J-S08033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

KEVIN LEE SHOLAR

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 385 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 1, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s): 

CP-67-CR-0004181-2021

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: MAY 8, 2023

The Commonwealth appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed 

following the guilty plea of Appellee, Kevin Lee Sholar, to driving under the 

influence (“DUI”)—high rate of alcohol and required financial responsibility.1 

We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.

On July 11, 2021, Appellee was arrested and charged with various DUI 

offenses and required financial responsibility after being involved in a singlevehicle crash. The DUI offenses were charged as second offenses based upon 

Appellee’s resolution of a prior DUI charge through the accelerated 

rehabilitative disposition (“ARD”) process. On December 7, 2021, Appellee 

entered an open guilty plea to one count of DUI—high rate of alcohol and 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(b) and 1786(f), respectively.
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required financial responsibility, noting his objection to the DUI being treated 

as a second offense for the purpose of sentencing. N.T., 12/7/21, at 6. 

Sentencing was deferred to permit the Commonwealth to present argument 

as to whether the instant DUI offense should be considered a first or second 

offense. Id. at 7-8. 

At that time, this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 

A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020), set forth the prevailing law on whether 

acceptance of ARD in an earlier DUI case could be considered a prior offense 

for sentencing in a subsequent DUI prosecution. In Chichkin, we held that 

the classification of ARD as a prior offense in Section 3806(a) of the Vehicle 

Code violated due process and therefore a defendant could not be sentenced 

as a recidivist DUI offender on that basis. Id. at 969-71; 75 Pa.C.S. § 3806(a) 

(defining a “prior offense” to include acceptance of ARD); see also 75 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3804 (setting forth escalating mandatory minimums for first, second, and 

subsequent DUI offenses).

At the February 1, 2022 sentencing hearing, the trial court did not 

permit the Commonwealth to submit Appellee’s certified driving record as 

proof that he committed the prior DUI offense that was resolved through ARD. 

N.T., 2/1/22, at 2-4. The court indicated that it was treating Appellee’s plea

to DUI—high rate of alcohol as a first offense and sentenced him to pay a $500 

fine and serve six months on restrictive probation, including two days of house 

arrest, on the DUI charge. Id. at 8; Sentencing Order, 2/1/22. The trial court 

further ordered Appellee to pay a fine of $200 on the required financial 
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responsibility charge. N.T., 2/1/22, at 8; Sentencing Order, 2/1/22. The 

Commonwealth then filed this timely appeal.

The Commonwealth raises the following issue before this Court:

Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt improperly sentenced [Appellee] as a 

first-time offender to Driving Under the Influence?

Commonwealth Brief at 4. The Commonwealth argues on appeal that 

Chichkin was wrongly decided as the decision is based upon a flawed reading 

of our precedent as well as Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013),

and that Pennsylvania’s ARD procedure provides adequate due process 

protections such that ARD can be considered a prior offense for sentencing 

purposes. 

The Commonwealth’s argument implicates the legality of Appellee’s 

sentence, which the Commonwealth may appeal as of right. See 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9781(a); Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227, 230 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(en banc). A claim relating to the legality of a sentence presents a question 

of law as to which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review 

is plenary. Moroz, 284 A.3d at 230.

This Court’s en banc decisions in Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 

A.3d 214, 217 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), appeal granted, No. 518 MAL 

2022 (Pa. March 15, 2023), and Moroz, which were filed during the pendency 

of this appeal, squarely address the issue presently before this Court. As we 

have recently explained, 
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The [Richards and Moroz] decisions emphasize that the General 

Assembly provided that “ARD will constitute a prior offense for 

purposes of sentencing on a second or subsequent DUI conviction 

. . ., and a defendant is presumed to be aware of the relevant 

statute.” Richards, 284 A.3d at 220 (citation omitted); Moroz, 

284 A.3d at 233. The nearly identical decisions therefore 

expressly overruled Chichkin and held “the portion of Section 

3806(a), which equates prior acceptance of ARD to a prior 

conviction for purposes of imposing a Section 3804 mandatory 

minimum sentence, passes constitutional muster.” Richards, 

284 A.3d at 220; Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233.

Commonwealth v. Hummel, ___ A.3d ___, 2023 PA Super 57, *3-4 (Pa. 

Super. filed April 4, 2023) (footnote omitted).2

Here, the trial court disregarded Appellee’s earlier acceptance of ARD 

and sentenced him as a first-time DUI offender in accordance with Chichkin. 

Under Richards and Moroz, this ruling was in error. See Moroz, 284 A.3d 

at 233 (concluding that “the trial court erred in sentencing [the a]ppellee as 

a first-time DUI offender without considering his acceptance of ARD for a prior 

DUI”); Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57, *4 (same); see also Commonwealth 

v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018) (noting that Pennsylvania

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2 Our Supreme Court addressed this issue more recently in Commonwealth

v. Verbeck, 290 A.3d 260 (Pa. 2023), splitting evenly on the question of 

whether a DUI ARD falls within the “prior conviction” exception to the general 

rule that a fact that increases punishment must be submitted to the fact finder 

and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. While our Supreme Court’s ruling had 

the effect of affirming this Court’s decision remanding for the defendant’s 

resentencing as a first-time offender, Verbeck lacks precedential effect. See 

Commonwealth v. Mosley, 114 A.3d 1072, 1082 n.11 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(“When a judgment of sentence is affirmed by an equally divided court, [] no 

precedent is established and the holding is not binding on other cases.”). 

Therefore, our en banc decisions of Richards and Moroz remain the binding 

law on this issue. See Hummel, 2023 PA Super 57, *4 n.1.
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appellate courts apply law in effect at time of decision and parties are entitled 

to benefit of changes in law while direct appeal is pending). We therefore 

vacate Appellee’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing 

consistent with this decision. See Moroz, 284 A.3d at 233; Hummel, 2023 

PA Super 57, *4.

Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. 

Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

Judge McCaffery files a concurring statement in which Judge Colins 

joins.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/8/2023