Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 77955 

1The Regulations, currently codified at 15 CFR 

parts 730 through 774 (2023), originally issued 

pursuant to the Export Administration Act (50 

U.S.C. 4601–4623 (Supp. III 2015) (‘‘EAA’’), which 

lapsed on August 21, 2001. The President, through 

Executive Order 13222 of August 17, 2001 (3 CFR, 

2001 Comp. 783 (2002)), as extended by successive 

Presidential Notices, continued the Regulations in 

effect under the International Emergency Economic 

Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701, et seq. (2012)) 

(‘‘IEEPA’’). On August 13, 2018, the President 

signed into law the John S. McCain National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, 

which includes the Export Control Reform Act of 

2018, 50 U.S.C. 4801–4852 (‘‘ECRA’’). While section 

1766 of ECRA repeals the provisions of the EAA 

(except for three sections which are inapplicable 

here), section 1768 of ECRA provides, in pertinent 

part, that all orders, rules, regulations, and other 

forms of administrative action that were made or 

issued under the EAA, including as continued in 

effect pursuant to IEEPA, and were in effect as of 

ECRA’s date of enactment (August 13, 2018), shall 

continue in effect according to their terms until 

modified, superseded, set aside, or revoked through 

action undertaken pursuant to the authority 

provided under ECRA. Moreover, section 1761(a)(5) 

of ECRA authorizes the issuance of temporary 

denial orders. 

2See, e.g., 87 FR 12856 (March 8, 2022). 

3See https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/allarticles/13-policyguidance/country-guidance/2172- 

russia-export-controls-list-of-common-high-priorityitems. Note that additional HTS codes were added 

Continued 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. A renewal 

request may be opposed by Rossiya as 

provided in section 766.24(d), by filing 

a written submission with the Assistant 

Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be provided 

to Rossiya and shall be published in the 

Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for one year. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25091 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Bureau of Industry and Security 

Nikolay Goltsev, a/k/a Nick Stevens, a/ 

k/a Gio Ross, 107 Rue Caron, SteAnne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada 

H9X4A1; Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 

3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11224; 

Kristina Puzyreva, 107 Rue Caron, SteAnne-De-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada 

H9X4A1; Vladimir Bochkarev, 

Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, Apt. 173, 

Moscow, Russia; Pavel Chernikov, 

Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt. 13, 

Moscow, Russia 123242; Yekaterina 

Vetoshkina, Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 

173, Moscow, Russia, 109431; Oleg 

Zenchenko, Vesenniya Street 16, 

Taytsy, Petersburg Region, Russia and 

Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St. 

Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH 

Brothers Group, Inc., 3734 Laurel Ave., 

Brooklyn, NY 11224; SN Electronics, 

Inc., 2650 AB Coney Island Ave., 

Brooklyn, NY 11223; Suntronic F.Z.E., 

Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed, StAmberjem Tower E1/913, Ajman, 

United Arab Emirates; Order 

Temporarily Denying Export Privileges 

Pursuant to section 766.24 of the 

Export Administration Regulations (the 

‘‘Regulations’’ or ‘‘EAR’’),1 the Bureau of 

Industry and Security (‘‘BIS’’), U.S. 

Department of Commerce, through its 

Office of Export Enforcement (‘‘OEE’’), 

has requested the issuance of an Order 

temporarily denying, for a period of 180 

days, the export privileges under the 

Regulations of: Nikolay Goltsev, 

Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina 

Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel 

Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg 

Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc. 

(‘‘SH Brothers’’), SN Electronics, Inc. 

(‘‘SN Electronics’’), and Suntronic FZE 

(‘‘Suntronic’’). OEE’s request and related 

information indicates that these parties 

are located in New York, the Russian 

Federation and the United Arab 

Emirates (‘‘U.A.E.’’), at the respective 

addresses listed on the caption page of 

this order and on page 16, infra. 

I. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to section 766.24, BIS may 

issue an order temporarily denying a 

respondent’s export privileges upon a 

showing that the order is necessary in 

the public interest to prevent an 

‘‘imminent violation’’ of the 

Regulations. 15 CFR 766.24(b)(1) and 

766.24(d). ‘‘A violation may be 

‘imminent’ either in time or degree of 

likelihood.’’ 15 CFR 766.24(b)(3). BIS 

may show ‘‘either that a violation is 

about to occur, or that the general 

circumstances of the matter under 

investigation or case under criminal or 

administrative charges demonstrate a 

likelihood of future violations.’’ Id. As 

to the likelihood of future violations, 

BIS may show that the violation under 

investigation or charge ‘‘is significant, 

deliberate, covert and/or likely to occur 

again, rather than technical or 

negligent[.]’’ Id. A ‘‘[l]ack of information 

establishing the precise time a violation 

may occur does not preclude a finding 

that a violation is imminent, so long as 

there is sufficient reason to believe the 

likelihood of a violation.’’ Id. 

II. OEE’S Request for a Temporary 

Denial Order 

The U.S. Commerce Department, 

through BIS, responded to the Russian 

Federation’s (‘‘Russia’s’’) further 

invasion of Ukraine by implementing a 

sweeping series of stringent export 

controls that severely restrict Russia’s 

access to technologies and other items 

that it needs to sustain its aggressive 

military capabilities. These controls 

primarily target Russia’s defense, 

aerospace, and maritime sectors and are 

intended to cut off Russia’s access to 

vital technological inputs, atrophy key 

sectors of its industrial base, and 

undercut Russia’s strategic ambitions to 

exert influence on the world stage. 

As of February 24, 2022, any item 

classified under any Export 

Classification Control Number 

(‘‘ECCN’’) in Categories 3 through 9 of 

the Commerce Control List (‘‘CCL’’) 

required a license to be exported or 

reexported to Russia. See 87 FR 12226 

(Mar. 3, 2022). As of April 8, 2022, the 

license requirements for Russia were 

expanded to cover all items on the CCL. 

See 87 FR 22130 (Apr. 14, 2022). These 

rules were codified in 15 CFR 746.8, 

which state, ‘‘a license is required, 

excluding deemed exports and deemed 

reexports, to export, reexport, or transfer 

(in-country) to or within Russia or 

Belarus any item subject to the EAR and 

specified in any Export Control 

Classification Number (ECCN) on the 

CCL.’’ 

BIS has imposed additional license 

requirements for exports, reexports and 

transfers to or within Russia of any 

items subject to the EAR that were 

identified under certain Schedule B or 

Harmonized Tariff Schedule 6 (‘‘HTS’’) 

numbers under Supplement No. 4 to 

Part 746—Russian and Belarusian 

Industry Sector Sanctions Pursuant to 

§ 746.5(a)(1)(ii).2 HTS codes take their 

first six digits from the corresponding 

Harmonized System (‘‘HS’’) code, a 

standardized numerical method of 

classifying traded products used by 

customs authorities around the world. 

On September 14, 2023, working in 

conjunction with the United Kingdom 

and European Union, BIS published a 

‘‘Common High Priority Items List,’’ 

which identified items by their 

corresponding HTS codes listed in 

Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 that Russia 

sought to procure for its weapons 

programs.3


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
77956 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 

to Supp. No. 4 to Part 746, including for items 

identified on the ‘‘Common High Priority Items 

List,’’ pursuant to several Federal Register notices. 

See 87 FR 57068 (Sep. 16, 2022); 88 FR 12175 (Feb. 

27, 2023); and 88 FR 33922 (May 23, 2023). 

4The co-conspirators are also charged with, inter 

alia, conspiracy to defraud the United States, wire 

fraud and wire fraud conspiracy, and money 

laundering conspiracy. 

5 ‘‘OOO’’ is the abbreviation for the Russian 

business entity type ‘‘j,otcndj c juhfybxtyyjq 

jndtncndtyyjcnm.,’’ which means limited private 

company and is roughly the equivalent of a limited 

liability company or LLC in the United States. 6See 87 FR 13141 (Mar. 9, 2022). 7https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

jy1494. 

On or about November 6, 2023, 

Goltsev, Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, 

Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and 

Zenchenko (collectively ‘‘the coconspirators’’) were each indicted on 

multiple counts in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of 

New York. The charges include, but are 

not limited to, conspiring to violate U.S. 

export control laws in connection with 

the unlicensed export of items on the 

CCL and Supp. No. 4 to Part 746. The 

co-conspirators are also charged with 

smuggling, as well as failure to file and 

filing false Electronic Export 

Information (‘‘EEI’’).4

In its request, OEE has presented 

evidence indicating that, between at 

least on or about January 2022 and 

October 2023, Goltsev, Nasriddinov, 

Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov, 

Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko conspired 

to violate ECRA and the EAR by 

unlawfully sourcing and exporting 

millions of dollars in dual-use 

electronics from the United States for 

export to Russia without the required 

licenses. In instances where a particular 

item may not have required an export 

license, the co-conspirators also made, 

and caused to be made, false and 

misleading statements with respect to 

EEI filings in order to conceal the 

ultimate end destination and end user. 

As alleged in the indictment, Goltsev 

and Nasriddinov sourced and purchased 

U.S.-origin electronics at the direction 

of Russian procurement agents, 

including Bochkarev, Chernikov, 

Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko. Goltsev, 

Nasriddinov, and Puzyreva utilized 

U.S.-registered companies, SH Brothers 

Group, Inc. and SN Electronics, Inc., 

both located in Brooklyn, NY, as part of 

the procurement scheme. Before 

ultimate diversion to Russia, some of 

these items were shipped to thirdcountry transshipment companies, 

including Suntronic, a front company 

located in the United Arab Emirates and 

utilized by Bochkarev. Based on the 

facts alleged in the indictment, Goltsev, 

Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev, 

Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko 

were aware of U.S. export control laws 

and took affirmative action to conceal 

their unlawful export-related activities 

in order to deceive U.S. manufacturers 

and distributors, and to evade detection 

by law enforcement. 

A. The Unlawful Procurement Scheme 

As further alleged in the indictment, 

several of the co-conspirators worked to 

procure items on behalf of various 

Russian entities. For example, until in 

or about August 2022, Vetoshkina, a 

Russian national residing in Russia, 

served as a procurement manager for 

OOO 5 Radioavtomatika 

(‘‘Radioavtomatika’’), a Russian defense 

procurement firm based in Moscow. 

Radioavtomatika was added to the BIS 

Entity List on or about March 3, 2022.6

Vetoshkina then began working for OOO 

Komtech (‘‘Komtech’’), a Moscow-based 

electronics distributor. 

Chernikov, a Russian national 

residing in Russia, conducted 

procurement operations for OOO 

Testkomplekt (‘‘Testkomplekt’’), another 

Moscow-based electronics distributor 

that has held contracts with Russian 

military entities. Testkomplekt was 

added to OFAC’s Specially Designated 

Nationals (‘‘SDN’’) list on or about May 

19, 2023, pursuant to Executive Order 

14024.7 Similarly, Zenchenko 

conducted procurement operations for 

OOO NEVA–EKB (‘‘EKB-Neva’’), a 

Moscow-based electronics supplier, 

which was added to OFAC’s SDN list on 

or about May 19, 2023, pursuant to 

Executive Order 14024. Goltsev, a 

Russian national residing in Canada, 

also had long-standing relationships 

with Radioavtomatika, Testkomplekt, 

EKB–NEVA and other Russia-based 

entities, and had procured electronic 

components for them for years. 

Based on evidence presented by OEE 

and as further stated in the indictment, 

Bochkarev, Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and 

Zenchenko received orders from 

Russian end users in the defense and 

technology sectors seeking to acquire 

U.S.-origin items. They then relayed 

these requests to Goltsev, who used 

aliases, including ‘‘Nick Stevens’’ and 

‘‘Gio Ross,’’ to communicate with U.S. 

manufacturers and distributors. In these 

communications, Goltsev made material 

misrepresentations about the 

transactions, including about the 

ultimate end use and end users, as well 

as the parties involved in the 

transactions. Goltsev and Nasriddinov, a 

dual-national of Russia and Tajikistan 

residing in New York, purchased the 

items from U.S. companies. Nasriddinov 

received the items at various addresses 

in Brooklyn, New York and supervised 

their repackaging. To further the 

scheme, Puzyreva, Goltsev’s spouse, 

utilized numerous bank accounts, 

including one that listed Nasriddinov’s 

home address as the address of record. 

After repackaging the items, 

Nasriddinov and Goltsev then exported 

the items from the United States for 

transshipment to Russia and Russian 

end users, including Radioavtomatika, 

Komtech, Testkomplekt, and EKB– 

NEVA. Using SH Brothers and SN 

Electronics, Nasriddinov and Goltsev 

shipped the items through various 

intermediaries located in third 

countries, including China, India, 

Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. 

One such intermediary was Suntronic, 

located in the U.A.E. and used by 

Bochkarev to conduct multiple 

procurement operations for Russian 

entities. 

As part of the scheme, Goltsev, 

Nasriddinov, Puzyreva, Bochkarev, 

Chernikov, Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko 

also made, and caused to be made, 

material misrepresentations and 

omissions, including with respect to EEI 

filings, to conceal the unlawful 

procurement transactions. As a result of 

their actions, the co-conspirators caused 

U.S. companies to, among other things, 

sell and export electronic components 

in violation of ECRA and the EAR. 

Some of the items sourced and 

exported by Goltsev, Nasriddinov, 

Puzyreva, Bochkarev, Chernikov, 

Vetoshkina, and Zenchenko included 

electronic components and integrated 

circuits listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 

of the EAR and requiring a license to 

Russia, which have been designated as 

‘‘Tier 1’’ items on the Common High 

Priority Items List. These priority items 

pose a heightened risk of being diverted 

illegally to Russia because of their 

importance to Russia’s war efforts. 

B. Knowledge of U.S. Export Controls 

and Intent To Evade 

As further alleged in the indictment, 

communications between the coconspirators indicate that they had 

knowledge of U.S. export controls and 

made efforts to conceal their unlawful 

procurement. For example, in or about 

October 2021, after Vetoshkina advised 

Goltsev that paperwork for an order of 

electronics stated that the items were 

destined for Russia, Goltsev advised her 

to use a Hong Kong-based company as 

the ‘‘bill-to’’ and confirmed that he 

would nonetheless ship the items to 

Radioavtomatika. In another 

communication to Goltsev in or about 

October 2022, Vetoshkina’s employee 

listed several different electronic 

components, including coaxial switches 

and capacitors, that required a license to 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 77957 

8See 88 FR 12170 (Feb. 27, 2023). 

be shipped to Russia and stated, ‘‘please 

tell me do you have these goods, 

priceless in Russia.’’ Goltsev responded 

with price quotations for the items. 

Based on facts alleged in the 

indictment, other communications 

between Goltsev and Russian 

procurement agents, including 

Chernikov, demonstrate a knowledge of 

export control laws and sanctions, as 

well as an intent to conceal. For 

example, in a December 2022 text 

message exchange with Chernikov 

regarding an order placed through SH 

Brothers, Goltsev requested ‘‘separate 

invoices. . .the ECCN[s] aren’t very 

pretty. We’ll ship them piecemeal.’’ In 

another communication in or about 

February 28, 2023, Goltsev mentions the 

sanctioning of Electronic Network, Inc. 

(‘‘Electronic Network’’), a company 

based in Montreal, Canada, which was 

added to the BIS Entity List on or about 

February 24, 2023.8 Goltsev said, ‘‘. . . 

do me a favor. If anyone ever asks about 

me, don’t tell them who I am, where I 

am, etc. . . . Elnet’s [Electronic 

Network] been in trouble for a long time 

because they exported a lot to Russia.’’ 

Goltsev was an account manager and 

purchasing coordinator for Electronic 

Network. 

Communications between Goltsev and 

Zenchenko also reflect knowledge of 

and familiarity with U.S. export 

controls. Specifically, Goltsev also 

received requests from Zenchenko to 

obtain items on the CCL that were 

controlled for anti-terrorism reasons. 

For example, on or about December 16, 

2022, in response to a query, Zenchenko 

advised Goltsev that ‘‘76 pcs, you can 

buy them here with ECCN 3A991.c.3.’’ 

In a message on or about February 1, 

2023, Zenchenko asked Goltsev, ‘‘ECCN: 

5A991.b.4 can you get this?’’ and 

included a screenshot of a product from 

a Texas-based electronics distributor. 

Similarly, in a message on or about 

February 6, 2023, Zenchenko asked 

Goltsev, ‘‘can you get this ECCN? 

4A994.’’ In a message on or about 

February 22, 2023, Zenchenko requested 

‘‘40 pcs ECCN 5A991.b.1 Can you get 

this?’’ At the time of these 

communications, each of ECCNs listed 

in this paragraph required an export 

license to Russia and was subject to a 

presumption of denial licensing policy. 

See Section 746.8. Between November 

2022 and February 2023, SH Brothers 

made nine shipments to Zenchenko in 

Russia through a Turkish intermediary. 

C. SH Brothers, SN Electronics, and 

Suntronic 

As alleged in the indictment and 

based on evidence presented by OEE, 

the co-conspirators used SH Brothers 

and SN Electronics to export items from 

the United States through 

intermediaries located in third 

countries. OEE has presented evidence 

that Nasriddinov founded SH Brothers 

on or about June 11, 2021 and SN 

Electronics, which was registered in his 

wife’s name, on or about January 30, 

2023. Both companies have listed 

addresses in Brooklyn, New York. One 

of intermediaries used for 

transshipment to Russia was Suntronic, 

a front company located in the U.A.E. 

and used by Bochkarev to conduct 

procurement operations for multiple 

Russian entities. As alleged in the 

indictment, on or about and between 

August 2022 and September 2023, SH 

Brothers exported more than 250 

shipments of electronic components, 

valued at more than $7 million, to thirdcountry transshipment companies, 

including Suntronic, where they were 

then unlawfully diverted to Russia. 

The indictment further alleges that, 

between in or about November 2022 and 

August 2023, SH Brothers exported 

approximately 27 shipments, valued at 

approximately $1,086,058, to Suntronic. 

These shipments were then sent to 

Russian end users, including Petersburg 

Intelligent Transportation Logistics 

(‘‘Petersburg’’), which was added to 

OFAC’s SDN list on or about May 19, 

2023; Suntronic received approximately 

$15 million from Petersburg between in 

or about October 2022 and February 

2023. As detailed in the indictment, one 

of the shipments, occurring in or about 

June 23, 2023, was for transceivers 

listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the 

EAR and requiring a license to Russia, 

which carried a Tier 1 HTS code listed 

on the Common High Priority Items List. 

The transceivers, which have been 

found in Russian UAVs, required a 

license from BIS to be exported to 

Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1) of 

the Regulations. These types of 

transceivers have been found in Russian 

unmanned aerial vehicles (‘‘UAVs’’) in 

Ukraine. 

Based on the facts set forth in the 

indictment, Goltsev and Bochkarev 

communicated about the shipments, 

including ways in which to conceal the 

ultimate destination and end users. For 

example, in a communication in or 

about January 2023, Goltsev informed 

Bochkarev that he needed an end user 

declaration and Bochkarev responded, 

‘‘darn.’’ The two ultimately agreed to 

falsely list a U.A.E. company as the end 

user. In a February 2023 

communication, Goltsev advised 

Bochkarev to ‘‘write something more 

substantial [to the U.S. company] so that 

there are no more questions.’’ After 

Bochkarev asked, ‘‘is it better to provide 

them with a Chinese end user,’’ Goltsev 

stated ‘‘yes should be ok.’’ In another 

message on or about March 3, 2023, 

Bochkarev asked Goltsev about the 

possibility of making one shipment paid 

‘‘via the Chinese company,’’ since ‘‘each 

one separately so expensive, or does it 

mean extra trouble at customs?’’ Goltsev 

responded, ‘‘no sir, more than 50–60 

will trigger a lot of interest it’s better to 

break it up.’’ 

The indictment also alleges that 

between in or about September 2022 

and November 2022, SH Brothers made 

approximately 15 shipments of 

electronic components, valued at 

approximately $352,000, to 

Testkomplekt through an intermediary 

located in Hong Kong. In or about 

November 2022, U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (‘‘CBP’’) detained 

some shipments from SH Brothers that 

were allegedly bound for Hong Kong but 

ultimately destined for Testkomplekt in 

Russia. As detailed in the indictment, 

Chernikov repeatedly questioned 

Goltsev about the status of the detained 

shipments and provided him with false 

information to use in responding to CBP 

inquiries. 

Based on the facts alleged in the 

indictment and evidence presented by 

OEE, SH Brothers also made a shipment 

of microchips to Vetoshkina’s company, 

Komtech, through a Turkish 

intermediary. Specifically, in a message 

on or about August 31, 2022, Komtech’s 

founder and director requested that 

Vetoshkina procure 3,000 microchips 

made by an Arizona-based 

manufacturer. Vetoshkina sourced the 

microchips through Goltsev and SH 

Brothers, who received several 

payments from the Turkish 

intermediary, including an October 3, 

2022 payment for $5,300. The wire 

details for this payment listed the part 

number of the microchips and denoted 

‘‘QTY 2000.’’ 

In a message exchange on or about 

April 21, 2023, Vetoshkina and Goltsev 

discussed shipping the microchips 

through China or Turkey, ultimately 

deciding to make the shipment through 

Turkey to ‘‘avoid problems.’’ Goltsev 

provided Vetoshkina with an SH 

Brothers invoice for 3,000 pieces of the 

requested microchip, which listed the 

applicable HTS codes and payment 

information for an SH Brothers bank 

account in Brooklyn, New York. On or 

about April 17, 2023, a U.S. company 

shipped a package containing the 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
77958 Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 

microchips was mailed to SH Brothers 

and two days later, on or about April 25, 

2023, Nasriddinov sent the same items 

to the intermediary in Turkey. OEE’s 

evidence includes an invoice for 3,000 

ATMEGA8A–MN Microchip 

Microcontrollers, and a second line item 

of 2,000 ATMEGA8A–MN Microchip 

Microcontrollers, bearing Tier 1 HTS 

code 8542310001, which is listed in 

Supp. No. 4 to Part 746 of the EAR and 

requires a license to Russia. The HTS 

code is listed on the Common High 

Priority Items List and the microchips 

would have required a license from BIS 

to be exported to Russia. See Section 

746.5(a)(1)(ii). 

Based on OEE’s investigation, which 

remains ongoing, SH Brothers also 

furthered the scheme by making false 

EEI filings, including by declaring that 

items were being shipped to one party 

when they were, in fact, being shipped 

to another, presumably to further 

obfuscate the transactions with respect 

to the ultimate destination and to evade 

detection by law enforcement. For 

example, OEE has presented evidence 

that, an EEI filing made by SH Brothers 

in or about February 16, 2023 indicated 

that shipment was destined for China, 

with an intermediary consignee also 

located in China. Based on 

corresponding DHL records, however, 

the items were shipped to a different 

location in China not identified on the 

EEI. Records also reflect that the 

shipment contained items that would 

have required a license for export to 

Russia, specifically CY7C109D–10VXI 

Infineon SRAM Chips, bearing HTS 

code 8542320041 and classified under 

ECCN 3A991.b.2.b. 

In another EEI filing made by SH 

Brothers on or about February 9, 2023, 

ostensibly to the U.A.E, SH Brothers 

identified the intermediary consignee as 

Suntronic. Corresponding DHL records, 

however, show that SH Brothers 

shipped the items to a company located 

in Hong Kong. The shipment contained 

a ADM3202ARNZ AD Transmitter, 

bearing HTS code 8542390001, a Tier 1 

HTS code listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 

746 of the EAR, which would have 

required an export license for export to 

Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1). 

OEE’s investigation also indicates 

that, in or about January 2023, in a 

further effort to evade detection and in 

response to law enforcement scrutiny, 

including the delay or detention of 

several outbound shipments from SH 

Brothers, Goltsev and Nasriddinov 

began using SN Electronics to order and 

export electronic components. As 

alleged in the indictment, on or about 

and between November 8, 2022 and 

November 15, 2022, Goltsev and 

Nasriddinov exchanged a series of 

messages discussing a shipment of 

electronic components that had been 

detained by U.S. officials at John F. 

Kennedy International Airport (‘‘JFK’’) 

in Queens, New York. Goltsev 

commented that shipping to Russia had 

become ‘‘dangerous’’ and went on to 

say, ‘‘we need to figure out why they 

keep holding the package . . . I don’t 

really understand how they figured [it] 

out.’’ In a subsequent message, on or 

about November 9, 2022, Goltsev 

commented that, ‘‘in the future we will 

need to load from several companies, 

not to attract attention . . . for now 

large packages will be dangerous until 

we understand what they figured out 

. . . we will need to think of 

diversifying the load . . . so that not 

everything is moving from the same 

deck.’’ 

In subsequent communications 

between on or about January 31, 2023 

and February 10, 2023, Nasriddinov 

confirmed to Goltsev that the ‘‘new 

company is already functioning . . . Its 

called SN Electronics’’ and Goltsev 

responded, ‘‘Wonderful sir . . . Eagerly 

waiting for Tax ID sir. We had problems 

with some large orders from [a Texasbased company] . . . we will reorder 

later from SN.’’ Nasriddinov later 

provided Goltsev with SN Electronics’ 

registered address in Brooklyn, New 

York, which was also the address of a 

restaurant that Nasriddinov owned. 

As detailed in the indictment, Goltsev 

and Nasriddinov then used SN 

Electronics to obtain approximately 

$36,871.49 worth of non-reflective 

switches, listed in Supp. No. 4 to Part 

746 of the EAR and requiring a license 

to Russia, from a U.S. company for 

Chernikov and Testkomplekt. Although 

Nasriddinov had initially placed the 

order for these non-reflective switches 

from the U.S. company through SH 

Brothers, the order was cancelled and 

the U.S. company told Goltsev that the 

‘‘manufacturer requires that shipments 

of this product be direct to an END 

CUSTOMER from an AUTHORIZED 

DISTRIBUTOR only.’’ 

Goltsev subsequently placed the same 

order through SN Electronics, using the 

alias ‘‘Gio Ross’’ in his email 

communications with the U.S. company 

and falsely claimed in an email on or 

about February 15, 2023 that SN 

Electronics was a ‘‘prototype and design 

manufacturing company.’’ On or about 

February 21, 2023, the order was 

shipped to an SN Electronics address in 

Brooklyn, New York and, on or about 

February 27, 2023, Nasriddinov 

exported the items to a Hong-Kong 

based transshipment company 

frequently utilized by Testkomplekt. 

The switches had Tier 1 HTS codes that 

were included on the Common High 

Priority Items List and required a 

license from BIS to be exported to 

Russia pursuant to section 746.5(a)(1). 

III. Findings 

I find that the evidence presented by 

BIS demonstrates that a violation of the 

Regulations by the above-captioned 

parties is imminent in both time and 

degree of likelihood. This includes 

evidence demonstrating the breadth of 

the conspiracy, that multiple parties and 

entities are involved, and that the 

conduct occurred over a lengthy period 

of time. As such, a TDO is needed to 

give notice to persons and companies in 

the United States and abroad that they 

should cease dealing with Nikolay 

Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 

Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, 

Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina 

Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH 

Brothers Group, Inc. (‘‘SH Brothers’’), 

SN Electronics, Inc. (‘‘SN Electronics’’), 

and Suntronic FZE (‘‘Suntronic’’) in 

export or reexport transactions 

involving items subject to the EAR. 

Such a TDO is consistent with the 

public interest to preclude future 

violations of the Regulations given the 

deliberate, covert, and determined 

nature of the misconduct and clear 

disregard for complying with U.S. 

export control laws. 

This Order is being issued on an ex 

parte basis without a hearing based 

upon BIS’s showing of an imminent 

violation in accordance with section 

766.24 of the Regulations. 

It is therefore ordered: 

First, that NIKOLAY GOLTSEV, a/k/a 

NICK STEVENS, a/k/a GIO ROSS, with 

an address at 107 Rue Caron, Ste-AnneDe-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; 

SALIMDZHON NASRIDDINOV, with an 

address at 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, 

NY 11224; KRISTINA PUZYREVA, with 

an address at 107 Rue Caron, Ste-AnneDe-Bellevue, Quebec, Canada H9X4A1; 

VLADIMIR BOCHKAREV, with an 

address at Privolnaya Street 75, Korp.1, 

Apt. 173, Moscow, Russia; PAVEL 

CHERNIKOV, with an address at 

Zoologicheskiy Pereulok 9/11. Apt.13, 

Moscow, Russia 123242; YEKATERINA 

VETOSHKINA, with an address at 

Ulitsa Privolnaya 75/1, Apt. 173, 

Moscow, Russia, 109431; OLEG 

ZENCHENKO, with an address at 

Vesenniya Street 16, Taytsy, Petersburg 

Region, Russia and an address at 

Kupchinskaya Street 29/1, Apt. 363, St. 

Petersburg, Russia 192283; SH 

BROTHERS GROUP, INC., with an 

address at 3734 Laurel Ave., Brooklyn, 

NY 11224; SN ELECTRONICS, INC., 

with an address at 2650 AB Coney 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 88, No. 218 / Tuesday, November 14, 2023 / Notices 77959 

1See Antidumping Duty Order: Fresh Garlic from 

the People’s Republic of China, 59 FR 59209 

(November 16, 1994) (Order). 

2See Petitioners Letter, ‘‘Petitioners’ Request for 

Circumvention Ruling Pursuant to Section 781(c) of 

the Tariff Act of 1930, As Amended,’’ dated 

February 16, 2023 (Circumvention Request). 

3See Circumvention Request. 

4See Fresh Garlic From the People’s Republic of 

China: Initiation of Circumvention Inquiry on the 

Antidumping Duty Order, 88 FR 37510 (June 8, 

2023) (Initiation Notice), and accompanying 

Initiation Checklist. 

Island Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11223; and 

SUNTRONIC FZE, with an address at 

Shiekh Khalifa Bin Zayed St-Amberjem 

Tower E1/913 Ajman, United Arab 

Emirates; and when acting for or on 

their behalf, any successors or assigns, 

agents, or employees (each a ‘‘Denied 

Person’’ and collectively the ‘‘Denied 

Persons’’) may not, directly or 

indirectly, participate in any way in any 

transaction involving any commodity, 

software or technology (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as ‘‘item’’) 

exported or to be exported from the 

United States that is subject to the EAR, 

or in any other activity subject to the 

EAR including, but not limited to: 

A. Applying for, obtaining, or using 

any license, License Exception, or 

export control document; 

B. Carrying on negotiations 

concerning, or ordering, buying, 

receiving, using, selling, delivering, 

storing, disposing of, forwarding, 

transporting, financing, or otherwise 

servicing in any way, any transaction 

involving any item exported or to be 

exported from the United States that is 

subject to the EAR, or in any other 

activity subject to the EAR; or 

C. Benefitting in any way from any 

transaction involving any item exported 

or to be exported from the United States 

that is subject to the EAR, or in any 

other activity subject to the EAR. 

Second, that no person may, directly 

or indirectly, do any of the following: 

A. Export or reexport to or on behalf 

of a Denied Person any item subject to 

the EAR; 

B. Take any action that facilitates the 

acquisition or attempted acquisition by 

a Denied Person of the ownership, 

possession, or control of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States, 

including financing or other support 

activities related to a transaction 

whereby a Denied Person acquires or 

attempts to acquire such ownership, 

possession or control; 

C. Take any action to acquire from or 

to facilitate the acquisition or attempted 

acquisition from a Denied Person of any 

item subject to the EAR that has been 

exported from the United States; 

D. Obtain from a Denied Person in the 

United States any item subject to the 

EAR with knowledge or reason to know 

that the item will be, or is intended to 

be, exported from the United States; or 

E. Engage in any transaction to service 

any item subject to the EAR that has 

been or will be exported from the 

United States and which is owned, 

possessed or controlled by a Denied 

Person, or service any item, of whatever 

origin, that is owned, possessed or 

controlled by a Denied Person if such 

service involves the use of any item 

subject to the EAR that has been or will 

be exported from the United States. For 

purposes of this paragraph, servicing 

means installation, maintenance, repair, 

modification or testing. 

Third, that, after notice and 

opportunity for comment as provided in 

section 766.23 of the EAR, any other 

person, firm, corporation, or business 

organization related to Nikolay Goltsev, 

Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, Kristina 

Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel 

Chernikov, Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg 

Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc., SN 

Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE by 

affiliation, ownership, control, or 

position of responsibility in the conduct 

of trade or related services may also be 

made subject to the provisions of this 

Order. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

section 766.24(e) of the EAR, Nikolay 

Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov, 

Kristina Puzyreva, Vladimir Bochkarev, 

Pavel Chernikov, Yekaterina 

Vetoshkina, Oleg Zenchenko, SH 

Brothers Group, Inc., SN Electronics, 

Inc., and Suntronic FZE may, at any 

time, appeal this Order by filing a full 

written statement in support of the 

appeal with the Office of the 

Administrative Law Judge, U.S. Coast 

Guard ALJ Docketing Center, 40 South 

Gay Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202– 

4022. 

In accordance with the provisions of 

section 766.24(d) of the EAR, BIS may 

seek renewal of this Order by filing a 

written request not later than 20 days 

before the expiration date. Respondents 

Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon 

Nasriddinov, Kristina Puzyreva, 

Vladimir Bochkarev, Pavel Chernikov, 

Yekaterina Vetoshkina, Oleg 

Zenchenko, SH Brothers Group, Inc., SN 

Electronics, Inc., and Suntronic FZE 

may oppose a request to renew this 

Order by filing a written submission 

with the Assistant Secretary for Export 

Enforcement, which must be received 

not later than seven days before the 

expiration date of the Order. 

A copy of this Order shall be served 

on each denied person and shall be 

published in the Federal Register. 

This Order is effective immediately 

and shall remain in effect for 180 days. 

Matthew S. Axelrod, 

Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export 

Enforcement. 

[FR Doc. 2023–25005 Filed 11–13–23; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3510–DT–P 

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

International Trade Administration 

[A–570–831] 

Fresh Garlic From the People’s 

Republic of China: Preliminary 

Affirmative Determination of 

Circumvention 

AGENCY: Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

Department of Commerce. 

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of 

Commerce (Commerce) preliminarily 

determines that imports of small and 

large garlic chunks from the People’s 

Republic of China (China) are 

circumventing the antidumping (AD) 

order on fresh garlic from China. 

DATES: Applicable November 14, 2023. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Charles DeFilippo or Jacob Saude, AD/ 

CVD Operations, Office VII, 

Enforcement and Compliance, 

International Trade Administration, 

U.S. Department of Commerce, 1401 

Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, 

DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482–3797 or 

202–482–0981, respectively. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On November 16, 1994, Commerce 

published the AD order on imports of 

fresh garlic from China.1 On February 

16, 2023, the Fresh Garlic Producers 

Association and its individual members 

(collectively, the petitioners) requested 

that Commerce initiate a circumvention 

inquiry with regard to small and large 

garlic chunks that are exported to the 

United States from China.2 In the 

Circumvention Request, the petitioners 

alleged that small and large garlic 

chunks constitute merchandise altered 

in form or appearance in such minor 

respects that it should be included 

within the scope of the Order, pursuant 

to section 781(c) of the Tariff Act of 

1930, as amended (the Act) and 19 CFR 

251.226(j).3

On June 8, 2023, Commerce published 

in the Federal Register the notice of 

initiation of this circumvention 

inquiry.4 In the Initiation Notice, 


khammond on DSKJM1Z7X2PROD with NOTICES