Document No. 190. 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES, )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION

) NO. 04-CR-489

)

NORVEL VAS, )

)

Defendant. )

______________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RUFE, J. June 1, 2007

On February 8, 2007, after a four-day trial, Defendant Norvel Vas was convicted

of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms. On May 11,

2007, the Court sentenced Vas to 120 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of

supervised release. Vas then filed a second pro se Notice of Appeal on May 15, 2007. While

1

Vas’s grounds for appeal are not known to this Court, the Court herein sets forth the facts and

procedural history in this matter, and its rationale buttressing the discretionary sentence imposed

in this case. The Court submits that its sentence, imposed in accordance with the sentencing

statute, is reasonable, and that no other grounds for appeal appear meritorious. 

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

On October 27, 2002, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officers Eric

Riddick, Richard Riddick, and Mark Moore were on patrol in the vicinity of the 5500 block of

Beaumont Avenue in Philadelphia, where several robberies and gunshots had been reported over the

previous several days. The Officers were dressed in plain clothes and driving an unmarked police

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 1 of 16
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car. Officer Richard Riddick drove the patrol car, Officer Moore rode in the front passenger’s seat,

and Officer Eric Riddick, a nineteen-year veteran of the Philadelphia Police Department, rode in the

backseat of the car. As the officers traveled westbound on Beaumont Avenue, they observed three

black males standing in front of 5513 Beaumont Avenue alongside a parked car. One of the men,

who stood approximately ten feet apart from the other two males, was wearing a dark blue baseball

hat, a pair of sunglasses, and a blue, long-sleeved shirt underneath a white tee-shirt. This man was

later identified as Defendant Norvel Vas. 

Vas looked at Officer Eric Riddick overtop his sunglasses, ducked down behind the

parked car, then jumped up from his crouched position, and began running eastbound on Beaumont

Avenue toward 55th Street. Officer Richard Riddick stopped the patrol vehicle, and Officer Eric

Riddick exited the vehicle to approach the men. Officer Eric Riddick asked the two men still

standing by the vehicle why Vas ran away, and they responded by saying only that they did not know

him. 

Officer EricRiddick then saw Vas turn the corner at Beaumont Avenue and run north

on 55th Street. Officer Eric Riddick walked to the corner of Beaumont Avenue and 55th Street and

looked up 55th Street, but he did not see Vas. Officer Eric Riddick then walked to the entrance of

the driveway that ran behind the houses on Beaumont Avenue. Looking down the driveway, Officer

Eric Riddick saw Vas place a large, dark-colored handgun in the left front wheel well of a silver

Mitsubishi parked in the driveway. Vas did not see Officer Eric Riddick, as the officer had backed

out of the driveway after he observed Vas place a gun on the wheel well. Officer Eric Riddick then

saw Vas walk back toward him in the direction of 55th Street. Vas was no longer wearing the dark

blue baseball hat, sunglasses, or white tee-shirt. When Vas reached the end of the driveway at 55th

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 2 of 16
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Street, Officer Eric Riddick identified himself as a police officer and asked Vas to approach. Vas

stated to the officer that he had done nothing, and again ran away. 

Vas ran north on 55th Street, then turned westbound onto Florence Avenue. Vas ran

onto the porch of a home at 5502 Florence Avenue, and banged on the door for the occupant to give

him entry, shouting: “Aunt Lucy, Aunt Lucy, it’s me, let me in, let me in.” Officers Richard Riddick

and Moore then joined Officer Eric Riddick in front of the 5502 Florence Avenue property. The

officers apprehended Vas on the porch and detained him. Once Vas was detained, Officer Eric

Riddick returned to the driveway where he had seen Vas place a gun in the wheel well of the silver

Mitsubishi. There, he recovered a loaded nine-millimeter handgun and a loaded forty-caliber Glock

pistol with an “obliterated” serial number. Officer Eric Riddick continued searching near the silver

Mitsubishi and retrieved Vas’s discarded clothing—the dark blue baseball hat, sunglasses, and white

tee-shirt. Officer Eric Riddick returned with the recovered firearms and personal items to the

location where Vas had been detained, and directed Officers Richard Riddick and Moore to arrest

Vas. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The procedural history in this matter includes two separate trials and a substantial

amount of filings. While Vas exhibited a high level of intellect in both his oral advocacy skills and

in his ability to research and understand the law, his obstreperous and litigious personality often

burdened the record with unnecessary filings and unreasonable delays. Nonetheless, the Court

entertained all reasonable requests and exercised leniency where necessary in light of Vas’s

intermittent pro se representation. 

On September 21, 2004, Magistrate Judge Charles B. Smith appointed the Defender

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 3 of 16
At Vas’s initial appearance in federal court, he was represented by Rossman Thompson, Esquire, an

2

assistant federal public defender.

Document No. 20. 3

In the following months, the Court granted two trial date continuances requested by Vas and one such 4

request by the government. 

 Document No. 40. 5

Document No. 42. 6

4

Association of Philadelphia, Federal Courts Division, to represent Vas at trial. The original trial 2

date was set for November 26, 2004. On September 23, 2004, Benjamin B. Cooper of the Defender

Association of Philadelphia entered his appearance as counsel for Vas. Four days later, Mr. Cooper

filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney due to a conflict of interest. After a hearing, the Court

granted the motion to withdraw.

On October 13, 2004, the Court appointed as substitute counsel Jeanne Damirgian

from the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”) Panel for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On October

3

29, 2004, the Court granted Vas’s unopposed Motion to Continue Trial Date and Extend Time

Within Which to File Pretrial Motions. On March 16, 2005, the Court granted Vas’s Application 4

for Additional Funds for Investigative Services to allow Vas to hire a private investigator. 

5

While preparing for trial, Vas and Ms. Damirgian reached an impasse concerning trial

strategy, preparation, and how best to utilize the services of the private investigator. Their attorneyclient relationship deteriorated to the point where the two were unable to communicate to develop

a cogent defense. As such, Ms. Damirgian filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel on May 27,

2005, which the Court granted after conducting a hearing on the motion and learning of Vas’s 6

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 4 of 16
 Document No. 45. 7

Document No. 46. 8

Document No. 48. 9

 Document No. 50. 10

Document No. 53. 11

Document No. 51. 12

Document No. 59. 13

Document No. 61. 14

Document No. 64. 

15

Document No. 66. 

16

Document No. 69. 17

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acquiescence in counsel’s decision to withdraw . The Court thereafter promptly appointed Patrick 7

Egan, also a member of the CJA panel, as substitute counsel. On June 14, 2005, Vas, through 8

counsel, filed another Motion to Continue the Trial Date, which the Court granted. The Court set 9

the final trial date for October 25, 2005.

Between July 22, 2005, and October 17, 2005, Vas filed five pro se motions and two

letters with the Court despite being represented by counsel. These pro se filings included a Motion

for Discovery, a lettered addendum to supplement his attorney’s Motion to Suppress Physical 10 11

Evidence, a Notice of Particulars Concerning the 911 Call of Citizen Jean Hastings, a Motion for 12 13

Change of Appointed Counsel, a Request for Witnesses and to Change Appointed Counsel, a 14 15

letter stating that “Mr. Patrick Egan has advised me to represent myself,” and a Motion as to Use

16

of Extrinsic Evidence/Witness Impeachment, Defense Witness List/Discovery Issues wherein he

“plead[ed] . . . the Court to change his appointed counsel.” On October 5, 2005, the Court heard

17

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 5 of 16
At the hearing, Defendant complained that Mr. Egan failed to call all three arresting officers to testify at 18

his suppression hearing. The Court notes that Mr. Egan called two of the three arresting officers, but made a

strategic decision not to call the third officer. Based on the arguments and information provided at the October 5th

hearing, the Court found Mr. Egan to be competent and capable of representing Defendant in his criminal trial.

See N.T. 10/25/05 at 21. 19

See Document Nos. 83-86. 20

Document No. 88. 21

Document No. 103. 22

Document Nos. 108 & 109. 23

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Vas’s Motion for Change of Appointed Counsel, and denied the motion as groundless.18

Vas’s trial commenced on October 25, 2005. Moments before the jury selection

process was to begin, Vas informed the Court through counsel that he “wish[ed] to proceed pro se

and have [Mr. Egan] as backup counsel.” The Court denied Vas’s request to proceed pro se. 19

Moments later, Vas requested again that he be allowed to represent himself. The Court heard

argument on Vas’s open-court, impromptu motion to proceed pro se, but denied the motion. Vas

proceeded to trial represented by Mr. Egan and, after a two-day trial, was convicted for violating 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

On November 7, 2005, Vas, through counsel, timely filed, among several pro se postconviction motions, a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. 20 21

 Upon appointment of Edward Meehan as new counsel for Vas after the Court granted Patrick Egan’s

Motion to Withdraw as Attorney, Vas moved to withdraw his first Motion for a New Trial and filed 22

a second Motion for New Trial. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order filed on May 31, 2006, the 23

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 6 of 16
Document No. 111. As set forth in the May 31 Memorandum Opinion, although Vas’s antics cloud the 24

issue of whether or not his request to represent himself was legitimately made and despite the fact that the Court

ultimately conducted a thorough inquiry to determine whether Vas’s request to proceed pro se was made in full

recognition of the charges against him, possible punishments and defenses, and the logistical pitfalls inherent in selfrepresentation, the Court concluded, in an abundance of caution, that it erred in its failure to immediately conduct a

Faretta inquiry when Vas made his initial request to represent himself. See Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806

(1975). As such, the Court granted Vas a new trial.

Document No. 112. 25

Document No. 114. 26

 Document No. 117. 27

Document Nos. 120-23, 125, 129-39, 141, 148, & 149. 

28

Document No. 137. 29

Document No. 150. The Court notes that it entertained Vas’s request to represent himself pro se and 30

conducted an appropriate colloquy. See N.T. 11/21/06 at 6:1-8:17. Specifically, Vas could not answer simple “yes”

and “no” questions such as “do you understand that you have a right to counsel; yes or no?” Id. Accordingly, the

Court denied Vas’s request to represent himself. Id. 

See Document Nos. 128, 140, 150, 158, & 161. 31

7

Court granted Vas’s Motion for a New Trial.24

On June 5, 2006, Vas filed a lettered request for another change of appointed

counsel. After a June 15, 2006 hearing, the Court denied Vas’s request. On June 16, 2006, the 25 26

Court granted Vas additional time to prepare for his second trial. Vas subsequently filed a stream 27

of pro se lettered requests and pretrial motions, including a Motion to Assert/Invoke Defendant’s 28

Right of Self Representation and Remove Appointed Counsel. The Court denied Vas’s request to

29

represent himself pro se and to remove appointed counsel. The Court also disposed of each of 30

Vas’s other requests and motions by Order, and the Court herein incorporates by reference its Orders

of October 27, 2006, November 3, 2006, November 27, 2006, January 12, 2007, and February 2,

2007.31

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 7 of 16
N.T. 2/5/07 at 11:2-6. 32

Id. at 11:2-23:7. 33

N.T. 2/8/07 at 9:21-22. 34

 Document No. 175. 35

See United States v. Hashagen, 816 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1987). The Court was not apprised of the 36

Hashagen Order and became aware of it only after independent review of the appellate record. 

N.T. 5/9/07 at 64:10-65:24. 37

Id. 38

8

Vas’s second trial commenced on February 5, 2007. Prior to selecting the jury, Vas

renewed his request to represent himself at trial. After the Court conducted an extensive colloquy 32

with Vas, the Court concluded that Vas was competent to represent himself at trial and did so.33

After two days of testimony, the Court charged the jury, and after a day of deliberations, the jury

rendered its guilty verdict on February 8, 2007. Vas did not file any post-verdict motions prior to 34

sentencing, but on March 14, 2007, prior to his sentencing, he filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. On 35

March 19, 2007, the Third Circuit issued a Hashagen Order that stayed review of his appeal until 36

sentence was imposed. 

III. SENTENCING

On May 9, 2007, the Court sentenced Vas to a partially consecutive, partially

concurrent term of 120 months’ imprisonment, and three additional years of supervised release.37

Eighty-four months of the sentence are to run consecutive to the sentence that he is currently serving

for a homicide conviction in Pennsylvania, and thirty-six months of the sentence are to run

concurrent. Considering the facts of this case, Vas’s criminal history, and all relevant § 3553(a)

38

factors established by Congress, the Court believes that this is a reasonable sentence, and that the

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 8 of 16
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006). 39

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the relevant factors to be considered in imposing a sentence include: 40

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;

(2) the need for the sentence imposed–

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care,

or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available; 

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for . . . the applicable category of

offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . ;

(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . ;

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who

have been found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329, 332 (internal citations omitted). 41

Id. at 332. 

42

Id. at 330. 43

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sentence should be affirmed if Vas challenges its reasonableness.

For a sentence to be reasonable under Booker, “[t]he record must demonstrate [that]

the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors,” including the range 39

suggested by the sentencing guidelines. Accordingly, the Court must give “meaningful 40

consideration” to “any sentencing grounds properly raised by the parties which have recognized legal

merit and factual support in the record.” “[T]here are no magic words that the district judge must

41

invoke when sentencing,” however, and the district court need not mechanically state by rote that

it has considered each of the factors when imposing a sentence. A sentence must be affirmed by 42

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals where the district court issued a sentence “for reasons that are

logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” The party that challenges the 43

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 9 of 16
Id. at 332. 44

See Apr. 30, 2007 Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 14. In assessing Vas’s sentence, the Probation

45

Office used the November 1, 2001 edition of the Guidelines Manual. Id. ¶ 13. 

Id. ¶¶ 15, 23. 

46

Id. ¶ 47. 47

Id. ¶ 79. 48

Id. 49

Id. 50

The Court notes that Vas objected to the PSR on more than the three grounds listed above, but these

51

other grounds lacked merit and focused on the language used to describe Vas’s past criminal acts. Accordingly, they

did not provide the Court with any basis to amend the PSR or reduce Vas’s sentence. 

10

sentence has the burden of proving that it is unreasonable.

44

As set forth in the revised Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), prepared by

Leon C. King of the U.S. Probation Office on April 30, 2007, because Vas has at least two prior

felony convictions for crimes of violence, he received a base offense level of 24 under the

Guidelines. He also received two points under the specific offense calculation because one of the 45

two guns he was convicted of possessing in this matter had an obliterated serial number, thereby

resulting in a total offense level of 26. The Probation Office further computed a criminal-history 46

score of 17, placing Vas in a criminal-history category of VI. Based on a total offense level of 26 47

and a criminal-history category of VI, the advisory guideline range for imprisonment is 120 to 150

months. The statutory maximum for a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), however, is 120 48

months. Accordingly, the Probation Office set forth that the effective guideline range is 120 49

months.

50

Vas objected to his calculated guideline range on three primary grounds: (1) that he 51

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 10 of 16
See N.T. 5/7/07 at 26:2-15. 52

Id. at 29:6-21. 53

Id. at 41:1-8. 54

See id. at 26:2-29:3. See also N.T. 2/8/07 at 11:13-16:19. 

55

N.T. 5/7/07 at 26:2-29:3. 56

Id. 57

11

should not have been given a two-point enhancement in his specific offense calculation for

possessing a gun with an obliterated serial number; (2) that his base offense level was improperly

52

calculated because he has only one, not two, prior felony convictions for crimes of violence; and 53

(3) that his criminal history was improperly calculated because he was given three points each for

two offenses that arose from the same facts and circumstances.54

First, with respect to the two-point enhancement given to Vas for possessing a firearm

with an obliterated serial number, the Court concurs with Vas that the jury found in his favor as to

a non-binding special interrogatory that questioned whether they found, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that Vas possessed a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Nonetheless, the Court is guided 55

by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard at sentencing, and finds that it is more likely than not

that Vas possessed a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Even if these two points were 56

eliminated from Vas’s total offense level, his total offense level would be 24. This total offense

level, in combination with a criminal history category of VI, results in a recommended sentencing

range of 100 to 125 months, and the sentenced imposed by the Court falls within this range. 

57

Second, as set forth during sentencing, the Court will not change Vas’s base offense

level because the Court finds that Vas did commit two prior crimes of violence, appropriately

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 11 of 16
Id. at 29:12-15. 58

Id. at 29:6-40:12. 59

No. 06-2024, 2007 WL 1109243 (3d Cir. Apr. 13, 2007) (not precedential opinion). 60

Id. at *3. 61

12

yielding a base offense level of 24. There is no dispute that Vas’s prior robbery conviction is a crime

of violence. Vas argues only that his prior charge for resisting arrest does not qualify as a crime 58

of violence. 

59

In United States v. Manigault, the Third Circuit discussed the process of 60

determining whether a crime qualifies as a crime of violence as defined in Section 4B1.2(a) of the

Guidelines:

Application Note 1 defines a crime of violence as including conduct which ‘by its

nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’ U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2 Application Note 1. We look only to the elements of the charge and not to

underlying facts in determining whether a particular conviction qualifies as a crime

of violence. Id. Manigault pled guilty to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, which criminalizes

‘recklessly engag[ing] in conduct which places or may place another person in danger

of death or serious bodily injury.’ The two elements of the crime are 1) recklessness

and 2) placing anotherin danger of death or serious bodily injury. Recklessly placing

another in danger of ‘death or serious bodily harm’ is clearly conduct presenting a

‘serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 Application

Note 1. Therefore, a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 is a crime of violence and

Manigault is a career offender under § 4B1.2.61

The crime at issue here, resisting arrest under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, is defined as

follows:

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of

preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other

duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or

anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome

the resistance.

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 12 of 16
65 Fed. Appx. 869 (3d Cir. 2003). 62

Id. at 872 (“The other crime of violence was a conviction in state court for resisting arrest following a

63

scuffle, his having been apprehended for a traffic offense.”).

See N.T. 5/9/07 at 13:11-23. 64

See Apr. 30, 2007 Presentence Investigation Report ¶¶ 42, 44. 

65

See N.T. 5/7/07 at 40:13-51:15. 66

13

In United States v. Boynes, a not-precedential opinion, the Third Circuit summarily concluded that 62

a resisting-arrest conviction is a crime of violence as defined by the Guidelines. The Court agrees. 63

Resisting arrest requires either “a substantial risk of bodily injury” or “substantial force to overcome

the resistance,” and this is clearly conduct presenting “serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” Accordingly, the Court denied Vas’s request to amend his base offense level, and

concluded that a base offense level of 24 is appropriate. 

64

Third, the Court agreed with Vas’s third objection that he was improperly assessed

three additional points for two crimes that arose out of the same facts and circumstances. Paragraph

42 of the April 30 revised PSR assessed three points against Vas on a conviction for carrying

firearms without a license, and paragraph 44 of the PSR assessed three points against Vas on a

conviction for third-degree murder. After a thorough discussion ofthe facts surrounding these two 65

convictions at the May 7, 2007 sentencing hearing, Vas and the government both made clear that the

arrests leading to these convictions occurred only a few hours apart, and that the firearms charge was

related to the murder charge. As a result, the Court reduced Vas’s total criminal history points from 66

17 to 14 and ordered that the PSR be revised to reflect this reduction. Because only 13 criminalhistory points are needed to establish a criminal-history category of VI, the reduction to 14 points

resulted in no change to the Guidelines range. On May 10, 2007, Mr. King of the Probation Office

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N.T. 5/9/07 at 46:24-49:20. 67

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filed a revised PSR reflecting this reduction in criminal history points.

Finally, after addressing each of Vas’s objections to the PSR, and after allowing Vas

the opportunity to speak candidly with the Court prior to sentencing about his criminal past and

reasons for living the life that he has, the Court discussed in detail its reasons for imposing a 120-

month sentence. 

I’m looking at somebody with a history of arrests and a history of convictions for

which you served sentences . . . . This has all been since you were eighteen . . . and

it continues . . . throughout your twenties and then into your thirties. . . . So, you’re

not learning from your mistakes which is the biggest single factor that I need to

assess. Your ability to learn is the most important piece of you being rehabilitated.

. . . You’re a violent and dangerous man, Mr. Vas. You may have a personality that

says otherwise, but what you have been convicted of numerous times shows a

different person than the one who speaks in court. . . . What bothers me is I don’t

know how to protect the public from you and that’s a real concern, that’s a real

concern to me. . . . So, lets hope you are too old when you get out because you’re not

safe in the community, and right now that becomes more important than your actual

correction or rehabilitation because the factors are not all even in any case. In your

case, because you’ve had so many chances to learn from your mistakes and you

haven’t, the factors weigh in favor of protecting the public, deterring you, and

promoting respect for the law.

67

There’s danger in Mr. Vas if he is let loose in the community because he’s never

shown anything but [dangerous behavior]. I don’t know why, but he is more

dangerous to those persons in authority, such as police officers, than others. But,

being convicted of homicide of another civilian says that he’s probably and

potentially dangerous to anyone. . . . There’s danger if the Court says run everything

concurrently with your history, Mr. Vas. There’s danger because others might think

that they could get a pass, and a totally concurrent sentence is a pass. . . . So a totally

concurrent sentence is not something the Court chooses because of your history and

because of the aggravating factors that we havementioned that are apparent from this

case, including your eight prior convictions, six of which involve firearms or acts of

violence. Therefore, we look at how much time is necessary for you to learn your

lesson to protect the public, to promote respect for the law, to deter you from

committing additional crime, and perhaps to offer you some ability to learn skills to

rehabilitate yourself . . . . 

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 14 of 16
Id. at 61:16-64:20. 68

Beyond the Court’s independent review of the record, Edward Meehan, Vas’s former attorney, noted his 69

review of the record at the May 7 sentencing hearing. Upon his review, Mr. Meehan advised Vas that because he

failed to make objections of record throughout the trial despite Mr. Meehan advising him throughout the trial to

make certain objections, he may have waived his ability to appeal potentially objectionable issues. N.T. 5/7/07 at

9:2-24. Mr. Meehan further informed Vas that he received an “incredibly fair trial by the Court” and that even if he

did have any motions, it was his belief that by failing to object during trial that he in all probability had waived that

right. Id. Finally, he informed Vas that he would not assist Vas in filing any post-trial motions because he did not

believe there were any meritorious issues to bring before the Court. Id.

15

Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, it is the judgment of this Court that

Norvel Vas be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned

for a term of one hundred twenty months. I chose that figure because it is the

maximum statutory penalty for this crime. It also happens to be the minimum

guideline sentence. . . . I think anything less than the maximum penalty for you and

your criminal history and your conduct would be egregious. 

68

In light of the above discussion, it is the Court’s belief that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors were

sufficiently addressed. Specifically, the Court took great measure to carefully consider the nature

and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of Vas, and the need for a sentence

that reflects the seriousness of the offense, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment

for the offense, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protects the public from further

crimes of Vas. Moreover, the sentence was at the low end of the recommended Guideline range.

Therefore, the Court considers the 120-month sentence imposed in this case to be reasonable and

consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

IV. CONCLUSION

After independent review of the record by the Court, the Court failed to locate any

potential meritorious issues for appeal stemming from Vas’s second trial. At best, Vas may appeal

69

his sentence, and for the reasons set forth herein, it is the Court’s belief that the 120-month sentence

imposed was reasonable, and consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

Case 2:04-cr-00489-CMR Document 197 Filed 06/04/07 Page 15 of 16
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Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Cynthia M. Rufe

CYNTHIA M. RUFE, J.

June 1, 2007

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