[Cite as State v. Newsome, 2017-Ohio-7488.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HOCKING COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : Case No. 17CA2 

Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 : 

vs. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT 

 : ENTRY 

JASON M. NEWSOME, : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. : Released: 08/31/17 

_____________________________________________________________ 

APPEARANCES: 

Ryan Shepler, Kernen & Shepler, LLC, Logan, Ohio, for Appellant. 

Benjamin E. Fickel, Hocking County Prosecutor, Logan, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________ 

McFarland, J. 

{¶1} Jason Newsome appeals from the trial court’s judgment 

revoking his community control and imposing a prison term after it 

determined he had violated his community control by obstructing official 

business. On appeal, Appellant contends that 1) the State failed to prove 

obstructing official business or any other offense by a preponderance of the 

evidence; and 2) the trial court erred by admitting and relying upon hearsay 

in finding that he committed a probation violation. Because the State 

provided substantial evidence that Appellant obstructed official business, 

and because the Ohio Rules of Evidence regarding hearsay do not apply to 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 2

community control revocation hearings, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court erred or abused its discretion in revoking Appellant’s community 

control. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

FACTS 

{¶2} Appellant, Jason Newsome, pled guilty to one count of 

trafficking in heroin, a fourth degree felony, and was sentenced to 

community control on April 11, 2013. A motion was filed on September 26, 

2016, alleging Appellant had violated the terms of his supervision and 

requesting his community control be revoked, based upon the following: 

“1. Condition #1: ‘I will obey federal, state and local laws and 

ordinances, including those related to illegal drug use and 

registration with authorities. I will have no contact with the 

victim of my current offense(s).’ 

To wit: On or about 09/14/2016, in the vicinity of Hocking 

County, you caused or attempted to cause physical harm to 

Carol J. Francis. 

To wit: On or about 09/14/2016, in the vicinity of Hocking 

County, you purposely delayed the performance by a public 

office of the public officials [sic] authorized acts.” 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 3

{¶3} A revocation hearing was held on November 29, 2016. At the 

beginning of the hearing, the State withdrew the first grounds stated in their 

motion, which alleged Appellant had caused or attempted to cause physical 

harm to Carol J. Francis. The State explained that Ms. Francis had refused 

to cooperate with them on the misdemeanor charges that were filed and that 

it did not have Ms. Francis available as a witness that day. The State went 

forward on their allegation that Appellant had obstructed official business 

and presented one witness, Deputy Dustin Wesselhoeft. 

{¶4} Testimony presented by Deputy Wesselhoeft indicated that on 

the night in question, he was dispatched to Carol Francis’ residence in 

response to a complaint that Appellant had assaulted her, as well as 

numerous calls that an intoxicated individual was knocking on doors. The 

deputy testified that while he was conducting his investigation at the 

victim’s residence, he observed a car quickly pull in and then out of the 

victim’s driveway. Because he was informed by the victim and another 

individual there that Appellant was in the vehicle, the deputy quickly left 

and initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle. However, because the deputy was 

informed by the vehicle occupants that Appellant had been dropped off at 

the victim’s house, he returned to her house. Upon arriving, he was 

informed that Appellant had briefly entered the house and the fled to the 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 4

woods. Deputy Wesselhoeft eventually located Appellant in the woods and 

he was taken into custody without further incident. 

{¶5} Defense counsel raised several objections to the deputy’s 

testimony, arguing it constituted hearsay evidence. The trial court, however, 

overruled the objections. After hearing the evidence, the trial court revoked 

Appellant’s community control and ordered him to serve the remainder of 

the original term of an eighteen-month prison sentence. It is from this 

decision that Appellant now brings his timely appeals, setting forth two 

assignments of error for our review. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

“I. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL 

BUSINESS OR ANY OTHER OFFENSE BY A 

PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE. 

II. THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING AND RELYING UPON 

HEARSAY IN FINDING THAT MR. NEWSOME COMMITTED A 

PROBATION VIOLATION.” 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I 

{¶6} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends the State 

failed to prove that he obstructed official business, or any other offense, by a 

preponderance of the evidence. The State counters by arguing that Deputy 

Wesselhoeft’s testimony established the elements of obstructing official 

business, and that the trial court properly concluded the State provided 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 5

substantial proof, the lesser standard for community control violations, that 

Appellant committed the offense. Based upon the following we agree with 

the State. 

{¶7} This Court recently reflected on the proper standard of review 

when reviewing decisions revoking community control in State v. Johnson, 

4th Dist. Meigs No. 14CA10, 2015-Ohio-1373. In Johnson, we noted that 

this Court has previously applied a two-part standard in such cases, as 

follows: 

“ ‘Because a community control revocation hearing is not a 

criminal trial, the State does not have to establish a violation 

with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Wolfson, 

Lawrence App. No. 03CA25, 2004–Ohio–2750, ¶ 7, citing 

State v. Payne, Warren App. No. CA2001–09–081, 2002–

Ohio–1916, in turn citing State v. Hylton (1991), 75 Ohio 

App.3d 778, 782, 600 N.E.2d 821. Instead, the prosecution 

must present “substantial” proof that a defendant violated the 

terms of his community control sanctions. Wolfson, citing 

Hylton at 782, 600 N.E.2d 821. Accordingly, we apply the 

“some competent, credible evidence” standard set forth in C.E. 

Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 

N.E.2d 578, to determine whether a court's finding that a 

defendant violated the terms of his community control sanction 

is supported by the evidence. Wolfson at ¶ 7, citing State v. 

Umphries (July 9, 1998), Pickaway App. No. 97CA45; State v. 

Puckett (Nov. 12, 1996), Athens App. No. 96CA1712. This 

highly deferential standard is akin to a preponderance of the 

evidence burden of proof. Wolfson, citing State v. Kehoe (May 

18, 1994), Medina App. No. 2284–M. * * * Thus, we conclude 

the appropriate review in this matter is twofold. First, we 

review the record to determine whether there is substantial 

evidence to support the court's finding that C.M.C. violated the 

terms of probation or community control. If it does, then we 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 6

review the court's ultimate decision to revoke probation, i.e., the 

sanction, under the more deferential abuse of discretion 

standard.’ ” Johnson at ¶ 13; quoting In the Matter of C.M.C., 

4th Dist. Washington No. 09CA15, 2009–Ohio–4223, ¶ 17. 

{¶8} Here, a notice of violation was filed alleging Appellant had 

violated the terms of his community control by obstructing official business. 

R.C. 2921.31 prohibits obstructing official business and provides in section 

(A) as follows: 

“No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to 

prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official 

of any authorized act within the public official’s official 

capacity.” 

As previously noted by this Court, “Ohio courts have interpreted this statute 

to criminalize only affirmative acts, not the failure to act.” State v. Certain, 

2009-Ohio-148, 905 N.E.2d 1259, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.); citing State v. May, 4th 

Dist. Highland No. 06CA10, 2007-Ohio-1428, fn. 5 (“An affirmative act is 

required to prove a R.C. 2921.31 obstruction of official business violation”); 

State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, 

at ¶ 10 (“A violation of this statute requires an affirmative act. A person 

cannot be guilty of obstructing official business by doing nothing or failing 

to act”); State v. Prestel, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 20822, 2005-Ohio5236, ¶ 16 (“Ohio courts have consistently held that in order to violate the 

obstructing official business statute, a defendant must engage in some 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 7

affirmative or overt act or undertaking that hampers or impedes a public 

official in the performance of the official's lawful duties, as opposed to 

merely failing or refusing to cooperate or obey a police officer's request for 

information”); State v. Grooms, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP–1244, 2005-

Ohio-706, ¶ 18 (“R.C. 2921.31(A) requires proof of an affirmative act that 

hampered or impeded performance of the lawful duties of a public official”). 

{¶9} Appellant contends that the State failed to prove an affirmative 

act on his part or that he acted without privilege. Appellant also contends 

the State failed to prove that law enforcement was actually hampered or 

impeded. Appellant claims that his actions of running into the woods and 

hiding in the weeds when he saw law enforcement was not criminal conduct, 

absent some law enforcement command to do otherwise, and that he simply 

exercised his constitutional right to refrain from speaking with the deputies. 

Appellant further informs this Court that he has been unable to locate a 

single case where an obstructing official business conviction was upheld 

where the defendant merely avoided law enforcement without disobeying a 

verbal command of law enforcement. 

{¶10} In State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-5378, 56 N.E.3d 286 (9th Dist.), 

¶ 7, the court acknowledged that “[a]n affirmative act is required in order to 

support a finding that an individual was guilty of obstructing official 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 8

business[,]” and that “the ‘mere failure to obey a law enforcement officer’s 

request may not amount to obstruction.’ ” (internal citations omitted). 

However, the court also recognized “that the ‘affirmative act of running 

from an officer’ does impede an officer’s lawful duty.” Id.; quoting State v. 

Sanders, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23504, 2007-Ohio-2898, ¶ 21. State v. 

Sanders, as well as several other cases cited by the Harris court, all involved 

scenarios where defendants either ran or retreated from law enforcement 

after being given an order to either, stop, come out, or put their hands up. 

{¶11} Here, the evidence suggests Appellant ran and hid from law 

enforcement when he saw law enforcement, but before law enforcement 

spotted him. Thus, law enforcement didn’t have an opportunity to order 

Appellant to stop. They were, nevertheless, looking for him, and the 

evidence suggests Appellant knew that and sought to evade them. As such, 

the evidence indicates Appellant was aware that police officers were 

attempting to detain him when he fled into the woods and hid in the weeds. 

The officers’ “official business” was to investigate the allegations made by 

the various callers as well as Appellant’s ex-girlfriend, Carol Francis’, report 

that Appellant had assaulted her. Appellant had no privilege to hamper the 

officers in the performance of their official duties, but his actions caused 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 9

them to chase and stop a vehicle and then search woods to find him. We 

conclude such actions do, in fact, constitute affirmative acts. 

{¶12} In State v. LaPorte, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3450, 2015-Ohio294, ¶19, a situation involving law enforcement responding to a residence as 

a result of a domestic violence report was compared to a situation where a 

defendant flees from a Terry stop. See also State v. Willey, 2015-Ohio-4572, 

46 N.E.3d 1121 (5th Dist.) (comparing a situation involving law 

enforcement responding to a residence in response to a report of a “domestic 

incident” as a Terry stop.) As noted by the Willey court, “the law within the 

State of Ohio recognizes three types of police-citizen encounters: consensual 

encounters, Terry stops (brief investigatory stop or detention), and arrests.” 

Id. at ¶ 31 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Millerton, 2015-

Ohio-34, 26 N.E.3d 317 (2nd Dist.); State v. Glauser, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas 

No. 2011AP100039, 2012-Ohio-3230; State v. DeBrossard, 4th Dist. Ross 

No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054. A Terry stop is an investigatory detention 

and is valid if an officer has reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity. Willey at ¶ 32. 

{¶13} As set forth above, law enforcement responded to Appellant’s 

ex-girlfriend’s house on the night in question due to several reports of an 

intoxicated individual knocking on doors, as well as a report that Appellant 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 10

had assaulted his ex-girlfriend. This type of interaction can be compared to 

or characterized as a Terry stop, or brief investigatory detention. While 

conducting their investigation at the residence, law enforcement witnessed a 

vehicle pull into and then out of Francis’ driveway. Upon being informed 

by the residents that Appellant was in the vehicle, law enforcement left and 

gave chase to the vehicle, ultimately being informed by the occupants of the 

vehicle that Appellant had been dropped off at Francis’ house. When law 

enforcement returned to the residence they were then informed that 

Appellant had briefly entered the house and then fled into the woods. Law 

enforcement eventually found Appellant hiding in the weeds in the woods 

next to Francis’ house. 

{¶14} Several courts have held that a defendant’s act of fleeing from 

a Terry stop is an affirmative act and constitutes obstructing official 

business. In State v. Ross, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2007-CA-00127, 2008 WL 

568303, ¶ 28, the court explained that “ ‘[h]eadlong flight-wherever it 

occurs-is the consummate act of evasion: it is not necessarily indicative of 

wrongdoing, but it is certainty suggestive of such.’ ” Quoting Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000); see also State v. 

Glauser, supra, at ¶ 21 (unprovoked flight is simply not a mere refusal to 

cooperate.) Similarly, this Court concluded in State v. Certain, 180 Ohio 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 11

App.3d 457, 2009-Ohio-148, 905 N.E.2d 1259, ¶ 14, that “fleeing from 

police ‘to hamper or impede the police from finding out [the defendant’s] 

identity’ would be a violation of R.C. 2921.31.” Thus, we conclude that 

here, based upon the facts before us, the trial court did not err or abuse its 

discretion in finding that Appellant’s act of fleeing from law enforcement 

constituted an affirmative act that hampered and impeded law enforcement’s 

investigation on the night in question. 

{¶15} We further reject Appellant’s argument that he was under no 

obligation to make himself available to law enforcement on the night in 

question and that he was merely exercising his Fifth Amendment right to 

remain silent. In State v. Glauser the court reasoned as follows in 

determining that an officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 

justify pursuing the appellant with an intent to stop him: 

“In Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 

L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), the suspect fled upon seeing police officers 

patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. An 

officer exited his patrol car and stopped the suspect. In 

upholding the stop, the United States Supreme Court held that 

headlong flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but 

it is certainly suggestive of wrongdoing: 

‘Such a holding is entirely consistent with our decision in 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 

(1983), where we held that when an officer, without reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the 

individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his 

business. Id., at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319. And any “refusal to 

cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 12

objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” 

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 

L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). But unprovoked flight is simply not a mere 

refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very nature, is not “going 

about one’s business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing 

officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and 

investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right 

to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the 

face of police questioning.’ ” Glauser at ¶ 19-21. 

Thus, while Appellant is correct that he had a right to remain silent in the 

face of questioning by law enforcement, he was without privilege to flee 

from them to avoid investigation. 

{¶16} Additionally, with regard to any suggestion by Appellant that 

he could not have obstructed official business without disobeying the order 

of an officer, there is no such requirement contained in the elements of 

obstructing official business. Appellant was not charged with resisting arrest 

or failure to comply with the order of a police officer. Disobeying an order 

of a police officer is not an element the State was required to prove in order 

to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant 

obstructed official business. Although many cases involving this offense 

have fact patterns that include defendants failing to obey an order and 

fleeing from law enforcement, we conclude a defendant can still obstruct 

official business without disobeying an order of law enforcement. See State 

v. Puterbaugh, 142 Ohio App.3d 185, 755 N.E.2d 359, *363 (reasoning that 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 13

there is no need to discuss falsification, as defendant was charged with 

obstructing official business, not falsification). Similarly, because failing to 

obey an order of a police officer is not an element of obstructing official 

business, there is no requirement that such element be proven by the State 

here. 

{¶17} Finally, with respect to Appellant’s assertions that the State’s 

failure to file a formal criminal complaint charging Appellant with 

obstructing official business and dismissal of the assault charges involving 

Appellant’s girlfriend in some way invalidates the State’s claim that he 

violated his probation, we disagree. As this Court has previously explained, 

“community control, probation, and parole can be revoked, even if the 

underlying criminal charges are dismissed, the defendant is acquitted, or the 

conviction is overturned, unless all factual support for the revocation is 

removed.” State v. Johnson, supra, at ¶ 16; citing Barnett v. Ohio Adult 

Parole Auth., 81 Ohio St.3d 385, 387, 692 N.E.2d 135 (1998); State v. 

McCants, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–120725, 2013–Ohio–2646, ¶ 9. 

{¶18} As discussed above, Appellant’s interaction with law 

enforcement on the night in question was essentially pursuant to a Terrytype stop or investigatory detention. Terry stops “must be viewed within the 

totality of the circumstances” presented to the officer at the time. State v. 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 14

Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, (1980), paragraph one of 

syllabus. At the time law enforcement sought Appellant, they were 

investigating a report of an assault by Appellant of his ex-girlfriend. The 

fact that the State did not go forward on their original claim in the notice of 

violation that referenced the assault because the victim would not cooperate 

does not diminish the fact that law enforcement was responding to a 

domestic report on the night in question and was operating under those facts 

at the time. The dismissal of the assault complaint and failure to file a 

complaint charging obstructing official business in this case did not remove 

all factual support for the trial court’s finding that he violated his community 

control. Therefore, the trial court’s determination that Appellant violated his 

community control by obstructing the official business of law enforcement 

officers who were responding to investigate a report of Appellant assaulting 

his ex-girlfriend was supported by substantial proof. 

{¶19} Thus, in light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the 

trial court erred or abused its discretion in finding the State proved, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that Appellant violated the terms of his 

community control by obstructing official business. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 15

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II 

{¶20} In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that the 

trial court erred by admitting and relying upon hearsay in finding that he 

committed a probation violation. In making this argument, Appellant 

concedes that the Rules of Evidence do not apply at community control 

revocation hearings. Nevertheless, he argues that he was prejudiced by the 

introduction of hearsay evidence because it was the only evidence that was 

presented by the State. He contends “[t]he present case involves evidence 

that is exclusively hearsay[,]” and that his due process rights require that he 

be provided a right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 

{¶21} This Court has previously noted, with regard to the 

applicability of the Rules of Evidence to community control or probation 

revocation hearings, that “ ‘[p]robation-revocation hearings are not subject 

to the rules of evidence and thus allow for the admission of [otherwise 

inadmissible] evidence.’ ” State v. Johnson, supra, at ¶ 24; quoting State v. 

Ohly, 166 Ohio App.3d 808, 2006–Ohio–2353, 853 N.E.2d 675, ¶ 21 (6th 

Dist.); State v. Estep, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA22, 2004–Ohio–1747, ¶ 6 

(“The Rules of Evidence do not apply to community control revocation 

hearings”); Evid.R. 101(C)(3) (“These rules do not apply in * * * 

[p]roceedings granting or revoking probation [and] proceedings with respect 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 16

to community control sanctions * * * ”); 1 Giannelli, Baldwin's Ohio 

Practice Evidence, Section 101.11 (3d Ed.2014) (“Rule 101(C)(3) exempts 

from the Rules of Evidence a number of criminal proceedings, including 

those involving sentencing, probation, and community control sanctions”); 

State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004–Ohio–4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 16 

(recognizing “no meaningful distinction between community control and 

probation”). “The rationale for this exception is that a trial court should be 

able to consider any reliable and relevant evidence indicating whether the 

probationer has violated the terms of probation, since a probation or 

community control revocation hearing is an informal proceeding, not a 

criminal trial.” State v. Gullet, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2006–0010, 

2006–Ohio–6564, ¶ 27; citing Columbus v. Bickel, 77 Ohio App.3d 26, 36, 

601 N.E.2d 61 (10th Dist.1991). Thus, we reject any argument by Appellant 

that the trial court’s reliance on hearsay evidence, in general, constituted 

error. 

{¶22} With respect to Appellant’s argument that the evidence 

presented by the State was exclusively hearsay and that the trial court’s 

reliance upon it, without more, deprived him of his due process rights and 

constituted reversible error, Appellant is correct that “ ‘[t]he introduction of 

hearsay evidence into a probation-revocation hearing is reversible error 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 17

when that evidence is the only evidence presented and is crucial to a 

determination of a probation violation.’ ” Johnson at ¶ 25; quoting State v. 

Ohly at ¶ 21; see also State v. McCants, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120725, 

2013-Ohio-2646, ¶ 14 (“Although the rules of evidence are inapplicable to 

revocation hearings, the admission of hearsay may implicate the defendant’s 

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.”). 

{¶23} Here, however, the trial court did not rely exclusively on 

hearsay evidence. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court as 

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). This 

Court has consistently held that “ ‘ “[i]t is well settled that statements 

offered by police to explain their conduct while investigating a crime are not 

hearsay because they are not offered for their truth, but rather, are offered as 

an explanation of the process of investigation.” ’ ” State v. Trainer, 4th Dist. 

Pickaway No. 14CA21, 2015-Ohio-2548, ¶ 12; quoting State v. Gerald, 4th 

Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3519, 2014–Ohio–3629, ¶ 70; quoting State v. Spires, 

4th Dist. Gallia No. 10CA10, 2011–Ohio–3661, ¶ 13; quoting State v. 

Warren, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83823, 2004–Ohio–5599, ¶ 46; citing State 

v. Price, 80 Ohio App.3d 108, 110, 608 N.E.2d 1088 (1992); State v. 

Braxton, 102 Ohio App.3d 28, 49, 656 N.E.2d 970 (1995); State v. Blevins, 

36 Ohio App.3d 147, 149, 521 N.E.2d 1105 (1987). 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 18

{¶24} The testimony to which Appellant objected during the hearing 

involved statements made by Deputy Dustin Wesselhoeft regarding the steps 

he took in attempting to locate Appellant as he was conducting his 

investigation on the night in question. He first testified to a report he 

personally received from dispatch. He next testified to the information 

provided to him by the victim regarding the identity and location of 

Appellant as he was conducting his investigation. He next testified to 

personally seeing a vehicle pull into the driveway and then leave, as well as 

the information provided to him indicating Appellant was in the vehicle, 

which led him to follow and then stop that vehicle. He then testified 

regarding information provided by the driver of the vehicle he stopped, that 

indicated Appellant had been dropped off at the victim’s residence, which 

led him to return to the residence to continue his investigation. He then 

testified to information provided again by the victim and another person in 

the victim’s house indicating Appellant had fled into the woods. He finally 

testified to personally locating Appellant, who was hiding in the weeds in 

the woods near the house. 

{¶25} While some of the information contained in Appellant’s 

testimony was provided to Appellant by individuals that did not testify at 

trial, some of the testimony was based upon the deputy’s eyewitness account 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 19

of what happened that night. Other statements encompassed within the 

deputy’s testimony that explained the course of the investigation and how 

Appellant was eventually located were not hearsay, as they served as an 

explanation of the process of the investigation. In fact, when Appellant’s 

counsel repeatedly objected to the testimony during the hearing, the 

objections were overruled based upon the trial court’s stated reasoning that 

“[n]ormally this sort of thing is not offered for the truth, but just simply to 

explain the officer’s subsequent actions so -- * * * All right. So we’ll 

overrule that at that [sic] this point.” Thus, the trial court properly overruled 

Appellant’s objections on the correct basis. Based upon the foregoing, we 

find no merit to the arguments raised in Appellant’s second assignment of 

error and it is, therefore, overruled. 

{¶26} Having found that the State provided substantial proof that 

Appellant obstructed official business, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court erred or abused its discretion in revoking Appellant’s probation. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 
Hocking App. No. 17CA2 20

JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be 

assessed to Appellant. 

 The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing 

the Hocking County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

 IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE 

UPON BAIL HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL 

COURT OR THIS COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to 

exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of a 

continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio 

an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If 

a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the 

expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a 

notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal 

period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme 

Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the 

appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as of the date 

of such dismissal. 

 A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to 

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Hoover, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion as to Assignment of Error II; 

 Concurs in Judgment Only as to Assignment of Error I. 

Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment Only. 

For the Court, 

 BY: ______________________________ 

 Matthew W. McFarland, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL: Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this 

document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for 

further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.