[Cite as State v. Smith, 2023-Ohio-1504.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ROSS COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 22CA21

v. :

CULLEY G. SMITH, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Defendant-Appellee. :

________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Carrie L. Charles, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, 

Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellant.

Max Hersch, Assistant State Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for 

appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT

DATE JOURNALIZED:5-1-23

ABELE, J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Common Pleas 

Court judgment that granted a motion to dismiss an indictment 

based upon the failure to bring Culley Smith, defendant below 

and appellee herein, to trial within the statutory speedy-trial 

time frame. 

{¶2} The State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant 

herein, assigns the following errors for review:
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FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED 

APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS BY RULING TIME 

WAS NOT TOLLED PURSUANT TO R.C. 2945.71 FROM 

APRIL 12, 2021 UNTIL SEPTEMBER 24, 2021.”

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

“THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION GRANTING 

APPELLEE’S MOTION TO DISMISS WAS NOT 

SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT, CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.”

{¶3} The present appeal concerns appellee’s right to a

speedy trial. On March 6, 2020, a Ross County Grand Jury 

returned an indictment that charged appellee with three counts 

of aggravated vehicular assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.08. 

Appellee’s arrests occurred on March 21, 2020, and his release 

on his own recognizance on March 23, 2020. The trial court 

later scheduled the matter for a November 17, 2020 jury trial.

{¶4} On October 28, 2020, appellant filed a motion to 

continue the trial. On February 4, 2021, the trial court 

granted the motion to continue the trial and scheduled the 

matter for an April 13, 2021 jury trial. The court also noted 

that speedy-trial time would be tolled.

{¶5} On April 12, 2021, the trial court visiting judge 

recused himself from the case and vacated the April 13, 2021 

trial date. The court stated that “Defendant’s speedy trial 

deadline is tolled by a previous entry.” This document bears a 
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stamp that indicates “filed with the judge of the Ross County 

Common Pleas Court.” 

{¶6} On August 20, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court assigned a 

second visiting judge to preside over the case. On August 23, 

2021, the court scheduled a September 24, 2021 status 

conference. On September 24, 2021, the trial court issued an 

order and noted that the parties discussed whether the April to 

September 2021 delay posed a speedy-trial issue and gave 

appellee an opportunity to file a motion to dismiss. The 

court’s entry stated that the April 12, 2021 entry had been 

“received but not filed on April 12, 2021.” Additionally, on 

September 27, 2021, the second visiting judge noted that he had 

a conflict that required recusal and ordered the court 

administrator to contact the Ohio Supreme Court to appoint a new 

judge. 

{¶7} On October 8, 2021, appellee filed a motion to dismiss 

and asserted that the first visiting judge did not file the 

entry of recusal with the clerk’s office and the entry was not 

“filed or docketed with the Court in any manner.” He also 

asserted that 167 speedy-trial days elapsed through April 2021, 

but the days that have since elapsed should not be excluded from 

the speedy-trial date count. Appellee contended that, before 
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the April 2021 status conference, his trial counsel learned that 

the first visiting judge planned to recuse himself and the 

status conference and jury trial would not occur as scheduled. 

Appellee argued that neither the court nor the state took 

further action until the second visiting judge held a September 

24,2021 status conference. Appellee claimed “nothing [was] 

docketed, signed, journalized, or filed in this matter until 

September 2021, well outside the time limits of speedy trial.”

{¶8} Appellant, however, asserted that the first visiting 

judge prepared an entry and placed it in the file, but it may 

not have been properly docketed due to an internal office error. 

The state nonetheless argued that the speedy-trial clock 

remained tolled due to the absence of a judge to preside over 

the case because it had no “practical ability” to bring appellee 

to trial until a new judge had been assigned. 

{¶9} In his response brief, appellee continued to assert 

that the first visiting judge’s April 12, 2021 entry had not 

been filed until five months after the fact. 

{¶10} On April 4, 2022, the Ohio Supreme Court assigned a 

third visiting judge to hear the case. On June 21, 2022, the 

court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The 

court found that the indictment was filed on March 6, 2020, the 
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defendant arraigned on March 23, 2020, the case set for trial on 

April 13, 2021, then on April 12, 2021 the judge recused himself 

and vacated the trial date. The court found, however, that the 

April 12, 2021 

entry was not filed or docketed in any manner until 

nearly five months later. There is no reason given in 

the entry for the continuance aside from the retirement 

of the assigned Judge. There is no mention of the 

reasonableness of the continuance. There is no mention 

of any of the tolling provisions of R.C. 2945.72, no 

mention of speedy trial whatsoever. 

The court found that the first visiting judge “failed to enter 

an order of continuance and the reason therefor by journal entry 

prior to the expiration of the time limit prescribed by R.C. 

2945.71” in accordance with State v. Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 

N.E.2d 571 (1982), and State v. King, 70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 

N.E.2d 903 (1994) and dismissed the indictment. This appeal 

followed.

A

{¶11} For ease of discussion, we combine our review of 

appellant’s two assignments of error. Appellant asserts that 

the trial court incorrectly concluded that the speedy-trial time 

period had not been extended between April 13, 2021 and 

September 24, 2021. Appellant asserts that on April 12, 2021, 

the first visiting judge filed an entry to indicate that he 
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recused himself from the matter, vacated the April 13, 2021 

trial date, and stated that the speedy-trial clock remained 

tolled. Appellant further points out that the April 12, 2021 

entry’s stamp states that the entry was “filed with the judge of 

the Ross County Common Pleas Court” and “acknowledges same had 

not been docketed with the Clerk of Courts.” Appellant 

nevertheless contends that the court’s entry properly extended 

the speedy-trial time period. 

{¶12} Appellee, on the other hand, asserts that the April

12, 2021 entry did not extend the speedy-trial time period 

because it had not been docketed until five months later. 

Appellee contends that, even if the court timely prepared the 

entry, the clerk had not docketed the entry before the speedytrial deadline expired.

B

{¶13} “Review of a speedy-trial claim involves a mixed 

question of law and fact. Therefore, we defer to the trial 

court’s factual findings if they are supported by competent, 

credible evidence, but we review the application of the law to 

those facts de novo.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d 179, 2020-

Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15; accord State v. Howerton, 4th 

Dist. Lawrence No. 20CA2, 2021-Ohio-913, ¶ 11; State v. Spencer, 
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2017-Ohio-456, 84 N.E.3d 106, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.); State v. Brooks, 

2018-Ohio-2210, 114 N.E.3d 220, ¶ 21 (4th Dist.).

C

{¶14} Criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to a 

speedy trial under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. 

Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (an “accused shall 

enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial”); Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 10 (an accused has the right to 

“a speedy public trial by an impartial jury”). The speedy-trial 

guarantee “minimize[s] the possibility of lengthy incarceration 

prior to trial,” “reduce[s] the lesser, but nevertheless

substantial, impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while 

released on bail,” and “shorten[s] the disruption of life caused 

by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” 

United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 71

L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); accord State v. Triplett, 78 Ohio St.3d 566, 

568, 679 N.E.2d 290 (1997).

{¶15} Ohio’s speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 to 

2945.73, “constitute a rational effort to enforce the 

constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused 

charged with the commission of a felony or a misdemeanor.” 

State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 416 N.E.2d 589 (1980), 
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syllabus; accord State v. Martin, 156 Ohio St.3d 503, 2019-Ohio2010, 129 N.E.3d 437, ¶ 15; State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St.3d 207, 

2007-Ohio-1534, 863 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 11; Brecksville v. Cook, 75 

Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996); see Barker v. Wingo, 

407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) (states 

“are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with 

constitutional standards”). To that end, R.C. 2945.71 

designates specific time requirements for the state to try an 

accused. State v. Hughes, 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 425, 715 N.E.2d 

540 (1999). As relevant in the case at bar, R.C. 2945.71(C)(2) 

requires a person accused of a felony to be brought to trial 

within 270 days of the individual’s arrest. 

{¶16} Generally, the 270-day speedy trial time period clock 

begins the day after a defendant’s arrest. State v. Davis, 4th 

Dist. Scioto No. 12CA3506, 2013–Ohio–5311, ¶ 21, citing R.C. 

1.14 and Crim.R. 45(A) (“When computing how much time has run 

against [the state] under R.C. 2945.71, we begin with the day 

after the date [the defendant] was arrested”). Also, “For 

purposes of calculating speedy-trial time, ‘each day during 

which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending 

charge shall be counted as three days.’” State v. Ramey, 132 
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Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-2904, 971 N.E.2d 937, ¶ 15, quoting 

R.C. 2945.71(E). 

{¶17} R.C. 2945.72 specifies the circumstances that may 

extend the 270-day period. Id. at ¶ 24. As relevant in the 

case at bar, R.C. 2945.72(H) states that “the period of any 

reasonable continuance granted other than upon the accused’s own 

motion” extends the 270-day time period. 

{¶18} In general, courts must “strictly construe the speedy 

trial statutes against the state,” Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio 

St.3d 53, 57, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996), and must “strictly enforce 

the legislative mandates evident in these statutes.” Pachay, 64 

Ohio St.2d at 221; e.g., State v. Parker, 113 Ohio St.3d 207, 

2007-Ohio-1534, 863 N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 15. Consequently, “[t]he 

prosecution and the trial courts have a mandatory duty to try an 

accused within the time frame provided by the statute.” Ramey

at ¶ 14. If an accused is not brought to trial within the time 

limits set forth in the speedy-trial statutes, and if an 

exception does not apply, R.C. 2945.73(B) requires the court, 

upon motion at or before trial, to discharge the accused. 

{¶19} In the case sub judice, the parties dispute whether 

the trial court’s April 12, 2021 entry extended the 270-day 

period to bring appellee to trial. Appellant argues that after 
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the first visiting judge filed the April 12, 2021 entry to 

recuse himself, the speedy-trial time was extended until 

September 24, 2021, the date of the second visiting judge’s 

status conference. Appellant contends that, as of the date that 

the second visiting judge recused himself, September 27, 2021, 

only 197 speedy-trial days had elapsed. Appellant further 

asserts that speedy-trial time remained tolled until the third 

visiting judge ruled on appellee’s motion. Appellant therefore 

argues that the 270-day period did not expire.

{¶20} Appellee counters that, because the court did not 

docket the trial court’s April 12, 2021 entry until five months 

later, the first visiting judge’s entry did not comply with the 

requirement that an entry that extends speedy-trial time must be 

journalized before the 270-day period expires. As such, he 

argues that because the 166 days that elapsed between April 12, 

2021 and September 24, 2021 do not fall within one of the 

exceptions to extend speedy-trial time, well over 270 days 

elapsed by the time of the second visiting judge’s September 27, 

2021 recusal.

{¶21} To support his argument, appellee relies upon State v. 

Mincy, 2 Ohio St.3d 6, 441 N.E.2d 571 (1982), and State v. King, 

70 Ohio St.3d 158, 637 N.E.2d 903 (1994). In Mincy, the court 
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held that when a trial court sua sponte continues a criminal 

trial, the court “must enter the order of continuance and the 

reasons therefor by journal entry prior to the expiration of the 

time limit prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant 

to trial.” Id. at syllabus. In Mincy, on the date the case had 

been scheduled for trial court personnel contacted the 

defendant’s trial counsel to inform counsel that the trial would 

not be held as scheduled. Also, the court did not file a 

journal entry to explain a reason for the continuance. At the 

time, the defendant had been incarcerated for 87 days.

{¶22} On the defendant’s 94th day of confinement, the trial 

court held a scheduling conference and scheduled the trial to be 

held 6 days later, on the defendant’s 100th day of confinement. 

Before trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment 

based upon the state’s failure to bring him to trial within the 

speedy-trial time period. The trial court, however, overruled 

the motion. Subsequently, a jury found the defendant guilty and 

he appealed the decision that overruled his motion to dismiss. 

The appellate court concluded that the defendant did not receive 

a speedy trial and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The 

state then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
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{¶23} After review, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the 

appellate court’s decision and judgment. The court 

characterized the issue as “whether a trial court may wait until 

after the expiration of the statutory time within which a 

criminal defendant must be brought to trial to file its journal 

entry continuing the case and setting forth the reasons for 

granting the continuance.” Id. at 7. The court noted that its 

previous decisions had upheld sua sponte continuances as 

reasonable, but further pointed out that in those prior cases, 

“the continuances were made by journal entry prior to the 

expiration of the time limit in R.C. 2945.71.” Id. at 8. Thus,

the court rejected the state’s argument that “because the trial 

was set within the ninety day period and the continuance was 

reasonable, no violation of R.C. 2945.71 occurred even though no 

entry had been made prior to the expiration of the ninetieth 

day.” Id. The court explained that it had “previously 

condemned after-the-fact extension and does not find it to be a 

meaningful distinction that [the defendant’s] trial was 

initially scheduled within the statutory time limit.” Id. 

Consequently, the court held: “Since a court may only speak 

through its journal, it is necessary that such an entry be 
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spread upon its journal prior to the expiration of the statutory 

time limit.” Id. (citations omitted).

{¶24} In King, the court reaffirmed Mincy that when a trial 

court sua sponte continues a criminal trial, it must enter the 

continuance order and state the reasons for the continuance 

before speedy-trial time expires. Id. at 163. In King, the 

trial court sua sponte continued the defendant’s trial “without 

recording a judgment entry explaining the reasons for continuing 

the trial beyond the expiration of the ninety-day period.” Id.

at 162. Instead, the trial judge’s secretary sent the parties 

notice of the new trial date. The court reasoned that the 

secretary’s notice was ineffective because “[i]t is axiomatic 

that ‘[i]n Ohio a court speaks through its journal.’” Id., 

quoting State ex rel. Worcester v. Donnellon, 49 Ohio St.3d 117, 

118, 551 N.E.2d 183 (1990). The court thus concluded that trial 

courts must journalize sua sponte continuances before speedytrial time expires.

{¶25} More recently, the Ohio Supreme Court discussed 

Mincy’s requirements as follows: 

Ideally, “[w]hen sua sponte granting a continuance 

under R.C. 2945.72(H), the trial court must enter the 

order of continuance and the reasons therefor by journal 

entry prior to the expiration of the time limit 

prescribed in R.C. 2945.71 for bringing a defendant to 

trial.” 
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Ramey at ¶ 32, quoting Mincy, syllabus. The Ramey court noted 

that it had “[o]n several occasions, * * * found it necessary to 

address trial courts’ imperfect handling of continuances under 

R.C. 2945.72(H).” Id. at ¶ 33, citing State v. McRae, 55 Ohio 

St.2d 149, 152, 378 N.E.2d 476, 477 (1978). The court stated 

that in these imperfect situations, “an appellate court may 

affirm a conviction challenged on speedy-trial grounds even if 

the trial court did not expressly enumerate any reasons 

justifying the delay when the reasonableness of the continuance 

is otherwise affirmatively demonstrated by the record.”1 Id.; 

State v. Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d 208, 210, 357 N.E.2d 1095 (1976) 

(“[t]he record of the trial court must in some manner 

affirmatively demonstrate that a sua sponte continuance by the 

court was reasonable in light of its necessity or purpose”). 

{¶26} In Lee, for example, the court stated that when a 

court, by entry before the speedy-trial time expires, lists a 

In State v. Belville, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-3879, ___ 

N.E.3d ___, the court rejected the defendant’s argument that R.C. 

2945.72(E), which tolls the speedy-trial clock for “[a]ny period 

of delay necessitated by reason of a * * * motion, proceeding, or 

action made or instituted by the accused,” required trial courts 

to “contemporaneously announce that a tolling event is taking 

place.” Id. at ¶ 31. The court stated that the plain language of 

the statute only requires “that the delay be necessitated by the 

defendant’s action.” Id.
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reason for the continuance and notifies the defendant and the 

defendant’s counsel of the continuance, entry, and reasons, then 

“the reasonableness of the extension cannot be seriously 

questioned and is satisfactorily evidenced by the failure of the 

defendant to object and to assert persuasively his basis for a 

contrary conclusion.” Id. at 210.

{¶27} Additionally, in State v. Martin, 56 Ohio St.2d 289, 

384 N.E.2d 239 (1978), the court held that a trial court’s sua 

sponte continuance entry, filed as an App.R. 9(E) supplement to 

the record, adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of the 

continuance. In that case, the defendant was arrested and 

waived the Crim.R. 5 time frame to hold a preliminary hearing. 

The court scheduled a preliminary hearing and, upon defense 

counsel’s request, later reset the hearing. Some witnesses did 

not appear, however, so the court rescheduled the hearing. 

Eventually, the court held the preliminary hearing, found 

probable cause, and ordered the defendant remain incarcerated 

pending further action from the grand jury. The court then held 

a jury trial and the jury found the defendant guilty. The 

defendant appealed the trial court’s decision.

{¶28} During the pendency of the appeal, the trial court 

filed an App.R. 9(E) supplemental entry that recited the reasons 
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for continuing the preliminary hearing (crowded docket * * * and 

due to the expected length of the preliminary hearing).” Next, 

the entry observed that defense counsel asked the court to 

continue the preliminary hearing. The entry, however, did not 

mention the reason for further continuing the hearing, but the 

trial court record indicated that it had been continued because 

witnesses did not appear. The appellate court reversed the 

trial court’s judgment and determined that the trial occurred 

beyond the speedy-trial time limit. The state appealed to the 

Ohio Supreme Court.

{¶29} After review, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the 

appellate court’s judgment and determined that the defendant’s 

waiver of the Crim.R. 5 time frame and the trial court’s 

continuances extended the speedy-trial time until the date of 

the preliminary hearing. In doing so, the court noted that a 

trial court’s sua sponte continuance extends speedy-trial time 

so long as the record demonstrates “the ‘necessity and 

reasonableness of the continuance.’” Martin, 56 Ohio St.2d at 

293, quoting State v. Wentworth, 54 Ohio St.2d 171, 176, 375 

N.E.2d 424 (1978). The court further observed that “‘[m]ere 

entries by the trial court’ would satisfy the statutory 

requirement ‘when the reasonableness of the continuance cannot 
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be seriously questioned.’” Id., quoting Lee, 48 Ohio St.2d at 

209. The court thus applied these principles and concluded that 

the continuances of the preliminary hearing were both “good 

cause” under Crim.R. 5 and “reasonable” under R.C. 2945.72(H). 

The court noted that the defendant agreed to waive the Crim.R. 5 

time period and that the court set the preliminary hearing to be 

held within a reasonable amount of time, given the court’s 

crowded docket and the anticipated length of the preliminary 

hearing. Additionally, defense counsel requested an additional 

continuance that further extended the speedy-trial time period. 

Next, the court sua sponte continued the preliminary hearing 

when some witnesses did not appear as scheduled.

{¶30} The court concluded that the record and the 

supplemental journal entry showed that the delay in holding the 

preliminary hearing was reasonable and that the time that 

elapsed during this period, therefore, did not count for 

purposes of computing speedy-trial time. 

{¶31} Admittedly, Martin explicitly expressed displeasure 

with the use of a “supplemental journal entry * * * to explain 

the ‘reasonableness’” of the continuances Id. at 295. The court 

cautioned that it did not intend “to advocate the use of this 

procedural tool as a substitute for a lower court affirmatively 
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demonstrating the reasonableness of an extension pursuant to

R.C. 2945.72(H) in the first place.” Id. The court explained:

It is imperative that the trial courts in this state 

conscientiously strive to perform their statutory duties 

by stating the circumstances surrounding these 

continuances so as not to preclude effective appellate 

review. The necessity and purpose of such an extension 

should be clearly reflected from the record at the time 

it was granted.

Id.

{¶32} Despite these cautions, the Martin court nevertheless 

concluded that the record and the supplemental journal entry 

adequately demonstrated the reasonableness of the trial court’s 

continuance. We also note that Martin has not been overruled. 

{¶33} We fully recognize that the events that occurred in 

the case sub judice are unusual. Appellee’s arrest occurred on

March 21, 2020, six days before the Ohio Supreme Court’s first 

order that acknowledged Am.Sub. HB 197 that tolled all time 

limitations and deadlines in the Revised Code. Obviously, 

during the ensuing months, courts had to confront extraordinary 

circumstances. Nevertheless, in the case at bar the docket 

sheet indicates that the trial court’s entry to continue the 

April 13, 2021 trial date was filed on April 12, 2021. Yet, the 

third visiting judge found, and appellee insists, that this 

entry was not filed until five months later. Appellant’s 
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memorandum contra to appellee’s motion to dismiss also suggests 

some type of internal office error may have occurred when filing 

the entry. In any event, we believe that Ramey, Lee, and Martin

support the conclusion that the record before us demonstrates 

the necessity and reasonableness of the continuance. Ramey

instructs that “the determination of reasonableness must be made 

on the existing record.” Id. at ¶ 34. In the case at bar, the 

record, as it currently exists, contains an April 12, 2021 entry 

that (1) states that the first visiting judge recused himself 

from presiding over the trial, (2) vacated the trial date, and 

(3) provided that speedy-trial time remained tolled. This entry 

is listed on the court’s docket sheet as filed on April 12, 

2021. Thus, according to the docket sheet, this entry, docketed 

on April 12, 2021, tolled the speedy trial time before speedytrial time expired. Therefore, based upon our review of the 

existing record, the trial court entered the April 12, 2021 

entry before the expiration of appellant’s speedy-trial time. 

We are unable to locate anything in the record to support the 

assertion that the April 12, 2021 entry was not docketed. The 

parties did not point to anything in the record, other than 

unsupported assertions, to demonstrate that the April 12, 2021 

entry was not filed until five months after the fact.
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{¶34} Furthermore, we believe that the trial court’s sua 

sponte continuance was reasonable. The court’s entry states 

that the trial judge recused himself. A trial judge’s recusal 

constitutes reasonable cause to continue a trial. See State v. 

Nichols, 4th Dist. Adams No. 12CA955, 2013-Ohio-308, ¶ 21, 

citing Lyndhurst v. Di Fiore, 8th Dist. No. 88654, 2007–Ohio–

3538, ¶ 10. Moreover, using Martin’s logic, even if some 

procedural irregularity occurred when filing the April 12, 2021 

entry, this entry is part of the record on appeal and the 

clerk’s docket sheet indicates that it was filed April 12, 2021. 

Therefore, we believe that we may properly consider this entry 

when we ascertain the reasonableness of the continuance. See 

Craig v. Welply, 104 Ohio St. 312, 315, 136 N.E. 143 (1922) 

(“the court speaks by its journal, and * * * the date of the 

judgment is the date of its entry upon the journal of the 

court”).

{¶35} Additionally, we do not believe that our decision 

conflicts with either Mincy or King. In those cases, the record 

did not contain any documents that revealed the reasons the 

trial courts continued the matters. In the case at bar, by 

contrast, the record contains an entry that expressly reveals 

the reason that the trial court continued the trial, and the 
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docket sheet indicates that it was filed before the speedy-trial 

time expired. 

{¶36} Consequently, based upon our review of the record, we

believe that the trial court’s April 12, 2021 sua sponte 

continuance extended the time period within which the state must 

bring appellee to trial. Therefore, we agree with appellant 

that the speedy-trial clock tolled between April 12, 2021 and 

September 24, 2021.

{¶37} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we 

sustain appellant’s assignments of error, reverse trial court’s 

judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE 

REMANDED FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH 

THIS OPINION.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the case 

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Appellant shall recover of appellee the costs herein taxed.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this 

appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this 

Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this 

judgment into execution.

If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail 

has been previously granted, it is continued for a period of 60 

days upon the bail previously posted. The purpose of said stay 

is to allow appellant to file with the Ohio Supreme Court an 

application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in 

that court. The stay as herein continued will terminate at the 

expiration of the 60-day period.

The stay will also terminate if appellant fails to file a 

notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court in the 45-day 

period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of 

the Ohio Supreme Court. Additionally, if the Ohio Supreme Court 

dismisses the appeal prior to the expiration of said 60 days, 

the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that 

mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

For the Court

BY:__________________________ 

 Peter B. Abele, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
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Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a 

final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal 

commences from the date of filing with the clerk.