W h e n w e us e the sing u la r “p la intiff ,” w e a re re fer rin g to M rs . B a iley. 1 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Fe brua ry 4, 200 4 S es sio n PEGG Y BAIL EY, ET AL 

### . v. DR . JOHN J. TA SKER Appeal f romthe Law Cou rt for Sulli van Coun ty No. C34264(M ) John S . McLe llan, I II, Jud ge

F ILED MARCH 17, 2004
No. E2003-00844-COA- R3-CV

Pe g g y B a ile y a ndhe r h us ba nd , G ary

B a ile y , s ue d D r. John J

. Tas ke r f or wr on g fu l c on du c t in 1
connec tion with two separ ate surge ries, one on April 10, 1997, and another on J une 24, 1999. The trial court gr anted the defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt, finding that the materia l filed by the parties fails to ref

lect a g enuine issue of m aterial fac t and that the recor d befor e it demonstrates conclusively

(1) that the de fendant did not viol ate the applicable standard of car e, and ( 2) that the plaintiffs’ cla ims were f

iled outside the period of the applicable statutes of limitations and of repose

. Th e plaint if

fs app e a l. We a ff

ir m. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Law Cou rt Aff irm ed; Case R em anded
C H A RLES D. S US ANO , J R ., J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which H ER SCH EL P. F RAN KS and D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J J ., joined.
R i c h ar d A

. S p i v e y, K i n g s p o r t , T e n n e s s e e , f o r t h e ap p e l l a n t s , P e g g y B a i l e y a n d G ar y B a i l e y.
J eff rey M. Ward, Gre eneville, Te nnessee , for the a ppellee, D r. John J . Tasker

. OP IN ION
I.
I n D e c e mbe r, 19 96 , th e plaint if f w a s r e fe rr e d to the de fe nd a nt, a Ki ng sp ort OB /G YN , w ith sy mptoms of abdominal pain, irreg ular bl ee d i n g, and other complaints. On J anuary 9, 1997, the defe ndant op er ated on the plaintiff, which oper ation reve aled the pr esenc e of f ree fluid and blood in the pelvic ca vity . The de fendant removed the fluid and blood.J u n e 1 1 , 2 0 0 0 , w a s a S u n d a y. See T en n
. R. Ci v
. P. 6. 01. 2

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 8

- 1

- 1 0 5 (a) (20 0 0 ). 3
-2- When the plaintiff’s sy mptoms persisted, the defe ndant re commended a hy sterec tomy . The plaint if f t e sti fi e d th a t, on Ap ri l 9, 19 97 , the de fe nd a nt tol d h e r h e wo uldpe rf orm th e hy ste re c tom y vag inally , b u t t hat if, during the proc edure , he dete rmined that it was nec essary to remove he r ovarie s, he would stop the proc edure and make an incision in her a b d o m en
. The de fendant pe rf orme d th e hy ste rectom y on Ap ri l 10 , 1 99 7. L a te r o n th e sa me da y , th e plaint if f l e arn e d th a t, co n tr ar y to th e d e f

e n d a n t’ s a s s u r a n c e o f

A p r il 9 , 1 9 9 7 , h e h a d in f a c t r e mo v e d h e r

o varie s lapar oscopica lly

rathe r than throug h an abdominal incision.
Sub se qu e ntl y , o n a n u nid e nti fi e d d a te in the sa me y e ar, the plaint if f, wh ile c le a nin g the ho us e of Dr . Alle y , the a ne sth e sio log ist wh o w a s p re se nt at th e Ap ri l 10 , 1 99 7, su rg e ry , d isc us se d w ithhim the problems she ha d experience d since the sur g ery . The plaintiff told Dr

. Alley that “something was wrong ,” at which point Dr

. Alley , acc ording to the plaintiff, told he r that the def endant should have “opene d up” the plaintiff instea d of per forming the surg ery lapar oscopica lly

. Due to re curring urinary trac t infec tions and bacteria l infec tions, the plaintiff later sa w two differ ent g y necolog ists, as well as her family phy sician, Dr. Hay nes. She cla ims that, on J une 11, 1999, Dr. Hay nes diag nosed her condition as a pun ct u red urethra . The plaintiff inter prete d Dr. Haynes’ diag nosis to mean that the puncture occur red during he r hy sterect omy . Acc ording to the plaint if f, Dr . H a y ne s r e fe rr e d h e r b a c k to the de fe nd a nt f or e valuatio n a ndtr e a tme nt. Upon his examination of t he plainti ff, the de fendant determined that the problems she ha d been ha ving w ere not due to a punctured urethra, but rathe r were caused by a S kene’ s absce ss, which is “an infe ction of one of

sever al par aure thral g lands.” On June 24, 1999, the def endant pe rformed a se c on d s ur g e ry

on the plaint if

f t o d rain the abs c e ss.
On J u n e 12, 2000, the plaintiff and he r husband f iled a pro se c o mp lain t a g a in st the 2 defe ndant, alleg ing ( 1) that he ha d committed a batt er y o n h er in the perf ormanc e of the hy sterec tomy

on April 10, 1997, and (2) that the surg ery had bee n neg lige ntly

perf ormed. Approxim ately

one month later, on July17, 2000, the plaintiffs took a voluntary nonsui t without prejudice . On J uly

11, 2001, within the one -y ear saving statute, the plaintiffs re filed the identica l 3 l aw s u i t , aga i n ac t i n g pro s e . T he re a ft e r, the plaint if fs re ta ine d c ou ns e l.
Th e de fe nd a nt f

ile d a mot ionto d ism iss , a lle g ing th at the plaint if fs ha d f ile d th e ir la ws uit outside the period of

the applica

ble stat u t es of limitation and of repose . That motion was denied. On Marc h 14, 20 0 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint so as to alleg e that the d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o a d v i s e t h e p l a i n t i f f o f t h e s p e c i f

i c r i s k s i n v o l v e d i n t h e A p r i l 1 0 , 1 9 9 7 , s u r g e r y; that the def

endant f raudule ntly

conce aled from the pl aintiff his “tortious acts a nd omissions ”; and that th e d e f

e n d a n t w a s n e g li g e n t in h is p e r f o r man c e o f th e s e c o n d s u r g e r y o n Ju n e 2 4 , 1 9 9 9

. The plaintiffs’ motion to amend was g rante d by the trial court on Febr

uary 26, 2003.-3-

On September

3, 2002 , t h e d efendant filed a motion for summary

judgme nt, supported by his statement of undisputed fa cts . On Fe bruary 26, 2003, the trial court entere d an orde r g ranting the def endant’ s motion. From this order, the pla intiffs appea l.
II. Summary judgme nt should be g rante d “whe n both the fac ts and the conc lusions to be drawn from the f

acts pe rmit a rea sonable pe rson to rea ch only one conc lusion.” C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W. 2d23 , 2 6 ( Te nn . 1 99 5) (c itatio n o mit te d) . Si nc e a mot ionfo r s umm ary

judgm ent pr e se nts a pu re qu e sti on of

la w, ou r r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss as to the trial court’s judgme nt. Gonzales v. A lm an Con str. Co. , 85 7 S.W. 2d 42 , 44 (T e nn
. Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ). Ou r r ole is to decide anew if summary judgme nt is appropriate

.

III

. A.
Th e iss ue s r a ise d o n th is a pp e a l c a n b e su c c inc tly

state d a s f

oll ow s:
1. Di d th e tr ia l c ou rt

abu se its dis c re tio n whe n it de nie d th e plaint if

fs ’ motion to continue the hearing on the defe ndant’s motio n for su mma ry jud g me nt?
2. Did the trial court e rr in f ailing to f ind a g enuine issue of

materia l fa c t a s to the plaint if

fs ’ c on te ntion that

the de fe nd a nt f

ra ud ule ntl y conce aled his neg lige nt treatment of the plaintiff?
3. I s the de fe nd a nt e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt b a se d o n th e statut e of limitations and the statute of re pose?
4. I s th e de fe nd a nt e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt ba se d u po n h is testimonyreg arding the standar d of ca re?
B.
Th e plaint if

fs arg ue that th e tr ia l c ou rt abu se d it s d isc re tio n whe n it de nie d th e ir mot ionto continue the summary

judgme nt hearing. We disag ree
. On M ay 3, 2002, the trial court entere d a sche duling or der r equiring that all party depositions be take n on or be fo re Ma y 31 , 20 02

. I n a dd iti on , th e or de r r e qu ir e d th e plaint if fs to d isc los e the ir expert witnesses within 45 day s following the deposition of the defe ndant. The de fendant was deposed on May

28, 2002. Howeve r, t he plainti ffs failed t o disclose t heir e x pert witnesse s during the period specified in the sc heduling order

.-4-

The plaintiffs f

iled a motion to revise the scheduling order on J uly 22, 2002, reque sting the tr ia l c ou rt to e xten d un til Au g us t 21 , 20 02 , the tim e fo r dis c los ur e of e xpe rt wi tne sse s. On Au g us t 21, 2002, the plaintiffs sent a le tter to the def endant, na ming two of the plaintiff’s tre ating phy sicians a s e xpe rt wi tne sse s, bu t th e le tte r d id n ot d isc los e the op ini on s o f tho se ph y sic ia ns
. On Octobe r 31, 20 0 2 , t h e p laintiffs filed a se cond motion to revise the sc heduling order , re qu est in g t hi s time that th e c ou rt e xten d th e tim e fo r d isc los ur e of a dd iti on a l e xpe rt

wi tne sse s to Dec ember

31, 2002. The pa

rties appe are d befor e the tria l court on De cembe r 20, 2002, to arg ue the defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt. Howeve r, due to c onfusion cause d by th emisnumbering of the pa rag raphs in the de fen d an t ’s s tatement of undisputed f acts, the tria l court continued the hearing to F ebrua

ry 7, 20 0 3

. The c ourt instructed the pla intiffs that they had to have “an e x pert witness to properly

oppose [the defe ndant’s] moti on.”
On J anuary

27, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a motion to continue the hear i ng on the summary judgme nt motion unt il March 7, 200 3

. I n s u p p o rt of their motion, the plaintiffs submitted the aff idavit of their attorne y . The a ffidavit re cites that the issues raised in the defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt “ar e suff

iciently complex as to r equire a substantial amount of time for further re se arc h a nde va luatio n” ; th a t pl a int if fs ’ co un se l has “ fo un d [himse lf ] in the mid st o f an e sp e c ia lly bu sy c r i m i n a l a n d c i v i l tr i a l d o c k e t ” ; t h a to f f i c e r e p a i r s d u e t o f

l o o d i n g h a v e i n t e r f

e r e d w i th counsel’s a

bilityto conduct business; that the hea rt condition of the plaintiff’s husband ha s require d c ou ns e l to “ a vo id m a tte rs that up se t hi m,” c a us ing c ou ns el to be “disin c lin e d to e ng a g e in discussions with him reg arding this matter due to

. . . conce rn for his well-be ing” ; and that counse l needs more time to find an expert witness. I n denying the plaintiffs’ motion on Fe bruary 7, 2003, t h e t ri al co u rt s t at ed t h e f o l l o wi n g:
B a se d u po n th e fo re g oin g pr oc e du ra l hi sto ry a ndthe ov e ral l circ umstances a nd conditions involved in thi s case , the Court, in the exercise of its discr etion, finds that the plaintiffs’ motion to continue and for a d d it io n a l t im e is n o t w e ll ta k e n a n d th e r e f

o r e s h o u ldbe denied.
Under the abuse of discre tion standard,
a trial court’s ruling “will be upheld so long as re asonable minds can disag ree as t o [t he] propriety of the de cision made.” Sta te v . Sc ott , 33 S.W. 3d746, 75 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Sta te v . G ill ila nd , 22 S.W .3d 266, 27 3 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) . A tr ia l c ou rt abu se s it s d is cretion on ly wh e n it “applie[s] an incorre ct leg al standard, or re ache [s] a dec ision which is a g a ins t lo g ic or

re a so nin g th at cau se [s] a n in jus tic e to the pa

rt y complaining .” State v. Shirley , 6 S.W .3d 243, 247 (Tenn. 1999)

. The abuse of discretion st andar d does not permit the appe llate court to substitute its judg ment for that of the trial c ourt. My int v . Al lst ate Ins . Co ., 970 S.W .2d 920, 927 (Tenn. 1998)

.-5-

Eldridge v. Eldridge , 42 S.W .3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001) . I n view of the fac t the plaintiffs had more than nine months fr om the time of the initial sche duling order until the hearing on t h e s u m m ary jud g me nt m oti on to f

inda n e xpe rt wi tne ss to c on tr ov e rt the de po sit ion te sti mon y of the de fe nd a nt, we be lieve the trial court’s decision to deny the pl aintiffs’ moti on for y et more time to find an e x pert was, at a minimum, a decision about which “re asonable minds can disag ree as to [the] propriety of the dec ision made.” Gi lli lan d , 22 S.W .3d at 273. I n fac t, we doubt that few , if any , would find a continuance justified in this case by the fa cts set forth in the a ffidavit. The plaintiffs a

rg ue, among other thing s, that they wer e unable to locate an ex pert due to the failure of the de fendant to timely provide them with his office notes perta ining to his treatment of the plaintiff. Howe ver, the plaintiffs rec eived these rec ords on Novembe r 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 , an d, as the de fe nd a nt p oin ts o ut i n h is b ri e f, that g a ve the plaint if fs 79 day s to loc a te a n e xpe rt . In a ny e ve nt, the re asons adva nced by

the plaintiffs for

a delay as set fo rt h i n their counse l’s aff idavit, standing a lon e , a reno t, i n o ur

jud g ment , su ffi cie nt to p la c e the tr ia l c ou rt in e rr or fo r f a ili ng to g rant a c on tin ua nc e . In sho rt , we fi nd no abu se of dis c re tio n inthe tr ia l c ou rt ’s de nia l of the plaint if

fs ’ motion.
C.
We now turn to the dual issues of whe ther the plaintiffs’ claim of a battery in the first surg ery is barre d by

the applica

ble statute of limita t i o n s an d whether their cla im of neg lige nce in the perf ormanc e of that surg ery

is barre d by

the statute of r epose.
As pr e vio us ly no ted , th e de fe nd a nt p e rf orme d s ur g e ry

on the plaint if

f o n tw o s e pa

rate occa sions, i.e. , on April 10, 1997, and a g ain on J une 24, 1999. The p l ai n t i ff s’ orig inal complaint was filed on June 12, 2000. I n that complaint, the plaintiffs alleg ed (1) neg lige nce and, what appe ars to be, (2) an informed c onsent medica l malprac tice ca use of a ction, all with respec t to the A pril 10, 19 97 , s ur ge ry
. Whil e the J une 24, 1999, surg ery is mentioned in the orig inal complaint, thereare no a lle g a tio ns of

a c aus e of a c tio n w ith re sp e c t to that se c on d s ur g e ry . T he se c on d s ur g e ry is mentioned only

in passing and appar ently only as a c onsequenc e of the earlier surg ery . I n our jud g me nt, the g ra va me n of the orig ina l c omp la int de a ls e xclu siv e ly

wi th the fi rs t su rg e ry

of Ap ri l 10, 1997.
I n the prec eding para g raph we stated that the plaintiffs, in their orig inal complaint, alleg ed “what appea

rs to be” an informed consent medical malprac tice action. We say this because it is not entirely clea r to us whether

the plaintiffs ar e pu rsuing an informe d consent medic al malpra ctice action or a

medical battery

suit. See Bla nc har

d v . Ke llum , 975 S.W .2d 522, 524-25 (Te nn. 1998). The a lleg ations in the orig inal complaint and the plaintiffs’ second c omplaint seem to indicate the former , while the pl ai n t i ff’ s testimonyessentially consists of an ac cusation that the de fenda nt perf ormed a proce dure not authorized by her. Reg ardle ss of which it is, the plaintiff’ s own testimony r e f l e c t s t h a tt h e p l a i n t i f

f s w e r e a w ar e o f s u f

f i c i e n t f a c t s o n t h e d a y o f t h e f

i r s ts u r g e r y, a n d c e r t a i n l y,W e s ay “ n o l at er t h an t h e e n d of 1997” bec au s e t h e pl ai n t i f f c ou l d n ot pi n poi n t t h e dat e of t h e con v er s at i on 4
ot h er t h an t o s ay t h at i t oc cu r r ed s omet i me i n 1997.

Se e fo o t no t e 2 t o t hi s o p i ni o n. 5
-6- based upon the plaint i ff ’s conve rsation with Dr. Alley , no later tha n the end of 1997, to put the

4 plaintiffs on notice of a cause of action against the defendant for a battery , be it an informe d consent medical malpr actice claim or a medical battery

claim. The origina l suit fil ed J une 12, 2000, wa s filed more tha n one y ear

afte r both dates. Henc e, this part of the plaintiffs’ cla im is barred bya oney ea r s t atut e of limitations. Assuming their c laim is one based upon informed conse nt medical malprac tice, the a

pplicable statute of

limit ations is the one-y ear period set forth in T enn. Code Ann. § 2 9- 26 -1 16 (2 00 0) . I f the plaint if fs are c la imi ng a me dic a l bat te ry , the pe ri odof lim itatio ns is a g a in one y ear , but this time pursuant to the provisi ons of Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104( a)( 1) (2000) . As can be seen, the period of limitations, u n d er both scena rios, is one y ear . The plaintiffs’ orig inal c omp la int wa s f ile d o n Jun e 12 , 2 00 0, mor e than one y e ar a ft e r b othof the po ssi ble tr ig g e ri ng e ve nts

. Henc e, the “ battery ” part of their cla im was not timelyfiled. As to the plaintiffs’ c laim that the defe nd an t n eg lige ntly puncture d the plaintiff’s ur ethra during her hy sterec tomy , the plaintiffs asse rt that they did not become a war e the ur ethra had bee n puncture d in that surg ery until J une 11, 1999, when, acc ording to the plaintiff, her family phy sician, Dr . H a y ne s, re ve a le d th is f a c t to he r. I f thi s be the c a se , the plaint if fs ha d unti l J un e 12 , 2 00 0, to 5 fi le su it a s to the ne g lig e nc e c la im i n o rd e r t o s a tis fy the app lic able statut e of

lim itatio ns . Su it, in fa c t, w a s f

ile d on June 12 , 2 00 0. Th is f ili ng , h ow e ve r, wh ile sa tis fying the statut e of lim itatio ns , is o u t s i d e t h e t h r e e
- y e a

r p e r i o d o f t h e s t a t u t e o f

r e p o s e
. T h a t p e r i o d e x p i r e d o n A p r i l 1 0 , 2 0 0 0

. In ord er t o avoid t he bar

ring eff ect of the statute of r epose, the plaintiffs contend that the defe ndant fraudulently

conce aled his neg lige nce. T hey rely upon the “f

raudule nt conce alment” lang uag e of Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 26 -1 16 (a)(3) to e sta bli sh the tim e lin e ss o f the ir su it, wh ic h, a c c or din g to them, was filed “within one (1) y ear afte r discovery that the cause of action exis ts.” Id . The c rux of the plaintiffs’ arg ument is that the defe ndant puncture d the plaintiff’s ure thra during the April 10, 1997, surg er y ; t h at h e knowing ly conce aled this fac t from the plaintiff; and that this “fraudule nt conce alment” tolled the r unning of the statute of r epose. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-116(a )(3) provides fo r t h e t o l l ing of the statute of r epose f

or “fr audulent conc ealment on the part of the defendant.” When fac ed with a f acia lly -valid def

ense of the statute of repose , a plaintiff must e stablish a g round for tolling the statute. See Gree n v. Sacks , 56 S.W .3d 513, 518 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).
T h e S u p r e m e C o u r th a s a d d r e s s e d t h e e l e m e n t s o f a f r a u d u l e n tc o n c e a l m e n tc l a i mt h u s l y: [A] plaintiff in a lack of informed consent c ase ( or any other medic al ma lpr a c tic e c a se ) atte mpt ing to t oll the statut e of re po se c on ta ine d in [Tenn. Code Ann. §] 29-26-116(a) (3) by relying upon the fra udulent c on c e a lme nt e xce pti on to the statut e mus t e sta bli sh that ( 1) the he a lthW hi l e t he p l ai nt i f f ’ s t est i m o ny regardi ng her conversat i o n wi t h D r. H aynes i s hearsay when o f fered t o pro ve 6
t he t rut h of t he st at em ent t hat t he p l ai nt i f f ’ s uret hra was p unct ured i n t he f i rs t s urgery , i t is a d m i ss i b l e t o pro ve when t he p la intiff s first l ear ned o f t h is fac t v is-a -v is w h e n th e s ta tute o f l im itatio n s b e g a n to ru n o n the ir n e g lige n c e c la im . T h is i s be ca u s e t h e s u bj ec t e v i den ce i s re l ev an t on t h e i s s u e of wh en t h e pl ai n t i f

f s wer e f i r s t put on not i ce of

t h ei r c au s e of act i on. Si nce , wi t h re s pect t o not i ce, t he pl ai nt i f f s are not o f

fer i ng t he ev i dence t o prove t he t r ut h of t he mat t er as s er t ed in th e c o n v e rs a tio n , t h e e v id e n c e is no t he a rs a y a n d he n c e no t b a rr e d b y the he a rs a y ru le

. See Thom ps on v . Adcok , 63 S .W .3 d 7 8 3 , 7 9 3 ( T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 1 ); see a l so N e il P . C o h e n , S a ra h Y . S h e p p e a rd & D o n a ld F . P a ine , Tenne s s ee Law of Evi dence § 8

. 0 1 [7] (4t h ed

. 20 0 0 ). -7-

car e provide r took aff

irmative ac tion to conceal the wrong doing or re ma ine d s ile nt andfaile d to dis c los e ma te ri a l fa c ts de sp ite a du ty to do so , ( 2) the plaint if

f c ou ld n ot h a ve dis c ov e re d th e wr on g de sp ite exercising rea sonable c are and dilige nce, ( 3) the he alth car e provide r knew of the fa cts g iving rise to the ca u se of a ction and, (4) a conce alment, which may consist of the def

endant withholding mate r ia l i n f

o r mati o n , ma

k in g u s e o f

s o me d e v ic e to mi s le a d the plaintiff, or simply rema ining silent and failing to disc lose m at eria l fac ts when there was a

duty to speak.
Shadr ick v. Coker , 963 S.W .2d 726, 736 (Tenn. 1998)

. I n the instant case , the def endant testified u n der oath that the plaintiff’s ure thra wa s not pu nc tur e d inthe su rg e ry

of Ap ri l 10, 1 99 7. Th e plaint if fs allege , based upon a

conver sation that the plaintiff say s she had with her famil y p h y s i cian, Dr. Haynes, that the de fendant did puncture he r u r e t h r a d u r i n g t h a ts u r g e r y. The plaintiffs did not pre sent the verified testimony of Dr. H ay nes or a

n y one else establishing that the plaintiff’s urethra was puncture d or, if puncture d, was done so as a r esult of any neg lige nce on the part of the def

endant in the April 10, 1997, surge ry . Neither the plainti ff ’s deposit ion te sti mon y re g ard ing he r c on ve rs a tio n w ith Dr . H a y ne s n or the c lin ic a l no te s of Dr . H a y ne s f ile d in the re cord, or

the two in combination, are legally sufficie nt to establish either of these fac ts. I n order to be consider ed on summary judgme nt, the proff

ere d proof must be a dmissibl e evide nce. See By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 215-16 (Tenn. 1993) (“[T] he fa cts on which the nonmova nt relies must be admissible at the trial but need not be in admissible form as pre sented in the motion.”) Since none of the evidenc e upon which the plaintiffs rely would be “admissible at the trial” to pro v e t h at t he plaintiff’s u r e th r a w a s p u n c tu r e d in th e f ir s t s u r g e r y , th a t e v id e n c e c a n n o t b e u s e d to c r e a te a

6 g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t onthe iss ue of

fr a ud ule nt c on c e a lme nt. Since the only

admissible evidence befor e us establishes t hat t he defenda nt did not puncture the plaint if

f’ s u re thr a , th e re is n o b a sis fo r f ind ing a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t on the plaint if

fs ’ alleg ation of fr audulent concea lment. Simpl y stated, one cannot concea l that which did not occur

. Thus, assuming, a s we must in the summary judgme nt context, t hat the plaintiffs’ origina l complaint a s to the ne g lig e nt p e rf

orma nc e of

the fi rs t su rg e ry

wa s f ile d w ith in the pe ri odof

the app lica

bleT enn. C o d e A nn. § 2 9

- 2 6

- 1 1 6 (a)( 3 ). 7
-8- statute of limitations, nevertheless, it was filed outside the period of the three -y ear statute of re pose. 7 He nc e , th e tr ia l c ou rt

didno t e rr

in d ism iss ing it o n s umm ary jud g me nt.
D.
I n th e plaint if

fs ’ mot ion to am e nd fi le d Mar c h 14, 20 02 , the y a sse rt , for the fi rs t ti me , c la ims of malpra ctice a

rising out of

the J une 24, 1999, surg ery . Specifi cally , the plaintiffs cla im that the defe ndant neg lige ntly left surgica l g auze i n the plaintiff’s body in that second surg ery . The plaintiff asserts that she first learned of this fac t in Aug ust, 1999, when the defe ndant t old her a nurse ha d left g auze in her body

during the J une 24, 1999, surg ery . Howe v er , as previously noted, when the plaintiffs filed their initial lawsuit on J une 12, 2 0 0 0 , t here was no mention made of a c laim for malprac tice ag ainst the defe ndant arising out of the June 24, 1999, surg ery . The fir st tim e such a claim is mentioned is in the plaintiffs’ motion to amend. Ac cording ly , the plaintiffs’ a ction is tim ebarr ed by the one- y ear

statute of limitations, unless the plaintiffs can show that the new alleg ations in the amende d complaint with respe ct to the J une 24, 1999, surg ery relate bac k to a claim asse rted in a still-pending ple ading filed within one y ear of Aug ust, 1999.
Te nn . R. Civ . P. 15 .0 3 p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
Whe ne ve r the c la im o r d e fe ns e a sse rt e d ina me nd e d ple a din g s a ro se out of the conduc t, transac tion, or occur renc e set forth or attempted to b e se t forth in the orig ina l pl e a din g , th e a me nd me nt r e la te s b a c k to t h e d at e o f t h e o ri gi n al p l ea d i n g. The plaintiffs c ontend that, by ref ere ncing the J une 24, 1999, surg er y i n their or igi na l c omp la int , the y fo c us e d th e de fe nd a nt’ s atte nti on on that su rg e ry in a way th at was su ffi c ie nt t o c omp e l a ho ldi ng that th e a lle g a tio ns wi th r e sp e c t to the June 24 , 1 99 9, su rg e ry in the mot ion to ame ndre la te back to the date of t he original complaint. We disag ree with the pl aintiffs’ approac h to the issue of relation back under

Rule 15.03.
I t is clear to us that the pr oper a pplication of Rule 15.03 in this case foc uses on the second complai n t fi l ed o n J uly

11, 2001, and not on the fir st c omp la int

fi le d o n Jun e 12 , 2 00 0. Th is i s beca use it is the second c omplaint – the pending one – that the m otion seeks to amend. We believe that Rule 15.03 nece ssarily bring s into play

the complaint soug ht to be amende d and not an e arlier complaint long sinc e dismissed.
What w e sa id e arl ie r a

bo ut the re fe re nc e to the se c on d s ur g e ry in th e plai nti ff s’ fi rs t c omp la int c a n a lso be sa id with re sp e c t to the sa me re fe re nc e in the se c on d co mpl a int fi le d on July 11, 2001. This is because the two complaints are identical

. There fore , beca use t he first surge ry

of April 10, 1997, is the sole “c onduct, tran s ac t i o n , o r occ urre nce” out of which the c laims in the complaint of Jul y

11, 2001, arose , the matters pe rtaining to the second surger y as s et forth in the-9-

motion to amend do not arise out of the f actua l predicate in the J uly 11, 2001, complaint, and, there fore , the doctrine of re lation back doe s not apply

. See Gam ble v. Hospital Corporat ion of Am erica , 676 S.W .2 d 3 4 0 , 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984) ( holding that “ althoug h the subsequent operation might arise out of the ‘c onduct, transa ction or occ urrence’ in the orig inal pleading , the
c lai m o f neglig ence in the second ope ration did not arise out of the ‘conduc t, transac tion or oc c ur re nc e ’ s e t ou t in the orig ina l pl e a din g ” ) ( e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . T he plaint if fs ’ c la im w ith re sp e c t to the June 24 , 19 99 , s ur g e ry a c c ru e d, un de r the plaint if fs ’ the ory of the c a se , inAu g us t, 1999

. T h e a s s e r ti o n o f th e ir c laim in th e M ar c h 1 4 , 2 0 0 2 , mo ti o n to a me n d f a ll s w e ll outsi de the one-y ear statute of limitations i n Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-116.
E. Finally , the plaintiffs cha lleng e the tria l court’s de cision to gr ant the def endant summary judgme nt based upon his testimony that he was familiar with the applicable s tandar d of ca re and that he did not violate it.
I n order to preva il a t t ri al i n a m edica l malprac tice ca se, a pla intiff is require d to prove, t h ro u gh ex p er tt es t i m o n y , t h e f o l l o wi n g: (1) The rec og nized standard of acc eptable professional practice in the profe ssion and the spec ialty th er eo f, if any , that the def endant prac tices in the community in which the def

endant pr actice s or in a simil ar c ommunityat the time the alleg ed injury or wrong ful ac tion occur red; (2 ) T hat th e de fe nd ant ac te d w ith le ss tha n o r f a ile d to a c t w ith ordinary and re asonable car e in ac cordance w ith such standard; a nd (3) As a proximate result of the de fendant’s neg lige nt act or omission, the plaintiff suff

ere d injuries which would not otherw ise have occur red.
Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 26 -1 15 (a ) ( Sup p. 20 03 ); see also Tenn. Code An n
. § 29-26-115( b) (Supp. 2003). F urthermor e, a de fendant w ill not be presumed neg lige nt, and a jury must be “instructed that injury alone doe s not raise a presumption of the defe ndant’s neg lige nce.” See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-115( c) & (d) ( Supp. 2003).
I n the defe ndant’s deposition, he testified that he is f amiliar with the standard o f c ar e for pr a c tic ing g y ne c olo g ist s in the Ki ng sp ort are a a nd tha t he c omp lie d wi th that stand ard of c are in h is treatment of the p l ai n t i ff . Furthermore , the def endant e stablished throug h his own testimonythat he ca used no injury

to the plaintiff which other wise would not have occur red, and that the plaintiff d i d n o th a v e a

p u n c t u r e d u r e t h r a

f o l l o w i n g t h e A p r i l 1 0 , 1 9 9 7 , s u r g e r y.-10-

B e c a us e th e def

end antnegat ed, th rou gh hi s d epo si ti on tes ti mo ny , al l o f thee sse nti a l e le me nts of the plaintiffs’ case , the burde n of proof shifted to the plaintiffs to prove, thr oug h expert medical testimony , the eleme nts set forth in Tenn. Code Ann. § 29- 26-115(a ). Howe ver, the plaintiffs failed to provide the c ourt with any e xpe rt te sti mon y on the se po int s. I ns te a d, the plaint if fs a tte mpt e d to neg ate the te stimonyof the de fendant by calling into question the defendant’s cre dibilit y
. I n his deposition, the d efendant wa s asked if he had bee n involved in other lawsuits. The defe ndant mentioned six other law suits, all re lated to me dical malprac tice. When asked if ther e we re others, the de fendant stated that “[t] h er e m ay b e more of the m” and “ [t ]hat’s all I can r eca ll right now.” The plaintiffs, pointing out that the defendant had been involved – both as a plaintiff and a defe ndant – in over 60 la wsuits of various ty pes in Sulli van County , arg ue that the def endant f ailed “to answe r truthfully questions a bout his involvement in other la wsuits.” I n addition, when aske d if he had ever been char g ed with any crimes, the defe ndant responde d only that h e h ad re ce i ved speeding and park i n g t ickets. The pla intiffs point out t hat, in Sulli van County , “ther e we re two misdemeanor c riminal case s naming him as a def endant a nd these involved wildlife violations.”
Ba sed upon the fore g oing, the plaintiffs contend that the de fendant is not t o be believe d and that, as a r esult, his testimony with r espec t to the standar d of ca re should be c onsidered c ontroverte d for the purposes of summary judgme nt. The plaintiffs re ly upon the ca se of Knap

p v . Ho lid

ay Inns , Inc. , 682 S.W .2d 936 (T en n
. C t. App. 1984), which pr ovides that “doubt as to the c redibility of materia l witnesses will create a g enuine issue of materia l fac t sufficient to re nder g ranting a summary judgme nt improper.” Id. a t 94 2. We do not be lie ve that Knapp has pre cede ntial value in the instant case
. Knapp involved the liabilityof the owne r of a cockta il lounge f

or the wr ong ful death of an individual whose death alleg edly resulted from the neg lige nt driving of a co- defe ndant who had be en drinking at t he cocktail lounge just prior to the acc ident. Id

. at 938. I n Knapp , all known witnesses to the co-de fendant’s time at the coc ktail lounge testified on summary jud gm en t i n support of the position of the owner of the lounge

. Id

. I n reje cting the loung e owne r’s a rg ument that it was entitled t o s u m m ar y

j u d gm en t , we s ai d t h e f

o l l o wi n g:
This case prese nts a clea

r si tuation wher e a summary judgme nt is not proper b ec au s e the outcome of this case rests solely upon the c re dib ility of th e wi tne sse s w ho c a n b e c on sid e re d c omp e te nt t o testify from per sonal knowl ed ge a b o u t[ co -d ef en d an t ] No rm an L ane’ s demea nor and c onduct while he w as at Chug g ers prior to the fata l a c c ide nt. Mr

. Kn app sq ua re ly c ha lle ng e d the c re dib ili ty of the se wi tne sse s in the tr ia l c ou rt a nd ha s suf fi c ie ntl y c a lle d th e c re dib ili ty of these w itnesses into question to cre ate a g enuine issue of materia l fac t.
Id . at 943.
I n Knapp , t h e w i t n e s s e s w h o s e c r e d i b i l i t y w a s a t t a c k e d w e r e a ll fact witne sse s a ndthe ir c re dib ili ty

or la c k th e re of

wa s r e la te d d ir e c tly

to the ir ve rs ion s o f the e vents of the e ve nin g in-11-

question

. I n t h e ca s e at ba r, the issue of the defe ndant’s cr edibilitydoes not g o direc tly to the de fe nd a nt’ s ex

pe rt testimonyreg arding whether he violated the standard of car e in his treatment of the plaintiff. The cre dibilit y issue in the instant case is pe riphera l to the substance of the def endant’ s t e s t i m o n y.
Be cau s e th e p lain ti f

f s f a il e d to c o me f

o r th w ith e xp e r t me d ic a l te s ti mo n y to e s ta b li sh the re qu ir e d e le me nts of the ir c a se wh e n f a c e d w ith the de fe nd a nt’ s te sti mon y ne g a tin g tho se e le me nts , we hold that the tria l court did not err in gr anting summary

judgme nt to the defe ndant.
I V.
The judgme nt of the trial court is affirmed. T his case is re manded to the tria l court for the collection o f c o s ts a s s e s s e d b e lo w , p u r s u a n t to ap p li c ab le la w
. Co s ts o n ap p e a l ar e ta xe d to the appellants, Peg g y

Bailey and Ga ry Bailey

.

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, J R., J UDGE