Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of 

DENNY DOUGLAS TITUS,

 Deceased. 

EMILY R. HANSEN,

 Respondent,

v.

FRED V. CHRISTIANSON,

Appellant.

 No. 79760-3-I

 (consolidated with 79660-7-I)

 DIVISION ONE

 UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SMITH, J. — The court appointed Emily Hansen as guardian ad litem 

(GAL) for Denny Douglas Titus in two actions where the State sought to protect 

Titus from financial exploitation by Robert Crawford. In this Trust and Estate

Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA), ch. 11.96A RCW, petition, the trial court 

granted summary judgment in favor of Hansen, finding Fred Christianson, a 

former personal representative of Titus’s estate, liable for Hansen’s creditor’s 

claims flowing from her appointment as GAL and awarding her fees incurred as a 

result of the TEDRA petition. The court also imposed sanctions against 

Christianson and his attorney. 

Because Christianson breached his fiduciary duty by failing to act as a 

reasonably prudent person in the management of the estate and because 

Hansen was unable to collect her claims from the estate due to Christianson’s 
No. 79760-3-I/2

2

actions, Hansen was entitled to judgment against Christianson personally. 

Additionally, pursuant to RCW 11.96A.150, Hansen was entitled to the fees she 

incurred as a result of the TEDRA petition. We therefore affirm the trial court’s 

order on summary judgment. However, because Christianson did not receive 

adequate notice that Hansen sought sanctions against him personally, we 

reverse the award of sanctions. 

FACTS

In 2015, Titus twice signed powers of attorney to Crawford. Additionally, 

in August 2015, Titus executed a quitclaim deed transferring “all right, title, and 

interest” in his home (property) located in Seattle, Washington, to Crawford’s 

company, Marathon Legal Services Inc. Titus and Crawford also signed a “Letter 

of Agreement Re Employment Agreement” (agreement). Therein, Marathon 

agreed to pay Titus $75,000 within 30 to 90 days of the agreement and a $3,000 

monthly salary “as a Marathon contractor.” Marathon also agreed to assume rent 

and utilities for Titus’s office space, and title to the property was to revert back to 

Titus in 2017, after Titus’s “two year tenancy at $1.00 per year.”1 The Real 

Estate Excise Tax Supplemental Statement noted that the property was a “gift” 

without consideration and that Titus would “continue to make 100% of the 

payments on [the] total debt of $165,000.02.”

Shortly after Crawford and Titus executed the agreement, Titus’s pastor, 

Sharon Bush, filed a complaint with the State alleging that Crawford was 

 

1 Title should have reverted to Titus’s estate on August 4, 2017. In fact, 

Marathon retained title until the property was foreclosed upon in 2018.
No. 79760-3-I/3

3

exploiting Titus. On this basis, the State brought a guardianship petition alleging 

that Titus was incapacitated (guardianship petition). The State also brought an 

action under the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA), ch. 74.34 RCW, to have 

Titus declared a vulnerable adult (AVAA petition). The court issued a temporary 

order of protection—or Vulnerable Adult Protection Order (VAPO)—against 

Crawford, restraining the sale of the property and ordering an account of every 

dollar that “came into or out of Mr. Titus’ estate since [Crawford] became 

attorney-in-fact.”2 Pursuant to these petitions, the court appointed Hansen as 

GAL and Kameron Kirkevold as Titus’s attorney. 

In her role as GAL, Hansen spoke with Titus. During their conversation, 

Titus stated that he received neither the $75,000 owed to him pursuant to the 

agreement nor a monthly payment from Crawford. Specifically, Titus “insisted 

that Mr. Crawford had no obligation to pay him until the sale of his house.” Titus 

“threatened to end his life” and said that “[h]e only need[ed] Mr. Crawford to take 

care of him and his tremendous debt.” 

In her GAL report, Hansen determined that Titus was a vulnerable adult in 

need of protection from Crawford’s financial exploitation. She concluded that 

Titus was “unable to handle any of his financial affairs” and could not adequately 

care for his medical needs. Hansen found that “Crawford persuaded [Titus] to 

transfer title to five (5) vehicles to him,” including titles to four classic vehicles, 

“estimated at $20-25,000 in the aggregate.” Crawford sold the vehicles, but Titus 

neither knew of the amount received as payment nor received any payment. 

 

2 The record does not contain the protection orders. 
No. 79760-3-I/4

4

Furthermore, Titus had “no idea whatsoever the extent of his assets and income 

expended by Mr. Crawford,” and did not “have any interest in an accounting.” 

Hansen concluded that because of “cognitive impairment resulting from serious 

medical conditions, [Titus’s] decision-making was significantly impaired,” and he 

was unable “to comprehend [Crawford’s] egregious self-dealing.”

On July 2, 2016, Titus died intestate. Thereafter, the court struck the trial 

for the guardianship petition and dismissed the petition. In August 2016, the 

probate court appointed Christianson as personal representative of Titus’s

estate. Christianson served under court supervision. The court did not require 

Christianson to post a bond for the estate. However, the court ordered him to 

“advise the court on the known assets and liabilities of the estate” within 60 days

in order to determine whether a bond was necessary to protect the estate. 

Christianson did not comply and never secured a bond for the estate’s protection. 

In May 2017, Christianson and Crawford entered into an agreement for 

payment of $65,000 to the estate “upon the sale of Marathon’s property”

(settlement). The settlement agreement “release[d] and discharge[d] Marathon 

and all principals, officers, agents, attorneys, employees . . . of Marathon, from 

any and all claims, demands, causes of action known or unknown which the 

Estate may now have or may hereafter have in relation to any matter between 

the Parties.” The estate never received the promised payment.

In August 2017, after the court had approved two previous creditor’s 

claims for $17,147.45 and $9,961.84, Hansen filed a second amended creditor’s 

claim requesting a principal judgment amount of $15,837.22 against the estate. 
No. 79760-3-I/5

5

The court approved her claim and added it to the two prior awards, including an 

“interest at the rate of 12% per annum . . . until paid in full.” At the same time, 

Christianson secured the rescission of the VAPO and dismissal of the AVAA

petition without prejudice.3 In the order dismissing the AVAA petition and the 

VAPO, the court awarded fees to Hansen. 

In April 2018, the mortgagee foreclosed on Titus’s property because the 

mortgage had not been paid since June 1, 2016. The mortgagee’s complaint 

showed that despite the VAPO enjoining Crawford from the sale or encumbrance 

of Titus’s residence, in September 2016, Crawford had recorded two deeds of 

trust: (1) $350,000 to his business associate, Anita Frick, and (2) $250,000 to 

Louis J. Berg.

On September 7, 2018, the court issued an order to show cause to revoke 

Christianson’s letters of administration. During the hearing, Hansen again 

requested the approved GAL fees. The court noted that there was no objection 

to Hansen’s creditor’s claims and that, therefore, the estate must pay the fees 

within 30 days. The court ordered judgment of Hansen’s fees for $50,009.38 and 

awarded her an additional $2,400.00 to “be paid by the Estate of Denny Douglas 

Titus.” Additionally, pursuant to RCW 11.28.250, the court removed Christianson 

as personal representative for mismanagement, waste, and neglect.4 

 

3 Kirkevold originally requested, on behalf of Titus, dismissal of the VAPA 

petition in April 2016. However, the court did not dismiss the petition until 

Christianson took over as personal representative. 

4 RCW 11.28.250 provides the trial court authority to revoke letters from a 

personal representative when the court “has reason to believe that [they have] 

wasted, embezzled, or mismanaged, . . . or ha[ve] wrongfully neglected the 

estate.” 
No. 79760-3-I/6

6

When the estate did not pay her claims within 30 days, Hansen filed a 

TEDRA petition against Christianson, alleging that he breached his fiduciary duty 

by, among other things, entering into the settlement with Crawford and seeking 

rescission of the VAPO. Hansen alleged that Christianson never provided her 

with his filed response to the TEDRA petition.5 But in his response, Christianson 

alleged that the State’s agents perpetuate “a massive guardianship and probate 

fraud (“GPF”) scheme.” Christianson also asserted that, among other things, 

Hansen attempted to extort Crawford, has “criminal history,” and committed 

manslaughter in the second degree. Christianson “assert[ed] [his] right under 18 

U.S. Code § 4 to demand” that “the Court notify the United States Attorney for 

the Western District” of Hansen’s “federal criminal activity.” He argued that the 

court’s failure to notify the U.S. attorney “would constitute the Court having 

committed the federal crime of Misprision of Felony.” Christianson also argued 

that Hansen and the trial court “failed to cite valid evidence supported by the 

court record of the alleged waste, mismanagement or neglect.” 

In December 2018, Hansen moved for CR 11 sanctions against 

Christianson’s attorney, Jonathan Grindell. In her motion, Hansen contended 

that Grindell filed irrelevant pleadings and exhibits not well grounded in fact and 

not warranted by existing law, and concealed and refused to serve pleadings on 

Hansen. In granting Hansen’s CR 11 motion, the court made 29 findings of 

Christianson and Grindell’s “bad faith litigation conduct[,] . . . result[ing] in 

 

5 During a later hearing, Hansen admitted that she “had forgotten to sign 

up for e-service.” 
No. 79760-3-I/7

7

[Hansen’s] increased litigation time and expense.” The court imposed $10,000 in 

sanctions against Christianson and Grindell, jointly and severally. 

In January 2019, Hansen moved for summary judgment, and in February 

2019, the court heard Hansen’s motion. There, Christianson asserted “[t]here 

are numerous, numerous genuine material facts.” He was unable to cite the 

record for even one genuine issue of material fact. That day, the trial court 

granted Hansen’s motion for summary judgment against Christianson, awarding 

her $55,072.68 and pursuant to RCW 11.40.080, RCW 11.96.150,6 or 

RCW 4.84.185, reasonable attorney fees and costs. 

Later, Hansen sought to reduce to judgment the CR 11 sanctions imposed 

on Christianson and Grindell. In reply, Christianson asked the court to remove 

joint and several liability on Christianson, arguing that the order violated his right 

to due process. The court disagreed and in its order noted that Hansen’s initial 

CR 11 motion only sought sanctions against Grindell, but that it was entitled to 

impose sanctions against Christianson or Grindell. The court granted Hansen’s 

motion and found it had authority to impose sanctions against Christianson and 

Grindell jointly and severally. 

Hansen later submitted her presentation of proposed judgment on her 

motion for summary judgment. Therein, she sought supplemental judgment for 

the fees she incurred following the court’s original decision on summary 

judgment. Christianson replied, arguing that the trial court did not have authority 

 

6 The trial court committed an obvious scrivener’s error when it said it 

awarded fees under RCW 11.94A.150 because no such statute exists. 
No. 79760-3-I/8

8

under RCW 11.40.080(2), RCW 11.94A.150, or RCW 4.84.185 to impose a 

supplemental judgment in favor of Hansen. He also challenged many of the fees 

that Hansen requested.

In June 2019, the court issued a judgment nunc pro tunc, ordering 

judgment in favor of Hansen in the principal amount of $55,072.68, “including 

prejudgment interest through February 15, 2019.” Pursuant to RCW 11.40.080, 

RCW 11.96A.150, and RCW 4.84.185, the court also awarded Hansen attorney 

fees and costs of $41,989 and “post-judgment interest at the rate of 12% per 

annum on this judgment from February 15, 2019,” until paid in full. Christianson 

appeals. 

ANALYSIS

Summary Judgment

Christianson contends that the trial court erred when it granted Hansen’s 

motion for summary judgment and found him liable for Hansen’s creditor’s 

claims. We disagree. 

“We review summary judgment orders de novo, considering the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). 

“Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, affidavits, 

depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a 

matter of law.” Green v. Normandy Park, 137 Wn. App. 665, 681, 151 P.3d 1038 

(2007). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is no 
No. 79760-3-I/9

9

genuine issue of material fact. Hash by Hash v. Children’s Orthopedic Hosp. & 

Med. Ctr., 110 Wn.2d 912, 915, 757 P.2d 507 (1988).

Hansen argued below that she was entitled to summary judgment 

because (1) Crawford breached his fiduciary duty as attorney-in-fact for Titus by 

engaging in self-dealing and (2) as a result, Christianson breached his fiduciary 

duty as the estate’s personal representative by securing the dismissal of the 

AVAA petition and entering into the settlement with Crawford. She further 

argued that but for Christianson’s breach of his fiduciary duty, the estate would 

have been solvent and capable of paying her creditor’s claims. In all respects, 

we conclude that Hansen met her burden to show that there were no genuine 

issues of material fact.

First, as attorney-in-fact, Crawford owed Titus a fiduciary duty. In 

particular, Crawford had a duty to act in good faith and “[a]ct so as not to create a 

conflict of interest that impairs the agent’s ability to act impartially in the 

principal’s[—in this case, Titus’s—]best interest.” RCW 11.125.140(1)(b), (2)(b). 

Crawford created a conflict of interest by receiving title to the property and 

entering into the agreement, which benefited his company. And Crawford and 

Marathon failed to fulfill their contractual obligations. Specifically, Titus received 

none of the promised payments, and the property’s title never reverted back to 

the estate as required by the agreement. Crawford also never paid rent on 

Titus’s office space, and he executed two deeds of trust on the property, one of 

which was for a business associate, despite a VAPO enjoining such actions. 

Finally, Crawford sold Titus’s cars and did not pay Titus or the estate any of the 
No. 79760-3-I/10

10

proceeds, and Hansen presented evidence that he withdrew funds from Titus’s

account. While we must take all reasonable inferences in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, Christianson provided no evidence from which 

we may infer anything contrary to these facts. In short, Hansen presented 

sufficient evidence that Crawford did not act in good faith or in Titus’s best 

interest. Therefore, Hansen satisfied her burden to show that no genuine issue 

of material fact existed and that Crawford breached his duty as attorney-in-fact. 

Next, with regard to Christianson’s duty, an estate’s “personal 

representative stands in a fiduciary relationship to those beneficially interested in 

the estate.” In re Estate of Larson, 103 Wn.2d 517, 521, 694 P.2d 1051 (1985). 

The personal representative “is obligated to exercise the utmost good faith and 

diligence in administering the estate in the best interests of the heirs.” Larson, 

103 Wn.2d at 521. To this end, a personal representative must “utilize the skill, 

judgment, and diligence which would be employed by the ordinarily cautious and 

prudent person in the management of [their] own trust affairs.” Hesthagen v. 

Harby, 78 Wn.2d 934, 942, 481 P.2d 438 (1971). And it is the personal 

representative’s duty “to settle the estate[ ] . . . as rapidly and as quickly as 

possible, without sacrifice to the probate or nonprobate estate” and to “collect all 

debts due the deceased and pay all debts.” RCW 11.48.010. 

Because Crawford had breached his fiduciary duty and owed the estate 

considerable debts, a prudent personal representative would not have entered 

into the settlement. Hansen presented evidence that the settlement sacrificed 

the validity of the estate. In particular, the settlement failed to account for over 
No. 79760-3-I/11

11

$100,000 Crawford owed to the estate pursuant to the agreement and did not 

consider the payments that Crawford transferred to himself from Titus’s bank 

account or the sale of Titus’s vehicles. In addition, Christianson failed to 

(1) secure the settlement’s payment, (2) receive the court’s approval of the 

settlement, as required, (3) provide an accounting of the estate’s assets, as 

required, and (4) secure a bond for the estate’s protection. In short, Hansen 

presented evidence, even taken in the light most favorable to Christianson, that

when he entered into the settlement and secured the rescission of the VAPO, 

Christianson did not utilize the skill, judgment, and diligence that an ordinarily 

cautious and prudent person would employ in the management of their own trust 

affairs. 

Hansen also presented evidence that Christianson’s actions resulted in 

her inability to collect her creditor’s claims from the estate. Under 

RCW 11.48.080, “[n]o personal representative shall be accountable for any debts 

due the estate, if it shall appear that they remain uncollected without his or her 

fault.” Here, the settlement agreement allowed Crawford to retain title to the 

property until he sold it and thereafter pay the estate only $65,000 of the sale 

proceeds; at the same time, Crawford planned to receive $200,000 from the sale. 

And rescission of the VAPO meant that Crawford could sell the property. Without 

the estate’s sale of the property, Hansen alleged in her declaration—and 

Christianson failed to rebut—the estate was unable to pay its creditors.7

 

7

In April 2018, the due and unpaid principal balance on the property’s 

mortgage was $160,414.63, plus interest. The total of the creditors’ claims in 

April 2018 was around $127,000.00. As of December 20, 2018, Realtor.com 
No. 79760-3-I/12

12

Accordingly, Christianson was responsible for Hansen’s inability to collect her 

debts from the estate, and he was personally liable for Hansen’s creditor’s claims

against the estate. For the above reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding 

that Christianson breached his fiduciary duty and finding him liable for Hansen’s 

creditor’s claims. 

Christianson disagrees and contends that “Hash is directly applicable to 

this case.” In Hash, six-year-old Joanne Marie Hash sued Children’s Orthopedic 

Hospital (COH) after she fractured her femur while undergoing physical therapy. 

10 Wn.2d at 913. COH moved for summary judgment and submitted two 

affidavits, one of which stated that “[i]t is possible for a child to suffer a fractured 

bone during physical therapy when the therapist is not negligent.” Hash, 110 

Wn.2d at 913-14 (alteration in original). Hash did not submit affidavits in 

response to COH’s motion but contended that COH failed to submit sufficient 

evidence to establish that there were no genuine issues of material fact. Hash, 

110 Wn.2d at 914. Our Supreme Court concluded that COH had not met its 

burden to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Hash, 110 

Wn.2d at 916. The court reasoned that the submitted affidavits included no 

account of the material facts and that a reasonable inference from the above 

statement, when resolved in Hash’s favor, is that negligence could have caused 

Hash’s injury. Hash, 110 Wn.2d at 916.

Hash is distinguishable because, here, Hansen did not present evidence 

 

listed the property’s value as $652,200.00. Given the mortgage and federal and 

state tax liens, the property’s sale was more than sufficient to cover all creditors’ 

claims with residual to Titus’s son. 
No. 79760-3-I/13

13

that, when taken in the light most favorable to Christianson, provides an 

inference that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Instead, as discussed 

above, Hansen met her burden to prove that Christianson breached his fiduciary 

duty by failing to collect on the debts Crawford owed to the estate, by entering

into the settlement and thereby sacrificing the estate’s solvency, and by utilizing 

poor judgment when he dismissed the AVAA petition. Moreover, Hansen 

provided evidence of the facts in her declaration and the numerous exhibits

attached thereto. Accordingly, Hash is not applicable to this case. 

Christianson makes a number of additional arguments that are 

unpersuasive. He contends that Hansen provided no authority to support the 

proposition that Christianson was required to maintain the AVAA petition or 

VAPO against Crawford. While it is true that Christianson was not statutorily 

obligated to maintain the AVAA petition,8 as discussed above, Hansen 

established that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a 

reasonably prudent personal representative would have sought dismissal of the 

AVAA petition or the VAPO in this case.

Additionally, Christianson contends that Hansen—to prevail on her motion 

for summary judgment—was required to show that (1) an action by the estate 

against Marathon would not have been successful, (2) had Christianson 

 

8 Rather, RCW 74.34.210 leaves the decision to the discretion of the 

estate’s personal representative. It provides that in the death of a vulnerable 

adult, “the right to . . . maintain the action shall be transferred to . . . the 

administrator of the deceased, for recovery of all damages for the benefit of the 

deceased person’s beneficiaries . . . or . . . for recovery of all economic losses 

sustained by the deceased person’s estate.” 
No. 79760-3-I/14

14

remained the estate’s personal representative, he would not have pursued an 

action against Crawford, (3) the estate can no longer pursue a claim against 

Crawford, and (4) the AVAA petition against Crawford would have been 

successful. Contrary to Christianson’s assertion at oral argument, the settlement 

explicitly released Crawford and Marathon from all liability to the estate. As such, 

these contentions are unpersuasive as no action against either could have 

ensued. Furthermore, with regard to the AVAA petition, while its guaranteed 

success would have further supported Hansen’s argument, it is not required—

and therefore immaterial—to prove that Christianson breached his fiduciary duty.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded. 

Attorney Fees and Costs

Christianson also challenges the court’s award of Hansen’s attorney fees 

and costs for the TEDRA petition. We conclude that the trial court had the 

authority to grant fees under RCW 11.96A.150 and that the fee award was 

reasonable. 

“Whether a party is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees is a question of 

law and is reviewed on appeal de novo.” Durland v. San Juan County, 182

Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014). Generally, an award of attorney fees must 

be “authorized by contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity.” Durland, 

182 Wn.2d at 76. To this end, the trial court awarded Hansen fees based on 

RCW 11.40.080(2) and RCW 11.96A.150.9 

 

9 On appeal, Hansen does not contend that the trial court had authority 

under RCW 4.48.185. Accordingly, we do not address RCW 4.48.185 or the trial 

court’s reliance thereon.
No. 79760-3-I/15

15

Under RCW 11.40.080(2), an estate’s creditor is entitled to recover fees 

from the estate. Accordingly, under its plain language, the statute did not provide 

authority for the court to grant fees to Hansen from Christianson. Thus, the trial 

court lacked the statutory authority under RCW 11.40.080(2) to award Hansen’s 

TEDRA fees from Christianson, and it therefore erred in that respect.

Under RCW 11.96A.150, in a TEDRA petition, “[e]ither the superior court 

or any court on an appeal may, in its discretion, order costs, including reasonable 

attorneys’ fees, to be awarded to any party . . . [f]rom any party to the 

proceedings.” And the court may grant fees and costs “in such amount and in 

such manner as the court determines to be equitable.” RCW 11.96A.150(1). “In 

exercising its discretion, . . . the court may consider any and all factors that it 

deems to be relevant and appropriate, which factors may but need not include 

whether the litigation benefits the estate or trust involved.” RCW 11.96A.150(1). 

In short, RCW 11.96A.150 authorizes the court broad discretion to grant attorney 

fees and costs in a TEDRA action. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Lamb, 173 

Wn.2d 173, 198, 265 P.3d 876 (2011) (“The express language of 

RCW 11.96A.150 leaves attorney fee awards in cases resolving guardianship 

disputes to the court’s discretion.”). Thus, the trial court had authority to award 

Hansen fees. 

Christianson disagrees and contends that the trial court should have 

considered the novelty of the case and whether Hansen’s TEDRA petition 

benefited the estate.10 The court’s failure to consider these facts is not an abuse 

 

10 In support of his contention, Christianson cites a number of cases that 
No. 79760-3-I/16

16

of discretion because the court “may consider any and all factors that it deems to 

be relevant and appropriate.” RCW 11.96A.150(1). Moreover, the statute 

specifically provides that a court need not consider whether the petition benefited 

the estate. RCW 11.96A.150(1). Accordingly, Christianson’s contention fails.

Because the court had authority to award fees, we next review whether

the award was reasonable. To this end, “[w]e review for abuse of discretion 

whether the amount of an attorney fee award is proper.” Bright v. Frank Russell 

Invs., 191 Wn. App. 73, 78, 361 P.3d 245 (2015).

Christianson asserts that the fees were “grossly excessive.” In particular, 

Christianson asserts that Hansen received fees for research completed before 

she began drafting her TEDRA petition. He points to, among other things, 

Hansen’s inclusion of services for her research into Marathon, for the removal of 

Christianson as personal representative, and for the preparation of her motion for 

sanctions. But the trial court had discretion to impose the fee award that it 

 

involved the appellate court either exercising its own discretion to determine 

whether to award fees on appeal or affirming the trial court’s decision by finding 

no abuse of discretion. See In re Estate of Collister, 195 Wn. App. 371, 382 P.3d 

37 (2016) (awarding neither party attorney fees on appeal because the court 

accepted the losing party’s argument in part); In re Washington Builders Ben. 

Trust, 173 Wn. App. 34, 85-86, 293 P.3d 1206 (2013) (declining to award fees to 

one party where the litigation raised “unique issues” but awarding fees to another 

party for those issues on which it prevailed on appeal); In re Estate of Lowe, 191 

Wn. App. 216, 239-40, 361 P.3d 789 (2015) (affirming the trial court’s decision to 

grant the appellant fees, but exercising its discretion and denying fees on appeal 

because the prevailing party kept silver “treasure” that “ably allows him to afford 

the expense of this appeal”); In re Estate of Jones, 170 Wn. App. 594, 287 P.3d 

610 (2012) (affirming the trial court’s decision to deny attorney fees to the 

prevailing party in a TEDRA action). These cases only reaffirm that we should 

not disturb a fee award under RCW 11.96A.150 absent a showing that the trial 

court acted unreasonably. 
No. 79760-3-I/17

17

deemed equitable. And Christianson failed to show that the award was 

manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. See Bright, 191 Wn. 

App. at 78 (“‘A trial court abuses its discretion if a decision is manifestly 

unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.’” (quoting 

Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 304 v. Skagit County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 

177 Wn.2d 718, 730, 305 P.3d 1079 (2013)).

Next, Christianson claims that Hansen received duplicative costs because 

“[a]t least part of the services for which [she] was awarded $41,989 were also 

awarded to her in the CR 11 motion.” Christianson makes the conclusory 

assertion that “she was double compensated by $5,655” because of the CR 11 

award. But Christianson does not point to evidence in the record that Hansen

was awarded double recovery for the same services. See In re Estate of Palmer, 

145 Wn. App. 249, 265, 187 P.3d 758 (2008) (The appellant is “obligated to 

demonstrate why specific findings of the trial court are not supported by the 

evidence and to cite to the record in support of that argument.” (emphasis 

added)). Therefore, we are not persuaded that the trial court’s award was 

unreasonable. See Scott Fetzer Co. v. Weeks, 122 Wn.2d 141, 147, 859 P.2d 

1210 (1993) (When attorney fees are authorized, in order to reverse the award 

based on unreasonableness, the opponent must show “that the trial court 

manifestly abused its discretion.” (emphasis added)). 

Christianson also contends that in its nunc pro tunc order, the court 

entered prejudgment interest on Hansen’s fees incurred as a result of the
No. 79760-3-I/18

18

TEDRA petition.11 A nunc pro tunc order records a prior act of the court that was 

“actually performed but not entered into the record at that time.” State v. 

Rosenbaum, 56 Wn. App. 407, 410-11, 784 P.2d 166 (1989); see also State v. 

Hendrickson, 165 Wn.2d 474, 478, 198 P.3d 1029 (2009). 

Here, the court’s June nunc pro tunc order recorded an action already 

performed by the court in the February order, i.e., the award of fees and 

postjudgment interest thereon. Because the original judgment included Hansen’s 

fees and the original judgment was entered in February, the court’s order 

granting interest beginning in February recorded an event that occurred at that 

time. In the June order, the court adjusted the fees to include the additional work 

Hansen did replying to Christianson’s responses to her entry of judgment motion, 

considered additional documents from both parties, and again awarded

postjudgment interest dating back to February 15, 2019. Accordingly, the court 

did not award prejudgment interest, the nunc pro tunc order was not improper, 

and the trial court did not err.

As a final matter, Christianson contends that the trial court’s order granting 

fees should be reversed because the trial court offered only five days for his 

response to Hansen’s motion and failed to exclude holidays. CR 6(d) and King 

County Superior Court Local Civil Rule 7(b)(4)(A) require a moving party to 

provide notice of written motions at least five and six days in advance of the 

hearing thereon, respectively. But “‘CR 6(d) is not jurisdictional, and . . . reversal 

 

11 In its nunc pro tunc order, the court only addresses “prejudgment 

interest” with respect to Hansen’s creditor’s claims. That interest, the court 

notes, is included in the judgment’s principal amount. 
No. 79760-3-I/19

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for failure to comply requires a showing of prejudice.’” Goucher v. J.R. Simplot 

Co., 104 Wn.2d 662, 665, 709 P.2d 774 (1985) (quoting Brown v. Safeway 

Stores, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 359, 364, 617 P.2d 704 (1980)). Christianson has not 

shown prejudice. In fact, Christianson did respond to Hansen’s motion for fees 

months later, and the court took into account Christianson’s response when it 

entered the nunc pro tunc order for fees and costs on June 17, 2019. Therefore, 

the error does not require reversal. See, e.g., King County Water Dist. No. 90 v. 

City of Renton, 88 Wn. App. 214, 231, 944 P.2d 1067 (1997) (holding that the 

court’s order issued two days after a party’s motion was submitted was not 

reversible error and that the nonmoving party, which failed to reply to the motion, 

“was given sufficient notice and opportunity to be heard on the issue of 

sanctions”). 

Sanctions

Christianson also asserts that the court did not provide adequate notice 

that he would be sanctioned and that therefore the trial court erred when it 

imposed sanctions against him. We agree. 

“CR 11 procedures ‘obviously must comport with’ the due process 

requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard.” King County Water Dist. 

No. 90, 88 Wn. App. at 231 (quoting Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 

224, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992)). And “‘[a]n elementary and fundamental requirement 

of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 

reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties 

of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
No. 79760-3-I/20

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objections.’” Young v. Thomas, 193 Wn. App. 427, 440, 378 P.3d 183 (2016) 

(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S. 

Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950)). Accordingly, whether Christianson received 

adequate notice of personal sanctions is an issue of constitutional magnitude and 

may be raised for the first time on appeal. See RAP 2.5(a)(3) (A party may raise, 

“for the first time in the appellate court,” a “manifest error affecting a 

constitutional right.”). 

Here, the trial court sanctioned Grindell and Christianson jointly and 

severally. But the record did not indicate that Hansen sought sanctions against 

Christianson. Specifically, Hansen’s motion stated that she sought “entry of an 

order of sanctions against . . . Christianson’s attorney, Jonathan Grindell.” She 

cited “Mr. Grindell’s conduct” in support of her motion and concluded that she 

was seeking sanctions “against Mr. Grindell personally.” At the sanctions 

hearing, the court and Hansen’s comments did not indicate an intent to impose 

sanctions against Christianson. In particular, the court challenged Grindell’s 

conduct specifically, stating that he “misrepresented” the court’s orders in his 

motions to the court. And Hansen alleged that Grindell continuously partook in 

ex parte communication and failed to serve Hansen pleadings. In short, 

Hansen’s motion was not reasonably calculated to apprise Christianson that she 

sought sanctions against him personally. Thus, the court’s imposition of 

sanctions against Christianson violated his due process rights of notice and 

opportunity to state his objections and therefore must be reversed. 
No. 79760-3-I/21

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Fees on Appeal

Hanson requests fees on appeal pursuant to RCW 11.96A.150. It is within 

this court’s discretion to award fees and costs to Hansen as the substantially 

prevailing party on appeal. RCW 11.96A.150. We may order an amount of fees 

deemed “equitable” and “may consider any and all factors that [we] deem[ ] to be 

relevant and appropriate.” RCW 11.96A.150. And contrary to Christianson’s 

contention, this appeal does not involve a unique issue; it is merely a common 

breach of fiduciary duty claim. Cf., Bale v. Allison, 173 Wn. App. 435, 461, 294 

P.3d 789 (2013) (holding that the issue of whether a quitclaim deed “must recite 

consideration” was a unique issue and “an award of fees to either party [was] 

unwarranted”); In re Estate of D’Agosto, 134 Wn. App. 390, 402, 139 P.3d 1125 

(2006) (holding that in “novel issues of statutory construction[, a]n award of fees 

to either party is unwarranted”). And here, Christianson’s bad faith litigation 

practices throughout the proceedings below, including alleging that Hansen 

committed manslaughter and other conduct the trial court considered 

sanctionable, entitles Hansen to her fees and costs on appeal subject to her 

compliance with RAP 18.1. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in part. 

 

WE CONCUR: