IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. DIANNE MEYERS, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

CONSHOHOCKEN CATHOLIC SCHOOL : 

and ARCHDIOCESE OF :

PHILADELPHIA, :

Defendants : NO. 03-4693

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

McLaughlin, J. December 30, 2004

M. Dianne Meyers alleges that Conshohocken Catholic

School (“CCS”) and the Archdiocese of Philadelphia

(“Archdiocese”) refused to permit her to return to work after

recuperation from a disability and precluded her from seeking

future employment with other Catholic schools within the

Archdiocese in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. The Court

held oral argument on this motion on November 2, 2004. The Court

will grant the defendants’ motion because Meyers has not

established a prima facie case of disability discrimination by

showing that she is an otherwise qualified individual under the

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1. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Summary judgment is appropriate if all of the evidence

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c). The moving party has the initial burden

of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. 

Once the moving party has satisfied this requirement, the nonmoving party must present evidence that there is a genuine issue

of material fact. The non-moving party may not simply rest on

the pleadings, but must go beyond the pleadings in presenting

evidence of a dispute of fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986).

2. CCS was formed when St. Matthew’s and other schools were

consolidated due to low student enrollment. Pl.’s Resp. at 2.

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ADA. Further, Meyers has not proffered sufficient evidence to

defeat summary judgment by showing that the defendants’ stated

reason for their employment action was a pretext for

discrimination. 

I. Background

The facts in the light most favorable to Meyers are as

follows.1 Meyers worked at CCS as an elementary school teacher

from September 1996 until October 2001. Meyers also worked as

director of CCS’s C.A.R.E.S. program, a program supervising

students before and after school. Prior to CCS, Meyers was a

teacher at St. Matthew’s Parish School from 1984 to 1996.2 By

the end of Meyers’s employment with CCS, she had worked for the

Archdiocese for 28 years. Pl.’s Resp. to Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Resp.”)

at 1-3.

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Meyers suffers from two conditions on the basis of

which she claims she was discriminated: myasthenia gravis and

reactive airways disease. Meyers was first diagnosed with

myasthenia gravis, a neuromuscular disease, 22 years ago. She

was first diagnosed with reactive airways disease, a form of

asthma, in 2000. Meyers Deposition (“Meyers Dep.”) at 83, 175. 

Both CCS and St. Matthew’s hired Meyers with knowledge that she

suffered from myasthenia gravis. Id. at 156-57. 

 According to Meyers, the myasthenia gravis manifests

itself through crisis periods that may last anywhere from a

couple of days to a couple of weeks. Id. at 197-198. The

myasthenia gravis causes difficulty breathing and a weakening of

her bones and muscles. Pl.’s Resp. at 4. The reactive airways

disease causes her to have difficulty breathing when she

encounters perfume and other chemical irritants. Meyers Dep. at

83.

During the plaintiff’s tenure at St. Matthew’s and CCS,

she experienced symptoms from her medical conditions that caused

her to take time off work. As early as 1988, the principal of

St. Matthew’s school expressed concern about Meyers’s ability to

do her job due to her illness. In a teacher performance

evaluation, the principal stated that although Meyers had not

missed an unusual number of days, she did not provide the

students with the kind of education of which she was capable due

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3. Meyers argues that because she has made no claims of

discrimination prior to 1996 when CCS was formed, defendants’

arguments regarding absences prior to 1996 should not have any

bearing on the Court’s determination of this motion. Pl.’s Resp.

at 12. However, Meyers’s history of attendance is relevant to

the defendants’ view that Meyers was unable to provide reliable

and predictable attendance for her students. 

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to her health problems. 1987-88 Evaluation, Defs’ Mot. Summ. J.

(“Defs.’ Mot.”), Ex. 7. 

Meyers’s health-related absences varied over the years

of her employment. The parties dispute the number of absences in

some years, with the defendants citing more absences. Where

there are disputes in the record, they are resolved in favor of

Meyers as the non-moving party. According to Meyers, she was

absent: 14.5 days in the 1991-92 school year; 4 days in the

1992-1993 school year; 59.5 days in the 1993-94 school year; 8.5

days in the 1994-95 school year; 10 days in the 1995-96 school

year; 15 days in the 1997-98 school year; 16.5 days in the 1998-

99 school year; 2.5 days in the 1999-2000 school year; and 9 days

in the 2000-01 school year.3 Pl’s Resp. at 13-17. She went on

long-term disability leave during the 1996-97 school year. 

In addition to Meyers’s health-related absences, she

experienced symptoms of reactive airways disease, asthma, and

myasthenia gravis that required her to leave work to seek

immediate medical attention. Between 1996 and 2001, the

principal of CCS, Jacqueline Kerrigan (“Kerrigan”), would drive

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4. Meyers claims that she would have been able to return to work

full-time and did not need this special schedule. Meyers Dep. at

101. One of her doctors stated that she could return to work. 

The other doctor stated that Meyers should not return to school

and that she should have more time off from work. 

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Meyers to the hospital when she became ill at work. According to

Kerrigan, she had driven Meyers to the hospital 15 to 20 times

when she became ill at work. Kerrigan Dep. at 74. During the

times Meyers left early to seek medical attention, Kerrigan would

find a replacement teacher to cover Meyers’s class. 

Kerrigan and CCS made efforts to accommodate Meyers’s

medical conditions. After a myasthenic crisis in the 1996-97

school year, Kerrigan allowed Meyers to go on an alternative work

schedule. In November 1996, Meyers experienced a myasthenic

crisis, causing her to miss six days from work. Meyers Dep. at

100. Following her return to work, Kerrigan placed Meyers on a

schedule where she would come to work three days a week for half

a day so that she could build up her strength. The school hired

a substitute teacher to cover her class the rest of the time. 

Id. at 101.4

On February 4, 1997 of that same school year, Meyers

became ill again. She spent some time in the hospital and

returned to work on February 11, 1997. Id. at 103-04. 

Thereafter, Meyers took a disability leave for the remainder of

the school year. Id. at 113. The school continued to provide

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Meyers a salary and health insurance coverage so that she would

not suffer a financial hardship while she awaited a decision

about her disability benefits claim. Id. at 114; Kerrigan Dep.

at 129-30. 

Meyers claims that she took the disability leave at

Kerrigan’s insistence so that she would not lose her job. Meyers

Dep. at 113. Meyers did not believe the disability leave was

necessary because one of her doctors stated that she could return

to work. However, another one of her doctors disagreed, stating

that Meyers was unable “to sustain physical work (even standing)

for more than a few minutes” and that she should return to work

no sooner than September 1997. Meyers Dep., Ex. 15. Meyers did

not return to work until September 1997. 

Meyers’s medical conditions impacted other aspects of

her job. Due to her reactive airways disease, Meyers did not

attend some school-related activities and events where teachers

who wore perfume would be present. Meyers did not attend daily

faculty meetings, annual faculty retreats, district meetings, and

monthly mass in order to avoid having an asthma attack. Meyers

Dep. at 85-95. Kerrigan never required Meyers to engage in an

activity that could lead to an asthma attack, even though the

activities were a part of her teaching responsibilities. Id. at

87, 91; Pl.’s Resp. at 6-7. Kerrigan also asked faculty members

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to stop wearing strong perfume, explaining that Meyers could not

be around the perfume. Meyers Dep. at 83-84.

The events leading up to Meyers’s termination of

employment with CCS followed a myasthenic crisis in the beginning

of the 2001-02 school year. On September 4, 2001, one day before

the new school year began, Meyers became ill. She was

hospitalized on that day and released three days later to begin

recuperating. Id. at 15. 

After consulting with her doctor, Meyers called

Kerrigan to inform her that she would be able to return to work

on September 17, 2001. Before allowing Meyers to return to work,

Kerrigan informed her that she would need a doctor’s

certification stating that she could “assume all of the

encompassing duties of a second grade elementary school teacher

and that [she is] able to move freely throughout the classroom

and school attending to those duties.” Defs’ Mot., Ex. 4. 

Meyers’s doctor sent a letter stating that while Meyers could

return to work without limitation of movement in the classroom,

her future clinical status was unclear, as her disease could

return at any time without clear warning. Id. Another one of

Meyers’s doctors sent a letter stating that Meyers had suffered

an acute exacerbation of myasthenia gravis that could occur

without warning, lasting anywhere from one to several days. Id. 

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On September 18, 2001, Meyers called Kerrigan again to

inquire about when she could return to work. Kerrigan responded

that the doctors’ letters did not answer the school’s question

regarding her ability to work, and that she needed to talk to the

pastors, who are in charge of running the school. See Gasper

Genuardi Dep. at 6. Kerrigan and the pastors scheduled a meeting

with Meyers for September 26, 2001. 

Meyers met with Kerrigan and the pastors on September

26, 2001 to discuss her ability to provide regular attendance. 

Kerrigan and the pastors asked Meyers whether she could promise

to provide “consistency and continuity” in coming to work every

day. Meyers responded that she could not, acknowledging the

unpredictable nature of her disease. Meyers Dep. at 29. 

After Meyers responded that she could not provide

consistency and continuity, Kerrigan and the pastors discussed

with Meyers possible employment alternatives within the school. 

The options included offering Meyers a full-time substitute

position in addition to her position as director of the

C.A.R.E.S. program and hiring a permanent teacher’s aide for the

classroom. Id. at 39. Meyers did not agree to these options

because she felt was that she was capable of working in her

current position. Id. at 36, 39.

On October 4, 2001, Meyers had another discussion with

Kerrigan regarding her return to work. During this discussion,

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Meyers stated that Kerrigan told her that if she were to come

back to school, she was to do nothing but teach. Id. at 43-44. 

Kerrigan asked Meyers whether she would return to work, and

Meyers informed her that she would let Kerrigan know the next

day. 

The next day, Meyers called Kerrigan to inform her that

she would be returning to work. Id. at 45. According to Meyers,

Kerrigan said that she could return to work, but that she did not

believe it was in the best interests of the school and she would

not support her in the school. Id. at 45-47. At the end of the

discussion, Meyers informed Kerrigan that the school would have

to fire her because she would not quit. Id. at 47.

On October 12, 2001, Kerrigan called Meyers to schedule

a meeting for October 16, 2001 to discuss a separation agreement

with the school. Id. at 50. At the meeting, the school

presented Meyers with a separation agreement, which would provide

health insurance and severance pay in exchange for a release of

all claims. Meyers said that she did not sign the agreement

because it included a clause that would prohibit her from working

in the Archdiocese again. Id. at 52. The defendants later

removed the language in the separation agreement precluding

Meyers from future employment within the Archdiocese. 

On October 17, 2001, Meyers called the director of

Elementary Personnel for the Archdiocese, Mary Rochford. During

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the conversation, she informed Ms. Rochford that the school asked

her to sign a separation agreement and sought assistance in

dealing with the issue. Ms. Rochford allegedly replied that

there was nothing that she could do and that as far as she was

concerned, Meyers would never teach in the Archdiocese again. 

Id. at 58-59. 

Meyers alleges discriminatory treatment based on her

myasthenia gravis and reactive airways disease. In Count I of

the complaint, Meyers alleges that the defendants’ refusal to

permit her to return to work following her myasthenic crisis in

2001 and the defendants’ refusal to reasonably accommodate her

perceived impairments violated the ADA. In Count II of the

complaint, under the PHRA, Meyers alleges that CCS terminated her

employment and the Archdiocese has restricted and will continue

to restrict her future employment within the Archdiocese.

In their motion for summary judgment, the defendants

argue that Meyers is not protected under the ADA and the PHRA.

They argue that Meyers has failed to establish a prima facie case

of discrimination by presenting evidence that she is an otherwise

qualified individual with a disability. The defendants argue

that Meyers cannot establish a disability by showing that she was

substantially limited in a major life activity. Further, they

argue that she was unable to perform the essential functions of

her job with or without reasonable accommodations. Even if

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Meyers is protected under the ADA and the PHRA, the defendants

argue that she is unable to rebut their legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for their employment action: concern

about the lack of consistency and continuity for children in her

class.

II. Discussion

The decision whether to grant or deny summary judgment

in a disability discrimination action under the ADA is governed

by the Supreme Court’s burden-shifting analysis in McDonnellDouglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this analysis, the

plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of

discrimination. If the plaintiff does so, the burden of

production shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 

Walton v. Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania,

168 F.3d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1999); Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d

494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000). In order to defeat summary judgment,

the plaintiff has to point to some evidence, direct or

circumstantial, from which a fact finder could reasonably either

(1) disbelieve the defendant’s articulated legitimate reasons; or

(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more

likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the

employer’s action. Walton, 168 F.3d at 668.

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5. The Third Circuit has held that the same analysis applies

when discussing the PHRA and the ADA. Williams v. Philadelphia

Housing Authority Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 761 n.6 (3d Cir.

2004); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d

Cir. 1999); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.

1996). Thus, it is only necessary to discuss the plaintiff’s ADA

claims. 

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A. Prima Facie Case

In order to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination under the ADA5, the plaintiff must show that: (1)

she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she

is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the

job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer;

and (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action as a result

of the discrimination. Taylor v. Phoenixville School Dist., 184

F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999); Shaner, 204 F.3d at 500. The

defendants argue that Meyers has not established a prima facie

case of discrimination because she is not disabled and not

otherwise qualified. The defendants do not dispute and the Court

will assume that Meyers suffered an adverse employment action. 

1. Disability

The ADA defines a disability as either: (A) a physical

or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the

major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an

impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 

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42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Meyers argues that she is disabled because

she has an impairment that substantially limits a major life

activity and the defendants regarded her as having such an

impairment. Pl.’s Resp. at 33, 46. Because the Court finds that

the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to establish a

physical impairment that substantially limits a major life

activity, the Court will not consider whether there is also

sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants regarded her

as having such an impairment.

The plaintiff claims that she suffers from myasthenia

gravis and reactive airways disease. The defendants do not

dispute that these are impairments for purposes of the ADA. The

contested issue is whether Meyers’s impairments substantially

limit a major life activity. 

The EEOC regulations provide that an individual is

substantially limited in a major life activity if she is unable

to perform a major life activity that the average person in the

general population can perform or is significantly restricted as

to the condition, manner, or duration of performing the major

life activity as compared to the average person in the general

population. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i) and (ii). 

Major life activities are “those basic activities that

the average person in the general population can perform with

little or no difficulty.” Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216

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F.3d 354, 361 (3d Cir. 2000). The EEOC regulations provide that

examples of major life activities include “caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,

breathing, and working.” Id. 

Meyers asserts that she is substantially limited in her

ability to breathe, speak, see, walk, climb and descend stairs,

and swallow. The defendants do not argue that these are not

major life activities under the ADA. They argue that Meyers has

not established that as a result of her impairments, she is

substantially limited in her ability to engage in these

activities. After a close review of the record evidence, the

Court agrees with the defendants on all Meyers’s activities

except her breathing. 

Meyers, as the ADA plaintiff, “bears the burden of

establishing that [she] is disabled within the meaning of the

ADA,” and she must affirmatively point to evidence in the record

that establishes that she is substantially limited in a major

life activity in order to survive a motion for summary judgment. 

See Marinelli, 216 F.3d at 363. In support of her argument that

she is substantially limited in the major life activities

described above, Meyers points primarily to three sources of

evidence: her deposition testimony, records from her treating

physicians, and her affidavit. 

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Most of Meyers’s breathing difficulties result from her

reactive airways disease. When she is around perfume, strong

cleaning products, or smoke, she has an asthma attack. Meyers

Dep. at 75. Meyers described her physical symptoms when she has

an asthma attack: 

My throat closes up....I develop what is called a

stridor and it’s an ungodly noise that you make when

you breathe and it’s like you’re grasping for air, that

you can’t get enough in, you can get it out but you

can’t get the air in....And at times I have stopped

breathing. 

Id. at 75-76.

Meyers’s physician documented the impact that an asthma

attack can have on her breathing. According to her doctor: 

When an exacerbation occurs, Meyers has an acute

difficulty breathing, thus impacting her ability to

perform most other functions...until the condition

passes. This can last up to several days....

[E]xacerbations are caused by specific inhalants. I

have asked Meyers to always try to strictly avoid

exposure to inhalants such as perfumes, dust, etc.

Request for Medical Verification, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 19.

Meyers also experiences difficulty in breathing as a

result of her myasthenia gravis. Meyers testified that an asthma

attack and myasthenia gravis are difficult to distinguish because

myasthenia gravis causes her to experience some of the same

symptoms. An asthma attack may also trigger symptoms of

myasthenia gravis. Meyers Dep. at 88-89. 

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Meyers takes measures to minimize the frequency and

severity of her breathing difficulties. In her deposition, she

stated that she is able to prevent asthma attacks from happening

and end asthma attacks by removing herself from settings where

triggers are present. For example, she has left stores and

restaurants a number of times after she has begun to have 

breathing difficulties. Id. at 75-76. She can usually avoid a

more severe reaction by using an inhaler or an Epipen. Pl.’s

Resp. at 6. 

The defendants do not dispute Meyers’s limitations in

breathing during an asthma attack or a myasthenic crisis. They

argue that the temporary and sporadic nature of these breathing

difficulties, coupled with Meyers’s ability to avoid asthma

attack triggers, demonstrates that Meyers does not have a

substantial limitation in breathing. 

Although temporary and non-chronic impairments of short

duration are not covered by the ADA, an ADA plaintiff need not

experience symptoms of an impairment every day to establish that

an impairment is substantially limiting. See Rinehimer v.

Cemcolift, Inc. 292 F.3d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 2002); Taylor, 184

F.3d at 309. In finding that the plaintiff was disabled in

Taylor, the Court of Appeals considered the EEOC factors for

determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major

life activity: (1) the nature and severity of the impairment;

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(2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3)

the permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the

impairment. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 309; 29 C.F.R. §

1630.2(j)(2). 

The Court will consider how each of these factors

applies here. First, the nature and severity of Meyers’s

conditions are such that Meyers has been hospitalized on numerous

occasions. She must always avoid exposure to common fumes or run

the risk of having an asthma attack, which can trigger a

myasthenic crisis. Meyers has had to leave stores and

restaurants a number of times because of difficulty breathing. 

Meyers Dep. at 75-76. After suffering an asthma attack at a

faculty retreat, Kerrigan had to rush Meyers to the nearest

hospital for medical treatment. Id. at 88. When Meyers has not

been able to prevent an asthma attack, her symptoms have been so

severe that she has stopped breathing entirely. Id. The nature

and severity of her impairments weigh in favor of finding a

substantial limitation. 

Second, the duration of the impairments varied. If

Meyers suffered a myasthenic crisis or an asthma attack, she

could be impaired for one to several days. These impairments

lasted long enough for Meyers to miss time from work and seek

medical attention on some occasions. 

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Third, Meyers’s impairments and attendant symptoms are

likely to be permanent and long-term. There is no medical

indication that her conditions will improve over time. The

myasthenia gravis, which Meyers has had for over 20 years, is an

unpredictable condition that occurs without much warning. She is

likely to experience asthma attacks as long as she encounters

exposure to chemical irritants. 

The Court concludes that there is sufficient evidence

in the record for which a jury could conclude that Meyers is

substantially limited in the major life activity of breathing.

The Court concludes that there is insufficient evidence

in the record to establish that Meyers is substantially limited

in any of the other major life activities. 

! Meyers is not substantially limited in speaking. 

In her deposition, she stated that if she talks continuously or

all day long, her voice will start to get hoarse so that it

sounds like she has a cold. Meyers Dep. at 73. The fact that

her voice may become hoarse after speaking all day does not

establish a substantial limitation, rendering her significantly

less able to speak than an average person. See, e.g., Crawley v.

Runyon, 1998 WL 355529, *6-*7 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1998)(finding

that the plaintiff's impairment, which caused moderate to severe

hoarseness that at times affected both the quality and the volume

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6. The plaintiff brought claims under the Rehabilitation Act. 

The substantive standards for determining liability are the same

under both the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with

Disabilities Act. See McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dept. Of

Public Welfare, Polk Center, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995).

19

of his speech, did not substantially limit the plaintiff’s

ability to talk.6). 

! Meyers is not substantially limited in seeing. She

testified that if she does extensive reading, her eyelids start

to droop. She stated, however, “There’s nothing wrong with my

vision, but my eyelids will droop.” Meyers Dep. at 73. The

Court finds that this does not constitute a substantial

limitation. 

! Meyers is not substantially limited in walking or

climbing and descending stairs. She testified that she cannot

run and it is hard for her to manage steps. Id. at 79. But she

also stated that she had no problems walking or standing for long

periods of time. Id. at 86-87. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94

F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 1996)(finding a plaintiff, who had trouble

climbing stairs, requiring him to move slowly and hold the

handrail, was not substantially limited in the major life

activity of walking). 

! Meyers is not substantially limited in swallowing

or eating. The plaintiff’s affidavit states that when she eats

something that requires strenuous chewing, like steak, her throat

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muscles become tired and she has to wait to swallow her food. 

Meyers Affidavit, Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 6. The plaintiff’s inability

to eat certain foods does not constitute a substantial limitation

in eating. 

2. Otherwise Qualified Individual

The second element of the prima facie case that Meyers

must establish is that she is otherwise qualified to perform the

essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable

accommodations by her employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The

defendants argue that Meyers is not otherwise qualified because

she could not perform the following essential functions of her

job: (1) providing regular and reliable attendance in her

classroom duties; and (2) attending mandatory teaching events,

such as daily faculty meetings, district meetings, monthly mass,

and other religious activities.

Meyers concedes that she could not attend various

teaching events, but argues that attendance at such events is not

an essential function of her job. Meyers concedes that

attendance at work can be an essential function of a job, but

argues that she can fulfill that requirement with the reasonable

accommodations that the Archdiocese and CCS have been giving her

for years. Because the Court will conclude that Meyers’s

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inability to provide regular attendance at work renders her

otherwise unqualified, the Court need not reach the issue as to

whether attendance at the various teaching events is an essential

function of her job. 

An employee who does not come to work on a regular

basis is not “qualified” under the ADA. Smith v. Davis, 248 F.3d

249, 251 (3d Cir. 2001). In Smith, the Third Circuit cited with

approval Tyndall v. National Education Centers, 31 F.3d 209, 213

(4th Cir. 1994), the facts of which are similar to this case. In

Tyndall, a part-time instructor who had lupus began to miss work

with increasing frequency. Id. at 211. As in this case, she

also missed the beginning of an instructional cycle, which the

court described as “a crucial time” for the school’s operations. 

Id. The court held that the plaintiff was not otherwise

qualified because the absences rendered the plaintiff unable to

perform the essential functions of her job even with reasonable

accommodations for her disability. 

The record in this case demonstrates that Meyers has

not been able to provide regular and reliable attendance

throughout her employment with CCS. From 1996 until 2001, Meyers

consistently experienced health-related absences. During at

least two school years, Meyers could not meet the school’s annual

attendance requirements. Pl.’s Resp. at 15-16. In the fall of

2001, Meyers suffered a myasthenic crisis, causing her to miss

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the beginning of the new school year. In addition to Meyers’s

sometimes lengthy absences, Meyers’s absences were unpredictable. 

The onset of a myasthenic crisis at times happened while Meyers

was at school, causing her to seek immediate medical attention. 

At the time of her termination from CCS, neither Meyers nor her

doctors could provide the defendants with any indication that she

would be able to work regularly due to the unpredictable course

of her illness. Meyers Dep. at 198. 

For many years, the school went to extraordinary levels

to accommodate Meyers’s needs. Some of the school’s

accommodations included: permitting Meyers to take absences

whenever she became ill for as long as she needed; excusing her

from attending daily faculty meetings, monthly mass, annual

faculty retreats, district meetings, and other required teaching

duties so that she could avoid potential triggers of an asthma

attack; finding teachers to replace her when she became ill or

when she did not attend school activities with her students;

permitting her to leave work early when she became ill and

rushing her to the hospital; allowing her to work on a reduced

work schedule; and allowing her to take a long-term disability. 

Meyers agrees that up until the time of termination, the school

provided all the accommodations that she requested. Oral

Argument Transcript at 21. 

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 22 of 28
23

Meyers argues that the school should continue to

provide her with these accommodations indefinitely. The

plaintiff is making a quasi-estoppel argument that because the

Archdiocese has allowed her to take off whatever time she wanted

whenever she wanted, they must continue to do so. The Court

cannot accept this argument. The Third Circuit has found that

when an employer has exceeded the ADA’s requirement of reasonable

accommodation, its decision to discontinue the accommodation does

not give the plaintiff a cause of action against it. See Walton,

168 F.3d at 671 (finding that unpaid leave, which the employer

granted in the past, was beyond the scope of the ADA). 

The defendants’ past accommodations to Meyers’s

illnesses were beyond the scope of the ADA’s requirements. The

defendants were not required to accommodate Meyers’s illnesses by

allowing her to miss work whenever and for however long she was

ill. Regular attendance was an essential function of Meyers’s

job and could only be performed when Meyers was in the classroom

with her students. Any accommodation that excused Meyers from

this requirement was unnecessary under the ADA, as an employer

need not eliminate the essential functions of a position in order

to accommodate an employee’s disability. See, e.g., Shannon v.

New York City Transit Authority, 332 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2003);

Mason v. Avaya Communications, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1124 (10th

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 23 of 28
24

Cir. 2004). An employer’s policies that exceed the requirements

of the ADA do not set the standard of reasonable accommodation

nor do they demonstrate that an employer has conceded the

reasonableness of such accommodations. See Holbrook v.

Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 December 29, 2004(11th Cir.

1997); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dept. Of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545

(7th Cir. 1995). Because allowing Meyers to miss work whenever

she became ill was not reasonable, the defendants were not

required to continue this accommodation. 

If the Court imposed this requirement, the incentive

for an employer to go beyond even what is required by the ADA

would be diminished. We want to encourage schools to try to go

beyond what even is reasonable to accommodate their teachers. 

But when they finally conclude after years of accommodating

someone, they cannot continue, they ought not be estopped from

arguing that it is not reasonable to require the continuance of

extraordinary measures to allow a teacher to continue teaching. 

The Archdiocese and CCS have gone beyond what is reasonable here.

The Court, of course, is sympathetic to Meyers, who

suffers from these physical ailments. But to demand that the

school continue to employ her when her doctors cannot predict the

course of her illness and give the school any understanding of

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 24 of 28
25

how many days she will be out or, more important for scheduling

purposes, when she will be out, is unreasonable. 

B. Pretext Analysis

If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the

burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment

action. See Walton, 168 F.3d at 668. The defendants argue that

the school was concerned about the lack of consistency and

continuity for the children in her class. In order to defeat

summary judgment, the plaintiff has to point to some evidence

that the defendants’ proffered reason for the employment action

was pretextual. In arguing that the defendants’ reasons are

pretextual, Meyers points to the following evidence: the

defendants never questioned her teaching ability; her students

never suffered academically or otherwise; the school hired

replacement teachers in 1997 when she was capable of teaching her

own class; and she had used less sick days than the school allots

to teachers at the time of her termination. 

Even if the defendants never questioned Meyers’s

ability to teach, Meyers was still unable to perform an essential

function of her job by providing regular attendance. Presenting

evidence of the quality of her teaching would not cause a

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26

reasonable fact finder to disbelieve that the school was

concerned about consistency and continuity for the students. In

addition to having the requisite teaching skills, it is at least

as important for a teacher to be able to demonstrate these skills

by coming to work on a regular and predictable basis, especially

at the beginning of a new school year. It would have been

unreasonable for the defendants to allow the pattern to continue

until students began to suffer academically or otherwise. 

The fact that the school hired substitute teachers when

Meyers claims that she was available to teach does not show that

the school was not concerned about consistency and continuity for

her students. First, the record shows that at least one of

Meyers’s doctors believed that she was unable to return to work

the year that she was on long-term disability following her

myasthenic crisis. Second, pointing to a single occurrence in

1997 does not cast doubt on the defendants’ stated reason for

their employment action four years later.

Finally, Meyers argues that the defendants’ reason is

pretextual because she would not have exceeded her allotted

number of sick days if the defendants allowed her to return to

work. Pl.’s Resp. at 49-50. This argument fails to take into

consideration a continuous pattern of irregular and unpredictable

attendance. Meyers had worked for CCS since 1996 and since that

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 26 of 28
27

time she had been absent each year for health-related illnesses

and exceeded the sick leave allowance twice already. 

Even assuming that Meyers would have only been absent

the first 8.5 days of the school year, it is doubtful that she

would have been able to meet the attendance requirements for the

rest of the year especially in light of the letters Meyers’s

doctors sent to the school. It was reasonable for the defendants

to take into account her history of attendance when making a

determination that she could not provide consistency and

continuity for her students. 

The Court finds that Meyers has not established

sufficient evidence that the defendants’ reason for the

employment action was pretextual. There is no reason to suspect

that the defendants discriminated against Meyers’s illness or

sought to avoid reasonable accommodations. 

An appropriate order follows. 

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 27 of 28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

M. DIANNE MEYERS, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. :

:

CONSHOHOCKEN CATHOLIC SCHOOL : 

and ARCHDIOCESE OF :

PHILADELPHIA, :

Defendants : NO. 03-4693

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of December, 2004, upon consideration

of the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 15),

the plaintiff’s response, the defendants’ reply brief, and after

oral argument held on November 2, 2004, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

the motion is GRANTED for the reasons set forth in a memorandum

of today’s date. Judgment is hereby ordered for the defendants

and against the plaintiff.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Mary A. McLaughlin

MARY A. McLAUGHLIN, J.

Case 2:03-cv-04693-MAM Document 26 Filed 12/30/04 Page 28 of 28