Volume 2, Issue 5 November 1998

National Security Report

Background and Perspective on Important National Security and Defense Policy Issues,

Written and Produced by

From the Chairman...

Chairman, House National Security Committee

U.S. Policy Towards Iraq:

Conceding Defeat?

Saddam Hussein:

Slipping out of the box

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Coming on theheels of the

collapse of the Soviet

empire, the coalition

victory over Iraq in the

1991 Gulf War seemed

to hold the promise of

a new era. Our crushing

defeat of the Iraqi army seemed to codify

America’s standing as the world’s “sole

superpower.”

Eight years later, the promise of those

heady days has not been fulfilled, and our

troubles with Saddam Hussein seem to

reflect our troubles elsewhere in the world.

In fact, Saddam has been increasingly able

to claw his way out of his diplomatic,

economic, military and strategic isolation.

Today, Saddam Hussein is as close to

slipping out of his “box” as he has been

since the Gulf War ended in 1991.

According to Scott Ritter, a former United

Nations weapons inspector, Saddam may

be only six months away from developing

the chemical and biological weapons of

mass destruction that we have sought to

keep out of his hands. And the viability of

the United Nations inspection regime is

very much in doubt. Despite the

devastation it suffered during Desert Storm,

the Iraqi military still maintains significant

capabilities. And if Saddam finally succeeds

in developing and fielding an arsenal of

chemical or biological weapons he will pose

an even larger threat to the region and to

American interests.

In recent weeks, the Administration has

tried to make the case that Saddam remains

boxed in and isolated. Yet, the Saudis and

our other allies in the region have distanced

themselves from us over the years. It may

be that the U.S. is increasingly the one that

I

raqi President Saddam Hussein’s most

recent and most serious challenge to the

international community — halting all cooperation with United Nations weapons inspectors — has brought the United States

the closest to war with Iraq since 1991.

However, the United States has again refrained from military action in exchange for

a last-minute promise from Saddam

Hussein that he will

allow UN weapons

inspectors to resume their work unconditionally. This

continuing pattern

of Iraqi behavior —

placing obstacles in

the path of weapons inspectors and

then removing

them in the face of

a threatened military response —

has raised new

questions regarding the credibility

of the United States

and the effectiveness of efforts to

prevent Iraq from reconstituting its ability

to develop or use weapons of mass destruction.

Nearly eight years after the Gulf War dislodged Iraqi troops from Kuwait, Saddam

Hussein is still in power. U.S. policy toward Iraq continues to be one of containing Iraqi aggression while attempting to

dismantle the Iraqi programs for weapons

of mass destruction. However, this policy

has been increasingly buffeted by strong

political cross-currents that have called into

question the long-term resolve and ability

of the United States to bring about the desired changes in Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s

repeated challenges to the authority of the

international community have left the coalition of states that defeated him frustrated,

fatigued, and divided over the proper balance between “carrots” and “sticks.” Iraq’s

most recent act of defiance has sought to

exploit these divisions. Moreover, debate

continues over whether the crux of the

problem in Iraq is Saddam Hussein’s continuing drive to acquire and maintain weapons of mass destruction or, more

broadly, his seemingly unshakable

grip on power.

As a result of

its invasion of Kuwait, economic

sanctions were imposed on Iraq, and

these sanctions remain in place today.

In addition, as a consequence of its Gulf

War defeat, Iraq

was forced to accept stringent disarmament conditions

established by the

United Nations Security Council.

“No-fly zones,” enforced primarily by U.S.

aircraft operating from bases in Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey, were established over the northern and southern sections of the country. Since 1991, the southern no-fly zone has been expanded, and

U.S. pilots continue to fly routine patrols

over Iraq as part of a “contingency operation” that has become a semi-permanent

and costly feature of U.S. military operations in the post-Cold War world.

The Disarmament Regime and

Iraqi Noncompliance

UN Security Council Resolution 687,

adopted on April 3, 1991, required Iraq to

Background

Brief

Background

Brief
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provide a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass

destruction and ballistic missile programs,

and to “unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless,

under international supervision, of: (a) all

chemical and biological weapons and all

stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities; [and] (b) all ballistic

missiles with a range greater than 150

kilometers and related major parts, and

repair and production facilities.” In addition, Iraq was forced to “unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop

nuclear weapons or nuclear-weaponsusable material or any subsystems or

components... or manufacturing facilities.”

The nuclear disarmament task was

entrusted to the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). To carry out

Iraq’s disarmament in the chemical,

biological, and ballistic missile area, the

UN Security Council established a

Special Commission on Iraq, referred to

as UNSCOM. This new organization was

tasked with the responsibility of

conducting on-site and challenge

inspections of declared and suspected

Iraqi sites containing information,

equipment, or technology related to

Iraq’s chemical, biological, or ballistic

missile programs. Moreover, the UN

Security Council directed Iraq to “allow

the Special Commission, the IAEA and

their inspection teams immediate,

unconditional and unrestricted access

to any and all areas, facilities, equipment,

records and means of transportation

which they wish to inspect.”

Since 1991, UNSCOM inspectors have

been repeatedly denied the “immediate,

unconditional and unrestricted access” Iraq

promised to provide, prompting the UN

Security Council to declare Iraq in “material

breach” of its cease-fire obligations seven

times between 1991 and 1993. In 1996, the

Security Council called Iraq’s refusal to

allow UNSCOM access to certain sites “a

clear violation” of its obligations. In

addition, the information provided by Iraq

on its weapons programs has repeatedly

proven erroneous and the Iraqis have

revised their official “full, final and complete

disclosure” statements on numerous

occasions.

Each Iraqi challenge has been viewed as

more serious than the previous one. Thus,

some observers have concluded that

through his tactics, Saddam Hussein has

been able to exacerbate political fissures in

the once solid United Nations coalition and

has been successful at chipping away at

political support for a continuation of the

inspection regime and economic sanctions.

Iraq’s decision to cease all cooperation

with UN weapons inspectors continued the

challenge to the UN weapons inspection

regime that began on October 29, 1997, when

Iraq blocked U.S. weapons inspectors from

participating in UNSCOM inspections,

effectively suspending the inspection

process. On November 13, 1997, Iraq

expelled U.S. weapons experts from the

country. The expulsion occurred as

inspection teams were closing in on what

was thought to be a major discovery

involving Iraq’s biological weapons

program.

In October 1997, the United States

responded to the Iraqi expulsion by

deploying additional military forces to the

Persian Gulf, including a

second aircraft carrier.

Russian intervention with

Saddam Hussein resulted

in an agreement by Iraq

to allow U.S. inspectors

to return and for

UNSCOM’s work to

continue, in exchange for

Russia’s agreement to

work toward a lifting of the

economic sanctions.

However, Iraq refused to

allow UNSCOM access to

what it declared to be “sensitive”

presidential sites, and declared more than

60 such sites off-limits to inspectors. This

prompted Secretary of Defense Cohen to

threaten military strikes, stating that any

U.S. strike “will not be a pin-prick.” The

threat of U.S. force was opposed by Russia

and other UN Security Council members.

On January 12, 1998, Iraq again

threatened to expel U.S. arms inspectors

and blocked an inspection team headed

by William “Scott” Ritter from conducting

an inspection. In response, the UN

Security Council condemned Iraq’s action,

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard

Butler withdrew Ritter’s UNSCOM team

from Iraq, and the future of the inspection

regime was again placed in doubt.

The Military Option Takes Shape

On February 4, 1998, as diplomatic efforts

to resolve the crisis foundered, the United

States deployed more than 30,000 troops,

30 ships, and over 200 strike aircraft to the

Persian Gulf region, redeploying aircraft

carriers from Europe and the Pacific.

President Clinton declared that “something

is going to have to give here.” Secretary

of State Madeleine Albright stated that “we

have all but exhausted the diplomatic

option” and threatened “substantial

strikes” if Iraq failed to comply fully with

UN resolutions. Press reports indicated

that the strike plan, code-named “Operation

Desert Thunder,” involved launching

approximately 300 combat sorties a day and

firing hundreds of cruise missiles. From

November 1997 to March 1998, the cost of

deploying additional U.S. forces to the Gulf

was estimated at approximately $600

million.

The Gulf buildup impacted U.S. forces

deployed elsewhere in the world. Press

reports indicated that General John Tillelli,

the commander of U.S. forces in Korea,

expressed concerns that the diversion of

military resources from the Pacific region

to the Gulf weakened his ability to defend

South Korea. U.S. military officials in

Europe reportedly echoed similar concerns

about their ability to maintain readiness.

U.S. policy regarding military action

against Iraq was described in various ways

on numerous occasions by Administration

An Iraqi Al-Hussein ballistic missile being dismantled. spokespersons. By February 1998, the of-
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ficially-articulated objectives of any potential U.S. military strike had been downgraded. Administration spokespersons

conceded that a strike would not eliminate

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capability, but would significantly retard it.

The crisis over UNSCOM inspections

highlighted the danger of allowing Saddam

Hussein to possess weapons of mass

destruction and the ballistic missiles that

could deliver them. Continuing reports of

clandestine Iraqi work on biological

weapons, including anthrax, raised

concerns over Iraq’s ability to quickly

reconstitute a dangerous offensive

biological weapons capability in the

absence of effective inspections. Secretary

of Defense Cohen highlighted the threat

on national television by holding up a 5-

pound bag of sugar and emphasizing that

a similar quantity of anthrax “would

destroy at least half the population” of a

city the size of Washington, D.C.

A Crisis Averted?: The

Annan Agreement

In an effort to preclude military action by

the United States, UN Secretary General

Kofi Annan traveled to Baghdad on

February 20, 1998 to negotiate a diplomatic

outcome to the inspection standoff. Some

analysts considered the attempt to

negotiate a diplomatic solution to the crisis

likely to result in a further step toward the

unraveling of the inspection regime and a

loosening of the sanctions imposed on

Iraq. This concern was heightened by an

interview Annan gave to the BBC, aired on

February 10, 1998, in which he stated that

full Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions

“is the position today. It does not mean

that, depending on what can be worked

out, that would be the position tomorrow.”

While some in the Administration referred

to Saddam Hussein as being “in a box,”

other private analysts questioned whether

it was the United States that was “in a box.”

An agreement was reached in Baghdad

that allowed for the inspection of eight

“sensitive” sites, sometimes referred to as

“presidential compounds,” under a

modified inspection procedure that

established a “special group” of diplomats

and experts. In exchange, Iraq again

committed to abide by all relevant UN

resolutions. The agreement also called

upon member states of the UN to “respect

legitimate concerns of Iraq relating to

national security, sovereignty and dignity.”

“Saddam can be trusted.... I think I can do

business with him,” Annan declared.

Supporters of the agreement argued that

it accomplished the goal of allowing critical

weapons inspections to resume and was

preferable to a military confrontation.

Opponents charged that it undermined the

work of UNSCOM and represented a retreat

from the principle of unfettered access to

any suspected site. Former UNSCOM

weapons inspector David Kay called the

agreement “fundamentally flawed,” stating

that it “could set back even the modest

progress UNSCOM has made.”

On March 2, 1998, the Security Council

warned Iraq that it would face “the severest

consequences” if it reneged on the deal

brokered by Secretary General Annan.

President Clinton stated that “no one

seriously believes that there can be a

breach of this agreement by Iraq without

serious consequences.” He also stated

that U.S. forces would remain in the Gulf

region “until we are satisfied that Iraq is

complying with its commitments.”

Assistant Secretary of State James Rubin

stated that “military force will ensue if

Iraq violates this agreement.” UN

inspection teams returned to Iraq and

resumed the search for prohibited

weapons under the modified inspection

regime.

The 1998 U.S. Policy Review

Despite the resumption of inspections

after almost a two-month hiatus, on April

16, 1998, UNSCOM Executive Chairman

Butler reported “virtually no progress” in

verifying Iraq’s declarations of compliance

with UN directives that would allow

economic sanctions to be lifted. Concerns

were also raised that Iraq had used the

suspension of inspections to purge

sensitive sites of any incriminating

evidence related to the Iraqi weapons of

mass destruction program. Nevertheless,

on April 30, 1998, President Clinton

declared that he was “encouraged by

[Iraq’s] level of compliance so far with the

UN inspections....”

On May 24, 1998, Secretary Cohen

announced that the United States would

reduce its military presence in the Gulf back

to November 1997 pre-crisis levels. Recent

press reports have indicated that this

drawdown was the result of a policy review,

begun last spring. That review reportedly

concluded the United States could not

afford to sustain the high level of

operational deployments in the region

without serious impact on defense

readiness elsewhere, and that the cost of

building up and building down in response

to the waxing and waning of Iraqi-generated

crises would be prohibitive.

The use of U.S. military force against Iraq

— under what conditions and against what

targets — continues to be a topic of debate, especially in light of the recentlyaborted U.S. airstrikes. There is little political support among the countries of the

original anti-Iraq coalition for unilateral U.S.

military action. With the exception of Great

Britain, no U.S. allies have demonstrated a

willingness to commit combat forces to any

military strike. Most of Iraq’s neighbors

are highly cognizant of Saddam Hussein’s

political resiliency and capacity to again

threaten them. They are also sensitive to

the prevalent view on the “Arab street”

that the Iraqi people have suffered enough.

Therefore, most Iraqi neighbors are reluctant to support any military option.

In the United States, opinions vary regarding the effectiveness of diplomacy and

Destroyed warheads from Iraqi missiles

capable of carrying chemical and

biological weapons.
4 National Security Report

The National Security Report is archived on the House National Security Committee website at: http://www.house.gov/nsc/. Additional background

information may be obtained from Tom Donnelly (x65372), David Trachtenber g (x60532), or Michelle Spencer (x53036) on the committee staff.

is “boxed in.” I am also concerned with

the fact that we have drawn down our

force levels in the region in recent

months – not in reaction to Saddam’s

improved behavior, but because of the

serious strain that constant deployments

is having on an already overextended

U.S. military. A reduced military

presence and allies who have begun to

hedge their bets – these are neither

encouraging signs, nor signs of strength.

It would appear that Saddam, with a lot

of patience and persistence, may be

gaining the upper hand in this seven year

standoff, and in so doing, demonstrating

the shortcomings of the Administration’s Iraq policy.

whether U.S. military power, if eventually

brought to bear, should be limited to and

directed against Iraq’s weapons of mass

destruction facilities or against the infrastructure that keeps Saddam Hussein in

power. In addition, indigenous Iraqi opposition is fractured, leading some to argue

that removing Saddam Hussein from power

would require more than just limited air

strikes, but the deployment of thousands

of U.S. ground troops as well.

The spring policy review also reportedly

concluded that it would be difficult, if not

impossible, to continue to preserve the inspection regime in the face of Iraqi obstructionism and dissension among coalition

partners and allies over the long-term benefits. Instead, U.S. policy reportedly shifted

to placing priority on preserving the sanctions regime. On September 9, 1998, the

UN Security Council voted to suspend all

further periodic reviews of the sanctions

regime, essentially continuing the sanctions indefinitely.

The Inspection Regime Under

Siege

As the U.S. force drawdown continued

into August, Saddam Hussein announced

a freeze on all cooperation with UN weapons inspectors, a move that President

Clinton described as “unacceptable.” On

August 3, 1998, the House voted 407-6 to

declare Iraq in “material breach” of its arms

dismantlement obligations. UNSCOM formally suspended inspections on August

9, 1998. No new inspections of Iraqi sites

have occurred in the past three months.

On August 10, 1998, the London Times

reported that the Clinton Administration

had intervened with UNSCOM Executive

Chairman Butler on several occasions to

block inspections of sensitive Iraqi sites

due to concerns that the inspections would

be too provocative to Iraq. Secretary of

State Albright reportedly called Butler directly to urge a delay in several inspections. Subsequent press reports indicated

that Butler acceded to the requests. Secretary Albright admitted that she had “consulted” with Butler over the timing of

planned inspections, but denied that she

had compelled Butler to cancel any planned

inspections. At a broader policy level, Secretary Albright challenged the notion that

the U.S. policy of containment had failed.

“Saddam may be rattling his cage again,”

she noted, “but he has no way to break out

of it.”

On August 26, 1998, Scott Ritter resigned

as an UNSCOM weapons inspector, accusing the United States and the UN of

undermining the work of UNSCOM, which

he stated had been “hobbled” by “unfettered Iraqi obstruction and nonexistent Security Council enforcement of its own resolutions.” Secretary Albright countered that

Ritter did not “have a clue” about U.S.

policy toward Iraq and that the United

States has been the strongest supporter of

UNSCOM. UNSCOM Executive Chairman

Butler claimed that Ritter’s version of

events “is not accurate.” In testimony before a joint session of the Senate Armed

Services and Foreign Relations Committee

on September 3, 1998, Ritter accused the

“highest levels of the Administration’s national security team,” including Secretary

Albright, of “interference and manipulation.” “I do have a clue,” he stated. “Our

government has expressed its policy one

way and then acted [in] another.” In testimony before the House National Security

Committee on September 16, 1998, Ritter

called the implementation of U.S. policy “inconsistent and ineffective.” “Iraq still

poses a real and meaningful threat to its

neighbors,” he noted, “and nothing the Security Council or the United States is doing currently will change this fact.”

On October 31, 1998, Iraq announced that

it would halt all cooperation with UN arms

inspectors and would not allow long-term

monitoring operations to continue. This

was the first time the viability of the longterm weapons monitoring regime had been

explicitly threatened. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan responded that Iraq was

“in total breach of Security Council resolutions,” and the Security Council declared

Iraq to be in “flagrant violation” of its obligations. President Clinton called Iraq’s action “completely unacceptable,” while a

National Security Council spokesman declared that Iraq’s action “cannot be tolerated” and hinted at the possible use of

military force.

As the United States once again increased its deployments in the Gulf region

and a military strike appeared imminent,

Saddam Hussein reversed course. In a

November 14, 1998 letter to UN Secretary

General Annan, Iraq agreed to allow

UNSCOM and the IAEA “to perform their

normal duties...” President Clinton, who

had reportedly already given the launch

order for air strikes, aborted the military

action and announced on November 15,

1998 that Iraq had “backed down.” However, few observers believe Saddam

Hussein will now abide by the agreements

he has repeatedly flouted over the past

eight years. Instead, many predict the cycle

of Iraqi obstructionism will continue.

Conclusion

U.S. policy toward Iraq has undergone a

significant transformation since the allied

coalition victory in the Gulf War almost

eight years ago. As a result, Saddam

Hussein may be closer to achieving his

ultimate objectives: destroying the political cohesion of the allied coalition, undermining support for U.S. military action, increasing his political standing within the

Arab world, maintaining his grip on power,

preserving his capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic

missiles capable of launching them, eliminating the UN-imposed weapons inspection and monitoring regime, and, eventually, overcoming economic sanctions. If

he is successful, the military victory won

by the United States and its partners in

1991 will have turned out to be hollow.

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