## In the Court of Appeal s Second Appellate Di stri ct of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 21

- 00278

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 393rd District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. 19

- 07 07

- 431

Before Wo mack, Wallach, and Walker, J J. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack 

### I N THE 

### I NTEREST OF 

### B.A., B .W., AND 

### B.W., C H ILDREN2 MEMORANDUM OPINIO N
I. I NTRODUCTION Ap pell ant C.H. (

Mother ) appeals the trial court ’ s order terminating h er parental rights to her child ren B. A. ( Ba rbara ) , B .W. ( Bella ), and B. W

. (

Bristol ) (collectively the
Children )

. 1 In her sole issue on appe al, Mot her argues that sh e was depr ived of due
process as a result of the actions and comments of the trial judge who presided over the early part of this case (the former trial jud ge)

. S he all ege s that the former trial judge was bias ed and pre judice d , that h e advocat ed on behalf of the Depart ment o f Family and Prot ective Services (the Department) , and that his sua sp onte finding of aggravated circums tances denied her the opportunit y to e ngage in se rvices and deprived her of due proce ss . Because Mother failed to object at the trial

- court level to the complaints she no w raises on appeal , and because the case was transferred from the former trial judge to a different trial judge ( of w hom Mot her makes no complaint)
who pres ided ov er a jur y trial that cul minated in the termination of Mother ’ s paren tal rights, we hold that Mother ’ s complaint is not preserved for our review. Thus, we will
affirm.

1 We use alias es to ref e r to t he C h ild ren and th eir parents

. See Tex. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 109.0 02( d); Tex

. R. App. P. 9.8( b)(2)

.3 II
. B ACKGROUND
A. Invest igation and R emoval
Mother an d B.A. (B rad

) are the parent s of Bar bara

. Mother and L.W. ( Levi) are the parents of Bella and Bristol. 2 The Department became involved with Mother in Ju ne 2018, following a
domestic incident in w hich Levi was alleged to have “ pull[ed] a gun ” on M o ther. In August 2018 , t he Department again became involved with Mother after a domest ic

violence incident be tween Levi and Mother that occurred while Barbara and Bella
were present. As part of that investigation, Mother and Barbara wer e sent for drug testing ; Barbara tested positive for cocaine ; and M other testified positive for marijuana. 3 The Department referred the case to Family

- Based Safety Services, 4 and
Barbara and B ella were placed with their maternal gra ndmothe r. 5

2 Brad voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to Barbara, and Levi voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to Bella an d Bristol. The t r ial court terminated B rad ’ s and Levi ’ s respect ive pare nt al rights based on those relinquishments. B rad and Levi do not appeal.

3 Barbara was five at the time of the drug test

.

4 Family

- Based Safety S e rvices “ is a CPS program that works w it h parent s to tr y t o keep children in the home. ” In re D.C. , No. 05

- 19

- 01217

- CV, 2020 WL 1042692 , at *1 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Mar. 4, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ; see 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 700.7 10.

5 Bris tol had not been born at this time.4

In January 2019, the Department re moved Bar bara and Be lla following a third
domest ic

- v io lence incident at Mother ’ s apartment that occurred while Bella was present. That same month, the D epartment filed its petition to ter minate Mother ’ s
pa rental rights to Barbara and Bell a, and the case w as a ssi gned to the former trial judge. B. The Monitored Return, the Car Accident During the Period of the Mon itored Return, and the Subsequent R e moval
In November 2019, a differ ent tri al judge or dered a monitored return of
Barbara and Bella to Mother. Two months later , Mother was driving approximately

s eventy miles per hour when he r car rear

- ended another vehicle. Barbara was in the
back seat of Mother ’ s c ar at t he time of the acci dent, and Barbara was not in a car s eat and was not we aring a seatbelt. Barbara was taken to the ho spital after the acciden t, where she was treated for a fractured arm and a vaginal tear.
Medical person nel opined t hat Barbara ’ s vaginal tear was not caused by the car
acci dent but that it was consistent with sexual abuse. M other initially refused to allow
Bar bara to be examined by a sexual assau l t nurse examiner (SANE) , maintaining th at Barbara ’ s injury was not caused by sexual abuse

. When a SANE examin ation wa s later attempted, the SANE nurse was unable to complete the eva luation due to the
sti tches and sutures in Barbara ’ s vaginal ar ea. During a forensic interview after t he car accident, Barbara told the interviewer
that “ she did not know if anyone had touche d her private areas

. ” Barbara also told5

the i nterview er that M other had allowed her to dr ink a n alcoholic dri nk while they
were l ying in bed one night. Mother denied ever giving Bar bara alc ohol. The
Children ’s foster mother , however, later recounted an occa sion whe n she had given
Barbara a water bo ttle, Barbara had bec o me upset , and Barb ara had told the foster
mother , “I don ’t w ant to drink fuzzy drink.

. . . [S]ometimes I drink fuzzy drink when I go to bad places. ” The foster mother also recounted that Barbara had told her, “[Mother] said I have to say my sti t che s are from the car a ccident. ” A few days after the car accident, the Depa rtment removed Barbara and Bella
from Mother ’ s care, and the former trial judge set a po st

- r emoval adversary hearing for February 2020. The Department also filed a new case re ques ting the termination
of Mother ’ s paren tal rig hts to Bristol

— who had been born in September 2019

— and
it removed Bristol from Mother ’ s care
. In the week following her removal, Br istol was exhibiting irritability, fussiness,
inconsola bilit

y , heavy sweating, and tr e mors. As descri bed by the Children ’ s foster mother, Bristol “ scream [ed] uncontrollably for a period of ten hours at one point. ”
Bristol was taken to Children ’ s Medical Center in Dallas , w here she was diag nosed with drug withdrawa l and where she s tayed f or three days

. C. The Complained

- Of Adversary Hearing Before the Former Trial Judge A post

- re moval adversary hearing took place before the former trial ju dge over two days in February 2020. The complaints Mother makes now on a ppeal s tem from6

c ertain acti ons and comments may by the former trial judge at the po st

- removal adversary hearing. 1. Interrogation of Witne sses Mother complain s that at th e hearing, the former trial judge “ activel y inter rogated witnesses and [Mothe r ] herse lf, effect

iv ely advocating for the Department. ” Mother points to four examples of this alleged interrogation o f
witnesses. First, Mother po ints to qu estions t hat the former trial judge asked d uring
Mother ’ s c ross

- examination of a nurse , after the nurse test ified th at one of the
Children had test ed positive for COVID

- 19 : [The Former Trial Jud ge ]: I ’ m sorr y, but I have to know

. Do yo u all not ask, under those circumstances, ask questions about whether

— obviously the child may not have traveled to China or a count ry where that virus has or iginated, but ask about interna tional travel and cont ac t that m ay have led to the child being expos ed? [The Witness]: Always. That ’ s actually

— [The Former T rial Judge ]: Did you

— [The Witness ]: That ’ s actual ly prompted, and we do assess those. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Did you f ind anything out in th at regard? [ The Witness ]: There was no trave l. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Huh? [ The Witness ]: There was no international travel. Is that what you are

—7

[The F ormer Trial Jud ge ]: Right. No reason to believe the child was exposed th rough someone else ’ s i nte rnation al travel? [The Witness]: Correct. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Is that virus now randomly occur ring? [The Witness]: There are hundreds of strains of Coronavirus, s o this is basically a cold. So this is not the stra in th at we see in China. S o t hat ’ s

— [The Former Trial Judge ]: I though t this was like a sudden Ebola outbreak. [Mother ’ s Attorney] : No, Your Honor. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Forgiv e us. Us lawye rs are not real smart. [T he Witness ]: When I saw that pop up, I thought, wow, s he ’ s not s ick. But it shows she had an exposu re. [The Former Trial Judge ]: All I could think about is ho w in the world is this infant being exposed to Cor ona virus. Did not k now that . Thank you. [The Witn e ss ]: No. This is just basically a common col d. [The F ormer Trial Judge ]: I will resume b eing blissfully ignorant. Second, Mothe r points to the following exchange that o ccurred during the Department ’ s examination of o ne of its investig ator s , who was testifying about
conversati ons with M other regarding the car accident : [The Former Trial Judge ]: I ’ m sorry, then I got to interrupt. You said just a little while ago that [Mother] reported to you that [Bar bara] was in t he back seat. [The Witness ]: S o t he even ing of the incident she was in the b ack seat because they were on their way to get the four

- year

- old. And the other8

two childre n were still in daycare. I ’ m not sure as to wh y she wasn ’ t in a car sea t at that time , b ut the explanation was the ot her

— [The Former Trial Judge ]: Okay. I ’ m ju st trying to make sure I ’ m not

— I ’ ve heard you reference back and fron t both now. [The W itne ss ]: Yes. [The Former Trial Judge ]: So are you saying that she told y ou generally t hat [Bar bara] will r ide in the f ron t seat, but at the time of the accident [Ba r bara] was in the back sea t? [The Witness ]: That ’ s correct. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Ok ay. Because the other chil dren weren ’ t in the car with them? [The Witn ess ]: They we re not, yes. [The Former Trial Jud ge ]: T hank you for clarifying. Third, Mother points to several questions that the former trial judge asked
Mo ther following the Department ’ s redirect examination of her

. The complaine d

- of questions inc l uded q uestions re garding Mother ’ s marita l status, Levi ’ s incarceration,
the identi t

y of Bristol ’ s father, whether Bristol ha d any Native American an cestry,
whethe r Barbara cried d uring the car accident, the speed Mo ther was traveling during
the car acc ide n t , whe ther she ap plied her brakes be fore the impact, the facts relating
to how B arbara got into the back seat o f the car on the day of the accident, w hether
th e base of the car seat was in the car , whether the base of the ca r seat was buckled,
and whet her Mother had ver ifi ed that Barbara was buc k led in the car on the day of
the accident.9

Fourth, Mother points to the followi ng exchange that occurred at the

con clusion of the te st

imony from the Children ’ s maternal grandmother : [The Former Trial Judge ]: Ma ’ a m , do you not rea lize that children [Barbara ’ s] age and younger are supposed to be in car seats? [The W itness ]: I did not know, because [Barbara] is not a littl e girl. I
wa s going by the weight requirement. [T he Former Trial Judge ]: So what ’ s the weig h t requirement ? [The Witness ]: 70 pounds. I swear I thought it was 70 pounds. [The Former Trial Judge ]: Where did you get that? [The Witness ]: My kids are g rown. [The Former Trial Judge ]: I wo uldn ’ t neces sar ily exp ect you to know.
2 . I nappropr iate Comments
Mo ther also complains t h at at the hearing, the former trial judge made certain comments that were inap propriate and demonst rated that he “ harbor ed a de ep

- seated antagonism towards [Mother]. ” 6 Mother poi nts to the following statement made by
the former tr ial judg e just b efore both sides gave their cl osing arguments at the hearing:

6 In its brief, the D epar tment ar g ues that the for mer trial judge made several favorable rulings to Mother an d that he also expressed “ an ger and frustration ” toward one of the Department ’ s witnesses. The Department p oints t o an exchange the former trial judge had at a la ter h earing with a Department caseworker who was testi fying as a witness , w here the former trial judge stated, “ Oh, my God, p lease answer the question. You know the answer. Give her the answer. ” Th e for mer trial judge went on to tell the caseworker , “ No , i t is not appro p riate. M y God, is it really that difficult to ad mit ? Please ask your next question. Holy crap

. ”10

At best, that day mother committed the offens e, the felo ny offense of endangering a c hild, a t best. And, at best, mother comm itted the felon y offense of injury to a child. I do n ’ t know why mother wasn ’ t arrested. I don ’ t kn ow why mother has not been charged. But I have no control over that.
Wha t I do know is that mother ’ s direct a cti ons, an d not just omissions, actions, jus tif

ied those two felony charges. And but for the gr ace of God we have not had to bury [Bar bara]. And it seems like that ’ s lost on everybody while we are arguing about sexual abuse. I don ’ t know a parent, I gue ss I shoul d say I don ’ t know a go od parent t hat wouldn ’ t , with absolute certainty, verify that t hei r child is buckled in the ba ck seat if they are going to be hopping on the highway going 70 miles an hour. No good pare nt would f ind themselves in that situ ati on. Mother also points to the following exchange that occurred when the
Chil dren ’ s foster mot her was testifying regar ding the Children ’ s prog r ess in he r care : [ The Wi tness ] : [B ristol

] is also doing well

. She didn ’ t h ave any significant medic al concern s during that ti me at all, or sinc e. She has seasonal allergi es. That ’ s kind o f the biggest med ical thing. She has some displaced an g er. She gets very angry at things and t hrow s, hits,
scream s quite oft en. She stomps her feet. Again, she is 18 months old,
so

— [ The F ormer Trial Judge ] : Have you ever met a wo man that doesn ’ t do that?
3. Sua Sponte Finding of Ag gravated Circumstances Mother also complains that at the hearing, the former t rial judge made a sua sponte finding of agg ravated circumstances which denied her th e opportunity to engage in services and denied her due p rocess. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 262.2015

. Mother claims that “ it was clear from the outset that [the former trial judge] had
alr eady de cided what he was going to do, and he would do anything to make sure that11

the results in ‘ his ’ court met with his exp ectations. ” Moth er points t o a statement made by the former trial judge at the conclusion o f the first d ay of th e heari ng, where he stated,
I think the circumstances also ma y very well lead to an aggravated circumstances finding. So I would like you to think about t h at relative to the services the Department is asking for, and whether there should even be services at all , based on findings that the Court may be able to make relative to the allegations and the evidence presented so far. Mother next poi nts to a stat emen t made by the former trial judge on the second day of th e hearing, prior to cl osing ar guments , w here he stated,
I think there s h ould be [an] aggravated circumstances finding. I don ’ t think there is any need for a service plan at this poin t. I don ’ t t hink there is any need for the Departmen t to attempt to return the children to [M] other

. I think there needs to be a jury trial se t sooner rather than later. I will entertain your argument on why I shouldn ’ t do that. That ’ s what I am inclin ed to do.
I und erstand th ere are other facto rs that extend beyond merely findin [ g ] that a par ent ha s committ ed those offenses. But what is di st urbing above all is that all this occurred, it would be one thing if this just happened, and I guess to some e xtent all par en ts are entitled to be give n some deference that they won ’ t be perfect and they w ill ma ke mistak es. B ut this all h appened at a ti me when [Mother] was under this Court ’ s scrutiny, when [Mother] was under the Department ’ s scrut iny, [the attor n ey ad litem ’ s ] sc r utiny, CASA ’ s scrutiny, at a time when she was supposed to be demonstrating t o us tha t she c a n pr ovide her children with a saf

e and stable environment. Bam. 70 mil es an hour. Could have killed that child. Makes me sick. And I don ’ t u nderstand why , ba s ed on t he evidence that has been presented, there ’ s not just an aggravated ci rcumstan ces fin d i ng and a trial set.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the former trial judge made a finding of aggravated circumstances

— e ven though the Depa rtment did no t sp ecifically request a12

finding of aggravated cir cumstances

— and he set a trial date f or June 1, 2020. Se e id

. The former trial judge later signed a written order finding aggravated circumstances against Mother.
D. The Tra n sfer to the 39 3 rd District C ourt , the Jury Trial Before the 39 3rd District Court, and the Final Te rmination Order
On J an u ary 15, 2021, 7 th e case s involving the Children w ere transferred from
the 431st District Court to the 393rd District Court “ as part of the realloc at ion of
caselo ads for the District Court s of Denton County

. ” The case involving Barbara and
Bel la was later consolidated with the case involving Bristol. In July 2021, the trial judge of t he 393rd District Court presided over a nine

day jury trial on the merits of th e De partme nt ’ s petiti on t o te rminate Mother ’ s parental rights to the C hildren

. At the c onclusion of the trial, the jury unanimously
found that Mother ’ s parental rights to the Children shou ld be termin ated und er pred icate grounds (D), (E), and ( O) an d that ter mination of her parental rights was in
the best interest of the Chil dren. See id. § 161.001. The trial judge of the 393rd
District Court later entered a final order of terminat ion con sistent with th e jury ’ s f indings. 8 Mo ther appeals fro m that termin atio n order.

7 Alt h ough trial had been set for June 1, 20 20, the trial date was continu ed du e to the COVID

- 19 pandemic

.

8 The former trial judge ’ s agg rav at ed

- circumsta n ces finding was not mentioned in the jury charge, nor was it mentioned in the final order of termination. Moreover, the trial j udge of the 393rd District Court granted M other ’ s limine request that the parties not reference the former tri al ju dge ’ s aggrav a ted

- circ umstances finding

.13 II I. D ISCUSSION In her sole issue on appeal, Mot her argues that the former trial judge was bias ed and prejudice d , that h e advocat ed on behalf of the Department , an d that h is

sua sp onte find ing of aggravated circum s tances denied h er the opport unit y to engage in services and deprived her of due proce ss . The Department counters that because Mother failed to object to any of the complained

- of actions or comme nts by the
f orme r trial judge, Mother has failed to preserve the complaints she is no w ma king on appeal. While Moth er admits that “ her appoin te d trial counsel failed to object to [ the former trial judge ’ s] unreasonable behavior and f ailed t o reque st that [ t he former trial judge ] re cuse [

himself ] , ” Mother contends that her failure to object “ d oes n ot operate as a waiver of error. ”
A. The Law on Preser

vation To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present to the trial

cou rt a timely request, obje ction, or motion that states the specific grounds for the
desired ru ling, if n ot ap parent from the request ’ s, objection ’ s, or motion ’ s context. Tex. R. App. P. 33 .1(a)(1)(A); see also Tex. R. Evid. 103(a)(1 ). If a party fails to do this, error is not pre served. Bus hell v. Dean , 803 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Tex. 1991) (op. on re h ’ g).
Wit h res pect to a complaint regarding a trial judge ’ s alleged imp roper con duct or
comments, “ [t]he claimant bears the burden to ‘ exp lain how any co mments made by the trial judge wer e incurable or would excuse ’ the claimant ’ s ‘ failure to preserve

e rr or. ’ ” In re Co mmitment of Stutev ille , 463 S.W.3d 54 3, 557 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st14

Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Fran cis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001)).
Error that fall s within the narrow category o f “ fundamental er ror ” requires no trial

- cou rt pr edicate for appe llate review. In re B.L.D. , 113 S.W.3d 340, 35 0 (Tex. 2003). Fundam ental error exists in rare instances in which e rror di rectly and adversely
affects the i ntere st of the public generally, as that interest i s declared by t he statute s or

co nstitution of our state, or instances in which the record affir mat ively and conclusively shows that the court rendering the judgment lacked subject

- matter jurisdiction. Mac

k Tru cks , Inc. v. Tam ez

, 206 S.W.3d 572, 577 (Tex. 2006).
Althou gh not frame d in terms of fu ndamental error, t he Texas Supreme Court has recognized that claims of judicial bias would not be waived by a fa i l ure to object
in t he trial court if “ the conduct or comment cannot be rendered harm less by proper
instruction. ” D ow Chem. , 46 S.W. 3d at 241. As we have explained previously, “ [t]his

‘ limited, ’ ‘ narrow, ’ and ‘ rare ’ exception to the preservation

- of

- error requirem ents in civil cases essentially requires a harm analysis

— the error ‘ probably caused the rendition of an imp ro per judgme nt ’

— t o determine if the error was incurable and, therefore, not subject to waiver. ” In re L.S. , No. 02

- 17

- 00132

- CV , 2017 WL 4172 584 ,
at *16 (Te x. App.

— Fort Worth Sept. 21, 2017, no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( first citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1); the n citing B.L .D. , 113 S.W.3d at 350

– 51; then citing In re K.R. , 63 S.W.3d 796, 799

– 800 (Tex. 2001); and t hen citing Dow Chem. , 46 S.W.3d at 24 1).15

B. Applica tion of the Law to the Facts
Here , it is undisputed that Mother did not object at the trial

- court le vel regard ing t he complaints she now makes on appeal. And Mother does not argue that
the trial court lacked subject

- m att er j urisd iction n or cont end , let alone d emonstra te,
that the former trial judg e ’ s actions and comments directly and adversely affecte d the public inte rest as declared in the statutes or constitution of our state

. See Mack Trucks , 206 S.W.3d at 577. Th us, the issue of whether Mother has preserv ed her c omplaint s

turns on whether the alleged error “ probably caused the rendition of an imp ro per judgme nt. ” L.S. , 2017 WL 4172584, at *16. Having revi ew ed the record and Mother ’ s complaints, we cannot sa y t hat the alleged error “ probably caused t he rendi tion of an improper judgment. ” See id

. The

a ctions and comments made by the former tr ial judge that M other complains of
occurred at the po st

- removal adversary hearing in February 2020

. Subsequ ent to that
h earing, the case was transferr ed to th e 393rd District Court, and the trial judge of the
393rd District Court

— not the former tr ial ju dg e
— pres ided over a nine

- day jury trial in July 2021. Mother makes no complaint regarding the trial judge of the 393 rd
Dis trict Court and no complaint r egarding the July 2021 jury trial, and Mother does not explain how the action s and comments of the form er trial judge im p acted the results of the July 2021 jury trial. 9 Indeed, the relief that Mother seeks on app eal

—

9 To the ex tent that Mother complains that the former trial judge ’ s su a sponte finding of a ggravat ed circumstances limited her ability to engage in services, we note16

t ha t we r everse the termination order a nd reman d the case back to the trial court

— seems redundant when the case was already transfe rred away f ro m the former tr

i al judge and wher e a trial befo re a different judge has already taken place

. To su pport her argument , Mother points us to L.S. , a termination c ase involving the former trial judge, where we held that the former trial judg e ’ s conduct in
th at case demonst r ated a “ deep

- seated antagonism ” against one of the parents that deprived the parent of “ a fair trial before an impartial fact

- fi nder and resulted in
f undamental and harmful er ror. ” 2017 WL 4172584 , at *21. In L.S. , we detailed

numerous in stances where t h e former trial judge demonstrated his bias again st the
parent , and we noted that the final terminat ion hearing was a bench trial before the former trial judge

. Id. at *5

– 13. We ultimately h eld th at “ [b]ased on the exceptional and singul ar facts that are clearly shown in the record here , . . . [the for mer tri al jud ge]
ceased to be a neutral and unbi ase d fact

- finder

. . . which probably resulted in the rendition of an improper judgment

. . . . ” Id. at *1. We thus reversed the order of

te rm ination and rem a nded the case for a new trial before a diffe rent tr ial judge. Id.

at *21.

that co m plaints regarding a trial court ’ s fin din g of aggravate d circumstances made in a temporary ord er are moot after rendition of a final termination order. See In re A.K. , 487 S .W.3d 6 79, 683

– 84 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2016, no pet.) ( holding that father ’ s comp laints about aggravated

- cir cumstances fi nd ings in temp o rary orders were mooted by final termi nation order); M.Z. v. Tex. Dep ’ t of Fam. & Protective Serv s. , No. 03

- 13

- 00858

- C V, 2014 WL 2191978, at *6 n.8 (Tex. App.

— Austin May 22, 201 4, no pet.) (mem. op.) ( holding that mother ’ s complain t about ag gr avated

- circu m stanc es finding in temporary order was mooted by final termination order).17

Even though L.S. involv ed the same trial judge as the one at issue here, L.S. is easily distinguishable. In L.S. , the Department ’ s termination petition was tried i n a bench trial before the former trial judge. Id. at *7 n. 11. He re, in con trast, the Department ’ s te rmination petition was tried before a jur y presided over by the trial judge for the 393rd District Court. Thus, while in L.S. we held that the former tr ial judge ’ s act

i ons and comments “ probably resulted in the r enditio n of an im proper judgment, ” we ca nn ot say the same here. Id. at *21. Accordingly, Mother has not preserved the complaints she makes on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Dow
Ch em . , 46 S.W.3d at 241; Bushe ll , 803 S.W.2d at 712; L. S. , 2017 WL 4172 584, at *1 6

. We overrule Mother ’ s sole issue.
IV. C ONCLUS ION Having overruled Mother ’ s sol e issue , we affirm the terminati on order.

/s/ Dana Womack
Da n a Womack Justice
Deli vered: January 27, 2022