UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

HOLLI LUNDAHL, a/k/a Holli Telford, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

THE HOME DEPOT, INC.; 

CITIBANK, N.A., 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 14-8001 

(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00222-SWS) 

(D. Wyo.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before McHUGH, McKAY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Plaintiff Holli Lundahl, proceeding pro se,1 appeals from the district court’s 

order denying her motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against defendants 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Ms. Lundahl is under filing restrictions, as described in Johnson v. Stock, 

No. 03-4219, 2005 WL 1349963, at *3-4 (10th Cir. June 8, 2005). This court granted 

her permission to proceed pro se in this case by order issued February 5, 2014. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 3, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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Home Depot, Inc., and Citibank N.A based on her assertion they wrongfully removed 

the case from state court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 

I. Background 

 Ms. Lundahl filed a pro se lawsuit in Wyoming state court in July 2013, 

against Home Depot, Citibank (collectively, the “Defendants”), and three credit 

reporting agencies. She alleged she received an incorrect refund on her Home Depot 

credit card, which is issued by Citibank. She did not serve, and later voluntarily 

dismissed, the credit reporting agencies. The state court entered default judgment 

against the Defendants on September 23, 2013, after they failed to file an answer. 

On October 1, 2013, the Defendants removed the suit to federal court, asserting the 

district court’s original federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 

1441(a). The Defendants also sought to set aside the Wyoming default judgment 

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), claiming they had not been properly served in state 

court. 

The Defendants asserted that Ms. Lundahl’s complaint included two federal 

claims. First, her complaint alleged she had been assessed interest on her credit card 

“in violation of . . . the federal and state usury laws; thus constituting illegal loan 

sharking on Home Depot[’s] and Citibank’s behalf.” R. Vol. 1, at 17, Compl. ¶ 13. 

The Defendants noted that Citibank is a national bank and cited the Supreme Court’s 

“‘longstanding and consistent construction of the National Bank Act as providing an 

exclusive federal cause of action for usury against national banks.’” Id. at 7, Notice 
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of Removal (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003); 

see 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (interest rate and usury provisions relating to national banks). 

Second, Ms. Lundahl’s complaint alleged she was entitled to compensatory damages 

because she had been subjected to an increased mortgage rate “as a result of 

defendants[’] willful violations of the Wyoming Consumer Protection Act and the 

[f]ederal [Fair] Credit Reporting Act, [15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (“FCRA”)].” 

R. Vol. 1, at 19, Compl. ¶ 20. 

Ms. Lundahl moved to remand the action to state court, arguing that the sole 

claim asserted against the Defendants was a violation of Wyoming law; that the 

FCRA claim was asserted only against the three credit reporting agencies, which she 

had dismissed; and that her complaint mentioned usury under federal law only in 

passing. She also moved to strike the Defendants’ motion to set aside the default 

judgment and requested sanctions or contempt damages in the amount of $20,000 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 based on their wrongful removal of 

the case from state court. 

The district court held a hearing on the parties’ motions. It stated it had 

“carefully reviewed and re-reviewed the complaint” and reviewed the law with 

respect to the FCRA. R. Doc. 32, (“Hr’g Tr.”), at 7.2

 The court concluded that, 

 

2

 The transcript of the November 22, 2013, hearing was filed in the district court 

on April 24, 2014, after the primary volumes of the record on appeal were filed. The 

transcript is also part of the record on appeal pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 11.2(A) (“In a 

(continued) 
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“while [it could] certainly see the basis that the defendants in this action sought 

removal, upon review and based upon the subsequent dismissal of the consumer 

credit reporting agency defendants,” there was not a federal question that was fairly 

presented. Id. at 7-8.3

 The district court noted that while paragraph 20 of 

Ms. Lundahl’s complaint broadly sought damages against “defendants” for violation 

of the FCRA, paragraph 5 of the complaint, which discussed her FCRA claim in 

detail, was asserted only against the credit reporting agencies. Id. at 8. Thus, 

notwithstanding Ms. Lundahl’s broad use of the term “defendants” in paragraph 20, 

the district court concluded that, in the context of paragraph 5, Ms. Lundahl’s FCRA 

claim was not asserted against Home Depot or Citibank. Id. As to the federal usury 

claim, the district court noted that Ms. Lundahl’s prayer for relief on the final page of 

her complaint did not actually claim any damages tied to usury interest. Id. at 8-9. 

The district court described its decision to remand as a “close call” because 

Ms. Lundahl’s complaint was drafted in generalities and failed to separate the claims 

for relief. Id. at 9. 

 

pro se appeal . . . the district court clerk must forward the record to the circuit clerk 

[which] must include any transcript that has been filed . . . .”). 

3

 The transcript of the November 22, 2013 hearing was filed in the district court 

April 24, 2014, after the record on appeal was filed, but it is part of the record on 

appeal pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 11.2(A) (“[i]n a pro se appeal . . . the district court 

clerk must forward the record to the circuit clerk [which] must include any transcript 

that has been filed . . . .”). 
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“[B]ased upon the lack of specificity” in Ms. Lundahl’s complaint and the 

court’s conclusion that the Defendants had a “good faith basis” to seek removal, the 

district court declined to impose any damages or sanctions for filing a notice of 

removal, as Ms. Lundahl had requested. Id. The district court remanded the case to 

state court and ruled the Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(4) motion seeking to vacate the 

state’s default judgment was moot. 

II. Discussion 

 Ms. Lundahl appeals the district court’s denial of sanctions under Rule 11.4

 

Under Rule 11, a signer of a pleading “certifies that to the best of the person’s 

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the 

circumstances,” the pleading “is not being presented for any improper purpose, such 

as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase in the cost of litigation” 

and that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing 

law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 

 

4

 Ms. Lundahl’s brief does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of her 

request for costs and expenses incurred as a result of the removal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), though she makes a few passing references to § 1447(c). 

Awards under § 1447(c) are left to the district court’s wide discretion, and there is no 

presumption in favor of a § 1447(c) award when a case is remanded to state court. 

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136-41 (2005) (noting that 

“awarding fees simply because the party did not prevail could discourage all but the 

most airtight claims, for seldom can a party be sure of ultimate success”) (bracket 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]hen an objectively reasonable basis 

exists [for seeking removal], fees should be denied.” Id. at 141. As a pro se litigant, 

we construe Ms. Lundahl’s brief liberally; thus, to the extent that she preserved her 

§ 1447(c) claim for appellate review, we find no abuse of the district court’s 

discretion in denying her request. 
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law or for establishing new law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). This certification standard is 

one of “[objective] reasonableness under the circumstances.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v. 

Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1991) (emphasis omitted). 

If a court determines that a party has violated Rule 11(b), it may, in its 

discretion, impose sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (“[T]he court may impose an 

appropriate sanction. . . .”) (emphasis added)). “This court reviews the district 

court’s refusal to impose Rule 11 sanctions for abuse of discretion.” Brown v. 

Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221, 1228 n.3 (10th Cir. 2013). Under this standard, reversal 

would be appropriate only if the district court “based its ruling on an erroneous view 

of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. 

Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). 

Ms. Lundahl argues that: (1) Rule 11 sanctions were mandatory because the 

Defendants’ basis for removal was a sham; (2) Rule 11 sanctions were proper 

because the Defendants’ action amounted to economic extortion; and (3) Rule 11 

sanctions were mandatory because removal of the state suit was barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine.5

 Contrary to the premise of her arguments, sanctions 

 

5

 Ms. Lundahl failed to raise this issue—that removal was improper because 

federal review of the state court’s default judgment was barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine—in the district court. Her argument is without merit in 

any event. “The Rooker –Feldman doctrine arose out of [28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)], and 

provides that only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state 

court judgments.” Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 641 (10th Cir. 2006). But removal 

does not constitute an appeal, de facto or otherwise, of the state court proceedings; 

rather it is a continuation of the proceedings and “[t]he jurisdiction exercised on 

(continued) 
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under Rule 11 are discretionary; not mandatory. See 5A C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed.), § 1331 at 476 (explaining that under the 

1993 amendments to Rule 11, “[t]he district court now has discretion in determining 

whether or not to apply sanctions for a Rule 11 violation and no longer is mandated 

to do so as was true under the 1983 amendment”); Brown, 725 F.3d at 1228 & nn.2 & 

3 (rejecting as meritless the argument that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion when it 

refuses to impose sanctions . . . for a clear violation of Rule 11”). 

 Ms. Lundahl claims it was “undisputed” that she asserted only state law claims 

against the Defendants. Aplt. Opening Br. at 6. But this is factually incorrect: her 

complaint facially alleged federal claims against Home Depot and Citibank; the 

Defendants disputed her claim that she asserted only state law claims against them; 

and the district court characterized that dispute as a “close call,” Hr’g Tr. at 9. 

Ms. Lundahl argues removal was frivolous because only credit reporting agencies can 

be liable under the FCRA. But she did not raise this argument below, arguing only 

that her complaint did not allege a federal claim against the Defendants. She 

supported this argument by misquoting her complaint, omitting the FCRA allegations 

against “defendants” in paragraph 20. Compare R. Vol. 1, at 19, Compl. ¶ 20, with 

id. at 256. Moreover, Ms. Lundahl’s discussion of her complaint on appeal is 

selective; she makes no mention of the allegation in her complaint that Home Depot 

 

removal is original not appellate.” Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 452 

(1943). 
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and Citibank, specifically, engaged in illegal loan sharking in violation of federal 

usury laws. Id. at 17, Compl. ¶ 13. 

The Supreme Court has ruled that circuit courts are to apply an abuse of 

discretion standard when reviewing all aspects of a district court’s Rule 11 decision, 

including its determination “that a litigant’s position is factually well grounded and 

legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes.” Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 403-05. Here, the 

district court determined that its decision to remand was a “close call,” and that it 

could “certainly see the basis” for Defendants’ removal, particularly given the 

deficiencies and generalities in Ms. Lundahl’s complaint. Hr’g Tr. at 7-9. Based 

upon our review of the record, we see no abuse of the district court’s discretion to 

deny Ms. Lundahl’s request for sanctions. 

 Affirmed. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Carolyn B. McHugh 

 Circuit Judge