1 Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint omits a Count Three.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN J. KORESKO, V, et al.

v.

JEFF BLEIWEIS, et al.

: CIVIL ACTION 

:

: NO. 04-CV-769

:

:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Kauffman, J. September 27, 2005

Plaintiffs John Koresko, V (“Koresko”) and Pennmont Benefit Services, Inc.

(“PennMont”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action for interference with present and

prospective business and contractual relationships (Count One), misappropriation of trade secrets

(Count Two), commercial disparagement (Count Four), and civil conspiracy (Count Five) against

Defendants Jeff Bleiweis (“Bleiweis”), Raymond Ankner (“Ankner”), CJA and Associates

(“CJA”), and the Travelers Life and Annuity Company (“Travelers”).1 Now before the Court is

the Motion to Dismiss of Bleiweis, Ankner and CJA (the “CJA Defendants”) for lack of personal

jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be

denied.

I. BACKGROUND

PennMont is a Pennsylvania corporation that markets insurance products and pension

programs for financial professionals and their clients. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

(“Complaint”) at ¶ 5. Koresko is PennMont’s General Counsel. Id. at ¶ 4. CJA is one of
2 Neither the Complaint nor the affidavits Plaintiffs have submitted allege that the

October Meeting took place in Pennsylvania.

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PennMont’s chief competitors. Id. at ¶ 7. Bleiweis is CJA’s Senior Vice President and General

Counsel. Id. at 6. Travelers is an insurance company, which at various times has marketed and

sold life insurance products through Defendants CJA and Bleiweis.

Between March 2000 and the present, Koresko devised an innovative patent-pending

pension program that uses variable insurance contracts to fund a defined benefit program (the

“invention”). Id. at ¶ 9. The invention involves structuring benefit programs in a novel manner

under Section 412(i) of the Internal Revenue Code (“412(i)”) that allows larger tax deductions to

participating employers, accelerated funding of a guaranteed pension payout, and the purchase of

insurance on a tax advantaged basis. Id. at ¶ 12. By agreement, PennMont was to serve as the

exclusive vendor for the invention – a position from which the company expected a significant

profit. Id. at ¶ 14.

In October 2001, Koresko met with a number of Travelers executives to discuss the

possibility of PennMont and Travelers forming a partnership to market and sell variable

insurance and annuity products (the “October Meeting”). At the meeting, Koresko gave a

presentation in which he described the invention. Before beginning the presentation, however,

Koresko confirmed that everyone had read the confidentiality agreement and that no one

objected.2

 Id. at ¶¶ 20-26. In September 2002, Koresko again revealed information about the

invention, which was expressly protected by a confidentiality agreement. Id. at ¶ 28.

Unbeknownst to PennMont and Koresko, CJA and Travelers agreed to jointly pursue

business in the defined benefit plan market – the same market to which Koresko and PennMont
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expected to apply the invention. Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. The partnership was formed at some point prior

to September 2002.

The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that Defendants employed unlawful means to

divert customers away from PennMont. The first such act alleged is a national teleconference for

insurance agents and other insurance professionals Defendants held on November 25, 2002 (the

“teleconference”). Id. at ¶ 37. In that teleconference, Travelers and CJA disclosed confidential

information about the invention that Travelers’ employees had learned from Koresko. Id. at ¶ 40. 

Travelers and CJA also used the teleconference to “commercially disparage PennMont and the

invention.” Id. at ¶ 37. Plaintiffs allege that the teleconference was advertised nationally and

“broadcast into Pennsylvania generally.” Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Dismiss

(“Response”) at 6.

Plaintiffs also allege that CJA has incorporated the information Travelers gathered from

its meetings with Koresko into its own products, and that CJA is marketing those products

nationally, including in Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶ 42, 52-53. As proof of CJA’s marketing activity

in Pennsylvania, Plaintiffs recount CJA’s attempt to sell its defined benefit program to Margaret

Lawson (“Lawson”), who resides in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and is a “Pennsylvanialicensed life insurance agent.” Aff. of Margaret Carroll-Collemacine (now Lawson), Jun. 4, 2004

(“Lawson Aff. 6/4/2004") at ¶¶ 1-2. Lawson’s affidavit states that she was “surfing the internet

when [she] came across CJA and Associates as a provider” of employee benefit and pension

programs, “including 412(i) plans.” Aff. of Margaret Lawson, July 22, 2004 (“Lawson Aff.

7/22/2004") at ¶ 3. She then requested information about the program from CJA. Id. at ¶ 5. A

representative from CJA, Jennifer Ankner, subsequently contacted Lawson both in writing and
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on Lawson’s cell phone to discuss Lawson’s interest in CJA’s products. Id. at ¶¶ 7-12. 

Defendants allege that Lawson was actually employed by Plaintiffs when she contacted CJA

through the company’s website. Defendants’ Reply Brief at 5.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Bleiweis published an article (the “article”) in a trade

publication headquartered in Pennsylvania, which “defamed” Plaintiffs and the invention. 

Plaintiff’s Opposition at 12.

 II. LEGAL STANDARD

When, as in this case, a defendant brings a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2),

the plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction[.]” Miller Yacht Sales, Inc.

v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004). To meet that burden, the plaintiff “need only establish

a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken

as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor.” Id.

A federal district court sitting in diversity may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign

defendant’s person to the extent allowed for by the law of the state in which the district court is

located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Personal jurisdiction under state law, in turn, involves two

steps. First, the district court must determine that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant

would be consistent with the relevant state long-arm statute; the court must then consider

whether exercising jurisdiction would be consistent with the requirements of due process. IMO

Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998). In Pennsylvania, the long-arm

statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent allowed by the

Constitution. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis focuses solely on federal due process

requirements. Applied Tech. Int’l, Ltd. v. Goldstein, 2004 WL 2360388 at * 2 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
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For personal jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause requires “(1) that the ‘defendant have

constitutionally sufficient minimum contacts with the forum...and (2) that subjecting the

defendant to the court’s jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.’” Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, 318 F.3d 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Burger King

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). Minimum contacts exist when there is “‘some

act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws[.]’” Id. (quoting

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)). 

A defendant’s contacts with the forum state reach the minimum level in one of two ways. 

When the contacts are “continuous and systematic,” the court may exercise “general jurisdiction”

over the defendant even if the contacts are unrelated to the plaintiff’s cause of action. See

Verotex Certainteed Corp. v. Consol. Fiber Glass Prod. Co., 75 F.3d 147, 151 n.3 (3d Cir. 1996). 

Specific jurisdiction, in contrast, exists “only if the plaintiff’s cause of action is related to or

arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum,” Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d

361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002), such that the defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into

court” in that forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs concede that the Court lacks general jurisdiction over Defendants. Plaintiffs’

Opposition at 9. Because the specific jurisdiction analysis is, by its nature, claim specific, the

Court must examine each of Plaintiffs’ claims individually. Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248,

255 (3d Cir. 2001) (Specific jurisdiction analysis “is claim specific because a conclusion that the

District Court has personal jurisdiction over one of the defendants as to a particular claim
3 The Court will consider these contacts as being common to all Defendants, as the

Complaint asserts a conspiracy claim and “personal jurisdiction over a non-Pennsylvania

defendant may be asserted if ‘substantial acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in

Pennsylvania and the non-forum co-conspirator was aware of or should have been aware of those

acts.’” CDI Int’l, Inc. v. Marck, 2005 WL 146890, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2005) (quoting

Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., 14 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718 (M.D. Pa. 1998)).

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asserted by [the plaintiff] does not necessarily mean that it has personal jurisdiction over that

same defendant as to the plaintiff’s other claims.”).

A. Interference with Present and Prospective Business and Contractual

Relationships

Plaintiffs support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over their interference with

business relationships claim (the “interference claim”) with three contacts:3

 (1) the teleconference

Defendants conducted which Plaintiffs claim was directed toward Pennsylvania; (2) CJA’s

marketing activities in Pennsylvania; (3) Bleiweis’ allegedly defamatory article. Accordingly,

the question before the Court is whether this alleged conduct is sufficiently related to both the

interference claim and Pennsylvania that Defendants “should reasonably anticipate being haled

into court” here. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297.

The interference claim is based on the theory that Defendants frightened off many of

PennMont’s potential clients by defaming both PennMont and the invention. The teleconference,

which Defendants allegedly used as a forum to criticize the invention, Complaint at ¶ 39, is

therefore clearly related to that claim. Less certain, however, is whether the teleconference

constitutes a contact with Pennsylvania. The only link Plaintiffs have provided between the

teleconference and Pennsylvania is an assertion in their opposition brief that the teleconference
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was “advertised and broadcast into Pennsylvania generally.”

However, this assertion is problematic for two reasons. First, it is not corroborated by

any of the affidavits Plaintiffs have provided, and therefore does not satisfy the Plaintiffs’

obligation to provide proof in the form of affidavits. Schiller-Pfeiffer, Inc. v. Country Home

Prods., Inc., 2004 WL 2755585 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2004). Second, Plaintiffs’

unsubstantiated allegation that the teleconference was “advertised and broadcast into

Pennsylvania generally” is not sufficiently specific. To meet their burden, Plaintiffs must set out

the contacts on which they would base specific jurisdiction with “reasonable particularity.” 

Gehling v. St. George’s School of Medicine, Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1985); see also 4

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1067.6 3d ed. 2005)

(stating that a plaintiff must set out specific facts on which jurisdiction may be based). Plaintiffs

have not indicated whether there were any Pennsylvania residents participating in the call, or

even whether they had advertised the call to Pennsylvania businesses or residents. Id.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the teleconference cannot serve as a basis for specific personal

jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs contend that CJA’s efforts to market in Pennsylvania products that have

incorporated elements of the invention is also a contact that supports specific personal

jurisdiction with regard to Plaintiffs’ Interference claim. As evidence of CJA’s marketing

activities, Plaintiffs have submitted documents produced by Defendants indicating that CJA has

identified Pennsylvania as “one of its key 15 states in the 412(i) arena, the very subject of this

lawsuit.” See Plaintiffs’ Surreply at 5; see also Status Report Fixed Annuity, attached as Exh. C

to Miller Aff. 4/7/05.
4 Plaintiffs do, however, allege that Lawson read the article.

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However, CJA’s intention to promote its product in Pennsylvania does not in itself

constitute a Pennsylvania contact. For CJA’s marketing activities to support the Court’s exercise

of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs must present specific evidence that CJA has acted on that

intention. Gehling, 773 F.2d at 542. The only specific instance of marketing Plaintiffs have

alleged involves CJA’s correspondence with Lawson. As noted above, Lawson sent an email to

CJA inquiring about its 412(i) products after browsing the company’s website. CJA then

contacted Lawson in response, both via email and written letter. Defendants allege that Lawson

was actually employed by Plaintiffs when she contacted CJA and that her request for information

was pretextual. Her real aim, Defendants contend, was to render CJA subject to personal

jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. Defendants’ Reply Brief at 6. Plaintiffs do not deny that allegation. 

See Toys “R” Us, 318 F.3d at 454 (“The only documented sales to persons in the United States

are the two contacts orchestrated by [the plaintiff].”). Because Plaintiffs have failed to allege or

provide evidence of specific instances in which CJA has attempted to market products that

incorporate elements of the invention in Pennsylvania, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations

as to CJA’s marketing do not support personal jurisdiction.

The article Bleiweis published is also related to the interference claim insofar as it 

discouraged prospective clients from doing business with PennMont. Plaintiffs have failed to

make specific allegations as to whether any Pennsylvania businesses or residents read the article

or even whether it was published in Pennsylvania.4

 However, Plaintiffs have alleged that the

article was printed by the Society of Financial Service Professionals (“SFSP”), which has its

headquarters in Pennsylvania. See Plaintiffs’ Opposition at 12. 
5 SFSP is a “Pennsylvania society which does business in Pennsylvania and

[provides] the financial services industry various services, including national publications,

continuing education, consumer referral, research, network and advertising.” See Lawson Aff.

6/4/04 at ¶ 12. 

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Defendants’ use of a Pennsylvania-based organization to publish their allegedly

defamatory article clearly constitutes a contact with Pennsylvania sufficiently related to

Plaintiffs’ interference claim that it subjects Defendants to the Court’s personal jurisdiction. 

SFSP, as Defendants’ publisher, played a substantial role in the allegedly defamatory article’s

publication. By printing their article in SFSP’s publication, Defendants used SFSP’s reputation

to lend credibility to the claims they were making.5

 In short, Defendants’ use of a Pennsylvania

publisher played an important causal role in the publication of the allegedly defamatory article. 

To that extent, Defendants could reasonably have anticipated being “haled into court” in this

forum. See Remick, 384 F.3d at 99 (holding that the defendant’s contact with the forum state

need not be the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries to satisfy due process requirements). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants with

respect to the interference claim.

B. Commercial Defamation

The same reasoning applies to Plaintiffs’ commercial defamation claim, which also arises

out of the allegedly defamatory article. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants are subject to

personal jurisdiction with respect to Plaintiffs’ commercial defamation claim.

C. Civil Conspiracy

A similar analysis applies to Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim. To the extent that the

defamatory article was an act in furtherance of the alleged civil conspiracy, that claim “arises out
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of” the Pennsylvania contacts Defendants made in the course of securing the article’s publication. 

Accordingly, the Court also has personal jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ civil conspiracy claim. 

D. Misappropriation of Trade Secrets

A contact with the forum can also support the exercise of personal jurisdiction if it is

sufficiently related to the claim. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.

408, 414 (1984) (“When a controversy is related to or "arises out of" a defendant's contacts with

the forum, the Court has said that a "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the

litigation" is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction.”). In this case, Defendants’

alleged defamatory acts and misappropriation of trade secrets were both means to the same end:

taking business away from PennMont and bringing it to CJA. Since both were part of a larger

coordinated scheme, the defamatory article is related to the alleged misappropriation of trade

secrets claim. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that the Due Process limits on personal jurisdiction

are intended to protect “an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding

judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’” 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471-72 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

319 (1945)). This protection is accomplished by insuring that “individuals have ‘fair warning

that a particular activity may subject them to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign[.]’” Id.

(quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977)).

Here, Defendants purposefully engaged in conduct in Pennsylvania to further their

scheme to win business away from PennMont. Their use of a Pennsylvania publisher established

a “meaningful” relation between Pennsylvania and the entire scheme, including the claim of 
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Jurisdiction over the misappropriation of trade secrets claim could also be based

upon the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, as all four of Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the

same constellation of facts. See Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555 (3d Cir.

1973); 4A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069.7 (3d

ed. 2005) (A district court has discretion to exercise personal jurisdiction over a claim when that

claim arises out of the same common nucleus of operative fact as does a claim that is within the

in personam jurisdiction power of the court.)

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misappropriation of PennMont’s trade secrets. That “meaningful relation” gave Defendants “fair

warning” that they should have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court” here for the

scheme in its entirety.6

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN J. KORESKO, V, et al.

v.

JEFF BLEIWEIS, et al.

: CIVIL ACTION

:

: NO. 04-CV-769

:

:

ORDER

AND NOW, this __27th____ day of September, 2005, upon consideration of CJA

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (docket No. 95) and for the reasons stated in the accompanying

Memorandum, it is ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.

BY THE COURT:

S/Bruce W. Kauffman

BRUCE W. KAUFFMAN, J.