IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERMONT COX : CIVIL ACTION

V. : (Capital case)

MARTIN HORN, et al. : Nos. 00-5289, 10-2673

COMMONWEALTH’S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

Jermont Cox is a Pennsylvania state prisoner who stands convicted of two firstdegree murders; he received the death penalty for one, and life imprisonment for the 

other. He filed the two above-captioned habeas petitions a decade apart. He now 

requests additional discovery as part of these federal proceedings, many years after his 

trial.

Cox committed these two killings in the summer of 1992, while working as an 

enforcer for a Philadelphia drug trafficking organization. In the first murder, Cox and an 

associate killed a man named Terence Stewart, by pulling up next to Stewart’s car and 

shooting him multiple times, while Stewart’s friend sat next to him. In the second 

murder, Cox and the same co-hort killed a man named Roosevelt Watson as the victim 

stood in a phone booth. Cox originally pled guilty to both murders in exchange for his 

cooperation in the cases against his co-conspirators; he withdrew those pleas, however, 

and was convicted after a consolidated jury trial in 1995. He received the death sentence 

for the Stewart murder, and a life sentence for killing Watson.1

 

1

In 1993, Cox was convicted of a third murder, a crime that also took place in the 

summer of 1992. The name of that victim was Lawrence Davis. Cox received a separate 

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With respect to the Stewart murder, under state law exclusive appellate 

jurisdiction for capital cases lies with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; that Court 

affirmed the judgment on direct appeal on May 3, 1999. Commonwealth v. Cox, 728 

A.2d 923 (Pa. 1999) (“Stewart Direct Appeal Opinion”), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 904 

(2001). On February 6, 2001, Cox filed a petition for state collateral review under the 

Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). The state trial court denied Cox’s

guilt phase claims after a hearing, on July 29, 2005. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

affirmed the denial of PCRA relief on November 19, 2009. Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 

A.2d 666 (Pa. 2009) (“Stewart PCRA Appeal Opinion”).

Meanwhile, the state courts also reviewed Cox’s related life sentence (for the 

killing of Watson). The Superior Court denied Cox’s direct appeal on June 20, 1996. 

Commonwealth v. Cox, 683 A.2d 309 (Pa. Super. 1996) (memorandum) (“Watson Direct 

Appeal Opinion”), and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review on January 16, 

1997. A few months later, Cox filed a PCRA petition in the Watson/life case, which was 

denied without a hearing on June 18, 1998. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of 

collateral relief on June 22, 1999. Commonwealth v. Cox, 742 A.2d 201 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (memorandum)(“Watson PCRA Appeal Opinion”) (A copy of this opinion is 

attached as Exhibit A). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court again denied review, 745 A.2d 

1218 (Pa. 1999) (table). More recently, on April 17, 2009, Cox (now represented by the 

 

life sentence for the Davis murder, after a bench trial. Commonwealth v. Cox, 664 A.2d 

1054 (Pa. Super. 1995) (memorandum), appeal denied, 675 A.2d 1242 (1996). Cox 

recently filed a second PCRA petition in the Davis case; the Superior Court recently 

affirmed the denial of this late petition, and a copy of that decision is attached as Exhibit 

B. Cox’s habeas petition challenging his conviction for the Davis murder was denied by 

this Court in 2004 (E.D. Pa. 00-5188), and that denial of relief was affirmed by the Third 

Circuit, Cox v. Horn, 174 Fed. Appx. 84 (3d Cir. 2006).

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Federal Defenders) filed another PCRA in the Watson/life case, arguing that the 

supposed unreliability of ballistics evidence undermines his conviction. That PCRA 

petition is still pending.

In federal court, the Federal Defenders represent Cox in both matters. In the life 

case (No. 00-5289), Cox filed his habeas petition in 2000 and he filed a supporting 

Memorandum of Law in 2002; the Commonwealth also filed a response in 2002, but 

proceedings were stayed for several years while Cox pursued relief in state court in his 

capital case. This Court recently restored the life case to the active docket. In the death 

penalty case (No. 10-2673), Cox filed his habeas petition in November of 2010. He has 

not yet filed a supporting memorandum of law.

In July of 2011, Cox filed a Motion for Discovery, relating to both cases. 

Specifically, he asks for two categories of discovery: (1) ballistics evidence: (2) “police 

investigatory files.” Motion at 7-9, 10-11.

I. Principles underlying the availability of discovery in federal habeas

"A habeas petitioner, unlike the civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to 

discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Peterkin v. Horn, 30 F. Supp.2d 513, 516 

(E.D. Pa. 1998) (emphasis added), citing Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 117 S. Ct. 

1793, 1796-77 (1997). This is because factual development is supposed to happen in 

state court, and an order of habeas discovery implies that state processes were somehow 

inadequate. That is, if a habeas petitioner did not receive certain documents during preor post-trial state litigation, that means either (1) he did not ask for this discovery in state 

court; (2) his request was not properly made under state law; and/or (3) the state court 

found that he was not legally entitled to this discovery. Any one of these three 

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possibilities demands at least an explanation from the petitioner before the federal court 

may override the state court process and order new discovery.

Even before the current federal habeas deferential standards (“AEDPA”) became 

effective in 1996, the Supreme Court had explained the principle that facts pertaining to 

federal claims raised by state prisoners must first be developed in state court. Keeney v. 

Tamaro-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992) (habeas petitioner's failure to develop pertinent 

facts in state court amounts to the default of claim). This principle was codified and 

made stronger under AEDPA. The new standard reframes the inquiry and directs the 

federal habeas court to assess the reasonableness of the state court determination in light 

of governing Supreme Court precedent. See Terry Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 

1523 (2000). This new standard serves to protect the important "presumption of finality 

and legality that attaches to a conviction at the conclusion of direct review." Calderon v. 

Coleman, 119 S. Ct. 500, 503 (1998) (citation omitted). Allowing a fresh start to 

discovery, years after the trial, and after years of state court review have ended, obviously 

runs counter to any “presumption of finality.”

The Supreme Court has recently explained again that where a final state judgment 

and conviction is at issue, the pre-trial rights and duties pertaining to discovery simply do 

not apply. The question here is narrower – where the state provides procedures that are 

not “fundamentally inadequate” to vindicate federal rights, those state procedures must be 

respected, and federal courts are not simply an alternative venue for factual development 

of criminal cases. District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009). 

This includes discovery procedures: once a defendant has been convicted in state court, 

pre-trial rules no longer apply, and neither Brady v. Maryland nor any other federal 

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principle requires that he be provided with all material evidence around which he might 

build a claim. Id.; see also id. at 2324-26 (Alito, J., with Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[w]e 

have long recognized the need to impose sharp limits on state prisoners’ efforts to bypass 

state courts with their discovery requests ... [Brady] claims should be brought in habeas” 

subject to “exhaustion requirements and discovery limits”).

Cox’s legal argument is supported almost entirely by Habeas Rule 6, which 

allows discovery upon a showing of “good cause.” Motion at 4-5. But Rule 6, which 

was enacted before the AEDPA, does not justify this kind of open-ended discovery.2

In reality, the “good cause” requirement means that the applicant must do more 

than ask for discovery and assert that it would be helpful. He must identify the claims for 

which discovery is sought; why the discovery could aid the petitioner in proving his 

claim, that is, that the state court acted unreasonably; whether the discovery was sought 

in state court, and if not, why not; whether the petitioner is entitled to further factual 

development of the claim(s) in federal court; and whether the claims are defaulted or 

untimely. See Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000) (prisoner must 

be diligent in developing state court record in order to present these facts to federal 

court); Marshall v. Beard, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, *6-9 (E.D. Pa. 2004) 

 

2

It is worth noting that The two Supreme Court cases on which Cox primarily relies to 

define the “good cause” standard, Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), and Bracy v. 

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997), were both pre-AEDPA cases. But the focus of federal 

habeas review has now been shifted, and it follows that discovery cannot be routinely 

granted, especially before preliminary questions of exhaustion and default have been 

addressed. Finally, in both Harris and Bracy, discovery was apparently granted after the 

petition had been answered and the claims weighed, where here petitioner seeks 

discovery before he has even filed a supporting memorandum in the death penalty case.

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(Kauffman, J.) (where state court reasonably rejected claims, additional discovery in 

capital case would not alter outcome and is properly denied); Abu-Jamal v. Horn , 2001 

WL 827468, *2 (E.D.Pa.) (Yohn, J.) (death-sentenced petitioner who "seeks discovery 

regarding new evidence to support the merits of a claim, under AEDPA standards, ... 

cannot establish good cause where he fails to demonstrate that he is entitled to a hearing 

at which the discovered evidence may be admitted"); Holloway v. Horn, 161 F. Supp.2d 

452, 467, 509 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Van Antwerpen, J.) (discovery order in capital case 

appropriate only after initial questions of default, and contours of particular claims, are 

considered), rev’d on other grounds, 355 F.3d 707 (3d Cir. 2004). See also Marshall v. 

Beard, 2010 WL 1257632 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (Golden, J.) (denying Federal Defenders’ 

request for entire homicide file in capital case, noting the lack of specificity of the 

requests, the petitioner’s failure to develop the record in state court, the prior discovery 

provided in state court, and problems posed by exhaustion, default, and the passage of 

time). It is ultimately Cox’s burden to show that this case is not like most other habeas 

cases, and that these unusual circumstances justify federal court discovery all these years 

after trial.3 Cox has not made this showing.

 

3 Cox cites a number of cases from other courts in this district which, he says, suggesting 

that discovery is granted in local habeas cases as a matter of routine. Motion at 5-6 n.4. 

But his description of these other cases is misleading. For one thing, in several of them, 

the bulk of the requests were denied, including requests for the entire police homicide 

file, which is the center of Cox’s demands. See Marshall v. Beard, 2004 WL 1925141 

(E.D. 2004) (denying records pertaining to medical examiner’s report, police 

interrogations, and jury selection in other cases), and 2010 1257632 (E.D. 2010) (denying 

production of police investigative file and evidence concerning particular detectives’ 

patterns of conduct); Washington v. Beard, No. 07-cv-3462 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2010) 

(Stengel, J.) (denying production of police homicide file). Many of these cases also 

involved production of particular items, like the prosecutor’s notes of jury selection, after

an evidentiary hearing had been granted, after questions of default had been addressed, 

and/or after the court decided that the state courts’ handling of the claim(s) in question 

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It is especially not routine to order production of entire police files, which is one 

of Cox’s requests. If state prisoners can demand and receive entire files in federal court, 

demands not made in state court, in support of claims that were reasonably denied in state 

court, and which are based on simple speculation (for example, the police “may” have 

been hiding something, or other incidents “might” have had something to do with this 

one), then it is unclear what the state rules of discovery are for, except to delay the real 

action until the federal habeas petition is filed.

Finally, even without the significant restrictions on habeas discovery, the 

Defenders’ request would not be justified. The Third Circuit has held that Brady “does 

not require that the prosecution make the file available for the defendant’s general 

perusal.” United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 191 (3d Cir. 1998). See also Kyles v. 

Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37 (1995) (“[w]e have never held that the Constitution 

demands an open file policy”). In other words, federal criminal defendants do not have 

access to the authorities’ entire file, in the absence of particular special circumstances. A 

state defendant, who has already received discovery and been convicted, and who has 

litigated his case for years in state court, should not be given the benefit of a more 

generous file-on-demand policy.

 

was somehow unreasonable. See, e.g., In re Horn, 185 Fed. Appx. 199 (3d Cir. 2006) 

(denying mandamus relief on jurisdictional grounds) (district court granted discovery 

only after determining that evidentiary hearing was appropriate); Holloway v. Horn, 161 

F. Supp.2d 452, 509-510 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (same). The lesson is not that wide-ranging 

discovery before any briefing is “routine” (it is not routine), but that requests must be 

carefully and individually examined, in light of the particular claim at issue, its litigation 

history in state court, and the petitioner’s diligence in pursuing it.

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Police files are a critical resource that implicate important confidentiality and 

investigatory interests, and their disclosure must be considered with care and restraint. 

Cox has not shown that his requests are remotely justified. 

II. Ballistics evidence

First, Cox asks for all documents relating to the ballistics evidence in this case, 

and he also requests access to the ballistics evidence itself, for testing purposes. Motion

at 9. He asks for these items in support of his claims that his trial lawyer was ineffective 

for failing to “conduct an independent investigation” of the Commonwealth’s ballistics 

evidence. Motion at 7. 

Briefly, the ballistics evidence at trial established that the .38 caliber bullets 

recovered from Watson’s body had been fired from the same gun as the .38 caliber 

bullets recovered from Lawrence Davis, Cox’s third murder victim. This evidence was 

admitted “to prove [Cox’s] identity and access to the murder weapon.” Stewart Direct 

Appeal Opinion, 728 A.2d at 932. Cox first argued in state court that this evidence 

should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant; after the state supreme court 

rejected this claim,4 Cox more recently raised the argument that his lawyer should have 

challenged the reliability of the ballistics evidence, and this is the claim for which he 

wants discovery.

Cox does not discuss the state court litigation of this claim at all, and it is easy to 

see why: his similar claims have been soundly and repeatedly rejected by the state 

 

4

See Stewart PCRA Appeal Opinion, 983 A.2d at 683 (holding that ballistics evidence 

was relevant, as part of rejection of claim that Cox’s direct appeal counsel was ineffective 

for failing to challenge admissibility of this evidence).

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courts. But as a prerequisite to discovery in federal habeas review, Cox must at least 

attempt to explain why the pre-trial discovery was not sufficient, and why the state courts 

rejected his claims; otherwise, he is simply asking this court to overrule the state courts

without any real discussion, under the banner of the “good cause” standard.

This is part of Cox’s larger failure to meaningfully address exhaustion. Indeed, 

Cox’s entire discussion of the subject in his recently-filed Watson/life Petition is his 1-

page “Statement on Exhaustion,” in which he simply claims that it is the 

Commonwealth’s burden to raise any exhaustion issues as an affirmative defense. 

Petition at 3-4. This is flatly improper. The local rules governing capital habeas 

petitions – rules that were generated after careful study by a group which included 

judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel, including petitioner’s institutional counsel –

states that in the petition, and not later, the prisoner “must identify at what stage of the 

proceedings each claim was exhausted in state court.” Local Rule Civ. P. 9.4(2)(b). 

Furthermore, exhaustion and default are not “affirmative defenses” in any meaningful 

sense: the habeas statute itself requires exhaustion as a prerequisite to relief, 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A), and directs that the State “shall not be deemed to have waived the 

exhaustion requirement” unless the State “expressly waives the requirement,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(3). Exhaustion must be addressed as a threshold matter, not sometime later, 

and it is neither lawful nor fair to force the Commonwealth to guess what theories of 

exhaustion Cox will rely upon, or where he raised his claims.

With respect to the ballistics claim, there has been extensive state court litigation 

on the subject. Most obviously, Cox raised a ballistics/ineffectiveness claim during 

PCRA review of his capital case, and the state courts rejected it on the merits. The 

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that, generally, defense counsel will not be 

deemed ineffective for failing to call an expert merely to “critically evaluate expert 

testimony which was presented by the prosecution.” Stewart PCRA Appeal Opinion, 983 

A.2d at 692. There must be something more – some specific reason to conclude that such 

investigation would have been fruitful. But Cox’s trial counsel “testified at the PCRA 

hearing that she did not have the ballistics evidence tested because she saw nothing in the 

report prepared by the Commonwealth’s ballistician that was of import or that required 

further investigation.” Id. 

Cox’s only argument in state court (and he repeats these arguments here) is that 

this kind of ballistics evidence can be unreliable as a general matter; in support of this 

argument, he relies on a report issued by the National Academy of Sciences. He does not 

attach this report, so it is difficult to address it. From Cox’s description, the report seems 

to conclude that “much forensic evidence – including, for example, bite marks and 

firearm and toolmark identification” – is often introduced in criminal trials as establishing 

a definitive match for purposes of identification, when the real significance of such 

evidence should be more “modest.” Motion at 9. But these are general assertions, 

unconnected to this case; Cox has not explained whether (or if) the evidence in his own 

case was unfairly characterized, or if the tests were unreliable. And even without this 

evidence, Cox had been connected to the murder of Davis by his own confession; he had 

also been convicted of that murder in a different trial. For that reason, the state supreme 

court concluded, “counsel’s decision not to seek an independent review of the ballistic 

evidence was reasonable.” 983 A.2d at 692. The Court also affirmed the PCRA court’s 

denial of Cox’s request for ballistics discovery: “[t]he assertion that independent testing 

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might result in the discovery of exculpatory evidence is not a sufficient reason to overturn 

the decision of the PCRA court.” Id.

Cox does not explain why this conclusion was unreasonable. If it was reasonable, 

Cox is not entitled to discovery. Indeed, if he did manage to put together a claim that 

relied on facts or evidence not before the state court, that would itself preclude habeas 

relief on the new claim, at least without some showing of “cause and prejudice” to justify 

his failure to present the same claim to the state courts. Cullen v. Pinholster, ---U.S.---, 

2011 WL 1225705, *8, 11 n.10 (April 4, 2011).

More recently, Cox raised a similar claim in connection with the Watson/life case

in 2009, when he filed a PCRA petition (apparently his third in that case) arguing that 

new scientific developments have shown that ballistics evidence is often unreliable. That 

petition is still pending in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, although a few 

weeks ago the PCRA court issued a notice under Pa. R. Crim. P. Rule 907 indicating its 

intent to dismiss the petition as untimely. (About two weeks ago, Cox filed a response to 

the Rule 907 notice, but there has been no decision yet.)

 Finally, Cox raised similar arguments in connection with his third murder

conviction, that is, the murder of Lawrence Davis, which was connected to the murder of 

Watson by the disputed ballistics evidence. In 2009, the Superior Court affirmed the 

denial of PCRA relief on these claims. Commonwealth v. Cox, No. 113 EDA 2009 (Pa. 

Super., Sept. 23, 2009) (“Davis PCRA Opinion”) (A copy of this decision is attached as 

Exhibit B). The Superior Court held that this third PCRA was both untimely and 

meritless. Davis PCRA Opinion at 2, 5-7. Cox argued that his PCRA petition was timely 

because it depended on new facts, specifically recent developments generally 

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undermining the credibility of ballistics evidence. He cited the same National Academy 

of Sciences study he relies on here, which was published in 2009; in addition, he relied 

on two media pieces: (1) an article in the Washington Post discrediting an FBI ballistics 

identification method, which appeared on November 19, 2007, and (2) an accompanying 

story on the 60 Minutes television program the previous day. Davis PCRA Opinion at 3-

4. The Superior Court noted that Cox had missed the 60-day window for filing PCRA 

petitions based on new evidence – he filed his collateral petition more than 60 days after 

the Post article and the 60 Minutes show. The court also found, in the alternative, that 

Cox had suffered no prejudice from counsel’s failure to challenge the reliability of the 

ballistics evidence. Davis PCRA Opinion at 6-8. The court reasoned that there was 

other, strong evidence that Cox had killed Davis, and had done so intentionally, so it 

would not have accomplished anything to challenge the ballistics evidence.

Cox does not mention any of this background, but it is important. The state courts 

rejected these claims, and rejected this same discovery request. If a federal court can 

simply overrule that decision, without any deference to the state courts’ decisionmaking, 

then the rules of deference and exhaustion add up to little. Cox has made no attempt to 

argue that the state courts were wrong to reject these requests, let alone unreasonable. 

The state courts have held that any challenge to the ballistics evidence relating to the 

Davis murder, is untimely; the state PCRA court has indicated that it is poised to make 

the same ruling with respect to the Watson/life case; and as for the Stewart/death case,

the state courts rejected the discovery request because Cox made no allegations about the 

unreliability of the ballistics evidence in this case, as opposed to generally. The Superior 

Court also held that discovery was inappropriate, because there was plenty of evidence 

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connecting Cox to all three murders beyond mere ballistics, so Cox had not demonstrated 

sufficient prejudice.

This Court should not accept Cox’s invitation to ignore all of this litigation, which 

he has not even mentioned, especially based on a scientific report he has not even 

proffered. This is too casual an approach to the limitations on habeas review.

II. Police Investigative Files

Cox also requests access to “all police reports and/or documents.” Motion at 11-

12. He attempts to justify this request on the basis of several claims regarding 

“significant exculpatory evidence:” an alibi argument that Cox’s lawyer failed to make

with respect to the Watson shooting, “favorable treatment” supposedly given to 

Commonwealth witnesses, and a challenge to Cox’s confession to the Stewart murder. 

Motion at 10. This set of discovery requests appears to be limited at first, but in fact Cox 

is asking for the entire internal homicide file, as far as the Commonwealth can tell.

As noted above, however, federal law does not require disclosure of entire police 

files, not in federal prosecutions, and certainly not in state prosecutions being reviewed 

on habeas. The requests must be reasonably specific, and related to specific claims. 

While Cox mentions a few claims which, he contends, justify this discovery, he once 

again entirely omits any discussion of the state court litigation, and once again it falls on 

the Commonwealth to address this topic in the first instance. For that reason alone, this 

discovery request should be denied, at least until after the claims have actually been 

briefed.

Cox argued on direct appeal in his death penalty conviction that his lawyer was 

ineffective for failing to cross-examine two witnesses about benefits given to them by the 

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Commonwealth in their other criminal cases. The state supreme court rejected this claim, 

holding that there was no prejudice because there was plenty of independent evidence of 

Cox’s motive for the killings, which was the primary thrust of these witness’s testimony. 

Stewart Direct Appeal Opinion, 728 A.2d at 933. Cox does not explain why this was 

unreasonable; if the state court decision was reasonable, then Cox is not entitled to

further discovery on the claim, and in any event this Court would not be empowered to 

consider the new evidence absent unusual circumstances. Cullen, 2011 WL 1225705, *8-

11.

Cox does not say where (or if) he exhausted the “alibi” claim. Cox did raise an 

alibi claim in the Watson/life case, on PCRA; he argued that his trial lawyer (and direct 

appeal counsel) was ineffective for not presenting the testimony of an alibi witness 

named Kevin Tadlock; Cox attached a statement from Tadlock to his PCRA petition, in 

which Tadlock said that he and Cox were out drinking together when Watson was killed. 

The Superior Court rejected this claim, however, because the statement from Tadlock 

was unsigned and otherwise improper. Watson PCRA Appeal Opinion at 3. Cox does 

not mention the state court’s decision, let alone why this Court should overlook it. Nor 

does Cox explain how discovery could help this claim – Cox obviously already knows 

about Tadlock and there is no indication that there is anything in the police file relating to 

him.

Finally, Cox suggests that discovery of all police documents is justified by his 

claim that his confession to the Stewart shooting contained facts that “contradicted other 

evidence in the case.” Motion at 10. He includes a citation to a claim in the Stewart 

petition, in which he argues that his lawyer should have attacked the prosecutor’s 

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suggestion that part of Cox’s confession to the Stewart murder was false (that is, that he 

wasn’t himself the shooter). Once again, Cox makes no attempt to explain where he 

raised this claim in state court, and the Commonwealth believes he never properly 

presented any such argument. That means that the claim is defaulted, and no discovery is 

available. In any event, it is unclear why discovery would advance this claim in the first 

place – the claim is that Cox’s trial counsel should have introduced readily available

evidence that supported Cox’s confession; the claim is not that the police had information 

contradicting the prosecution’s theory of the case. (This is an ineffectiveness claim, after 

all.) If Cox simply means that the police might have secret information to support his 

most recent factual theory, he has no actual reason to think this is true – except for his

general theory that the police are probably hiding something, because that is what police 

do. That is not good enough for a habeas discovery request.

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CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully request that this Court deny the motion 

for discovery.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Thomas W. Dolgenos

THOMAS W. DOLGENOS

Chief, Federal Litigation

Case 2:00-cv-05289-EGS Document 36 Filed 09/06/11 Page 16 of 17
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERMONT COX : CIVIL ACTION

V. :

MARTIN HORN, et al. : Nos. 00-5289, 10-2673

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Response to Petitioner’s Motion for 

Discovery was duly served on September 6, 2011, by this Court’s ECF system, and in 

addition one copy was served United States Mail, first class postage prepaid, on counsel 

for petitioner:

Stuart Lev, Esq.

Federal Community Defender Office

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Capital Habeas Corpus Unit

The Curtis Center, Suite 545-W

Independence Square West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

/s/ Thomas W. Dolgenos

_______________________

THOMAS W. DOLGENOS

Chief, Federal Litigation

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