J-A25031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JAMES W. SCOTT, JR. AND 

CATHARINE M. SCOTT 

Appellants

v.

SUNOCO PIPELINE, L.P.

Appellee

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 369 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered January 29, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-CV-05654-QT

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2021

Appellants, James W. Scott, Jr. and Catharine M. Scott, appeal from the 

order entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, which granted 

summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Sunoco Pipeline, L.P., in this quiet 

title action. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:

[Appellants] are the current owners of 0.48 acres of 

property located at 41 Woodbine Drive, Hershey, 

Pennsylvania 17033 (“Subject Property”). On April 29, 

1936, then owners of the Subject Property, Martin B. Nye 

and Agnes M. Nye, entered into a Right of Way Agreement 

with respect to the Subject Property with Keystone Pipe Line 

Company (“1936 Easement”). Under the 1936 Easement, 

Keystone Pipe Line obtained an easement over and through 

the Subject Property to lay a pipe line, and maintain, 

operate, repair and remove said line over a portion of the 

Property. The easement states that any additional pipelines 

shall be within 50 feet of any then existing line. Pursuant 

to the 1936 Easement, a pipeline was installed on the 
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Subject Property and was a part of the Mariner East pipeline 

system. 

Prior to the initiation of the instant case, [Appellee, the 

successor in interest to Keystone,] sought to build a new 

pipeline, known as Mariner East 2, which was to run parallel 

to the existing Mariner East pipeline system, including 

across the Subject Property. ... By letter dated June 17, 

2015, [Appellee] advised [Appellants] that it intended to 

exercise its right to lay additional pipelines on the Subject 

Property pursuant to the 1936 Easement and enclosed 

payment for [Appellee]’s exercise of its additional line 

rights, as required by the 1936 Easement. 

On July 22, 2016, [Appellants] commenced this action by 

filing an Action to Quiet Title, requesting that the [c]ourt 

enter an Order declaring that [Appellee] has no right, title, 

lien, or interest in [Appellants’] Property beyond the fifty 

feet in width and depth of the existing pipeline and seeking 

a permanent injunction against [Appellee] asserting any 

adverse claim to [Appellants’] title in the Property. 

(Trial Court Opinion, filed January 29, 2020, at 1-2) (internal footnote 

omitted) (emphasis added). 

On August 22, 2016, Appellee filed an answer with new matter and 

counterclaims for ejectment, quiet title (in the alternative), declaratory 

judgment, and breach of contract. Appellants filed preliminary objections to 

Appellee’s counterclaim for breach of contract, which the court overruled on 

March 3, 2017. On May 17, 2017, Appellants filed a motion for an emergency 

hearing, requesting an injunction against Appellee from installing the new 

pipeline beyond 50 feet in depth. Pursuant to Appellants’ motion, the court 

conducted an emergency hearing on May 30, 2017, and ultimately denied 

Appellants’ injunction request. Appellee subsequently constructed the new 
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pipeline, installing it within 50 feet of either side of the existing pipeline as 

measured horizontally but at a depth of 118 feet. 

On July 30, 2019, the court issued a notice of proposed termination of 

the case due to docket inactivity. In response, Appellants filed a statement 

on August 14, 2019, of their intention to proceed. On September 19, 2019, 

Appellants filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint in which they 

sought to raise additional causes of action against Appellee and to join 

Precision Pipeline, LLC, a contractor involved in the construction of Mariner 

East 2, as a defendant.1 Following a status hearing on September 25, 2019, 

the court entered an order directing the parties to file cross-motions for 

summary judgment on or before October 25, 2019. Additionally, the court 

entered an order, by stipulation of the parties, that action on Appellants’ 

motion to file an amended complaint be stayed pending disposition of the 

summary judgment motions. 

Appellee filed a summary judgment motion on October 25, 2019, and 

Appellants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the same day. 

Following a hearing on the motions on December 20, 2019, the court issued 

an order and opinion on January 29, 2020, granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee on its quiet title claim, and against Appellants on their quiet 

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1 Appellants initially filed on September 6, 2019, a combined motion for leave 

to file an amended complaint and petition for appointment of viewers. On 

September 10, 2019, the court determined it would not entertain Appellants’ 

motion/petition as these are two separate forms of relief. 
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title claim. The court also denied Appellants’ requests for summary judgment 

on Appellee’s remaining counterclaims. Appellants timely filed a notice of 

appeal on February 25, 2020. On February 27, 2020, the court ordered 

Appellants to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), which Appellants filed on March 17, 2020. 

Appellants raise three issues on appeal: 

Whether, in granting summary judgment against 

[Appellants], the trial judge abused its discretion and 

[erred] as a matter of law when [the court] held that 

[Appellee] may install an additional pipeline 118 feet from 

existing pipelines, even though the easement 

unambiguously limits the installation of an additional 

pipeline to a distance of 50 feet. 

Whether the trial court [erred] as a matter of law when it: 

(1) held that the easement language was ambiguous even 

though both parties agreed it was not and basing its decision 

on the sole fact that the parties disagreed, which has been 

found by appellate courts to be an insufficient basis; (2) 

failed to take evidence relating to the intent of the parties 

who signed the easement but instead relied upon facts not 

of record; (3) failed to apply a single principle of contract 

interpretation to determine the intent of the parties; (4) 

denied [Appellants’] request for summary judgment as to 

Counterclaim 4 Breach of Contract even though [Appellee] 

did not produce any evidence of facts essential to that cause 

of action, did not brief the issue, or raise it at oral argument, 

nor did the Judge address it at all in [the court’s]

Memorandum Opinion. 

Whether the trial court’s findings of fact were manifestly 

unreasonable when they were not based upon facts of 

record, and even if they were, which they are not, the 

court’s application of the facts was manifestly unreasonable. 

(Appellants’ Brief at 4-5). 

In their issues combined, Appellants argue the trial court erred in 
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granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee for several reasons. First, 

Appellants contend the court erred in determining that the language of the 

1936 easement was ambiguous solely because the parties disagreed over the 

meaning of the phrase “within fifty (50) feet of any then existing line.” Rather, 

Appellants assert the language of the easement is unambiguous, as it is not 

susceptible to different constructions. Appellants maintain Appellee’s 

attempts to create a different meaning and limit the phrase to a “twodimensional horizontal plane only” are unreasonable and contrary to the plain 

meaning of the easement. (Appellants’ Brief at 26). 

Second, Appellants argue that in granting Appellee’s motion for 

summary judgment, the trial court made findings of fact that went beyond the 

scope of the evidence in the record. Appellants maintain the court should 

have held an evidentiary hearing/bench trial to determine the original parties’ 

intent. Appellants assert each party filed summary judgment motions because 

the parties agreed that the easement was unambiguous, and the plain 

meaning of the easement controlled. Appellants emphasize that, as a result, 

neither party submitted evidence of the original parties’ intent because neither 

Appellants nor Appellee felt that was an issue during discovery. Instead, 

Appellants requested that the court hold an evidentiary hearing if it found the 

easement’s language to be ambiguous, as there would then be a genuine issue 

of material fact as to the original parties’ intent. Appellants allege they also

proffered various evidence/arguments concerning intent that they would have
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introduced or expanded upon during an evidentiary hearing or bench trial, 

including, inter alia, that: (1) the easement states Appellee is obligated to pay 

for any damages to crops or fences resulting from the pipeline’s construction, 

showing the original parties’ expectation that the surface would be 

damaged/affected by the installation of the pipeline which was something that 

would occur only if the pipeline was installed near the surface using

conventional trenching methods; (2) if horizontal directional drilling (“HDD”) 

was not invented until 1971, as Appellee claims, then the original parties to 

the easement could not have intended for the pipeline to be installed at a 

depth of 118 feet, let alone 50 feet; (3) the original property owners may have 

wanted to limit the depth of the pipeline to preserve their subterranean 

mineral rights; and (4) similar easements from the same grantee dating from 

around 1936 do not include the “within fifty (50) feet” language, 

demonstrating that the grantors specifically negotiated this language into the 

1936 easement.

Third, Appellants argue the trial judge failed to apply “a single principle 

of contract interpretation” in granting Appellee’s motion for summary 

judgment. (Id. at 41). Specifically, Appellants allege the trial court failed to 

construe the “alleged silence in the contract regarding the absence of the word 

‘depth’” against Appellee, where Appellee’s predecessors drafted the contract 

and Appellee has “special expertise” in the construction, operation and 

maintenance of pipelines. (Id. at 43). 
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Fourth, Appellants argue the court erred in granting summary judgment 

as to Counterclaim 4 (breach of contract) where Appellants did not breach the 

easement agreement, or cause damages. Additionally, Appellants emphasize 

that Appellee did not address this issue in its motion for summary judgment 

or brief, and the court failed to address this issue in its memorandum opinion. 

Appellants concede that the court’s resolution of the quiet title claim, although 

erroneous, would also effectively resolve Counterclaims 1 (ejectment), 2

(quiet title), and 3 (declaratory judgment). Appellants, however, maintain 

that it does not resolve Counterclaim 4 (breach of contract) because that claim

requires proof of additional elements unrelated to a simple interpretation of

the easement agreement. 

Finally, Appellants attack the court’s factual findings as “manifestly 

unreasonable.” (Id. at 45). Specifically, Appellants challenge several of the 

court’s conclusions, including, inter alia, (1) the court’s claim that Appellants’ 

interpretation of the easement as not limited to the horizontal plane would 

allow Appellee to build a pipeline “forty-seven (47) feet above ground,”

despite the easement’s utilization of the word “lay” in reference to the 

placement of the pipeline; (2) the court’s assertion that there is no evidence 

to present at a bench trial regarding the original parties’ intent even though it 

then states that it is going to rely upon evidence gleaned from “the 

circumstances that could have been known to Mr. and Mrs. Nye in 1936;” (3) 

the court’s claim that there is no reason to believe that the Nyes thought they 
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had important mineral rights to protect, even though there is no reason to 

believe otherwise, and (4) the court’s utilization of opposing counsel’s “one 

mile from the courthouse” analogy cuts against the court’s own reasoning 

because if people assume one mile from the courthouse is a measure of 

horizontal distance, then Appellee’s pipeline should be limited to 50 feet 

horizontally and not permitted at a depth of 118 feet. Appellants conclude 

this Court should reverse and remand the case so that the trial court can 

consider Appellants’ motion to amend their complaint and so Appellants can 

file a petition for appointment of viewers to award damages for “a de facto

taking by an entity clothed with the power of eminent domain....” (Id. at 55). 

For the following reasons, we agree that some relief is due. 

Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment requires 

us to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an 

error of law. Mee v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 908 A.2d 344, 347 (Pa.Super. 

2006). 

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on 

facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing 

and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its 

discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies 

the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking 

reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it 

does not follow legal procedure.

Miller v. Sacred Heart Hosp., 753 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa.Super. 2000) (internal 

citations omitted). Our scope of review is plenary. Pappas v. Asbel, 564 Pa. 

407, 418, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 938, 122 S.Ct. 
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2618, 153 L.Ed.2d 802 (2002). In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment:

[W]e apply the same standard as the trial court, reviewing 

all the evidence of record to determine whether there exists 

a genuine issue of material fact. We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts 

as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must 

be resolved against the moving party. Only where there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is clear that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 

law will summary judgment be entered. All doubts as to the 

existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be 

resolved against the moving party. 

Motions for summary judgment necessarily and directly 

implicate the plaintiff’s proof of the elements of [a] cause of 

action. Summary judgment is proper if, after the 

completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including 

the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will 

bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce 

evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense 

which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted 

to a jury. In other words, whenever there is no genuine 

issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the 

cause of action or defense, which could be established by 

additional discovery or expert report and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary 

judgment is appropriate. Thus, a record that supports 

summary judgment either (1) shows the material facts are 

undisputed or (2) contains insufficient evidence of facts to 

make out a prima facie cause of action or defense. 

Upon appellate review, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

conclusions of law, but may reach our own conclusions. 

Chenot v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., 895 A.2d 55, 61 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, “the same rules of construction that apply to contracts are 

applicable in the constructions of easements[.]” McNaughton Properties, 
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LP v. Barr, 981 A.2d 222, 227 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “When 

reviewing an express easement, the language of the agreement, unless 

ambiguous, controls.” Baney v. Eoute, 784 A.2d 132, 136 (Pa.Super. 2001). 

“A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of different 

constructions and capable of being understood in more tha[n] one sense.” 

Juniata Valley Bank v. Martin Oil Co., 736 A.2d 650, 662 (Pa.Super. 1999). 

“Clear contractual terms that are capable of one reasonable interpretation 

must be given effect without reference to matters outside of the contract.” 

Baney, supra.

When the language is ambiguous, however, a court may resort to 

evidence of extrinsic circumstances as an aid to interpretation. PARC 

Holdings, Inc. v. Killian, 785 A.2d 106, 112 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal 

denied, 568 Pa. 702, 796 A.2d 984 (2002). In doing so, the court must 

ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of the 

circumstances in existence at the time of conveyance. Id.

Such intention (of the parties) is determined by a fair 

interpretation and construction of the grant and may be shown by 

the words employed construed with reference to the attending 

circumstances known to the parties at the time the grant was 

made. Moreover, when the terms of an express grant of an 

easement are general, ambiguous, and not defined by reference 

to the circumstances known to the parties at the time of the grant, 

the express easement is to be construed in favor of the grantee,

and the easement may be used in any manner that is reasonable.

Lease v. Doll, 485 Pa. 615, 621, 403 A.2d 558, 561-562 (1979) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “Whether an ambiguity exists is a question 
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of law subject to plenary review. However, resolution of conflicting parol 

evidence relevant to what the parties intended by an ambiguous provision is 

for the trier of fact.” PARC Holdings, supra (citations omitted). 

Significantly, a contract is not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the 

parties do not agree on the proper construction. Betz v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 

957 A.2d 1244 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 606 Pa. 659, 995 A.2d 350 

(2010). 

Instantly, the trial court determined the phrase “within fifty (50) feet” 

was ambiguous. Contrary to Appellants’ claims, however, the court did not 

find the easement’s language was ambiguous just because the parties 

disagreed on the meaning of the phrase. Rather, the trial court found the 

phrase to be ambiguous because “it is capable of being understood in more 

than one sense,” and “both parties’ interpretations are reasonable based 

solely on the language itself....” (Trial Court Opinion at 4). We agree with the 

court’s conclusion on this matter. See PARC Holdings, supra; Juniata 

Valley Bank, supra. 

We disagree, however, with the court’s analysis of the original parties’ 

intent concerning the phrase at issue. Here, as the court found the phrase 

“within fifty (50) feet” to be ambiguous, further fact-finding concerning the 

original parties’ intent and the circumstances present in 1936 was required for 

the court to interpret the easement properly. The court’s conclusion that it 

would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine what Mr. and Mrs. Nye 
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intended when they entered into the easement in 1936, and the court’s 

attempt to glean this intent from the language of the easement and the limited 

evidence presented to it, are insufficient. Rather, Appellants and Appellee 

should have been afforded the opportunity to present evidence on this issue, 

such as evidence of the language from other easements of that time or proof 

of the original parties’ concerns for their subterranean mineral rights. See 

Taylor v. Sailor, No. 1383 WDA 2018 (Pa.Super. filed August 28, 2019) 

(unpublished memorandum) (concluding entry of summary judgment was 

inappropriate where ambiguous phrase “over and across existing 

improvements” created issue of material fact as to what parties intended for 

easement).2 Under these circumstances, genuine issues of material fact 

remain and the entry of summary judgment was improper. See Chenot, 

supra. Accordingly, we reverse the order granting summary judgment in 

favor of Appellee and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing.3 See 

Taylor, supra (reversing order granting summary judgment in similar 

circumstances).

Order reversed; case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is 

relinquished. 

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2 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (explaining that unpublished non-precedential 

memoranda decisions of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited 

for persuasive value). 

3

In light of this disposition, we need not address Appellants’ remaining issues. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/14/2021