same rates for use of the same system regardless of when they

take service. The sweeping reorganization of the transmission grid that will occur as the

result of the Commission's RTO initiative and the industry's own movement towards

unbundling of the assets themselves is the best time to consider what type of rate

treatments, going forward, will best serve the needs of competitive energy markets.

b. Return on Equity

Several of the innovative rate options in the Final Rule involve adjustments to the

return on equity allowed in the calculation of transmission rates. 71 These options

include: formulary rates, risk adjustments and rates of return that do not vary with

changes in the capital structure. We offered these options because they remove some of
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -86- 

the disincentives that may accompany joining an RTO, they recognize changes in risk

involved in restructuring and they take some account of the changes in the industry that

have an impact on owners' risk.

Rehearing Requests

NRECA and TDU Systems ask that the Commission clarify its position on the

increased risk that RTOs will be expected to experience. They are concerned that the

Commission may have prejudged the issue and determined that RTOs will experience

greater risk entitling them to a higher rate of return. They ask the Commission to clarify

that the Commission will assess the risk of each RTO based on evidence brought to bear

on a case-by-case basis.

Industrial Consumers argue that the Commission cannot assume that participation

in an RTO increases risks for transmission owners. On the contrary, they argue that

evidence shows that risks involved in RTO participation and divested transmission

operation will actually be lower. Industrial Consumers point to findings of the California

Public Utilities Commission and commentaries of utility investment analysts to support

its proposition. They state further that risks are lower for RTO participants because of

the statutory requirement that regulators allow a reasonable rate of return, unbundling

will shield transmission owners from prudence reviews on the generation side, and more

competitive generation will reduce bypass opportunities.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -87- 

72Id. at 31,194.

Commission Conclusion

The Final Rule draws no conclusions about the risks of a transmission-only

business. It simply observes that the uncertainty created during the restructuring

transition may increase risk. We have not prejudged the risk issue, and that issue will be

determined case-by-case.

c. Accelerated Depreciation and Incremental Pricing for New

Transmission Investments

The Final Rule recognized that new transmission investment may need innovative

rate treatment to make necessary enhancements viable in the RTO context. For that

reason, we stated that we would consider proposals to allow accelerated depreciation of

new transmission assets and proposals to charge incremental rates for new investment

while charging embedded rates for existing investment. 72

Rehearing Requests

TANC/MID claims that the Commission's willingness to consider accelerated

depreciation and incremental pricing for new investment is arbitrary and capricious and is

not supported by substantial evidence. It claims that transmission projects are impeded

more by siting and environmental concerns than by inadequate financing. TANC/MID

also argues that incremental pricing for new investment while applying average pricing

for existing facilities violates the Commission's policy against "and" pricing.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -88- 

73Inquiry Concerning the Commission's Pricing Policy for Transmission Services

Provided by Public Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, Policy Statement, FERC

Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,005 (1994), clarified, 71 FERC ¶ 61,195 (1995).

TDU Systems disagrees with the Commission that accelerated depreciation and

incremental pricing are needed for new transmission investment. It finds them

unwarranted deviations from established pricing policy. If the Commission adopts such

rate policies for RTOs, it should require that any affected new facilities be put out for

competitive bid.

Commission Conclusion

With respect to accelerated depreciation for new transmission investment, as with

the other innovative rate treatments discussed in the Final Rule, we did not guarantee that

it would be allowed in every situation. Rather, we stated that we were willing to provide

the flexibility to permit RTOs to propose non-traditional depreciation schedules. All such

proposals will be required to be supported by the explanations and analyses set forth in

section 35.34(e)(1). We do not believe that our willingness to consider such proposals is

arbitrary and capricious. 

We disagree that we have departed from our policy against "and" pricing. The

form of "and" pricing that the Commission has prohibited is described in the

Transmission Pricing Policy Statement. 73 There we addressed "and" pricing at the

corporate level, i.e., proposals by individual transmission providers to assess certain
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -89- 

74FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,165.

customers both an embedded cost rate and an incremental cost rate, while assessing only

an embedded cost rate to their own uses of the transmission system. While the pricing

proposals we will entertain for RTOs may combine elements of embedded cost rates and

incremental cost rates, they do not constitute corporate "and" pricing. Indeed, we have

already approved these rate forms for most existing ISOs, noting for example, that it is

acceptable to charge both a non-pancaked access fee based on embedded costs and an

incremental charge reflecting opportunity costs or expansion costs. Significantly, unlike

the corporate "and" pricing prohibited under our Transmission Pricing Policy Statement,

the objective of this pricing proposal is not to make the cost faced by one group of

transmission users (i.e., the wholesale customer) higher than another's (i.e., native load). 

Rather, this type of pricing is intended to (1) reduce the cost of transmission over

multiple utility systems in both constrained and unconstrained situations and (2) rely on

congestion charges to provide a uniform price signal to all users in constrained situations.

We shall not dictate that an RTO put transmission projects out for competitive bid. 

As we noted in the Final Rule, the Commission will not mandate any specific approach in

how an RTO satisfies the function of planning and expansion. 74

d. Other Innovative Rate Issues

Rehearing petitions were filed on other innovative rate issues as described below.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -90- 

Rehearing Requests

NRECA is concerned that some of the innovative rate proposals discussed in

Order No. 2000 may produce rates significantly higher than the rates that would be

approved under existing cost-of-service principles. NRECA asks that the Commission

clarify that the reasonableness of innovative rates offered by an RTO must be measured

against established cost of service principles.

EEI suggests that the innovative ratemaking treatments be extended to all

transmission-owning public utilities, even to non-RTOs. TAPS contends that the

Commission should require RTOs seeking rate incentives to make them available to

entities, other than existing transmission owners, who are willing to invest in

transmission.

SoCal Edison requests that the Commission clarify that transmission owners who

participate in an ISO type of RTO may file for innovative rate treatments. SoCal Edison

states that the language in the Final Rule seems to imply that only an RTO can seek

innovative rate treatment. It contends that there is no rationale for precluding

transmission owners from seeking innovative rates if the desired rate treatment otherwise

comports with Order No. 2000's requirements. Further, it states that the ROE-based

innovative rate treatments are more appropriate for the revenue requirement filing that

can be made by transmission owners. Therefore, SoCal Edison asks the Commission to

clarify that transmission owners as well as RTOs can seek innovative rate treatment.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -91- 

75Id. at 31,173.

76Id. at 31,172. See also section 35.34(e)(1)(i).

Commission Conclusion

In response to NRECA, we reaffirm our statement in the Final Rule that the

innovative rate treatments we have offered do not depart from cost of service principles,

i.e., that transmission prices must reflect the costs of providing the service. 75

 

We reject EEI's request to extend the innovative rate treatments to public utilities

that do not participate in RTOs. The Final Rule addresses RTOs; the innovative rate

treatments discussed in the Final Rule must be justified in terms of how the proposed rate

treatment would help achieve RTO goals. 76 It is outside the scope of this rulemaking to

address the extent to which such innovative rate treatments could be justified in the

absence of RTO benefits.

We agree with SoCal Edison that some of the ROE-based innovative rate

treatments relate most directly to the revenue requirement and, in the ISO context, the

transmission owner may be responsible for filing the revenue requirement under section

205 of the FPA. A proposed innovative ROE treatment for a transmission owner's

revenue requirement can best be evaluated in the context of any other innovative rate

treatments proposed for the RTO. In addition, the justification required by section

35.34(e) involves an evaluation of factors related to the RTO as a whole, not only the
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -92- 

77FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,196.

revenue requirement of an individual owner. The collaborative process provides an

important opportunity for the parties to consider the procedures that will apply to the

filing of innovative rate treatments. 

6. Additional Ratemaking Issues

There were several ratemaking issues not discussed above that were introduced in

the Final Rule and addressed in petitions for rehearing. In the Final Rule, we determined

that these issues, while important, were at a level of detail that they were better

considered in individual RTO proposals. 77

Rehearing Requests

Duke asks for clarification as to how RTO development and operating costs will

be recovered. Duke asserts that such costs can be quite high, and even though the

Commission is apparently committed to allowing such reasonable costs in transmission

rates, Duke is concerned about what happens if state regulators do not authorize charging

such costs to bundled retail transmission customers. Duke seeks clarification that if

certain non-jurisdictional customers cannot be charged, the Commission will allow

wholesale and unbundled retail customers to bear all the costs.

TAPS suggests that the Commission should require RTOs seeking rate incentives

to make them available to other market participants.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -93- 

78Id. at 31,195.

SoCal Cities requests that the Commission clarify our description of its position on

time-differentiated rates 78 to state: "Metropolitan and Cal DWR favor the use of timeof-use pricing or off-peak rates for transmission; SoCal Cities oppose any generalized

requirement for time-differentiated transmission rates."

Commission Conclusion

We decline to make any generic rulings, in the abstract, on the recovery of RTO

development and operating costs. We do not agree that the benefits of RTOs flow only to

wholesale markets. For example, retail suppliers will benefit by access to regional

markets at non-pancaked rates under an RTO. However, we are cognizant that there may

be limitations on the ability of transmission providers to provide for recovery of these

costs from all retail ratepayers in the near-term. We encourage parties to raise these

issues during the collaboration process and to involve state regulators and representatives

of retail consumers in these discussions. We expect that any RTO proposal will address

these matters.

In response to TAPS, there is nothing in our Final Rule that precludes an RTO

from involving entities other than existing transmission owners in transmission

expansion. Indeed, we expect that the innovative rate treatments we have adopted will

provide greater flexibility to RTOs in ensuring timely and efficient expansion.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -94- 

79Id. at 31,196.

We accept SoCal Cities' clarification of its position.

7. Filing Procedures for Innovative Rate Proposals

As articulated in the Final Rule, the Commission will evaluate all RTO proposals

including any innovative rate treatment based on the applicant's demonstration of how the

proposed rate treatment would help achieve the goals of regional transmission

organizations, including efficient use of and investment in the transmission system and

reliability benefits. 79 We also required that applicants provide a cost-benefit analysis,

including rate impacts, and demonstrate that the proposed rate treatment is appropriate for

the proposed RTO and that the rate proposal is just, reasonable, and not unduly

discriminatory. In addition, the Final Rule stated that pricing proposals involving

moratoriums and returns on equity that do not vary according to capital structure may not

be included in RTO rates after January 1, 2005. 

Rehearing Requests

EEI and SoCal Edison argue that the Commission should eliminate the

requirement of a cost-benefit analysis in order to receive innovative rates. These entities

note that cost-benefit analyses are difficult to perform, speculative in nature, and are

likely to result in expensive and time-consuming litigation of competing hypotheticals

and models. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -95- 

Alliance Companies contend that the choice of January 1, 2005 is arbitrary and

capricious, and unlikely to accomplish the Commission's goal of encouraging voluntary

formation of RTOs. Alliance Companies requests that the Commission eliminate the

sunset provision, and permit transmission owner participants in an RTO to address these

issues in their RTO applications. Likewise, EEI is concerned with the sunset provision of

January 1, 2005. EEI asserts that the Commission should not sunset innovative rate

methods, but review them on a case-by-case basis instead.

Commission Conclusion

We shall not eliminate the cost-benefit analysis requirement. Those urging us to

consider the transmission rate reforms we adopted in the Final Rule argued that

innovative rate treatments would create tangible benefits for electric markets. Moreover,

we expect that an evaluation of the impacts of any proposed rate treatment on electric

markets would be an integral part of the process that filing parties would undertake before

selecting and filing a specific innovative rate treatment. 

We disagree that our selection of the sunset date is arbitrary and capricious. As

we noted in the Final Rule, the innovative rate treatments which are available for a

limited time are appropriate during a transitional period only. The transition period we

selected reflects a reasonable balance of the benefits to RTO formation provided by

mechanisms such as a rate moratorium and the inability to rely on these mechanisms for

an extended period of time.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -96- 

80FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,200-02.

F. Other Issues

1. Public Power and Cooperatives

The Final Rule concluded that a properly formed RTO should include all

transmission owners in a specific region, including municipals, cooperatives, Federal

Power Marketing Agencies, Tennessee Valley Authority and other state and local

entities. 80 Section 35.34(d)(4) of the regulatory text required that an RTO proposal filed

with the Commission include a description of "efforts made to include public power

entities in the proposed Regional Transmission Organization."

Rehearing Requests

NRECA and Dairyland seek clarification and revision of section 35.34(d)(4) of the

regulatory text. These entities assert that the Commission inadvertently failed to include

the term "cooperatives" in the regulatory text, while the corresponding text of the

preamble repeatedly referred to public power entities and cooperatives separately. 

 East Texas Cooperatives assert that although the Final Rule directs RTOs to

include public power and cooperatives in the planning process, it does not require RTOs

to allow small transmission owners to place their facilities under the RTO tariff and

recover a portion of their annual transmission revenue requirements through the RTO

tariff. East Texas Cooperatives argue that it does little good to require RTOs to include
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -97- 

81While the filing requirements of section 35.34(c) apply only to public utilities, 

we will permit submittals by non-public utilities if they wish to inform the Commission

of their views. 

cooperatives in the development process if the RTO may refuse to allow the cooperative

to place its facilities under the RTO tariff and receive an allocation of revenue.

Commission Conclusion

As requested by NRECA and Dairyland, we clarify that section 35.34(d)(4) should

include cooperatives consistent with the text of the preamble. In fact, our intent was for

those proposing RTOs to consult with all non-public utility transmission owners in its

region. We will revise section 35.34(d)(4) to read as follows, with the addition to the text

underlined: "Any proposal filed under this paragraph (d) must include an explanation of

efforts made to include public power entities and electric power cooperatives in the

proposed Regional Transmission Organization."

In response to East Texas Cooperatives, the Commission explained in the Final

Rule that participation by public power entities and cooperatives is vital to ensure that

each RTO is appropriate in size and scope. We continue to expect public power entities

and cooperatives to join RTOs and to participate fully in RTO formation and operation. 81

Furthermore, we agree that all transmission owners should be compensated for the use of

their facilities, although we cannot conclude in this rehearing order what types of

compensation methods should be used in a particular circumstance. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -98- 

82FERC Stats. & Reg. ¶ 31,089 at 31,205.

2. Existing Transmission Contracts

In the Final Rule, the Commission concluded it is not appropriate to order generic

abrogation of existing transmission contracts at this time. 82 We adopted the measured

approach of addressing the issue of existing transmission contracts on an RTO-by-RTO

basis and we stated that each RTO can propose whatever contract reform is necessary. 

The Commission stated that its goal in review of existing transmission contracts is to

balance the desire to honor existing contractual arrangements with the need for a uniform

approach for transmission pricing and the elimination of pancaked rates. 

Rehearing Requests

Metropolitan, PSE&G and TANC/MID request rehearing on this issue. 

Metropolitan and TANC/MID argue that the Commission failed to provide a reasonable

explanation for encouraging RTOs to propose piecemeal abrogation of existing contracts

and that this policy is a departure from Order No. 888. PSE&G asserts that the

Commission erred in refusing to address treatment of existing contracts on a generic basis

and that the Commission should allow existing contracts to remain in effect following the

formation of an RTO.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -99- 

83Id.

84Id. at 31,027.

Commission Conclusion

We clarify that Order No. 2000 did not order abrogation of existing transmission

contracts. We continue to recognize that existing contracts represent negotiated

agreements. However, this issue has arisen in every ISO filing tendered to date, and we

intend to address the issue of existing transmission contracts on an RTO-by-RTO basis

when it arises again. RTOs may propose whatever contract reform they conclude is

necessary to convert from existing contracts to RTO service. The circumstances faced by

each region may differ significantly and the likelihood that parties can reach agreement

on how to resolve this issue is enhanced if they have the flexibility to design regionspecific solutions. As we stated in the Final Rule: "[O]ur goal in reviewing existing

transmission contracts and contract transition plans is to balance the desire to honor

existing contractual arrangements with the need for a uniform approach for transmission

pricing and the elimination of pancaked rates." 83 

3. Lighter Handed Regulation

In the Final Rule, the Commission concluded that a properly structured RTO

would reduce the need for Commission oversight and scrutiny, which would benefit both

the industry and the Commission. 84 We stated that some degree of deference could be
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -100- 

granted on certain issues to independent RTOs that have appropriate procedural

mechanisms in place to ensure adequate representation of all viewpoints. In the Final

Rule, the Commission noted that we cannot delineate the appropriate degree of deference,

or on what issues. We believe, however, to the extent an issue can be resolved fairly

within a region without Commission involvement, benefits accrue to all parties. 

Rehearing Requests

Dynegy argues that the Commission's deference standard has the potential to

confer broad unilateral powers on RTOs. Dynegy requests that the Commission: (1)

clarify that if a party challenges the bona fides of an alleged consensus, the Commission

will independently examine the facts and circumstances to determine if there was a true

consensus; and (2) clarify that if an RTO seeks deference on the adoption of a particular

rule, the Commission will ensure that the rule is promulgated in advance pursuant to

appropriate internal procedures and subject to Commission review.

Commission Conclusion

At the outset, we note that we will continue to apply the level of regulation and

scrutiny that is necessary to ensure that public utilities comply with the FPA and our

regulations. We confirm that our purpose is not to rely solely on consensus as the basis

for accepting RTO provisions. However, we intend to give considerable weight to those

aspects of an RTO proposal that result from good faith efforts and an inclusive

collaboration process. We encourage all parties to participate in the collaborative
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -101- 

85See id. at 31,226.

process and to consider the diverse interests and needs of the other participants. In this

rehearing order, we will not dictate the procedures that RTOs must follow in adopting

and promulgating rules. We expect, however, that these procedures will be clearly

defined in any RTO proposal that is filed with the Commission.

G. Implementation Issues

1. Filing Requirements

In the Final Rule, the Commission required that all public utilities that own,

operate or control interstate transmission facilities (except those already participating in

an approved regional transmission entity) file by October 15, 2000, either a proposal to

participate in an RTO or an alternative filing describing efforts and plans to participate in

an RTO. 85

Rehearing Requests

NRECA notes that some entities (small utilities as defined by the Small Business

Association and entities with only limited and discrete transmission facilities that do not

form an integrated transmission grid) have been granted waivers of some of the

requirements of Order Nos. 888 and 889. NRECA requests that the Commission clarify

that utilities with such waivers also be granted waivers from the filings mandated by

section 35.34(c). NRECA argues that the transmission facilities owned by a utility
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -102- 

86We also clarify that we are not precluding such entities from participating in

joint filings with other public utilities or having other public utilities file on their behalf.

holding waivers from Order Nos. 888 and 889 are not critical to an RTO and that the

costs associated with making the section 35.34(c) filing will exceed the benefits. 

Commission Conclusion

We deny NRECA's request to waive the filing requirements of section 35.34(c) to

entities that have been granted waivers from some of the requirements of Order Nos. 888

and 889. We note that the Final Rule only requires that each public utility that owns,

operates or controls transmission facilities participate in one-time filings proposing an

RTO or make a filing explaining why they are not participating in an RTO proposal. In

any filing explaining why they are not participating in an RTO, we will allow entities that

previously have been granted waiver from some or all of the requirements of Order Nos.

888 and 889 to make an abbreviated filing. 86 However, we expect that all utilities,

including those transmission-owning utilities that received waivers, will participate in the

collaborative process. Moreover, during the collaborative process, we expect those

utilities to consider their involvement in an RTO, e.g., to ensure that formation of an RTO

is not impaired by the exclusion of their limited transmission facilities. 

2. Deadline for RTO Operation

In the Final Rule, the Commission retained the originally proposed startup and

other functional implementation deadlines (RTO startup by December 15, 2001,
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -103- 

87See FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,229.

implementation of congestion management by December 15, 2002, and implementation

of the parallel path flow coordination and transmission planning and expansion functions

by 2004). 87

Rehearing Requests

Duke is concerned that it will not be able to comply with the time schedule set

forth in Order No. 2000 for formation of an RTO without infringing on state jurisdiction

over retail electric service. Duke requests clarification that the timetables set forth in

Order No. 2000 are merely benchmarks and that Commission will permit public utilities

to transition to RTO membership in a manner that is coordinated with state retail service

restructuring and unbundling. In addition, EEI argues that the time schedules for RTO

implementation are unreasonable and unrealistic given the record of RTO formation to

date. EEI requests that the Commission modify the time schedules consistent with the

flexibility shown throughout the Final Rule and to reflect a reasonable timetable for the

development and implementation of an RTO.

Commission Conclusion

We will deny EEI's request to modify the time schedules adopted in the Final

Rule. We will also reject Duke's clarification that the RTO operational deadlines in the

Final Rule are merely benchmarks. We continue to believe that the timetable for RTO
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -104- 

88See id. at 31,229.

formation and implementation established in the Final Rule is feasible and realistic. First,

we note that all industry participants and the Commission have learned a great deal

during the formation of the five ISOs under Commission jurisdiction and this knowledge

should facilitate RTO formation. Second, the Final Rule provided flexibility that enables

an RTO to satisfy the minimum characteristics and functions in a cost efficient manner. 

Moreover, we adopted a longer phase-in period for functions that may be difficult to

establish, such as congestion management, parallel path flow measures, and transmission

planning and expansion. In response to Duke, we stated in the Final Rule that "an

acceptable RTO structure need not be a monolithic organization that requires an extended

period of time to become fully set up so that it can directly 'push all of the buttons.'" 88 In

sum, we continue to think that the phased startup and other implementation deadlines are

reasonable. 

IV. REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires rulemakings to either contain a description

and analysis of the effect that a proposed or Final Rule will have on small entities or to

contain a certification that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities. In Order No. 2000, the Commission certified that

the Final Rule would not impose a significant economic impact on a substantial number
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -105- 

89The OMB control numbers for this collection of information are 1902-0096 and

1902-0082.

of small entities. No rehearing requests of Order No. 2000 were filed on this issue and

the Commission finds no reason to alter its previous findings on this issue.

V. PUBLIC REPORTING BURDEN AND INFORMATION COLLECTION

STATEMENT

Order No. 2000 contained an information collection statement that the

Commission submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 89 Given that

this order on rehearing makes only minor revisions to Order No. 2000, OMB approval

for this order will not be necessary. However, the Commission will send a copy of this

order to OMB for informational purposes.

The information reporting requirements under this order are unchanged from those

contained in Order No. 2000. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting

requirements by contacting the following: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888

First Street, NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Michael Miller, Office of the Chief

Information Officer, Phone: (202) 208-1415, fax: (202) 208-2425, E-mail: 

mike.miller@ferc.fed.us] or send your comments to the Office of Management and

Budget, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Washington, DC 20503,

[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, phone: (202)

395-3087, fax: (202) 395-7285].
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -106- 

VI. EFFECTIVE DATE AND CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION

Changes to Order No. 2000 made in this order on rehearing will become effective

on [30 days after publication in the Federal Register].

VII. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY

In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the

Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the

contents of this document via the Internet through FERC's Home Page

(http://www.ferc.fed.us) and in FERC's Public Reference Room during normal business

hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street, N.E., Room 2A,

Washington, D.C. 20426.

From FERC's Home Page on the Internet, this information is available in both the

Commission Issuance Posting System (CIPS) and the Records and Information

Management System (RIMS).

• CIPS provides access to the texts of formal documents issued by the

Commission since November 14, 1994. CIPS can be accessed using the

CIPS link or the Energy Information Online icon. The full text of this

document will be available on CIPS in ASCII and WordPerfect 8.0 format

for viewing, printing, and/or downloading.

• RIMS contains images of documents submitted to and issues by the

Commission after November 16, 1981. Documents from November 1995
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -107- 

to the present can be viewed and printed from FERC's Home Page using the

RIMS link or the Energy Information Online icon. Descriptions of

documents back to November 16, 1981, are also available from RIMS-onthe-Web; requests for copies of these and other older documents should be

submitted to the Public Reference Room.

User assistance is available for RIMS, CIPS, and the Website during normal

business hours from our Help line at (202) 208-2222 (e-mail to WebMaster@ferc.fed.us)

of the Public Reference Room at (202) 208-1371 (e-mail to

public.referenceroom@ferc.fed.us).

During normal business hours, documents can also be viewed and/or printed in

FERC's Public Reference Room, where RIMS, CIPS, and the FERC Website are

available. User assistance is also available.

List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35

Electric power rates, Electric utilities, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements

By the Commission.

( S E A L )

David P. Boergers,

 Secretary.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -108- 

In consideration of the foregoing, the Commission amends Part 35, Chapter I, Title

18 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 35 - FILING OF RATE SCHEDULES

1. The authority citation for Part 35 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a-825r, 2601-2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101-

7352.

2. Part 35 is amended by revising § 35.34 to read as follows:

Subpart F - Procedures and Requirements Regarding Regional Transmission

Organizations

§ 35.34 Regional Transmission Organizations.

(a) Purpose. This section establishes required characteristics and functions for

Regional Transmission Organizations for the purpose of promoting efficiency and

reliability in the operation and planning of the electric transmission grid and ensuring

non-discrimination in the provision of electric transmission services. This section further

directs each public utility that owns, operates, or controls facilities used for the

transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce to make certain filings with respect

to forming and participating in a Regional Transmission Organization.

(b) Definitions. 

(1) Regional Transmission Organization means an entity that satisfies the

minimum characteristics set forth in paragraph (j) of this section, performs the functions
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -109- 

set forth in paragraph (k) of this section, and accommodates the open architecture

condition set forth in paragraph (l) of this section.

(2) Market participant means:

(i) Any entity that, either directly or through an affiliate, sells or brokers electric

energy, or provides ancillary services to the Regional Transmission Organization, unless

the Commission finds that the entity does not have economic or commercial interests that

would be significantly affected by the Regional Transmission Organization's actions or

decisions; and 

(ii) Any other entity that the Commission finds has economic or commercial

interests that would be significantly affected by the Regional Transmission Organization's

actions or decisions.

(3) Affiliate means the definition given in section 2(a)(11) of the Public Utility

Holding Company Act (15 U.S.C. 79b(a)(11)). 

(4) Class of market participants means two or more market participants with

common economic or commercial interests.

(c) General rule. Except for those public utilities subject to the requirements of

paragraph (h) of this section, every public utility that owns, operates or controls facilities

used for the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce as of March 6, 2000

must file with the Commission, no later than October 15, 2000, one of the following: 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -110- 

(1) A proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization consisting

of one of the types of submittals set forth in paragraph (d) of this section; or 

(2) An alternative filing consistent with paragraph (g) of this section. 

(d) Proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization. For purposes

of this section, a proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization means: 

(1) Such filings, made individually or jointly with other entities, pursuant to

sections 203, 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as

are necessary to create a new Regional Transmission Organization;

(2) Such filings, made individually or jointly with other entities, pursuant to

sections 203, 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as

are necessary to join a Regional Transmission Organization approved by the Commission

on or before the date of the filing; or

(3) A petition for declaratory order, filed individually or jointly with other entities,

asking whether a proposed transmission entity would qualify as a Regional Transmission

Organization and containing at least the following:

(i) A detailed description of the proposed transmission entity, including a

description of the organizational and operational structure and the intended participants;

(ii) A discussion of how the transmission entity would satisfy each of the

characteristics and functions of a Regional Transmission Organization specified in

paragraphs (j), (k)and (l) of this section; 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -111- 

(iii) A detailed description of the Federal Power Act section 205 rates that will be

filed for the Regional Transmission Organization; and

(iv) A commitment to make filings pursuant to sections 203, 205 and 206 of the

Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824b, 824d, and 824e), as necessary, promptly after the

Commission issues an order in response to the petition.

(4) Any proposal filed under this paragraph (d) must include an explanation of

efforts made to include public power entities and electric power cooperatives in the

proposed Regional Transmission Organization.

(e) Innovative transmission rate treatments for Regional Transmission

Organizations.

(1) The Commission will consider authorizing any innovative transmission rate

treatment, as discussed in this paragraph (e), for an approved Regional Transmission

Organization. An applicant's request must include:

 (i) A detailed explanation of how any proposed rate treatment would help achieve

the goals of Regional Transmission Organizations, including efficient use of and

investment in the transmission system and reliability benefits to consumers;

(ii) A cost-benefit analysis, including rate impacts; and

(iii) A detailed explanation of why the proposed rate treatment is appropriate for

the Regional Transmission Organization.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -112- 

The applicant must support any rate proposal under this paragraph (e) as just, reasonable,

and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.

(2) For purposes of this paragraph (e), innovative transmission rate treatment

means any of the following: 

(i) A transmission rate moratorium, which may include proposals based on

formerly bundled retail transmission rates; 

(ii) Rates of return that:

(A) Are formulary; 

(B) Consider risk premiums and account for demonstrated adjustments in risk; or

(C) Do not vary with capital structure; 

(iii) Non-traditional depreciation schedules for new transmission investment; 

(iv) Transmission rates based on levelized recovery of capital costs; 

(v) Transmission rates that combine elements of incremental cost pricing for new

transmission facilities with an embedded-cost access fee for existing transmission

facilities; or

(vi) Performance-based transmission rates.

(3) A request for performance-based transmission rates under this paragraph (e)

may include factors such as: 

(i) A method for calculating initial transmission rates (including price caps and any

provisions for discounting); 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -113- 

(ii) A mechanism for adjusting initial rates, which may be derived from or based

upon external factors or indices or a specific performance measure; 

(iii) Time periods for redetermining initial rates; and 

(iv) Costs to be excluded from performance-based rates. 

(4) An innovative transmission rate treatment or any other rate proposal made for

an approved Regional Transmission Organization may be requested as part of any filing

that is made under paragraph (d) of this section or in any subsequent rate change proposal

under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d). Unless otherwise ordered

by the Commission, an approved Regional Transmission Organization may not include in

rates any innovative transmission rate treatment under paragraphs (e)(2)(i) and

(e)(2)(ii)(C) of this section after January 1, 2005.

(f) Transfer of operational control. Any public utility's proposal to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization filed pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this section

must propose that operational control of that public utility's transmission facilities will be

transferred to the Regional Transmission Organization on a schedule that will allow the

Regional Transmission Organization to commence operating the facilities no later than

December 15, 2001.

Note to paragraph (f): The requirement in paragraph (f) of this section may be

satisfied by proposing to transfer to the Regional Transmission Organization ownership

of the facilities in addition to operational control. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -114- 

(g) Alternative filing. Any filing made pursuant to paragraph (c)(2) of this section

must contain:

(1) A description of any efforts made by that public utility to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization; 

(2) A detailed explanation of the economic, operational, commercial, regulatory,

or other reasons the public utility has not made a filing to participate in a Regional

Transmission Organization, including identification of any existing obstacles to

participation in a Regional Transmission Organization; and 

(3) The specific plans, if any, the public utility has for further work toward

participation in a Regional Transmission Organization, a proposed timetable for such

activity, an explanation of efforts made to include public power entities in the proposed

Regional Transmission Organization, and any factors (including any law, rule or

regulation) that may affect the public utility's ability or decision to participate in a

Regional Transmission Organization.

(h) Public utilities participating in approved transmission entities. Every public

utility that owns, operates or controls facilities used for the transmission of electric

energy in interstate commerce as of March 6, 2000, and that has filed with the

Commission on or before March 6, 2000 to transfer operational control of its facilities to

a transmission entity that has been approved or conditionally approved by the

Commission on or before March 6, 2000 as being in conformance with the eleven ISO
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -115- 

principles set forth in Order No. 888, FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations

Preamble January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access and Stranded

Costs), must, individually or jointly with other entities, file with the Commission, no later

than January 15, 2001:

(1) A statement that it is participating in a transmission entity that has been so

approved; 

(2) A detailed explanation of the extent to which the transmission entity in which

it participates has the characteristics and performs the functions of a Regional

Transmission Organization specified in paragraphs (j) and (k) of this section and

accommodates the open architecture conditions in paragraph (l) of this section; and

(3) To the extent the transmission entity in which the public utility participates

does not meet all the requirements of a Regional Transmission Organization specified in

paragraphs (j), (k), and (l) of this section, 

(i) A proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization that meets

such requirements in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, 

(ii) A proposal to modify the existing transmission entity so that it conforms to the

requirements of a Regional Transmission Organization, or 

(iii) A filing containing the information specified in paragraph (g) of this section

addressing any efforts, obstacles, and plans with respect to conformance with those

requirements.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -116- 

(i) Entities that become public utilities with transmission facilities. An entity that

is not a public utility that owns, operates or controls facilities used for the transmission of

electric energy in interstate commerce as of March 6, 2000, but later becomes such a

public utility, must file a proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization

in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section, or an alternative filing in accordance

with paragraph (g) of this section, by October 15, 2000 or 60 days prior to the date on

which the public utility engages in any transmission of electric energy in interstate

commerce, whichever comes later. If a proposal to participate in accordance with

paragraph (d) of this section is filed, it must propose that operational control of the

applicant's transmission system will be transferred to the Regional Transmission

Organization within six months of filing the proposal.

(j) Required characteristics for a Regional Transmission Organization. A Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the following characteristics when it commences

operation:

(1) Independence. The Regional Transmission Organization must be independent

of any market participant. The Regional Transmission Organization must include, as part

of its demonstration of independence, a demonstration that it meets the following:

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization, its employees, and any nonstakeholder directors must not have financial interests in any market participant. 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -117- 

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have a decision making process

that is independent of control by any market participant or class of participants.

(iii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have exclusive and independent

authority under section 205 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d), to propose rates,

terms and conditions of transmission service provided over the facilities it operates. 

Note to paragraph (j)(1)(iii): Transmission owners retain authority under section 205 of

the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824d) to seek recovery from the Regional Transmission

Organization of the revenue requirements associated with the transmission facilities that

they own. 

(iv)(A) The Regional Transmission Organization must provide:

(1) With respect to any Regional Transmission Organization in which market

participants have an ownership interest, a compliance audit of the independence of the

Regional Transmission Organization's decision making process under paragraph (j)(1)(ii)

of this section, to be performed two years after approval of the Regional Transmission

Organization, and every three years thereafter, unless otherwise provided by the

Commission.

(2) With respect to any Regional Transmission Organization in which market

participants have a role in the Regional Transmission Organization's decision making

process but do not have an ownership interest, a compliance audit of the independence of

the Regional Transmission Organization's decision making process under paragraph
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -118- 

(j)(1)(ii) of this section, to be performed two years after its approval as a Regional

Transmission Organization.

(B) The compliance audits under paragraph (j)(1)(iv)(A) of this section must be

performed by auditors who are not affiliated with the Regional Transmission Organization

or transmission facility owners that are members of the Regional Transmission

Organization.

(2) Scope and regional configuration. The Regional Transmission Organization

must serve an appropriate region. The region must be of sufficient scope and

configuration to permit the Regional Transmission Organization to maintain reliability,

effectively perform its required functions, and support efficient and non-discriminatory

power markets.

(3) Operational authority. The Regional Transmission Organization must have

operational authority for all transmission facilities under its control. The Regional

Transmission Organization must include, as part of its demonstration of operational

authority, a demonstration that it meets the following: 

(i) If any operational functions are delegated to, or shared with, entities other than

the Regional Transmission Organization, the Regional Transmission Organization must

ensure that this sharing of operational authority will not adversely affect reliability or

provide any market participant with an unfair competitive advantage. Within two years

after initial operation as a Regional Transmission Organization, the Regional Transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -119- 

Organization must prepare a public report that assesses whether any division of

operational authority hinders the Regional Transmission Organization in providing

reliable, non-discriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must be the security coordinator for

the facilities that it controls. 

(4) Short-term reliability. The Regional Transmission Organization must have

exclusive authority for maintaining the short-term reliability of the grid that it operates. 

The Regional Transmission Organization must include, as part of its demonstration with

respect to reliability, a demonstration that it meets the following:

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization must have exclusive authority for

receiving, confirming and implementing all interchange schedules. 

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have the right to order

redispatch of any generator connected to transmission facilities it operates if necessary for

the reliable operation of these facilities.

(iii) When the Regional Transmission Organization operates transmission facilities

owned by other entities, the Regional Transmission Organization must have authority to

approve or disapprove all requests for scheduled outages of transmission facilities to

ensure that the outages can be accommodated within established reliability standards.

(iv) If the Regional Transmission Organization operates under reliability standards

established by another entity (e.g., a regional reliability council), the Regional
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -120- 

Transmission Organization must report to the Commission if these standards hinder it

from providing reliable, non-discriminatory and efficiently priced transmission service.

(k) Required functions of a Regional Transmission Organization. The Regional

Transmission Organization must perform the following functions. Unless otherwise

noted, the Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy these obligations when it

commences operations.

(1) Tariff administration and design. The Regional Transmission Organization

must administer its own transmission tariff and employ a transmission pricing system that

will promote efficient use and expansion of transmission and generation facilities. As part

of its demonstration with respect to tariff administration and design, the Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs (k)(1)(i) and

(ii) of this section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or

superior to satisfying such standards.

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization must be the only provider of

transmission service over the facilities under its control, and must be the sole administrator

of its own Commission-approved open access transmission tariff. The Regional

Transmission Organization must have the sole authority to receive, evaluate, and approve

or deny all requests for transmission service. The Regional Transmission Organization

must have the authority to review and approve requests for new interconnections.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -121- 

(ii) Customers under the Regional Transmission Organization tariff must not be

charged multiple access fees for the recovery of capital costs for transmission service over

facilities that the Regional Transmission Organization controls . 

(2) Congestion management. The Regional Transmission Organization must ensure

the development and operation of market mechanisms to manage transmission congestion. 

As part of its demonstration with respect to congestion management, the Regional

Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraph (k)(2)(i) of this

section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to

satisfying such standards.

(i) The market mechanisms must accommodate broad participation by all market

participants, and must provide all transmission customers with efficient price signals that

show the consequences of their transmission usage decisions. The Regional Transmission

Organization must either operate such markets itself or ensure that the task is performed

by another entity that is not affiliated with any market participant.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the market mechanism

requirement no later than one year after it commences initial operation. However, it must

have in place at the time of initial operation an effective protocol for managing congestion.

(3) Parallel path flow. The Regional Transmission Organization must develop and

implement procedures to address parallel path flow issues within its region and with other

regions. The Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy this requirement with
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -122- 

respect to coordination with other regions no later than three years after it commences

initial operation.

(4) Ancillary services. The Regional Transmission Organization must serve as a

provider of last resort of all ancillary services required by Order No. 888, FERC Statutes

and Regulations, Regulations Preamble January 1991-June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on

Open Access and Stranded Costs), and subsequent orders. As part of its demonstration

with respect to ancillary services, the Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the

standards listed in paragraphs (k)(4)(i)-(iii) of this section, or demonstrate that an

alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to satisfying such standards.

(i) All market participants must have the option of self-supplying or acquiring

ancillary services from third parties subject to any restrictions imposed by the Commission

in Order No. 888, FERC Statutes and Regulations, Regulations Preamble January 1991-

June 1996 ¶ 31,036 (Final Rule on Open Access and Stranded Costs), and subsequent

orders.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization must have the authority to decide the

minimum required amounts of each ancillary service and, if necessary, the locations at

which these services must be provided. All ancillary service providers must be subject to

direct or indirect operational control by the Regional Transmission Organization. The

Regional Transmission Organization must promote the development of competitive

markets for ancillary services whenever feasible.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -123- 

(iii) The Regional Transmission Organization must ensure that its transmission

customers have access to a real-time balancing market. The Regional Transmission

Organization must either develop and operate this market itself or ensure that this task is

performed by another entity that is not affiliated with any market participant.

(5) OASIS and Total Transmission Capability (TTC) and Available Transmission

Capability (ATC). The Regional Transmission Organization must be the single OASIS

site administrator for all transmission facilities under its control and independently

calculate TTC and ATC. 

(6) Market monitoring. To ensure that the Regional Transmission Organization

provides reliable, efficient and not unduly discriminatory transmission service, the

Regional Transmission Organization must provide for objective monitoring of markets it

operates or administers to identify market design flaws, market power abuses and

opportunities for efficiency improvements, and propose appropriate actions. As part of its

demonstration with respect to market monitoring, the Regional Transmission Organization

must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs (k)(6)(i) through (k)(6)(iii) of this section,

or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent with or superior to satisfying such

standards.

(i) Market monitoring must include monitoring the behavior of market participants

in the region, including transmission owners other than the Regional Transmission

Organization, if any, to determine if their actions hinder the Regional Transmission
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -124- 

Organization in providing reliable, efficient and not unduly discriminatory transmission

service.

(ii) With respect to markets the Regional Transmission Organization operates or

administers, there must be a periodic assessment of how behavior in markets operated by

others (e.g., bilateral power sales markets and power markets operated by unaffiliated

power exchanges) affects Regional Transmission Organization operations and how

Regional Transmission Organization operations affect the efficiency of power markets

operated by others.

(iii) Reports on opportunities for efficiency improvement, market power abuses and

market design flaws must be filed with the Commission and affected regulatory

authorities. 

(7) Planning and expansion. The Regional Transmission Organization must be

responsible for planning, and for directing or arranging, necessary transmission

expansions, additions, and upgrades that will enable it to provide efficient, reliable and

non-discriminatory transmission service and coordinate such efforts with the appropriate

state authorities. As part of its demonstration with respect to planning and expansion, the

Regional Transmission Organization must satisfy the standards listed in paragraphs

(k)(7)(i) and (ii) of this section, or demonstrate that an alternative proposal is consistent

with or superior to satisfying such standards.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -125- 

(i) The Regional Transmission Organization planning and expansion process must

encourage market-driven operating and investment actions for preventing and relieving

congestion.

(ii) The Regional Transmission Organization’s planning and expansion process

must accommodate efforts by state regulatory commissions to create multi-state

agreements to review and approve new transmission facilities. The Regional Transmission

Organization's planning and expansion process must be coordinated with programs of

existing Regional Transmission Groups (See § 2.21 of this chapter) where appropriate.

(iii) If the Regional Transmission Organization is unable to satisfy this requirement

when it commences operation, it must file with the Commission a plan with specified

milestones that will ensure that it meets this requirement no later than three years after

initial operation.

(8) Interregional coordination. The Regional Transmission Organization must

ensure the integration of reliability practices within an interconnection and market

interface practices among regions.

(l) Open architecture.

(1) Any proposal to participate in a Regional Transmission Organization must not

contain any provision that would limit the capability of the Regional Transmission

Organization to evolve in ways that would improve its efficiency, consistent with the

requirements in paragraphs (j) and (k) of this section.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -126- 

(2) Nothing in this regulation precludes an approved Regional Transmission

Organization from seeking to evolve with respect to its organizational design, market

design, geographic scope, ownership arrangements, or methods of operational control, or

in other appropriate ways if the change is consistent with the requirements of this section. 

Any future filing seeking approval of such changes must demonstrate that the proposed

changes will meet the requirements of paragraphs (j), (k) and (l) of this section.
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -127- 

(Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.)

Appendix to Preamble-- List of Petitioners

Abbreviation -- Petitioner

1. AEP -- American Electric Power System

2. Alliance Companies -- American Electric Power Service Corporation, Consumers 

Energy Company, Detroit Edison Company, FirstEnergy Corp. and Virginia 

Electric and Power Company

3. CCEM -- Coalition for a Competitive Electricity Market

4. CFA -- Consumer Federation of America

5. Conectiv -- Conectiv

6. CTA -- Competitive Transmission Association, Inc.

7. Dairyland -- Dairyland Power Cooperative

8. Duke -- Duke Energy Corporation

9. Dynegy -- Dynegy Inc.

10. East Texas Cooperatives -- East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc., Northeast Texas 

Electric Cooperative, Inc., Sam Rayburn G&T Electric Cooperative, Inc., Tex-La 

Electric Cooperative of Texas, Inc.

11. EEI -- Edison Electric Institute

12. Entergy -- Entergy Services, Inc.

13. EPSA -- Electric Power Supply Association

14. Independent Companies -- New England Power Company, Montaup Electric 

Company, National Grid Group, plc, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, 

Metropolitan Edison Company, Pennsylvania Electric Company, Vermont Electric 

Power Company and NSTAR Services Company

15. Industrial Consumers -- Electricity Consumers Resource Council, American 

Iron & Steel Institute and Chemical Manufactures Association

16. ISO Participants -- Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Conectiv, Consolidated 

Edison Company of New York, Inc., Northeast Utilities Service Company, PP&L, 

Inc., Potomac Electric Power Company, Public Service Electric and Gas Company

17. Metropolitan -- Metropolitan Water District of Southern California

18. Midwest ISO Participants -- Alliant Utilities, Ameren, Central Illinois Light 

Company, Cinergy Corp., Commonwealth Edison Company, Hoosier Energy 

Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., Illinois Power Company, Kentucky Utilities 

Company, Louisville Gas & Electric Company, Northern States Power Company, 
Docket No. RM99-2-001 -128- 

Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company, Southern Illinois Power Cooperative, 

Wabash Valley Power Association, Inc. and Wisconsin Electric Power Company

19. New Orleans -- Council of the City of New Orleans

20. NRECA -- National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

21. PECO -- PECO Energy Company

22. Pennsylvania Commission -- Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

23. PP&L Companies -- PP&L, Inc., PP&L EnergyPlus Co., LLC and PP&L 

Montana, LLC

24. PSE&G -- Public Service Electric and Gas Company

25. Puget Sound -- Puget Sound Energy, Inc.

26. SMUD -- Sacramento Municipal Utility District

27. Snohomish -- Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County, Washington

28. SoCal Cities -- Cities of Anaheim, Azusa, Banning, Colton, and Riverside, 

California

29. SoCal Edison -- Southern California Edison Company

30. South Carolina Authority -- South Carolina Public Service Authority

31. Southern Company -- Southern Company Services, Inc. acting as agent for 

Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, GulfPower Company, 

Mississippi Power Company and Savannah Electric and Power Company

32. SRP -- Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District

33. Steel Dynamics -- Steel Dynamics, Inc.

34. TANC/MID -- Transmission Agency of Northern California/Modesto 

Irrigation District

35. TAPS -- Transmission Access Policy Study Group

36. TDU Systems -- Alabama Electric Cooperative, Inc., Arkansas Electric 

Cooperative Corporation, Golden Spread Electric Cooperative, Kansas Electric 

Power Cooperative, Inc., North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation, Old 

Dominion Electric Cooperative, Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. and South 

Mississippi Electric Power Association

37. Transmission Owners of NY -- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, 

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., Long Island Power Authority, 

New York State Electric & Gas Corporation, Niagara Mohawk Power 

Corporation, Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Rochester Gas & Electric 

Corporation, Power Authority of the State of New York

38. United Illuminating -- United Illuminating Company