IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: :

:

A Condemnation Proceeding In Rem by :

the Redevelopment Authority of the City :

of Philadelphia for the Purpose of : No. 1071 C.D. 2019

Redevelopment of North Philadelphia : Argued: June 8, 2020

Redevelopment Area, Model Cities Urban :

Renewal Area, Condemnation No. 31L :

Including Certain Land Improvements and :

Properties :

:

Appeal of: Hussein Mansour :

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge1

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: January 6, 2021

Hussein Mansour (Appellant) appeals the order of the Philadelphia 

County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) granting the Philadelphia 

Redevelopment Authority’s (Authority) Motion to Strike Deeds (Motion), and 

directing that: (1) the July 31, 2006 deed from Philadelphia County (County) 

Sheriff John D. Green (Sheriff) as grantor to Maya Elkhansa (Elkhansa) and Nawal 

Mansour (N. Mansour) as grantees, recorded in the City of Philadelphia’s (City) 

Department of Records on August 25, 2006, as Document ID #51516769, be 

1The decision in this case was reached prior to January 4, 2021, when Judge Brobson 

became President Judge.
2

stricken; (2) the April 15, 2011 deed from N. Mansour, by Appellant as her 

attorney-in-fact, and Elkhansa as grantors to Appellant as grantee, recorded in the 

City’s Department of Records on May 18, 2011, as Document ID #52348550, be 

stricken; and (3) the County’s Recorder of Deeds shall record the trial court’s 

order, along with the legal description of the property located at 1907-15 Ridge 

Avenue, as evidence that the Authority is the owner of that property. We reverse

and remand.

On August 11, 2005, the Authority filed in the trial court a 

Declaration of Taking, pursuant to its authority under Sections 9(i) and 12 of the 

Urban Redevelopment Law,2 with respect to property identified, inter alia, as 

2 Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, as amended, 35 P.S. §§1709(i), 1712. Section 9(i) 

states, in relevant part:

[The] Authority shall constitute a public body, corporate and 

politic, exercising public powers of the Commonwealth as an 

agency thereof, which powers shall include all powers necessary 

or appropriate to carry out and effectuate the purposes and 

provisions of this act, including the following powers in addition 

to those herein otherwise granted:

* * *

 (i) To acquire by eminent domain any real property, including 

improvements and fixtures for the public purposes set forth in this 

act, in the manner hereinafter provided[.]

In turn, Section 12 states, in relevant part, that “[t]itle to any property acquired by [the] Authority 

through eminent domain shall be an absolute or fee simple title, unless a lesser title shall be 

designated in the eminent domain proceedings,” and that “[t]he Authority may exercise the right 

of eminent domain in the manner provided by law for the exercise of such right by cities or 

counties, as the case may be, of the same class as the city or county in which such Authority is 

organized to operate.” 35 P.S. §1712.
3

1901-21 Ridge Avenue in the City. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 40a-47a.3 That 

same day, the Authority recorded a Notice of Condemnation with the County 

Recorder of Deeds in the City’s Department of Records pursuant to former Section 

404 of the former Eminent Domain Code,4 upon its condemnation of the property 

identified in the Declaration of Taking. Id. at 51a-57a. The owner of a portion of 

3 The former Section 402(a) of the Eminent Domain Code, Act of June 22, 1964, Spec.

Sess., P.L. 84, as amended, formerly 26 P.S. §1-402(a), repealed by the Act of May 4, 2006, P.L. 

112, provided, in pertinent part:

(a) Condemnation, under the power of condemnation given by law 

to a condemnor, which shall not be enlarged or diminished hereby, 

shall be effected only by the filing in court of a declaration of 

taking, . . . and thereupon the title which the condemnor acquires 

in the property condemned shall pass to the condemnor on the date 

of such filing, and the condemnor shall be entitled to possession as 

provided in section 407.

4 Former Section 404 of the former Eminent Domain Code stated, in relevant part:

 The condemnor, upon filing its declaration of taking, shall on the 

same day lodge for record a notice thereof in the office of the 

recorder of deeds of the county in which the property is located. 

. . . The notice shall specify the court term and number of the 

declaration of taking and the date it was filed, and shall contain a

description or plan of the property condemned sufficient for the 

identification thereof and the names of the owners of the property 

interests condemned, as reasonably known to the condemnor, and 

shall be indexed in the deed indices showing the condemnee set 

forth in the notice as grantor and the condemnor as grantee. . . . 

Upon the notice being assigned a book and page number by the 

recorder of deeds the condemnor shall file with the prothonotary 

under the caption of the declaration of taking a memorandum of 

the book and page number in which the notice is recorded.

Formerly 26 P.S. §1-404 (repealed).
4

the condemned property, the property located at 1901-15 Ridge Avenue, at the 

time of condemnation was JIWI Rental Association, Inc. (JIWI). Id. at 56a.

On September 29, 2005, the City’s Office of Property Assessment and 

Wachovia Bank, N.A. (Wachovia) filed a tax lien action in the trial court under the

statute popularly known as the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act (Liens Act)5

to collect unpaid real estate taxes on a portion of condemned property formerly 

owned by JIWI, the property located at 1907-15 Ridge Avenue. R.R. at 23a-26a. 

On March 9, 2006, a writ of execution was entered in the matter. Id. at 69a.

On June 13, 2006, the property located at 1907-15 Ridge Avenue was 

sold by the Sheriff to Elkhansa and N. Mansour at a tax sale for $120,000.00. R.R. 

at 25a-26a. On July 31, 2006, the Sheriff executed a deed conveying that property 

from JIWI to Elkhansa and N. Mansour. Id. at 59a-62a. On August 25, 2006, the 

Sheriff’s deed was recorded with the County Recorder of Deeds in the City’s 

5 Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§7101-7455. Section 31.2(a) of 

the Liens Act, added by the Act of March 15, 1956, P.L. (1955) 1274, 53 P.S. §7382(a), states, in 

pertinent part:

(a) In . . . cities of the first class, whenever a claimant has filed its 

tax or municipal claim in accordance with the requirements of this 

act, it may file its petition in the court in which the proceeding is 

pending, setting forth the facts necessary to show the right to sell, 

together with searches or a title insurance policy, showing the state 

of record and the ownership of the property, and of all tax and 

municipal claims, mortgages, ground rents or other charges on, or 

estates in, the land, as shown by the official records of the city . . . 

and thereupon the court shall grant a rule upon all parties thus 

shown to be interested, to appear and show cause why a decree 

should not be made that the property be sold, freed and cleared of 

their respective claims, mortgages, ground rents, charges and 

estates. . . .
5

Department of Records as Document ID #51516769. Id. at 59a.6 The Authority 

was not a party in the tax lien action and was not served with any of the court 

filings related thereto. Id. at 129a, 137a, 138a, 140a. Nevertheless, the City’s 

Board of Revision of Taxes recognized Elkhansa and N. Mansour as the record 

owners of the property at 1907-15 Ridge Avenue. Id. at 75a.

On November 3, 2006, Elkhansa and N. Mansour were notified by an 

adjacent property owner that title to the property at 1907-15 Ridge Avenue was not 

vested in Wachovia, but was vested in the Authority. R.R. at 69a. Counsel for 

Elkhansa and N. Mansour subsequently contacted the Authority and the Authority 

confirmed that it claimed title to the property as of August 11, 2005. Id. As a 

result, counsel for Elkhansa and N. Mansour filed a writ of summons regarding 

title to the property and sent the Authority a letter regarding their claim to title to 

the property. Id. at 69a-70a. On February 3, 2010, counsel filed a praecipe to 

discontinue Elkhansa’s and N. Mansour’s action regarding their claim to title to the 

property.

By deed dated April 25, 2011, Elkhansa and N. Mansour, by 

Appellant as her attorney-in-fact, conveyed title to the property to Appellant for 

$190,000.00. R.R. at 83a-87a. On May 18, 2011, the deed was recorded in the 

City’s Department of Records as Document ID #52348550. Id. at 83a.7

By March 5, 2015 order, the trial court granted the Authority’s 

Petition for Leave to Pay Estimated Just Compensation into Court, and $50,000.00 

6 The documents relating to the tax sale were only kept for seven years in the normal 

course of business and no longer exist. R.R. at 139a-140a.

7

It should be noted that the City’s Office of Property Assessment listed Appellant as the 

property owner from April 14, 2011, until July 7, 2019. See https://propertybeta.phila.gov/#/?address=1907-15%20RIDGE%20AVE (last visited January 5, 2021).
6

was paid for the premises at 1901-15 Ridge Avenue “to the Prothonotary to hold 

for the use of the person or persons entitled thereto in the above-captioned 

proceedings[.]” Trial Court 3/5/15 Order at 1-2. The trial court’s order also 

directed that it “is entered without prejudice to any party in interest to petition for 

the Appointment of a Board of Viewers pursuant to the Eminent Domain Code[, 26 

Pa. C.S. §§101 – 1106.]” Id. at 1. On June 1, 2015, the trial court’s Prothonotary 

issued a Receipt for Deposit of Escrow – Custodia Legis Funds, which 

acknowledged the Authority’s deposit of the funds pursuant to the trial court’s 

order.

On June 24, 2016, the Authority, the administratrix of the estate of 

JIWI’s former president, and JIWI’s then-president executed a Stipulation, which 

states, in relevant part:

6. Just Compensation for the acquisition of the 

Property in the amount of Fifty Thousand ($50,000.00) 

Dollars was paid to the Prothonotary of the [trial court], 

specifically in connection with the condemnation of the 

[p]roperty, to hold same for the use of the person or 

persons entitled thereto, by virtue of the Order of the 

[trial court], dated March 5, 2015.

7. The balance of the estimated just compensation 

remaining in court paid in connection with the 

condemnation of 1901-15 Ridge Avenue, Philadelphia, 

PA shall be paid to ADVANTAGE ABSTRACT, INC., 

so that distribution may be made thereupon to the person 

or persons entitled thereto in accordance with Section 

521 of the Eminent Domain Code. See 26 Pa. C.S.[] 

§521.[8]

8 Section 521(b) of the Eminent Domain Code states:

(b) Distribution of damages.--

(Footnote continued on next page...)
7

6/24/16 Stipulation at 2 (emphasis in original).

On June 28, 2016, the trial court issued an order stating:

[I]n accordance with the foregoing Stipulation, the 

Prothonotary is directed to pay the balance remaining in 

court for the property located at 1901-15 Ridge Avenue, 

Philadelphia, PA to ADVANTAGE ABSTRACT, INC., 

without commission or fees being deductible therefrom 

for distribution to the person or persons entitled thereto.

Trial Court 6/28/16 Order (emphasis in original).

On July 28, 2016, the Authority, the administratrix of the estate of 

JIWI’s former president, and JIWI’s then-president executed a Stipulation of 

Payment of Condemnation Damages, which states:

This Stipulation is entered . . . by and between 

Ryan D. Harmon, attorney for the [Authority], and 

 

(continued...)

(1) The condemnor shall distribute the damages properly. If the 

condemnor is unable to determine proper distribution of the 

damages, it may, without payment into court, petition the court to 

distribute the damages and shall furnish the court with a schedule 

of proposed distribution.

(2) Notice of the filing of the petition and schedule of proposed 

distribution shall be given to all condemnees, mortgagees, 

judgment creditors and other lienholders, as shown in the proposed 

schedule, in any manner as the court may direct by general rule or 

special order.

(3) The court may hear the matter or may appoint a master to hear 

and report or may order any issue tried by the court and jury as 

may appear proper under all the circumstances.

(4) The court shall then enter an order of distribution of the fund.

26 Pa. C.S. §521(b). 
8

[JIWI], the former owner of premises 1901-15 Ridge 

Avenue (the “Premises”).

It is hereby stipulated and agreed that:

1. The Authority condemned the Premises 

pursuant to the Declaration of Taking filed as of the 

above court term and number.

2. The Authority made payment in the amount 

of Forty-Six Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-Four Dollars 

and Eighty-Seven Cents ($46,694.87), the balance 

remaining from the $50,000 payment into Court, plus 

delay damages in the amount of Eighteen Thousand Six 

Hundred Sixty-One Dollars and Fifty-One Cents 

($18,661.54) [sic] to [JIWI], the former owner of the 

Premises in full satisfaction of such former owner’s 

condemnation claims.

R.R. at 27a-28a (emphasis in original).

On March 3, 2019, the Authority filed the instant Motion to strike the 

deeds of Appellant, N. Mansour, and Elkhansa in the trial court under the docket 

number and caption of the foregoing former Eminent Domain Code action. The 

Authority and Appellant entered into a Stipulation in which they “stipulate[d] and 

agree[d] to the entry of the proposed Consent Order submitted herewith.” 4/3/19 

Stipulation. In turn, the trial court issued an April 5, 2019 Consent Order, which 

states, in relevant part, that “[Appellant] is JOINED in this action as an Intervening 

party.” Trial Court 4/5/19 Consent Order.

On June 13, 2019, following argument on the Motion, but without 

taking any evidence, the trial court issued an order granting the Motion striking 

Elkhansa’s, N. Mansour’s, and Appellant’s deeds, and directing the filing of the 
9

order as proof of the Authority’s title to the property. Trial Court 6/13/19 Order. 

Appellant then filed this appeal. 9

On appeal, Appellant raises a number of issues regarding the trial 

court’s purported error in granting the Authority’s Motion. Notwithstanding, we 

are constrained to reverse the trial court’s order on the basis that it was without 

jurisdiction in the first instance to determine Appellant’s title to the property via 

the Authority’s Motion that was filed under the caption and docket number of the 

former Eminent Domain Code proceedings.

10

As outlined above, neither Appellant nor his predecessors in title were 

ever a party to, and never participated in, the eminent domain proceedings 

involving the condemnation of the property formerly owned by JIWI located at 

1901-15 Ridge Avenue. The mere filing of a motion to intervene, after full and 

complete satisfaction of all just compensation was made to the record owner, JIWI, 

was not sufficient to confer intervenor status upon Appellant or his predecessors in 

title in those eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g., Appeal of Gottlieb, 63 A.2d 

42, 43 (Pa. 1949) (“It is obvious that petitioner’s request for leave to intervene is 

hopelessly belated inasmuch as the taking of the land in question occurred nearly 

twenty years ago and the owner finally withdrew his claim more than nine years 

ago. If there is to be any intervention at all, it must be timely.”); Kovacs v. 

9 Because this appeal presents pure questions of law, our standard of review is de novo

and our scope of review is plenary. Seeton v. Pennsylvania Game Commission, 937 A.2d 1028, 

1032 n.4 (Pa. 2007).

10

“It is well settled that questions of jurisdiction can never be waived, and they may be 

raised at any time by the parties or sua sponte by an appellate court.” Riverwatch Condominium 

Owners Association v. Restoration Development Corporation, 931 A.2d 133, 138 n.5 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted).
10

Redevelopment Authority of City of Philadelphia, 328 A.2d 545, 547-48 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1974) (“Goodman should not have been permitted to intervene. [Former] 

Section 506(b) of the [Eminent Domain Code, formerly] 26 P.S. §1-506(b) 

([repealed]), provide[d]: ‘(t)he court may permit a mortgagee, judgment creditor 

or other lienholder to intervene in the proceedings where his interest is not 

adequately protected . . . .’ Goodman was not a judgment creditor . . . and she was 

not a lienholder. . . . Of equal impropriety, of course, was that portion of the lower 

court’s order directing the condemnee and its principal stockholder to pay the 

intervening ‘successor owner’ $500 a week.”).11

Moreover, and more importantly, the instant action seeking to strike 

the deeds in question may not be initiated by the mere expedience of the filing of 

the Authority’s Motion. Indeed, as the Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained:

[Pa. R.C.P. No.] 1007 provides that “[a]n action 

may be commenced by filing with the prothonotary (1) a 

praecipe for a writ of summons, or (2) a complaint.”

[S]ee also Pa. R.C.P. [No.] 1063 (stating that action to 

quiet title shall be commenced by filing of complaint 

with prothonotary); Pa. R.C.P. [No.] 1061(b)(2), (3) 

(providing that quiet title action may be brought to 

determine validity of “deed affecting any right, lien, title 

or interest in land” or to “compel an adverse party to . . . 

cancel . . . any deed”).

11 See also Section 19.2 of the Urban Redevelopment Law, added by the Act of October 

2, 2002, P.L. 796, 35 P.S. §1719.2 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of 42 Pa. C.S. §5526(4) 

(relating to five year limitation) or any other provision of law to the contrary, a proceeding to 

challenge just compensation or other damages if a redevelopment authority has exercised powers 

of condemnation pursuant to this act and made payment in accordance with section 407(a) or (b) 

of the [Eminent Domain Code], is subject to a one-year statute of limitations.”); Harkovich v. 

Pfirrmann, 627 A.2d 776, 779 (Pa. Super. 1993) (“The lack of in personam jurisdiction over the 

plaintiffs with respect to the relief sought by the defendant in his counterclaim in this case 

renders the judgment against the plaintiffs absolutely void and a nullity. It also precludes the 

award of a new trial.”) (citation omitted).
11

Here, [the lot owner] commenced this action by 

filing with the trial court a “Motion to Remove Deed 

from Record.” As our Supreme Court has recognized, 

however, “[n]owhere do the rules [of civil procedure] 

provide for commencing an action by a petition.”

Hartmann v. Peterson, [265 A.2d 127, 128 (Pa. 1970)].

“With no complaint, summons or amicable agreement to 

bring [an] action within the power to act of the court 

below, [the court] has no power to make any order 

whatsoever, including an order allowing the filing of a 

complaint nunc pro tunc.” Id.; see also In re Casale, 

[517 A.2d 1260, 1263 (Pa. 1986)] (“[A]n action brought 

by petition and rule, neither authorized by statute nor 

auxiliary to jurisdiction already obtained and not 

designed to correct the court’s own records, is a nullity 

and confers no jurisdiction on the court.”) (footnote 

omitted); Wm. Garlick & Sons, Inc. v. Lambert, [287 

A.2d 143, 144 (Pa. 1972)] (stating that “a petition is only 

permitted where it is ancillary to an already pending 

action”). Here, the trial court dismissed the action as not 

properly commenced, but then ordered that the deed be 

stricken despite the absence of a properly commenced 

action. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, we 

conclude that its order was a nullity. Accord In re 

Corr[ection] of Official Records with Civ[il] Action, [404 

A.2d 741, 742-43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979)] (reversing trial 

court order directing recorder of deeds to remove oil and 

gas leases from public records, where trial court lacked 

jurisdiction because suit was improperly commenced by 

petition and rule).

In re G.J.K. & Sons, LLC, 175 A.3d 1033, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2017) (footnotes 

omitted). “[B]ecause the commencement of this action was improper under 

Pa. R.C.P. No. 1007, the court below had no power to act whatsoever and there 

was no jurisdiction established over appellant. The proceeding below was a 

nullity. We must remand for dismissal of the proceeding.” In re Correction of 

Official Records with Civil Action, 404 A.2d at 473 (citation omitted).
12

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is reversed, and the matter is 

remanded to that court for dismissal of the proceeding.

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In Re: :

:

A Condemnation Proceeding In Rem by :

the Redevelopment Authority of the City :

of Philadelphia for the Purpose of : No. 1071 C.D. 2019

Redevelopment of North Philadelphia : 

Redevelopment Area, Model Cities Urban :

Renewal Area, Condemnation No. 31L :

Including Certain Land Improvements and :

Properties :

:

Appeal of: Hussein Mansour :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 6

th day of January, 2021, the order of the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dated June 10, 2019, is REVERSED,

and the matter is remanded to that court for dismissal of the proceeding.

Jurisdiction is RELINQUISHED.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge