Volume 2, Issue 3 May 1998

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues,

Written and Produced by

From the Chairman...

Chairman, House National Security Committee

Strategy versus Resources:

The FY 1999 Defense Budget Debate in Context

Managing Risk:

The FY 1999 Defense

Authorization Act

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For the first time, the President’s fiscal

year 1999 defense budget request fully reflects the Pentagon’s recent review of defense strategy — the Quadrennial Defense

Review (QDR). Fortunately, the QDR’s declared strategy more accurately reflects the

true scope of America’s post-Cold-War defense strategy than did the previous Bottom-Up Review (BUR). Furthermore, its

central strategic visions of shaping the international environment in ways that will

protect and advance U.S. national security

interests, preparing U.S. military forces for

future challenges to those interests, and

responding to current threats are reasonable. Unfortunately, the President’s budget does not support the demands of the

nation’s strategy.

Ironically, the increased clarity of the

QDR’s strategic vision only serves to highlight the disparities between requirements,

forces and resources. While the QDR retains the BUR’s requirement to fight and

win two nearly simultaneous regional theater wars, persuasively arguing that such

a capability “is the sine qua non of a superpower and is essential to the credibility

of our overall national security strategy,” it

also requires that U.S. armed forces “be

prepared to conduct successfully multiple,

concurrent [smaller-scale contingency] operations worldwide, in

any environment, including one

in which an adversary uses asymmetric means, such [nuclear, biological, or chemical] weapons.”

In addition, the QDR demands

that DOD prepare now for an uncertain future that may include

“significant” future threats from

a rising China or a reinvigorated

and aggressive Russia, and

where military technologies, doctrine and organizations have

changed radically. The QDR’s

strategic vision for the post-Cold War world

is truly a demanding one.

Despite this expansive strategy, the Administration’s fiscal year 1999 defense budget continues a 14 year real decline in defense spending. The President’s defense

budget request of $270.6 billion in budget authority is a 1.1 percent real decline from current defense spending levels, is more than

$54 billion short of keeping pace with inflation over the next five years, and is 39 percent lower than mid-1980s defense spending

levels. Indeed, the fiscal year 1999 defense

budget request represents the lowest real

level of U.S. defense spending since before

the Korean War. Today, the unofficial motto

of the U.S. military is “doing more with less”

for good reason: missions increase as forces

and resources decline.

The gap between strategic requirements

of the post-Cold War world and the levels of

resources committed to U.S. national security continues to widen. As senior National

Security Committee members of both parties

recently wrote to the President and leaders of

Congress, “[I]t is our collective judgment that,

short of an unwise retrenchment and overhaul of U.S. national security strategy, fixing

On May 6, the

House National Security Committee

favorably reported

H.R. 3616 - the National Defense Authorization Act for

Fiscal Year 1999 on

a bi-partisan 50-1 vote. Although this

vote leaves the impression that crafting

this bill was an easy task, the truth is far

different. In fact, caught between an international geopolitical environment that

requires an expansive U.S. national security strategy and a domestic political

environment bounded by declining defense budgets locked in place by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the committee was left to figure out how best to

manage risk. There should be no illusions about the level of risk associated

with our military’s ability to carry out its

mission — the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently assessed it as “moderate to high.”

Thus, the committee’s actions with regard

to the FY 1999 defense authorization bill

were intended to protect those programs

that will help lower the risks to U.S. national security interests by protecting core

readiness, enhancing quality of life and

increasing the pace at which rapidly aging equipment is modernized or replaced.

Central to these efforts are the

committee’s initiatives related to force

readiness. In recent months, the committee conducted a series of field hearings at

military installations in addition to its traditional budget oversight hearings.

These hearings confirmed an ongoing

pattern of spare part shortages, a high

Eroding Defense Budgets

Between fiscal year 1999 and fiscal year 2003, the

President’s defense budget falls $54.4 billion short

of keeping pace with inflation.

265

275

285

295

305

315

FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 FY 02 FY 03

Billions of Dollars

Inflation Adjusted Baseline

283.6

286.9

296.9

270.9

275.7 FY 99 President’s Budget

(as scored by CBO)

276.4

284.9

293.4

302.2

311.5

$54.4 B
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the nation’s long-term defense program will

require increased defense spending.” Measured by any of the QDR’s benchmarks –

shaping, preparing, or responding – the current defense program is underresourced.

The Strains of Shaping

The QDR asserts that DOD “has an essential role to play” in shaping the international

environment to benefit U.S. national interests.

Yet the review’s treatment of the military capabilities essential to this shaping effort understates the magnitude of the task. As recent trends indicate, the constant employment of military power strains today’s smaller

military forces. The Administration’s propensity to use U.S. military forces in a multitude

of nontraditional roles around the world has

merely magnified the strains of downsizing.

To fully understand the challenges implicit

in trying to shape the international environment, it is necessary to consider recent events

in broad perspective. The collapse of the

Soviet Union, almost a decade ago, was one

of this century’s, and perhaps history’s, great

turning points. The Red Army’s retreat left in

its wake a security vacuum stretching from

Europe to Africa to Asia, tossing dozens of

nations, many of them tied to U.S. national

interests in one way or the other, into a state

of uncertainty — freed from Soviet tyranny

but unable to guarantee their own independence and security.

The result for the United States is both

new opportunity and new challenge. In

their desire for both freedom and security,

many of these fledgling states have turned

to the U.S. as their best hope. Nowhere is

this more in evidence then the desire of the

newly independent nations of Central and

Eastern Europe to join the NATO alliance.

While the challenges presented by NATO

expansion are daunting and not yet well

understood, similarly difficult challenges to

shaping the international environment exist elsewhere around the globe. As indicated above, the demise of the Soviet Union

has brought turmoil and uncertainty hand

in hand with independence. The United

States’ interests in protecting the world’s

energy supplies and distribution network

will be complicated as new supplies and

routes are developed to deliver Caspian Sea

and Central Asian gas and oil to market.

Likewise, the loss of the common security

goal of containment of the Soviet Union

will continue to complicate American relations with China, which continues its aggressive policy of acquiring advanced military technologies. Moreover, even the financial crisis in East Asia could have unpredictable political consequences that

might further complicate shaping of the international environment.

While the QDR’s requirement to “shape

the international environment” is essential

to the protection of American security

interests, its implications are far from

understood. Trying to achieve the QDR’s

goal of “promoting regional stability” will

require a continued global military presence.

From protecting against threats to the

American homeland; to projecting power

to Europe, the Pacific Rim, the Gulf and the

expanding region responsible for the

world’s energy supplies; to defending the

international system from a wide variety of

transnational threats including proliferation

and information warfare, shaping the

complex and increasingly dangerous postCold War international environment is one

of the central reasons the U.S. military is

“doing more with less.”

Preparing for an Uncertain Future

Beyond shaping today’s security environment, the QDR recognizes that the security environment of the future will pose entirely new problems. The geopolitical uncertainties alone are remarkable; the United

States’ status as the world’s only superpower

is an anomaly of history — no single nation

has ever enjoyed such unchallenged global

influence. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that American preeminence will last indefinitely.

Much of the basis for U.S. military superiority rests upon its technological edge, and

the organizational and doctrinal advantages

that this edge allows. Significant investments

in defense made in the 1980s brought to the

battlefield a generation of weapons systems

without rival, as revealed so strikingly in Operation Desert Storm. Yet the “procurement

holiday,” beginning in the early 1990s and

continuing still, is eroding this U.S. technological edge. In some areas, lack of investment has allowed vulnerabilities to remain unaddressed. For example, Scud missiles of the

kind that caused significant American casualties in the Gulf War have become even more

of a threat to U.S. forces and American allies

today than they were in 1991. This vulnerability remains today, and it is one that is well

understood by our potential enemies.

Moreover, weapons platforms and systems

procured during the 1980s, based on 1970s

technology, are prematurely aging due to the

high operational tempo associated with repeated extended contingency operations.

The same M1A1 tanks and Apache helicopters, sophisticated F-15E strike fighters and

carrier battle groups that defeated the Iraqi

military are too often found today at checkpoints in Bosnia, flying figure-8s enforcing

no-fly zones, or steaming from ocean to ocean

to react to the crisis of the day. As a result,

military equipment is getting older and wearing out faster than planned.

Finally, the battlefield advantages conferred

by the application of information technologies and similar innovations to military systems will dramatically impact warfare in the

near future. The United States has heretofore set the pace in the practical application

of the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs,” during the innovation in “smart” and

“brilliant” munitions; battlefield surveillance,

reconnaissance, and intelligence; and the

rapid dissemination of information. But the

U.S. military’s “innovation edge” is eroding

as well. The overall advance and proliferation of high technology, much of it commerShaping the complex and increasingly

dangerous international environment is

one of the central reasons the U.S. military

is “doing more with less.”
National Security Report 3

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cially available, will certainly enhance the

military capabilities of future enemies of the

United States. The task for the United States

is to retain its edge across the broad spectrum of military technology through modernization and innovation.

Faced with these realities, the QDR calls

for the Department of Defense to pursue a

“focused modernization effort” and to “increase procurement spending now so that

we can ensure tomorrow’s forces are every

bit as capable as today’s.” However the attention being paid to preparing for a strategically and technologically uncertain future

is, by any standard, inadequate. The shortfalls in resources committed to research, development and procurement are at least as

great as the shortfalls in requirements for the

shaping missions described above. The independent National Defense Panel’s (NDP)

assessment of the QDR highlighted this point,

stating that “the Panel considers the [QDR]

modernization plan to have more budget risk

than is acknowledged by the QDR. The funding necessary to attain the procurement

goal...rests on several key

assumptions...The Panel considers each of

these assumptions to be somewhat tenuous.

Collectively, they represent a budget risk

which could potentially undermine the entire Defense Strategy.”

Even though the Joint Chiefs of Staff established that $60 billion per year in constantdollar procurement funding was the minimum

amount required to modernize the force starting in 1998, the President’s fiscal year 1999

defense budget request, falling over $11 billion short of the target, postpones attainment of this modernization funding goal for

the fourth consecutive year. Whether in

modernizing today’s military or preparing

tomorrow’s force, the current level of investment is inadequate. Sustaining the technological advantages that give U.S. military

forces an unquestioned edge wherever

they operate is a keystone to U.S. national

security strategy. Indeed, it is a central

foundation upon which that strategy is

built.

Unfortunately, the Administration is articulating a strategy for an uncertain future

that is built upon an eroding foundation.

The true uncertainty about the future is

not whether there will be threats to U.S.

national security interests, but what form

these threats will take. Threats may come

from rogue states like Iraq or Iran, newly

armed with more accurate ballistic missiles,

weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons; they may

come from other large and powerful nations

like a retrenched Russia or an ascendant

China; they may come from terrorist

groups, drug traffickers or other ruthless

and well-resourced international organizations; they may come from ethnic nationalists for whom war can be an end as much

as a means. Yet wherever these future

threats originate, failure to prepare to meet

them will only encourage America’s enemies.

Responding to a Crisis

In “shaping the international environment,” U.S. military forces are linked to

American diplomacy, business, and political ideology. In “preparing for an uncertain future,” DOD is mortgaging its technological future by robbing long-term investment accounts to pay short-term operational bills and may, even under the best

of circumstances, be hard pressed to keep

pace with commercial enterprise. Yet some

tasks remain unique to the military. The

military’s most critical capability, indeed its

raison d’etre, is its role in response to international crisis or the outbreak

of war. The collapse of the Soviet Union has not changed this

fundamental reality.

Today’s armed forces

must be ready to respond to the

full spectrum of crises, from deterrence, to coercion, to the conduct of an increasing number of

“smaller-scale contingencies”

or “military operations other

than war,” and to fighting and

winning the major theater wars

that would pose the greatest threat to U.S.

national security interests. This crisis response requirement is the essential element

of the QDR’s strategy, indeed of any appropriate U.S. national military strategy. As important as the QDR’s requirements are to

“shape the international environment” and

to “prepare for an uncertain future,” the primary responsibility of U.S. armed forces is to

defend America and its global interests

against present and future threats.

As the post-Soviet period has evolved, the

number and duration of smaller-scale contingencies has increased. Yet the core of U.S.

national military strategy remains, and must

remain, the requirement to maintain the capability to fight and to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. This benchmark

has served the United States military well during the post-Cold War era. Absent a well

understood and precisely defined threat such

as the Soviet military, the two-war standard

has been the only means for preserving the

kind of flexible and global military capability

required for the vast array of security responsibilities that the United States maintains. According to the QDR, “If the United States

were to forego its ability to defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time, our

standing as a global power, as the security

partner of choice and the leader of the international community, would be called into

question.”

This two-war benchmark is also an appropriate peacetime force-sizing mechanism that

follows clearly from an appreciation of the

kinds of potential commitments and conflicts

that confront the United States today.

America’s adversaries are at all times acutely

aware of the proximity and presence of U.S.

forces. Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander-inchief of U.S. Central Command, recently testified before the National Security Committee

that Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein clearly times

his provocative actions to those occasions

when U.S. military force presence in the Gulf

is lower. Likewise, the continuing economic

and humanitarian crisis in North Korea, combined with that regime’s continuing investment in its military capability, could easily provide the spark to renewed conflict. In these

and other vital regions, the presence of strong

U.S. forces and their overwhelming conventional combat capability provide a convincing deterrent force, and a lethal fighting force.

Wherever future threats originate, failure to prepare

to meet them will only encourage America’s enemies.
4 National Security Report

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From the Chairman...

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operations and personnel tempo, and continued deterioration of military infrastructure and facilities. In fact, the service chiefs

of staff have identified approximately $10

billion in unfunded requirements in fiscal

year 1999 alone. Tellingly, the largest portion of these unfunded requirements pertain to core readiness needs – training,

spare parts, and other basics. Indeed, almost the entire Air Force unfunded requirements list reflected readiness shortfalls. In

an effort to correct readiness failures, the

committee did its best to increase spending in core readiness accounts at the expense of lower priority spending on administrative and support functions.

Likewise, the committee recognizes that

quality of life is inextricably tied to force

readiness. This is particularly true in

today’s force projection environment characterized by its high pace of operations

and the stress it places on both individuals and families. Thus, the committee took

a five-part approach to maintaining a decent quality of life for service members and

their families: providing fair compensation;

improving the military health care system;

maintaining the value of retirement benefits;

supporting key morale, welfare and recreation programs; and ensuring that military

personnel and their families live and work

in the best possible facilities.

Finally, the committee remains frustrated

with its limited ability to manage risk within

the modernization accounts. The

President’s fiscal year 1999 procurement

budget request of $48.7 billion is over $11

billion short of the requirement set by the

Joint Chiefs. The research and development request – the key not only to robust

modernization but to innovation in the next

century – falls even shorter of the requirement to prepare for an uncertain future.

Over the next five years, defense spending

for research and development accounts are

projected to fall by at least 14 percent.

Thus, this year’s bill reflects an effort to

protect critical modernization projects in an

effort to limit long-term risk.

Unfortunately, the committee’s best efforts to manage risk will entail improvements at the margin only. The magnitude of the shortfalls is so great that

they cannot be eliminated by a wiser

allocation of resources alone. Nor can

any foreseeable defense reform, including new rounds of base closures proposed by the Administration, provide

sufficient savings to reapply towards

critical shortfalls in a timely manner. In

short, the committee attempted to ensure, within the severe constraints of a

declining defense budget, the most effective U.S. military force possible. By

reprioritizing the Administration’s budget request, the committee has provided DOD with additional tools and

resources necessary to recruit and retain the best people, train them to the

highest standard, equip them with the

most advanced military technology and

provide them with a standard of life

more commensurate with that of the

American citizens they are sworn to

protect. Having done so, the committee nonetheless finds itself deeply

troubled that the world’s sole superpower is running a “moderate to high”

risk when it comes to its ability to promote and protect vital national security interests.

The National Security Report is archived on the world wide web site of the House National Security Committee at: http://www.house.gov/nsc/.

Additional background information may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372) or David Trachtenberg (x60532) on the committee staff.

Unfortunately, the de facto motto of the

U.S. military – “doing more with less” – has

become today’s reality. American soldiers,

sailors, airmen and Marines are in fact doing

much more than protecting the nation’s interests and preparing to fight the nation’s

wars. Indeed, the burdens of peacekeeping, peacemaking and the variety of other

operations other than war that increasingly

occupy our military’s time are preventing

them from properly and adequately training.

This is the unspoken reality underlying

the QDR’s recognition of smaller-scale contingencies; “the demand for [smaller-scale

contingency] operations is expected to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years.” Yet

even while acknowledging the burdens imposed by multiple, concurrent peacekeeping operations, the QDR underestimates the

high political profile, import and even permanence they assume over time. The QDR’s

assertion that “U.S. forces must also be able

to withdraw from [such] operations, reconstitute, and then deploy to a major theater

war in accordance with required timelines”

is an unrealistic, even naïve, expectation.

A textbook example of the complexities of

meeting both warfighting requirements and

peacekeeping missions was clearly illustrated several weeks ago when the Army

announced that the 1st Cavalry Division

would be deployed from Fort Hood, Texas,

to Bosnia as the U.S. follow-on force. The

1

st Cavalry Division is the most modern,

best equipped and best trained heavy division in the entire Army, and would be

among the first two divisions to deploy in

the event of a major theater war. Yet the

debilitating demand of constantly rotating

forces to Bosnia – resulting from the

President’s commitment to an increasingly

open-ended mission in the Balkans — is

compelling the Army to beat its sharpest

sword into a plowshare. The Army has yet

to explain how it will meet its requirement

to rapidly deploy heavy forces in the event

of a major theater war while the 1st Cavalry

Division is in Bosnia. What is true of the

Army applies equally to the other services:

to Air Force fighter squadrons employed

in no-fly zones, to Navy aircraft carriers

transferred from the Pacific, where they

would support a Korea contingency, to the

Persian Gulf, to the Marine Corps which, in

the recent testimony of Commandant Gen.

Charles Krulak is “not a two [major theater

war] force.”

In sum, the pervasive mismatch between

strategic objectives and defense resources

that undermines the QDR’s vision of shaping the international environment and preparing for an uncertain future most seriously

affects the ability of the U.S. military to respond to current crises. This is a potentially

catastrophic mismatch, and one with very real

consequences, as foretold in the QDR: shortfalls in warfighting capacity “risk undermining both deterrence and the credibility of U.S.

security commitments in key regions of the

world. This, in turn, could cause allies and

friends to adopt more divergent defense policies and postures, thereby weakening the

web of alliances and coalitions on which we

rely to protect our interests abroad.” Indeed,

in Europe, in the Gulf, and in East Asia, the

ability of America to defend its interests by

responding to multiple crises remains an open

question.