[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 14-15004

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cr-80001-KAM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

JOHN ANTONARAS, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(September 29, 2015)

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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John Antonaras appeals his convictions and sentence of 54 months of 

imprisonment for one count of conspiring to commit bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1344, 1349, and five counts of making false statements on applications for 

business loans for David Demayo and Michael Mangra, id. § 1014. Antonaras 

challenges the admission of evidence about his preparation of false tax returns for 

which he was not charged and of a recording of his conversation with a 

coconspirator. Antonaras also challenges a jury instruction about liability for 

coconspirators’ actions, see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S. Ct. 

1180 (1946), and the enhancement of his sentence for the use of sophisticated 

means, United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), and, for 

the first time, for his use of a special skill, id. § 3B1.3. We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony 

from coconspirator Naveen Saddi about false tax returns that Antonaras prepared

for Greg Gardner and for Hal and Helene Unschuld. Antonaras, a certified public 

accountant, prepared false tax returns for David Demayo and Michael Mangra as 

part of a conspiracy to obtain business loans through a scheme to defraud the 

lenders. Saddi’s testimony about false tax returns that Antonaras prepared for

Gardner and the Unschulds explained “the chain of events explaining the context, 

motive, and set-up of [Antonaras’s] crime, . . . form[ed] an integral and natural . . . 

account of the crime, . . . [and] complete[d] the story of the crime for the jury.” 

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United States v. McLean, 138 F.3d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting United 

States v. Williford, 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985)). Saddi, who completed 

fraudulent loan applications for the conspiracy, testified that he included Antonaras 

in the scheme to defraud after he prepared and signed false tax returns for Gardner

that withstood screening by loan officers. Because Antonaras successfully used a

sophisticated method to allocate inflated income between wages and corporate 

distributions, Saddi referred a client, Demayo, to Antonaras. After Demayo also 

obtained a business loan, Saddi had Antonaras prepare false tax returns for Mangra 

and the Unschulds. Antonaras argues that the Unschulds’ false tax returns should 

have been excluded because they were prepared after the timeframe alleged in the 

indictment, but those returns were substantially similar to other false returns that 

Antonaras prepared and were admissible to prove that he knowingly participated in 

the conspiracy and to refute his defense that someone else applied his certification 

stamp to the returns. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Antonaras argues that the evidence 

about Gardner’s and the Unschulds’ returns was unduly prejudicial, but the district 

court eliminated any potential prejudice by instructing the jury during Saddi’s 

testimony and at the end of the case that the evidence could only be used “to 

decide whether . . . Antonaras had the state of mind or intent necessary . . . [or] a

motive or the opportunity to commit the acts charged; [if] he acted in accordance 

with . . . a plan or in preparing to commit a crime; or [if] he committed the acts 

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charged in the indictment by accident or mistake.” See United States v. Edouard, 

485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007).

The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it admitted a 

recording of a conversation between Antonaras and Gardner. The recording was 

admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements offered against an 

opposing party that was made by him in his individual capacity. See Fed. R. Evid. 

801(d)(2)(A). Although the two men briefly discussed prospective fraudulent 

loans, the conversation proved Antonaras’s involvement in making false returns for 

the Unschulds, Mangra, and Demayo. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Antonaras stated

that he “[did not] mind . . . doing things for certain clients” like “Mr. Unschuld” by 

“do[ing] the numbers to make it work” when “they don’t have the numbers”; he

knew that Mangra added his name to his brother’s medical practice to obtain a 

loan, and he was uncomfortable doing business with Demayo. Antonaras argues 

that the recording is an “idle conversation between former coconspirators [three 

years] after the conspiracy ended that should not have been admitted . . . [under] 

United States v. Phillip[s], 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1981),” but Phillips prohibits the 

admission of a “retrospective statement” by a coconspirator under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).

Antonaras argues that the district court should not have instructed the jury 

that he could be vicariously liable for false statements made by his coconspirators, 

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but this argument fails. A defendant is liable for all reasonably foreseeable offenses 

committed by coconspirators during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 

Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645–48, 66 S. Ct. at 1183–84. Because the issue of 

foreseeability is a question for the jury, we affirm the use of a Pinkerton instruction 

when the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that it was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy that a 

coconspirator would make a false statement. See United States v. Mothersill, 87 

F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 1996). Antonaras conspired to defraud banks by 

fraudulently obtaining loans, and it was reasonably foreseeable that his 

coconspirators would make false statements in furtherance of that scheme. 

Antonaras argues that he could not have foreseen that his coconspirators would 

reuse false tax returns that he prepared for Demayo and Mangra, but Antonaras 

declined to impose any restrictions on using the returns when given an opportunity 

to do so. Demayo testified that when he divulged his plan to apply for two loans 

and asked if there were limits on using the false tax returns, Antonaras “said he 

didn’t care” and it “[d]idn’t matter” to him. And Antonaras referred Mangra to 

Saddi; attended a meeting in which Mangra and Saddi discussed obtaining 

fraudulent loans; and Antonaras exacted a $6,000 commission for referring Mangra 

to Saddi.

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The district court did not abuse its discretion when it enhanced Antonaras’s 

offense level for use of sophisticated means. Antonaras was subject to a two level 

increase in his offense level because the conspiracy involved “especially complex 

or especially intricate offense conduct . . . to . . . execut[e] or conceal[] . . . [the] 

offense.” See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) & cmt. n.9(B). The conspiracy submitted 

fraudulent applications for business loans; created numerous false financial 

documents to support the fraudulent applications; modified articles of 

incorporation and other business formation documents to add owners with better 

credit ratings; opened bank accounts using borrowed funds to prove 

creditworthiness; bribed a bank officer to assist in processing and approving the 

loans; and laundered the loan proceeds. See United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 

1178, 1199 (11th Cir. 2011).

The district court also did not plainly err by enhancing Antonaras’s sentence 

for his “use[ of] a special skill[] in a manner that significantly facilitated the 

commission or concealment of the offense.” See id. § 3B1.3 & cmt. n.4. Antonaras 

used his skills as an accountant to prepare false tax returns that accounted credibly 

for the inflated income on the fraudulent loan applications. Antonaras also created 

stock account statements to substantiate dividends reported on the false tax returns; 

W-2 forms that overstated the incomes of the borrowers; and corporate tax returns, 

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balance sheets, and income statements that listed concocted earnings and expenses 

to make the businesses eligible for large loans.

The district court also did not plainly err by applying cumulatively the 

sophisticated means and special skill enhancements. The Sentencing Guidelines 

state that “enhancements . . . are to be applied cumulatively . . . [a]bsent an 

instruction to the contrary,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.4(B). “Impermissible double 

counting occurs only when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a 

defendant’s punishment on account of a kind of harm that has already been fully 

accounted for by application of another part of the Guidelines.” United States v. 

Flanders, 752 F.3d 1317, 1340 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Webb, 

665 F.3d 1380, 1382 (11th Cir. 2012)). Antonaras fails to cite any facts or 

authority suggesting that the cumulative application of the enhancements 

constitutes impermissible double counting.

We AFFIRM Antonaras’s convictions and sentence.

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