In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2419

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MONTRELL DUPRIEST,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:04-cr-00285 — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED JULY 27, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. This case comes before us on a second appeal from a supervised release revocation hearing. 

The first time we heard this case, we remanded for resentencing after the government conceded that the term of imprisonment—eighteen months—exceeded the statutory maximum by six months. This time, the issue before us is whether the district court failed to consider the relevant 18 U.S.C. 
2 No. 14-2419

§ 3553(a) factors before resentencing Appellant Montrell 

DuPriest.1

I. BACKGROUND

In 2006, DuPriest pled guilty to one count of “Use of a 

Telephone to Facilitate a Drug Trafficking Crime.” Notably, 

Judge Stadtmueller served as the sentencing judge for that 

offense. He sentenced DuPriest to a forty-eight-month term 

of imprisonment and a twelve-month term of supervised release. Judge Stadtmueller ran the sentence concurrently with

DuPriest’s related state sentence in Wisconsin. 

DuPriest was released from confinement on November 

15, 2012. Five months later, while serving his concurrent 

terms of state and federal supervised release, Milwaukee police arrested DuPriest after observing him enter an abandoned house. The officers searched him and found a pistol 

and forty-three small bags of marijuana. The State of Wisconsin charged DuPriest in Milwaukee County Court with 

possession of a firearm and possession with intent to deliver 

THC. Wisconsin dismissed those charges once the federal 

government took over prosecution, but it did seek incarceration for the violation of his state supervised release. He eventually received an eighteen-month sentence on the state violation. 

DuPriest subsequently pled guilty to the federal offense 

of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). That plea had two immediate consequences. First, it 

 1 DuPriest’s name appears in court documents with an uppercase “P” 

and a lowercase “p”. We adopt the former, as that is the convention used 

by his attorneys in briefing this appeal.
No. 14-2419 3

meant that DuPriest would be sentenced for the firearm offense under § 922(g). And second, it meant that DuPriest 

would then face mandatory revocation and a second term of 

imprisonment for violating the terms of his federal supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g). 

District Judge Adelman served as the sentencing judge 

for the underlying § 922(g) offense. He sentenced DuPriest to 

a thirty-three-month term of imprisonment and a twentyfour-month term of supervised release. Judge Adelman ran 

that sentence concurrently to DuPriest’s eighteen-month 

state revocation sentence. 

In consideration for DuPriest’s guilty plea before Judge 

Adelman, the government agreed to recommend a federal 

revocation sentence that would run concurrently with his 

sentence for the underlying crime under § 922(g). The government upheld its end of the bargain. The only question 

that remained was whether the judge at the revocation hearing would go along with it.

Re-enter Judge Stadtmueller, the same judge who sentenced DuPriest in 2006. He presided over DuPriest’s revocation hearing. He disagreed with the government’s recommendation for a concurrent sentence. He subsequently issued an eighteen-month term of imprisonment, with nine of 

those months to be served concurrently to the sentence for 

the underlying crime, and the remaining nine to be served 

consecutively. Judge Stadtmueller justified the consecutive 

portion of the sentence by emphasizing the need for incremental punishment. 

As mentioned in our introduction, DuPriest appealed the 

revocation sentence, and the government conceded error on 
4 No. 14-2419

appeal. Given the sentence miscalculation—eighteen months 

was clearly six months more than the statutory maximum—

we remanded for resentencing on the revocation issue.

On remand, Judge Stadtmueller again served as the sentencing judge. This marked the third time in ten years that 

he sentenced DuPriest. Pursuant to the terms of the original 

plea deal, the government asked for a twelve-month concurrent sentence. DuPriest’s attorney asked for a five-month 

term of imprisonment to run consecutively to the imprisonment for § 922(g) offense. 

Judge Stadtmueller rejected both requests. He issued the 

statutory maximum twelve-month sentence. And as before, 

he made half the sentence concurrent and the other half consecutive. As justification, Judge Stadtmueller again relied on 

the need for incremental punishment. Then he went a step 

further. Over the course of three transcribed pages, Judge 

Stadtmueller explained the reasons behind his sentence. We 

reproduce his explanation in its entirety here:

Well, Mr. Du[P]riest, I appreciate the thought that 

you would like to do better. As I often say in these 

hearings, we have an absolute pandemic of violence in this community, and it starts with people 

like yourself who unfortunately have not learned 

from the error of their way.

And I’m not here to suggest that you’re out on the 

street pointing a gun at any and everyone whom 

you might have contact. But guns in the wrong 

hands, particularly with individuals who are convicted of criminal conduct, in particular felonies, 

are a recipe for disaster.
No. 14-2419 5

You, sir, are very, very fortunate that you’re even 

able to sit in a courtroom because there isn’t a single day, not a single day that goes by in this community or any urban community where individuals 

are not shot and many, many times killed as a result of being in the wrong place at the wrong time, 

involved in drug trafficking or other criminal conduct that involves violence. 

And your record speaks loud and clear of your inability to conform your conduct to the requirements 

of the law. That’s why we’re here. We’re not here 

because I take any great pride or joy in having to 

send anybody to prison. But unfortunately we as a 

society have figured out no better way to deal with 

this phenomenon other than to remove people from 

their homes, the community, and incarcerate them.

It’s very, very sad. As you well know as a prisoner, 

we have more individuals in prison in these United 

States than any country in the world. We have barely 5 percent of the world’s population yet we have 

over 25 percent of the world’s incarcerated defendants. And it’s become very, very, very expensive—

over $17 million a day at the federal level alone. 

Over $6 billion of the U.S. Department of Justice 

budget is being spent on the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons. But unfortunately the voters and members 

of Congress, indeed every state legislature haven’t 

figured out a better way to deal with all of this.

And so in the unique circumstances of your case, 

obviously you haven’t learned a lot from your prior 

encounters with the criminal justice system. And as 

I made very, very clear at the sentencing hearing 
6 No. 14-2419

back in December, contrary to what was represented by an advocate in the court of appeals,2 there is 

a very, very cogent reason that the sentence is to 

run consecutive, because there must—indeed must 

be incremental punishment for those who are unable to even conform their conduct to the requirements of supervised release. If it were otherwise it 

would be a total mockery of the criminal justice 

system.

With all due respect to [the government’s] recommendation of a concurrent sentence, as I invoked 

the term earlier, it’s plainly ludicrous and I decline 

respectfully to do so in spite of the fact that it’s expensive because, once again, we haven’t figured out 

a better way to deal with those who violate the law, 

and violating the law includes separate violations 

of the terms of supervised release.

And so with the knowledge that the maximum 

term of imprisonment in Mr. Du[P]riest’s case is 12 

months and giving him some modicum of relief 

from an otherwise 12-month sentence, the court is 

going to impose a 12-month sentence. 6 months is 

to run concurrent with the sentence imposed in the 

Eastern District of Wisconsin Case No. 13-CR-102, 

and 6 months is to run consecutive to that sentence 

... . 

 

2 At the beginning of the hearing, the government suggested that Judge 

Stadtmueller did not fully explain the reason behind his first revocation 

sentence. Judge Stadtmueller did not appreciate the suggestion, describing it as “frankly disingenuous” and “[l]udicrous”. Today, we review the 

reasons offered for this sentence, and pass no judgment on those offered 

for the original, vacated sentence. 
No. 14-2419 7

(Sent. Tr. 7-9.)

DuPriest appeals. He argues that the district court did 

not consider a number of the sentencing factors under 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a): (1) the nature and circumstances of his arrest; (2) his history and characteristics; (3) necessary deterrence; and (4) protection of the public. His case, therefore, is 

one of procedural error. The government asks us to affirm. 

In its view, the record demonstrates that the district court 

thoughtfully and expressly considered all the relevant sentencing factors and provided ample reasoning for the sentence imposed.

II. ANALYSIS

We look through a “highly deferential” lens when reviewing a sentence for violation of the conditions of supervised release. United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 

2014). Indeed, our review is similar to “’the narrowest judicial review of judgments we know,’ namely judicial review 

of sanctions imposed by prison disciplinary boards.” United 

States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007)). 

Needless to say, this exacting standard presents an uphill 

battle for DuPriest.

DuPriest’s argument is that the district court failed to 

consider the § 3553(a) factors before imposing its sentence. 

He faults the district court for calling the government’s request for an entirely concurrent sentence “ludicrous.” And 

he construes the three-page sentence explanation as more of 

a reason to reform the prison system than to give him consecutive jail time. DuPriest’s points are well-taken, but his 

selective reading of the sentencing transcript looks past the 
8 No. 14-2419

serious and significant reasons offered by the district court 

for a consecutive sentence. 

For example, the district court noted DuPriest’s inability 

to learn from his past mistakes. The court tied that inability 

to the need for incremental (or consecutive) punishment—

the primary thrust behind its consecutive sentence. In the 

court’s view, incremental punishment promoted respect for 

the rule of law. The lack of a consecutive sentence for 

DuPriest, the court reasoned, would result in “a total mockery of the criminal justice system.” These rational points directly address the sentencing factors of § 3553(a).

As for the court’s commentary on the costs of this Nation’s prison system, that commentary flowed from the 

court’s discussion on protecting the public and providing the 

proper, correctional sentence for the offender—additional 

§ 3553(a) factors. The court acknowledged, for example, that 

society has not “figured out” a “better way” to address recidivist, violent criminals “other than to remove [them] from 

their homes, the community, and incarcerate them.” Finally, 

the court also discussed the serious effects of violent crime 

on the community, which, of course, is relevant given 

DuPriest’s underlying offense of firearm possession.

It is well-established that a district court “need not consider the § 3553 factors in check-list form.” Jones, 774 F.3d at 

404. Instead, a district court need only provide an adequate 

explanation for its reasons—based on the sentencing factors 

found in § 3553(a)—in issuing its sentence.3 Here, the district 

 3 This circuit has not squarely decided whether a court must consider the 

§ 3553(a) factors when sentencing a defendant under the mandatory rev-

(continued...)
No. 14-2419 9

court did just that. It found the seriousness of the underlying 

offense, possession of a firearm by a felon, to be a significant 

factor in its sentencing decision. It is also found the inability 

of DuPriest to learn from his “prior encounters with the 

criminal justice system” and to “conform” his “conduct” to 

the “requirements of the law” to be equally significant. 

Judge Stadtmueller should know, as this was the third time 

that he had the opportunity to sentence DuPriest. 

In sum, the district court provided ample information for 

this court to conduct meaningful appellate review. It addressed the § 3553(a) factors, and it carefully balanced society’s needs against the need to sentence DuPriest under § 

3583. We find no error in the court’s sentence or in its explanation meting it out.4

III. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

 

(...continued)

ocation provision of § 3583. See Jones, 774 F.3d at 404. Because the district 

court addressed the factors in this case, we save the resolution of that 

issue for another case.

4 For the first time in his Reply Brief, DuPriest argues that his sentence 

violates the parsimony principle found in § 3553(a). We disagree. The 

parsimony principle requires district courts to “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set 

forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Here, the 

district court exhaustively explained the reasons behind its carefully tailored sentence for this repeat offender, and we find no merit in the argument that the sentence is either unreasonable or somehow greater 

than necessary.