IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

May 13, 2015 Session

IN RE ADISON P.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henderson County

No. 140881 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Judge

No. W2014-01901-COA-R3-CV – Filed May 29, 2015

This case arises from a writ of mandamus issued by the Circuit Court for Henderson 

County. The writ of mandamus directed Appellant/Judge Robert Stevie Beal, of the 

Juvenile Court for Henderson County, to hold a hearing on Appellee’s motion for a show 

cause order in the underlying child custody case. Appellant appeals, arguing that the 

Circuit Court did not have authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the Juvenile Court 

because the Circuit Court and Juvenile Court have concurrent jurisdiction over custody

matters. Before oral argument in the instant appeal, this Court entered judgment in 

Appellee’s separate, accelerated, interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court 

Rule 10B. In re Adison P., No. W2015-00393-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1869456 

(Tenn. Ct. App. April 21, 2015) (“Adison I”). In Adison I, this Court reversed Judge 

Beal’s order denying Appellee’s motion for recusal. Although not part of our appellate 

record in this appeal, we take judicial notice of our judgment in Adison I. Having 

removed Judge Beal from the underlying case, we conclude that the writ of mandamus, 

which is issued directly to “Judge Beal,” is rendered null by his removal from the case. 

Because no present ongoing controversy remains in this case, this appeal is dismissed as 

moot. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; The Appeal is Dismissed

KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and BRANDON O. GIBSON, J., joined.

Chadwick R. Wood, Lexington, Tennessee, for the appellant, The Honorable Robert 

Stevie Beal.
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Brian Schuette, Bowling Green, Kentucky, pro hac vice, for the appellee, William R.F.

OPINION

I. Background

In the interests of consistency and judicial economy, we recite the relevant factual 

and procedural history as set out in Adison I:

[Appellant] Father and the minor child’s mother . . . Joey M.P. 

(“Mother”), were not married when the minor child was born. 

Approximately a year after the minor child’s birth, the trial court held a 

hearing with regard to custody and paternity. An order on the hearing was 

subsequently entered on December 8, 2003. In addition to declaring Father 

as the minor child’s natural father, the trial court’s December 8, 2003, order 

provided Father with specified visitation rights.

According to Father, Mother, over time, consistently failed to follow 

the trial court’s order with respect to visitation. As a result, on July 11, 

2011, Father filed a petition for contempt and asked that the trial court enter 

an order granting him temporary exclusive custody of the minor child. In 

addition to alleging that Mother had refused to allow Father to exercise 

certain visitation rights, Father alleged that Mother had removed the minor 

child to Texas. The parties later reached an agreement concerning the 

parenting issues, and on August 25, 2011, an agreed order was entered 

prohibiting Mother from removing the minor child [from] Tennessee absent 

court approval.

Despite the agreed order entered in August of 2011, the friction 

between the parties continued. Visitation disputes remained a problem and 

led to further litigation. Once again, however, the parties were able to reach 

some resolution. Following a successful mediation, the trial court entered an 

agreed order on June 4, 2013. This agreed order permitted Mother to 

relocate to Texas with the minor child and outlined certain dates on which 

Father would have visitation. In relevant part, the June 4, 2013, order 

provided that Father was entitled to visitation with the minor child “during 

the summer months with the exception of one week.”

According to Father, although his summer visitation with the minor 

child was scheduled to begin on June 5, 2013, he claims he was unable to
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exercise that visitation as a result of his inability to locate or communicate 

with Mother. He further claims that although the trial court held a 

telephonic conference with the parties’ counsel on June 26, 2013, the trial 

court did not enter an order following the conference and refused to order 

Mother to comply with the parties’ agreed visitation order. Eventually, on 

July 26, 2013, Father, acting pro se, filed a “Petition for Contempt and 

Emergency Change of Custody.” Despite his efforts to schedule this petition 

for a hearing before Judge Steve Beal, Father alleges that the trial court 

refused to hear his petition. Father later retained the assistance of counsel 

and filed a motion for the entry of a show cause order. Therein, Father 

requested that Mother appear and show cause why she should not be held in 

contempt for failing to abide by the agreed order entered on June 4, 2013. 

Father also gave notice to Mother’s counsel that the matter was set for 

hearing on April 23, 2014.

Father alleges that when his counsel appeared before the trial court 

to present his motion, Judge Beal refused to hear it. Apparently, Judge Beal 

indicated he would not hear the motion unless Mother’s counsel consented 

to the hearing or Mother was personally served with process. Father 

believed that such a requirement was unnecessary in light of the fact that he 

had properly noticed the motion and served it on Mother’s counsel of 

record. Accordingly, on June 9, 2014, Father filed a complaint for 

mandamus relief in the Circuit Court of Henderson County. Father also 

filed a complaint against Judge Beal with the Tennessee Board of Judicial 

Conduct on June 13, 2014. Therein, Father alleged that Judge Beal's failure 

to hear his motion constituted judicial misconduct.

On July 28, 2014, the Circuit Court conducted a hearing on Father's 

complaint for mandamus relief. Approximately a month later, on August 27, 

2014, the Circuit Court entered a writ of mandamus granting Father relief in 

relation to his motion for the entry of a show cause order. Specifically, the 

Circuit Court directed Judge Beal to set Father's motion for the entry of a 

show cause order for hearing.[Footnote 3 states: “As noted by Father, Judge 

Beal has appealed the order of the Circuit Court that granted mandamus 

relief. That appeal, In re Adison P., No. W2014–01901–COA–R3–CV, is 

still pending in this Court.” The appeal referenced in Adison I is the 

instant appeal]. Following the Circuit Court’s grant of mandamus relief, 

Father filed a petition in the trial court requesting that Judge Beal recuse 

himself from overseeing the visitation dispute between the parties. Judge 

Beal denied the motion, and although Father subsequently filed a petition 
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for recusal appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we dismissed 

the appeal as untimely.

On December 4, 2014, Father filed a second motion for recusal. This 

motion was predicated on grounds different from those that had been 

specifically raised in the first motion for recusal. Namely, the second 

motion alleged that there was a reasonable question regarding Judge Beal’s 

objectivity in Father’s case due to the fact that Judge Beal directed Father’s 

counsel to draft an order that partially enforced Father’s visitation rights, 

only to redraft the order to exclude those provisions. As Father recited in 

the motion:

* * *

On January 7, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on Father’s second 

motion for recusal, and on February 17, 2015, Judge Beal entered an order 

denying the motion. Judge Beal dismissed Father’s second motion for 

recusal by reasoning that the matters complained of had been disposed of in 

the order denying Father’s first motion for recusal. As such, Judge Beal 

considered the matters to be res judicata. Following Judge Beal’s denial of 

the second motion for recusal, Father timely pursued this accelerated appeal 

pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B [in Adison I].

Adison I, 2015 WL 1869456, at *1-*3 (footnotes omitted). In Adison I, this Court 

reversed Judge Beal’s order denying Father’s second motion for recusal. Id. at *6. On 

April 21, 2015, this Court entered its Judgment in Adison I. The Judgment states that 

“[t]he decision of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for 

transfer to a different Judge.”

The instant appeal concerns the authority of the Circuit Court of Henderson 

County to issue a writ of mandamus to Judge Beal, on a case in which the Juvenile Court 

has concurrent jurisdiction with the Circuit Court, requiring Judge Beal to hold a hearing 

on Father’s petition in the underlying child custody case. In his complaint for mandamus 

relief, filed on June 9, 2014, Father makes several claims for relief, including, inter alia, 

“entry of an order directing an appropriate judicial official to conduct a hearing on all 

pending motions . . . .” After conducting a hearing on July 28, 2014, the Circuit Court 

issued a writ of mandamus, stating, in pertinent part that “Judge Beal is hereby 

ORDERED to take appropriate action on [Father’s] motion for entry of show cause order 

by setting the matter for a hearing.” The writ specifically indicates that the Circuit Court 

“is not directing Judge Beal to rule on the Motion in any particular manner, only that 
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Judge Beal must grant [Father] a hearing on his Motion.”

II. Issues

Judge Beal appeals. He raises three issues for review, which we restate as 

follows:

1. Whether the Circuit Court had authority to issue a writ of mandamus to 

Judge Beal when the Circuit Court and Juvenile Court had concurrent 

jurisdiction over the underlying case.

2. If the mandamus was properly issued by the Circuit Court, whether the 

Circuit Court erred in making legal findings that are not allowed in a 

mandamus action.

3. Whether the Circuit Court should have granted Judge Beal’s motion to 

dismiss the complaint for writ of mandamus because there was no evidence 

presented in support of Father’s complaint.

III. Analysis

We note at the outset that this Court’s April 21, 2015 judgment in Adison I is not 

part of the appellate record in the instant appeal. Nonetheless, Tennessee law indicates 

that a court may take judicial notice of its own records and orders. See Harris v. State, 

301 S.W.3d 141, 147 n. 4 (Tenn. 2010) (“The Court may take judicial notice of its own 

records.”); Reid v. Morristown Power et al., No. E2012–02480–COA–R3CV, 2013 WL 

3282916 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 26, 2013); State v. Lawson, 291 S.W.3d 864, 870 (Tenn.

2009) (observing “the axiom that if the proceedings are of a particular court, that court 

may appropriately take judicial notice”); Hughes v. State, 451 S.W.2d 696, 697 (Tenn.

Crim. App.1969) (a court “can take judicial notice of its own orders and judgments”). 

Accordingly, we take judicial notice of our April 21, 2015 order, requiring the case to be 

transferred from Judge Beal to another judge. Furthermore, Tennessee Supreme Court 

Rule 10B Section 2.07 states that: “In an accelerated interlocutory appeal decided by 

either the Court of Appeals . . . a party may seek the Supreme Court’s review of the 

intermediate court’s decision by filing an accelerated application for permission to appeal. 

The application shall be filed in the Supreme Court within ten days of the filing date of 

the intermediate court’s order or opinion.” Here, neither party sought review from the 

Tennessee Supreme Court of our judgment in Adison I within the ten day time limit. 

Accordingly, the mandate issued on May 13, 2015, and our judgment in Adison I is now 

final.
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Turning to the writ of mandamus, importantly, the mandate is issued directly to 

“Judge Beal,” as opposed to a more generalized mandate to the trial court or the trial 

judge. In light of our holding in Adison I, Judge Beal is no longer associated with this

case. Because Judge Beal is recused from the case, a mandate directing him to take 

some action vis-à-vis the case is of no further effect, i.e., the writ of mandamus is moot.

 

The doctrine of justiciability prevents courts from adjudicating cases that do not 

involve a “genuine and existing controversy.” McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 

137 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994). “Our courts will not render advisory opinions or decide 

abstract legal questions.” Id. (internal citations omitted). A case must be justiciable when 

it is filed and throughout the course of litigation, including during the appeal. Id. Our 

courts will decline to hear a case if it does not “involve a genuine, continuing controversy 

requiring the adjudication of presently existing rights.” Alliance for Native Am. Indian 

Rights in Tenn., Inc. v. Nicely, 182 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005).

A moot case is no longer justiciable because it “has lost its character as a present, 

live controversy.” McIntyre, 884 S.W.2d at 137. Generally, a case is moot when it “no 

longer serves as a means to provide relief to the prevailing party.” Id. There are only a 

few recognized exceptions to the mootness rule: (1) the issue is of great public 

importance or affects the administration of justice; (2) the challenged conduct is capable 

of repetition and will likely evade judicial review;1(3) the primary subject of the dispute 

has become moot, but collateral consequences to one of the parties remain; and (4) the 

defendant voluntarily stops engaging in the challenged conduct. Norma Faye Pyles 

Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn. 2009). Only 

if the issue falls within a recognized exception do we have discretion to reach the merits 

of the appeal. Alliance for Native Am. Indian Rights, 182 S.W.3d at 339. 

With Judge Beal’s recusal, any live controversy concerning a writ of mandamus 

directed to Judge Beal in this case is extinguished. We further conclude that none of the 

foregoing exceptions to the mootness doctrine are triggered in this case. Therefore, we 

dismiss the appeal as moot, pretermitting the remaining issues.

 

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To qualify for this exception, a party must show: (1) a “reasonable expectation” or 

“demonstrated probability” that the acts that instigated litigation will reoccur; (2) “a risk that 

effective judicial remedies cannot be provided in the event [the acts] reoccur;” and (3) “that the 

same complaining party will be prejudiced by the [ ] act when it reoccurs.” Alliance for Native 

Am. Indian Rights, 182 S.W.3d at 339-40. A “theoretical possibility that an act might reoccur” 

is not sufficient to invoke this exception. Id. at 340.
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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal as moot. The case is remanded 

to the trial court for such further proceedings as may be necessary and are consistent with 

this opinion. Costs of the appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Robert Stevie Beal 

and his surety, for all of which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

KENNY ARMSTRONG, JUDGE