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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 

 v. : CRIMINAL NOS. 04-278 

 04-552 

DEMETRIUS JERMAINE ANDERSON : 

 

UNITED STATES’ MEMORANDUM 

CONCERNING FINANCIAL PENALTIES

The United States files this memorandum concerning the financial penalties 

portion of the defendant’s sentence as directed by this Court’s order of April 3, 2019. In that 

order the Court asked the parties to submit legal memoranda concerning defendant Demetrius 

Anderson’s present obligation to pay the financial penalties, and how the obligations would be 

structured and enforced. The government urges the Court to find that the restitution obligation 

of $4,140 that was part of the sentence it imposed in 2005 remains in force. The government 

further submits that if Anderson fails to honor the payment agreement he has submitted, the 

government can collect this restitution through the civil means it has available, just as such 

obligations are enforced with defendants whose restitution is not fully paid when they complete 

their supervised release and who fail to make payments. The government also submits that the 

special assessment imposed ($400) is no longer enforceable, as this obligation is only collectable 

for five years, which has already passed. 
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Original Sentence and State Custody 

Anderson’s case present a rarely occurring situation where state authorities did 

not turn Anderson over to the U.S. Marshal upon the completion of his state sentence, pursuant 

to a federal detainer that was in place, but rather released him from custody. That occurred in 

November 2006, but the Marshals did not discover it until late 2018 or early 2019. At the 

Marshal’s request, this Court issued a warrant for Anderson’s arrest. The Marshals then located 

Anderson in Connecticut where he was living and took him into custody. A Magistrate Judge 

in Connecticut released Anderson on an unsecured bond on March 20, 2019. This Court issued 

its order for further briefing on April 3, 2019. 

On January 18, 2005, Anderson pleaded guilty to charges relating to passing and 

possessing counterfeit currency (CR 04-278) and to charges relating to identity theft related to 

the purchase of automobiles (CR 04-552). 

On May 4, 2005, this Court sentenced Anderson to serve 16 months 

imprisonment, three years of supervised release, a special assessment of $400, and ordered 

restitution of $4,140 ($160 to Strawbridge’s and $3,980 to Ikea). The restitution related to the 

counterfeit currency charges in CR 04-278. Because Anderson was here on a writ to the 

authorities in Connecticut, he was returned to Connecticut following this sentencing hearing. 

The Marshals placed a federal detainer for Anderson with Connecticut authorities, and 

Connecticut confirmed it had the detainer. Anderson was technically in Connecticut custody 

when being held by the Marshal when Anderson was here on a writ, and when the Marshal 
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returned him to Connecticut Anderson had not served nor gotten credit for any of his 16-month 

federal sentence. 

Anderson then pleaded guilty in Connecticut to forgery and failure to appear 

charges. On June 28, 2005, the state judge in Connecticut sentenced Anderson to three years 

imprisonment on each count, with the sentences on the counts to run concurrently with each 

other. Connecticut authorities then imprisoned Anderson in Connecticut to serve this sentence. 

On November 2, 2006, Anderson completed his state sentence. Notwithstanding 

the federal detainer, Connecticut released Anderson from custody without notifying the 

Marshals. Anderson remained out of custody until the Marshals arrested Anderson on March 

20, 2019 on this Court’s recent warrant. 

B. Sentence Calculation 

After the Marshals found and arrested Anderson in Connecticut, they notified the 

U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) that Anderson was ready to serve his federal sentence, and asked 

BOP to compute that sentence and designate the location where the sentence would be served. 

BOP examined the unusual facts of this case and looked at the reason for the extended time out 

of custody between Anderson’s release in November 2006 and his arrest on March 20, 2019. 

The BOP, relying on Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2007), determined that 

Anderson should receive “credit for the time he was at liberty” following his erroneous release 

on November 2, 2006. BOP determined that the application of this credit resulted in a federal 

BOP release date of December 30, 2007. BOP has thus determined that Anderson’s federal 

custody sentence has been satisfied. 
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The BOP did not address the other parts of Anderson’s sentence because only the 

custody portion was a matter under BOP’s authority. This Court’s sentence also included three 

years of supervised release, a $400 special assessment, and restitution of $4,140. At this 

Court’s request, this memorandum addresses the financial aspects of this sentence. The parties, 

in a joint motion filed on April 2, 2019, recommended that the Court find that Anderson’s 

supervised release sentence was satisfied during his time at liberty following his federal release 

date of December 30, 2007, because Anderson did not incur any arrests or convictions, is 

employed, does not appear to be in need of current Probation Office supervision, and was not 

given the opportunity to serve his supervised release term immediately following his release 

from custody. Cf. Johnson v. Mathieson, 2015 WL 3772776 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2015) 

(supervised release term dismissed under similar facts, but without discussion); But see U.S. v. 

Grant, 862 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 2017)(declining to follow Vega in the Fourth Circuit and collecting 

cases). 

II. DISPOSITION OF FINANCIAL PENALTIES 

A. Special Assessment 

The special assessment of $400 is no longer collectable. Section 3013 of Title 

18 addresses special assessments. Section 3013(c) states: 

(c) The obligation to pay an assessment ceases five years after the date of the 

judgment. This subsection shall apply to all assessments irrespective of the date 

of imposition. 

18 U.S.C. §3013(c). 

Because more than five years have passed since this Court imposed this sentence, 

Anderson no longer has an obligation to pay this $400 special assessment. The fact that he was 
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improperly released should not change this conclusion. There is no exception in this statute for 

tolling the five year limit. The government submits that it would not be appropriate here to 

apply a theory similar to the fugitive disentitlement doctrine,1 or the tolling of statutes of 

limitations for a fugitive,2

 because Anderson was out of custody due to the actions of 

governmental authorities, not by his own improper doing (as would be the case if he had escaped 

and were a fugitive at large for the period he was at liberty). The government realizes that 

Anderson did not, on his own, take steps to begin payments on his financial obligations, which 

he would have had no reason to believe were extinguished. However, in a case where 

restitution is owed and no payments are made, the government usually will initiate contact and/or 

begin collection proceedings, which it did not do here.3

 Anderson’s failure to unilaterally 

initiate payment appears to be insufficient to provide a basis for tolling the operation of 

§3013(c), which itself has no provision for tolling. Thus, there is no basis for tolling the five 

year limitation, and Anderson no longer owes the $400 special assessment. 

B. Restitution 

 This Court also ordered Anderson to pay $4,140 in restitution to two retail 

businesses ($160 to Strawbridge’s and $3,980 to Ikea). This was in connection with Anderson 

passing counterfeit currency and changing out real currency for counterfeit currency. 

 

1 The Supreme Court has held that the fugitive disentitlement doctrine justifies the dismissal of 

appeals when the defendant is a fugitive. Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 824 (1996)

(“In accord with these principles, we have held federal courts do have authority to dismiss an 

appeal or writ of certiorari if the party seeking relief is a fugitive while the matter is pending.”) 

2 “No statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice.” 18 U.S.C. §3290. 

3 The Third Circuit has noted that “a defendant . . . has no affirmative duty to aid in the 

execution of his sentence.” Vega, 493 F.3d at 319, quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 

(1972). 
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This obligation to pay restitution is still active and enforceable. Restitution 

obligations are enforceable for twenty years from the date of the defendant’s release from 

prison.4 This Court imposed the restitution in May of 2005, and Anderson was released from 

imprisonment in November of 2006. Thus, the restitution obligation will continue to be 

enforceable until 20 years after Anderson’s release from imprisonment, that is, until November 

of 2026. 

This obligation should not be affected by the fact that Anderson was released by 

Connecticut without those authorities notifying the Marshal. The theory that supported his 

receiving credit for time at liberty with respect to his custody sentence does not similarly apply 

to his restitution obligation. As explained in Vega, the decision to grant a defendant credit 

against his sentence of imprisonment for time at liberty under these facts is based on a common 

law notion that a prisoner “cannot be required to serve [his sentence] in installments.” Vega, 

493 F.3d at 318, quoting White v. Pearlman, 42 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1930). Thus, requiring 

Anderson to serve 16 months imprisonment after a gap of liberty of more than 12 years, when 

the government failed to notice the error of Connecticut failing to honor its detainer, would 

infringe on this common law right. However, requiring Anderson to pay the restitution after 12 

years at liberty is not the same as imprisonment by installments. 

First, monetary penalties are often paid over time, usually on a payment schedule 

initially ordered by the sentencing court. Although small payments are usually paid while the 

defendant is incarcerated, unless the total to be paid is small, defendants often continue payments 

 

4 “The liability to pay restitution shall terminate on the date that is the later of 20 years from the 

entry of judgment or 20 years after release from imprisonment of the person ordered to pay 

restitution.” 18 U.S.C. §3613(b). 
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after release. These, then, are necessarily payments by installments, and it is a usual course of 

payment. Second, if a defendant fails to pay as ordered, the government will undertake 

collection efforts. This usually takes time to initiate, and there may often be gaps in payments 

without prejudice to the defendant. Third, here, Anderson benefits by not having to make 

payments for a period of time. There is no interest charge on the restitution owed, and the delay 

in payment is to his benefit. Finally, there is no inequity in insisting that Anderson repay the 

money he stole from the retail businesses through the use of counterfeit currency. There is no 

equitable reason that he should be able to keep the bounty of his crime just because his debt is 12 

years old. The debt is still legally enforceable, and the victims are still out the funds. Thus, 

unlike the burden of serving prison time “by installments,” there is no actual prejudice to 

requiring Anderson to repay the money he stole even 12 years after he was released from prison. 

The theory of prejudice underlying the credit for time at liberty against his sentence of 

incarceration does not therefore extend to the delayed repayment of a justly owed and legally 

collectable monetary debt. The restitution obligation is therefore still enforceable and 

collectable. 

In addition, there is a difference between the treatment of the imprisonment and 

supervised release portion of the sentence and the restitution. The imprisonment and supervised 

release are deemed satisfied by the passage of time on release (imprisonment by the BOP’s 

calculation, and the government and the defendant urge the Court to find the supervised release 

portion satisfied). The payment of restitution is not satisfied because Anderson has not made 

any payments toward restitution. The passage of time, within the 20 year limit, does not affect 

the legal collectability of the restitution. 
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Anderson’s obligation to repay his $4,140 in restitution is structured through his 

agreement to pay. Anderson has agreed, in writing, to pay this restitution in monthly 

installments of $250 until the debt is paid. At this rate, the restitution will be paid in about 17 

months. This obligation will be enforced, initially, by the government’s monitoring of 

Anderson’s payments to the Clerk of Court of these monthly installments. 

If Anderson fails to pay the restitution in this manner, the government will 

enforce the judgment of restitution “in accordance with the practices and procedures for the 

enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal or State Law.” 18 U.S.C. §§3613(a), 

3664(m)(1)(A)(i). The United States Attorney’s office routinely uses the civil enforcement 

tools at its disposal to obtain payment of restitution, fines, and special assessments. This may 

arise when a defendant has completed supervised release, and thus is not subject to a violation of 

supervised release hearing, but still owes a balance on his financial obligation. In that case, the 

government will take action to collect the amount owed. It would enforce Anderson’s 

obligation here in the same way. 

For the above reasons, the government urges this Court to find that the special 

assessment is no longer collectable, and that the restitution obligation is still in effect. 

Respectfully yours, 

WILLIAM M. MCSWAIN 

United States Attorney 

__s/ Albert S. Glenn________________ 

ALBERT S. GLENN 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: April 12, 2019 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I caused a copy of 

UNITED STATES’ MEMORANDUM 

CONCERNING FINANCIAL PENALTIES 

to be served on the below date by mail on the following: 

Rossman D. Thompson, Jr. 

Assistant Federal Defender 

Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division 

The Curtis Center Building 

601 Walnut Street, Suite 540 West 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

 

 s/ Albert S. Glenn 

 ALBERT S. GLENN 

 Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: April 12, 2019