UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BARBARA DARBY, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 14-1032 (RC) : v. : Re Document No.: 16 : DAVID J. SHULKIN, 1 Secretary, : United States Department of Veterans Affairs, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION FOR R ELIEF FROM F INAL J UDGMENT
Plaintiff, Ms. Barbara Darby, filed a pro se complaint that this Court dismissed for insufficient service of process . Several years later, Ms. Darby moved for reconsideration, which this Court construes as a moti on pursuant to Federal Rule of Ci vil Procedure 60. The Court denies the motion because Ms. D arby does not substantively expl ain why the Court should reconsider its prior opinion, t he motion was not filed within a reasonable time, and no extraordinary circumstances exist.

I. BACKGROUND Ms. Darby sued the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in 2014, alleging that it discriminated against her by denyi ng her a promotion to GS-9 an d reclassifying her position as a

1 Secretary Shulkin is substituted as the defendant in accordanc e with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d).2 “Secretary.” 2 Mem. Op. & Order at 1 ( Nov. 19, 2014), ECF No. 10. After a tan gled procedural history, her case arrived before this Court and the Court grant ed the VA’s motion to dismiss due to insufficient service of process in November of 2014. See generally Mem. Op. & Order. More than two years after that determination, Ms. Darby filed a n appeal. See Notice of Appeal (Dec. 13, 2016), ECF No. 11. This appeal was untimely on its face because it was filed after the permissible time set by the Federal Rules of Appellat e Procedure. 3 Ms. Darby now requests that this Court “reconsider[]” its November 2014 order . Motion (Pl.’s Mot.) at 1 4 (Feb. 14, 2017), ECF No. 16. The Court cons trues Ms. Darby’s filing a s a motion for relief from judgment in accordance with Feder al Rule of Civil Procedure 60. 5 Ms. Darby’s motion alludes to s everal potential grounds for rel ief. First, she notes that she is pro se , and “was not aware of the time limitation” to file an appeal. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Second, she mentions that she ha s “fallen on hardship.” Pl.’s M ot. at 1. The Court interprets this as a reference to financial hardship because she attaches docum ents relating to eviction proceedings against her in December of 2014 and January of 2015 . Pl.’s Mot. at 8–9. Third, she notes that she suffers from de pression and post-traumatic stres s disorder. Pl.’s Mot. at 1. Ms. Darby supports this assertion with a document from the Veterans Benefits Administration in

2 The Court has previously described the facts of this case, see generally Mem. Op. & Order (Nov. 19, 2014), ECF No. 10, a nd recites only the most re levant facts here.
3 Federal Rule of Appellate Proced ure 4(a)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within 60 days of the entry of j udgment when one of the parties is a United States officer sued in his or her official capacity.
4 The Court cites to the ECF page numbers

. 5 Ms. Darby may not seek relief unde r Federal Rule of Civil Proc edure 59(e) because such motions must be strictl y filed within 28 days of the entry of judgment. See Ctr. for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n , 781 F.2d 935, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1986).3 June of 2016 which states that Ms. Darby receives benefits for being 70% disabled due to posttraumatic stress disorder and 10% disabled due to a back proble m. Pl.’s Mot. at 3–7.

II. DISCUSSION Rule 60(b) permits courts to set aside final judgments for any of six enumerated reasons.
See Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility , 309 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 2015); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Three of these grounds—exc usable neglect, newly discover ed evidence, and fraud—are unavailable to Ms. Darby because they require that the motion f or relief be brought within a year of the final order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Of th e three remaining grounds, the only one potentially applicable to this c ase is Rule 60(b)(6), which per mits a district court to provide relief from a final order upon a motion “ made within a reasonable time ” for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P r. 60(c)(1). District courts e njoy “a large measure of discretion” in ruling on Rule 60(b) motions. Randall v. Merrill Lynch , 820 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
see also 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, p. 319 (3d ed. 2012). The party seeking r elief under Rule 60(b) bears the burden of showing that he or she is entitled to relief. Jarvis v. Parker , 13 F. Supp. 3d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Norris v. Salazar , 277 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2011)). As a threshold matter, Ms. Dar by’s motion cannot succeed becaus e it was not brought in a reasonable time. “In this Circ uit, courts almost uniformly de ny Rule 60(b)(6) motions as untimely when they are filed more th an three months after judgm ent.” Carvajal v. Drug Enf’t
Admin. , 286 F.R.D. 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases); see also Brannum v. Buriltanu , No. 96-302, 1999 WL 680007, at *2 (D.D. C. July 28, 1999). The rare cases in which Rule 60(b)(6) motions were granted more than t hree months after judgment invo lved extreme and extenuating circumstances not present here. Cf. Klapprott v. United States , 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (upholding4 relief under Rule 60 when the gove rnment sought to denaturalize the movant-inmate after incarcerating him for multiple ye ars, during which several of h is attempts to challenge their determinations went awry). Here, more than two years passed after the judgment before Ms. Darby moved for relief. Ms. Darby does not allege that she is incarcerated, nor does sh e assert that she learned of the final judgment only recently. Indeed, while Ms. Darby’s motion alludes in general to financial hardship and mental health iss ues, she nowhere explains why she has been unable to respond to the final judgment in any way f or the past two years. The Court therefore concludes that her motion was not filed within a reasonable time. See Carvajal , 286 F.R.D. at 28 (denying a Rule 60 motion as untimely when a pro se inmate waited at least ten mont hs after receiving notice of the final judgment). In addition, Ms. Darby’s motion cannot meet the high bar for re lief under Rule 60(b)(6). The Supreme Court has “require d a movant seeking relief under R ule 60(b)(6) to show ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Salazar ex rel. Salazar v. District of Columbia , 633 F.3d 1110, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005)). “Extraordinary circumstances is a high bar,” United States v. Phillip Morris USA Inc. , 840 F.3d 844, 852 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation mar ks omitted), satisfied only w hen “the decision not to appeal [is essentially] an involuntary one,” Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia , 841 F.2d 1133, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and courts shoul d thus grant Rule 60(b)(6) re lief “sparingly,” Oladokun v. Correctional Treatment Facility , 309 F.R.D. 94, 101 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Walsh v. Hagee , 10 F. Supp. 3d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2013)). None of Ms. Darby’s three clai med reasons justifying relief con stitutes an extraordinary circumstance. First, Ms. Darby relies on her pro se status. However, mere pro se status does not5 justify reconsideration under Rule 60. See Carvajal , 286 F.R.D. at 27 (“That courts will often give pro se inmates more time to learn a bout case developments, however, d oes not mean that courts allow inmates significan tly more time than other litigan ts to file after learning about the developments. Moreover, there is no general excuse for a pro se plaintiff’s procedural missteps in a civil case.” (citing McNeil v. United States , 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Bowie v. Maddox , 677 F.Supp.2d 276, 282 (D.D.C. 2010))); see also Goddard v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union Local
32BJ , 310 F.R.D. 190, 192 (D.D.C. 2015) (“C ourts in this district, furthermore, have not given great weight to pro se status when evaluating delays in bringing Rule 60(b) motions.” (collecting cases)). Ms. Darby claims none of the confounding circumstances , such as lack of knowledge of the judgment or incarcerati on, which courts have found may add to pro se status and justify Rule 60 relief. Second, Ms. Darby claims that she experienced financial hardshi p. However, Ms. Darby does not specifically explain the amount or type of hardship sh e experienced, or how that prevented her from taking any act ion in this case for more than two years. Ms. Darby submits two documents suggesting that she was facing eviction in Decemb er of 2014 and January of 2015, see Pl.’s Mot. at 8–9, but does not elaborate on her situation outs ide of those two months. 6 The D.C. Circuit has clearly est ablished that “mere financial h ardship [is] insufficient justification for vacating a fi nal judgment under Rule 60(b).” Randall v. Merrill Lynch , 820 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 7

6 Ms. Darby’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis states that she currently receives only disability income and has cred it card debt, but also does not e xplain her inability to file any motions in this case over the last two years . See generally Application to P roceed, ECF No. 12.
7 The Court notes that the D.C. Circuit’s affirmance in Randall of the district court’s decision to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on a combination o f financial hardship and serious6 Third, Ms. Darby claims that she was suffering from health issu es, including a back injury and post-traumatic stress disorder. However, Ms. Darby d oes not explain how either of those conditions affected her ab ility to pursue relief in this case. The D.C. Circuit has previously addressed, in the equi table tolling context , when a mental heal th condition excuses a plaintiff’s lack of action in a case. The s tandard applied by the D.C. circ uit is a “high” hurdle requiring that the plaintiff was “ non compos mentis ,” or “incapable of handling [hi s or] her own affairs or unable to function [in] society.” Smith-Haynie v. Di strict of Columbia , 155 F.3d 575, 579–80 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitte d). “Impaired judgment alone is not enough” to meet this standard, instead the plaintiff’s ment al impairment must be “of such a nature as to show [he or she] is unable to manage [his or her] business affairs or estate, or to comprehend [his or her] legal rights or l iabilities.” 8 Id. (citations omitted). “To make this determination, courts have often f ocused on whether the plainti ff was ‘ever adjudged incompetent, signed a power of attorney, had a guardian or care taker appointed, or otherwise took measures to let someone else handle [his or her] affairs.’ ” Dahlman v. Am. Ass’n of Retired
Persons , 791 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Speiser v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs. , 670 F. Supp. 380, 385 (1986)).

health problems, exacerbated by the litigation, does not contro l this Court’s exercise of discretion.
8 See also Perry v. U.S. Dep’t of State , 669 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that a plaintiff suffering from pos t-traumatic stress disorder and other mental health concerns had not established that he was non compos mentis because he had written lette rs and taken the foreign service exam, and his doctor’s affidavit did not address all re levant time periods); see also id. at 67 (noting that the plaintiff “h as not produced evidence that h e was ever adjudged incompetent, signed a power of attorney, had a guardian or caretaker appoint ed, or otherwise took measures to let someone else handle [his] affairs such as might be done for someone who is non compos mentis ” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miller v. Rosenker , 578 F. Supp. 2d 67, 72 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Suffering from a severe p anic disorder and depression i s not evidence of the type of total incapacity necessary to warrant equi table tolling.” (internal q uotation marks omitted)).7 Because Ms. Darby would not meet this high bar, the Court finds that extraordinary circumstances justifying relie f are absent. Ms. Darby’s motion itself is general and conclusory and does not offer any explanati on of how her health issues hav e impaired her ability to proceed with her claims or daily life. T he documentation she attaches d escribes some difficulties caused by her conditions, including a gene ral difficulty in attending classes, participating in large groups, and staying near loud noises. See generally Pl.’s Mot. However, t hese difficulties do not rise to the level of preventing he r from managing her own affai rs or functioning in society. No evidence in the record suggests that Ms. Darby h as been appoint ed a guardian, found incompetent, or otherwise removed from the management of her ow n affairs. In addition to these procedural i ssues, Ms. Darby’s motion does not offer any substantive reason for the Court to reconsid er its prior opinion. Ms. Darby ’s motion consists of three short paragraphs, and appears to ent irely address the lengthy elapsed time between this Court’s final judgment and the filing of the mo tion. The D.C. Circuit has sta ted that “a Rule 60(b) movant ‘must at least establish that it possesses a potentially merito rious claim or defense which, if proven, will bring success in its wake.’” Murray v. District of Columbia , 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co. , 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1992) and collecting cases). Ms. Darby’s motion does not address the reas ons this Court previously dismissed her case for lack of s ervice of process at all, much less present a potentially meritorious defense, and thus fa ils to justify reconsideration. 9 The Court therefore declines to reconsider its final judgment.

9 Furthermore, the judgment from w hich Ms. Darby seeks relief wa s not a default judgment. Indeed, Ms. Darby res ponded to the VA’s motion to dis miss. See generally Mem. Op. & Order, ECF No. 10; Submission of Mem. (Oct. 20, 2014), ECF No . 9. The considerations which sometimes militate in favor of Rule 60 relief from defaul t judgments in order that disputes8 III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment (ECF No. 16) is DENIED

.

Dated: April 24, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

may be resolved on the merits t herefore do not apply with equal force here. See Norris v. Salazar , 277 F.R.D. 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2011) (“R esolution on the merits is preferable to a judgment by default and, therefore, courts s hould liberall y allow relief under Rule 60(b), a s a ‘corrective remedy, mitigating the harsh impact of calendar rules when a li tigant’s action is dismissed as a result of counsel’s n eglect.’” (quoting Butler v. Pearson , 636 F.2d 526, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).