*Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 96-20420

Summary Calendar

 

SHERRILYN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

 

USDC No. H-95-4797

September 18, 1996

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sherrilyn Williams appeals the district court's order

dismissing with prejudice her claims against her former employer,

Travelers Insurance Company. We find no error and affirm.

I

Williams initially filed this suit in Texas state court and

alleged three causes of action under Texas law: wrongful
2

termination in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation

claim, termination based on gender discrimination, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Invoking diversity jurisdiction,

Travelers removed the matter to federal district court. Williams

did not make a formal motion for a remand to state court and did

not challenge the federal court's authority to hear a matter

arising under a state workers' compensation statute until more than

three months after removal.

In connection with two pre-trial conferences, the court

requested the parties to submit documents to support their factual

assertions. Williams claimed in her original petition that her

personnel file "did not contain any complaints or incidents which

would necessitate disciplinary action or the termination of her

employment." The court discovered, however, that Williams's file

contained a series of memoranda in which Travelers notified

Williams that her performance was inadequate. More than five

months before termination—and more than three months before the

injury at the heart of Williams's workers' compensation

claim—Travelers issued a "final warning," which stated that

Williams would be fired if she continued to fall below standards in

specific areas.

Based on the contents of Williams's personnel file, the court

dismissed the suit with prejudice. The court explained in its

brief opinion that Williams's claims had been "disproved
3

absolutely" and that poor performance, rather than Williams's

workers' compensation claim, was the basis of her termination.

II

As a preliminary matter, Williams argues that federal courts

lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims that arise under state

workers’ compensation laws. It is true that “[a] civil action in

any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of

such State may not be removed to any district court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(c) (1994). This statute, however,

speaks simply to the parties’ procedural rights rather than to the

jurisdictional reach of the federal courts. St. Paul Ins. Co. v.

Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1994); Williams v. AC Spark

Plugs, 985 F.2d 783, 786-88 (5th Cir. 1993). Perhaps the plaintiff

could have taken advantage of her procedural right to a remand to

the Texas state court system if she had moved for a remand within

thirty days of Travelers’s notice of removal. See 28 U.S.C.A. §

1447(c) (1994). But because she failed to act within the thirtyday period, she waived her opportunity to have a state court hear

her complaint. The federal district court had diversity

jurisdiction and did not overstep its authority in ruling on

Williams’s lawsuit.

Williams further contends that the dismissal violated Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c), which requires summary judgment motions to be served
4

at least ten days before a hearing. In this case, the court

entered its dismissal three days after its March 19 request for

employment documents. Although the court’s order did not specify

whether Williams had failed to state or claim or had instead failed

to present adequate summary judgment evidence, we view the

dismissal as the result of a failure in the pleadings under Rule

12(b)(6). Williams’s complaint stated that “her personnel record

did not contain any complaints or incidents which would necessitate

disciplinary action or the termination of her employment.” The

most casual reading of the personnel file demonstrates that this

assertion is false. Williams has not contested the authenticity of

the documents furnished by Travelers. Instead, she characterizes

the documents as summary judgment evidence to which she had

inadequate opportunity to respond. But her complaint itself

introduces the file as the basis of her suit, and a court can

properly consider such documents on a motion to dismiss, even when

the opposing party actually submits them to the court. See Pension

Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consolidated Indus., 998 F.2d 1192,

1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (expressing concern that “a plaintiff with a

legally deficient claim could survive a motion to dismiss simply by

failing to attach a dispositive document on which it relied”),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994); Lovelace v. Software Spectrum,

Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Kramer v.

Time Warner, Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991)) (allowing a

court to inspect SEC documents outside of the pleadings in ruling
5

on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Branch v.

Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir.) (“[D]ocuments whose contents

are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party

questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading,

may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss.”), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2704 (1994). The personnel

records reveal that Williams cannot possibly prevail on her theory

that her workers’ compensation claim caused Travelers to fire her.

The district court properly reached the conclusion that Williams’s

complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

granted.

Finally, Williams asserts that the court failed to address her

claims for gender discrimination and intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The court’s order and opinion made no specific

reference to these claims. We are satisfied, however, that the

court committed no error in dismissing them. In light of the

personnel record, Williams has alleged no facts that suggest

outrageous conduct, severe emotional distress, or gender as a

causal element in Travelers’s decision to terminate her employment.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.