COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Elder 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

SHANE LARUE BAILEY 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2799-97-3 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 JANUARY 5, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY 

David V. Williams, Judge 

 Sandra Lynn Haley, Assistant Public Defender, 

for appellant. 

 Richard Barton Campbell, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Shane Larue Bailey (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

driving after having been adjudged an habitual offender in 

violation of Code § 46.2-357. The sole issue raised is whether 

the evidence established a reasonable, articulable suspicion upon 

which to stop appellant. Finding the evidence sufficient, we 

affirm. 

 The facts are undisputed. On February 6, 1997 between 

1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m., Trooper J.L. Turner (Turner) and two 

other officers were conducting a roadblock at the intersection of 

Routes 606 and 674 in Henry County. Traffic was "light." There 

was a knoll on the road north of the roadblock, and a driver 

travelling south could not see the roadblock until the vehicle 

came to the top of the knoll. 

 As Turner looked north from the roadblock, he saw 
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appellant's vehicle reach the top of the knoll, "stop suddenly," 

and turn right into the driveway of a private residence 

approximately 50-75 yards (150-225 feet) from the roadblock. 

Turner stated that appellant drove slowly into the driveway as if 

hesitant about stopping there and he continued to look at Turner. 

 As appellant stepped out of the vehicle, he continued to look at 

Turner and the other two troopers.1

 Turner walked toward appellant, who knocked on the front 

door of the residence and then walked back toward his vehicle. 

Turner approached appellant and asked him for his "driver's 

permit." Appellant stated that it was in his car and he went to 

retrieve it. He gave Turner a Virginia identification card 

rather than a driver's license. Turner said, "You're on a 

suspended license," and appellant responded, "No, I'm an habitual 

offender." Turner then placed appellant in his patrol car and 

ran a DMV check, which verified that appellant was an habitual 

offender. 

 Turner testified that at the time he first saw appellant he 

was committing no traffic violation. Additionally, appellant did 

not attempt to make a U-turn to avoid the roadblock. Rather, 

Turner testified that "[t]he only reason I approached [appellant] 

 1Specifically, Trooper Turner testified that "[t]he vehicle 

was kind of real hesitant about going in the driveway. I can 

remember that. It was real slow to stop. As he was turning in 

the driveway, I was watching the vehicle and the driver, and the 

driver kept looking toward me. He was going real slow, like he 

was real hesitant about stopping at the driveway." 
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in the first place was his suspicious way he was going through 

the driveway and kept looking at me." 

 Appellant was charged with driving after having been 

declared an habitual offender, second offense, in violation of 

Code § 46.2-357. In denying appellant's pretrial motion to 

suppress, the court stated: 

 In this situation . . . [appellant's] vehicle 

immediately came to a stop and then in a very 

hesitant fashion turned into a private 

driveway at the same time, according to the 

trooper, the [appellant] is basically keeping 

his eye on the police officers, goes up and 

knocks on the door. While he's knocking on 

the door, he's still watching the State 

Troopers. It's my feeling the trooper in 

this case had reasonable articulable 

suspicion and had the perfect right to go up 

and see what was going on. 

Accordingly, the trial court found appellant guilty as charged. 

 II. 

 When the police stop a vehicle and detain its occupants, the 

action constitutes a "seizure" of the person for Fourth Amendment 

purposes. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1988); 

Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 609, 611, 363 S.E.2d 708, 709 

(1988). If the stop of the vehicle is without a warrant, the 

Commonwealth has the burden to prove the stop was legal. See

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Simmons 

v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989). 

Any warrantless stop of a vehicle which leads to an arrest of its 

occupants requires probable cause to believe that a crime has 

been committed. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654 n.10. However, if 
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an officer has an "articulable and reasonable suspicion that a 

motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, 

or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to 

seizure for violation of the law," the officer may conduct an 

investigatory stop of the vehicle limited in time and scope to 

ascertaining whether the suspicions are accurate. Id. at 663; 

Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984); Zimmerman, 234 

Va. at 611, 363 S.E.2d at 709. 

 In the present case, appellant was seized within the meaning 

of the Fourth Amendment when Turner approached and asked for 

appellant's driver's license. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. 

App. 49, 55-56, 480 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1997) (en banc); Brown v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 694, 695, 440 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1994). 

However, at the time of the seizure, Turner had a reasonable 

basis for believing that appellant was evading the roadblock. 

See Commonwealth v. Eaves, 13 Va. App. 162, 408 S.E.2d 925 

(1991); Stroud v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 633, 636, 370 S.E.2d 

721, 723 (1988). 

 In Stroud, we held that a police officer had a reasonable, 

articulable suspicion of wrongdoing when he observed the 

defendant make a U-turn within 100-150 feet of a police 

roadblock. See Stroud, 6 Va. App. at 636, 370 S.E.2d at 723. 

The officer testified that based upon his eleven years of 

experience with the state police he suspected from the driver's 

conduct that he was attempting to avoid the roadblock because he 
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was either unlicensed or otherwise in violation of the law. See

id. at 634-35, 370 S.E.2d at 722. 

 Likewise, in Eaves, the officer observed the defendant make 

a U-turn approximately 100 feet to 1/10 mile before the traffic 

checkpoint. The officer testified that the defendant was 

traveling in the left southbound lane when "all of a sudden" he 

engaged his turn signal at a deceleration lane, made a U-turn, 

and headed back in the opposite direction from the roadblock. 

See Eaves, 13 Va. App. at 165, 408 S.E.2d at 927. The 

deceleration lane was only about 35-40 feet long. The officer 

described the turn of the vehicle as "abrupt," "immediate," and 

"quick." Id. We concluded that the officer's observations gave 

him a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the defendant. 

See id. at 166, 408 S.E.2d at 927-28. 

 In the instant case, appellant's conduct produced at least 

as much reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity as 

that involved in Stroud and Eaves and was sufficient to support 

Turner's stop of appellant. As Turner looked north from the 

roadblock, he saw appellant's vehicle reach the top of the knoll, 

"stop suddenly," and turn right into the driveway of a private 

residence. Turner described appellant's behavior as "real 

hesitant," "slow to stop," "going real slow," "like he was real 

hesitant about stopping in the driveway." Moreover, appellant 

"started easing up into the driveway . . . looking at [Turner] at 

all times." We find that this evidence gave Turner reasonable 
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suspicion that appellant turned to avoid the roadblock because he 

was unlicensed or otherwise in violation of the law. Murphy v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 139, 384 S.E.2d 125 (1989), relied on by 

appellant, is distinguishable from this case. We held in Murphy

that a legal right turn onto a dead-end road with a roadblock in 

view, without more, did not give police reasonable suspicion to 

suspect the defendant of criminal misconduct. See id. at 141, 

384 S.E.2d at 126. Appellant argues that like the driver in 

Murphy, his actions in making a right turn into a private 

driveway 50-75 yards ahead of the roadblock did not give Turner a 

reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may have occurred or 

been occurring. We disagree. 

 In Murphy, the officer observed the defendant make a "normal

and legal" right turn onto a dead-end street approximately 350 

feet before a checkpoint. Id. (emphasis added). The officer 

acknowledged that nothing distinguished the operation of the 

defendant's vehicle from that of any other driver attempting to 

make a right turn. See id. Unlike the situation in Murphy where 

no suspicious circumstances existed apart from a lawful turn into 

an existing roadway, Turner observed factors which "independently 

raise[d] suspicion of criminal activity" and suggested that 

appellant made the turn into the private residence to evade the 

roadblock. Id. at 145, 384 S.E.2d at 128 (emphasis added). 

Turner described appellant's car as "stop[ping] suddenly" when it 

reached the top of the knoll. Additionally, appellant "slowly" 
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turned into the driveway while constantly keeping his eyes on 

Turner. Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that 

Turner possessed a reasonable suspicion that appellant's purpose 

in turning was to avoid the roadblock because he was unlicensed 
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or involved in criminal activity. Accordingly, we affirm 

appellant's conviction. 

 Affirmed.