[J-42-2022]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

BAER, C.J., TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

Appellee

v.

DONTEZ PERRIN, 

Appellant

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No. 2 EAP 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of 

Superior Court entered on 

6/04/2021 at No. 1642 EDA 2020 

(reargument denied 08/17/2021) 

affirming the Order entered on 

08/18/2020 in the Court of Common 

Pleas, Philadelphia County, Criminal 

Division at No. CP-51-CR-0003284-

2008.

ARGUED: September 13, 2022

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: March 21, 2023

In this appeal by allowance, we are tasked with determining whether the trial court 

erred in refusing to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility in the context 

of a post-sentence motion for a new trial. As we determine that the trial court was well 

within its right to reject the proposed stipulation, we affirm its denial of Appellant’s motion.

In 2010 Appellant Dontez Perrin was convicted after a non-jury trial of conspiracy, 

aggravated assault, robbery, possessing instruments of crime, simple assault, recklessly

endangering another person, receiving stolen property, firearms not to be carried without 

a license, and possession of firearm by minor1 for his role in the robbery and assault of 

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907(a), 2701(a), 2705, 3925(a), 6106(a)(1), 6110.1.
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the victim Rodney Thompson when Thompson arrived at an apartment to deliver a pizza. 

The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of five to ten years’ imprisonment.

At Appellant’s trial, the Commonwealth presented two witnesses: Thompson and 

Lynwood Perry, who admitted he participated in the robbery. Relevant to the issue 

currently before the Court, at Appellant’s trial, Perry testified that Appellant participated in 

the Thompson robbery with him and Amir Jackson. According to Perry, Jackson called 

to order the pizza, and Jackson and Perry went to wait in the vacant apartment they 

identified over the phone. When Thompson arrived with the pizza, Appellant came up 

behind him and pushed him through the apartment door, where he was beaten and 

robbed by the other two co-conspirators. Perry further acknowledged that he was 

testifying for the Commonwealth pursuant to a deal with the federal government in hopes 

of receiving a lighter sentence for federal charges stemming from his participation in the 

robbery of Thompson along with other robberies.2 

After Appellant’s direct appellate rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc, Appellant 

appealed his judgment of sentence to the Superior Court. While that appeal was pending, 

the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office (DAO) forwarded to Appellant’s counsel 

communication it had received from the FBI. The document contained a summary of an 

interview FBI Agent Joseph Majarowitz conducted with Curtis Brown, who had been 

incarcerated with Perry at the federal detention center. During that interview, Brown 

stated Perry spoke of testifying against Appellant, and Perry “indicated that he testified 

that Appellant was involved in the robbery because ‘someone had to “go down” for it,’ but 

that Appellant was not actually involved in the crime.” Perrin I, 59 A.3d at 665. 

2 For a complete description of the facts and circumstances underlying Appellant’s 

conviction see Commonwealth v. Perrin, 59 A.3d 663 (Pa. Super. 2013) (Perrin I), 

vacated & remanded, 103 A.3d 1224 (Pa. 2014) (per curiam).
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In light of the Commonwealth’s disclosure, Appellant filed a petition with the 

Superior Court to remand the case for a new trial or to pursue an after discovered 

evidence petition with the trial court. The intermediate court denied the petition without 

prejudice to Appellant’s ability to raise the issue in his appellate brief. Thereafter, a 

divided Superior Court panel vacated Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remanded 

for Appellant to “flesh-out his claim” before the trial court with additional evidence. See 

id. at 667. 

Complying with the Superior Court’s directive, the trial court ultimately conducted 

an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s after discovered evidence claim.

3 At the evidentiary 

hearing4, Appellant presented the testimony of Agent Majarowitz and Brown, but not 

Perry. As the Superior Court later summarized, Brown testified as follows:

that he did not know [Appellant] but was cellmates with Perry for about two 

months at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia. He testified that 

Perry told him that he lied on the stand about [Appellant’s] involvement 

because he was hoping to get a more lenient sentence. Brown testified that 

he only told Special Agent Majarowitz about Perry because he felt it was 

the right thing to do, not because he believed that he had to do so to get 

sentencing consideration in his case.

Commonwealth v. Perrin, 11 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1777409 (Pa. Super. Apr. 23, 2019) 

(“Perrin II”I) (unpublished). The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, finding 

that since Appellant did not call Perry to testify, the testimony of Brown and Agent 

3 In order to be granted a new trial based on an after discovered evidence claim a 

Defendant must show the evidence “1) has been discovered after trial and could not have 

been obtained at or prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence, 

2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; 3) will not be used solely to impeach a 

witness’s credibility and 4) is of such a nature and character that a different verdict will 

likely result if a new trial is granted.” Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 311 (Pa. 

2017), citing Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 A.2d 1277, 1284 (Pa. 2005). 

4 For a full discussion of the procedural process that led to the evidentiary hearing see 

Commonwealth v. Perrin, 108 A.3d 50 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Perrin II”)
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Majarowitz “was hearsay that [Appellant] could only use to impeach Perry’s credibility, a 

purpose prohibited by Pennsylvania precedent.” Id. at *5. Appellant again appealed.

The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s ruling, determining that “Perry was 

‘unavailable’ within the meaning of Pa.R.E. 804[,]”5 and thus the testimony of Brown and 

Majarowitz was not excludable hearsay. Id. at 7-9. The court granted Appellant relief as 

follows:

[W]e vacate the court’s order denying [Appellant’s] motion for a new trial 

and remand for the determination of whether Brown’s testimony was 

credible so as to justify a new trial. We note that the original trial court judge 

who decided [Appellant’s] claim is no longer sitting. Hence, on remand we 

direct the jurist appointed to handle this matter to hold a hearing at which 

[Appellant] shall present his witnesses again so that the trial court need not 

rely on a cold record to make its credibility determinations.

Id. at *9 (citation omitted).

On remand, the case was scheduled for a hearing on July 30, 2019, but was 

continued several times at the request of the parties. On February 24, 2020, Appellant

and the DAO’s Conviction Integrity Unit filed a Joint Memorandum of Law and Stipulations 

of Fact (Joint Stipulations). The stipulations included: 

44. Brown testified at the [2017 evidentiary] hearing that:

He did not know Perrin but was cellmates with Perry for about 

two months at the Federal Detention Center In Philadelphia. 

He testified that Perry told him that he lied on the stand about 

Perrin’s involvement because he was hoping to get a more 

5 “A declarant is considered to be unavailable as a witness if the declarant is absent from 

the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other 

reasonable means, to procure the declarant’s attendance or testimony, in the case of a 

hearsay exception under Rule 804(B)(2), (3), or (4).” Pa.R.E. 804(a)(5)(B). The Superior 

Court found Perry’s statement was admissible pursuant to Pa.R.E. 804(b)(3)(B) (“The 

following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay if the declarant is unavailable as a 

witness: ... A statement that ... is supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly 

indicate its trustworthiness, if it is offered in a criminal case as one that tends to expose 

the declarant to criminal liability.” Perrin III, 11 EDA 2018 at *7-9. 
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lenient sentence. Brown testified that he only told Special 

Agent Majarowitz about Perry because he felt it was the right 

thing to do, not because he believed that he had to do so to 

get sentencing consideration in his case.

47. The Parties therefore stipulate that, if Brown were called to testify at 

another evidentiary hearing, his testimony will be consistent with the 

account he provided at the 2017 evidentiary hearing. 

54. If called to testify a second time, the Parties stipulate that Brown would 

do so credibly. 

Joint Stipulations, 2/24/2020 at 10-11 (emphasis added). The Joint Stipulations 

concluded the parties have “resolve[d] the only remaining factual dispute” – Brown’s 

credibility – and since they stipulate “that Perry’s testimony can no longer be credited ... 

there is no need” for an evidentiary hearing “to present Brown’s or Majarowitz’s testimony 

... a second time.” Id. at 13-14. The DAO thus conceded that Appellant was entitled to a 

new trial based on his after discovered evidence claim.

The trial court heard argument on the Joint Stipulations on March 12, 2020. The 

court did not accept the stipulations and the case was continued for an evidentiary hearing 

on March 26, 2020, which was canceled due to the Covid-19 emergency. A video status 

conference was held on July 9, 2020, at which time Appellant objected to the trial court’s 

decision against proceeding by stipulation, which the trial court overruled and 

rescheduled the evidentiary hearing to take place via video on August 6, 2020. On that 

date, the trial court convened the evidentiary hearing, at which time the parties again 

sought to proceed via stipulation, which the trial court again denied. When the trial court 

called for presentation of evidence by Appellant, his counsel declined, stating that 

presenting Mr. Brown’s testimony would be against her client’s best interest, without 

further elaboration.

The trial court denied Appellant’s motion for a new trial, explaining that where the 

Superior Court’s remand carried “specific instructions to hold a hearing at which the 
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defense ‘shall’ present its witnesses in order for [the trial] [c]ourt to make credibility 

determinations[,]” Appellant’s refusal to present any witnesses prevented the court “from 

making the requisite determination as to ... Brown’s credibility.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 

No. CP-51-CR-0003284-2008, Order, at 2 n.1 (C.P. Phila. 8/18/20). The court further 

“concluded that the determination of credibility was not amendable to stipulation.” Id. 

Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, arguing the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for a new trial without considering the parties’ factual stipulations.

On appeal, Appellant argued the trial court was required to accept the parties’

stipulation that Brown was credible. He acknowledged that the Superior Court’s prior 

directive that the trial court hold a hearing to determine Brown’s credibility was reasonable 

at the time, but circumstances changed as the DAO agreed Brown was credible. Thus, 

according to Appellant, the parties resolved the sole factual question at issue and there 

was no need to present Brown’s (or Agent Majarowitz’s) testimony a second time. The 

DAO concurred in Appellant’s argument. A panel of the Superior Court, however, found 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the parties’ stipulation and denying 

Appellant’s request for a new trial absent the presentation of testimony. The panel agreed 

that “usually, parties may stipulate as to what a witness will testify to, and such a 

stipulation promotes efficiency in litigation.” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 1642 EDA 2020, 

2021 WL 2288081 at *6 (Pa. Super., Aug. 28, 2020) (unpublished). It found, however, 

that the parties ignored the court’s prior directive that on remand Appellant “shall present 

his witnesses again so that the trial court” could make its own credibility findings. Id. at 

13 (quoting Perrin III, 11 EDA 2018 at *9) (emphasis provided by Superior Court). The 

panel further found the Joint Stipulations failed to explain why Appellant could not present 

Brown or Agent Majarowitz at a new evidentiary hearing or how the DAO arrived at its 
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present position that Perry was not credible, after defending his credibility throughout the 

case. Id. at *13-14. 

We granted Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal to address whether “the

trial court abuse[d] its discretion in refusing to accept the parties’ stipulations regarding 

the credibility of witnesses[.]” Commonwealth v. Perrin, 271 A.3d 1283 (Pa. 2022) (per 

curiam). As the DAO’s position is aligned with that of Appellant, we invited the Attorney 

General to participate in the case as amicus curiae and to file a brief and attend oral 

argument. The Attorney General accepted the Court’s invitation and filed a brief and 

participated in oral argument. 

Initially, as this Court has previously explained, the “term ‘discretion’ imports the 

exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within

the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will 

of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Gill, 206 A.3d 459, 466 (Pa. 2019) (internal brackets, 

quotation marks and citation omitted). An appellate court should not disturb a trial court’s 

discretionary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. See id. An abuse of discretion is more 

than merely an error of judgment but is rather the result of an error of law or is manifestly 

unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. See Commonwealth v. 

DiStefano, 265 A.3d 290, 297 (Pa. 2021) (citing Gill, 206 A.3d at 466-67).

The parties and the Attorney General all agree stipulations are a well-established 

and critical tool for resolving undisputed factual issues. Stipulations help litigants and 

courts narrow the issues needing to be decided, encouraging judicial economy and 

conserving the limited resources of courts and litigants alike. There is disagreement, 

however, on what role, if any, courts should play in determining whether or not to accept 

factual stipulations proposed by the parties. Appellant and the DAO argue that trial courts 

are required to accept all factual stipulations proposed by the parties and the courts do
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not have any discretion to refuse to accept the proposed stipulations. In their view, factual 

stipulations are binding and conclusive on a trial court. Appellant’s Brief at 13 (citing 

Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 214 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2020)); DAO Brief at 28 (citing 

Commonwealth v. Mathis, 163 A.2d 1167, 1171 (Pa. Super. 1979); Falcione v. Cornell 

Sch. Dist., 557 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa. Super. 1989)). Thus, in their view, once parties 

stipulate to certain facts, the trial court is obligated to accept them as true since, in 

Appellant’s words, “courts resolve factual disputes between parties, they do not create 

them where none exist.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. The DAO goes further, arguing that if 

trial courts were permitted to reject factual stipulations proposed by the parties, the courts 

would be invading a prosecutor’s decision in what manner to prove their case, violating 

the principle of prosecutorial discretion. DAO Brief at 34. 

In Appellant’s and the DAO’s view, this precept extends to stipulations pertaining 

to witness credibility. Appellant posits that there is no distinction between factual 

stipulations and stipulations as to credibility because when parties stipulate that a witness 

will testify a certain way, they do so with the understanding that the witness will also testify 

credibly. Appellant’s Brief at 15. The DAO recognizes that when credibility is disputed, 

credibility determinations fall in the purview of the trial court, but that is not the case when 

the parties are in agreement. DAO Brief at 34, 36. Stipulations hold little value if the 

credibility of the evidence remains in question and permitting trial courts to disregard such 

stipulations would burden both the parties and the courts. Id. at 40. 

Appellant and the DAO both rely on the Superior Court’s prior decision in 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 215 A.3d 1019 (Pa.Super. 2019). In Williams, the defendant 

had been convicted of various drug and firearms offenses in a non-jury trial. Williams, 

215 A.3d at 1022. The sole witness at Williams’s trial was the arresting officer. Id. After 

his sentence became final, he was informed by the Commonwealth of serious allegations
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of misconduct by the arresting officer. Id. Williams in turn filed a PCRA petition and the 

Commonwealth agreed he was entitled to PCRA relief. Id. Prior to an evidentiary hearing 

on Williams’s PCRA petition, he and the Commonwealth entered into stipulations

regarding the arresting officer’s misconduct, indicating that similarly situated individuals 

had been granted relief, and reflecting that the Commonwealth no longer stood by the 

arresting officer’s credibility. Id. at 1025.

The PCRA court, however, denied relief. Id. at 1022. On appeal, the Superior 

Court reviewed the evidence, including the stipulations and witness affidavits Williams 

submitted at his evidentiary hearing, and determined the PCRA court erred by denying 

Williams’ petition. Unlike the proposed stipulations at issue herein, the stipulations in 

Williams did not assert a potential witness at an evidentiary hearing would testify credibly. 

See id. Further, again unlike Appellant, the defendant in Williams submitted evidence 

beyond the stipulations at his evidentiary hearing, specifically two witness affidavits and 

testimony detailing how he was being treated differently than other similarly situated 

individuals. See id. The issue before the Superior Court in Williams was whether the 

PCRA court erred in denying Williams’s after discovered evidence claim based on the 

entire record before it and not whether the PCRA court erred in rejecting a proposed 

stipulation as to a potential witness’s credibility. As there was no proposed stipulation to 

witness credibility in Williams, it does not speak to the issue currently before the Court 

and the parties’ reliance on it is unpersuasive. 

The Attorney General, on the other hand, argues that while stipulations, even those 

related to credibility, play a vital role in the criminal justice process, trial courts should 

retain the discretion to decline to accept factual stipulations regarding ultimate, dispositive 

issues of fact. Attorney General Brief at 17. This is especially true in criminal matters 

where the prosecution and the defense, the stipulating parties, are not the only parties 
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with an interest in the outcome of the case. Id. at 20-21. In the Attorney General’s view, 

the issue currently before the Court is analogous to the one we addressed in 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130 (Pa. 2018). Brown involved the trial court’s denial 

of PCRA relief in a capital case. On appeal to this Court, the parties attempted to stipulate 

that the petitioner was entitled to sentencing relief due to ineffective assistance of his trial 

counsel. According to the Attorney General, this Court rejected the parties’ proposed 

stipulation, holding that, after a criminal conviction, “neither the parties, by agreement, 

nor this Court absent a finding of legal error, have the power or ability” to disturb the 

verdict. Attorney General Brief at 17 (quoting Brown, 196 A.3d at 144). The Attorney 

General continues that we rejected the Commonwealth’s prosecutorial discretion 

argument by holding that “[p]rosecutorial discretion provides no power to instruct a court 

to undo the verdict without all necessary and appropriate judicial review.” Id. (quoting 

Brown, 196 A.3d at 146). The Attorney General contends that our reasoning in Brown 

applies equally to the case sub judice, where the parties attempted to bind the trial court 

to a factual stipulation that dictated a specific legal conclusion, that Appellant was entitled 

to a new trial. In the Attorney General’s view, any attempt to distinguish the scenarios 

based on a factual rather than legal stipulation is a distinction without a difference. 

In order to prevent the parties from circumventing the courts’ reviewing authority, 

the Attorney General favors recognizing that trial courts retain discretion to accept or 

reject factual dispositive stipulations. This would permit trial courts to determine if a 

hearing is required, despite the parties’ protestations. Attorney General Brief at 25. In 

such a scenario, the trial court would be the arbiter of whether or not the verdict should 

be overturned, exercising judicial review.

We agree with the parties that factual stipulations are an integral and valuable part 

of our judicial system. When parties can agree to narrow the factual disagreements at 
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issue, courts should encourage their effort. Factual stipulations help conserve the limited 

resources of both the courts and the parties and can ease strain on a burdened judicial 

system. As such, courts should generally willingly consider factual stipulations proposed 

by the parties. Courts, however, retain an important role in overseeing the administration 

of the judicial process and cannot be relegated to a mere rubber stamp for the parties.

“A stipulation is a declaration that the fact agreed upon is proven [, and a] valid 

stipulation must be enforced according to its terms.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 902 A.2d 

430, 460 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Commonwealth Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069, 1088 (Pa. 2001)). 

Therefore, for a stipulation to be enforceable it must be valid. While parties have wide 

latitude to enter into valid and enforceable stipulations, that ability is not unfettered. For 

example, parties cannot stipulate to matters affecting the jurisdiction, business, or 

convenience of the courts. Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600 (citing Northbrook 

Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008)). These areas are not 

subject to stipulation by the parties as they are inherently and traditionally the prerogative 

of the judiciary. Determinations of witness credibility affecting a post-sentence motion for 

a new trial, like the situation at bar, similarly belong to the court as the finder of fact. See 

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1282 (Pa. 2016) (emphasizing the PCRA 

court’s “exclusive prerogative to make credibility determinations”); see also 

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 26-27 (Pa. 2011) (“The finder of fact – here, the 

jury – exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses, and may 

choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”) (citing Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 

860 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa. 2004)). A trial court considering a defendant’s post-sentence 

motion for a new trial sits as the finder of fact and judges whether the evidence supports 

the defendant’s request. As such, the question of witness credibility in such a scenario 

is in the sole prerogative of the trial court. The parties accordingly do not have the 
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authority in post-verdict litigation to enter into a valid and enforceable stipulation as to any 

potential witnesses’ credibility and bind the court thereto, as that would interfere with the 

role of the post-verdict court.

 This Court has previously held that “the parties may stipulate, and be bound by 

their acts as the law of the case, in all matters affecting them without affecting the 

jurisdiction and prerogatives of the court.” Foley Bros. v. Commonwealth Dep’t of 

Highways, 163 A.2d 80, 83-84 (Pa. 1960). Once a guilty verdict is handed down in a 

criminal case, however, the matter no longer solely affects the parties. At that point the 

community has an interest in the verdict. See Brown, 196 A.3d at 146 (“A representative 

cross section of the community has issued its decision, and the prosecutor, having sought

and obtained the death sentence, may not thereafter unilaterally alter that decision. The 

community now has an interest in the verdict, which may thereafter be disrupted only if a 

court finds legal error.”);

6 accord State v. Tangalin, 657 P.2d 1025 (Haw. 1983) (“[I]t is 

well established that matters affecting the public interest cannot be made the subject of 

stipulations so as to control the court’s action with respect thereto. Criminal cases are 

per se matters affecting public interest and so the court’s determination of credibility 

cannot be controlled by the parties’ stipulations.”). As the community in the post-sentence

timeframe has an interest in the case, a stipulation purporting to establish witness 

credibility in a post-sentence motion for a new trial is not one that solely affects the parties. 

Where, as here, a defendant files a post-sentence motion for a new trial based on an after 

discovered evidence claim, the defendant must meet four specific requirements. See 

supra at 3, n.3 (setting forth requirements for an after discovered evidence claim). In 

6 Brown addressed a situation where a defendant was challenging a jury’s imposition of 

the death penalty, while the verdict in the case sub judice was issued by the trial court 

after a non-jury trial. The community’s interest in the verdict is the same in either case, 

as it stems from the entry of the verdict rather than how that verdict was reached.
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such circumstances, the trial court sits as the finder of fact and the sole arbiter of issues 

of witness credibility. See Mitchell, 141 A.3d at 1282. That being the case, any attempt 

by the parties to force the trial court to accept a proposed stipulation as to witness 

credibility does not solely affect the parties and intrudes on the jurisdiction and prerogative 

of the court. Parties cannot require the court to accept any such stipulation as binding

during post-verdict fact-finding.

7 

Appellant was convicted by the trial court after a non-jury trial. He then ultimately 

filed a post-sentence motion for a new trial. The determination of whether he was entitled 

to relief laid in the discretion of the trial court. As the factfinder, the trial court had sole 

authority to make determinations as to witness credibility. As such, the parties’ attempt 

to stipulate as to Brown’s credibility intruded into the trial court’s jurisdiction and 

prerogative. Thus, the Joint Stipulations purporting to stipulate that Brown would testify 

credibly was neither valid nor enforceable. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to accept the parties’ proposed stipulation. The order of the Superior 

Court is affirmed.8

7 We do not address the question of whether the trial court, in its discretion, may accept 

a proposed stipulation as to witness credibility as that is not the circumstance currently 

before the Court. The Court’s “adjudicatory process is structured to cast a narrow focus 

on matters framed by the litigants before the Court in a highly directed fashion, and, as 

such, we sit to decide concrete cases.” D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204, 217 (Pa. 2016)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (stating that consideration of the 

constitutionality of a portion of the custody statute granting grandparents standing in 

certain circumstances that were not at issue in the case should be left for a case where 

the issue was squarely before the Court).

8 We note that in addition to the question of whether the parties can force the trial court 

to accept a stipulation as to witness credibility, this case also includes the additional 

circumstance of the directive by the Superior Court to the trial court to hold a hearing to 

assess the witnesses’ credibility. Appellant argues that the trial court was not bound by 

this directive due to a change in circumstances, i.e., the parties’ agreement that Brown’s 

testimony was credible. The DAO’s advocacy, on the other hand, does not address the 

Superior Court’s directive. Neither party offers any support for the premise that the trial 

court was free to ignore the Superior Court’s directive let alone that the parties had the 

(continued...)
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Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the 

opinion.

Justice Dougherty files a concurring opinion in which Justice Wecht joins.

The Late Chief Justice Baer did not participate in the decision of this matter.

 

authority to mandate that the trial court do so. We need not reach this issue as we have 

resolved the issue raised herein on a different basis.