19

- 3353

- cv Village Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

____________________ August Term, 20 2 1 (Argued: January 14, 2022 Decided: August 5, 2022 )
Docket No. 19

- 3353

- cv

____________________ VILLAGE GREEN AT SAYVILLE, LLC , Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

v. TOWN OF ISLIP, THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF ISLIP, THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF ISLIP, ANGIE M. CARPENTER, STEVEN J. FLOTTERON, TRISH BERGIN WEICHBRODT, JOHN C. COCHRANE, JR., MARY KATE MULLEN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE TOWN BOARD OF THE TOWN OF ISLIP, EDWARD FRIEDLAND, KEVIN BROWN, ANTHONY MUSUMECI, JOSEPH DEVINCENT, DONALD FIORE, DANIEL DELUCA, MICHA EL KENNEDY, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWN OF ISLIP, Defendants

- Appell ees .

____________________ Before: POOLER, CHIN , and CARNEY , Circuit Judges

.2 Village Green at Sayville, LLC sued the Town of Islip, its Town Board, its Planning Board, and the members of the Town and Planning Boards, alleging that a pattern of racial , ethnic, and national origin discrimination by the defendants stifle d Village Green’s effort to build an affordable apartment complex in Sayville, a hamlet in Islip. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hurley, J. ), dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Village G reen’s land

- use claims were not ripe under the framework established by Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank , 473 U.S. 172 (1985) , overruled in part on other grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott , 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)

. We disagree.
V acated and remanded

.

____________________ MARK A. CUTHBERTSON , Huntington , N

. Y

. , for Plaintiff

- Appellant

. TIMOTHY F. HILL (Lisa A. Perillo, on the brief ) , Messina Perillo Hill, LLP, Sayville, N

. Y

. , for Defendants

- Appellees

. John R. DiCiocc i o , Islip Town Attorney’s Office ( on the brief ), Islip, N

. Y

. , for Defendants

- Appellees

. POOLER, Circuit Judge : In 2006, the Town of Islip , New York rezoned a vacant plot of land to
allow Village Green at Sayville, LLC, a real estate developer, to bui ld a housing complex Village Green hoped would be accessible to low

- income and minority populations

. T he project languished for the next eight years , however, as the developer struggled to comply with a pair of covenants and restrictions (“C&Rs”) that accompanied the rezoning. In 2014, Village Green petitioned the3 T own B oard to remove the C&Rs. In November 2016, a ft er several contentious public hearing s and the completion of a number of planning studies , the t own

s upervisor moved for the Town Board to approve the application

. But the motion was not seconded, and no vote was held. A month later, a resolution filed with
the t own c lerk deemed the motion to have “fail[ed] for lack of second , ” App’x at
317 , and Islip’s t own a ttorney told Village Green that “the Town is treating the failed motion to approve as a denial” of the application, such that “no further proceedings before the Town Board, Planning Board, or any other Town Agency
would be held , ” App’x at 3 2

- 33 ¶ 67. Village Green then brought this suit , alleging that the t own stifled the project in an unlawful effort to exclude minorities from living in Sayville , the hamlet in Islip where the property is
located

. We address today on ly the narrow issue of ripeness

. F ederal suits in the
land

- use context , like this one, are generally not ripe for adjudication until a lan downer receives a final, definitive decision on a land

- use applicati o n . Williamson Cnty. Reg. Planning Bd. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City , 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) , overruled in part on other grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott , 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019)

. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of4 New York (Hurley, J. ) concluded that the Town Board had not yet reached a final
decision on Village Green’s application to remove the C&Rs . We disagree.
W ithout taking a position on the merits of Village Green’s racial , ethnic, and national origin discrimination claims, we conclude that the dispute is ripe . We
therefore vacate the dismissal of th is action and remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background 1 The property a t issue is 7.29 acre s . Around a thousand feet wide and
g enerally level in grade, i t has 590 feet of frontage on the south side of Long Island’s Sunrise Highway, a major east

- west artery ten lanes wide where it abuts

1 Although the town submitted evidence beyond the pleadings in support of its motion to dismiss, the district court did not make findings of fact and looked solely to the allegations in Village Green’s complaint in ruling on the motion

. This was appropriate because the evidence proffered by the town does not contradict the relevant allegations in the pleadings. See Carter v. HealthPort Techs

. , LLC , 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d Cir. 2016). In reviewing this grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we therefore “accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Sharkey v. Quarantillo , 541 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).5 the property

. Just north of the property sits the Sayville Motor Inn. To the
southeast is a neighborhood of mainly single

- family houses

. In February 2006, Islip’s Town Board granted Village Green’s application to rezone the property from Business One to Residence CA , condition ed on a number of C&Rs , including t wo that proved controversial : first, that the development could consist only of condominiums owned by dwelling unit

owners , not renters

— even though a Residence CA zoning designation generally allows rental properties as a matter of right; and second, that the development
must be connected to an off

- site sanitary treatment plant (“STP”). In December 2006, the t own e ngineer authorized construction of 38 single

- family attached
condominiums on the property

. For much of the next decade, Village Green struggled to obtain funding

an d comply with the C&Rs. C onnection to an off

- site STP proved especially

onerous . Reaching the Sayville Commons STP , the only feasible option , would require Village Green to lay approximately 1.3 miles of sewer pipe, and several nearby landowners

— including the Sayville Union Free School District and the Town of Islip itself

— refused to grant the necessary easements. In the meantime , the t own also allocated the Sayville Commons STP ’ s remaining capacity to6 another develo pment , foreclosing , in Village Green’s view , its ability to compl y with the off

- site STP requiremen t.
So Village Green began the process of remov ing the two C&Rs and
clear ing a path to development

. In May 2014, following pre - submission meetings
with the p lanning d epartment, Village Green petitioned the Town Board to allow
it to construct an apartment complex of 64 rental units, with twenty percent set aside as affordable units , with an on

- site STP

. The Town Board referred the application to the Planning Board, which held a public hearing on November 13,
2014. Local opposition was strong. In addition to expressing co ncerns that

a partments might increase traffic, harm the environment, and diminish property value s , s everal residents questioned whether the development would come to resemble the Sayville Motor Inn, the nearby property

— not owned or operated by Village Green

— perceived by some as a hotbed of crime, drugs, and prostitution

. One resident told the Planning Board that “[w]hen you change the actual demographics of the area, you [ degrad e] everything that happens in an area with apartments as opposed to single family homes.” App’x at 2 7. Added another:

“ T here are lots of apartments available that are affordable in Sayville

. I really don’t know why we need any more.” App’x at 27

. One resident asked, “[i]f they7 can’t rent out the apartments, what do you think is going to happen? They’ll g o to Section 8.” App’x at 28. 2 And another objected that Village Green “ keep [s] stressing how lovely the buildings are.

. . . But we are not talking about what’s on the outside. We’re talking about what might be on the inside.” App’x at 27

. E ighteen months passed after this hearing before the Planning Board
considered a motion to re commend that the Town Board approve Village
Green’s application

. In May 2016, the p lanning d epartment reported that Village
Green had undertaken studies satisfactorily addressing concerns about traffic impacts, wetlands, and property value diminution

. Put to a vote, though , the

seven - member Planning Board failed to pass the motion : After the v ice c hairman recused himself, the vote was 3

- 3 and deemed a “non

- action. ” App’x at 29 ¶ 53. Village Green again modified its application , now seeking to build only 59
rental units , with half of those set aside for senior citizens

. On June 30, 2016, the
Town Board held a public hearing

. M embers of the public again made hostile
comments, discussing “Section 8” and “transient s , ” and pledging that

2 The Section 8 program provides federal housing assistance to low

- income individuals. See Salute v. Stratford Greens Garden Apartments , 136 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 1998)

.8 townspeople “will not forget if this project is approved.” App’x at 30

- 31

. As one
resident recounted: As a child, I was born in Brooklyn. I lived in the projects. It was beautiful when we started living there. Gorgeous. But then Section 8 came in. It went from a beautiful area to a war zone. It looked like Iraq.

. . . We don’t know what type of element is going to be moving into these apartments and what they’re going to leave behi nd

. . . [whether there is] going to be any drug activity, crime, prostitution , murder.

. . . It’s going to be the murder capital of Suffolk [County]. App’x at 1 6 ¶ 7

. The crowd was so vocal that the t own s upervisor several times
admonished people for shouting and at one point threatened to suspend the meeting

. Four months later, o n November 3, 2016, the renewed application was on the Planning Board ’s agenda as a recommendation item ; but the Planning Board
did not act that day , because , according to Village Green, one of the development project ’s most outspoken opponents was out of town

. Two weeks later

— on November 17, 2016

— the Town Board placed Village Green’s application on its agenda for a vote. A large group of residents opposed to the development
attended , although they were not permitted to speak. After presentations by the
p lanning d epartment and Village Green, t he t own s upervisor moved for the Town Board to approve the app lication. No other Town Board member seconded9 the motion , however, and no vote was held. The same night, the Town Board unanimously approved an application by Renzon Concepcion, another developer, to modify a similar C&R t hat had required 30 condominium units to instead allow 44 rental apartments. Renzon’s development was located in the majority

- minority hamlet of Brentwood. 3 A resolution filed with the t own c lerk on December 8, 2016 deemed the motion to approve to have “fail[ed] for lack o f second.” App’x at 317. A week
later , Islip’s t own a ttorney informed Village Green’s attorney that “the Town is treating the failed motion to approve as a denial of the Village Green
A pplication, and that no further proceedings before the Town Board, Planning Board, or any other Town Agency would be held.” App’x at 32

- 33 ¶ 67. Village Green’s attorney sent the t own a ttorney a letter the same day summarizing their conversation and asking for a written response if the t own a ttorney disputed making those statements. No response came

. Neither t he Town Board nor any other town agency has acted on Village Green’s application since 2016

.

3 A “majority

- minority” community is one “in which minorities make up a majority of the population.” Mhany Mgmt

. , Inc. v. Cnty. of Nassau , 819 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 2016)

.10 II. Procedural Background After receiving no response to its letter, Village Green filed two suits . First, in December 2016, it filed an Article 78 action in New York Supreme Court , seeking a declaration that the contested C&Rs were illegal and unenforceable
and an orde r for the t own to approve the application and issue the necessary building permits. See Village Green at Sayville v. Town of Islip , No. 011060/2016 ( N.Y

. Sup . Ct. ). T hat action is ongoing

. Village Green’s second case is the one before us. In December 2017 the developer filed, and in August 2018 it amended, a federal complaint alleging that
the t own blocked its housing project to exclude minorities from Sayville

. Village Green contends that Islip is highly segregated by race and national origin, with
its African

- American and Hispanic populations overwhelmingly concentrated in the hamlets of Brentwood, Bay Shore, and Central Islip, while Sayville is over
90% non

- Hispanic white and has a much lower foreign

- born population than Islip overall ; that by requiring C&Rs that allow only owner - occupied
condominiums in places like Sayville, the t own has prevented construction of the type of affordable and market

- rate rental apartments that m inorities are disproportionately likely to occupy ; that the T own Board frequently grants11 applications to modify C&Rs to permit rental apartments in majority

- minority

a reas of town like Brentwood, while refusing to do so in predominantly white

areas like Sayville ; and that, in refusing to modify Village Green’s C&Rs, the

t own unlawfully limit ed housing opportunities for m inorities and families with
children , perpetuating ethnic and racial segregation

. Village Green’s complaint set forth causes of action under the Fair Housing
Act (“FHA”) , 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (Count One) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Two); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (Count Three); the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count Four) ; New York Executive
Law § 296 (5)

— New York’s FHA equivalent

— and § 296(6) (Count Five) ; substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count Six) ; and the

t akings c lause s of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count Seven)

. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment deeming the defendant s ’ acts unlawful, an injunction directing them to remedy the effects of their discriminatory conduct, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’
fees

. In two orders, t he district court dismissed each claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Th e district court principally concluded that Village Green’s12 claims were not yet ripe because it ha d not received a final decision on the application to remove the C&Rs, as “ t he Town Board never voted

. . . at the November 2016 meeting, ” and “ neither the Town Board, the Planning Board, nor any other Town agency has taken any action” since then. Village Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip , No. 2:17

- cv - 7391, 2019 WL 4737054, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (“ Village Green I ”) ; id. at *11 (dismissing the first, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action); see also Village Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip , No. 2:17

- cv 7391, 2021 WL 230298 , at *2, *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021) (“ Village Green II ”) (dismissing the second, third, and fifth causes of action). The district court also concluded that Village Green failed to satisf y the limited futility exception to the
final

- decision requirement , which applies if seeking a final decision on a land

- use application would be futile. Id. at *9 ; see also Sherman v. Town of Chester , 752 F.3d 554, 56 1

- 62 (2d Cir. 2014)

. This appeal followed

. DISCUSSION
W e are not asked at this stage to assess the merits of Village Green ’s
discrimination claims. The only issue is whether they are ripe for adjudication

. “We review de novo a district court’s determination that it lacks subject

- matter13 jurisdiction on ripeness grounds.” Nat’l Org

. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh , 714 F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013)

. I. Ripeness in the Land
- Use Context “To be justiciable, a cause of action must be ripe

— it must present a real, substantial controversy, not a mere hypothetical question.” Kurtz v. Verizon New York, Inc. , 758 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Walsh , 714 F. 3d at 687)

. “Ripeness is a doctrine rooted in both Article III’s case or controversy requirement and prudential limitations on the exercise of judicial authority.” Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n , 402 F.3d 342 , 347 (2d Cir. 2005)

. “At its heart is whether we would benefit from deferring initial review until the claims
we are called on to consider have arisen in a more concrete and final form.” Id

. That is , ripeness “ is ‘ peculiarly a question of timing ’ as cases may later become
read y for adjudication

. . . .” Id. (quoting Reg’l Rail Reorg. Act Cases , 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974) ). Our goal is to avoid “entangling [ourselves] in abstract disagreements over matters that are premature for review because the injury is merely speculative and may never occur.” Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002) , abrogated on other grounds by Knick , 139 S. Ct. 2162

.14 Th is concern about untimely adjudicatio n is especially pronounced in the
land

- use context

. Land

- use controversies , despite their ability to generate federal suits like this one, are “ matters of local concern more aptly suited for local
resolution , ” Murphy , 402 F.3d at 348 , and “ federal courts should not become zoning boards of appeal,” Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill

. of Mineola , 273 F.3d 4 9 4, 505 (2d Cir. 2011)

. Accordingly, federal courts adhere to “specific ripeness requirements applicable to land use disputes. ” Murphy , 402 F.3d at 34 7

. Williamson County is the foundational case. 473 U.S. 172 . There, the Supreme
Court held that a claim alleging a Fifth Amendment taking is not ripe until two prerequisites are met : first, that the “government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue ” (the final

- decision requirement); and second, that the plaintiff has sought just compensation through an available state procedure (the exhaustion requirement)

. Id. at 186 , 194

. T he Supreme Court has since overruled the exhaustion requirement on the ground that it “impose[d] an unjustif iable burden on takings plaintiffs [and] conflict[ed] with the rest of our takings jurisprudence

. ” Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2167

.15 In contrast, t he final

- decision requirement not only remains good law but has been expanded , in this Circuit at least , to “zoning challenges based on substantive due process; First Amendment rights of assembly and free exercise; the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000; [] a state analogue
to RLUIPA ,” as well as to “zoning challenges under the [Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) , 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ] based on allegations of
intentional discrimination.” Sunrise Detox V , LLC v. City of White Plains , 769 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) ; see also Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco , 141 S. Ct. 2226 (2021) (per curiam) ( applying Williamson County ’s final

decision requirement after Knick )

. Still , the final

- decision requirement “is not mechanically applied.” Murphy , 402 F.3d at 349

. “A property owner, for example, will be excused from obtaining a final decision if pursuing an appeal to a zoning board of appeals or seeking a
variance would be futile ” or “ when a zoning agency lacks discretion to grant variances or has dug in its heels and made clear that all such applications will be
denied.” Id. Similarly, “a plaintiff need not await a final decision to challenge a zoning policy that is discriminatory on its face, or the manipulation of a zoning16 process out of discriminatory animus to avoi d a final decision.” Sunrise Detox , 769 F.3d at 123 (citations omitted).
II. All of Village Green’s Claims Require a Final Decision Before assessing whether Village Green received a final decision on its application to remove the C&Rs, w e must address which of it s claims are in fact subject to the final

- decision requirement. Cognizant that “[t]he Williamson County ripeness test is a fact

- sensitive inquiry

. . . applicable to various types of land use challenges,” Murphy , 402 F.3d at 350 , w e agree with the district court that the requirement applies to each claim. Village Green’s takings , due process, and equal protection claims plainly must satisfy finality. See Williamson C nty. , 473 U.S. at 186 (takings); Southview Assocs. v. Bongartz , 980 F.2d 84, 96

- 97 (2d Cir. 1992) (substantive due process); Dougherty , 282 F.3d at 8 8

- 8 9 (equal prote ction)

. W e further conclude that a final decision is required for Village Green’s land

- use claims under the FHA, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and New York Executive Law § 296. 4

4 The consensus among lower courts is that, at least for as

- applied FHA claims in th e land

- use context, a final decision is required. See, e.g. , Congregational Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of Pomona , 915 F. Supp. 2d 574, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Jenkins v. Eaton , No. 08

- cv - 0713, 2009 WL 811592, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.17 Sunrise Detox , our most recent case to address an extension of the final

decision requirement, shows why this is so

. Sunrise Detox

— like Village Green, a developer

— had sought a special permit to establish a drug and alcohol rehabilitation facility as a “community reside nce” in White Plains. 769 F.3d at
119

. After White Plains’ Department of Building advised that the proposed facility did not qualify as a community residence under the applicable regulations , meaning that Sunrise would have to “either appl [y] for a variance or appeal [] the determination , ” Sunrise instead sued the city , alleging
discrimination in violation of the ADA

. Id. Sunrise argued that the final

- decision requirement did not apply to “zoning challenges under the ADA based on allegations of intentional discrimination,” because intentional discrimination
“cause [s] a uniquely immediate injury rendering such claims ripe from the act of
discrimination.” Id. at 12 1

- 2 2 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). We disagreed. Because Sunri se principally sought “an injunction blocking the

Mar. 27, 2009); S &R Dev. Estates, LLC v. Bass , 588 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460

- 61 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). Other circuits have held the same. Lapid

- Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Scotch Plains , 284 F.3d 442, 451 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., M d. , 124 F.3d 597, 602 (4th Cir. 1997); Oxford House

- A v. City of Univ

. City , 87 F.3d 1022, 1024

- 25 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Vill. of Palatine , 37 F.3d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir. 1994).18 disapproval and authorizing construction of its project , ” we explained that “[r]egardless of the basis of the claim

. . . the relief sought brings the case squarely within the compass of Williamson County a nd its progeny.” Id. at 123

. As in those cases, the zoning review process had to play out before it could “be known whether the allegedly discriminatory [conduct]

. . . had any effect at all on Sunrise’s application.” Id. Thus , we held, “a plaintiff allegi ng discrimination in
the context of a land

- use dispute is subject to the final

- decision requirement unless he can show that he suffered some injury independent of the challenged
land

- use decision.” Id.
What we said of Sunrise’s ADA claim applies equally to each of Village Green’s claims. Village Green is, like Sunrise, “a plaintiff alleging discrimination
in the context of a land

- use dispute.” Id. And like Sunrise , Village Green principally seeks an injunction “directing Defendants to take all affirmative steps necessary to remedy the effects of the[ir] illegal, discriminatory conduct.” App’x
at 44. 5 Finally, once again like Sunrise, Village Green does not allege that it

5 In Sunrise Detox , the plaintiff did not seek “compensat ory damages from the official who it claims acted out of discriminatory motivation,” so we saw no need to address “whether a property owner who claimed that a local official vetoed his or her development project out of hostility based on the owner’s race, gen der, disability, or the like, in violation of federal statutory or constitutional law, could19 suffered an injury independent of the la nd

- use decision

— for instance, that the town has any facially discriminatory policies. 6 For each cause of action, Village Green alleges that its rights were violated when the town’s “denial of [its] application

. . . resulted in dwellings in Sayville being made unavailable to
Minorities in the Town

. ” App’x at 38 ¶ 98

. I t stands to reason that the developer must first prove that we can look to a “final, definitive position” from the town on that application

. S ee Sunrise Detox , 769 F.3d at 124 . Absent that showing, Village Green’s claims cannot be said to have “yet matured to a point that warrants decision.” 13B Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3532 (3d ed. 2022). Village Green argue s that t his Court’s ruling in Mhany Management, Inc. v. County of Nassau demonstrates that a final decision is not required for its FHA

seek immediate recompense in federal court from that official for

. . . dignitary or emotional harm

. . . even in the absence of a final decision on the developmen t proposal

. ” 769 F.3d at 123 . Here, unlike in Sunrise Detox , Village Green does seek damages in addition to an injunction. But we need not address the question left open in Sunrise Detox , because Village Green’s claim for monetary damages does not sound in dignitary or emotional harm and because, in any event, we conclude that Village Green has received a final decision

.
6 See App’x at 37 ¶¶ 89

- 90 (acknowledging the town’s “facially

- neutral custom, policy, or practice” of “refusing to modify C&Rs that limit development to owner - occupied condominiums or age

- restricted rental apartments”).20 claim. See 819 F.3d 581 . We disagree. In Mhany , we held that developers had standing to pursue claims that Nassau County and the Incorporated Village of Garden City had discriminatorily rezoned parcels of county

- owned land to prevent low

- and middle

- income housing from being built on those sites , in violation of the FHA

. Id. at 598 , 623 . We focused on the second and third prongs
of the three

- part Lujan test for Article III standing: whether the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,” and whether it is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision. ” Id. at 600 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env ’t Servs. , 528 U.S. 167, 180

- 81 (2000) ). We concluded that these requirements had been satisfied because the developers had shown that, absent the defendants’ challenged conduct, there was a “ ‘ substantial probability ’ that housing with greater minority occupancy would have been built.” Id. at 600

- 601 (quoting Fair Hous

. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington , 316 F.3d 357, 363 (2d Cir. 2003) ). Our conclusion today is consistent with Mhany . The final

- decision requirement,
and constitutional ripeness generally, are “really just about the first Lujan
factor”

— whether a plaintiff’s injury is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent. Walsh , 714 F.3d at 688 . Because there was no disp ute in Mhany that the21 defendants had made the final decision to rezone the challenged parcels of land,

see 819 F.3d at 606 , that case simply did not address the contours of the final

decision requirement

. III. This Dispute Is Ripe Having concluded that Village Green’s claims are all subject to the final

decision requirement, w e turn to the central issue: Has Village Green received a “final, definitive decision” on its application to remove the C&Rs, or are further proceedings before town agencies necessary for the claims to “arise[] in a more
concrete and final form?” Murphy , 402 F.3d at 347 , 353 . Here we part ways with
the district court and conclude that this dispute is ripe.
We have characterized Williamson County ’s “jurisdictional prerequisite ” as

“ condition [ing] federal review on a property owner submitting at least one meaningful application” to the relevant municipal entity. Id. at 348. This is principally because it is “virtual [ ly ] impossib [ le ] ” for us to determine “ what development will be permitted on a particular lot of land when its use is subject to the decision of a regulatory body invested with great discretion, which it has not yet even been asked to exercise.” Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan

. Agency , 520 U.S. 725, 739 (1997)

. Two of our cases make the point clearly. In Sunrise Detox , the22 decision not to pursu e the “administrative avenues for relief outlined in the zoning ordinan ce”

— and the fact that Sunrise was advised, in a letter from the Department of Building commissioner , to “either seek a variance or appeal the department’s determination to the Zoning Board of Appeals”

— pre vented us from being able to “‘look to a final, definitive position’ from the city regarding [Sunrise’s] application.” 769 F.3d at 121, 124 (quoting Murphy , 402 F.3d at 347 ). “A federal lawsuit at this stage,” we explained, “would inhibit the kind of give

and

- take negotiation that often resolves land use problems, and would in that way impair or truncate a process that must be allowed to run its course.” Id. “ I n light of Sunrise’s midstream abandonment of the zoning process

. . . its claim [wa ] s not yet ripe.” Id.
Landowner abandonment of the zoning process was even more pronounced in Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Commission

. The dispute there
stemmed from the Sunday afternoon prayer group meetings , often attended by between ten and sixty people , that Robert and Mary Murphy held weekly in
their home on a seven - residence cul

- de

- sac in New Milford, Connecticut. Murphy , 402 F.3d at 34 4

- 4 5

. After the neighbors complained of congestion and excessive noise, New Milford’s z oning c ommission directed its z oning23 e nforcement o fficer (“ZEO”) to investigate. Id. at 345

. The ZEO “visited the Murphys’ property on three Sundays and found that from thirteen to twenty cars lined the Murphys’ driveway, their rear yard and the cul

- de

- sac.” Id. T he z oning

c ommission issued an opinion concluding that “the weekly, sizable prayer meetings were not a customary accessory use in a single

- family residential area.” Id. The commission sent the Murphys an informal letter so advising them. Id. Two days later , the Murphys sued th e z oning c ommission , to which the ZEO responded with a formal cease and desist order

. Id. However, i nstead of

“ appeal [ing] the cease and desist order to the Zoning Board of Appeals, where they could have sought a variance , ” t he Murphys continued with their federal
suit. Id. The dispute was not ripe because the Murphys’ “fail[ure] to submit a single variance application in thi s matter

. . . depriv[ed] us of any certainty as to what use of the Murphys’ property would be permitted.” Id. at 353

. This case is a far cry from Sunrise Detox and Murphy

. There is no question that Village Green submitted a “meaningful application” to municipal agencies
to address its land

- use dilemma

. Id. at 348

. Certainly, Village Green did not shirk the “give

- and

- take negotiation that often resolves land use problems , ” Sunrise
Detox , 769 F.3d at 124

— even if, in this case, negotiation was evidently fruitless

.24 Village Green did not sue when, after seven years of trying to comply with the
C&Rs , it came to believe that compliance had bec o me impossible . Instead, the developer began the arduous process of modifying the C&Rs . That process began in 2013, with the pre - submission meetings with the p lanning d epartment ; continued i n 2014, when Village Green filed its formal application to modify the
C&Rs and defended its project during public hearings ; took shape o ver the next two years, when it worked with the p lanning d epartment on a series of studies
on traf fic, property values, and wetland issues and modified its application
several times to accommodate concerns from residents and the t own s ; and was set to culminate in November 2016 , with a formal motion to approve before the
Town Board

. Through its compliance with all that the t own asked of it, Village
Green in no way “impair[ed] or truncate[d] a process that must be allowed to run
its course.” Id. Of course, submitting a meaningful application is only part of the equation. T he municipal entity responsible for the relevant zoning laws must also have an opportunity to commit to a position

. S ee , e.g. , Pakdel , 141 S. Ct. at 2230 (“Once the government is committed to a position

. . . the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution.”); Unity Ventures v. Lake Cnty. , 841 F.2d 770, 775 (7th Cir. 1988)25 (“A final decision must be demonstrated by a development plan submit ted, considered, and rejected by the governmental entity.” (emphasis added) ). It is at this stage that the district court concluded that Village Green’s claims were not ripe

. The Town Board never took a definit iv e position , according to the district court, because it never voted at the November 2016 meeting and has not considered the application since then. See Village Green I , 2019 WL 4737054, at *5

. We see things differently. It would no doubt be easier for us to conclude that Village Green received a final decision had the Town Board done what the developer asked it to do: vote publicly , yes or no, on the application. The parties
seem to agree a no - vote on November 17, 2016 , would have ripen ed the dispute.
But because the Town Board declined to give its position this way , we must

assess the more unusual route it did take : first, noting in a n official resolution
that the “motion to approve fails for lack of second,” App’x at 317 ; then apparently choosing to “treat [] the failed motion to approve as a denial of the application” and promising that no town agency would hear anything further on the matter; App’x at 3 2

- 33 ¶ 67; and finally , true to that promise , scheduling no further proceedings on the application in the almost six years since

.26 We conclude that, through t his sequence of events , the Town Board
demonstrated its “ arriv [al] at a definitive position on the issue that inflict [ed] an actual, concrete injury” on Village Green. Williamson Cnty. , 473 U.S. at 193.
Consider first the resolution filed with the t own c lerk on December 8, 2016

. In full, it states: WHEREAS, an application has been filed by Village Green at Sayville, LLC (“t he applicant”) with respect to the property located at 0 Sunrise Highway, Sayville and referred to on the Suffolk County Tax Map as 0500

- 258.00

- 03.00

- 001.000); and WHEREAS, the applicant seeks a modification of deed covenants and restrictions associated with TC 4726 in order to construct 59 apartment[s] (58 rental apartments and 1 superintendent apartment) instead of 38 single family attached dwellings, and WHEREAS, a public hearing was held before the Town Board on June 30, 2016, at which time decision was reserved; and WHEREAS, the item was scheduled for a decision before the Town Board on November 17, 2016. NOW, THEREFORE, on motion by Supervisor Ang i e Carpenter to grant the a pplication, be it RESOLVED, that the motion to approve fails for lack of second. App’x at 317.27 Th e resolution bears many indicia of finality

. It acknowledges that , while
the Town Board “reserved” its decision on the application on June 30, the application was “scheduled for a decision” on November 17. The

“ RESOL [ UTION ]” that follows

— that the “motion to approve fails”

— can naturally be read as constituting that decision. Unlike at the June 30 meeting, at which the Town Board passed a “motion t o reserve decision and ask[ed] that the Planning Board review this application again ,” App’x at 281, this resolution does
not contemplate future proceedings. It does not reschedule the vote. It gives no further instructions to Village Green. In other words, i t offers no indication that
the Town Board intended its denial for lack of second to be any less final than a

no - vote would have been

. Village Green’s conversation with the t own a ttorne y
— who serves as “legal counsel to the Town of Islip [and] the T own Board” 7

— reaffirms these
observations

. The t own a ttorney told Village Green that the failed motion was a

7 See Town Attorney , Town of Islip, https://www.islipny.gov/departments/town

attorney (last visited Aug. 4 , 2022) . A court may take “routine[]” judicial notice of “documents retrieved from official government websites.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC , 127 F. Supp. 3d 156, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ; see Cangemi v. United States , 13 F.4th 115, 124 n.4 (2d Cir. 2021) (taking judicial notice of agency website)

.28 denial of the application and that “no further proceedings

. . . would be held.” App’x at 3 2

- 33 ¶ 67. The t own a ttorney then failed to respond to a letter from Village Green asking if he disputed having said this

. Taking these events together , i t was far from “merely speculative” that Village Green ’s application
had failed. See Sunrise Detox , 769 F.3d at 122

. To the contrary, o ther th an by simply voting

— as Village Green repeatedly asked it to do

— the Town Board
could not have made its position any clearer

. The district court faulted Village Green for citing no “relevant binding precedent suggesting that [the t own a ttorney’s] utterance, such as it may be, constitutes a final decision, or is otherwise binding on the Town Board.” Village Green I , 2019 WL 4737054 , at *5. This criticism miss es the mark

. It is true that, ordinarily, a t own a ttorney will “not have the powe r to bind [a] Zoning Board with regard to ” a land

- use application. Carbone v. Town of Bedford , 534 N.Y.S.2d 211, 21 2 (2d Dep’t 1988)

. But Village Green asserts not that the t own a ttorney denied its application on his own authorit y, but merely that he conveyed the
Town Board ’s position

. We cannot fathom why Village Green should now be penalized for having believed him

. Nor do we agree with the district court that
the Town Board’s failure to act since November 2016 weighs in the defendants’29 favor

. T he reason there would be “no further proceedings , ” per the t own

a ttorney, was that the application had been denied. App’x at 3 2 ¶ 67. That the
Town Board kept its word bolsters , not undermines, its decision’s finality

. 8 Ultimately, we need not s peculate why the Town Board would decide to deny the application without a formal vote and fors wear further public proceedings

. It suffices to say that , taking as true the material factual allegations in the complaint

— as at this stage we must

— such a decision was made. If a dispute can ripen when a municipal entity uses “repetitive and unfair procedures” to avoid a final decision, see Sherman , 752 F.3d at 563 , it surely ripens when, as here, the entity makes plain that it has reached a decision that, by all accounts, it intends to be final. Because the rejection of Village Green’s application inflicted “a ‘concrete and particularized ’” injury , not one that is

8 The town’s position on appeal further supports our conclusion that a failed motion to approve can serve as a final decision: the town maintains that the Town Board “has complete discretion in co nsidering [Village Green’s] Application and may even refuse to consider it if it so chooses .” Appellees ’ Br. at 7 (emphasis added).30 “merely speculative and may never occur , ” Sunrise Detox , 769 F.3d at 122 (citations omitted) , we conclude that Village Green’s claims are ripe. 9
CONCLUSION For the reasons above, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

9 Because Village Green received a final decision on its application to remove the C&Rs, we need not address its alternative claim that “[s]eeking a final decision would [have been] futile

. ” Sherman , 752 F.3d at 563

.