2020 WI App 79

COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN

PUBLISHED OPINION

Case No.: 2019AP2034

Complete Title of Case: 

† Petition for Review filed

ANDREA TOWNSEND,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

CHARTSWAP, LLC,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.†

Opinion Filed: November 17, 2020

Submitted on Briefs: September 9, 2020

Oral Argument: 

JUDGES: Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.

Concurred:

Dissented:

Appellant

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, the cause was submitted on the brief 

of Robert J. Welcenbach of Welcenbach Law Offices, S.C., Milwaukee, 

Scott Borison of Legg Law Firm LLC, Frederick, MD, and John Craig 

Jones of Jones & Hill, LLC, Oakdale, LA. 

Respondent

ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendant-respondent, the cause was submitted on the 

brief of Andrew J. Wronski and Anne-Louise T. Mittal of Foley & 

Lardner LLP of Milwaukee. 
2020 WI App 79

COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

November 17, 2020

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2019AP2034 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV9938

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

ANDREA TOWNSEND,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

CHARTSWAP, LLC,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County: 

PAUL R. VAN GRUNSVEN, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.

Before Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ. 

¶1 DONALD, J. Andrea Townsend appeals an order of the circuit 

court dismissing her action against ChartSwap, LLC. At issue on appeal is 
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2

whether ChartSwap may be held liable for violating WIS. STAT.

§ 146.83(3f)(b) (2017-18),

1 which limits the amount that a health care provider 

can charge for furnishing copies of patient care records. Upon review, we reverse 

and remand. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 4, 2018, Townsend filed a class action complaint 

against ChartSwap alleging the fees ChartSwap charged for providing copies of 

medical records and billings exceeded statutorily imposed limits set forth in WIS.

STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b). According to the complaint, following a car accident, 

Townsend authorized her attorneys to obtain her medical records and billings from 

Milwaukee Radiologists. ChartSwap responded to the records request and 

provided a one-page certified health care bill for Townsend in the sum of $35.87. 

Townsend’s attorneys paid the fee and obtained Townsend’s records.

¶3 Townsend alleged, on behalf of herself and class members, that 

ChartSwap charged an amount in excess of the statutorily-regulated rates dictated 

by WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b), which provides:

(b) Except as provided in sub. (1f), a health care provider 

may charge no more than the total of all of the following 

that apply for providing the copies requested under par. (a):

1. For paper copies: $1 per page for the first 25 pages; 

75 cents per page for pages 26 to 50; 50 cents per page 

for pages 51 to 100; and 30 cents per page for pages 

101 and above.

 

1

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise 

noted.
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2. For microfiche or microfilm copies, $1.50 per page.

3. For a print of an X-ray, $10 per image.

4. If the requester is not the patient or a person 

authorized by the patient, for certification of copies, a 

single $8 charge.

5. If the requester is not the patient or a person 

authorized by the patient, a single retrieval fee of $20 

for all copies requested.

6. Actual shipping costs and any applicable taxes.

The complaint alleged that ChartSwap was subject to the same statutory 

regulations as the health care provider, here, Milwaukee Radiologists. The 

complaint also alleged a claim of unjust enrichment.2

¶4 ChartSwap moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that WIS. STAT.

§ 146.83(3f)(b) applies only to “health care providers,” “a term that the healthrecords statute defines as comprising 26 discrete categories of individual health 

care providers, associations of individual health care providers, and licensed health 

care facilities.” 

¶5 The circuit court granted ChartSwap’s motion to dismiss. Relying 

on a decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Wisconsin, Smith v. RecordQuest, LLC, 380 F. Supp. 3d 838 (E.D. Wis. 2019), 

the circuit court found that WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b) does not impose liability on 

entities that are not health care providers even when they act as agents of health

 

2

 Because we reverse on the grounds that ChartSwap is subject to WIS. STAT.

§ 146.83(3f)(b), we need not address the issue of unjust enrichment on appeal. See State v. 

Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (We address cases on the 

narrowest possible grounds.).
No. 2019AP2034

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care providers. In other words, the circuit court found that ChartSwap “cannot be 

liable simply by virtue of being an agent of Milwaukee Radiologists.” 

¶6 This appeal follows. 

DISCUSSION

¶7 Our review of a circuit court’s order granting a defendant’s motion 

to dismiss is de novo. See Beloit Liquidating Tr. v. Grade, 2004 WI 39, ¶17, 270 

Wis. 2d 356, 677 N.W.2d 298. Here, the motion to dismiss turns on a question of

statutory interpretation, an issue we also review independently of the circuit court. 

See Juneau Cnty. v. Associated Bank, N.A., 2013 WI App 29, ¶15, 346 Wis. 2d 

264, 828 N.W.2d 262. “The purpose of statutory interpretation is to discern the 

intent of the legislature. When we interpret a statute, we begin with the statute’s 

plain language, as we assume the legislature’s intent is expressed in the words it 

used.” Id., ¶16 (internal citation omitted). In addition, “[w]e interpret statutory 

language in the context in which it is used, [and] in relation to the language of 

surrounding or closely-related statutes[.]” Id. If this process of interpretation 

yields a plain meaning, the statute is unambiguous, and we apply its plain 

meaning. See State v. Harmon, 2006 WI App 214, ¶10, 296 Wis. 2d 861, 723 

N.W.2d 732.

¶8 Access to patient health care records is governed by WIS. STAT.

§ 146.83. Under subsection (3f), a health care provider shall provide copies of a 

patient’s health care records “if a person requests copies of a patient’s health care 

records, provides informed consent, and pays the applicable fees under par. (b)[.]” 

Id. As stated above, paragraph (b) imposes certain limits on costs imposed by 

health care providers. The term “health care provider” applies to specifically-
No. 2019AP2034

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trained medical professionals and does not specifically apply to medical records 

providers or medical billing agencies. See WIS. STAT. § 146.81. 

¶9 ChartSwap argues that because it is not a health care provider, it is 

not subject to the billing limitations set forth by WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b). 

ChartSwap’s argument, however, ignores a key maxim of statutory construction, 

which is that statutory provisions are not to be read in isolation, but must “be 

looked at so as not to render any portion of the statute superfluous ... [and so as] to 

avoid an unreasonable or absurd interpretation.” Belding v. DeMoulin, 2013 WI 

App 26, ¶6, 346 Wis. 2d 160, 828 N.W.2d 890 (citation omitted). 

¶10 With this maxim in mind, we are unwilling to read WIS. STAT.

§ 146.83 in a vacuum. Instead, we read this statute in conjunction with the 

remedial provision set forth in WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(b), which explicitly 

imposes liability upon “any person ... who violates [§] 146.83,” and WIS. STAT.

§ 990.001(9), which expressly states that when construing legislative requirements 

found in all statutes, the legislature’s requirements apply with equal force to the 

acts of agents. While we agree that ChartSwap is not a health care provider, we 

cannot ignore statutory agency law, which states:

In construing Wisconsin laws the following rules shall be 

observed unless construction in accordance with a rule 

would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent 

of the legislature:

....

Acts by agents. If a statute requires an act to be done 

which may legally be done by an agent, such requirement 

includes all such acts when done by an authorized agent.
No. 2019AP2034

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Sec. 990.001(9). This statute reflects the general principle of agency law that if a 

statute requires a certain action, the requirement equally applies to a principal’s 

agents.

¶11 Relying on a decision of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin in Smith, ChartSwap contends that this principle is 

inapplicable to the case at bar. 

¶12 Smith dealt with a similar factual situation to the one before us. In 

that case, the district court stated that while WIS. STAT. § 990.001(9) 

imputes the agent’s actions to the principal for purposes of 

measuring the principal’s liability under a Wisconsin law; it 

does not impute the principal’s liability to the agent 

whenever the agent performs the act that results in the 

principal’s liability. Thus, the rule does not support the 

[notion] that the health[]records statute should be 

interpreted to impose liability on persons who are not 

health care providers when they act as agents of health care 

providers. 

Smith, 380 F. Supp. 3d at 844.

¶13 We note, first, that the district court’s decision is not binding upon 

us. See State v. Mechtel, 176 Wis. 2d 87, 94-95, 499 N.W.2d 662 (1993). More 

importantly, however, the district court’s decision not only undermines the 

underlying purpose of WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b), which is to protect patients 

from being charged excessive fees for access to information in the custody and 

control of health care providers, but it also misinterprets WIS. STAT. § 990.001(9) 

because the statute does not specifically deal with the imputation of liability. 

Rather, the statute codifies the general rule of agency law, which is that if a statute 

requires a certain action, that requirement applies equally to a principal’s agents.

See Rosecky v. Tomaszewski, 225 Wis. 438, 441-42, 274 N.W. 259 (1937) 
No. 2019AP2034

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(“[W]hen a statute requires an act to be done which may by law as well be done by 

an agent as by the principal, such requisition shall be construed to include all such 

acts when done by an agent.... [T]he reason for [the predecessor statute to 

§ 990.001(9)] ... is that the act of an authorized agent is the act of the principal.”). 

Accordingly, we conclude that agents of health care providers have no greater 

power to charge fees in excess of those permitted by § 146.83(3f)(b) than the 

providers themselves.

¶14 Here, Milwaukee Radiologists outsourced its responsibility to 

provide patient records to ChartSwap. To allow a third-party to circumvent the 

statutory limitation on health care providers simply because it does not provide 

actual health care services would defeat the purpose of WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b) 

in and of itself and would yield absurd results. The intent of the legislature was to 

ensure that patients have access to medical records in the custody and control of 

health care providers without being charged more than the reasonable costs of 

copying and mailing them. See Moya v. Aurora Healthcare, Inc., 2017 WI 45, 

¶34, 375 Wis. 2d 38, 894 N.W.2d 405 (Statutes addressing patient health care 

records embody the “legislature’s expressed intent that a person with a written 

authorization from a patient does not have to pay the certification charge or 

retrieval fee for obtaining health care records.”); Cruz v. All Saints Healthcare 

Sys., Inc., 2001 WI App 67, ¶8, 242 Wis. 2d 432, 625 N.W.2d 344 

(Section 146.83 expresses the legislature’s intent that a person is entitled to obtain 

his or her medical records at a reasonable cost.). This intent would be completely 

defeated through a construction of the statute that would allow patients to be 

charged more than the reasonable copying and mailing costs if the providers hire 

others to perform the task of supplying the records. In short, the goal of patient 
No. 2019AP2034

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protection would be eviscerated if health care providers could simply contract with 

parties who were permitted to charge fees of their own liking. 

¶15 Therefore, we conclude that ChartSwap was subject to the cost 

containment protections provided by WIS. STAT. § 146.83(3f)(b), and, as an agent 

of Milwaukee Radiologists under WIS. STAT. § 990.001(9), qualifies as “any 

person” under the remedial provisions of WIS. STAT. § 146.84(1)(b). We reverse 

the order of the circuit court and remand the matter.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded.