United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued January 28, 2009

Decided June 23, 2009

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

  KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

       JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2994

BRENT ALLAN WINTERS,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN TAYLOR,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District

of Illinois.

No. 3:08‐cv‐216‐JPG‐DGW

J. Phil Gilbert,

Judge.

O R D E R

Brent Winters sued John Taylor, a federal public defender, for making slanderous

statements about Winters during the course of a tax fraud prosecution. The district court

dismissed Winters’s claim on the ground that Taylor, a federal employee acting within the

scope of his authority, was entitled to sovereign immunity. Rather than appeal that dismissal,

Winters fileda secondactionagainstTaylor basedon the same allegedly slanderous statements.

The district court again dismissed Winters’s suit based on the grounds of sovereign immunity

and issue preclusion. This time, Winters appealed, but because we conclude that the district

court’s judgment in Winters’s first action precludes this second action, we affirm.   

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2994 Page 2

BACKGROUND

In April 2006, the United States charged Winters, Ken Tylman, and Debra Hills with filing

a fraudulent tax return and conspiracy to defraud the IRS. The district court appointed Taylor,

a federal public defender, to represent Tylman. At the end of a meeting between Taylor and

Tylman atthe federal courthouse inUrbana,Illinois,Taylor allegedly shouted thatWinters and

his co‐defendants were “all guilty” and “all fuckin’ liars.” Taylor’s statements were within

earshot of Hills and other bystanders in the courthouse hallway.

Based on Taylor’s statements, Winters filed a complaint of slander in Illinois state court,

naming Taylor and the Office of the Federal Public Defender as defendants. The defendants

removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) based on the federal defense of

sovereign immunity. The district court agreed that the defendants were entitled to sovereign

immunity because, based on the allegations in Winters’s complaint, Taylor “made the

statements in the scope of his federal authority” while representingTylman. Having concluded

that Winters’s claim was barred by sovereign immunity, the court dismissed Winters’s

complaint “for lack of jurisdiction.”

Winters did not appeal the district court’s dismissal of his first action. Instead, he returned

to Illinois state court and filed a second action based on the same statements. Winters’s second

complaint named only Taylor as a defendant and, in addition to a slander count, contained a

count of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Taylor again removed the case to federal

court, citing the federaldefenses of claim preclusion,issuepreclusion, andsovereignimmunity.

The district court dismissed Winters’s slander claim on the ground of issue preclusion, since

the court had decided that exact claim in favor of Taylor in the first action. As for Winters’s

emotional distress claim, the court held that this claim was barred by sovereign immunity,

since Winters’s suit against “a federal officer in his official capacity [was] tantamount to a suit

against the United States.”

Winters appeals, arguing that the district court should have remanded the case to state

court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, Winters argues that the court

erred in recognizing Taylor’s sovereign immunity defense without conducting an evidentiary

hearing on whether Taylor’s statements were within the scope of his federal employment.

ANALYSIS

Beginning with Winters’s jurisdictional challenge, Winters argues that removal was

improper becausehis complaintdidnotpleada federal question, as requiredforremovalunder

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, in addition to § 1441(a), Taylor’s notice ofremoval cited, and the

district courtrelied on, § 1442(a), which allows federal officers sued in state court to remove the

case to federal court if they raise a colorable federal defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); Mesa v.
No. 08‐2994 Page 3

California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989). Taylor raised the defense of sovereign immunity, claiming

that he made the allegedly slanderous statements while “acting solely in his official capacity”

as a federal public defender “and/or acting under color of authority [of law].” This claim of

sovereign immunity is sufficiently “colorable” to support removal under § 1442(a). Cf. In re

Subpoena in Collins, 524 F.3d 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (recognizing a federal employee’s

sovereign immunity defense against a subpoena seeking “facts [the employee] observed by

virtue of his official duties and in his official capacity as a federal employee”). Although we

conclude below that Taylor does not actually win this case on the basis of sovereign immunity,

that outcome does not make removal improper. The federal officer need only assert a defense

that is “plausible,” not necessarily successful, to remove under § 1442(a). Venezia v. Robinson,

16 F.3d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1994).     

On the merits of Taylor’s sovereign immunity defense, in Winters’s first slander action, the

district court held that Taylor was entitled to sovereign immunity because he “made the

statements in the scope of his federal authority” as a public defender. Then, in this action, the

court concluded that Winters’s slander claim was barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

The issue of Taylor’s sovereign immunity defense against Winters’s claim was “actually

litigated” and “essential” to the final judgment in the first action. H‐D Mich., Inc. v. Top Quality

Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2007) (providing the elements of an issue preclusion, or

“collateral estoppel,” defense).

Forthe firsttime on appeal,Winters cites theWestfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679,to illustrate why

Taylor was not entitled to sovereign immunity againstWinters’s claims.TheAct gives a federal

employee immunity against a tort suit arising out of acts committed in the scope of his

employment,providedthatthe employee follows a few, simpleprocedures. First,the employee

must promptly deliverthe pleadings in the suitto theAttorneyGeneral(“AG”) or his designee.

28 U.S.C. § 2679(c)(1). Then, if the AG certifies that the employee “was acting within the scope

of his office or employment” when he committed the alleged tort, the United States “shall be

substituted as the party defendant,” and the employee is off the hook. Id. § 2679(d)(1). Even if

the AG refuses to issue a scope‐of‐employment certification, the employee may petition the

district court to certify that he was acting within the scope of his employment and substitute

the United States as the party defendant. Id. § 2679(d)(3).  

As Winters points out, Taylor never obtained the AG’s certification that his allegedly

slanderous statements were within the scope of his federal employment. Absent such

certification,Winters argues,Taylor has no sovereign immunitydefenseundertheWestfallAct.

We think that Winters’s belated citation to the Westfall Act in this appeal reflects some

uncertainty as to who exactly Winters was suing at various stages of these proceedings. In the

first action, Winters’s complaint named the “Law Firm of Richard H. Parsons [i.e., the Chief
No. 08‐2994 Page 4

Federal PublicDefenderforthe CentralDistrict ofIllinois], Federal PublicDefenders&Richard

Parsons,Esq.,JohnTaylor,Esq., andOthersUnknown.”Thedistrict courtinterpretedWinters’s

complaint as naming the “Office ofthe Federal Public Defender” and officers ofthat agency “in

their official capacities” as defendants. Because the court thought that Winters was suing a

federal agency, the court had no reason to consider the requirements for Westfall certification.

The Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, allows a federal employee sued in an individual capacity

to convert the action to one against the United States, thereby obtaining indirectly the benefit

of the United States’ sovereign immunity. See Sullivan v. United States, 21 F.3d 198, 200 (7th Cir.

1994) (examining whether federal public defenders sued individually were entitled to the

protections of the Act). But federal agencies may assert a sovereign immunity defense directly,

without the aid of the Act. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (“The only

immunities that can be claimed in an official‐capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity

that the entity, qua entity, may possess . . . .”).  

Winters’s second complaint—that is, the complaint in this action—named only “John

Taylor” as a defendant, which suggests a suit against Taylor individually. As an individual

federal employee sued in tort, Taylor should have been able to claim sovereign immunity only

after receiving a Westfall scope‐of‐employment certification. Again, however, the issue of

Westfall certification never arose in the proceedings below because the district court assumed

that Winters’s second action, like his first action, was against “a federal officer in his official

capacity” and therefore “tantamount to a suit against the United States.” This assumption that

Winters was suing a federal agency the second time around is questionable, since Winters’s

second complaint simply named “John Taylor” as the sole defendant. Nevertheless, we believe

that the court’s dismissal of Winters’s second action on the ground of issue preclusion was

correct.

In determining that the defendants in the first action were entitled to sovereign immunity,

the district court found that Winters’s own allegations established that Taylor “made the

statements in the scope of his federal authority” while “representing Tylman” as a public

defender. This finding has issue preclusive effect in Winters’s second action because (1) the

issue of whether Taylor’s allegedly slanderous statements were within the scope of his federal

employment is the same in both actions; (2) the parties actually litigated the issue in the first

action; (3)resolution of this issue was essential to the district court’s final judgment dismissing

Winters’s first action on sovereign immunity grounds; and (4) Winters was fully represented

in the first action. See H‐D Mich., 496 F.3d at 760. So the very issue that Winters seeks to litigate

here, whether Taylor was acting within the scope of his employment, is precluded by the first

action. SinceWinters’s claims are barred by issue preclusion,Winters’s observation that Taylor

failed to comply with the certification requirements of the Westfall Act is inconsequential. At

this point, requiring Taylor to seek a scope‐of‐employment certification through the Act’s

procedures would serve no purpose.
No. 08‐2994 Page 5

Although the district courtrelied on issue preclusion only with respecttoWinters’s slander

claim, we conclude that issue preclusion also bars Winters’s negligent infliction of emotional

distress claim. Winters’s emotional distress claim arises out of the same statements as his

slander claim, and both claims fail if, as the district court found, Taylor was acting within the

scope of his federal authority and therefore entitled to sovereign immunity.   

Winters argues that the district court erred in the first action by finding that Taylor acted

within the scope of his authority without conducting an evidentiary hearing. SinceWinters did

not appeal from the judgment in that action, this argument is not properly before us. See Tartt

v. Nw.Cmty. Hosp., 453 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2006)(applying preclusive effectto a prior district

court judgment that the plaintiff failed to appeal). Moreover, a district court is not required to

conduct an evidentiary hearing on the scope‐of‐employmentissue where, as here,the court can

rely on the plaintiff’s own allegations. See Brumfield v. Sanders, 232 F.3d 376, 379‐80 (3d Cir.

2000) (upholding the district court’s refusal to grant additional discovery on the scope‐of‐

employment question where the AG issued a Westfall certification based on facts pleaded in

the complaint); RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996)

(“No hearing on certification is necessary where even if the plaintiff’s assertions were true, the

complaint allegations establish that the employee was acting within the scope of his/her

employment.”).

One final matter deserves consideration before barring Winters’s case on the ground of

issue preclusion. After concluding in the first action that the defendants were entitled to

sovereign immunity, the district court purported to dismiss the case for “lack of jurisdiction.”

Ordinarily a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction carries no preclusive effect, except with respect

to the jurisdictional ruling itself. Hill v. Potter, 352 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2003). However, as

the district court recognized in this second action, it erred in characterizing its dismissal of the

first action as jurisdictional because “sovereign immunity does not diminish a court’s

subject‐matterjurisdiction.” Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 371 (7th Cir. 2008). We have also

recognized that, although courts sometimes conflate the concepts of sovereign immunity and

subject matter jurisdiction, the availability of a sovereign immunity defense is fully subject to

principles of preclusion. See United States v. County of Cook, Ill., 167 F.3d 381, 385, 389‐90 (7th

Cir. 1999). The district court dismissed Winters’s first action on the ground that Taylor acted

within the scope of his employment and was therefore entitled to sovereign immunity. Having

litigated that issue in the first action, Winters is precluded from rearguing it here.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.