# C_2016059EN.01004902.xml

| 15.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 59/49 |
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15.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 59/49

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Action brought on 29 December 2015 — Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe v Commission

(Case T-759/15)

(2016/C 059/57)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Fiat Chrysler Finance Europe (FCFE) (Luxembourg, Luxembourg) (represented by: J. Rodriguez, Solicitor, M. Engel and G. Maisto, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | declare the action for annulment admissible; |
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declare the action for annulment admissible;

| — | annul Articles 1-4 of the Commission’s decision dated 21 October 2015 addressed to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (‘Luxembourg’) in case SA.38375 (2914/C ex 2014 NN) (‘Contested Decision’); |
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annul Articles 1-4 of the Commission’s decision dated 21 October 2015 addressed to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (‘Luxembourg’) in case SA.38375 (2914/C ex 2014 NN) (‘Contested Decision’);

| — | order the Commission to pay FCFE’s costs. |
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order the Commission to pay FCFE’s costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant relies on four pleas in law.

| 1. | First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches Article 107 TFEU because the Commission has misapplied the concept of ‘selective advantage’ and failed to show that the APA is liable to distort competition. |
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1.

First plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches Article 107 TFEU because the Commission has misapplied the concept of ‘selective advantage’ and failed to show that the APA is liable to distort competition.

| 2. | Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches Article 296(2) TFEU and its duty to state reasons through its failure to explain how it derives the arm’s length principle from Union law, or even what the principle is and through its superficial description of the APA’s effect on competition. |
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2.

Second plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches Article 296(2) TFEU and its duty to state reasons through its failure to explain how it derives the arm’s length principle from Union law, or even what the principle is and through its superficial description of the APA’s effect on competition.

| 3. | Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches the principle of legal certainty since the Commission’s novel formulation of the arm’s length principle introduces complete uncertainty and confusion as to when an advance pricing agreement, and indeed any transfer pricing analysis might breach EU state aid rules. |
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3.

Third plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches the principle of legal certainty since the Commission’s novel formulation of the arm’s length principle introduces complete uncertainty and confusion as to when an advance pricing agreement, and indeed any transfer pricing analysis might breach EU state aid rules.

| 4. | Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches the principle of legitimate expectations since the Commission has created a legitimate expectation that for state aid purposes it assesses transfer pricing arrangements on the basis of the OECD Guidelines and its sudden departure from this has breached the principle of legitimate expectations. |
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4.

Fourth plea in law, alleging that the contested decision breaches the principle of legitimate expectations since the Commission has created a legitimate expectation that for state aid purposes it assesses transfer pricing arrangements on the basis of the OECD Guidelines and its sudden departure from this has breached the principle of legitimate expectations.

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