United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Finance, U.S. Senate

Report to the Chairman, Committee on 

October 1996 CHILD SUPPORT


ENFORCEMENT


Reorienting 

Management Toward 

Achieving Better 

Program Results 

GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14


United States GAO General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Health, Education, and 

Human Services Division 

B-271600 

October 25, 1996 

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.


Chairman, Committee on Finance


United States Senate


Dear Mr. Chairman:


This report, prepared at your request, examines the federal Office of Child Support


Enforcement’s (OCSE) management of the nation’s child support enforcement program. It


evaluates the progress OCSE has made in implementing previous GAO recommendations to


reorient its management of the program toward results and makes recommendations to the


Secretary of Health and Human Services.


We will send copies of the report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the Ranking


Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Finance; and the Chairmen and Ranking Minority


Members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; the House Committee on


Government Reform and Oversight; and the House Subcommittee on Human Resources,


Committee on Ways and Means. We also will send copies to other interested parties and make


copies available to others upon request.


Please contact us—Jane L. Ross at (202) 512-7215 or L. Nye Stevens at (202) 512-8676—if you


have any questions. Other GAO contacts and major contributors to this report are listed in


appendix IV.


Sincerely yours,


Jane L. Ross


Director, Income Security Issues


Health, Education, and Human Services Division


L. Nye Stevens


Director, Federal Management and


Workforce Issues 

General Government Division 
Executive Summary


Each year, the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Purpose	 Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and state child support programs face 

the growing needs of millions of individuals seeking child support 

services. In 1995, OCSE reported an estimated caseload of 20.1 million 

custodial parents seeking such services through the nation’s child support 

enforcement program, an increase of about 50 percent over the total 

caseload reported in 1991. States collected about $10.8 billion in child 

support payments for 3.8 million of these cases in 1995, or about 

19 percent of the caseload.1 

In 1994, GAO reported that the child support enforcement program lacked 

essential management tools to improve its responsiveness to the child 

support needs of children and families. As a result, GAO recommended that 

OCSE focus its program management on long-term outcomes by 

(1) strengthening its partnership with state and local child support 

enforcement programs to improve operations, (2) developing its own 

management strategies for helping to achieve national program goals, 

(3) reorienting its audit function to assess state program results, and 

(4) redesigning the federal incentive funding structure to provide greater 

impetus for improved state performance. OCSE agreed to address GAO’s 

recommendations through implementation of the Government 

Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, legislation to promote 

efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs and establish a system to 

set goals for program performance and measure results.2

 At the request of 

the Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, this report assesses OCSE’s 

progress in addressing GAO’s recommendations. 

The child support enforcement program, established in 1975 under title Background	 IV-D of the Social Security Act, provides services such as locating absent 

parents, establishing paternity, obtaining and enforcing child support 

orders, collecting support payments, and enforcing court-mandated 

requirements to provide health insurance for eligible children. In 1995, 

recipients included about 10.8 million families who received Aid to 

Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits and about 9.3 million 

families who did not. State and local governments administer the program, 

and OCSE establishes national policies and monitors state and local 

1

In response to growing caseloads, some states have moved to privatize the collection of child support 

payments. See Child Support Enforcement: States and Localities Move to Privatized Services 

(GAO/HEHS-96-43FS, Nov. 20, 1995) and Child Support Enforcement: States’ Experience With Private 

Agencies’ Collection of Support Payments (GAO/HEHS-97-11, Oct. 23, 1996). 

2

For a more detailed discussion of GAO’s earlier findings, see Child Support Enforcement: Families 

Could Benefit From Stronger Enforcement Program (GAO/HEHS-95-24, Dec. 27, 1994). 

Page 2 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

programs. Program costs are shared by the federal and state governments, 

with the federal government paying about two-thirds of state program 

costs, about $2.1 billion in 1995. 

Recent federal initiatives, such as GPRA, have attempted to improve 

program management throughout the government by focusing managerial 

priorities and accountability on the intended outcomes of federal 

programs and services, rather than on resource or activity measures, such 

as staffing levels and tasks completed. GPRA’s stated purpose is to improve 

program effectiveness, service delivery, and congressional 

decision-making. 

To reorient federal planning and management toward program results, 

GPRA requires federal agencies to (1) develop strategic plans containing 

mission statements and outcome-related strategic goals, (2) develop 

annual performance goals and indicators, and (3) prepare annual reports 

with information on the extent to which the agency has met its annual 

performance goals. In addition to these steps, a key practice used by 

federal and state agencies in reinforcing results-oriented management is to 

create incentives that increase accountability for results.3 

Results in Brief	 OCSE is making progress in reorienting its management of the child support 

enforcement program toward program results. For example, OCSE and the 

states approved 5-year national goals and objectives for increasing the 

number of paternities established, support orders obtained, and 

collections received, thereby focusing OCSE’s management orientation on 

key program outcomes. In addition, OCSE has negotiated voluntary 

performance agreements with states specifying intended state program 

results. As a critical next step, OCSE needs to develop its own long-term 

strategies for how it will help achieve the national program goals. Such a 

plan should prioritize OCSE’s responsibilities, specify intended results, and 

develop measures for assessing its own performance. 

As OCSE reorients its management of the child support enforcement 

program, it faces additional challenges in fostering improved state 

program results. For example, OCSE’s audits continue to focus on state 

compliance and it has not yet begun to audit state progress toward 

achieving program goals, as GAO previously recommended. Several reasons 

that OCSE officials cited for not auditing state program results include the 

3

These steps and related critical practices are described in more detail in Executive Guide: Effectively 

Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). 

Page 3 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

lack of performance measures coupled with the absence of penalties for 

poor-performing states, as well as limited staff resources to conduct both 

compliance and program results audits. GAO believes, however, that OCSE 

has the experience and expertise to readily design and implement program 

results audits. Moreover, the resource issue will be mitigated by the 1996 

welfare reform legislation, which vests primary responsibility for 

reviewing compliance with the states.4 

Another obstacle facing OCSE is a federal incentive funding structure that is 

based on maximizing child support collections relative to administrative 

costs rather than reflecting all the program goals, thus limiting its use as 

an incentive for improved results. GAO found that all states currently 

receive some incentive payments regardless of how well they perform 

such functions as collecting support payments. The current incentive 

payment structure does not base payments on paternities and support 

orders established. 

Under the welfare reform legislation enacted in August 1996, HHS and the 

states are required to develop a new incentive funding structure and report 

to the Congress by March 1, 1997. The legislation does not specify the 

contents of the new structure. In contrast to current federal incentive 

funding, GAO sees this new legislation as an opportunity for HHS to more 

strongly link incentive funding with demonstrated state performance. 

Principal Findings


Jointly Developed Goals 

Strengthen Federal/State 

Partnership 

In February 1995, OCSE and the states approved the program’s first national 

strategic plan containing jointly developed outcome-oriented goals and 

objectives for increasing the number of paternities and support orders 

established and the amount of collections received. For each goal, such as 

establishing paternity for all children, OCSE and the states have identified 

objectives or interim results that must be achieved to meet a stated goal. 

Under paternity establishment, for example, the objective is to increase 

establishment of paternities within 1 year of birth. OCSE and most state 

officials that GAO contacted believe the joint planning process has 

strengthened the federal/state partnership by enabling them to help shape 

the national program’s long-term goals and objectives. 

4

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. 

Page 4 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

OCSE and states have also developed voluntary performance agreements 

that project expected increases in paternities established, support orders 

obtained, and collections received in each state. OCSE officials believe, 

however, that without legislation that ties the incentive funding structure 

to state performance, they cannot effectively use these agreements as a 

tool to help achieve the national goals. For example, if a state met or 

exceeded its goals for establishing paternities and obtaining support 

orders, the current structure would not reward its progress. 

Because states often need help planning and implementing their child 

support enforcement programs, OCSE has provided information on how to 

implement new legislative requirements, such as procedures for 

suspending and revoking the driver’s or other licenses of parents who have 

not met their child support obligations. OCSE officials and most state 

program officials believe that OCSE has been responsive to their requests 

for technical assistance. However, officials in four states that GAO 

contacted said that OCSE should provide additional assistance to improve 

state program results. For example, officials in Alabama said that it would 

be helpful if OCSE developed staffing standards, as currently required by 

federal law, to assist states in their workload management. 

OCSE Needs Its Own 

Long-Term Strategies for 

Helping to Achieve 

National Goals 

To complement state efforts, OCSE also recognizes the need to develop its 

own strategies for how it will contribute to achieving the national program 

goals by establishing its own priorities, projecting anticipated results from 

its operations, and developing performance measures to assess its own 

performance. GAO reported earlier that OCSE did not have a planning 

process that focused on outcomes for its role in leading the program.5 

Beginning in 1995, OCSE established for its top managers annual 

performance agreements that are intended to hold managers and staff 

accountable for implementing certain tasks and responsibilities, such as 

promoting effective collection techniques. In addition to these annual 

agreements, however, OCSE also needs to develop its own long-term 

management strategies for how it will help achieve the newly established 

program goals. 

5

GAO/HEHS-95-24, Dec. 27, 1994. 

Page 5 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

OCSE Faces Additional 

Challenges in Fostering 

Improved State Program 

Results 

Effective oversight mechanisms, such as conducting results-oriented 

audits and obtaining accurate and comparable state-reported data, are 

management tools that can help foster state progress toward increasing 

the number of paternities established, support orders obtained, and 

collections received. GAO previously reported that OCSE audits were 

focused on processes and not state program results. OCSE had included 

over 50 criteria for assessing compliance with federal requirements and 

state program procedures. To provide a more results-oriented oversight 

capability, GAO previously recommended placing greater emphasis on 

auditing state program results. 

OCSE has not yet begun to audit state program results. Its officials told GAO 

that they could not effectively audit these results without approved 

performance measures and penalties to enforce audit findings. In addition, 

OCSE officials believe that their staff resources would be strained by 

conducting both program results and legislatively required compliance 

audits. Without such audits, states continue to believe that OCSE’s 

compliance audits are not an effective management tool to help them 

improve program results. 

GAO believes that OCSE should conduct program results audits to 

investigate problems that inhibit the effectiveness of state programs and 

recommend, when appropriate, corrective actions. OCSE has the expertise 

and knowledge that would allow it to design and conduct such audits. 

Moreover, the 1996 welfare reform legislation requires states to review and 

report annually on their compliance with federal program requirements. 

Instead of conducting compliance audits, OCSE is required under the new 

legislation to review the states’ compliance reports and provide them with 

comments, recommendations for corrective actions, and technical 

assistance. These changes should reduce OCSE’s workload previously 

associated with compliance audits and allow it to begin conducting 

program results audits. 

While it has not yet audited state program results, OCSE has made efforts to 

simplify its audit processes and assess the accuracy of state-reported data. 

In December 1994, OCSE streamlined its audits by reducing the number of 

audit criteria for determining state compliance with federal requirements. 

For example, OCSE reduced the number of criteria to assess state 

compliance with required procedures for opening and closing child 

support enforcement cases. Beginning in 1994, OCSE also increased its 

emphasis on auditing the accuracy of state program data and the systems 

through which states report their data to OCSE. At the time of GAO’s review, 

Page 6 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

OCSE had conducted reporting system reviews in 20 states, most of which 

found data inaccuracies and unreliable reporting systems. 

In addition to data inaccuracies reported through OCSE’s audits, 

discrepancies among state programs’ data also magnify difficulties in 

assessing state performance. OCSE officials believe that data discrepancies, 

such as differences in how states define a child support case, reflect 

variances in state domestic law and other dissimilarities in 

state-administered programs. Recognizing these difficulties, OCSE has 

attempted to improve the comparability of performance data by 

establishing standard definitions for its performance measures and pilot 

testing those measures. In response to OCSE’s request, six states are 

participating in the pilot. 

Federal Incentive Funding A major constraint to OCSE’s achieving results-oriented management of the 

Structure Remains Weakly child support enforcement program has been the lack of a funding 

Linked With State structure that has real financial incentives for improved state results. The 

Performance	 incentive funding structure remains weakly linked with state program 

performance. Incentive payments, based on a ratio of collections to state 

program costs, do not consider state progress toward achieving the other 

two national goals of establishing paternities and obtaining support 

orders. In addition, states can be awarded 6 to 10 percent of their 

collections based on their collections-to-cost ratio, and all receive at least 

6 percent in incentive funds regardless of how well or poorly they perform. 

OCSE and state officials that GAO interviewed agreed that the current 

incentive funding structure needs to be improved. The newly enacted 

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 

requires HHS and the states to develop a revised incentive funding structure 

that must be revenue-neutral to the federal government and report to the 

Congress by March 1, 1997. The new structure will become effective for 

fiscal year 2000. The legislation does not say how the new incentive 

funding structure should be revised. GAO believes that a new structure 

should base incentive payments on an assessment of state progress toward 

meeting each of the three program goals. For such a structure to provide 

real impetus for improved performance, it must also utilize approved 

performance measures and audits of state program results. 

Recommendations	 GAO is making a number of recommendations to the Secretary of HHS that 

include having OCSE develop its own long-term management strategies and 

Page 7 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

program priorities, conduct program results audits of state progress 

toward achieving the national program goals, and include payments in the 

new incentive system, required by recent welfare reform legislation, that 

are based on state progress toward achieving the program goals. 

HHS expressed its commitment to moving forward in the direction of GAO’s Agency Comments	 recommendations (see app. III). For example, OCSE has created a series of 

federal/state work groups to address longer-term issues and planned major 

enhancements to the Federal Parent Locator Service. As OCSE proceeds, 

GAO believes that OCSE also should ensure that it has strategies to establish 

its own priorities, specify anticipated results from its program activities, 

and develop measures to assess its performance. 

While HHS cited welfare reform legislation that requires that OCSE assess 

the accuracy of state-reported data, GAO believes that OCSE’s audit function 

should also address why states have not met performance targets and 

make recommendations for improvement. 

HHS also stated that OCSE has made progress toward revising the basis on 

which states receive incentive payments. While these steps show promise 

in strengthening the linkage between the incentive funding structure and 

state performance, the revised structure, when fully implemented, should 

base payments on state progress made toward achieving all three program 

goals as GAO recommends. 

GAO also obtained comments on selected segments of the draft report from 

four states included in its review. These states and HHS provided technical 

comments that GAO incorporated in the final report as appropriate. 

Page 8 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 9 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Contents


Executive Summary 2


Chapter 1 


Introduction
 Child Support Enforcement Program Overview 12


GAO-Reported Management Challenges 16


GPRA Provides Opportunity for OCSE to Manage for Results 16


Scope and Methodology 18


Chapter 2 


Federal/State


Partnership


Strengthened; OCSE


Needs Its Own


Strategies to Manage


for Results


22 

OCSE and the States Developed National Goals and Objectives 22 

and Strengthened Their Partnership 

OCSE Needs to Develop Its Own Strategies to Help Achieve 26 

National Goals and Objectives 

Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces


Additional Challenges


in Fostering Improved


State Program Results


Despite Improvements, OCSE Audits Remain Compliance 

Focused


While Efforts Attempt to Resolve Data Problems, Discrepancies 

Among States Magnify Challenges in Assessing Performance 

Federal Incentive Funding Structure Remains Weakly Linked to 

State Performance 

Chapter 4 


Conclusions,


Recommendations,


and Agency


Comments


Recommendations 35


Agency Comments 35


Appendixes Appendix I: Local Participation in OCSE’s GPRA Pilot Project 38


Appendix II: Selected Program and Demographic Characteristics 40


of Case-Study States


Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Health and 41


Human Services and Our Evaluation


Appendix IV: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 45


Page 10 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 

12 

28 

28 

31 

32 

34 
Contents 

Related GAO Products 48


Tables Table 1.1: HHS Regional Offices Contacted and the 

Corresponding State or Local Child Support Enforcement 

Programs 

Table 2.1: Child Support Enforcement Goals Developed Jointly by 

OCSE and State Program Officials 

Figures Figure 1.1: The Federal/State Partnership in the Child Support 

Enforcement Program 

Figure 1.2: States Selected for Case Studies of Child Support 

Enforcement Programs 

Figure 1.3: States Selected by OCSE for GPRA Pilot Projects 

Abbreviations 

ACF Administration for Children and Families


AFDC Aid to Families With Dependent Children


GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993


HHS Department of Health and Human Services


METS Measuring Excellence Through Statistics


OCSE Office of Child Support Enforcement


OMB Office of Management and Budget


Page 11 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 

21 

23 

14 

19 

20 
Chapter 1 


Introduction


The general well-being of children and families is a critical national policy 

goal. Current priorities aimed at protecting children and preserving 

families include an effective child support enforcement program to meet 

the needs of millions of parents who annually seek child support for their 

eligible children. In our report, Child Support Enforcement: Families 

Could Benefit From Stronger Enforcement Program (GAO/HEHS-95-24, 

Dec. 27, 1994), we found that the Office of Child Support Enforcement 

(OCSE) lacked essential management tools, such as programwide planning 

and goal-setting, to assess and improve program performance. On the 

basis of these findings, we made several recommendations to strengthen 

OCSE’s leadership and management of the program. Given the need to 

improve program management, the Chairman, Senate Committee on 

Finance, asked us to assess the progress that OCSE has made in 

implementing our previous recommendations. 

Child Support 

Enforcement Program 

Overview 

A rise in welfare costs resulting from out-of-wedlock birth rates and 

parental desertion, coupled with a growing demand to relieve taxpayers of 

the financial burden of supporting these families, prompted the Congress 

to create the national child support enforcement program. Created in 1975 

under title IV-D of the Social Security Act, the program’s purpose is to 

strengthen existing state and local efforts to find noncustodial parents, 

establish paternity, obtain support orders, and collect support payments. 

The national program incorporated the already existing state programs. 

Increasingly, the child support enforcement program has faced the 

growing demands of millions of children and families seeking support 

payments. In 1995, the program reported an estimated 20.1 million cases, 

an increase of about 50 percent over the previous 5 years. In that year, 

states collected about $10.8 billion in child support payments for 

3.8 million cases, or 19 percent of the program’s caseload. Expenditures to 

administer the child support enforcement program totaled about 

$3.0 billion, of which $2.1 billion was paid by the federal government. In 

response to the growing caseloads and as a way to improve performance, 

some states have privatized child support enforcement services to 

supplement their own state-administered programs.6 

The program serves two populations: families receiving Aid to Families 

With Dependent Children (AFDC)7

 and those who do not. The Congress 

6

GAO/HEHS-96-43FS, Nov. 20, 1995, and GAO/HEHS-97-11, Oct. 23, 1996. 

7

As of July 1, 1997, AFDC will be replaced by block grants under the Temporary Assistance for Needy 

Families program. 

Page 12 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

believed that government welfare expenditures could be reduced and to 

some extent prevented by recouping AFDC benefits from noncustodial 

parents’ child support payments. In addition, the Congress believed that 

earlier enforcement of child support obligations for families not receiving 

AFDC could help prevent these families from needing support in the form of 

welfare benefits. 

Families entering the child support enforcement program require different 

combinations of services at different times. In some cases, the child’s 

paternity has not been established and the location of the alleged father is 

unknown. In these cases, the custodial parent needs help with every step: 

locating the alleged father, establishing paternity and a child support 

order, enforcing the order, and collecting the support payment. In other 

cases, the custodial parent may have a child support order, and child 

support enforcement agencies must periodically review and, possibly, 

modify the order as a result of changes in the employment status or other 

circumstances pertaining to the noncustodial parent. For AFDC recipients, 

the family receives the first $50 of any current child support payment each 

month without a decrease in its AFDC payment.8

 Any remainder of the child 

support payment is retained by the federal and state governments in 

proportion to their respective AFDC payments. Payments that are collected 

on behalf of non-AFDC families are sent to the families. 

The child support enforcement program is an intergovernmental program 

involving the federal, state, and local governments. Federal responsibility 

for the program lies within the Department of Health and Human Services’ 

(HHS) Administration for Children and Families (ACF). Within ACF, OCSE 

central office and regional office staff develop policy and oversee the 

state-administered programs. Figure 1.1 illustrates the partnership 

arrangements among key players involved in overseeing and administering 

the child support enforcement program. 

8

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 eliminates the 

requirement to pass the first $50 of child support to families receiving AFDC. 

Page 13 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Figure 1.1: The Federal/State 

Partnership in the Child Support 

Enforcement Program 

Children and Families 

OCSE 

Partnership 

States/Counties 

• Policy Guidance 

• Oversight 

• Enforcement 

• Administration 

• Service Delivery 

National Goals 

• Paternities 

• Support Orders 

• Collections 

The child support enforcement program envisions an aggressive federal 

role in ensuring that states provide effective child support services. 

Federal law requires OCSE to establish standards for state program 

effectiveness and to monitor the operation of state programs through 

periodic audits. To help ensure program effectiveness, OCSE has the 

authority to assess financial penalties if an audit reveals that a state has 

failed to meet certain program standards. Among other functions, regional 

office staff review state child support enforcement plans to ensure 

consistent adherence with federal requirements. OCSE also is authorized to 

work with the states to help them plan, develop, design, and establish 

effective programs. In addition, OCSE is responsible for maintaining 

effective working relationships with federal, state, and local government 

officials; national interest groups; and other key stakeholders in the child 

support field. 

State child support enforcement agencies are responsible for all activities 

leading to securing from noncustodial parents financial support and 

medical insurance coverage for children. The agencies provide four 

principal services: (1) locating absent parents, (2) establishing paternity, 

(3) obtaining and enforcing child support orders, and (4) collecting 

support payments. To meet federal requirements and receive federal 

Page 14 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

funds, state child support enforcement programs must have HHS-approved 

plans indicating compliance with federal law and regulations and must 

operate in accordance with those plans. HHS can levy financial penalties 

against states found substantially out of compliance with their plan. 

There are significant differences in the ways state child support 

enforcement programs are organized, which state organization they report 

to, what relationships exist between the child support enforcement 

program and other state agencies, and the policies and procedures that are 

followed. These characteristics usually vary by the type of service delivery 

structure, levels of court involvement required by state family law, 

population distribution, and other variables. For example, some state child 

support agencies operate their programs with state funds through a 

network of regional offices, while others share the federal funding with 

and supervise county and other local jurisdictions’ operations. 

The child support enforcement funding structure was designed to share 

program costs between the federal and state governments. The federal 

government matches 66 percent of states’ administrative and certain 

management information systems development costs9

 and 90 percent of 

laboratory costs related to paternity establishment. The federal 

government also pays incentives to states for collection efficiency. These 

incentives are calculated separately for AFDC and non-AFDC collections by 

dividing the amount collected for each category by total program 

administrative costs. On the basis of these calculations, states with higher 

ratios of collections to program costs receive more incentive funds than 

states with lower ratios. Incentive payments for AFDC collections range 

from amounts equal to 6 to 10 percent of the collections. Incentive 

payments for non-AFDC collections also range from 6 to 10 percent of 

non-AFDC collections but cannot be greater than 115 percent of the AFDC 

incentive payments. These incentive payments are funded from the federal 

portion of recovered AFDC collections. States must share incentives with 

local governments that bear some of the program’s administrative costs. 

However, states may use the incentive payments and AFDC recoveries to 

fund programs other than child support enforcement. 

9

The federal government reimburses states for 90 percent of their management information systems’ 

development costs incurred or planned before fiscal year 1996. 

Page 15 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

GAO-Reported 

Management 

Challenges 

GPRA Provides 

Opportunity for OCSE 

to Manage for Results 

We reported earlier10 that clear federal management strategies coupled 

with state management efforts could better position the child support 

enforcement program to serve the families that depend on it. The increase 

in children needing support has focused attention on federal and state 

efforts to enforce parental responsibilities to support their children. 

However, these efforts have been hampered by management weaknesses, 

such as the lack of programwide planning and accurate data, that have 

kept OCSE from developing specific strategies for contributing to improved 

program performance and judging how well the program is working. We 

also reported that OCSE had reduced the level of technical assistance it 

provided to state programs following reductions in federal program 

resources. Various organization and staffing changes reduced the number 

of federal staff assigned to the child support enforcement program, 

thereby creating communication problems between federal and state 

program officials. OCSE audits and data collection efforts, while satisfying 

legal requirements for monitoring and tracking the states’ programs, did 

not provide either OCSE or the states with adequate information on 

program results. Moreover, we reported that federal incentive funding was 

not sufficiently aligned with desired program outcomes. 

On the basis of these and other findings, we made several 

recommendations to the Secretary of HHS to focus management of the 

child support enforcement program on results. These recommendations 

address four key program areas for which OCSE has responsibility: 

(1) strengthening its partnership with state child support programs, 

(2) developing its own management strategies for how it will contribute to 

improved program results, (3) reorienting its audit processes to assess 

state results, and (4) realigning federal incentive funding with state 

performance. OCSE said it would address our recommendations in the 

course of its implementation of the Government Performance and Results 

Act (GPRA) of 1993, legislation that focuses federal departments’ and 

agencies’ management on program results. 

GPRA requires federal agencies to reorient program management toward 

results. Traditionally, federal agencies have used factors such as the 

amount of program funds, the level of staff deployed, or the number of 

tasks completed as measures of performance. By only using these kinds of 

measures, an agency has not considered whether its programs have 

produced real results. Today’s environment is more results-oriented. The 

Congress, executive branch, and the public are beginning to hold agencies 

10GAO/HEHS-95-24, Dec. 27, 1994. 

Page 16 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

accountable less for inputs and outputs than for outcomes, such as how 

programs affect participants’ lives. 

Under GPRA, federal agencies are faced with reorienting their policies, 

planning efforts, and operations toward measuring and improving program 

results. To reorient federal planning and management, GPRA requires 

federal agencies to (1) define their mission and desired outcomes, 

(2) measure performance, and (3) report performance information as a 

basis for making management decisions.11 The first step—defining mission 

and desired outcomes—requires agencies to develop strategic plans 

containing mission statements and outcome-related strategic goals. The 

Environmental Protection Agency, for example, launched the National 

Environmental Goals Project, a long-range planning initiative under which 

it involved stakeholders in developing measurable goals, such as managing 

and cleaning up radioactive waste, for the agency to pursue in improving 

the quality of the nation’s environment. The second step—measuring 

performance—requires agencies to develop annual performance plans 

with annual performance goals and indicators to measure performance. 

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for example, set 

up a method to measure its performance by measuring changes in the lead 

time it gives the public before severe weather events. The third 

step—reporting performance information—requires agencies to prepare 

annual performance reports with information on the extent to which they 

have met their annual performance goals. To implement this step, the 

Department of Veterans Affairs initiated efforts to provide caregivers 

improved medical outcomes data to use in improving services to veterans. 

To begin implementing GPRA, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

designated 68 pilot tests for performance planning and reporting in 26 

federal entities. OCSE was one of the federal agencies selected by OMB in 

1994 to undertake a pilot test.12 OMB based its selection of OCSE, in part, on 

OCSE’s previous efforts to develop a 5-year strategic plan; its ability to 

quantify program goals, such as child support collections; and the 

involvement of state and local governments as key program 

administrators. 

11These steps and related critical practices are described in more detail in GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996. 

12OCSE also selected 27 states, two counties, two cities, and Puerto Rico to operate local GPRA 

demonstration programs intended to place greater emphasis on desired program outcomes. Appendix I 

describes the state and county demonstration programs operated in the states we selected for case 

study work. 

Page 17 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Scope and 

Methodology 

To review OCSE’s progress made toward implementing our previous 

recommendations, we examined OCSE program management and 

conducted case studies in seven states (see fig. 1.2). We interviewed OCSE 

central office and regional staff and obtained relevant documentation to 

discuss and analyze management initiatives undertaken since our previous 

review. We also interviewed state and local program officials to obtain 

their perspectives on any recent changes in their interactions with OCSE. 

Regarding OCSE’s implementation of GPRA, we reviewed GPRA 

documentation, such as strategic plans, performance reports, memoranda, 

and studies. Our review also included interviews with officials in HHS’ 

Office of the Secretary, ACF, and OMB. In addition, we reviewed changes in 

OCSE’s management policies and practices since our previous report. We 

did not assess, however, the child support enforcement program results 

attributable to such changes because of the relatively short period of time 

they had been in effect. 

Page 18 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Figure 1.2: States Selected for Case Studies of Child Support Enforcement Programs 

States Selected for Case Study Work 

The seven case studies we conducted were designed to obtain information 

on local program priorities and state interactions with OCSE regional and 

central office staff. We judgmentally selected states that differed in their 

fiscal health, geographic location, demographics, program administration, 

status of any state GPRA pilot projects (see fig. 1.3), and management 

reform initiatives. 

Page 19 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Figure 1.3: States Selected by OCSE for GPRA Pilot Projects 

States With GPRA Pilot Project 

Note: OCSE also selected five other jurisdictions as pilot projects, including two counties, two 

cities, and Puerto Rico. 

On the basis of these selection criteria, we reviewed child support 

enforcement programs in Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, 

Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. Our case studies also included interviews 

with officials in six regional offices, covering 33 state or local programs, as 

shown in table 1.1. In addition, we interviewed representatives from five 

national interest groups—the Center for Law and Social Policy, Children’s 

Defense Fund, National Council of Child Support Enforcement 

Page 20 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Administrators, National Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and Family 

Development, and Association for Children for Enforcement of 

Support—to obtain their views on implementation of the child support 

enforcement program. Appendix II contains a profile of selected program 

and demographic data for each state included in our review. 

Table 1.1: HHS Regional Offices 

Contacted and the Corresponding Regional office (location) Corresponding programs 

State or Local Child Support 

Enforcement Programs Region II (New York) 

Region III (Philadelphia) 

New Jersey, New York, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands 

Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, 

Virginia, and West Virginia 

Region IV (Atlanta) Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North 

Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 

Region V (Chicago) Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and 

Wisconsin 

Region VI (Dallas) Arizona, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas 

Region X (Seattle) Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington 

We conducted our review from June 1995 through August 1996 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. HHS 

provided comments on a draft of this report. These comments are 

presented and evaluated in chapter 4 and included in appendix III. We also 

obtained comments from states selected for our case studies. Their 

suggested revisions and technical comments from HHS were included in the 

report as appropriate. 

Page 21 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened; 

OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage 

for Results 

OCSE has made progress in reorienting its management toward program 

results by working with the states to develop national goals and objectives 

for increasing the number of paternities established, support orders 

obtained, and collections received. Through this joint planning process, 

OCSE has also strengthened its partnership with state child support 

enforcement programs. The partnership was further strengthened by 

OCSE’s designating regional staff to provide technical assistance responsive 

to local needs. As a next step in its planning process, OCSE needs to 

develop its own long-term strategies for how it will help achieve the 

national goals and objectives, in addition to annual performance 

agreements established for top managers. 

OCSE and the States In February 1995, OCSE and the states developed and approved a strategic 

plan with national goals and objectives for the child support enforcement

Developed National program. In our earlier review, we found that OCSE’s planning efforts had 

Goals and Objectives not focused on overall program goals. Except for paternity establishment, 

the program lacked long-term goals and objectives. In addition, OCSE had and Strengthened not sought input from its state partners, leading to uncertainty and

Their Partnership frustration among state officials regarding the future direction of the 

program and their lack of participation in program planning. 

National Program Goals 

and Objectives Established 

Recognizing the need to improve its planning process and working 

relationships with states, OCSE sought to reorient its management focus 

toward program outcomes and involve states in the development of 

program goals and objectives. GPRA provided legislative impetus for OCSE to 

initiate a new management orientation intended to look beyond traditional 

management and planning priorities, such as process-oriented tasks and 

activities. In 1994, as the first step in this long-term process, OCSE specified 

performance levels that states were expected to achieve in such areas as 

paternities established and collections received. However, state program 

officials strongly objected to this mandate, because they did not have an 

opportunity to participate in this planning process. 

Following these initial planning efforts, OCSE sought to obtain wider 

participation from program officials at the federal, state, and local levels of 

government. In addition, OCSE established task forces consisting of federal, 

state, and local officials to help focus management of the program on 

long-term goals. OCSE regional officials also worked with states to help 

reorient program management toward results. During the planning 

process, participants agreed that the national goals and objectives would 

Page 22 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened;


OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage


for Results


be based on the collective suggestions of the states and that the plan’s 

final approval would be reached through a consensus. After reaching 

consensus, OCSE and state program officials for the first time approved 

mutually acceptable goals and objectives, as shown in table 2.1. 

Table 2.1: Child Support Enforcement


Goals Developed Jointly by OCSE and Program service area Program goal


State Program Officials Paternities established All children have parentage established 

Support orders established	 All children in child support enforcement cases have 

financial and medical support orders 

Collections received	 All children in child support enforcement cases receive 

financial and medical support from both parents 

For each goal, the participants identified interim objectives that, if 

achieved, would represent progress toward the stated goal. For example, 

OCSE and the states first agreed to increase the number of paternities 

established within 1 year of birth to help meet the goal of establishing 

paternity for all children with child support enforcement cases. 

At the time of our review, OCSE and the states also were developing 

performance measures, such as the percentage of children in the child 

support enforcement caseload with paternity resolved, as statistical tools 

for identifying state progress toward achieving these goals. In addition, 

OCSE intends to work with states to develop performance standards against 

which it will assess the quality of state performance, consistent with GPRA. 

Performance Agreements In an effort to achieve the program goals established under GPRA, OCSE has 

With States Attempt to encouraged its regional staff to develop performance agreements with 

Link National and State states. These agreements are to specify both general working relationships 

Goals	 between OCSE regional offices and state program officials and performance 

goals for each state. In four states that we visited, regional and state 

officials negotiated mutually acceptable goals for the agreements. OCSE 

officials said that by working toward the goals in each agreement, states 

would help meet the desired national increases in the number of 

paternities established, support orders obtained, and collections received. 

OCSE officials said, however, that they are limited in using the performance 

agreements as an effective management tool for fostering improved 

program performance. They explained that OCSE does not currently have 

the statutory authority to link federal incentive funding to the achievement 

of performance goals included in each agreement. OCSE officials also stated 

Page 23 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened;


OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage


for Results


that, until legislation making that link is enacted, they must rely on the 

good will of states to improve program results. The limitations of the 

current incentive funding structure are discussed in further detail in 

chapter 3. 

Federal/State Partnership 

Strengthened 

Since our previous review, OCSE and the states have worked to strengthen 

their partnership. Joint program planning conducted by both OCSE and 

state officials in 1994 and 1995 has increased the states’ influence in 

developing the national goals and objectives, compared with the level of 

state involvement we previously reported. During this joint planning, state 

officials had an opportunity to discuss the challenges that they face as the 

programs’ principal administrators. Child support program officials in five 

of seven states we contacted generally believe that OCSE made a 

commitment to work actively with states as partners. 

As program partners, state officials had the opportunity to develop, 

amend, and approve specific program objectives. For example, OCSE and 

state officials created a Performance Measures Work Group to develop 

statistical measures for assessing state progress toward achieving the 

national goals and objectives. The work group, which consists of officials 

from ACF, OCSE, and state and local child support enforcement programs, 

met several times in 1995 and 1996 to discuss mutually acceptable 

performance measures. OCSE also selected 32 local GPRA pilot programs 

that states and counties believed would strengthen federal/state 

commitment to improve program results. Appendix I contains a brief 

description of the five state and county pilot programs operated in the 

states we reviewed. These pilots cover a broad range of program services 

and focus state and local program management on goals and objectives 

similar to those established at the national level. 

OCSE Technical 

Assistance Generally 

Responsive to State Needs, 

but Could Be Better 

Targeted in Certain Cases 

To further strengthen its partnership with states, OCSE improved its 

technical assistance in response to state program needs. In our earlier 

review of the child support enforcement program, we reported that HHS 

had experienced workforce reductions in the 1980s, leading to fewer 

resources in OCSE. As a result, technical assistance and training, which had 

formed a large part of OCSE efforts to foster improved program results, 

virtually disappeared. In addition, an HHS-wide reorganization left OCSE 

with no organizational control over those HHS regional staff serving as 

contact points for the states on some program matters. Since our previous 

review, HHS has reorganized staffing assignments in its 10 regional offices 

Page 24 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened;


OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage


for Results


to decentralize program decision-making. As a result, OCSE central and 

regional office staff, often designated as child support enforcement 

program managers and specialists, are now providing technical assistance 

more responsively to state needs. 

Program officials in six of seven states included in our review were 

generally satisfied with the responsiveness of OCSE regional staff. For 

example, Oregon officials stated that child support enforcement officials 

in federal Region X have continually provided technical assistance on 

regulatory interpretations and have sponsored forums to discuss other 

issues pertaining to customer service and specialized interstate cases. New 

Jersey program staff also said that they worked closely with OCSE officials 

in Region II to identify state GPRA pilot project strategies, such as 

processing criminal child support enforcement cases, that could be used 

to improve the New Jersey program. 

On the whole, OCSE officials believe that they have been responsive to state 

inquiries. In certain cases, several state officials and national interest 

groups we contacted believe that OCSE could provide more effective 

guidance or financial support to improve state programs. For example: 

•	 Alabama child support enforcement officials stated it would be helpful if 

OCSE developed staffing standards, as currently required by federal law, in 

cooperation with state child support staff. Such standards could be used 

by states to assist in caseload distributions and workload management. 

•	 In Minnesota, child support officials in four counties believed that, 

through additional funding, OCSE could promote state and local level 

development of innovative approaches to service delivery. 

•	 Several national interest groups we contacted believe that OCSE does not 

actively promote innovative approaches to state program improvement. 

Representatives from these groups said that OCSE has not fulfilled its role 

in fostering improved state programs. While the representatives told us 

that OCSE has assembled relevant program data as a central depository of 

information, they believe that OCSE should work more closely with states 

to help foster improved program results. 

Page 25 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened;


OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage


for Results


OCSE Needs to	 While OCSE has made notable progress in developing national goals and 

objectives for the program as a whole and establishing performance

Develop Its Own agreements with states, as a next step it now needs to develop its own 

Strategies to Help	 plan for realizing the long-term program goals. As the federal partner in 

child support enforcement, OCSE has responsibility to help achieve the Achieve National national goals developed jointly with states. Further, GPRA requires OCSE to 

Goals and Objectives	 develop such strategies by describing the operational processes, skills, 

technologies, and resources required to meet the program’s goals. 

As we reported in December 1994, the scope of OCSE responsibilities has 

grown with each expansion in legislative requirements, such as provisions 

contained in the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 and the 

Family Support Act of 1988. OCSE has undertaken initiatives to address 

issues as diverse as developing a standardized form for withholding 

income from noncustodial parents who owe child support to piloting a 

system for identifying parents’ Social Security numbers. 

In response to its growing responsibilities, OCSE recognizes the need to 

establish its own strategies for how it will help achieve newly established 

program goals. Beginning in 1995, key managers—including the Assistant 

Secretary for Children and Families, who is also the Director of Child 

Support Enforcement, and the Deputy Director of Child Support 

Enforcement—developed their own annual performance agreements in 

consultation with selected states. These agreements, similar to personnel 

contracts for the federal government’s Senior Executive Service, are 

intended to hold OCSE senior managers and staff accountable for achieving 

program goals. For example, the 1996 agreement between the Assistant 

Secretary and Deputy Director cites the national program goals and a 

mixture of 52 measurable and abstract process goals that the Deputy 

Director is required to meet, including promoting “effective asset 

identification and collection techniques” and continuing “a meaningful 

dialogue with national public interest groups.” 

While performance agreements have been developed for its top managers, 

OCSE also needs to develop its own long-term management strategies for 

helping to achieve the program goals, prioritize its responsibilities, specify 

intended results from its operations, and identify measures for assessing 

its own performance. Unlike long-term management strategies for the 

organization, the performance agreements specify annual program goals 

for OCSE’s top managers. For example, one such performance agreement 

indicates that OCSE will promote the review and modification of child 

support orders to help foster the self-sufficiency of eligible clientele. 

Page 26 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


Federal/State Partnership Strengthened;


OCSE Needs Its Own Strategies to Manage


for Results


However, the agreement does not specify how each manager will promote 

such a tool, how such promotion will contribute toward achieving the 

national goals, or any performance measures for assessing progress 

toward meeting the goals through this particular activity. Without its own 

long-term management strategies for helping to achieve the national 

program goals, OCSE will be hindered in establishing its priorities and 

applying its resources in ways that will effectively contribute to improved 

program results. 

Page 27 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in 

Fostering Improved State Program Results 

While OCSE has established national goals and objectives through a 

strengthened partnership with state child support enforcement programs, 

it faces additional challenges in fostering improved state performance. To 

help move management of the program toward a more results-oriented 

focus, OCSE undertook efforts to improve its audit processes, the quality of 

state-reported data, and the federal incentive funding structure. Beyond 

these initial efforts, more needs to be accomplished in all three areas in 

order to further OCSE’s reorientation toward managing for results. 

We reported earlier that OCSE’s audit role was focused more on assessing Despite state compliance with federal program requirements than on assessing the

Improvements, OCSE effectiveness of state programs. Therefore, we recommended that OCSE 

Audits Remain change its audit function to focus more on state program results. While 

compliance audits are needed, program results audits, in contrast, would Compliance Focused	 (1) measure state progress toward accomplishing the national goals; 

(2) investigate barriers to effective child support enforcement programs; 

(3) recommend program improvements, when appropriate; and (4) ensure 

that the data states submit on their performance are accurate and 

comparable across states. 

OCSE Primarily Audits 

States’ Compliance With 

Program Requirements 

Currently, OCSE’s audits, which include a substantial compliance review 

and several more specialized audits,13 remain largely focused on state 

compliance with federal program requirements. While OCSE officials agreed 

that their audits, as currently constructed, are insufficient for assessing 

state program results, they identified several reasons why they do not 

conduct such program results audits. According to the Director of OCSE’s 

Division of Audit, OCSE cannot use a program results audit until it and the 

states approve performance measures currently under consideration. He 

said that once these performance measures are finalized they can then be 

used as criteria for auditing program results. The Director also indicated 

that if OCSE was not relieved of its current statutory requirement to 

conduct the substantial compliance audits, its operations would be 

strained by having to conduct both compliance and program results audits 

with limited staff resources. The Director of OCSE’s Division of Audit also 

believed that a penalty provision similar to that used for its substantial 

compliance audits would be needed to sanction states for poor 

13The scope of OCSE’s substantial compliance audit, conducted at least once every 3 years, covers a 

broad array of federal regulations intended to determine whether a state’s entire child support 

enforcement program meets federal requirements. OCSE’s specialized audits, which include reporting 

system reviews, audits of undistributed collections, and limited cost reviews, are designed to 

determine whether a state has met federal requirements in specific areas of program administration. 

Page 28 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in


Fostering Improved State Program Results


performance. He said that without a penalty provision, program results 

audits would be construed by states as merely advisory. Other OCSE 

officials said that, given their current emphasis on compliance audits, it 

may be inappropriate to penalize states for poor performance while 

finding them in compliance with regulatory requirements. 

We believe that OCSE can conduct program results audits that would 

provide states with valuable information to use in improving program 

results. First, we believe that OCSE could conduct such audits without 

approved performance measures by using its accumulated knowledge of 

state practices and results. Once approved, however, performance 

measures could provide OCSE auditors with additional criteria to assess 

state progress toward achieving the national goals. Also, program results 

audits could be conducted at the discretion of OCSE’s Director, Division of 

Audit, considering the history of each state’s program, staff workloads, 

and other factors. In addition, recent welfare reform legislation—the 

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 

1996—requires that states review and report annually on their compliance 

with federal program requirements. Instead of conducting compliance 

audits, OCSE is required under the legislation to review the states’ 

compliance reports and provide them with comments, recommendations 

for corrective actions, and technical assistance. This should reduce OCSE’s 

workload previously associated with compliance audits, thereby making 

resources available to conduct the program results audits. Finally, we do 

not believe that penalties are necessary because the intent of such audits 

would be to help states improve their performance. 

OCSE Streamlined Audits 

and Focused Reviews on 

State Reporting Systems 

While OCSE has not yet audited state program results, it has undertaken 

other initiatives to improve its oversight of state programs. Previously, 

states expressed concern about the scope, complexity, and length of time 

it took to respond to substantial compliance audits conducted by OCSE. At 

the time of our previous review, OCSE relied on an audit approach that had 

over 50 compliance criteria. These criteria included 29 for auditing state 

compliance with federal requirements and 23 to ensure that states 

provided child support services in accordance with their approved state 

plans. For these audits, states had to provide the necessary evidence to 

demonstrate the extent to which they met the applicable criteria. In 

addition, audits were untimely—sometimes final reports were not issued 

until 2 years after the period audited. In these cases, the audits were not a 

useful management tool to states. 

Page 29 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in


Fostering Improved State Program Results


In December 1994, OCSE issued final regulations to streamline its 

substantial compliance audits and make them less burdensome to states. 

Using a materiality test,14 OCSE decided that if 90 percent or more of all 

states met a particular criterion, thus demonstrating general proficiency, 

that criterion would be deleted from the substantial compliance audit. As a 

result of eliminating several criteria, these audits have been redefined and 

now focus on state compliance with service-related criteria. 

In addition to its efforts to streamline its audit processes, OCSE has 

undertaken efforts to assess the accuracy of state data. In our previous 

report, we recommended that OCSE reexamine its audit role to support 

accurate state performance reporting. Since our recommendation, OCSE 

has placed greater emphasis on its reporting system reviews, which 

analyze the procedures and systems states use to accumulate, record, and 

report data. Since 1994, OCSE conducted reporting system reviews in 20 

states, most of which found that the audited state did not have reliable 

systems for reporting data accurately and that improvements will be 

needed as OCSE moves to results-oriented management. To date, OCSE has 

received responses from six states on actions they have taken to address 

its findings and recommendations. OCSE suspects that it is possible that 

other states are taking action to correct problems identified but have not 

yet provided documentation of these actions. Of those states that have 

notified OCSE, typical corrective actions include the following: 

•	 establishing procedures requiring periodic reconciliations of collections 

and expenditure data to ensure accuracy, 

•	 revising states’ automated system programming to generate collections 

data without the need for manual data entry, and 

•	 revising states’ reporting format to document the cumulative fees 

collected from absent parents for the cost of blood testing to determine 

paternity. 

The greater emphasis that OCSE has placed on assessing the accuracy of 

state-reported data corresponds to its audit role contained in the recent 

welfare reform legislation. This law requires that OCSE, at least once every 

3 years, assess the completeness, reliability, and security of data and the 

accuracy of state reporting systems. 

14Standards of materiality are defined as the relative importance or relevance of an item included in or 

omitted from the analysis of operations. 

Page 30 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in


Fostering Improved State Program Results


While Efforts Attempt In addition to the data accuracy issues surfaced through OCSE’s reporting

system reviews, the lack of comparable data across state and local

to Resolve Data jurisdictions compounds the challenges OCSE faces in measuring state 

Problems,	 performance. For example, data discrepancies resulting from differences 

in the way the states define what constitutes a child support case Discrepancies Among contribute to the current difficulty of uniformly measuring state

States Magnify performance. In OCSE’s move toward results-oriented management under 

Challenges in	 GPRA, quality data that are accurate and comparable will be needed to 

make performance-based incentive payments to states and management Assessing decisions on the future direction of child support enforcement. In addition 

Performance	 to the reporting systems reviews, the efforts of OCSE’s Performance 

Measures Work Group to develop a set of GPRA performance measures may 

also prove useful in improving data quality by bringing about greater 

comparability in state reporting. 

Given the numerous entities that can be involved in state child support 

enforcement programs, such as courts, hospitals, and other state and 

county agencies, we earlier reported that OCSE needed universally 

understood definitions and procedures by which states can collect and 

report data. As early as 1992, OCSE undertook efforts through its Measuring 

Excellence Through Statistics (METS) initiative to improve the 

comparability of state-reported data by developing standard data 

definitions for key child support enforcement terms, including a definition 

for what constitutes a child support enforcement case. In the process of 

developing measures to assess state performance, the Performance 

Measures Work Group has built upon the work of the METS initiative by 

incorporating the use of standardized definitions for measuring state 

performance. For example, measures that have been developed to assess 

state performance in obtaining support orders require that states use the 

METS definition of a child support enforcement case to report these data. 

In 1996, OCSE requested that states test the data requirements for 

performance measures currently under development. It asked that states 

identify differences in how they currently compile and report data and 

how they would be compiled and reported using performance measures. 

While at the time of our review no state had yet provided OCSE any 

substantive feedback on the pilot, OCSE officials said that data 

requirements for several of the proposed performance measures would 

require states to obtain data from sources other than those that currently 

provide information on program factors such as out-of-wedlock births and 

the location of noncustodial parents. 

Page 31 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
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OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in


Fostering Improved State Program Results


Federal Incentive	 In our previous report, we found that the incentive funding structure has 

yet to achieve its potential. In practice, all states—regardless of

Funding Structure performance—received some incentive payments. Moreover, the amount 

Remains Weakly	 of incentive payments depends on a state’s collections and program costs 

and does not reflect success in achieving each of the three program goals, Linked to State such as establishing paternities and obtaining support orders. Therefore,

Performance	 we previously recommended that OCSE reexamine the incentive funding 

structure because of its poor linkage to state program outcomes. Today, 

the incentive funding structure remains weakly linked with state program 

performance. A new arrangement that considers progress toward 

achieving the national program goals will be needed in order to foster 

improved program results. 

State child support enforcement programs receive 66 percent of their 

program costs through federal financial participation and additional funds 

as a result of the incentive funding policy prescribed by law. In 1995, 

incentive payments to states were estimated at $400 million. However, the 

current incentive funding structure has two major limitations. First, while 

funding is awarded to states on the basis of a collections-to-cost ratio, the 

current structure does not consider other program results, such as 

increased paternities established and support orders obtained. Second, 

states receive incentive funding equal to at least 6 percent of their 

collections, regardless of how well or poorly they perform. Therefore, as 

currently constructed, federal funding does not provide a real incentive for 

states to improve their performance. 

OCSE officials told us that the current incentive funding structure does not 

provide them an effective means to foster improved program results at the 

state level. They said, for example, that the performance agreements OCSE 

currently has with the states to improve program results are 

unenforceable. Under the existing incentive funding structure, if a state 

fails to meet or exceed stated goals, OCSE does not have the statutory 

authority to alter the existing incentive funding scheme to adjust the 

state’s award consistent with its performance. 

The state program officials we interviewed also agree that the current 

incentive funding structure needs improvement. In designing a new 

structure, state officials believe that the existing pool of incentive funds 

should not be reduced and that incentive payments should be based on 

one or more of several standards, such as improving state performance, 

surpassing an aggregate level of performance, or completing appropriate 

corrective actions. State officials also believe that OCSE must help states 

Page 32 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 3 


OCSE Faces Additional Challenges in


Fostering Improved State Program Results


meet the standards under a new system and should be held accountable 

for states’ successes or failures. In response to these state views, OCSE 

officials have continued to work closely with the states to include their 

priorities in development and approval of the measures used to assess 

performance of the program. In addition, state officials cited the continued 

need for uniform data definitions, such as those included in METS, and 

compliance with program requirements to help ensure that the new system 

is fair to all states. 

The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 

1996, when fully implemented, will establish a new incentive funding 

structure. It requires the Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the states, 

to develop a new incentive funding structure that provides payments to 

states based on performance. The Secretary must report details of the new 

system to the Congress by March 1, 1997. The system developed will 

become effective for fiscal year 2000; the current structure will remain 

effective until then. While the legislation requires HHS and the states to 

develop a new structure, it does not specify the factors on which incentive 

payments should be based. 

Page 33 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 4 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and 

Agency Comments 

To date, through implementation of GPRA and other undertakings, OCSE has 

made notable progress toward establishing a results-oriented framework 

for the child support enforcement program. While OCSE has additional 

steps to take, the challenges it faces in managing for results can be met. 

The national child support enforcement program, however, continues to 

face growing service needs without the benefit of knowing how OCSE plans 

to help achieve the program’s newly established goals and objectives. We 

believe that OCSE should develop its own long-term management strategies, 

as we had previously recommended, to help meet the national goals and 

objectives. In accordance with GPRA requirements, OCSE’s activities, core 

processes, and resources should be aligned to support its mission and help 

it achieve these goals. Through long-term management strategies, OCSE can 

prioritize its expanding program responsibilities, conduct operations in 

direct support of the national goals, specify the results anticipated from 

implementing its strategies, and develop measures for assessing its own 

performance. By strengthening the linkage between its management 

strategies and the national goals, we believe that OCSE will be in a better 

position to foster improved program results. 

While OCSE has initiated certain management improvements to establish 

program goals and strengthen its partnership with states, limitations in its 

audit processes and the federal incentive funding structure continue to 

constrain improvements in program results. While we recognize that 

performance measures have yet to be approved, we continue to believe 

that OCSE should assess state program performance to identify problems 

states encounter that inhibit their effectiveness and, when appropriate, 

recommend actions to help states improve their performance. Once 

approved, performance measures would help define audit criteria for 

assessing state performance. Moreover, program results audits could help 

OCSE respond to state requests for additional information on how to 

improve program performance. 

The incentive funding structure remains weakly linked with state 

performance. New welfare reform legislation—the Personal Responsibility 

and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996—requires HHS and the 

states to develop a new incentive funding structure. The act does not 

specify the factors to be used in assessing state performance. We believe 

that the structure should be realigned so that incentive payments are 

earned for progress toward the agreed upon national goals of increasing 

the number of paternities established, support orders obtained, and 

collections received. By realigning incentive funding with state 

Page 34 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 4 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


performance, OCSE would be better equipped to reward states for progress 

toward achieving the national goals. 

Recommendations	 We recommend that the Secretary of HHS direct OCSE, as part of its GPRA 

efforts, to do the following: 

•	 Develop its own long-term management strategies, in conjunction with the 

states, to help increase paternities established, support orders obtained, 

and collections received. Such strategies should (1) prioritize OCSE’s roles 

and responsibilities, (2) specify results that OCSE anticipates from its 

prioritized operations, and (3) develop performance measures for 

assessing its own performance. 

•	 Conduct program results audits of state progress toward achieving the 

national program goals. These audits should assess the accuracy of 

state-reported data; investigate barriers to achieving improved program 

results; and recommend approaches, when appropriate, for states to meet 

program goals. 

•	 Include payments in the new incentive system, required by recent welfare 

reform legislation, that are based on state progress toward increasing 

paternities established, support orders obtained, and collections received. 

HHS provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III). HHS Agency Comments	 generally concurs with our recommendations. The Department expressed 

its commitment to moving forward in the direction of our 

recommendation that OCSE develop its own long-term management 

strategy. It stated that developing longer-term management strategies and 

program priorities can be beneficial and cited steps OCSE has taken in this 

direction, such as creating a series of federal/state work groups to address 

longer-term issues and planning major enhancements to the Federal 

Parent Locator Service. We are encouraged by the Department’s 

commitment to OCSE developing its own long-term management strategy 

and by these initial efforts. As OCSE proceeds to fully implement our 

recommendation, it also should ensure that, as the national office for the 

child support enforcement program, it has strategies to establish its own 

priorities, specify anticipated results from its program activities, and 

develop measures to assess its performance. 

In response to our recommendation on program results auditing, HHS 

commented that with the enactment of welfare reform, OCSE will be 

required to conduct program results audits. While welfare reform 

Page 35 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 4 


Conclusions, Recommendations, and


Agency Comments


legislation requires that OCSE verify the accuracy of state-reported data, 

our recommendation covers several additional steps essential for 

reorienting OCSE’s audit function toward program results. Specifically, 

program results audits conducted by OCSE should investigate why states 

have not met performance targets and make recommendations, when 

appropriate, to assist states in improving their performance. 

With regard to our recommendation related to developing a new incentive 

funding structure, HHS stated that OCSE, through its strategic planning 

process and the Performance Measures Work Group, has made progress 

toward revising the basis on which states receive incentive payments. 

While these steps show promise in strengthening the linkage between the 

incentive funding structure and state performance, the revised structure, 

when fully implemented, should base payments on state progress made 

toward achieving all three program goals as we recommend. 

HHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final 

report as appropriate. 

Page 36 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 37 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Local Participation in OCSE’s GPRA Pilot 

Project 

OCSE invited state and county governments to begin their own GPRA pilots 

to help them become familiar with GPRA principles. In response, 27 states, 

two counties, two cities, and Puerto Rico volunteered to participate by 

working on projects that focus on specific issues related to the national 

goals and objectives. For example, some states are focusing on efforts to 

improve child support collections through employment counseling for 

noncustodial parents. In certain cases, the local GPRA pilots cover the full 

range of child support services; other pilots focus on a more narrow set of 

services, such as locating noncustodial parents. Still other states have 

initiated demonstrations integrating child support and AFDC program 

services. 

The pilots included in our case studies are briefly described below. 

Illinois: Employment Illinois proposes to increase the number of support orders enforced and 

Counseling/


“One Stop Shopping”


collections received by establishing a unit to address the employment 

needs of noncustodial parents and to streamline certain program 

procedures. Procedures that could be streamlined include employment 

services for noncustodial parents and use of cooperative agreements. 

Hennepin County, Hennepin County initiated a pilot project to test the relationship between 

Minnesota: Measuring federal incentive funding passed through to county child support 

Program Performance enforcement programs and performance in several areas, including 

paternity establishment and the review and adjustment of child support 

orders. 

New Jersey: Sharing New Jersey intends to share procedures and case selection criteria with 

Procedures and Case other states in federal Region II to increase the number of criminal cases 

Selection Criteria and submitted to the U.S. Attorney’s Office. The state also proposes to develop 

a birth facility/hospital-based model that permits electronic processing of Facilitating Paternity voluntary paternity acknowledgments, notification of births, parent Establishment information, and other data essential to assist in establishing paternity. 

Texas: Collocation of Child Texas plans to improve the information gathered from custodial parents at 

Support/AFDC Case the time they apply or recertify for AFDC so that state officials have the 

Processing necessary information to establish and enforce child support when AFDC 

caseworkers refer cases to child support enforcement officials. 

Page 38 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Local Participation in OCSE’s GPRA Pilot


Project


Virginia: Welfare/Child Virginia child support officials proposed a project to develop performance 

Support Interface	 indicators that measure and improve coordination between welfare and 

child support agencies in rural, suburban, and urban areas. 

Page 39 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix II 


Selected Program and Demographic


Characteristics of Case-Study States


Percent of 

female-headed 

households 

without spouse, 

State (federal region) 

Principal state 

entity 

administering 

the programa 

State 

State- or population (in State per Percent of 

county-run thousands), capita income, children in 

program 1995 1994 poverty, 1989 

Alabama (IV-Atlanta)	 Department of 

Human 

Resources 

State 4,253 $17,924 24.0 

Illinois (V-Chicago) Department of State 11,830 23,607 16.8 

Public Aid 

Minnesota (V-Chicago) Department of County 4,610 22,258 12.4 

Human Services 

New Jersey (II-New York) Department of County 7,945 27,741 11.0 

Human Services 

Oregon (X-Seattle) Department of State 3,141 20,469 15.2 

Human 

Resources 

Texas (VI-Dallas) Office of the State 18,724 19,719 24.0 

Attorney General 

Virginia (III-Philadelphia) Department of State 6,618 22,499 13.0 

Social Services 

aOther entities may also assist in administering the state’s child support enforcement program. 

Source: State child support programs, U.S. Bureau of the Census. 

Page 40 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 

1990 

54.4 

55.2 

64.1 

46.8 

64.3 

59.6 

53.6 
Appendix III 


Comments From the Department of Health 

and Human Services and Our Evaluation 

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those in the 

report text appear at the 

end of this appendix. 

Page 41 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix III 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services and Our Evaluation


See comment 1. 

Now on p. 3. 

Now on p. 5. 

Page 42 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix III 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services and Our Evaluation


See comment 2. 

See comment 3. 

Page 43 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix III 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services and Our Evaluation


GAO Comments	 1. We are encouraged by HHS’ commitment to OCSE developing its own 

long-term management strategy and by these initial efforts. As OCSE 

proceeds to fully implement our recommendation, it also should ensure 

that, as the national office for the child support enforcement program, it 

has strategies to establish its own priorities, specify anticipated results 

from its program activities, and develop measures to assess its 

performance. 

2. While welfare reform legislation requires that OCSE verify the accuracy 

of state-reported data, our recommendation covers several additional 

steps essential for reorienting OCSE’s audit function toward assessing state 

program results. Specifically, program results audits conducted by OCSE 

should investigate why states have not met performance targets and make 

recommendations, when appropriate, to assist states to improve their 

programs. 

3. Steps taken by OCSE and the states to strengthen the linkage between the 

incentive funding structure and state performance show promise toward 

revising the basis on which states receive incentive payments. As a pivotal 

element in reorienting program management toward results, the revised 

structure when fully implemented should base payments on state progress 

made toward achieving all three program goals as we recommend. 

Page 44 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments


GAO Contacts	 Mark E. Ward, Evaluator-in-Charge, (202) 512-7274 

David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, (202) 512-7201 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to those named above, the following individuals made 

important contributions to this report: J.C. Mihm directed our work on 

implementation of GPRA; Gregory Curtis and Kevin C. Malone designed 

project tasks, conducted interviews, analyzed data, and wrote sections of 

the report; James P. Wright provided guidance on methodological and 

analytical issues; Kevin M. Kumanga, Catherine V. Pardee, Christopher D. 

Morehouse, and Lisa R. Shames offered their perspectives on program 

management derived from past GAO work; and Dayna K. Shah and Mary W. 

Reich provided legal assistance. 

Page 45 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments


Page 46 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments


Page 47 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
Related GAO Products


Child Support Enforcement: States’ Experience With Private Agencies’ 

Collection of Support Payments (GAO/HEHS-97-11, Oct. 23, 1996). 

Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance 

and Results Act (GAO/GGD-96-118, June 1996). 

Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA’s Objectives Requires Strong 

Congressional Role (GAO/T-GGD-96-79, Mar. 6, 1996). 

Child Support Enforcement: States and Localities Move to Privatized 

Services (GAO/HEHS-96-43FS, Nov. 20, 1995). 

Managing for Results: Status of the Government Performance and Results 

Act (GAO/T-GGD-95-193, June 27, 1995). 

Child Support Enforcement: Opportunity to Reduce Federal and State 

Costs (GAO/T-HEHS-95-181, June 13, 1995). 

Child Support Enforcement: Families Could Benefit From Stronger 

Enforcement Program (GAO/HEHS-95-24, Dec. 27, 1994). 

Managing for Results: State Experiences Provide Insights for Federal 

Management Reforms (GAO/GGD-95-22, Dec. 21, 1994). 

Child Support Enforcement: Federal Efforts Have Not Kept Pace With 

Expanding Program (GAO/T-HEHS-94-209, July 20, 1994). 

Improving Government: Actions Needed to Sustain and Enhance 

Management Reforms (GAO/T-OCG-94-1, Jan. 27, 1994). 

(106601) Page 48 GAO/HEHS/GGD-97-14 Child Support Enforcement 
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