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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

|

CRAIG MARTEN | CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff, |

| NO. 03-6734

vs. |

|

HAROLD GODWIN, ET AL. |

Defendant. |

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Tucker, J. December _____, 2005

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27). For

the reasons set forth below, upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the entire record, and

the applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Craig Marten (“Marten”), a resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

(“Commonwealth”), brings this action for defamation and First and Fourteenth Amendment

constitutional violations pursuant to 42. U.S.C. § 1983. Defendant Harold Godwin (“Godwin”)

is a Kansas resident and a professor at the University of Kansas School of Pharmacy. Defendant

James Kleoppel (“Kleoppel”) is a Missouri resident and clinical instructor in the University of

Kansas School of Pharmacy. Defendant Ronald Ragan (“Ragan”) is a Kansas resident and the

director of the non-traditional pharmacy program at the University of Kansas. Defendant

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University of Kansas (the “University”) is a major university operated by the State of Kansas

Board of Regents offering a Non-Traditional Pharm.D (“NTPD”) program through its School of

Pharmacy. 

In the spring of 2001, Plaintiff, a licensed pharmacist, applied to the University for

admission into the NTPD program. Plaintiff became aware of the program through the

University’s website. The NTPD program provides online courses accessed through the Internet

allowing students to complete the entire NTPD program in their respective “home region”

without ever having to travel to the University. 

 In August 2001, Plaintiff was accepted into the University’s NTPD program. During the

Spring of 2002, after taking and passing two courses, Marten presented his concerns about the

NTPD program to Defendant Ragan, the program director. On or about May 9, 2002, Plaintiff

allegedly contacted the Dean of the University to complain about Defendant Ragan's

unresponsiveness. Subsequently, Plaintiff alleges that Ragan threatened to have Plaintiff

expelled from the NTPD program. In response, Plaintiff reported Defendant Ragan's actions to

the University Ombudsman and to the Better Business Bureau. Plaintiff claims that, in

retaliation, Defendants Godwin and Kleoppel, conspired to accuse him of plagiarism. 

On December 20, 2002, Plaintiff was expelled from the NTPD program for alleged

plagiarism. Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ conduct deprived him of his First and Fourteenth

Amendment constitutional rights when Defendants, in retaliation for Plaintiff's complaints,

falsely accused of him of plagiarism and expelled him from the University. Plaintiff further

contends that Defendants’ statements regarding Plaintiffs alleged academic misconduct were

false, defamatory, and malicious.

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Plaintiff seeks reinstatement into the University’s NTPD program, compensatory and

punitive damages, and other relief as the Court deems just and proper. Plaintiff also demands

judgment in his favor and against Defendants, jointly and severally, in an amount in excess of

$150,000, together with interest and cost of suit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under

governing law. Id.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing

the district court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular

issue at trial, the movant’s initial Celotex burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the

district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, “the adverse party’s

response, by affidavits or otherwise, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Id. That is, summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to

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1 Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute states: “personal jurisdiction shall extend to all

persons...to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the U.S. and may be based on the

most minimum contact with this Commonwealth...” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322 (b). Due to

Pennsylvania’s broad long-arm statute, a Court can have jurisdiction over defendants based on

very minimal contacts.

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rebut by making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322. “[I]f the opponent [of summary judgment] has exceeded the ‘mere scintilla’ [of

evidence] threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit

the movant’s version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant’s

evidence far outweighs that of its opponent.” Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America,

Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). The court must view the evidence presented in the

light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a federal district court to

exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants like Godwin, Ragan, Kloeppel and the

University to the “extent permissible under the law of the state where the district court sits.” 

Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat’l Assoc. V. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992); accord

North Penn Gas v. Corning Natural Gas, 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied ,

498 U.S. 847 (1990). Under the Commonwealth’s long-arm statutes,1 there are two potential

bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: general jurisdiction

and specific jurisdiction. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322 (b). Thus, the Commonwealth’s

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2 Once a defense challenging personal jurisdiction has been raised, the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence, by way of affidavits and otherwise, that

the defendant did have sufficient forum contacts for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. 

Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1217; Cateret Savings Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146 (3d. Cir.),

cert denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that either

(1) the particular cause of action sued upon arose from the defendant’s activities in the forum

state (“specific jurisdiction”), or (2) that the defendant has “continuous and systematic” contact

with the forum state (“general jurisdiction”). Helicopeteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 404, 414 n. 9 (1984); Gehling v. St. Georges’s School of Medicine Ltd., 773 F.2d

539, 541 (3d Cir. 1985).

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long-arm statutes are “coextensive with the due process clause of the United States Constitution,”

Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984), and

ultimately permits jurisdiction so long as the nonresident has sufficient minimum contacts with

the Commonwealth and the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident

comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Dollar Savings Bank v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d

208, 213 (3d Cir. 1984). 

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants assert the Court lacks personal

jurisdiction in this case because none of the nonresident Defendants enjoys continuous and

substantial affiliations with the Commonwealth or has purposefully availed him or itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the Commonwealth.2

In order to have proper personal jurisdiction over nonresidential defendants who

committed an intentional tort outside the forum, the Third Circuit requires satisfaction of a three

prong test. IMO Indus., Inc. v. Keikert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 256 (3d Cir. 1998). First, the

defendant must have committed an intentional tort. Id. Second, the plaintiff must have felt the

brunt of the harm caused by that tort in the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal

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point of the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the tort. Id. Third, the defendant must

have expressly aimed his tortious conduct at the forum such that the forum can be said to be the

focal point of the tortious activity. Id. (applying Pennsylvania law).

Defendants argue that the plagiarism related to work submitted to the NTPD in Kansas,

Plaintiff’s work product was evaluated in Kansas, the assessment of Plaintiff’s alleged plagiarism

occurred in Kansas, Plaintiff’s complaint to the Better Business Bureau was made to the

Northeast Bureau in Kansas and the expulsion from the University’s NTPD program occurred in

Kansas. Defendants assert that for these reasons, Plaintiff cannot show that the focal point of the

alleged harm was in the Commonwealth nor that the tortious harm was aimed at the

Commonwealth. 

Plaintiff claims that each of the three criteria is satisfied. Plaintiff claims satisfaction of

the first prong because the Defendants do not contest the intentional tort alleged in Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint. (Plf. Ans. Def. Mot. Summ. J. 6) Plaintiff asserts satisfaction of the

second criteria because “the place where Plaintiff took the courses offered in the NTPD program

and the place where he suffered his injuries occurred entirely within this judicial jurisdiction.” 

Id. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, aware of the fact that Plaintiff was enrolled in the

NTPD program and taking his course load over the internet through the University’s

“correspondence” program from Pennsylvania, aimed their tortious conduct at him in

Pennsylvania. Id.

This Court does not agree. Plaintiff relies on bare, unsubstantiated allegations without

proffering any evidence as required by Pennsylvania law. Moreover, Plaintiff improperly relies

on the Court’s prior determination on the pleadings when the present determination requires

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evidence. In granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court does not reach the

merits regarding whether it has jurisdiction in this case over nonresident Defendant because

Plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of proof under the law. Furthermore, the Court does not

reach the merits of the case.

CONCLUSION

After careful review of the record, for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. An appropriate Order follows.

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