IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

RICHARD T. FARREN ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) Civil Action No. 04 CV 995 

 ) 

EXPERIAN INFORMATION ) 

SOLUTIONS, INC. ) 

and ) 

TRANSUNION, LLC ) 

and ) 

ANDERSON FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC. ) 

and ) 

GMAC ) 

and ) 

RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

ORDER 

 AND NOW, this ____ day of ____, 2005, upon consideration of the Defendant 

RJM Acquisition Funding LLC’s Motion for Reconsider in Part the Order of July 29, 

2005, relating to Summary Judgment, and any response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED 

and the Motion is GRANTED. It is further ORDERED that summary judgment is 

granted to RJM on Counts 2 and 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint and that those counts are 

dismissed with prejudice. 

__________________________ 

GENE E.K. PRATTER, U.S.D.J.

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 1 of 16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

RICHARD T. FARREN ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) Civil Action No. 04 CV 995 

 ) 

EXPERIAN INFORMATION ) 

SOLUTIONS, INC. ) 

and ) 

TRANSUNION, LLC ) 

and ) 

ANDERSON FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC. ) 

and ) 

GMAC ) 

and ) 

RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT, RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC’S, MOTION TO 

RECONSIDER IN PART THE COURT ORDER OF JULY 29, 2005. 

The Defendant, RJM Acquisitions Funding, LLC, by its attorneys, pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and Local Rule 7.1 of the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, respectfully moves this Court to reconsider, in part, the July 29, 2005 

Order, in support thereof, RJM relies on the attached Brief and the Exhibits thereto (all 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 2 of 16
2

Exhibits were previously submitted to the Court in support of RJM’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment, and are resubmitted here, for the Court’s convenience). 

Respectfully submitted, 

RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC 

August 8, 2005 By:_ Michael K. Sullivan_______ 

Michael K. Sullivan, Esq. 

Atty. I.D. No. 56607 

BLANK ROME LLP 

One Logan Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

(215)569-5509 

Joseph S. Messer (pro hac vice) 

Maria L. Whiteman (pro hac vice) 

Messer & Stilp, Ltd. 

166 W. Washington, Suite 300 

Chicago, Illinois 60602 

312-334-FIRM (3476)

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 3 of 16
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 

RICHARD T. FARREN ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

vs. ) Civil Action No. 04 CV 995 

 ) 

EXPERIAN INFORMATION ) 

SOLUTIONS, INC. ) 

and ) 

TRANSUNION, LLC ) 

and ) 

ANDERSON FINANCIAL NETWORK, INC. ) 

and ) 

GMAC ) 

and ) 

RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

 ) 

DEFENDANT, RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING 

 LLC’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 

 RECONSIDER IN PART THE COURT ORDER OF JULY 29, 2005.

INTRODUCTION 

RJM Acquisitions Funding LLC (“RJM”) is entitled to summary judgment on all 

counts of Plaintiff’s Complaint. The uncontrovered evidence shows that RJM fully 

complied with § 1682s-2(b)(1) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) and did not 

violate § 1692e(8) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Therefore, this 

Court should reconsider, in part, its July 29, 2005 Order denying RJM’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment as to Count Two and the remaining claims in Count Five of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 4 of 16
2

JURISDICTION 

This Court has jurisdiction to reconsider its July 29, 2005 Order because denial of 

summary judgment motion is an interlocutory order. See McKethan v Texas Farm 

Bureau, 996 F2d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, (510 U.S. 1046 (1994)). This trial 

court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even 

in absence of new evidence or intervening change in or clarification of substantive law. 

Id. Moreover, summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue of any material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A court should grant a motion for summary 

judgment when the record shows that a reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving 

party. See Evantash v. G.E. Capital Mortgage Services, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

23131, *8 (E.D. Pa. 2003). 

ARGUMENT AND RELEVANT LAW 

 A trial is not necessary in this case because RJM is entitled to summary judgment 

on all of the claims in Counts Two and Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, this Court 

should reconsider its July 29, 2005 ruling and grant RJM summary judgment on Count 

Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint because the evidence shows that (a) RJM followed its fivestep investigation procedure in full compliance with § 1682s-2(b)(1) of the FCRA, and 

(b) RJM’s investigation met the standard imposed by the Court of Appeals for the 

Seventh Circuit in Westra v. Credit Controls of Pinellas, 2005 WL 1274277 (7th Cir. May 

27, 2005), and adopted by this Court in its Court’s July 29, 2005 ruling. Second, this 

Court should reconsider its July 29, 2005 ruling and grant RJM summary judgment on 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 5 of 16
3

Count Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint because (a) RJM did not violate the requirement 

imposed by the plain language of § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA, and (b) in any event the 

evidence shows that RJM timely notified Experian and Trans Union regarding Plaintiff’s 

dispute and requested that its tradeline be deleted from Plaintiff’s credit report. 

I. RJM IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT TWO OF 

PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE RJM FULLY COMPLIED WITH 

§ 1681s-2(b) OF THE FCRA. 

Pursuant to § 1681s-2(b) of the FCRA a data furnisher, such as RJM, has the 

following obligation upon receipt of a CDV from a consumer-reporting agency (“CRA”) 

such as Experian or Trans Union.1

 The data furnisher must: (1) conduct an investigation 

with respect to the disputed information; (2) review all relevant information provided by 

the CRA; (3) report the results of its investigation to the CRA within 30 days; and (4) if 

the investigation finds the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to 

all consumer reporting agencies to which the person furnished the information and 

maintain consumer files on a nationwide basis. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). In this case 

the uncontroverted evidence shows that RJM’s employees followed RJM’s five-step 

investigation procedure and timely reporting the results back to Experian and Trans 

Union in compliance with § 1681s-3(b) of the FCRA. 

 

1

 The duty to investigate a consumer’s credit reporting dispute rests primarily with the CRA reporting the 

debt. CRAs such as Experian and Trans Union have an obligation under 1681i(a) to conduct a 

reinvestigation upon notice of a dispute from a consumer. See 15 U.S.C. §1681i(a). A CRAs obligation to 

reinvestigate requires more than “mere parroting” of the creditor’s information. See Crane v. Trans Union, 

LLC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 311, 318 (E.D. Pa. 2003)(citing Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286-

87(7th Cir. 1994)). CRAs bear some responsibility for evaluating the accuracy of information obtained 

from data furnishers. See Crane, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 318(citing Stevenson v. TRW, Inc., 987 F.2d 288, 293 

(5th Cir. 1993)). 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 6 of 16
4

A. RJM EMPLOYEES TESTIFIED THAT THEY FOLLOWED RJM’S 

5-STEP § 1681s-2(b) INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE AND 

PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ADVANCED EVIDENCE TO THE 

CONTRARY. 

The Court has found that RJM’s five-step procedure was reasonable as a matter of 

law. See Court Order Dated July 29, 2005. And the uncontroverted evidence shows that 

RJM followed its five-step procedure when investigating the Experian and Trans Union 

CDVs. First, Joan Tischler testified that she completed the five-step process upon receipt 

of the Experian CDV on or about July 29, 2003. See Ms. Tischler’s Affidavit attached as 

Exhibit A at ¶ 12.2

 Second, Cassandra Pannell testified that she reviewed the results of 

Ms. Tischler’s investigation before reporting the results back to Experian. See Affidavit 

of Ms. Pannell’s attached as Exhibit B at ¶ 13. Ms. Pannell also testified that she 

completed the five-step procedure upon receipt of the Trans Union CDV. See Affidavit 

of Ms. Pannell attached as Exhibit B at ¶¶ 15-22. Finally, Lynn Cohen testified that she 

reviewed the Trans Union CDV before reporting the results back to Trans Union. See

Affidavit of Ms. Cohen’s attached as Exhibit C at ¶¶ 7-9. 

Plaintiff failed to offer any evidence to the contrary to the assertion that RJM 

employees followed the five-step procedure.3

 Plaintiff merely argued that RJM’s 5-step 

procedure was not reasonable and argued for a higher investigation standard, which this 

Court rejected when it ruled that “[t]he standard Mr. Farren urges the Court to demand of 

 

2

 All of the Exhibits attached to this Motion were previously attached to RJM’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment. The Exhibits have been attached hereto for the convenience of the Court. 

3

 Plaintiff did argue that “RJM Director of Credit Bureau Reporting, Lynn Cohen, even contradicted her 

own Affidavit during her deposition as to whether Mr. Farren’s dispute to TU was handled according to 

procedures for initial disputes or subsequent disputes.” See Plaintiff’s Response at p. 24. However, such 

distinction is without a difference because RJM’s five-step procedure is followed regardless if it is an initial 

dispute or a subsequent dispute. See Affidavit of Ms Pannell attached as Exhibit B at ¶¶ 5-22; see also

Affidavit of Ms. Cohen attached as Exhibit C at ¶¶ 6-9. 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 7 of 16
5

RJM and similar data furnishers is significantly higher than the requirements found in 15 

U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).” See the July 29, 2005 Memorandum and Opinion at 12. 

Despite the uncontroverted evidence, this Court held, “a reasonable jury could 

find that RJM did not follow its own reasonable procedures in this case by failing to 

investigate the address conflict or missing date of birth.” See the July 29, 2005 

Memorandum and Opinion at 13. However the evidence shows that RJM did investigate 

the “address conflict” and discharged its duties under § 1681s-2(b) with respect to that 

conflict by reporting the address in RJM and Fingerhut’s records back to Experian on the 

CDV it returned to Experian. See, the returned Experian CDV, attached as Exhibit D. In 

fact, the Experian CDV does not ask that RJM verify the identification information, it 

merely states, “Please check the ‘SAME’ box for each identification item appearing on 

the CDV which is identical to your records. Provide different information in the shaded 

area.” See Exhibit D. The “Verified as Reported” box is next to the account information, 

not the identification information. See Exhibit “D.” Accordingly, RJM followed its 

procedures when it provided Experian with the “different” address in its records and 

verified the account information as reported. Thus, RJM had no obligation to report the 

results of its investigation to Trans Union pursuant to § 1691s-2(b)(1) because RJM did 

not determine that its reporting was incomplete or inaccurate. 

Further, the evidence shows that RJM did not violate § 1681s-2(b) with respect to 

the “missing date of birth,” because RJM, having never received information regarding 

the debtor’s date of birth on the Fingerhut account, had nothing to investigate. See the 

Fingerhut Account Statement attached as Exhibit E. Moreover, Plaintiff cannot expect 

RJM to investigate his date of birth when Plaintiff did not provide a date of birth on the 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 8 of 16
6

Experian CDV. See Exhibit D. Because RJM had no conflicting information regarding 

the date of birth set forth in the Experian and Trans Union CDVs, RJM had nothing to 

report back to those CRAs regarding the issue pursuant to § 1681s-2(b). 

Further, this Court stated that it was “unclear whether RJM notified the credit 

reporting agencies of the potential conflict over the address or merely modified the CDV 

to reflect the address provided by the credit reporting agencies.” See the July 29, 2005 

Memorandum and Opinion at 13. The CDVs demonstrate, however, that RJM notified 

Experian that it had “different” identification information by filling in the shaded area 

next to the address field on the CDV. Moreover, the instructions on the Trans Union 

CDV were as follows: “Check the corresponding Same box for each item that is identical 

to your records. If any of this information on the left is incorrect, write the corrections in 

the boxes on the right.” According to RJM’s records, although the P.O. Box in Tampa, 

Florida was not listed as an address for the Plaintiff, it does not mean that the address was 

“incorrect.”4

 

Finally, the evidence shows that when RJM returned the CDVs to Experian and 

Trans Union – within 30 days as required under § 1681s-2(b)(1) - RJM timely notified 

the credit reporting agencies of the results of its investigation. See, the return dates of 

July 25, 2003 and July 29, 2003 set forth on the returned Experian CDV attached as 

Exhibit D and the Trans Union CDV attached as Exhibit F. Accordingly, RJM is entitled 

to summary judgment on Count Two of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

 

4

 The Trans Union CDV is also clear that the Trans Union is only requesting RJM to verify the account 

information. As stated next in the middle of the CDV, “Verify the following account information and 

select one of the three options along the left side. If appropriate, identify changed information in the 

shaded box directly below the item.” This set of instructions only pertains to the account information and 

not the identification information. RJM did not modify the account information as reported on Plaintiff’s 

account. Therefore, RJM had no obligation to update the CRAs regarding any incomplete or inaccurate 

reporting pursuant to § 1681s-2(b). 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 9 of 16
7

B. RJM’S § 1681s-2(b) INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE MET THE 

STANDARD IMPOSED BY WESTRA AND CORRECTLY ADOPTED 

BY THIS COURT. 

This Court correctly adopted the standard established by the Court of Appeals for 

the Seventh Circuit in Westra, 2005 WL 1274277. at *1. In Westra the court found an 

investigation essentially the same as that performed by RJM to be reasonable, given that 

the data furnisher had not been informed that fraud or identity theft was alleged. Id. This 

was the exact situation faced by RJM when it received the Experian and Trans Union 

CDVs. Id. In applying this standard this Court correctly ruled that § 1681s-2(b) “...does 

not require RJM or any data furnisher to take extraordinary means to investigate and 

discover disputed information but rather calls for a more passive investigation where the 

data furnisher is determining only that the information provided to it matches the 

information in its records.” See the July 29, 2005 Memorandum and Opinion at 12. As 

the uncontroverted evidence shows, this is precisely the type of investigation RJM 

conducted in response to the Experian and Trans Union CDVs. 

 At the time it received the Experian and Trans Union CDVs, RJM was not on 

notice that it should investigate the “address conflict” because Experian did not provide 

RJM with a copy of the letter Plaintiff sent to Experian stating that he never used the P.O. 

Box in Tampa, Florida. See Plaintiff’s Letter to Experian attached hereto as Exhibit G. 

As this Court noted, the FCRA imposes different obligations on CRAs than data 

furnishers. See July 29, 2005 Memorandum and Opinion at 11. Specifically, under § 

1681i(a)(2)(A) of the FCRA, CRAs are obligated to, among other things, provide 

notification of the dispute to the data furnisher and include all relevant information 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 10 of 16
8

regarding the dispute that the agency has received from the consumer. See 15 U.S.C. § 

1681i(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 

Because Experian failed to provide RJM notice that there was an “address 

conflict,” RJM had no obligation to conduct a more thorough investigation under §1681s2(b). Experian and Trans Union were parties to this lawsuit and both have settled with 

the Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff has already been compensated by Experian and Trans 

Union’s for their failure to comply with §1681i(a)(2)(A) by providing RJM will all of the 

relevant information regarding Plaintiff’s dispute pursuant. Accordingly, it would be 

unfair, and legally illogical, for this Court not to grant summary judgment in RJM’s favor 

on Plaintiff’s §1681s-2(b) claim. 

Similarly, the fact that Plaintiff’s date of birth was missing from RJM’s records 

does not impose a more thorough investigation on RJM under § 1681s-2(b). In fact, the 

only reason the date of birth was “missing” was because whoever purchased the 9-piece 

chili set from Fingerhut –the original creditor – using Plaintiff’s name and social security 

number did not provide one. See, Fingerhut Account Statement attached as Exhibit E. 

Thus, when RJM reviewed the statement of account that it received from Fingerhut 

during its investigation, it was not on notice that there was anything inaccurate or 

incomplete regarding Plaintiff’s date of birth.5

 

Finally, if this Court’s July 29, 2005 Memorandum and Opinion is allowed to 

stand, it will provide every consumer who causes a CDV to be sent to a data furnisher 

 

5

 Logically, the absence of a date of birth, or a different address, in the original creditor’s files does not give 

rise to a more thorough investigation under 1681s-2(b). It is not standard in the retail industry to require a 

consumer to provide a date of birth when purchasing merchandise from a mail order catalog, the Internet or 

from a consumer in a face-to-face transaction at a retail store. Moreover, debtors often move or use 

alternative mailing addresses, which may or may not appear on a debtor’s credit report. 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 11 of 16
9

who lacks the consumer’s date of birth or current address with a “wild card” to force a 

jury trial on the issue of whether the data furnisher’s investigation under § 1681s-2(b) 

was reasonable. And the consumer will hold this wild card regardless of whether the 

CDV fails to explain the consumer’s dispute, or how exhaustive the data furnisher’s 

investigation is in response to the CDV. This cannot be the state of the law. 

Accordingly, RJM is entitled to summary judgment on Count Two of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. 

II. RJM IS ALSO ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON COUNT 

FIVE OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT BECAUSE RJM DID NOT 

VIOLATE § 1692e(8) OF THE FDCPA. 

 

 RJM did not violate the requirement imposed by the plain language of § 1692e(8) 

of the FDCPA. Under § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA a debt collector such as RJM is 

prohibited from: 

communicating or threatening to communicate to any 

person credit information which is known or which should 

be known to be false, including the failure to communicate 

that a disputed debt is disputed. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8). In response to Plaintiff’s allegation in Count 5 of his Complaint 

that RJM violated § 1692e(8) of the FDCPA this Court found that there were two issues 

for it to decide, “...the first being whether there is evidence that RJM should have 

informed Experian and Trans Union prior to the phone [conversation between Plaintiff 

and John Coscia of RJM] that there was a dispute, and second, whether the notification of 

Experian and Trans Union was timely.” See the July 29, 2005 Memorandum and 

Opinion at 17. Respectfully, by framing the issue as it has the Court has misconstrued 

the requirement of §1692e(8) of the FDCPA. While §1692e(8) would prohibit a debt 

collector who knows that a debt is disputed from reporting that debt to a CRA without 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 12 of 16
10

communicating that the debt is disputed, nothing in §1692e(8) requires a debt collector 

who subsequently learns of a dispute to independently report that dispute to the CRAs to 

which the debt collector previously reported the debt. Rather, the obligation of 

§1692e(8) to report the debt as disputed would only arise if the debt collector were to 

again communicate to the CRA regarding the debt. 

 Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) staff commented on this issue 

on December 13, 1988, and stated as follows: 

Section 807(8) prohibits "Communicating or threatening to 

communicate to any person [false] credit information . . . , 

including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is 

disputed." 

1. Disputed debt. If a debt collector knows that a debt is 

disputed by the consumer, either from receipt of written 

notice (section 809) or other means, and reports it to a 

credit bureau, he must report it as disputed. 

2. Post-report dispute. When a debt collector learns of a 

dispute after reporting the debt to a credit bureau, the 

dispute need not also be reported. 

See 53 Fed. Reg. 50097-50110 (Dec. 13, 1988); see also FTC website at 

http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fdcpa/commentary.htm#807 (last visited on August 8, 

2005). Thus, the plain language of the FDCPA and the FTC make it clear, a debt 

collector does not have an affirmative obligation to report a debt as disputed if the debt 

collector is apprised of the dispute after reporting the debt to a consumer reporting 

agency. 

In this case, Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that RJM knew of Plaintiff’s 

dispute until he called Mr. Coscia of RJM and explained the dispute to him. And even if 

it could be said that Plaintiff’s call to Mr. Coscia triggered an obligation on RJM’s behalf 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 13 of 16
11

under §1692e(8) to report the debt to the CRAs as disputed (which it could not because 

§1692e(8) does not impose this obligation) the evidence shows that RJM timely 

requested that Experian and Trans Union delete its tradeline from Plaintiff’s credit report. 

Specifically, in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, RJM presented testimony 

and two documents establishing the fact that RJM timely instructed Trans Union to delete 

RJM’s tradeline on Plaintiff’s credit report. 

First, RJM presented the testimony of John Coscia, which states that he instructed 

both CRAs to delete the reporting on August 24, 2003. See Affidavit of John Coscia 

attached hereto as Exhibit H at ¶ 8. Second, RJM’s collector notes corroborate Mr. 

Coscia’s testimony indicating that a request to the CRAs to delete RJM’s reporting of the 

account on August 24, 2003. See RJM’s Collector Notes attached hereto as Exhibit I. 

Moreover, RJM presented a copy of its October 2003 tape that was sent to Trans Union 

in October 2003, which does not contain Plaintiff’s account.6

 See the printout of RJM’s 

reporting in October 2003 attached hereto as Exhibit J. 

Finally, the Trans Union’s representative states that it did not receive a 

communication from RJM from August 2003 through April 2004 regarding Plaintiff’s 

account. See Declaration of Eileen Little attached hereto as Exhibit K at ¶ 5. Thus, the 

only communication made by RJM to any persons after learning that Plaintiff disputed 

the debt was the communications to Trans Union and Experian, in which RJM requested 

that its tradeline be deleted from Plaintiff’s credit report. Accordingly, as a matter of law, 

 

6

 The only evidence that Plaintiff has offered in opposition to these facts is documentation and a declaration 

from a representative of Trans Union that RJM did not request that it delete its tradeline until April 2004, 

after this lawsuit was filed. However, Trans Union is no longer a party in this lawsuit as it settled with 

Plaintiff and has been dismissed. Trans Union also entered into a written settlement agreement with 

Plaintiff, which Plaintiff refused to produce during discovery, citing a settlement agreement containing a 

confidentiality clause. Thus, Plaintiff has already recovered for any “harm” that he may have suffered from 

Trans Union’s failure to delete RJM’s tradeline in August 2003. 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 14 of 16
12

this Court must find that RJM did not violate §1692e(8) of the FDCPA and therefore 

RJM is entitled to summary judgment on Count Five of Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant RJM Acquisition Funding LLC respectfully 

asks this Court to reconsider its July 29, 2005 Order with respect to Counts 2 and 5 only, 

and to find as a matter of law that RJM is also entitled to summary judgment on Counts 2 

and 5. 

Respectfully submitted, 

RJM ACQUISITIONS FUNDING LLC 

August 8, 2005 By:_/s/ Michael K. Sullivan_______ 

Michael K. Sullivan, Esq. 

Atty. I.D. No. 56607 

BLANK ROME LLP 

One Logan Square 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

(215)569-5509 

Joseph S. Messer (pro hac vice) 

Maria L. Whiteman (pro hac vice) 

Messer & Stilp, Ltd. 

166 W. Washington, Suite 300 

Chicago, Illinois 60602 

312-334-FIRM (3476)

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 15 of 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Michael K. Sullivan hereby certifies that on this date a true and correct copy of 

Defendant RJM Acquisition Funding LLC’s Motion for Reconsideration in Part of the 

Court Order of July 29, 2005 was served on Plaintiff’s counsel by first class United 

States mail, postage prepaid, at the following address: 

John Soumilas, Esq. 

Francis & Mailman, P.C. 

19th Floor, Land Title Building 

100 South Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19110 

Dated: August 8, 2005 _/s/_Michael K. Sullivan__ 

 Michael K. Sullivan 

Case 2:04-cv-00995-GP Document 59 Filed 08/08/05 Page 16 of 16