### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE Februar y 11, 2 003 Session
R. JACKSON ROSE v. RICK WELCH
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Claiborne County No. 8415 James B. Scott, Judge, by Interchange

FILED MARCH 11, 2003

No. E2002-02042-COA-R3-CV

Attorney R. Ja ckson Ros e (“Plaintiff”) was hired by Rick Welch (“Defendant’) to defend him on drug related criminal charges. The parties agreed to a flat fee of $25,000 for this legal representation. A retainer of $5,000 was paid up-front. Defe ndant signed a promissory note for the remaining $20,000. Defendant

claims he lost conf idence in Plaintiff

’s ability to adequa tely represent him after Defendant

paid a total of $6,850 in attorney fees. Defendant discharged Plaintiff a nd obtained new counsel. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract. Defe

ndant filed a counterclaim for lega l malpractice and also claimed as a defense, inter alia , that Plaintiff’s representation fell below the professional standardof care. The case was trie d to a jury. After all of the proof was presented, the Trial Court directed a verdict for Plain

tiff because Defend ant had of

fered n o expert pr

oof to supp ort his counter claim or his defense to the breach of contract claim. We hold expert proof was not nec essary in order f or Defe ndant toprove he lost confidence in Plaintiff and discharged him with cause for that
reason. We, there

fore, r everse the entry of the

directed verdict

as to that issue only and rema nd the
case for trial on the sole issue of termination for cause because of De fendant’s “loss of confidence.” We affirm all other aspects of the Trial Court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appe al as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cir

cuit Court Affir

med in P art and Re

versed in P

art; Case Remanded.

D. M ICHAEL S WINEY , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H OUSTON M. G ODDARD , P.J., and H ERSCHEL P. F RANKS , J., joined.

Johnny V. Dunaway , LaFollette, Tennessee, for the Appellant Rick Welch.

Mark D. Edmonds, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the A ppellee R. Jackson Rose.1 Th e po lice co nfiscated $8,4 65 in cash d uring the raid. D efend ant even tually entered into a co mpro mise

agreement wit

h th e Sta te a nd it

was a greed that

one- half of the se f unds, or $4, 232.50, woul d be returne d to D efend ant.
-2- OPINION Background

This la ws ui t i nv ol ve s a cl ai m f or un pa id at to rn ey’ s fees. Af ter Defendant was arrested on signif icant dr ug rela ted offe nses and c

riminal ch arges were pending in the Claiborne County Criminal Court, Defendant signed a promissory note (“Note ”) in the amount of $20,000 for Plaintiff to represent

him in the criminal action. The Note provided for a fifteen perc ent attorney’ s fee in the event of default. When Defendant alleg edly defa ulted, Plaintiff brought suit on the Note claiming $18,150 still was owed. Plaintiff also sought the additional fifteen percent for attorne y’s fees.

Defendant filed an answer to the complaint deny ing he owed

Pl ainti ff anythi ng. Defendant

asserted several defenses to the bre ach of contract claim, i ncluding accord and satisfaction, failure of consideration, and pay ment in full for services pe rformed. Defend ant also fil ed a cou nt erc lai m. In this counterclaim, Defendant acknowledg ed contracting with Plaintiff for Plaintiff to represent him in the criminal action for a set fee of $25,000. Plaintiff was paid $5,000
as a retainer and Defendant signed the Note for the remaining $20,000. D efendant claimed that after he paid Plaintiff a total of $6,850, he discharged Plaintiff as his counse l “for fa ilure to in vestiga te and develop his case and to perform the cont racted legal services.” Defe ndant also asserted that because Pl ai nt if f b re ac he d t he co nt ra ct by n ot pr oviding c ompetent and ade quate le gal ser

vices, Plaintiff’s fees should be limited to qua ntum merui t . Utilizing a quantum m eruit basis for establishing fees, Defendant maintained Plaintiff actually had be en overpaid and owed Defendant the return of “at least” $5,000. Defendant a lso alleged certain funds of his had been seizedwhen the police raided his home and that a total of $4,232.50 had been returned. 1 Defendant

claimed Plaintiff
was in possession of these funds and should be required to deposit them into the registry of the court pending resolutio n of the va rious issue s. In

his counterclaim, Defendant sought damag es of $5,000, the retu rn of the $4,232.50 , as well a s attorne y’ s fees.

In response

to the cou

ntercla im, Plaintif

f deni ed failing to investigate properly the claim or develop the case. Plaintiff acknowledged that he possessed $4,232.50 in funds which had been returne d to Defe ndant by the State. Plaintiff claimed, howe ver, that he and Defendant had agreed these funds were to be applied toward Plaintiff’s fees. Neverthe less, Plain tiff depo sited thes e funds into the registry

of the court until the lawsuit was resolved.

A ju ry t rial was conducted on March 15, 2002. Plaintiff was the f

irst witne ss t o te st if y. Dur i ng his testimony, Plaintiff outlined in some detail the work he did in re presenting Defendant

on the cr iminal cha

rges. For examp le, Plainti ff explain ed his successful efforts to have the bond reduced s o Def endant could be released from jail. Plaintiff also detailed the steps he undertook

in the partially succe ssful effort to recover Defenda nt’s money and prope

rty that had

been2 After P laintiff was d ischarg ed, D efend ant’s new coun sel also fil ed a M otion to Sup press , which se t forth

essentia lly the same arguments set forth in t he motion filed by Plaint iff . The Criminal

Court Judge ev entual ly r uled t hat the sea rch wa rrant wa s invalid , thereb y leadin g to the d ismissal o f the crim inal cha rges ag ainst D efend ant. -3- seized. Plaintiff also discussed his defense strategy which he maintained was discussed with and agreed to by Defenda

nt. Plaintiff identified documents from the criminal court fi le as wel l a s document s filed with

the State during the process of recover ing the confiscated property . Plaintiff identified a Motion to

Suppress h

e prepa red and f iled in the

criminal court action on Defendant ’ s behalf in an attempt to establish the invalidity of the searc h warrant. Plaintiff

testifie d to his opinion about the strong likelihood that this motion would be successful and his discussions with Defendant regarding same. According to Plaintiff, if the Motion to Supp ress was gran ted, the c riminal c ase agains tDefend ant esse

ntially would be o ver bec ause

all of the State’s evidence would be excluded at trial. 2 According to Plaintiff, during the course of try ing to obtain the return of a truck which had been confiscated during the raid, a disa

gre emen t aro se be twee n Def enda nt an d Def

enda nt’s exwife, Tammy

Higdon (“Higdon”), as to who owne d the truck. Plaintiff informed Defendant that he didnot and co

uld not re

present Higdon in obtainin g the re turn of the truck if there was any disagreement between them as to owner ship. Plaintiff testified Defendant then told him to pursue having the truck returned to Higdon, which he did. The State agreed to retur n the truck to Higdon. The State also

agreed to return

one-half of the mo ney

and some o f the othe

r confis cated ite

ms to Defend ant. When Plaintiff received a check for the f unds the State had agreed to return, the check
was made pay

able to both Plaintiff and Defendant. As stated previously , Plaintiff claims Defendant to ld him to apply these funds towar d payment of his attorney ’s fees. However, when Plaintiff received the check and presented it to Defen dan t for endorsement, Defendant refuse d to sign the check until he obtained the truck from Higdon.

The majority

of Plaintif

f’s cro ss-examina

tion, as we

ll a s D efendant’s direct examination, centered around what investigation was or was not undertaken, what few doc uments were filed in the criminal court action, and what Plaintiff allegedly did not do. The clear import of this proof wa s an atte

mpt to show t

hat Plainti ff should

have done much more in the criminal court action by w ay

of invest igation , documen

tation, the filing o f pleadi ngs, an d keeping in contact with Defend ant. There also was some discontent by Defendant concerning

Plaintiff’s not obtaining the return of certai n seized item s or not obtaining them as expeditiously as Def endant thought was appropriate.

Defendant terminated

the legal s ervice s of Plainti ff via le tter dated July

6, 1999. Th

is letter st ates, in p ertinen

t part, a s follows:

Due to the c ircums tances in this case involving the 1993 Chevrolet truck and Tammy Hig don, I have decided to relieve y ou as my lega l counsel

.... I als o feel there wa s an injusti ce done because I told y ou that the truck belong ed to me no t Miss Hig don. I also feel there is3 Defe nda nt app arently inte nde d on putting fo rth exp ert pro of to es tabli sh th e profes sional st andard of care

through test

imony of the at torney who represe nted him i n th e cri minal act ion aft er Pla int

if f’ s se rvi ces w ere t ermi nate d. However, due to an une xpe cted illne ss De fenda nt’s seco nd atto rney wa s unab le to test ify at tri al and no expert proof wa s off ered.
-4-

another conflic t of inter

est beca use you repre sent

Barry Williams in
a case where my

racec ar van ha s been se

ized for n umerous m

o nth s and you haven’t tr i ed to retrieve it. I am requesting an itemized statement of every thing you have done on my behalf in both my cases so far, an d I wo

uld appreciate a

refund o f the unus ed portio n of these funds.... Higdon was call ed as a w itness at trial. Higdon testified there was never any doubt the truck actually

belong ed to Defe ndant. However, Higdon had claimed the c onfiscated truck (whi ch was not ti tled) ac tually belong ed to her

so the Stat

e “would not keep i

t.” I n other w ords, Higdon claimed the truck was hers and since she wa s notinvolved in the alleged cr im in al ac ti vi ty, the truck shouldnot have b een seize d and the S tate should give itback to her. Since the truck was returned to H igdon, we can only conclude this ruse w as succe ssful. I n any event, H igdon pa id Plaintiff $1,000 in a

ttorney ’s fees for him

to obtain the truck for her. Higdon therea fter re fused to give the truck to D efenda

nt until he reimbursed her the

$1,000 in attorney’s fees and the filing fee which she incurred. Once De fendant reimburs ed these

sums, Hig don retur

ned the tr

uck to Defend ant.
After

hearing all the proof, the Trial Court directe d a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and dismissed Defendant’s counterclaim. The Trial Court conc luded Plaintiff had established a breach of contract. The Tria

l Co urt also concluded Defendant was required to provide expert proof regarding the professional standard of care which Plaintiff allegedly

failed to meet

and, without such proof, Defendant’s counterclaim as well as his defe nse to the breach

of contr act claim must

fail. 3 The Trial Court then concluded:

The Court finds that the parties entered int o a contr act for services in the amount of $25,000.00, and that the Defendant executed a note

in the amount of $20,000.00 to secure the pay ment of said fees. The Court further fi nds tha t the Defendant/CounterPlaintiff is entitl ed to a set-off from $25,000.00 for pay ments made by him or on his behal f in th e amount of $6,850.00, for a total of $18,150.00. The Court

furthe r finds tha

t the Plaint

iff is ent itled to pre-judgment

interest at the legal rate of 10% from June 28, 1999 ( six months from the date of

said note) which amount is $4,927.85, for a total of p rincipa l and interest as of March 15, 2002 of $23,077.85. The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is en ti tl ed to 15 % a tt or ne ys fees pursuant to said note in the amount of $3,461.68.-5- The Trial Cour

t also dete rmined th at the previ ously confiscated f unds which had been deposited into the registry of the court should be given to Plaintiff and this sum, plus any accrued interest, should be credited against the total amount of the judg ment.

Defendant appeals, raising the following issue:

Did the Trial Court err in ruling that [Defendant] was required to present expert testimony regarding [Plaintiff’s] failure to represe nt [Defenda nt] in accordance wi th the professional standard of care required of attorneys, a

nd t hat the absence of such testimony mandatedthe entry of a

directed verdict in favor

of [Plaintiff], where [Defenda nt’s] defenses were based on Tenne s see co ntract law and not legal malpractice?
Discussion The standard of review in determining whe ther a trial court was correct in granting
a directed verdict is set forth in Wharton Transport Corp. v. Bridges , 606 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn. 1980):

On review of the grant of a directed verdict on motion of a defenda nt, it is not the office of an appellate court to weigh the
ev ide nce. Rather, it must take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence in favo r of the p laintiff , indulging in all

reasona ble inferences in his favor, and disregarding any ev id en ce to th e c on tr ar y. The tria l judge' s action ma

y be sustaine d only

if there is no material evidence in the record that would support a verdict for the plaintiff, under any of

the theories that he has advanced.

Id. at 525 (quot ing Cecil v. H ardin , 575 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1978)).

Ini ti al ly, we will discuss the propriety of the Trial Court’s dismissal of Defendant’s counter claim for lack of expert pro of . Defendant relies heavily on Lewis v. Cap uto , No. E1999- 01182-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 269 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2000), no appl. perm. appeal filed , for his position that no expert proof was needed. In Lewis , the plaintiff sued his former at to rn ey. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit after concluding the statute of limitations had expired, and the plaintiff appealed. The issues on appeal involved the appropriate statute of limitations for the plaintiff

’s v arious c laims . After liberally construing the allegations in the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, t

his Court c onclu ded t wo causes of action had been asserte d. The first cause of action centered around plaintiff allege dly being injure d by his reliance upon the defenda nt’s fau lty legal advice. Id . at ** 11-12. We held these allegations could fairly be read to state a claim for lega l malpractice, which we observed requires a plaintiff to " prove that the attorney' s conduct fell below that degre e o f c ar e, sk il l, an d d il ig en ce wh ic h i s c om mo nl y po ss es se d a nd ex er ci se d b y at to rn eys-6-

practicing in the same jurisdiction ...[and] demonstrate a nexus bet ween the negligence and the injury." Id . at ** 9, 11-12 (quoting Sanjines v. Ortwein and Associa tes, P.C. , 984 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tenn. 1998)). We also discussed the plaintiff’s allegation that he was injured by the defendant’s breach of contract when he failed to repre sent the plaintiff aft er incarce ration. Id . at * 12. We concluded

this allega

tion state d a cause

of actio n for bre ach of c ontract and was not

premised on a belief that the attorney ha

d failed to adhere to theprofessional standard of care required of Tennessee attorne ys. Id . A lega

l malpractice cla

im has a one y ear sta

tute of limitations, regardless of whether the action is grounded in tort or contract. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(2). We conclu ded this
was the appr

opriate statute of limitationsfor the p laintiff ’s first c laim. With reg ard to the plaintiff’s secondcause of action

for breach of contract, we held this claim, which did not involve alleg ations of failing to adhere to the profession al standard of care, was g overned by the six year statute of limitations found in Tenn. Code Ann § 28-3-109(a)(3). Lewis , 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 269 at * 11- 12.

Defendant’s counter claim ass erts only one cause of action which he claims entitles him to an award of

damage s. Specif

ically , Defen dant state s: “[Plaintif f] breached his contract w ith [Defenda nt] by failing to pr

ovide competent, adequate legal servic es.” In his brief, Def endant argues the “ Lewis Court made it very cle ar that a cli ent’s ca

use of action aga

inst an attor ney for fail ure to perform pursuant to his cont

ract l ies sepa

rately from an al leg ation

of le gal malpr acti ce.”We disagree with Plaintiff’s interpre tation o f Lewis as applicable to this case. Defendant’s denominating his counterclaim as a cause of action in tort or a br each of contract is not the cri t ical factor here. Whatis determinative is Defendant’s allegation that Plaint iff’s co nduct fell below th e acce ptable professional standar

d of car e there by r esulting in i nj ury for w hi ch D efe nda nt see ks d ama ges . In order for Def endant to succeed on his counterclaim, he would have to show Plaintiff’s “c onduct fell below that degree of care , skill, and diligence which is commonly possessed an d exercis e d by at to rn eys practic ing in the sa me jurisdiction ... [and] demonstrate a nexus between the negligence
a nd th e i nj ur y” Lewis , 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 269 at * 9 (quoting Sanjines v. Ortwein and Associate s, P.C. , 984 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tenn. 1998)). It is inescapable that De f end ant’s counterclaim asserts a cause of action for legal malpractice.

In a lega l malpractice ac tion, exper t testimony

is requir ed to establish

negligence and proximate

cause un less th e alleged malpractice is within the common knowledg e of laymen. See Bursack v. Wilson , 982 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). As stated in Cleckne r v. Dale , 719 S.W.2d 535 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986):

Whether a lawy er's c onduct me ets a

particu lar stand ard of c onduct is nota questio n of law f

or the court. I

t is a question of fact for

the jury
or other finder of fact to decide.... Whether a lawy er's c onduct me ets the appl icable professional standards is generally believed to be beyond the common knowledge of lay persons. Thus, except in cases involving clear a

nd palpab le negl

igence , most

courts considering the issue have held that ca ses of le gal m alprac tic e cannot be decided-7- withoutexpert proof regarding the a pplicable standar d of care and whether the lawy er's conduct complies with this standard....

* * * *

We have determined ... [t]he lawyer’s standard of care, except in the most extreme c ases, sh oul d b e p ro ve d u si ng ex pe rt te st im on y. Likewise, whether the lawy er’s conduct in a given case de partedfrom the applica

ble stand ard shoul d also be proved by expert testimony....

Cleckner , 719 S.W.2d at 540 (citations omitted).

Even assuming Defendant’s testimony to be true and disregarding any contrary evidence, as we must on appeal, we conclude Defenda nt’s allegations of Plaintiff’s failure to meet
a particular standard of conduct are not within the common knowledge of lay men and expert proof was, therefore, required. Defe ndant presented no such proof. According ly, the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing Defendant’s counterclaim is affirmed.

Separat e from the claim in Def endant’ s counter

claim is De

fendant ’s defe

nse to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Specifica lly, Defenda

nt first as se rts Plaintiff breached the contract by not complying with the appr opriate professional standard of care. This differs from the malpractice claim in the counte rclaim on ly in that Defendant is not using Plaintiff’s claimed failure to comply with the standard of care as a sword, but

rather as a shield to the br

each of contract claim agains thim. Defendant claims this defense does not amount to a

claim for leg al malpra

ctice because he terminated Plaintiff’s services and obtained new coun sel befo

re ther e was an y le gally cogniza ble in ju ry. Taking

that one s tep furth

er, Def endant a rgues s ince it is n ot a claim for ma lpractice, no expert proof was required.

We disagr

ee. The critica l factor as to whe

ther Def endant ne eded expe

rt proof is Defendant’s allegations that Plaintiff’s conduct fell below the a ppropriate standard of care for an attorney. De

fendant’s need for

expert proof on this issue was triggered by Defendant’s claim that Pla intiff’s co nduct fell below the profe ssional sta ndard of care, a nd that thisallege d failure was a defense to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. As stated above , the acceptable professional standard of care f or Plaintif f is not within the common knowledge of lay men and expert proof was, therefore, required in order to establish this standard of care. The Tria l Court cor

rectly held this defense to the breach of contract claim mus t failwithout expert proof. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court on this issue.
Next, Defendant argues that due to the a ctions (or in actions) of Plaintif f, he lost confidence in Plaintiff’s ability to adequa

tely repres ent him. Defend ant claim s he had g ood caus e to terminate t h e attorn ey -client r elationsh ip becau se he lost

confide nce in Pla intiff. A ccordin g to Defend ant, he did not needexpert proof to establish this good cause and, therefore, the Tr ial Court erred in directing a verdict in fa vor of Plaintiff.4 The Craw ford Court went

on to hold t

hat mis conduct of

an att orney in violation of a statute or acts against pub lic polic y, or in b reach of the atto rney’s fidu ciary d uty to the cl ient may suppo rt a comp lete forfeiture of fees, dep end ing on the pa rticular fac ts and c ircum stance s of the ca se. Craw ford , 656 S. W.2d at 364, 365.
-8- In Tenness ee, a cl

i ent has the right to discharge his or her a ttorney with or without
cause. Chambliss, Bahner & Crawford v. Luther , 531 S.W.2d 108 , 109 (T enn. Ct. App. 1975). Whether or not the client ha d just cau se to disc harge

his or her attorney

directly impacts the potential compensation the discharged attorney may be entitled to rec eive for services performed. In Adams
v. Mellen , 618 S.W.2d 4 85 (Tenn . Ct. App. 1981), this Courtdiscusse d the ty pe of damages a

vailable to an a ttorn ey dischar ged wit hout cause. Quoti ng Brownlow v. Payne , 2 Tenn. App. 15 4, 16 2 (1925), the Adams Court stated:

W here an attor

ney has been dischar ged by his client without cause , the attorney may

rescindthe contract of

employment and may

recover on a quantum

meruit fo

r servic es rende

red up to t

h e date of h

is discharge; or he may treat t he con tract as con tinu ing, although broken by the client, and may r

ecover for the breach. Ac cording to the weight of authority, the measure

of da mages f

or such br

each of contract, is the full contract price.

Adams , 618 S.W.2d at 488. An at torney dischar ged wit hout caus e can thu s elect to recover based on the full contract price or on quantum m eruit , whichever is greater.

As one might expect, the relief available to an attorney who is dischar

ged for cause is not as favorable. When an attorney is discharged for cause, the a ttorney is entitled to recove r on the basis of quantum m eruit or breach of contract, whichev er is less

. See Crawford v. Logan , 656 S.W.2d 360, 364 (Tenn. 1983). 4

Defendant

argues on appeal

that the Trial Court erred in directing a verdict because, in addition to the o ther argument s we discussed and rejected above, if De fendant fired Plaintiff because he hadlost confidence in Plaintiff, that firing would have been for cause. Defenda

nt relies upon a serie s of Tennessee c ases concerning disagr eements betw een an attor ney and clie nt as to whether or not tosettle a l awsuit. Pla intiff ar gues on appeal t hat a clie nt’s loss of

confide nce in his attorney being sufficien

t to come within the

“for ca use” umbr

ella is limited to those disa greem ents betweenan attorney

and client over a settlement in a contingency

matter. We disagree with Plaintiff. We see no re ason to limitthis rule only to those disagreements between an attorney and client over
a settl ement in a co ntin ge ncy matter. Therefore, we hold that a “for c ause” firing “includes the client’s right to discharge the attorney whenever

the client ceases to have absolute confidence in the relationship. See Chambliss, Bahner , and Crawford v. Luther , 531 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. App. 1975).” McGee v. Maynard, No. 01-A-01-9810-CV-00539, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXI S 559 at * 4 (Tenn. Ct

. App. Aug. 12, 1999), no appl. perm. appeal filed

.-9-

The parties a

re also in disagr eement a s to whethe

r a clien t’s discha rge of his or her attorney “for cause” because of the client’s loss of c onfidence must be ob jectively rea sonable. Defendant argues such a “for cause” discharg e need only be subjectively

reasona ble, whe reas Pla intiff ins ists it must be objectively rea sonable. In the present c ase, if Defendant did not subjectiv ely

and actu ally lose confidence in Plaintiff, this absence of a loss of confidenc e certainly would defeat any

claim that the discharge was “for c ause” based on this ground. We hold that a client must first establish that the discharge was the result of his actual loss of confidence in his attorney in order to prove it was a “for cause” discharg e.
The more centra l iss ue is w hethe r a cli ent, h ere the Defend ant, a lso m ust p rove t he dis charge
was objectively rea sonable. If an objective standard is not

utilized, any client would be able to defe at a contractually a

g reed f ee arrangement so long

as the attorney

is discharged for a client’s loss of confidencefor any r

eason, no matter how objectively irrational or unreasonable the stated reason for the loss of confidence may be. Such a result would, for al l pract ical p urpos es, ma ke ever y dischar ge of an attorney “ for cause.” We do n ot think this i s a legally sound approach. Cf. Video Catalog Channel, Inc. v. Blackwelder , No. 03A01-9705-CH-00155, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXI S 636 at *6 ( Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1997), no appl. perm. appeal filed (“Whethe r good c ause existst o terminat e an employment contra

ct is a determination made on a case-b y- case

basis, and exists where the dischar

ge is ‘ obje ct iv el y r easonable’”). I n light of the foregoing, we hold that in order for a client, here the Defendant, to establish that he terminated his attorney’s, her

e the Plaintiff’s, services for ca us e b ec au se he lo st co nf id en ce in hi s a tt or ne y, the clien t must prove

that he a ctually didlose confidencein his attorney and that his rea sons for the loss of confiden ce leading to the attorney’ s discharge were objectively reasonable.

Our standard

of review requires us to take the stronge st legitimate view of the evidenc e in favor of Defendant, indulging in all reasona ble inferences in his f

avor, and disregarding a

ny evidence to the contrary . Utilizing this standard, we believe there is material evidence in the r ecord, even withoutany

expert testimony having bee n presented, that would support a verdict for Defe ndant on Defendant’s theory

that he di scharg ed Plaintif f with ca use beca use he lost confidence in Plaintiff.

In summary , both Def

endant’ s counter

claim and his defe nse to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against him based upon Plaintiff’s alleged failure to adhere to the professional standard of care required expert testimony to establish the accepta ble prof essional s tandard of care. Defenda nt presented no such testimony. The Trial Court cor rectly direct ed a verdict as to Defendant’s counter claim and his def

en se based

upon Plaint

iff’s alleged f

ailure to meet the a

ccepta ble professional standard of care. However, D efendant’s claim that he lost co nfidenc e inPlaintiff and firedhim for that reason did not require expert testimony , and, therefore , the Tria l Court er red in directing a verdict as to that issue. We remand this case for a trial on the sole issue of whether Defend ant disch arged

Plaintiff with caus e because

Defend ant had lo st

confidence in Plaintiff, and depending upon the jury’s answe r t o that i ssue, the amount of damages, if any , to be awarded Plaintiff. In all other respects, the judg ment of the Trial Court is affirmed.-10- Conclusion

The judgment of the Tria l Court is a

ffirmed in part a nd rever sed in par

t, and this cause is remanded to the Trial Court for such further proceeding s as are required consistent with thi s Opinion. The costs on a ppeal are as sessed on

e-half agains t the Appe

llant Rick Welch, and his surety, and one -half against the Appellee R. Jackson Rose.

___________________________________ D. MICHAEL

SWINEY, JUDGE