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CAN THE USE OF FACTUAL DATA ANALYSIS

STRENGTHEN NATIONAL SECURITY? PART ONE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION

POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND

THE CENSUS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 6, 2003

Serial No. 108–72

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

DAN BURTON, Indiana

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

DOUG OSE, California

RON LEWIS, Kentucky

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas

WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

CHRIS BELL, Texas

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

PETER SIRH, Staff Director

MELISSA WOJCIAK, Deputy Staff Director

ROB BORDEN, Parliamentarian

TERESA AUSTIN, Chief Clerk

PHILIP M. SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS AND THE CENSUS

ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida, Chairman

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

DOUG OSE, California

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

BOB DIX, Staff Director

SCOTT KLEIN, Professional Staff Member

URSULA WOJCIECHOWSKI, Clerk

DAVID MCMILLEN, Minority Professional Staff Member

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on May 6, 2003 ................................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Loy, Admiral James L., Director, Transportation Security Administration 31

McCraw, Steve, Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau

of Investigation, accompanied by William Hooten, Deputy Executive

Assistant Director ......................................................................................... 13

Tether, Tony, Director, Defense Advance Research Project Agency, Department of Defense ..................................................................................... 46

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Clay, Hon. Wm. Lacy, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Missouri, prepared statement of .................................................................. 8

Loy, Admiral James L., Director, Transportation Security Administration,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 34

McCraw, Steve, Assistant Director, Office of Intelligence, Federal Bureau

of Investigation, prepared statement of ...................................................... 16

Miller, Hon. Candice, a Representative in Congress from the State of

Michigan, prepared statement of ................................................................. 25

Putnam, Hon. Adam H., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Florida, prepared statement of ................................................................ 4

Tether, Tony, Director, Defense Advance Research Project Agency, Department of Defense, prepared statement of .............................................. 49

(1)

CAN THE USE OF FACTUAL DATA ANALYSIS

STRENGTHEN NATIONAL SECURITY? PART

ONE

TUESDAY, MAY 6, 2003

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION POLICY,

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND THE CENSUS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Putnam (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Putnam, Miller and Clay.

Staff present: Bob Dix, staff director; John Hambel, senior counsel; Scott Klein, Chip Walker, Lori Martin, and Casey Welch, professional staff members; Ursula Wojchechowski, clerk; Suzanne

Lightman, fellow; David McMillen, minority professional staff

member; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. PUTNAM. A quorum being present. The hearing of the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental

Relations and the Census will come to order. Good afternoon and

welcome to today’s hearing, ‘‘Can the Use of Factual Data Analysis

Strengthen National Security? Part One.’’ First of all, I’d like to

thank everyone for bearing with us as we’ve had to make time and

room changes for today’s hearing. We appreciate your cooperation.

In an effort to prevent future terrorist attacks and enhance law

enforcement efforts, deputies and agencies throughout the Federal

Government have begun developing strategies that will assist in

the identification of potential risks through the use of technology

and information sharing. The truth is that there is a tremendous

amount of information that already resides in the public venue.

However, due to past practices of stovepipe mentalities and turf

issues, much relevant information that could be of use or interest

to law enforcement officials has not been easily accessible.

In particular, since September 11, 2001, it has been imminently

clear that we must do a better job of compiling and sharing information that will provide, enhance the opportunities for law enforcement and national security officials to identify potential risks in

advance. Federal agencies have utilized methodologies that facilitate data base exploration for quite some time in an effort to root

out waste, fraud and abuse. In fact the recent highly public case

of government credit card abuse was flushed out, and the perpetraVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:37 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\90399.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tors identified through the use of data mining or factual data analysis, as some call it.

Now, a number of Federal agencies with the responsibility for

homeland security and law enforcement are employing the lessons

learned through the use of factual data analysis or the conclusions

drawn from this analytical process to increase their ability to detect patterns and relationships within the masses of data they have

access to in an effort to increase risk assessment capabilities. This

hearing will examine whether the use of this process will successfully enhance efforts to strengthen law enforcement and national

security.

Does factual data analysis contribute to increase the risk detection? As we have previously established, factual data analysis is

not a technology in and of itself. It is an analytical process that utilizes technology in an effort to identify patterns and relationships

that were previously unknown. It has been used successfully in the

private sector to craft specific marketing and sales programs. It has

been used successfully in the public sector to identify and address

instances of waste, fraud and abuse.

The hope is that these same technological advances that aid marketers in identifying customers for their products and law enforcement in catching tax evaders or identifying welfare fraud will also

detect patterns that should raise suspicion among those working

would improve our Nation’s security. Today we have witnesses representing the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration, and

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Each of these three agencies proposes to use factual data analysis or conclusions drawn from the process to enhance homeland security. Specifically, we will be examining the FBI’s Trilogy and related technology analysis tools, TSA’s computer-assisted

prescreening process system [CAPPS] II, and DARPA’s total information awareness [TIA]. We have asked each of these witnesses to

explain their agency’s program and talk about the role factual data

analysis is envisioned to play. While each of these agencies proposals is different in its construct and each may generate varying responses and levels of interest, the subcommittee will seek to learn

more about the source, accuracy, reliability, and security of the

data that is accessed to determine risk assessment.

Let me be clear, we are not here to compare one project to the

other, nor are we here to evaluate the strategic basis for these

projects. We are here to examine the use of technology in the facilitation of this process and the techniques, processes and outcomes

that are produced. We hope to listen and learn from these expert

witnesses and hear factual information about these projects. We

also recognize that there is clearly some concern and reluctance on

the part of some of the witnesses to even be here today because of

some of the press coverage about these projects. Today we will examine the facts about how data will be compiled, what data will

be assembled, what steps are taken to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data, how the data will be analyzed, and what will

be done with the results as well as how the privacy and personal

freedom of the public will be protected by the process itself. We expect full and complete disclosure.

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In 2 weeks after gathering and evaluating the information that

will be presented today, the subcommittee will reconvene and examine this issue from a standpoint of privacy and personal freedom

concerns in part 2 of this hearing. The subcommittee believes this

is a good place to start from. From an oversight perspective, we

look forward to working with these agencies as they continue to

plan and implement their proposals for enhancing homeland security.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Adam H. Putnam follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. It’s my pleasure now to yield to the gentleman from

Missouri, the ranking member, Mr. Clay, for any opening remarks

that he may have.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for calling

this hearing. I look forward to today’s testimony. When government

agencies collect information about American citizens, then those

citizens have a right to see that information and correct it if there

are errors. I would like to begin by quoting one of our witnesses

from our last hearing on data mining, Professor Jeffrey Rosen. At

that hearing, Professor Rosen opened his testimony with this statement: ‘‘It’s possible to design data mining technologies in ways that

strike better or worse balances between liberty and security. But

there is no guarantee that the executive branch or the technology

just left to their own devices will demand and provide technologies

that strike the balance in a reasonable way. Congress, therefore,

has a special responsibility to provide technological and legal oversight of data mining to ensure that the most invasive searches are

focused on the most serious crimes.’’

Our job today is to gather as much information as possible about

these three programs so that we can assure that the balance between liberty and security is a good one. Over the past 2 years, we

have seen a heavy thumb on the balance scale in favor of security.

However, it is not clear that we are necessarily more secure because of it. We have also seen the liberty of individuals abused in

ways we have not seen in this country since the internment of the

Japanese during World War II. We learned in hindsight that

breach of liberty was a terrible misuse of government power. The

government quietly admitted so when it turned to those people interned and asked them to serve in the military or to work as translators.

Much later our government officially apologized. President Clinton, in issuing that policy said, ‘‘we recognize the wrongs of the

past and offer our profound regret to those who endured such grave

injustice. We understand that our Nation’s actions were rooted in

racial prejudice and wartime hysteria. And we must learn from the

past and dedicate ourselves as a Nation to renewing and strengthening equality, justice and freedom.’’

Today our government faces a threat to our national security

that many have compared to World War II. President Bush compared the attack on the World Trade Center to the bombing of

Pearl Harbor. In the days that followed that attack, the President’s

speech writers used President Roosevelt’s speeches from December

1941 to shape President Bush’s remarks. We must learn from the

past and not allow our fears to destroy the very liberties for which

we fight. The descriptions of the programs we are considering today

with secret filings and warrantless searches of our electronic lives

puncture that thin wall between liberty and security. At the same

time, these programs have not proved that they have a benefit

strong enough to justify that breach.

Finally, I’d like to thank the Defense Advance Research Project

Agency for providing this testimony to the subcommittee in a timely fashion. It’s a shame that the FBI and TSA did not show the

same respect for this subcommittee. Again, let me thank the witVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:37 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\90399.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nesses for their testimony. And I ask that my statement be included in the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re very welcome. Thank you, Mr. Clay. We appreciate your interest.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Wm. Lacy Clay follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. And obviously this is going to be an interesting

hearing. At this time, I’d like to recognize the vice chair of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief opening

statement if I may. I look forward to hearing the testimony of all

the witnesses. I’m very appreciative of all of you coming here today.

I think this will be a fascinating hearing. I think the issue of factual data analysis as a tool to strengthen national security is certainly one of the most significant issues facing our Nation. In fact,

today in our society. And with the implementation of the E-government Act of 2002 and the growing importance of information technology in our world establishing investigative techniques such as

factual data analysis are vital, absolutely vital if our Nation is to

successfully prosecute the war on terror.

As we know, the terrorists seem to have an uncanny ability to

adapt to our methods of prevention. In many instances, they are

using our freedoms against us. In my view, I think we need to

focus all of our resources and attention to ensure we are always at

least one step ahead of them if possible. Federal officials currently

have at their disposal the resources and knowledge to implement

systems that assist us in this process. These officials currently occupy the vanguard of our defenses and need not to necessarily be

hampered by bureaucracy in their efforts.

However, the American people must have confidence that the

Federal Government is using this new source of information in a

very ethical and proper and effective way. It’s absolutely essential

that a proper balance be made between the operation of the government as it prosecutes the war on terror and the disclosure of operations to citizens that it was set up to protect. And for this reason,

it’s the responsibility of this subcommittee to ensure that the factual data analysis as a tool be not abused.

For example, I’m certainly very encouraged that the Total Information Awareness Project [TIA], is being conducted by the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency [DARPA], and it has been relatively transparent. Why only in its beginning phases this program

provides a hope that we can analyze the patterns of a terrorist to

anticipate their next move? And some have expressed concern

about programs such as these. But the mere fact that Mr. McCraw,

Admiral Loy, and Dr. Tether have agreed to testify certainly shows

that the Federal Government is concerned about the perception

that Congress and the public has about data analysis as well.

I’m very much looking forward to working with the chairman and

members of the subcommittee and full committee to ensure that

this program receives the proper congressional oversight and I certainly will be interested to hear the testimony provided today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You’re very welcome, Mrs. Miller. We thank you.

With that, we will move to the witnesses. You’re all experienced

with congressional testimony. You understand the light system.

We’ll ask you to adhere to the timing out of respect for everyone’s

schedules. Today each witness will testify on his own panel. After

each witness has given the 5-minute statement, the subcommittee

will ask questions particular to that witness’s agency. After all

three panels have testified and answered this initial round of quesVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:37 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\90399.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tioning, the three witnesses will return to the witness table to answer future rounds of questions.

As you are aware, we swear in our witnesses. So if Mr. McCraw

would please rise for the swearing in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for the record the witness has responded in

the affirmative. I will ask if there are associates from your agency

who intend to provide supporting evidence or testimony for the subcommittee, that you rise and be sworn in also at the appropriate

time. Our first witness today is Steven C. McCraw, a 20-year FBI

veteran. He’s assisted this year to the newly created Office of Intelligence. His office will be responsible for implementing FBI intelligence strategies, making sure that intelligence is properly collected, managed and shared within the FBI, with State and local

law enforcement through the 66 Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and

with the intelligence community, including the new Terrorist

Threat Integration Center.

Previous to his current appointment, he was special agent in

charge of the FBI San Antonio field office and served as the director of the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force before that. We’re

pleased to have you and you’re recognized for your statement.

STATEMENT OF STEVE McCRAW, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM HOOTEN, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I owe yourself

and the members of the subcommittee an apology because you

didn’t have my statement well in advance. I have been notified that

it has been cleared. I ask your permission that we do submit it for

the record.

Mr. PUTNAM. How quickly can you get it to the subcommittee

using all the miracles of technology?

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, I have to turn around here, Mr. Chairman,

with your permission. Making copies and driving it here right now

at this time.

Mr. PUTNAM. I’m quite certain we have a fax machine. If they

want to get it to us that way, we’ll be able to afford the audience

and others the opportunity to review it as well in a timely manner.

We look forward to that. Thank you. You’re recognized.

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you. First, I’d like to take the opportunity

to thank each and every one of you for your support in enabling

the FBI to modernize its information technology systems. I think,

in fact, in all the statements that you made, you know, previously

including the letter asking the FBI’s participation in this important

hearing, I noted the importance and value added benefits of utilizing technology. Clearly, the FBI’s focus is trying to utilize these advances to manage and to find links, relationships, and patterns of

individuals within its own data systems. To that end, it’s the information in terms that the FBI legally and lawfully collects in the

course of its investigations that becomes a part of its system of

records.

As background in terms of discussion of data mining, I believe

it’s important to understand the term ‘‘data mining’’ as it’s used

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commonly today. It’s defined as technology that facilitates the ability to sort through masses of amounts of information through data

base explorations, extract specific information in accordance with

defined criteria, and then identify patterns of interest to users.

Also, as I mentioned before, it’s an outstanding tool to be able

to go through those data sets and identify links, relationships, and

associations between individuals of interest. And in effect, what it

does is automate what analysts and agents have had to do for

years. So what it does, it allows analysts and agents to work cheaper, faster, smarter. And that is how the FBI, in terms of its Trilogy,

is going about it.

Now, one thing that has been critically important to the FBI and

we have a strong commitment to and that is the rule of law, the

Constitution, the statutes that you in Congress have passed, the

Attorney General guidelines, the Privacy Act, and all of the laws

and statutes that clearly delineate and guidelines for the FBI in

terms of how they can properly and lawfully collect information.

Because in effect, that’s the information that we would be utilizing

this technology on, its own internal information.

One of the advantages, the FBI, from lessons learned over the

years, is that we have, and the reasons we have what the Office

of General Counsel has, an Administrative Law Unit, we have an

Investigative Law Unit, the reason we have in the field the Chief

Division Counsels so that these rules and regulations that are

closely adhered to and followed up on is to ensure that an agent

doesn’t go out on an fishing expedition in terms of looking at an

individual, arbitrarily looks at a person or surveils a person, but

there’s predication, a reason for doing it. It’s the same thing that

we’re talking about in terms of data mining. There’s a reason, first,

to collect the information. Once we collect it lawfully, then naturally we want to exploit the latest technology so that we can work

better, in protecting Americans from terrorism, from crime, and

from foreign intelligence activities.

Ensuring the appropriate controls to protect the privacy of the

Federal Government data, we must also look at in terms of public

source data. And that is data that is derived and sold by public

companies that people have access to, you and I, certainly the private industry utilizes this, and clearly the FBI does utilize public

source data as a tool, and clearly as a tool for leads.

Again, so we can work more economically, we can save time, and

we can be more efficient in what we’re doing in terms of investigations. Now, we’ve learned from lessons learned, and as you well

know, is that public source data is not always accurate. In fact,

many times there are errors. So we have to be mindful it’s a tool

that requires followup investigation.

I’m sure, there have been instances were they’ve come across erroneous information. I’m applying for a mortgage at this time—and

they’ve identified inaccurate information. In so doing, it makes you

mindful of how much other information was linked to a particular

credit card inappropriately. Well, you know, the systems aren’t perfect. They’re run by people. That’s why it’s only a tool for FBI. And

that when we use public source data that we extract the relevant

components of it before we bring it into the FBI system of records.

We don’t, and we won’t, go out and purchase wholesale data sets

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that are publicly available and incorporate that with the names of

myself, my family, you and hundreds of thousands of other Americans in our system of records for convenience sake.

Clearly we have an obligation to be mindful of those things. I

look forward to any questions that you might have later. Thank

you very much for your time.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. McCraw. I’m informed that we are

either electronically or by fax receiving your testimony so we appreciate that.

Mr. MCCRAW. We don’t have the greatest success rate in technology, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for that. We’re trying to get better with it.

Mr. PUTNAM. We’re going to try to help you.

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McCraw follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. I’d like to recognize the gentleman from Missouri

to begin his round of questions. Mr. Clay, you’re recognized.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCraw, a few weeks ago, the FBI issued a final rule that

exempted information held by the FBI like the information in Trilogy from the Privacy Act requirements that the information held

on individuals be accurate and timely. In other words, the FBI is

going to make no effort to assure that the information they hold

on an individual is correct. Now, some of these records are available to local law enforcement officials. When someone is stopped for

a traffic violation, the officer runs that person’s identity through a

number of systems, one of the systems checked is the FBI’s National Crime Information Center. Under this new rule, the FBI no

longer is obligated to assure that the information held by the National Crime Information Center is correct. That means that people

will be detained and arrested based on inaccurate information

when all they have done is roll through a stop sign. Will you explain to this committee why the FBI believes it is no longer necessary to verify the accuracy of the information it holds on individuals?

Mr. MCCRAW. Mr. Clay, one reason without discussing the statute for years and maintaining these high standards in terms of

what data is entered into the NCIC is for that very specific reason

that you gave, is that we have police officers out there, they stop

for a traffic ticket, run the name and they have been advised all

of a sudden this person is wanted. In accordance with officer safety

and established guidelines, they have this person arrested. Clearly,

there has to be, you know, strict guidelines when you use NCIC,

and in fact, it has to not be just for the FBI, but all users of NCIC

that have access and enter records into it. Those requirements are,

and it’s been held in place and there will be no shifting of those

requirements in terms of agents being obligated in terms of the accuracy of the information that goes in there.

That’s critical in terms of the FBI in terms of how it operates

NCIC. It’s also important for us in our own system of record that

we have accurate information. But sometimes what we may find in

our own system of records is a report, a lead that someone is suspected by somebody of doing something and that we’re obligated as

FBI, in the FBI, to followup on. And we find during the course of

it that’s not accurate.

In fact we found that for other reasons that the allegation was

made that wasn’t accurate. I’m not in a position to discuss some

of the technology issues or the statute that you referred to, but obviously, we want everything in our data base to be correct. But I

can assure you there is instances where we collect information that

when we do further investigation, we find out, in fact, that statement was not correct to begin with.

Mr. CLAY. So then what happens? Do you go back and correct

your records? I mean, do you delete that information that is incorrect from the records or do you put it in a different category?

Mr. MCCRAW. No, sir. We just include in the record that we have

gone out and done this and determined that, in fact, this allegation

was not true.

Mr. CLAY. So that’s the system the FBI has in place.

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Mr. MCCRAW. Because we’re obligated to keep all information

that we collect and also show the business process of what we actually did or did not do.

Mr. CLAY. What about some information that is so inaccurate

that you list some motorist stopped as being on the FBI 10 most

wanted list, and then you detain this person and you find out he

or she is not the right person. Then how do you correct that?

Mr. MCCRAW. We’re still obligated to report the facts and the

facts are that in your scenario that the FBI made a mistake. We

still need to maintain the fact that we had a report, we acted inappropriately, we made a mistake and it’s still there and it’s documented.

Mr. CLAY. It would seem that out of efficiency to law enforcement

you would go and clean up that error and take it out of that record

so that the next law enforcement officer doesn’t pull that information up.

Mr. MCCRAW. I couldn’t agree more, Congressman. As it relates

to NCIC, and what State and local law enforcement have access to,

absolutely. If there’s a mistake that has been made, or if someone

has been located they have to be immediately taken out of NCIC

because that issue could have been resolved. We have to be mindful

and the rules and guidelines require that it is immediately corrected if there’s an inaccuracy found at NCIC.

Mr. CLAY. And that’s what happens now.

Mr. MCCRAW. Absolutely.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. At this time, I recognize the Vice Chair, Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McCraw, pleasure

to have you here. First of all, let me just say that my experience

with your agents in the Detroit area has been remarkable. You

have some really fabulous folks there that have done a very excellent job. And I felt like I was achieving nirvana with them because

I was speaking to them every single day after September 11 in my

previous capacity as the Michigan Secretary of State, where we do

the motor vehicle kinds of things.

As you might recall, after September 11 there were nine individuals that appeared on every newspaper in the Nation where these

fellows had—this is about a week after September 11—these individuals had obtained commercial driver’s licenses with hazardous

material endorsements. And they were all ostensibly from Michigan. As we found out later, I think there were only two that actually got a CDL with a HAZMAT endorsement from us. The rest

weren’t Americans, but they were here of Arabic descent that had

just gotten a driver’s license through the sources that they should

have not from another State, actually.

But at any rate, you know you look at some of these things. And

that actually led us to make a proposal. I wasn’t a Member of Congress then, but something that we had talked about actually did

become a part of the Patriot Act in my State, if you want a concealed weapons permit, we do a criminal background check. But if

you want a commercial driver’s license with a hazardous material

endorsement and drive around with 10,000 gallons of liquid propane, no problem, just fill out a form.

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So we thought then to try to think like terrorists ourselves. As

I said in my opening statements many times, these individuals are

using our freedoms against us.

And I sort of preface that with asking you, if you were aware if

the Federal motor carrier division has promulgated rules or implemented them in which there is a requirement for an FBI criminal

background check for anyone who is receiving not a CDL, Commercial driver’s license, but a hazardous material endorsement. We

have a large population of people who are of Arabic descent, and

I compliment the FBI and Justice. It is very common knowledge

there was a large group of individuals who were called in to be

questioned in the Detroit area, and I think it was handled with a

high degree of sensitivity by the FBI. I certainly again commend

the Detroit agents for how they handled that.

But do you have any knowledge if anything is happening in that

area where there is a criminal background check now required for

those that are getting those kinds of things? What has your experience been as you are creating these data bases as you interact with

State agencies such as a DMV or others?

[The prepared statement of Hon. Candice Miller follows:]

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Mr. MCCRAW. First, I want to thank you for your kind words. I

appreciate that. I’ll relay that to the special agent in charge in Detroit, and hopefully to his agents as well. I’m not familiar with

what has been done right now in terms of regulations. And it may

be better asked to the TSA, they may know better. If I’m not mistaken I think that’s in their bailiwick, by statute. I do know one

of the things that the FBI has been criticized for over the years,

that we’ve been trying to correct, and clearly the director stepped

ahead in doing so in your question in terms of how we’re using

data bases. We take—and also addresses one of Mr. Clay’s concerns

as well—individuals under investigation for terrorism that we actually have a predicated subject, and they’re investigated by the full

field investigation, the FBI has taken, the Director ordered and has

taken those names and put them into NCIC.

For two reasons, there is predication, there is not an arrest scenario with it, but there is predication so the State and local officers

have access to that information who are really the front lines of

public safety and need that information.

So those are the types of things that we’re doing, and there’s a

number of other information sharing initiatives that really are

technology-based, like a national alert system. We want to be able

to reach out to those chiefs of police using the latest technology

through their cell phones and PDAs and text messaging, and let

them know, we’re in the process of doing those similar type of

things and even looking, the chairman noted earlier, at the importance, in post September 11, of sharing information in ways that

we can do it better and collocate investigative data, multi agencies,

use encryption point-to-point over the Internet backbone to access

information and provide details. I hope that was responsive to your

question.

Mrs. MILLER. It was. Because I think it’s so important, as you

mention, as we saw since September 11, we’ve had individuals that

have been picked up for routine traffic violations that were suspected terrorists. And the patrol in the black and white car didn’t

have the information or whatever as they’re trying to share some

of these data bases. My understanding is that the FBI currently

has 31 different data bases, separate data bases which you’re trying to combine under this Trilogy project. First of all, why do you

have 31 different data bases? How is it working as you try to notify

some of those?

Mr. MCCRAW. It’s not working. Fortunately behind me, I have

the Deputy Assistant Director, who we are fortunate to have in the

FBI, whose job is to make those things work. And for years we’ve

had antiquated systems, stovepipe systems, and certainly, Mr.

Hooten is in a better state to describe the state of affairs he inherited, but clearly it was a detriment in terms of what we needed to

do in our mission.

So I have no defense for it. Clearly it was a problem. Certainly

this Director recognizes the need for technology. And fortunately

for us, and thankful to you that you’ve empowered people from the

outside that come with the latest technological skills like Mr.

Hooten, Mr. Lauer to come in and address this important issue.

Mrs. MILLER. Thank you. I don’t have any further questions, but

I certainly look forward to working with you and make sure you

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have the resources that you need to work these systems. It’s critical. No use sitting here pointing fingers on what we should have

done 3, 4 or 5 years ago. We need to look to the future. We’ve got

a new enemy. These terrorists are different. They live in the shadows and prey on the innocent. We do need to utilize technology to

assist you in doing your job. Thank you very much.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you very much. We do have your testimony

so thank you.

Mr. MCCRAW. Again, apologize for the delay.

Mr. PUTNAM. My understanding for the record, it was held up at

OMB, not at FBI; is that correct?

Mr. MCCRAW. I don’t know that I’m supposed to comment on why

it’s held up. I know one thing, if I had done it sooner, it would have

been likely cleared in time. So it’s really my fault.

Mr. PUTNAM. Well, we’re glad that we have it now.

In your testimony you indicated that you have traditionally used

factual data analysis, the collection of data bases prior to Trilogy.

Could you please compare what you have done in the past with the

technology that Trilogy will provide for you.

Mr. MCCRAW. Certainly. Currently in the FBI we have the system called ACS. It provides an antiquated software over a full text

data that allows you to go through a number of green screens. It

allows someone to try to do a full text query, just like you would

a search on the Internet, a search engine. However, it is so cumbersome and is so difficult and you are overloaded with a tsunami

of information that comes back hardly useful.

Moreover, there is no visual link type of tools or link analysis

tools that are common use; certainly the Department of Defense

uses it; a number of different agencies have been using it successfully over the years.

So right now the type of technology that is being brought on

board and actually being used, even though development is being

utilized right now by our counterterrorism analysts, is a tremendous benefit to our analysts. They will actually be able to go to specific sets of information for query. One of the major advances using

a software package that actually works is that there is no question

that we would have gotten to the Phoenix memo just asking the

question, in terms of are there any threats in aviation.

Also it’s really important to utilize push technology, which the

private industry has been using for years.

Again, I’m just describing what we’re doing now versus what I

was able to do before. And let’s say an analyst has a certain issue

or topic, let’s say it’s ricin, anything in the FBI records gets loaded

up into if it had ricin, whether it came in the community, whether

it was an FD 302, which was an investigative report that the FBI

did, or whether it was an insert or electronic communication, that

information is pushed to the analyst.

Now, the scope is the prototype, and Mr. Hooten and Mr. Lauer

and others in their professional project managers are working on

perfecting the technology. And it improves every day. Already we’re

seeing some tremendous advancements when we standardize the

data, provide it in a useful format, and apply these state-of-the-art

technology tools on top of it.

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Mr. PUTNAM. In quickly reviewing your written testimony, the

term Trilogy is never mentioned. Would you define Trilogy for the

subcommittee?

Mr. MCCRAW. I think Mr. Hooten is probably better to define it,

but Trilogy, I’ll attempt it, my understanding is that it is the entire

modernization of information technology in the FBI.

If you don’t mind, could we have Mr. Hooten.

Mr. PUTNAM. Please stand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for the record the witness responded in the affirmative.

Mr. HOOTEN. Trilogy is two very specific contracts. One is to redraw our infrastructure of networks, which is virtually non existent. That part has already been done. The second part is going

through and upgrading our hardware inlcuding our old PCs. The

third part is several applications of software, the main one is the

virtual case file, which is the replacement, as Steve said, for the

old ACS system. So it will be our new system of records. It’s the

management of our cases. But it’s not a data analysis tool which

is what this particular subject is. That system that Steve has been

referring to is SCOPE, which is a development system that we’re

currently working on that’s made up of the series of COTS products

that we are just basically buying off the shelf and doing some quick

modifications so that these analysts can have something in their

hands that they can use right away. That is closer to this sort of

data mining idea, going through sets of data, multiple data bases

and looking for particular things.

Mr. PUTNAM. The SCOPE would be more of what you would traditionally define as data mining than Trilogy?

Mr. HOOTEN. Yes.

Mr. PUTNAM. And SCOPE stands for what?

Mr. HOOTEN. I was afraid you would ask me that. I can’t tell you

off the top of my head. We’ve been calling it SCOPE so long I forget

what it stands for. I can find out for you though.

Mr. PUTNAM. OK. That would be helpful. What new data bases

would be searched through SCOPE or through the new Trilogy program that are not currently accessed or utilized today or prior to

the deployment of those two programs?

Mr. HOOTEN. Nothing new. It’s the same thing we’re doing now.

The first one is our ACS, which is our system of records, that’s our

main data base. The nine other things that are very helpful to the

analyst are called SAMnet, which are all the cables coming in.

Mr. PUTNAM. According to your written testimony, ‘‘the FBI uses

information collected by public source companies to obtain information on individuals during the course of its terrorist criminal and

foreign intelligence investigative activities.’’ What type of public

source companies have data bases that are accessed prior to an

event that would trigger an investigation?

Mr. MCCRAW. That we would use as an investigative tool? To

name some of the public names, LEXIS/NEXIS, Choice Point.

There’s several of them out there that have information, driver’s license information, government information that they’ve purchased

and that through a query over the Internet and for a fee, you’re

able to find out additional information about a name. Again, it’s a

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nice tool. It saves valuable lead time. But it has to be done not on

a fishing expedition, it’s done based upon a reason. There has to

be a reason why you decided to run somebody through that data

base.

Mr. PUTNAM. Could you please elaborate some on what role these

improvements, and you’ve outlined two or three different programs,

how will they contribute to better collaborative efforts between the

FBI and the CIA with the Terrorist Threat Investigation Center?

Mr. MCCRAW. Well first and foremost, it allows the FBI to properly manage its information so we can extract the essential elements of information and to get that in through reports officers,

and subject matter experts to get that to the TTIC, also to the

Counterterrorism Center as well and to other customers out in the

community that need that information.

From the technology standpoint, Mr. Hooten can explain a lot

better. It has been standardized so when there’s sets of information

that the FBI is legally able to provide the intelligence community

with, it can do in a standardized format, that it can then use without additional, you know, contractors having to rewrite the format.

Better——

Mr. PUTNAM. Before you do, I think, for the record, if you would,

please give your full name and your position.

Mr. HOOTEN. William L. Hooten. My position is Deputy Executive Assistant Director over at administration.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you. I appreciate that. Thanks for your help.

Mr. HOOTEN. Sure.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Clay raised some interesting issues about the

accuracy. What is the level of sophistication of technology today

that an Arabic name, for example, would be case sensitive or would

certain persons who have the same name and perhaps even the

same middle initial and perhaps even the same middle name, what

level of sophistication is there to prevent people from being caught

up in a mistaken identity?

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, obviously, transliteration has been a problem

that all of us face in the government in terms of names. I mean,

Waheed Alshiri, I know of at least 14 different types in juxtapositions of the name itself and in public source data alone in which

it it appeared. And many times there is insufficient data that you

can actually make a determination that it was, in fact, that person.

Because there is no date of birth, biographical data or other relational type of data that you can be assured it’s that person. That’s

why it’s careful, especially if your operating in the public and proprietary data bases, that there is always followup along those lines,

and that it’s properly characterized, that information.

Again, a tool within our own system now that we’re bringing on

greater and advanced tools, there is varying degrees of software

that has greater success in terms of discerning those differences, in

providing a greater ability of analysts to be able to try to get the

transliterations, the juxtapositions or incorrect spellings during the

course of an investigation that it was captured.

So clearly, technology has improved. It empowers the analyst and

agent to do things that we couldn’t do in the past, but it still requires followup work on every piece. And certainly it’s an analytVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:37 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\90399.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ical judgment, an investigative judgment when you brought this information together.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. McCraw, we’re going to have to move to the

second panel recognizing, of course, that everyone will be on the

panel together as soon as we have gone through these individually.

Somebody had to be first and you drew the short straw. So thank

you very much for leading us off on this hearing. At this time we’ll

excuse the first panel and seat the second.

Mr. MCCRAW. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Admiral, are you ready?

Admiral LOY. I’m ready to be sworn, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. Let me introduce you first. We appreciate you being

here. And look forward to your testimony. Admiral James Loy is

the administrator of the Transportation Security Administration.

Previous to his service in this position, Admiral Loy was Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard and served as the Coast Guard

chief of staff from 1996 to 1998. From 1994 to 1996, he was Commander of the Coast Guard’s Atlantic area. His other flag assignments were as chief of personnel and training and commander of

the 8th Coast Guard district. A career sea going officer, Admiral

Loy has served tours aboard six Coast Guard cutters, including

command of a patrol boat in combat during the Vietnam War and

command of major cutters in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Admiral Loy graduated from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in

1964 and holds masters degrees from Wesleyan University and the

University of Rhode Island. Certainly a very distinguished career

serving our Nation. We look forward to your service at the new Department of Homeland Security. Please rise and I’ll swear you in.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for the record, the Admiral responded in the

affirmative. Is there anyone with you that needed to do that also?

Admiral LOY. I don’t think so.

Mr. PUTNAM. You don’t need anybody to answer questions?

Admiral LOY. We’ll see, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. Very well. You’re recognized.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES L. LOY, DIRECTOR,

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Admiral LOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and good afternoon.

Congressman Clay. Good afternoon, sir. Thanks for the opportunity

to discuss CAPPS II as a project with your subcommittee. Mr. Clay,

I clearly got your message on time, sir, and we’ll make sure that

we follow that closely in the future. If I may, sir, I’ll offer my written testimony for the record and simply try to emphasize a couple

of important points with my oral testimony about this project, and

then answer your questions if I may, sir.

First, it’s important to recognize that the existing CAPPS system

is seriously flawed and in need of replacement. We’ve studied this

system at great length and replacement is the right word. It’s too

broken in both concept and execution to be upgraded or repaired.

Discussing its shortcomings in a public hearing, I believe, is a bit

inappropriate, sir, but I would like to offer the committee a followon closed briefing if there is any interest in that after our time together today.

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My point here is that CAPPS II would be a huge security improvement. I believe of all the elements that we’ve put in place in

designing a system of systems for aviation security first and for the

rest of transportation of now and into the future, CAPPS II has the

most potential to improve both security and customer service. Our

goal is to simply keep foreign terrorists off airplanes. And CAPPS

II is a key piece of our interlocking system of systems. And it’s also

very important to note, I believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are working hard with other detection and screening project owners in the

new Department of Homeland Security to ensure good stewardship

of the taxpayers’ investment in all of these projects. We don’t need

redundancies; we don’t need overlaps; but we do need gaps closed,

and we’re working very hard to see those goals come to closure.

Second, the goals of CAPPS II are simply twofold and very basic:

They are to radically improve the identification authentication of

travelers and with that, improve the identification and detection of

known and unknown foreign terrorists before they board an airplane, including those that associate with terrorists.

Third, the Aviation Transportation Security Act directed TSA to

focus on CAPPS, the current system, and any of its successor systems for improvement and to ensure that any such system would

evaluate all would-be passengers before they board. That’s precisely what we’re doing. Our review to date again clearly indicates

the requirement for a replacement system.

Fourth, CAPPS II will be a limited risk assessment tool based on

dynamic intelligence information about the activities of known terrorists and their associates. It will be run by TSA inside a compartmented government firewall and sensitive to changing intelligence

assessments or the alert conditions, for example, as set by DHS.

Think of it, if you will, as a theostat, for the risk assessment scores

returned by the CAPPS II tool can be compared to higher or lower

limits set by intelligence inputs for the day.

Fifth, unlike the classic definition of data mining as outlined in

your invitation to testify, where one searches through reams of

data to detect or identify hitherto unknown patterns, CAPPS II will

be a traveler-activated search where traveler-offered data elements

provided to secure a reservation, name, address, phone number,

and date of birth, will initiate the identification authentication

score, as well as the risk assessment score. The search will be to

determine if well-known patterns are found to drive that risk assessment score higher than the threshold acceptable for the security environment of the moment.

The products of the search, the result and risk score and identification score will translate to a simple direction to the checkpoint

at the airport. Green, have a nice flight; yellow, provide secondary

screening before boarding; or red, refer to law enforcement as one

whose risk score deserves law enforcement scrutiny, and in any

case, who will not board that flight.

Sixth, we have recognized the importance of privacy concerns

and have conducted considerable outreach to the privacy and civil

liberties arenas. At multiple day offsites, we have collaborated with

a good number of those with privacy concerns because we have

them as well. We have met with groups of privacy officers from the

business community, with groups of stakeholders in the privacy

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arena, and with individuals who have a deep conviction about the

fourth amendment. We’ve also met with congressional representatives, with Senators and their staffs, and have listened intently so

as to develop a privacy strategy for CAPPS II that will be a

strength of our system, not a weakness.

Most recently, we have engaged the review of Ms. Nuala O’Connor Kelly, the newly established privacy officer at the Department

of Homeland Security, to validate our commitment to doing this

right. And as we speak, she is with our delegation to the EU to sort

out international privacy concerns. And I am simply of the mind

that we can design, if we put our minds to it, a solid program

where security and privacy are complementary goals. That’s why

we designed our Federal Register notice to solicit the widest spectrum of comment possible. When our listening is done, we will reissue that notice based on what we’ve learned.

Seventh, CAPPS II will not build data bases on U.S. persons permitted to fly; will never see the commercial data being used to authenticate identification; will not search medical records or criminal records nor see credit ratings, overdue bills or any such data

to assess risk; will not generate new intelligence; and will not keep

even the risk scores after travel is complete.

Eighth, CAPPS II will be a serious resource allocation tool. It

will allow us to better schedule Federal air marshals, to better

schedule screeners, even the new Federal flight deck officers—

‘‘guns in the cockpit,’’ if you will—so as to optimize the resources

we have to throw against the security problems we face.

Last, Mr. Chairman, CAPPS II will be counterintuitive in the

sense that we will not be looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Rather, we will be taking that haystack off the needle, identifying those thousands and thousands of perfectly innocent travelers, opting them in, if you will, thereby leaving only those we can’t

evaluate as OK to be the subject of added scrutiny.

Today about 15 percent of the travelers are dubbed selectees, and

undergo secondary screening. We believe we can bring that percentage way down, and thereby make not only a significant difference in security, but also a significant difference in customer

service as well.

Thank you for your attention, sir. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Admiral.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. As with our previous witness, our ranking member

will be recognized first for questions.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you Admiral for

being here today. I want to salute you for your leadership in the

area of airline security, over the TSA and being willing to serve

this Nation in that capacity.

Admiral, airline security has a troubled history of racial

profiling, even before the attack on the World Trade Towers. During the 1991 Gulf war, individuals with Middle Eastern names

were forced off their flights despite the fact they were American

citizens. One gentleman, an American citizen, whose parents were

from Bangladesh, was told he should carry his passport to prove

his citizenship.

Last year the ACLU testified before Congress of dozens of such

incidents, individuals discriminated against in airports or on airplanes based on race and heritage. The same people who oversaw

the private contractors who provided discriminatory security are

now designing new systems. What is TSA doing to prevent racial

profiling from continuing in our air transportation?

Admiral LOY. Mr. Clay, the design work associated with CAPPS

II as the replacement for the existent CAPPS program in place

today has a very clear specification: there will be no racial or gender profiling. We frankly don’t believe there’s any value in going

in that direction at the other end of a security risk assessment.

What one has to do with the other is simply unknown to us. So the

design work here is to keep such things totally out of the picture

by specifying in the contract that we don’t go there. There is no

reason for it either, and it’s certainly totally out of both my personal and our organizational ethic.

Mr. CLAY. You mentioned in your testimony the random checks

that occur, I was leaving Orlando a couple weeks ago, from the

Chair’s area, I had a one-way ticket back here to Washington and

I had four ‘‘S′′s on my ticket. Quickly routed into special security,

take off the shoes and all of that.

Mr. PUTNAM. It’s not racial, man, I was there with you.

Mr. CLAY. You did it, too. I mean, so now under CAPPS II it will

be less and less of that?

Admiral LOY. Absolutely, sir.

Mr. CLAY. How do you get picked?

Admiral LOY. Today CAPPS is a rule-based system. It has been

that way with no changes to those rules for a rather lengthy period

of time. In the immediate wake of the tragedies of September 11,

2001, those rules were actually reinforced. I would rather not go

into a public listing of those rules, but I can tell you that they are

recognizable; they are compromisable; they are broken, sir. That is

exactly the reason why CAPPS, as a system in place today, needs

to be replaced.

We will not have rules associated with the manner in which

CAPPS II will do its work. We will take advantage of added pieces

of information that we will ask of travelers. A condition of a reservation is that you no longer just give your name; you give your

name, address, phone number and date of birth, and allow the extraordinary technology of today to give us a risk score associated

with authenticating that identification.

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Mr. CLAY. Thank you. Admiral, 2 weeks ago the Wall Street

Journal ran an article on the problems created by the no-fly list.

That article began with the story of Larry Mussara. Mr. Mussara

is a retired Coast Guard Commander, the father of three, a local

hero in Alaska for his daring helicopter rescues of stranded fishermen and mountaineers.

But, every time Mr. Mussara flies Alaska Airlines, which is

about once a month, he gets stopped, often missing his plane. This

kind of error occurs because Mr. Mussara has a name similar to

one or more names on the no-fly list.

In CAPPS II, the TSA is going to use a number of private data

bases to make these same kind of comparisons. Will that increase

the chance of a missmatch like the one Mr. Mussara faces?

Admiral LOY. No, sir. It will actually radically decrease the

chance of a mismatch. I want to make it clear here, Mr. Mussara

will not be singled out in the days when CAPPS II is an active program, though he is focused on time and time again, unfortunately,

under the program that is in place today.

Mr. CLAY. Just to wrap up with you. Can you share with us how

many names are on the no-fly list? Is that available?

Admiral LOY. Again, sir, I think that I would prefer to tell you

that in confidence or in private. I will be happy to do that. I can

offer that CAPPS II compared to CAPPS as it is in place today is

quantum levels better in both identification scrutiny, and in risk

assessment across a watch list created predominately by the Justice Department in the Terrorist Tracking Task Force over the

course of this last year. So we are talking hundreds on one hand,

tens of thousands on the other.

Mr. CLAY. Under CAPPS II the kind of mistakes that Mr.

Mussara encounters will not occur?

Admiral LOY. That is exactly right, sir.

Mr. CLAY. Well, thank you very much for that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. The gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Miller.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to

my colleagues, I have also been under selection numerous times. It

seems, to go through the whole check.

I have to tell you that I was on a flight on Friday night with six

Members. I noticed all of the Republicans were being selected, but

not the Democrats. So I don’t think it is racial, it is partisan. That

is my observation.

Admiral, I appreciate your testimony and certainly your service

to our Nation as well. I would like to ask a question as you talked

to categorizing it as a risk assessment score, perhaps we can call

it a threat score, what have you.

Will it only be the TSA that would have that kind of information

of a threat score? Will you be utilizing or sharing, or sharing any

of this information with commercial entities? If you do intend to

share any of it with commercial entities, how can your organization

ensure that the commercial entities are not sharing this information when they should not be?

Admiral LOY. Ma’am, we will not be sharing the risk scores, either with respect to identification or with respect to final risk, with

41

anyone outside that firewall I described as being the break point

between inside government and outside government.

We will be enormously concerned about four or five privacy parameters that I believe are the framing elements of what we wanted to build our privacy strategy around. But particularly to your

point, we will not be getting into data itself; we will be designing

arithmetic algorithms that will be able to search those data bases.

Our first effort will be to take those traveler-initiated pieces of

information—PNR data—aggregate them, and send them to commercial data bases for the manipulation, if you will, that offers us

back an identification authentication.

Goal one is to be able to look travelers in the eye and have great

confidence that they are who they claim to be. That is job one, to

get us from where we are today, with a name-based system only,

with its potential for challenge, and this goes directly to Mr. Clay’s

question as well, and toward a system where we have great confidence that the person who is asking for this reservation is the

person he claims to be.

Second, armed with that, we will run that authenticated name

against the government data bases. That will reflect for us a final

risk score determination. That will only be shared with another law

enforcement organization if the purpose for which CAPPS II has

been met, should they or should they not be allowed to board that

plane. And there is a recognition in that risk score that law enforcement attention is actually in order.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Admiral, you said, ‘‘we want to look

them in the eye and make sure that they are the person that they

are claiming to be.’’ So, let me ask if you have any comment on

using technology, the retinal scans, looking them in the eye. That

is the best technology that we really have available today.

I will tell you, as a frequent traveler, I would be happy to have

presecurity clearance and look me in the eye and make sure that

you do the retinal scan and let me through the lines rather than

standing there forever.

Do you have any comment about whether we ever get to that

point? I recognize the privacy advocates are talking about that.

But, I mean, I think it makes a lot of sense.

Admiral LOY. Well, we are actually working with the privacy advocates at the table, on design work, both with respect to CAPPS

II and with respect to another project that we have underway, the

transportation workers identification credential. The notion there is

biometrical, such that the identification, so beating the so-called

identity theft issue is very much within our grasp.

CAPPS II will not have a biometric base associated with it, but

I think we are only months away from having as a foundation

block CAPPS II on one hand and the TWIC program on the other.

We will build a registered traveler program that will be biometrically based, that will seek those players who are willing to step forward to get the background investigation, and get it accredited in

the form of a biometrically-based card, so that we can facilitate a

quicker passage through the airport system.

Everyone will always go through the basic screening, and then

of course if you trigger an alarm, based on having gone through the

magnetometer, whatever screening is required there.

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If we can facilitate that in a frequent flyer line, or in some fashion that we can work out, and I am very optimistic that we can

do that with the airlines, because they see it as a great value as

well, we will end up doing exactly what you described. I would like

to call it a registered traveler program, rather than frequent, which

is, of course, associated with airlines exclusively, if you will, or

trusted, the obverse of which I am not too keen on, labeling people

as untrusted travelers.

So we are right there. That is exactly the design work that we

are following.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Well, call it whatever you want to.

I would like to sign up when you get it available, please.

You mentioned that the purpose of CAPPS is really, a primary

purpose is obviously to improve identification processes and those

kinds of things. You heard me mention earlier I had been a person

that was in charge of DMVs.

And, of course, the driver’s license really has become sort of the

critical foundation of establishing anyones identity, whether they

are utilizing driver’s licenses, whether they are utilizing State identification cards, what have you.

Let me ask you to comment on something that Secretary Ridge

has, I know, made some comments on. There has been a lot of discussion amongst all of the States about the possibility, the potential of having a nationwide driver’s license, because currently the

type of primary documents that are required by the individual

States to establish identity have such a huge fluctuation it is unbelievable. We take a lot of pride in Michigan, we think that we have

some of the more stringent standards in the Nation. Minnesota

also has very stringent standards.

But I have never been able to figure out why it matters whether

you get a driver’s license in Minnesota or Michigan or Tennessee,

or what have you, and that you have all of these different requirements. It must be an unbelievable challenge for yourself, the FBI

and others, looking at these driver’s licenses that are often times

issued with erroneous documentation or very little kind of primary

identification requirements.

I think people are sometimes startled to know that it is the rule

rather than the exception that almost every State in our Nation

must issue a driver’s license or a State identification card to people

that we know are here illegally, illegal aliens are getting these

driver’s licenses. By most of our State laws we are required to give

those out.

So I can’t imagine what kind of impact that is having on the

CAPPS program, and some of these others as you try to identify

trusted travelers.

Admiral LOY. Yes, ma’am. I think you are absolutely right on

point. We have given up using that base as a means by which we

can gain confidence that a person who claims to be whoever they

claim to be is really that person.

In the other work of the Transportation Security Administration

across all modes of transportation, that is where the transportation

workers’ identification credential is going, because, among other

reasons, we can’t have faith in the systems you were just describing.

43

The notion of a biometrically based transportation workers’ credential, both for identification purposes and for access control purposes, is where we believe we need to go in the transportation system at large. And we are working on two prototype projects in that

regard, one in the Philadelphia area, and one in the Los Angeles

area over the next several months.

So I reinforce your concerns, and let you know that we can’t go

there with comfort and have to design a better mousetrap. I would

also offer, based on your question to our first panelists, that just

last Friday, ma’am, we did issue an interim final rule on hazardous

materials endorsements on CDLs in conjunction with FMCSA, as

well as RSPA, the Research and Special Programs Administration

in DOT, with Justice alongside in terms of making sure we have

met that requirement that you described in the Patriot Act.

And it does require a BI, which is exactly, I think, the question

you asked.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You are very welcome.

Admiral, several things about the mechanics of CAPPS II program. First of all, the international terrorist organizations have

shown a remarkable agility in selecting a variety of different targets. And in response to September 11th, I think that we have

disappropriately focused our efforts on protecting airline safety at

the expense of rail, passenger cruise ships and other potential

threats. Will this same technology be deployed for rail and passenger cruise lines?

Admiral LOY. The potential is very much there, sir. My notion is

that CAPPS II is a phased kind of project. Our first goal needs to

be to construct; I have analogized it to our closets at home. And

our first challenge is to build the rail. And then how we develop

and use the multiple applications that might come from the risk

assessment engines that will be designed as the rail. I liken those

to multiple hangers sequentially being put on that rod over time.

And with not only the knowledge of, but the consent of oversightresponsible organizations, not the least of which, of course, is the

Congress.

So, yes, my charge from Secretary Ridge is to build a national

transportation system security plan, not an aviation security plan.

And it does go to aviation, it does go to maritime, and it is about

rail, transit systems, highways, and pipelines. All of those, plus

maritime and aviation, compose our national transportation system.

My goal is to make sure that Secretary Ridge is not found with

a weak link among any or all of those aspects of our system. And,

of course, that is just one of the puzzle pieces he has to fit into his

much bigger challenge across the rest of our homeland.

Mr. PUTNAM. Do you currently have congressional authorization

to deploy that beyond air travel?

Admiral LOY. We do not. That is exactly why I said it would be

enormously important for us to come back and think it through

carefully, not only with authorizing committees, but of course to

seek the appropriations necessary to make it happen.

44

Mr. PUTNAM. And how would the technology detect or review or

assign a threat score to suspect domestic terrorists?

Admiral LOY. The process would be absolutely similar, sir.

Armed with those four pieces of information, the system would first

of all build that identification score. That score then, as part of a

review of those government data bases, would allow us to assign

that final risk score. It frankly doesn’t matter whether it is a foreign terrorist, although that is what we are looking for. Our challenge to allowing a U.S. person on that plane would simply be

based on the fact that their score had elevated beyond the threshold of going from yellow to red, and we would then allow an investigative effort to take place by the right law enforcement organization.

Mr. PUTNAM. So it would then also detect persons who are not

necessarily a threat to that airline, but who are wanted for some

other crime?

Admiral LOY. As you heard me say earlier, sir, we are not

searching NCIC as part of the data that we are looking at. This

is a very focused tool, designed not without potential to do other

things, if authorized and challenged by the Congress to do so, but

at the moment, we are charged with finding, in the aviation sector,

foreign terrorists or those associated with foreign terrorists and

keep them off airplanes. That is our very limited goal at the moment.

Mr. PUTNAM. Certainly the additional hangers that would be in

your closet would inevitably lead to the technological ability in detecting anyone on rail, seacraft, aircraft, who would be then reviewed in data bases, that would include any number of warrants

outstanding for any number of crimes.

Admiral LOY. The potential there is very real, sir. And frankly

at the other end of the day, even as heinous as it sounds, the ax

murderer that gets on the airplane with a clean record in New Orleans and goes to Los Angeles and commits his or her crime, is not

the person we are trying to keep off that airplane at the moment.

Mr. PUTNAM. Today.

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. But, clearly circumstances could change?

Admiral LOY. As I indicated, there are several issues here.

First of all, Mission Creep, if you will, is one of those absolute

parameters that the privacy community is enormously concerned

about, and I am enormously concerned about. We will build such

concerns into the privacy strategy that we will have for CAPPS II.

On the other hand, over the course of time, with an airing, clearly with the oversight associated with not only the Congress but our

continued collaboration with our privacy colleagues, there are

changes that can be made. There can be additional hangers hung

on the closet rod.

Mr. PUTNAM. Let me—you mentioned that the score—the criteria

that determine the score change, depending on different circumstances.

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. Who sets the criteria? Who makes those changes

based on other intelligence or other circumstances?

45

Admiral LOY. Well, I would offer, sir, that it is the identification

score that comes back first across that firewall from its mix in the

commercial data bases that will be searched. Armed with that

score, we then assess the risk and produce the final risk score, and

that score is going to be probably the same, regardless of what is

also happening at the same time.

That process will run its course, and we will end up with a risk

score for that traveler. In the meantime, if we are at alert condition

blue or yellow or orange or red, there may be enormously different

attention being paid to one thing or another.

If the intelligence drift over the course of that past month or

week or day or hour is being focused on an airline or an airport

or a flight or such things as that, then we would have the ability

to adjust that rheostat in such a fashion, if there is a score of—

pretend it is 100 max, if it was a score of 94, if 1 day would find

you in a yellow capacity as opposed to red, based on the focus of

intelligence that day, the security environment, if you will, that is

associated with the world in which we are living in.

We believe it is enormously important for this system to recognize adjustments in the flow of intelligence across our daily desks

and be able to do something about it. At the moment, nothing like

that exists in the CAPPS system that is on the books today.

Mr. PUTNAM. And all of that is based simply on name, address,

phone number, and date of birth?

Admiral LOY. That is correct. That is the only data; that is only

four pieces of data that, A, the traveler will offer, that, B, TSA will

aggregate, that, C, will go to the commercial review process to

produce the identification authentication score.

And when it comes then back into across that firewall to be assessed against our government data bases for the final risk score,

there are no other pieces of data. We will only see scores, not data

beyond what the traveler offers us.

Mr. PUTNAM. It will be sensitive enough that if Mr. Clay purchases a ticket from Washington and uses his Washington address

and phone number, and returns back from Missiouri using his Missouri address and phone number, the discrepancy alone will not

flag him red?

Admiral LOY. That is exactly the case. Because, first of all, if it

ever occurs, his opportunity for redress is, again, one of those parameters in the privacy strategy that we will have for CAPPS II

that offers an appeal system to challenge decisions that have been

made.

Now, to the degree he goes red on that flight or even yellow, he

has every right to call us. We are going to establish an ombudsman—we are not going to call it that, passenger advocate, I think,

is the phrase that we are going to use—whose purpose in life is

going to be to take calls from people who feel that they have been

misread by the system, and adjust accordingly.

That person will be able to search the data and come to the right

answer.

Mr. PUTNAM. In a timely manner for him to make his flight?

Admiral LOY. I can’t say that it will be in a timely manner for

him to make his flight. If it requires research that the person, that

46

the passenger advocate has to do for us, that is not a promise that

I can make today.

Mr. PUTNAM. I have overstepped the bounds of time that I set

for everyone else. I apologize. We will excuse this panel temporarily

and swear in the third panel and then bring all three of you back

forward.

So at this time we will excuse you, Admiral. Thank you for your

testimony. And we will welcome panel three.

Admiral LOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, sir.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Note for the record Dr. Tether responded in the affirmative.

Dr. Anthony J. Tether was appointed as Director of the Defense

Advanced Research Projects Agency on June 18, 2001. DARPA is

the principal agency within the Department of Defense for research, development and demonstration of concepts, devices and

systems that provide highly advanced military capabilities.

As Director, Dr. Tether is responsible for management of the

agency’s projects for high-payoff innovative research and development. Prior to his appointment as Director, DARPA, Dr. Tether

held the position of chief executive officer and president of the Sequoia Group, which he founded in 1996.

He has served as chief executive officer for Dynamics Technology

Inc., vice president of Science Applications International Corp.’s

Advanced Technology Sector, and then vice president and general

manager for Range Systems at SAIC.

He spent 6 years as vice president for technology and advanced

development at Ford Aerospace and has also held positions in the

Department of Defense serving as Director of DARPA’s Strategic

Technology Office from 1982 through 1986, and as Director of the

National Intelligence Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1978 to 1982.

Prior to entering government service, he served as executive vice

president of Systems Control from 1969 to 1978, where he applied

estimation and control theory to military and commercial problems

with particular concentration on development and specifications of

algorithms to perform realtime resource allocation and control.

Your mother must be very proud.

Mr. TETHER. Well, I haven’t been able to hold a job for very long.

Mr. PUTNAM. You do move around a lot. But you are not exactly

slumming. We welcome you to the subcommittee, and look forward

to your testimony, if we can understand it.

STATEMENT OF TONY TETHER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCE RESEARCH PROJECT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. TETHER. Well, thank you very much. I would like to offer my

written testimony for the record if I can.

I am not going to really go through much of the written testimony, since you have had it, and have had a chance to review it.

So I just want to make a few points.

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First of all, my testimony today is less on TIA, the Total Information Awareness Program, as a program and more addresses just

a very small part of that program, the data mining part of it.

The TIA itself is a much larger program dealing with collaborative technology, language translation, biometrics identification

and so forth and so on. Now, on the other hand, you all will be getting a major report on May 20th, assuming that I can get it

through all of the coordination that still has to go on, which will

describe in great detail for you the Total Information Awareness

Program, as a program. So you will have that available to you very

shortly.

Data mining, as sometimes used, more commonly used, refers to

the clever statistical techniques which basically seek to comb

through large amounts of data looking for previously unknown but

useful possible patterns. And, as you know, it has been used commercially by pharmaceutical companies and so forth and so on.

The problem is that this approach, while useful for coming up

with correlations, does lead to many false positives and so forth

and so on. Also, it typically requires that all of the data be centralized in one place for those algorithms to work. We are really not

pursuing that technique. I want to really make that clear, primarily, because if you have done nothing but read the papers about

TIA, you are thinking that we doing nothing at DARPA but just

piling through tons and tons of data about people in the United

States looking for possible wrongdoings, and nothing could really

be further from the truth.

Our approach basically starts with a hypothesis about attack scenarios. Given an attack scenario, we create a model, a model which

basically says, if this is the attack scenario being carried out, these

are the observables, these are the questions that if we asked them,

that came up positive, would indicate to us that this attack scenario was underway.

So basically what we end up doing, we spend a lot of effort and

time, basically in creating a model, which ends up with a pattern,

a pattern that indicates that model or attack scenario is true.

We then take that pattern to the data base, and look in the data

base to see if that pattern exists. Now, this allows us basically to

really cut down, to narrow to scope on the data bases on the answers. Also, it also allows us to let the data bases remain distributed. We don’t have to bring the data to a central location with this

approach.

Basically, this is not a new approach, one of the questions was,

well, how do you know that your approaches are going to provide

any security? This is really an approach that has been under development by DARPA and other agencies for many years. One of the

examples is in image processing.

When we receive an image, we can either have an analyst go

through and look at every little pixel to see if a target is there, or

we can develop a model that says, this is what a target looks like

in this picture, and then have the algorithms go through the image

to find if that target is there.

And this is called automatic target recognition, very successful.

We have used it for years, and quite frankly, have just recently

used it in the last Iraq war very successfully.

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Privacy, however, is really a major concern to us. And from the

outset of the TIA program, we have really worried about privacy.

Now, we worried about privacy for perhaps a different reason. But

it does transcend into the public. As you can tell from reading my

resume, I have been around for a long time. And every time there

has been an intelligence failure, it has never been because we

didn’t have the data. We have always had the data.

And, I think, as you see from the hearings on September 11, it

turns out we always had the data. The problem was that the data

was distributed. The problem is that some of data was held by CIA.

Some of the data was held by NSA. The problem was is that there

was no method to have everybody collaborate to work on a problem

to bring that data to be able to answer questions.

One of the reasons that there is difficulty in doing that, is that

the agencies try to protect their sources and methods, for good reasons.

I mean, this is for really good reasons. SIGINT, signals intelligence, is a special case. It has special rules and regulations because signals intelligence is gathering information overseas, but it

can accidentally pull in what is known as data about U.S. persons,

which is not just people, but also corporations. So there is a regulation that prevents people from really automatically sharing raw

data.

So we really are worried about the privacy concerns from how do

we develop a system which would allow this collaboration to take

place with distributed data bases for everyone to get together virtually, work on a problem, yet be comfortable that the privacy of

their data bases was going to be held.

And we have spent a lot of time and a lot of money on that. One

of the major things we also believe is that an audit technique has

to be developed. In other words, in order for people to feel comfortable about somebody seeing a piece of data, they want to know,

in my world, the DOD world, there is a technique known as

ORCON, originator controlled data.

This is an attempt by the originator to make sure the data is not

not used for other than the purpose for which it was granted to the

individual. We believe that you need to have an audit technology

which attaches itself to the data so that everyone, from that moment on, will know who is looking at that data and where has that

data gone. We are spending a great deal of money and effort trying

to do that too.

I think I will stop, because time is getting late and I ask you for

your questions.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Dr. Tether.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tether follows:]

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Mr. PUTNAM. We will lead off with Mr. Clay, again.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Dr. Tether

for being here.

You indicate that TIA will use transaction information held by

private companies. What will you do to assess the accuracy of those

information systems?

Mr. TETHER. Well, actually, I don’t think we ever really said that

TIA will use transaction information held by private companies. I

know it has been said in the press. Our emphasis really has been

on the data that is currently legally collected by our intelligence

community, and also the counterintelligence community.

Now, what we have done, I, personally, believe that all of the

data that we really need to have in order to detect these attacks

already exists in that legally gathered data, because of my experience.

On the other hand, we have looked at, ‘‘Is there other data that

perhaps would accelerate the process of coming to a conclusion

about whether an attack is going on?’’ So we have had research ongoing to see if there was other data besides data that is normally

collected by the intelligence community that could be used.

Now, we have a lot of researchers. DARPA itself does not have

any internal capability. We contract out. We have researchers and

industry that really do the work. So we have to describe a problem

to them to work on. And in some of the descriptions of the problems we talked about transaction data. And I am afraid that they

probably took it maybe a little more literally than we really meant

it. We didn’t mean credit card data. We really were looking for people to research data as to what might be extra data.

Now, we have found in that research that transportation data is

probably data that makes a lot of sense to be included into the mix.

Why? Because these terrorists have to travel. And they don’t have

their own means of communication, which means they are going to

have to take commercial means of communication like airlines,

trains, rental cars, rental trucks and so forth and so on. So it looks

like, if we were to add data that looks like it must be very advantageous, we would say transportation data really looks like it would

be advantageous.

But, again as to how do we know the data is good, and I don’t

mean this as a cop-out, but at DARPA we develop the tools. You

have heard about these other two organizations who want to have

this capability, but they can’t have the capability if someone

doesn’t develop the tools.

We are the ones that basically develop the tools for them to use.

And presumably we don’t collect any data, but we are developing

tools for them to use on the data. And the accuracy of the data is

really on their nickel.

Mr. CLAY. Doctor, along these lines, you indicate in your testimony that you want to operate a system that is consistent with the

spirit not the letter of the Privacy Act.

Mr. TETHER. That is correct.

Mr. CLAY. I don’t quite understand how you are going to do that.

Fundamental to the Privacy Act is the right of individuals to see

the information held about them, and to correct that information.

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Since DARPA will be using data held in the private sector, it

cannot give individuals the right of access and correction, to say

that you are going to comply with the Privacy Act seems misleading.

How will you address this fundamental conflict?

Mr. TETHER. Well, the fundamental conflict again is going back

to what we do. We don’t collect any data. We are not the people

that collect data. We are the people that supply the analytical tools

to those who collect the data. Now, we do worry about privacy.

And, therefore, we are providing technology so that the people in

the different agencies, as they share data with each other, can be

comfortable that their sources and methods are not being compromised.

We are developing new technology for doing that. For example,

one of the major efforts we have in this privacy technology, we

have Oracle as a contractor. Why Oracle? Well, as you know they

are a great data base company. And, in fact, it is the only way we

will get the transitioning of that technology is to have a company

like that develop the technology and be comfortable with its use,

to pull it in.

But we really are not the ones that collect the data. And I really

want to make that very clear. We are the ones that supply the tools

to the people that collect the data, who by the way are operating

in full cognizance of all of the regulations.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you for that.

You, know, you talked in your testimony about us knowing the

hijackers, knowing they were here 2 days after September 11, having known Attorney General Ashcroft for the last 20 years as my

State AG, Governor and U.S. Senator, he is a guy that can’t keep

a job either, but he told me that we knew that the hijackers were

in this country, we just had no real good system of tracking them.

Now, we’ll be able to track them under this new technology?

Mr. TETHER. We are developing a technology, which will allow

the agencies involved to easily collaborate with each other and to

be able to ask questions and create a model.

For example, if one of the models was, and we knew that using

an aircraft as a weapon was something on their minds, because of

the Philippines in 1995. So that was a known technique. Now,

imagine if we had a model created about how would somebody go

and use an airplane as a weapon? And we had created all of the

indicators that had to be true.

Well, one would say, well, it is going to be hard to have somebody have a pilot who is being paid to fly that airplane actually fly

it into a building. So that means that someone is going to probably

have to take over the plane and learn how to fly it.

So one question would be, do we have any unusual people learning aviation? OK. Imagine if we had a collaborative system like we

are talking about, and there was a set of questions up there, and

one of them is, has anybody come across anybody wanting to learn

how to fly aircraft under unusual circumstances, like maybe they

don’t care if they land?

If that system had been in effect, that question in that memo

that the FBI talked about, would have popped up, and people

would have looked at it and looked further into it. I really believe

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that. What we are doing is providing the technology to allow that

to happen, not the collection of the data itself.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Doctor, for your answers. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. The gentlelady from Michigan.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Tether, I think that you may have just answered my question

here. I am listening to you talk about modeling and models, and

so as opposed to doing sort of broad surveillance, as you are doing

the construct for your models and using some of those things for

investigative work, then you say you do a model and you find a

pattern, then you match the pattern against the data bases.

I was going to ask you for an example, a pattern of what. Could

you give us a pattern of what? And perhaps you just answered

that, by talking about someone going to a flight school and learn

how to fly an airplane, didn’t care whether or not he landed. That

is a pattern of odd behavior.

Mr. TETHER. That is a pattern of odd behavior that would come

out if you had a center which people from different agencies were

able to collaborate and actually address various questions. Now, we

used to do this in the cold war in Germany in Stuttgart, there was

a center where there was like 250 questions that were developed

over the years for what would the state of the Soviet Union be if

it were going to attack us?

And there were a whole bunch of questions. Some of them were,

where is the Soviet leadership? Are they still publicly visible? The

CIA could go over with their HUMINT people and find out the answer to that question and come back and say they are visible, yes

we know where they are, and never have to disclose their source.

And that is what I meant about having the technique to protect the

sources and methods.

But, we have had that system in the past. And it has worked

really well. It is just never been applied here. We firmly believe

that, first of all, all of our agencies have these stovepipes. These

are really based on culture. We don’t want to get rid of the stovepipes. I don’t think anybody wants to either, because there is a certain value to having a culture.

But, what we are trying to do is develop the technology so those

stovepipes can be punctured full of holes. While the culture remains, it allows people to cross communicate in a very easy way.

That is really all TIA is about. The data mining part is really the

easiest part. It is all of the going before, the collaboration technology and coming up with the models, which you then take the

pattern to the data base.

That part, while really not trivial, is really the easy part. It is

really the before part that is what we are trying to do. I hope that

helps.

Mrs. MILLER OF MICHIGAN. Yes. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. PUTNAM. You mentioned that there was no transactional

data contemplated, that was in the media, but that actually was

not contemplated by DARPA?

Mr. TETHER. Except in a research way to assess what might be

a sweet spot of new data that is not currently being collected by

our intelligence and counterintelligence organizations.

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Mr. PUTNAM. You identified transportation data.

Mr. TETHER. I probably will regret that. But that seems to be a

major part to the puzzle, because of the fact that these terrorists

don’t have their own Air Forces or Navy and have to rely upon

commercial capabilities.

Mr. PUTNAM. But you are stating here, on the record, that you

don’t contemplate monitoring credit card transactions, library card

check-outs, video rentals.

Mr. TETHER. Contemplating is the word I am having trouble

with, because we have a lot of researchers who are out there looking at what data might be useful.

I personally would be extraordinarily surprised if video rentals,

and such, would be some of that data. The only person I know of

who has said that credit card data monitoring would be a good

thing to do, actually was President Clinton at an address at UC

Davis in the spring of 2002, because he talked about some facts

about the hijackers with their credit cards being maxed out, and

so forth and so on, which might have tipped you off that something

is wrong about this person who has six credit cards that are all

maxed out.

But that is sort of a hindsight type of input, that I don’t really

know if it would be valuable in doing the predictive something.

Mr. PUTNAM. I am not trying to back you in a corner. I am trying

to help you guys fix a little bit of your PR problem.

Mr. TETHER. I am trying to contemplate.

Mr. PUTNAM. We pay you to contemplate.

Mr. TETHER. You pay us to contemplate.

Mr. PUTNAM. So there is no plans to deploy?

Mr. TETHER. There are no plans to deploy. Contemplate, is there

a researcher someplace that we are paying at some university who

is thinking.

Mr. PUTNAM. Again, I am not trying to back you in a corner. I

am trying to get out there what is not occurring.

Mr. TETHER. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. I will stop there in the interests of time, and let’s

go ahead and reseat everyone. Let’s take a 2-minute recess and

allow everyone to come forward.

[Recess.]

Mr. PUTNAM. Let’s go ahead and reconvene. I want to thank Admiral Loy and Mr. McCraw for remaining with the committee. We

deliberately gave everyone their own panel to focus on the unique

aspects of each of those systems, which I think is an important distinction to draw, because they are unique and have different purposes.

But, under the umbrella of general factual data analysis or data

mining, I think it also makes some sense to bring everyone back

and talk about collaboration and some of the other issues that are

common to all three departments or agencies.

So we will, in keeping with our tradition, allow Mr. Clay to lead

off with questions for the entire panel.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is a dark cloud of secrecy that hangs over this administration. And the programs we are discussing today are a part of the

reason that cloud is so dark. These agencies are creating surveilVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:37 Feb 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 D:\DOCS\90399.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
63

lance systems, and they don’t want to tell the American people how

they work. Just this week U.S. News reported that there are a

number of children among the detainees at Guantanamo. How

many we don’t know, but we do know that the Secretary of State

has objected to the situation.

TSA wants to develop a profiling system and doesn’t want to

allow the public to see or correct the information that is used to

profile them. The FBI has decided that it no longer has to worry

about the accuracy of the information it holds on people. DARPA

wants to build yet another system to profile the American public.

Security at any cost is not what either Congress or the American

public wants. Systems that skirt the Privacy Act or try to wiggle

under the fourth amendment are not in our best interest. As we

saw, when the public learned about the TIA program at DARPA,

they were outraged, and Congress put a hold on the funding for

that program.

I would like to ask each of you to explain to the subcommittee

what you are doing to explain to the public what you are doing,

and why you must keep it a secret.

Admiral LOY. Mr. Clay, thank you very much for the opportunity.

First of all, TSA has filed a Federal Register notice, probably with

as wide a set of opportunities for comment as has ever been published. We have reached out deliberately to a large spectrum of the

privacy community, those folks who would be the first to support

the fourth amendment.

We intend to continue to hold that ongoing conversation by holding public meetings about exactly what CAPPS II is all about. We

are absolutely not putting together a profiling system that we will

be ashamed of or fear offering to the public for comment. In fact,

we are going desperately quickly in the other direction, to give

every opportunity to the public, through public meetings, and

through publicly stated records, with every intention of refiling a

public notice when we have heard that conversation carefully and

forged the privacy strategy associated with CAPPS II.

So I take issue with the kind of question that seems shaped

around a conclusion, when, in fact, the conversation has not even

been continuously held yet.

Mr. CLAY. Well, Admiral, I shape it that way because in our last

hearing, Mark Forman, the Federal CIO, indicated that TSA was

not meeting its deadlines for providing information to OMB. That

was the end of March. Has TSA provided OMB with all of the information that OMB has requested about CAPPS II since that

hearing?

Admiral LOY. Indeed we have, sir. What Mr. Forman is responsible for is making sure that the business case end of CAPPS II

complies, not only with the procedures appropriate in any instance,

but those that are sensitive in a project like you and I are speaking

about.

Indeed we have provided that information to OMB.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you. Dr. Tether.

Mr. TETHER. Well, first of all, DARPA is not developing a system

to profile the American public. And I hope, maybe I have convinced

you in our previous conversation and the testimony.

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Nothing could really be further from the truth. I mean, we aren’t

doing that at all. As far as secrecy, I can’t think of anybody that

has been more open about what we are doing. It is because of the

nature of us. In order to develop this technology, we reach out for

everybody that we can. Consequently, we advertise what we are

doing. In this particular area, all of what we are doing is really unclassified.

Now, the application of it and the use of it on the data, the data

becomes classified. But the actual technology and all is unclassified. We had a conference last year. We had 2,000 people there. We

disclosed fully what we were doing. The press was there. We even

here in the House last year, in the House Authorization Report,

what we were doing was lauded by the report. As, ‘‘Hey, this is

really great stuff.’’

Now, so it hasn’t been kept quiet. On the other hand, because of

the deluge of comments that happened last fall, I knew what was

going on at DARPA, I was reading the papers. I mean, my God, I

finally called up my guys, and asked if they were doing what I

thought they were doing? I really became worried myself.

I can imagine that you all, with the inputs that you were getting

from your constituents, I know about them because a lot of them

have been forwarded to me to answer, that you must have been

worried too.

Some of them were so outrageous we were stunned, quite frankly. The one mistake that we at DARPA made is that we were so

stunned by the outrageous comments that we didn’t do anything

about it for some time. We just watched it. And finally we woke

up and got over here and tried to get the truth out.

Now, on the other hand the Department of Defense, the Honorable Pete Aldridge, who I work for, said, ‘‘Look, I know that what

you are doing is OK, Tony. But I am going to do two things to

make sure that everybody else believes that too.’’ First of all, two

boards have been created in the Department of Defense, an internal board and an external board. The internal board is really set

up to really just review the DARPA TIA project. OK, to make sure

that the DARPA TIA project is truly following all of the rules and

regulations and so forth and so on.

And we have certain outputs already from our internal Inspector

General that says what we are doing is in compliance with all of

the laws and regulations. On the other hand, they have also established an external board. Now, this external board is comprised of

people from the outside. I didn’t give you a list in my testimony,

but I would be happy to do that, of people on the outside, some are

privacy advocates, but all are well known, and understand the Constitution and the laws and regulations.

And the purpose of that is not just for us. But you see in the Department, if you want to do experiments on animals, you go to an

animal board. You say, look this is an experiment using animals.

Can I do it? And the board says yes or no. If you want to use humans, same thing. What we don’t have is a board that really does

privacy things.

If you go to the board and say look, here is a new information

technique that I want to use. You know, can I do it? Is it violating

any laws and regulations? This external board is supposed to be a

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board that people like us can go to and get someone to say yes or

no on what we are trying to do. But we really have been open.

We are not developing a system to profile the American public.

Mr. CLAY. Thank you.

Mr. McCraw.

Mr. MCCRAW. Yes, sir, Congressman.

First, I would like to say, you know, a core value of the FBI is

a rigorous obedience to the Constitution and the rule of law. And

that there is no justification at all when the FBI is in search of or

investigating or trying to enforce the law, violating the law. We

must adhere to all proscribed laws by Congress, the attorney general guidelines.

In maintaining, you know, the data in our systems, we need to

apply to those laws and we will. And whatever laws and whatever

rules that are applicable, the internal guidelines, the FBI will

abide by those.

Mr. CLAY. Let me say in summary, Mr. Chairman, to the witnesses, that TSA won’t tell us how CAPPS II works or what data

goes into it.

DARPA wants to keep the same kinds of secrets. The FBI issued

a rule saying that it doesn’t have to keep its records on Americans

accurate and up to date. I would like each of you to go back to your

respective agencies and figure out what you can do to help build

public confidence in your activities through openness and then report back to this committee and tell us what you think would make

this process a little easier on the American public.

Mr. MCCRAW. If I may, I would like to go back and research the

rule that you are referring to, because, clearly, I need to. I will do

that. And I will get back to you.

Mr. CLAY. Get back to us. I would appreciate it. Thank you.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Clay. And if you have additional

questions at any time, just let me know.

I really sympathize with the position that all three of you are in.

Prior to September 11th, we would have town hall meetings and

letters and phone calls where people were unhappy about red light

cameras. And then people were unhappy when Tampa hosted the

Super Bowl and they deployed a new face recognition technology

that scanned the crowd and detected people who may be terrorists

or who may be criminals. And people were up in arms. It was a

very hot constituent issue.

On September 12th, people were up in arms that we had not

done more to surveil potential bad people, to track potentially bad

people, to keep tabs on them or to prevent their entry into this

country and so forth and so on.

We are plowing new ground here. We are taking advantage of

wonderful new technologies that offer the hope of greater national

security, and the threat of greater intrusiveness into innocent lives.

And we hold Mr. McCraw and Admiral Loy on a regular basis responsible for all a lot of those things, for the safety of Americans,

and yet all of us as policymakers in the executive branch and the

legislative branch and the judiciary, are all trying to find this new

line to go along with this new technology.

So we have this obligation to find this balance and to take the

promise of the technology, without having inaccuracies, cause good

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people to be held, detained or held in suspicion or cause to disrupt

their lives, whether it is as simple as missing a flight or as serious

as being detained and questioned and perhaps even held for some

charge that is false.

So that is what we are attempting to do with this Phase 1 of

these hearings is exercise our responsibility to weigh in on where

these lines are. All of these events, all of these terrorist incidents

have highlighted new weaknesses and new gaps in our ability as

a country to detect or prevent them.

And one of them is really a lack of collaboration, it is not a technological challenge, it is a human capital challenge, and a couple

of you have referred to that. You are a creature of the FBI culture,

a very proud, rich tradition in law enforcement.

You are a DOD animal, a creature of that community. And Admiral Loy, you and your guys are still figuring out your culture.

Admiral LOY. Well, I came with one from 200 years of culture.

Mr. PUTNAM. You certainly have a rich tradition from the Coast

Guard, and, hopefully, that will influence the spotted zebra that we

have created at Homeland Security. But, how can each of you address the challenge of overcoming the cultural obstacles to utilize

this technology, to share the data, to break down the mistrust, and

have this system, these systems when they are deployed in an efficient way, have them truly collaborative across the Federal Government and including State and local law enforcement, beginning

with Admiral Loy.

Admiral LOY. Sir, it is an enormous challenge. If you go back to

even a founding father, the balance was being discussed even then.

Franklin said, ‘‘He who would give up even a moment of liberty for

hours of safety deserves neither.’’

Our challenge is to build the culture you were just describing. It

is to take a set of core values, I use the phrase that was just used

a moment ago, and in our case at TSA, to bring together a composite of people from so many different walks of life, not only the Federal Government, but from throughout America as well, and compose a culture. That culture would be based on the Constitution

that we all hold so dear, and we would be reminded on a daily

basis that what was attacked on September 11, 2001 was not just

the World Trade Center, it was not just the Pentagon, but it was

the whole notion, idea and ethic of what America is all about. We

should be in the business in a post-September 11 environment of

designing systems that recognize that very Constitutional foundation that we are so enormously proud of as Americans.

I also, at this particular point in my 1-year tutelage of this organization, have come to conclude that the Founding Fathers, also

had mobility as one of the inalienable rights they were talking

about. My challenge is to protect that particular notion for Americans who want to get up and go, wherever they want to go, with

some security and comfort. This includes not only being able to get

to their destination, but any system that will be imposed on them

for either their benefit for security or for their benefit for safety

will be such that they don’t feel they have given up something in

the way of privacy in order to be comfortable in the way of security.

That is the challenge that we have on a daily basis; you’re absolutely right. It’s the execution of those things, day after day after

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day, and the aggregation of that which will represent the answer

at the other end of the day as to whether we, in our generation,

had our chance to get it right and did so. That calls for a commitment to the very basic precepts that have always guided legislators, judges and operators in the executive branch, to meet the

needs of Americans.

Mr. TETHER. First of all, I think you’re absolutely right, collaboration is the key. And that is really the technology that really

needs to be developed that will allow people like the three of us to

be able to remain physically where our particular offices are, but

yet be able to go into a ‘‘room’’ and have no constraints on being

able to talk to each other like we’re at this table right now. We’re

working hard on developing that collaboration technology which we

believe in and we’re experimenting with it. We have experimental

nodes at several places within the DOD, INSCOM, overseas,

SOCOM, STRATCOM, JFCOM, these are all DOD locations. We

are putting in these experimental nodes where the collaboration

technology and other tools are being tried. I really agree with you.

Now how do we make people comfortable with what we’re doing?

Well, hearings like this. This is really the right way to do it. I don’t

know how else to do it except talk about what we’re doing. To talk

about it where people will listen. I’m sure there’s press here in the

room. And you know, this is the way to do it. Hearings like this,

congressional oversight.

As you know, we had a major flap, over the last year, and a lot

of good came out of that. Because we weren’t doing anything

wrong. But now I believe that with the report that’s coming out

and the conversations that we’ve had, a lot of other people are understanding what we’re doing. I think they’re starting to be more

comfortable with it. At least I’m not getting as many letters as I

was. But collaboration is the tool, the coin of the realm. And meetings like this and hearings like this are the way we’re going to

make people in the United States comfortable. That’s all I have.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. McCraw.

Mr. MCCRAW. Yes, sir. First it gives me another chance an opportunity to thank you. For example, the Patriot Act, now enables us

to share data with other agencies that we could not up until the

passing of the Patriot Act, as well as certain modifications in terms

of the Attorney General guidelines. I know it’s been talked about

a great deal about the cultures within agencies not sharing information, protecting information. And I’m not going to say that the

FBI has had the best reputation in the past in terms of sharing information, but we’ve all worked with the American public and

we’ve all taken an oath. And one core value we all share is we’re

all willing to sacrifice for our country. Like you, we all love our

country.

We cannot afford to have something happen like September 11th,

because we didn’t share information as a result of parochial reasons. And, frankly, with technology and the type of things that the

good doctor is working on, clearly it enables us, I think, collectively

as a community, to leverage that technology so that we can find

those links, relationships, and do what all of us want to do, and

every American citizen wants to do and that’s protect the United

States from a future terrorist attack.

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Mr. PUTNAM. Let me change gears just a little bit with you, Mr.

McCraw, because Admiral Loy and I had sort of an extended dialog

over the long-term potential of the CAPPS technology. It is difficult

for me to believe that at some point in the future, when hopefully

the national tension has declined a bit over international terror

and it has returned to good old fashioned crime, it’s difficult to believe that we wouldn’t take that technology and use it as a tool to

capture someone who had kidnapped a minor, was attempting to

bring them back across different States on an airline, essentially

an Amber Alert plus, it’s difficult to believe that you wouldn’t take

that same technology that’s already paid for, that’s already in

place, that’s already omnipresent and use it to capture felons, drug

dealers, perhaps even a step further, people who owe child support,

it’s limitless when you already have that type of technology in

place.

So as a law enforcement officer and former field agent, wouldn’t

the temptation be you would want to go to the parents of someone

whose child has been kidnapped and say we’ve sent out the alert;

there’s no station, no airport, no cruise terminal anywhere, no rental car agency, that they could go without being picked up?

Mr. MCCRAW. Well, you know, clearly, we’re excited about the

technology because it doesn’t just make us more effective in terrorism, you’re right, it also makes us more effective with our own data

in the internal data we collect when we’re trying to investigate corporate fraud, gang-related violence, the sniper case, all of these

particular things will enable us, whatever the agent is investigating, and certainly to the degree that there’s things in place, technology that’s out there that we can employ over other data sets, as

long as it’s legally permissible by law, by statute and attorney general guidelines then clearly we would love to leverage that and will

leverage that not being unlike we use some of the technologies out

there in the private sector today and information when we are

using some of the public source data base that we talked about.

Mr. PUTNAM. Admiral Loy, is there anything you want to add to

that?

Admiral LOY. Yes, sir. I will just add that is what the notion of

oversight is all about, both the general congressional oversight of

what the executive branch is up to, checks and balances in the

classic sense, but more appropriately, an oversight group not only

about the Congress but to include folks who have as a raison d’etre

in life, the fourth amendment, to have them be part of that system.

So Mission Creep is not part of what occurs in a program without

the attention very carefully and very publicly being brought to the

attention of whoever is responsible for that program.

So if it’s me responsible for CAPPS II 5 years from now when

what you just described has occurred, I want my oversight panel

to be composed in such a fashion that as soon as there is the appearance of Mission Creep in the CAPPS II system, someone will

very clearly bring that to my attention, and, as appropriate, bring

it to your attention.

Mr. PUTNAM. Dr. Tether, is it your opinion that the appropriate

deployment of CAPPS II and Trilogy will substantially improve national security?

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Mr. TETHER. Boy, that’s a good question. The word is substantially. I believe I do know about CAPPS II. We were involved with

the source election in CAPPS II, so I know about it. And I also do

know something about Trilogy, because we were involved in talking

with the FBI also about providing them some capability. We’re prohibited by the way from providing either of these folks these tools

that we’re developing.

And I would say yes. I believe that. Especially if they have the

right tools. I’m hesitating because I’m not really sure what tools

they’re going to have. I really think the fury over what we’re doing

hasn’t been by the people. The privacy people are well-intentioned,

but they know that we’re not the problem. It’s the people who are

going to use the tools and the people who are going to authorize

the use of the tools that are the problem. But if they can stop the

tools from being built, they don’t have to worry about the other

people. I really believe that’s the reason for the fury over what

we’re doing. But the tools are important. These folks could use the

tools. And I believe that they will. If he does his job right, with the

right tools, security will definitely be greatly enhanced.

Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. McCraw and Admiral Loy, will both of your

programs, and Dr. Tether, as part of your research, does your program envision a mechanism for the public to have redress of inaccurate or incomplete information that would make them whole essentially for whatever harm is done?

Admiral LOY. Absolutely sir. The passenger advocate role that I

mentioned in my testimony is being designed to offer that redress

opportunity for anyone aggrieved by the system.

Mr. TETHER. Same here. What we’re doing is developing this

audit technology so that the data, the information can only be used

for the purpose for which it was granted and not abused by being

taken out of that environment and used elsewhere. That audit

technology again is very crucial to all of this. If it works well, the

public or anyone can be assured that the data will only be used for

what it was authorized to be used for, and not anything else.

Mr. PUTNAM. Is it limited in its effectiveness to TIA, or does it

have potential for these other——

Mr. TETHER. Oh, it’s very general. In fact, it needs to be general

because the data bases are not homogenous, they’re heterogenous

data bases so it has to be general.

Mr. PUTNAM. Anybody can pull up their credit reports and find

mistakes and have an opportunity——

Mr. TETHER. In our case, only if a person is authorized to see the

credit report can he pull up the credit report. But then that credit

report cannot be used for other purposes, without the audit technology either preventing it or raising an alarm that it’s being done.

That’s what I mean.

Admiral LOY. We’re using, sir, a software system called Radiant

Mercury, which is an NSA-accredited—literally, the top accreditation, if you will, that you can get in this regard. It’s essentially a

real-time logging system that will facilitate tracking for everybody

that needs to understand access to the system that has been encountered. It will be a literally a real-time logging of who went in,

got what, for what purpose. That’s one of the auditing systems that

we’re using in the CAPPS II program.

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Mr. PUTNAM. Radiant Mercury?

Admiral LOY. Radiant Mercury, a proprietary system by Lockheed Martin.

Mr. PUTNAM. Only in homeland security?

Admiral LOY. No, sir. That’s software that any program manager

who needs it for an auditing program or auditing software piece

can either purchase or lease as appropriate from its proprietary

owner.

Mr. MCCRAW. Auditing is a very important function with us as

well, including some of the risk technology that the doctor talked

about. In fact, using that, we will definitely improve within the FBI

information, who has a right to have access. Are there patterns of

activity being done by an agent that would signal a concern in

terms of the access? Also, we’re even looking at using the same

type of technology to provide greater oversight in terms of operations of sources. Because that pattern technology is there and how

we can do a better job of using technology, building into Trilogy,

things that can serve as triggers, as alarms of activity that we need

to take a closer look at.

Mr. PUTNAM. Dr. Tether, are you aware of other nation’s approaches to data mining and where they are in their sophistication,

and are there other customers in the Federal Government who

have this level of data mining technology or greater that may be

employed?

Mr. TETHER. You mean the technology that we’re trying to develop?

Mr. PUTNAM. Well, you’ve got three different ones represented.

I’m just curious how many others there may be in the rest of the

community or in other agencies that we’re not as familiar with.

Mr. TETHER. With respect to other nations, I don’t know of any.

That may be just ignorance on my part. But I don’t know of any

that have technology that is anything like what we’re talking about

here. With respect to other Federal agencies, NSA obviously has a

concern of people who have access to data that may have audit capability there. They’re worried about making sure that data on

U.S. persons stays in special compartments. CIA undoubtedly has

the same with respect to their human capabilities. Other than that

I don’t think so. I mean, other than that, I think you’ve, for better

or worse, you’ve got it here at the table.

Mr. PUTNAM. Admiral Loy, any comments on that?

Admiral LOY. I don’t have any to add, simply because I’m not

sure of what others might be. There is one point that you asked

us to comment on earlier, Mr. Chairman. I would be remiss if I

didn’t add that the whole purpose of DHS, as I understand the legislation, was to facilitate the notion of information sharing, and

that is exactly what’s going on under Secretary Ridge. He is wedded clearly to the notion of the value in pulling together all those

disparate agencies under one roof.

For example, part of the review process for allowing CAPPS II

to go on and making budgetary judgments with respect to building

out our facility out at Annapolis Junction was to make absolutely

certain that it took into acocunt other programs in the Bureau, the

old Customs service, now the BCP Bureau under BTS or BICE, the

new Bureau that used to be fundamentally INS under BTS, and

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whether there are screening projects going on in any of those organizations. Secretary Ridge and Under Secretary Hutchinson are

making absolutely certain that we are present together in the same

room and we’re not allowed out until the notion of redundancies

and overlaps and such are eliminated at the design stage and dealt

with in a fashion that was the intention, I think, of the Congress

when DHS was put together.

Mr. PUTNAM. And you’re satisfied that information sharing is occurring between the intelligence community?

Admiral LOY. I still think we have a way to go. There’s no doubt

about that. But it is so much better than it was. We all had this

quest for connecting the dots after September 11, 2001, and as I

think we heard from Dr. Tether the potential to connect those dots

is infinitely better today than it was then, sir.

Mr. PUTNAM. With regard to CAPPS II and the TSA, are we

ahead of everybody else in the world? Do the Israelis have a model

or someone else out there?

Admiral LOY. Actually I’m going over to Israel at the end of the

month with several purposes in mind, among which are to check

the passenger prescreening process that they use there to make

sure that we are learning about whatever they may have that they

haven’t shared with us already.

Mr. PUTNAM. Very good.

Dr. Tether.

Mr. TETHER. This is ignorance.

Admiral LOY. Is Customs part of TSA?

Mr. TETHER. It’s part of homeland security. Customs has a very

good system for looking at imports coming in to be able to determine whether a cargo ship or cargo is suspect to know which ships

to go and further inspect. And they have a very good system in

place.

Admiral LOY. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I have been personally

writing about and convinced for several years that the point of origin, the point of destination, with transparency in between is the

real key to our understanding the cargo piece, perhaps as well as

the passenger piece, in terms of those who would be aboard or even

the crews. But properly manifested cargo and people on ships at

sea coming toward the United States is an enormous challenge for

us to deal with. This goes to your earlier question about the rest

of the transportation system not being left behind. As Americans,

we have a pretty good penchant to continue to fight last year’s war.

Mr. PUTNAM. It’s important that the rest of the world join us

with all the ports that are now international and the tremendous

volume of cargo.

Admiral LOY. Commissioner Bonner has really done an excellent

job in his outreach to ports around the world, in his so-called CSI

initiative, which basically has convinced about 25 of the major

ports of the world who send things to the United States to be in

a reciprocity agreement to allowing Customs, U.S. BCP inspectors,

portal inspectors to be literally on the pier when things are being

loaded on the ship as opposed to when they’re already here. It’s too

late if they’re already here.

Mr. PUTNAM. Admiral, do you have any final comments for the

subcommittee?

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Admiral LOY. Only to thank you for the opportunity as offered

in the letter of invitation to offer to the committee some insights

as to the intentions of where we’re going and how we’re going to

do it. I appreciate that opportunity, sir, and look forward to working with you in the future.

Mr. PUTNAM. Dr. Tether, anything from DARPA?

Mr. TETHER. No. Thank you very much. I do believe that hearings like this are the way to get the public comfortable, and thank

you for having it. Thank you for having me.

Mr. PUTNAM. Director McCraw.

Mr. MCCRAW. There’s only one director. If I want to keep my job,

I better make that clear. The only thing I know it was to the culture question that has been echoed is that we recognize the FBI’s

unique collections of data, and we have to be able to share that

data to the widest extent possible by law and also leveraging information technology that the good doctor has been working on over

at DARPA. So thank you very much for the time of being here.

Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you. I thank all of our distinguished witnesses for their participation today. I’m grateful for their cooperation with Congress. We’re particularly grateful at your efforts to

get in your written testimony. Your cooperation is key as we continue to deal with these important issues facing the Nation and the

Congress. I want to thank the subcommittee members for their

participation, particularly our ranking member. I appreciate everything that you’ve done. And in the event that there may be additional questions we did not reach today, the record shall remain

open for 2 weeks for submitted questions and answers. Thank you

all. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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