UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

CAROLINE ADAMS,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

AT-1221-18-0080-W-1

DATE: August 1, 2023

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Caroline Adams, Alexandria, Virginia, pro se.

Patricia Reddy-Parkinson, Esquire, Portsmouth, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which 

dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following 

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision 

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, 

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material 

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to

find that the appellant exhausted her administrative remedy with the Office of 

Special Counsel (OSC) but failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a 

protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity that was a contributing 

factor to a personnel action, we AFFIRM the initial decision. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 At the time relevant to this appeal, the appellant was employed by the 

agency as a Human Resources Officer. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 1. On

November 2, 2017, she filed an IRA appeal with the Board, claiming that she was 

suspended for 7 days in November of 2015, not given a promotion in February of 

2016, and experienced a hostile work environment and harassment because she 

reported to her congressman that the agency performed illegal actions to pass an 

Office of Personnel Management (OPM) delegated examination authority

inspection and that it engaged in illegal hiring practices. Id. at 5, 7. The 

administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order informing the appellant of what 

she was required to prove to establish Board jurisdiction over her claim. IAF, 

Tab 3. The appellant responded, arguing that she was unable to retain counsel to 

assist in presenting evidence due to the impending holidays. IAF, Tab 6 at 4. 
3

She also indicated that she had filed a complaint with OSC, but that it terminated 

its investigation. Id. 

¶3 On December 1, 2017, the administrative judge issued an initial decision, 

wherein she considered OSC’s August 28, 2017 close-out letter—the only 

evidence submitted below by the appellant regarding exhaustion—but ultimately 

found that the appellant failed to prove that she exhausted her administrative 

remedy with OSC. IAF, Tab 8, Initial Decision (ID) at 3-4. Accordingly, she 

dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. ID at 4. 

¶4 The appellant has filed a petition for review arguing that she did not receive 

a hearing and submitting, for the first time, OSC’s August 15, 2017 preliminary 

determination letter. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 6-10. The

agency responded to the appellant’s petition for review, and she filed a reply. 

PFR File, Tabs 3-4.2

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶5 The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant proves by 

preponderant evidence that she exhausted her administrative remedies before 

OSC and makes nonfrivolous allegations that (1) she made a protected disclosure 

described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described 

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or 

protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail 

to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Edwards v.

Department of Labor, 2022 MSPB 9, ¶ 8, aff’d, No. 2022-1967, 2023 WL 

 

2 With the appellant’s reply, she includes a copy of an OSC complaint. PFR File, Tab 4

at 32-59. This complaint is dated June 25, 2012, and references case number MA-12-

3534, and therefore, appears to predate all the allegations in the instant appeal. All the 

remaining OSC correspondence submitted by the appellant references case number 

MA-17-2121. IAF, Tab 1 at 10-15; PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-10, Tab 4 at 6-10. Thus, it is 

unclear whether the appellant is asserting that the 2012 OSC complaint corresponds 

with her current claims before the Board. Regardless, as further explained below, we 

otherwise conclude that the appellant exhausted her administrative remedy with OSC. 
4

4398002 (Fed. Cir. July 7, 2023); Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 

123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016); see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221(e)(1). 

The appellant proved by preponderant evidence that she exhausted her 

administrative remedy with OSC. 

¶6 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant 

must only show that she provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an 

investigation into her allegations of whistleblowing reprisal. Chambers v.

Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. Generally, exhaustion 

can be demonstrated through the appellant’s OSC complaint, evidence the 

original complaint was amended (including but not limited to OSC’s 

determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended 

allegations), and the appellant’s written responses to OSC. Mason v. Department 

of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8 (2011). Alternatively, exhaustion 

may be proven through other sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or 

declaration attesting that the appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts 

in her appeal. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.

¶7 In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that, apart from the 

August 28, 2017 close-out letter, there was “no additional information indicating 

that the appellant gave sufficient information to OSC to conduct an investigation” 

into her broad allegations. ID at 4. Regardless of whether we agree with this 

finding, on review, the appellant supplements her submissions regarding the 

exhaustion requirement. With her petition for review, she submits, for the first 

time, OSC’s August 15, 2017 preliminary determination letter.

3

 PFR File, Tab 4 

 

3 Generally, the Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time on review 

absent a showing that the documents and the information contained in the documents 

were unavailable before the record closed despite due diligence and the evidence is of 

sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. 

Cleaton v. Department of Justice, 122 M.S.P.R. 296, ¶ 7 (2015), aff’d, 839 F.3d 1126

(Fed. Cir. 2016). However, because the appellant’s evidence concerns the question of 
5

at 6-10. In that letter, OSC references the appellant’s allegations that she 

reported alleged hiring and recruitment violations to a U.S. Senator and a hostile

work environment to a U.S. House of Representatives staffer on October 22, 

2015. PFR File, Tab 4 at 6. These allegations are similar to her allegations 

before the Board that she was subjected to reprisal for disclosing to a 

congressman that the agency committed “illegal actions” to pass an OPM

delegated examination authority inspection and that it engaged in illegal hiring 

practices. IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Therefore, we conclude that the appellant provided 

OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into her claims of 

whistleblower reprisal. See Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8¶ 10. Accordingly, we 

modify the initial decision to find that the appellant proved that she exhausted her 

administrative remedy with OSC. See id. 

The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure 

or engaged in a protected activity that was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action. 

¶8 Assuming, without finding, that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that 

she made a protected disclosure or engaged in a protected activity, 4we 

 

jurisdiction, and jurisdiction is always before the Board, we consider it here. See Lovoy 

v. Department of Health and Human Services, 94 M.S.P.R. 571, ¶ 30 (2003).

4

The appellant’s allegations that she disclosed to Congress that the agency performed

illegal actions to pass an OPM inspection and engaged in illegal hiring practices do not

contain sufficient detail to determine whether she is alleging that an agency official

engaged in any of the wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, Tab 1 at 5. 

Notably, she does not allege any specific actions that were taken, who allegedly took

those actions, or why she believes those actions to be illegal. Id. Rather, her bare

assertions amount to the legal conclusion that unknown agency officials engaged in

undefined illegal acts, and such allegations are insufficient to meet the nonfrivolous

allegation standard. See Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army, 101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13

(2006); see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(s) (explaining that a nonfrivolous allegation must be

“more than conclusory”). Nonetheless, on December 20, 2019, Congress passed the

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2020, which amended 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8) to add subsection (C), which explicitly covers disclosures to Congress

when such disclosures are otherwise covered under subsection (B). See Pub. L. 116-92,

§ 5721, 133 Stat. 1198, 2175 (2019). Here, the appellant alleges that she made her
6

nonetheless find that she failed to nonfrivolously allege that such a disclosure or 

activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action. One way to establish the 

contributing factor criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under which an 

employee may nonfrivolously allege that the official taking the personnel action 

knew of the disclosure or activity, and that the personnel action occurred within a 

period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure or 

activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Chambers, 2022 MSPB 

8, ¶ 15; Salerno, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 13. 

¶9 Here, the appellant has not alleged that any agency official responsible for,

or who had influence over, her 7-day suspension or the decision not to promote 

her had any knowledge of her disclosure to Congress. 5 IAF, Tabs 1, 6; PFR File, 

Tabs 1, 4. Thus, she has failed to meet the knowledge prong of the 

knowledge/timing test and has, therefore, failed to nonfrivolously allege the 

contributing factor element under that test.

6

 However, the knowledge/timing test

 

disclosure to Congress in October of 2015, PFR File, Tab 4 at 6, which is 5 years before

the passage of the NDAA of 2020. We need not determine whether this provision is

retroactive, and if so, whether the appellant's alleged disclosure is covered under it

because, as explained below, we otherwise find that she failed to nonfrivolously allege

that any disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in a personnel action.

5 A failure to promote and a 7-day suspension qualify as personnel actions under 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii). The appellant’s vague allegation that she was 

harassed and subjected to a hostile work environment is not sufficiently specific, even 

if construed liberally, to constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of a personnel action under 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii). See Skarada v Department of Veterans Affairs, 

2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16 (explaining when an allegation of a hostile work environment 

constitutes an allegation of a personnel action). 

6 Additionally, the appellant does not specifically allege in her pleadings when she 

made her disclosure to Congress; however, communication from OSC shows that the

appellant alleged that her disclosures to Congress occurred on or around October 22,

2015, PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. Regarding her alleged 7-day suspension, the agency 

proposed that action on October 16, 2015. IAF, Tab 1 at 7. The Board has found that a 

disclosure occurring after the personnel action at issue could not have been a 

contributing factor in that action. See Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 27. Thus, the 

appellant’s disclosure to Congress could not have been a contributing factor in the 

7-day suspension. See id. 
7

is not the only way for an appellant to satisfy the contributing factor element. 

Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 14 (2012). Other

evidence relevant to that inquiry is evidence pertaining to the strength or 

weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the personnel action, whether the 

whistleblowing was personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and 

whether these individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. 

Id., ¶ 15. 

¶10 Here, although the nature of the appellant’s alleged disclosure could 

implicate the human resources office in which she is employed, her allegations 

are brief and vague, and do not offer any details regarding any specific agency 

official who was involved in the alleged wrongdoing that she disclosed. IAF,

Tabs 1, 6; PFR File, Tabs 1, 4. Thus, she has not nonfrivolously alleged that her 

whistleblowing was personally directed at an agency official responsible for the

personnel actions at issue here. Further, she makes no allegations that any agency 

official responsible for the 7-day suspension or denial of her promotion had a 

desire or motive to retaliate against her. IAF, Tabs 1, 6; PFR File, Tabs 1, 4. 

Finally, although the appellant challenges the agency’s reason for suspending her 

for 7 days, that challenge is summary in nature and asserts only that the agency’s 

reason for the suspension was “false.” IAF, Tab 1 at 5. Assessing these factors 

on balance, we find that the appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that her 

disclosure to Congress was a contributing factor in the 7-day suspension or the 

denial of a promotion. 

¶11 Based on the foregoing, we modify the initial decision to find that the 

appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a prot ected disclosure or 

engaged in a protected activity that was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action. Because we ultimately agree with the administrative judge that the 

appellant failed to establish jurisdiction over her claims, we deny the appellant’s 

petition for review and affirm the initial decision as modified. 
8

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS7

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum.

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

 

7

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
9

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative

receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on 
10

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be 

entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any 

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 
11

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.8 The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

 

8

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
12

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

 

 

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board