### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE D ec em be r 14, 200 4 S es sio n STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KEN NET H WA YN E BA LL Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for G ree ne County No. 03CR018 Jam es E. Beckner, Judge

No. E2004-00501-CC A-R3- CD - F iled April 6, 2005

A Gre ene County

jury convicted the Def

endant, Ke nneth Way ne B all, of one c ount of driving under the i nfluenc e, and the t rial court sentenc ed him to 11 months and 29 day s, of which 10 pe rce nt was to be serve d befor e elig ibil i t y for rehabilitative re lease prog rams. In this appeal, the de fenda nt contests the suff

iciency of the c onvicting e vidence and contends that the tria l court er red in de ny ing his m ot io n to su pp re ss the re su lts of a br e a tha ly zer

te st d e sp ite the of

fi c e r’ s la c k o f r e a so na

ble g ro un ds to b e lie ve that he wa s int oxic a te d a nd de sp ite the of fi c e r’ s failu re to f

oll ow the 20 -m inu te ob se rv a tio n p ro toc ol. We a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of t h e co urt, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., joined. Rog e r A . Wo ols e y , G re e ne vil le , T e nn e sse e , f or the Ap pe lla nt, Ke nn e th Way ne B a ll.
Paul G . Su mme rs , Attorne y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; C. Be rk el ey Be ll, J r., District Attorney Gene ral; and Eric Christiansen, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee. OP IN ION
On Dec ember

17, 2002, sometime after 1:00 a.m., Offic er Tr avis Egger s was on routine patrol in Gr eene ville. He wa s assig ned to the Commercia l Vehicle E nforc ement Division of the Te nn e sse e De pa

rt me nt o f S a fe ty

a ndwa s c e rt if

ie d to op e rate the I nto xime te r 30 00

. At so me point, of which Off

icer Eg g ers was uncertain, he was driving southbound on I nterstate 81 f ollowed by a tra ctor-tr ailer truc k that the offic er w as esc orting off the r oad and putting “out of service .” The office r spi ed the defe ndant’s vehicle, a pickup truck, stopped on the other side of the roa d with the flasher s on, and he c ould make out the fig ure of a lone individual.-2- Offic er Eg g ers did not stop at that t i m e t o i n vestig ate. He continued to esc ort the trac tor-tra iler truck f

or an o t h er s ev en mi les, turned of f at Exit 36, and waited to ensure that the tr a c tor -t raile r truc k pull e d off a t a de sig nate d lo c a tio n. Of

fi c e r E g g e rs the n r e -e nte re d th e int e rs ta te trave ling north and pulled over at m ile marke r 43 whe re the defe ndant’s truc k was pa rked on the shoulder of the road. O ffice r Eg g ers testified that 14 minutes elapsed betwe en the time he f irst saw the vehicle and whe n he re turned to it.

Offic er Eg g ers s ai d t hat when he first arrived at the location of the defe ndant’s vehicle, the defe ndant was standing at the side of the vehicle. When the officer got out of his cr uiser, the def endant a pproac hed and a dvised that he wa s out of g as. Off icer Eg g ers of

fer ed to help, and he testified that he did not independe ntly verify whether the truck ne eded g asoline. The ke y s to the truc k w e re in the de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht f ro nt p a nts po c ke t, andthe of fi c e r s a w n o e vid e nc e of

a lc oh ol i n or aro un d the truc k. Th e of

fi c e r ne ve r as ke d or oth e rw ise de te rm ine d w he n th e de fe nd a nt’ s v e hic le ran out of g as, did not chec k the hood to see if the eng ine was w arm, a nd did not attempt to st art the vehicle. D uring the cour se of f urther discussions, Of

fice r Eg g ers be g an to suspect that the de fendant was intox icated.

The encounte r betwee n the men wa s rec orded on the office r’s in-c ar vide o came ra, and the video ta

pe w as p l ay ed for

the jury . Offic er Eg g ers testified that he ar rested the defe ndant on the char g e of driving under the influence and tra nsported him to the Gre ene County weig h station to perform a bre athaly zer test. The intox imeter printout re g istered a breath/alcohol level of 0.18.
Offic er Eg g ers was the state’s sole witness at trial. The defe ndant calle d W i l l iam Grove r, who re sided in J eff erson City

and had been a

long- time acqua intance of the def endant. Mr. Grove r testified that the defe ndant came to his house on D ece mber 16, 2002, at approxim ately 7:00 p.m. The defendant had with him a six -pac k of bee r; he c onsumed two and one -half bottles of be er wh ile a t Mr . G ro ve r’ s r e sid e nc e a ndle ft thr e e fu ll b ott le s w he n he de pa rt e d sh ortly a ft e r 10 :00 p. m. Mr. Grove r noticed nothing unusual about the defe ndant’s sobriety when he arrived, and Mr. G rover testified that in his opinion t he def endant ha d co m p l et e control of his fa culties when he departed. Mr. Grove r said that the de fendant was hea ring -impaired, and the evening that the def endant visited, the def endant c omplained of a

cold or sinus ailment.
The de fendant took the stand. He e x plained that Mr. Gr over ha d extended an invitation to vi sit and that Mr. Grove r had shown an interest in buy ing the defe ndant’s truc k. The defe ndant conf

irmed that he ha d a hea

ring problem stemming f

rom his service in Vietnam and that on the eve ning he visited Mr. G ro v er , h e h ad a cold a nd had bee n taking Afrin na sal spray and Ny quil. The defe ndant said that he ha d not been drinking be fore he ar rived at Mr. Grove r’s house, and during his three- hour visit, he consumed two or thr ee be ers.

Th e de fe nd a nt t e sti fi e d th a t onhis way ho me a ndsome ti me aft er 1 1:0 0 p .m. , h is “vehic le just quit running” at mile marker 43. T he def endant was uncertain of the sourc e of the mecha nical diffic ulty ; t h e gas gau ge on the truck did not reg ister cor rec tly , and the truc k had a-3-

history of the dist ributor’s becoming corrode d. The defenda nt also rec alled that in try ing to start the truck, the battery

almost completely

discharg ed.
The de fendant got out of the truck, started walking up the hig hway , and tried to “ flag a ride .” When he wa s unsucce ssful, he re turned to the truc k, g ot inside, and ac tivated t he fla shers ho pin g to attr a c t a tte nti on . B y the tim e the of

fi c e r p ull e d b ehi ndhim , th e de fe nd a nt w a s a g a in out s i d e the truck on the left side. The office r’s video ta pe that wa s play ed for

the jury showed a n inc or re c t date of

No ve mbe r 1 7, ins te a d o f D e c e mbe r 1 7. Th e tim e , h ow e ve r, on the tape e vid e ntl y was a ccur ate. It showed the off icer arriving shortly afte r 1: 00 a.m., which acc ording to the defe ndant wo u l d h av e b ee n ap p ro x i m at el y t wo h o u rs an d 1 5 m i n u t es af t erh i s tru cks t o p p ed o p er at i n g. The defenda nt testified t hat t he off icer made no inquiries r eg arding when the tr uck broke dow n and whether it would run. The defenda nt claimed that the of fice r also did not chec k the hood of the truck o r t ry t o s t art the ve hicle. The office r did ask the de fendant to submi t to an intox imeter a lcohol test, and the de fendant said that he had no obje ct i o n s to comply ing w ith the reque st. Rega

rding his cold medicine, the de fendant testified th at hi s Afrin wa s in his ins ide coat pocket a nd that the Ny quil was in the truck. Acc ording to the defendant, he was suff ering from sinus problems at t h e t i m e, an d he had ta ken some Ny quil approxi mately five to 10 minutes befor e the office r pulled up behind the truc k.

O nc r o s s
- e xami n ati o n , th ed e f e n d an t ad mi tt e d

that he first denie d having had anything to drink when the of

fice r aske d him. Only

afte r the off

icer presse d did the defendant a dmit drinking tw o o r thr e e be e rs e arl ie r, but th e defe nd a nt s til l di d n ot m e nti on the Ny qu il. Th e de fe nd a nt a lso a dmi tte d n e ve r m e nti on ing to the of fi c e r any oth e r p os sib le pr ob le ms w iththe truc k, su c h a s w ith the distributor. I n terms of a low char g e on the truck battery , the defe ndant ag ree d that the video tape showed the truc k flasher s operating at a normal rate.

When the state aske d the def endant to ac count for his a ctivities during the two hours a nd15 min ute s th a t he wa s str a nd e d on the ro a ds ide , th e de fe nd a nt s a id that a t f ir st, he sp e nt s ome time try ing to g et the truck to start. When it would not, the defendant started walking up the roa d beca use he “ knew ther e wa s an exit and a g as station up the road at the next ex it.” The de fenda nt testified that he ne ver ma de it to the exit beca use hi s l egs started hurting, a nd he re turned to the truck. Along the way , the def endant thre w up hi s hands at passing vehicles, but no one would stop.
Ba sed on the evidenc e prese nted, the jury convicted the defe ndant of driving under the influenc e and se t a fine in the amount of $500. The court approve d the jury fine a nd s et the defe ndant’s re lease elig ibilit y date at 10 perc ent of the required mi sdemea nor sentence of 11 months a nd29 day s.T he defendan t couc hes hi s i s s ue i n t er ms of t he t r i al cour t ’ s er r or i n fai l i ng t o di r ect a j udgment of ac qui t t al 1 in t h e c a se
. T h e sta n d a rd b y w h ic h tria l c o u rts d e te rm ine a n d a p p e llate c o u rts re v ie w a m o tio n fo r j u d g m e n t o f ac q u itt a l, ho wever, i s ess ent i al l y t he same st and ard ap p l i ed when det erm i ni ng t he suf f i ci ency o f t he evi d ence af t er a co nvi ct i o n. See St at e v. Thom ps on , 5 4 9 S .W .2 d 9 4 3 , 9 4 6 (T e n n . 1 9 7 7 ); St at e v. Ander s on , 880 S. W

. 2d 720, 726 ( T en n
. Cr i m. App. 1 9 9 4 ).

E f

fect i ve Jul y 1, 20 0 3 , T enness ee C o d e A nno t at ed s e c tio n 55

- 1 0

- 4 0 1 (a)( 2 ) was am end ed t o read: “ T he 2

a lc o h o l co n c e n tra tio n in su c h p e rs o n ’s b lo o d o r b re a th is e igh t-hu n d re d ths o f o n e p e rc e n t (.0 8 % ) o r m o re .”

-4- I. Evid ence Suff

iciency.
I n his first issue, the defe ndant assails the sufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e. He arg ues that t he st ate failed t o prove bey ond a reasonable doubt that he was “driving ” or “in phy sical c on tr ol” of

his truc k w hil e un de r the inf lue nc e of a n in toxic a nt. 1
Our standard of revie w is a familiar one. When an acc used cha lleng es the suff iciency of the e v i d en ce , an appellate court inspec ts the evidentiary landsca pe, including the direc t and circ umstantial contours, from the vantag e point most ag ree able to the prosec ution. The re viewing court then de cides whe ther the evidenc e and the infer ence s that flow there from per mit any rational fac t finder to conc lude bey ond a re asonable doubt that the defe ndant is g uiltyof the c harg ed crime. See Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( e ); J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2791-92 (1979) ; State v. Dunc an , 698 S.W. 2d 63 , 67 (T e nn . 1 98 5) ; State v. Dy kes , 80 3 S.W. 2d25 0, 25 3 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 1990), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1 (Tenn. 2000)

.

I n determining suff

iciency o f t he proof

, the appe llate court does not replay and rew eig h the evidenc e. Se e Sta te v. Ma tt he ws , 805 S.W .2d 776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

. Wit ness credibility , the weig ht and value of the evidenc e, and f

actua l disputes are e ntrusted to the finder of fac t. State v. Cabbage , 5 71 S.W. 2d83 2, 83 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 8) ; Lia k as v . S tate , 199 Tenn. 298, 30 5, 28 6 S. W.2 d 8 56 , 8 59 (1 95 6) ; F a r m e r v . S tat e , 5 7 4 S .W.2d 49, 51 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Simpl y stated, the c ourt will not subst itute its judgme nt f or that of the trier

of fa ct. I nstead, the c ourt extends to t he State of Te nnes s ee t h e st rong est leg itimate view of the e vidence contained in the rec ord as we ll as all rea sonable and leg itimate infere nces that may be drawn from the evidenc e. See Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d at 835.

At the t ime of t he charg ed offense in this case , Code section 55-10- 401(a) (2) made it “unlawful for

any person to drive or to be in phy sical control of any automobile” while the “alc ohol c oncentr ation in suc h person’ s blood or breath is ten-hundredths of one perc ent (.10%) or mor e .” Te nn . Co de An n. § 5 5- 10 -4 01 (a )( 2) (S up p. 20 02 ). Th e re c or d b e fo re us do e s n ot i nd ic a te 2 prec isely under w hat theory

the jury found the defe ndant g uilty– either driving while intoxicated or be ing in p hy sic a l c on tr ol o f a mot or veh icl e while int oxic a te d. No ne the le ss, a g e ne ra l ve rd ic t is permitted whe n only

one offe nse is at issue based upon a single criminal occ urre nce. See State v

.T h e def en dan t does n ot ch al l en g e t h e s u f f i ci en cy of t h e ev i den ce w i t h r es pec t t o t h e el eme n t s of i n t ox i ca t i on 3

o r o f b e ing o n a p u b lic ro a d

. -5- Butler , 1 08 S.W. 3d84 5, 85 0 n .3 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; State v. Lemac ks , 996 S.W .2d 166, 171 (Tenn. 1999)

. The c rime at issue is a “ st ri ct l iability offe nse.” Sta te v . Ka in , 2 4 S. W.3 d 8 16 , 8 18 (T e nn . Crim. App. 2000).
Re g ard ing the drivi ng -w hil e -i nto xicate d mo de of the of fe ns e , th e de fe nd a nt m e re ly asserts that the s tate off

ere d no evidenc e that he w as “driving” at a time that he w as intox icated. T he defe ndant re serve s the bulk of his arg ument to the phy sical-c on t rol mode of the of fense . By

that mode of c ommitt ing the offe nse, it is settl ed that the leg islature intended “ to remove f rom the inebriate d t he option of oper ating a vehic le.” State v. Turner , 9 53 S.W. 2d21 3, 21 5 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 199 6 ). Corre ctly

rec og nizi ng that our supre me court in State v. Lawrence , 849 S.W .2d 761 (Tenn. 1993) , broug ht forth a “ totalityof the c ircumstance s” test, the defe ndant insists that (a) he wa s not inside the t ruck when t he officer arrived; (b) the key s wer e in his pocket, not the ig nition; and (c ) the ve hic le wa s inc apa ble of be ing drive n or mov e d un de r its ow n po wer. Th e defe nd a nt, there fore , maintains that his conviction cannot stand. 3

I n Lawrence , a deputy discovere d the defendant asleep behind the whee l of his truck that was pa

rked in the r oad; the truc k eng ine was not running , and the ig nition k ey wa s in the de fe nd a nt’ s p oc ke t. T he c ou rt de ve lop e d a

“ hig hly fa c tua l” tot a lit y

of t he cir cums ta nc e s te st, wher eby the trier of

fac t should take into acc ount fac tors including [1] the location of the defe ndant in relation t o t h e vehicle, [2] the wh er eab o u t s o f t h e ign i t i o n k ey , [ 3 ] wh et h er t h e mo t o r w as ru n n i n g, [4] th e de fe nd a nt’ s a

bil ity , bu t for

his int oxic a tio n, to d ir e c t th e us e or no n- us e of

the ve hic le , o r [5 ] the e xten t to w hic h th e ve hic le its e lf is capa ble of be ing ope rate d or moved unde r its o wn power or otherwise.
Id

. at 765. The court added that the “same consider ations can be used as c ircumstantial evidenc e that the def endant ha d been driving the vehicle .” Id

. I n apply ing the test, the Lawrence co u rt h el d that the def endant wa s in phy sical c on tr ol o f the truc k. Th e c ou rt no te d th a t th e de fe nd a nt “ wa s in sid e of the ve hic le , b e hin d th e wh e e l, a n d h a d p o s s e s s io n o f

th e k e y s [, ]” th a t h e “ w a s a lo n e in th e tr u c k a n d n o o n e e ls e w a s inth e ar e a [, ]” and that it was “undisputed that, but f or his intox ication, he ha d the pre sent phy sical ability to direct the vehicle ’s oper ation and movement[, beca use he] could have at any time started the e ng ine and driven a way .” Id . The Lawrence c ou rt a lso op ine d th a t th e de fe nd a nt could proba

bly have be en convic ted of “driving,” the alternative way of violating T.C.A. § 55-10-401. Althoug h no one actua lly saw the Def endant driving his vehic le, the evide nce amply s u p p o rts the-6- conclusion that he did so. From the undisputed fa cts in th e re cord, the inf e r e n c e m a y

r e a s o n ab l y

b e m a d e t h a tt h e D e f

e n d a n td r o v e his vehicle w hile under the influence of an intoxi cant.
Id . at 766.
I n 2003, the supreme court in State v. Butler , 108 S.W .3d 845 (Tenn. 2003) , ref ined the fifth Lawrence fac tor – the extent to which the vehicle its el f is capa ble of be ing ope rate d or moved un d er i ts own power or otherwise. T he court “adopt[ed] the reasona bly capa ble of be ing rende red ope rable standard in cases whe re[in] a def endant c ontests the element of phy sical control based upon a lleg ed inoper ability of the ve hicle.” Id . at 852. B y that standard, the prope r foc us [i s] not narr owly on the “mechanica l condition of the car when it comes to re st, but upon the status of its occupant and the nature of the authority

he or she exerted over the vehicle in arriving at the place from which, by virtue of its inopera bility , it can no long er mov e .”

. . . [W]he re “ci rcu mst a nti a l e vid e nc e pe rm its a le g iti ma te infere nce that the car was wher e it wa s and was perf orming as it was beca use of the defe ndant’s choice , it f ollows that the defe ndant was in” phy sical control of

the vehicle

. Id

. (q u o t i n g State v. Sme lter , 36 Wash. App. 439, 444 -4 5 , 6 7 4 P.2d 690, 693 (1984) (de fenda nt found intox icated in his vehicle that wa s out of g as; conviction prope rly based on f

act that de fendant drove ve hicle until it ran out of g as))

.

Apply i n g t he Lawrence fac tors, as interpr eted in Butler , th e e vid e nc e is c le arl y su ff ic ie nt t o s u p p o r t t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s c o n v i c t i o n b a s e d o n p h y s i c a l c o n tr o l o f t h e v e h i c l e
. I tis un dis pu te d th a t t he de fe nd a nt w a s th e pe rs on drivi ng the truc k; n o o ne e lse wa s in vo lve d inits operation. The defenda nt was found in close prox imityto the vehicle. A lthough the tr uck key s were no t in the ig nit ion , a

c on vic tio n b a se d u po n ph y sic a l c on tr ol do e s n ot “ hin g e ” on that lo ne fa c tor , ju st a s “ ph y sic a l c on tr ol do e s no t hin g e on wh e the r the ve hic le ’s e ng ine is r un nin g or wh e the r the ve hic le is in mot ion.” Butler , 108 S.W .3d at 851.

The de fendant seems to sug g est that bec ause the office r did not eng ag e in an investigation to independently determine if the vehicle was operational, the jury was ther eby

oblige d to acc ept his testimony that the truck r an out of g as, that its battery was down, and that the truck ha d a history of developing a corr oded dis tributor. We disag ree
. The jury was not obligated t o find the defe ndant’s testimony

cre dible, and we are awa re of no leg al re quirement that a n arr esting office r must verify

whether the vehicle is operational. More over, e ven if the jury cre dited the def

endant’ s testimonythat the truck w as out of g as, that fa ct does not neg ate the de fendant’s being in phy sical control of the tr

uck. Per Butler , which found the rea soning of the Washington c ourt in Smelter persua sive, the mec hanica l condition of the truck whe n it came t o re s t – out of g as – is not de te rm inativ e . Ins te a d, if the truc k w a s “ ‘w he re it w a s an d wa s p e rfo rm ing as it wa s beca use of the-7-

defe ndant’s choic e, it follows that the def endant wa s in’” phy sical control of the vehicle

. Id. at 852 (q u o t i n g Smelter , 674 P.2d at 693) (e mphasis added in Butler); see also State v . Roger Dale B ryan , No. M2003-01366-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Cri m
. Ap p ., Nashville, Jul y 7, 2004), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2004)

. The defenda nt’s choice to drive the truck unti l it ran out of g as does not provide an esca pe route from convic tion in thi s case
.

L a s t , th ej u r

y c ou ld h a ve c on vic te d th e de fe nd a nt b a se d o n a the ory that th e de fe nd a nt, w h i l e i n t o x i c a t e d , h a d a c t u a l l y d r i v e n h i s tru c k

u n t i l i tc a m e t o t h e p o i n t o f r e s to n t h e i n t e r s t a t e
. In view of t he def

endant’ s admission that he – and no one e lse – drove the truck on the r oad to the po int wh e re it wa s fou nd , the jury re a so na bly c ou ld ha ve fo un d th a t he wa s in toxic a te d w he n h e did so. See Lawrence , 8 49 S.W. 2da t 76 6; Roger Dale B ryan , slip op. at 5.

Acc ording ly , we hold that the e vidence is sufficient to sustain the def endant’ s conviction of driving under the influence

. II. Results of I ntoxim ete r Test.
I n State v. Sensing , 8 43 S.W. 2d41 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) , th e su pr e me c ou rt he ld that a s a foundation for

admissibili ty

of intox imeter test re sults, a testi ng office r m ust be able to addre ss the fo llo wi ng six po int s:

We hold that the testing of fi ce r m ust be able to testify (1) that the tests were perf

ormed in ac cordance w ith the s tandar ds and oper ating proce dure pr omulgated bythe fore nsic servic es division of the Tenne ssee B ureau of I nvestig ation, (2) that he was prope rly certified in a c c or da nc e wi th tho se sta nd ard s, (3 ) that th e e vid e nti ary br e a th test i n g i n s tru m en tu s ed wa s ce rt i fi ed b y t h e f o re n s i c s er v i ce s d i v ision, was tested reg ularly for acc urac y and wa s working properly when the breath test was per formed, ( 4) that the motorist was observed for the re qu i s i t e 2 0 m i n u t e s p r i o r t o t h e t e s t , a n d d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , h e did no t ha ve fo re ig n ma tte r in his mou th, didno t c on su me a ny a lc oh oli c bever ag e, s m o ke, or r eg urg itate, (5) e vidence that he followe d the presc ribed ope rational proc edure , (6) identify the printout re cord offe red in e vidence (as) th e re sult of the test g iven to the per son tested.
Id . at 416. Pr e tr ia l, the de fe nd a nt c ha lle ng e d th e a dmi ssi bil ity of the .1 8 in toxim e te r t e st r e su lts in his case, and the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The defenda nt focused on the Sensing 20 -m inu te ob ser vat io n re qu ir e me nt, a ndhe arg ue d th e n – a s h e do e s n ow – th a t O ff ic e r E g g e rs ’ testimonyfails to establish that he observe d the defe ndant for the require d 20-minute period be fore having the def

endant blow into the mac hine.-8- The de fendant bases his arg ument on a compa rison of the ti m e n o t ed when the defe ndant sig ned the implied conse nt form (3 : 1 1 a.m.) with t he printout time shown on the intox imeter test re sults (3:29 a.m.). That compa rison reve als an 18-minute time span, two minutes short of the re quired observation period. Eve n so, Offic er Egg ers testified and explained to the satis fa c tio n o f the tr ia l c ou rt that hi s ti me re fe re nc e s w e re bas ed on th e wa ll c loc k inthe ro om, wh e re a s th e int oxime te r’ s in te rn a l c loc k g e ne rate d th e tim e print e d o n th e te st r e su lts :

THE COURT: How do I know t hat y ou had him under obse rvation for 20 minutes or more ? How do y ou know?
THE WI TNESS: By

the times that was on the impli ed consent, I waite d 2 0 mi nu te s to g ive the te st. THE COURT: By

what watch or c lock?
THE WI TNESS: By

this clock, rig ht here (indicating photogr aph). THE COURT: By

the – You wa ited 20 minutes on that clock – On the clock that rea d 3:11 when y ou finished t he im plied consent, y ou loo ke d at th a t c loc k f

or 20 min ute s?
THE WI TNESS: True.
THE COURT: Until it said – ?
THE WI TNESS: 3:31.
THE COURT: 3:31?
TH E WITN ESS: Cor

re c t.
THE COURT: And then –
T H E WI T N E SS : We a c tu a ll y s ta r te d o b s e r v in g h im b e f

o r e 3 :1 1

. We fi lle d o ut this imp lie d c on se nt.
THE C OURT: But when y ou went to the intox imeter, it printed out 3:29?
TH E WITN ESS: Cor

re c t.
The de fendant arg ues that Off icer Eg g ers’ testimonyis uncerta in and suspect. The trial court, howe ver, found that the officer credibly testified t hat t he 20-minut e observation period ha d b e e n s a tis fi e d b a se d on th e wal l clo c k. We d o n ot s e c on d- g ue ss the tr ia l c ou rt ’s c re dib ili ty-9-

determinations. See State v . W alton , 4 1 S. W.3 d 7 5, 81 (T e nn
. 20 01 ) ( qu e sti on s r e g ard ing wi tne ss c re dib ili ty

a ndre so lut ionof

c on fl ic ts i n th e e vid e nc e are ma tte rs e ntr us te d to the tr ia l ju dg e ); Sta te v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996) (“[A] trial court’s findings of fac t in a suppression hea ring will be upheld unless the evide nce pr eponder ates other wise.”)

.

We h oldthat th e tr ia l c ou rt did no t e rr in a dmi tti ng the re su lts of the int oxime te r t e st in this case.
III. Reasonable Grounds f or Bre athalyzerTest.
I n his f inal issue the defe ndant arg ues that the offic er did not have rea sonable g rounds to reque st that he subm it to a breathaly zer test; theref ore, he claims, the test re sults shoul d have be en suppressed on that basis. The def endant pr edicates his a

rg ument on Code section 55-10- 406(a) (1), wh ic h p ro vid e s,
An y pe rs on wh o d ri ve s a ny

mot or ve hic le in the state is deeme d to ha ve g iven consent to a test for the purpose of determining the alcohol ic o r

d ru g c o n te n t o f

th a t p e r s o n ’ s b lo o d ; p r o v id e d , th at such test is administered at the direc tion of a law enf orce ment office r ha vin g re a so na

ble g ro un ds to be lie ve su c h pe rs on wa s drivi ng wh ile under the i n fl u ence of an intoxi cant or drug , as def

ined in § 55-10-405. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 10-406(a )(1) (2004).

The de f e n d a n t c h ar a c te r iz e s th e r e c o r d in th is c a s e a s “ v o id ” o f a n y te s ti mony or e vid e nc e that w ou ld c aus e Of fi c e r Eg g e rs to be lie ve that the de fe nd a nt w a s in toxic a te d. Th e state counter s that the video tape re cording of the encounte r betwe en the de fendant and Off icer Eg g ers offe rs suffic ient evidenc e and justification for the off icer ’s re quest that the def endant submit to a br e a tha ly e r t e st.

We note that the def

endant include s no citation in his brie f to the rec ord whe rein the issue he raises was litigated or decide d. Our re view of the rec ord re veals that pre trial, the def endant filed a motion to s uppress that a lleg ed, inte r a lia , tha t the arr e sti ng of fi c e r did no t ha ve re a so na ble g rounds to be lieve the defe ndant was intox icated so as to r equest that he s u b m i t t o a b re athaly zer test. That same motion also challeng ed whe ther the Sensing 20-minute observation requireme nt had been me t. Howeve r, whe n the suppression motion wa s litigated, the defe ndant evidently abandone d the c la im r e g ard ing the e xiste nc e of re a so na ble g ro un ds to be lie ve that he wa s in toxic a te d; at le a st, the transc ript of the hea

ring does not ref

lect that the c laim was pursue d at that time. Following conviction, the def endant f iled a motion for new t ri al in which he r ealleg ed that the a

rre sting off

icer did not have re asonabl e gro unds to believe that he was unde r the influence of alcohol. A minute entry appea rs in the re cord stating that the motion for new trial was-10-

overr uled o n J anuary

30, 2004. No transc ript of the new -trial motion hearing is include d in the re c or d; l ike wi se no writt e n o rd e r a pp e ars
. Ac c or din g ly , w e are of

the op ini on that th e de fe nd a nt h a s wai ve d a pp e llate c on sid e ratio n o f this iss ue on tw o g ro un ds . F ir st, “ [A] pa rty is n ot e nti tle d to re lie f i f the pa rt y invited error , waived an err or, or f ailed to ta ke whateve r steps wer e rea sonably available to cure an err or.” Te nn. R. App. P. 36(a), Advisory Com m i s s i o n Cmts. S econd, it is well settled that whe n a party seeks a ppellate r eview, the re is a duty to prepa re a rec ord which convey s a fair, acc urate and complete a ccount of

what transpired wit h respe ct t o the issues forming the basis of the a ppeal. See Sta te v . B all ar

d , 855 S.W .2d 557, 561 (Tenn. 1993) (holding failure to include transc ript prec ludes appellate revie w); State v. Bunc h , 6 46 S.W. 2d15 8, 16 0 ( Te nn . 1 98 3) ; State v. Oody , 8 2 3 S.W .2d 554, 559 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (holding trial court’ s ruling pr esumed c orre ct in the abse nce of an ade quate r ecor d on appea l). Where the r ecor d is incomplete and doe s not contain a tra nscript of the proceeding s rele vant t o an is sue presented for revie w, or portions of the r ecor d upon which the party reli es , an appellate court is precluded f rom considering the issue. Se e Sta te v . R ob e rts , 755 S.W .2d 833, 836 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Absent the nece ssary rele vant materia l in the r ecor d, we decline to c onsider the merits of this i ssue. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b).
IV . C onc lusi on.
Acc ording ly , for the f

oreg oing r easons, we aff

irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE