J-S41036-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRIAN PHILIP BENNETT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 615 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0000782-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRIAN PHILLIP BENNETT 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 616 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-28-CR-0001927-2018

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 06, 2023

Appellant Brian Phillip Bennett appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County after a jury 

convicted Appellant of involuntary manslaughter, endangering the welfare of 

a child (two counts), delivery of a controlled substance, criminal use of a 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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communication facility, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant 

challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting his 

involuntary manslaughter conviction and asserts that the trial court abused 

its discretion in imposing his sentence. We affirm.

Appellant was charged with third-degree murder along with the 

aforementioned offenses in connection with the untimely death of L.S.

(“Child”), the three-year-old daughter of Appellant’s girlfriend, Brittany 

Higgins. As discussed infra, Child died after ingesting methamphetamine and 

buprenorphine, which Appellant and Higgins admitted to possessing.

1

Appellant proceeded to a joint jury trial along with Thomas Stephen Keogh, 

the individual accused of acting as the supplier for the drug distribution ring 

that ultimately sold and delivered the drugs that led to Child’s death.2

The tragic factual background in this case was described in great detail 

by the trial court in its March 21, 2022 opinion. We will summarize the 

undisputed facts that were developed over multiple days at Appellant’s trial.

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1 Higgins, who was charged as a co-defendant, entered a nolo contendere plea 

to third-degree murder and received a sentence of ten to twenty years’ 

imprisonment for her role in Child’s death. Higgins entered a cooperation 

agreement with the prosecution and testified against Appellant at his trial.

2 Keogh was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance, corrupt 

organizations, drug delivery resulting in death, and criminal use of 

communication facility. Keogh received an aggregate sentence of 12 years, 1 

month to 24 years, 2 months’ incarceration. Keogh’s appeal (docketed at 585 

MDA 2022) has been resolved in a separate decision.

The Commonwealth also prosecuted multiple other individuals who pled 

guilty to their role in the drug distribution ring and testified against Appellant 

and Keogh after signing cooperation agreements. 
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On Saturday, January 6, 2018, at approximately 8:00 p.m., emergency 

personnel were summoned to an apartment in Greencastle Borough based on

the report of an “unconscious toddler.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 9/8/21, at 

23. Higgins called 9-1-1 to report she had discovered three-year-old Child, 

lying in her bed, cold and stiff and with bruises on her face. Id. at 21.

When emergency medical technicians (EMTs) arrived at the home, they

discovered Child lifeless, lying on her back on a bed in a bedroom near the 

kitchen. Id. at 34-35. EMT Richard Wertman indicated he did not believe the 

child had died recently as rigor mortis had already set in. Id. at 35-36.

When Corporal Ismail El-Guemra of the Pennsylvania State Police

responded to the scene and was informed Child was deceased, he observed 

that Child had dark areas around her mouth and did not appear to have been 

cared for properly. Id. at 29. While speaking with Higgins and Appellant, 

Corporal El-Guemra noted that both adults appeared to be distressed, but 

noticed Appellant was in even more stress. Id. at 27.

The Forensics Services Unit of the State Police collected evidence and 

took photographs of the scene as well as Child’s condition and the markings 

on her face. Id. at 41. Child was wearing a pink Hello Kitty shirt, was lying on 

a mattress without sheets, and her head was surrounded by stuffed animals.

Id. at 47; N.T., 9/10/21, at 16-17. One of the investigators thought it was 

strange that Child was laying on a mattress without sheets and expressed 

concern that the bedroom could have been staged. Id. at 47.
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Dr. Samuel Land conducted Child’s autopsy and found no evidence of 

significant disease, infection, bacteria, virus, or organisms that could have 

been responsible for Child’s death. Id. at 95-119. Dr. Land determined Child 

did not have any significant internal trauma or broken bones and asserted the 

bruises on Child’s head were not the cause of her death. Id. at 100-103, 110-

11.3 Dr. Land noted that the dark coloration on Child’s face was postmortem 

injury caused by “gastric contents,” most likely vomit, that had splashed on 

her face and had been there for “some time.” Id. at 107-109.

Dr. Land sent samples of Child’s blood for toxicological testing, which 

revealed the presence of methamphetamine (18 nanograms/milliliter) and 

buprenorphine in her system (1.2 nanograms/milliliter). Id. at 67-68, 80, 95-

97. Methamphetamine, a stimulant that is almost always used illegally, can 

elevate blood pressure and temperature, and can lead to seizures or misfiring 

of the heart. Id. at 96, 116. Buprenorphine is a semi-synthetic opioid used to 

treat opioid abuse and withdrawal symptoms. Id. at 96-97. Buprenorphine is 

sold as Suboxone or Subutex tablets that dissolve under the tongue; 

Suboxone contains naloxone whereas Subutex does not. Id. at 72, 99. Child’s 

toxicology tests did not reveal the presence of naloxone. Id. at 95.4

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3 Dr. Land noted Child had a black eye as well as bruising to her left chin, 

which he opined was an unusual pattern of injury for a three-year-old. N.T., 

9/8/21, at 111-113. Dr. Land also discovered a bruise on Child’s face which 

he attributed to an open hand slap mark. Id.

4 The prosecution presented testimony of forensic toxicologists that tested 

Child’s blood samples. Dr. Robert Middleburg of NMS Labs testified that blood 

testing does not always detect the presence of naloxone as it might be in such 

a small quantity that it cannot be measured. N.T., 9/8/21, at 72-73. 
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Based on his professional training, education, and experience, Dr. Land 

concluded with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Child’s cause of 

death was mixed substance toxicity of methamphetamine and buprenorphine, 

neither of which was prescribed to Child. Id. at 114-117. Dr. Land indicated

either drug could have been lethal to Child, but stated there was no way to 

differentiate which drug ultimately caused her death. Id. at 102.

When police initially interviewed Appellant and Higgins, Higgins told 

police that she was unsure of how Child had died as she was sick in bed all 

day with the flu on January 6, 2018, and she believed that Appellant was 

caring for Child. N.T., 9/9/22, at 21-22, 36. 

However, when officers presented Higgins and Appellant with toxicology 

reports noting the presence of drugs in Child’s system, Higgins and Appellant 

confessed that they were high on methamphetamine (“meth”) the night of 

January 5, 2018 to the morning of January 6, 2018, the time period in which 

Child likely ingested the drugs. Id. at 30-33. 

Higgins admitted to police that she and Appellant regularly used meth 

in the home they shared with her two children: L.H., her nine-year old son, 

and Child, her three-year old daughter. Id. at 30, 43-46. While Higgins had

been prescribed Suboxone and Appellant was prescribed Subutex, the couple 

would share both of these drugs. Id. at 50-51, 112-13, 117, 129.

Higgins told police that she purchased meth on January 5, 2018 from 

Rodney (Allen) Mower, who delivered it to their residence at 5:00 p.m. Id. at 

32-33, 47-48. Higgins conceded that she and Appellant bought meth to share 
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together on numerous occasions from Mower and other individuals. Id. at 47, 

87-88. As Mower had just received a large amount of meth from his supplier, 

Mower cut the meth on their kitchen table to measure it out into individual 

packages. Id. at 69-76. When asked if the action in cutting the meth had left 

“teeny tiny particles ... on [her] kitchen table at some point that Friday night,” 

Higgins admitted it was possible. Id. at 76.

Higgins believed Child was in the living room behind a baby gate when 

Mower delivered the meth. Id. Once Higgins received the meth, she went into 

her bedroom to use the drugs and did not return that evening. Id. at 47-49. 

As Higgins was extremely dehydrated and malnourished from drug use, it 

would take her hours to find a vein to inject the meth. Id. at 47. When she 

finally injected herself, Higgins entered a trans-like state, and had sexual 

intercourse with Appellant. Id. at 56-57. After Higgins came down from her 

high, she crashed as she had gone days without sleep. Id. at 57. 

Although Higgins woke around 9 or 10 a.m. the next morning to an 

alarm she had set to take care of the kids, Appellant turned off the alarm and 

told her he would take care of the children that day. Id. Appellant woke 

Higgins up several hours later around 6-7 p.m. and brought her food he had 

purchased from McDonald’s. Id. at 54-59. When Higgins asked where the 

children were, Appellant indicated that Child appeared to be sleeping and L.H. 

was at his grandmother’s house. Id.

Higgins went into Child’s bedroom at 8 p.m to wake her up. Id. at 49. 

At that point, Higgins had not seen Child for more than 24 hours since she 
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injected the meth the previous evening and had not checked on her. Id. When 

Higgins discovered Child was cold, stiff, unresponsive, and with bruises on her 

body, she began to scream and asked Appellant, “[w]hat did you do?” Id. at 

56, 61. Appellant responded with surprise, put his head in his hands, and 

claimed that he did not know what happened. Id. at 61. Thereafter, Higgins 

used her cell phone to call 9-1-1. Id. at 63.

Higgins noted that she found Child lying face up on the mattress without 

sheets but surrounded by stuffed animals. Id. at 54. Higgins did not notice 

any vomit near Child. Id. Higgins recalled that there was a sheet on Child’s 

bed on the night of January 4, 2018 and asserted she always had sheets on 

Child’s bed as the mattress was a plastic material. Id. at 54-55. Higgins 

claimed she did not put Child to bed on January 5, 2018. Id.

While Higgins denied cleaning up the bedroom after finding Child 

unresponsive, she admitted that she “probably” threw drugs away before first 

responders arrived. Id. at 55-56. Higgins did not suspect that L.S. died from 

ingesting drugs, but believed the marks on Child’s face were bruises that had 

something to do with her death. 

Higgins shared that she was careful to keep her meth and Suboxone in 

a small wooden jewelry box in her bedroom. Id. at 89-90. She found it helpful 

to store the drugs in her bedroom as she only typically used them there as it 

was so difficult for her to find a vein to do so. Id. at 68. She also kept her 

drugs concealed so Appellant would not use them. Id. at 91.
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In comparison, Appellant would keep his drugs on his person so that he 

could use it when he wished and to keep it from Higgins. Id. at 90. Higgins 

indicated that Appellant would inject his drugs “wherever he needed to” and

would use meth in multiple areas of the home, even in the kitchen or living 

room where the children were. Id. at 68.

Higgins felt Appellant was not careful with his drug use as he often left 

drugs in areas accessible to the children; Higgins addressed her concern with 

Appellant out of fear that her children would find the drugs. Id. at 92. On one 

of those occasions, Appellant left a needle full of drugs on the kitchen counter 

where Higgins’ son found it and asked what it was. Id. at 92-93. Higgins 

realized Child could have easily found it as well. Id.

Higgins consented to a search of her cell phone. Id. at 65. At trial, the 

prosecution introduced text messages from Higgins to Appellant that were 

sent prior to Child’s death. In one message, Higgins wrote, “[s]he always ends 

up with marks like that when we do [meth] and I space out. Are you sure you 

didn’t get rough with her or something in the last few days[?]” Id. at 159.

Appellant responded that he had no idea what happened to Child. Id.

In a text message one month before Child’s death, Higgins wrote “you 

cannot ever leave shit out like this[,]” and sent Appellant a picture of his 

nightstand next to his bed, where he had left a spoon and Q-tips which were 

used to absorb drugs and presumably had drug residue on them. Id. at 160-

61. Higgins then wrote “what if [Child] would have eaten it and overdosed 

before she woke me up this morning ... you could have killed my child.” Id. at 
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161-62. Higgins continued on, “[i]f you want to be her parent you’ve got to 

start thinking like a fucking parent.” Id. at 162.

Sergeant Aaron Martin testified that officers conducted a second search 

of Appellant and Higgins’ apartment after receiving Child’s toxicology reports

and recovered both drugs and paraphernalia. Id. at 229. Specifically, police 

discovered a white powdery substance on the night table, in a syringe, and on 

the floor next to Appellant’s side of the bed. Id. at 232-34. Officers also found 

packaging for buprenorphine and naloxone tablets, as well as Q-tips, syringes, 

glassine baggies, foil wrappers used for smoking, and smoking devices made 

of glass and metal. Id. at 234-239.

Trooper Lindsay Trace, the lead investigator, testified as to his role in 

conducting interviews with Appellant after Child’s death and the electronic 

evidence obtained from Appellant’s cell phone. N.T., 9/10/21, at 7-8. Trooper 

Trace indicated that Appellant eventually confessed to using meth the night of 

January 5, 2018 and early morning of January 6, 2018. In addition, Trooper 

Trace recalled that Appellant shared that he put the children to bed on the 

night of January 5th because Higgins was sick in her room. 

Trooper Trace testified that investigators recovered deleted videos from 

Appellant’s phone taken the morning of January 6, 2018. Id. at 105. The first 

video, taken at 10:18 a.m. shows Appellant standing over Child as she lay in 

bed. N.T., 9/13/21, at 5. The second video, taken at 11:18 a.m., scanned 

Child’s body and showed her wearing a red shirt, which was different than the 

Hello Kitty shirt Child was wearing when she was found by first responders. 
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Id. at 5-6, 11-12; N.T., 9/8/21, at 47. In addition, in the video, there were 

no stuffed animals on Child’s bed, but first responders found numerous stuffed 

animals on her bed when they found Child deceased. N.T., 9/8/21, at 12-13.

Trooper Trace testified that Child’s room looked different in the video than 

when he had arrived at the scene. Id. at 15.

Trooper Trace obtained Appellant’s internet search records for the 

morning of January 6, 2018, which showed two searches on how to shock the 

heart back into rhythm, three searches for toddler not breathing, limp body, 

and eight searches for toddler CPR. Id. at 39. There were no searches for child 

ingestion of Subutex, Suboxone, or buprenorphine. Id.

Dr. Kathryn Crowell, a pediatrician at Penn State Hershey Children’s 

Hospital, testified as an expert in child abuse and neglect. When viewing 

photographs of Child’s bruises on her body, Dr. Crowell believed such injuries 

were caused by “blunt force trauma” and repetitive abuse, opining that 

someone struck Child with more force than should have been used with 

“general caretaking and day-to-day activities.” N.T., 9/9/21, 14, 19-20.

The prosecution presented testimony of Brittany Baker, an acquaintance 

of Appellant and Higgins who sold them meth and also abused controlled 

substances. Baker indicated that on January 6, 2018, the day Child was 

discovered deceased, she met with Appellant on two separate occasions to sell 

him meth, once at approximately 10 a.m. and again in the evening. Id. at 

180-83. When Baker asked where Higgins was, Appellant told her that Higgins 

and the kids were sick and sleeping. Id. at 182.
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Appellant testified in his own defense at trial. He characterized himself 

as a “functioning drug addict” that was able to hold employment. N.T.,

9/15/21, at 59-60. He recalled that on the evening of January 5, 2018, Mower 

delivered meth to the apartment Appellant shared with Higgins and her 

children. Id. at 61-62. Appellant described the meth as the size of a baseball 

and the largest amount of meth he had ever seen. Id. Appellant agreed Mower 

weighed and divided the meth on the couple’s kitchen table. Id. at 63-64.

Appellant admitted that he and Higgins started to inject the meth after 

Mower left, but Higgins went into her bedroom to do so. Id. at 65-66.

Appellant believed the children were behind a baby gate in the living room

when the meth was delivered and claimed he put them to bed around 11 p.m.

Id. Appellant alleged for the first time at trial that Higgins went into Child’s 

bedroom thirty minutes after he had put her to bed. Id. at 68. Appellant did 

not sleep at all the evening, but stayed awake having sexual intercourse with 

Higgins until 5 or 6 a.m. Id. at 71. 

When Appellant checked on Child at approximately 10 a.m., he found 

her unresponsive, cold, and blue. Id. at 72-73. He attempted to slap her to 

“see what’s going on” and believed she might have been deceased. Id.

Appellant claimed that he tried to give Child CPR and did not realize Child had 

ingested drugs. Id. at 74-77. Appellant testified that there was no vomit on 

Child and denied changing her clothes. Id. When asked if Higgins had changed 

Child’s clothes, he responded, “it would have had to have been.” Id. 
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Appellant asserted that he took videos of Child in her bed accidentally 

and subsequently deleted it, not because he wanted to obstruct the 

investigation, but simply because he did not realize what the video was. Id. 

at 79-80. After finding Child unresponsive, Appellant admitted that he did not 

call an ambulance, but instead went to purchase more meth. Id. at 82-83.

Appellant claimed that he did not know Child had ingested drugs, but 

learned she died from drug toxicity when one of the troopers told him. Id. at 

76-77. Appellant admitted to his drug use at the home he shared with the 

children, but claimed he and Higgins had “separate stashes” of drugs and 

denied ever leaving drugs or drug paraphernalia unattended. Id. at 95. When 

asked if he was responsible for Child’s death, he responded that “I used meth,

absolutely. It was in her system absolutely but did we both have separate 

stashes, did I leave with some left on the table by me, no.” Id. at 85.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury acquitted Appellant of third-degree 

murder, but convicted him on the remaining charges. On November 10, 2021, 

trial court sentenced Appellant to the following terms of imprisonment: 60-

120 months for involuntary manslaughter, two terms of 36-72 months for 

endangering the welfare of a child, 30-60 months for unlawful delivery, 18-36

months for criminal use of a communication facility, and 6-12 months for 

possession of drug paraphernalia. As all these sentences ran consecutively 

(with the exception of the paraphernalia charge), Appellant received an 

aggregate sentence of 180-360 months’ (15-30 years’) imprisonment.
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On November 22, 2021, Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions,5

which the trial court denied on March 22, 2022. On April 18, 2022, Appellant 

filed timely notices of appeal and subsequently complied with the trial court’s 

direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal (stated 

verbatim):

1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally insufficient 

to establish that [Appellant’s] actions/inaction was a direct 

cause of death where the Commonwealth’s expert opined that 

the cause of death was mixed drug toxicity?

2. Whether [Appellant’s] conviction for Involuntary Manslaughter 

was against the weight of the evidence where the 

Commonwealth’s theory at trial was the deceased child 

accidentally ingested two separate narcotics? In the 

alternative, Bennett’s failure to render aid (which is belied by 

the record) was not a direct cause of the child’s death from 

multiple drug toxicity and the verdict shocks one’s sense of 

justice?

3. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing outside the

aggravated range was manifestly and unduly harsh as the 

sentencing scheme employed by the Court on all convictions 

was tantamount to a sentence for third-degree murder – a 

charge Appellant was acquitted of by the jury. Especially in 

light of the fact that the for-profit narcotics dealer 

([Appellant’s] co-defendant at trial) was given substantially 

less time for a more serious conviction)?

Appellant’s Brief, at 8 (renumbered for ease of review).

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5 Appellant’s post-sentence motions were timely filed on Monday, November 

22, 2021. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (whenever the last day of any ... period 

shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday..., such 

day shall be omitted from the computation).
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In the first two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency and weight 

of the evidence supporting his conviction for involuntary manslaughter. We 

begin by noting the difference between sufficiency and weight claims:

The distinction between a claim challenging the sufficiency of 

evidence and a claim challenging the weight of evidence is critical.

A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary 

to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the verdict but claims that “notwithstanding 

all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to 

ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to 

deny justice.” A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, 

however, asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support at 

least one material element of the crime for which Appellant has 

been convicted.

Commonwealth v. Arias, __A.3d __, 2022 PA Super 202 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 258 (Pa.Super. 2003) 

(citation omitted)).

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our 

standard of review is as follows:

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must 

determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all 

elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 

133 (Pa.Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact 

finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141 (Pa. Super. 

2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it 

links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Moreno, supra at 136.

Commonwealth v. Juray, 275 A.3d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citations 

omitted).
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The Crimes Code provides that an individual “is guilty of involuntary

manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a 

reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless 

or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2504(a). In other words, “involuntary manslaughter requires 1) a 

mental state of either recklessness or gross negligence[,] and 2) a causal 

nexus between the conduct of the accused and the death of the victim.”

Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 151 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 A.2d 801, 806 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

Specifically, Appellant limits his sufficiency challenge to argue that there 

was insufficient evidence that his conduct was a legal cause of Child’s death. 

As the autopsy revealed that Child’s cause of death was mixed substance 

toxicity, Appellant claims the prosecution failed to show how Child 

simultaneously ingested both meth and buprenorphine and could not prove 

which drug ultimately was the cause of Child’s death. 

As to the meth, Appellant denies that Child accessed his stash of meth

as he testified that he did not leave his meth unattended. With respect to the 

buprenorphine, Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to present 

any evidence as to how Child accessed this drug. Further, Appellant argues 

that Child could not have ingested Subutex, the brand of buprenorphine 

Appellant was prescribed as Child did not have naloxone in her system. 

In addition, while Appellant admits that he failed to seek emergency 

assistance for Child when he found her lifeless on the morning of January 6, 
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2018, he asserts there is no evidence that the delay in contacting medical 

personnel resulted in Child’s death.

In reviewing similar claims, this Court has held that:

“It is undisputed that the Commonwealth must prove a direct

causal relationship between the acts of a defendant and the 

victim's death.” Commonwealth v. Long, 425 Pa.Super. 170, 

624 A.2d 200, 203 (1993). “Criminal responsibility is properly 

assessed against one whose conduct was a direct and substantial 

factor producing the death.” Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 835 

A.2d 801, 807 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citing Commonwealth v.

Nicotra, 425 Pa.Super. 600, 625 A.2d 1259, 1260 (1993)). “This 

is true even though ‘other factors combined with that conduct to 

achieve the result.’” Id. Additionally:

In order to impose criminal liability, causation must be direct 

and substantial. Defendants should not be exposed to a loss 

of liberty based on the tort standard which only provides 

that the event giving rise to the injury is a substantial factor. 

Although typically the tort concept refers to only substantial 

and not to direct and substantial as in the criminal context, 

the additional language in the criminal law does not provide 

much guidance. Therefore, criminal causation has come to 

involve a case-by-case social determination; i.e., is it just 

or fair under the facts of the case to expose the defendant 

to criminal sanctions. In other words, was the defendant's 

conduct so directly and substantially linked to the actual 

result as to give rise to imposition of criminal liability or was 

the actual result so remote and attenuated that it would be 

unfair to hold the defendant responsible for it?

Commonwealth v. Rementer, 410 Pa.Super. 9, 598 A.2d 1300, 

1304–05 (1991). “In seeking to define the requirement that a 

criminal defendant's conduct be a direct factor in the death of 

another, the courts of this Commonwealth have held that ‘so long 

as the defendant's conducted started the chain of causation which 

led to the victim's death, criminal responsibility for the crime of 

homicide may properly be found.’” McCloskey, 835 A.2d at 808 

(citing Nicotra, supra).

***
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“[I]t has never been the law of this Commonwealth that 

criminal responsibility must be confined to a sole or 

immediate cause of death.” Commonwealth v. Skufca, 457 

Pa. 124, 321 A.2d 889, 894 (1974) (citation omitted). “Criminal 

responsibility is properly assessed against one whose 

conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing 

the death even though other factors combined with that 

conduct to achieve the result.” Id.

Fabian, 60 A.3d at 152 (emphasis added).

Our review of the record in this case shows the Commonwealth met its 

burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant’s conduct was a 

direct and substantial factor in causing Child’s death. While Child’s autopsy 

results revealed Child’s cause of death was mixed substance toxicity of meth 

and buprenorphine, Appellant and Higgins admitted they regularly possessed 

and used both of these substances in the home they shared with Child.

More specifically, Appellant and Higgins admitted that they purchased 

and used meth on the evening of January 5, 2018, just hours before Child was 

found lifeless in her bed. Appellant and Higgins conceded that their seller, 

Mower, cut a large amount of meth on their kitchen table, an area accessible 

to Child. Although Appellant and Higgins asserted that Child was behind a 

baby gate when the meth was delivered, they admitted that after Child was 

placed in her bedroom that night to go to sleep, Child could leave her bedroom 

and was not restricted from entering the kitchen.

With respect to Child’s ingestion of buprenorphine, Appellant asserts 

that Child must have accessed Higgins’s Suboxone tablets (and not Appellant’s

Subutex tablets) as toxicology reports showed that Child did not have 
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naloxone in her system. However, this argument is based on Appellant’s faulty 

premise that Subutex contains naloxone and Suboxone does not. In reality,

as suggested by its name, Suboxone contains naloxone and buprenorphine, 

whereas Subutex is merely buprenorphine. As such, this contention actually 

works against the defense as the absence of naloxone in the toxicology reports 

would suggest that Child ingested Subutex, the brand of buprenorphine 

prescribed to Appellant.6

Despite the fact that no individual witnessed Child ingesting meth or 

buprenorphine before her death, the jury was free to consider the 

circumstantial evidence to conclude that Child accessed these substances that 

were in Appellant’s possession and control. Appellant admitted that there were 

no other sources of meth other than the amount he and Higgins purchased 

from Mower that evening. 

Appellant’s claim that Child could not have accessed the drugs in his 

“stash” is belied by the record. In addition to the fact that Appellant and 

Higgins may have left drug residue on the kitchen table the night before Child 

ingested meth, Higgins had confronted Appellant on multiple prior occasions 

when he recklessly left drugs and paraphernalia in areas accessible to her 

children and Higgins had expressed concern for their safety. Appellant 

____________________________________________

6 Nevertheless, the absence of naloxone in Child’s blood is not dispositive as 

forensic toxicologists testified that naloxone is often not measured in testing 

as it may be present in amounts too small to detect. Moreover, Appellant and 

Higgins shared their buprenorphine prescriptions with each other.
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admitted that he used his drugs in multiple areas of the house whereas Higgins 

claimed she confined her drug use to her bedroom.

Moreover, other circumstantial evidence points to Appellant’s culpability 

including the fact that he was the individual who put the children to bed on 

January 5, 2018. Appellant wanted the children to go to bed so that he and 

Higgins could do meth and have sexual intercourse. While Appellant told police 

that Higgins remained in her bedroom from the night of January 5th and the

majority of the day on January 6th, Appellant conceded that he did not sleep 

the entire night, turned off Higgins’s alarm in the morning, and told her he 

would take care of the children.

Appellant’s phone contained videos that showed he found Child 

unresponsive in the morning of January 6th. While his internet search history 

revealed inquiries about child CPR, Appellant did not seek emergency care to

help Child. Instead, after finding Child in this state, Appellant left the home 

on two occasions to purchase more meth and fast food. Appellant admitted he 

did not tell Higgins about Child’s condition, which Higgins did not discover until 

the evening of January 6th, after which she called 9-1-1. 

Further, first responders discovered Child in a scene that had been 

manipulated since the recording of the videos on Appellant’s phone that 

morning. Child’s clothes had been changed and stuffed animals had been 

staged on her bed, which did not have any sheets.

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude that there was sufficient 
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evidence to allow the jury to infer that Appellant’s reckless conduct caused 

Child’s death. Therefore, there is no merit to his sufficiency challenge.

Appellant also claims his involuntary manslaughter conviction is not 

supported by the weight of the evidence. Our standard of review for challenges 

to the weight of the evidence is well-established:

The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie 

in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support. 

Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial 

court has acted within the limits of its discretion.

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the 

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere 

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts 

would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of 

the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them 

or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a

weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review 

applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a 

review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question 

of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Windslowe, 158 A.3d 698, 712 (Pa.Super. 2017)

(citations omitted).

In raising this claim on appeal, Appellant simply asks this Court to find 

the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant does not 

cite to this Court’s standard of review in evaluating whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his challenge to the weight of the evidence.

In a recent decision, a panel of his Court in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 

259 A.3d 539, 541 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, 280 A.3d 866 (Pa. 2022), 
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found that the appellant did not properly mount an abuse-of-discretion attack 

against the trial court's decision to deny his challenge to the weight of the 

evidence, when the appellant failed to cite the correct standard review and 

“demonstrate how the trial court's ruling overrode the law, was manifestly 

unreasonable, or the product of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality.” Id. at 

542. As such, this Court was dismissed the weight claim as the appellant did 

not show that an abuse of discretion had occurred.

Similarly, in this case, Appellant does not acknowledge the distinction 

between the standards of review applied by trial courts and appellate courts 

to claims challenging the weight of the evidence. Appellant simply asks this 

Court to set aside the jury’s verdict, which he characterizes as “so contrary to 

the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Appellant’s Brief, at 32.

However, we may not conduct a de novo review of whether the jury’s 

verdict shocked the trial court’s conscience, but must defer to the trial court’s 

discretion. As Appellant has made no attempt to assess whether the trial court 

abused its discretion, we must dismiss his challenge to the weight of the 

evidence as meritless.

Lastly, Appellant claims that the trial court’s sentencing scheme, which 

included multiple consecutive sentences in the aggravated range of the 

guidelines, was manifestly and unduly harsh. In reviewing challenges to the 

trial court’s sentencing discretion, we are mindful that:

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Prior to reaching the 

merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[, w]e conduct a four-
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part analysis to determine: (1) whether appellant has filed a 

timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether 

the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to 

reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) 

whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa.Super. 2018) 

(quotation marks, some citations, and emphasis omitted). 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved numerous

sentencing claims in a timely post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief contains 

a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in which he asserts that the trial 

court (1) imposed aggravated range sentences without considering mitigating 

factors and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs, and (2) ran multiple sentences at 

the top of the guideline ranges consecutively. Appellant’s Brief, at 16-17.

In addition, to obtain review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects 

of a sentence, the appellant must raise also raise a substantial question that 

the sentence violates either the Sentencing Code or any fundamental 

sentencing norm. Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 A.3d 391, 401 (Pa.Super. 

2018). We make the substantial-question determination based on the 

contents of the Rule 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 

A.2d 617, 621-22 n. 14 (Pa. 2002) (noting that an “appellate court decides

whether to review the discretionary portions of a sentence by reviewing the 

Rule 2119(f) statement”) (emphasis and citation omitted).
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This Court has held that a claim that the trial court imposed an 

aggravated range sentence without consideration of mitigating circumstances 

raises a substantial question for our review. Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 

828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc). In addition, this Court has 

found that “a substantial question exists when the issue is whether the

decision to sentence consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what 

appears upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal 

conduct[.]” Commonwealth v. Bankes, ___A.3d___, 2022 PA Super 212 

(Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gonzalez-DeJusus, 994 A.2d 

595, 598-99 (Pa.Super. 2010)).

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant's claim that the trial 

court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors upon 

fashioning its aggravated range sentences along with his challenge to the 

imposition of his consecutive sentences as unduly excessive, each raises a 

substantial question. Thus, we proceed to address the merits of his sentencing 

claims.7 Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 340 (Pa.Super. 2015). 

Our standard of review of a sentencing claim is as follows:

____________________________________________

7 Appellant also baldly claims that the trial court’s sentence is excessive when 

compared to (1) the sentence given to his co-defendant, Keogh and (2) the 

penalty for a third-degree murder conviction for which Appellant was 

acquitted. Appellant did not raise these claims in his Rule 2119(f) statement 

or develop analysis to support his arguments on appeal. We find these claims 

waived for lack of development. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736 

(Pa.Super. 2014) (“[a]s Appellant has cited no legal authorities nor developed 

any meaningful analysis, we find this issue waived for lack of development”).
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa.Super. 2006).

Pursuant to Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, courts

“shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call for 

confinement that is consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of 

the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the 

community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9721(b). “[T]he court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open 

court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the 

sentence imposed.” Id. Nevertheless, “[a] sentencing court need not 

undertake a lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or 

specifically reference the statute in question.” Commonwealth v. Crump, 

995 A.2d 1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

Rather, the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court’s 

consideration of the facts of the case and the defendant’s character. Id. “In 

particular, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his

age, personal characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation.” 

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002).
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Appellant’s claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors 

and his need for rehabilitation is belied by the record. Notably, the trial court

had the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report prior to 

sentencing. “[W]here the trial court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is 

presumed that the court is aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and 

considerations, and that where the court has been so informed, its discretion 

should not be disturbed.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 

(Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). In addition, we can assume the court was 

aware of the relevant information regarding Appellant’s character and weighed 

those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors. Commonwealth 

v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

The sentencing transcript also shows that the trial court noted on the 

record that it had considered multiple mitigating factors such as Appellant’s 

“substance use history, criminal history, employment history, his version of 

events, and the many letters of support that were provided.” N.T. Sentencing, 

11/10/21, at 50. The trial court specifically noted the following:

[Appellant], I do think that the fact you have so many individuals 

who have taken the time to write me very thoughtful[,] caring 

letters, leads me to believe when this is all over you have a loving, 

supportive family and community to return to, and that I urge you 

to rely on the strength of these individuals as you continue to deal 

with the consequences of your behavior. 

Id. at 59-60.
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The trial court also recognized Appellant’s need for rehabilitation as it 

noted Appellant was “in the throes of his addiction” when he arranged two 

drug transactions after finding Child was unresponsive instead of contacting 

emergency personnel. Id. In imposing the sentence, the trial court directed 

that Appellant submit to a drug and alcohol assessment and undergo 

treatment and periodic testing as a condition of the sentence.

In its decision denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion, the trial court 

recognized Appellant had admitted to participating in two drug transactions 

after Child’s death and expressed remorse. However, the trial court noted that 

Appellant in his trial testimony had attempted to minimize his role in Child’s 

death and had not been fully truthful even when presented with the 

prosecution’s evidence.

We also reject Appellant’s claim that the trial court’s sentencing scheme 

was “manifestly and unduly harsh” in that it chose to impose multiple 

aggravated range sentences and run them consecutively. It is well established 

that the trial court has discretion to impose its sentences consecutively or 

concurrently to other sentences being imposed at the same time or to

sentences already imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a); Commonwealth v. 

Wright, 832 A.2d 1104, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (recognizing that “the trial 

[court] may determine whether, given the facts of a particular case, a 

sentence should run consecutive to or concurrent with another sentence being 

imposed”). 
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This Court has declined to disturb a consecutive sentencing scheme 

unless the aggregate sentence is “grossly disparate” to the defendant's 

conduct, or “viscerally appear[s] as patently unreasonable.” GonzalezDejusus, 994 A.2d at 599.

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that it was reasonable for 

the trial court to run Appellant’s individual aggravated range sentences 

consecutively to impose an aggregate term of 15-30 years’ imprisonment. The 

trial court considered the gravity of Appellant’s offenses and their impact on 

the victim and the community. The untimely death of three-year old Child 

“turned her family’s lives upside down” in the “most horrific set of 

circumstances anyone could ever envision having to live through.” N.T. 

11/10/21, at 45; Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 3/21/22, at 44-45.

The trial court explained its rationale for imposing aggravated range 

sentences:

[Appellant,] I have sentenced you in this way. Some of these 

sentences are at the top of the standard range – top of the 

aggravated range. I need for you to understand that I made this 

determination based on the evidence I heard. A little girl died on 

your watch.

The single most damning and disturbing piece of evidence that I 

saw, and I would suggest, perhaps, the jury say, was the video 

that you likely were not aware you took or probably would have 

tried to get rid of it, of you entering [Child’s] bedroom, trying to 

wake her by slapping her, and then leaving.

A period of time elapsed, 12 hours, during which that little girl laid 

on her bed. I don’t know if she was already dead when you tried 

to slap her or if she was in a severely compromised state, but 

what I do know is that for that period of time between you
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entering her bedroom and finding her in that state and her mother 

eventually calling 911, you did nothing.

You may have performed searches, and there was evidence to 

suggest you performed searches on the internet to figure out how 

to resuscitate her, but you never called people who could have 

helped.

Instead, in the throes of your addiction, you arranged two 

separate drug deliveries. I find that to be cold, callous, hardhearted, and the kind of behavior of someone who is completely 

devoid of any ability to provide care of a child.

These are the circumstances. I also saw evidence of a series of 

bruises, text messages from [Child’s] mother to you, that lead me 

to believe that [Child] was subjected to abusive behavior over a 

course of conduct. 

So these are the reasons I’m imposing the sentence that I have 

imposed.

N.T., 11/10/21, at 58-60.

We conclude that Appellant’s aggregate sentence of 15 to 30 years’ 

imprisonment is not patently unreasonable or grossly disparate to the criminal 

conduct proven in this case. We also decline to find that the trial court was 

required to give Appellant a volume discount for the numerous crimes for 

which he was convicted. See Commonwealth v. Clary, 226 A.3d 571, 581 

(Pa.Super. 2020) (emphasizing that “defendants convicted of multiple 

offenses are not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on their aggregate sentence”).

Accordingly, our review of the record, party briefs, trial court opinion, 

and relevant authority uncovers no reason to disturb the trial court's discretion 

in imposing its sentence. See Shugars, supra (“[s]entencing is a matter 

vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will 

not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion”).
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For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023