alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
(Reap. Dec. 10941)

#### C. J. Tower & Sons of Buffalo, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 17738, etc.

(Decided April 6, 1965)

*Barnes, Richardson é Colburn*for the plaintiff.

*John W. Douglas,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Nichols, Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule “A,” attached hereto and made a part hereof, are before me on the following stipulation of counsel for the respective parties:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the attorneys for the parties hereto subject to the approval of the court:

> That the merchandise covered by the appeals for reappraisement listed in Schedule “A”, attached hereto and made a part hereof, consists of steel strap similar in all material respects to the merchandise which was the subject of *Acme Steel Company*v. *United States,*C.A.D. 841.

> That the issues are similar in all material respects to the issues involved in said C.A.D. 841, and that the record therein may be incorporated herein and that *600the merchandise in this case was sold under conditions and practices similar to those which existed in said C.A.D. 841.

> That at the time of exportation the price at which such or similar merchandise was freely sold in the principal markets of Canada, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade for exportation to the United States, including the cost of all containers and coverings of whatever nature and all other expenses incidental to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, was the invoiced unit price.

> That the instant appeals are submitted for decision on the incorporated record and this stipulation.

In view of this stipulation and on the authority of the decision cited, I find that export value, as defined in section 402(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, is the proper basis for determining the value of the merchandise involved herein and that said value is represented by the respective invoiced unit prices.

Judgment will ’be rendered accordingly.
(Reap. Dec. 10315)

Entry No. 8080, etc.

#### Plywood & Door Manufacturers Corporation *v.*United States

(Decided August 7, 1962)

*Richard Van Steeriburgh*for the plaintiff.

*Joseph D. Guilfoyle,*Acting Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

The merchandise the subject of the appeals for reappraisement enumerated in the attached schedule “A” consists of birch plywood, exported from Finland during the years 1953 and 1954. Counsel for the parties have submitted the said appeals for decision upon written stipulation.

On the agreed facts, I find that export value, as defined in section 402(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, is the proper basis for the determi*368nation of the values of the merchandise involved and that such values were those set forth in column “4” of schedule “A,” packed, less the prorated amounts of the nondutiable charges set forth directly after the description of the merchandise in each instance in said schedule “A.”

Judgment will issue accordingly.
In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Alloy Steel
International, Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended September 30, 2006, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Gene Kostecki, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

                                               /s/Gene Kostecki
Date: December 22, 2006                 By:
                                            ------------------------------------
                                                  Gene Kostecki
                                                  Chief Executive Officer
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

EARL BOBBY WALKER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1220-96-4 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 JUNE 24, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CULPEPER COUNTY 

John R. Cullen, Judge 

 V. R. Shackelford, III (Shackelford, 

Honenberger, Thomas, Willis & Gregg, P.L.C., 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Earl Bobby Walker was charged with attempted capital murder 

and convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of assault 

and battery. He appeals this conviction on the ground that he 

was never arraigned on the indictment. We reverse and remand. 

 The parties are fully conversant with the record in the 

cause, and because this memorandum opinion carries no 

precedential value, no recitation of the facts is necessary. 

 Walker was indicted for abduction, rape, sodomy, and 

attempted capital murder. Due to a series of continuances and 

pretrial motions, Walker's arraignment on the attempted capital 

murder charge was inadvertently omitted. At trial, Walker was 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
- 2 - 

tried on all four indictments, including attempted capital 

murder. He had not been arraigned and had not entered a plea. 

 "[U]pon a trial of any felony, there must be a plea by the 

defendant." Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 296, 46 

S.E.2d 340, 342 (1948). The accused must have the charge read to 

him in open court and be asked to make a plea on that charge. 

See Code § 19.2-254. If the defendant will not enter a plea, the 

court must enter a plea of not guilty before the trial may 

commence. See Code § 19.2-259. "Without a plea entered in 

person by the accused, or by the court, there can be no trial of 

a felony charge." Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 960, 162 

S.E. 50, 52 (1932). This requirement is "jurisdictional in 

nature in the sense that without such a plea, 'there can be no 

trial of a felony charge.'" Cassidy v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 80, 

82, 168 S.E. 125, 126 (1969) (quoting Roach, 157 Va. at 960, 162 

S.E. at 52). 

 Walker was never arraigned and never entered a plea for 

attempted capital murder. Without a plea, the trial for 

attempted capital murder could not occur and was a nullity. His 

conviction resulting from that charge must be reversed. 

 We reverse the conviction for assault and battery and remand 

for further proceedings if the Commonwealth be so advised. 

 Reversed and remanded.
No. 60421.

protests 185909-K and 217469-K (San Francisco).

#### D. N. & E. Walter & Co. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of floor coverings, composed wholly or in chief value of rush and not of grass or of rice straw, which do not have a felt base, the same in all material respects as those the subject of Abstracts 57889 and 57890, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
CLD-212 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 21-1851

___________

IN RE: VICTOR B. PERKINS,

Petitioner

____________________________________

On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the

United States District Court for the District of Delaware

(Related to 1:19-cv-00491)

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

July 1, 2021

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 14, 2021)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Victor B. Perkins has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that we 

direct the United States District Court for the District of Delaware to “immediately 

adjudicate” a civil action that he filed in March 2019. For the following reasons, we will 

dismiss the petition as moot.

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Perkins’ complaint alleged that he had been injured by the drug Prilosec. (ECF 1.) 

The District Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint on October 15, 2019. The order 

dismissed some claims with prejudice, dismissed others without prejudice, and gave 

Perkins leave to amend.

1

 (ECF 13 & 14.) Perkins filed an amended complaint. (ECF 

25.) By order entered April 13, 2021, the District Court dismissed the amended 

complaint as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), concluding that 

further amendment would be futile. (ECF 28 & 29.) On April 26, Perkins filed a 

“Motion for Summary Judgment as a Matter of Default.” (ECF 30.) Shortly thereafter, 

he filed a notice of appeal; that appeal is pending. (ECF 33.) 

Perkins filed the mandamus petition in this Court on April 29, 2021. He asks that 

we order “the District of Delaware to issue its decision upon his Civil Action Litigation 

which has been pending before that court for over 2 years ....” As described above, 

however, the District Court dismissed his complaint by order entered April 13, 2021. 

Accordingly, we will dismiss the mandamus petition as moot.2

 See Blanciak v. 

Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur 

during the course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome 

1 Perkins appealed from this order, and we dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

See Perkins v. Proctor & Gamble, C.A. No. 19-3512 (order entered June 8, 2020). 

2 To the extent that Perkins asks us to direct the District Court to rule on his “Motion for 

Summary Judgment as a Matter of Default” (ECF 30), we conclude that mandamus relief 

is not warranted because it appears that his notice of appeal divested the District Court of 

jurisdiction over that motion. See Venen v. Sweet, 758 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1985).
3

of a suit or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 

dismissed as moot.”).
# C_2015381EN.01004701.xml

| 16.11.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 381/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.11.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 381/47

---

Action brought on 2 September 2015 — Hungary v European Commission

(Case T-505/15)

(2015/C 381/57)

Language of the case: Hungarian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Hungary (represented by: M.Z. Fehér, G.Koos and A. Pálfy, Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Commission

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Annul in part Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 4076 of 22 June 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) insofar as it excludes from European Union financing EUR 6 3 24  349,33 relating to the cross compliance audit, and |
| --- | --- |

—

Annul in part Commission Implementing Decision C(2015) 4076 of 22 June 2015 excluding from European Union financing certain expenditure incurred by the Member States under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) insofar as it excludes from European Union financing EUR 6 3 24  349,33 relating to the cross compliance audit, and

| — | Order the Commission to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

Order the Commission to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

In support of the action, the applicant disputes the findings of the Commission.

In that regard, the applicant states that the Commission complains that, in accordance with the fundamental principles applicable to the verification of aid, both the sanctions not imposed because of the inadequate or wholly absent verifications of cross compliance (the legal requirements of management and good agricultural and ecological conditions) and the sanctions provided for by the rules but deprived of their deterrent effect because they have not been applied or have been applied incorrectly must be regarded as fundamentally deficient verifications. Further, the Commission complains that, in a case of non-compliance considered to be ‘minor’ within the meaning of Article 24(2) of Regulation No 73/2009/EC, the Hungarian authorities applied tolerance thresholds on the basis of which no sanctions were imposed but which did not take into account aspects relating to animal and human health, in breach of the provisions of the EU legislation.

---
N OTE : This order is nonprecedential

. 

# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

__________________________

IN RE HO KEUNG TSE , Petitione r.

__________________________ Miscellaneous Docket No. 168

__________________________ On Petition for Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Califo rnia in No. 06

- CV

- 6573, Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong

.

__________________________ ON PETITION

__________________________ O R D E R Ho Keung Tse submits a petition for a writ of ma nd amus direct ing the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to (1) vacate its October 4, 2007 order staying the case pending reexamination of the patent in suit, (2) lift the stay and (3) reassign the case to a different district court judge

. Upon consideration thereof, I T I S O RDERED T HAT : Case: 13-168 Document: 6 Page: 1 Filed: 10/02/2013IN RE TSE 2 Apple Inc., MusicMatch, Inc., and Sony Network E ntertainment International LLC are directed to respond no later than October 15 , 201 3

. F OR T HE C OURT

/s/ Daniel E. O’Toole Daniel E. O’Toole Clerk
s2 6 Case: 13-168 Document: 6 Page: 2 Filed: 10/02/2013
No. 61750.

#### John S. Connor *v.*United States,

protest 321867-K (Baltimore).

Opinion by

Lawrence, J.

The protest was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
# Map            Ecuador.
# C_2017277EN.01001902.xml

| 21.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 277/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 277/19

---

Judgment of the Court (Seventh Chamber) of 21 June 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Corte d’appello di Genova — Italy) — Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), Comune di Genova

(Case C-449/16) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Social security - Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 - Article 3 - Family benefits - Directive 2011/98/EU - Article 12 - Right to equal treatment - Third-country nationals holding single permits))

(2017/C 277/26)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Corte d’appello di Genova

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Kerly Del Rosario Martinez Silva

Applicant:

Defendants: Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS), Comune di Genova

Defendants:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 12 of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which a third-country national holding a single permit within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that directive cannot receive a benefit such as the benefit for households having at least three minor children established by Legge n. 448 — Misure di finanza pubblica per la stabilizzazione e lo sviluppo (Law No 448 on public finance measures for stabilisation and development) of 23 December 1998.

---

(1)  OJ C 410, 7.11.2016.

1

---
# C_2018142EN.01000601.xml

| 23.4.2018 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 142/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.4.2018

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 142/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 28 February 2018 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas — Lithuania) — Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos v Nidera BV

(Case C-387/16) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Taxation - Value added tax (VAT) - Directive 2006/112/EC - Deduction of input tax - Article 183 - Refund of overpaid VAT - Late refund - Amount of default interest due under national law - Reduction of that amount for reasons not attributable to the taxable person - Whether permissible - Fiscal neutrality - Legal certainty))

(2018/C 142/07)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija prie Lietuvos Respublikos finansų ministerijos

Applicant:

Defendant: Nidera BV

Defendant:

Intervener: Vilniaus apskrities valstybinė mokesčių inspekcija

Intervener:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Article 183 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, read in the light of the principle of fiscal neutrality, must be interpreted as precluding a reduction in the amount of interest normally payable under national law on overpaid value added tax which was not refunded in due time for reasons connected to circumstances not attributable to the taxable person, such as the high amount of that interest when compared with the amount of the overpaid value added tax, the period of time during which the overpayment was not refunded and the underlying reasons for this, as well as the losses actually incurred by the taxable person.

---

(1)  OJ C 343, 19.9.2016.

1

---
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

: CIVIL ACTION NOS.

:

TESSEL : 02-3865

FILIPPO : 02-3871

JONES, et al. : 02-3909

HOLMAN, et al. : 02-3918

LAMB : 02-3947

JONES : 02-3956

LARSON : 02-3981

DRENTLAW : 02-4142

DURHAM : 02-4160

SIEGEL, et al. : 02-4178

NELSON, et al. : 02-4202

FOSTER, et al. : 02-4222

SIMINUK, et al. : 02-4251

NITZKO, et al. : 02-4270

MICHALIK, et al. : 02-4888

:

:

VS. :

:

BAYER CORPORATION, et al. :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this day of July, 2002, the Court having been previously

advised that the above action cannot proceed to trial and disposition because of the following

reason:

[ ] - Order staying these proceedings pending disposition of a related

action.

[ ] - Order staying these proceedings pending determination of

arbitration proceedings.

[ ] - Interlocutory appeal filed.

[ X ] - Other: Case is placed into suspense pending receipt of the Case

Transfer Order from the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation

transferring case to District of Minnesota..

Case 2:02-cv-04204-PBT Document 2 Filed 07/12/2002 Page 1 of 2
It is

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court mark this action closed for statistical purposes and

place the matter in the Civil Suspense File, and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction; and that the case be

restored to the trial docket when the action is in a status so that it may proceed to final

disposition; this order shall not prejudice the rights of the parties to this litigation.

BY THE COURT:

________________________________________

Petrese B. Tucker, Judge

Case 2:02-cv-04204-PBT Document 2 Filed 07/12/2002 Page 2 of 2
| 1.  | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                     |
|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|     |                                                                                                                                                                |
| 2.       | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the      Company. |

|                |   |                                                 |
|---------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------|
|                |   |                                                 |   |
| March      30, 2010 | By:    | /s/ Guy      Nissenson                          |   |
|                |   | Guy      Nissenson                                   |   |
|                |   | President,      Chief Executive Officer and Director |   |
|                |   |                                                 |   |
Exhibit 10.1


 


24th
June 2019


PHOENIX
PLUS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED


17/F,
THE WORKSTATION,


43
- 45, LYNDHURST TERRACE,


CENTRAL,
HONG KONG.


 


Dear
Sir,


 


Re
: APPOINTMENT LETTER AS TECHNICAL CONSULTANT


 


Refer
to the above matter we hereby appoint your company as our Technical Consultant with the scope of works as the following:


 


1)
Market and site survey on Green Technology Industry


 


2)
Marketing and Technical Consultation on Solar Energy


 


Detail
of service charges and work schedule are indicated in Annex 1. This appointment and authorization will be started from 1st
July 2019 till 30th June 2020. The renew of appointment contract will be by writing notice.


 


Yours
Sincerely,


 


ROOFRAMES
METALTECH SDN BHD


 


	/s/
    Lee Dexion	 
	Lee
    Dexion	 
	Business
    Development Manager
# C_2017300EN.01000602.xml

| 11.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 300/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

11.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 300/6

---

Judgment of the Court (Tenth Chamber) of 20 July 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas — Lithuania) — UAB ‘Gelvora’ v Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba

(Case C-357/16) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Unfair commercial practices - Directive 2005/29/EC - Scope - Debt collection agency - Consumer credit - Assignment of debt - Nature of the legal relationship between the agency and the debtor - Article 2(c) - Concept of ‘product’ - Recovery measures taken in parallel to the intervention of a bailiff))

(2017/C 300/08)

Language of the case: Lithuanian

Referring court

Referring court

Lietuvos vyriausiasis administracinis teismas

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: UAB ‘Gelvora’

Applicant:

Defendant: Valstybinė vartotojų teisių apsaugos tarnyba

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) must be interpreted as meaning that the legal relationship between a debt collection agency and the debtor, who has defaulted under a consumer credit agreement and whose debt has been assigned to that agency, falls within the material scope of the directive. The practices in which that agency engages in order to recover that debt fall within the concept of ‘product’ within the meaning of Article 2(c) of that directive. In that regard, the fact that the existence of the debt was confirmed by a court decision, and that that decision was passed to a bailiff for enforcement, is without consequence.

---

(1)  OJ C 335, 12.9.2016.

1

---
Unites States Department of Agriculture
Unites States Department of Agriculture
Unites States Department of Agriculture
Unites States Department of Agriculture
Unites States Department of Agriculture
Unites States Department of Agriculture