1 The Court previously ordered that Plaintiff’s letter to the

Court dated April 18, 2005 would be considered as a formal Motion

for Reconsideration on the basis of arguments raised by Plaintiff

in a prior undated letter to the Court which was received in

February 2005. (04/22/2005 Orders; Doc. Nos. 66, 68.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICIA EVANS :

: CIVIL ACTION

 v. :

: NO. 03-4975

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF :

PHILADELPHIA :

MEMORANDUM

Padova, J. June 2, 2005

Presently before the Court in this Title VII action is

Plaintiff Patricia Evans’ pro se Motion for Reconsideration of this

Court’s Memorandum and Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for a New

Trial and to Set Aside Jury Verdict.1 For the reasons that follow,

said Motion is denied in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Patricia Evans was employed as a Human Resources

Recruiter at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (the “Bank”)

from on or about July 5, 2000 to on or about November 7, 2001. In

late 2001, while Plaintiff was still employed by the Bank,

Plaintiff recommended three men from Africa who had been her

parking lot attendants for employment with the Bank. Although

Plaintiff believed that these three individuals were qualified for

the jobs for which they had applied, some of Plaintiff’s co-workers

in hiring positions declined to extend them job offers. At the

Case 2:03-cv-04975-JP Document 73 Filed 06/06/05 Page 1 of 11
2

same time, Plaintiff’s co-workers began to criticize her recruiting

practices, and Plaintiff brought the increasingly hostile work

environment to her supervisors’ attention. On November 7, 2001,

Plaintiff was discharged from her employment with the Bank. The

Bank stated that the reasons for Plaintiff’s termination were that

she had exercised poor judgment in the performance of her job

duties and that she had violated the Bank’s employee policies

against holding and campaigning for political office. Plaintiff

alleges that, in fact, she was terminated in retaliation for her

opposition to the Bank’s unlawful employment policies, as evidenced

by her fellow employees’ reluctance to hire the three African job

applicants. 

After her discharge, Plaintiff filed the instant action.

Count I of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted a claim for retaliation

in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title

VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., against the Bank. Count II of

the Complaint asserted a claim for retaliation in violation of the

Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) against the Bank. Count

III of the Complaint asserted a claim for aiding and abetting

Retaliation in violation of the PHRA against individual Bank

employees. Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court granted in

part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion, and dismissed Counts II

Case 2:03-cv-04975-JP Document 73 Filed 06/06/05 Page 2 of 11
3

and III of the Complaint. Accordingly, the sole issue that was

tried was Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in violation of Title

VII. After a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor

of the Bank and against Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s counsel then filed

a Motion for a New Trial and to Set Aside Jury Verdict, which this

Court denied by Memorandum and Order dated April 5, 2005.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se Motion for

Reconsideration of the Court’s April 5, 2005 Memorandum and Order.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct

manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered

evidence.” Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir.

1985). A motion for reconsideration will only be granted if the

moving party establishes: (1) the existence of newly available

evidence; (2) an intervening change in the controlling law; or (3)

a need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest

injustice. Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Magnesium

Elektron, 123 F.3d 111, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1997). Reconsideration of

a previous order is an extraordinary remedy to be employed

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial

resources. Moyer v. Italwork, Civ. A. No. 95-2264, 1997 WL 312178,

at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 1997). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the Court committed clear errors of law

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4

when it failed to grant her Motion for a New Trial and to Set Aside

Jury Verdict on the following four grounds: (1) the jury, as

empaneled, was not competent; (2) the jury’s verdict was against

the weight of the evidence; (3) the jury, as empaneled, did not

comply with the provisions of the Jury Selection and Service Act of

1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69; (4) Defendant impermissibly used a

peremptory challenge to strike an Asian male from the jury; and (5)

the jurors selected were not Plaintiff’s peers. The Court will

address each of Plaintiff’s contentions in turn. 

A. Jury Competency

Plaintiff argues that the jury, as empaneled, was not

competent because: (1) the Court did not strike for cause a juror

who had stated that a relative many years ago used to work for

Defendant; (2) three female jurors could not have been fair and

impartial because they were laughing and giggling during the voir

dire process; and (3) the jurors did not understand the jury charge

given by the Court because one juror was asleep and one juror

coughed. It is well-settled that “questions concerning the

competency of a jury ordinarily are not entertained once the jury

has rendered its verdict.” Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d

1073, 1078 (3d Cir. 1985). This general rule can only be overcome

by a “strong showing that a juror was incompetent.” Id. Here,

Plaintiff’s counsel did not voice any concern regarding the

competency of the jury at trial. Indeed, the Court questioned the

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5

juror whose relative many years ago had worked for Defendant about

his ability to remain impartial, and Plaintiff’s counsel was

satisfied with the juror’s answer, did not request that the juror

be struck for cause, and later stated that the selected jury was

satisfactory as seated. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence

tending to establish that this juror was not, in fact, impartial.

Similarly, counsel for Plaintiff at no time suggested that any

of the members of the jury panel had been inattentive at any point

during the trial. It is well-recognized that it

would be fundamentally unfair and injuries to

the public interest to permit a party, whose

counsel is aware of alleged juror misconduct

during the trial, to ‘gamble on a favorable

verdict by remaining silent, and then complain

in a post verdict motion that the verdict was

prejudicially influenced by that misconduct. 

Rayburn v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 638, 642

(E.D. Pa. 1999) (internal quotations omitted). Moreover, Plaintiff

has submitted no evidence which would tend to support her

allegations of alleged juror misconduct, nor did this Court

independently observe any misconduct taking place. Accordingly,

the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish the

necessary strong showing that the jury was not competent, and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied in this respect.

B. Verdict’s Evidentiary Basis

Plaintiff also argues that the Court should reconsider its

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6

Memorandum and Order denying her Motion for a New Trial because the

jury’s verdict was quick, preconceived, excessively partial and

against the weight of the evidence. The Court has previously ruled

that “there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that

Plaintiff had not engaged in a protected activity,” and that “the

brevity of jury deliberations does not by itself justify a new

trial.” Plaintiff has not presented any argument which would

establish that this Court made a clear error of fact or law in its

prior determination. Moreover, Plaintiff has not presented any

evidence which would establish that the jury’s verdict, though not

against the weight of the evidence, was preconceived or excessively

partial. Certainly the mere fact that the jury rendered a verdict

against Plaintiff and for Defendant does not give rise to an

inference that such verdict was improper. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration is denied in this respect. 

C. Compliance with Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968

Plaintiff next argues that the Jury Selection and Service Act

of 1968 (the “Jury Selection Act”) was violated because the jurors

did not reflect a cross-section of the community where Defendant is

located or Plaintiff resides. The Jury Selection Act provides that

“[i]t is the policy of the United States that all litigants in

Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to

grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section

of the community in the district or division wherein the court

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7

convenes.” 28 U.S.C. § 1861. In civil cases, parties may

challenge a court’s compliance with the Jury Selection Act “before

the voir dire examination begins, or within seven days after the

party discovered or could have discovered, by the exercise of

diligence, the grounds [for the challenge], whichever is earlier,

[and move] to stay the proceedings . . . .” Id. § 1867.

“Compliance with the procedural provisions of the Act is the

exclusive means of challenging the jury on the basis of a violation

of the statute.” Virgin Islands v. Navarro, 513 F.2d 11, 18 (3d

Cir. 1975). Here, Plaintiff did not challenge the Court’s

compliance with the Act within the requisite time period or move to

the stay proceedings. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has failed to comply with the procedures established by the Jury

Selection Act, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied

in this respect.

4. Peremptory Challenge

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant impermissibly exercised

a peremptory challenge to an Asian male who was the only nonCaucasian juror on the panel, thereby preventing the selection of

a jury which would have adopted an alternate or mutual perspective

based on its relationship to Plaintiff’s professional work

experience, ethnicity, social and professional culture and

Case 2:03-cv-04975-JP Document 73 Filed 06/06/05 Page 7 of 11
2 The Court notes that Plaintiff is African-American.

8

demographics.2 In Batson v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme

Court established the unconstitutionality of the use of race-based

peremptory challenges in criminal trials. Batson v. Kentucky,476

U.S. 79 (1986). The principles set forth in Batson were later

extended to include civil litigants. Edmonson v. Leesville

Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). It is well-established that

“failure to make a timely objection during jury selection waives a

Batson claim.” Bastien v. Dragovich, 128 F. Supp. 2d 204, 213

(M.D. Pa. 2000) (citations ommitted). Here, Plaintiff’s counsel

did not object to Defendant’s use of peremptory challenges during

jury selection or at any other time during trial. Accordingly, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has waived any Batson challenge in this

case, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied in this

respect.

5. Jury of Peers

Finally, Plaintiff argues that her federal constitutional

right to a jury of her peers was violated because the jury selected

did not share Plaintiff’s ethnicity, work history, professional and

social culture, demographics, and life experience. The Seventh

Amendment guarantees the right of trial by a jury of one’s peers in

suits of common law where the value in controversy exceeds twenty

dollars. U.S. Const. amend. VII. “Under our constitution, a jury

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of one’s peers means a fair sampling of a cross-section of the

citizenry of the vicinage in which the case is to be tried.” Henry

v. State Farm Ins. Co., 788 F. Supp. 241, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1992). To

satisfy this requirement, “petit juries must be drawn from a source

fai[r]ly representative of the community[,] [but there is] no

requirement that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the

community and reflect the various distinctive groups in the

population.” Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975). While

parties therefore “are not entitled to a jury of any particular

composition[,] . . . the jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or

venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude

distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be

reasonably representative thereof.” Id. (citations omitted).

Moreover the Supreme Court has held that in order to establish a

violation of the fair-cross-section requirement of the Seventh

Amendment, a plaintiff must show 

(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a

“distinctive” group in the community; (2) that

the representation of this group in venires

from which juries are selected is not fair and

reasonable in relation to the number of such

persons in the community; and (3) that this

underrepresentation is due to systematic

exclusion of the group in the jury-selection

process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).

Here, Plaintiff has not argued that the jury venire itself,

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rather than the jury actually selected, impermissibly excluded

persons on the basis of their ethnicity, work history, professional

and social culture, demographics, and life experience. Moreover,

Plaintiff has not produced any evidence tending to establish that

such persons are distinctive groups in the community, that such

groups were not in fact fairly and reasonably represented in the

jury venire, or that they were systematically excluded during the

jury selection process. See id. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has failed to establish that her constitutional right to

a jury of peers was violated, and Plaintiff’s Motion for

Reconsideration is denied in this respect. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Court committed

clear errors of fact or law when it denied Plaintiff’s Motion for

a New Trial. Plaintiff’s pro se Motion for Reconsideration is,

therefore, denied. 

An appropriate Order follows.

Case 2:03-cv-04975-JP Document 73 Filed 06/06/05 Page 10 of 11
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICIA EVANS :

 : CIVIL ACTION

 v. :

 : NO. 03-4975

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF :

PHILADELPHIA :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2nd day of June, 2005, upon consideration of

Plaintiff Patricia Evans’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. No. 69)

and all documents in response thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

said Motion is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

 

/s/ John R. Padova

______________________

John R. Padova, J.

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