This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before

publication in the New York Reports.

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No. 90 

Jacqueline El-Dehdan,

 Respondent,

 v.

Salim El-Dehdan, Also Known as 

Sam Reed,

 Appellant.

Donna Aldea, for appellant.

Karina E. Alomar, for respondent.

RIVERA, J.:

Defendant challenges a determination of civil contempt for

his failure to comply with a January 2010 order issued in the

course of the parties' matrimonial proceeding. That order

requires him to deposit in escrow the proceeds of the sale of

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properties which are the subject of a prior equitable

distribution determination in favor of plaintiff.

We conclude that plaintiff met her burden in support of her

motion for civil contempt by establishing that defendant violated

a lawful, clear mandate of the court, of which he had knowledge,

and that such violation resulted in prejudice to her rights. We

reject defendant's contentions that a civil contempt

determination requires a finding of a contemnor's wilful

violation of the underlying order, and that Supreme Court could

not draw a negative inference from defendant's invocation of his

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination at the contempt

hearing.

We, therefore, conclude that the evidence adduced at the

hearing established a sufficient basis for the civil contempt

judgment. Accordingly, we answer in the affirmative the certified

question as to whether the Appellate Division properly affirmed

Supreme Court.

I. 

Defendant, Salim El-Dehdan, a/k/a Sam Reed, concedes that he

has not complied with an order issued in a matrimonial proceeding

commenced by plaintiff Jacqueline El-Dehdan, defendant's former

spouse. To address the specific issue of the propriety of the

contempt order challenged in this appeal, we begin with a review

of the somewhat tortuous procedural history of the parties'

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matrimonial action.

A. The Matrimonial Action for Divorce and Equitable 

 Distribution

In October 2008, plaintiff commenced an action for divorce

and equitable distribution, and thereafter moved by order to show

cause for pendente lite relief seeking, in part, to restrain

defendant's transfer of any real property held jointly or

individually by the parties. The signed order to show cause set

a hearing date on the motion, but did not include a restraint on

the transfer of defendant's property. Soon thereafter defendant

cross moved to dismiss the matrimonial action as barred on res

judicata grounds, claiming the parties were divorced pursuant to

a Lebanese judgment, and furthermore, that plaintiff's prior New

York divorce action was dismissed with prejudice.

At an initial court appearance in January 2009, Supreme

Court indicated that another hearing would likely be necessary on

the question of the legality of the Lebanese divorce. The record

of the hearing demonstrates that the court and the parties were

under the impression that the October 2008 order to show cause

mandated a restraint on defendant's properties, and that the

court intended to extend that restraint into the future. Before

adjourning to permit additional submissions by the parties, the

following colloquy ensued. 

THE COURT: I get the feeling I'm going to

need a hearing. I get the feeling you're

going to need a lot of different people

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coming in to testify. But I'm going to keep

the status quo. All restraints will remain

in full force and effect pending further

order of this Court. 

* * *

DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: Just for Clarification,

as far as restraining orders, what is being

restrained?

THE COURT: All their assets. 

DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL: Joint assets, your

Honor?

THE COURT: Anything you have. Bank accounts,

you can't close out any accounts. Any

buildings, you can't sell, mortgage, can't do

anything. And don't violate my order.

THE DEFENDANT: Of course. I have nothing

anymore, your Honor. I have no business

anymore, because I been [sic] recovering from

the expenses that I paid for the year 2000.

THE COURT: Okay. We're going to see what

expenses were paid.

Notwithstanding defendant's statements that he would comply

with the court's directive and that he did not have any property

that would be subject to restraint, within two weeks of this

court appearance, defendant contracted to transfer one of his

real properties, which he then sold the following month. Two

weeks later, he contracted to sell another property. 

Specifically, he entered into a contract to sell 171 Ainslie

Street, Brooklyn, New York, a/k/a 254/256 Leonard Street, on

February 23, 2009, and then transferred this property on March

31, 2009. He also contracted to sell and transferred 60-17 60th

Road, Maspeth, New York on April 6, 2009. Defendant would later

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concede that he transferred the Brooklyn property for $950,000,

and the Maspeth property for no consideration.

At the next hearing, held on February 4, 2009 and attended

by defendant and his counsel, the court informed the parties that

it was sending the legal validity of the Lebanese divorce and the

equitable distribution matters to a referee for a hearing and

recommended determination. The court then referenced property in

defendant's control, saying, "I think there's some money out

there. But right now, you want to hold on to your money, that's

fine." The court continued, "[w]e are going to go for a hearing. 

If, in fact, you are divorced, then we will move on to the next

issue of equitable distribution. If you are not divorced, we are

here anyway."

Defendant failed to appear at the scheduled April 2009 date

for the referee's hearing. At that time, defendant's counsel

moved to be relieved from the case, and stated that she had told

defendant that his appearance at the hearing was required, and

that counsel would seek to be relieved. Supreme Court granted

counsel's motion.

The court then held defendant in default for failure to

appear, and denied, with prejudice, defendant's pending motion to

dismiss plaintiff's matrimonial proceeding. The court adjourned

the referee's inquest on equitable distribution, and modified the

assignment to include consideration of plaintiff's grounds for

divorce. 

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Although served with notice, defendant failed to appear at

the October 2009 rescheduled referee's inquest. Nevertheless,

the referee proceeded with the inquest, issued a decision

granting plaintiff's motion for divorce on grounds of cruel and

inhuman treatment, awarded plaintiff exclusive title to the

Brooklyn and Maspeth properties and awarded title to defendant in

property located in Glendale, New York, and a dry cleaning

business he owned and operated.

Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant's motions to

vacate the April 2009 denial of his cross motion to dismiss 

plaintiff's matrimonial action, as well as the referee's decision

granting a divorce and equitable distribution. The Appellate

Division dismissed defendant's appeal from this decision.

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Civil Contempt and Deposit 

 of the Transfer Proceeds

After plaintiff's attorney learned defendant had transferred

the Brooklyn and Maspeth properties, she filed an order to show

cause seeking, inter alia, that defendant be held in civil

contempt for violation of the October 2008 order, and that he be

required to deposit the proceeds from the transfers with

plaintiff's attorney. Thereafter, in January 2010, Supreme Court

signed the order to show cause, which in addition to scheduling a

hearing on plaintiff's contempt motion, directed defendant to

immediately deposit with plaintiff's counsel the net proceeds of

the transfers, reduced by broker's fees, taxes and mortgage

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payments.1 Defendant was personally served with this order to

show cause.

As is clear from the record of the contempt hearing, the

court and all the parties were under the mistaken belief that the

October 2008 order to show cause prohibited the transfers. 

Supreme Court found defendant in contempt and ordered him

incarcerated until he paid $150,000 and returned the deeds and

ownership of the Brooklyn and Maspeth properties and the dry

cleaning business to the marital estate. Defendant remained

incarcerated for two weeks, until defendant's new counsel

discovered that the October 2008 order to show cause contained no

restraint provision and brought the matter to the court's

attention, whereupon the court ordered defendant's immediate

release.

C. Plaintiff's Motion for Civil and Criminal Contempt 

 Based on the January 2010 Order

In August 2010, plaintiff filed a motion to hold defendant

in civil and criminal contempt for his failure to deposit the

1 The order also placed a restraint on the business of

defendant and on the Glendale, New York property; required

defendant to provide plaintiff's attorney with copies of the

contract and all closing documents for the transfers of the

Brooklyn and Maspeth properties; restricted defendant from

accessing any bank account or other financial account or fund

that might be in his name or the name of his business or an

agent; ordered defendant to submit his passport to the court; and

ordered that defendant would be responsible for all tax

consequences of the transfers of the Brooklyn and Maspeth

properties.

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proceeds with plaintiff's attorney as required by the January

2010 order. Defendant cross moved to vacate that order, arguing

that it was void because it was obtained by plaintiff's fraud

upon the court, namely her misrepresentations that the October

2008 order prohibited defendant's transfer of the properties. 

Although defendant conceded he sold the Brooklyn property, he

disputed the amount of the proceeds, claiming he received

$561,046.21, not $950,000 as plaintiff alleged. He further

asserted that he no longer had any of these funds. With respect

to the Maspeth property, he claimed he received no money for the

transfer, never had possession of the property, and, in fact, he

only took title as a favor to friends so that they could secure a

new mortgage. He also claimed that the property since had been

transferred back to the owners through their son. He further

contended that he did not act in wilful disobedience of a

judicial mandate because no order was in place when he actually

transferred the properties.

At the hearing before the referee assigned to consider the

parties' motions, defendant's counsel stipulated that defendant

was served with a copy of the January 2010 order in February

2010, and that defendant failed to deposit the funds in

plaintiff's counsel's escrow account as required by that order.

He further stipulated to submission of the recorded deed that

evidenced the transfer of the Brooklyn property.

Plaintiff testified on her own behalf that she received none

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of the proceeds from the transfer of the Brooklyn property and

submitted into evidence proof of the transfer, including

defendant's contract of sale and closing. Plaintiff further

submitted into evidence an affidavit of personal service for the

January 2010 order. Plaintiff also called defendant as a witness. 

During his testimony he refused to answer any questions related

to the proceeds from the transfer, and invoked his Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination. Specifically, he

refused to explain what he did with the proceeds from the

transfer and whether he was currently in possession of the money.

The referee found that defendant had actual knowledge of the

terms of the January 2010 order, he dissipated marital assets

after the commencement of the matrimonial action, namely the

Brooklyn and Maspeth properties, and had not deposited the

proceeds from the transfer. The referee found specifically that

less than one month after he filed his affidavit in support of

his motion to dismiss plaintiff's action for divorce, defendant

executed a contract of sale for the Brooklyn property for

$950,000, received a $150,000 deposit for the sale, wired

$516,046.21 to a bank from the sale proceeds, and that the deed

was thereafter recorded. However, the referee concluded that

plaintiff failed to establish that defendant could deposit the

funds after the order was issued, and therefore recommended

denial of the motion for civil contempt. The referee also

recommended denial of the motion for criminal contempt, finding

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that plaintiff failed to establish defendant's wilful violation

of the January 2010 order.

In September 2011, Supreme Court granted plaintiff's motion

to set aside the referee's report, concluding that the referee's

findings were not supported by the record. After finding that

all the elements of civil contempt were satisfied in this case,

the court noted that the Fifth Amendment did not relieve

defendant of the usual evidentiary burden in a civil proceeding,

and also found that defendant's actions were wilful. Supreme

Court thus found defendant in contempt of court for failing to

comply with the January 2010 order, and provided that he "could

purge himself of the contempt" by depositing his passport and the

proceeds from the Brooklyn property transfer within 20 days of

the contempt order. Failure to do so would result in his

incarceration.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, treating

Supreme Court's decision as, in effect, granting only plaintiff's

motion for civil contempt because the court did not impose a

definite jail term without opportunity to purge the contempt (114

AD3d 4 [2d Dept 2013]). In a comprehensive and insightful

opinion, the Appellate Division broadly addressed and clarified

the burdens of proof where the contemnor invokes the Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as well as what

the court considered to be inconsistencies in the case law

regarding the elements of civil contempt. The Appellate Division

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granted defendant leave to appeal, and certified the question

whether its opinion and order was properly made. (2d Dept, May

14, 2014, index No. 56786/08.)

II.

Defendant challenges the Appellate Division's decision on

three grounds: plaintiff failed to establish the necessary

elements of civil contempt, including defendant's wilful

violation of a lawful court order;2 he was denied the opportunity

to collaterally attack the January 2010 order; and in the context

of a hearing on a joint civil and criminal contempt motion,

Supreme Court may not draw a negative inference from defendant's

invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. We are

unpersuaded by these arguments, and address each of them in turn.

A. Evidence of Defendant's Civil Contempt

1. Elements of Civil Contempt and Plaintiff's Burden 

 of Proof

Under Judiciary Law § 753, "[a] court of record has power to

punish, by fine and imprisonment, or either, a neglect or

violation of duty, or other misconduct, by which a right or

remedy of a party to a civil action or special proceeding,

2 Defendant does not challenge the Appellate Division's

determination that Supreme Court granted only the civil contempt

branch of plaintiff's motion, and requests specifically that we

reverse and vacate the civil contempt judgment. Our review is

therefore limited to the matter as briefed by defendant.

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pending in the court may be defeated, impaired, impeded, or

prejudiced" (Judiciary Law § 753 [A]; see generally

People v Sweat, 24 NY3d 348, 353-354 [2104] [discussing Judiciary

Law Section 753]). In Matter of McCormick v Axelrod (59 NY2d 574

[1983]), this Court described the elements necessary to support a

finding of civil contempt. First, "it must be determined that a

lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal

mandate, was in effect" (id. at 583). Second, "[i]t must appear,

with reasonable certainty, that the order has been disobeyed"

(id.). Third, "the party to be held in contempt must have had

knowledge of the court's order, although it is not necessary that

the order actually have been served upon the party" (id.). 

Fourth, "prejudice to the right of a party to the litigation must

be demonstrated" (id.; see Karg v Kern, 125 AD3d 527, 528-529

[1st Dept 2015] [contempt requires a showing of a violation of a

clear and unequivocal court mandate and that the movant was

thereby prejudiced]; Matter of Vernon D., 119 AD3d 784, 784 [2d

Dept 2014] [civil contempt was properly found where the contemnor

did not obey a clear and unequivocal order]; N. Tonawanda First

ex rel. Kern v City of N. Tonawanda, 94 AD3d 1537, 1538 [4th Dept

2012] [order violated must be an unequivocal mandate]; Conners v

Pallozzi, 241 AD2d 719, 719 [3d Dept 1997] [evidence proving with

a reasonable certainty that a prior court order has been violated

will support a finding of civil contempt]; N.A. Dev. Co. Ltd. v

Jones, 99 AD2d 238, 242 [1st Dept 1984] [movant must establish a

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reasonable certainty]; Power Auth of State of NY v Moeller, 57

AD2d 380, 382 [3d Dept 1977] [personal service is not necessary

if the party has actual knowledge of the order], lv denied 42

NY2d 806 [1977]).

In order to carry her burden, plaintiff had to establish by

clear and convincing evidence defendant's violation of the

January 2010 order (Town of Southampton v R.K.B. Realty, LLC, 91

AD3d 628, 629 [2d Dept 2012]) [the movant bears the burden of

establishing contempt with clear and convincing evidence]; Tener

v Cremer, 89 AD3d 75, 78 [1st Dept 2011] [same]; Town of Copake v

13 Lackawanna Properties, LLC, 73 AD3d 1308, 1309 [3d Dept 2010]

[civil contempt requires clear and convincing evidence], lv

denied 20 NY3d 857 [2013]; Dietrich v Michii, 57 AD3d 1527 [4th

Dept 2008] [same]; Raphael v Raphael, 20 AD3d 463, 463-464 [2d

Dept 2005] [same]; Graham v Graham, 152 AD2d 653, 654-655 [2d

Dept 1989] [same]).

2. Plaintiff's Evidence

Here, there is no genuine dispute that plaintiff

established, by clear and convincing evidence, defendant's

requisite knowledge of the order and noncompliance. Defendant's

counsel stipulated at the contempt hearing before the referee

that defendant was previously served with the January 2010 order,

and also admitted that defendant had not complied. Indeed, now

five years after the order was signed and issued defendant has

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yet to comply.

Plaintiff also easily established that defendant's failure

to deposit the proceeds was prejudicial to her interests.

Defendant's conduct denied plaintiff equitable distribution in

accordance with the 2009 determination awarding her title to the

Brooklyn and Maspeth properties.

The real dispute between the parties centers on whether "a

lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal

mandate, was in effect" (McCormick, 59 NY2d at 583). We conclude

that the January 2010 order constitutes the lawful order which

defendant failed to comply with, and defendant's efforts to

distract our analysis from that central and obvious conclusion

are without legal or record factual support.

The signed January 2010 order explicitly states that the

defendant 

"shall deposit immediately with the

Plaintiff's attorney the sum of nine hundred

fifty thousand ($950,000.00) dollars which is

the sum of money he purportedly received from

the transfer of [the property] 171 Ainslie

Street, Brooklyn, New York and 64-17 60th

Road, Maspeth, New York, minus the money paid

for [the] real estate broker, transfer taxes

and payment of the underlying mortgage."

 

This unambiguous directive, describing the property and the exact

amount of the proceeds, and directing defendant to immediately

deposit those funds with counsel, left no doubt as to its

requirements and time frame, and, therefore, constitutes "a

lawful order of the court, clearly expressing an unequivocal

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mandate, [that] was in effect" (McCormick, 59 NY2d at 583).

Nevertheless, defendant claims that the January 2010 order

is not lawful. According to defendant, the order is a nullity

because it was procured based on plaintiff's attorney's

misrepresentations, and in violation of his due process rights to

notice and a hearing. In essence what defendant seeks to do is

excise from the January 2010 order its mandatory language that he

deposit the proceeds of the transfer. However, the fact that the

January 2010 order contains plaintiff's request for contempt does

not negate the order's clear directive that defendant deposit the

proceeds. That portion of the order did not seek to penalize

defendant but rather to preserve funds for plaintiff's benefit. 

As the referee's report on the contempt motion explained, part of

the intent of the January 2010 order was "to preserve funds to

protect the plaintiff's rights to equitable distribution as

decided by the undersigned in the decision issued" in December

2009.

We further note that defendant's description of plaintiff's

request for relief undermines his current argument that the

January 2010 order sought only to address a violation of a

(nonexistent) restraint provision in the October 2008 order. In

his brief to this Court, defendant declares that plaintiff's

order to show cause "sought multiple layers of relief--including

(A) contempt, and (B) an immediate deposit of money," leading

Supreme Court to "address[] only the first issue--namely, whether

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Mr. Reed should be held in contempt. It never addressed the

separate and immediate order for Mr. Reed to convey money to

Plaintiff's attorney." Thus, defendant, in actuality, recognizes

that the provisions of the January 2010 order reflect different,

compartmentalized directives.

With respect to defendant's due process argument, the record

does not support defendant's claim that he was denied notice and

a hearing. To the contrary, the record establishes that he

received notice of the hearing as he was personally served with

the January 2010 order. Furthermore, his arguments in opposition

to the motion for contempt, and in support of his cross motion to

vacate the January 2010 order, were fully submitted and

considered by Supreme Court prior to issuance of its civil

contempt order.

To the extent defendant complains that the January 2010

order is invalid because it was issued ex parte, the law is clear

that a court is authorized to issue an order to preserve marital

property, both in advance of, and upon, a determination of

equitable distribution. In accordance with Domestic Relations

Law § 234, in an action for divorce the court may "(1) determine

any question as to the title to property arising between the

parties, and (2) make such direction, between the parties,

concerning the possession of property, as in the court's

discretion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of

the case and of the respective parties" (see also CPLR § 2214 [d]

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[a "court in a proper case may grant an order to show cause, to

be served in lieu of a notice of motion"]; CPLR § 6313 [a]

[allowing for a temporary restraining order]; 22 NYCRR 202.7 [f]

[permitting the court to grant temporary injunctive relief upon

an affirmation demonstrating significant prejudice to the party

seeking the restraining order if prior notice is given to the

adverse party]). Therefore, the January 2010 order to deposit the

proceeds from the transfer was well within the court's authority

(see e.g. Nederlander v Nederlander, 102 AD3d 416 [1st Dept 2013]

["in order to protect (the) expectancy (of spouses in marital

property) pending equitable distribution, to maintain the status

quo, and to prevent the dissipation of marital property, the

court must be able to issue orders to ensure that such marital

property is protected should it later become the subject of

equitable distribution"]; Maillard v Maillard, 211 AD2d 963, 964

[3d Dept 1995] ["Domestic Relations Law § 234 allows courts to

issue preliminary injunctions aimed at the preservation of

marital assets pending equitable distribution. . . . Proper cause

may be shown to exist by the admission . . . that there was a

conversion and/or dissipation of marital assets"] [internal

citations omitted]; Nebot v Nebot, 139 AD2d 635 [2d Dept 1988]

[as defendant's only claim to a property purchased with the

separate funds of the plaintiff was to any part of the

appreciation she might have contributed to, it was appropriate

for the court to require that half of the proceeds of the sale be

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placed in escrow while the determination was pending]; Palitz v

Palitz, 111 AD2d 119 [1st Dept 1985] [court found it appropriate

to deposit half the assets of a dissolved corporation in an

escrow account while the determination was made as to whether the

corporation was marital property, and to allow for "other prudent

investments yielding substantially greater returns"]; Monroe v

Monroe, 108 AD2d 793, 794 [2d Dept 1985] [Domestic Relations Law

§ 234 allows courts to issue preliminary injunctions outside of

the requirements of CPLR article 63]; Leibowits v Leibowits, 93

AD2d 535, 535-536 [2d Dept 1983] ["Section 234 of the Domestic

Relations Law provides the authority for the issuance of an order

restraining disposition of marital assets during the pendency of

a divorce action. Therefore, compliance with the formalities and

jurisprudential requirements of article 63 of the CPLR relative

to preliminary injunctions is not a prerequisite to an order of

restraint"]; Perry v Perry, 79 AD2d 851 [4th Dept 1980] ["[i]n an

action for divorce the court may determine any question as to the

title to property arising between the parties"]; Weinstock v

Weinstock, 8 Misc 3d 221, 223 [Sup Ct 2005] ["Section 234 of the

Domestic Relations Law specifically empowers the court to

determine any question as to the title or possession of property

as between the parties in a matrimonial action . . . . This power

. . . necessarily includes the power to prevent a party from

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frustrating such delivery by improper disposition of assets"]).3

Defendant is also foreclosed from arguing to this Court that

the equitable distribution determination itself is invalid. 

Having previously unsuccessfully challenged that decision,

defendant should not be given a "second bite at the apple" in

this appeal from the civil contempt judgment. Moreover, inasmuch

as the court awarded plaintiff the Brooklyn and Maspeth

properties in its equitable distribution determination the

propriety of which is not at issue on this appeal it was

perfectly lawful for the court to require defendant to deposit

the proceeds of his transfer of those properties with plaintiff's

counsel, regardless of whether the initial transfer of the

properties violated any court order. 

3 In 2009, the New York legislature amended the Domestic

Relations Law to provide upon commencement of a divorce action

for automatic orders restraining the parties from transferring or

disposing of marital assets, without written consent of the other

party or consent of the court (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B]

[2] [b]). As described in a letter from the Chair of the

Assembly Judiciary Committee to the Governor, the automatic

orders were intended to address the hardship to one spouse caused

by unilateral dissipation of marital assets upon commencement of

divorce proceedings.

"Having standardized orders automatically in

effect from the commencement of a case would

ensure timely prevention of dissipation of

assets and would eliminate the expense and

delays involved in making applications for

temporary restraining orders. It is not

uncommon for parties to dissipate assets as

soon as divorce papers are served. This

results in extreme hardship to one party in

the divorce action" 

(New York Bill Jacket, 2009 A.B. 2574, Ch. 72.)

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3. Wilfulness is Not a Required Element of Civil 

 Contempt

Defendant argues that Supreme Court's finding of contempt is

not supported by the record because the evidence failed to

establish that he wilfully disobeyed the January 2010 order. 

According to defendant our case law establishes that wilful

conduct is a necessary element of both civil and criminal

contempt, and that what distinguishes the two is merely the level

of a contemnor's wilfulness. Defendant's arguments are

contradicted by statute as well as our prior holdings (McCormick,

59 NY2d at 583).

Turning to the relevant statutory provision, nowhere in

Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3] is wilfulness explicitly set forth as

an element of civil contempt (Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; see

also McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]). Indeed the only

mention of wilfulness for civil contempt is in § 753 [A] [1],

which is not at issue in this case as it applies only to "[a]n

attorney, counsellor, clerk, sheriff, coroner," or someone

otherwise selected or appointed for judicial or ministerial

service. In contrast, Judiciary Law § 750, the criminal 

contempt provision, permits a court to impose punishment for

criminal contempt only for "wilful disobedience to its lawful

mandate" (Judiciary Law § 750 [A] [3]; see also Sweat, 24 NY3d at

353-354). This statutory language makes clear that where the

legislature intended to require wilfulness, it knew how to do so,

and any omission of such element is intentional (Statutes Law 

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§ 74 [McKinney]; Pajak v Pajak, 56 NY2d 394, 397 [1982] ["[t]he

failure of the Legislature to include a matter within a

particular statute is an indication that its exclusion was

intended"]). We are, of course, not at liberty to read into the

statute what is not mandated by the Legislature (Statutes Law §

94 [McKinney]; Lederer v Wise Shoe Co., 276 NY 459, 465 [1938]

["[w]e do not by implication read into a clause of a rule or

statute a limitation for which we find no sound reason and which

would render the clause futile"]). 

Apart from the statute, this Court has not imposed a

wilfulness requirement for civil contempt (McCain,84 NY2d;

McCormick, 59 NY2d). Nevertheless, defendant relies on McCormick

and McCain v Dinkins, to persuade us that, absent a finding of

wilfulness, civil contempt cannot be imposed. However, those

cases stands for the opposite proposition. 

In McCormick this Court explained that civil contempt seeks

"the vindication of a private right of a party to litigation and

any penalty imposed upon the contemnor is designed to compensate

the injured private party for the loss of or interference with

that right" (McCormick, 59 NY2d at 583, citing State of New York

v Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345 [1978]). Whereas, criminal contempt

"involves vindication of an offense against public justice and is

utilized to protect the dignity of the judicial system and to

compel respect for its mandates" (id., citing King v. Barnes, 113

NY 476 [1889]). This Court then stated that "the element which

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serves to elevate a contempt from civil to criminal is the level

of willfulness with which the conduct is carried out" (id.).

Defendant argues the Court must have meant that both forms

of contempt require wilfulness, just in varying degrees. We

reject this interpretation because it depends on reading the

language in isolation, rather than as an integral part of the

Court's entire analysis. Read in context, it is clear that the

language does not mean that wilfulness is required. Indeed, the

Court's analysis is devoid of any mention or application of

wilfulness as a necessary element of civil contempt. Instead,

the Court granted the motion for civil contempt, despite its 

conclusion that there was no evidence of wilfulness to support a

finding of criminal contempt.

The meaning to be attached to the Court's "level of

wilfulness" language is that the contemnor's action must connote

an intentionality not otherwise indicative of wrongfulness

(McCormick, 59 NY2d at 583). In other words, the contemnor must

have a consciousness that reflects an awareness of the act that

is other than "unwitting conduct" (Bryan v United States, 524 US

184, 191 [1998]. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1630 [8th ed

2004] [defining willfulness as "[v]oluntary and intentional"]). 

This Court again upheld a finding of civil contempt without

requiring willfulness in McCain (84 NY2d at 226-227). In that

case, the Court cited to McCormick's distinction between criminal

and civil contempt as based on "the level of willfulness associated

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with the conduct" and, just as in McCormick, engaged in a civil

contempt analysis without reference to wilfulness as a necessary

element (id. at 226). As these cases establish, wilfulness is not

an element of civil contempt. We, therefore, agree with the

Appellate Division that civil contempt is established, regardless

of the contemnor's motive, when disobedience of the court's order

"defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices the rights or remedies of

a party" (El-Dehdan, 114 AD3d at 17 [internal citations omitted]).

4. Defendant's Response

Once plaintiff met her burden and established that defendant

violated the order to deposit the proceeds from the transfer, it

was incumbent upon defendant to proffer evidence of his inability

to pay. Defendant's argument to the contrary is unpersuasive

because, as the contemnor, he is the party who is charged with

violating the court's order, and also the party with access to

the relevant financial information regarding his ability to pay. 

Nonetheless, defendant failed to submit evidence that he

could not pay due to a lack of sufficient funds, economic

distress or financial hardship, or some other obstacle to his

compliance with the January 2010 order to deposit the proceeds. 

Instead, he submitted an affidavit containing bald face

statements that by January 29, 2010, he "was no longer in

possession of the proceeds of the March, 2009 sale," that he

received less from the sale of the Brooklyn property than

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evidenced by the transfer documents, and that he received nothing

from the transfer of the Maspeth property as he was merely

holding it in his name for friends. Such "[v]ague and conclusory

allegations of . . . inability to pay or perform are not

acceptable" (Matter of Storm, 28 AD2d 290, 294 [1st Dept 1967]). 

Rather, courts have required a more specific showing of the

contemnor's economic status (see e.g. Yeager v Yeager, 38 AD3d

534, 534-535 [2d Dept 2007] [plaintiff husband met his burden of

showing his inability to comply with the judgment by establishing

he had no additional source of funds after accounting for

payments made in accordance with the pendente lite order and his

reasonable needs, and where his investment account was frozen

pursuant to court order]; Ovsanikow v Ovsanikow, 224 AD2d 786,

787 [3d Dept 1996] [an undocumented assertion of the inability to

pay without any evidentiary support, will not suffice to provide

the defense of a financial inability to pay]; Bowie v Bowie, 182

AD2d 1049, 1051 [3d Dept 1992] [contemnor failed to establish

inability to pay where papers consisted of a brief two-page

affidavit wherein he summarily denied the arrearages and asserted

financial inability to pay, but lacked current documentation

supporting his claims]; Lake v Schuner, 106 AD2d 893, 894 [4th

Dept 1984] [record established that plaintiff was impoverished

and therefore unable to comply with his support order]; and

compare Kainth v Kainth, 36 AD3d 915, 916 [2d Dept 2007] ["[t]he

evidence adduced at the hearing established that the father's

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income for the 12 months preceding the hearing was insufficient

to permit payments in accordance with the order of support.

Further, the father's loss of higher paying employment was not

self-imposed, and the record contains evidence of his active, but

unsuccessful, pursuit of similar employment"], lv dismissed 8

NY3d 1003 [2007]).

B. Collateral Attack on the January 2010 Order

Defendant's argument that he was entitled to collaterally

challenge the January 2010 order in the contempt proceeding is

simply another version of his claim that the October 2008 order

did not prohibit his transfer of the properties. Defendant,

however, ignores the fact that the October 2008 order is not the

subject of the civil contempt order, and, consequently, the

contents of the October order are not material to the issues

before us.

Instead, the contempt order defendant challenges on this

appeal is based on his failure to comply with the January 2010

order, which required that he deposit with the plaintiff's

attorney the proceeds from the transfer. Whether his transfer of

the property initially violated any order of the court is beside

the point. Moreover, as we have already discussed, the court was

well within its authority to issue the January 2010 order.

C. Defendant's Invocation of the Fifth Amendment

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Defendant contends that Supreme Court improperly drew a

negative inference from his invocation of his Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination during the contempt hearing. He

maintains that by holding one hearing on plaintiff's joint motion

for civil and criminal contempt he was forced to choose between

protecting himself against civil liability by testifying as to

his lack of funds, and exercising his rights under the Fifth

Amendment to remain silent so as to avoid criminal contempt. We

find his argument unpersuasive and conclude that under the

circumstances of this case, where defendant failed to take steps

to avoid the alleged dilemma complained of here, Supreme Court

acted within its authority to draw a negative inference, and in

so doing did not violate defendant's constitutional rights.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself." However, the

right against self incrimination does not automatically insulate

a party to a civil action from potential liability. Both the

United States Supreme Court, in Baxter v Palmigiano (425 US 308,

318 [1976]), and this Court, in Marine Midland Bank v Russo

Produce (50 NY2d 31, 42 [1980]), have held that a negative

inference may be drawn in the civil context when a party invokes

the right against self incrimination. Here, defendant could

invoke the privilege, but that did not relieve him of his burden

to present adequate evidence of his financial inability to comply

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with the January 2010 order so as to avoid civil contempt

liability (US v Rylander, 460 US 752, 758 [1983] [invocation of

Fifth Amendment does not "substitute for evidence that would

assist in meeting a burden of production"]; Access Capital Inc. v

DeCicco, 302 AD2d 48, 51 [1st Dept 2002] ["[w]hile a party may

not be compelled to answer questions that might adversely affect

his criminal interest, the privilege does not relieve the party

of the usual evidentiary burden attendant upon a civil

proceeding; nor does it afford any protection against the

consequences of failing to submit competent evidence"]). As we

have explained, defendant relied on his conclusory statements

that he no longer has the proceeds of the transfers and that he

has no funds to deposit with the respondent's attorney. He

cannot seek to avoid the consequences of this failure to proffer

sufficient evidence by invoking his Fifth Amendment right.

We might view this case differently if defendant had sought

relief from Supreme Court to avoid the prejudice he now claims

was the result of a joint civil and criminal contempt hearing. 

If defendant was concerned about the spill-over effect of

invoking his Fifth Amendment right, he could have sought to

bifurcate the hearing so that the court would first consider

plaintiff's criminal contempt allegations (CPLR § 2201; Britt v

Intl. Bus Services, Inc., 255 AD2d 143, 144 [1st Dept 1998]). He

chose not to do so. Instead, he seeks reversal of the contempt

determination, or, in the alternative, that we grant a new

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hearing solely on civil liability. The latter is essentially a

request for the very remedy he could have sought from Supreme

Court if he had filed a request to bifurcate. Thus, because he

failed to seek this relief before Supreme Court, in the first

instance, he cannot complain that Supreme Court erred in drawing

negative inferences specifically allowed by law.

We are especially reticent in the context of matrimonial

proceedings to issue a decision that may, unintentionally,

undermine legislative efforts to protect parties from

unauthorized unilateral dissipation of marital assets. To permit

defendant to avoid contempt by refusing to answer, even though he

failed to request that the court hold the civil contempt branch

of plaintiff's motion in abeyance pending the outcome of the

criminal contempt branch, would incentivize defendant, and those

similarly situated, to refrain from seeking relief initially

before the contempt court, and later argue on appeal that the

proceeding was constitutionally infirm. We decline to sanction

this conduct where doing so will result in prejudice to those,

like plaintiff, who have established the existence of conduct

evincing civil contempt, and will thereby further delay and

obstruct plaintiff's efforts to secure any remaining marital

assets she may be entitled to under the prior equitable

distribution determination.

III.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division order should be

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affirmed, with costs, and the certified question answered in the

affirmative.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Order affirmed, with costs, and certified question answered in

the affirmative. Opinion by Judge Rivera. Chief Judge Lippman

and Judges Pigott, Abdus-Salaam, Stein and Fahey concur.

Decided October 20, 2015

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