14-1579-cv 

Fox v. Colvin 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 21st day of January, two thousand fifteen. 

PRESENT: RALPH K. WINTER, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

 REENA RAGGI, 

 Circuit Judges. 

 

RONALD ROBERT FOX, III, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 14-1579-cv 

 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: HOWARD D. OLINSKY, Olinsky Law Group, 

Syracuse, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: DANIEL R. JANES, Special Assistant U.S. 

Attorney for Richard S. Hartunian, United 

States Attorney, Northern District of New 

York; Stephen P Conte, on the brief, Regional 

Chief Counsel, Social Security Administration, 

New York, NY. 
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 Appeal from a March 25, 2014 judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be and hereby is 

AFFIRMED. 

Plaintiff Ronald Robert Fox, III appeals from the judgment of the District Court affirming 

the denial by the Commissioner of Social Security of Fox’s application for Social Security benefits 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In reviewing the denial of an SSI claim, “[w]e undertake a plenary 

review of the administrative record, and our focus is on the administrative ruling more than on the 

district court's decision.” Lamay v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009). Pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied 

the correct legal standard and whether substantial evidence supported its conclusions. See Cichocki v. 

Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 175-76 (2d Cir. 2013). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere 

scintilla[;] [i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Burgess v. Astrue, 

537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)). In evaluating whether the requisite substantial evidence exists, we 

“defer to the Commissioner’s resolution of conflicting evidence,” Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 

118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012), and can reject findings of fact “only if a reasonable factfinder would have to 

conclude otherwise,” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). In applying these standards here, we assume the parties’ familiarity with 

the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 

Plaintiff challenges the disability determination on the grounds that the Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”) improperly discounted Fox’s treating physician’s opinion and improperly assessed 

witness credibility. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly evaluated the opinions provided by 

Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vierhile is belied by the ALJ’s opinion itself, which states that the 

form report completed by Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vierhile “has been considered,” but was 

unpersuasive in certain respects to the ALJ because “certain of the more extreme/marked 

limitations assessed are inconsistent with the claimant’s activities of daily living and the record as a 

whole, and are unsupported by contemporaneously reported examination notes.” Appellant’s App’x 

at 46. Where, as here, a treating physician’s assessment is contradicted by other substantial record 

evidence, including the testimony of the plaintiff and the opinions of other medical experts, the ALJ 

properly denied controlling weight to Dr. Wang and Nurse Practitioner Vierhile’s form report. 

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004); Veino v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 578, 588 (2d Cir. 

2002). 

The ALJ’s impairment and credibility determinations are also supported by substantial 

evidence. The ALJ carefully evaluated the record regarding Fox’s limitations (or lack thereof) in the 

six functional equivalency domains set forth in 20 C.F.R. 416.926a, concluding that Fox had a 
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marked limitation in interacting and relating with others, less than marked limitations in four other 

domains and no significant limitations at all in a final domain. In so determining, the ALJ relied 

upon extensive record evidence, including testimony from Fox and his mother, Fox’s school reports, 

physician and medical expert reports, and information regarding Fox’s successful participation in a 

vocational welding program, ability to pass the GED exam in one sitting, involvement in a 

recreational bowling league, and relationship with a long-term girlfriend. Based upon our 

independent review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial 

evidence, and that plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION 

We have considered all of the arguments raised by plaintiff on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the March 25, 2014 judgment of the District 

Court. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk