UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 02-4233

RONALD E. WALKER,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.

(CR-01-103)

Submitted: September 4, 2002

Decided: September 23, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

E. Dixon Ericson, JOHN R. MITCHELL, L.C., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey Warner, United States Attorney, Stephanie L. Haines, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West

Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Ronald E. Walker appeals his convictions and sentences on charges

of aiding and abetting a scheme involving mail and wire fraud and the

use of fire in committing a federal felony. Walker was convicted of

three separate fraudulent schemes. The first, which he does not challenge on appeal, involved tools and equipment that he falsely reported

stolen from his garage. The second concerned a truck belonging to

Charles D. Matthews, which Matthews falsely reported stolen to

obtain insurance money. The third fraud involved Walker’s and Matthews’ trucks and a flatbed trailer that were purposely set on fire in

order to collect insurance proceeds. Walker was sentenced to thirtyseven months for aiding and abetting mail and wire fraud and a consecutive term of one hundred twenty months for use of fire in the

commission of a federal felony. 

I.

Walker first argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury

on the materiality element of mail and wire fraud. See United States

v. Neder, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) ("Accordingly, we hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud,

and bank fraud statutes."). To prove the omission, Walker cites to a

portion of the district court’s instructions discussing the required relationship between the use of the mail and the fraudulent scheme and

the defendant’s personal involvement with the use of the mail. However, while that section of the instructions did not mention materiality,

the remainder of the instructions properly explained to the jury that

the Government was required to prove that the fraud concerned a

material matter. (See J.A. at 483-85 ("[T]he government would have

to prove to you . . . that the scheme . . . involved a plan . . . to deceive

another with regard to a material matter."), 486 ("The term false or

fraudulent pretenses . . . means a statement . . . which concerns a

material or important fact.").) The court also defined the term "material fact." (J.A. at 486). Thus, because the jury instructions as a whole

were fair, adequate, and proper, there was no error. See Smith v. Univ.

of NC, 632 F.2d 316, 332 (4th Cir. 1980) (standard of review). 

2 UNITED STATES v. WALKER
II.

Walker challenges the district court’s limitation of his crossexamination of two Government witnesses. First, he claims he should

have been permitted to question Lorrie Walker as to her involvement

with drug dealers while serving as a Government informant. Second,

he asserts that he should have been allowed to interrogate Matthews

regarding his avoidance through his plea agreement of a ten year

mandatory minimum sentence for use of fire in the commission of a

felony. 

A district court’s decision to limit cross-examination is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 358

(4th Cir. 1997). A defendant has a right under the Confrontation

Clause to cross-examine witnesses who are cooperating with the Government about potential sources of bias. Id. However, the trial court

retains the discretion to place reasonable limits on cross-examination

based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice,

confusion, repetition, or relevance. Delware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

673, 678-79 (1986). An improper denial of an opportunity to examine

a witness for bias is subject to harmless error review. Id. at 684. 

Regarding Lorrie Walker’s testimony, Walker asserted that his

cross-examination would have shown that Lorrie Walker was highly

motivated to provide information and trial testimony adverse to

Walker to avoid prosecution for her alleged involvement in drug dealing. However, specific instances of unconvicted conduct are only

admissible to attack a witness’s credibility if they are probative of

truthfulness or untruthfulness. Fed. R. Evid. 608. Walker did not proffer evidence that the Government was aware of the drug dealing and

purposely ignored it in order to obtain testimony against Walker. Further, drug dealing is not the type of conduct that necessarily bears on

a witness’s character for truthfulness. See United States v. Leake, 642

F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that Rule 608(b) expressly permits inquiry into instances of misconduct that are clearly probative of

truthfulness or untruthfulness, such as perjury, fraud, swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement). Finally, Walker’s theory would gut

Rule 608(b), since every Government witness who has committed

uncharged criminal conduct has an interest in cooperating with the

Government to avoid prosecution or detection. Thus, because Rule

UNITED STATES v. WALKER 3
608(b) prevents the admission of prior conduct except as it bears on

a propensity to tell the truth, the district court’s limitation was proper.

Turning to the cross-examination of Matthews, the court refused to

allow questioning regarding the mandatory minimum sentence

because such questioning would, in effect, inform the jury as to the

sentence faced by Walker. The court did, however, permit generic

questioning as to whether Matthews had secured a favorable bargain

by assisting the Government. Because the district court’s limitation

was reasonable and because Walker was still able to cross-examine

Matthews regarding his favorable plea, we find that Walker was not

prejudiced by the court’s ruling. 

III.

Walker next argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that

he aided and abetted Matthews in defrauding the insurance companies

regarding the "stolen" truck and the burned trucks. According to

Walker, the evidence only showed that he was aware of Matthews’

scheme, but failed to prove that he was involved. We review a jury

verdict for sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether there

is substantial evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

Government, to support the verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315

U.S. 60, 80 (1942). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we

do not review the credibility of the witnesses, and we assume that the

jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of the Government. United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998).

Regarding the "stolen" truck fraud, Dennie Leach and Matthews

testified that Walker initiated the idea, fronted the money for the new

truck, and stored Matthews’ "stolen" truck in his garage while Matthews reported to his insurance company that it was stolen. Leach and

David King testified that they saw the Matthews’ disassembled truck

in Walker’s garage. Finally, Leach testified that Walker told him to

get rid of the truck pieces. The testimony, if believed, was more than

sufficient to show that Walker aided and abetted Matthews in

defrauding the insurance company. 

Concerning the truck fire fraud, Lorrie Walker and Matthews both

testified that Walker was involved in planning the burning of the

4 UNITED STATES v. WALKER
trucks and choosing the method for setting the fire. Other witnesses

stated that Walker lied to the police about not having insurance on his

burned truck. Finally, Walker filed a claim on his truck and collected

the insurance proceeds. Again, if believed, this testimony was sufficient to show that Walker aided and abetted a scheme to defraud. 

IV.

Section 844(h) reads, in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever - 

(1) uses fire or an explosive to commit any felony

which may be prosecuted in a court of the United

States, or 

(2) carries an explosive during the commission of

any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of

the United States, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to

imprisonment for ten years . . . . Notwithstanding

any other provision of law, the court shall not

place on probation or suspend the sentence of any

person convicted of a violation of this subsection,

nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under

this subsection run concurrently with any other

term of imprisonment including that imposed for

the felony in which the explosive was used or carried. 

Walker argues that the language barring the concurrent running of the

additional sentence with "any other term of imprisonment including

that imposed for the felony in which the explosive was used or carried" (emphasis added), does not bar concurrent sentences as to

crimes, such as Walker’s, that involved fire rather than explosives.

However, we have already rejected Walker’s argument. United States

v. Ramey, 24 F.3d 602, 610 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Certainly [the statute’s]

language of inclusion cannot be tortured into an exclusion of sentences for underlying fire-related felonies.").1

 Thus, the court’s con1Ramey was abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. United States, 529

U.S. 848 (2000). 

UNITED STATES v. WALKER 5
clusion that the ten year sentence under § 844(h) must run

consecutively to Walker’s other convictions was not error.2

V.

Finally, Walker contends that, because § 844(h)(1) does not contain

an interstate nexus, his conviction is invalid. However, § 844(h)(1)

does not facially exceed Congress’s commerce power, because it is

a generic penalty section that draws its constitutional authority from

the requirement that the underlying felonies—here, mail and wire

fraud—can be prosecuted "in a court of the United States." Because

Walker concedes that federal jurisdiction exists regarding his mail

and wire fraud convictions, there was no jurisdictional error in his

conviction. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 528

(9th Cir. 1995). 

Accordingly, we affirm Walker’s convictions and sentences. We

dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

2Walker also argues that the ten-year minimum mandatory penalty was

disproportionately severe in his case. However, we will not review a sentence for proportionality if that sentence is less than life without parole.

United States v. Lockhart, 58 F.3d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1995). 

6 UNITED STATES v. WALKER