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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, :

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL TRUST, and :

BARNETT INTERNATIONAL, :

:

Plaintiffs and : CIVIL ACTION

Counterclaim Defendants, :

: No. 04-cv-3798

v. :

:

OSWALDO FELICIANO and INNOVATIVE :

MEDIA MACHINE, INC., :

:

Defendants and :

Counterclaim Plaintiffs. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joyner, J. December 4, 2008

Presently before the Court are Counterclaim Plaintiff’s

Motion to Mold Judgment to Include Prejudgment Interest (Doc. No.

175), Counterclaim Defendant’s Response (Doc. No. 178), and

Counterclaim Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. No. 183). For the reasons

set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion and awards 

prejudgment interest on Counterclaim Plaintiff’s award of back

pay damages and breach of contract damages.

Background

In August of 2004, Parexel brought suit against former

employee Oswaldo Feliciano and Innovative Media Machine, Inc.

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 1 of 10
 Barnett became a division of Parexel International Corporation 1

during the course of Feliciano’s employment.

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(“IMM”) for tortious interference with contract relations,

commercial disparagement, misappropriation of confidential or

proprietary information, breach of contract and defamation. 

Feliciano, who worked as a Managing Systems Architect for

Barnett, brought counter-claims alleging that he was terminated 1

for refusing to engage in illegal activity in violation of

Pennsylvania public policy when requested to do so by his

supervisor and in retaliation, in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley

Act of 2002 (“SOX”), for reporting his supervisor’s allegedly

illegal activities. Specifically, Feliciano claimed that Ann

Carraher, Vice President of Barnett Educational Systems,

wrongfully obtained the membership records of various private

organizations and authorized the incorporation of these records

into a Parexel marketing database. Between July of 2003 and

October of 2003, Feliciano made complaints regarding the

allegedly unlawful use of the database to various Barnett

employees, including Ms. Carraher herself and Lisa Roth, head of

Human Resources. Upon Ms. Roth’s request, Lorrie Ferraro, Human

Resources Director at Parexel, commenced an investigation of the

matter which resulted in Ms. Carraher’s termination in April of

2004. On June 21, 2004, Feliciano himself was terminated. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 2 of 10
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Counterclaim Defendants (“Defendants”) contended that Feliciano

was terminated because he had an undisclosed ownership interest

in an outside company, in violation of the terms of his

employment agreement. The company in question, IMM, provided

services to Parexel during the course of Feliciano’s employment,

and it was alleged that Feliciano was involved in approving

payments to IMM, but never disclosed his conflict of interest.

In an Order dated June 30th, 2008, this Court granted

summary judgment in favor of Counterclaim Plaintiff (“Plaintiff”)

on Defendants’ claims of tortious interference, commercial

disparagement, breach of contract and misappropriation of

proprietary information. A trial commenced on the remaining

claims on September 9, 2008. At the conclusion of trial, the

jury found that Parexel had retaliated against Feliciano in

violation of SOX and had terminated Feliciano’s employment

because he refused to engage in illegal conduct in violation of

Pennsylvania public policy. The jury awarded Feliciano $44,000

in back pay on the wrongful termination and retaliation claims as

well as $50,000 in compensatory damages and $1.7 million in

punitive damages on the wrongful termination claim. The jury

also awarded IMM $45,000 for its breach of contract claim. 

At the conclusion of trial, we denied Defendants motion for

judgment as a matter of law on the SOX claim. After trial, we

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 3 of 10
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also denied Defendants renewed motion for judgment as a matter of

law or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 50(b) and motion for remittitur of the punitive damages

award or, in the alternative, for a new trial on the wrongful

termination claim. Plaintiff now moves to mold the judgment to 

include prejudgment interest on the back pay and breach of

contract damages awards. 

Discussion

A. Back Pay

An employee who prevails in a retaliation claim pursuant to

SOX is entitled “to all relief necessary to make the employee

whole,” including “back pay, with interest.” 18 U.S.C. §

1514A(c). Defendants argue first that Plaintiff is not entitled

to prejudgment interest pursuant to SOX because the back pay

award was made on the wrongful termination claim. Defendants

then argue that Plaintiff is not entitled to prejudgment interest

on the back pay award because the jury did not specify a time

period for which the back pay was awarded. 

Upon review of the verdict sheet and the jury instructions,

it is clear that the back pay award was for both the SOX claim

and the wrongful termination claim. Although question three on

the verdict slip only refers to the wrongful termination claim,

the Court explained in its instructions to the jury that the back

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 4 of 10
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pay applied “to both Claim Number 1 and Claim Number 2" but that

the verdict slip included only one back pay because Plaintiff was

not entitled to double back pay. N.T., Sept. 15, 2008, at 141. 

The jury then found Defendants guilty of both retaliation under

SOX and unlawful termination in violation of Pennsylvania public

policy. Thus, the back pay award was for both the SOX claim and

the unlawful termination and Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment

interest. 

To determine the applicable amount of prejudgment interest,

the Third Circuit has instructed in wrongful termination cases

under Title VII that the district court may use the rate

contained in the federal post-judgment interest rate statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1961(a), for guidance to determine the applicable

interest rate. Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation, Co., 785

F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986). In fact, many courts have employed

this approach in calculating prejudgment interest. See, e.g.,

Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 2007 WL 2753171 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2007);

O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (E.D.

Pa. 2000); Shovlin, 1997 WL 102523, at *2. Among other reasons,

this approach is desirable because it is easy to determine the

rate by using the rate charts in the federal statute, and the

Treasury bill (“T-bill”) rates found in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 are a

“suitable approximation of the available return for a typical

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 5 of 10
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risk-free investment” during the back pay period. O’Neill, 108

F. Supp. 2d at 445 (quoting Davis v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co., 964

F. Supp. 560, 576 (D.N.J. 1997)). The post-judgment interest

rate statute provides for the calculation as follows:

Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the

entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to weekly 1-year

constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for

the calendar week preceding.

28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). 

The Court finds that this calculation is also appropriate

under the present circumstances because here, as in Title VII

cases, awarding prejudgment interest “serves to compensate a

plaintiff for the loss of the use of money that the plaintiff

otherwise would have earned had he not been unjustly discharged.” 

Booker v. Taylor Milk Co., 64 F.3d 860, 868 (3d Cir. 1995). 

Plaintiff calculated the prejudgment interest due on the

back pay award in the above method and by dividing the amount of

the back pay award by the amount of time between Plaitiff’s

termination and the judgment in his favor. Defendant did not

challenge the method of the calculation, but rather asserted that

Plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the

jury did not specify a time period for which back pay was

awarded. The Court, however, instructed the jury that “[b]ack

pay is an amount that reasonably compensates the plaintiff for

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 6 of 10
Plaintiff earned $98,000 a year at Parexel. N.T., Sept. 9, 2008, at 2

260.

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Period Back-Pay 1 Year T-Bill Interest

6/21/04-6/20/05 $44,000 3.42% $1505

6/21/05-6/20/06 $44,000 5.23% $2301

6/21/06-6/20/07 $44,000 4.97% $2187

6/21/07-6/20/08 $44,000 2.49% $1096

6/21/08-9/15/08 $44,000 1.66% $172

Total $7261

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any lost income and benefits from the date of his termination of

his employment until he found new employment earning at least

what he earned while working at Parexel.” N.T., Sept. 15, 2008,

at 141. Plaintiff proffered uncontradicted testimony that he was

terminated by Defendants on June 21, 2004. Defendants’ cross

examination of Plaintiff brought to light that Plaintiff began

earning income through a company called SEI in November of 2004

in the amount of $136,000 a year. See N.T., Sept. 9, 2008, at

260. Thus, the appropriate time period for which the jury 2

awarded back pay was June 21, 2004 until October 31, 2004 and the

amount of interest should be calculated as if the pay would have

been received during that time period. The proper amount of

prejudgment interest on the back pay award is, therefore, $7261.3

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 7 of 10
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B. Breach of Contract 

Under Pennsylvania law, prejudgment interest is awardable as

a legal right in contract cases. Fernandez v. Levin, 548 A.2d

1191, 1193 (Pa. 1988); Kaiser v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 741 A.2d

748, 755 (Pa. Super. 1999). “That right to interest begins at

the time payment is withheld after it has been the duty of the

debtor to make such payment.” Fernandez, 548 A.2d at 1193. The

legal rate of interest is six percent (6%) per year, as provided

by statute. See Fiat Motors of N. Am. v. Mellon Bank, 827 F.2d

924, 931 (3d Cir. 1987); Sec. Pac. Int’l Bank v. Nat’l Bank of W.

Pa., 772 F. Supp. 874, 878 (W.D. Pa. 1991); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. §

202 (2008). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s calculation of prejudgment

interest on the breach of contract award is incorrect. They

argue that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the

date of filing the complaint and not from the date of demand. As

stated above, however, under Pennsylvania law, prejudgment

interest is calculated from the date on which payment became due. 

See Fernandez, 548 A.2d at 1193. Under the present

circumstances, payment became due in June, 2004, when Plaintiff

demanded payment of the unpaid invoices.

Defendants also argue that the jury must have included

interest in its award because it awarded Plaintiff $45,000

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 8 of 10
 This amount represents $44,000 at 6% for 51 months (4.25 years), less 4

the $1,000 awarded by the jury in excess of the amount Feliciano testified was

owed to IMM. 

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whereas Plaintiff’s complaint only claimed he was due $42,609

plus interest. Feliciano testified at trial, however, that

Parexel owed IMM $44,000 and the jury was within its right to

credit this testimony. See N.T., Sept. 9, 2008, at 240. 

Nonetheless, Defendants’ argument is persuasive to the extent

that the jury’s award exceeded $44,000. The Court, therefore,

finds for the Plaintiff to the extent that he is owed prejudgment

interest on the breach of contract claim, but concludes that the

proper amount due is $10,220.4

Conclusion

In sum, we find that Plaintiff is entitled to $7261 in

prejudgment interest on the back pay award and $10,220 in

prejudgment interest on the breach of contract award. 

An order follows.

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 9 of 10
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, :

PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL TRUST, and :

BARNETT INTERNATIONAL, :

:

Plaintiffs and : CIVIL ACTION

Counterclaim Defendants, :

: No. 04-cv-3798

v. :

:

OSWALDO FELICIANO and INNOVATIVE :

MEDIA MACHINE, INC., :

:

Defendants and :

Counterclaim Plaintiffs. :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 4th day of December, 2008, upon

consideration of Counterclaim Plaintiff’s Motion to Mold Judgment

to Include Prejudgment Interest (Doc. No. 175), and responses

thereto (Doc. Nos. 178, 183), for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is

GRANTED and Counterclaim Plaintiff is awarded a total of

$17,481.00 in prejudgment interest on the back pay damages award

and the breach of contract damages award.

BY THE COURT:

s/J. Curtis Joyner 

J. CURTIS JOYNER, J. 

Case 2:04-cv-03798-JCJ Document 203 Filed 12/08/08 Page 10 of 10