ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM 

AND U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS: 

A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPLIANCE 

James M. Smith 

INSS Occasional Paper 14 

Environmental Security Series

June 1997 

USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado 
ii
iii

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 

necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Air 

Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. This paper is 

approved for public release by SAF/PAS; distribution is unlimited. The 

findings of this paper are the result of research conducted during 1996 under 

the auspices of an INSS grant. 

* * * * * * * 

Comments pertaining to this paper are invited and should be forwarded to: 

 Director, USAF Institute for National Security Studies 

 HQ USAFA/DFES 

 2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5L27 

 USAF Academy, CO 80840 

 phone: 719-333-2717 

 fax: 719-333-2716 

 email: inss@usafa.af.mil 

* * * * * * * 

Visit the Institute for National Security Studies home page at 

http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Foreword vii 

Executive Summary ix 

Introduction 1 

Context: Environmental Regulation in the United States 2 

States and Environmental Federalism 7 

Implementation Models 10 

Four Case Studies 13 

 Wyoming 13 

 Oklahoma 14 

 Colorado 16 

 California 19 

Analysis and Recommendations 21 

 Command Structures 23 

Conclusion 28 

Endnotes 29
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vii

FOREWORD 

Environmental security issues have emerged as one of the most 

important non-traditional security concerns of the post-Cold War era. This 

paper traces the development of the increasingly complex and stringent 

environmental standards found in the United States. It then focuses on how 

the U.S. military can best comply with these standards at both the national and 

state levels. Dr Smith finds that many of the most important environmental 

compliance issues for the U.S. military have devolved from the national to the 

state level. He uses case studies and an environmental capacity/motivation 

model developed by James Lester to categorize and predict state 

environmental policies. Dr Smith argues that the military must take 

environmental federalism into account in order to craft successful compliance 

strategies and organizations. 

INSS is pleased to publish this second INSS Occasional Paper in the 

Institute’s environmental security series, with funding from the Army 

Environmental Policy Institute located at the Georgia Institute of Technology. 

This paper should be very useful and interesting to all who deal with 

environmental compliance issues. 

About the Institute 

 INSS is primarily sponsored by the Policy Division, Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation Directorate, Headquarters US Air Force (USAF/XONP) 

and the Dean of the Faculty, US Air Force Academy. Our other current 

sponsors include: the Air Staff’s Directorate for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance (USAF/XOI); OSD Net Assessment; the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency; the Army Environmental Policy Institute; Army Space 

Command; and the On-Site Inspection Agency. The mission of the Institute is 

to promote national security research for the Department of Defense within the 

military academic community, and to support the Air Force national security 

education program. Its primary purpose is to promote research in fields of 
viii

interest to INSS’ sponsors: international security policy (especially arms 

control and nonproliferation/counterproliferation), Air Force planning issues, 

regional security policy, conflict in the information age (including the 

revolution in military affairs and information warfare), environmental security, 

and space policy. 

INSS coordinates and focuses outside thinking in various disciplines 

and across services to develop new ideas for USAF policy making. The 

Institute develops topics, selects researchers from within the military academic 

community, and administers sponsored research. It also hosts conferences and 

workshops which facilitate the dissemination of information to a wide range of 

private and government organizations. INSS is in its fifth year of providing 

valuable, cost-effective research to meet the needs of the Air Staff and our 

other sponsors. We appreciate your continued interest in INSS and its 

research products. 

PETER L. HAYS, Lt Colonel, USAF 

Director, Institute for National Security Studies 
ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Recent regulatory trends and political decisions have resulted in 

devolution of environmental regulation responsibility from the federal 

government to the states. The resulting compliance situation for the military is 

one of multiple bureaucracies, layered regulations, duplicated reporting 

requirements, and conflicting mission priorities, all in a "business" in which 

there is an inherent potential for significant environmental damage. The 

military official charged with environmental compliance is responding to 

many masters and pressures. This paper suggests a compliance strategy and 

organization to respond to environmental devolution and federalism. 

 The context of environmental regulation policy today is incremental 

(progressing with advances in science and politics through a series of 

increasingly broad regulatory requirements); fragmented (between pollution 

mediums—air, water, waste—and between executive agencies, legislative 

committees, courts, interest groups, and state agencies); and federal (with 

national, state, and local governments sharing responsibilities for 

environmental standards and enforcement). 

 Empirical studies of state regulatory policy find that political factors, 

such as party control of the governorship and the legislature, bureaucratic 

capability, and recent changes in state population, best explain state actions. 

Economic factors (state wealth and competition with other states, the 

economic significance of the polluting industries) are also important 

influences. Overall, state environmental policy can be explained by the 

severity of the state's pollution problem, the wealth of the state's population, 

the partisanship of state politics, and the organizational capacity of the state 

government. 

 Attempts to specify an integrated model of state policy actions are of 

mixed utility, but a model by James Lester that focuses on state bureaucratic 

capacity and environmental motivation appears to have utility for predicting 

state enforcement on military installations. Field interviews at military bases 
x

in four states (California, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Wyoming), each 

representing one of Lester's four policy making and enforcement categories, 

demonstrate that the model is highly accurate in characterizing state actions. 

 Since environmental federalism is here to stay, military 

environmental managers should devise a compliance strategy which adapts to 

local demands while also ensuring continuing mission accomplishment. 

Armed with current knowledge of state motivation and capacity for 

environmental regulation, the strategy must incorporate continuity, coherence, 

and communications. Continuity is essential in the face of incremental 

environmental policy changes, coherence helps bridge the fragmented policies 

and organizations that characterize environmental enforcement today, and 

communications are needed to help state regulators understand the unique 

demands of the military mission while also keeping base environmental 

managers informed of state concerns. 

 As environmental regulation is characterized by layered federal and 

state regulations increasingly enforced by the states, a state-centered 

compliance strategy might best be implemented by a military structure built 

around the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. 

Service commands are not generally helpful as intermediaries between base 

and service officials and should be removed from the environmental chain of 

command. Total centralization of bases under service headquarters would 

limit the local adaptability needed in today’s decentralized situation. 

Conversely, total decentralization to the base level, while consistent with the 

management structure chosen by the National Park Service, is inconsistent 

with military culture and tradition. With national standards and state 

enforcement, a mix of national input adapted to fit local base conditions would 

best combine coherence with adaptability. 

 Finally, continuity in local base management is also essential. Baselevel environmental managers must have tenure to lend the continuity and 

coherence which the strategy calls for. Military tour extension or reliance on 

civilian personnel in these positions would seem to be indicated. Research 
xi

also indicates that state and local regulators tend to lump all military 

installations into one category, so tenured base managers must communicate 

with each other to learn of issues and precedents which may affect them. 

 The states will continue to sit at the center of American 

environmental regulation. Knowing what drives state policy and action, 

understanding how one’s state combines motivation and capacity to determine 

its particular enforcement, and adapting national direction to form a 

continuous, coherent base compliance strategy will allow bases to complete 

their military missions within environmental constraints. All of this requires 

constant monitoring, analysis, adaptation, and communication. Bases carry 

out national policy mandates, but they are also tenants within state 

environments. They must adapt to both sets of demands. 
xii

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY 

Lieutenant General Paul E. Stein 

Superintendent 

Brigadier General Ruben A. Cubero 

Dean of the Faculty 

HEADQUARTERS, US AIR FORCE 

PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE 

Major General Thomas H. Neary 

Director, Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

Colonel Dutch Miller 

Chief, Policy Division 

USAF INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES 

Lieutenant Colonel Peter L. Hays 

Director 

Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey A. Larsen 

Editor 

Ms Marsha Taylor 

Cover Design 
xiii

INSS OCCASIONAL PAPERS

1. Explaining Weapons Proliferation: Going Beyond the Security Dilemma. 

Gregory J. Rattray, July 1994 

2. The Ukrainian Military: Instrument for Defense or Domestic Challenge? 

Oleg Strekal, November 1994 

3. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration’s 

Response. William E. Berry, Jr., March 1995 

4. Environmental Assistance as National Security Policy: Helping the 

Former Soviet Union Find Solutions to its Environmental Problems. Robert 

L. Dunaway, November 1995 

5. Economic Power in the Sino-U.S. Relationship. Kevin F. Donovan, 

December 1995 

6. Nuclear Proliferation: Diminishing Threat? William H. Kincade, 

December 1995

7. Nuclear Proliferation: The Diplomatic Role of Non-Weaponized 

Programs. Rosalind R. Reynolds, January 1996

8. Five Minutes Past Midnight: The Clear and Present Danger of Nuclear 

Weapons Grade Fissile Materials. Guy B. Roberts, February 1996 

9. The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare. Richard 

W. Aldrich, April 1996 

10. Weapons Proliferation and Organized Crime: The Russian Military and 

Security Force Dimension. Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., June 1996 

11. Melancholy Reunion: A Report from the Future on the Collapse of 

Civil-Military Relations in the United States. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., October 

1996 

12. Russia’s Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An 

Opportunity for Arms Control. Stephen P. Lambert and David A. Miller, 

April 1997

13. Political-Military Affairs Officers and the Air Force: Continued 

Turbulence in a Vital Career Specialty. James E. Kinzer and Marybeth 

Peterson Ulrich, April 1997 
Environmental Federalism and U.S. Military Installations: 

A Framework for Compliance 

Introduction 

 Recent regulatory trends and political decisions have resulted in 

continuing devolution of environmental regulation responsibility from the 

federal government to the states. This devolution presents all regulated 

enterprises with a more complex environmental compliance situation, one with 

potentially significant implications. Obviously, the impact is minimal on the 

single-site, single-pollutant small business, and it is much greater on the 

multiple-site, multiple-pollutant complex business. However, it presents 

perhaps an even greater challenge to the US military, which operates bases 

and posts throughout the United States, most of which include a community, 

many hosting a commercial area, and each focusing around a military 

operational mission with its uninterrupted accomplishment being a matter of 

national security concern. 

 The resulting compliance situation for the military is one of multiple 

bureaucracies, layered state and federal regulations, duplicated reporting 

requirements and channels, and conflicting mission priorities—all in a 

“business” with inherent potential for significant environmental damage.1

 The 

military official charged with environmental compliance is serving many 

masters and responding to many pressures. Does this mean that the military 

services must devolve compliance strategy-making and implementation to 

each and every installation to deal with its own set of federal, state, and local 

concerns? Or must the services establish 50 different state compliance 

structures to address the regulation regime at the state level? What is the 

trade-off between national security concerns and local environmental 
2

pressures, and what is the balance between federal direction and local 

implementation? In short, how does the military comply on compliance? 

 This paper suggests a compliance strategy and organization, or at 

least a manageably small set of compliance options, for the military to respond 

to environmental devolution. First, we review the context of environmental 

regulation to identify its key characteristics today. Next, within that context, 

the paper addresses the central factors that determine state environmental 

regulation and enforcement. Three state implementation models are discussed 

as vehicles to simplify and group the states for use in designing military 

environmental compliance strategies. The results of field interviews and 

analysis of one of these models are presented to confirm its applicability. 

Finally, we consider the implications of this analysis of environmental 

enforcement under devolution, along with some preliminary recommendations 

for designing a military compliance strategy and structure for the twenty-first 

century. 

Context: Environmental Regulation in the United States 

 Environmental regulation has become a major factor in American 

politics and public policy. The agenda was set by both a forceful recognition 

of the problem, including several environmental disasters, and the 

mobilization of political activism during the 1960s. The first generation of 

federal regulation was enacted by Congress in the 1960s and was followed by 

broader, more stringent regulation in the 1970s. After a pause, caused both by 

politics and the need for science to catch up with policy, new and even more 

demanding regulations were enacted in the 1980s. The 1990s are seeing the 

enforcement of these regulations devolve increasingly to the states. 

Figure 1: Major Federal Environmental Laws2
3

1963 Clean Air Act 

1964 Wilderness Act 

1965 Highway Beautification Act 

1965 Water Quality Act 

1967 Air Quality Act 

1968 Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 

1969 National Environmental Policy Act 

1969 Endangered Species Conservation Act 

1970 Clean Air Amendments 

1970 Water Quality Improvement Act 

1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act 

1972 Marine Mammal Protection Act 

1972 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act 

1972 Coastal Zone Management Act 

1972 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act 

1972 Noise Control Act 

1973 Endangered Species Act 

1974 Safe Drinking Water Act 

1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act 

1976 National Forest Management Act 

1976 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 

1976 Toxic Substance Control Act 

1977 Clean Air Act Amendments 

1977 Clean Water Act 

1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 

1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments 

1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

 Liability Act 

1980 Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 

1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 

1986 Safe Drinking Water Amendments 

1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 

1987 Water Quality Act 

1988 Endangered Species Act Reauthorization 

1988 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments 

American environmental regulation today is characterized by incrementalism, 

fragmentation, and federalism. 

 Environmental legislation and regulation have developed in 

increments since the 1960s. Major American environmental laws enacted 

from the 1960s through the 1980s are summarized in Figure 1. The 1960s saw 

environmental issues firmly established on the federal policy agenda, but the 
4

substance of the legislation was relatively thin. Technical knowledge was still 

lacking, and institutional capabilities to deal with these ill-defined problems 

were often nonexistent. The federal government acted in response to the 

growing popular environmental movement, but it took only very cautious first 

steps. This set the stage for the 1970s—the environmental decade. 

 The early environmental movement was spurred both by the general 

appeal of the topic and some highly visible environmental disasters in the late 

1960s, as well as by the general spirit of political activism of the 1960s. It had 

won broad support and popular acceptance by Earth Day 1970. The 

politicians recognized and seized this situation early in the decade. President 

Nixon sought to place himself at the center of environmental issues in an 

attempt to preempt support for his likely 1972 rival, Senator Ed Muskie, the 

congressional champion of environmental legislation. With the President and 

a key Senator from the opposite party both supporting environmental action, 

the government responded with a series of environmental acts.3

 Figure 1 

points out the power of election years—1972 and 1976 in particular. 

 The 1970s institutionalized environmental regulation, but also 

pointed out many problems in implementing those regulations. In some cases 

the lack of technical knowledge about pollutants and their effects, coupled 

with delays in developing technical solutions to the problems, required 

amending the regulation. In other cases institutional shortcomings led to the 

need to change requirements. In any case, problems with 1970s regulation 

plus the anti-regulatory ideology of the Reagan Administration put new 

environmental regulation on hold for much of the 1980s. Only legislation 

addressing the extreme problems of toxic waste, along with a few amendments 

to the 1970s standards, succeeded in clearing congressional and administration 

hurdles into law.4

 The 1980s debate centered around both ideology and cost. 

Republicans, pushing Reagan’s New Federalism concepts, backed an ideology 

of deregulation—removing federal government oversight from a number of 

regulated sectors and areas. Democrats were generally successful in keeping 
5

federal environmental regulation in place, but at the time all sides began to 

recognize its high costs, both to government and to regulated businesses. This 

debate carried over into the 1990s, particularly into the 104th Congress and its 

antiregulatory ideology.5

 As Figure 1 points out, environmental regulation of 

most pollutants is now in its fourth through sixth generation—it is 

incremental. And, as Figure 1 also shows, it is fragmented by pollutant 

category. 

 Environmental regulation enforcement and oversight is fragmented 

within both science and the American federal system. Environmental laws 

and regulations are designed to address the specific problems of various 

mediums of pollution—air, water, waste. They are further disaggregated by 

the source of the pollution or its severity—point sources or nonpoint sources 

for water; stationary sources, auto emissions, and acid rain for air; solid waste, 

toxic waste, or radioactive waste; etc. This fragmentation carries over into the 

organization of the regulatory agencies.6

 Separate offices, agencies, and committees regulate air, water, and 

waste, with further subdivisions such as drinking water versus ground water 

versus waste water. In the executive branch, for example, there are today over 

30 federal agencies with environmental “turf,” divided between 11 cabinet 

departments plus the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).7

 And while 

the EPA was created to consolidate executive branch regulation of pollution, it 

was created by executive order, not law.8

 “In political terms, this means that 

the EPA is not a single gorilla, but a whole family of gorillas, one for each law 

and each program.”9

 Likewise, the committees with oversight responsibility number in the 

teens for each house of Congress.10 And the federal court system addresses 

environmental law decisions throughout its 55 divisions, with jurisdiction 

lying in over 100 separate courts.11 This dispersed policy community is 

matched by an equally diverse community of organized interests that reflects 

diverse memberships, strategies, and agendas.12
6

 Finally, the states each address environmental protection and 

regulation in their own unique fashion, with health agencies, mini-EPAs, or 

environmental “superagencies” charged with enforcement of federal and state 

standards.13 Some states delegate enforcement to local agencies for specific 

pollutants or mediums. In some cases, these local agencies have extensive 

experience in environmental regulation. For example, Los Angeles County, 

California has been regulating air quality since 1948.14 Many states also 

separate endangered species and historic preservation regulation from 

pollution regulation, creating even more agencies which the military 

installation program must address. The environmental landscape is covered 

with agencies, interests, and shared and overlapping responsibilities, and the 

military installation environmental program manager serves many “masters.” 

 Within this fragmented landscape, federalism has today become a, if 

not the, central factor in American environmental regulation and enforcement. 

Environmental regulation began in the states before it became a federal issue, 

and early federal efforts set national quality standards which were enforced at 

the state level. During the 1970s the federal government began enforcing 

many of its own standards, but the pendulum swung back toward the states 

during the 1980s and the Reagan Administration. Under the administrative 

umbrella of “partial preemption,” which requires states to enforce federal 

standards, responsibility has flowed from Washington to the states.15 Today 

all 50 states enforce federal air quality standards, 48 states enforce federal 

waste regulations, and at least 38 implement federal water quality standards.16 

This devolution, now largely without the federal funding which had 

traditionally accompanied such enforcement shifts, continues at an accelerated 

pace into the mid-1990s. The states have become key players in 

environmental regulation. 

States and Environmental Federalism 
7

 Only a few years ago American state government was considered the 

weakest link in the federal-state-local chain. That has now changed. Today 

states are often characterized as engines of policy innovation and positive 

change, and “the notion of states as laboratories for policy experimentation is 

about to receive a thorough test.”17 The reformation of state legislatures and 

the accompanying professionalization of state bureaucracies together have 

made states full partners in today’s intergovernmental public policy process. 

States are also now capable of autonomous policy initiation and action. The 

combination of increased state capability, federal devolution of policy 

implementation, and cutbacks in federal funding for the increased state policy 

roles has created a complex mix of state actions and policies. State policy 

decisions are centered around economic issues and concerns, and states today 

are in direct economic competition with one another.18 Yet economic factors 

alone do not account for state and local environmental enforcement. 

 A recent survey of the empirical literature on what determines state 

decisions on redistributive policy issues, including health and safety issues 

(which are closely related to environmental issues), found that the three key 

determinants of state policy decisions are unified party control of both the 

executive and legislature, a sizable and strong bureaucracy, and significant 

recent changes in the state population. The next tier of influence came from 

economic competition from neighboring states, the state fiscal condition at the 

time of the decision, the ideology of the state representatives (as determined 

by party affiliation), and demand, particularly as expressed by organized 

interest groups. Third in importance were interparty competition and per 

capita income.19

 But do these same factors apply specifically to environmental policy 

and its regulation? A growing body of literature examines environmental 

federalism, much of it consisting of empirical studies of one medium or policy 

area. 

Air: Most studies of state policy and regulation on air pollution 

hypothesize influence from specific economic, political, or interest group 
8

factors. State regulatory bodies were found to be less responsive to short-term 

political forces than were federal EPA regulators (although inconsistent when 

viewed across states), more effective when dealing with point sources 

(smokestacks) than with mobile sources (automobiles), and much more 

sensitive to the polluting industries which represent a significant contribution 

to the state economy.20 A recent study found interactive influences from a 

number of factors. The more strident and effective state air regulation 

programs were associated with wealthier states, those with more professional 

state legislatures, and strong polluting industries (more severe pollution 

problems). A high dependence on fossil fuel industries for jobs and tax 

dollars was found to be the primary deterrent to the strength of state 

regulation. Ideological factors and interest group activities were only minor 

influences on state regulation of air quality. The highest aggregate effect was 

both direct and indirect economic influences.21

Water: Similarly, state water regulation was found to be most 

influenced by the strength of mining industries and agriculture in the state 

(both are primary polluters, but agriculture demands stronger regulation to 

ensure soil and water quality while mining seeks regulatory relief) and by the 

strength of liberal political interests in state politics. General economic factors 

such as state wealth, state government professionalization, and interest group 

activities have less influence on regulation, but are still important inputs to 

water regulation in the states.22

Waste: Waste regulation is perhaps the most complex area of state 

environmental policy. Many observers believe that the severity of the state 

problem determines to a large extent the level of state regulatory decisions and 

actions, and studies have confirmed that hypothesis.23 At the same time, this 

is an area where state regulatory agencies are seen as prone to being 

“captured” by the polluting industries because of state dependency on jobs and 

taxes. Indeed, industry siting decisions are shown to be influenced by the 

regulatory climates of states competing for those industries, and interstate 

competition is a significant factor here even though the uniform federal 
9

standards were designed in part to “level the playing field” between the 

states.24 Further, industry does strongly influence state expenditures on 

wastes, and industry appeals have been shown to delay state actions.25 Federal 

funding, and the resulting federal influence over state actions, can overcome 

much of the influence of local industries, however. In this complex area 

interest groups often carry considerable weight, and political factors are more 

significant tiebreakers than are the economic factors.26

 The “bottom line” from these studies is that each environmental 

medium has its own unique policy parameters, but each includes significant 

input from federal oversight, state political factors, complex state economic 

factors, and state organizational capacity.27 This combination of “vertical” 

factors (federal-state intergovernmental) and “horizontal” factors (state and 

interstate) reflects the incremental, fragmented, and federal nature of 

environmental regulation today.28 And recent attempts to designate an 

integrated model of environmental federalism, while valuable first steps, do 

not significantly alter the list of state and federal political, economic, and 

organizational inputs.29

 So the literature points to a number of influences and conditions 

which help determine state policy making and implementation for 

environmental regulation. Trying to put these pieces together, Lester and 

Lombard point out four explanations for state environmental decisions which 

dominate that literature. These are: 1) the severity of the state problem 

(increased pollution which results from rapid growth, industrialization, and 

increased consumption); 2) the wealth of the state polity (wealthier 

populations will spend more on environmental protection); 3) the partisanship 

of state politics (Democrats tend to be more environmentally strident than 

Republicans); and 4) the organizational capacity of the state (the more 

“professional” state legislatures and bureaucracies will be more willing to 

support strong environmental policy than others). They acknowledge that 

each of these arguments has found support, but argue that a broader 

intergovernmental model may be needed to fully capture the complexity of 
10

state decisions and actions.30 In the meantime, we do have a few models 

which attempt to categorize and rank the states as to their actual or likely 

performance as environmental regulators. 

Implementation Models 

 As indicated, there is no single, comprehensive theory or model of 

state environmental regulation. However, studies do suggest some 

enforcement groupings, which rank and categorize the states according to their 

regulatory effort and stridency, might contribute to formulating a compliance 

strategy for the military. These models group the 50 states based on 

environmental spending, on environmental innovation, and on organizational 

capacity and motivation. 

 Federal spending still exceeds state spending on the environment, but 

it has decreased since 1977, making state spending increasingly important.31 

The “wealth argument” holds that, particularly as federal spending decreases, 

a state’s commitment and effort can be judged by its spending on 

environmental programs. States are ranked by their total spending, per capita 

spending, and environmental spending as a percentage of state budget.32 This 

ranking, however, is difficult to use as a guide to state enforcement programs 

or actions because it is not finely enough disaggregated to identify specific 

state efforts. For example, Wyoming is ranked first or second in the nation in 

both per capita spending and environmental spending as a percentage of state 

budget. This is misleading in that the figures include spending on “natural 

resources,” which in Wyoming includes significant expenditures for mining 

reclamation and fish and game management, including promotion of state 

guides, fishing, and hunting.33 This is important “environmental” spending, 

but it is not directly related to our focus on state environmental enforcement 

on military installations. To determine how Wyoming, or any other state, is 

likely to regulate military activities, other models must be examined. 
11

 Another category of ranking/grouping models for state environmental 

efforts is based on state and local innovation in environmental programs. This 

approach offers possible utility for military installations because the level of 

state initiative would seem to indicate the predisposition of the state to add its 

own regulations to existing federal standards. One problem with the most 

widely reported innovation models, however, is that they include ranking 

factors beyond those of interest to the military installation. For example, the 

two primary rankings include specific emphasis on energy conservation 

promotion and on recycling programs well beyond many military base efforts. 

They also include private, nongovernmental initiatives, which may mask the 

strength and direction of governmental regulatory efforts.34

 A third model groups states by a combination of organizational 

capacity and motivation. The political, fiscal, and managerial capacity of state 

institutions to accept and implement federal programs, as well as their own 

initiatives, is certainly a critical factor in assessing the strength of state efforts. 

Motivation is also key to predicting and measuring the state’s willingness and 

ability to overcome the influence of economic competition and the inevitable 

calls to delay or reduce enforcement efforts which raise the costs of doing 

business in the state.35 These factors, internal to the states themselves, allow 

grouping states in a way that is very meaningful to the military environmental 

manager—they predict specific state actions and limitations in environmental 

regulation and enforcement.36

 Based on separate studies and rankings of the states on the capacity 

and commitment dimensions, Lester identifies the states as falling into one of 

four categories. His first group, the “progressives,” combine a high degree of 

environmental commitment with strong institutional capacity—they have the 

motivation and capability to enforce strident environmental standards. These 

states will fully enforce federal standards, and they will likely add additional 

state standards in many areas. The second group, the “strugglers,” combine a 

high degree of commitment with limited institutional capacities—they want to 

be forceful in their regulation but have only limited resources to pursue their 
12

environmental goals. These states should fully enforce federal standards, but 

will be slower and less innovative than the “progressives” in adding their own 

environmental programs.37

Figure 2: Lester’s Capacity/Motivation Model38

Progressives: High capacity and motivation 

California New Jersey 

Florida New York 

Maryland Oregon 

Massachusetts Washington 

Michigan Wisconsin 

Strugglers: Limited capacity, high 

 motivation 

Colorado Montana 

Connecticut Nevada 

Delaware New Hampshire 

Hawaii North Carolina 

Idaho North Dakota 

Iowa Rhode Island 

Maine Vermont 

Minnesota 

Delayers: High capacity, limited motivation 

Alabama Louisiana South Carolina 

Alaska Missouri Tennessee 

Arkansas Ohio Texas 

Georgia Oklahoma Virginia 

Illinois Pennsylvania West Virginia 

Regressives: Neither capacity nor 

motivation 

Arizona Nebraska 

Indiana New Mexico 

Kansas South Dakota 

Kentucky Utah 

Mississippi Wyoming 
13

 Group three, the “delayers,” have the institutional capacity to support 

a strong environmental program, but lack the commitment to go beyond 

federal standards. Many of these states have a strong energy industry 

presence in the state economy. They are predicted to implement federal 

standards slowly and to not advance beyond the federal requirements. Finally, 

group four, the “regressives,” lack both the capacity and commitment to 

environmental ends. They may not even fully implement federal standards, 

according to Lester, and will not take any further environmental actions.40

 The utility of Lester’s grouping is already apparent when you note 

that Wyoming was ranked first or second in spending, and Lester places the 

state in the “regressive” category of expected state action. Spending alone 

may be an inadequate measure. The capacity/motivation model provides 

significant information for designing a state compliance strategy for military 

installations. 

 Limited testing of this model was conducted during the summer of 

1996 at military installations in four states, one from each of Lester’s four 

categories. The states and installations of focus were California (Travis Air 

Force Base), Colorado (Fort Carson and the Air Force Academy), Oklahoma 

(Fort Sill and Altus Air Force Base), and Wyoming (F.E. Warren Air Force 

Base). The environmental regulation situation and enforcement experience 

were surveyed for each base. The general results are summarized below and 

serve to confirm the Lester model predictions. 

Four Case Studies

Wyoming: A “Regressive” 

 The expectation for environmental regulation enforcement in 

Wyoming, according to the Lester model, is for relatively minimal 

enforcement. Wyoming is hypothesized to lack both the institutional capacity 

and the motivation for strident enforcement. That is fairly close to the 

experience of F.E. Warren Air Force Base. The state enforces federal 
14

standards, but does not do so with any perceived stridency except in the area 

of groundwater pollution. Perhaps because groundwater is a critical asset in 

the arid and semi-arid West, state regulators are “cracking down” on this 

issue. In other areas, such as air pollution—where the base was told “don’t be 

too hard on yourself” in a recent self inventory—the regulator-regulated 

relationship is characterized as a “partnership.” At the policy level, the state 

seeks informal input from base environmental managers in drafting 

enforcement implementation standards, and there is some movement of 

personnel from military environmental management positions into state 

policy-level positions upon their retirement from military service. Base 

personnel felt no pressure from any local organized environmental groups, and 

they anticipate no real changes in their compliance situation in the foreseeable 

future. The base mission (missile operations management) was not seen as 

threatened in any way by environmental problems or regulatory pressures. 

 F.E. Warren missile operations also include sites in Colorado, a 

“struggler” state expected to enforce environmental regulation more 

vigorously, according to the Lester model. This is the experience of the F.E. 

Warren environmental regulators, who noted that the Colorado regulators 

were “much tougher on water and waste regulation.” The Lester model is 

supported by the experience of the F.E. Warren environmental managers. 

Oklahoma: A “Delayer” 

 The Lester model predicts that Oklahoma, while institutionally 

capable of aggressive enforcement of either state or enhanced federal 

standards, will not have the motivation to go much beyond federal 

requirements. That, again, is fairly close to the experience of the two military 

installations surveyed. The Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality 

(ODEQ); a relatively new organization which combines environmental 

regulatory functions formerly residing in the Departments of Pollution 

Control, Health, and Natural Resources; was characterized as active and able 

in its regulation, faithfully implementing federal standards. At the policy 
15

level, however, capable administrators do not advocate regulation beyond 

those federal standards. For example, federal water quality standards are still 

enforced by the EPA since the state of Oklahoma has made no move to 

assume that responsibility (water regulation authority is transferred to a state 

largely at its option). Military environmental managers report that they can 

work with the state regulators—that they develop and foster a fairly close oneon-one business relationship with their regulators—and that the stridency of 

the regulation is largely a function of the specific situation at hand. 

 The most frequent “complaint” voiced by military environmental 

managers was that, due to higher pay scales in private environmental jobs, the 

state regulators tend to turn over with some frequency, and new relationships 

must then be fostered. However, the Fort Sill managers maintain a close 

working relationship with individuals at the policy level, whom they visit 

monthly to gain insight into any pending changes and to maintain an open 

communication link. This relationship was credited for educating regulators 

on the unique issues and problems of the Fort Sill mission, and was seen as 

central to long-term maintenance of the cooperative relationship between the 

base and the state regulators. Altus Air Force Base environmental managers 

had also recently instituted a practice of quarterly visits to the ODEQ. Both 

installations characterized their relationships with local leaders, citizens, and 

groups as “friendly and productive.” No significant threats to base missions 

(Fort Sill—artillery training, Altus—flight training) were experienced or 

anticipated. 

 The Fort Sill environmental management function also exercises 

some responsibility for Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, and for several Army Reserve 

facilities in Texas. Both Arkansas and Texas are classified with Oklahoma as 

“delayers,” and that again is fairly consistent with the experience of the Fort 

Sill environmental staff. The Fort Chaffee situation is somewhat unique in 

that it is being closed as an active installation, with the majority of its real 

estate becoming a National Guard facility and a few acres transferring to the 

private sector. A combined federal/state effort, with EPA District Six 
16

overseeing the environmental dimension, is managing this transfer. Issues 

arising from the transfer have been negotiated in what was characterized as a 

“reasonable, common sense” atmosphere. On the other hand, Texas was seen 

as becoming slightly more strident in its enforcement of waste regulations, but 

overall was characterized as not much different from Oklahoma. Lester’s 

model seems to apply for these three states. 

 Anecdotal evidence also supports the applicability of the Lester 

model to other Group Three states. The EPA recently found that three 

states—Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—are “reporting only a handful of 

major pollution violations,” perhaps because of the influence of energy 

industry companies within the states. While other states also “worry” the 

EPA, these three “delayer” states are acting in accordance with the 

expectations of the Lester model.41

Colorado: A “Struggler” 

 According to Figure 2, one would expect Colorado to attempt to 

enforce environmental standards vigorously, but to have that effort moderated 

by its limited institutional capacity. There is again evidence of the accuracy of 

this prediction. For example, the two bases surveyed here benefit from the 

fact that both the Denver metropolitan area and the city of Colorado Springs 

are air quality nonattainment zones. Significant air quality effort is focused on 

those areas, further limiting state capabilities for stridency elsewhere and in 

other mediums. The extent of the pollution problem of the mining sector, past 

and present, further diverts state focus from the two bases. These institutional 

limitations, however, also have negative implications for these installations. 

For example, Fort Carson has been ordered to clean up 10 waste disposal sites 

under deadlines and standards which the base feels are unwarranted. As Fort 

Carson’s environmental restoration supervisor put it, “The state wants to put 

us in a box with these (polluted) places like the Rocky Mountain Arsenal 

[chemical weapons], Rocky Flats [plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons] or 

Lowry Landfill [unexploded bombs from World War II activities on the 
17

range]. But we’re not like that. We’re boring.”42 The state did not until 

recently have the capability to discriminate between the significant threats of 

chemical weapon residue and plutonium waste, on the one hand, and oils, 

solvents, paint, etc., on the other, so they simply sought to enforce one set of 

standards and deadlines on all military waste sites. A state with a stronger 

institutional capability would likely find no problem in taking the time and 

assigning the people needed to make such distinctions and designate 

individualized standards and deadlines. 

 The military managers characterize state regulators as individually 

highly talented, but feel that institutionally they are limited in the role they can 

play and the way they play it. The state is reorganizing some of its functions, 

but these changes appear to be more along the lines of transferring functions 

between agencies, not in strengthening the agencies themselves. The 

assignment of added resources to these agencies, however, indicates that they 

will steadily increase their enforcement capabilities. 

 Colorado state policy and enforcement are seen as being strongly 

influenced by economic factors. The state, through its voluntary reporting 

programs, allows considerable discretion to businesses in the timing and 

nature of cleanup actions for self-reported violations.43 The federal 

installations do not feel that they are given that much latitude. The voluntary 

programs do not fully apply to them since they are not likely to move their 

“business” to another state. Fort Carson managers are maintaining a 

continuing program of visits to state policy-level officials to ensure mutual 

understanding and to attempt to influence future interpretations of these 

policies. 

 Finally, organized interest groups are conspicuously present in 

Colorado, but they are not seen as “problems” by the bases. The Air Force 

Academy, with a relatively low polluting academic mission and flying 

program, has organized an Environmental Cooperation Council (ECC) which 

includes federal, state, and local governments, citizens, and interest groups. 

They meet monthly, adopting a “regional” environmental management focus, 
18

with open communication between the military managers and the organized 

interests. The result is an open working relationship, conducive to 

cooperation or businesslike disagreement. Fort Carson, with a higher potential 

for environmental damage from its combat mechanized infantry operation, 

hosts an active Restoration Advisory Board (RAB), a Land Use Technical 

Advisory Committee (LUTAC) somewhat similar to the Academy’s ECC, and 

other outreach programs and initiatives. These are seen as valuable in 

establishing and maintaining a “professional” dialogue, as well as in gaining 

local support should it be needed for challenging state demands. The bases 

see gradually increasing environmental pressures coming from the state as it 

increases its ability to match ambition with action, but they do not see their 

central missions as threatened in the foreseeable future. 

 On a more general note, beyond military installation environmental 

compliance, Colorado was recently “prodded” by the EPA to speed up and 

toughen its enforcement of hazardous waste violations. The core of the issue 

is Colorado’s limited institutional capability—it has only five hazardous waste 

inspectors for 4,600 facilities which handle hazardous waste. In the 12 years 

since the state assumed hazardous waste enforcement responsibility from the 

EPA, only 1600 of those facilities have even been inspected. Those 

inspections have resulted in 1047 enforcement actions against 640 entities, but 

such violations have taken a year or more to resolve following their discovery. 

 Within EPA District 8, North Dakota has also been “prodded” for 

similar capacity-related delays; both states are institutionally limited 

“strugglers” in the Lester model.45 Colorado and Idaho are also among a 

group of states that environmental groups have asked the EPA to decertify 

because state laws allow companies to avoid harsh penalties for self-reported 

violations. The states argue that the incentive to self-report reduces their 

administrative burden while still identifying and rectifying the problems.46 

However, the EPA recently imposed fines on one company 20 times larger 

than the state had levied, even though the company had also corrected the 

violation.47 Finally, Rhode Island, another “struggler,” has been warned by 
19

the EPA to increase its institutional capacity for enforcement or lose its charter 

for water pollution enforcement.48 Lester’s “strugglers” are performing as 

predicted. 

California: A “Progressive”

 Lester cites California specifically, and its fellow “progressives” in 

general, as likely to add significant state and local environmental standards to 

existing federal regulations. Travis Air Force Base’s experience certainly 

underscores that the prediction is reality. California is highly decentralized in 

its regulatory organization. There are air and water management regions 

under the state, and now hazardous waste and hazardous materials 

management are being devolved to local government Certified Unified 

Program Agencies (CUPAs). The local agencies enforce federal and state 

regulations, and some add their own standards as well. These regional 

regulators vary in their regulation just as the states do under the Lester model, 

but all are fairly strident in enforcing at least the federal and state standards. 

For example, California has added its own more restrictive standards to some 

federal air quality regulations, and the Los Angeles area is the single most 

severe nonattainment area for air quality in the nation. On a significantly bad 

air quality day during the Gulf War buildup, Norton Air Force Base was 

ordered by their local air quality region to shut down all of their aircraft power 

carts and associated ground support equipment. Such ground support 

equipment is classified as a stationary air pollution source, and local 

procedures called for all such sources to be shut down under air conditions 

such as existed that particular day. Norton was, at that time, in the process of 

providing significant air logistics support to the US forces in Saudi Arabia. 

Congress and the President have effectively waived federal sovereign 

immunity for environmental enforcement, ordering the bases to comply with 

federal, state, and local regulation, and local regulators can, thus, at least 

temporarily impact national security capabilities.49 This is typical of the 

strident level of California enforcement. 
20

 At Travis Air Force Base itself, officials report mixed experiences 

with their many federal, state, and local regulators. In addition to the air, 

water, and waste regulators, they also deal with a county Airport Land Use 

Commission, a local Greenbelt Authority, and several species, wetlands, 

historic preservation, and other regulatory concerns. Now a CUPA has been 

added. Early experience here, when the local CUPA sought to fine the base 

for several waste areas which are still under EPA enforcement and for which 

the CUPA had neither responsibility nor authority, indicates that yet another 

learning curve needs to be climbed. The CUPA has notified the base to expect 

26 visits per year to inspect 60 to 130 sites—just for hazardous waste and 

materials regulation. 

 Still, base environmental managers state that once a relationship is 

established, with mutual education and understanding, a businesslike 

atmosphere is possible. The multitude of regulatory agencies greatly 

complicates the establishment and maintenance of such relationships, 

however. Not surprisingly, the base managers report no regular contact with 

state policy-level institutions and officials, but instead they foster closer 

relationships with local political and environmental officials. They note the 

presence of several active local environmental interest groups, many of whom 

are regular and active participants in base-community boards and meetings. 

They see their mission (airlift operations) as occasionally limited by 

environmental enforcement actions, and are “concerned,” at least mildly, 

about the long-term ability to sustain operations at this base. 

Analysis and Recommendations 

 So what does all of this say about military environmental 

management? First, the devolution of environmental regulation will continue, 

and may well accelerate, in the near-term future. The political pressures 

favoring decentralized enforcement are too broadly based to reverse course 

any time soon. Further, national polls indicate that public opinion solidly 
21

supports continuing environmental regulation.50 So federal standards will 

likely not moderate, at least some of the states will be inclined to add their 

own more stringent standards, and all states will see combined federal and 

local pressure to enforce at least the federal standards. Added increments of 

fragmented regulation will characterize environmental federalism. 

 Therefore, those factors which the empirical literature indicates as 

most significant in state environmental decisions and actions take on an added 

degree of importance to any regulated enterprise, including the US military. 

Military managers must monitor and analyze these political and economic 

factors to anticipate and respond to changing state regulation demands. The 

compliance strategy adopted by the military must be aimed toward meeting 

legitimate federal, state, and local standards, regardless of who is enforcing 

those standards, within the demands of accomplishing the national security 

mission. Such a strategy can only be designed with detailed understanding of 

the context and the letter of multi-layered regulation, and any such strategy 

must ultimately be localized to the unique demands of state and local 

requirements. 

 The knowledge and understanding needed for an effective state-level 

compliance strategy require detailed monitoring and analysis of the four key 

factors behind most state policy decisions and actions. This monitoring and 

analysis is required for each state hosting a military installation. The severity 

of the environmental problems facing a state will not usually change in the 

short term. However, a particularly dangerous or extensive environmental 

threat may be discovered, or the media might focus increased attention on 

existing problems, causing increased salience of the environmental threats to 

the local population. Short-term motivation toward increased stridency in 

standards and enforcement, as well as calls to strengthen organizational 

capacity, could result. Similarly, the wealth of the state and its population are 

not given to significant short-term changes, but the level of spending allocated 

to environmental agencies and programs could change at any time. 

Significantly increased or decreased spending signals important changes in 
22

motivation and capacity which can directly affect the stridency of state 

enforcement. 

 If severity and wealth are not generally given to short-term changes, 

the partisan balance of state politics can change at any election. Democratic 

governors in states where the Democrats also control the legislature are 

associated with more strident environmental policies and enforcement, while 

Republican control generally indicates less strident environmental action. 

Mixed party control is associated with intermediate-level environmental 

programs at the state level. Further, state bureaucratic capacity can be affected 

by organizational changes and budgetary changes. Realignments of state 

legislative committees can also affect capability. Finally, interest group 

activity and other motivation factors, especially economic competition with 

other states, particularly neighboring states, are important. All of these state 

factors must be monitored for their impacts on enforcement actions, and for 

input into the military compliance strategy and associated activities. For 

example, a reminder of the significant economic input which the base makes 

to the local economy might play into a state’s economic competition 

equation.51

 A military "compliance within mission requirements" strategy should 

incorporate three primary characteristics: continuity, coherence, and 

communication. In the face of incremental changes to the myriad 

environmental regulations and to the multiple layers of enforcement, 

continuity is essential to a rational and predictable management program. 

Without continuity, compliance actions become reactive and resemble a 

shotgun pattern of random responses. Second, coherence is needed to bridge 

the multiple and fragmented dimensions of the various environmental 

mediums and regulations. These many regulations and regulators exist within 

a single context, and a coherent military approach to planning and managing 

compliance actions offers a degree of simplification not possible in a reactive, 

fragmented response. Third, communication is essential to deal with the 

multiple and layered regulatory agencies which impact the base mission. 
23

Communication facilitates educating the regulators on the unique nature and 

importance of the military operations while at the same time allowing the 

military manager to listen, learn, and anticipate regulatory changes driven by 

the state political economy. This mutual understanding and detailed 

knowledge of emerging trends allows the military manager to be proactive in 

base compliance programs, as well as enabling effective reaction to any 

unanticipated regulatory demands. The three together—continuity, coherence, 

and communication—are clearly essential to an effective environmental 

compliance strategy—one which also ensures continuous and coherent 

mission accomplishment. 

Command Structures

 Placing continuity, coherence, and communication at the heart of the 

military compliance strategy requires a structure which allows and fosters both 

national- and state-level initiatives to meet federal and state regulation 

standards and actions. Just as the unique capabilities and characteristics of 

airpower have been demonstrated to best be managed through centralized 

control and decentralized execution, the same command and control approach 

seems best suited to the unique characteristics and requirements of 

decentralized environmental regulation. This will require a reexamination of 

the existing service-command-installation chain of command. 

 While none of the environmental managers interviewed for this study 

indicated a dysfunctional amount of micromanagement from their parent 

command, virtually all of them indicated at least some complaint against the 

command level of their chain. In most cases this complaint was simply the 

need to educate newly assigned overseers on the specific problems and state 

compliance demands of their installation, as opposed to the installation and 

state at which that new boss had last served. In a few cases, however, 

command policies and practices were seen as detrimental to those base 

programs tailored to specific state and local compliance demands. In two 

cases current command actions and requirements were seen as "dangerous" or 
24

detrimental to long-term compliance within the demands of state 

environmental enforcement, with this disconnect attributed to a lack of 

understanding of and appreciation for the base's specific situation.52 The 

commands were also characterized as widely different in their approaches to 

base oversight and environmental compliance, which makes continuity and 

coherence difficult to attain at best. While the two services of the bases 

surveyed also differ on their policies and requirements, the major command 

level was clearly indicated as the level of concern in today's decentralized 

compliance world. 

 So what structural options are available? One would be to centralize 

all controls at the national service level, but this option would be completely 

out of step with the multi-layered, federalized enforcement situation the bases 

face today. Another would be to completely decentralize authority and 

responsibility to the individual installation. The National Park Service has 

adopted this solution to the unique local situations faced by its parks, with 

each park manager now largely an autonomous actor.53 This approach not 

only flies in the face of military tradition and culture, but it misses the 

efficiencies of at least partial centralization since most of the locally enforced 

environmental regulations are still federal standards. National-level 

communication of these standards, changes in their focus or content, and at 

least broad guidelines as to a preferred compliance plan for these national 

standards would be lost with the complete decentralization of environmental 

management. So that leaves a combined national-local management 

arrangement as most fitting. The national guidelines can then be adapted and 

tailored to the specifics of local regulation and enforcement, with a sharing of 

responsibility and authority. 

 The commands may not readily agree to diminished authority over 

"their" installations, but they have little productive input to the federal-statelocal environmental enforcement situation which those bases face today. They 

could remain in the reporting chain, as a communication conduit allowing 

them to monitor base actions and expenditures, but the details of national and 
25

local compliance actions should be decided and directed by those with the 

knowledge and information needed to respond to locally implemented 

enforcement. 

 Other intermediate-level organizations, such as the recently 

established regional Department of Defense assistance teams (mirroring the 

EPA regional structure), may be of some utility in helping either the national 

or installation managers adapt to localized requirements. With expanded state 

direction of environmental enforcement, EPA rules and oversight must be 

modified for the state capacity and motivation (as highlighted in the Lester 

model) for a full explanation of state and local action. If regional authorities 

are to be of significant utility, it would probably best be as expert analysts of 

the various state policy initiatives within their area of emphasis. 

Unfortunately, the EPA regions do not conveniently align with the state 

environmental stridency categories, so most regional analysts would be 

addressing several very different types of state policy. For example, Region 4, 

out of Atlanta and covering the southeastern United States, includes states 

representing all four of Lester’s categories. (See Figure 3.) 

Figure 3: EPA REGIONS with Lester’s Categories54

Region 1 (Boston)

2 Connecticut 

2 Maine 

1 Massachusetts 

2 New Hampshire 

2 Rhode Island 

2 Vermont 

Region 2 (New York)

1 New Jersey 

1 New York 

Region 3 (Philadelphia)

2 Delaware 

1 Maryland 

3 Pennsylvania 

3 Virginia 

Region 6 (Dallas)

3 Arkansas 

3 Louisiana 

4 New Mexico 

3 Oklahoma 

3 Texas 

Region 7 (Kansas City)

2 Iowa 

4 Kansas 

3 Missouri 

4 Nebraska 

Region 8 (Denver)

2 Colorado 

2 Montana 

2 North Dakota 
26

3 West Virginia 4 South Dakota 

4 Utah 

Region 4 (Atlanta)

3 Alabama 

1 Florida 

3 Georgia 

4 Kentucky 

4 Mississippi 

2 North Carolina 

3 South Carolina 

3 Tennessee 

Region 5 (Chicago)

3 Illinois 

4 Indiana 

1 Michigan 

2 Minnesota 

3 Ohio 

1 Wisconsin 

4 Wyoming 

Region 9 (San Francisco)

4 Arizona 

1 California 

2 Hawaii 

2 Nevada 

Region 10 (Seattle)

3 Alaska 

2 Idaho 

1 Oregon 

1 Washington 

 This organizational shift would also require a significant redirection 

of the traditional military management roles. The DOD managers would be 

interposed between the services and the installations, largely replacing the 

commands, as opposed to their current role of assistance to the installations 

regardless of service, and liaison to the commands. Also, the DOD may 

centralize national control into the joint community and away from the 

services, for there is no substantive reason not to do this—environmental 

regulation is inherently “purple.” Other “purple” functional areas such as 

logistics, intelligence, communications, and medical affairs have been or are 

being consolidated under joint direction and management. With environment 

too, either service or joint centralization/decentralization is indicated. It 

remains to the services and the Department of Defense to work out the 

details.55

 Centralized control but decentralized execution of environmental 

compliance fits the regulatory situation of the bases today, but structural 

arrangements and practices should not stop there. Base management should 

be structured to facilitate continuity and coherence. This means controlled 
27

military tours and/or an extensive civilian presence in these key management 

positions. All but one of the installations surveyed for this study had civilians 

as the base environmental manager, with a mix of uniformed and civilian 

personnel involved in carrying out the base function. Environmental 

management today is not the place for amateurs or those "passing through" 

enroute to other professions or assignments. Uniformed personnel must have 

enough tenure to 1) learn the local situation and its unique requirements, and 

2) contribute to a coherent base compliance strategy. Finally, all the various 

military installations in the state (or locality in those states further 

decentralizing to district management) must be encouraged to communicate 

with each other toward further coherence in the overall military response to 

local enforcement. Several environmental managers noted that state or local 

authorities looked upon all military installations as being "equal," and any 

action or precedent at one is likely to impact on others. Regular 

communication is essential to understand and plan for compliance demands. 

Conclusion

 Environmental federalism is here to stay. US military installations 

must learn to live with and adapt to environmental regulations, and complete 

their important security missions within the parameters of incremental, 

fragmented, and federalized environmental enforcement. Knowing what 

drives state policy and action, understanding how your state combines 

motivation and capacity to determine its particular enforcement stridency 

level, and adapting national direction to form a continuous, coherent base 

compliance strategy will allow bases to complete their military missions 

within environmental constraints. All of this requires constant monitoring, 

analysis, adaptation, and communication, but it can and must be accomplished. 

Bases carry out national policy mandates, but they are also tenants within state 

environments. They must adapt to both sets of demands. 
28

ENDNOTES 

 

 1William D. Palmer, “Environmental Compliance: Implications for Senior 

Commanders,” Parameters XXIII (Spring 1993): 81-92; and Odelia Funke, “National 

Security and the Environment,” in Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New 

Agenda, 2nd ed., ed. Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (Washington DC: CQ Press, 

1994), 323-345. 

 2

Source: Pamela Fessler, “A Quarter-Century of Activism Erected a Bulwark of 

Laws,” Environment ‘90: The Legislative Agenda (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1990), 

18-21. 

 3

Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level: Politics and 

Progress in Controlling Pollution (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993): 43-60; and 

Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig, “Environmental Policy From the 1970s to the 

1990s: Continuity and Change,” in Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New 

Agenda, 2nd ed., ed. Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft (Washington DC: CQ Press, 

1994), 3-29. 

 4

Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level, 43-60; and Kraft and Vig, 

“Environmental Policy From the 1970s to the 1990s,” 10-14. 

 5

Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level, 43-60; Kraft and Vig, 

“Environmental Policy From the 1970s to the 1990s,” 11-15; and James A. Thurber, 

“The Impact of the Congressional Budget Process on Environmental Policy in the 

104th Congress,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political 

Science Association, San Francisco, CA, March 14-16, 1996. 

 6

Walter A. Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy, 2nd ed. (Washington 

DC: CQ Press, 1991), 33-36. 

 7

Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy, 16-19; and Kraft and Vig, 

“Environmental Policy From the 1970s to the 1990s,” 5-7. 

 8

Susan J. Buck, Understanding Environmental Administration and Law

(Washington DC: Island Press, 1991), 17-27; DeWitt John, Civic Environmentalism: 

Alternatives to Regulation in States and Communities (Washington DC: CQ Press, 

1994), 1-20; and Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory 

Change: A Tale of Two Agencies 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 

225-277. 

 9

John, Civic Environmentalism, 6. 

 10Chuck Alston, “Key Players: Their Spheres of Influence Go From Heavens to 

Earth,” Environment ‘90: The Legislative Agenda (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1990), 

14-17. 

 11Thomas More Hoban and Richard Oliver Brooks, Green Justice: The 

Environment and the Courts (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 7; and Kraft and 

Vig, “Environmental Policy From the 1970s to the 1990s,” 5-7. 

 12George Hager, “Lobbyists: For Industry and Opponents, A Showdown Is in the 

Air,” Environment ‘90: The Legislative Agenda (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1990), 

10-13; Rosenbaum, Environmental Politics and Policy, 66-110; John C. Pierce, Mary 

Ann E. Steger, Brent S. Steel, and Nicholas P. Lovrich, Citizens, Political 

Communication, and Interest Groups: Environmental Organizations in Canada and 

the United States (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992); Christopher J. Bosso, “After the 

Movement: Environmental Activism in the 1990s,” in Environmental Policy in the 

1990s: Toward a New Agenda, 2nd ed., ed. Norman J. Vig and Michael E. Kraft 

(Washington DC: CQ Press, 1994), 31-50; and Virginia Gray and David Lowery, 

“Environmental Limits on the Diversity of State Interest Organization Systems: A 
29

 

Population Ecology Interpretation,” Political Research Quarterly 49 (March 1996): 

103-118. 

 13Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level, 13-42. 

 14Robert D. Thomas, “Intergovernmental Coordination and the Implementation of 

National Air and Water Pollution Policies,” in Public Policy Making in a Federal 

System, ed. Charles O. Jones and Robert D. Thomas (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE 

Publications, 1976), 129-187. 

 15Timothy J. Conlan, James D. Riggle, and Donna E. Schwartz, “Deregulating 

Federalism? The Politics of Mandate Reform in the 104th Congress,” Publius: The 

Journal of Federalism 25 (Summer 1995): 23-40; Michael A. Pagano and Ann M. 

Bowman, “The State of American Federalism, 1994-1995,” Publius, The Journal of 

Federalism 25 (Summer 1995): 1-21; and Harris and Milkis, The Politics of 

Regulatory Change, 356-389. 

 16Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level, 13-42. 

 17Pagano and Bowman, “The State of American Federalism,” 19. 

 18Paul Brace and Aubrey Jewett, “The State of State Politics Research,” Political 

Research Quarterly 48 (September 1995): 643-681. 

 19Paul Brace, “Federal Devolution and the Domain of Feasible Policy Alternatives 

in the American States,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political 

Science Association, San Francisco, CA, March 14-16, 1996 (italics are from the 

original). 

 20Dan B. Wood, “Federalism and Policy Responsiveness: The Clean Air Case,” 

Journal of Politics 53 (August 1991): 851-859; and Evan J. Ringquist, “Does 

Regulation Matter? Evaluating the Effects of State Air Pollution Control Programs,” 

Journal of Politics 55 (November 1993): 1022-1045. 

 21Evan J. Ringquist, “Testing Theories of State Policy-Making,” American Politics 

Quarterly 21 (July 1993): 320-342. 

 22Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level, 104-154; and Evan J. 

Ringquist, “Policy Influence and Policy Responsiveness in State Pollution Control,” 

Policy Studies Journal 22 (Spring 1994): 25-43. 

 23Charles Davis and Richard Feiock, “Testing Theories of State Hazardous Waste 

Regulation: A Reassessment of the Williams and Matheny Study,” American Politics 

Quarterly 20 (October 1992): 501-511; and Ringquist, “Policy Influence and Policy 

Responsiveness in State Pollution Control.” 

 24Richard Feiock and Charles Davis, “Can State Hazardous Waste Regulation Be 

Reconciled with Economic Development Policies? An Empirical Assessment of the 

Goetz-Rowland Model,” American Politics Quarterly 19 (July 1991): 364-376; 

Charles Davis, “State Environmental Regulation and Economic Development,” Policy 

Studies Review 11 (Spring 1992): 149-157; and Robert E. Corkran, “Hardrock Mining 

Reclamation Regulation: A Selected State Comparison, 1978-1995,” paper presented 

at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 

March 14-16, 1996. 

 25Davis and Feiock, “Testing Theories of State Hazardous Waste Regulation;” and 

Charles Davis, “Who Shapes Environmental Policy? State Enforcement of the Federal 

Hazardous Waste Program,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western 

Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, March 14-16, 1996. 

 26Feiock and Davis, “Can State Hazardous Waste Regulation Be Reconciled with 

Economic Development Policies?”; Davis and Feiock, “Testing Theories of State 

Hazardous Waste Regulation;” Ringquist, Policy Influence and Policy Responsiveness 

in State Pollution Control;” and Davis, “Who Shapes Environmental Policy?” 
30

 

 27David M. Hedge, Michael J. Scicchitano, and Patricia Metz, “The Principal-Agent 

Model and Regulatory Federalism,” Western Political Quarterly 44 (December 1991): 

1055-1080; Richard Feiock and Christopher Stream, “Growth vs. Environment: 

Assessing the Impact of State Environmental Policy Instruments,” paper presented at 

the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, 

March 14-16, 1996. 

 28William R. Lowry, The Dimensions of Federalism: State Governments and 

Pollution Control Policies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 12. 

 29James P. Lester, “Comparative State Environmental Politics and Policy: The 

Evolution of a Literature,” Policy Studies Journal 22 (Winter 1994): 696-700. 

 30James P. Lester and Emmett N. Lombard, “The Comparative Analysis of State 

Environmental Policy,” Natural Resources Journal 30 (Spring 1990): 301-319. 

 31John, Civic Environmentalism, 52-58. 

 32Steven R. Brown and L. Edward Garner, ed., Resource Guide to State 

Environmental Management (Lexington, KY: Council on State Governments, 1988). 

 33Indeed, interview sources pointed out that up to 86% of the annual state spending 

on “natural resources” in Wyoming actually goes to mining reclamation and fish and 

game management. 

 34 John, Civic Environmentalism, 51-83. 

 35Charles Davis and James P. Lester, “Federalism and Environmental Policy,” in 

Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, ed. James P. Lester 

(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), 57-84. 

 36James P. Lester, “A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States,” in 

Environmental Policy in the 1990s: Toward a New Agenda, 2nd ed., ed. Norman J. 

Vig and Michael E. Kraft (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1994), 51-68. 

 37Lester, “A New Federalism,” 63-64; and Lester, “Federalism and State 

Environmental Policy,” pp. 54-55. 

 38Sources: Lester, "A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States," pp. 

51-68; and James P. Lester, "Federalism and State Environmental Policy," in 

Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence, 2nd ed., ed James P. 

Lester (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), 54-56. 

 40Lester, “A New Federalism,” 64-65; and Lester, “Federalism and State 

Environmental Policy,” 55-56. 

 41John H. Cushman, Jr. “Some States Ignoring Pollution Laws, EPA Says,” Denver 

Post, December 15, 1996, sec. A. 

 42Todd Hartman, “Army, State Feud Over Carson Cleanup,” Colorado Springs 

Gazette Telegraph, May 26, 1996, sec. A. 

 43Noreen, “State Seeks Regulatory Wisdom;” Frank, “Coors, EPA Argue Rules;” 

Hartman, “Army, State Feud Over Carson Cleanup;” and Obmascik, “Polluters Get Off 

Scot Free.” 

 45Todd Hartman, “Colorado’s Hazardous Wait: The Machine Moves Slowly to 

Enforce the Law,” Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, January 5, 1997, sec. A. 

 46John H. Cushman, Jr., “Laws to Guard Environment Are Skirted, Groups Assert,” 

New York Times, January 30, 1997, sec. A. 

 47Robert Kowalski, “EPA Fines Firms After State Won’t,” Denver Post, March 19, 

1997, sec. A. 

 48John H. Cushman, Jr., “E.P.A. Warns Rhode Island About Water Quality Efforts,” 

New York Times, February 4, 1997, sec. A. 

 49See Palmer, “Environmental Compliance,” 86-87; Charles W. Tucker, 

“Compliance by Federal Facilities with State and Local Environmental Regulations,” 
31

 

Naval Law Review XXXV (Spring 1986) reprinted in Laurent R. Hourcle, 

Environmental Law for the Air Force (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 

December 1987), 315-340; and Michael Donnelly and James G. Van Ness, “The 

Warrior and the Druid—The DOD and Environmental Law,” Federal Bar News & 

Journal 33 (January 1986) reprinted in Hourcle, Environmental Law for the Air Force,

343-349. 

 50Mark Obmascik, “Environment Bites Back, Nips GOP In Polls,” Denver Post, 

September 28, 1996, sec. B. 

 51Bill Vogrin, “The Big, Green Money Machine: Carson Infuses Springs with 

Cash,” Colorado Springs Gazette Telegraph, September 22, 1996, sec. A. 

 52Base environmental managers made these statements under the promise of 

anonymity. 

 53Stephen D. Ryder, “National Parks and the Politics of Adjacent Lands: The Case 

of Petroglyph National Monument,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the 

Western Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, March 14-16, 1996. 

 54Sources: Evan J. Ringquist, Environmental Protection at the State Level: Politics 

and Progress in Controlling Pollution (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 37; and 

Lester, “A New Federalism? Environmental Policy in the States,” pp. 63-65. 

 55Retired Admiral William Owens, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, is a vocal advocate of consolidating “common” defense functions. See Robert 

Holzer, “Debate Targets Extent of Goldwater-Nichols Review,” Defense News (9-15 

December 1996): 41.