UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4154

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

TREVIN MAURICE GIBSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4169

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL RONDALE GIBSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4183

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.
2

DESHAUN ENTREA SPRUILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Greenville. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (4:12-cr-00075-D-1; 4:12-cr-00075-D-2; 

4:12-cr-00075-D-4)

Argued: September 17, 2015 Decided: October 22, 2015

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Shedd joined.

ARGUED: Eric Joseph Brignac, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC 

DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Yvonne 

Victoria Watford-McKinney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, 

Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Terry F. Rose, 

Smithfield, North Carolina for Appellant Trevin Maurice Gibson. 

Brian M. Aus, BRIAN AUS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Durham, North 

Carolina, for Appellant Michael Rondale Gibson. Thomas G. 

Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Circuit Judge:

Deshaun Spruill, Michael Gibson, and Trevin Gibson 

(collectively, the defendants) each pleaded guilty to two counts 

of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime 

of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In their 

consolidated appeals, they present the following issues: (1) 

whether Spruill’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable; (2) 

whether Michael Gibson’s and Trevin Gibson’s sentences are 

substantively unreasonable; and (3) whether Trevin Gibson’s 

sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation 

of the Eighth Amendment. Upon review of the defendants’ 

sentences, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

I.

The defendants participated in a number of armed robberies 

between September 2011 and January 2012, which occurred at “fast 

food” restaurants throughout the eastern part of North Carolina. 

Trevin Gibson and Michael Gibson participated in, respectively, 

ten and five robberies. Deshaun Spruill participated in ten 

robberies and one additional robbery attempt.

In each of these robberies, various defendants, with their 

faces concealed by hooded sweatshirts, bandanas, or masks, 

entered a fast food restaurant brandishing firearms and knives. 

One defendant escorted the store manager at gunpoint to open the 

restaurant’s safe, while the remaining defendants stayed in the 
4

front of the restaurant and removed cash from the cash 

registers. The government described the robbery spree as a 

“reign of terror” across multiple jurisdictions, which required 

the use of substantial law enforcement resources and the 

coordination of multiple law enforcement agencies.

In June 2012, the defendants were charged with 16 counts of 

robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and 16 counts of 

using firearms during the robberies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1).1 Under their respective plea agreements, each 

defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of using or carrying a 

firearm during a crime of violence under Section 924(c)(1), in 

exchange for the government dismissing the other charges. These 

counts of conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of 

five years’ imprisonment for the first offense and 25 years’ 

imprisonment for the second offense, to be served consecutively. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (C), (D). The government and each 

defendant agreed that the advisory guideline sentence for each 

defendant was the statutory minimum of 30 years’ imprisonment. 

The district court accepted the defendants’ guilty pleas, and 

 1 Five defendants were accused of participating in this 

spree. Codefendant Marcus Garrett did not file an appeal of his 

conviction or his sentence. This Court dismissed codefendant 

Prentise Wilkins’ appeal pursuant to a valid waiver of his 

appellate rights. See United States v. Wilkins, 604 F. App’x. 

322, 323 (4th Cir. 2015).
5

found each of the three defendants guilty of the two firearms

charges.

Spruill received a 396-month sentence, which upwardly 

departed from the advisory guideline sentence of 360 months. 

Spruill argued at the sentencing hearing that the minimum 

sentence allowed by statute would be sufficient punishment, 

because he had a difficult family background and no criminal 

record, had graduated from high school and enrolled in community 

college, had committed to enlisting in the Army, and had 

accepted responsibility for his actions. The district court 

explained that it had “considered all arguments [Spruill’s] 

lawyer [had] made,” but found that other factors warranted an 

upward departure. The court found that Spruill had participated 

in eight robberies and one attempted robbery, in addition to the 

two robberies forming the basis of Spruill’s firearms 

convictions.

The court explained that the robbery spree “terrorized” the 

victims who were “making minimum wage” and “trying to live an 

honest life,” and attributed Spruill’s criminal conduct to his 

own “greed.” During the sentencing hearing, the district court 

commented that Spruill had exhibited a “smirk,” which indicated 

that Spruill felt “no remorse at all.” Based on these factors, 

the district court concluded that “society needs to be protected 

from [Spruill].” The court relied on the dismissed robbery and 
6

firearms counts to apply U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21, which allowed the 

court to upwardly depart “to reflect the actual seriousness of 

the offense based on conduct underlying a charge dismissed as 

part of a plea agreement.” In sentencing Spruill for the first 

count of conviction, the court upwardly departed from the 

guideline sentence of 60 months, and imposed a sentence of 96 

months. On the second count, the court imposed the guideline 

sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment.

The district court also applied an upward departure in 

sentencing Michael Gibson. At the sentencing hearing, Michael 

Gibson argued that the guideline sentence was an appropriate 

sentence based on his youth, his substance abuse problems, and 

his acceptance of responsibility. Disagreeing with this 

argument, the government asked the court to consider a 

photograph from the September 3, 2011 robbery, which depicted a 

victim whose countenance reflected an “absolute vision of fear.” 

The district court considered the violent nature of the 

robberies, the vulnerability of the victims, Michael Gibson’s 

criminal history, and the dismissed robbery and firearms counts, 

and found that “serious punishment” was required “to reflect the 

serious nature of his crimes” and to “protect society.” The 

district court cited the dismissed robbery and firearms charges 

and applied a Section 5K2.21 upward departure from the guideline 

sentence of 60 months and sentenced Michael Gibson to 132 months 
7

on the first firearms count. The court imposed the guideline 

sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment on the second firearms 

count.

The district court imposed a greater sentence on Trevin 

Gibson than the sentences received by any of his codefendants. 

When Trevin Gibson participated in the first two robberies, he 

was still in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), serving 

a sentence in home detention for breaking and entering a 

sporting goods store and stealing 12 firearms. After his 

release from BOP custody, while on supervised release, Trevin 

Gibson participated in eight more robberies, bringing his total 

participation to ten robberies. Ultimately, Trevin Gibson was 

convicted of two firearms charges arising from robberies 

committed while he was on supervised release.

At his sentencing hearing, Trevin Gibson argued that the 

guideline sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment was sufficient, 

especially considering the likely revocation of supervised 

release in his prior criminal case. However, he did not offer 

any particular mitigating reason that would have justified a 

more lenient sentence than those already imposed on Michael 

Gibson or Spruill. At the hearing, the government gave a vivid 

description of the robbery spree. In addition to describing the 

“reign of terror” that these robberies caused and the 

substantial law enforcement resources expended, the government 
8

highlighted Trevin Gibson’s prior criminal history and his 

participation in some of the robberies while still in BOP 

custody.

The district court found that Trevin Gibson’s commission of 

the first two robberies while in BOP custody, and his commission 

of eight more robberies while on supervised release, reflected a 

complete lack of respect for the law. In addition, the district 

court discussed the severity of the robberies, their effect on 

the victims, and the likelihood that Trevin Gibson would engage 

in recidivist conduct. Taking into account Trevin Gibson’s age, 

education, and “the entire record in this case,” the court 

applied a Section 5K2.21 upward departure. As a result, Trevin 

Gibson received a sentence of 216 months’ imprisonment on the 

first firearms count, increased from the guideline sentence of 

60 months. He also received the guideline sentence of 300 

months’ imprisonment on the second firearms count, which yielded 

a cumulative consecutive sentence of 516 months’ imprisonment 

for the two offenses. This appeal followed. 

II.

The defendants each present different arguments regarding 

their respective sentences and the reasons why those sentences 

should be vacated and the cases remanded for resentencing. 

Accordingly, we will address those arguments separately.
9

A.

Deshaun Spruill argues on appeal that the district court 

imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence, in that the court 

failed to address directly the arguments that Spruill raised at 

sentencing. Spruill asks that we adopt the Seventh Circuit’s 

holding in United States v. Villegas-Miranda, and conclude that 

a district court must address all the sentencing arguments 

raised by a defendant that are “not so weak as not to merit 

discussion.” 579 F.3d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United 

States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Assuming, without deciding, that we would adopt such a 

rule, the rule still would be inapplicable to the arguments that 

Spruill raised at his sentencing hearing. The Seventh Circuit 

cases on which Spruill relies require only that a district court 

explain its rejection of a particular legal principle raised by 

a defendant. See Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d at 803–04 (holding 

that a district court must address an argument that a defendant 

is entitled to credit for time served in state custody); 

Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679 (vacating a district court sentence 

for failing to address the defendant’s argument for a 

“diminished capacity” departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13). Here, 

however, Spruill did not advance arguments invoking any 

particular legal principle or doctrine. Rather, Spruill’s 

factual arguments, which included his enrollment in community 
10

college and his commitment to enlist in the Army, concerned the 

appropriate weight to be accorded the circumstances of his 

personal history under the Section 3553(a) factors. Therefore, 

we do not give further consideration to Spruill’s request that 

we adopt certain procedures imposed by the Seventh Circuit, and 

turn to consider his Section 3553(a) arguments under our own 

circuit precedent.

We have held that a district court must consider the 

statutory factors and explain the reasons for its sentence, but 

that the court need not explicitly reference Section 3553(a) or 

discuss on the record every statutory factor. United States v. 

Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court 

is required only to make an individualized assessment that is 

adequate to allow meaningful appellate review. United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, we 

infer that the district court has considered all relevant 

arguments presented at the sentencing hearing, especially when 

the court states on the record that it has done so. See Rita v. 

United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358–59 (2007) (holding that the 

sentencing judge is not required to state explicitly that he has 

heard and considered all arguments when “[t]he record makes 

clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument”).

At Spruill’s sentencing, the district court expressly 

stated that it had considered “all arguments [Spruill’s] lawyer 
11

has made” and “all [Section 3553(a)] factors” before sentencing 

Spruill. Those statements by the district court demonstrate 

that the court considered and rejected Spruill’s arguments. Id.

at 358. In addition, the court found that the “smirk” Spruill 

exhibited before the court was evidence of his lack of remorse, 

and indicated a need for incarceration to deter Spruill from 

engaging in future criminal activity. When the district court 

applied an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.21, the court 

primarily relied on the nature and seriousness of the dismissed 

robbery and firearms counts. Considered as a whole, this record 

shows that the district court made an individualized assessment 

and gave an adequate explanation of its reasons for imposing 

Spruill’s particular sentence. See Carter, 564 F.3d at 330. We 

thus conclude that Spruill’s sentence was not procedurally 

unreasonable.

B.

Michael Gibson argues that his sentence of 432 months’ 

imprisonment was substantively unreasonable. He contends that 

the district court failed to consider his youth as a mitigating 

factor, overstated the seriousness of his youthful criminal 

history, and failed to consider the “effect of aging” in 

determining the likelihood that he would commit additional 

criminal acts if released. We address each of these arguments 

in turn.
12

This Court reviews the substantive reasonableness of a 

district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion, taking into 

account the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 56 (2007); United States v. Morace, 594 

F.3d 340, 345–46 (4th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court also has 

held that the abuse-of-discretion standard requires that 

appellate courts reject the use of rigid percentage-based 

formulas when evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a 

non-guideline sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47–49.

We conclude that Michael Gibson has not shown that the 

district court failed to consider his relative youth during the 

sentencing hearing. The district court stated on the record 

that it had “considered all arguments [Michael Gibson’s] lawyer 

has made.” This record is sufficient to show that the district 

court actually considered the argument concerning Michael 

Gibson’s relative youth presented at the sentencing hearing. 

See Rita, 551 U.S. at 358–59; see also discussion supra Part 

II.A.

Additionally, we conclude that Michael Gibson’s reliance on 

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005), and United States 

v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014), is unavailing. 

Unlike the defendant in Simmons, who was sentenced to the death 

penalty for acts committed as a juvenile, Michael Gibson was 

sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and received an upward 
13

departure, for crimes he committed at 19 years of age. Although 

this Court in Howard cautioned district courts against 

“focus[ing] extensively on a [juvenile criminal record] . . . at 

the expense of a reasoned analysis of other pertinent factors,” 

773 F.3d at 531, Michael Gibson’s criminal history only includes 

one crime committed before his eighteenth birthday, and the 

district court mentioned that marijuana offense only in passing 

while focusing on his more serious adult convictions and on 

other Section 3553(a) factors. And nothing in the record 

supports a conclusion that the court focused on that single 

marijuana offense “at the expense of a reasoned analysis of 

other pertinent factors.” Id. Accordingly, we conclude that 

the district court did not fail to consider Michael Gibson’s 

youth as a factor in determining his appropriate sentence.

Michael Gibson next argues that a total sentence of 30 

years would have been sufficient in his case. He notes that if 

he were given such a sentence he would be over 50 years old at 

the time of his release, and that, generally, statistics show 

that the incidence of recidivism drops significantly for 

offenders over 45 years old. See Howard, 773 F.3d at 533 

(collecting studies). We are not persuaded by this argument. 

Statistical correlations among large populations will not 

undermine the validity of a district court’s careful, 

individualized assessment of a particular defendant convicted of 
14

a particular crime. We therefore turn to review the factors 

that the district court actually cited when sentencing Michael 

Gibson.

The district court emphasized the serious nature of the 

robberies, the vulnerability of the victims, and Michael 

Gibson’s failure to “turn away from a criminal lifestyle” after 

his prior convictions. Michael Gibson’s sentence of 432 months 

for the two firearms convictions reflects a 20-percent increase 

over the combined guideline sentence for both counts. His 

attempt to focus solely on the district court’s greater upward 

departure on the first count ignores Gall’s directive that 

substantive reasonableness be evaluated by examining the 

totality of the circumstances without “rigid mathematical 

formulation.” 552 U.S. at 47–51. Moreover, without a plea 

agreement, Michael Gibson would have faced a statutory minimum 

of an additional 75 years’ imprisonment for the three dismissed 

firearms counts that provided part of the basis for the Section 

5K2.21 departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C). Therefore, we 

conclude that the imposition of a six-year upward departure for 

the three dismissed firearms counts and the five robbery counts 

was not an abuse of discretion, and that Michael Gibson’s 36-
15

year sentence is substantively reasonable under the totality of 

the circumstances.2

C.

Trevin Gibson argues that his sentence of 43 years is 

substantively unreasonable and violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We first 

analyze the substantive reasonableness of the sentence before 

turning to the constitutional question. 

Trevin Gibson’s central contention regarding substantive 

reasonableness is that the factual record was insufficient to 

support the 13-year upward departure imposed by the district 

court. As discussed above, we review the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion under an 

analysis of the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51. 

The district court found that Trevin Gibson’s participation 

in the robbery spree while still serving a sentence in BOP 

custody and on supervised release reflected “utter and sheer 

disrespect for the law,” and indicated a high risk of recidivism 

 2 Because the district court did not err in calculating 

Michael Gibson’s advisory guideline sentence, and we determine 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying 

a Section 5K2.21 departure, we need not address Michael Gibson’s 

argument that the court’s alternative variant sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. 
16

if he were to receive only the minimum punishment afforded by 

statute. The court also discussed Trevin Gibson’s participation 

in eight other robberies in the same spree, and concluded that 

“these violent, despicable acts” warranted an upward departure 

in sentence. Trevin Gibson’s eight dismissed firearms counts 

would have carried a mandatory minimum of 200 years of 

additional imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), but the 

district court applied only a 13-year upward departure under 

Section 5K2.21. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court listed sufficient reasons, complete with citations to the 

record, to support the substantive reasonableness of the upward 

departure.

Trevin Gibson argues, nevertheless, that the guideline 

sentence already accounted for his criminal history and the 

nature of the typical armed robbery, with the result that the 

district court unreasonably “double counted” those factors in 

imposing the upward departure of 13 years. However, contrary to 

Trevin Gibson’s characterization of the sentencing proceedings, 

the district court only counted these factors once, because 

neither factor raised the advisory guideline sentence from the 

statutory mandatory minimum. And, in any event, the sentencing 

guidelines permit double counting unless expressly prohibited, 

which was not the case here. See United States v. RiveraSantana, 668 F.3d 95, 102 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a single 
17

prior conviction may properly be used to calculate two upward 

departures, an upward variance, and a sixteen-level enhancement, 

because the guidelines do not prohibit such multiple counting); 

see also United States v. Crawford, 18 F.3d 1173, 1179 (4th Cir. 

1994) (holding that “double counting is permissible under the 

guidelines except where it is expressly prohibited”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that Trevin 

Gibson’s sentence is substantively reasonable.

Trevin Gibson also argues that his sentence of 43 years 

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. We disagree. 

Although the Eighth Amendment requires proportionality in 

punishment, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth 

Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly

disproportionate to the crime.” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 

59–60 (2010) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Cobler, 

748 F.3d 570, 575 (4th Cir. 2014). And the Supreme Court has 

identified only one such grossly disproportionate sentence of 

imprisonment, in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983), in 

which the defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole for a single conviction for 

passing a bad check in the amount of $100. Id. at 281–82. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court even has upheld under the Eighth 

Amendment a sentence of 25 years to life imprisonment for a 
18

single non-violent crime of shoplifting $1,200 worth of golf 

clubs. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 18-20 (2003) 

(plurality opinion). 

In contrast, Trevin Gibson was sentenced to a term of 43 

years’ imprisonment for two firearms offenses related to armed 

robberies, which were part of a robbery spree involving multiple 

violent crimes that “terrorized” several communities, and were 

committed while he was in home detention or on supervised 

release for another serious firearms offense. Trevin Gibson was 

responsible for over $5,000 in victim losses attributable to his 

crimes of conviction, and over $15,000 in victim losses related 

to the dismissed robberies. Therefore, we hold that, under the 

Supreme Court’s proportionality decisions and our decision in 

Cobler, Trevin Gibson’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate 

to his criminal conduct, even if considered solely with 

reference to the two counts of conviction. Accordingly, we 

conclude that his sentence does not violate the Eighth 

Amendment.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm the sentences of Deshaun 

Spruill, Michael Gibson, and Trevin Gibson.

AFFIRMED