alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 3.12

ENDORSED
STATE OF DELAWARE
SECRETARY OF STATE
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS
FILED 02:15 PM 12/18/2000
001634414 - 3331788

                       CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

                                       OF

                      INSPIRATION MEDIA OF PENNSYLVANIA, LP


        The undersigned, desiring to form a limited partnership pursuant to
Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 6 Delaware Code, Chapter 17,
do hereby certify as follows:

        1.     The name of the limited partnership is Inspiration Media of
               Pennsylvania, LP.

        II     The address of the Partnership's registered office in the State
               of Delaware is 9 East Loockerman Street, Kent County, Dover,
               Delaware 19901. The name of the Partnership's registered agent
               for service of process in the State of Delaware at such address
               is National Registered Agents, Inc.

        II     The name and mailing address of the sole general partner is as
               follows:


               NAME:                                      MAILING ADDRESS:
               -----                                      ---------------

               Salem Radio Operation -                    4880 Santa Rosa Road
               New York, Inc.                             Suite 300
                                                          Camarillo, CA 93012

        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate of
Limited Partnership of Salem Media of New York, LP, as of December 13, 2000.


                                      SALEM RADIO OPERATION - NEW
                                      YORK, INC., a Delaware corporation, as the
                                      General Partner


                                      By:  /s/ Jonathan L. Block
                                           -------------------------------------

                                      Name: Jonathan L. Block
                                           -------------------------------------

<PAGE>   2

                                      Title:    Vice President
Before the Third Division,

November 28, 1952

No. 56950.

#### Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. *v.*United States,

protests 134143-K, etc. (New York).

Opinion by

Ekwall, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that certain items of the merchandise consist of figures the same in all material respects as those the subject of *Wm. S. Pitcairn Corp.*v. *United States*(39 C. C. P. A. 15, C. A. D. 458), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
### NUMBER 13 - 14 - 00 469 - CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS , RICHARD FREYMANN, CLIFF COPPEDGE, LARRY FAULKS, DELLA OAKLEY,

AND ERIC RECHARD JACKSON

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion 1 

### Per Curiam Relators, State Farm Lloyds , Ri chard Freymann, Cliff Coppedge, Larry Faulks, Della Oakley, and Eric Rechard Jackson, have filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct respondent, the Honorable Rose Guerra Reyna, Presiding Judge of the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, to withdraw her order denying relators’ verified plea in abateme nt and to enter an order abating the suit

1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(d) ( “ When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. ” ); T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).2

for damages brought agai nst relators by the real part ies in i nterest, Leonardo Fuentes and Alma Fuentes , un til sixty days after t he y provide relators with a notice letter for their claim stating the specific, separ ate amounts for the claimed damages and attorney’s fees. See T EX

. I NS

. C ODE A NN . § 541.154 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Prior Notice of Action”); id. § 541.155 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Abatement”); T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.1 (“Commencement” of Original Proceedings). In addition, relators request that this Court issue immediate temporary relief staying respondent’s order denying the plea in abatement. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.10 (“Temporary Relief”).
T he Court, having e xamined and fully considered th e petition for writ of mandamus and the applicable law, is of the opinion that th e petition for writ of mandamus should be denied for the reasons expressed in our opinion in In re State Farm Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Nath an Burris , No. 13

- 14

- 00347

- CV, 2014 WL _____ (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), available at http://www.search.txcourts.gov/case.aspx?cn=13

- 14

- 00348

- CV. Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petit ion for writ of mandamus an d request for immediate temporary relief

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 52.8( d ).

PER CURIAM

D elivered and filed the 2nd day of September, 2014.
-78 -77 -76 -75

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# C_2015279EN.01005001.xml

| 24.8.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 279/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

24.8.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 279/50

---

Action brought on 1 July 2015 — Dr Vita v OHIM (69)

(Case T-360/15)

(2015/C 279/63)

Language of the case: Polish

Parties

Applicant: Dr Vita sp. z o.o. (Olsztyn, Poland) (represented by: D. Rzążewska, lawyer)

Defendant: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Details of the proceedings before OHIM

Trade mark at issue: Community figurative mark including the number ‘69’ — Application No 12 794 566

Contested decision: Decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of OHIM of 1 April 2015 in Case R 2513/2014-5

Form of order sought

The applicant claims that the Court should:

| — | annul the contested decision; |
| --- | --- |

—

annul the contested decision;

| — | order OHIM to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order OHIM to pay the costs.

Plea in law

| — | Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) and Article 7(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 |
| --- | --- |

—

Infringement of Article 7(1)(b) and (c) and Article 7(2) of Regulation No 207/2009

---
Before the First Division,

March 31, 1955

No. 58882.

protest 240766-K (New York).

#### I. B. Cohen & Sons Corp. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Oliver, C. J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of harmonicas the same in all material respects as those the subject of Abstract 47121, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 68632.

protest 62/2501 (Seattle).

#### Frank P. Dow Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

*375Opinion by

Ford, J.

Jn accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of plastic friction tape similar in all material respects to that the subject of Abstract 66860, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
Document

Exhibit 10.7.1.1

Amendment to EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


This Amendment to EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is entered into as of the 31st day of December, 2020, by and between Wynn Resorts, Limited (“Employer”) and Matt Maddox (“Employee”). Capitalized terms that are not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement (as defined below).


RECITALS


WHEREAS, Employer and Employee have entered into that certain Employment Agreement, effective as of December 16, 2019 (the “Agreement”);


WHEREAS, due to the unforeseen negative economic climate resulting from the current COVID-19 Pandemic, Employer and Employee desire to amend the Agreement in order to assist Employer in conserving cash flow and maintaining business stability and thereby preserving Employee’s employment;


NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the respective representations, warranties, covenants and agreements set forth in the Agreement, the parties hereto agree as follows:


1.Amendment.


Employer and Employee hereby agree to amend Section 7(a) of the Agreement in its entirety to read as follows:


(a)        Base Salary.  Employer hereby covenants and agrees to pay to Employee, and Employee hereby covenants and agrees to accept from Employer, a base salary at the rate of One Million, Six Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,600,000.00) per annum, payable in such installments as shall be convenient to Employer (the “Base Salary”). Employee shall be subject to performance reviews and the Base Salary may be increased but not decreased as a result of any such review. Such Base Salary shall be exclusive of and in addition to any other benefits which Employer, in its sole discretion, may make available to Employee, including, but not limited to, any discretionary bonus, profit sharing plan, pension plan, retirement plan, disability or life insurance plan, medical and/or hospitalization plan, or any and all other benefit plans which may be in effect during the Term.


2.      Termination Provisions.  During the term of this Amendment, should Employer choose to exercise the termination provisions under Sections 6(a) and (b) of the Agreement, any separation payment owed shall be calculated using the Base Salary as defined prior to any salary reduction Amendment.


3.      Effectiveness.  The amendment set forth in Section 1 shall be effective as of January 1, 2021 and shall remain in effect until March 31, 2021. After which time, the Base Salary shall revert to the level set forth in the terms of the Agreement.




4.      Other Provisions of Agreement.  The parties acknowledge that the Agreement is being modified only as stated herein and agree that nothing else in the Agreement shall be affected by this Amendment.




IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Amendment to be executed as of the date first written above.














Wynn Resorts, Limited


/s/ Craig S. Billings
__________________________________
Craig S. Billings, President












EMPLOYEE


/s/ Matt Maddox
_____________________________
Matt Maddox
Case No. 6,658.

#### HOME v. SEMPLE et al.

[3 McLean, 150.] 1

Circuit Court, D. Indiana.

May Term, 1843.

Debt — Action of — When Maintainable — Panties.

1. An action of debt will lie where the sum is certain, and it is the duty of the defendant to pay the amount to plaintiff.

2. The action may be brought by the assignee against the acceptor of a bill; and consequently by the payee against the acceptor.

3. An indorser may bring debt against the drawer, although there may be intermediate in-dorsements, by striking out those indorsements.

At law.

Wright & Patterson, for plaintiff.

H. B. L. Engram, for defendants.

OPINION OF THE COURT. This is an action of debt brought by the indorsee against the drawer of a bill, there being several intermediate assignments. A general demurrer was filed. It is laid down in Hardr. 435, that debt does not lie by a payee against the acceptor of a bill for want of privity. But debt will lie wherever the common law raises a duty, and the acceptor is bound legally and morally to the payee. He accepts and thereby promises to pay to the payee of the bill the sum named. There is then a privity between them, on which, according to the doctrine in Hardress, an action of debt may be sustained. In Bishop v. Young, 2 Bos. & P. 78, it was held that debt would lie by the payee of a note against the maker, where the note was expressed to be for value received. In that case the doctrine laid down by Hardress was considered. And in Raborg v. Peyton, 2 Wheat. [15 U. S.] 385, the court says: “In general, the legal predicament of the maker of a note is like that of the acceptor of a bill. Each is liable to the payee for the payment of the note or bill in the first instance; and after indorsement, each incurs the same liabilities. And if an action of débt will lie in favor of the payee of the note against the maker, it is not easy to perceive any sound principle, upon which it ought to be denied against an acceptor of a bill. The acceptance of a bill is just as much an admission of a debt between the immediate parties, as a drawing of a note.” It has been held that debt will lie in favor of a payee against the drawer, in case of non-payment by the acceptor. Hard’s Case. 1 Salk. 23; Hodges v. Steward, Skin. 346; 10 Wend. 341. Upon the whole, we think the action of debt in this case is sustainable, the plaintiff striking out the intermediate indorsements, and that the demurrer must be overruled. Judgment.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 02-10274

Summary Calendar

CATHLEEN P. RANCIER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

BAPTIST ST. ANTHONY’S HOSPITAL CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Northern District of Texas, Amarillo Division

(2:01-CV-210-J)

August 19, 2002

Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Cathleen Rancier appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judg ment in favor of her former employer, Baptist St. Anthony

Hospital Corporation (“St. Anthony”). Rancier argues that she has

established a prima facie case for her claims that St. Anthony laid2

her off because of her race and age in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Age

Discrimination Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, et. seq.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de

novo. C haney v. New Orleans Pub. Facil ity Mgmt., Inc. , 179 F.3d

164, 167 (5th Cir. 1999); Grimes v. Texas Dep’t of Mental Health &

Mental Retardation

, 102 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1996). “Summary

judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” G rimes

, 102 F.3d at 139 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). In

employment discrimination cases, the question is whether a genuine

issue of fact exists as to whether the defendant intentionally

discriminated against the plaintiff. I d. Unsubstantiated

assertions are not competent summ ary judgment evidence. C haney

,

179 F.3d at 167; Grimes , 102 F.3d at 139.

A Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a

prim a facie case of discrimination. M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green

, 41 1 U.S. 792, 801-03 (1973). “Once that showing has been

made, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.”

Munoz v. Orr , 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell

Douglas

, 411 U.S. at 802-03). The plaintiff must then demonstrate

that the employer’s reason was pretext. I d. “Thus, a plaintiff’s

prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that

the employer’s assert ed justification is false, may permit the3

trier of fact to conclude that the employer u nlawfully

discriminated.” R eeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , Inc. , 530

U.S. 133, 135 (2000).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rancier,

we find that St. Anthony presented evid ence of nondiscriminatory

reasons for its decision to lay Rancier off, and that Rancier

failed to show pretext or falsity of the explanation. We therefore

affirm the district court’s order dated February 4, 2002.

AFFIRMED.
No. 62467.

#### J. J. Boll *v.*United States,

protest 326907-K (New York).

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

The protest was dismissed for lack of prosecution.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL ACTION

 

 VS. : 

JUAN ANTONIO GARCIA-VILLA : NO. 03-CR-745-01

 ORDER

 AND NOW, this 6th day of December, 2011, upon 

consideration of the Defendant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, 

Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 (Document 137), 

Government’s Motion to Dismiss (Document 141) and the Defendant’s 

response thereto (Document 142), it is hereby ORDERED that the 

Defendant’s motion is DISMISSED.1

 BY THE COURT:

 /s/ J. Curtis Joyner

 

 J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.
 

1. The Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived

in his plea agreement and plea before this Court the right to

present any collateral challenge to his conviction and sentence. 

He has failed to allege any miscarriage of justice that would

overcome that waiver. See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557

(3 Cir. 2001). rd
No. 60378.

protest 200131-K (New York).

#### Kollners, Inc., and Hudson Shipping Co., Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Donlon, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of beef or veal similar in all material respects to that the subject of *Swift & Company et al.*v. *United States*(33 Cust. Ct. 212, C. D. 1655), the claim of the plaintiffs was sustained.
**Exhibit 32**

 

**CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**

**PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of TenFold Corporation (the “Company”) for the period ended June 30, 2003 as filed with theSecurities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Nancy M. Harvey, President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge: 

 

(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 

 

(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

/s/ Nancy M.Harvey                                                                             

Nancy M. Harvey 

*President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chief Financial Officer*

August 13, 2003
No. 57869.

protests 185665-K, etc. (Ogdensburg).

#### F. W. Myers & Co. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Rao, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise is the same in all material respects as that the subject of *United States*v. *Geo. Wm. Rueff, Inc.*(41 C. C. P. A. 95, C. A. D. 535), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
No. 63561.

protest 325765-K (New York).

#### Bonwit Teller, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Ford, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise consists of beaded bags, not ornamented with beads, spangles, or bugles, nor embroidered, tamboured, appliqued, or scalloped, composed in chief value of beads (other than imitation pearl beads, beads in imitation of precious or semiprecious stones, and beads in chief value of synthetic resin), the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
February 10, 1948

No. 52166.

Suit 4575.

#### Sheffler Merchandise Co., Inc. *v.*United States.

C. D. 1043 affirmed November 29, 1947. C. A. D. 372.
No. 53439.

protest 146225-K (A) (New York).

#### Morris Hess & Co. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Mollison, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protest.
Before the Third Division,

July 11, 1950

No. 54532.

#### D. F. De Bernardi & Co. et al. *v.*United States,

protests 154883-K, etc. (San Francisco).

*239Opinion by

Cline, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the merchandise is similar in all material respects to that the subject of *Naumes Forwarding Service*v. *United States*(24 Cust. Ct. 93, C. D. 1214), the claim for free-entry under paragraph 1646 was sustained.
Case No. 6,667.

#### HOOE et al. v. ALEXANDRIA.

[1 Cranch, C. C. 98.] 1

Circuit Court, District of Columbia.

Nov. Term, 1802.

Masteb and Servant — Negligence — Verdict— Amount of — Costs.

1. A person who has a right to do an act, has a right to the necessary means; and if, in the use of such means, a damage be sustained by another, the former is not liable.

2. The principal is liable for the conduct of his agent while acting in his employment, although he act without or contrary to his order; • 3. Full costs are allowed upon a verdict of one cent damages in an action upon the case for damages occasioned by raising the level of the street.

[In Case No. 6,666 an objection to certain evidence was overruled.]

Action on the case [by Hooe and Harrison] for filling up the street so as to shut up the windows and doors of the plaintiffs’ warehouses.

Hr. Simms and Hr. Swann, for plaintiffs,

moved the court to instruct the jury, “that if it shall be their opinion that Faw was street commissioner for the corporation of Alexandria at the time when the injury was done, and was then in the actual employment of the corporation, then the corporation are liable for his conduct while in their actual employment as aforesaid, although in the execution of the said employment he •should go beyond their express orders,” and that if, in raising the street, any damage accrued to the plaintiffs, they were entitled to recover in this action. Leader v. Moxton, 3 Wils. 461; Meredith’s Case, 4 Term R. 794.

KILTY, Chief Judge.

1. The corporation have by law a right to pave the streets, and of course to raise or lower particular parts of any street, if such raising or lowering should be necessary for performing the work in a reasonable and proper manner; •and the individuals who may be injured by it, have no right of action for such injury, unless expressly given by act of assembly. But, if a wanton and unnecessary injury is done, an action may be sustained. 2. The corporation, if liable at all, are answerable for the conduct of their commissioner if he was acting under their authority, and was engaged in the work in which they employed him. when the injury, if any, was done, although he may have acted without their orders, or contrary to-them. But if he committed an injury unconnected with the business in which he was employed, his being in the employ of the corporation will not make them liable. The jury having found a verdict for one cent damages, a question was made whether that would carry the costs in an action upon the case for injury done by raising the level of the street. The authorities cited were, Rev. Code Va. p. 116, § 17, and the English statutes of 22 & 23 Car. II., and 8 & 9 W. & M.

Mr. Simms, for plaintiffs. The act of assembly has copied the English statutes, and the decisions in Virginia have been similar to those in England, and have confined the meaning of the act to actions of trespass, quare clausum fregit, although the words of the statutes, and of the act, are, “and all other actions personal.” '

THE COURT allowed full costs.