MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	103

Docket: Yor-19-280

Argued: May	11,	2020

Decided: August	11,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ., and	HJELM,	A.R.J.

Majority: MEAD,	GORMAN,	and	HUMPHREY,	JJ.,	and	HJELM,	A.R.J.

Dissent: HORTON,	JABAR,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

STATE	OF	MAINE

v.

EMANUEL	J.	SLOBODA

GORMAN,	J.

[¶1]	 	 Emanuel	 J.	 Sloboda	 appeals	 from	 a	 judgment	 of	 conviction	 for

violating	 a	 condition	 of	 release	 (Class	 C),	 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 1092(1)(B)	 (2020),	

entered	by	 the	 trial	court	 (York	County,	Douglas,	J.)	after	a	jury-waived	 trial.		

Sloboda	 contends	 that	 the	 court	 lacked subject	 matter	 jurisdiction	 over	 his	

prosecution	because	 the	violation at	issue	occurred	in	New	Hampshire.1		We	

agree, vacate	the	conviction,	and	remand	for	dismissal	of	the	indictment.

 1		Briefs	of	amici curiae	were	submitted	by	the	Office	of	the	Maine	Attorney	General;	AEquitas;	and	

Lawrence	C.	Winger,	Esq.		
2

I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]		In	2019,	Sloboda	was	indicted	 for	violating	a	condition	of	release	

(Class	 C),	 15	M.R.S.	 §	 1092(1)(B),	 to	which	 he	 pleaded	 not	 guilty.2	 	During	 a	

one-day	 jury-waived	 trial	 on	 the	 indictment,	 Sloboda	 challenged	 the	 court’s	

subject	matter	jurisdiction	based	on	the	fact	that	his	alleged	violation	occurred

outside	 Maine,	 in	 New	 Hampshire.	 	 Among	 its	 findings	 and	 conclusions

rendered	at	the	end	of	the	trial,	the	court determined that	it	had	jurisdiction.		

[¶3]	 	 The	 court	 also	found,	 based	 on	 competent	 record	 evidence,	 that	

Sloboda	was	on	preconviction	bail,	a	condition	of	which	was	 that	he	have	no	

direct	or	indirect	contact	with	a particular individual,	when,	on	November	25,	

2018,	he	violated	that	condition	by	having	contact	with	that individual at	a	store

in	Rochester,	New	Hampshire.		Based	on	these	facts,	the	court	found	Sloboda	

 2		Sloboda	was	also	charged	with	aggravated	assault	(Class	A),	17-A	M.R.S.	§§	208(1)(C),	1252(4-A)	

(2018);	 domestic	 violence	 assault	 (Class	 C),	 17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 207-A(1)(A)	 (2020);	 17-A M.R.S.	

§ 1252(4-A);	 and	 two	 additional	 counts	 of	 violating	 a	 condition	 of	 release	 (Class	 C),	 15	 M.R.S.	

§ 1092(1)(B)	(2020).		Section	208	has	since	been	amended,	P.L.	2019,	ch.	91,	§	1	(effective	Sept.	19,	

2019),	and	section	1252	has	since	been	repealed	and	replaced,	P.L.	2019,	ch.	113,	§	A-1	(emergency,	

effective	May	16,	2019)	(codified	at	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1604	(2020)),	but	these	subsequent	enactments	do	

not	affect	this	appeal.

The	State	dismissed	the	charges	of	aggravated	assault,	domestic	assault,	and	one	count	of	violating	

a	condition	of	release.		Sloboda	was	found	not	guilty	of the	other	charge	of	violating	a	condition	of	

release.		None	of	these	charges	is	at	issue	in	the	present	appeal.
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guilty	of	 the	offense	and	sentenced	him to	serve	six	months	in	jail.3 Sloboda	

timely	appeals.		See 15	M.R.S.	§	2115	(2020);	M.R.	App.	P.	2B(b)(1).

II.		DISCUSSION

[¶4]	 	 Sloboda	 contends	 that	 the	 trial	 court	 lacked	 subject	 matter	

jurisdiction	because	the	court	found	that	he	violated	the	condition	of	release	in	

New	Hampshire.		We	review	de	novo	the	trial	court’s	subject	matter	jurisdiction	

by	interpreting	 the	criminal	jurisdiction	 statute,	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	7	 (2020).		See

State	v.	McLaughlin,	2018 ME	97,	¶	9,	189 A.3d	262;	State	v.	St.	Onge,	2011	ME	

73,	 ¶	 13,	 21	 A.3d	 1028;	 see	 also M.R.U.	 Crim.	 P.	 12(b)(2);	 State	 v.	 Liberty,	

2004 ME	 88,	 ¶	 7,	 853 A.2d	 760 (stating	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 trial	 court’s	

jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any	time during	the	pendency	of	the	proceeding).	

We	first	interpret the	provision	in	accordance	with	its	unambiguous	meaning

based	on	the	plain	language	of	the	statute.		See McLaughlin,	2018	ME	97,	¶	9,	

189	A.3d	262.

[¶5]		A trial	court’s	“[t]erritorial”	criminal	jurisdiction	is	limited	 to	 the	

seven	bases	for	which	17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)	provides:

1. Except	as	otherwise	provided	in	this	section,	a	person	may	

be	convicted	under	the	laws	of	this	State	for	any	crime	committed	

 3	 	 The	 judgment	 and	 commitment	 incorrectly	 reflects	 that	 the	 findings	 were	 reached	 by	 jury	

verdict	rather	than	by	the	court’s	determination,	that	Sloboda	pleaded	guilty	to	the	charge,	and	that	

Sloboda	was	convicted	of	a	second	count	of	violating	a	condition of	release.		
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by	the	person’s	own	conduct	or	by	the	conduct	of	another	for	which	

the	person	is	legally	accountable	only	if:

A. Either	the	conduct	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	or	the	

result	that	is	such	an	element	occurs	within	this	State	or	has	

a	territorial	relationship	to	this	State;

B. Conduct	 occurring	 outside	 this	 State	 constitutes	 an	

attempt	to	commit	a	crime	under	the	laws	of	this	State	and	

the	intent	is	that	the	crime	take	place	within	this	State;

C. Conduct	 occurring	 outside	 this	 State	 would	 constitute	 a	

criminal	conspiracy	under	the	laws	of	this	State,	an	overt	act	

in	 furtherance	of	 the	conspiracy	occurs	within	 this State	or	

has	a	 territorial	relationship	 to	 this	State,	and	 the	object	of	

the	conspiracy	is	that	a	crime	take	place	within	this	State;

D. Conduct	occurring	within	this	State	or	having	a	territorial	

relationship	to	this	State	would	constitute	complicity	in the	

commission	 of,	 or	 an	 attempt,	 solicitation	 or	 conspiracy	 to	

commit	an	offense	in	another	jurisdiction	that	is	also	a	crime	

under	the	law	of	this	State;

E. The	 crime	 consists	 of	 the	 omission	 to	 perform	 a	 duty	

imposed	on	a	person	by	 the	law	of	 this	State,	regardless	of	

where	that	person	is	when	the	omission	occurs;

F. The	crime	is	based	on	a	statute	of	this	State	that	expressly	

prohibits	conduct	outside	the	State,	when	the	person	knows	

or	should	know	that	the	person’s	conduct	affects	an	interest	

of	the State	protected	by	that	statute;	or

G. Jurisdiction	is	otherwise	provided	by	law.

See	Ginn	v.	Penobscot	Co.,	342	A.2d	270,	274	(Me.	1975)	(“The	court	is	created	

by	statute,	and	has	that	jurisdiction	only	which	the	statute	has	conferred	upon	
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it,	and	that is	a	limited	jurisdiction.		It	has	no	other	authority.”	(quotation	marks	

omitted));	State	v.	Baldwin,	305	A.2d	555,	559	(Me.	1973)	(“It	is	elementary	law	

that	the	statutes	of	a	state	have	no	extra-territorial	force,	nor	do	its	courts	have	

any	 jurisdiction of	 offenses	 committed	 in	 other	 states	 or	 foreign	 countries.”	

(quotation	marks	omitted)).		

[¶6]		Viewed	most	simply,	section	7(1)(A)	sets	out	four	alternatives	by	

which	a	Maine	court	has	subject	matter	jurisdiction	in	a	criminal	matter:	when	

(1)	 conduct	that	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 has	 a	 territorial	 relationship	 to	

Maine,	(2)	the	result	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	has	a	territorial	relationship	

to	 Maine,	 (3) conduct	 that	 is	 an	 element	 of	 the	 crime	 occurred	 in	 Maine,	 or	

(4) the	result	that	is	an	element	of	the	crime	occurred	in	Maine.		The	court	found	

jurisdiction	 in	 this	 matter	 based	 specifically	 on	 one	 of	 the	 territorial	

relationship	alternatives;	it	determined that	Maine	had	a	sufficient	nexus	to	the	

crime	 because the	 relevant	 bail	 condition	 that	 Sloboda	 was	 alleged	 to	 have	

violated	was	issued	in	Maine	as	to	an	underlying	crime	committed	in	Maine.		As	

17-A	M.R.S.	 §	7(4)	 states,	however,	 territorial	 relationship	jurisdiction	 exists

only	when	it	is	impossible	to	determine	where	the	conduct	occurred	in	relation	

to	the	state	boundary	line:	

4. Conduct	 or	 a	 result	 has	 a	 territorial	 relationship	 to	 this	

State	if	it	is	not	possible	to	determine	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	
6

that	it	occurred	inside	or	outside	of	this	State,	because	a	boundary	

cannot	be	precisely	located	or	the	location	of	any	person	cannot	be	

precisely	 established	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 boundary,	 and	 if	 the	 court	

determines	that	this	State	has	a	substantial	interest	in	prohibiting	

the	 conduct	 or	 result.	 In	 determining	 whether this	 State	 has	 a	

substantial	interest,	the	court	shall	consider	the	following	factors:

A. The	relationship	to	this	State	of	the	actor	or	actors	and	of	

persons	 affected	 by	 the	 conduct	 or	 result,	 whether	 as	

citizens,	residents	or	visitors;

B. The	location	of	the	actor	or	actors	and	persons	affected	by	

the	conduct	or	result	prior	to	and	after	the	conduct	or	result;	

C. The	 place	 in	 which	 other	 crimes,	 if	 any,	 in	 the	 same	

criminal	episode	were	committed;	and

D. The	 place	 in	 which	 the	 intent	 to commit	 the	 crime	 was	

formed.

Because,	based	 on	 the	court’s	supported	 findings,	it	is possible	 to	determine	

precisely	 where	 Sloboda’s	 conduct	 occurred,	 the	 territorial	 relationship	 of	

Sloboda’s	crime	to	Maine	provides	no	basis	for	jurisdiction.		See	State v.	Collin,	

1997	 ME	 6,	 ¶	 10,	 687	 A.2d	 962 (vacating	 the	 trial	 court’s	 employment	 of	

territorial	 relationship	 jurisdiction	 because	 there	 was	 no	 “reasonable	 doubt	

about	the	location	of	a	boundary	or	the	location	of	a	person	in	relation	to	the	

boundary”	and	noting	that	“[t]he	state’s	substantial	interest	in	prohibiting	the	

conduct	 is	 not	 sufficient	 by	 itself	 to	 support	 a	 finding	 of	 a	 territorial	
7

relationship”).		The	court’s	reliance	on	territorial	relationship	jurisdiction	was	

therefore	error.

[¶7]	 	 The	 State argues that,	 despite	 this	 error,	 we	 should	 affirm	 the	

conviction	because the	court	had	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	one	of	the	other	two	

alternatives	in	section	7(1)(A)	based	on	where	the	conduct	or	result	element	

occurred. We	therefore	consider	what	constitutes	a	conduct	element	or	a	result	

element.		

[¶8]		Title	17-A	M.R.S.	§	32	(2020) organizes	the	elements	of	a	crime	into	

four	categories:	“the	forbidden	conduct;	the	attendant	circumstances	specified	

in	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 crime;	 the	 intention,	 knowledge,	 recklessness	 or	

negligence	 as	 may	 be	 required;	 and	 any	 required	 result.”4	 	 A	 state-of-mind	

element	 is	 statutorily	 defined	 with	 reference	 to	 the	 mental	 processes	 of	 the	

defendant—i.e.,	the	defendant’s	awareness	of	a	risk	or	whether	the	defendant	

has	a	 “conscious	 object.”		17-A M.R.S.	 §	 35	 (2020)	(defining	 “[i]ntentionally,”	

“[k]nowingly,”	 “[r]ecklessly,”	 and	 “[c]riminal	 negligence”).	 	 This	 is	

distinguished	from	the	“conduct”	category	of	elements,	which	is	the	only	one	

among	 the	 four in	 section	 32 that	 could	 reasonably	 be	 read	 to	 refer	 to	 the	

defendant’s	physical	actions.		See Model	Penal	Code	§	1.13(5)	(Am.	 Law	 Inst.	

 4 We	will	use	the	phrase	“state-of-mind”	to	discuss	the	third	element.
8

1962)	(defining	“conduct”	as	“an	action	or	omission	and	its	accompanying	state	

of	 mind,	 or,	 where	 relevant,	 a	 series	 of	 acts	 and	 omissions”);	 Conduct,	 New	

Oxford	American	Dictionary	(3d	ed.	2010)	(stating	that	“conduct”	means	“the	

manner	in	which	a	person	behaves”);	see	also State	v.	Lindell,	2020	ME	49,	¶	19,	

--- A.3d	---(concluding	that	“the	jury	was	entitled	to	interpret	[‘conduct’]	within	

its	common	meaning”); State	v.	Gladu,	2014	ME	23,	¶	9,	86	A.3d	1182	(stating	

that,	“as	a	general	rule,	words	and	phrases	that	are	not	expressly	defined	in	a	

statute	must	be	given	their	plain	and	natural	meaning	and	should	be	construed	

according	to their	natural	import	in	common	and	approved	usage,”	including	

according	to	dictionary	definitions	(quotation	marks	omitted)).

[¶9]		Attendant	circumstances	elements	refer	to	factors	such	as	the	status	

of	a	defendant,	the	age	or	other	attributes	of	the	victim,	or	the	existence	of	prior	

convictions	that	increase	the	class	of	a	crime.		See	State	v.	Sumulikoski,	110	A.3d	

856,	 858,	 862-64	 (N.J.	 2015)	 (holding	 that	 the	 fact that	 the	 defendant	 had	

assumed	 responsibility	 for	 the	 victims	 as	 chaperone	 for	 a	 school	 trip	

constituted	 an	 attendant	 circumstance	 rather	 than	 conduct,	 and	 defining	

“status”	 as	 “a	 person’s	 legal	 condition,	 whether	 personal	 or	 proprietary;	 the	

sum	total	of a	person’s	legal	rights,	duties,	liabilities,	and	other	legal	relations”	

(alteration	 omitted)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted));	 Attendant,	 New	 Oxford	
9

American	 Dictionary	 (3d	 ed.	 2010)	 (“occurring	 with	 or	 as	 a	 result	 of;	

accompanying”);	Circumstance,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	(3d	ed.	2010)	

(“a	fact	or	condition	connected	with	or	relevant	to	an	event	or	action”).

[¶10]		As	to	the	result	element,	17-A	M.R.S.	§	33	(2020)	provides,	“Unless	

otherwise	provided,	when	causing	a	result	is	an	element	of	a	crime,	causation	

may	be	found	when	the	result	would	not	have	occurred	but	for	the	conduct	of	

the	 defendant,	 operating	 either	 alone	 or	 concurrently	 with	 another	 cause.”		

Thus,	a	result	element	is	one	that	requires	the	defendant	to	have	caused	some	

specified	harm or	other	outcome.		See	Result,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	

(3d	ed.	2010)	(“a	consequence,	effect,	or	outcome	of	something”).		

[¶11]	 	Interpreting	 section	 7(1)(A)	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 section	 32	

reveals that	 not	 all	 elements	 of	 a	 crime	 are	 relevant	 to	 jurisdiction.	 	 Only	

conduct	elements	and	result	elements	affect	subject	matter	jurisdiction;	if	only	

an	 attendant	 circumstances	 element	 or	 a	 state-of-mind	 element	 occurs	 in	

Maine,	Maine	has	no	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	section	7(1)(A).		For	example,	if	a	

defendant	with	a	Maine	felony	conviction	then	obtained possession	of	a	firearm	

in	 New	 Hampshire,	 Maine	 would	 not	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 crime	

committed	 by	 the	 defendant	 because	 only	 the defendant’s	 underlying	 felony	

status—the	attendant	circumstance—occurred	in	Maine.		
10

[¶12]		In	order	to	determine	which	elements	of	the	crime	of violating	a	

condition	of	release	should	be	considered	in	determining	Maine’s	jurisdiction,	

we	determine	in	which	category—conduct,	result,	state-of-mind,	and	attendant	

circumstances—those	 elements	 belong.	 	 Violation	 of	 a	 condition	 of	 release	

requires	proof	that	the	defendant	is	on	preconviction	or	postconviction	bail	at	

the	 time	 that	 he	 or	 she	 “in	 fact,	 violates	 a	 condition	 of	 release.”	 	 15	 M.R.S.	

§ 1092(1)	(2020);	see State	v.	LeBlanc-Simpson,	2018	ME	109,	¶	17,	190 A.3d	

1015.		It	is	a	Class	C	crime	when	the	underlying	charge on	which	the	defendant	

was	bailed	was	“punishable	by	a	maximum	period	of	imprisonment	of	one	year	

or	more	and	the	condition	of	release	violated	is	one	specified	in	section	1026,	

subsection	3,	paragraph	A,	 subparagraph	 (5),	 (8),	 (10-A)	 or	 (13).”		15	M.R.S.	

§ 1092(1)(B).	 	 Violation	 of	 a	 condition	 of	 release	 is	 a	 strict	 liability	 crime,	

15 M.R.S.	§	1092(3),	meaning	no	proof	of	a	culpable	state	of	mind	is	required,	

but	 the	 State	must	 establish	 that	 the	 defendant	 “had	 prior	 knowledge	 of	 the	

relevant	conditions	of	release.”		LeBlanc-Simpson,	2018 ME	109,	¶	18,	190	A.3d	

1015.

[¶13]		As	discussed	above,	the	State	charged	Sloboda	with	a	violation	of	

a	condition	of	release based	on	its	allegations that	(1)	Sloboda	was	subject	to	

preconviction	bail	on	November	25,	2018, that	required	him	to	have	no	contact	
11

with	 certain	 individuals; (2)	 the	 underlying	 bail	 was	 for	 a	 burglary	 charge

(Class	B),	17-A M.R.S.	§	401(1)(B)(4)	(2020),	punishable	by	up	to	ten	years	in	

prison,	see	17-A	 M.R.S.	 §	 1252(2)(B)	 (2018);	 and (3) he	 violated	 the	 bail	 by	

having	contact	with	one	of	the	prohibited	individuals.		Two of	these	elements—

that	 Sloboda	was	 subject	 to	 a preconviction	 bail	 condition	 on	November	 25,	

2018,	that	required	him	to	have	no	contact	with	a	particular	individual,	and	that	

the	underlying	charge on	which	he	was	bailed	was	for	burglary,	punishable	by	

up	 to	 ten	 years	 in	 prison—constitute	 attendant	 circumstances	 elements

pursuant	to	section	32.		15	M.R.S.	§	1092(1)(B).		The	requirement	that	Sloboda	

had	prior	knowledge	that	he	was	subject	to	that	condition	of	release	is	either	a	

state-of-mind	element or	an	attendant	circumstances	element,	but	we	need	not	

determine	which	because	the	fact	that	his knowledge	of	the	condition may	have	

occurred	in	Maine	is	irrelevant	to	a	jurisdiction	analysis	pursuant	to	the	plain	

language	of	section	7(1)(A).		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	32.

[¶14]		The	conduct	element	in	Sloboda’s	crime	is	the	act	of	having	contact	

with	the	victim,	and	the	court	found,	based	on	competent	record	evidence,	that	

such	conduct	occurred	only	in	New	Hampshire.		Thus,	the	location	of	Sloboda’s	

conduct	is	no	basis	for	the	court’s	jurisdiction	in	Maine.		
12

[¶15]		The	only	remaining	source	of	jurisdiction—and	the	alternative	to	

which	 the	 parties	 dedicate	 their	 arguments—is	 if	 the	 crime	 of	 violation	 of	 a	

condition	of	release	requires	proof	of	a	result	element	and	that	result	occurred	

in	Maine.5		17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A).		

[¶16]		The	State	contends	that	a	result	element	exists	in	the	requirement	

that	Sloboda’s	contact	with	the	victim	“in	fact,	violates	a	condition	of	release,”	

in	Maine.	 That	is,	the	State	argues	that	although the	defendant’s	conduct was	

the	contact	with	the	victim	in	New	Hampshire,	the	result was	a	bail	violation	in	

Maine	because	Sloboda	was	not	subject	to	a	bail	order	in	New	Hampshire	and	

 5		Section	7	contains	additional	limitations	applicable	to	jurisdiction	based	on	the	location	of	a	

result	that	is	an	element:	

2.		Subsection	1,	paragraph	A	does	not	apply	if:

A. Causing	a	particular	result	or	danger	of	causing	that	result	is	an	element	and	the	

result	occurs	or	is	designed	or	likely	to	occur	only	in	another	jurisdiction	where	the	

conduct	charged	would	not	constitute	an	offense;	or	

B. Causing	a	particular	result	is	an	element	of	the	crime	and	the	result	is	caused	by	

conduct	occurring	outside	the	State	which	would	not	constitute	an	offense	if	the	result	

had	occurred	there.

17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(2)	(2020).		By	these	exclusions,	Maine	has	no	jurisdiction	if	a	bail	violation	“would	

not	constitute	an	offense”	in	New	Hampshire.		17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(2)(A)-(B).		These	exclusions	do	not	

apply	 in	 the	 instant	 matter	 because	 violating	 a	 bail	 condition	 is	 an	 offense	 in	 New	 Hampshire.		

Although	it	is	not	a	crime	pursuant	to	New	Hampshire	statute,	the	New	Hampshire	Supreme	Court	

has	held	that	violating	a	bail	condition	constitutes	criminal	contempt,	which	is	a	common	law	crime	

punishable	by	 fines	 or	imprisonment.		State	v.	Smith,	35 A.3d	646,	649-50	(N.H.	2011)	 (“We	have	

expressly	rejected	the	argument	that	contempt	is	not	a	crime	simply	because	it	is	not	defined	in	the	

Criminal	Code.”); State	v.	Nott,	821	A.2d	976,	978	(N.H.	2003)	(holding	that	“violation	of	a	bail	order”	

constitutes	“criminal	contempt”);	State	v.	Martina,	600 A.2d	132,	137-38	(N.H.	1991)	(requiring	that	

the	State	must	prove	criminal	contempt	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt	and	noting	 that	 the	 resulting	

“imposition	of	a	fine	or	imprisonment	is	punitive	rather	than	remedial”	(quotation	marks	omitted)).
13

it	was	Maine’s	bail	order	that	Sloboda	“in	fact,	violate[d]”	by	having	contact	with	

the	 victim.	 	 15 M.R.S.	 § 1092(1).	 	 Contrary	 to	 the	 State’s	 assertion,	 however,	

section	1092(1)(B)	has	no	result	element.		As	we	have	already	concluded,	the	

fact	 that	 the	 defendant	 was	 on	 preconviction	 or	 postconviction	 bail	 is	 not	 a	

result	 element.	 	 It	 is	 instead	 an	 attendant	 circumstance	 element.	 	 Thus,	 the	

State’s	 argument	 fails	 because	 jurisdiction	 cannot	 be	 conveyed	 pursuant	 to	

section	 7(1)(A)	 based	 on	 the	 locus	 of	 an	 attendant	 circumstance.	 	 See	

Sumulikoski,	110	A.3d	at	862	(“[A]	defendant’s	status	alone	does	not	provide	a	

basis	for jurisdiction.”).		

[¶17]		Although	there	are	myriad	criminal	statutes	that	expressly	require	

proof	of	a	particular	harm or	result caused	by	the	defendant,6 the	plain	language	

of	section	1092(1)(B)	does	not	require	any	particular	harm.		The	requirement	

in	 section	 1092(1)(B)	 that	 Sloboda	 “in	 fact,	 violates	 a	 condition	 of	 release”	

refers	both	to	 the	conduct element,	which,	it	is	undisputed,	 occurred	in	New	

 6		See,	e.g.,	17-A	M.R.S.	 §	201(1)(A)	(2020)	(defining	murder	 to	include	 “caus[ing]	 the	death	of	

another	human	being”);	17-A	M.R.S.	§	454(1)(A)	(2020)	(including,	as	an	element	of	tampering	with	

a	witness,	that	the	defendant	“[i]nduces	or	otherwise	causes	.	.	.	a	witness	. .	.	[t]o	testify	or	inform	in	

a	manner	the	actor	knows	to	be	false”);	17-A	M.R.S.	§	501-A(1)(A)(1)	(2020)	(stating	that	one	means	

of	committing	disorderly	conduct	is	by	“caus[ing]	annoyance	to	others	by	intentionally	.	.	.	[m]aking	

loud	and	unreasonable	noises”);	17-A	M.R.S.	§	703(1)(B)	(2020)	(setting	out	the	elements	of	forgery,	

including	that	the	defendant	“causes	another,	by	deception,	to	sign	or	execute	a	written	instrument”);	

17-A	M.R.S.	§	805(1)(C)	(2020)	(providing,	as	an	element	of	aggravated	criminal	mischief,	that	the	

defendant’s	 act	 “thereby	 causes	 a	 substantial	 interruption	 or	 impairment	 of	 [gas,	 water,	

transportation,	etc.]	service	rendered	to	the	public”);	17-A	M.R.S.	§	1002-A(1)(A)	(2020)	(stating	that	

the	criminal	use	of	laser	pointers	is	committed	when,	inter	alia,	the	defendant’s	use	of	a	laser	pointer	

“[c]auses	bodily	injury	to	[an]other	person”).
14

Hampshire,	and to the	attendant	circumstances	element,	which	cannot	confer	

jurisdiction.

[¶18]		Pursuant	to	the	unambiguous	language	of	section	7(1)(A),	only	the	

occurrence	 of	 the	 conduct	 or	 the	 result	 elements	in	Maine	will	 afford	Maine	

jurisdiction.		Because	Sloboda’s	conduct	occurred	in	New	Hampshire	and	his	

offense	contains	no	 result	element,	 section	7(1)(A)	provides no	basis	 for	 the	

court’s	exercise	of	subject	matter	jurisdiction	over	Sloboda’s	prosecution.	 This	

conclusion	is	also	consistent	with	the	holding	in	Collin,	in	which	the	defendant	

was	convicted	of	 theft	by	receiving	stolen	property	 that	belonged	 to	a	victim	

from Maine.		1997	ME	6,	¶¶ 2-4,	687	A.2d	962.		Although	the	defendant acted	

only	in	Canada,	the	State	argued	that	Maine	had	jurisdiction	to	prosecute	him

because	the	result	of	the	theft	was	to	deprive	a	Maine	company	of	its	property.		

Id. ¶¶ 3,	11.		We	declined	to	apply	section	7(1)(A)	because	the	asserted	result—

loss	to	the	victim—was	not	an	element	of	the	crime	of	theft	by	receiving	stolen	

property,	and, therefore,	the	fact	that	the	victim	was	in	Maine	was	“irrelevant.”7		

Collin,	1997 ME	6,	¶	11,	687	A.2d	962.

 7		This	is	unlike	the	analysis	employed	in	those	states	whose	statutes	provide	for	jurisdiction	when	

the	result	occurs	in	that	state	but	that	do	not	require	that	the	result	be	an	element	of	the	crime.		In	

Arizona,	 for	 example,	 the	 legislature	 has	 “maximize[d]	 the	 reach	 of	 its	 criminal	 jurisdiction	 by	

omitting	 the	 restriction	 that	 the	 result	 occurring	 within	 the	 state	 must	 be	 an	 element	 of	 the	

offense. Thus,	under	Arizona	law,	if	[the	defendant’s]	conduct	had	a	direct	effect	in	Arizona,	Arizona	

can	assert	jurisdiction.”		State	v.	Flores,	188	P.3d	706,	713	(Ariz.	Ct.	App.	2008)	(emphasis	omitted)	

(citation	omitted)	(quotation	marks	omitted).		
15

[¶19]		We	also discern	no basis	for	the	court’s	exercise	of	jurisdiction	in	

the	 other	 subdivisions of	 section	 7.	 	 In	 particular,	 the	 Attorney	 General	 and	

AEquitas,	as	amici, suggest	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	section	

7(1)(E),	which	applies	when	“[t]he	crime	consists	of	the	omission	to	perform	a	

duty	imposed	 on	 a	 person	 by	 the	law	 of	 this	 State,	 regardless	 of	where	 that	

person	is	when	the	omission	occurs.”8		By	its	plain	language,	an	“omission”	is	“a	

failure	 to	do	something.”		Omission,	New	Oxford	American	Dictionary	(3d	ed.	

2010).		The	essence	of	the amici’s argument	is	that	Sloboda	failed	to	perform	

his	legal	duty	to	comply	with	the	bail	order	by	affirmatively	acting in	violation	

of	 the	bail	 order.		This attempted	application	 of	 section	7(1)(E)	 to	Sloboda’s	

prosecution	is,	however, an	exercise	in	semantic	gymnastics.		

 8 We	note	that	neither	of	the	parties themselves	presented	an	argument	relating	to	17-A	M.R.S.	

§ 7(1)(E) (2020),	either	in	the	trial	court	or	in this	appeal,	and	only	two	of	the	amici	have	done	so	

here.		Ordinarily,	we	will	 recognize	a	contention	 raised	by	an	amicus	curiae	 only	if	the	issue	was

raised	in	the	trial	court	and	at	least	one	of	the	parties	also	pursues	the	argument	on	appeal.	 See	Ross	

v.	Acadian	Seaplants,	Ltd.,	2019	ME	45,	¶	5	n.2,	206	A.3d	283;	Jacobs	v.	Jacobs,	507	A.2d	596,	597 n.1	

(Me.	1986).		Jurisdictional	questions are	not hampered	by	these	preservation	principles,	however,	

because	jurisdiction	is	foundational.		See,	e.g.	Ford	Motor	Co.	v.	Darling’s,	2014	ME	7,	¶	41,	86	A.3d	35	

(stating	that	“the	issue	of	jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any	time	in	a	proceeding,	including	sua	sponte	

by	this	Court”);	Guardianship	of	Gabriel	W.,	666	A.2d	505,	507-08	(Me.	1995)	(“Lack	of	subject	matter	

jurisdiction	may	be	raised	at	any	time, including	in	collateral	proceedings	when	lack of	subject	matter	

jurisdiction	appears	on	the	face	of	the	record	of	the	judgment	attacked.”	(citation	omitted));	Pederson	

v.	Cole,	501 A.2d	23,	25	n.2	(Me.	1985) (“The	defense	of	lack	of	subject-matter	jurisdiction	may	be	

raised	at	any	time,	even	sua	sponte by	an	appellate	court.”);	Moody	v.	Port	Clyde	Dev. Co.,	102	Me.	365,	

384,	66 A.	967 (1907)	(“The	very	foundation	of	judicial	proceedings	is	jurisdiction.	The	question	of	

jurisdiction	 may	 therefore	 be	 raised	 at	 any	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 by	 any	 suggestion	 that	will	

apprise	the	court	of	the	want	thereof.”).		Here,	given	that	we	could notice	and	resolve	jurisdictional	

issues	even	if	not	otherwise	raised	at	all,	and	given	that	the	amici	have	presented	argument	regarding	

section	7(1)(E)	through	an	established	procedural	mechanism,	see	M.R.	App.	P.	7A(e),	we	consider	

that	argument.	
16

[¶20]		We	rejected	a	similar	approach	in	State	v.	Branch-Wear,	in	which	

the	 defendant	 was	 convicted	 of	 tampering	 with	 a	 victim	 by	 preventing	 her	

daughter	from	testifying	in	a	prosecution.		1997	ME	110,	¶¶	2-6,	695	A.2d	1169.		

The	defendant	argued	 that	 the	State	had	impermissibly	prosecuted	her	 for	a	

crime	of	omission	for	failing	to	meet	her	legal	obligation	of	producing	the	child	

at	the	trial.		Id. ¶	8.		We	characterized	the	defendant’s	argument	as	“a	play	on	

words,”	 noting	 that	 the	 “failures	 to	 act”	 that	 the	 defendant	 described	 were	

instead	“acts	of	evasion	.	.	.	and	deceit	.	.	.	that	caused	her	daughter	to	withhold	

testimony.”		Id. ¶¶	8,	10	(“The	State	and	[the	defendant]	are	looking	at	the	same	

conduct.		They	are	simply	describing	it	differently.”).		We	concluded	 that	 the	

State	 had	 “presented	 evidence	 of	 a	 crime	 of	 commission,	 not	 voluntary	

omission,”	 in	 the	 defendant’s	 efforts	 to	 keep	 the	 child	 from	 reaching	 the	

courthouse.		Id. ¶ 10.

[¶21]	 	 The	 crimes	 of	 omission	 to	 which	 section	 7(1)(E)	 might	 apply	

instead	 include	 the	 failure	 to	 pay	 taxes	 or	 child	 support	 due	 in	 Maine,	 for	

example—instances	 of	 criminal	 nonfeasance rather	 than	 any	 affirmative	

criminal	 act.	 	 See Model	 Penal	 Code	 &	 Commentaries § 1.03	 cmt.	 5	 at	 52-53	

(Am. Law	Inst.	1985);	cf.	Lindell,	2020	ME	49,	¶	25,	--- A.3d	--- (concluding	that	
17

the	defendant’s	affirmative	conduct	in	falsifying	tax	returns	in	Maine	allowed	

the	Maine	court	jurisdiction	over	his	prosecution	pursuant	to	section	7(1)(A)).		

[¶22]		Our	decision today is	entirely	a	function	of	our	construction	and	

application	of	 the	jurisdictional	statute	as	 the	Legislature	has	enacted	it.		For	

the	reasons	we	have	discussed,	through	its	enactments, the	Legislature	has	not	

conferred	Maine’s	courts	with	authority	to	adjudicate	the	charge	filed	against	

Sloboda.	 	In	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 basis	 for	 the	 court’s	 exercise	 of	 jurisdiction	

pursuant	to	section	7(1),	Sloboda’s	conviction	cannot	stand.9		

[¶23]		Contrary	 to	 the	State’s	suggestion,	however,	our	conclusion	 that	

Maine	 lacks	 jurisdiction	 to	 prosecute	 Sloboda	 on	 a	 charge	 of	 violating	 a	

condition	 of	 release	 for	 his	 conduct	 in	 New	 Hampshire	 does	 not	 altogether	

deprive	Maine	of	a	means	of	enforcing	its	bail	conditions.		Bail	conditions	are

imposed	“in	 order	 to	 reasonably	 ensure	 the	 appearance	 of	 the	 defendant	 as	

required,	 to	otherwise	reasonably	ensure	 the	integrity	of	 the	judicial	process	

and,	 when	 applicable,	 to	 reasonably	 ensure	 the	 safety	 of	 others	 in	 the	

community.”	 15 M.R.S.	§	1002 (2020).		Where,	as	here,	a	defendant	violates	bail	

conditions—even	in	New	Hampshire—Maine is free	to	initiate	bail	revocation	

proceedings and	 ask	 that	 the	 defendant	be	held pending	 trial.	 	See 15	M.R.S.	

 9		Because	we	agree	with	Sloboda	that	the	trial	court	lacked	subject	matter	jurisdiction,	we	do	not	

address	Sloboda’s	challenge	to	the	sufficiency	of	the	evidence	supporting	his	conviction.		
18

§§ 1095-1097	 (2020).	 	 Moreover,	 when	 a	 defendant’s	 violation	 of a bail	

condition	 constitutes a	 new	 criminal	 act—if,	 for	 example,	 Sloboda	 had	

assaulted	the	protected	individual—that	new	criminal	act	could	be	prosecuted	

as	 such	 in	 the	 appropriate	 jurisdiction.	 	This,	 however,	 does	 not	 change	 the	

conclusion that,	as	written, the	unambiguous	provisions	of	section	7(1)	do	not	

give	Maine	courts	subject	matter	jurisdiction	in	this	case.		For	us	to	conclude	

otherwise,	we	would	be	required	to	rewrite	the	statute,	and	that	we	cannot	do.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	 vacated.	 	 Remanded	 for	 entry	 of	

dismissal of	the	indictment.

HORTON,	J.,	with	whom	JABAR	and	CONNORS,	JJ.,	join,	dissenting.

[¶24]	 	I	 respectfully	 dissent	 from	 the	 Court’s	 conclusion	 that	 the	 trial	

court	lacked	statutory	jurisdiction	to	convict	Emanuel	J.	Sloboda	for	violating	

the	no-contact	bail	condition.		I	would	affirm	the	conviction	based	on	the	court’s	

jurisdiction	 over	 the	 subject	matter	 and	 Sloboda’s	 person,	 and	 based	 on	 the	

sufficiency	of	the	evidence	to	prove	the	alleged	violation	beyond	a	reasonable	

doubt.
19

[¶25]		Jurisdiction	existed	because	Sloboda’s	failure	to	comply	with	his	

conditions	of	release	fell	within	the	statutory	provision	conferring	jurisdiction	

on	the	Maine	courts	to	convict	a	defendant	of	a	crime	if	“[t]he	crime	consists	of	

the	omission	to	perform	a	duty	imposed	on	a	person	by	the	law	of	this	State,	

regardless	 of	 where	 that	 person	 is	 when	 the	 omission	 occurs,”	 17-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 7(1)(E)	(2020);	see 15	M.R.S.	§	1092	(2020).

10

[¶26]		The	bail	code authorizes	Maine	courts	 to	impose	upon	criminal	

defendants	 the duty	 to	 comply	 with	 conditions	 of	 release. See 15	 M.R.S.	

§ 1026(1),	 (3)(A)	 (2020) (authorizing	 imposition	 of	 conditions	 of	 release);	

15 M.R.S.	 §	 1092	 (criminalizing	 the	 failure	 to	 comply	 with	 conditions	 of	

release).		That	duty	is	“imposed	on	a	person”	for	purposes	of	section	7(1)(E)	

when	a	court with	jurisdiction	over	the	person issues	a	bail	bond,	commitment	

order,	and	conditions-of-release	form	consistent	with	15	M.R.S.	§	1026	(2020).		

As	is	typically	true	of	a duty	imposed	by	court	order,	Sloboda’s	duty	to	comply	

 10		Although	I	conclude	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction,	I	do	so	on	different	grounds	than	the	trial	

court.		See	Bouchard	v.	Frost,	2004	ME	9,	¶	8,	840	A.2d	109	(“[W]e	can	affirm	a	judgment	on	rationale	

different	 than	 that	 relied	 on	 by	 the	 [trial	 c]ourt.”).	 	 I	 therefore	 do	 not	 address	 the	 trial	 court’s	

conclusion	 that	 it	 had	 jurisdiction	 based	 on	 a	 “territorial	 relationship”	 between	 the	 results	 of	

Sloboda’s	conduct	and	the	State	of	Maine.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A),	(4)	(2020).		In	addition, because	

I	conclude	that	the	court	had	jurisdiction	to	convict	Sloboda	pursuant	to	17-A	M.R.S.	§ 7(1)(E)	(2020),	

I	need	not	address	the	State’s	contention	that	the	result	of	Sloboda’s	offense	occurred	in	Maine	and	

the	court	therefore	had	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(A).		But	I	would	not	foreclose	the	

possibility	that	section	7(1)(A)	was	intended	to	encompass	results	inherent	in	offenses	that	do	not	

specify	 a	 certain	 harm.	 	 See,	 e.g.,	 Brehm	 v.	 State,	 558	 N.E.2d	 906,	 907-09 (Ind.	 Ct.	 App.	 1990)

(discussing	a	statute	with	substantively	identical	“result”	language	and	reaching	a	conclusion	similar	

to	the	one	urged	by	the	State	in	this	case).
20

with	 his	 bail	 conditions,	 which	 was	 imposed	 by	 a	 court	 having	 personal	

jurisdiction	over	him,11 continued	to	apply regardless	of	where	he	was,	within	

the	meaning	of	section	7(1)(E).		See	Commonwealth	v.	Maguigan,	511	A.2d	1327,	

1332	(Pa. 1986) (explaining	that	a	criminal	court’s	personal	jurisdiction	over	

an	absent	defendant	includes	the	authority	to	compel	the	defendant	to	return	

for	 trial).		The	Court’s	observation	 that	 the	State	could	or	should	have	 filed	a	

motion	 to	 revoke	 Sloboda’s	 bail	 instead	 of	 prosecuting	 him	 implicitly	

acknowledges	 that	 his	 duty	 to	 comply	 with	 bail	 conditions	 applied	 outside	

Maine—otherwise,	there	would	be	no	basis	for	the	State	to	move	to	revoke	bail.		

See Court’s	Opinion	¶	23.

[¶27]	 	 The	 bail	 bond	 that	 Sloboda	 signed	 included	 the	 following	

provision:	“As	a	condition	of	my	release,	I shall	comply	with	any	condition(s)	

set	forth	on	the	Conditions	of	Release	form.”12		The	attached	commitment	order	

and	conditions-of-release	form	included	a	condition	prohibiting	contact	with	a	

specific	 person.	 	 The	 court	 found,	 based	 on	 competent	 evidence	 admitted	

 11		“It	is	well	settled	that	a	[criminal]	court	has	personal jurisdiction	over	any	party	who	appears	

before	it,	regardless	of	how	his	appearance	was	obtained.”		United	States	v.	Lussier,	929	F.2d	25,	27	

(1st	Cir.	1991).

12	 	 In	 signing	 the	 bail	 bond,	 Sloboda	 also	 acknowledged:	 “I	 agree	 to	 obey	 the	 following	

conditions	of	my	release	so	long	as	this	bail	bond	remains	in	effect.		I	understand	that	it	is	a	crime	

for	me	to	violate	any	of	these	conditions,	and	that	if	I	violate	these	conditions	I	will	be	subject	to	arrest,	

jail	and/or	a	fine.”		(Italic	emphasis	added.)
21

during	 a	 trial,	 that	 Sloboda	 failed	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 no-contact	 condition.		

Pursuant	 to	 the	 plain	 language	 of section	 7(1)(E),	 Sloboda’s	 conduct	

constituted	an	“omission	to	perform”	his	duty	of	compliance.		See,	e.g., State	v.	

Conroy,	2020	ME	22,	¶	19,	225	A.3d	1011 (“We	look	first	to	the	plain	language	

of	the	statute	to	determine	its	meaning	if	we	can	do	so	while	avoiding	absurd,	

illogical,	or	inconsistent	results.”).

[¶28]		Focusing	on	the	affirmative	act	constituting	the	bail	violation,	the	

Court	concludes,	to	the	contrary,	that	Sloboda’s	conduct	could	not	constitute	an	

“omission”	to	perform	a	duty	within	the	meaning	of	section	7(1)(E):

The	 essence	 of	 [the	 argument	 that	 jurisdiction	 exists	 under	

section 7(1)(E)]	is	that	Sloboda failed	to	perform	his	legal	duty	to	

comply	with	the	bail	order	by	affirmatively	acting in	violation	of	the	

bail	 order.	 	 This attempted	 application	 of	 section	 7(1)(E)	 to	

Sloboda’s	 prosecution	 is,	 however, an	 exercise	 in	 semantic	

gymnastics.

Court’s	Opinion	¶ 19.		The	Court	notes	that	“[t]he	crimes	of	omission	to	which	

section	 7(1)(E)	 might	 apply	instead	include	 the	 failure	 to	 pay	 taxes	 or	 child	

support	due	in	Maine,	for	example—instances	of	criminal	nonfeasance	rather	

than	any	affirmative	criminal	act.”		Court’s	Opinion	¶ 21.

[¶29]		The	Court’s	conclusion	is	inconsistent	with	the	language	of	the	bail	

code.		The	bail	code	defines	all	of	the	conditions	of	release	that	it	authorizes in	

mandatory	 terms	 so	 as	 to	 create	 an	 affirmative	 duty to	 comply with	 all	
22

conditions	 of	 release,	 even	 when	 the	 substantive	 effect	 of	 a	 condition	 is	

prohibitory.13		See	15	M.R.S.	§	1026(3)(A)(1)-(19).		Indeed,	the	imposition	of	a	

no-contact	condition	such	as	the	one	in	this	case	requires	a	defendant	to

[a]void	 all	 contact with	 a	 victim	 of	 the	 alleged	 crime,	 a	 potential	

witness	 regarding	 the	 alleged	 crime	 or	 with	 any	 other	 family	 or	

household	members	 of	 the	 victim	 or	 the	defendant	 or	 to	contact	

those	individuals	only	at	certain	times	or	under	certain	conditions.

15	M.R.S.	§	1026(3)(A)(5)	(emphasis	added).

[¶30]	 	 Thus,	 the	 bail	 code	 defines	 conditions of	 release	 as	 affirmative	

mandates.		A	failure	to	comply	with	a	bail	condition—even	a	failure	that	takes	

the	 form	 of	 an	 affirmative	 act—must	 therefore	 constitute	 an	 “omission	 to	

perform	 a	 duty”	 for	 purposes	 of	 section 7(1)(E).14	 	 See	 State	 v.	 Jones,	

 13	 	 For	 example,	 conditions	 that	 restrict	 residence	 or	 travel,	 impose	 a	 curfew,	 or	 prohibit	

possession	 of	 firearms	are	all	defined	in	mandatory	 rather	 than	prohibitory	 terms.		See	15	M.R.S.	

§ 1026(3)(A)(4)	(2020)	(“Abide	by	specified	restrictions	on	personal	associations,	place	of	abode	or	

travel”);	 15 M.R.S.	 § 1026(3)(A)(7)	 (2020)	 (“Comply	 with	 a	 specified	 curfew”);	 15	 M.R.S.	

§ 1026(3)(A)(8)	(2020)	(“Refrain	from	possessing	a	firearm	or	other	dangerous	weapon”).		The	plain	

effect	of	the	Legislature’s	chosen	phrasing	is	to	create	affirmative	duties	of	compliance,	such	that	a	

failure	to	comply	is	an	omission	to	perform	a	mandated	duty.

14		This	conclusion	is	consistent	with	our	decision	in	State	v.	Damon,	317	A.2d	459	(Me.	1974).		

There,	we	equated	 the	affirmative	act	of	 “[e]scape	of	 furlough”	with	 the	 “wilful	 failure	 to	 resume	

physical	confinement	at	the	Maine	State	Prison.”		Id. at	460-61.		Courts	in	other	jurisdictions	have	

also	held,	in	other	contexts,	that	defendants	omitted	to	perform	legal	duties	by	acting	affirmatively,	

as	opposed	to	by	failing	to	act.		The	District	Court	of	Appeal	of	Florida,	for	example,	concluded	that	

the	 state	 had	 jurisdiction	 to	 convict	 a	 defendant	 of	 the	 affirmative	 criminal	 act	 of	 identity	 theft	

because	the	crime	constituted	an	omission	to	perform	a	duty	to	obtain	consent	from	the	victim.		See	

State	v.	Roberts,	143	So.	3d	936,	936-39	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	2014);	see	also	Commonwealth	v.	Thompson,	

50 N.E.3d	 845,	 857-58	 (Mass.	 App.	 Ct.	 2016)	 (examining	 credit	 card	 fraud,	 discussing	 similar	

principles,	and	deciding	the	same); State	v.	James,	79	P.3d	169,	173-77	(Kan.	2003)	(concluding	that	

the	state	had	jurisdiction	where	the	defendant	violated	a	duty	to	refrain	from	mistreating	dependent	

adults	by	leaving	the	victims	in	a	hot	car,	causing	their	deaths).		The	Florida	court	also	concluded	that	

the	state	had	jurisdiction	to	convict	a	defendant	of	a	crime	prohibiting	the	removal	of	children	from	
23

673 P.2d 455,	456	(Kan.	Ct.	App.	1983)(noting	that	a	statute	extending	criminal

jurisdiction	 to	 the	 omission	 to	 perform	 a	 duty	 imposed	 on	 a	 person	 by	 law	

regardless	of	 the	person’s	location	“codifies	 the	common	law	principle	 that	a	

person	may	commit	a	crime	within	 this	 state	while	remaining	outside	it,	and	

such	crime	may	be	an	act	of	omission	as	well	as	an	act	of	commission”	(emphasis	

added)).

[¶31]	 The	 Court’s	 focus	 on	 the	 affirmative	 nature	 of	 Sloboda’s	 bail	

violation	as	the	sole	basis	for	its	conclusion	that	section	7(1)(E)	does	not	confer	

jurisdiction	implies	 a	 view	 that	 section	 7(1)(E)	would apply	if	 Sloboda’s	 bail	

violation	consisted	of a	failure to act.		Court’s	Opinion	¶¶ 19-21.		In	that	case,

section	 7(1)(E)	 would	 confer	 jurisdiction	 to	 prosecute	 out-of-state	 bail	

violations	involving	inaction	by	the	defendant,	such	as	failing	to	notify	the	court	

of	 an	 address	 change or	 to	 take	 medications	 as	 prescribed,	 but	 would	 not	

authorize	prosecution	of	out-of-state	violations	such	as	having	contact	with	an	

alleged	victim	or	committing	a	new	crime.

 

the	state	in	violation	of	a	court	order,	where	the	defendant’s	affirmative	acts	in	violation	of	the	order	

occurred	entirely	outside	of	the	state.		State	v.	Costa,	558	So.	2d	525,	526	(Fla.	Dist.	Ct.	App.	1990)	

(citing	a	territorial	applicability	statute	providing	that	“[a]n	offense	that	is	based	on	an	omission	to	

perform	a	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this	state is	committed	within	the	state,	regardless	of	the	location	

of	 the	offender	at	the	 time	of	 the	omission”	(quotation	marks	omitted));	see,	e.g.,	People	v.	Caruso,	

519 N.E.2d	 440,	 442-46	 (Ill.	 1987)	 (concluding	 that	 a	 child	 abduction	 crime	 that	 prohibited	

“violat[ing]	.	.	.	a	valid	court	order	.	.	.	by	concealing	or	detaining	[a]	child	or	removing	[a]	child	from	

the	jurisdiction	of	the	court”	was	“based	on	an	omission	to	perform	a	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this	

State”	(quotation	marks	omitted)).
24

[¶32]		But	nothing	in	either	the	bail	code	or	section	7(1)(E)	indicates	that	

the	 Legislature	 intended	 to	 confer	 jurisdiction	 over	 violations	 of	 some	

conditions	of	release	but	not	violations	of	other	conditions	of	release,	and	there	

would	be	no	cogent	basis	for	the	Legislature	to	draw	that	distinction.15		In	fact,	

it	is	the	violations	involving	affirmative	acts	that	can	result	in	direct	and	even	

lethal	 harm	 to	 victims,	 witnesses, and	 others.	 	 The	 Legislature	 cannot	 have	

intended	to	confer	jurisdiction	to	prosecute	an	out-of-state	violation	consisting	

of	 failure	 to	 take	 medications	 or	 to	 report	 an	 address	 change	 but	 not to	

prosecute	 an	 out-of-state	 violation	 consisting	 of	 contact	 (or	 worse)	 with	 an	

alleged	victim,	a	co-defendant,	or	a	witness.

[¶33]	 	 At	 oral	 argument,	 even	 Sloboda	 agreed	 that	 a	 defendant	 can	 be	

prosecuted	for	a	bail	violation	in	Maine	based	on	wholly	out-of-state	criminal	

 15		Nor	does	the	legislative	history	suggest	such	an	interpretation.		Section	7(1)(E)	incorporates	

language	present	in	section	1.03	of	 the	Model	Penal	Code.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	7(1)(E);	Model	Penal	

Code	&	 Commentaries	 §	 1.03(1)(e)	 (Am.	 Law	 Inst.	 1985)	 (providing	 for	 jurisdiction	 where	 “the	

offense	consists of	the	omission	to	perform	a	legal	duty	imposed	by	the	law	of	this	State with	respect	to	

domicile,	residence	or	a	relationship	to	a	person,	thing	or	transaction	in	the	State”	(emphasis	added)).		

Section	1.03	“propose[d]	broad	jurisdictional	bases,	within	the	limits	of	due	process,”	based	“[o]n	the	

premise[s]	that	it	is	particularly	desirable	in	a	federated	state	to	increase	jurisdictional	options	and	

that	if	a	state’s	assertion	of	jurisdiction	does	not	result	in	unfairness	to	the	person	charged,	the	state	

should	 be	 accorded	 jurisdiction	 over	 all	 those	 who	 engage	 in	 conduct	 that	 affects	 the	 state’s	

interests.”		Model	Penal	Code	&	Commentaries	§	1.03	explanatory	note	(Am.	Law	Inst.	1985).		Given	

the	 express	 notice	 to	 Sloboda	 that	 he	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 prosecution	 if	 he	 violated	 any	 of	 the	

conditions	of	his	release,	and	the	detrimental	effect	of	the	bail	violation	within	Maine,	jurisdiction	to	

convict	Sloboda	in	Maine	does	not	present	fairness	concerns.		See	Strassheim	v.	Daily,	221	U.S.	280,	

284-85	(1911);	United	States	v.	Woodward,	149	F.3d	46,	66	&	n.11	(1st	Cir.	1998);	State	v.	Vetrano,	

121	Me.	368,	380,	117	A.	460	(1922).
25

conduct	committed	while	on	bail.16		His	acknowledgment	is	significant	because	

a	 condition	 prohibiting	 criminal	 conduct	 is	 no	 different,	 for	 purposes	 of	

section 7(1)(E),	from	a	condition	prohibiting	contact	with	a	specific	person.		See

State	 v.	 West,	 512	 N.W.2d	 207,	 208-09	 (Wis.	 Ct.	 App.	 1993) (holding	 that	 a	

defendant	who	violated	a	Wisconsin	bail	order	by	committing	a	crime	in	Ohio	

could	 be	 prosecuted	 in	 Wisconsin	 for	 the	 crime	 of	 “bail	 jumping”);	see	 also

15 M.R.S.	§ 1026(1)	(providing	that	“[e]very	order	for	the	pretrial	release	of	any	

defendant	must	include	.	.	.	the	condition[] that	the	defendant	refrain	from	new	

criminal	conduct”).

[¶34]	 	 The	 Court’s	 interpretation	 means	 that	 defendants	 whose	 bail	

conditions	prohibit	them	from	having	contact	with	out-of-state	alleged	victims,	

co-defendants, or	 witnesses; from	 possession	 of	 firearms	 or	 dangerous	

weapons; from	consuming	alcoholic	beverages; from	operating	motor	vehicles;

from	accessing	the	Internet; or	from	engaging	in	any	other	non-criminal	activity	

can	 circumvent	 prosecution	 simply	 by	 violating	 those	 conditions	 in	 another	

 16		Sloboda	gave	the	following	example:	“Say	it’s	a	domestic	case,	and	some	parent	neglects	their	

child.		They’re	prosecuted	in	New	Hampshire	 .	 .	 .	 .	They’re	convicted.		You	 take	 that	conviction	 to	

Maine	and	then	you	prosecute	them	under	the	Maine	bail	order and	say,	‘See,	you	didn’t	follow	your	

Maine	bail	order;	you	were	convicted	of	a	crime.’”		In	response	to	a	question	about	whether	the	State	

could	enforce	bail	conditions	by	moving	to	revoke	bail,	Sloboda	replied,	“Of	course,	or	by	proving	that	

he	had	contact	in	Rochester	[New	Hampshire];	New	Hampshire	gives	full	faith	and	credit	to	the	Maine	

order;	he’s	convicted	of	violating	a	legal	order	in	New	Hampshire;	you	take	that	certified	conviction	

to	Maine,	and	then	prosecute	him.”
26

jurisdiction.		To	protect	the	State’s	ability	to	prosecute	bail	violations,	it	would	

be	understandable	for	prosecutors	to	ask	more	frequently	for	bail	conditions	

prohibiting	defendants	 from	leaving	 the	State	 of	Maine,	although	 the	Court’s	

interpretation	now	calls	into	question	whether	a	defendant	subject	 to	such	a	

condition	could	be	prosecuted	for	leaving	the	state.

[¶35]	 	 Finally,	 beyond	 the	 bail	 context,	 the	 Court’s	 interpretation	 of	

section	7(1)(E)	also	calls	into	question	whether	a	defendant	who	affirmatively	

violates	a	Maine	protection	order	can	be	prosecuted	if	the	defendant	and	the	

plaintiff	are	both	outside	the	state	at	the	time.		See 17-A	M.R.S.	§	506-B	(2020);	

see	 also 5	 M.R.S.	 §	 4659(1)	 (2020);	 15	 M.R.S.	 §	 321(6)	(2020);	 19-A	 M.R.S.	

§ 4011(1),	(4)	(2020).		If	the	order	were	a	qualifying	protection	order,	the	full	

faith	and	credit	provision	of	the	United	States	Code	would	authorize	the	state	

in	 which	 the	 violation	 occurred	 to	 prosecute,	 see	 18	 U.S.C.S.	 §	 2265	

(LEXIS through	 Pub. L. No.	 116-149),	 but	 that	 state	 might	 not,	 and	 Maine	

definitely	could	not	under	the	Court’s	interpretation.

[¶36]	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 I	 would	 affirm,	 because	 the	 court	 had	

jurisdiction and the	record	evidence	was	sufficient	to	support	the	conviction.
27

Harry	 Center,	 Esq.	 (orally),	 Woodman	 Edmands	 Danylik	 Austin	 Smith	 &	

Jacques,	P.A.,	Biddeford,	for	appellant	Emanuel	J.	Sloboda

Kathryn	 Loftus	 Slattery,	 District	 Attorney,	 and	 Andrew	 E.	 Berggren,	 Esq.	

(orally),	Prosecutorial	District	#1,	Alfred,	for	appellee	State	of	Maine

Aaron	M.	Frey,	Attorney	General,	and	Laura	A.	Yustak,	Asst.	Atty.	Gen.,	Office	of	

the	Attorney	General,	Augusta,	for	amicus	curiae	Office	of	the	Maine	Attorney	

General

Jeff	Goldman,	Esq.,	Morgan,	Lewis	&	 Bockius	 LLP,	 Boston,	Massachusetts,	 for	

amicus	curiae	AEquitas

Lawrence	C.	Winger,	amicus	curiae	pro	se

York	County	Unified	Criminal	Docket	docket	number	CR-2018-1073

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY