Report to Congressional Committees 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO 

March 2004 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 

Changing Conditions 

Drive Need for New 

F/A-22 Business Case 

GAO-04-391 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-391.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at 

(202) 512-4841 or lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-391, a report to 

congressional committees 

March 2004 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 

Changing Conditions Drive Need for New 

F/A-22 Business Case 

The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be less detectable to 

adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to provide a 

pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation through 

integrated avionics. In addition, the Air Force plans to expand the F/A-22’s 

ability to engage targets on the ground to provide a robust capability not 

originally planned at the start of the program. The Air Force plans to begin 

initial operational test and evaluation in March 2004 and to seek full rate 

production approval in December 2004. 

The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it 

began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase 

the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force had 

originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only afford 

218 aircraft. Second, in order to develop the expanded air-to-ground attack 

capability, the Office of Secretary of Defense estimates that the Air Force 

will need $11.7 billion in modernization funding. Lastly, the Air Force has 

determined that new avionics computer processors and architecture are 

needed to support most planned enhancements, which will further increase 

program costs and risk. 

Further, the development test program continues to experience problems 

and risks further delays. The F/A-22’s avionics continue to experience 

shutdowns and failures. Moreover, the F/A-22 has not met its reliability 

requirements and has experienced failures in its computerized maintenance 

support system. This has led to aircraft spending more time on the ground 

undergoing maintenance. 

Due to the risks of future cost increases and schedule delays, a 

congressional subcommittee requested that DOD provide business case 

information on the F/A-22. However, the information DOD provided did not 

address why this aircraft is needed given current and projected threats. The 

business case also did not address how many aircraft the Air Force needs to 

accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can afford considering the 

full life-cycle costs, whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities 

are needed, and what are the opportunity costs associated with purchasing 

any proposed quantities of this aircraft. While the response stated that the 

Air Force still plans to buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft, the Air Force estimates that 

only 218 aircraft are affordable within congressionally imposed funding 

limitations. In addition, significant investment decisions remain and could 

affect another $40 billion to support this program through full rate 

production and implementation of the spiraled improvement efforts. 

In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in 

today’s environment, the large investments that remain, and unknown 

outcomes of planned operational testing, GAO continues to have concerns 

regarding the DOD’s readiness to make a full rate production decision. 

Following a history of increasing 

cost estimates to complete F/A-22 

development, Congress asked GAO 

to assess the Air Force’s F/A-22 

development program annually 

and determine whether the Air 

Force is meeting key performance, 

schedule, and cost goals. On 

April 23, 2003, a congressional 

subcommittee requested that the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

provide more detailed information 

on the business case that supports 

the estimated quantities and costs 

for an affordable F/A-22 program. 

Specifically, GAO (1) identified 

changes in the F/A-22 program since 

its inception, (2) reviewed the status 

of the development activities, and 

(3) examined the sufficiency of 

business case information provided 

for congressional oversight. 

GAO recommends that DOD 

complete a new business case that 

determines the continued need for 

the F/A-22 and the number of aircraft

required for its air-to-air and air-toground roles based on capabilities, 

need, alternatives, and constraints 

of future defense spending 

departmentwide. GAO also 

recommends that plans and costs for 

resolving problems identified during 

initial operational testing be 

provided to the defense committees 

prior to the department’s full rate 

production decision. DOD 

partially concurred with both 

recommendations. GAO believes a 

business case and the plans and 

costs of corrective action should be 

reported to Congress. 
Page i GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

Significant Changes Have Occurred in the F/A-22 Program During 

Nearly Two Decades of Development 5

Remaining Development and Operational Testing Could Impact 

F/A-22 Program Outcomes 10

DOD Did Not Provide Congress Sufficient Business Case 

Information to Justify Current Aircraft Quantities or 

Modernization Investment Plans 18

Conclusions 19

Recommendations for Executive Action 20

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 20

Scope and Methodology 22

Appendix I Comments from the Department of Defense 25 

Appendix II GAO Staff Acknowledgments 27 

Related GAO Products 28 

Tables 

Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started 

in 1986 6

Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 

Program 8

Figures 

Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004 12

Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes 16

Contents 
Page ii GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Abbreviations 

CAIG Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

CIP common integrated processors 

DOD Department of Defense 

MTBAA Mean Time Between Avionics Anomaly 

MTBIE Mean Time Between Instability Events 

IOT&E initial operational test and evaluation 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 
Page 1 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

March 15, 2004 

Congressional Committees 

The Air Force is developing the F/A-22 aircraft to be an air superiority and 

ground attack aircraft with advanced features to make it less detectable to 

adversaries, capable of high speeds for long ranges, and able to provide a 

pilot with improved awareness of the surrounding situation. The ability 

to engage targets on the ground is being expanded to provide a robust 

capability not originally planned at the start of the program.1

 The Air 

Force plans to begin initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) to 

demonstrate the aircraft’s operational effectiveness and suitability in 

March 2004 and to seek full rate production approval in December 2004. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 requires 

us to assess the Air Force’s F/A-22 development program annually and 

determine whether the Air Force is meeting key performance, schedule, 

and cost goals.2

 The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, asked us to continue 

monitoring the F/A-22 development program during a hearing on April 2, 

2003. On April 23, 2003, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government 

Reform, asked the Department of Defense (DOD) to provide more detailed 

information on the business case that supports the estimated quantities 

and costs for an affordable F/A-22 program. In response to the concerns 

and directions of these various committees, we (1) identified changes in 

the F/A-22 program since its inception, (2) reviewed the status of the 

development activities, and (3) examined the sufficiency of business case 

information provided for congressional oversight. 

We performed our work from July 2003 through March 2004 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 1

 As a result, in September 2002 the Air Force changed the aircraft’s designation from F-22 

to F/A-22, which includes increased emphasis on acquiring an improved air-to-ground 

capability. 

2

 Pub. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217. 

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it 

began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase 

the quantities of aircraft that were planned 18 years ago. The Air Force had 

originally planned to buy 750 aircraft, but it now estimates it can only 

afford 218 aircraft under the congressionally imposed limit on production 

funding. Development costs have grown 127 percent, to $28.7 billion, and 

the program could incur further cost growth before development and 

testing is completed. This reduction in buying power and increased costs 

are largely a result of the program’s failure to base acquisition decisions on 

high levels of knowledge at critical junctures in the development program.3

Second, the Air Force has decided to add a robust air-to-ground attack 

capability not previously envisioned but now considered necessary to 

increase the utility of the aircraft. The Office of Secretary of Defense 

estimated the Air Force would need as much as $11.7 billion to develop 

the expanded capability. Lastly, the Air Force has determined that new 

avionics computer processors and architecture are needed to support 

some planned enhancements, which will further increase program costs 

and risk. 

The development test program continues to experience problems and 

risks further delays. The F/A-22’s advanced avionics system—which allows 

a pilot to have better control of information regarding the surrounding 

situation—frequently failed, delaying earlier testing, and must now be 

proven stable before IOT&E can start. The F/A-22’s avionics system 

continues to experience shutdowns and failures. Recently, the Air Force 

established a new criterion to measure the stability of the avionics 

software and hardware and its readiness to begin IOT&E. The new 

criterion is more comprehensive but requires fewer hours of operation 

before a failure occurs than the original criterion. To date, the program 

has not met the new criterion. In addition, the F/A-22 program has not met 

its reliability requirements, resulting in aircraft spending more time on the 

ground undergoing maintenance. Further, the program has experienced 

failures in its computerized maintenance support system, which have 

prevented maintenance crews from correctly diagnosing and addressing 

problems on the aircraft. As a result of the problems with the development 

 3

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are 

Possible If DOD Can Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program, GAO-03-645T (Washington, 

D.C.: Apr. 11, 2003). We testified on the failure to use these best practice acquisition 

concepts in the F/A-22 program and used the F/A-22 program as a case study to show 

lessons to be learned had the F/A-22 applied this best practice approach in its development 

and procurement activities. 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

test program, the start of IOT&E has been delayed, and the time to 

complete it has been compressed by 4 months. Additional delays in 

completing IOT&E could jeopardize the full rate production decision in 

December 2004. 

Due to significant changes to the program and the risks of future cost 

increases and schedule delays, a congressional subcommittee requested 

that DOD provide business case information on the F/A-22.4

 However, the 

information provided by DOD did not address how many aircraft the Air 

Force needs to accomplish its missions, how many the Air Force can 

afford, and whether investments in new air-to-ground capabilities are 

needed. Instead, the information shows that the Air Force still plans to 

buy 277 F/A-22 aircraft despite estimates that state it can only afford 

218 aircraft and the potential for further reduction in buying power from 

cost increases in the development program. In the past, reducing the 

amount of funds available in the procurement budget has offset 

development cost growth. This is a part of DOD’s “buy to budget” plan. 

If the current congressionally imposed production cap of $36.8 billion is 

maintained and the Air Force uses more procurement funds to address 

higher development costs, the number of F/A-22 aircraft the Air Force 

could buy would be reduced. 

We are making recommendations that DOD complete a new business case 

that justifies the continued need for the F/A-22 and determines the number 

of F/A-22 aircraft needed in its air-to-air and air-to-ground roles based on 

capabilities, need, alternatives, and constraints of future defense spending 

departmentwide. We also recommend that the results of IOT&E be 

provided to the defense committees prior to making the full rate 

production decision. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD 

stated that it partially concurred with our recommendations. 

The F/A-22 is planned to be an air superiority and ground attack aircraft 

with advanced features to make it less detectable to adversaries (stealth 

characteristics) and capable of high speeds for long ranges.5

 It has 

 4

 The Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, 

House Committee on Government Reform, requested the F/A-22 business case information 

as a result of the April 11, 2003, hearings. 

5

 Air superiority is the degree of air dominance that allows the conduct of operations by 

land, sea, and air forces without prohibitive interference by the enemy. 

Background 
Page 4 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

integrated avionics that greatly improve pilots’ awareness of the situation 

surrounding them. The objectives of the F/A-22 development program are 

to (1) design, fabricate, test, and deliver 9 F/A-22 development test 

aircraft, 2 nonflying structural test aircraft, 6 production representative 

test aircraft, and 37 flight-qualified engines; (2) design, fabricate, integrate, 

and test the avionics; and (3) design, develop, and test the support and 

training systems. The F/A-22 is being developed under contracts with 

Lockheed Martin Corporation, the prime contractor (for the aircraft),and 

Pratt & Whitney Corporation (for the engine). 

Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the 

development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation for 

both the development and the production.6

 Subsequently, the National 

Defense Authorization Act of 2002 eliminated the cost limitation for the 

development, but it left the cost limit for the production.7

 The production 

program is now limited to $36.8 billion.8

 The current cost estimate of the 

development program is $28.7 billion. 

Currently, the F/A-22 program is both in development and production. 

Development is in its final stages, and production has been ongoing since 

fiscal year 1999. 

The aircraft’s development problems and schedule delays in completing 

flight testing have led to congressional concerns. The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 prohibited the obligation of 

$136 million in procurement funds until the Under Secretary of Defense, 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, submitted to the congressional 

defense committees, among other things, a certification that the avionics 

software installed on test aircraft can operate at least 5 hours on average 

before certain types of avionics anomalies occur. The Under Secretary of 

Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, the final authority in 

making acquisition decisions in DOD, has also included this criterion as a 

requirement for the F/A-22 program before entering IOT&E . 

 6

 Pub. L. 105-85 (Nov. 18, 1997), section 217. 

7

 Pub. L. 107-107 (Dec. 28, 2001), section 213. 

8

 The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act’s provisions, was $43.4 billon. 
Page 5 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

The F/A-22 program has experienced several significant changes since it 

began development in 1986. First, the Air Force cannot afford to purchase 

the quantities of aircraft that were originally planned 18 years ago. This 

reduction in buying power is attributed, in a large part, to increases in 

development time and cost due to the program’s failure to employ a 

knowledge-based acquisition approach to developing the F/A-22. 

Second, in September 2002, the Air Force decided to add a more robust 

air-to-ground attack capability than previously envisioned but now 

deemed needed to increase the utility of the aircraft. This capability will 

add significant cost to the program over the next 10 years. Lastly, the Air 

Force has determined that new computer processors and architecture are 

needed to support some planned enhancements, which will further 

increase program costs and risk. 

Since the F/A-22 acquisition program started in 1986, cost and schedule 

estimates have grown significantly, thus contributing to a loss in 

buying power. Development costs are now estimated at $28.7 billion, a 

127 percent increase over the 1986 estimates. Planned development cycle 

time has grown from 9 years to 19 years, and the initial operational 

capability date has slipped over 9 years, from March 1996 to December 

2005. These schedule extensions, delays, and cost increases were major 

contributors to changes in the Air Force’s initial plan to purchase 

750 aircraft. Current Air Force budget estimates include plans to purchase 

277 aircraft. Table 1 shows the changes in the F/A-22 program since its 

start in 1986 based on information provided in Selected Acquisition 

Reports9

 over time. 

 9

 Selected Acquisition Reports are standard, comprehensive, summary status reports of 

major defense acquisition programs (acquisition category I) required for periodic 

submission to Congress. They include key cost, schedule, and technical information. 

Significant Changes 

Have Occurred in 

the F/A-22 Program 

during Nearly 

Two Decades 

of Development 

Delays and Higher Costs 

Have Reduced DOD’s 

Buying Power 
Page 6 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Table 1: Changes in F/A-22 Program Estimates Since It Started in 1986 

1986—Start of 

demonstration and 

validation 

1991—Start of engineering 

and manufacturing 

development

2002—Current available 

Selected Acquisition Report 

information 

Development cost $12.6 billion $19.5 billion $28.7 billion 

Development cycle time 9 years 16 years 19 years 

Development test and evaluation Not estimated 51 months 99 months 

Initial operational capability March 1996 Not shown in report December 2005 

Quantities 750 648 276a

Sources: Selected Acquisition Reports and Air Force documents. 

Note: All references to F/A-22 costs in this report are in then-year dollars in order to maintain 

consistent reporting with our prior reports on the F/A-22 aircraft. 

a

In fiscal year 2003, the Air Force increased the number of F/A-22 aircraft it planned to buy from 276 

to 277. 

In our 1988 report, the average unit procurement cost was estimated by 

the Air Force to be $69 million.10 Today, after schedule delays and 

development problems, the estimated average unit procurement costs 

have grown to $153 million—almost a 122 percent increase. The Air Force 

does not expect the development program to be completed until 2005 and 

with IOT&E still to be completed, the possibility of additional changes and 

costs is likely. 

As we previously reported,11 the acquisition approach of the F/A-22 

program has contributed to cost increases and delays in schedule. Leading 

commercial firms that we studied employ an acquisition approach that 

evolves a product to its ultimate capabilities on the basis of mature 

technologies and available resources. Further, product enhancements are 

planned for subsequent development efforts only when technologies are 

proven to be mature and other resources are available. Our work has 

shown that commercial firms ensure that high levels of knowledge exist 

at three critical junctures in a development program. First, a match 

must be made between a customer’s needs and the available resources—

technology, engineering knowledge, time, and funding—before a new 

development program is launched. Second, a product’s design must 

 10 U.S. General Accounting Office, Aircraft Development: The Advanced Tactical Fighter’s 

Costs, Schedule, and Performance Goals, GAO/NSIAD-88-76 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 13, 

1988). 

11 GAO-03-645T. 
Page 7 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

demonstrate its ability to meet performance requirements and be stable 

about midway through development. Third, the developer must show that 

the product can be manufactured within cost, schedule, and quality targets 

and is demonstrated to be reliable before production begins. 

In contrast, the F-22 acquisition strategy from the outset was to achieve 

full capability in a “big bang” approach instead of evolving development in 

manageable increments of new capability. By not using an evolutionary 

approach, the Air Force took on significant risk and onerous technology 

challenges. The three critical technologies that were immature at the 

start of the program included low-observable materials, propulsion, 

and integrated avionics. Integrated avionics has been a source of major 

schedule delays and cost increases in the F/A-22 program. Starting the 

program with these immature technologies prevented the program from 

knowing cost, schedule, and performance ramifications until late in the 

development program, after significant investments had already been 

made. Efforts to mature technology cascaded into development, delaying 

attainment of design and production maturity. The overall result has been 

significant delays and substantially higher investments to buy over 

60 percent fewer aircraft. 

Developing an expanded air-to-ground attack capability for the F/A-22 will 

be costly and add risk to the program. The Air Force began development 

of the F/A-22 as a replacement for the F-15 air superiority fighter with 

primary emphasis on the air-to-air role. It was never intended to have 

robust air-to-ground capability. Its need was based on a projection that 

the Soviet Union would develop and produce large numbers of advanced 

fighter aircraft. The F/A-22 was intended to identify, track, and kill 

advanced fighters before it was targeted, giving it the edge and making it 

a more lethal and survivable aircraft than an F-15. However, the original 

Soviet threat never materialized. To enhance the utility of the F/A-22, the 

Air Force plans to develop a robust air-to-ground attack capability to be 

able to engage a greater variety of ground targets, such as surface-to-air 

missile systems, that have posed a significant threat to U.S. aircraft in 

recent years. 

The Air Force has a modernization program to improve the capabilities of 

the F/A-22 focused largely on a new robust air-to-ground capability. It has 

five developmental spirals planned over more than a 10-year period, with 

the initial spiral started in 2003. Table 2 shows each spiral as currently 

planned. In March 2003, the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Analysis 

Improvement Group (CAIG) estimated that the Air Force would need 

Additional Investments 

Needed to Expand F/A-22 

Capability 
Page 8 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

$11.7 billion for the planned modernization program. The CAIG estimate 

included costs for development, production, and the retrofit of 

some aircraft. As of March 2003, the Air Force F/A-22 approved program 

baseline did not include estimated costs for the full modernization effort. 

Instead, the Air Force estimate included $3.5 billion for modernization 

efforts planned through fiscal year 2009. 

Table 2: Planned Modernization Enhancements for the F/A-22 Program 

Fiscal year expected to incorporate enhancements 

2007 2011 2013 2015 

Developmental spiral Global Strike Basic Global Strike 

Enhanceda 

Global Strike Full Enhanced 

Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

Examples of enhancements to be 

added 

Capability to launch 

Joint Direct Attack 

Munition at faster 

F/A-22 air speeds 

and at longer 

distances and update 

to air-to-air 

capabilities. 

Improved radar 

capabilities to seek 

and destroy advanced 

surface-to-air missile 

systems and integrate 

additional air-toground weapons. 

Increased capability 

to suppress or 

destroy the full range 

of air defenses and 

improve speed and 

accuracy of targeting. 

Capability for full 

intelligence, 

surveillance, and 

reconnaissance 

integration for 

increased target sets 

and lethality. 

Cost Analysis Improvement Group’s 

estimate through fiscal year 2015 

$11.7 billion 

Sources: Air Force and Office of Secretary of Defense. 

a

 The Global Strike Enhanced includes two developmental spirals to achieve the planned enhanced 

capability. 

To support the F/A-22’s expanded capability beyond Global Strike 

Enhanced, the Air Force has determined that its baseline computer 

architecture and critical avionics processors will need to be replaced. 

Current processors are old and obsolete, cannot be supported, and do not 

have sufficient capacity to meet the increased processing demands 

required for planned new air-to-ground capabilities beyond Global Strike 

Enhanced. As a bridge to meet this expanded capability, the Air Force 

plans to modify some avionics processors and purchase sufficient 

quantities to support production of the first 155 F/A-22 aircraft. 

The F/A-22 is dependent on its onboard computers and software to 

perform its mission. Unlike other fighter aircraft, it has a highly advanced, 

integrated avionics system capable of detecting, identifying, and engaging 

the enemy at ranges beyond a pilot’s vision. The key to the F/A-22 avionics 

New Computer 

Architecture and 

Avionics Processors 

Needed to Support 

Expanded Capability 
Page 9 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

lies in its fully integrated core architecture and its two central, networked 

computers called common integrated processors (CIP). CIPs use very 

high-speed integrated circuits to collect, process, and integrate data and 

signals from the aircraft’s sensors. CIP serves as the “brains” for the 

F/A-22’s integrated avionics system and is unique to this aircraft. 

The primary processor in CIP is the Intel i960MX microprocessor,12 which 

is used strictly for avionics processing. This microprocessor is based on 

1990’s technology and has a 32-bit processor that operates at speeds of 

25mhz. By today’s technology standards, the processor is considered 

obsolete and cannot support spiral developments beyond the Global Strike 

Enhanced. In mid-2003, the manufacturer of the microprocessor informed 

the Air Force that it planned to permanently shut down the i960MX 

production line by January 2004 because the microprocessor was no 

longer a viable product for the company. 

As a result, the Air Force decided in November 2003 to replace its 

computer architecture and avionics processors to support the F/A-22’s 

expanded capabilities. In December 2003, the Air Force purchased its last 

i960MX microprocessors when it bought 820 of the microprocessors. 

According to program officials, this quantity and previously purchased 

quantities are sufficient to support production of 155 F/A-22 aircraft. These 

officials believe that with some minor upgrades to improve processing 

capacity, these processors will be able to support the baseline aircraft 

and the developmental spirals—Global Strike Basic and Global Strike 

Enhanced. However, the Air Force plans for the remaining 

production aircraft to include a new computer architecture and avionics 

processor needed to support the final two planned spirals—Global Strike 

Full and Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. 

At the time of our review, the Air Force believed its best long-term 

solution to its avionics architecture and computer-processing shortfalls 

was a new, modern, open system architecture. Rather than start a new 

development program, the program office plans to leverage two other 

ongoing Air Force development or modification programs for this 

processing capability: the new architecture being developed for the F-35 

and the new commercial off-the-shelf general-purpose processors 

designed for newer versions of the F-16. According to F/A-22 program 

officials, this new architecture will be state-of-the-art and will have ample 

 12 The i960MX microprocessor is a registered trademark of the Intel Corporation. 
Page 10 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

processing capacity to accommodate all future air-to-ground capabilities 

as currently planned. These officials do not expect the new architecture to 

be fully developed and ready for installation in the F/A-22 for at least 5 to 

6 years. 

F/A-22 program officials acknowledge that this mass changeover of 

the F/A-22 computer architecture and avionics processor will be a 

time-consuming and costly effort and will likely create additional program 

risks. Air Force cost estimates are not yet available. Nevertheless, program 

officials estimate the nonrecurring engineering costs alone could be at 

least $300 million. At the time of our review, the Air Force had not made 

a decision about retrofitting aircraft equipped with the i960MX 

microprocessor. Additional risks are likely because the new processor and 

architecture are being developed by other major aircraft programs and will 

require extensive integration and operational testing to ensure that the 

F/A-22 program does not encounter similar problems that have delayed 

integration and testing of the F/A-22’s current avionics suite. 

The F/A-22 program did not meet key testing goals established for fiscal 

year 2003 and required for the aircraft to begin IOT&E testing. The Air 

Force’s efforts to stabilize avionics software and improve its performance 

have not been sufficiently demonstrated, and entrance criterion previously 

set for starting IOT&E testing has been changed. In addition, the F/A-22 

program is not performing as expected in some other key performance 

areas, including reliability and maintenance support. The ongoing 

problems have led to a revised test schedule, which has compressed the 

time to complete initial operational testing by 4 months, and have 

increased the potential for cost increases and delays in the full rate 

production decision. The program has made progress in correcting several 

of the design problems we identified in our March 2003 report. 

The Air Force changed the avionics stability metric planned as a criterion 

to enter IOT&E from an average of 20 hours between avionics software 

failures to a broader measure of an average of 5 hours between avionics 

software or hardware failures. Current testing shows the program 

continues to have problems meeting the new and old avionics stability 

metrics. 

Because the F/A-22 avionics encountered frequent shutdowns over the 

last few years, many test flights were delayed. As a result, the Air Force 

Operational Test and Evaluation Center wanted assurances that the 

Remaining 

Development and 

Operational Testing 

Could Impact F/A-22 

Program Outcomes 

Air Force Changed 

Avionics Performance 

Criterion to Start 

Operational Testing 
Page 11 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

avionics would work before it was willing to start the IOT&E program. It 

established a requirement for a 20-hour performance metric that was to be 

demonstrated before IOT&E would begin. The metric was Mean Time 

Between Instability Events (MTBIE)13 and tracked two distinct types of 

avionics software failures: 

• Hard failures (type 1) that were the most serious resulting in a complete 

avionics system shutdown requiring the need to restart the avionics 

system. 

• Significant failures (type 2) that were less serious failures but required the 

pilot to restart an individual subsystem that failed versus the complete 

avionics system. 

Using personal computers as an analogy, a type 1 failure would be 

equivalent to a failure of one’s personal computer that requires it to be 

shut down and rebooted, except that the time to restart the F/A-22 

avionics system could take substantially longer. A type 2 failure would 

be equivalent to a failure in a particular application, such as the word 

processing program shutting down. Even with such a failure, other 

software applications could still be operated while the word processing 

software was restarted. Likewise, in the case of the F/A-22, other 

applications would still be operable despite the failure of any single 

application, such as a shutdown in the communication, navigation, and 

identification system. 

In July 2003, the Air Force decided to switch to a different metric—Mean 

Time Between Avionics Anomaly (MTBAA)—to measure the performance 

of the avionics software for the start of IOT&E. Two main differences 

between the new metric and its predecessor are the new metric 

(1) includes hardware and some subsystem software failures not 

previously counted and (2) requires a failure rate based on an average of 

5 hours without experiencing avionics anomalies, instead of 20 hours. 

According to Air Force operational test officials, they adopted this new 

metric because they believe it is a better measure of the avionics 

operational performance needed to start IOT&E, whereas the previous 

metric was more technically focused on software performance, excluding 

hardware failures. They also said the 5-hour criterion would provide a 

minimum amount of effective operational test time to efficiently conduct 

 13 MTBIE is the ratio of the total hours the avionics are turned on divided by the number of 

countable instability events averaged over multiple flights. It was derived by conducting 

dedicated stability flights, nominally six flights of 2.5 hours duration each. 
Page 12 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

IOT&E. In turn, Congress included the new metric in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.14 Testing as of January 2004 

showed the program had achieved 2.7 hours—54 percent of the 

requirement. Once this criterion is achieved, the avionics must still 

undergo rigorous operational testing to demonstrate its effectiveness and 

suitability in a realistic environment. Figure 1 shows the status of the 

MTBIE and MTBAA metrics. 

Figure 1: Status of F/A-22 Avionics Metrics, as of January 2004 

Note: MTBIE is no longer tracked by the Air Force. 

The figure shows that MTBIE, the previous criterion, was demonstrated 

at about 67 percent of the requirement. In addition, the type 1 failures, 

causing a complete shutdown of the avionics system, have significantly 

diminished. They are occurring only about once every 25 hours on 

average. This is the result of a substantial effort on the part of the 

Air Force and the contractor to identify and fix problems that led to 

the instability in the F/A-22 avionics software. Type 2 failures are still 

 14 Pub. L. 108-136 (Nov. 24, 2003), section 133. 
Page 13 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

occurring frequently. While less serious when compared to the entire 

avionics suite shutting down, type 2 failures become serious if critical 

subsystem software shuts down when its function is needed for the 

success of the mission or survivability of the aircraft. 

In September 2003, the F/A-22 contractor reported a high number of 

outstanding avionics Common Problem Reports.15 Of the 231 reports 

of problems not resolved, about 25 (or 11 percent) were identified as 

stability-related problems. The remaining 206 reports (89 percent) were 

the result of avionics performance or functional problems. For example, 

the communication, navigation, and identification subsystem accounted 

for nearly 36 percent of the total reports. Because the avionics system is 

essential to the success of the F/A-22, the integrated avionics still needs 

to be demonstrated to meet design specifications and operational 

requirements. Reductions in avionics performance could affect the ability 

of the F/A-22 to effectively carry out its expected missions. 

The F/A-22 program is not meeting its requirements for a reliable aircraft 

and it is not using a best practice approach. The Air Force established 

reliability requirements to be achieved at the completion of development 

and at system maturity.16 As a measure of the system’s overall reliability, 

the Air Force established a requirement for 1.95-hours mean time between 

maintenance by the completion of development, and 3-hours mean time 

between maintenance at system maturity. This measure of reliability 

represents the average flight time between maintenance actions. As of 

October 2003, the Air Force had only been able to demonstrate a reliability 

of about 0.5 flying hours between maintenance actions or about 26 percent 

of the development requirement and 17 percent of system maturity 

requirement. This has led to the development test aircraft spending more 

time than planned on the ground undergoing maintenance. 

During 2003, the Air Force identified 68 parts that had a high rate of failure 

causing them to be removed or replaced, affecting the F/A-22 system 

reliability. The contractor has initiated programs to eliminate the high 

failure rates experienced by these parts. The canopy has also been 

 15 Common Problem Reports are used to identify problems within the aircraft avionics. 

16 System maturity is defined by the Air Force as a point when the F/A-22s have 

accumulated 100,000 flying hours, expected to occur in 2008 after most F/A-22s are to be 

procured. 

Reliability Requirements 

Not Being Met 
Page 14 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

experiencing failures during testing, allowing it to achieve only about 

15 percent of its expected 1,600-hour life. A second manufacturer for 

canopies is being developed, but until it has passed qualification testing, 

it cannot be used as an alternative source for the high failing canopies. 

Best commercial practices for new product development require reliability 

to be demonstrated by the start of production. Our work has shown that 

product development engineers from leading commercial firms expect to 

achieve reliability requirements before entering production. They told us 

reliability is attained through an iterative process of design, test, analyze, 

and redesign.17 Commercial firms understand that once a system enters 

production, the costs to achieve reliability through this iterative design 

change process become significantly more expensive. The F/A-22 aircraft 

has been in production since fiscal year 1999, and the Air Force has on 

contract 52 production aircraft, and an additional 22 aircraft on long lead 

contracts representing 27 percent of the planned buy quantity. With 

83 percent of the reliability requirement yet to be achieved through this 

iterative design change process, the Air Force can expect to incur 

additional development and design change costs. If the Air Force fails to 

improve the F/A-22’s reliability before fielding the aircraft, the high failure 

rates will result in higher operational and support costs to keep 

the aircraft available for training or combat use. 

The F/A-22 is designed to have a computerized and paperless maintenance 

system that monitors, diagnoses, identifies, and reports failures to 

maintenance crews and that is intended to allow a faster maintenance 

turnaround to flight status. The onboard Diagnostics Health and 

Management system constantly monitors the aircraft’s systems and the 

performance of both hardware and software. It collects, analyzes, stores, 

and reports failures. Critical failures are reported to the pilot, and all 

failures are stored in a portable database for later use by ground 

maintenance crews. At the completion of a flight, the database is removed 

from the aircraft and is downloaded into a system on the ground, the 

Integrated Management Information System, which is a network of 

computers the maintainers use to process the maintenance and support 

information. This system further analyzes the downloaded information to 

 17 U.S. General Accounting Office, Best Practices: Capturing Design and 

Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-02-701

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002). 

Immaturity of Maintenance 

Support Systems 
Page 15 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

determine the problems and match failures with the appropriate digitized 

technical order data needed to make the repairs. This information is then 

loaded into handheld portable computers that the technicians use to repair 

the aircraft. 

According to DOD and Air Force test officials, these systems have been 

generating false reports of failures, which have caused maintenance staff 

to spend more hours than planned replacing items unnecessarily and 

trying to identify the actual problems. In addition, the maintenance 

systems are not providing all the technical data needed to repair 

the aircraft, thus making it more difficult to make repairs. According to the 

test officials, they do not have precise data to quantify the extent of the 

problems, and they said it has disrupted maintenance activities. A key 

indication has been the inability to fly aircraft as planned. We found that 

between October 2003 and January 2004 the test force could only fly about 

53 percent of the planned test flights and that the maintenance problems 

were a key contributor to this poor flying performance. 

Air Force officials do not expect the maintenance systems to be fully 

matured until December 2005. Consequently, the program office has had 

to provide additional funding to the contractor to purchase special test 

equipment that will be used to support maintenance requirements during 

operational testing. Moreover, because these systems will not be fully 

available during the operational testing, it may be difficult to assess the 

systems’ real performance. 

Progress in F/A-22 flight testing was slower than expected in 2003, and 

start of IOT&E was delayed an additional 7 months due to avionics and 

other problems. Realizing the Air Force would not be ready to enter initial 

operational testing as previously planned, the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense requested the F/A-22 program to establish a new operational test 

plan that included measures to ensure the aircraft and its avionics are 

ready before entering operational testing. In response, the Air Force put in 

place a two-phase operational test program. 

• Phase 1, also called an operational assessment, is not the official start of 

operational testing. It is intended to assess the F/A-22’s readiness for 

IOT&E. Started in October 2003, it calls for testing two F/A-22 aircraft to 

conduct live air-to-air missile shots, fly one-ship and two-ship formation 

operational sorties, and assess the computerized maintenance system’s 

maturity. It will include some flight tests that are planned to be repeated in 

IOT&E if the aircraft configuration changes. 

Problems in the 

Development Program 

Have Led to Further 

Delays and Changes in 

Operational Testing 
Page 16 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

• Phase 2 testing is considered the actual start of IOT&E. To begin this 

phase, the Air Force must meet a number of criteria. Perhaps most 

importantly, it must demonstrate that the F/A-22 integrated avionics will 

be able to operate for sufficient lengths of time, without shutting down. 

Other criteria that must be met prior to IOT&E include the availability of 

four fully configured F/A-22 test aircraft and one spare aircraft, the 

completion of live missile shots, the completion of key aircraft flight 

envelope testing (planned speed, altitude, and maneuver boundaries of the 

F/A-22), the completion of operational pilot and maintenance training, a 

useable system with technical data to fix problems, and the software 

upgrades to the maintenance system. 

Figure 2 compares the changes in the planned test program since our 

last report. 

Figure 2: F/A-22 Flight Test Schedule Changes 

According to Air Force test officials, results of some phase 1 tests could 

be used to satisfy IOT&E requirements if the aircraft and software 

configurations do not change for IOT&E testing. This could reduce the 

scope of the test effort planned during IOT&E. The Defense Acquisition 
Page 17 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Board18 is scheduled to review the F/A-22’s readiness for IOT&E in 

March 2004. 

At the present time, the Air Force expects to complete IOT&E in 

October 2004, before the full rate production decision, now expected in 

December 2004. The time allotted to complete IOT&E under the new test 

plan, however, has been compressed by 4 months, assuming phase 1 

testing results are not permitted to be used for IOT&E. This means the Air 

Force would have less time than previously planned to complete the same 

amount of testing. If the Air Force continues to experience delays in 

testing prior to IOT&E, then the full rate production decision would also 

have to be delayed until IOT&E is complete and the Beyond Low Rate 

Initial Production Report is delivered to Congress19. There is no consensus 

within DOD on the Air Force’s ability to meet this October 2004 milestone. 

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, Office of Secretary of 

Defense, believes the start of testing will slip, although the Air Force 

maintains it will meet its schedule. 

The Air Force has corrected design problems discussed in our March 2003 

report. To correct the movement or buffeting of the vertical fins in the 

tail section of the aircraft, the Air Force designed and implemented 

modifications, which strengthen the fin and hinge assemblies. Because of 

this problem, the Air Force placed restrictions on flights below 10,000 feet. 

Testing was done above and below 10,000 feet, and the flight restrictions 

were removed. Likewise, the Air Force modified the aircraft to prevent 

overheating concerns in the rear portion of the aircraft by adding thermal 

protection and strengthened strategic areas in the aft tail sections. The Air 

Force also plans to modify later production aircraft using a new venting 

approach to resolve the heat problems. We reported that the Air Force 

had also experienced separations in the horizontal tail materials. After 

additional testing, the Air Force deemed that the original tails met 

requirements established for the life of the airframe. However, the Air 

 18 The Defense Acquisition Board is DOD’s senior-level forum for advising the Under 

Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on critical decisions 

concerning major defense acquisition programs. 

19 10 U.S.C. 2399 provides that a major defense acquisition program may not proceed 

beyond low-rate initial production until initial operational test and evaluation is completed 

and the defense committees have received the report of testing results from the Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation. 

Past Design Problems 

Corrected 
Page 18 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Force redesigned the tail to reduce producibility costs. Tests will be 

performed on the redesigned tail in late 2004. 

DOD has not provided Congress with sufficient information to support the 

business case for buying and modernizing the F/A-22 program. In our 

testimony of April 11, 2003, before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on 

Government Reform, we stressed that the issue was not whether the 

F/A-22 should be produced, but rather in what quantities it is needed—as 

justified by a business case. We discussed the current and future 

environments in which the F/A-22 investment decision would have to be 

made, including the need to consider opportunity costs inside and outside 

DOD. DOD has planned investments over the next several years, on 

average $150 billion a year, to keep legacy systems working while at 

the same time modernizing and transforming U.S. national defense 

capabilities for the future. The F/A-22 program represents a sizable 

investment and must compete with other demands within the defense 

budget. This competition requires a knowledge-based approach to justify 

acquisition investment decisions and an efficient acquisition process to 

ensure programs are implemented within expectations set in associated 

business cases. 

Since the start of the F/A-22 program, acquisition costs have increased, 

the aircraft’s mission and key capabilities have expanded, fewer quantities 

are affordable, and delivery to the user has been delayed. The Air Force 

currently estimates the total F/A-22 acquisition program will cost about 

$72 billion, excluding all costs estimated to complete the spiral 

improvement effort. Including these costs brings the estimated total 

investment for the F/A-22 program to about $80 billion. Through fiscal year 

2004, about one-half this investment has been funded. 

In light of the changes in the program and investments that remain, the 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, asked DOD to 

provide a business case justifying the Air Force’s planned number of 

F/A-22s (276 at that time) as well as how many F/A-22s are affordable. In 

its response, DOD did not sufficiently address key business case questions 

such as how many F/A-22s are needed, how many are affordable, and if 

alternatives to planned investments increasing the F/A-22 air-to-ground 

capabilities exist. 

DOD Did Not Provide 

Congress Sufficient 

Business Case 

Information to Justify 

Current Aircraft 

Quantities or 

Modernization 

Investment Plans 
Page 19 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Instead, DOD stated it planned to buy 277 F/A-22s based on a “buy to 

budget” concept that determines quantities on the availability and efficient 

use of funds by the F/A-22 program office. Furthermore, justification for 

expanding the capability, for an estimated $8 billion to $12 billion 

investment, was not addressed in DOD’s response. While ground targets 

such as surface-to-air missile systems are acknowledged to be a significant 

threat today, the business case did not establish a justification for this 

investment or state what alternatives were considered. For example, the 

F-35 aircraft is also expected to have an air-to-ground role as are planned 

future unmanned combat air vehicles. These could be viable alternatives 

to this additional investment in F/A-22 capability. 

While the business case information submitted to Congress called for 

277 aircraft, DOD stated it could only afford to acquire between 216 

and 218 aircraft within the congressionally imposed cap on production 

costs—currently at $36.8 billion. DOD expects improvements in 

manufacturing efficiencies and other areas will provide it with sufficient 

funds to buy additional F/A-22 aircraft. However, this seems to be an 

unlikely scenario given the program’s history. Under the “buy to budget” 

approach, the previous $876 million increase in development costs was 

funded by taking funds mostly from production, thus reducing aircraft 

quantities by 49. With testing still incomplete and many important 

performance areas not yet demonstrated, the possibility for additional 

increases in development costs is likely. 

While DOD and the Air Force are focused on completing IOT&E and 

making a decision to go into full rate production, a more basic issue needs 

to be addressed. The conditions driving the business case that spurred the 

major investment decision to initially develop and buy 750 F-22 aircraft 

have changed. A revised and comprehensive business case assessment has 

not been completed and shared with congressional defense oversight 

committees. At the present time, it is uncertain how many F/A-22s are 

needed. The program has been in development for about 18 years, and 

DOD has invested over $40 billion. This investment represents about onehalf the estimated costs projected for the entire F/A-22 program. 

Therefore, DOD must still make investment decisions affecting another 

$40 billion to support this program through full rate production and 

implementation of the spiraled modernization effort. Based on current 

design problems and the development efforts that remain, the F/A-22 

program’s affordability is uncertain. Current conditions suggest the Air 

Force cannot afford to buy much more than 218 aircraft within the cost 

limitation imposed by Congress. 

Conclusions 
Page 20 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

In light of the uncertainty concerning how many aircraft are needed in 

today’s environment, the large investments that remain, and the unknown 

outcomes of planned initial operational testing, we continue to be 

concerned with DOD’s readiness to address a December 2004 decision to 

enter full rate production. Furthermore, IOT&E, intended to demonstrate 

the F/A-22 effectiveness and suitability, has not started and may not be 

completed as planned, which may delay the full rate production decision. 

With this testing outstanding, the risk is high that additional development 

funding will be needed to resolve problems that could result. 

Given the sizable investment that remains in the F/A-22 program, the 

uncertainties, and the ever changing financial demands of DOD, Congress 

and the Secretary of Defense would benefit from a comprehensive 

assessment of the number of F/A-22 aircraft needed as well as assurance 

that problems identified in initial operational testing will be identified and 

resolved. Specifically, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take 

the following two actions: 

• Complete a new business case analysis that determines the continued 

need for the F/A-22 and that specifically (a) addresses the need for an 

expanded air-to-ground capability and an assessment of alternatives, to 

include the feasibility of using other assets like the F-35 and unmanned 

aerial vehicles planned for the future; (b) justifies the quantity of 

F/A-22 aircraft needed to satisfy requirements for air-to-air and 

air-to-ground missions; and (c) provides evidence that the planned 

quantity is affordable within current budgets and the congressional 

funding limitation. The Secretary should provide the results of the 

business case analysis to the defense committees before the decision 

to start full rate production. 

• Before the full rate production decision is made and in conjunction with 

the Beyond Low-Rate Initial Production Report, provide the defense 

committees a plan that shows how the Air Force will correct and fund any 

major problems identified and still open after IOT&E is completed. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it partially 

concurred with our two recommendations. Regarding our first 

recommendation on completing a new business case for the F/A-22, DOD 

stated that it evaluates the F/A-22 business case elements as part of the 

annual budget process. Additionally, DOD’s response acknowledged that 

this year the department is undertaking a broader set of reviews under the 

Joint Capabilities Review process; the F/A-22 will be a part of this review. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Page 21 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

The President’s budget submission to Congress will reflect the results of 

these review efforts of the F/A-22 business case. 

We believe that the various reviews and assessments in the budget process 

along with the Joint Capabilities Review process present excellent 

opportunities for DOD to conduct a business case analysis. Other 

opportunities for completing the business case analysis include the 

independent and in-depth study requested by the Office of Management 

and Budget for the Comanche and F/A-22 programs. It is important, 

however, that the analysis sufficiently address the specific business case 

elements included in our recommendation—analysis of continued need, 

need for expanded air-to-ground capability, assessment of alternatives, 

justification of needed quantities, and evidence that planned quantities are 

affordable. In addition, it is important that the outcomes of the business 

case analysis are provided to the Congress prior to the full rate production 

decision. 

Regarding our second recommendation on providing Congress the plans 

to resolve outstanding problems after the completion of IOT&E, DOD 

stated that the law already requires the Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation, to submit to Congress a Beyond Low Rate Initial Production 

Report that includes the results of operational testing. Since this report is 

an independent assessment of test results, the department did not believe 

it appropriate to include in it Air Force plans and costs for corrective 

actions stemming from operational testing. However, DOD will present 

these actions and costs to the Defense Acquisition Board for decisions on 

the F/A-22 program that will be included in the President’s budget 

submission to Congress. 

We understand the legal requirements for submitting the Beyond Low Rate 

Initial Production Report. We also recognize that this is an independent 

report submitted by the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation. The 

intent of our recommendation is not to modify the report itself, but to 

ensure corrective actions and resultant costs are identified and reported in 

a timely fashion and before the full rate production decision is made. 

Because plans and costs could span over several years, such information 

may or may not be captured in annual budget submissions. We have 

modified our recommendation to clarify our intent. 
Page 22 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

To determine changes in the F/A-22 program since its inception, we 

analyzed cost information from Selected Acquisition Reports and obtained 

information from the Air Force on its plans to modernize the F/A-22 to 

include enhanced air-to-ground capabilities. We compared prior cost 

information with the Air Force’s current estimates to complete 

development and production of the F/A-22. 

To determine the impact of development and testing on program 

outcomes, we examined the extent to which the development program is 

meeting planned flight test goals for 2003 and the Air Force’s planned 

entry criterion for starting initial operational testing. 

In examining sufficiency of the business case DOD provided to a 

congressional oversight committee, we obtained a copy of the business 

plan and analyzed the various DOD assumptions and approaches used to 

make the assessment conclusions. 

In making these determinations, assessments, and identifications, we 

required access to current information about test results, performance 

estimates, schedule achievements and revisions, costs being 

incurred, aircraft modifications, and the program’s plans for continued 

development and initial production. The Air Force and the contractors 

gave us access to sufficient information to make informed judgments on 

the matters covered in this report. 

In performing our work, we obtained information or interviewed 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington D.C.; 

the F/A-22 System Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

Lockheed-Martin, Marietta, Georgia; the Defense Contract Management 

Agency, Marietta, Georgia; the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation 

Center, Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico; and the Combined Flight 

Test Center, Edwards Air Force Base, California. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and 

Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on request. In 

addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Scope and 

Methodology 
Page 23 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or Michael J. Hazard at (937) 258-7917 

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. 

Allen Li 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 
Page 24 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

List of Congressional Committees 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 25 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix I: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 26 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 
Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 27 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Marvin E. Bonner, Edward Browning, Roger Corrado, Steve Hunter, Gary 

Middleton, and Robert Ackley made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix II: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 28 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Best Practices: Better Acquisition Outcomes Are Possible If DOD Can 

Apply Lessons from F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-645T. Washington, D.C.: 

April 11, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 Program. GAO-03-603T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision to Increase F/A-22 

Production Rates While Development Risks Continue. GAO-03-431. 

Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to Better Inform Congress about 

Implications of Continuing Cost Growth. GAO-03-280. Washington, D.C.: 

February 28, 2003. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial Production Rates Should 

Be Lower to Reduce Risks. GAO-02-298. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2002. 

Tactical Aircraft: Continuing Difficulty Keeping F-22 Production Costs 

Within the Congressional Limitation. GAO-01-782. Washington, D.C.: 

July 16, 2001. 

Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Development and Testing Delays Indicate Need 

for Limit on Low-Rate Production. GAO-01-310. Washington, D.C.: 

March 15, 2001. 

Defense Acquisitions: Recent F-22 Production Cost Estimates Exceeded 

Congressional Limitation. GAO/NSIAD-00-178. Washington, D.C.: 

August 15, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Use of Cost Reduction Plans in Estimating 

F-22 Total Production Costs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-200. Washington, D.C.: 

June 15, 2000. 

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for 

Fiscal Year 2001. GAO/OCG-00-8. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2000. 

F-22 Aircraft: Development Cost Goal Achievable If Major Problems Are 

Avoided. GAO/NSIAD-00-68. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2000. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress in Meeting F-22 Cost and Schedule Goals.

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-58. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 1999. 

Related GAO Products 
Related GAO Products 

Page 29 GAO-04-391 F/A-22 Aircraft 

Fiscal Year 2000 Budget: DOD’s Production and RDT&E Programs.

GAO/NSIAD-99-233R. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 1999. 

Budget Issues: Budgetary Implications of Selected GAO Work for Fiscal 

Year 2000. GAO/OCG-99-26. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Progress of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F Engineering 

and Manufacturing Development Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-113. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

(120239) 
The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of 

Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities 

and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal 

government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; 

evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, 

recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed 

oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government 

is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is 

through the Internet. GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov) contains abstracts and fulltext files of current reports and testimony and an expanding archive of older 

products. The Web site features a search engine to help you locate documents 

using key words and phrases. You can print these documents in their entirety, 

including charts and other graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as “Today’s Reports,” on its Web site 

daily. The list contains links to the full-text document files. To have GAO e-mail 

this list to you every afternoon, go to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to e-mail 

alerts” under the “Order GAO Products” heading. 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. A 

check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. 

GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or more copies mailed to a 

single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. General Accounting Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Jeff Nelligan, Managing Director, NelliganJ@gao.gov (202) 512-4800 

U.S. General Accounting Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Public Affairs