IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-30018

WORLD FUEL SERVICES SINGAPORE PTE, LIMITED, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

M/V AS VARESIA, her engines, tackle, apparel, etcetera, in rem, 

 Defendant - Appellee

MS AS VARESIA GMBH & COMPANY KG, 

 Claimant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:16-CV-17435 

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Appellant, a Singapore-based marine fuel supplier, seeks to recover a 

debt arising from the supply of fuel to a Liberian-flagged vessel, the M/V AS 

VARESIA, whose owner is the real party in interest in this case. This appeal 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 12, 2018

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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concerns whether the district court reversibly erred by vacating an arrest of 

the vessel. Finding it did not, we AFFIRM.

I

In 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant World Fuel Services Singapore PTE Ltd. 

(World Fuel) contracted to provide marine fuel to Denmar Chartering and 

Trading GMBH (Denmar), which was chartering the cargo ship M/V AS 

VARESIA (the Varesia). The fuel was delivered on November 4, 2012, and 

World Fuel sent an invoice to the Varesia “AND/OR HER 

OWNERS/OPERATORS” and Denmar for $612,459.56. The invoice indicated 

that the balance was due by December 4, 2012. Denmar failed to pay this 

invoice by the due date, but did wire one payment of $200,023 on January 18, 

2013, and one payment of $500,023 on January 22, 2013. The parties dispute 

whether these payments were to be apportioned to the Varesia invoice or to 

other debts Denmar owed World Fuel. 

Denmar liquidated via insolvency proceedings in Germany in or around

July 2013. World Fuel received notice of these proceedings by September 2013, 

but did not participate in them. World Fuel alleges that, at the time of 

Denmar’s insolvency, Denmar owed World Fuel over five million dollars across

multiple invoices, including the Varesia invoice. World Fuel claims that 

Denmar’s failure to pay for the fuel gave rise to a maritime lien on the Varesia.

In May 2015, World Fuel sent a demand letter to MS AS VARESIA 

GMBH & Company KG, the owner of the Varesia (the Owner). In May 2016, 

World Fuel again demanded payment from the Owner and commenced a legal 

action in Australia to arrest the vessel, but ultimately did not have the vessel 

arrested. 

On the evening of December 10, 2016, the Varesia arrived in the 

Mississippi River. On December 15th, World Fuel filed a complaint in the 

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Eastern District of Louisiana seeking to enforce its lien and seeking a warrant

for the arrest of the Varesia. A warrant issued that same day, but at World 

Fuel’s request, the warrant was not served until the morning of January 5, 

2017.

Hours after the warrant was served, the Owner filed a motion to vacate 

the arrest, arguing, inter alia, that any lien had “been extinguished by the 

operation of laches and/or by payment.” In its memorandum in support of 

vacatur, the Owner contended that Denmar had allocated specific payments to 

the Varesia invoice, thereby extinguishing any lien on the Varesia. The Owner 

also argued that laches barred enforcement of the lien because (1) World Fuel’s

action was filed after the expiration of the analogous limitations period, (2) 

World Fuel’s delay was not excusable, and, as a result of the unjustified delay, 

(3) the Owner suffered prejudice in its ability to defend against the claim. 

The district court held a hearing on the motion to vacate the morning of 

Friday, January 6th. Counsel for World Fuel stated that he had not seen the 

motion to vacate until “very late” the night before, and so had not had an 

opportunity to research the laches issue. However, World Fuel asserted that 

in the years between the invoice and the arrest of the vessel in New Orleans, 

it “was attempting to collect from Denmar and following the [Varesia] to seek 

an opportunity to enforce the lien,” suggesting that World Fuel could not 

enforce its lien until the Varesia entered the United States. In response to the 

court’s questions about what “course of conduct” demonstrated “any type of 

attempt to pursue the claim,” rather than just the vessel, World Fuel pointed 

to the demand letter sent to the Owner in 2015 and stated that there may have 

been other factors showing World Fuel’s diligence. World Fuel continued that,

even if there was unjustified delay, there was no resultant prejudice to the 

Owner inasmuch as the record was “clear” that the Owner had “the ear of 

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Denmar’s [former] managing director,” the ability to get “documents from 

him,” and the ability to get “a sworn declaration from him.”

At the end of the motion hearing, the district court stated that it did not 

believe that the Owner’s argument regarding apportionment of payments to 

the Varesia debt successfully defeated World Fuel’s right to effect an arrest in 

good faith. However, the court requested an opposition memorandum from 

World Fuel addressing the Owner’s arguments with respect to laches. The 

court expressed concern that the Varesia had been taken out of commerce, 

which the Owner claimed cost roughly $27,000 per day. Accordingly, the court 

stated that any additional filings should be submitted by 9:00 am Monday, 

January 9th, so as to expedite the matter while giving World Fuel the 

opportunity to “respond fully to the laches argument.” The court indicated that 

it might rule on the motion as early as 9:45 am on January 9th.

On January 9th, the court extended the deadline for filing a response to 

11:00 am. World Fuel failed to file any opposition before the deadline. At 2:15 

pm, the court ruled that, “[o]n the showing made,” the warrant for the arrest 

of the Varesia was improvidently issued and should be vacated. After the 

district court entered its order, World Fuel filed its opposition. The district 

court then entered an order denying World Fuel’s “Ex Parte Emergency Motion 

to Reconsider.” That motion is not in the record on appeal. 

On January 10th, World Fuel filed a notice of appeal “from the 

order/judgment” that was “rendered and entered on January 9, 2017,” citing to 

the docket number of the order vacating the arrest of the Varesia. 

II

In maritime cases, as is the general rule in civil appeals, we review the 

district court’s factual determinations “for clear error and its conclusions of law 

de novo.” United States v. Ex-USS Cabot/Dedalo, 297 F.3d 378, 381 (5th Cir. 

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2002) (emphasis omitted). “The existence of laches is a question of fact,” Esso 

Int’l, Inc. v. The SS Captain John, 443 F.2d 1144, 1150 (5th Cir. 1971) (citing 

McDaniel v. Gulf & S. Am. Steamship Co., 228 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1955)), and 

therefore it is reviewed for clear error. 

III

Under the Commercial Instruments and Maritime Liens Act, “a person 

providing necessaries to a vessel on the order of the owner or a person 

authorized by the owner . . . has a maritime lien on the vessel.” 46 U.S.C. 

§ 31342(a)(1).1 When a party has a maritime lien, the mechanism of 

enforcement is an in rem action commenced by the arrest of the vessel. See, 

e.g., Merchs. Nat’l Bank v. Dredge Gen. G. L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338, 1344–

45 (5th Cir. 1981). After a vessel is arrested, the owner is entitled to a prompt 

post-seizure hearing, “at which the plaintiff shall be required to show why the 

arrest or attachment should not be vacated or other relief granted consistent 

with” the applicable rules of procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. SUPP. R. E(4)(f) (Rule 

E); see also Rule E Notes of Advisory Committee on 1985 Amendments (“The 

plaintiff has the burden of showing why the seizure should not be vacated.”). 

“The hearing is not intended to definitively resolve the dispute between the 

parties; rather, the [c]ourt must make a preliminary determination whether 

reasonable grounds exist for the arrest.” A. Coker & Co. v. Nat’l Shipping 

Agency Corp., No. CIV. A. 99-1440, 1999 WL 311941, at *1 (E.D. La. May 17, 

1999) (citing Salazar v. Atl. Sun, 881 F.2d 73, 79–80 (3d Cir. 1989)).

World Fuel argues that the district court’s deadline to file an opposition

did not allow sufficient time to prepare an opposition memorandum. World 

Fuel asserts that its ability to meet this deadline was hampered because its 

 

1 The parties do not dispute for present purposes that the basic prerequisites of this 

provision have been met.

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“witness for the laches issue was largely unavailable to gather documents and 

prepare his supporting affidavit because of out-of-town Navy Reserve” duty. 

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not impose any formal 

requirements for a post-seizure hearing, leaving the procedural details to local 

rules or the district court’s discretion. See S & S Diesel Marine Servs. v. M/V 

F-Troop, No. 11-60020-CIV, 2011 WL 1899402, at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 18, 2011) 

(“As the Supplemental Admiralty rules do not specify the form of the postarrest hearing, the details of the proceeding are left to the [c]ourt’s discretion.” 

(citing Salazar, 881 F.2d at 79)). World Fuel did not object to the district 

court’s deadline at the motion hearing and, on appeal, World Fuel does not 

point to any rule contravened by the district court’s short deadline. The district 

court did not arbitrarily set a tight deadline; rather, it explained its concern 

that the Owner was incurring significant costs each day the Varesia was 

arrested and therefore out of commerce. World Fuel does not argue that this 

concern was unfounded. Thus, World Fuel has not shown that the district 

court abused its discretion in setting the deadline to file an opposition 

memorandum.

Nor has World Fuel established an abuse of discretion as to the district 

court’s refusal to withhold judgment until it received World Fuel’s response. 

Extra-record materials cited by World Fuel show that, at 7:29 am on the day 

its response was due, World Fuel requested an extension until 11:00 am based 

on the unavailability of its witness. This extension was granted. At 11:44 am, 

a district court law clerk emailed counsel for World Fuel, inquiring about the 

status of the opposition on the judge’s behalf. World Fuel replied that it 

“should have everything together by 1:30 [pm].” The law clerk responded that 

the judge was in a meeting until 1:00 pm. At 1:59 pm, counsel for World Fuel 

emailed that the “client and his supervisor [were] reviewing the papers for 

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approval. [He] should have them shortly.” The court issued its order at 2:15

pm. World Fuel emailed its response to the court at 2:22 pm. At 2:45 pm, 

World Fuel emailed the judge’s law clerk an “Ex Parte Emergency Motion to 

Reconsider,” which, as reflected by the record, was denied. 

The court granted World Fuel the only two extensions it expressly 

requested, formally to 11:00 am and then tacitly to 1:30 pm. In light of the 

district court’s broad discretion to enforce its filing deadlines, cf., e.g., Hetzel v. 

Bethlehem Steel Corp., 50 F.3d 360, 367 (5th Cir. 1995), World Fuel has not 

demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant 

additional extensions.

Further, to the extent World Fuel argues that the district court erred by 

failing to reconsider its order in light of World Fuel’s late-filed opposition, 

World Fuel’s failure to appeal the denial of its motion for reconsideration

deprives us of jurisdiction to review that order. One of the minimum 

prerequisites for a notice of appeal is to “designate the judgment, order, or part 

thereof being appealed.” FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1)(B); see Kinsley v. Lakeview 

Reg’l Med. Ctr. LLC, 570 F.3d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 2009). This rule is construed 

liberally, such that “[a] mistake in designating orders to be appealed does not 

bar review if the intent to appeal a particular judgment can be fairly inferred 

and if the appellee is not prejudiced or misled by the mistake.” N.Y. Life Ins. 

Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Friou v. Phillips 

Petroleum Co., 948 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1991)). However, “when only a 

specified judgment or part thereof is noticed, the notice of appeal is generally 

strictly construed.” Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695, 700 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(quoting United States v. O’Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 890 n.4 (5th Cir. 1997)). 

World Fuel’s notice of appeal references the particular docket number of 

the order vacating the arrest and in no way intimates that other orders are 

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being appealed. Moreover, World Fuel’s briefing does not make clear that it is 

appealing the order denying reconsideration, and World Fuel does not argue 

that this court has jurisdiction over an appeal from that order. Inadequately 

briefed arguments are generally deemed forfeited. See Carl E. Woodward, 

L.L.C. v. Acceptance Indem. Ins. Co., 743 F.3d 91, 96 (5th Cir. 2014). We 

therefore will not consider whether the district court abused its discretion in 

denying World Fuel’s motion for reconsideration, as this issue is not properly 

before us.

This leads us to the district court’s merits determination, which we will 

consider in light of the arguments and evidence before the court at the time it 

ruled. See World Fuel Servs. Singapore Pte, Ltd. v. Bulk Juliana M/V, 822 

F.3d 766, 772 n.2 (5th Cir. 2016) (arguments not made in the district court 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); Theriot v. Par. of Jefferson, 185 

F.3d 477, 491 n.26 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An appellate court may not consider new 

evidence furnished for the first time on appeal and may not consider facts 

which were not before the district court at the time of the challenged ruling.”).2 

Where a party unreasonably delays in asserting a maritime lien, the lien 

may be extinguished by the doctrine of laches. See The Key City, 81 U.S. 653, 

660 (1871). “Laches is an equitable doctrine that, if proved, is a complete 

defense to an action irrespective of whether the analogous state statute of 

limitation has run.” Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209, 

1215 (5th Cir. 1980). This court employs a three-part test to determine 

whether laches precludes enforcement of a lien, deciding: (1) whether there 

was a delay in asserting the lien; (2) whether the delay was excusable; and (3) 

whether the delay resulted in undue prejudice to the party against whom the 

 

2 World Fuel fails to explain why this court should consider its additional arguments 

and evidence. Thus, and for the reasons previously discussed, we will not.

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lien is asserted. See id. Courts regularly look to an analogous statute of 

limitations to guide the analysis of what constitutes an unreasonable or 

inexcusable delay. See, e.g., id. But “[r]ather than marking an absolute cutoff date beyond which injured parties may no longer effectively bring suit, the 

analogous limitations period determines where falls the burden of proving or 

disproving inexcusable delay and resulting prejudice.” Barrois v. Nelda Faye, 

Inc., 597 F.2d 881, 884 (5th Cir. 1979). “Where . . . the statute has run prior to 

instituting suit, the plaintiff must prove either absence of prejudice or excuse 

for delay to repel a claim of laches.” Mecom, 622 F.2d at 1215 (citing Watz v. 

Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 11 (5th Cir. 1970)).

In the district court, the Owner asserted that: (1) the analogous statute 

of limitations was three years; (2) World Fuel had not taken any action against 

the Owner in those three years, aside from tracking the vessel and contacting 

the Owner once in May 2015 and once in May 2016, despite the fact that World 

Fuel knew that Denmar was insolvent by September 2013; (3) the Varesia 

ported multiple times in jurisdictions in which World Fuel could have arrested 

her; and (4) World Fuel’s delay prejudiced the Owner’s ability to defend against

World Fuel’s claim because it can no longer obtain corporate records from 

Denmar that might substantiate the Owner’s other principal theory in defense, 

that there was an agreement to allocate certain payments to the Varesia debt. 

At the time of the district court’s ruling, World Fuel’s counterarguments 

were limited. It had not made any arguments supporting its assertion that a 

different analogous statute of limitations should be considered. World Fuel 

argued that it had been diligent in enforcing its lien as, from 2012 until the 

time of the arrest in 2016, World Fuel attempted “to collect from Denmar and 

follow[ed] the vessel to seek an opportunity to enforce the lien”; it sent a 

demand letter to the Owner in 2015; and it filed papers commencing arrest 

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proceedings in Australia in 2016. World Fuel also implied that the Varesia 

had not docked anywhere that World Fuel could have seized her until she

arrived in New Orleans, though the Owner disputed this point. World Fuel

claimed that the Owner had not been prejudiced by the delay in enforcement 

because it had access to Denmar employees who could testify in support of the 

Owner’s position as well as documents bearing on its defense. 

World Fuel had the “burden of showing why the [arrest of the Varesia] 

should not be vacated.” See Rule E Notes of Advisory Committee. In light of 

its failure to make specific and timely arguments to the contrary, World Fuel 

cannot show that it was erroneous for the district court to look to Louisiana’s 

three-year statute of limitations and, accordingly, to place the burden of 

proving excusable delay or lack of prejudice on World Fuel. See Barrois, 597 

F.2d at 884. The Owner made plausible arguments tending to show that World 

Fuel’s delay was not reasonable and that the Owner was prejudiced by this 

delay. World Fuel’s contention that it sent two demand letters and tracked the 

Varesia is not sufficient to show diligence. Nor was World Fuel’s disputed 

assertion that it was unable to seize the Varesia before she arrived in New 

Orleans. And although World Fuel argued that the Owner could obtain some 

information from Denmar’s former managing director, World Fuel provided 

nothing to the district court tending to rebut the Owner’s claim that other 

relevant documentary evidence was rendered unavailable by delaying 

enforcement of the lien until long after Denmar’s liquidation. Like many of the 

issues in this appeal, invocation of laches “is addressed to the sound discretion 

of the trial court.” Goodwyn v. Dredge Ginger Ann, 342 F.2d 197, 197 (5th Cir. 

1965). Given the circumstances, World Fuel has not shown that the district 

court’s invocation of laches at this preliminary stage in the proceedings 

constitutes reversible error.

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***

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

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