SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-1024-20

WALTER TORMASI,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

___________________________

Submitted December 8, 2021 – Remanded January 26, 2022

Resubmitted February 15, 2022 – Decided August 18, 2022

Before Judges Hoffman, Whipple and Susswein.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of 

Corrections.

Walter Tormasi, appellant pro se.

Matthew J. Platkin, Acting Attorney General, attorney 

for respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Christopher C. Josephson, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-1024-20

Walter Tormasi, a State Prison inmate, appeals from a final agency 

decision by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), denying his 

request to file a patent infringement lawsuit against a computer company that he 

alleges has infringed upon his patent. We were previously "constrained to 

remand for DOC to clarify whether it approved or denied Tormasi's request [to 

file a patent infringement lawsuit], and if denied, to provide a statement of 

reasons to permit meaningful appellate review." Tormasi v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 

A-1024-20 (Jan. 26, 2022) (slip op. at 2). We retained jurisdiction. Id. at 8. 

On February 2, 2022, DOC issued a revised decision and denied Tormasi's 

request. After carefully reviewing the record in light of the governing legal 

principles, we affirm.

We presume the parties are familiar with the facts underlying this case. 

We add that on January 26, 2022, we remanded to DOC for clarification on 

whether the agency denied Tormasi's request to file a patent infringement 

lawsuit. Id. at 2, 8. We determined that,

[i]n this instance, the Administrator's initial response 

was so cryptic that we cannot even be sure whether it 

constitutes an acceptance or denial of Tormasi's request

[to file a patent infringement lawsuit]. The replies to 

Tormasi's two administrative appeals via the electronic 

grievance system shed no light on the situation and 

reveal little more than the administration's irritation 

with Tormasi's persistence.
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[Id. at 6–7.]

We further directed 

DOC to issue a clarified final decision within forty-five 

days of [our] decision. We offer[ed] no opinion on 

whether permission to file a patent infringement action 

in federal court should be granted. If the final agency 

decision is to deny Tormasi's request for permission to 

file a patent infringement suit, that decision shall 

include a statement of findings of fact and law that are 

sufficiently detailed to permit meaningful appellate 

review.

[Id. at 8.] 

On February 2, 2022, in response to our remand, DOC issued a final 

decision, denying Tormasi's request because he was in violation of the "nobusiness" rule. In rendering its decision, DOC noted that pursuant to N.J.A.C. 

10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(xviii) (.705),1"[t]he [d]epartment's 'no business' rule prohibits 

inmates from commencing or operating a business without prior approval from 

the Administrator." DOC noted that Tormasi had been violating the no-business 

rule since 2005, which is when he formed a company called Advanced Data 

Solutions Corp. (ADS); he never sought prior approval from the Administrator 

1

 We note that DOC's final agency decision indicates that the "no-business" rule 

is codified at N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(xix) (.705). Our research shows the "nobusiness" rule is found in N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(xviii) (.705).
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A-1024-20

to form ADS. DOC also recognized that multiple federal courts have determined 

that he was violating the no-business rule. See, e.g., Tormasi v. Hayman, 443 

F. App'x 742 (3d Cir. 2011). In particular, DOC was persuaded by the Federal 

Circuit's 2020 decision that concluded:

Mr. Tormasi's lawsuit is in furtherance of his 

intellectual property business by taking certain business 

actions purely to preserve the commercial value of his 

intellectual property . . . . For instance, Mr. Tormasi 

asserts that he took "precautionary measures to ensure 

that [his] intellectual property remained enforceable, 

licensable, and sellable to the fullest extent possible

. . . ." Mr. Tormasi further asserts that "[t]he purpose 

of [one of his] transfer[s] in ownership was to permit 

[himself] to . . . personally benefit from, an 

infringement action against WDC and other entities

. . . ." Mr. Tormasi then sued WDC for infringing the

'301 patent and sought damages of at least $5 billion

. . . . Accordingly, Mr. Tormasi's patent infringement 

suit is in furtherance of operating an intellectual 

property business for profit, and, therefore, prohibited 

under the "no business" rule.

[Tormasi v. W. Digit. Corp., 825 F. App'x 783, 788

(Fed. Cir. 2020).]

On February 15, 2022, we received a letter from Tormasi that contained 

DOC's final decision. Tormasi's letter also requested that his appeal be resubmitted. In his original appeal, Tormasi raised the following contention:
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A-1024-20

POINT I

THE DEPARTMENT OVERSTEPPED ITS BOUNDS 

IN REFUSING TO APPROVE TORMASI'S 

LAWSUITS FOR FILING/LITIGATION.

A. LEGAL STANDARDS GOVERNING DOC 

RULING

B. ALLOWANCE OF INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY 

THEFT

C. INJURY TO U.S. PATENT SYSTEM AND ITS 

BENEFICIARIES

D. INCONSISTENCY WITH PRIOR DOC RULING 

E. VIOLATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULES 

AND REGULATIONS

[Tormasi, A-1024-20 (slip op. at 5).]

We begin our analysis by acknowledging certain basic principles 

governing this appeal. The scope of our review of a final agency action is 

limited. See R. 2:2-3(a)(2). A final agency action will be reversed only if it is 

"arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial 

credible evidence in the record as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 

N.J. 571, 580 (1980) (citing Campbell v. Dep't of Civ. Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 

(1963)). In applying this highly deferential standard, courts inquire into 

"whether the decision conforms with relevant law, whether there is substantial 
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credible evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's decision, and 

whether in applying the relevant law to the facts, the agency clearly erred in 

reaching its conclusion." In re State & Sch. Emps.' Health Benefits Comm'ns' 

Implementation of Yucht, 233 N.J. 267, 280 (2018). 

Importantly, the agency is required to make findings of fact and give a 

statement of reasons. 

[D]eference does not require that we forego a careful 

review of administrative decisions simply because an 

agency has exercised its expertise. We cannot accept 

without question an agency's conclusory statements, 

even when they represent an exercise in agency 

expertise. The agency is "obliged . . . 'to tell us why.'"' 

[Balagun v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 361 N.J. Super. 199, 

202–03 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting In re Valley Hosp., 

240 N.J. Super. 301, 306 (App. Div. 1990))]. 

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(xviii) (.705) (the "no-business" 

rule) an inmate "commencing or operating a business or group for profit or 

commencing or operating a nonprofit enterprise without the approval of the 

Administrator" is subject to disciplinary actions or sanctions. Here, DOC denied 

Tormasi's request because he has been violating the no-business rule since 2005, 

the year in which he formed ADS without prior approval from the Administrator. 

Additionally, DOC concluded, in reliance on the Federal Circuit's decision, that 

filing a patent-infringement lawsuit on behalf of ADS would be in furtherance 
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of his intellectual property business, and therefore would be a violation of the 

no-business rule. 

The record before us supports DOC's determination that Tormasi never 

sought approval from the Administrator to operate ADS. Further, filing a patentinfringement lawsuit would be an attempt to preserve the commercial value of 

his intellectual property, which is clear evidence of operating a business for 

profit. See Tormasi, 825 F. App'x at 788. Accordingly, Tormasi has failed to 

show that DOC has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably in denying 

his request. We are satisfied, moreover, that the agency's final decision is 

supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(D). To the extent we have not addressed them, any remaining arguments 

raised by Tormasi lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written 

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.