* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determine d that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 95-20657

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

MINISTER DAVID IREDIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(95-CR-24-1)

December 11, 1996

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

On February 22, 1988, Minister David Iredia w as sentenced,

following a conviction by a jury, for 13 counts of credit card

fraud. He served time in prison for seven counts and was placed on

probation for the remaining s ix counts after the court suspended2

sentence for each of those six counts. Iredia was subsequently

deported to Nigeria on September 1, 1993.

Iredia illegally reentered the United States in October 1993,

and was arrested again on January 28, 1994, by agents of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) in the Woodlands,

Texas. The INS instituted deportation proceedings and on March 8,

1994, an order was issued for Iredia’s deportation from the United

States. On March 16, 1994, before his deportation, Iredia was

arrested by a U nited States Marshal at the Immigration Detention

Center for violating the probationary sentence imposed for his 1988

credit card conviction. Iredia was found guilty of violating his

probation by illegally reentering t he United States and was

sentenced to three years imprisonment.

Upon his release fromprison for the probation violation,

Iredia was returned to Houston pursuant to a detainer filed by the

INS, and was charged with illegally reentering the Un ited States

after deportation, a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. On August 11,

1995, Iredia entered an oral conditional plea. Following the plea,

the district court allowed Iredia to waive a Presentence

Investigation Report (“PSI”) and sentenced him that same day. The

district court imposed a sentence of 21 month s imprisonment

followed by a three year term of supervised release. Iredia filed

a timely notice of appeal.3 ANALYSIS

Iredia raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that

the district court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment

charging him with violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 because the government

failed to comply with the Speedy Trial Act, 1 8 U.S.C. § 3161, by

holding him in custody for purposes of both immigration and

criminal prosecution. We hold that Iredia’s civil arrest in

January 1994 in connection with his illegal status in this country

was carried out pursuant to the INS’s lawful function regarding

deportation and, therefore, did not implicate the Speedy Trial Act.

Iredia offers nothing to show that the subsequent criminal charge

of illegall y reentering the United States merely “gilds” the

initial charge of violating his probation for the 1988 credit card

conviction. S ee United States v. Giwa

, 831 F.2d 538, 541 (5th Cir.

1987) (an arrest on one charg e does not trigger the right to a

speedy trial on another charge filed after the arrest unless the

subsequent charge “gilds” the initial charge); and see United

States v. Cepeda-Luna

, 989 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1993) (civil

detention does not trigger the right to a speedy trial unless the

civil detention is merely a ruse to avoid the Speedy Trial Act).

Next, Iredia argues that the district court erred in failing

to advise him that, if his guilty plea was accepted, there would be

no trial of any kind and that he would b e waiving a jury trial.

Iredia contends that the district court’s failure to advise him of4

this fact violated F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 11(c)(4). After reviewing the

record in this case, we hold that Iredia knew and fully

comprehended that he had waived his right to a trial. He was

represented by experienced defense counsel and Iredia stated that

he was pleading guilty because he was g uilty and did not wish to

waste the court’s time. As such, we find that the district court’s

failure to advise Iredia that he would be waiving his right to a

jury trial upon the acceptance of his plea of guilty was harmless

error. S ee United States v. Johnson

, 1 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir.

1993) (en banc).

Finally, Iredia contends that the district court erred by

sentencing him without first or dering a PSI under F E D

. R. C RIM

. P.

32(b). However, the district court had the benefit of examining

Iredia’s prior presentence files and the record contained ample

information to support the district court’s findings. As such, the

district court’s decision to sentence Iredia without the benefit of

a new PSI was not clear error.

CONCLUSION

We have carefully reviewed the briefs, the reply brief, the

record excepts and relevant portions of the record itself; and for

the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should,

in all things, be

AFFIRMED

.