THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH 

AFRICA’S BIOLOGICAL 

WARFARE PROGRAM 

Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt 

INSS Occasional Paper 37 

Counterproliferation Series 

February 2001 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

USAF Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Air Force, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This 

paper is approved for public release by Air University/PA; distribution is 

unlimited. 

******* 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited; please forward to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: james.smith@usafa.af.mil 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss
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v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

The Origins of the Biological Warfare Program 2 

 Counter-Insurgency and Biological Warfare in 

Southern Africa 6 

 Variable Effectiveness of CBW in Counter-Insurgency 

and Difficulties Verifying Use of Biological Agents 9 

 Perceptions of a Soviet and Cuban “Threat” and Moves 

towards a Sophisticated CBW Program 13 

 “Total Onslaught” and Project Coast: Protests and 

Violence in South Africa Fuel Support for 

Expanded CBW Program 14 

 The Organizational Context of Project Coast: 7th 

Battalion of the SADF Medical Services (SAMS) 15 

Project Coast (1981-1993) 18 

 Suspected Chemical Warfare in Angola, 1985-1989 26 

 Plans for a Chemical and Biological Weapons Program 28 

 Project Coast and the Nuclear Weapons Program 

Compared 30 

 Internal Unrest and Project Coast 31 

 International Links Established During Project Coast 33 

 Transnational Links: The Ford Case and Basson 34 

 Corruption and the Deterioration of Project Coast 39 

Rollback of Project Coast (1988-1994) 44 

 De Klerk’s Efforts to Roll Back Secret SADF Projects 46 

 Proliferation and Counterproliferation 48 

 Continued “Third Force” Activities and CBW Use 50 

 Privitization, Corruption, and Drugs 52 

 A Chemical Weapons Attack on Mozambique? 54 

 The Steyn Report 56 

 The Steyn Report and the Rollback of Project Coast 60 

Transition to ANC Rule, Proliferation Concerns, and Efforts 

 to Conceal Project Coast Details (1994-1996) 63 

Basson’s Arrest and Trial and TRC Hearings (1997-2000) 72 
vi

 Revelations and Roadblocks during the Truth & 

Reconciliation Hearing on Project Coast after 

Basson’s Arrest in 1997 72 

 Wouter Basson’s Bail Hearing: The Role of NGOs and 

the Press in Ensuring Public Disclosure 79 

 The Basson Trial: 1999-Present 83 

 Implications of the Basson Trial to Date 87 

Conclusion 90 

Notes 95 
vii

FOREWORD 

We are pleased to publish this thirtieth-seventh volume in the

Occasional Paper series of the US Air Force Institute for National 

Security Studies (INSS). A series of United States commissions and 

studies has identified proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) as the nation’s number one national security threat entering the 

21st Century. Nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and homeland 

defense efforts are all receiving added emphasis to address that threat. 

Understanding the dynamics of proliferation is just a small part of that 

new security emphasis, and South Africa presents a unique and valuable 

case study of the motivations, mechanisms, and programs employed in 

WMD proliferation and in the decisions and actions taken to reverse that 

proliferation. 

This paper represents the second INSS Occasional Paper 

addressing South Africa’s proliferation and its reversal. Roy Horton’s 

August 1999 Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria’s Nuclear Weapons 

Experience is a valuable companion piece to Steve Burgess’ and Helen 

Purkitt’s detailed examination of the South African chemical and 

biological weapons program presented here. The strength of this paper is 

not only in its detailed history of the birth, development, and rollback of 

the CBW effort, but also in its vivid message of the complexity, 

uncertainty, and danger of even supposedly managed dismantlement of 

covert, largely unregulated, and mostly invisible weapons programs. 

The danger in CBW lies not only in its development or potential use, but 

in ever having certainty of its disposition and the real state of its overall 

threat. The questions remaining at the end of this paper speak volumes 

to the difficulties faced in the proliferation arena. 
viii

About the Institute

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the National Security Policy 

Division, Nuclear and Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US 

Air Force (HQ USAF/XONP) and the Dean of the Faculty, USAF 

Academy. Our other sponsors currently include the Air Staff’s 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Directorate (XOI) and the 

Air Force's 39th and 23rd Information Operations Squadrons; the 

Secretary of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA); the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Army Environmental Policy 

Institute; and the Air Force long-range plans directorate (XPXP). The 

mission of the Institute is “to promote national security research for the 

Department of Defense within the military academic community, and to 

support the Air Force national security education program.” Its research 

focuses on the areas of greatest interest to our organizational sponsors: 

arms control, proliferation, regional studies, Air Force policy, 

information operations, environmental security, and space policy. 

 INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various 

disciplines and across the military services to develop new ideas for 

defense policy making. To that end, the Institute develops topics, selects 

researchers from within the military academic community, and 

administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and workshops 

and facilitates the dissemination of information to a wide range of private 

and government organizations. INSS provides valuable, cost-effective 

research to meet the needs of our sponsors. We appreciate your 

continued interest in INSS and our research products. 

JAMES M. SMITH 

 Director
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

The profile of South Africa is of an increasingly isolated state that felt 

threatened by a more powerful state actor and hostile regimes and 

movements in neighboring states. One response of the apartheid regime 

to changing threat perceptions in the region was to develop a chemical 

and biological warfare (CBW) program, along with continued support 

for a nuclear weapons program, to counter perceived threats. The 

decision-making process, which was secretive and controlled by the 

military, enabled a sophisticated program to be developed with little 

outside scrutiny. Military and police units used chemical and biological 

agents for counter-insurgency warfare, assassination, and execution of 

war prisoners. Increasingly, the apartheid regime felt threatened by 

growing political opposition at home that supported the liberation 

armies’ goal of achieving majority rule through the use of illegal and 

violent means. The regime’s increasingly vulnerable position led to plans 

for research and development of exotic means to neutralize domestic 

opponents, as well as weaponization and large-scale offensive uses of the 

program. However, these plans were not operationalized. The end of 

the external threat led to a decision to negotiate with political opponents 

and unilaterally dismantle CBN programs. However, extensive external 

pressures by the US, UK and other countries were required to ensure roll 

back of biological and chemical programs. This dismantlement process 

proved to be a slow and difficult to implement due to the lack of civilian 

control over military programs. Subsequent revelations that the former 

director of Project Coast, Dr. Wouter Basson, had secretly retained 

copies of classified documents previously thought to be under limited 

government control, fuels continuing proliferation concerns in place. 

Today a divide exits between those who believe that South Africa 

developed one of the most sophisticated biological (and chemical) 
x

warfare programs and are concerned about proliferation and those who 

believe that Project Coast was a “pedestrian” program. The latter are 

focused more on the criminality and corruption of the program. 
The Rollback of the South African Biological Warfare Program 

INTRODUCTION 

From the 1960s until the 1990s, apartheid South Africa was an isolated state 

that felt threatened by growing domestic unrest, as well as by a more powerful 

state actor, the Soviet Union, which was helping hostile regimes and liberation 

movements in southern Africa. One response of the apartheid regime to 

changing threat perceptions outside and inside of South Africa was to develop 

a new and more sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) 

program, code-named “Project Coast,” and to accelerate a nuclear weapons 

program. The CBW decision-making process was secretive and controlled by 

the military and enabled a very sophisticated program to be developed with 

little outside scrutiny. Military and police units used chemical and biological 

agents for counter-insurgency warfare, assassination, and execution of war 

prisoners. As the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition at home, 

top political leaders approved plans for research and development of exotic 

means to neutralize opponents, large-scale offensive uses of the program, and 

weaponization. However, the plans were not operationalized. The end of the 

external threat led to a decision to unilaterally dismantle the program, prior to a 

shift to majority rule. Lack of civilian control over military programs made the 

rollback difficult, rife with corruption, and left proliferation concerns in place. 

 Ultimately, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries pressured the 

South African government to ensure that the CBW program was dismantled 

and the former project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, constrained. However, 

Basson secretly retained copies of Project Coast documents, which helped to 

perpetuate proliferation concerns. Today, a divide exists between those who 

believe that South Africa developed the “second most sophisticated” program, 

after the Soviet Union’s, and are concerned about proliferation and those who 

believe that it was “pedestrian.” The former are focused on the proliferation 

danger, while the latter are focused on the criminality and corruption of the 
2

program. 

This monograph analyzes the origins and development of the South 

African CBW program, as well as its rollback. It concludes with a profile of 

South Africa as a state that produced weapons of mass destruction and with a 

list of outstanding questions. More than twenty policy lessons, based on the 

South African case, are presented, which should be considered in future CBW 

non-proliferation studies. 

THE ORIGINS OF THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM 

In 1981 or earlier, the South African government initiated Project Coast, a 

sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program. The focus here 

is on the biological aspect of the program, which was especially sophisticated, 

and how it developed. 

Project Coast was not the first CBW program that the South African 

government had developed. From 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, South African 

troops fought in the two World Wars and faced the threat of CBW. Although 

the 1925 Geneva Conventions banned the use of chemical and biological 

weapons in warfare, Japan and the Soviet Union employed such weapons in 

WWII. As early as the 1930s, widespread evidence emerged of the efficacy of 

biological warfare (BW) based on scientific work conducted in the U.S., 

United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.1

 The South African scientific and 

military communities kept pace with the various developments in CBW. 

In the 1940s, South Africa produced mustard gas for possible use in 

WWII. According to Dr. Renfrew Christie,2

 the mining industry had 

developed, since the 1930s, explosives that were linked with chemical agents. 

The Anglo-American Corporation, Anglo-Vaal, and other companies were 

involved. The Director-General of War, H.J. van der Bijl, oversaw the 

production of chemical weapons and defensive measures that would protect 

South African troops against chemical and biological attack during the Second 

World War. 
3

During WWII, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts was a member of 

the British War Cabinet and party to CBW planning. For example, the War 

Cabinet, in 1943, planned to retaliate against the threat of Nazi biological 

warfare (BW) on British livestock. The plan was to use anthrax spores, 

released by 500-pound cluster bombs, each containing over 100 four-pound 

spore devices. Trials at Porton Down indicated that the cluster bombs 

produced effective aerosol concentration of spores that covered nearly 100 

acres from impact. The War Cabinet viewed BW as a “quick-fix” solution 

weapon requiring no special munitions or hardware. The British would simply 

charge ordinary cattle cakes with anthrax spores. This was a neat and simple 

example of wholly effective, precision deliverance, literally down the throat 

and into the stomach of targeted cattle. By the end of WWII, the British had 

stockpiled five million cakes.3

 During the Second World War, South Africa 

learned from the British the lesson that BW was simple technology that anyone 

could use and that it could be effective, under certain conditions, in Africa.4

In the 1940s and 1950s, South Africa’s wartime connections with Britain 

and the United States continued. South African officers trained in Britain and 

the United States in chemical and biological warfare strategy and tactics.5

 In 

the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration initiated the United States Peaceful 

Nuclear Energy program, which proved to be a significant factor contributing 

to South Africa’s ability to produce nuclear weapons.6

After the Second World War, in 1946, South Africa dumped large 

quantities of mustard gas out to sea. However, South Africa did not roll back 

its CBW program entirely. According to Dr. Vernon Joynt of Mechem and the 

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR),7

 the literature on the 

World War II program was maintained. Also, the South African Defense Force 

(SADF) maintained a small military program related to CBW research and 

development. The government also maintained funding for a modest number of 

basic research projects located in the Afrikaans universities and other 
4

government supported institutions. Much of this research was conducted under 

the umbrella of CSIR. 

In 1960, Dr. Joynt helped start a new phase of the chemical warfare (CW) 

program, when he corrected a problem with tear gas that was needed to control 

riots and to deal with militants hiding in the bush. In the 1960 Pondoland 

uprising in Transkei, tear gas was extensively used. That same year, Dr. Joynt 

was sent for a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare course in the 

United Kingdom. In the 1960s, CSIR continued to work on tear gas and on CX 

powder for tracking. Dr. Joynt fitted Cessnas for the army, which would be 

used in spreading CX powder. In the mid-1960s, CSIR worked on mustard gas 

and on gas masks to replace the World War II-vintage masks of the SADF. 

The Egyptians had used chemical weapons in Yemen, 1962-67, and may have 

passed it on to the African National Congress (ANC). So, South African 

leaders realized the importance of updating the CBW program. The EMAC 

(electrical, mechanical, agricultural, and chemical) Department worked on and 

innovated weapons, including chemical and biological agents during the 1960s 

and 1970s.8

In 1963, South Africa finally became a party to the 1925 Geneva 

Conventions, banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare. 

South Africa’s late accession indicated that, for 40 years, the SADF was 

prepared to use chemical and biological agents in warfare. As will be 

demonstrated, South African accession did not deter apartheid leaders from 

developing a new and sophisticated CBW program. 

According to Dr. Joynt, in the early 1970s, SADF generals asked the 

CSIR for “aggressive” chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents and 

wanted a CBW industry started. Dr. Joynt’s superior, Wim de Villiers 

commented that Africa was not the kind of continent for CBW and that it was 

too “complex” and too expensive to develop. In 1974, de Villiers wrote a tenpage report, in which he gave a R500 million (more than $500 million in 1974 
5

dollars) estimate to build a CBW program. Finally, de Villiers concluded that 

the USSR was too well armed with CBW and would retaliate against any 

CBW attack.9

 The SADF postponed its plans to develop an offensive CBW 

program and supported a minimal CBW research and development program, 

which was never well developed. By 1980, it consisted of only one individual 

who worked on CBW at the Special Forces complex in Pretoria.10

After the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the imposition of a United 

Nations arms embargo, the rulers of South Africa developed a heightened 

sense of isolation, withdrawing from the British Commonwealth in 1961 and 

distancing South Africa from the West. Especially under President Verwoerd 

in the 1960s, the ruling Afrikaner nationalist elite developed a “laager” (or 

“circle the wagons “) complex. Afrikaner nationalists saw themselves as an 

ethnic and religious minority and as “God’s chosen people,” surrounded by 

“black heathens” and “godless communists” and betrayed by the West. The 

iconoclastic character of the Afrikaner nationalists had been developed over 

300 years of settler history and a series of wars, with African kingdoms and 

with the British Empire. As the laager complex deepened, a similar process of 

isolation was developing in Israel, known as the “Masada complex.” Like their 

South African counterparts, Israeli leaders saw themselves as a “chosen 

people” surrounded by enemies who were attempting to annihilate them. By 

the late 1960s and early 1970s, the isolation of South Africa and Israel by 

African and Arab states led both countries to cooperate with each other on 

armaments development, including the nuclear weapons and missile programs. 

It is suspected that they also cooperated on chemical and biological warfare 

research and development. 

Counter-Insurgency and Biological Warfare in Southern Africa 

South Africa’s threat perceptions changed as guerrilla activities in the southern 

African region increased in the 1960s and 1970s. South African involvement in 

counter-insurgency campaigns in the region influenced the direction that South 
6

Africa’s CBW development took in the 1980s and also provided useful 

training opportunities, strategies, and tactics that influenced the way South 

African defense and police special covert units used CBW against political 

opponents. Moreover, many of the Selous Scouts, Rhodesia’s elite counterinsurgency force, who were experienced in using CBW for counterinsurgency, joined South Africa’s Special Forces and police after the political 

transition in Zimbabwe in 1980. Some of these individuals played key roles in 

incidents where South African Special Forces and police used CBW agents 

against opponents during the 1980s and 1990s.11

In the early 1960s, South Africa’s response to developing guerrilla 

movements and a changing regional security environment was to increase 

security force cooperation with Portuguese forces fighting guerrilla 

insurgencies in the former colonies of Angola and Mozambique and with 

Rhodesian police and defense forces. Increased involvement in security 

operations in southern African states was part of a national security strategy 

designed to counter communist-inspired guerrilla campaigns in those states. 

Also, the regime sought to be in a position to launch attacks on African 

National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) military 

training camps in Zambia and Tanzania.12 The South African military was 

anxious to obtain first-hand experience with counter-insurgency techniques 

and interested in exploring the potential usefulness of unconventional chemical 

and biological weapons.13

The Portuguese military were the first to use chemical and biological 

warfare for counter-insurgency warfare in Africa. Portuguese troops poisoned 

wells and threw drugged prisoners out of aircraft. South African military 

officers were dispatched to Portuguese Army units in Angola to gain 

experience in counter-insurgency warfare. In general, South African military 

personnel were not impressed with the overall effectiveness of Portuguese 

counter-insurgency programs. However, officers who worked in Angola did 
7

learn first-hand how the Portuguese military used defoliants and napalm, 

mined trails, and poisoned water holes as tactics to counter their guerrilla 

enemies without having to engage in direct combat.14

In the 1960s, South African police and military personnel started helping 

the former Rhodesian government deal with an increased “terrorist” threat. In 

1967, the South African Police (SAP) sent a contingent to help with border 

patrols, as ANC and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) guerrillas 

infiltrated into the county from Zambia. The SAP trained Rhodesian 

intelligence personnel and, later, the Selous Scouts in mine laying and other 

counter-insurgency techniques. The SAP acquired some of their techniques 

from the French in Algeria.15 In the mid-to-late 1960s, South African (SADF) 

military advisers in Zimbabwe assisted with the interrogation of captured ANC 

guerrillas. The South African military was interested in gaining experience in 

bush warfare and establishing enhanced intelligence monitoring capabilities of 

ANC and PAC political and guerrilla activities in neighboring states. A 

detachment of Corps of Signals of the SADF Monitoring Division known as 

“V Troop” started intercepting and de-ciphering coded radio transmissions of 

Zambian police in 1968. After the high-profile withdrawal of SAP forces in 

early 1975, SADF personnel remained behind, maintaining a low profile. Their 

presence was increasingly important to Rhodesian security, and SADF 

personnel participated in several counter-insurgency operations conducted by 

the Selous Scouts, from 1973 to 1979, in Rhodesia, Mozambique and 

Zambia.16 

The former commander of the Selous Scouts emphasized the importance 

of counter-insurgency tactics developed by the British in Malaysia and Kenya, 

but noted that they had to modify these tactics in the process of developing 

their distinctive approach towards counter-insurgency warfare.17 This approach 

included a willingness to experiment with new types of weapons, including 

chemical and biological ones.18 The Selous Scouts experimented with the use 
8

of poisons, for example, to impregnate toxins into blue jeans slated for 

guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and 

Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) guerrillas. The Scouts also 

experimented with poisoned pens to assassinate guerrilla leaders, and with 

bacteriological cultures that they introduced into the Ruya River near the 

Mozambique border in 1976. Former top Rhodesian intelligence operative, 

Henrik Ellert, claims that a Selous Scout operation poisoned the water supply 

of a town in Tete province, Mozambique in an attempt to kill ZANLA 

guerrillas who were reported to be operating in the area. Other accounts allege 

that Rhodesian military forces experimented with cholera to contaminate rivers 

and with the seeding of anthrax spores in farming areas used by ZANU and 

ZAPU in an effort to poison guerrilla food supplies.19 Finally, Rhodesian 

forces poisoned wells and were suspected of using chemical and biological 

agents, especially in the Rhodesia’s Eastern Highlands and across the border in 

Mozambique.20

As the 1970s developed, the Rhodesian government became increasingly 

dependent on South Africa for financial support and military hardware. By the 

end of the 1970s, SADF military intelligence was a principal source of funding 

for the Rhodesian counter-insurgency program, including the Selous Scouts. 

The Rhodesian defense budget was very small, and the regime had one 

rudimentary chemical and biological warfare plant that received outside aid 

from South Africa. In assisting Rhodesia, South African researchers continued 

to work on CBW and land mine projects.21

After 1980 and the independence of Zimbabwe, South African 

involvement in the Rhodesian guerrilla war provided useful training 

opportunities and personnel connections. Many Selous Scouts left Rhodesia 

and were quickly integrated into special units of the SADF and SAP. SADF 

Special Forces and SAP officers stationed in Rhodesia had studied the 

organizational structures and tactics used by the Selous Scouts, including the 
9

use of chemical and biological agents. Similar tactics were used in Namibia 

and Angola by personnel assigned to the 5th Reconnaissance Commandos, by 

the SAP security branch “crowbar” (koevoet) unit, and by the SADF Special 

Forces D40 unit. They were also employed in covert support operations for the 

Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and in Operation 

Barnacle in the 1970s and 1980s.22 The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) in 

South Africa employed many of these same tactics against political dissidents 

in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Toward the end of the apartheid era, the use 

of poisons against dissidents became routine CCB practice. By the time 

Eugene De Kock took charge of the CCB in 1988, he had a working 

relationship and regular contacts with Wouter Basson, the director of the CBW 

program, Project Coast. Whenever the CCB wanted “special tools” for 

interrogations or to eliminate political dissidents, Basson was available to 

supply customized orders.23

Variable Effectiveness of CBW in Counter-Insurgency and Difficulties 

Verifying Use of Biological Agents 

Evidence of the use of biological and toxic agents during the Rhodesian war 

indicates variability and, in some instances, unintended consequences. For 

example, the program developed by the Selous Scouts to poison new blue 

jeans that were then to be worn by ZANLA guerrillas was aborted, after 

several farmers died when they purchased and wore the jeans. Selous Scouts 

intermediaries, who were paid for each pair of jeans delivered to guerrillas, 

had started to sell the pants to stores that serviced rural populations. After the 

Selous Scouts received reports that ZANLA rebels were using a village in Tete 

province, Mozambique, the Selous Scouts introduced poisonous biological 

agents into the Ruya River to kill the guerrillas and their supporters. Despite 

intensive intelligence gathering efforts, no effects on the guerrillas were 

detected. However, over 200 villagers died suddenly after drinking the water in 

the reservoir that the Selous Scouts had poisoned.24 
10

Debates continue today about the veracity of the claims that former 

Rhodesian forces, with possible South African involvement, planted anthrax 

spores in grain fed to cattle in guerrilla-held areas. An anthrax epidemic that 

struck Zimbabwe’s cattle in the early 1980s afflicted nearly 10,000 cattle. This 

long-standing claim was published in 1999 in a book, issued in tandem with a 

BBC Panorama documentary on biological warfare, Plague Wars.

25 Officials 

of the Zimbabwean veterinary service repeated this allegation in 1999. They 

noted that the strain of bacteria responsible for the outbreak was not native to 

Zimbabwe and immediately alleged that these incidents could be linked to 

South Africa’s past chemical and biological warfare program. The current 

Zimbabwean government continues to emphasize that new reports of anthrax 

are the result of past South African involvement in the Rhodesian civil war. 26

These allegations could not be substantiated.27 

The continuing debates about whether allegations related to past use of 

anthrax as a biological weapon highlight the fact that many biological agents 

have long-term effects that are difficult to verify. This is especially true for 

allegations of the use of such agents as anthrax that can be either manufactured 

or natural in origin. The continuing controversy about whether anthrax was in 

fact used more than two decades later also suggests that allegations of BW use 

can be used as both a psychological weapon to intimidate civilians and rebels 

in a particular area and as a political dis-information tool of unpopular 

governments.28 In 1993, there was an outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe. Dr. 

Timothy Stamps, the Zimbabwean Minister of Health, told Tom Mangold of 

BBC Panorama that he believed this outbreak was the result of another BW 

attack since it seemed to be a controlled outbreak lasting three months and was 

eliminated in seven months.29

SADF experienced similar problems and variable results in their efforts to 

counter and possibly use CBW agents in military operations in Angola, 

Namibia, and Mozambique, as well as inside South Africa. Several CBW 
11

incidents underscored the variable effectiveness and unintended consequences 

of CBW, as well as the difficulties involved in documenting a CBW attack and 

those who initiated it. 

From the late 1970s onward, South Africa stepped up its military activities 

by supporting UNITA in Angola and the Mozambican Resistance Movement 

(RENAMO) in Mozambique. Operation Barnacle was launched, aimed at the 

ANC and Umkhonto we sizwe (MK) throughout southern Africa. In May 

1978, SADF launched the Cassinga raid, in which 800 people were killed. In 

the wake of the raid, SADF soldiers and paratroopers were accused of using 

chemical warfare.30 Combined with the reports coming out of Rhodesia and 

Mozambique of CBW usage, the Cubans, Angolans, and Mozambicans, as 

well as the liberation movements came to suspect that South Africa possessed 

an offensive CBW program. 

In Angola in the 1980s, South African troops faced increased costs and 

maneuverability problems once they were confronted with the prospect of 

wearing defensive CBW masks and uniforms that had to be changed daily. 

SADF troops routinely avoided local water supplies in Angola and parts of 

Namibia because they had little intelligence about whether water supplies had 

been poisoned by SADF Special Forces secret operations or by guerrillas of 

the South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), ANC/MK or 

UNITA.31 The SADF experienced repeated difficulties verifying alleged use of 

CBW gas by Cuban-backed Angolan government forces and were unable to 

irrefutably rebut allegations that SADF forces used chemical agents against 

SWAPO and refugee camps in Angola and Namibia. In addition, reports 

persisted that, in early 1989 in Angola, SADF was testing organophosphates, 

new generations of teargas, and battlefield missile warheads. Supposedly, the 

warheads were being designed to deliver chemical, biological agents, and 

possibly even a miniaturized nuclear device. Also, in early 1989, UNITA 

forces in Angola reportedly experienced “huge losses.”32 Some sources alleged 
12

that the deaths were due to SADF testing of chemical gases. Other sources 

close to SADF claimed that the deaths were due to an “unexpected shift in the 

wind” that blew chemical gases onto the UNITA troops. 

The question of who used what type of agents in Rhodesia, Namibia, 

Angola, and Mozambique raises important issues. If South African forces were 

involved in offensive CBW in southern Africa in the 1970s, it would have 

violated international commitments. These included the 1925 Geneva 

Conventions, which South Africa acceded to in 1963, and the Convention on 

the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 

Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), which 

South Africa signed in 1972 and ratified in 1975. Also, it means that the 

regime might have already developed chemical and biological weapons and 

used them. Claims that Project Coast was developed in the 1980s as a 

“defensive” program, in reaction to the “Soviet and Cuban threat” in Angola 

and Mozambique would lose credibility. South Africa of the 1970s would be 

viewed even more as an “outlaw state,” willing to break conventions and 

subject black victims to inhuman deaths. It would also appear that the regime 

was prepared to continually violate commitments to international law, if threats 

to its survival continued to grow. 

Perceptions of a Soviet and Cuban “Threat” and Moves towards a 

Sophisticated CBW Program 

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism led, from 1974 to 1976, to the takeover 

of Angola and Mozambique by revolutionary communist regimes, backed by 

the Soviet Union and Cuba. Suddenly, South African leaders found themselves 

surrounded by communist forces, which were viewed as implacable and 

unscrupulous enemies. South African defense experts knew that the Soviet 

Union possessed nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons. In regard 

to the Soviet BW program, indications of its scale and sophistication had been 

gained during and after negotiations surrounding the 1972 Biological Weapons 
13

Convention (BWC). 

According to former South African leaders and generals, NBC programs 

were developed with the intention of “countering the communist onslaught.” 

General (retired) Georg Meiring, former SADF Chief of Staff, commented that 

SADF sought protection against BW in the 1970s, as biological weapons 

became known as the “poor man’s atomic bomb” and as the possibility of BW 

by Soviet-trained SWAPO and ANC/MK guerrillas increased.33 According to 

Magnus Malan (SADF Chief of Staff, 1975-80 and Defense Minister, 1980-

91), the U.S. encouraged the SADF to enter Angola in October 1975, and then 

abandoned South Africa to face Cuban forces alone.34 In addition, South 

Africa faced the Soviet and Cuban NBC threat alone. In response, P.W. Botha 

and Malan proceeded to approve a new and more sophisticated CBW program 

and acceleration of the nuclear weapons program. According to Gen. (ret) Bill 

Sass, former State Security Council member and SADF Chief of Operations,35

he believed that the nuclear weapons program was developed to induce a 

Soviet nuclear threat that would attract the attention of the U.S. and the West. 

If South Africa faced a major communist onslaught, South Africa would target 

a major African city, like Luanda, in the hope of drawing in the U.S and the 

West. Similarly, Malan, Meiring and others claimed that the CBW program 

was intended to counter the Soviets and Cubans and ANC and SWAPO 

guerrilla groups, who might have used CBW in the 1970s and 1980s.36

However, such contentions remain open to question, until documents from the 

1970s prove these perceptions actually existed. 

“Total Onslaught” and Project Coast: Protests and Violence in South 

Africa Fuel Support for Expanded CBW Program 

In 1976, the Soweto uprisings began, bringing a wave of unrest to South 

Africa, after more than a decade of relative calm. The 1976 wave of rebellion 

continued into 1977, and unrest would persist until 1984, when an even greater 

uprising commenced and lasted for more than two years and reverberated until 
14

1990. The 1976 uprisings led the apartheid regime to search for ways, 

including the use of chemical agents, to control or incapacitate large groups of 

people. 

At the same time as the Soweto uprisings, the “Muldergate” scandal 

erupted. The scandal demonstrated that corruption was eating away at the 

formerly unquestioned strength of the apartheid regime. Informal norms had 

become entrenched by the mid-1970s that permitted an extensive level of 

corruption within the Afrikaner-dominated bureaucracies. The corruption was 

an important pre-condition that allowed Wouter Basson and other top officials 

to use the CBW program in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a cover for their 

personal gain. 

In the wake of these regime-shaking events, the Defense Minister, P.W. 

Botha, replaced B.J. Vorster as President in 1978 and initiated his vision of the 

“total strategy.” Botha differed from his predecessor in the degree that he was 

oriented towards the military (and special forces), especially because of his 

years of service as defense minister. He initiated a range of reforms, combined 

with the widespread use of coercive power, to ensure the survival of the 

regime. Power was increasingly consolidated in the hands of the military and 

taken away from civilians. In particular, Botha favored the development of 

advanced weapons projects and covert operations that would give South Africa 

additional advantages against its adversaries. South Africa initiated a series of 

internal and external military and paramilitary operations. These included 

assassinations, torture, and smuggling, as well as forgery, propaganda, and 

subversion. All were defined as “legitimate” weapons against the “total 

onslaught” of “red” and “black” forces. These practices were established at the 

top and legitimized deviant behavior throughout the military, police and 

intelligence services.37

Within the “any means necessary to survive” framework, preparations 

began to develop a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, called 
15

Project Coast, which would counteract and even rival the Soviet program. 

P.W. Botha and SADF Chief, Magnus Malan directed the Surgeon General, 

Major General Nieuwoudt, to launch the program.38 Nieuwoudt enlisted a 

young military doctor, Wouter Basson, to be his lieutenant and program 

director. In the late 1970s, they approached South African university scientists 

and specialists in weapons development to determine if they would be willing 

to participate in and even lead the different components of a CBW program.39

They also began to make contacts in the international scientific community. 

The Organizational Context of Project Coast: 7th Battalion of the SADF 

Medical Service (SAMS) 

The decision to locate the new chemical and biological warfare (CBW) 

program, Project Coast, within the SADF Medical Service (SAMS) would 

have important consequences for both the way the program was managed and 

the direction of research and development over time. At the time Project Coast 

was launched, SAMS existed as a separate medical branch of the South 

African military that had joint ties with Special Forces. The close connection 

with covert Special Forces operations provided a highly secret and loosely 

managed organizational context for the new chemical and biological warfare 

program. Weak managerial oversight and accountability quickly led to 

personal abuse of authority and corruption by Project Coast manager, Wouter 

Basson. 

South Africa’s involvement in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in 

important organizational changes within the military that ensured that the new 

CBW program was controlled by the military. Between 50 and 80 percent of 

all SADF military related deaths in Angola were due to difficulties 

encountered in getting immediate treatment for combat injuries, accidents, or 

treatment for diseases. There was already a long-standing appreciation among 

military leaders for the importance of immediate field treatment for SADF 

soldiers. This appreciation can be traced back to the large number of casualties 
16

incurred in the Anglo-Boer War.40 

In Angola, the importance of immediate battlefield medical attention was 

the primary rationale used to justify elevating and re-organizing the SAMS, as 

a new and separate fourth branch of the military. The new medical corps 

branch was placed on an equal footing in terms of operational command and 

administrative matters with the three existing branches of the service (army, 

navy and air force). SAMS received a mandate to develop defensive 

capabilities and to train to protect the South African Defense Force (SADF) 

from all types of attacks, including biological and chemical warfare. This 

mandate was the principal reason why managerial oversight and responsibility 

for the new CBW program was given to the 7th Battalion of the South African 

Medical Service. SAMS’s mission changed and became more ambiguous, as 

SADF forces shifted from battlefield operations to policing functions at home. 

The fact that 7th Battalion was accorded a large degree of autonomy from its 

inception and operated on a strict “need-to-know” basis meant that relatively 

few SADF officers, including the majority of senior SADF generals, had 

detailed knowledge of the activities of 7th Battalion throughout its existence.41

The 7th Battalion was a special support organization that was established 

to support special services operations. SAMS medical personal (e.g., doctors 

and orderlies) were also Special Forces officers who underwent special service 

training. During the period of South African involvement in Angola, many of 

these medical personal served as members of small (i.e., four-man) Special 

Forces covert action teams. While the military Surgeon General was 

responsible for the operations of seven medical battalions, the secret nature of 

7th Battalion operations during incursions into Angola meant that this unit had 

a high degree of operational autonomy. This autonomy and latitude for 

independent action continued throughout the 1980s, even though new types of 

Special Forces operations at home increasingly replaced the combat-related 

functions of the unit. As the SADF increasingly undertook policing and 
17

internal suppression of political dissidents at home, SAMS conducted new 

basic research projects and the development of new chemical and biological 

weapons that might assist. 

Maj. Gen. Nieuwoudt, the Surgeon General and head of SAMS, recruited 

Major (Dr.) Wouter Basson, the respected young cardiologist and personal 

physician of P.W. Botha, to head Project Coast.42 Although Project Coast was 

run by the military, Basson proved to be a highly successful entrepreneur who 

played a key role in defining the research and development agenda. He 

capitalized on the secret nature of this unit to establish a number of new 

projects and as a rationale for acting alone. From the start, Basson was a highly 

charismatic and effective recruiter who was apt at identifying and enlisting 

some of the most promising and highly skilled medical researchers from the 

military and from the larger civilian scientific community. Basson also proved 

to be a master manager of people. He was able to inspire loyalty and respect 

from employees. Many of these researchers and scientists joined the program 

because they were intrigued by the intellectual challenges and opportunities to 

participate in path-breaking research in one of several related disciplines, e.g. 

chemistry, anatomy, and virology. Almost all were Afrikaner South Africans 

who shared a sense of patriotic duty, a nationalistic zeal for the importance of 

the work, and a sense that their research was critical for maintaining national 

security.43

PROJECT COAST (1981-1993) 

From 1979 through 1981, the State Security Council, led by President Botha 

and Malan, and the SADF discussed the principles that might apply to the 

CBW program. It became clear that a program to defend against a Soviet CBW 

attack could only be built if the Soviet offensive program was emulated and 

then tested.44 As it became clear that an offensive CBW program was to be 

developed, discussions began concerning the possible uses for such a program. 

Malan proposed that signs of a chemical warfare attack in Angola would force 
18

the Cuban and Angolan forces to don suits, which would cut combat 

effectiveness in half. In 1981, General Constand Viljoen, SADF Chief of Staff, 

requested that the CBW program provide SADF with agents for crowd control 

in South Africa. Other possible uses considered included counter-insurgency, 

assassinations, and black population control. It is noteworthy that, during the 

process of launching the CBW program, no delegation from South Africa 

appeared at the 1980 review conference for the 1975 Biological Weapons 

Convention. 

In April 1981, a top-level SADF committee meeting finalized the 

principles for Project Coast.45 One principle was that chemical and biological 

warfare (CBW) should be treated as a top-secret matter, because it was 

susceptible to deception by adversaries. Another was that, since the West had 

supposedly fallen behind the Soviet Union, South Africa had to fend for itself 

in the CBW arena. The SADF committee decided that secrecy was essential 

and that South Africa would use front companies to research and produce 

chemical and biological weapons in top-secret installations. The desire for 

secrecy meant secret funding for the project, the creation of front companies, 

and the exclusion of the state arms producer (ARMSCOR) from the initial 

phases of the project. ARMSCOR would only be brought in during the 

weaponization phace of the program. As Malan suggested, South Africa would 

experiment with a strategy of forcing the enemy in Angola to don protective 

suits. The CBW program would also investigate means of dealing with 

massive demonstrations, insurrection, and insurgency, as well as black 

population growth. Another principle was that biological warfare (BW) had to 

be used with caution. BW could be devastatingly effective and, therefore, 

attractive. However, the regime was concerned that BW was difficult to 

control and that it could cause tremendous, plague-like damage. 

In May 1981, the Surgeon General and head of SAMS, Maj. Gen. 

Nieuwoudt, established Project Coast, and the Minister of Defense, Magnus 
19

Malan, and the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis, approved the 

Program.46 Nieuwoudt made Dr. Wouter Basson the Project Coast director, as 

well as specialist adviser to the Surgeon General. Basson also became a 

lieutenant colonel, joined the 7th SAMS Battalion, and began making trips to 

Angola with the SADF. In addition, he continued making trips abroad to make 

contacts with scientists and to procure supplies for Project Coast. 

In August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea in Angola. During 

the operation, evidence was discovered that the Cubans might be preparing for 

chemical warfare.47 Although the evidence was sketchy, top SADF generals 

chose to take action to counter CBW anyway. Defense Minister Malan took 

SADF generals to Angola to examine CBW protective suits and demonstrate 

problems that they created during combat. Afterwards, Malan reiterated his 

proposal that the SADF take measures that would force the Cubans rather than 

the South Africans to don suits. Accordingly, the SADF developed a strategy 

of deception, by firing “smoke” that would achieve such a result. In addition, 

Malan proposed that the CBW program be developed to counteract the ANC 

and its military wing, Umkhonto we sizwe (MK), which was in the process of 

escalating a revolutionary war with more than 3,000 guerrilla forces. The 

SADF had evidence that some of the ANC/MK troops had been trained in the 

Soviet Union in CBW techniques.48

Basson was “tasked” to develop Project Coast by a “kitchen cabinet,” 

composed of Minister of Defense Malan, SADC Chief (Gen. C. Viljoen), the 

Commanding Officer of Strategic Intelligence and Special Forces (Gen. K. 

Liebenberg), SAP Commissioner van der Merwe, and the Director General of 

the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Basson was placed in charge of 

managing all aspects of Project Coast, including defensive and offensive 

measures.49 The annual budget for Project Coast was estimated to be $10 

million, with a staff of 200 involved.50 Members of the Project Working Group 

included Surgeon-General Nieuwoudt and his deputy and successor, Dr. Niels 
20

Knobel. They were supposed to supervise Project Coast, but Knobel has 

claimed that they would rarely visit the front companies for fear of 

compromising their cover. Basson decided with the scientific researchers on 

requirements and costs. Much of Basson’s effort went into circumventing 

sanctions against the sale of military-related items to South Africa and into 

black market, sanctions-busting activities. All procurement was undertaken by 

Basson and signed off on by Nieuwoudt and by his successor, Knobel, who 

has claimed that he and Nieuwoudt were only told after the fact about Basson’s 

activities. 

The problem of procurement by SADF was the lack of civilian leadership 

and supervision. The SADF was still supplied with uniforms using 1930s 

regulations. A Special Defense Account was established by the SADF that 

precluded access by the Auditor-General.51 Thus, while Wouter Basson was 

required to provide records of financial expenditures for Project Coast 

activities, there was no effort throughout this period to match these records 

with those of covert special operations.52 The rationale of the need for secrecy 

for covert programs and Basson’s unsupervised activities would lead Project 

Coast into a morass of corruption. 

Minister of Defense (Magnus Malan) 

Chief of Military Command (SADF) 

(C. Viljoen 1980-85, J. Geldenhuys, 1985-90, K. Liebenberg, 1990-93) 

Security Working Group 

SADF Strategic Intelligence/Special Forces Chief (Liebenberg, 1980-90) 

Surgeon General (Niewoudt, 1980-88, Knobel, 1988-93) 

SAP Commissioner (van der Merwe) 

Project Officer (Basson) 

Project Officer (Basson) 

Roodeplaat RL Delta G Scientific Protechnik Infladel Admin/ 

Finance 

D. Goosen (83-86) Philip Mijburgh Jan Lourens D.J. Truter 

W. Swanepoel (86-93) 
21

The chain of command demonstrates that major decisions about Project 

Coast were in the hands of Defense Minister Malan and top SADF generals. 

Above is the chain of command for Project Coast, along with the four 

companies that were established to develop the CBW program. 

In 1982, the Delta G Scientific Company began work on chemical 

warfare agents for Project Coast. The chemicals that Delta G developed for 

testing were divided into lethal, incapacitating, and irritating agents. 

Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) then tested the biological effects of 

the agents from Delta G. RRL was the company that was primarily responsible 

for biological warfare. Protechnik Company was to develop the protective 

CBW equipment. 

In 1983, RRL opened and started research on biological agents and on 

the biological effects of chemical agents. Daan Goosen became the first head 

of RRL and served until 1986. According to Gen. (ret.) Georg Meiring, South 

Africa developed a sophisticated and dispersed project. Project Coast was not 

just one individual and was not just RRL.53 There were a number of different 

research and testing centers at universities and companies, and scientists in 

various parts of South Africa assisted Project Coast. Anthrax, cholera, 

botulinum, and a variety of pathogens were collected and/or developed at RRL 

and elsewhere for testing. Apparently, a principal objective was to collect and 

test a range of biological agents in order to develop protection from a Soviet 

BW attack. In 1984, Dr. Schalk van Rensburg joined RRL and started the 

cholera research program. By the end of 1984, Project Coast and RRL had 

tested a range of BW toxins and had developed countermeasures to ricin and 

botulinum. Reportedly, they had acquired anthrax, plague, cholera, E. coli, 

staph, necrotizing fasciitis, ricin, botulinum, gas gangrene, anti-matter bacteria, 

and the Ebola, Marburg, and Rift Valley viruses.54 However, one must 

question if RRL had the facilities to keep Marburg, Rift Valley, and Ebola 

viruses. 
22

Eventually, according to a number of sources in the U.S. and South 

Africa, Project Coast developed pathogens that had never before been seen. 

Project Coast managed to obtain the Soviet-developed flesh-eating bacteria, 

necrotizing fasciitis, as well as the antidote. In 1994, the South Africans 

surprised the Americans by revealing that they had the bacteria and then gave 

it to the U.S.55 However, claims by Basson and former Surgeon-General 

Knobel that South African espionage agents penetrated Soviet Russian 

programs during 1980s remain to be proven. 

According to Tom Mangold in Plague Wars,

56 baboons, trapped upcountry in Kruger National Park, were shipped by crate load to RRL for 

biological tests. There is evidence that some of these tests were done in the 

park itself. Tourists reportedly witnessed researchers using poison darts that 

took several hours to incapacitate or kill primates. The tourists registered their 

complaints and demanded that the practice be terminated. According to the 

Chief Warden of Kruger Park, the SADF used Kruger and other parks for 

military tests. However, Kruger Park officials were not told what was being 

tested, only what areas would be restricted and for how long. His impression is 

that more sensitive tests occurred on private reserves or Cape testing areas.57

It appears that, from the start, Project Coast was not just a “defensive” 

program.58 In the early 1980s, fears of a “black tidal wave” drove white 

scientists to try to develop a variety of means that could ensure the survival of 

white South Africa. Plans were devised to build a large-scale anthrax 

production facility at RRL. The anthrax could have been used either outside or 

inside South Africa, particularly where guerrillas were present. According to 

former RRL scientist, Mike Odendaal, who testified in the Basson trial, those 

plans were nearly operationalized in 1985. 

Also, reportedly part of Project Coast was genetic engineering research, 

which was being conducted to produce a “black bomb,” bacteria or other 

biological agents that would kill or weaken blacks and not whites. The black 
23

bomb could be used to wipe out or incapacitate an entire area where an 

insurrection was taking place.59 Project Coast scientists asked Basson to obtain 

a peptide synthesizer outside of South Africa that would assist in genetic 

engineering efforts. Also, some Project Coast scientists reportedly worked on 

controlling black fertility, as part of efforts to limit black population growth. 

Many aspects of Project Coast research projects, including the country’s 

links with other states, have not and may never be uncovered. Research on 

birth control methods to reduce the black birth rate was one such area. Daan 

Goosen, the managing director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories between 

1983 and 1986, told Tom Mangold of the BBC that Project Coast supported a 

project to develop a contraceptive that would have been applied clandestinely 

to blacks.60 Goosen claimed that Dr. Knobel knew all about this project and 

those scientists had been told that this was the most important research on 

which they could work. Goosen reported that the project had developed a 

vaccine for males and female and that the researchers were still searching for a 

means that it could be delivered to make blacks sterile without making them 

aware.61 Testimony given at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 

suggested that Project Coast researchers were also looking into putting birth 

control substances in water supplies.62

Project Coast claimed its first victims at the end of 1982, when 

“Operation Duel” was launched, which aimed to eliminate hundreds of 

SWAPO prisoners and SADF informants.63 Col. Johan Theron, 

Counterintelligence Officer in the Special Forces, testified at the Basson trial 

that he received muscle relaxant pills from Basson in December 1982 and 

killed approximately two hundred SWAPO prisoners, then dumped their 

bodies from airplanes out to sea. Also in Namibia, the Soviet Union accused 

South Africa of using herbicides. Napalm and phosphorous were allegedly 

used by the SADF in Angola during the 1980s, which was against the Geneva 

Conventions. 
24

In November 1983, Basson was allegedly involved in the use of CBW 

against regime opponents in Dukuduku in KwaZulu-Natal. There he instructed 

South African agents to tie their intended victims to trees and smear a jell-like 

ointment on their bodies. When that failed to kill them, they were allegedly 

injected with an anaesthetic drug and then a muscle relaxant. After they had 

died, their bodies were thrown into the sea. In 1985, four SWAPO detainees 

held at Reconnaissance Regiment headquarters were allegedly given a sleeping 

drug in soft drinks, taken to Lanseria airport outside Johannesburg and injected 

with three toxic substances supplied by Basson. Their bodies were thrown into 

the Atlantic Ocean. In 1986, Basson is also alleged to have supplied poisoned 

tea and orange that killed Special Forces member Lance Corporal Victor de 

Fonseca in a military hospital in Pretoria. Fonseca is said to have started 

“talking” about clandestine operations after developing brain cancer. These 

acts were part of the 16 murder charges introduced on 26 March 1999, prior to 

the October 1999 opening of Basson’s trial in South Africa. 64

In 1984, uprisings in South Africa started in the Vaal Triangle, south of 

Johannesburg, and spread throughout the country. The mass actions were far 

more widespread, violent and deadly than in 1960 or after 1976. The 

nationwide scope of these protests intensified concerns over crowd control and 

fueled ongoing efforts to develop weapons, including chemical and biological 

agents, to deal with the unrest. SADF Chief of Staff General Constand Viljoen, 

as well as Generals Liebenberg and Meiring, were seeking an offensive CBW 

substance that would weaken rioters and was weaker than tear gas. They 

consulted Basson and Project Coast. Also, the SADF sought a chemical that 

would color the skin for about two weeks and allow the identification of 

frontrunners in the violence.65 In response to General Viljoen, Delta G 

Scientific developed a “New Generation Tear (NGT) Gas,” also known as CR 

gas. The NGT gas was designed to be more powerful than conventional CS 
25

tear gas and to incapacitate without lethality or excessive irritation.66 NGT 

(CR) gas was intended to counteract rolling mass actions led by the ANC or its 

surrogates. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, NGT (CR) gas was used rarely 

and only on the Chief of the Army’s say-so. When NGT (CR) gas was used, it 

was usually mixed with CS gas and dissolved in water to be used by water 

cannon. 

Suspected Chemical Warfare in Angola, 1985-1989 

In 1985, UNITA leaders made the first of several claims (between 1985 and 

1989) that their troops had been attacked by chemical weapons (in this case, 

organophosphates) and asked SADF for assistance. In the 1985 incident, 

UNITA guerrillas reported that they had surrounded a town, and the Angolan 

government garrison had responded by using chemical agents.67 In 1985, Col. 

Wouter Basson took command of the 7th SAMS Battalion and assumed overall 

responsibility for protecting SADF and UNITA forces from CBW attack. 

Therefore, Basson came to inspect the alleged CW attack. Lt. Col. Johann 

Smith, a SADF liaison with UNITA, assisted Basson and claims that 

convincing evidence of chemical weapons use was found.68 In a second 

incident, in 1986, UNITA forces spotted a brown vapor, which they thought 

was mustard gas, and asked SADF for safeguards against CW. According to 

Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, who served in Angola off and on for 20 years, on a 

number of occasions between 1985 and 1988 the local population in 

southeastern Angola exhibited the type of disorientation indicative of CW.69 

UNITA claims and intelligence data heightened SADF fears of CBW 

attack in Angola, Namibia, and inside South Africa. According to Gen. (ret.) 

Bill Sass, former State Security Council member and SADF Chief of 

Operations, SADF had evidence that the Cubans actually brought their 

chemical warfare program to the battlefield as early as 1985.70 According to 

Gen. (ret.) Jannie Geldenhuys, SADF Chief of Staff, 1985-1990, the Cubans in 

Angola had the delivery capability and intention to use CBW, as indicated by 
26

radio intercepts.71 Cuban and Angolan army helicopters were shot down and 

were discovered to have had the capability to carry chemical agents. Soviet 

advisers captured gave evidence about CW use. In addition, fears rose that 

ANC/MK guerrillas might put BW agents in South African reservoirs.72 The 

need for protective equipment, clothing and antidotes and for CBW strategy 

and tactics intensified. Gen. Geldenhuys ordered counter-measures and the 

purchase of anti-CBW suits. P.W. Botha visited Angola and actually put on a 

suit. The cost for gear was expensive, especially gas masks, which were not 

reusable. Subsequently, Special Forces Gen. Liebenberg and Wouter Basson 

were investigated by the Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) in 

regard to 20 million rand in chemical warfare gear that was supposed to be 

delivered to UNITA. 

In Angola, the conflict reached a peak in October 1987, with the battle of 

Cuito Cuanavale. While Cuba and the Angolan government claimed a great 

victory, over 5,000 government troops were killed and advanced SAMs (SA8s) were captured by the SADF who, subsequently, gave them to the U.S. 

According to David Steward, President de Klerk’s chief of staff, 1989-1994,73

Cuban and Angolan government forces used CW at Cuito Cuanavale and at 

Lomba River. A UNITA commander on the ground, Gen. Deon Ferreira, 

claimed that he saw a “flash in the sky,” which was indicative of a CW attack. 

Later, UNITA troops were evacuated to Pretoria with their hair falling out. 

Basson led the investigation and brought with him Dr. Heyndrickx from 

Ghent, Belgium. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring,74 other European scientists 

accompanied them. Heyndrickx’s research project was done in loose 

collaboration with a clinic in Mavinga in southern Angola that was staffed by 

SADF personnel. Subsequently, Heyndrickx, as well as the South African 

government, accused the Angolan government of using CW. However, 

Heyndrickx refused to allow findings that MPLA used poison gas on UNITA 

in the Angolan war to be reviewed by his peer.75
27

In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale, SADF planned to assist UNITA in 

retaliating for the 1987 CW attacks by firing NGT (CR) gas from 120mm 

mortars and 155mm howitzers. Tests were conducted at the SADF training 

center.76 In addition, according to Cuban officers who were interrogated, CW 

agents had been brought into Angola. An indication occurred at the beginning 

of 1988, when the 50th Havana City Brigade arrived from Cuba with anti-CW 

protective gear. As mentioned earlier, reports of CW use continued into early 

1989, after peace agreements were signed for Angola and Namibia. 

Plans for a Chemical and Biological Weapons Program 

By 1985, several Project Coast program directors were planning for a massive 

escalation of the chemical and biological warfare program and working on 

plans that would have resulted in a weapons program. According to RRL 

scientist Mike Odendaal, he had received instructions to start a factory where 

biological agents would be produced in mass form, and 200,000 rand 

($100,000) had already been spent on the plans.77 A new wing had been added 

to Roodeplaat Research Laboratories for a production-scale laboratory, with 

fermenters that could produce 300 liters and upward of anthrax and other 

biological agents and a P-4 level laboratory. For the first few years, Project 

Coast used P-2 to P-3 facilities, and RRL only used two 10-gallon fermenters 

for growth medium. In 1985, when the new wing for RRL was built, a P-4 

facility was added. Basson and his superiors in the SADF (Generals 

Liebenberg, Nieuwoudt, and Viljoen, as well as Magnus Malan) approved the 

up-grade. 

According to RRL scientist Schalk van Rensburg, when Basson wanted 

the safety level raised to level 4, two British scientists, on an unauthorized visit 

from Porton Down, UK (which had been privatized) helped and advised.78

According to Tom Mangold, MI-6 opened a file on Basson after he attended 

the Second World Conference of Toxicologists in Ghent, Belgium, where he 

reportedly met with scientists, including some from Porton Down.79
28

Consequently, both American and British intelligence agencies knew of 

Basson’s activities during this time but did little against him. However, there is 

no evidence, besides Basson’s claims, that Basson ever visited Porton Down.80

In the end, the directors of Project Coast decided not to fund the larger 

fermenters. According to Odendaal, SADF decided that biological agents 

would be used in low-intensity regional skirmishes and assassinations, but not 

on a more massive scale.81 Therefore, in comparison to the USSR, which had 

scores of big fermenters, the South African program was quite small in size 

and scale. However, according to many American and South African experts, 

in terms of the range of biological agents possessed and the science involved, 

the CBW program was the “second most sophisticated program,” next to the 

Soviet’s, and more sophisticated than the Iraqi program that was uncovered in 

1995. 

A senior former army officer confirmed that “any thinking person in the 

SADF” knew that South Africa had developed chemical weapons, at least by 

the mid-1980s. He confirmed that South Africa was manufacturing chemical 

weapons from the mid-1980s until “whole scenario changed” in the early 

1990s.82 Earlier the army had spent most of its time testing decontamination 

gasses. Also at this time several public statements about developing methods to 

counter chemical attacks appeared. Weaponization began in cooperation with 

ARMSCOR, which developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles 

that would have the capability to carry chemical and biological agents. All of 

this was top secret, and the Americans and British only discovered 

weaponization in 1994. They did not insist that weaponization be included in 

the chemical and biological memorandum because they had no hard evidence 

upon which to make such a demand.83 The South African Ministry of Defense 

still denies that weaponization took place. 

While reports that the former South African government tested battlefield 

weapons capable of carrying biological agents and chemicals cannot be 
29

confirmed, there is evidence that such weapons were developed. Basson, much 

like his counterparts in other countries (e.g., Iraq), had difficulties developing 

effective delivery systems for using biological agents as a weapon of mass 

destruction. While Project Coast researchers undertook conceptual studies in 

the aerosolization of biological agents, the evidence available to date indicates 

that sophisticated aerosolization delivery systems were not developed. 

However, conceptual studies of such systems were well underway at the time 

Project Coast was shut down. Much more progress appears to have been 

achieved developing sophisticated artillery warheads and tactical missiles that 

were capable of delivering NBC warheads. What types of missiles and 

warheads were built, possibly tested and sold abroad remain among the most 

important questions related to South Africa’s CBN programs to still be 

answered.

Project Coast and the Nuclear Weapons Program Compared 

From the start, Project Coast had a secretive military culture that was 

impervious to scrutiny by civilian authorities. Project Coast was more 

compartmentalized, secretive, and loosely managed than the nuclear weapons 

program, which was controlled by ARMSCOR. A professor who worked on 

the nuclear weapons program claims that the highly technical nature of the 

nuclear weapons program required that it should be well controlled.84 The 

nuclear weapons program was militarized in the 1970s but remained under the 

control of ARMSCOR. Many of the nuclear scientists who worked on the 

nuclear program did not know about the CBW program and were surprised to 

learn that South Africa had one at all.85 As the money required to support P.W. 

Botha’s covert project, especially for the nuclear and missile programs, the 

budgets of the regular forces were increasingly squeezed. By the end of the 

1980s, this money crunch was creating tensions between the top professional 

military and the “securocrats.” Concerns of senior professional military leaders 

about the adverse effects on the air force, navy, and army if “PW was allowed 
30

to continue developing his toys” was a major factor fueling support to 

unilaterally close down the nuclear program.86 The conventional military 

leadership were less concerned about the costs associated with the CBW 

program As Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, a member of the former State Security 

Council recently observed, “details of Project Cost were not widely known 

among members of the SADF leadership.”87 

Internal Unrest and Project Coast 

In June 1985, a state of emergency was declared in South Africa, as the 

uprisings intensified. The government’s perceived need for crowd control 

agents intensified. General Viljoen asked his fellow generals how the SADF 

should respond to “fighting in the streets.” One proposal was for a “third 

force,” which would supposedly combine the military functions of the SADF 

and the police role of the SAP in suppressing unrest.88 Another proposal was to 

use non-lethal chemical weapons, particularly in the form of the new tear gas 

(NGT or CR), which Project Coast had developed. General Liebenberg 

revealed that chemical agents were being developed to make people passive 

and to render equipment unusable. Gen. Lothar Neethling, South African 

Police forensics commander, ordered the development of tear gas, gas 

grenades and tranquilizing drugs for use in pacifying rioters. Neethling was 

also an expert in use of CBW for assassination and worked closely with 

Basson, who supplied poisons to get rid of individuals.89 By 1986, the state of 

emergency led to massive waves of arrests and detentions in South Africa. In 

response, the ANC/MK vowed to “make the streets ungovernable.” The SADF 

proceeded with efforts to develop and apply CBW agents to counteract the 

“black onslaught.” 

The 1984-86 township unrest produced antipathy between military and 

civilian departments. In essence, the State Security Council, the SADF, and 

SAP took over the state. Civilian departments were subordinated to the State 

Security Council. Even the Education departments began to take orders from 
31

the SSC. At this time, the security forces perpetuated the doctrine of “plausible 

denial.” Security forces carried on activities in secret, which allowed civilians 

to deny knowledge.90

In 1986, the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) was created, drawing on 

the “dirty tricks” experiences of the Selous Scouts and D-40. The CCB became 

one of the cornerstones of an alleged “third force” that was dedicated to 

preventing the ANC/MK from taking power. There was a consensus in the 

Botha government that unconventional methods were needed, according to 

Malan’s testimony before the TRC, and that Malan personally approved 

establishment of CCB but never gave it instructions to have anyone killed. 

Malan denied the existence of a third force and refused to apply for amnesty 

from the TRC. However, he said he would apply for collective responsibility 

with the ANC leadership for acts committed during the violence that started in 

1960. Similarly, former Air Force General Tienie Groenwald said he would 

apply for amnesty for “clandestine operations” of the Afrikaner Volks Front. 

He acknowledged this body had connections with pre-1994 election bombings 

but that his involvement was limited to military operations. 

By 1987, the uprisings in South Africa had largely come to an end. At the 

same time, ANC/MK guerrillas stepped up their armed campaign, which came 

to include the bombing of civilian targets. While the Botha government sought 

ways of eliminating the guerrilla threat, negotiations between the apartheid

regime and Mandela continued. In response to the ANC/MK and other 

perceived threats, the CCB started operations in 1988. According to the Steyn 

Report and a number of interviews, Basson worked with the CCB, had offices 

in the same building, and supplied them with CBW poisons for assassination 

purposes. The Steyn Report also found that Basson and the CCB were 

receiving instructions from Malan and other superiors. However, Basson and 

the CCB interpreted the instructions as they saw fit. 
32

International Links Established During Project Coast 

From 1981 onwards, Basson and Project Coast scientists intensified their 

international contacts, particularly at conferences on CBW. South African 

delegations made visits to the U.S., Britain, Taiwan, Israel, and Germany. 

Basson attended a conference on biological warfare (BW) in San Antonio in 

1981. From 1981 to 1986, the Reagan administration followed a policy of 

“constructive engagement.” Reagan administration officials sent signals to the 

Botha regime that the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to American 

industries and scientists as the South Africans built up their defense industries. 

Under-Secretary of State William Clark went one step further and welcomed 

South African defense officials and experts to Washington and facilitated their 

interaction with U.S. counterparts. The attitude of Clark and others enabled 

South Africa to gain access to U.S. scientists. At the same time, Basson’s trip 

to San Antonio reportedly attracted the attention of American intelligence, and 

he was barred entry to the U.S. for scientific purposes.91 In 1984, the U.S. 

Center for Disease Control sent eight shipments of the Ebola, Marburg, and 

Rift Valley viruses to South Africa. Suddenly, South Africa possessed viruses 

that could be used with devastating effect in surrounding countries. 

Details of the extent and importance of South African cooperation with 

Israel in CBW research have not been disclosed. The two countries started 

working together on covert research related to nuclear weapons after World 

War II. These links had developed into a mature working relationship by the 

1970s. Bilateral cooperation between the two states proved especially fruitful 

in developing nuclear weapons and testing a number of increasingly 

sophisticated missiles. Israel and South Africa also cooperated closely in the 

production of the G-5 artillery gun to fight a conventional war.92 This line of 

research that cost millions of rand also explored the feasibility of using NBC 

warheads for the G-5, and later the G-6 gun. The Israelis also helped South 

Africa with armored cars and tanks and the Cheetah (a Mirage offshoot). 
33

Given the breadth and depth of cooperation, it is quite possible that Israel and 

South Africa cooperated on NBC efforts. It is significant that Basson went to 

Israel several times during the 1980s.93 

Transnational Links: The Ford Case and Basson 

New questions surfaced about the apartheid government’s international 

connections and interest in biological warfare and birth control methods in 

early 2000, after Pat Riley, one of the owners of a southern California biotech 

firm, BioFem, was shot and after his partner, Dr. Larry Ford, committed 

suicide. The Irvine, California police had questioned Dr. Ford about his 

partner’s shooting and, after Ford’s suicide, found documents in his house that 

led them to dig up his backyard. Although not all of the contents found have 

been disclosed, published accounts indicate that the police removed automatic 

rifles from a concrete bunker and tubes of cholera and typhoid fever germs 

from a freezer in the Ford house. 

At the time of his death, Ford was working on a “microbicide” form of 

birth control that he had patented in 1997. Ford claimed that his product, 

“Inner Confidence,” could prevent millions of people from dying of AIDS, 

especially in Africa, and in the process make investors extremely wealthy. His 

microbicide contraceptive was a vaginal suppository that contained chemicals 

that kill germs transmitted through sex, as well as sperm. The potential 

advantage of this type of contraceptive would be to protect the user from HIV 

and other sexually transmitted diseases. To date, no microbicide product has 

been approved for marketing. There was little interest in this birth control 

approach until the late 1990s, as several technical problems remained 

unsolved. The results of several small-scale trials, and one large-scale 

publicized study of another microbicide found that the chemicals in the 

microbicide damaged the lining of the vagina, making the user more, rather 

than less susceptible to HIV infection.94

Local authorities and the FBI, who launched a weapons of mass 
34

destruction investigation into this case, began investigating claims Ford made 

to his associates and friends that he served as a consultant to the SADF and 

had close ties with the CIA. Former South African General Surgeon, Dr. Niels 

Knobel, initially confirmed that he met Ford at a conference in San Diego, 

California in the late 1980s and that they had remained friends ever since. 

Knobel also confirmed that they shared an interest in AIDS, because they both 

knew that the epidemic was going to have a devastating impact in Africa. 

However, Knobel recently acknowledged that he met with Ford and his 

associates, during one of their many visits to the South African trade 

representative’s official residence in Los Angeles.95 In a recent phone 

interview, Knobel stated, “Our whole policy of protecting members of the 

defense force against HIV (educating them to use condoms) came from my 

relationship with Larry. We both worked toward a cure for AIDS that would 

be available to the vast population of Africa, (and) there was no political 

agenda.”96

Others reported that Ford visited South Africa several years earlier than 

Dr. Knobel acknowledged. According to Dr. Scharf, the former head of 

Military Hospital One in Pretoria, Ford visited in the mid-1980s as a guest of 

the South African Surgeon General. Dr. Scharf remembered a visit by Ford to 

his hospital as the guest of Knobel in 1984 or 1985. Knobel insisted that Ford 

be given VIP treatment (at the hospital’s expense). Scharf was offended by 

Ford’s request for human placenta that he wanted to use in his research on 

viruses. Scharf refused to cooperate and claimed that he threw Ford out of his 

office, after warning him that such activities would be very controversial, if 

they became public, due to the fact that all Africans viewed babies as sacred.97 

Recently, Knobel confirmed to American reporters that he helped Ford 

establish protocols to test his product in South Africa but said he did not know 

if those trials were every carried out. According to microbiologist Mike 

Odendaal, researcher at RRL, Ford also visited South Africa again in 1987 to 
35

instruct scientists working with a SADF front company on how to turn teabags, 

doilies, and pornographic magazines into “weapons” that could be used against 

the ANC by using species of clostridium bacteria. Odendaal reported that the 

scientists found much of Ford’s advice confusing and some went so far as to 

call him a fraud.98 

Police investigating this case have been unable to corroborate many of 

Ford’s claims made before his death. For example, Ford claimed that he 

parachuted into southern Africa during the apartheid era to take blood samples 

from dead guerrilla fighters in order to help the U.S. government determine the 

biological warfare agents against which the Soviets were vaccinating their 

allies.99 Another long-time Ford associate, Jerry D. Nilsson, also came under 

investigation. Nilsson claimed that he and Ford traveled to Africa together. In 

1988, Nilsson organized a group of doctors, including Ford, to buy a defunct 

Los Angeles hospital. The plan was to turn it into a state-of-the-art infectious 

disease research center, the Lake View Terrace Institute. Nilsson told the Los 

Angles Times that the facility was to be “one cog in a complex, far-reaching 

project” with related facilities in Africa, Germany, Italy and Britain. The 

scheme flopped when research groups denied they were backing the venture. 

The nature of Nilsson’s relationship with Ford has remained unclear. 

Police seized considerable material when they raided Nilsson’s house and 

storage lockers but did not release details of the searches. Nilsson’s friends 

claimed that he and Ford stashed chemicals and germs at several locations in 

southern California. Police acknowledged that the evidence strongly suggested 

that Dr. Ford was deeply involved in a conspiracy and that he would be in 

custody today were he alive. Another long-time associate of Ford claimed that 

only about one per cent of the story of Ford’s activities in Africa has been 

disclosed.100 

In July 2000, an Orange County, California grand jury heard evidence to 

determine the facts in the Ford case. Evidence pointed to Ford’s links to the 
36

former South African regime as part of a larger network with officials of the 

former government and perhaps with rogue elements. The FBI opened an 

international investigation to determine whether any crimes under U.S. law had 

occurred in South Africa. Ford claimed to have served as a consultant to the 

South African government, lecturing scientists on biological topics relevant for 

making BW. If true, his actions would have constituted a violation of U.S. 

laws, which prevented such contacts during the apartheid era.101

The results of a closed grand jury investigation of the Ford case have not 

been made public, but the discovery of biological agents and toxins in Ford’s 

possession renewed questions about whether Basson called upon former 

associates to conceal biological agents, poisons and drugs overseas. Testimony 

at the Basson’s trial to date has failed to explain where tons of drugs and 

smaller quantities of deadly toxins whose production Basson oversaw before 

his retirement from the military in 1993 went and why so many drugs were 

produced in the first place. One of the prosecutors in the Basson case has 

acknowledged that the prosecution still does not have a very clear idea about 

either the purpose of the drugs or their final destination.102 

At the time of Bassoon’s arrest, investigators found several trunks in his 

possession that contained documents and items related to Project Coast.103 The 

investigators also found a great deal of personal correspondence between 

Basson and individuals in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and other 

countries in the trunks and among Basson’s personal effects. One letter was 

from an individual in the UK, who lived near Heathrow Airport. This letter 

described what Basson should do if he needed to leave South Africa quickly. 

The letter said he should contact “them” when he arrived at Heathrow and that 

“we will collect you.” Other letters, from individuals in other countries, 

described similar emergency exit plans. 

The identity of this letter writer and others was not known by the 

investigators representing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
37

the South African President’s office, or the National Intelligence Agency 

(NIA), who were all present at the time after the trunks were found. The 

contents of the trunks were itemized, and the National Intelligence Agency 

(NIA) took control of them for security reasons. The chief investigator for the 

TRC at the time, Dr. Villa-Vicencia, never learned whether these letters were 

from private individuals or representatives of governments.104 

The documents are interesting, given statements made by Juergen 

Jacomet, a former Swiss military intelligence agent, who worked with Basson 

on money-laundering for Project Coast in Europe. He spoke of a right-wing 

conspiracy and alluded to the existence of an information organization of 

individuals, including Americans.105 The death of Dr. Ford and revelations of 

his South African involvement, and his failed effort to establish the Lake View 

Terrace Institute raised again the possibility of a right-wing international 

network, united by a vision of a South Africa once again ruled by whites. 

No evidence to date has been found to substantiate concerns expressed 

by some about possible linkages between Project Coast programs and the 

intentional use of HIV or microbicide contraceptives.106 However, the recent 

revelations since Ford’s death have been consistent with reports that the former 

South African government was already concerned about the future impact of 

the AIDS epidemic by the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, as the South African 

government became more aware of the magnitude of the impending AIDS 

epidemic, the SADF started testing thousands of SADF soldiers for HIV. The 

secret right-wing Afrikaner organization, the Broederbond, also recently 

acknowledged that they had completed population projections during the mid1980s. They suggested that whites would be in majority in the future due to the 

devastating effects that AIDS was projected to have on the black population of 

South Africa.107 

Throughout the 1980s, Basson continued his foreign visits and 

interaction with experts from the U.S., Britain and other countries. Most 
38

contacts appear to have been legal ones between Project Coast scientists and 

other scientists and consultants in Europe. Most of the substances and 

knowledge relevant to biological weapons were not controlled in the 1970s and 

1980s as there was not the same level of concern with the possible use of 

biological agents and chemical substances that emerged during the 1990s.108

However, Basson and Knobel subsequently claimed that Basson visited Iraq 

and Iran, the Philippines, North Korea, Croatia, and met with members of 

Colombian drug cartels, making contacts and collecting information. What was 

obtained or exchanged during these visits has not yet emerged. 

Corruption and the Deterioration of Project Coast 

Basson took advantage of the loose financial oversight and accountability 

requirements to ensure that he would acquire large sums of money from the 

project several years before the actual decisions were made to privatize these 

state-owned corporations. Starting in the mid-1980s, if not before, Basson was 

reported to have offered his friends and trusted employees the opportunity to 

invest in a number of these official front corporations. Basson and other early 

investors made overnight fortunes, when these corporations were privatized in 

the late 1980s.109 The magnitude of these profits, perhaps more than any other 

action, caught the attention of a non-military agency, the Office of Serious 

Economic Offenses, who started investigating the financial flows associated 

with Project Coast soon after these corporations shares were sold on the open 

market. 

Basson was the central figure in coordinating the funds and the whole 

program. He was the central point of contact between the scientists, the army, 

and the government sponsoring Project Coast. As the project expanded into 

sophisticated research into genetic engineering and the manufacturing of large 

amounts of Mandrax and Ecstasy (which may have been sold on the black 

market), millions of dollars were siphoned off into a series of elaborate holding 

companies. While Basson continues to maintain that the large amounts of 
39

Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produced by state-owned companies were 

authorized products intended for use in crowd control few observers, including 

the prosecution in his on-going trial believe this story.110 Instead, a mystery 

remains about why so many drugs were produced and where they went. 

As Basson and his closest associates skimmed millions of dollars from 

Project Coast activities, he and his American accountant, David Webster, 

developed an elaborate web of foreign shell companies to launder the money. 

Several offshore holding companies, such as WPW Investments that was 

incorporated in Cayman Island in 1986 sold initial share offers at low prices 

(e.g., $4.00 U.S. per share) to Basson. In this company, as in numerous others, 

Basson’s accountant, David Webster, was the Director while Basson maintain 

indirect control as a member of the Board. Towards the end of Project Coast, 

new companies were being incorporated and large amounts of assets were 

being transferred from existing companies to the new ones over a 24- or 48-

hour period111 The investigation of the South African forensic auditor, Hendrik 

Bruwer, took nearly seven years to complete. After traveling to the U.S., UK, 

Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, and Luxembourg, Bruwer produced an 800-

page report that highlighted serious illegalities in the SADF and former 

government. 

Obtaining permission from foreign governments delayed the 

investigation, as these ongoing investigations by other national and provincial 

bodies (e.g., the Transvaal Auditor Generals office). Basson’s American 

accountant, David Webster, who had acted as a nominee for Basson at first 

refused to hand over papers in his possession to South African investigators. 

He was eventually forced to do so by an American court. The international and 

transnational character of this case was highlighted by the fact that the Basson 

trial took the unusual step of holding sessions of the trial in Jacksonville, 

Florida in September 2000 in order to establish the exact nature and extent of 

David Webster’s involvement in the case. The complexity of these dealings are 
40

such that the prosecution believes that it will take most of the two years that 

the Basson trial is expected to last to present evidence to support fraud charges 

against Basson.112 

Project Coast ground to a halt in 1988, due to corruption by Basson and 

others. According to interviews with Project Coast scientists, between 1982 

and 1987, Project Coast was advancing as a sophisticated program.113 Project 

Coast had acquired anthrax, cholera, botulinum, and other biological agents, 

was planning to add a wing to RRL to produce massive amounts of anthrax, 

and was proceeding with genetic engineering research to produce germs that 

would harm blacks and not whites. However, as the communist threat receded 

in 1987-88 and as it seemed possible that the apartheid regime’s days were 

numbered, Basson and others took large amounts of money that was intended 

for Project Coast programs and diverted it to their own accounts. Elsewhere in 

government, top officials were taking funds on a large scale. As the biological 

warfare program stopped, Basson and others began to plan how to roll Project 

Coast back in such a way that would be advantageous to them. By 1988, 

President P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan and Wim de Villiers of ARMSCOR had 

initiated the privatization and liberalization of the defense industry. They 

envisaged a transfer of power to Mandela and the ANC and saw the need to 

keep the defense industry out of their hands. The privatization process opened 

the door to the type of corruption exhibited by Basson and his colleagues. 

In 1988, Basson was supposed to have bought a sophisticated peptide 

synthesizer for $2.2 million from clandestine sources. Project Coast 

researchers were attempting to make significant advances in the field of 

peptides to alter brain function, which was a key to creating a biological 

weapon that would affect blacks and not whites. However, at the trial of 

Basson, Dr. Lucia Steenkamp refuted claims that Basson had bought the 

peptide synthesizer, and the prosecution alleged that Basson defrauded SADF 

by pretending he needed the synthesizer but actually used the money for 
41

overseas business deals.114

In August 1988, Delta G scientists arranged for 1,000 kilograms of 

methaqualone to be produced. The production manager at Delta G approached

Dr. Philip Mijburgh, managing director of Medchem Consolidated 

Investments, and asked him to produce the methaqualone. What happened to 

the methaqualone and whether or not it was encapsulated remains unknown.115

The explanation given by witnesses at the Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission (TRC) hearings in 1998 was that the methaqualone was to be 

mixed into NGT (CR) gas and used for crowd control purposes. General 

Lothar Neethling testified that, on three occasions, he had been requested to 

provide Dr Basson with Mandrax tablets confiscated by the South African 

Narcotics Bureau (SANAB). He claimed that he had given Dr Basson 

approximately 200,000 tablets in total as well as quantities of LSD and dagga 

(marijuana), on the understanding that they would be investigated to determine 

whether they would be appropriate crowd control weapons. None of the 

witnesses could provide the TRC with any information about tests that had 

been conducted in this regard and at least one witness stated that these drugs 

would not be suitable for such a purpose. Medchem's role is noteworthy given 

the fact that Defense Minister Malan’s nephew, Dr. Mijburgh, was on the 

board. Mijburgh benefited from privatization of both Medchem and Delta G 

Scientific in the early 1990s. 

In 1988, Dr. Knobel became Surgeon General, after Dr. Nieuwoudt died. 

Basson briefed Knobel, claiming that he had penetrated facilities in the USSR, 

Libya, the U.S., and UK (Porton Down), as well as in Belgium, France, 

Switzerland, Germany, and Israel. Knobel still believes Basson’s claims. 

However, in retrospect, Knobel found that Basson’s activities were not 

sufficiently monitored and that the working group committee approach to 

supervision was a mistake.116 According to Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys,117 as the 

1980s proceeded, Project Coast continued to be managed by committee, which 
42

left it susceptible to mismanagement and corruption. Geldenhuys attended the 

steering committee for Project Coast on one or two occasions from 1985-1990. 

Usually, Geldenhuys was replaced by Surgeon General Nieuwoudt and, from 

1988-1990, by S-G Knobel. He also attended meetings of the satellite program 

on missiles. The problem was that a committee could not control Basson. 

According to Geldenhuys, General Liebenberg was convinced that the 

Project Coast steering committee (of which he was a member) was supplanted 

by the “Small Command Council,” especially in review of finances and in 

working with Basson. The Small Command Council was controlled by Malan 

and was for secret projects on a “need to know” basis. In contrast to his TRC 

statements about Project Coast, Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys now claims that, as 

SADF Chief of Staff, he monitored finances and that his chief of finance was 

good. He claimed that there was not disproportional spending on Project Coast 

and that secret funds were audited. Geldenhuys pointed out that, in the 1980s, 

South Africa was the “skunk” of the world. This led to an “unconventional 

arms trade” and to the use of middlemen and secret funds. However the Office 

of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) objected to secret funds, as well as 

“safe houses,” clandestine front companies and clandestine flights.118

ROLLBACK OF PROJECT COAST (1988-1994) 

In 1988, conditions for the rollback of the CBW program, Project Coast, 

improved dramatically as the pace of change accelerated in South Africa and 

southern Africa. President P.W. Botha and the South African Defense Force 

(SADF) realized that the Soviet Union was crumbling and knew they were 

going to win in Angola. Suddenly, P.W. Botha changed his position and 

accepted a change in strategy. The goal became minimal destruction, using 

cross border raids, and not defeat of the regime’s adversaries. As Botha 

realized there was a greatly reduced external threat, he agreed to enter into 

negotiations, which had started at a lower level in 1986, to reach a compromise 

with Nelson Mandela and the ANC. In 1988, the U.S., Cuba, Angola and 
43

South Africa negotiated the withdrawal of Cuban troops in exchange for the 

independence of Namibia, and by the end of the year, a deal was reached. The 

Soviet and Cuban threat that had helped give rise to Project Coast rapidly 

began to recede. However, the ANC/MK continued their guerrilla campaign, 

including the bombing of civilian targets.119 

At the beginning of 1989, President Botha became ill with heart 

problems and was replaced on an interim basis by F.W. de Klerk, an “outsider” 

to the state security system (including Project Coast). In April 1989, South 

African troops were confined to barracks in Namibia and were withdrawn by 

the end of the year. In September 1989, de Klerk was elected and inaugurated 

as State President and shunted Botha aside. De Klerk began his own five-year 

plan of ending apartheid. Part of his task included trying to establish civilian 

control over the security apparatus and rein in the “securocrats” and secret 

projects (like Project Coast). Talks with Mandela reached their climax, and top 

ANC prisoners, such as Walter Sisulu, were released. Finally, in February 

1990, de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC, PAC, and South African Communist 

Party and released Nelson Mandela. 

De Klerk’s decision to release Nelson Mandela and lift the ban on the 

ANC initiated a four-year period of negotiation and contention. In 1991, the 

Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process of negotiations 

began, involving the government, the ANC and other parties. In 1992, the

negotiation process slowed and concerns mounted as the campaign of rolling 

violence spread throughout South Africa. Violent clashes continued, especially 

in Kwazulu-Natal. At the same time, mistrust of de Klerk and the National 

Party government grew among ANC leaders. There was a real concern by all 

parties that the situation in South Africa would “ spin out of control” before a 

negotiated settlement was reached.120 The fear of collapse ultimately provided 

an important incentive that eventually brought most parties back to the 

negotiating table. In 1993, negotiations stalled, and violence continued. Chris 
44

Hani, leader of Umkhonto we sizwe (MK) and the South African Communist 

Party, as well as a possible successor to Nelson Mandela, was killed in a rightwing hit operation. The fear of a “third force” and a right-wing coup 

continued. 

During this period of negotiations, instability and violence, many in the 

regime believed that they needed insurance against the ANC/MK and the 

“black onslaught.” With this in mind, the CBW program was kept intact by 

Basson and his associates as insurance and was used in assassination attempts. 

Also, experiments with chemical warfare apparently continued, with an alleged 

attack on Mozambican troops as late as January 1992. At the same time, 

Basson, Philip Mijburgh and others were in the process of milking Project 

Coast for all the financial gain possible. Basson began to establish contacts 

with foreign governments, such as Libya, which might be interested in 

purchasing CBW secrets. Soon, Basson became the target of investigation 

from the National Intelligence Service (NIS), SADF counterintelligence, and 

the Office of Serious Economic Offenses, as well as the CIA and MI-6. The 

investigations culminated in the Steyn Report of December 1992 

De Klerk’s Efforts to Roll Back Secret SADF Projects 

When de Klerk became President in 1989, he sought to find out about the 

secret projects of the SADF, including the nuclear weapons and CBW 

programs. On 30 July 1989, President de Klerk announced formation of the 

Kahn Committee. It issued three interim reports and a final report on 19 

November 1991. Its mandate was limited: the committee considered only 

projects brought to its attention by the various state departments that were still 

operative, with a view to recommending the cancellation of covert activities 

wherever possible. Where the committee was of the opinion that projects 

should be allowed to continue, recommendations were to be made for the 

possible scaling down and, where necessary, adaptation of such projects. The 

committee was requested to ensure that projects did not benefit any particular 
45

political party or organization. Projects that were not terminated were to serve 

what was defined as “the national interest.” Such activities were said to include 

the elimination of violence, intimidation, sanctions and international isolation. 

However, the Kahn Committee, because of assurances given to De Klerk from 

Knobel and Basson that the CBW program was defensive, did not investigate 

Project Coast. 

According to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, the explanation for 

de Klerk’s lack of knowledge about the CBW program was institutional. The 

Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, was not served by a civilian Department 

of Defense that administered the SADF. Military personnel held all the top 

positions that should have been filled by civilians. Consequently, the flow of 

information was curtailed by secrecy. De Klerk claimed that Malan had kept 

information about the CBW program secret. P.W. Botha and Malan ran the 

State Security Council with no distinction between strategic and tactical levels. 

They approved projects and let the operatives proceed to carry them out as 

they saw fit. In sum, the apartheid regime had no conception of civil-military 

relations.121

After de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC and freed Mandela, he 

addressed the SADF and SAP. De Klerk stressed that the ANC was now a 

party and not the enemy. Needless to say, many in the security forces did not 

like the message. On 26 March 1990, President F.W. de Klerk was briefed by 

Surgeon General Knobel about the defensive side of the CBW program, such 

as gas masks and protective suits. Knobel informed de Klerk about work with 

lethal chemical agents, and in response, de Klerk ordered Knobel to stop work 

on the lethal agents. However, de Klerk was not provided with all of the details 

about Project Coast, especially about the offensive aspects of the CBW 

program and its use in assassination activities. The same was true with other 

SADF projects and “third force” activities.122 Only with the Steyn Report at 

the beginning of 1993, did de Klerk become aware of the skill, sophistication 
46

and offensive nature of Project Coast. 

According to General (ret.) Meiring, the CBW program was still needed 

after 1990, due to problems of crowd control and the possibility that the 

ANC/MK had CBW.123 At the same time, once de Klerk decided to roll back 

Project Coast, the process was time-consuming due to the sophistication of the 

program. Scientists and researchers had to be laid off over a period of time. 

Also, South Africa did not want to attract attention. According to Pierre Steyn, 

former Secretary of Defense, another major impediment to dismantlement was 

the bloated military that had developed throughout the 1980s. This meant that 

by the early 1990s the government faced a "situation of insubordination in the 

military by 1992.”124 In response to de Klerk’s order, intelligence procedures 

were restructured and personnel changes were made but police investigations 

were never able to flush out all the details of what was happening. Throughout 

the military, there was stonewalling. 

Proliferation and Counterproliferation 

At the beginning of 1990, the U.S., backed by Britain and Israel, issued a 

strongly worded “hostile nation warning” on rolling back the South African 

nuclear weapons program.125 With the prospect of the ANC taking power, the 

U.S., the UK and Israel did not want to see the program’s assets or secrets 

being sold to adversaries in the Middle East or elsewhere. De Klerk was 

persuaded by the ultimatum, especially as he saw no future need for nuclear 

weapons. In addition, South African officials were being forced by the U.S. to 

take a stand on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in time for the June 1990 

NPT review conference. According to Prof. Andre Buys,126 in early 1990, de 

Klerk decided to end the nuclear program. It took three years (1990-93) to 

dismantle. Documentation, diskettes and hard drives were destroyed. De Klerk 

appointed Prof. Mouton as the auditor to supervise the disarmament process. 

From 1990-93, “Operation Masada” was carried out by the government and 

involved shredding of document and destroying of hard drives relating to the 
47

nuclear weapons program and Project Coast.127

In contrast to the nuclear weapons program, no pressure was exerted in 

1989 or 1990 over the CBW program, even though the CIA released a report in 

1989 which placed South Africa on a list of countries that had developed and 

stockpiled chemical weapons. However, the main focus of concern for the 

United States and her allies was nuclear proliferation. For a brief time, 

between 1987 and August 1990, when South Africa sold the G-6 155mm gun 

and chemical warfare agents, including NGT (CR) gas, to Iraq, the United 

States became concerned about the proliferation of a conventional weapon that 

had the capability to throw “exotic” shells.128 However, there was little or no 

interest among U.S. policy and intelligence communities about possible 

proliferation threats associated with South Africa’s biological warfare 

program. The information that the CIA and MI-6 possessed was widely 

circulated or available within the Bush administration or the Thatcher/Major 

governments. This lack of interest changed in 1993, as the U.S. learned more 

about South Africa’s CBW and missile programs. Wouter Basson’s trips, 

particularly to Libya, and access to an informant, who provided the U.S. and 

allies with key details of Project Coast, increased the interest and concern of 

the United States, Great Britain and other allies. The new information led the 

U.S. and Britain to issue a demarche in April 1994. Israeli officials probably 

knew more about the program but did not want the U.S. and Britain to know 

that they were involved with it. 

According to Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion,129 as the head of SADF 

intelligence, he was asked for access to Project Coast secrets by good friends 

overseas. These included professional contacts in Germany, the U.S., 

Switzerland, and Austria. Also, top South African authorities, Generals 

Liebenberg and Meiring asked him if he could put Basson in touch with the 

right people. He refused to ask his U.S. counterparts, because he customarily 

met with them collectively and thought it would be awkward to ask. In the 
48

1980s, Thirion built a good relationship with his U.S. counterparts and 

cooperated with them in investigating the Soviet-built SA8 surface-to-air 

missile, after the SADF had captured it. He provided information about the G5 gun to American counterparts, even though ARMSCOR was on bad terms 

with the U.S. government. Thirion did not want to jeopardize his relationship 

with the U.S. by mentioning Basson. However, he did ask a Swiss agent oneon-one if he would be interested in meeting Basson. The agent replied that the 

Swiss government was indeed interested. Thirion was interested in defensive 

measures and encouraged the Swiss to put together a team of doctors and send 

them to Angola. 

In 1991, U.S. embassy officials, including the defense attaché, 

discovered that South Africa was running a CBW program at an arms show, 

including gas masks and protective suits.130 The Americans asked the South 

Africans about the CBW but elicited little response. Later, an American 

delegation was invited to visit Protechnik. By September 1991, the U.S. 

government (and not just the CIA) became aware of Basson and Project Coast 

and began to look for signs of proliferation, especially to ANC allies, such as 

Libya. 

Continued “Third Force” Activities and CBW Use 

In 1989 and the early 1990s, violence escalated inside South Africa, in spite of 

the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela. The ANC/MK reserved 

the right to resume their urban guerrilla warfare campaign, and violence 

between ANC and Inkatha supporters escalated in Kwazulu-Natal. In this 

atmosphere of violence, the Civilian Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and other 

“third force” agents intensified their murderous activities. In April 1989, the 

CCB attempted to assassinate the Reverend Frank Chikane with poison during 

a trip to Namibia.131 Another attempt was made during a trip to the U.S., where 

one doctor finally diagnosed his malady as organophosphate poisoning. 

According to the testimony of RRL scientist, Schalk Van Rensburg, to the 
49

TRC, the men who tried to kill Chikane with Parathion had poor intelligence. 

He stated, “They were counting on little (sic) forensic capability in Namibia. 

And too little was smeared over his underwear to kill him when he went to the 

U.S.”132 Chikane’s attempted assassination and several other incidents of CCB 

use illustrate the difficulties involved in using biological agents as methods of 

assassination.133 

CCB operative Petrus Jacobus Botes (who claimed to have also directed 

operations by the CCB in Mozambique and Swaziland) asserted that he was 

ordered, in May 1989, to contaminate the water supply at Dobra, a refugee 

camp located in Namibia, with cholera and yellow fever organisms. A South 

African army doctor provided them to him. In late August 1989, he led an 

attempt to contaminate the water supply. However, the attempt failed to have 

any effect because of the high chlorine content in the treated water at the 

camp.134

In May 1990, a South African newspaper, Vrye Weekblad, reported that a 

South African government covert operations unit, the CCB, employed 

biological agents against SWAPO. CCB had nearly 300 people working for it, 

and reportedly consumed about 0.28 per cent of the entire South African 

defense budget. The group had authority to operate inside South Africa and in 

neighboring countries. The CCB was disbanded at the end of 1990.135

In 1990, violence in KwaZulu-Natal and other parts of South Africa 

escalated, with assistance provided to Inkatha militants from the CCB and 

other “third force” agents. That same year, the Harms Commission 

investigated “third force” agencies, which led to the closing down of the CCB 

and Vlakplaas. As the CCB was being closed down, CCB operatives 

absconded with more than R12 million that was due to Mechem for teaching 

the CCB advanced demolition techniques.136 According to David Steward, 

these activities came as a surprise to F.W. de Klerk. In spite of the evidence, 

the 1991 Harms Commission was unable to uncover many of the secret 
50

projects and third force activities that were going on in South Africa. In early 

1992, Project Coast was still operating against the regime’s “enemies.” 

According to TRC testimony, Jan Lourens of RRL and Trevor Floyd of the 

CCB allegedly took poisoned screwdrivers to London with plan to kill ANC 

leader, Pallo Jordan and SACP/ANC military leader, Ronnie Kasrils. Basson 

allegedly developed “poison beer” to be used against South African blacks. 

Privatization, Corruption, and Drugs 

In April 1990, Minister of Defense Malan decided to privatize Roodeplaat 

Research Laboratories and Delta G, and Protechnik. Since de Klerk had made 

the decision to start rolling back Project Coast, the Ministry of Defense and 

SADF could no longer afford to sustain the three companies and their 

employees. However, the privatization proceeded with insufficient government 

oversight. In three years, Project Coast operatives pocketed state assets totaling 

more than R50 million, all for an investment of as little as R350,000, and 

attracted the attention of the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OEO). 

Among the chief beneficiaries was former Special Forces soldier Philip 

Mijburgh, nephew of Magnus Malan.137 

In July 1991, commercialization and privatization were put in motion. 

Malan ordered all research stopped by the end of August. Contracts with 

SADF were cancelled. The ownership of RRL and Delta G Scientific were 

transferred from Ministry of Defense to managers and scientists. In August 

1991, OSEO investigator Fouche testified to the TRC in 1996 that a five-year 

research contract between the SADF and Roodeplaat was canceled by the 

SADF on the same day Roodeplaat was privatized and transferred to Mijburgh 

and other colleagues in August 1991. The termination of the contract meant the 

SANDF had to pay these new owners R32.6 million in cancellation fees. In 

1992, Denel was created as the privatized production facility of ARMSCOR. 

However, ARMSCOR continued to control acquisitions and to maintain 

secrecy. 
51

In 1991, Basson began to build Merton House, a multi-million-rand 

building in Pretoria’s plush Arcadia suburb. Basson’s plan was allegedly to use 

the building as a high-class brothel. At the time the project was under 

construction, Basson claimed he was merely the middleman for a group of 

American doctors who were developing the property. This new building 

reportedly outraged local residents. Actual construction started in 1992, and 

even before the house was completed in 1993, it was up for sale for R8.5m. 

Waterson Properties built the mansion with directors Christopher Marlow, 

Tjaart Viljoen and Sam Bosch. Many important documents were allegedly 

seized from Bosch’s house shortly after Basson was arrested. Sam Bosch 

agreed to be a state witness in Basson’s 1999 criminal trial.138 

In December 1991, the Project Coast Coordinating Management 

Committee, including Knobel and Liebenberg, sent Basson to Croatia. There 

he purchased 500 kgs. of methaqualone from “renegade Croatians” (including 

high-ranking government officials) and brought it back to South Africa.139 The 

following year, benzilate and quinazolinone compounds, which were most 

difficult to develop, were acquired in Croatia. During his Croatian transactions, 

Basson “lost” $1.6 million. (TRC found that the Croatia deal was in itself 

extremely questionable, leading to a loss of millions of rand. Dr Basson 

intercepted Vatican bearer bonds to the value of $40 million that had been 

intended for the purchase of weapons by the Croatian government, leading to 

his arrest in Switzerland. Why the military was importing such large quantities 

of methaqualone at such high cost at this late stage of negotiations is not clear 

and was not adequately answered by Dr Knobel or Dr Basson. TRC questioned 

whether methaqualone was actually destroyed. 

In the early 1990s, Delta-G made a cash purchase for mercury from 

another former state-owned company, Thor Chemicals, a SADF frontcompany that was involved in the network of corporations working to provide 

materials for the covert CBW program. What this mercury was used for 
52

remains unknown. The prosecutor in the Basson trial investigated this purchase 

since mercury can also be used for the production of sassafras to produce 

Ecstasy. Others speculate that this purchase was related to the production of 

Mandrax. However, mercury produced by Thor Chemicals has also been 

linked to the mysterious nuclear substance, "Red Mercury."140

In 1992, Medchem and Delta G Scientific produced 1,000 kilograms of 

Ecstasy. The Ecstasy manufactured was, in all likelihood, encapsulated by 

Medchem Pharmaceuticals. This was a subsidiary of the holding company 

Medchem Consolidated Investments, under which Delta G Scientific also fell 

(according to TRC testimony). 

During the 1992 time period, a South African Air Force jet, which 

frequently flew abroad on top-secret missions, was allegedly carrying designer 

drugs, such as Mandrax. On this occasion, the Mandrax was for the use of a 

group of rugby enthusiasts who went to the first game between the Springboks 

and England when sporting ties were re-established. Dr. Johan Koekemoer, 

former research manager at Delta-G told this information to the Gauteng 

Attorney-General office researchers, after turning state’s evidence in Basson’s 

trial in June 1997. The reasons these drugs were frequently flown in the nose 

cone of this air force jet, while others were dumped in the sea, are unknown. 

A Chemical Weapons Attack on Mozambique? 

On 16 January 1992, a chemical warfare attack was reportedly launched on 

Mozambican troops. According to the December 20, 1992 report of Lt. 

General Pierre Steyn, the SADF, as an experimental training exercise, 

launched an attack from Komatipoort into Mozambique. A gas similar to 

teargas, causing pain and irritation, was allegedly sprayed from reconnaissance 

airplanes.141 Investigators were unable to determine the accuracy of this 

information, as the use of the Komatipoort airstrip was not regulated. After the 

incident, scientific teams from South Africa, Mozambique, Switzerland, 

Sweden, and the United Kingdom conducted a series of investigations. 
53

Military personnel from several countries also attempted to determine the 

cause of deaths of civilians in Mozambique who were suspected victims of 

CBW attacks. The reports were inconclusive. The only report that expressed a 

belief that the troops had been exposed to a chemical agent was that of the 

British scientist. These outside investigators had a great deal of difficulty 

disentangling the proximate cause of deaths since many of the victims were 

suffering from malnutrition and other diseases at the time of their death. A UN 

investigation was launched and was also unable to come to any firm 

conclusions. 142 The reported incident also raised American and British 

concerns, which helped lead to the demarche of 1994. 

According to Dr. Joynt, when the Steyn Report was leaked in 1993, it 

linked him to the reported attack on Mozambique.143 Joynt was using 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to locate mines for clearing in the Nkomati/ 

Komatipoort area. One of his planes was accused of dropping chemical agents 

on Mozambican soldiers in January 1992. After the alleged incident, 

approximately 40 soldiers were found to be acting strangely. 

Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC Defense Expert, asserts that battlefield use of 

CBW was evident with the Mozambique incident.144 A high-flying airplane 

launched a chemical attack against Mozambican soldiers on the border near 

Nkomati. The bomb exploded well above the ground. The use of CBW against 

Mozambican troops preceded the whites only referendum in 1992 and 

demonstrated the resolve of the de Klerk government. Afterwards, the UK 

Ministry of Defense, among others, sent inspectors to the site. Three teams of 

inspectors examined the site. 

Dr. Torie Pretorius believes that the SADF was carrying out an 

experiment on a chemical agent in Mozambique.145 The drone aircraft with 

yellow smoke was tested after De Klerk’s speech against secret projects in 

1990. In 1992, Bryan John Davie, who worked for Project Coast and the 

SADF Medical Service (SAMS) became part of the international verification 
54

team in Mozambique. That same year, he allegedly visited Porton Down. Now 

he is working for the ICBSW in The Hague as a BWC monitor. 

Gen. (ret.) Meiring stated that ANC/MK troops had been trained in 

CBW, and that SADF intelligence concluded that there could have been 

chemical and biological agents in Mozambique. According to Meiring, in 

January 1992, he and the Mozambican General Dias went to the hospital to 

inspect troops that had reportedly been subjected to a gas attack by SADF.146

The SADF 6th Medical Battalion found no evidence of a gas attack. The SADF 

concluded that the troops who were reportedly attacked had deserted in the 

face of a RENAMO attack. 

The Steyn Report 

The Steyn Report was the most ambitious attempt to uncover the secret 

projects of the SADF, including Project Coast, with the aim of helping to 

restore civilian control over the military. The year 1992 was a very sensitive 

period, and rapprochement between the regime and ANC was proceeding 

slowly. The behavior of the security forces was a big problem given the weak 

civilian control. All attempts at reform met with resistance. In 1990, Lt. Gen. 

Steyn was SADF Chief of Personnel and was working with Jakkie Cilliers 

(now director of the Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria) on civilian control 

of military. Together, they produced a code of conduct for SADF that was 

suppressed. Later, Lt. Gen. Steyn proposed opening the SADF to blacks, 

which would solve the National Service bottleneck, but the proposal was also 

suppressed. The problem in SADF was that traditional leaders (Malan, 

Liebenberg and others) had acquired an exalted status and were being driven 

by political convictions. Their underlings were following them blindly. In such 

a situation, a neutral code of conduct was alien. 

In mid-1992, Lt. Gen. Steyn was transferred and promoted to Chief of 

SADF staff, where he chaired staff functions and not line functions. However, 

he was in the position to control SADF programs. He worked with Roelf 
55

Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary, 1991-92. In the second half of 1992, the 

Goldstone Commission began to investigate violence in South Africa. SADF 

generals became increasingly concerned. During the investigations, Justice 

Goldstone stumbled upon damning evidence and reported directly to the 

President and not to the Cabinet or to the SADF. De Klerk was compelled to 

investigate and called Steyn to report to the Cabinet. The SADF Army Chief, 

General Meiring, and SAP General van der Merwe asked Steyn to investigate, 

and he agreed. On 18 November 1992, de Klerk appointed Lt. Gen. Steyn to 

investigate SADF secret projects, including Basson and Project Coast and 

"third force" activities that were racking the country. As a result, de Klerk 

learned of the activities of Basson, Project Coast, CCB and other covert 

units.147

SADF military procedures could not be used in the investigations, 

because the subjects of investigation were not all military personnel and 

because military procedures presupposed full cooperation from all involved. 

Instead, counterintelligence agencies were used. Upon request, President de 

Klerk made counterintelligence offices available. The only check on the 

validity of information was to utilize the National Intelligence Service (NIS) 

(later the National Intelligence Agency), headed by Dr. Barnard and Dr. 

Scholz and SADF counter-intelligence, led by Joffel van der Westhuizen, 

separately in order to confirm allegations.148 The CIA and MI6 were concerned 

and were in touch with the NIS/NIA. While the different organizations often 

had to rely upon information obtained from the same source, it was probable 

that the information that they received was valid. The NIS/NIA had been 

conducting its own intelligence operation, since 1989, investigating SADF and 

SAP secret projects. Targets for investigation included Project Coast and 

Basson, as well as Jan Lourens and Brian John Davie of Protechnik who were 

involved in the CBW experiments. According to a Weekly Mail & Guardian

account of the Steyn report the three front companies (Delta G, Roodeplaat 
56

Research Laboratories and Protechnik) were found to be involved in 

developing chemical and biological weapons.149 In 1991, SADF counterintelligence began investigating Basson after security leaks. Finally, evidence 

was found that Basson’s team had armed RENAMO with chemical weapons. 

The Steyn team quickly investigated projects that needed to be stopped. 

However, financial misdealings were not examined. Investigations went 

smoothly, until the first report was completed and issued on 20 December 

1992 and landed on de Klerk’s desk at the beginning of January 1993. De 

Klerk was asked to take action, even though there was no legal basis for 

action, no charges and no solid evidence. However, pre-emptive steps were 

necessary before a cover-up could be launched. De Klerk was presented with 

the counterintelligence evidence, which demonstrated that SADF secret 

programs ran against de Klerk’s stated policy of civilian control over the 

military. However, de Klerk failed to ask SADF Chief of Staff Liebenberg and 

SAP head van der Merwe if they knew about the illegal activities and, if they 

did not, to act concertedly. Instead, de Klerk called in Liebenberg, Meiring and 

the SADF Chief of Intelligence and informed them of the evidence. 

Liebenberg said he was “shocked” and would report back in 10 days. 

President de Klerk decided that firm and decisive action was needed, 

even though there was no conclusive evidence. In mid-January 1993, de Klerk 

called Liebenberg in again and announced that he had changed his mind and 

that he wanted to act assertively. He would fire the generals responsible for the 

CCB and other secret projects. De Klerk asked Liebenberg to ensure that the 

SADF policed itself. Subsequently, de Klerk launched another, more random 

investigation. Instead of acting against Liebenberg and van der Merwe, de 

Klerk let Liebenberg off the hook, and Liebenberg was not obliged to report 

back. De Klerk did not even confront the SAP’s van der Merwe about the 

activities of Eugene de Kock and the CCB unit of the SAP. As a result of the 

second investigation, 27 generals retired early. Col. Dr. Basson was required to 
57

leave the SADF at the end of March 1993 and was given a “soft retirement” 

and reserve status.150

By the first quarter of 1993, the sources of investigation were drying up. 

Steyn was ostracized, and there was no prosecution of SADF generals. In fact, 

some generals, such as Chris Thirion, sued the government and won. The 

Steyn Report found that Project Coast and Basson, RRL, Delta-G, Medchem, 

and SADF were all operating completely outside the purview of the civilian 

government, and the TRC confirmed these findings. According to David 

Steward, P.W. Botha was the only civilian who knew anything.151

Subsequently, the National Prosecutor’s office (Anton Ackermann and Dr. 

Torie Pretorius) took up the investigation, as evidence was laboriously dug up 

and as cases were developed against de Kock and Basson. After the Steyn and 

Goldstone Commissions, the SADF “put the shutters down.”152

According to General (ret.) Meiring, who was Army Chief of Staff, the 

“night of the generals” was based on hearsay evidence and the media.153 There 

was bad blood between the SADF and the NIS/NIA. Steyn was Acting Chief 

of SADF. He relied on unconfirmed evidence given to him by military 

intelligence and the NIS/NIA. Often, Steyn and de Klerk obtained information 

from only one source. 

The Steyn Report and the Rollback of Project Coast 

The Steyn Report found that Project Coast was offensive in nature. The SADF 

had to create an offensive CBW program in order to test defensive measures, 

and the lack of civilian control meant that the program was used as only a few 

top SADF leaders saw fit. Starting in 1985, the ANC and MK escalated their 

campaign of violence to include civilian targets, and the SADF and SAP 

retaliated by using dirty methods, including CBW. These methods persisted, 

even when efforts were made to assert civilian control, because a machine had 

been created in 1985-86. Gen. Liebenberg and Gen. Meiring, in particular, 
58

knew about SADF secret programs, including Project Coast, and took an 

assertive hand in running them. Gen. (ret.) Liebenberg signed for Project Coast 

activities and so did Surgeon General Knobel. 

De Klerk become aware of the scale, sophistication, and offensive uses 

of Project Coast at the start of 1993. Upon receiving Steyn’s report, de Klerk 

finally ordered the destruction of all lethal and incapacitating CBW agents, as 

well as research and operations and the retirement of Basson at the end of 

March 1993. In January 1993, the Minister of Defense, Kobie Coetzee, acting 

on de Klerk’s order, authorized all CBW research and development stopped 

and Project Coast documents containing formulas and experiments transferred 

to CD-ROMs. According to Kobus Bothma, in testimony at the Basson trial, 

an office secretary scanned the documents from Project Coast onto CD-ROMs. 

Philip Mijburgh transferred the CD-ROMs to the Ministry of Defense, where 

they were placed in the vaults, and President de Klerk was given a key to the 

contents, so that only the State President could open it, along with the Surgeon 

General, and Head of the NIA, Niel Barnard. Although it seemed that Project 

Coast had been rolled back, Mijburgh issued destruction documents that were 

inconclusive. While the South African government believed that it had rolled 

back Project Coast, four years later, in January 1997, police investigators 

found that Basson had taken copies of Project Coast documents home and 

hidden them in trunks. 

Whether all CBW agents were destroyed at the beginning or end of 1993 

remains a matter of opinion. Also, large quantities of drugs were unaccounted 

for and were either in possession of Basson or were secreted elsewhere. 

According to General (ret.) Meiring, all agents were dumped out to sea at the 

end of 1993. The Forensic Branch of the SAP, headed by SAP General Lothar 

Neethling, placed all agents destroyed on a schedule. The agents were dumped 

200 nautical miles south of Cape Argulhas. While lethal CBW agents were 

destroyed, the irritants, including NGT (CR) gas were kept.154 According to 
59

Knobel’s testimony to the TRC, SADF Counterintelligence destroyed all 

agents in January 1993. The methaqualone purchased in Croatia was allegedly 

destroyed then, after the order was received that work on all incapacitants 

should cease. On 7 January 1993, Knobel advised his superiors that South 

Africa “should conceal” NGT (CR) gas from the Chemical Weapons 

Convention. On 14 January 1993, South Africa acceded to the CWC. 

However, work on the dispersion of NGT (CR) gas continued.155 By March 

1993, South Africa completed the process of dismantling its six nuclear 

weapons. By the end of 1993, the South African missile program was rolled 

back. 

The order to terminate Project Coast led to the immediate transfer of 

ownership of RRL and Delta G to Project Coast managers, including Basson 

and Mijburgh. The way had been open to massive financial improprieties. The 

10 shareholders in the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories became millionaires 

overnight when the SADF closed down Project Coast at the beginning of 1993. 

Later, the SADF paid the debtors, who were the shareholders, a total of R18 

million ($18 million in 1993). However, the details of this multi-million-rand 

scam only emerged in 1996 in Parliament. This was almost a year after the 

South African National Defense Force (SANDF) had written off Project 

Coast’s debts of almost R22 million.156

According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, the process of rolling back the CBW 

Program took almost three years of commercializing the front companies and 

phasing out the scientists.157 In 1993, a forensic audit was conducted to 

determine the whereabouts of all moneys and the availability of CW and BW 

agents. The only problem that was detected was the Croatian swindle, and a 

South African agent was arrested by the Swiss government. Also in 1993, the 

Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) was investigating reports of 

financial misdealings, and General Meiring and Surgeon General Knobel 

appeared and gave testimony. They also briefed President de Klerk. 
60

In early 1993, the ANC and MK became aware of the Steyn Report and 

the CBW program.158 Another indication of the CBW program for the ANC 

was the “Red Mercury” campaign, which involved a number of high-level 

assassinations, including killings in Cape Town and the use of chemical 

compounds.159

On 31 March 1993, Basson was retired by President de Klerk from the 

SADF Medical Service (SAMS) and became a reservist. Basson had also been 

ordered to destroy Project Coast documentation. However, Basson did not 

follow, to the letter, the orders of his superiors and kept Project Coast research 

documentation alive. He was immediately employed by the government 

parastatal, Transnet, and went to Libya on contract to give advice on military 

counter-measures to CBW attack. Gen. (ret.) Meiring does not know if Basson 

gave away secrets. The U.S., especially, as well as the UK and other NATO 

countries knew about Project Coast and were worried that information would 

fall into the wrong hands. However, the U.S. and UK never knew exactly what 

South Africa possessed. 

TRANSITION TO ANC RULE, PROLIFERATION CONCERNS AND 

EFFORTS TO CONCEAL PROJECT COAST DETAILS (1994-1996) 

In the second half of 1993, negotiations between the de Klerk government and 

Nelson Mandela and the ANC gained momentum. In August 1993, the Office 

of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) informed MI-6 and the CIA of the 

misdeeds of Basson and Project Coast. The Americans and British became 

even more concerned when, in October 1993, Basson made his first trip to 

Libya on behalf of the infrastructure parastatal, Transnet, that included 

railroads and hospitals. This was the first of five visits to Libya, with his last 

visit in October 1995, and it is possible that he sold Project Coast secrets. In 

addition, South Africa submitted a Confidence Building Measure (CBM) for 

1993, as stipulated by the BWC, which provided details on the rollback of the 

biological side of Project Coast. In November 1993, the Americans and British 
61

objected to the South African CBM and began the process of interacting with 

the South African officials in an effort to see that Project Coast would be 

rolled back to their satisfaction. According to U.S. Ambassador Princeton 

Lyman, the South African CBM was not forthcoming on many aspects of the 

CBW program, including offensive uses, weaponization, and proliferation.160

According to Peter Goosen, proliferation expert in the Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, the South Africans lacked the technical expertise to submit an 

acceptable CBM and sought British and American assistance. In the meantime, 

de Klerk and his colleagues attempted to reassure the U.S. and the UK that the 

CBW program had been rolled back.161 

In January 1994, negotiations between the de Klerk government and 

Nelson Mandela and the ANC finally broke through, and elections were 

scheduled for April 27. As the momentous hand-over of power approached, the 

U.S. and UK became increasingly concerned about Basson and others 

proliferating chemical and biological warfare secrets. On 11 April 1994, the 

American Ambassador, Princeton Lyman, and the British High Commissioner, 

Anthony Reeve, delivered a demarche to President de Klerk.162 The U.S. and 

Britain demanded that their experts be briefed, that all CBW systems and 

records including the CD-ROMs be destroyed, that abuses of the program be 

investigated and reported, and that Mandela be informed. According to David 

Steward, de Klerk’s chief of staff, the American and British ambassadors 

regarded Basson as a “dangerous agent.”163

Within the American team, there were differences. Ambassador Lyman 

was primarily concerned with reducing the proliferation threat, and State 

Department and CIA officials joined him in this approach. However, officials 

from the National Security Council (NSC) were outraged by evidence of the 

use of CBW and wanted to see that those responsible were punished. 

Department of Defense officials were late in joining the U.S. team and felt 

marginalized. Consequently, they sided with the NSC. Ultimately, Ambassador 
62

Lyman was able to prevail and focus on proliferation concerns, even though 

CBW use was part of the demarche.

164

According to the former South African Surgeon General, Dr. Neil 

Knobel, de Klerk and the South Africans cooperated with the Americans and 

British.165 However, Knobel and other South African officials believed that the 

Americans and British were acting on the basis of questionable and 

uncorroborated evidence, some of which came from press reports. On 21 April 

1994, South Africa responded to the demarche and asserted that Project Coast 

records were a “national asset” and that the CD-ROMs would not be 

destroyed. According to Knobel, he and Basson were given responsibility for 

briefing the U.S. and British experts and Mandela. 

After the demarche and the inauguration of President Mandela in May 

1994, American and British delegations arrived for the first of several visits to 

South Africa. Knobel, Basson and others extensively briefed the delegations 

over a three-day period and took them on a tour of Roodeplaat Research 

Laboratories, which had been converted to commercial production. The SADF 

compiled a large file on Project Coast and gave it to the Americans and British. 

South Africa reassured the British and Americans that the three keys to gain 

access to Project Coast secrets on CD-ROM were in the hands of the President, 

Surgeon-General, and National Intelligence Agency head. The South Africans 

transferred information, which they had obtained from the Russian and Iraqi 

programs (including flesh-eating bacteria). Knobel claimed that Basson was 

offered a job and money by the U.S. and Britain but declined. Three teams 

(one from the United Nations, one Anglo-American, and one Confidence 

Building Measure team from the Geneva Conventions) investigated the 

January 1992 alleged CBW incident in Mozambique. In 1994 and 1995, 

American and British teams made more visits to South Africa to facilitate the 

rollback of the South African CBW program. 
63

Basson and his trips to Libya were the main source of contention 

between the U.S., Britain and South Africa. In spite of the demarche, Basson 

continued to visit Libya in 1994 and 1995, until he had completed five trips. 

The U.S. and UK kept up the pressure on South Africa to control Basson and 

suggested that the SANDF rehire him. Opinion on the damage done by Basson 

varies. According to Tom Mangold and Adams,166 there is no doubt that 

Basson was originally invited to Libya to help them with chemical warfare 

facilities at Rabta. General (ret.) Meiring believed that Basson did not pass 

secret information on the CBW program to the Libyans or to other foreign 

governments. However, he gave them other information and defensive CBW 

techniques. There was still secrecy about how the knowledge was passed. 

Meiring stressed that Basson was always under instructions, and there was 

nothing that went unnoticed by the SADF. 

According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, much of the information for Project 

Coast was obtained from the nationals of the U.S., Britain, and Germany; 

highly technical advanced knowledge passed from Americans, Britons, and 

Germans to the South Africans. The South African government did not want to 

cause the American and British governments embarrassment by revealing that 

fact. Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. State Department proliferation expert, 

and his British counterpart had led teams that examined Project Coast 

documents in 1994. The range of pathogens that were developed led to the 

American claim that South Africa had the “second most sophisticated program 

next to the Soviets.” While there was no evidence that South African scientists 

themselves had genetically modified pathogens to create new ones, there was 

evidence that Project Coast had obtained the pathogens from elsewhere. In 

addition, from 1989-93, the South African military had the capability to launch 

or deliver a nuclear or CBW payload. 

On 18 August 1994, Knobel briefed President Mandela, Defense 

Minister Modise and his deputy, Ronnie Kasrils. The SANDF also provided a 
64

large file on Project Coast. Before April 1994 and the elections, Mandela was 

only getting sketchy details from de Klerk about what was developed, 

according to senior ANC officials. Within the ANC, there was a debate, from 

1990-94, about whether to keep the nuclear program. However, the conclusion 

to roll back the CBW program was unanimous. According to the Dr. Ian 

Phillips, the ANC wanted to know where the information about the CBW 

program had disappeared. The ANC believes that people who are now living in 

the Middle East as well as the U.S. and Britain sold many of Project Coast’s 

secrets to foreign sources. 

 Despite these internal differences and uncertainties, the policies of the 

new South African government included a strong commitment to promoting 

non-proliferation norms and treaties. Prior to signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1994, former head of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 

Roelof “Pik” Botha, sought and got repeated assurances from Surgeon General 

Knobel and the Department of Defense that South Africa no longer had a 

biological warfare program. He repeated asked for clarification on this point as 

he had to give assurances that South Africa had destroyed its CBW program 

before signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March 1994.167

Lt. Gen. Steyn briefed Mandela, after his inauguration, on the findings of 

the Steyn Report. Mandela agreed not to release the Steyn Report due to 

concerns it might jeopardize the transition process. All parties, including 

Mandela’s office, Vice-President F.W. de Klerk, and two attorney generals, 

who had access to the information in the report, kept the report under wraps for 

more than two years. In 1997, The Weekly Mail and Guardian reported that 

President Mandela had been in possession of the Steyn Report since 1994. 

However, presidential liaison Parks Mankahlana denied that Mandela had a 

copy but confirmed that Steyn had briefed the president. The difficulties that 

de Klerk had in ensuring that his order to dismantle the CBW programs and a 

widespread tendency to stonewall the politicians were highly salient 
65

experiences for the military leadership appointed by Mandela. These 

experiences figured prominently in the mind of the new Secretary of Defense, 

Pierre Steyn, and others who were the first leaders of the new Office of 

Secretary of Defense (OSD). They believed that a combined headquarters, led 

by civilians, was critical for developing a professional and fully integrated new 

South African National Defense Force (SANDF). An important mission of the 

newly created OSD from the start was to put in place oversight and accounting 

procedures that would make it impossible for SANDF personnel to engage in 

the type of fraud and abuses associated with Project Coast.168 In 1995, 

according to Dr. Ian Phillips, the establishment of a Defense Department with 

the assistance of the U.S. and UK cleared up the problem of military 

dominance and the “security state.” The 1994 Defense Act created better 

structural differentiation and civilian control. The Mandela government had to 

find a way to implement the Defense Act in a piece-meal fashion, after it had 

been found to be unconstitutional, due to certain clauses. 

In November 1994, the Office for Serious Economic Offenses, a special 

unit attached to the Attorney General’s department, completed an official 

report on the activities and financial irregularities of a network of companies 

that supplied the SADF with pharmaceuticals and anti-chemical warfare 

equipment (i.e., Project Coast). The report was sent to Justice Minster Dullah 

Omar. The report was marked top secret and the minister was reported to be 

studying it.169 One researcher in the Attorney General’s office reported 

studying Project Coast in early 1993. Jan Swanepoel, head of the OSEO 

confirmed to The Weekly Mail and Guardian that the company network was 

under investigation in connection with “flow of funds connected with an army 

project.” A report in The Sunday Tribune in December 1994 described the 

network of companies working with SADF on biological and chemical 

warfare. They named the key directors of this network under investigation as 

Dr. Wouter Basson, Dr. Wynand Swanepoel, and Dr. Phillip Mijburgh (a 
66

nephew of Magnus Malan) and noted that all three had served in SADF’s 

medical service (SAMS). The Weekly Mail and Guardian reported, from 

correspondence between Basson and Mijburgh, that they were researching the 

legal aspects of CBW. The same newspaper also reported that SADF military 

officials used the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 

facilities to obtain and develop different strains of germs, some of which were 

highly toxic to humans.170

One week before an article in The Weekly Mail and Guardian, 

ARMSCOR acknowledged at the end of 1994 that it owned Protechnik, a 

chemical warfare research plant. Protechnik described itself as the biggest 

nuclear, biological and chemical laboratory in Africa. It was officially 

designed to develop only defensive equipment against chemical weapons. 

However, its operations stirred protests (and continue to do so) in the Pretoria 

metropolitan area, especially due to fears of accidents. By the end of 1994, 

more information about the CBW program was emerging from several sources. 

They included an investigation by a team from the Attorney General’s office 

and reports in The Sunday Tribune, and The Weekly Mail and Guardian, based 

on their independent investigations. Reports emerged of experiments at SADF 

research firms, including some bizarre experiments involving dogs.171 

In 1995, Basson’s trips to Libya continued. In February 1995, an article 

appeared in The Times of London on possible South African CBW links to 

Libya. Evidently, someone in MI-6 tipped off the Times. In March 1995, the 

CIA and DIA informed President Clinton of Basson’s activities, who 

authorized the sending of a delegation to South Africa, which met with 

Mandela. It is not certain if the delegation met with Basson or if was he in 

Libya. Once again, the Americans urged the Mandela government to bring 

Basson under control by rehiring him. On 15 April 1995, South Africa 

submitted a much-revised Confidence Building Measure (CBM). This was 

nearly two years after the U.S. and UK challenged the 1993 CBM (no CBM 
67

was submitted in 1994). This time U.S. and UK objections were addressed 

satisfactorily. Even so, the Americans and British continued to share concerns 

about proliferation of the secrets on the CD-ROMs by Basson and others. 

In May 1995, Defense Minister Modise and Secretary of Defense Pierre 

Steyn rehired Basson as a regular SANDF surgeon (he had been on reserve 

status). In early 1995, Generals Meiring and Knobel sat down and discussed 

Basson, after receiving information from NIA, CIA, and MI-6. Basson had 

been asked by government and SANDF officials to curb his behavior, but there 

was no way to do so, except to rehire him. Meiring and Knobel went to Deputy 

Minister of Defense Ronnie Kasrils and urged that Basson be rehired.172

Kasrils went to Modise and Steyn and recommended the same. Later, Kasrils 

defended the government’s action in rehiring Basson, by saying it was to stop 

him from giving valuable and potentially dangerous secrets about the chemical 

and biological warfare programs to other countries.173 Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC 

defense expert, said that Basson was rehired in order to bring him under 

parliamentary scrutiny at a time when no legislation was in place that could 

stop his activities.174 Evidently, great concern existed within the government, 

the SANDF, and among foreign governments about the possibility that Basson 

was selling Project Coast secrets. Even after being rehired by SANDF, Basson 

made another, albeit his final, trip to Libya in October 1995.175

A U.S. government lawsuit in Philadelphia against ARMSCOR created 

tense relations with the U.S. This hampered U.S. investigators in exploring 

possible ARMSCOR involvement in chemical and biological weaponization. 

However, overall U.S. relations with the Mandela government remained 

reasonably sound, and the investigations into Project Coast concluded 

satisfactorily. Finally, in October 1996 Vice Presidents Mbeki and Gore 

worked out an agreement so that ARMSCOR could plea bargain at a meeting 

of the US-South African Bi-national Commission. In early 1997, the Defense 

Committee and Modese signed the agreement in July 1997. 
68

In February 1996, the Mandela cabinet finally acted on the OSEO report, 

after 16 months of keeping it secret. This ruling gave OSEO investigators 

permission to follow the flow of funds overseas but did not agree to the request 

made by the Justice Ministry that the secrecy on the project, regulated by the 

Protection of Information Act, be lifted. However, no one was charged 

immediately, and Project Coast’s debts of R22 million had already been 

written off by the SANDF. In May, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on 

Public Accounts began its own investigations. However, this committee and a 

special parliamentary committee on Project Coast encountered resistance from 

SANDF chief, General Georg Meiring, who refused to release information 

about the CBW program.176 Even though parliamentary committee sessions 

were held in camera, members were unable to learn many details about Project 

Coast. In August 1996, the special committee finally questioned Basson’s 

involvement with the privatization of RRL. Since this was almost a year after 

Project Coast’s debts had been written off, it indicated how weak 

parliamentary oversight was in practice. 

The difficulties encountered by parliamentary committees to hear details 

of the military involvement in Project Coast reflects a transitional agreement 

reached by cabinet members of the Government of National Unity (GNU). The 

agreement, endorsed by President Mandela and his deputy presidents, Thabo 

Mbeki and F.W. de Klerk, supported General Meiring’s position that details of 

Project Coast should remain secret and that an earlier cabinet decision to lift 

the secrecy from the project did not apply. This decision in part reflected a 

concern that full disclosure might compromise ongoing criminal investigations. 

Mandela’s spokesman, Parks Mankahlana explained in confirming Mandela’s 

support for Meiring’s position that, “an overall lifting can be considered once 

the OSEO investigation is over.... There is no intention to impose permanent 

secrecy on the matter.” 177 The decision to withhold was taken due to concerns 

of the GNU, the new SANDF leadership, and former SADF generals, as well 
69

as the U.S., Great Britain, and other countries, that full public disclosure, either 

in parliament or in the TRC hearings, could pose a serious threat to domestic 

security. Foreign governments were also concerned that highly sensitive 

information might be leaked. Concerns about the fragile political situation that 

prevailed in South Africa and the possible reactions by the public or 

paramilitary groups to complete disclosure of Project Coast was a genuine 

source of concern of many South African politicians in the government and 

several interested foreign governments during this period.178

BASSON’S ARREST AND TRIAL AND TRC HEARINGS (1997-2000) 

Revelations and Roadblocks during the Truth & Reconciliation Hearing 

on Project Coast after Basson’s Arrest in 1997 

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 

established at the end of 1995 when Nelson Mandela officially appointed the 

Chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Dr. Alex Boraine, ViceChairperson, and 17 TRC Commissioners. The mandate of the Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission required full disclosure and transparency about the 

past actions of current and past government officials. In December 1996, 

Mandela’s office, for the first time, provided the TRC with a copy of the Steyn 

Report, so it could be investigated more fully. At the time, the TRC officials 

said that the information could not be released, because much of it was in the 

form of “untested allegations.”179

The TRC was “a political compromise born out of the negotiated 

settlement between a minority government and the liberation movements.” It 

was “a compromise between those who wanted an apartheid war crimes trial 

and those who demanded blanket amnesty for those who had killed, tortured 

and committed political crimes during the apartheid era.”180 The Commission 

tackled four tasks: 1) to reveal the truth about the period between 1960 and 

1994 in order to understand how the apartheid system developed and endured; 

2) to provide a forum for thousands of victims; 3) to consider what 
70

compensation victims deserved; and 4) to consider amnesty applications. After 

an investigative stage and a series of hearings, the TRC issued a final report in 

1998.181

From the outset there were limits imposed on the scope of the TRC’s 

investigations by its legal mandate, subsequent rulings of the executive branch, 

and political considerations, as well as ties to the fragile status quo that 

prevailed in the first years after the transition and time constraints. The TRC 

process has been criticized from several different quarters. Some have charged 

that the process was hopelessly naive from the beginning. Others have cited 

the lack of personnel with experience working in the military or intelligence 

community as a fatal flaw that limited the Commission’s ability to uncover the 

truth about past atrocities.182 However, the temper of the times and its legal 

mandate called for the body to primarily focus on uncovering past atrocities 

and promoting reconciliation. This mandate shaped the questions, procedures 

and personnel who worked as investigators and lawyers for the Commission. 

Moreover, TRC lawyers were required by law to protect the civil liberties of 

South African citizens who were accused of past wrongdoing, while ensuring 

that no one was above the law. These requirements meant that the TRC 

process was extremely slow and time-consuming. 

From the start the TRC investigation into Project Coast was limited by 

Ministry of Defense restrictions, designed to ensure that the investigation did 

not became a "fishing expedition.” TRC investigators worked closely with 

military intelligence and representatives of other agencies, as TRC 

investigators were sensitive to the needs of several ongoing criminal 

investigations and national security concerns. “National security” proved to be 

the major constraint on the scope of the hearings. Time was also a limiting 

factor, as Basson’s lawyers engaged in a series of stall tactics that delayed his 

appearance until the closing days of TRC hearings. Thus, a number of 

questions about this project remained unanswered at the time the TRC 
71

investigation phase ended. 

Initially, TRC investigators had little information about Project Coast. A 

top-secret briefing to a few commission members in 1996 revealed only that 

South Africa had a CBW capacity in the past, but only a “defensive” one, and 

that it was dismantled prior to the 1994 elections. The TRC continued with 

low-level investigations, but had so little information at their disposal that it 

seemed unlikely that anything new would emerge.183

This expectation changed suddenly in January 1997 when Basson was 

arrested during a sting operation on charges of fraud and the possession of 

illegal substances based on his alleged effort to sell 1,000 Ecstasy tablets.184 A 

subsequent search of Basson’s friend and business associate, Sam Bosch’s 

home, uncovered five or six trunks and a couple of suitcases that contained 

secret documents related to Project Coast that were thought to have been 

destroyed when the CBW program was dismantled. 

The senior TRC researcher, Dr. Villa-Vicencia, rushed to Pretoria after 

Basson was arrested in order to represent the TRC. He was joined by Mike 

Kennedy, the representative of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and 

representatives from the Office of Serious Economic Activities, and the 

Gauteng Attorney-General’s Special Investigation Team. Together they went 

through the contents of these trunks. After some initial squabbling, an 

agreement was reached that the NIA would take control and responsibility for 

keeping these documents secure. Before the documents were turned over to the 

NIA, the contents of the trunks were inventoried. 185 These documents 

contained the core of information, which formed the basis of the TRC’s 

investigative work over the next 18 months. The TRC called in Professor Peter 

Folb, University of Cape Town, to serve as their scientific and technical 

adviser. 

In March 1998, Chandre Gould, another TRC investigator who had 

access to the documents, and the TRC’s Commissioner, Wendy Orr, looked at 
72

some of the technical documents that had been found in Basson’s trunks. 

Gould wanted an explanation of some of the pharmaceutical and medical 

terminology. Orr was horrified by what she did understand, even though there 

was much that she did not understand in the contents. One of the first 

documents Dr. Orr examined was the infamous verkope lys (shopping or sales 

list).186 The senior TRC investigator, Villa-Vicencia, concluded that the trunks 

contained a “mixed bag” that included memorabilia, as well as sensitive 

technical information, which might prove embarrassing to foreign 

governments, as well as information readily available in open source literature 

(e.g., formulas for methaqualone and how to build a bomb). He felt that 

collectively, these documents confirmed the idea that South Africa’s biological 

weapons program had developed some very sophisticated processes and 

procedures.187

The beginning months of 1997 were the start of a period of 

unprecedented public disclosures by South African newspapers. A wide range 

of the government’s most sensitive information about past activities continued 

to leak and be reported by the press throughout the TRC deliberations. Thus, 

despite the fact that many Project Coast hearings were held behind closed 

doors, the public heard much of this testimony in an almost daily stream of 

revelations. Many of these articles revealed details about the scope of Project 

Coast activities and efforts by past officials to use CBW against political 

enemies. 

During this period TRC investigators were discovering “pockets of secret 

documents” that were supposed to be destroyed by former SAP, SADF 

intelligence and prison authorities but had not been shredded. As TRC 

investigators conducted spot checks of police stations in six different areas, 

they found a wealth of information contained in residual documents that were 

never destroyed.188 

The Project Coast hearings were scheduled to take place from 8 to 12 
73

June 1998. However, several weeks before these hearings started the Gauteng 

Attorney General expressed concerns that the appearance of key witnesses at 

these hearings might jeopardize their impending criminal prosecutions. 

Defense, NIA and representatives of President Mandela's Office all supported 

the position that much of information must remain classified, including 

information about SA collaboration with foreign countries, as it would pose a 

proliferation threat. Several members of the SANDF lobbied to not hold the 

hearings at all. 

At a hastily called meeting of representatives of various agencies at the 

end of May 1998, two main objections were raised. One objection to the TRC 

hearings was that information disclosed during these hearings could lead to the 

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that would cause South Africa to 

violate its international obligations. A second concern was that revelations of 

the involvement of various foreign governments in the CBW program could 

jeopardize international relations. South African government officials told the 

participants that Britain and the U.S. had voiced the strongest objections to the 

hearings. 189 Dr. Peter Folb, the TRC’s scientific adviser, disagreed with the 

official assessment during this meeting, “because much of the science involved 

in Project Coast was pedestrian.”190

The compromise that was reached was to have a small group of 

representatives from the meeting go through every document in the TRC’s 

possession and decide together which could be placed in the public domain at 

the hearing. Commissioner Orr, Dr. Folb, and TRC investigators Gould and 

Jerome Chaskalson represented the TRC. Knobel, his lawyers, NIA officials, 

and other SANDF members, represented the government. Documents were 

placed into one of three categories: (1) no restrictions (i.e., ones to be referred 

to in the hearing and released to the media); (2) ones to be referred to but not 

released; and, (3) those that would not be mentioned at all. 

The President’s office did not accept the TRC’s decision to hold the 
74

public hearings and issued an application to have section 33 (c) invoked, which 

would require that the hearing be held behind closed doors. Thabo Mbeki’s 

legal adviser and Abdul Minty, Chairperson of the Council for the NonProliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, formally presented the request 

for a closed hearing.191 After extensive discussions, the TRC went ahead with 

open hearings with the understanding that a government representative would 

monitor the proceedings to ensure that no proliferation or diplomatically 

embarrassing information was released. This agreement meant that the 

hearings were bogged down with legal motions and delays from the first day. 

On the first day of the hearing Dr. Knobel, accompanied by his lawyer, 

passed out several documents marked “top secret” to the media. These 

documents were subsequently recalled on the ground that they had not yet 

been cleared through the proper declassification channels. Months later, an 

unlucky Swiss journalist was detained at the South African airport and thrown 

in jail overnight when he was found leaving the country with classified 

documents from the first days of the TRC hearings. Dr. Folb, TRC senior 

expert technical adviser, was no longer allowed access to these materials, 

including his own memos, written for the TRC.192 

Legal wrangling delayed Basson’s appearance before the TRC until the 

last day of the hearings. However, scientists in charge of Project Coast projects 

did appear. Basson only testified after he was declared in contempt of a TRC 

citation and his lawyers had exhausted a lengthy appeals process. His Supreme 

Court application that he not be forced to testify before the TRC, due to his 

constitutional right not to incriminate himself, was turned down on 27 July 

1998. The TRC’s final closing date for non-amnesty hearings was 31 July, and 

legal wrangling meant that Basson did not take the stand until the last day. He 

did not reveal any new information and sidestepped most questions. The 

hearings ended with many questions unanswered. 

Although Basson used legal delaying tactics, the threat of criminal 
75

penalties did finally force him to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation 

Commission (TRC). Even though his TRC testimony was of little value, 

several individuals who had worked for Basson started to reveal many more 

details about the covert programs in their testimony in an effort to obtain TRC 

amnesty and immunity in future legal proceedings. The scientists began to talk 

to authorities about what CBW weapons and knowledge were developed, how 

the knowledge and weapons were used, and even some details about what was 

sold after the 1994 elections.193 Other individuals, such as Dr. Johan 

Koekemoer, former research manager of Delta-G, was arrested for being in 

possession of the designer drug Ecstasy and agreed to testify against Basson. 

The public also heard about the extensive misappropriation of public funds. 

Disclosures from the TRC had international ramifications. In response to 

testimony at the TRC hearings in June 1998, the British Military Intelligence 

(MI5) and police reopened files on six people who had died in Britain during 

the 1980s and 1990s of apparent strokes or heart attacks. The re-opened 

investigations were initiated to explore which of these deaths might have been 

murders related to South Africa’s secret germ warfare program. These 

investigations required unprecedented amounts of cooperation between South 

African and British intelligence services. The dead individuals had all worked 

in Britain against the apartheid regime, or had knowledge of Pretoria’s secret 

operation in the 1980s to acquire and develop chemical and biological 

weapons, at the time of their death in Great Britain.194

Despite the limited knowledge obtained from Basson at the TRC, these 

hearings played a critical role in opening up secret government activities. The 

TRC hearings on Project Coast opened "a window on the house of horrors" to 

public scrutiny and let public know much more about what went on during 

apartheid era. These disclosures in turn, helped to stimulate a national 

dialogue that was designed to allow the nation to start to heal. 195 These 

disclosures also established an important precedent ensured that South Africa’s 
76

most important post-1994 trial involving national security issues would be 

open rather than closed to the public. 

Wouter Basson’s Bail Hearing: The Role of NGOs and the Press in 

Ensuring Public Disclosure 

In August 1998, Basson was charged on 17 counts including murder, 

conspiracy to commit murder, fraud, and the possession of and dealing in, 

illegal substances. Why Basson had stolen them and kept them in his garage, 

just waiting to be discovered, is not clear. Dr. Daan Goosen, former managing 

director at RLL (until he complained that the program was out of control and 

was forced to resign), claimed that Basson kept the documents in order to have 

something of value (he was unable to replicate the knowledge on his own) and 

because he was possibly blackmailing people for protection. 196 Others 

expressed concern that he kept the documentation in order to be able to sell it 

to foreign governments (e.g., Libya) to maintain his lavish life style after 

stepping down as head of Project Coast. 

Efforts to understand Basson’s motives were complicated by the secrecy 

required by an ongoing criminal investigation and due to the government’s 

desire to keep further details of Project Court from being disclosed. 

Immediately after Basson’s arrest at the beginning of 1997, his defense 

attorney claimed that the NIA had kidnapped him. NIA's response was that 

they were holding him in protective custody due to numerous death threats. 

Basson's attorney’s submitted a 60-page bail application. Basson was 

eventually released. He went back to work at One Military Hospital in 

Pretoria. He works there when his court case is not in session. The South 

African government has been paying his legal costs. As of August 2000, 

Basson’s legal fees since his arrest in 1997 had cost the State 4 million rand 

(over half a million U.S. dollars).197

Basson's bail hearing and related legal proceedings were closed to the 
77

public. The State was operating on the assumption that the legal proceedings 

would remain closed to the public throughout much or all of the anticipated 

18-month criminal trial. This situation triggered a two-year legal effort by a 

non-governmental organization (NGO), the Freedom of Expression Institute 

(FIX), to make Basson's bail application open to the public. FIX filed a legal 

petition in 1997, after receiving a request from two newspapers, The Sunday 

Times and Mail & Guardian, to do something about the closed legal 

proceedings. FIX filed an application with the Magistrate Court as the sole 

plaintiff, because legal glitches precluded the two newspapers from filing as 

plaintiffs.198

The State's position was that the bail application contained information 

negative for South Africa’s foreign relations in three categories: 1) names of 

individuals who had not been charged; 2) names of countries mentioned in the 

bail application; and, 3) the names of local people involved in Basson’s 

business dealings. The Ministry of Justice insisted that the last category be 

kept secret, because to do otherwise would compromise ongoing criminal 

investigations. A second argument used by the State was similar to those heard 

during earlier efforts to keep the TRC’s Project Coast hearings closed, to wit 

that information in the bail application would be in violation of the NonProliferation Treaty that South Africa had ratified and promised to uphold. 

NIA argued that classified information should not be released until it had gone 

through the normal declassification process. 

FIX countered that much of this information was no longer secret, since 

it had already been made public by the TRC. They also noted that several 

reporters already had full transcripts from the hearings and had used this 

information in published press reports. On the day that the Regional Magistrate 

of Pretoria heard the bail request, several reporters were in the court until the 

Court went into camera session. FIX, now joined by several news 

organizations and an independent journalist, appealed to the Supreme Court. 
78

To support their position that much of the information in the bail hearing was 

already in the public domain, FIX prepared and presented a summary of the 

TRC hearings that included all information that had already been disclosed to 

the public.199 

The Supreme Court ruled that most sessions of Basson's upcoming trial 

would be held in public. An agreement was reached among the parties to the 

legal action that the bail application, with only a few deletions related to 

potential defendants in future legal cases, would be made public. When the 

Basson's trial opened on 4 October 1999, the room was filled with South 

African and foreign reporters. The result was a flurry of press reports during 

the opening days of the trial. However, as the drama of the opening sessions 

waned, few reporters bothered to show up to cover the trial on a daily basis. 

The verbatim transcripts of the trial are recorded in Afrikaans and few 

individuals outside of court officials can afford the high cost of these 

transcripts.200 Most of the major South African newspapers are not giving this 

case a high priority because they feel it is no longer newsworthy among a 

public suffering from “TRC fatigue.” This means that only a few local papers 

are sending reporters, while the larger ones only send reporters when there is a 

high profile witness. Only one independent reporter who works for a South 

African NGO, the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) has been taking notes 

of daily proceedings. 

The CCR has posted weekly and monthly summaries of the Basson trial 

on their web site, several weeks after the proceedings have been held. The 

summaries have become the primary continuous record of the case. South 

African and international observers must now rely on a single source for most 

of their information on perhaps the most important case under the new 

constitution. It has become evident that the CCR is developing a sense of 

ownership of what is obviously public information. The presence of additional 

NGOs would produce a broader and freer flow of information. 
79

The limited news coverage of the Basson case continued, even when the 

trial took the unprecedented step of shifting its venue to Jacksonville, Florida 

in September 2000. This unusual move was taken in order to hear evidence 

from American witnesses, including Basson’s accountant, David Webster. 

However, no English-speaking national newspaper or international wire 

service covered the story.201

Several other aspects of the legal wrangling over the Basson bail 

application and subsequent court case may have relevance for those interested 

in promoting non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and democracy 

worldwide. It is notable that the move to open the Basson legal process to the 

public was taken by an NGO, with a small staff of 4-6 individuals. The past 

and current senior administrators of FIX are highly experienced civil 

libertarian activists, who worked for years against the apartheid regime in 

well-known NGOs.202 NGOs continue to play a useful watchdog role of 

criticizing governmental actions that may be placing unnecessary limitations 

on the rights of individuals in the new South Africa.203 Even the prosecutor in 

the Basson hearing, while downplaying the importance of this legal action in 

light of what has come out in public court, acknowledged that it was an 

important test of individual guarantees included in the new constitution.204

From the State’s perspective, the legal action took up too much of their 

time during two critical months when they were also trying to finish their 

criminal investigations of Basson. The prosecution had opposed publicizing 

the bail account because they wanted to continue investigating murder charges 

without publicity. They supported the NIA position that all documents should 

go through standard declassification procedures. In camera sessions of 

Basson’s bail hearing, the State argued that holding court proceedings in 

public would endanger national security and individual lives. The prosecution 

noted that the publicity surrounding the bail hearing had made the job of 

convicting Basson much more difficult. The trial judge had excluded a large 
80

number of documents during the opening sessions of the trial that had been 

introduced during in camera sessions of the bail hearing on similar national 

security grounds that the prosecution had used.205 The pre-trial legal 

proceedings in the Basson case underscored the well-known democratic 

dilemma that protection of civil liberties and the right to free speech often 

make the prosecution’s job more difficult. However, in a society in the midst 

of a democratic transition and without historical norms supporting a strong 

independent judiciary and the right of the public and press to have access to 

information about the government, the fact that this dilemma was allowed to 

play out through the courts must be significant. 

The Basson Trial: 1999-Present206

The Basson trial promises to be one of the longest and most complicated trials 

in South African legal history. Basson was initially charged with multiple 

counts of fraud, murder, conspiracy to murder and possession of drugs 

(Ecstasy, Mandrax and cocaine). However, the trial was quickly halted by 

objections presented by his lawyers. In hindsight, the most important objection 

raised by the defense related to conspiracy to murder charges against Basson 

for the poisoning of 200 SWAPO prisoners of war in a Namibian detention 

camp and his alleged involvement in the murder of five other SWAPO 

members in Namibia. The defense argued that that there was no precedent 

under South African law to charge citizens for actions in other countries and 

that a general amnesty issued on the eve of Namibian independence in 1989 

protected all South African police and military members from criminal 

prosecution prior to that date.207 By the second week of the trial, it had become 

clear that the prosecution would experience serious difficulties in their efforts 

to win a conviction against Basson on murder charges. When the trial resumed, 

the presiding judge, Willie Hartzenberg, ruled that six of the eight 

murder/conspiracy to murder charges against Basson had to be withdrawn on 

the grounds that the Criminal Procedure Act did not allow prosecution in a 
81

South African court for crimes committed in another country. He also ruled 

that Basson was indemnified from prosecution by the Namibian amnesty. The 

judge’s decision to throw out these murder charges was a serious blow to the 

prosecutions case, since the five murder charges were the only ones that placed 

Basson at the scene of the crime.208 These rulings meant that the prosecution 

would not be able to present accounts of the CCB’s policies or methods of 

operations, which might have helped in proving Basson’s motives in the 

remaining 14 murder/attempted murder charges. 

The prosecutors were surprised by this ruling and have acknowledged 

that these rulings hurt the State’s case. The ruling was surprising, because the 

same prosecutors had used a similar approach in presenting evidence in an 

earlier case against Eugene de Kock, the former head of the CCB. In the de 

Kock case, the defense had not challenged the prosecutors’ evidence. 

However, the Basson case is very different from that of de Kock where the 

prosecution was able to obtain the cooperation of most of de Kock’s 25 

subordinates who testified against their former commanding officer. Dr. Torie 

Pretorius felt that another important difference was the fact that he (Pretorius) 

had a close working relationship with local authorities and criminal 

investigators working for the Goldstone Commission in obtaining four 

witnesses for 100 of the 176 murders counts against de Kock. What Pretorius 

learned from this experience was that the State would not win with only one 

cooperative co-conspirator, because the South African legal system was not set 

up to take on the old military establishment. In Basson’s case, there are no 

multiple witnesses who can implicate Basson in specific murders. As Dr. 

Pretorius explained, “Basson was the only common denominator” in most of 

these conspiracy/murders. The lack of evidence explains why the State did not 

charge any of Basson’s superiors. According to Dr. Pretorius, the lesson to be 

learned for prosecutors attempting to win conspiracy/murder cases involving 

CBW use is that the prosecutor must be at the murder scene as soon as 
82

possible and have a close working relationship with investigators on the 

ground.209 

The prosecution did not appeal the judge’s rulings regarding amnesty or 

murders that occurred outside South Africa. Instead, Prosecutor Anton 

Ackerman emphasized, after Basson had pleaded guilty to 61 charges, that 

most of these charges could not be considered apartheid crimes since they 

related to Basson’s self enrichment schemes. Other witnesses have testified 

how Basson was the central figure in an international sales and procurement 

network that included arms deals involving the Libyan and Pakistani 

governments and drug deals. Several additional witnesses testified to Basson’s 

involvement in manufacturing drugs and to his luxurious lifestyle. 

Basson’s financial dealings were extremely complex throughout the 10 

years of Project Coast. The prosecution’s charge sheet covering illegal money 

transactions runs several hundreds pages. The entire indictment spans two 

volumes. However, despite the complexity of these financial arrangements and 

the technical nature of many of the charges involving biological agents and 

chemical substances, the judge in this case did not exercise his option under 

South African law of calling upon his own expert assessors.210

During the sixth week of the trial the judge ruled that the State would not 

be allowed to use the record of Basson’s bail proceeding in the interest of 

national security. The judge also issued several additional rulings that 

criticized the procedures used by OSEO investigators in their dealings with 

Basson. During the 10th week of the trial, Prosecutor Ackerman submitted a 

request for adjournment to permit the Director of Public Prosecutions time to 

study the trial transcript and decide whether or not to request that Judge 

Harzenberg recuse himself from the case. This motion caused a great deal of 

controversy and delayed the trial for several weeks. When the trial resumed, 

Ackerman argued that South Africa law required a judge to be impartial, and 

that Judge Hartzenberg had shown bias on several counts. These included his 
83

rulings excluding evidence, his timing on ruling the inadmissibility of the 

record of Basson’s bail application, and by denying the prosecution sufficient 

time to research jurisdiction issues. Hartzenberg, who under South African law 

rules on the recusal request, dismissed it on the grounds that it was “frivolous, 

mind-boggling, absurd and ‘unfounded in its totality.’”211 

This was the first of several delaying events, including Ackerman’s 

absence from the trial for several weeks. Periodic bomb threats, which started 

in the sixth week of the trial, caused additional delays. These delays may be 

indicative of the types of judicial problems that can be expected when the 

judicial system of a new political order attempts to implement criminal charges 

against individuals who managed covert CBW programs. The prosecutors have 

requested but have not yet seen the information on the CD-ROMs related to 

the BW program that is currently held by the President. The prosecutors are 

still waiting for a reply to their request to see this information from the 

Ministry of Justice. The prosecution’s position is that all information should be 

declassified, even if it may endanger national security, if the information can 

be used to prove murder. While the prosecution remains convinced that they 

have enough evidence of fraud and abuse to convict Basson on multiple 

charges, others are beginning to wonder if the odds makers 

who are now betting that “Dr Death” will not be convicted of any criminal 

penalties or financial fines might be right. 

Implications of the Basson Trial to Date 

The Basson trial to date illustrates some of the difficulties involved in criminal 

proceedings against individuals who were involved in covert CBW programs 

with extensive international linkages in national courts. Based on the recovered 

stolen documents, the prosecution is convinced that Basson established his 

own procurement network that included a large number of diverse individuals 

worldwide (e.g., Heyndrickx, Webster, Ford). However, the prosecution has 
84

faced a number of obstacles in marshalling the evidence needed to prove that 

these actions constituted criminal acts. First, the prosecution had to obtain 

permission and funding from their government to undertake international 

investigations. Next, the prosecution had to win permission from federal and 

state authorities in the United States before they were able to examine relevant 

documents related to Basson’s transactions that were held by his American 

auditor, David Webster. They then had to attempt to penetrate a web of 

complex dealings, since Webster, not Basson, was the Chief Executive of 

many of Basson’s international holding corporations. Recently, the trial had to 

travel to Jacksonville, Florida in order to obtain the sworn statements of 

Americans they believe helped Basson to defraud the government because 

these foreign nationals had refused to return to South Africa voluntarily to 

testify. 

The prosecution also had to send process servers to Canada to subpoena 

two former doctors who had worked on Project Coast in order to force them to 

appear in court. They, like many other doctors, scientists and former Special 

Forces officers with knowledge about Project Coast, had already emigrated 

from South Africa. In other cases, potential witnesses were never located. 

Even in cases where key South African witnesses were still living in the 

country, the prosecution frequently had to promise legal immunity in order to 

gain full cooperation as States’ witnesses. 

The area that gave the prosecution the most difficulty was uncovering 

evidence related to the large number of illegal drugs that were produced under 

the auspices of Project Coast and subsequently sold on the black market. 

During the third week of the Basson trial, South Africa Narcotics Bureau 

officers involved in the sting operation that led to Basson’s arrest in January 

1997 testified that before the deals involving Basson they had never 

encountered Ecstasy capsules in South Africa. A pharmacist recruited to work 

at Delta G after his military service, Steven Buekes, told the Court that Basson 
85

had asked him to set up a facility to make Mandrax, including a laboratory 

where the base compound could be granulated. Buekes testified that he made 

100,000 tablets, marked MX on one side and RL (for Roussel Laboratories, 

legal manufacturers of Mandrax) using ingredients supplied by Basson. 

Another witness, Jerry Brandt, was managing director of the front company, 

Organochem, that was responsible for procurement for Delta G. Mr. Randt told 

the Court how he was tasked by Basson to procure the formula for 

manufacturing Ecstasy. 

These and other witnesses allowed the prosecution to show that Basson 

had authorized the manufacture of large amounts of Mandrax and Ecstasy 

under the auspices of Project Coast. However, the State still does not know 

why these drugs were manufactured, where they went, or where the profits 

from the sale of these drugs went. The prosecution does not believe the 

defense’s claims that these drugs were only manufactured and used by Special 

Forces to incriminate suspected ANC “terrorists” and sympathizers, and later 

as a means of crowd control. However, the prosecution is still missing many 

parts of the true story. What has come out in court to date is that Basson 

started producing hallucinogenic drugs during the mid-1980s. At some point 

the emphasis shifted to producing drugs for profit. However, the motives 

remain unknown, as do the targets (or customers), and the planned or actual 

methods of distributing these drugs. There is little evidence that Mandrax and 

ecstasy were produced for illegal sales in South Africa. Instead, the 

prosecutors are still exploring the possibility that the bulk of these drugs were 

destined for illicit sale in Europe, India, and possibly the United States. 

South African officials investigating the flow of illegal drugs have been 

hampered by the lack of forensic capability to do chemical fingerprint tests. 

Earlier investigations and the prosecutors in the Basson case failed in their first 

efforts to obtain the help of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in 

running these tests. There was no real interest among American officials, until 
86

a drug arrest in Chicago that involved the illegal possession of Ecstasy traced 

back to South Africa. Apparently one of the innovative processes developed by 

Project Coast researchers was an extremely pure type of the drug that had a 

unique root (e.g., no impurities). U.S. authorities were able to trace this 

particular sample back to Delta-G Laboratories. This incident led to greater 

international cooperation between U.S. and South African authorities involved 

in efforts to stem the flow of drugs internationally.212 A similar pattern of 

heightened U.S. interest emerged after Dr. Ford’s suicide in Newport, 

California in 2000. Revelations of links between Ford and his associates and 

Basson, Knobel and Project Coast led the FBI to initiate a “weapons of mass 

destruction investigation” to determine whether a U.S. crime had been 

committed in South Africa.213 

Each of these experiences suggest that effective measures designed to 

limit the proliferation of CBW or illegal drugs in the future will require much 

greater inter-agency cooperation within nation-states and new forms of 

international cooperation among agencies in several countries. The South 

African case suggests the need for greater coordination between defense and 

counterproliferation agencies and agencies whose primary mission are crime 

solving and prevention. The Basson trail is also useful for illustrating the 

complex ways that CBW project managers may be able to exploit transnational 

financial flows and international corporate instruments to quickly move, 

launder, and house large sums of money for either political or personal 

motives. New and increased difficulties in penetrating complex international 

entities have already emerged as a major problem in countering transnational 

crime. A similar pattern emerges from the South African case in the context of 

covert NBC programs. Thus, nonproliferation experts may have a new set of 

problems to worry about in this era of globalization. The Basson trial may also 

serve as a useful reminder of what may become a more general trend: the 

initiation or continuation of covert CBW programs primarily as a means to 
87

cover illegal personal gains from the sale of weapons (including CBW) and

drugs. 

CONCLUSION 

In this monograph, the profile of South Africa as a state that developed a CBW 

program has been drawn. South Africa was an isolated state that felt threatened 

by a more powerful state actor, the Soviet Union, which was helping hostile 

regimes and movements in neighboring states. One response of the apartheid

regime to changing threat perceptions in the region was to develop a CBW 

program and to accelerate a nuclear weapons program. The decision-making 

process, which was secretive and controlled by the military, enabled a very 

sophisticated program to be developed with little outside scrutiny. Military and 

police units used chemical and biological agents for counter-insurgency 

warfare, assassination, and execution of war prisoners. As the regime felt 

increasingly threatened by opposition at home, top political leaders approved 

plans for research and development of exotic means to neutralize opponents, 

large-scale offensive uses of the program, and weaponization. However, the 

plans were not operationalized. The end of the external threat led to a decision 

to unilaterally dismantle the program prior to a shift to majority rule. Lack of 

civilian control over military programs made the rollback difficult, rife with 

corruption and left proliferation concerns in place. Ultimately, the United 

States, Great Britain and other countries pressured the South African 

government to ensure that the CBW programs were dismantled and the former 

project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, constrained. Since Basson secretly 

retained copies of Project Coast documents, proliferation concerns remain. 

The information that has emerged to date about Project Coast suggests 

that a country that possesses chemical and biological weapons is likely to use 

them against adversaries at home and abroad. The unpredictable and harsh 

environment of southern Africa did not deter conventional or counterinsurgency units from experimenting with these weapons. However, in both 
88

the Angolan and Rhodesian conflicts, conventional arms remained the primary 

instruments by combatants. The South African case illustrates that the threat 

perceptions of top political leaders are the determining factors in whether they 

decide to undertake costly, covert CBW programs. The South African case 

also supports the proposition that once a political regime has CBW 

capabilities, they will use these capabilities against political enemies at home 

and abroad. 

The South African case also dramatically shows how thin the line is 

between defensive and offensive weapons. First the Iraqi and now the South 

African cases suggest that it is prudent to assume that if a country is suspected 

of developing covert nuclear capabilities, it is probably supporting research 

into the offensive uses of chemical and biological weapons as well. 

South African CBW programs also underscore the importance of control 

by civilians, of transparency, and of accountability. Some aspects of the 

apartheid regime’s management of their CBW programs may be unique. 

However this case vividly illustrates what will happen when there is loose 

accountability of covert NBC research and development by senior military and 

political leaders. 

The efforts to dismantle the South African CBW program illustrate how 

difficult effective NBC non-proliferation agreements will be to enforce. The 

discovery that Wouter Basson secretly kept some of the classified documents 

is deeply disturbing to those who believe that South Africa developed highly 

sophisticated CBW capabilities during the Project Coast years. For others, the 

science involved in the 10 years of research conducted by Project Coast was so 

pedestrian that they are not worried about the possibility of proliferation. 

Perhaps, some of the differences among interviewees in this study about the 

scope and level of sophistication can be reconciled and understood as a matter 

of differing priorities, interpretations, and policy lessons. Dr. Daan Goosen, the 

former manager of RRL, was one of a very small group of scientists-mangers 
89

who had detailed knowledge of many Project Coast projects. He readily 

acknowledged in a television interview that: 

Project Coast had the ability to be very, very 

sophisticated. We established the ability to do genetic 

engineering and all the fancy type of stuff that would 

produce good biological products, but nothing was really 

produced. 

In response to the next question, “But you don’t have to produce it, do 

you? You just have to have the knowledge, the production is easy. You and I 

could do it in a laboratory in 48 hours,” Goosen responded: 

Yes...this is one of the so-called myths surrounding 

biological warfare products, that is to a large extent 

misinformation. Any vaccines in any normal laboratory are 

producing tons and tons of the highest potent toxins, and it 

can be misused. So there wasn’t any super biological 

weapons developed and produced by the program. 

The interviewer next asked him to explain why the British and 

Americans were so worried about the program that they went to see President 

de Klerk, on one occasion, and, later, President Mandela, and said “Give this 

program up.” Dr. Goosen responded: 

The facilities were...state-of-the art. The laboratories, 

the P4 containments, everything. The scientists assembled 

there had the potential of developing really new and fancy 

biological weapons. But it was never done. When we got to 

the point that we should have produced, there was no support 

for the scientists to produce. It was very ineffective.... We 

produced some knowledge...and crude off-the-shelf 

assassination devices.... It is no use controlling scientists 

and laboratories, etc.; the real control lies in controlling the 

people who decide where to apply it or not, and that is the 

politicians. And as long as there is no agreement that can be 

enforced then you won’t control this [biological warfare].214

If Dr. Goosen’s assessment of what was developed by Project Coast is 

accurate, then one can find grounds to support either assessment regarding the 

sophistication of Project Coast. However, there are several unanswered 
90

questions about this program that merit study in future research in order to be 

in a better position to understand the evolution of CBW programs in South 

Africa and to be able to learn the right policy lessons from this case. These 

questions, with a few modifications, may also serve as a useful “checklist” of 

what needs to be answered in other cases where countries are known or 

suspected of pursuing covert CBW programs. 

We close with the most important questions remaining about the South 

African case and then with policy lessons for the future: 

1. What highly sophisticated biological agents/pathogens (including new ones) 

and unique processes and procedures did the South Africans develop under the 

auspices of Project Coast? Which ones did they acquire from abroad? From 

where? 

2. Which unique processes and procedures developed under the auspices of 

Project Coast were surprising to the American investigators (e.g., biological 

weapons; chemical weapons, drugs, germicides, and genetic engineering)? 

3. How important were each of the following to Project Coast developments: 

open-source literature, scientific contacts, and Basson’s network of covert 

procurement agents? 

4. Did the South Africans purchase poisons or chemicals abroad for use in 

their CBW program? Can a foreign government legally purchase similar 

chemicals and poisons today in the U.S., Canada, Europe, or elsewhere in the 

world? 

5. What specific coordination/cooperation was there between the former SADF 

military CBW programs during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s with 

foreign governments including U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Israel? 

6. Where will the key scientists involved in Project Coast be in the future? 

7. What type of delivery systems did South Africa develop to weaponize their 

CBW agents? How far did Project Coast go in developing aerosol means of 

delivering CBW? 

8. Did the South African government field-test any biological agents or 

chemicals? If yes, which ones, where? When? Why? 
91

9. What specifically and when did the U.S. and the UK learn about South 

Africa’s biological weapons program? How? 

10. How important was U.S. pressure in South Africa’s decision to close down 

its bio-chem. capabilities? What type of pressure was most effective, i.e., 

bilateral or multilateral efforts? 

11. Was Basson working with or without the knowledge of senior government 

officials when he visited Libya as a Transnet consultant? When he visited Iraq 

as a SADF colonel before 1990? To other countries? 

12. Why was Basson arrested? 

13. Why has the South African government not responded to the Basson 

prosecutor’s request to gain access to the CD-ROM information related to 

Project Coast? 

14. Why was so much Ecstasy and Mandrax produced? What was the 

methaqualone produced for Project Coast used for? 

15. What happened to the drugs? Where were they distributed? Who got the 

money from drug sales or distribution? 

16. Is there any evidence that Wouter Basson worked with foreign (i.e., 

Russian) or domestic organized crime syndicates? 

17. In its genetic engineering experiments, how close was South Africa to a 

“black bomb”? Are other countries developing similar biological weapons? 

18. Is there any evidence that the former South African government supported 

research, testing, or distribution of germicides designed to increase users’ 

susceptibility to AIDS or other diseases? 

19. Is there any truth to rumors that young, former Afrikaner right-wingers and 

former SADF and current SANDF personnel in South Africa are working with 

local syndicates and representatives of the Russian mafia to market drugs and 

arms or hardware capable of using CBW? 

20. How great a concern is South African NBC proliferation today? What are 

the concerns? 

21. What is the danger that secrets are likely to leak out of South African 

National Defense Force or be sold in the future? 
92

22. How effective is civilian control over the military (including control over 

former SADF officers who might be right-wing “moles” and ANC political 

appointees who might be hostile to the U.S. or anxious to increase their 

personal wealth)? 

NOTES 

 

1

 Edward Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ 

Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999); Albert J. Mauroni, America's 

Struggle with Chemical-Biological Warfare (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000); 

Erhard Geissler, et. al., eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, 

Development and Use from the Middle Ages to 1945 (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1999); Ken Alibek, with Stephen Handelman (Contributor) 

Biohazard. (New York: Random House, 1999); Tom Mangold and Jeff 

Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (New York: St. 

Martin’s Press, 1999); John Prados, “All Weapons Great and Small,”

Washington Post, Book World, 16 January 2000, 7. 

2

 Interview with Dr. Renfrew Christie, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 June 

2000. 

3

 Mangold, Plague Wars, 219. 

4

 Interview with Dr. Christie, 26 June 2000. 

5

 Interview with General (retired) Jannie Geldenhuys, Pretoria, South Africa, 

13 June 2000. 

6

 H.E. Purkitt, “The politics of denuclearization: The case of South Africa," 

Presentation at the Defense Nuclear Agency's Fourth Annual International 

Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, Penn., 21 June 1995. (Earlier 

draft presented at Institute for National Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force 

Academy, Colorado, 9 November 1994.) 

7

 Interview with Dr. Vernon Joynt of Mechem and the Council for Scientific 

and Industrial Research (CSIR), Pretoria, South Africa, 14 June 2000. 

8

 Interview with Dr. Torie Pretorius, prosecutor in the Basson trial, Pretoria, 

South Africa 21 June 2000. 

9

 Interview with Helmut Heitmann of Jane’s Defense Weekly, Cape Town, 

South Africa, 26 June 2000. Heitmann and other analysts subsequently echoed 

De Villiers’ skepticism about the usefulness of chemical and biological 

weapons in Africa. In the 1980s, Heitmann commented that chemical weapons 

were ineffective in Africa, given the heat, and the possibility that shifting 

winds could blow the agents onto one’s own troops. Biological weapons could 
93

 

be delivered through food and water, but the weapons could spread into one’s 

own population. 

10 Interviews with South African military and civilian officials, July 2000. 

11 For a further discussion of the role of former Selous Scouts and other 

foreigners in South Africa during the 1980s see Mangold, 218-23. See also, 

Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla 

war in Rhodesia 1962-1980 (Gweru: Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989). 

12 Analysis of the TRC Report by the SADF Contact bureau, 28 May, 1998, 

Pretoria, South Africa, and The Military in a political arena: The South 

African Defence Force (SADF) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 

(TRC), Pretoria, June 2000. 

13 There was a general awareness during the 1960s of the potency of anthrax 

and other biological agents as counter-insurgency weapons. In the 1960s, 

comic books featured “Captain Devil” who poured anthrax into the Orange 

River and killed communist guerrillas, according to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC 

defense expert, interviewed, 13 June 2000 in Pretoria, South Africa. 

14 South African military and political planners during the late 1960s and early 

1970s studied carefully the effectiveness of Portuguese “protected villages” in 

preventing guerrillas from gaining control of large sections of Angola. 

However, South African planners viewed a guerrilla threat at home to be 

highly unlikely at the time (Interview with Rocklyn Williams 5 July 2000). In 

planning for the long-term possibility of guerrilla activity, the government 

moved to expand the Bantu homeland policy to Lebowa and Venda and 

instituted policies to depopulate northern areas of South Africa. This approach 

was viewed as a more effective way of handling future problems and 

deflecting external critics with a promise of eventual independence for the ten 

designated homelands. 

In Angola, South African military planners however, were impressed by 

the ability of the Portuguese to regain the offensive in the late 1960s by using 

helicopters, poison, landmines, and other techniques to counter guerrilla gains. 

See John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla 

Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978), 116-118. 

15 Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000. 

16 The South African Police (SAP) started helping the Rhodesians to counter 

growing insurgency problem in the mid-1960s. Until 1974, the number of SAP 

(and SADF) personnel grew, until there were about 1,200 SAPs stationed in 

Rhodesia. While South African help was welcomed initially, tensions quickly 

developed with reports that SAP personnel were illegally shooting 
94

 

rhinoceroses for the horns in Chiwore game reserve and that they were illdisciplined, bored, and poorly trained. The first SAP contingents were relieved 

after three months. South Africa attempted to solve the problem by sending 

better-trained and more English speakers to Rhodesia. Tensions developed 

again as Rhodesians increasingly had to rely on South African manpower and 

military hardware in the early 1970s. Many Rhodesian troops resented South 

African efforts to tell them how to conduct their counter-insurgency 

campaigns. These tensions were one reason why the South African police 

presence was reduced during the 1970s [Interview, Defense Intelligence 

Agency (DIA) officials, Washington, D.C., 13 September 2000]. See also 

Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War and Ron Reid-Daly, with Peter Stiff, Selous 

Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago, 1983) for detailed 

accounts of these tensions. 

17 Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts.

18 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War. He claims that the Selous Scouts 

experimented with throwing cholera viruses in rivers but could not detect any 

adverse effects associated with this experiment. He reports that in 1976, a 

group of Scouts moved into the Ruya wildlife area near Mozambique and 

introduced measured quantities of bacteriological cultures into the water at 

several points along the Ruya river. Although the Scouts never knew if any 

fatalities resulted from these experiments, Ellert notes that these experiments 

corresponded in time with reports of deaths among people living on the banks 

of the Ruya River in Mozambique. These deaths were officially attributed to 

cholera (12). 

19 Mangold, Plague Wars, 214-218. 

20 Interview with Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies 

(ISS), Pretoria, 12 June 2000. The South African State in the Basson trial is 

planning to use information gathered by journalists to support charges against 

Basson related to the use of CBW in Rhodesia. However, the prosecution was 

unable to discuss this evidence while the trial is ongoing. Interview, Pretoria, 

July 2000). 

21 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 90-3; Interview with Peter Stiff, 12 July 

2000. 

22 From 1978 until independence the South African intelligence service 

stepped up their efforts to recruit experienced Rhodesian Special Forces, 

Ellert, 90. 

23 Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 

1997). South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and 
95

 

Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (Cape Town: The Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission, 1998). 

24 Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 111-113. 

25 Mangold, Plague Wars, 214-23. See also Meryl Nass, “Anthrax Epizootic in 

Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread? The PSR Quarterly vol. 2 

no. 4 December 1992. 

26 “Basson anthrax link to Zimbabwe,” 

http://www.saep.org/forDB/WARanthrax ZANNOW990331.htm. 

27 Many biological warfare experts discount the claims made in Plague Wars 

that Rhodesian and/or South African forces planted anthrax spores black 

farming areas in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In black farming areas under rebel 

control, there was no wildlife control or regular cattle dipping. During this 

period, there was a noticeable rise of rinderpest and other cattle diseases. 

According to Richard Cornwall, a senior defense analyst and expert on 

Zimbabwean politics at ISS-South Africa, “everything just broke down” 

(Interview, 4 July 2000). Under these conditions, it would have been extremely 

difficult to limit the effects of anthrax to only certain areas. 

Mangold cites a DIA report to support allegations that anthrax was 

planted in cattle feed in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. However, Dr. Bill Thom, 

Director of the African division of DIA, conducted a search of DIA files at the 

request of the authors and found that the DIA document number cited in 

Plague Wars was a citation for a regulation manual that had nothing to do with 

Africa or biological weapons (Interview, Bill Thom, 13 September 2000). 

Apparently, Mangold erred when citing a DIA report, or the document never 

existed. 

However, Mangold is confident that such experiments occurred, and it is 

possible that this strategy was one of the many BW experiments carried out by 

units of Selous Scouts in their quest to find new counter-insurgency tools. 

Regardless of the veracity of the allegations, the case is useful for illustrating 

how difficult it is to prove or disprove allegations of anthrax attacks. For a 

further discussion of the available evidence in this and other recent incidents of 

alleged use of anthrax as a weapon see Seth W. Carus, Working Paper on 

Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological agents in the 20th

Century, 3rd Revision (Washington, DC: Center for Counter-proliferation 

Research, National Defense University, 1998). 

28 The Mugabe government has become most unpopular in Zimbabwe. In the 

June 2000 parliamentary elections, Mugabe’s party, ZANU (PF), lost control 

of all urban seats and all parliamentary seats in Matabeland. 

29 Mangold, Plague Wars, 220. 
96

 

30 The Cassinga raid highlights the difficulties involved in verifying CBW 

incidents. The TRC concluded that this alleged use was developed under 

auspices of Project B. A report on the Cassinga attack was prepared by a joint 

UNHCR/WHO mission on 30 May 1978 and reproduced as Annexure V in 

UN document 13473 of 27 July 1979. However, observers who arrived 30 

minutes after the attack found no evidence of chemical weapons use. 

(Interviews with former SADF special forces officers and defense analysts, 

July 2000). 

31 Interviews with former SADF Special Forces officers, July 2000 

32 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Medical Hospital One 

Pretoria, 6 July 2000. 

33 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Georg Meiring, Pretoria, 3 July 2000. 

34 Interview with former Defense Minister Magnus Malan, Pretoria, 23 June 

2000. 

35 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, Pretoria, 12 June 2000. This rationale 

for developing nuclear weapons is the one most frequently mentioned by 

former SADF generals and some former politicians. For a further discussion of 

other rationales that have been provided by South African officials during and 

after the apartheid era, see Badenhorst (unpublished manuscript), Hounam and 

McQuillen (1995), Reiss (1995), and Stumpf (1995/96). 

36 According to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Phillip Schalwyk, South African forces in 

Angola received an urgent cable from UNITA commanders during Operation 

Savannah asking for help because they had been attacked by Cuban troops 

who wore “pig face masks.” Interview, 12 July 2000. 

37 Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. (New 

York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). 

38 Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000. 

39 Interview with Dr. Vernon Joynt, Pretoria, 14 June 2000. Dr. Joynt claims 

that Surgeon-General Nieuwoudt sent Major Wouter Basson to him in 1978 

and offered him the directorship of a chemical weapons program. While Joynt 

refused, many scientists and specialists accepted research projects by 

Nieuwoudt and Basson, and many did not tell their superiors. 

40 Seegers, The Military. See also S.A. Watt, “The Anglo-Boer War: The 

Medical Arrangements and implications thereof during the British occupation 

of Bloemfontein: March-August, 1900,” Military History Journal Vol. 9 No. 2 

(August). South African Military History Society / 

military.history@rapidttp.com. (Accessed 15 June 2000). 
97

 

41 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Military Medical Hospital 

One (Pretoria), 5 July 2000. Although 7th Medical Battalion Group is still in 

existence and tasked with the mission of supporting the 44th Parachute 

Brigade and Special Forces Brigade, the military medical service has 

undergone a dramatic reorganization since 1994. Authorization for a reorganized service, renamed the SADF Medical Service (SAMS) was approved 

by the Minister of Defense in March 1999. SAMS has a much broader 

mandate today that includes providing assistance to the health services of 

South Africa, in addition to providing comprehensive military health service to 

the National Defence Force and South African Police Service. 

42 In an interview in Pretoria on 13 June 2000, Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion stated 

that he first met Basson when the latter was earmarked in the late 1970s to 

become the doctor for SADF Special Forces. Thirion claims that Basson was 

arrogant, that he was Defense Minister Magnus Malan’s “blue-eyed boy,” and 

that he had the ear of General Kat Liebenberg of Special Forces. Thirion 

complained when Basson was given access to military intelligence and when 

Basson short-circuited the command structure. Thirion continued by 

commenting that, in the 1980s, Malan became a member of parliament and 

started the custom of showing people in his constituency that the SADF was 

winning the war in Namibia and Angola. He would bring generals from each 

branch of the service. However, Basson represented the Medical Health 

Service and not the Surgeon General. 

43 According to ANC defense expert Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 

2000, Dr. Basson was a “Dr. Strangelove” who was part of a group of young 

scientists, specialists, intellectuals and soldiers who emerged in the 1970s and 

enthusiastically supported the apartheid regime. Their “patriotism” provided 

them with the motivation to commit “perfect crimes” on behalf of the regime. 

Later, some members this group would claim that they were “only following 

orders.” 

Others, such as Dr. Daan Goosen, who was the managing director at 

RRL, remain unrepentant noting that “South Africa was in a war situation...the 

terrorists and political figures were the targets on the ANC side.” Dr. Goosen 

went on in this interview to explain that Basson spelled out to him, at the time 

they were negotiating Goosen’s employment, “that it would be a biological 

chemical weapons program [and that] it would be offensive. We initially spent 

a lot of time on the ethical use of these things, and I was convinced that the 

products would be used in a war sense, very ethically. There isn’t much of a 

difference if you use a gun to kill someone or if you use a more refined product 

to do that.” Frontline transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological 

weapons threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bioweapons. Transcript from television show 
98

 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/ . 

Many individuals, who worked on Project Coast or had contact with 

Basson within the military, including most former SADF generals and officers, 

continue to respect him as a brilliant heart surgeon. Many of these individuals 

assert that Basson did nothing wrong since all of his actions, including the 

alleged fraudulent ones, were approved by superiors. Others stress that they 

did not know specifics about most Project Coast programs or Basson’s 

financial activities until press revelations started to appear in the 1990s. 

44 Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000. 

45 See Lt. Gen. (Dr.) D.P. (Niels) Knobel’s testimony to the Truth and 

Reconciliation Commission (TRC), July 1998. 

46 Chris Oppermann, “How the taxpayer footed the bill for Project Coast,” 

Weekly Mail and Guardian archive, 27 June 1997. 

47 According to Helmut Heitmann, Jane’s Defense Weekly and defense expert, 

in a 26 June 2000 interview, the evidence was not conclusive. 

Heitmann was among the first journalists to raise questions about South 

African allegations that the Cubans had used chemical weapons in Angola and 

highlighted the difficulty of verifying the source of alleged CBW attacks 

(Heitmann, 1985, 1990; see also Steenkamp, 1989). 

48 Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June. 2000. Despite concerns by senior 

military leaders about the possibility that Cubans might use CBW in Angola, 

little time was spent on defensive CBW training during the 1970s. From the 

mid-1970s through the late 1970s only a few hours during one day of training 

was devoted to CBW of SADF infantry personnel. Most of these sessions 

focused on the use of CS gas. Many more hours of training were devoted to 

how to counter urban violence. Interview with Mark Malan, former SADF 

officer and senior researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies-South Africa, 

23 June 2000. 

49 According to Chandre Gould, formerly of the TRC, interviewed 29 June 

2000 in Johannesburg, South Africa. 

50 Mangold, Plague Wars, 236. They estimate four to five million pounds. 

51 Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000. 

52 Interview with Rocky Williams, ISS-South Africa, 5 July 2000. 

53 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. 

54 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 

55 Mangold, Plague Wars, 241. 
99

 

56 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 

57 Interview conducted in 1997 by Helen Purkitt. 

58 Magnus Malan indicated as much in a 23 June 2000 interview. 

59 According to Dr. Rocklyn Williams of ISS, Pretoria, interviewed 15 July 

2000, he debriefed a SADF sergeant in 1983 who talked about the 

development of a “black bomb.” 

60 Mangold, Plague Wars, 244. 

61 Mangold, Plague Wars, 244. In an interview for the television documentary, 

Dr. Daan Goosen again acknowledged that the target of Project Coast’s work 

on drugs that would induce infertility was the black population. One line of 

research was to develop a vaccine, one for males and one for females that 

could be given surreptitiously or under pretext. This research was based on 

open source contraceptive research. Another line of research was work on a 

[unnamed] product that could have been given without the knowledge of the 

person receiving it either orally or in some sort of injection. He went on to 

state, “the most serious problem as told to us [was] the birth rate of the black 

population, and that it would outgrow the resources of the country and it was 

very important that this be brought under control. There was no doubt about 

that. This was given to us by Basson, by the surgeon general...it was very 

clear that this was the most important project we had to work on.” Frontline 

transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons threats and 

how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons. Transcript 

from television show 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/. (Accessed 15 June 

2000) 

62 Interviews with South African journalist, 20 July 2000. 

63 According to Chandre Gould, formerly of the TRC in a presentation, 29 June 

2000. 

64 See the 1999 prosecution charge sheet against Basson. 

65 Interviews with retired generals Thirion and Geldenhuys, Pretoria, 13 June 

2000. 

66 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. As a subscriber to the 

Geneva Conventions, South Africa could not develop lethal CW agents. 

67 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. 

68 Interview with Col. (ret.) Johann Smith, Pretoria, 30 June 2000. He was 

certain that the MPLA and Cubans used CW in Angola. 
100

 

69 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000. 

70 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Sass, 12 June 2000. 

71 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000. 

72 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. 

73 Interview with David Steward, June 26, 2000. 

74 Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. Meiring was not certain if the 

Cubans and the MPLA used CW at Cuito Cuanavale in 1987. 

75 Soon after his investigation, reports emerged that Dr. Heyndrickx 

manufactured allegations that the Angolans were using CW and that he was on 

the payroll of the South African government or the CIA. In 1997, Weekly Mail 

and Guardian reported that Dr. Heyndrickx had been arrested for misusing 

funds at the University of Ghent and that the Belgian police are still looking 

for 12 British-made chemical agent monitors which Heyndrickx bought with 

university funds. He said he destroyed the machines because they were 

defective. 

76 Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

77 Testimony by Dr. Mike Odendaal in the Basson Trial, 24 May 2000. See 

“HIV Blood Sample Frozen for Chemical Warfare, Basson Trial Hears,” South 

African Press Association (SAPA), 24 May 2000. 

78 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 

79 Mangold, Plague Wars, 242. 

80 Dr. Basson told Mangold (Plague Wars, 442, note 443) in 1998 that the 

reason why a detailed investigation by Britain's MI-6 , the Security Service, 

failed to substantiate the allegations that he visited Porton Downs is because he 

used false names and passports for his frequent visits. Another possibility is 

that Basson met with former Porton Downs employees. Several former 

employees of Porton Downs report that they were asked to pose as employees 

after reporting contacts with Wouter Basson to British authorities. See Michael 

Evans, “South Africa may have ordered British deaths,” The Times (London), 

(14 July 1998), 7 for further details. 

81 Testimony by Dr. Odendaal, 24 May 2000. See “HIV,” SAPA, 24 May 2000. 

82 Interview with former South African military officer, July 2000. 

83 Ambassador Princeton Lyman, e-mail to Stephen Burgess, 18 September 

2000. Ambassador Princeton Lyman backtracked somewhat from earlier 

statements made in a 31 August 2000 interview about claims that 
101

 

weaponization took place. Donald Mahley of the U.S. State Department, who 

was part of the delegation to South Africa after the demarche of 11 April 1994, 

also downplayed evidence of weaponization in a 30 August 2000 interview. 

84 Professor Andre Buys, Director of Institute for Technical Innovation, 

University of Pretoria, in a 14 June 2000 interview. 

85 Professor Buys, in a 14 June 2000 interview. While the project manager for 

the nuclear bomb project was aware of ongoing research into chemical 

weapons (in an interview with Helen Purkitt, July 1994), even he did not have 

full access to the details of specific CBW projects. 

86 H.E. Purkitt, “The politics of denuclearization: The case of South Africa". 

Presentation at the Defense Nuclear Agency's Fourth Annual International 

Conference on Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, Penn., 21 June 1995. Earlier 

draft presented at Institute for National Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force 

Academy, Colorado, 9 November 1994. 

87 Interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, 3 July 2000. 

88 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000. Thirion claimed that he 

had proposed a gendarmerie or carabinieri to serve as the “third force.” 

Instead, P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan, and Adriaan Vlok devised the Civil 

Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and other agencies that were more covert and far 

more lethal. 

89 Interviews with Generals Thirion and Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000. 

90 Interview with David Steward, Executive Director, De Klerk Foundation and 

President de Klerk’s chief of staff (1989-94), Cape Town, 26 June 2000. 

91 Mangold, Plague Wars, 242. Skepticism still surrounds Basson and 

Knobel’s claims about Basson’s international activities. According to several 

interviewees, it is doubtful if Basson ever penetrated Porton Down or U.S. and 

Soviet facilities. 

92 According to Gen. (ret.) Sass, interviewed 12 June 2000 in Pretoria. 

93 According to Gen. (ret.) Sass, interviewed 12 June 2000 in Pretoria. 

94 Arthur Allen, “Mad Scientist,” Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/health/ 

feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed 9 August 2000). It has 

only been in the last few years that researchers have renewed their focus on 

finding an effective microbicide (a chemical that can kill off the virus). Three 

dozen microbicides are now in the pre-clinical testing stage, and 20 others are 

ready for safety trails in humans. Researchers were hoping that nonoxynol-9 

was the answer. However, in July of 2000, microbicide researchers from 
102

 

UNAIDS discovered to their horror that the spermicide nonoxynol-9, a 

chemical found in many contraceptives lubricants and gels worldwide, is not 

only ineffective against HIV, it actually appears to increase the chance of 

infection in high-risk women. Of 999 prostitutes in Africa and Thailand, 59 

women using a nonoxynol-9 contraceptive gel called Advantage-S became 

infected with HIV, compared with 41 women using a placebo. Claudia Kalb, 

“In ‘We Have to save Our People,” Newsweek, 24 July 2000 posed on afronets@usa.nealthnet.org, July 17, 2000. 

95 Jeff Collins, "Suspects all visited the home of a South African trade official, 

police say,” Orange Country Register, (July 18, 2000). Dr. Ford, Dino 

D’Saachs and Dr. Jerry Nilsson, who are all suspected of conspiring to kill 

Biofem Inc. chief executive James Patrick Riley, visited the South Africa trade 

attaché, Gideon Bouwer in the 1980s. 

96 Arthur Allen, “Vaginal Detergent,” Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/ 

health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed August 9, 2000). 

(http://salonmag.com/health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 

(accessed August 9, 2000). Jeff Collins, "Suspects all visited the home of a 

South African trade official, police say,” Orange Country Register, (18 July 

2000). 

97 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, 6 July 2000. 

98 Jeff Collins “Suspects all visited the home of a South African trade official, 

police say” The Orange County Register. (July 18, 2000). This article cites a 

Sunday Times interview with Knobel, in which he confirmed that he relied on 

Ford’s expertise whenever he had questions about chemical or biological 

weapons and said that he helped Ford and Riley gain approval for the use of 

products produced by BioFem. Knobel also confirmed that he introduced Ford 

to Wouter Basson, who arranged a briefing with Project Coast scientists and 

Dr. Ford at Fort Klapperkop outside Pretoria in June or July 1987 where he 

demonstrated how to lace teabags, doilies and even a Playboy magazine with 

deadly bacteria. A new project, Codename Project Larry, was started around 

the time of Ford’s visit but was closed within a few months. While Dr. Knobel 

reports no knowledge of a Project Larry, Adriaan Botha, a Project Coast 

scientist who attended this briefing, reported that Ford sent them five bags of 

biological material they hoped to cultivate into organisms that could be used to 

kill the enemies of apartheid. Jeff Collins “Ford advised South Africa on 

warfare devices," Orange County Register (15 March 2000). 

99 Arthur Allen, “Mad Scientist,” Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/ 

health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed August 9, 2000) 

100 See Andrew Bluth and Tony Saavedra “The materials are collected at the 
103

 

home of Jerry Nilsson, who was questioned and released, The Orange County 

Register, April 2, 2000 and Tony Saavedra "Surgeon says he doesn't know 

why he was subjected to a search” The Orange County Register, April 5, 2000 

101 There were also allegations that Ford may have tested his birth control 

product on prostitutes in South Africa. Julian Rademeyer “Illegal tests on SA 

prostitutes?” Pretoria News, 22 July 2000 (http://home.global.co.za/~jrad/ 

ptabio.htm) and Arthur Allen, “Mad Scientist,” Salon.com (http:// 

salonmag.com/ health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed 

August 9, 2000). See also articles in Los Angeles Times and other newspapers 

in Mad Scientist archive on Project Coast on the Mad Scientist web page 

(http://www.madsci.org). 

102 Interview with South African prosecutor in the Basson case, July 2000. 

103 Interview with Dr. Villa-Vicencia, former TRC investigator, 20 July, 2000. 

In addition to scientific literature, papers from scientific conferences, and 

government documents marked top secret, investigators found financial 

records, canceled checks, bags of foreign coins, memorabilia (e.g., a cartoon of 

Basson carrying a violin case), and several small bottles of scotch and beer 

cans, which they did not taste. The contents in these trunks were really a 

“mixed bag” of personal effects and top-secret documents. 

104 Interview with Dr. Villa-Vicencia, 20 July, 2000. 

105 Mangold, Plague Wars, 277-8. 

106 Dr. Daan Goosen, former managing direct of RRL, claimed that Project 

Coast never conducted research on HIV as a weapon. However, he 

acknowledged that Project Coast scientists were planning to do some work that 

he termed “legitimate work” for a European pharmaceutical company. 

Interview Transcript from television show 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/ (accessed 15 June 

2000) 

107 Interview with South African reporters who covered the TRC hearings, July 

2000. Despite the lack of evidence linking Project Coast research with the 

intentional use of AIDS, allegations that the policies of the former South 

African government were motivated by AIDS considerations are likely to be 

raised in the future, as the HIV epidemic peaks in South Africa. For example, 

one researcher at the International AIDS conference held in Durban in July 

2000 suggested in a paper that projections of huge losses in the black 

population through AIDS was the real reason why de Klerk had started 

transition process. 

108 As Daan Goosen noted, “biological weapons was a new field, and it was 
104

 

done all over by all countries, even England at Porton Down and the 

Americans at Fort Detrick. We know they were doing it, and we had contacts 

with all that work and the weapons that were developed.” Frontline 

transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons threats and 

how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons. 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/. (Accessed 15 June 

2000). 

109 Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, 6 July 2000. 

110 Interview with prosecutor in the Basson trial, July 2000. 

111 Affidavits and memorandums on file at the Freedom of Expression Institute, 

Johannesburg, South Africa. Prosecutors have already introduced into the trial 

documents found in Webster’s possession that indicate that the WPW group 

was started in the early 1980s by a group of South African doctors. According 

to these documents, they were tasked by southern African health authorities to 

set up clinics in various African countries. The State alleges that Basson set up 

the companies to create a cover for himself as a successful businessman. 

“Audit reveals Basson fraud,” Business Day, (14 June 2000). 

112 Unlike the allegations of murder that rest on proving an indirect link to 

Basson, many of the fraud charges already introduced at the Basson trial 

established his direct involvement. Documents in Webster’s possession 

showed Basson was the sole shareholder and beneficiary owner of the various 

companies in his groups. Bruwer, the forensic auditor, introduced documents 

that proved that Basson’s overseas companies, known as the WPW Group, and 

a local one, Wisdom Group had changed names and were restructured 

regularly. These restructurings complicated the investigation and made it more 

difficult to trace the flow of funds. Nonetheless, Bruwer was able to establish 

in detail the assets of these companies, which included two aircraft and 

properties in South Africa and overseas, as well as shares in other companies, 

all allegedly funded by state money. The state is trying to prove that Basson set 

up the companies to create a cover for himself as a “successful businessman.”

Business Day, 14 June 2000. 

113 Interview with Jacques Pauw, Johannesburg, 29 June 2000. Pauw had 

interviewed the Project Coast scientists, including Andre Immelman, Schalk 

van Rensburg, Mike Odendaal, Daan Goosens, and Peter Lourens. 

114 Interview with Col. (ret.) Johann Smith, 30 June 2000. Negotiations with 

Mandela and the end of the Angolan war led Basson and others to take 

advantage of a window of opportunity to get rich. He was able to deceive top 

generals and salted away millions. Smith was certain that Basson turned to 

dealing ecstasy and other drugs, because his money was in Swiss banks, and 
105

 

he still need to raise cash in South Africa. 

115 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 514. 

116 Interview with Dr. Niels Knobel, Pretoria, 15 June 2000. 

117 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000. 

118 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000. 

119 Interview with Brig. Gen (rtr.) Bill Sass, July 1994. See Purkitt, “The 

politics of denuclearization,” for further details of changes made at the end of 

P.W. Botha’s rule. 

120 See H. Purkitt, “"The cognitive basis of foreign policy expertise: Evidence 

from intuitive analyses of political novices and 'experts' in South Africa," in D. 

Sylvan and J. Voss (Eds.), Problem Representation and Political Decision 

Making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) for evidence of how 

widespread this fear was in 1992, after negotiations had broken down. 

121 Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000. 

122 Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000. 

123 According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

124 Interview with senior official of Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 

1997. 

125 According to Dr Renfrew Christie, interviewed 26 June 2000, the U.S., 

backed by Israel and the UK, issued a “hostile nation warning” to South Africa 

in January 1990 to destroy the nuclear weapons program in order to keep it out 

of ANC hands. Christie claimed that, in the 1980s, the Israel had been 

involved in South African NBC programs, and the U.S. and Britain did not 

object to South Africa developing those programs. 

126 Interview with Prof. Buys, 14 June 2000. 

127 Interview with De Wet Potgieter, a journalist in Pretoria who has reported 

for several South African newspapers, 13 June 2000. 

128 According to Col. Mike Ferguson, former Defense Attaché to South Africa 

interviewed 23 May 2000 in Washington, D.C. 

129 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000. 

130 According to Col. Mike Ferguson, interviewed 23 May 2000. 

131 Interview with Col. (ret.) Joep Joubert, Pretoria, 23 June 2000, who worked 

with the CCB and Special Forces and retired from the SADF, before the Harms 
106

 

Commission findings. He believed that Chikane had to be eliminated as an 

“enemy.” Joubert thought that the operation was well planned, and authority 

was given from the top, probably by P.W. Botha, Pik Botha, Adrian Vlok, and 

Magnus Malan. Joubert had testified before the Harms Commission that he had 

full responsibility for CCB and Special Forces missions and the budgeting of 

secret funds. He believed that a CBW program was essential and that in order 

to have a good defensive program, a good offensive program was needed. 

132 Testimony of RRL scientist, Schalk Van Rensburg, to the TRC on 9 June 

1998. 

133 Bumbled assassination attempts using BW devices seem to have been pretty 

common. This fits with what BW terrorist experts have found in other cases. 

See Carus, Working Paper on Bioterrorism, 88. Carus classifies this incident 

as probable or possible use but with no authoritative confirmation. In some 

cases, a biological agent was used, but there was no information to indicate 

whether the perpetrator knowingly caused the infection. The probability of 

intentional contamination for these cases is difficult to determine. See Carus, 

90. 

134 Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness.

135 Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, 226. 

136 According to Dr. Joynt, interviewed 14 June 2000. 

137 According to De Wet Potgieter, a journalist in Pretoria who has reported for 

several South African newspapers, interviewed 13 June 2000, Uwe Paschke, 

who married PW Botha’s daughter, and Philip Mijburgh, Magnus Malan’s 

nephew, both had connections to the CBW program and Basson. Mijburgh 

especially profited from the privatization of the front companies for Project 

Coast. 

138 In June 2000, the State in the Basson case called a number of witnesses in 

an attempt to prove that Basson lived a life of luxury, while defrauding the 

apartheid government of millions of rand. The court presented evidence that 

Libya had shown an interest in Basson’s luxury Pretoria home, Merton House, 

to use as an embassy. Basson had allegedly built the house to suit his luxurious 

lifestyle. However, the house became an embarrassment after extensive media 

coverage. It was eventually sold to the Zimbabwean government at a loss. 

Other witnesses testified that Basson took his business associates and 

employees on luxury overseas holiday trips and entertained lavishly, while 

earning a public servant’s salary. The Angolan rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, 

hired a private aircraft belonging to a group of companies owned by Basson. 

According to Defense Advocate, Jaap Cilliers, the aircraft often landed at U.S. 
107

 

military bases and was familiar to customs officials. He said the aircraft was 

seldom searched, which made it easier for Basson to transport equipment 

earmarked for Project Coast and SADF throughout the 1980s. Business Day, 

(14 June 2000). 

139 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 515. 

140 Stefaans Brummer, Weekly Mail and Guardian (20 December 1995). See 

also Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillen, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: 

Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare (London: Faber & Faber, 1995). In the mid1990s, the South African Broacasting show Agenda reported allegations of a 

large 1992 clandestine shipment of a mercuric substance to Delta G during 

research for a program on murders connected to deals in red mercury. The 

broadcast pointed out that Delta G was reported to have carried out research to 

create nerve gases that could immobilize enemy forces for a number of hours 

but not kill them, making it possible to overrun strategic installations without 

exposing friendly forces to dangerous compounds. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 

Landman, who headed of a special police team set up to probe a string of 

murders apparently connected to red mercury at the time, confirmed he also 

had evidence that Delta G had bought more than two tons of yellow mercuric 

oxide from controversial Natal-based mercury recyclers Thor Chemicals in 

September 1991. Agenda producer Jacques Pauw said there was evidence that 

yellow mercuric oxide was one of the "building blocks" of red mercury, the 

substance said to make nuclear devices smaller and more effective. Thor 

Chemicals executive Alan Kidger was murdered two months after the Delta G 

deal. Kidger was found completely dismembered and smeared with a black 

oily substance. His death has been linked to the trade in Red Mercury by 

police investigations. There is some evidence that the murders of Durban 

armaments dealers Don Juan Lange in June and Dirk Stoffberg in July 1994 

and perhaps others were connected to the trade in Red Mercury. To date, none 

of the “Red Mercury murders” has been solved. The prevailing theory of 

prosecutors and journalists is that all of these individuals were involved in 

clandestine arms procurement deals (Interviews, South Africa, 1994-2000). 

141 The TRC reports Lt. Gen. Pierre Steyn’s report to President F.W. de Klerk, 

20 December 1992, as source of this incident. 

142 TRC researchers could not arrange a meeting with the British investigator. 

Investigators met with Dr Staub, a member of both the Swiss and the United 

Nations investigating team. He told them that he believed that the troops had 

suffered dehydration and had not been the victims of a chemical attack. This 

explanation struck the Commission's investigation unit as unlikely but is 

consistent with the assessment of foreign military personnel who investigated 

this and other alleged incidents of CBW use in Mozambique during the early 
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1990s. As one foreign official who had investigated these incidents explained, 

“it’s very difficult to isolate cause of death when people are so malnourished 

and dehydrated when they die” Interview with foreign investigator, 

Johannesburg, South Africa, July 1992. See Purkitt, 1995 for additional details. 

143 According to Vernon Joynt, interviewed 14 June 2000. 

144 According to Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000. 

145 According to Prosecutor Dr. Torie Pretorius, interviewed 20 June 2000. 

146 According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

147 Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000. 

148 Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. 

149 According to a Weekly Mail & Guardian account, 14 November 1997. 

150 According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. Basson’s soft 

retirement meant that he was no longer an active member of the SADF but 

continued to draw a paycheck as a reserve SADF officer and doctor at a 

military hospital. 

151 This account of the Steyn Report relies on an interview with David Steward 

on 26 June 2000.

152 Interview with David Steward on 26 June 2000. 

153 According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

154 According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

155 See Knobel’s testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, July 

1998. 

156 Oppermann, “How the taxpayer footed the...” Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997. 

157 According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

158 According to Rocky Williams, ISS, Pretoria and former MK colonel, 

interviewed 15 June 2000. 

159 According to Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000. 

160 Interviews with Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Washington, D.C., 25 May 

and 31 August 2000. 

161 Interview with Peter Goosen, proliferation expert, Ministry of Foreign 

Affairs, Pretoria, 15 June 2000 
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162 According to Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000, Anglo-American 

cooperation on South Africa’s NBC program was not as smooth as it may have 

seemed. During the 1989-94 period, the British were was upset with the 

Americans at the latter’s efforts to promote their own “solution for South 

Africa.” 

163 Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000. 

164 Interview with Ambassador Lyman, 31 August 2000. 

165 Interview with Dr. Knobel, 15 June 2000. 

166 Mangold, Plague Wars, 243. 

167 Telephone interview with Roelof “Pik” Botha, 13 July 2000. He stressed in 

this interview that he never had detailed knowledge of South Africa’s CBW 

program, except when he had to obtain assurances that the program was closed 

down before South Africa signed the NPT. 

168 Interview by Helen Purkitt with senior South African OSD officials, 

Johannesburg, July 1997. 

169 Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994. 

170 Koch and Fleming, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994. 

171 Koch and Fleming, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994. 

172 General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. 

173 Oppermann, “How the taxpayer...,” Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997. 

174 Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed June 13, 2000. Phillips also commented that, at 

the time, General Meiring, Chief of SANDF, held the ANC-dominated 

government and parliament in “complete contempt.” 

175 Although Basson’s trips to Libya did decline after he was “rehired,” the 

South African government at one point placed Basson under an undeclared 

“house arrest.” 

176 Oppermann, “How the taxpayer...” Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997. 

177 Stefaans Brummer, The Mail and Guardian, 23 August 1996. 

178 This view was expressed in confidential interviews with both South African 

and U.S. officials. 

179 Soggot and Koch, Weekly Mail and Guardian archives, 27 June 1997. 

180 Max du Preez, “Forward” in Wendy Orr, From Biko to Basson. 

(Saxonwold, South Africa, Contra Press, 2000). 
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181 A rump TRC staff has remained to consider thousands of outstanding 

amnesty applications. The Commission plans to be out of business by early 

2001. 

182 According to the current staff of the TRC, the political climate of the day 

prevented the TRC from employing former military and intelligence personnel 

as researchers. Bishop Tutu and other senior members of the TRC reportedly 

accepted the criticisms that they were naïve about the willingness of senior 

politicians and some foot soldiers in the apartheid regime to engage in full 

disclosure and reconciliation in hindsight. According to these staff members, 

Bishop Tutu has stated recently that he would not have agreed to grant blanket 

amnesty, based on his experiences working with certain recalcitrant and 

unrepentant witnesses. The current TRC staff is planning to publish codicils to 

the original report covering former President de Klerk’s behavior as President, 

since a legal injunction by de Klerk forced the TRC to leave that section blank 

in the 1998 report. The Commission is also continuing to investigate the causes 

of the Heldenberg commercial airliner crash that was believed to be secretly 

carrying explosive materials for the nuclear program. An 800-page report 

about this incident was recently posted on the TRC web site and the 

Commission plans to issue a final report before it goes out of existence in 

2001. (Interview with Mr. Patti Prior, Advocate, and associates in the Legal 

Department of the TRC, Cape Town, 20 July 2000). 

The former top military leadership was so incensed by their treatment 

before the TRC and the procedures employed that they formed an informal 

Contact Bureau and issued an alternative report and response to the TRC final 

report. The purpose of this report was to address the flaws and perceived 

biased and unfair treatment of the SADF by the TRC and to provide the public 

with a “true picture of the Cold War and armed conflict – the spirit and 

dynamics, the psychoses and syndromes.” See Analysis of the TRC Report by 

the SADF Contact Bureau, 28 May 1999, compiled by Maj. Gen. Dirk Marais 

(ret.), Convener of the SADF Contact Bureau, Pretoria, South Africa. Despite 

this animosity, many of the retired generals associated with this network are 

now serving on advisory commissions for the SANDF. This group also 

maintains an office at SA Defense Headquarters. (Interview with Gen. (ret.) 

Dirk Marais, Convener of SADF Contact Bureau and telephone interview with 

Gen. (ret.) Jannie Geldenhuys, 13 July 2000). 

183 Orr, From Biko to Basson, 326. 

184 No coherent explanation has emerged to date to fully explain why Wouter 

Basson was caught peddling drugs or the timing of his drug arrest. Several of 

our interviewees emphasized the fact that there were tensions between the 

various agencies involved in monitoring Basson’s movements prior to his 

arrest. A couple of these interviewees reported that they were told that 
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Basson’s arrest was the result of the NIA losing out in a bureaucratic battle, 

after “others blew the whistle” on Basson’s drug activities. At the time of 

Basson’s arrest, several South African press reports attributed the timing of the 

arrest to CIA reports to the South African government that Basson was getting 

ready to flee the country, possibly to work in the Middle East, a few weeks 

before his arrest. The reports described how Basson had been under the 

protection of the NIA due to concerns that he would be the target of a foreign 

assassin. Chris Bateman “The man who knows too much about killing” Cape 

Times, (12 June 1998), 17. Another news report, which claimed to be based on 

OSEO sources, reported that Basson had sent four cases (three of them were 

worth R6m, R5,57m, and R220,815) out of country to banks in Luxemburg 

and Belgium, shortly before his arrest. The account went on to allege that 

British and Belgium secret agents were involved in these transactions. See 

Chris Bateman “Evil Einstein,” Cape Times, (12 June 1998), 17. 

185 At the time of Basson’s arrest, all of these investigators shared a sense of 

urgency because there was some question as to whether the government would 

be able to keep these records. These documents had been found towards the 

end of the week and the investigators were concerned that Basson's lawyers 

would be able to successfully argue in court the following week that the 

contents of the trunks were personal property. (Interview with Dr. VillaVicencia, 20 July 2000). 

186 The “verkope lys” was a list of items, allegedly ordered by Dr. Basson and 

given to CCB operatives. This list includes anthrax-infected cigarettes, 

shampoo poisoned with an insecticide, and poisoned chocolates. Orr, 328-9. 

See Appendix I for the complete list. 

187 Interview with Dr. Villa-Vicencia, former senior investigator for the TRC, 

21 July 2000. 

188 Interview with Dr. Villa-Vicencia, former senior investigator for the TRC, 

21 July 2000. 

189 For additional details of this meeting that included representatives of the old 

and new military and political guard, see Orr, 331-2. Dr. Orr notes that she 

arrived at this hastily called meeting and found that she was the only TRC (and 

the only woman) representative among the 40 participants. 

190 Orr, 332. She notes that Dr. Folb made himself forever unpopular with 

many participants at this meeting by making this observation. 

191 Chandre Gould confirmed the agreement regarding the status of documents 

in a telephone interview in July 2000. 

192 Telephone interview with Dr. Peter Folb, Cape Town, 20 July 2000. 
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193 For example, Dr Jan Lourens, a bio engineer who worked at Delta G and 

later headed Protechnek, was one of the scientists who applied for amnesty to 

the TRC after Basson’s arrest. He called the claims that Project Coast was a 

defensive program “nonsense.” He proved to be a particularly effective witness 

as he was able to produce some of the “James Bond type” weapons developed 

to deliver fatal doses of poison applicators (including umbrellas, screw drivers, 

signet ring with spring-loaded dose-powder) that had been made to order for 

Wouter Basson during his testimony. Lourens was also crucial as a witness 

because he testified that SADF chief Gen Kat Liebenberg told him to “forget 

about the whole thing...” and then told Lourens that “those are my toys...I 

want them back.” Instead, he had buried these “toys” at his Northern Transvaal 

farm and resigned from the military. After Basson’s arrest he told his story to 

Transvaal attorney general J. d’Oliveira and testified before the TRC. 

A former senior procurement official for Delta-G who worked for the 

company for eight years agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. This official 

proved to be very helpful since he kept a diary of contained details about all 

products and raw materials that entered the facility. The diary also described 

several business dealings that he had with Thor Chemicals executive, Alan 

Kidger, who was subsequently brutally murdered. This unnamed senior 

procurement official described Delta-G as "state-of-the-art” research 

laboratories consisting of five different facilities and described the cell 

structures that ensured that nobody really knew what the other was doing. 

194 Michael Evans, “South Africa may have ordered British deaths,” The Times

(14 July 1998), 7. 

195 Paraphrase of comments made by Dr. Villa-Vicencia, former senior 

investigator for TRC during an interview in July 2000. 

196 Frontline transcript of interview from Plague Wars: A report on biological 

weapons threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bioweapons. 1998 PBS Online and WBGH/FRONTLINE television show, 

http://www. pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/. 

197 This figure does not include the prosecution cost, those of the seven-year 

Office for Serious Economic Offenses investigation, or the cost of forensic 

auditor Hennie Bruwer’s investigation. 

198 Information in this section is based on an interview with Laura Polleciett, 

Director, Freedom of Expression (FIX) and several South African reporters 

during July 2000, and on information contained in FIX administrative files. 

199 Report on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) Transcript on 

South Africa’s Chemical and Biological Warfare. Freedom of Expression 

Institute, WWBI:\CS\GB\MM\TRCHearings_CBW.doc., 4/1/99. 
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200 By the seventh week of the trial even the prosecution lacked the funds to 

pay for court transcripts. The Court adjourned at the end of November 1999, 

reserving the right to re-examine former Surgeon General Knobel once they 

had examined the transcripts of the evidence. This delay was necessitated by 

the fact that the prosecution team lacked the funds to purchase the daily 

transcripts from the transcription services! 

201 A comprehensive search of all newspapers indexed in Nexis/Lexis during 

one week that the Basson trial was scheduled to be in session in Jacksonville, 

Florida did not locate a singe published account of these proceedings. This fact 

underscores how dependent observers are on a single source for their 

information about the trial. 

202 One worked for Black Sash, an NGO founded by white women liberals, 

whose initial mission was to help nonwhites who had run afoul of apartheid

pass laws. 

203 During the late 1980s after the former South African government had 

banned nearly all labor and civic organizations that supported majority rule, a 

loose coalition of groups forms under the umbrella of the United Democratic 

Movement (UDM). UDM served as the principle source of legal political 

opposition to the apartheid regime. Continuing crackdowns led to many new, 

small non-governmental organizations being formed. Funding to promote 

democracy by the US and other Western countries was critical to the operation 

of many of these groups to exist throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. 

Currently organizations such as FIX are struggling to stay in business due the 

lack of financial support from domestic or international donors. 

204 Interview with Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor in the Basson trial, 12 July 2000. 

205 Interview with Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor in the Basson trial, 12 July 2000. 

206 Much of the descriptive narrative in this section relies on the trial 

summaries posted on the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) web site and 

South African press accounts of actions taken during the trial to date. To 

access these summaries, see http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/cbw/cbw_index.html

207 The prosecution also objected to conspiracy charges arguing that it was 

unprecedented for a person to be charged with conspiracy to murder when the 

murder took place in another country. The reporter covering the trial for CCR, 

Marlene Burger, noted in her summary that there was a precedent in South 

Africa for this, since the case against former policeman, Eugene De Kock, 

included charges for crimes committed in another country (see Trial Week 

One, CCR Web Page. Both prosecutors in this case, Dr. Tore Pretorius and 

Anton Ackerman (SC), are well aware of this precedent as they represented the 
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State in its successful prosecution of De Kock in his capacity as head of the 

CCB unit of the South African police. 

208 The judge also threw out two murder charges that occurred in Swaziland 

and a plot by an SADF hit squad to contaminate the water of a SWAPO transit 

camp with cholera shortly before the Namibian elections. The judge upheld the 

state’s right to prosecute Basson for the death of a Swapo member who was 

fed poisoned “jungle juice” in Owamboland because this victim was flown to a 

military hospital in South Africa for treatment and thus, died within the court’s 

jurisdiction (Week Two, CCR Trial summary). 

209 Interview with Dr. Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor, 12 July 2000. 

210 Marlene Burger, the investigative reporter who is taking notes during the 

trial for the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), observed in a phone 

interview that this was a highly unusual. In most complex cases involving 

intricate corporate maneuvers judges bring in expert assessors to help them 

interpret the evidence. (Interview, July 2000). 

211 Quotes taken from the CCR Trial Summary for week twelve. 

212 Interviews with South African authorities, July 2000 

213 Interviews with U.S. authorities, July 2000. 

214 Frontline transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons 

threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons,

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/ . 
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