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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ELWOOD F. MENEAR, and :

MARJORIE MENEAR, h/w : CIVIL ACTION

:

Plaintiffs, : NO. 03-4756

:

v. :

:

U.S. AIRWAYS, INC., and :

TINA PERRY :

:

Defendants. :

:

O R D E R

AND NOW, this day of October, 2003, upon

consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand (Doc. 3),

Defendant’s Response, and Plaintiff’s Supplemental Pleading, it

is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED for the

reasons set forth below.

I. Background

This case arises, in part, from events that unfolded at

an airline security checkpoint on January 13, 2002. Plaintiff is

a commercial airplane pilot employed by Defendant U.S. Airways,

Inc. Plaintiff was arrested when, angered at his treatment by

airport security personnel, he stated that he could “take [a]

plane down in his underwear” if he so desired. The Plaintiffs

brought their action for, amongst other things, negligence,

malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, in state court,

where the Defendants removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The

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Plaintiffs ask this Court for remand. The Defendants argue that

they belong in this Court on two grounds; first that the field of

aviation security is completely preempted by federal law and

second, that the claim arises out of a collective bargaining

agreement giving this Court jurisdiction under the Railway Labor

Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

II. Federal Preemption of Aviation Security

The well-pleaded complaint rule states, in essence, that a

defendant may not remove to federal court a plaintiff’s claims

unless the claims present a federal question on their face. The

well-pleaded complaint rule does not apply in cases of “complete

preemption.” The Third Circuit permits removal where (1) a

federal statute has civil enforcement provisions “within the

scope of which plaintiff’s claims fall,” and (2) there is a clear

congressional intent to allow removal. Goepel v. National Postal

Mail Handlers Union, 36 F.3d 306, 311 (3d Cir. 1994). Defendants

cite Abdullah v. American Airlines, 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999),

which held that the field of aviation security is preempted by

federal law. Aviation security may be governed exclusively by

federal law; this is a different issue, however, than whether

state common law claims arising from the behavior of security

personnel may be removed. Even Abdullah notes that, at least so

far as injuries on aircraft are concerned, “plaintiffs may

recover damages under state and territorial remedial schemes.” 

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Id. at 368. In short, although the FAA may be a defense to some

claims, and it may state the appropriate standard of care for

others, it does not compel removal. 

III. The Railway Labor Act

Defendants correctly observe that the RLA completely

preempts issues relating to collective bargaining agreements

between unions representing air carriers and their employees. 

RLA preemption only occurs, however, when a claim requires

interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement; the claims

here do not meet this standard. The mere fact that a collective

bargaining agreement existed between the two parties is not

enough to confer original jurisdiction on this Court - and it is

certainly not enough to justify disturbing the Plaintiff’s choice

of forum. The claims at bar appear to be grounded in tortuous

misconduct - not contractual obligations. Plaintiff’s statement

at the security checkpoint may have been ill-conceived, but it

was not an “employment grievance” as the Defendants claim. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s detention at the security checkpoint by

Defendant and the Philadelphia Police was not a form of employee

discipline. The detention of Plaintiff may or may not have been

justified by the circumstances - but the fact that he was a pilot

who happened to work for the Defendant does not, by itself, bring

his dispute into the purview of his collective bargaining

agreement. Thus, without more, the RLA cannot be invoked to

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create jurisdiction in this case.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Remand is GRANTED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_______________________________

 Clarence C. Newcomer, S.J. 

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