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SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST, PART 1

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 13, 2011

Serial No. 112–27

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Eliot Cohen, Ph.D., Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies, 

The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), The 

Johns Hopkins University ................................................................................... 6

Mr. J. Scott Carpenter, Keston Family Fellow, Washington Institute for Near 

East Policy ............................................................................................................ 12

Mr. Michael Makovsky, Ph.D., Foreign Policy Director, Bipartisan Policy Center .......................................................................................................................... 20

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Eliot Cohen, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 9

Mr. J. Scott Carpenter: Prepared statement ......................................................... 15

Mr. Michael Makovsky, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................. 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 58

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 59

(1)

SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PART 1

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come to order. I want to thank 

everyone for being here. We are going to have votes here very 

shortly, so we are going to try to get at least our opening statements in here. 

I want to welcome all my colleagues to the third hearing of the 

Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia. This hearing was 

called to assess the current trajectory of the political transitions in 

the Middle East, and to take stock of where the U.S. stands today. 

Nearly 4 months ago, Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor in 

Ben Arous, Tunisia, touched off a tidal wave of unrest that continues to share the Arab world to its very foundation. His self-immolation became a symbol around which Tunisians united to overthrow former President Ben Ali, whose oppressive regime had at 

that point been ruling for over 20 years. 

Arab citizens throughout the Middle East looked on, and inspired 

by the revolution in Tunisia took to the streets in unprecedented 

numbers. For us sitting here today, it is perhaps the most striking 

that, unlike in the past, the citizens of the region are not protesting 

against the U.S. or against Israel, but against the failings of their 

own governments. 

Hidden under a thin veneer of stability, Arab autocracies for decades have allowed the social and political foundations of their countries to fester, and in many cases rot. It was only a matter of time 

until the citizens of the region stood up and together said, 

‘‘Enough.’’

Although each country has its own distinctive history and its 

own set of unique circumstances, the current unrest is, at its core, 

about rewriting the social contract throughout the Arab world. 

The citizens in the streets stand collectively and demand the 

same fundamental human rights that are the birthright of every 

individual on earth. They remind us that the rights to life, liberty, 

and the pursuit of happiness do not stop at the water’s edge. 

2

Four months into this transition, it is appropriate to pause and 

assess where the region is heading, and to examine the effectiveness of the administration’s policy to date. The regional shifts happening throughout the Middle East place the United States and 

our allies at a precipice in history. 

The entire strategic framework upon which our foreign policy in 

that region has been based is rapidly transforming. U.S. policy 

must transform with it. It is, however, unclear today whether the 

administration’s foreign policy is, in reality, adapting as it must. 

Over the past months, the administration has dithered in many 

cases, and vacillated. On several occasions, high-level officials have 

even contradicted one another, suggesting that not only is there no 

unified vision, but no clear policy either. 

This has left Members of Congress and citizens of the region 

alike confused as to what the administration’s objective actually is, 

and with what means it seeks to achieve it. 

Also missing is a clear strategic vision for the Middle East as a 

whole. Rather than stepping back and determining first what its 

desired end state is, the administration is stuck in reaction mode. 

The result is that foreign policy becomes slave to each individual 

development on the ground, and consequently the United States 

appears in many cases indecisive and non-committal. Instead of 

leading the way to a more prosperous future for the peoples of the 

Middle East, the administration looks as if it is waiting to see who 

ends up on top before picking a side. 

Instead of viewing this as an unprecedented opportunity to help 

spread democracy and freedom to parts of the world that do not 

currently know it, the administration gives the impression that the 

protests are more of an inconvenience in many cases, that they are 

getting in the way of grand plans to extend outreached hands in 

pursuit of unclenched fists. 

Nearly 6 years ago, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stood in 

front of an audience at the American University of Cairo and declared that, ‘‘For 60 years, the United States pursued stability at 

the expense of democracy in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Now we are taking a different course. We are supporting the 

democratic aspirations of all people.’’

Similarly, over 7 years ago, before an audience at the National 

Endowment for Democracy, President Bush stated that, ‘‘As 

changes come to the Middle Eastern region, those with power 

should ask themselves: Will they be remembered for resisting reform, or for leading it?’’

These words are, perhaps, more fitting today than at any other 

time in recent history. Although President Bush was speaking 

about regional leaders, it is my firm belief that U.S. policymakers 

should ask themselves the same question. 

And I will now yield to the distinguished gentleman, the ranking 

member of the committee from New York, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Chairman, very much. 1947, 5th of 

June. Standing in Harvard Yard, Secretary of State George Marshall tried to explain why additional foreign aid was critical to 

American security. 

3

Since the end of World War II, America had already given or loaned some $14 billion to Europe. To provide some sense of scale, 

total Federal outlays in 1947 were $34.5 billion. 

But the wave of Soviet-backed takeovers and ubiquitous subversion, along with stark warnings of pending starvation and economic 

collapse, convinced the Truman administration that more needed to 

be done to help Europe recover. 

America stood alone, at the time, as an economic colossus in 

1945, American GDP was greater than all other Allied and Axis 

economies combined. While much of the world was ravaged between 1940 and 1950, the United States economy, in comparison, 

grew by 150 percent. 

With clear victory in two theaters of war, sole possession of nuclear arms, and a homeland untouched by the devastation of war, 

American preeminence and self-confidence were justifiably at alltime highs. 

But Marshall’s words were characteristically understated. Coolly, 

he explained the downward spiral gripping Europe’s economy. Secretary Marshall warned that Europe’s needs were, as he said, ‘‘So 

much greater than her present ability to pay that she much have 

substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political 

deterioration of a very grave character.’’

Secretary Marshall then called for the United States to provide 

assistance ‘‘so far as it may be practical for us to do so,’’ and for 

full partnership with European recipients to make that assistance 

effective. 

He then departed from his written text. Clearly, he felt something was awry, or missing, or needed to be said. He apologized for 

having used Harvard’s commencement for what he said were rather technical discussions. ‘‘But,’’ he said, ‘‘to my mind it is of vast 

importance that our people reach some general understanding of 

what the complications really are, rather than react from a passion, or a prejudice, or an emotional moment.’’

He continued, ‘‘As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of the troubles. It is virtually impossible at 

this distance, merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp all the real significance of the 

situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs upon a 

proper judgement. It hangs, I think,’’ he said, ‘‘to a large extent on 

the realization of the American people of just what are the various 

dominant factors, what are the reactions of the people, what are 

the justifications for those reactions, what are the sufferings. What 

is needed, what can be done, what must be done.’’

These are the questions I think we ought to be asking during 

this amazing wave of change and revolution going through the 

Middle East. We are not the same nation that we were in 1947, 

and the world is different now than it was then. 

But today, as then, there are still no substitutes for American 

leadership. And by leadership, I don’t just mean rhetoric. Marshall’s speech was not a plan. Marshall’s plan was nothing without 

the billions of dollars needed to actually make a difference at the 

time. 

The Middle East today doesn’t need the old Marshall Plan, and 

even if we had the resources to commit—which we don’t—it almost 

4

certainly wouldn’t work. Post-war Europe and today’s Arab world 

are very different places, in very different times, with very different economies, very different governments, and very different 

needs. 

But that doesn’t mean there is nothing to be done to aid both the 

people in need and to help stabilize the region that is vital to our 

economic and national security interests. The political transformations that began this year are not likely to be over soon, and 

the consequences of what have already transpired will unfold over 

years, not weeks or months. 

But one challenge does seem to be the same, and that is to convey to the American public and to the Congress, distant from the 

troubles abroad and already fed up with the costs of war and the 

burden of assisting others, why it is so critical not to falter at this 

point. 

It seems likely to me that we are witnessing a profound change 

in world politics, as occurred following World War II or the end of 

the Cold War. Lines of alignment are disappearing, and the lines 

are being redrawn. Different ideologies and models for government 

are competing in societies without deep institutional safeguards to 

preserve order and provide stability. 

Salafists, Muslim Brothers, Islamist radicals, all see opportunities in the emerging freedom and liberty which we so rightfully celebrate. While brutally suppressing its own people, Iran is racing 

ahead with its nuclear arms program, bolstering its efforts in subversion of the Arab states, exacerbating Sunni/Shia conflicts, and 

sending more and more advanced weapons to anti-Israel terrorist 

groups. 

The Middle East is poised at a moment of becoming. One of the—

one future offers a new Arab modernity, where culture and space 

for Islamist radicalism is squeezed by the desire of ordinary people 

to pursue their own dreams of peace and prosperity. 

The alternative future is one of greater tension, more tyranny, 

deeper regression into ignorance and hatred and violence. Amid all 

this chaos and change, I am certain of just one thing. Now is not 

the time for America to go wobbly or withdraw or turn inward. 

Now is not the time to try to be a superpower on the cheap. 

Now is the time for us to live up to the example left to us by 

President Truman and Secretary Marshall of judicious leadership, 

built upon a carefully constructed bipartisan consensus at home, 

and a true partnership with our allies abroad. 

Today’s problems are different, and the solutions must be different as well. But we may still hope, as Secretary Marshall said, 

that ‘‘With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people 

to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly 

placed upon our country, the difficulties that I have outlined can 

and will be overcome.’’

To that, I would just add ‘‘Amen.’’

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. The committee will be in recess. We have four votes on the floor. We will 

be back very shortly, and then we will continue. 

[Whereupon, at 2:44 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 3:22 p.m. the same day.] 

5

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come back to order. The chair 

and the ranking member have given our opening statements, and 

we would invite any members of the committee, if they would like 

to give a 1-minute opening statement. Mr. Higgins? Okay. 

And we will go ahead and introduce our distinguished panel here 

this afternoon. We will begin with Eliot Cohen, who is the Robert 

E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins 

School of Advanced International studies, and is founding director 

of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies. 

He received his B.A. degree from Harvard University in 1977, 

and his Ph.D. there in 1982. He has served on the policy planning 

staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as a member of the 

Defense Policy Board of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 

most recently as Councillor of the Department of State, serving as 

Secretary Condoleezza Rice’s Senior Advisor on Strategic Issues. 

He has also served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve. And on behalf of the subcommittee, I would like to thank 

you for your service to our country. 

Next we have J. Scott Carpenter, who is the Keston Family Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and is the 

director of Project Fikra, which focuses on empowering Arab democrats in their struggle against extremism. 

Mr. Carpenter previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary 

of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and also as the coordinator for the State Department’s broader Middle East and 

north Africa initiatives. 

Prior to this, he served as director of the governance group for 

the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

Rights, and Labor, where his responsibilities included overseeing 

U.S. democracy promotion and human rights policy in the Middle 

East and southeast Asia. And we thank you for being here, Mr. 

Carpenter. 

And last but not least, Michael Makovsky currently serves as the 

foreign policy director for the Bipartisan Policy Center. From 2002–

2006, he served as Special Assistant for Iraqi Energy Policy in the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Director of Essential Services in the Washington offices of the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

Prior to his work in the Pentagon, he worked over a decade as 

a senior energy market analyst for various investment firms. 

Makovsky has a Ph.D. in diplomatic history from Harvard University, an M.B.A. in finance from Columbia Business School, and a 

B.A. in history from the University of Chicago. And we welcome 

you here this afternoon, Mr. Makovsky. 

And we appreciate, again, all three of our distinguished panelists 

here this afternoon. And I see that another member has entered 

here, and if Mr. Rohrabacher, the gentleman from California, 

would like to make a 1-minute opening statement relative to the 

Middle East and Egypt and the rest, we would love to hear it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. One thing I know after 22 years here, and 7 

years in the White House before that, is peace doesn’t happen on 

its own, and neither does freedom happen on its own. It is a prodVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:34 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\041311\65796 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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uct of a lot of hard work, and the right ideas and the right approach. 

And if we are to have more freedom in this world, and more 

peace in the Middle East, we have got to do things that work, and 

I am very interested in hearing different people’s perspective on 

that. 

One last note. I am very supportive of what was the Reagan Doctrine. I was very involved in that in the White House. It worked. 

It ended the Cold War. We helped people fight their own fights. 

People in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, wherever, we didn’t send our 

troops into those countries and risk confrontation directly with the 

Soviets. We helped those other people fighting for their freedom. 

And that brought an end to the Cold War with the Soviet Union 

in a peaceful way. There has to be some corollary to that in the 

Middle East and throughout the world, where we would help people like those in Libya who are fighting for their freedom, without 

actually sending our troops on the ground and thus risking being 

dragged into a quagmire. 

I am very interested in the opinions of our guests today, and I 

will be paying attention. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We will begin with Mr. 

Cohen, and you will be recognized for 5 minutes, as each of the witnesses will be. 

We actually have a lighting system, and you should be able to 

see the yellow light come on, which will tell you that you have 1 

minute to wrap up. When your red light comes on, if you could conclude your testimony, we would appreciate it. 

And we will restrict ourselves to that 5 minutes as well. 

So Mr. Cohen, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. ELIOT COHEN, PH.D., ROBERT E. OSGOOD 

PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE PAUL H. NITZE 

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (SAIS), 

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Chairman Chabot and members of the 

subcommittee. I have a longer statement, which I would like to 

have entered into the record, if that would be possible. 

Let me just summarize three points. The first, very much along 

the lines of remarks that have already been made. And that is, we 

are living in the middle of astounding events, which I think disprove a lot of the truisms and cliches of experts on the Middle 

East. 

But I think we have to remind ourselves of the tremendous uncertainty that surrounds these developments. If there are two 

phrases I would like to see banned from the public discussion of 

the Arab Spring, one would be the arc of history, and the other 

would be being on the wrong side of history. 

I don’t think history has an arc, that is to say a curve that we 

can calculate. And I certainly don’t think that history chooses 

sides. It is what people decide to do. And although I think we have 

to be tremendously impressed at the courage of Arab demonstrators, there iss nothing that guarantees that these revolutions are 

going to have a happy outcome. 

7

Ours did. The Velvet Revolutions did. The French Revolution did 

not. The Russian Revolution did not. The Chinese Revolution did 

not. The Iranian Revolution did not. So the first point is, we simply 

cannot take for granted the triumph of liberal forces in the Middle 

East. 

My second broad point is that in the Middle East we are going 

to face—we do face—that age-old clash between American ideals 

and American self-interest. That, of course, is a tension that goes 

back even before our independence from Great Britain. 

There are numerous cases, of course. One that comes to mind is 

that of Bahrain, where our democratic instincts will tilt to the Shia 

population, our geopolitical interests, to include our alliance with 

Saudi Arabia, our concern about Iran, will tilt in favor of the regime. 

What should we do about that? I would say, first and foremost, 

the United States should always be the friend of the cause of liberty. And I have used the word liberty advisedly and in preference 

to democracy. 

We should care about fundamental rights: Impartial courts, freedom of conscience, security of life and property, representation in 

any of a number of forms, and the opening of opportunity, particularly for women. We should care more for those things than we necessarily do for elections, per se. 

I think we also have to accept the fact that in some cases our 

interests and our values will not coincide, and there will be times 

when we have to act in ways which will appear—and may in fact 

be—inconsistent. 

And I think there is a great need for America’s leaders, not only 

the White House but in Congress, to be up front explaining why 

that is so, because it will be so. 

And we need to consider not only these countries as individual 

cases, but the region as a whole. And that leads me to my third 

point, which is about Libya, even though I know that that is not 

necessarily within the remit of this subcommittee. 

I believe it was the right course of action to intervene on behalf 

of the Libyan rebels. I wish we had done so earlier. Both our ideals 

and our self-interest are engaged there. 

I can understand why people opposed the use of force in Libya, 

but that debate is over. We are committed to getting rid of Colonel 

Gaddafi. I have to say, though, I am dismayed by a number of 

things. 

I am particularly dismayed by the half-heartedness of our effort 

in this war. And it is a war, because we are dropping bombs on 

people. We are killing soldiers. We are destroying equipment. 

Having committed the United States to this conflict, we really do 

need to see it through to the end. I think if Colonel Gaddafi were 

to remain in power at the end of this, after President Obama has 

said that he has to go, we will live to regret it. 

And I believe that unless he and his sons are really, permanently 

put out of the way, there is a good chance that we will have at 

least another Lockerbie, if not something worse. 

And I think beyond that, we have to think about the demonstration effects of Libya. What is at test right there is whether regimes 

can use extreme ruthlessness toward their own populations. That 

8

is what is being tested. And we really don’t, I think, have the ability simply to stay out of that. 

And that is my last point, really, which has to do with where we 

stand in the Middle East. Our country is not in the mood for grand 

projects in that part of the world, and for perfectly good reasons. 

Nor do I think we should embark on any. 

But even so, to paraphrase that highly experienced agitator, 

Leon Trotsky, we may not be interested in revolution, but revolution—including the Arab revolution—is definitely going to be interested in us. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Carpenter, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. J. SCOTT CARPENTER, KESTON FAMILY 

FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY 

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the 

opportunity to appear before you today. Having just returned from 

a fact-finding mission to Tunisia and Egypt, I look forward to sharing my observations, and request that my full statement be included in the record. 

Mr. Chairman, the revolutions currently sweeping the region create new opportunities for the United States, but also dangers. I 

recognize those dangers, but on the whole I would say that there 

is more to celebrate here than to fear. There is little doubt in my 

mind, for instance, that the Tunisians will be the first in the Arab 

world to successfully transition to a true representative democracy. 

Egypt, however, is the bellwether. If Egypt succeeds in its transition, it will transform the rest of the region. Its population, strategic location, and traditional role practically guarantee it. 

There is new confidence in Egypt, and a democratic spirit I found 

that pervades the country. And if it is institutionalized in the new 

Egyptian state, a democratic Egypt that respects human and political rights, including religious freedom, is an Egypt that will make 

a better partner for the U.S. than the declining Mubarak regime 

ever was. Such an Egypt may not see eye to eye with the United 

States or Israel about various aspects of policy, but no one I spoke 

with on my last trip advocated or believed that Egypt would abrogate the peace treaty with Israel or envisioned a war with Israel. 

The if in that previous paragraph, Mr. Chairman, is a big one. 

The transition there is bound to be rocky. Short-term challenges include stabilizing the economy, restoring law and order, and securing the Sinai region. Still, prominent businesspeople and other political actives with whom I met were remarkably bullish about 

Egypt’s future, including the ability to compete politically with 

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To manage toward a positive outcome, I believe it is critical that 

the U.S. do everything it can to help Egypt and Tunisia consolidate 

their democratic transitions. Doing so will require creativity, some 

resources, and the intestinal fortitude to weather the ups and 

downs of the countries’ domestic politics. 

The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, will play a role in the respective elections that are quickly approaching. This will require 

the U.S. to strike a wise balance between on the one hand being 

alive to the dangers the Brotherhood and its allies pose to critical 

U.S. interests and on the other hand providing the Brotherhood 

with a political gift through lightning-rod statements or actions 

that could motivate voters otherwise indifferent to the Brotherhood’s message to support the movement. 

It is important the administration send a clear message to the 

political elites and voting publics in Egypt and Tunisia that indicate the sorts of governments that we will support: Those committed to universal freedoms, including religious liberty and practice. 

In the case of Egypt, we must clearly also state that we support 

a government that fulfills its international obligations, including 

upholding the peace treaty with Israel. The administration must 

also act to create incentives encouraging Egyptians and Tunisians 

to choose the sort of leadership with whom we will build new and 

lasting relations. 

In the case of Egypt, such incentives might include opening negotiations for a free trade agreement or expanding the QIZ programs. 

For both governments, I would recommend an early loan, 

collateralized by seized assets of the ancien regime, which could be 

a powerful incentive. 

Mr. Chairman, even now the prospect of successful democratic 

transition is posing challenges to reactionary powers in the region, 

including Syria and Iran. Iran’s primary influence derives from its 

soft power and revolutionary rhetoric. If democracy succeeds in 

marginalizing Islamist political ideology, Iran’s theocratic pretensions will be similarly marginalized. 

As we have already seen in Egypt and Tunisia, anti-Americanism 

and a fixation on the Palestinian conflict, the twin diets of Iranian 

rhetoric, have been subsumed completely by a newfound preoccupation with domestic affairs and practical concerns. 

What is true for Iran, however, is also true for America’s ally, 

Saudi Arabia, another theocracy with pretensions to leading the Islamic world. The U.S. and the Kingdom perceive regional developments through different prisms. 

For the U.S., the changes are natural consequences of poor governance being expressed through unstoppable popular protests. For 

the Saudis, who see Iranians under every bed, there is an absolute 

paranoia about Shia ascendancy. At this critical moment of cascading change, the Saudis are creating a self-fulfilling prophecy 

which will be wholly negative for U.S. interests, in my view. 

The violence used against Bahrain Shia in recent weeks is contributing to the radicalization of Shia across the region. For this 

reason, it is critical that the U.S. find some way to convince Riyadh 

that the focus should be on managing change, rather than trying 

to stop it or roll it back. 

14

At the same time, if the U.S. is to fundamentally leverage the 

changes taking place in the region, the administration must find a 

way to reinvigorate the Green Movement in Iran. In April 2009, 

the administration missed a golden opportunity to do so, because 

it was convinced that it would risk efforts to broker a nuclear deal 

with Iran. This was a strategic mistake, but it has a second chance. 

I strongly believe the Arab revolutions of 2011 pose an insurmountable challenge to Iran’s regime, but accelerating the impact 

will require a comprehensive strategy. Forging such a strategy and 

pursuing it aggressively, however, will do little to calm Saudi Arabia, whose greatest nightmare is a democratic Iran that becomes 

a strong U.S. ally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Makovsky, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL MAKOVSKY, PH.D., FOREIGN 

POLICY DIRECTOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Ackerman, and members of the committee for giving me 

the opportunity to speak to you this afternoon. I want to highlight 

three key points I made in my written submission, my written testimony: What are U.S. interests in the region, the impact of political turbulence on Iran, and U.S. energy security. 

Winston Churchill wrote during the Second World War, ‘‘Everything for the war, whether controversial or not, and nothing controversial that is not bona fide needed for the war.’’ He approached 

all world issues with such single-mindedness. I believe we have to 

do the same during the fog of events. 

So what are our interests, first of all, in the region? I would say 

our top interests in the region are three: A secure flow of oil, a secure Israel, and reducing and defeating Islamic radicalism and terror. 

A single threat, more than any other, would undermine all three 

of these interests: A nuclear Iran. Therefore, I believe that preventing a nuclear Iran should remain our paramount goal and 

guide our policies among the fog of events. 

I support, like my colleagues here at the table, that liberalization, if it took root in the region, would serve the U.S. interest and 

would undermine Iran. However, there have been some disturbing 

events that have gone on in the turmoil, and I will just highlight 

how they have also affected Iran. 

I think so far the turmoil has been rather beneficial for Iran. It 

has weakened some of its allies. Mubarak is gone, Lebanon is moving the Hezbollah camp. The one interesting development that 

could go the other way is what is happening in Syria. I think the 


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anti-Iran coalition in the region has frayed due to a lack of confidence in U.S. leadership and support, which Secretary Gates and 

Tom Donilon have been trying to address in their recent trips to 

the region. 

Also, the international attention on Iran’s nuclear development 

has been diverted. Meanly, Iran has been only—despite Stuxnet 

and international sanctions, which have really been tough, Iran 

has been not only making its way, but actually advancing in its nuclear program. 

And I think going forward, we need to have a new phase of our 

Iran policy. I think the administration needs to enforce sanctions 

on the books. We should consider new sanctions, but try to avoid 

sanctions that would be counterproductive, which my initial sense 

is that—some talk about banning Iranian oil exports, and that 

would actually come under the latter category. 

I think we should pursue a triple track policy: Diplomacy, sanctions, and a visible and credible preparation for a military option. 

These de rigeur comments by the administration that all options 

are on the table, often followed by remarks about how risky it 

would be, are actually not doing the trick. 

The Iranis don’t seem very afraid of a U.S. strike or a U.S.-allied 

strike. And until we are, we don’t have a chance of a diplomatic 

solution to this problem. I think then, of course, whatever we 

threaten we have to be prepared to do. Because as I said, this is 

the primary strategic threat we have. 

I would like to switch and move on to how this affects—what has 

been going on in the region, how it affects our energy security. I 

anticipate this upheaval will be extended, and I think that it will 

lead to less oil supplies and higher prices, undermining our energy 

security. And I will highlight four reasons why, and what we can 

do about it. 

First, we should expect that production disruptions are not only 

going to occur in countries experiencing turmoil, like you see in 

Libya, but then that there will be a prolonged disruption even after 

there is some peace that comes to that country. 

History is littered with such examples: Iran, Iraq, Russia, Venezuela, all experienced significant turmoil politically, and their oil 

production has never returned to their previous peaks, even as of 

today. 

Transit will be more risky. We could talk about several of the 

choke points, but I will just highlight the Bab el-Mandeb choke 

point off of Yemen, which could become even more dangerous if 

there is even more of a collapse of authority in Yemen. 

Third, oil demand is likely to rise and export will shrink among 

the oil exporting countries that are experiencing turmoil, because 

the regimes need to continue to subsidize fuel to mollify their populaces. And I should add that the oil exporting countries in the Middle East have actually been one of the growth—they have had actually the biggest growth of demand, actually, one of three, China 

and the United States are the other two, in the last decade. 

The fourth factor, oil exporting regimes need higher prices and 

revenue to pay for higher social spending. Witness the Saudi expenditure, or commitment to spent $130 billion. Thus, I think gulf 

22

Arabs are unlikely to undercut Iran’s economy by supplying more 

oil and lowering prices. 

Iran could only increase its revenue by higher prices, because its 

oil production has declined 17 percent in the last 3 years. In the 

remaining seconds, I will just say Iraq actually offers some hope in 

all this. Iraq could be—is actually breaking out of its ban in oil production, and could be an energy superpower. And this not only 

serves U.S. interests in providing more oil to the market, but I 

would add there are some challenges there. Because they have to 

expand and diversify export routes, Turkey and the Persian Gulf, 

I think they should go into Jordan. And I see my time is over. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Makovsky follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. We may be able to get into 

some of the things you were going to go into in our questions here, 

and I will recognize myself first for 5 minutes. 

And I will begin with you, if I can, Mr. Cohen. Since taking office, the administration’s policy toward Syria has been focused almost exclusively on engagement with Damascus. Two years and 

one ambassador later, I think it is fair to conclude that the engagement path has not exactly borne fruit. 

Despite what he may say, Assad has made clear through his actions, both past and most recently, that he couldn’t be further from 

being a reformer. Along this line, I would like to ask you about a 

recent statement Secretary of State Clinton made in an interview 

with Bob Schieffer. 

Most of the focus on this statement has been about Secretary 

Clinton’s suggestion that Bashar al-Assad, a ruthless dictator, 

might in fact be a reformer. But I want to ask you about a different 

portion of her statement, specifically what she said before that particular gaffe. In response to Bob Schieffer asking why, given the 

ruthless assault against peaceful protestors, Secretary Clinton 

viewed the situation in Syria as different from that in Libya and 

why we did not take action in Syria and we are in Libya, she had 

this to say. 

This is her quote: ‘‘Well, if there were a coalition of the international community, if there were the passage of a Security Council resolution, if there were a call by the Arab League, if there was 

a condemnation that was universal—but that is not going to happen, because I don’t think that it is clear what will occur, what will 

unfold.’’

So what would you have to say relative to Syria, and what would 

your comments be about those comments? 

Mr. COHEN. Let me break that in two. First, on Syria, I quite 

agree. Look, this is a regime which throughout the Iraq War, during part of which I was in government, was really fostering the 

worst kind of attacks on American Servicemen and Women serving 

in Iraq, and we really never called them to account. 

We never called them to account for their nuclear program, and 

we have continued to allow ourselves to be, I think, gulled by the 

Syrian regime. So I don’t think Bashar al-Assad is really a reformer. I don’t think it is a regime that we should be dealing with. 

I don’t think we should have sent an ambassador in return for 

nothing, which is what we did. 

And I do think we have to realize that there is an opportunity 

here. Not simply a humanitarian opportunity for the people of 

Syria, but if that regime were changed by an uprising of the Syrian 

people, that would break one of Iran’s major links to the Middle 

East. 

Syria is Iran’s most important Arab ally, and I think strategically that is the way to think about it. The other comment I would 

make would be about the tone of the remark, and it does disturb 

me the extent to which the administration, throughout all this, has 

referenced the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, world opinion. I mean, the issue is really what American policy is, and to be 

perfectly frank with you, to go back to Libya for a moment, I would 

have been happier if congressional consent had been asked——

44

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Mr. COHEN [continuing]. And not just the consent of the United 

Nations. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right, and that is one of my objections, is really 

that I think like both President Bushes did, they should have come 

here, I think, and gotten Congress’ approval. And I think they 

would have gotten it. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Carpenter, next. You used the term ‘‘halfheartedness’’ when you referred to our actions in Libya thus far. 

What do you think we should have done differently? Obviously not 

being able to go back and redo what we didn’t do, or undo what 

we did do, how should we move things differently? Because it looks 

like we may well be on our way to a divided country, at least at 

this point. And I don’t think that is in anybody’s best interest. 

Mr. CARPENTER. As you suggest, Mr. Chairman, there is no use 

crying over spilled milk. But I would say that the United States 

had an opportunity to lead earlier, that a no-fly zone could have 

been imposed earlier and more robustly, well before Benghazi came 

under direct threat and sparked the global concern that led to the 

Security Council resolution. 

In terms of what I think needs to happen now, again I understand that the administration has been loath to want to lead from 

the front, but only to encourage from behind. 

But clearly the situation is deteriorating there, and I think for 

the importance of American power and because I think that 

Gaddafi returning to power in any way in Libya would be extremely destabilizing for both Tunisia and Egypt in the mediumterm, it is critical that we devote additional air assets to the struggle, including those that could be used against ground forces, for 

instance AC–130 gunships. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, my 

time has expired. If we do a second round, I will get to you, Mr. 

Makovsky. 

The ranking member, the gentleman from New York, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chairman. I am trying to find a 

sense of direction here that everybody is encouraging us to do, and 

trying to understand the position of the administration, which I 

think has not been as articulate as I would like to see it. 

The chairman has very appropriately called this hearing Shifting 

Sands, and if you have ever been on shifting sands I guess you 

know it is kind of difficult to get your footing. It is also difficult 

for the critics to get their footing, as well, so let me just observe 

that I am not sure that Secretary Clinton—and she can certainly 

speak for herself, or misspeak for herself if that is your view—actually said that Colonel Gaddafi was a reformer—Assad, I am sorry. 

But what she said was Members of Congress, I believe that includes Senators, have told her that. I am not sure that that is her 

view, or that she was just observing what she was told. 

But nonetheless, my dad served in World War II. I was a little 

baby when he came home. But I remember two expressions he 

came home with that I can repeat here. One was, ‘‘He who hesitates is lost.’’ And the other was, ‘‘Look before you leap.’’

45

Whenever I would do something, he would impose one of those 

two if I screwed up my guess. And I asked him, ‘‘How do you know 

when to look before you leap and how do you know that you are 

going to be lost if you hesitate?’’

And he says, ‘‘Experience. You make a lot of mistakes first.’’ I am 

not sure what we are supposed to be here listening to advice, not 

just from our panel but from others as well. If you were to pick any 

three countries in the region that are in a state of transition, on 

a scale of one to 10, with one being just saying, ‘‘Hey guys, we wish 

you a lot of luck’’ and 10 being full-fledged support, which includes 

U.S. military support, troops, and a blank check commitment, 

name the country and give me 1 to 10 what you would do if you 

were the administration. 

Mr. CHABOT. Is there one particular——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let us start with Mr. Cohen. Just the order you 

went in. 

Mr. COHEN. That is a difficult question. I think in the case of 

Libya, once having committed ourselves to the use of force and having committed ourselves to the overthrow of Colonel Gaddafi, which 

is really where we are——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did we commit ourselves to the use of force in 

Libya? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, we have done it. And the President has indicated that we are in this to back up our European allies, but for 

sure we have used it. And for sure he has said that——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Sometimes that means ‘‘I will hold your coat.’’

Mr. COHEN. But the first week was very far from holding the 

coat, and we are doing a lot more than holding the coat. And as 

I think we are already——

Mr. ACKERMAN. How far do we go, is the question. 

Mr. COHEN. I would be willing to go, I think, where Mr. Carpenter would go, that is to say——

Mr. ACKERMAN. What is the number? 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t think there is a need for troops on the ground 

beyond trainers and advisers to the rebels. I think we probably 

need a lot more in the way of lethal air power. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is that a 3 or a 7? 

Mr. COHEN. I am not quite sure. I find it hard to think about it 

in that way. I mean, I can think concretely what I would be in 

favor of doing in Libya, which is AC–130s, A–10s, Special Operations Forces to train the rebels. I would be against putting in the 

82nd, but I don’t think we need that. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You have a number of troops or a dollar amount? 

Mr. COHEN. What? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. You have a number of troops, or a dollar 

amount? 

Mr. COHEN. At this point, given what we have chosen to do, I 

really don’t think that is what I would be thinking about. Because 

I really do think that the stakes are very high. If we fail, if the 

President having said Gaddafi has to go, Gaddafi stays, if he ends 

up having stood up against NATO and a large coalition——

Mr. ACKERMAN. So it is like President Bush saying, ‘‘That is unacceptable,’’ referring to behavior from any number of——

46

Mr. COHEN. I think that is unacceptable. Do I think this is $100 

billion commitment? No, I don’t. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. COHEN. But can I tell you whether it is 40,000,000 or 

150,000,000? I can’t. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Carpenter? 

Mr. CARPENTER. I would just say very quickly I would invest 

very heavily—no need for troops, but I would invest very heavily—

in helping Egypt succeed. Frankly, I think Yemen is a basket case 

no matter what happens, and I would not invest a ton of money 

there, although I understand the rationales for doing so. It is in the 

Saudis’ backyard, and I think we can coordinate with them and 

help. 

In terms of Libya, I would say it is probably a 6, because it 

doesn’t warrant ground troops but it is very, very important. But 

I think there are different categories here. I think, as Mr. Cohen 

suggested, that the United States, whether we think we have committed ourselves or not, we have committed ourselves, and people 

around the region and the world believe we have. So success is important. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. With the chairman’s indulgence, if Dr. Makovsky 

can——

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you. I concur with what Eliot and Scott 

said about Libya. Once we have committed, then we have got to do 

our best, short of ground troops, to get Gaddafi out. The only other 

country I think we should consider doing any heavy military investment in is Iran. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman 

from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, the chairman of the Oversight 

and Investigations Subcommittee, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me remind Dr. Cohen and the other two witnesses, yes, 

the stakes are very high, you said, but so is our level of deficit 

spending. We no longer can do what we did 10 years ago, and 20 

years ago, and 30 years ago. The United States—we are not just 

broke, we are on the edge of an economic catastrophe. 

We have $4.5 trillion more in debt after 2 years of this administration than we were before. What is the interest rate on that? If 

we keep going the way it is, and especially when the interest rate 

starts going up, it will crowd out all spending, and there will be 

a collapse, and none of the things that you are talking about will 

be affordable, because the money will have gone into inflation. Everyone’s savings will be gone. 

We are on the edge of a catastrophe in a number of ways, but 

we still face these major challenges that we are talking about 

today. But it has to be within the context of what we can afford 

to do now. And we no longer—certainly, we can no longer afford to 

send our troops all over the world and garrison the world, and try 

to use American troops as the shock troops that will play the deciding factor in every war that is going on, that concerns us. 

Thus we have got to have another strategy. As I stated in the 

beginning, I think we can possibly afford a strategy that does not 

47

put American troops on the ground. And I am going to add one 

more factor here, and that is—and I agree with you, maybe AC–

130 gunships would be good—if we have already committed ourselves, if you are going to help them out—you know what Teddy 

Roosevelt said was the worst sin? Does anyone know there? 

Teddy Roosevelt said the worst sin is hitting someone softly, because you just make them mad. So if we are going to do it, let us 

do it. But that doesn’t mean sending troops in. 

I have had discussions with people representing the Libyan 

Council there in Benghazi, and they have insisted to me that they 

are willing to, and will be making public statements to the point 

that they are willing to pay all the expenses of the United States 

in what we are doing to help them win their freedom. 

Would you say that is a major factor, or would be a major factor 

in our consideration? 

Mr. COHEN. It sounds like a great idea. I mean, we managed to 

fight the first Gulf War with other people’s money. If I could, Congressman, could I just say, I don’t think any of us are in favor of 

massive financial aid programs. And I am not in favor of military 

intervention in Syria. I do think Libya is a very distinct case, and 

for better or for worse we are committed. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. COHEN. And part of the price—I don’t know how we price out 

a Lockerbie. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, let us note this, that the cost of sending 

troops to another country and doing warfare there is far more expensive than aid programs, although I generally am not in favor 

of nation-building aid programs either. But it is $1 million a head per troop in Afghanistan, and so we are spending about $100 billion a year over there, and guess what? 

The Gross National Product of that country is only about $12- or 

$14 billion. Something is wrong there, somewhere. 

So I would hope that we are able to think creatively enough to 

utilize our resources and our financial resources to the maximum. 

For example, in Afghanistan, I think we could buy off every leader 

in that country, all the way down to the village level, for $2- or $3 

billion, not $100 billion a year. 

Mr. Chairman, that is a deal. Three billion dollars to get us out 

of a $100 billion liability. So I think that—and I agree with the 

panel, let me just say. I agree with what each of you had to say. 

We need to do what is right in Libya, and it will be a message to 

everybody else in the Gulf if we do. But we need to do it with letting them do their fighting, but us backing them us, and them paying for it. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. I think the ranking 

member and I have both agreed that if we can get out of Afghanistan for $3 billion and you can make it happen, we are with you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I can guarantee it right now. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. We need to talk further. The distinguished gentleman from the great State of Massachusetts, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HIGGINS. New York. 

Mr. CHABOT. Oh, I am sorry. New York, I am sorry. 

Mr. HIGGINS. It is an even greater state. 

48

Mr. CHABOT. An even greater state. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was, I suppose, more 

confident about the changes that we saw occurring in the Middle 

East and north Africa a month ago than I am today. 

Mr. Carpenter, you had said that there is a feel in Egypt, a 

democratic spirit and a confidence. Yet we see that the army that 

is overseeing the democratization process just arrested a blogger 

for insulting the military. 

A month ago, I believed that there were the two most powerful 

forces in the world, that being youth and technology, youth and 

technology that was empowered to not only organize, but the inspiration, if you will, for what was going on in these revolutions, at 

the basis. 

In other words, they would see what was going on in the rest of 

the world, and find that under their repressive regimes, these 

countries, and in particular the youth, had been held down. And 

what they wanted to be were citizens, not subjects. 

So when you look for a coherent center to all this instability, 

with uncertain outcomes, you can’t find it, because there isn’t one. 

And while I would agree, a month ago, that Egypt perhaps is the 

place that can set the model for a democratic, more or less, Middle 

East and north Africa, I am less certain of that today. 

So I would be interested in each of your assessments as to where 

this is likely to go, who potentially is the emerging leader, and 

what kind of democratic government can we see in that part of the 

world that can serve not only as an inspiration but as a model for 

other countries, including Turkey. 

I traveled the region last month and was particularly impressed 

with what I saw in Turkey. If you go to the airport in Istanbul and 

you look at the departure board, they are going to places that I 

can’t even pronounce, which is a good sign. It shows that it is a 

functioning economy that is seeking to build economic relationships 

with other people. So I would be interested in your assessment, 

each of you, relative to those issues. 

Mr. CARPENTER. I will try to be very short. I am not saying that 

this has—that there is any inevitability in the direction that this 

is headed. What I will say, that your concerns about the arrest and 

sentencing of a blogger in Egypt by the military is not only our concern, but it is an Egyptian concern. 

And I can guarantee you that the people will be out on the 

streets on Friday, and this will be an additional command. Last 

week, it was that the military do more to hold President Mubarak 

and his sons accountable, and guess what? Today it was announced 

that they are proceeding with the detention of the President and 

his two sons. 

The military wants, desperately wants, to get out of the business 

of governing the country. Every petition—if you can imagine, every 

petition, from everyone in the country, whether it is the Muslim 

Brotherhood or a demonstrator in the street, or a professor at a 

university—are all being directed at the Supreme Military Council. 

They are in a position to have to meet all of those demands. They 

need to get out of that business. They want to move quickly to elections. 

49

And there is a hunger for those elections. People argue about 

whether it should happen sooner, faster. But everyone also believes 

that to have the military stay in charge is not a positive thing, and 

will lead to a military dictatorship, because they won’t be able to 

sustain this level of interaction. 

So it is not inevitable. We cannot sit on our hands, because I 

think if we do, it could create a self-fulfilling prophecy. We have 

to get in the game, much as we did with Indonesia, much as we 

did with the transitions in Latin America and Eastern Europe. 

Mr. COHEN. As you know, my view is that we have entered a 

very unpredictable time. And I suspect some of these revolutions 

will turn out well, and some of them will turn out poorly. 

I think where our investments should be to help shape this is in 

doing things which are really not expensive at all, to help develop 

civil societies. 

So some of this is the kind of thing that the Republican and 

Democratic Institutes do to teach people how to set up political parties. Some of it could be the kinds of things that we did after the 

end of the Cold War with Eastern European militaries, for example, getting them used to the idea of being subordinate to civilian 

authority, and so on. It is really about helping to shape and educate a generation, and I think that is where we will have our greatest payoff, which is not a particularly expensive investment. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I share your concern about how this will play 

out. Eliot cited a few examples of revolutions that didn’t go the way 

we thought. As we all know, the French Revolution had a counterrevolution, things played out—the Russian Revolution, and so on. 

I expect that a lot of these upheavals in these countries are going 

to take a long time to play out. They might settle down for a bit, 

but it is going to take a while. And it is understandable that it 

should take a while, given the histories of a lot of these countries. 

I share the idea about doing anything we can on civil society. 

Perhaps we should also revisit what we could do in terms of our 

public diplomacy tools, and try to convey our values and our interests with these countries, and perhaps we could influence things. 

Again, I think that a lot of these protests are organic, they are 

local. And the United States was not a part of that, so we don’t 

want to be too much out in front of these. I don’t think that would 

be too constructive. We want to be supportive. 

To answer your question about which of the countries you think 

you have the most faith in, obviously, given that this will play out 

for a while, it is hard to know. But I would say, of all the countries, 

I think Iran is actually possible. I am not 100 percent convinced 

of the leaders of the Green group as actually that they are the ones 

that we want to be supporting fully. We don’t know who exactly 

would take charge, but the Persians—Iran is a coherent country, 

and the people seem very hungry there, if ever we could get past 

this awful regime. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. We are going to go into a second round, and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I will get to you this time, Mr. Makovsky, because I didn’t get 

to you last time. You had touched on energy in your talk, which 

essentially in that part of the world means oil, obviously. And it 

50

is my understanding that Libya puts out, ballpark I think it is 1.2 

or 1.3 million barrels a day, versus Saudi Arabia which I think is 

8.3 million a day. 

And obviously we have seen—that is my first question, really. 

How much do you think the instability in the region, and Libya 

most particularly, how much impact has that had on what we are 

seeing in the U.S. now versus, perhaps, the moratorium on oil rigs 

after the spill in the Gulf, and the natural tendency of oil to go up 

as the summer driving season is approach, and those other things 

which are obviously factors? How much do you think it is related 

to the instability? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Thank you. A few parts on that. I agree with 

you, what you last said. Production anywhere is supply everywhere, so whether we produce it in North Dakota or we produce 

it in Libya, it is oil in the market, and that is important. 

You were right, Libya was producing about one and a half, 1.6 

million barrels a day. And the Saudis are estimated to have produced around 9 million barrels a day. The lower number that you 

cited is closer to their OPEC quota. 

I think that the issue with Libya is twofold. One is that it is a 

particularly desirable crude oil and there is no spare capacity for 

that sort of crude oil in the world, so the Saudis aren’t fully able 

to fill that void. It is what they call sweeter, and it is lighter, to 

use the terminology in the industry. 

So that is one problem. Price usually balances that. When you 

have supply issues, prices will go up. The second issue is I think 

it made folks in the market worry that other countries will follow. 

Libya, as you point out, is generally a small player, but it just 

raises concerns. It is the first of the oil producing countries to really experience deep turmoil, so it made the market worried. 

I personally feel that the market has underestimated, frankly, 

the risks in the region. 

Mr. CHABOT. Really? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. But you do think it has had a substantial impact? 

From what you are saying now, it really should have been or could 

have been even higher than it has been. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. It could. Again, there are two parts of it, as you 

kind of alluded to. One is the actual supply that is missing from 

the market, and then there is what people call the risk premium, 

or a political risk premium that other countries could follow. And 

so those are the two pieces. 

Mr. CHABOT. My follow up question is, if Libya has had such an 

impact, and the rest of the region, with the instability, were Saudi 

Arabia to become unstable, what would the possible impact of that 

be? And how stable is Saudi Arabia right now? 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I——

Mr. CHABOT. The other gentlemen, I would welcome your input 

on that as well, if you would like to——

Mr. MAKOVSKY. If I could punt the ladder to my other colleagues 

on the stability—if Saudi Arabia would be destabilized significantly, it would have a huge impact on the oil market. If I could 

add something to this? 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. 

51

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I want to finish up. I think Iraq here could actually be very helpful. They are now producing more oil than they 

have for many years, since before the war. There is a lot of money 

pouring in, billions of dollars from a lot of companies. 

And it is not just oil. Natural gas is also very important, and 

they could supply a lot both to Asia and to Europe, and reduce the 

European dependency on Russian supplies. 

So I think anything we could do to help Iraqi oil—and I think 

there are too many things. I would say one, when we talk about 

what forces hopefully could stay in Iraq after 2011, the 5th Fleet 

should continue to protect the export terminals in the south. And 

anything that we could support having to do with diversifying and 

securing their export capacity. 

Mr. CHABOT. And I would remind folks that one of the criticisms 

of the United States was that we were going into Iraq to take their 

oil. We obviously didn’t take their oil. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. No. And I would argue, if anything, I think we 

were a little spooked by that idea so we didn’t actually do enough. 

The idea was—we didn’t go in for oil, and we were getting plenty 

of Iraqi oil before the war. In fact we were one of the biggest buyers of Iraqi oil before the war. 

That said, it is in our interests that Iraq develops its energy sector. It also hurts Iran. It improves the oil market. It improves our 

economy. 

Mr. CHABOT. Well, it was one of the Democratic amendments 

that I agreed with and voted for years ago that we should have 

used, I think it was half of the rebuilding of Iraq should have been 

paid for by their oil, as opposed to the U.S. taxpayer. But we failed 

on that amendment. 

Because, my recollection is, the Bush administration was concerned that it would send the wrong message to Iraq, and might 

be consistent with those criticisms of the United States that we 

were just going in to take their oil, which was absurd from the 

start. 

But if you took a poll in the Middle East, I am guessing it would 

be pretty high that people would agree that that is why we went 

in there, and what we did. Which we clearly didn’t. 

Stability in Saudi Arabia, if either one of the other gentlemen 

might like to take that very quickly, because then I will turn it 

over to Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. CARPENTER. I think that, on the face of it, all of the aspects 

for instability do exist in Saudi Arabia. The Al-Saud family, we are 

talking about 2,000-plus princes and members, a very large population, the average age probably being around 20, 22, which means 

that the leadership is about 60 years older. You have a succession 

crisis coming up. 

But on the whole, they do have resources, and they are using 

them to deploy against this, as Mike mentioned, in a massive way. 

So I think they are going to buy themselves some time. The question is, what do you do with it? 

Mr. COHEN. You know, 6 months ago we would have told you 

Egypt is massively stable, so I wouldn’t count on Saudi Arabia. 

That is point one. I mean, I agree with everything Mr. Carpenter 

just said. I also think because of the succession problem that they 

52

have, you are going to have a geriatric leadership as far as the eye 

can see, and that is not a good thing. 

And the third thing is, the Iranians clearly have an interest in 

messing around with them, and particularly with the Shia population, which is of course in some of the oil producing regions. So 

I would not rule out some sort of major shock. And if that were to 

happen, then the world really is going to look like a very different 

kind of place. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. Very good answer. The gentleman from New York, and not Massachusetts, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. The world indeed is going 

to look like a different place no matter how some of these situations turn out, it would appear. I didn’t mean to trivialize before 

by asking the assignment of a number, but I was trying to get a 

perspective in scale of which countries were worth investing more 

in than others, and how much we are willing to invest in those 

countries. 

I know it is very fuzzy, and the answer really is, ‘‘It depends,’’ 

but what I did get from the general remarks was basically that 

Egypt is too big to fail, that Yemen is too crazy to get involved 

with, and that Libya is okay because we said it was okay and 

therefore we have to do it. Do what, I am still not entirely positive. 

But take Egypt. The question is, I see a danger in the high expectations that exist among the Egyptian people, that we are not 

as involved as we are committed, that the Muslim Brotherhood and 

even others are planning at a rapid rate of how to take advantage 

of the situation as quickly as they can. 

The military is probably figuring out how to get out of this business while remaining in business business. And both the military 

and those who are more mischievous are probably looking at the 

possibility of being in business together to satisfy their mutual interest. At the same time, the people are going to become frustrated 

because those high expectations cannot be possibly met in an expedient amount of time. 

Question two is if we ignore basket cases, do we do so at our 

peril? What happens when that happens? A lot of people will tell 

you we are in Afghanistan because we can’t put Pakistan at risk, 

whatever all that means. What happens in Saudi Arabia if nobody 

intervenes in Yemen and the bad guys take over in full force? 

And I will leave it at those two questions, and we will start with 

Dr. Makovsky. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Your second question was what do we do in basket case countries? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. Well, the best we have——

Mr. ACKERMAN. My colleague from California made very strongly, as he often does, that the cost of getting involved is too high. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is right. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I tried to make the case earlier that the cost of 

staying out of it may not be acceptable in the world either, because 

there is a high price for that, too. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. That is right. And if you stay out of it, often the 

cost only rises. So I would argue that with what are called often 

53

fragile states, like a Yemen or a Pakistan, sometimes putting some 

money down—and I recognize the budgetary constraints that the 

country is facing, which are very significant—but some money to 

help on governance issues and on security forces could help, because it is seen as some money down could save a lot of money 

later if things collapse, and we have seen that in some of the countries that you mentioned, so that would be one issue. 

And I agree with you about Yemen being a country that is very 

scary. One of the dangers with Yemen is that if things collapse, 

that if President Saleh leaves, the country is an artificial construct. 

So some of the consequences could be al-Qaeda getting even more 

room for maneuverability, more piracy off the shores, which will 

raise oil prices, and also instability in the Arabian Peninsula. I 

thought my time was up. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Carpenter? 

Mr. CARPENTER. Just about Yemen, Yemen has been a nearly 

failed state for a very long time. I think we have been trying to 

keep it on life support the best we can, but there has been no political will by the Saleh regime to address very basic issues, whether 

it is basic education or water allocation, or anything. 

I think that ultimately Michael could be right about al-Qaeda in 

Yemen, but the problems in Yemen go much beyond al-Qaeda in 

Yemen. And that in fact, if the country were to split, the south 

might be a better partner, in fact, for issues related to piracy or 

any other issue. 

But these are real problems, and I don’t see really how the 

United States intervenes. But minimal investments in the security 

aspects, to safeguard what are our real, true interests in Yemen, 

which is going after al-Qaeda, I think, is critically important. 

In terms of Egypt and raising expectations, look. I think you are 

right that people have very high expectations, but I also think that 

having the opportunity to express themselves and be able to organize is going to go a long way to being able to vent some of those 

frustrations. 

And people are very, very poor. And because they are very, very 

poor, even a modest increase in their living standards will be, I 

think, greatly appreciated. There are businesspeople in Egypt, and 

they are not fleeing with their capital. 

They want to invest in the country. They want to invest in its 

future. They believe in its future. So I think, yes, this is going to 

be a rocky time. The Muslim Brotherhood is organizing. In my 

view, based on my conversations with people there, I think they are 

way overconfident. I think there is a vast silent majority of people 

that do not want to see Islamists come to power in Egypt, and I 

think that they have a fighting chance of creating a bulwark 

against them. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Cohen, did you want to respond? 

Mr. COHEN. Just real quickly. Actually, I do think I have to note 

that I am from Massachusetts, so I appreciate the compliments to 

Massachusetts. 

Mr. CHABOT. I was reminded, by the way, it is not a great state. 

It is a great commonwealth. 

Mr. COHEN. Yes. In answer to the question, I think really quickly, pretty clearly Egypt is the most important country in the Arab 

54

world for all the obvious reasons, and it would seem to me that 

that is where most of our efforts should focus. 

The second point I should offer is that although it is important 

to think about each of these countries individually, there is also regional dynamics, and to some extent I think we have to think about 

this as almost as much of a regional issue. 

Because a country like Tunisia might not be intrinsically important, but it is Tunisia that set off this whole wave of events. Which 

leads to the last point, which is the weights of these countries may 

change depending on events. 

We may think Yemen is just such a basket case that there is not 

much good you can do there, leave it alone. And tomorrow developments may occur which are just going to force us to think about 

it differently, the way we thought about Afghanistan on September 

10th, 2001. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired, and 

we will conclude this afternoon with questions by the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is a good 

point that this is—to look at this from a regional context, I think, 

is very important. And when you look at countries like Syria and 

Libya and Yemen and Bahrain, countries that are fractured by 

tribal, ethnic, and religious divisions—you look at Saudi Arabia, 

and it is 90 percent Sunni, 10 percent Shiite. Bahrain, a Sunni minority rules over a Shiite majority. 

How significant in this regional context is the Shiite/Sunni divide, and how will that play out moving forward? 

Mr. CARPENTER. We all have many aspects of our identity, and 

if you touch on any one part of that identity in a negative way, all 

of a sudden that becomes the preeminent element of your identity. 

I think that is why in my testimony I said that Saudi Arabia right 

now is, unfortunately in my view, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

Because the Shia in Bahrain were Bahraini first, and now are 

Shia to the core. And I think it is true, it is happening in Kuwait 

now where it wasn’t the case before. So I think that this issue is 

going to become a very real one, the sectarian issue. 

You see it forcing Prime Minister Maliki to makes statements 

which I don’t think he would have made before. It gives opening 

to Nasrallah, Mukhtar al-Sadr all of a sudden appears on the scene 

to defend the rights of the Shia in Bahrain. 

This is not healthy, and it is not good for American vital interests in the region. Because I think if the sectarian fire gets going, 

it is going to be very hard to stop, and it is going to be destabilizing. 

Just one other very quick point. I would say that when we talk 

about regional, we need to change the way we think. I think we 

really do need to have a north African strategy. You have Egypt, 

you have Tunisia, you have Libya, Algeria, and Morocco. 

If somehow that area gets its act together, that is where all of 

the population in this region is, and that would be a huge win for 

all of us. And so the Gulf is another challenge, and we need to 

begin to separate the two, in my opinion. 

55

Mr. COHEN. I guess just two thoughts. Again, I agree with everything that was just said. I think this is why, for example, in the 

case of Bahrain, although our geopolitical interests really require 

that we support that government to some extent, it means that we 

should not let go of sort of quietly pushing for reform that will ease 

that tension. And that is not just on humanitarian grounds. It is 

on long-term enlightened self-interest grounds. 

I also think this really shouldn’t color our overall policy toward 

Iraq. I think it is unfortunate that so much of the administration’s 

approach to Iraq has been, ‘‘How do we liquidate with dignity this 

commitment that we never wanted and that we opposed?’’

And whether one was in favor of the Iraq War or not, the fact 

is we have an Iraq that is a Shia-dominated country that is aligned 

with the United States. That is an asset, and we should begin 

treating it as an asset rather than as a liability to be liquidated. 

Mr. MAKOVSKY. I agree with that. That is why, because of Iraq, 

we can’t see things exactly only on sectarian grounds between Shia 

and Sunni. Clearly, it is an issue. Clearly, it is an opening for the 

Iranians. And certainly Bahrain is a perfect example which the Iranians feel belongs to them, and they have had a lot of historical 

involvement. 

So clearly with some countries it is an issue. I don’t think it is 

a decisive issue. It is certainly an important issue, and it obviously 

matters in Lebanon. But in Iraq I would also agree with what Eliot 

Cohen just said, that it doesn’t break down exactly that way. There 

are a lot of Shia Iraqis that are not in favor of more Persian influence in Iraq. 

Also, there are Shia that are, of course, but just because they are 

Shia does not mean they want more Iranian influence in southern 

Iraq. And I agree with what Eliot just said, that we should really 

do whatever we can to help make Iraq a success. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, gentlemen. Your testimony has been 

very helpful and insightful. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. And I would like to echo the gentleman 

from New York, that I think the panel this afternoon has been particularly helpful, and your testimony, I think, has really been excellent. So we appreciate it very much. 

And I would remind members that they have 5 legislative days 

to insert any statements or questions in the record. And if there 

is no further business to come before the committee, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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