IV 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. RES. 749 

Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory sanctions authorities under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 

in response to the Government of the Russian Federation’s continued 

aggression in Ukraine and forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea 

and assault on democratic institutions around the world, including 

through cyber attacks. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 26, 2018 

Mr. CONNOLLY (for himself, Mr. ENGEL, Ms. BASS, Mr. BERA, Mr. BRENDAN

F. BOYLE of Pennsylvania, Mr. CASTRO of Texas, Mr. CICILLINE, Mr. 

DEUTCH, Mr. ESPAILLAT, Ms. FRANKEL of Florida, Mr. KEATING, Ms. 

KELLY of Illinois, Mr. TED LIEU of California, Mr. MEEKS, Mr. SCHNEIDER, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. SIRES, Mr. SUOZZI, Ms. TITUS, and Mrs. 

TORRES) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on 

House Administration, the Judiciary, Oversight and Government Reform, 

Financial Services, and Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently 

determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

RESOLUTION 

Calling upon the President to exercise relevant mandatory 

sanctions authorities under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in response to the Government of the Russian Federation’s continued aggression in Ukraine and forcible and illegal annexation of 

Crimea and assault on democratic institutions around 

the world, including through cyber attacks. 


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Whereas, on January 6, 2017, an assessment of the United 

States intelligence community entitled, ‘‘Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections’’ 

stated, ‘‘Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential 

election’’ and warned that ‘‘Moscow will apply lessons 

learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the 

U.S. Presidential election to future influence efforts 

worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election 

processes’’; 

Whereas a report of the minority staff of the Committee on 

Foreign Relations of the Senate released on January 10, 

2018, and entitled ‘‘Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security’’ assessed that the Government of the 

Russian Federation ‘‘employs an asymmetric arsenal that 

includes military invasions, cyber attacks, disinformation, 

support for fringe political groups, and the weaponization 

of energy resources, organized crime and corruption.’’ 

and that the Government of the Russian Federation ‘‘will 

continue to develop and refine its arsenal to use on democracies around the world, including against U.S. elections in 2018 and 2020’’; 

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine and threatens the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including by its forcible and illegal annexation of Crimea 

and its support for violent separatists in the eastern part 

of Ukraine; 

Whereas the Government of the Russian Federation continues to provide financial, material, and technological 


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support to the Government of Syria, which has enabled 

the latter to acquire or develop a range of lethal capacities it has deployed against civilians in its territory, including acts that may constitute war crimes, crimes 

against humanity or other violations of international 

human rights law; 

Whereas the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 886) 

passed with overwhelming bipartisan majorities in the 

Senate and the House of Representatives, and title II of 

that Act was developed to respond to the interference of 

the Government of the Russian Federation in the United 

States 2016 election and the aggression of that Government in Ukraine and Syria and to deter such malicious 

activities in the future; 

Whereas the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act was signed by the President and enacted 

into law on August 2, 2017, thereby codifying a range of 

mandatory sanctions against the Government of the Russian Federation for its malicious activities against the 

United States democratic process and in Ukraine and 

Syria; 

Whereas in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on January 29, 2018, Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Pompeo said he ‘‘had not seen a significant decrease’’ in attempts by the Government of the 

Russian Federation to subvert democracies in Europe 

and the United States and, when asked if that Government would try and interfere in the 2018 United States 

election, he said that he had ‘‘every expectation that they 

will continue to try and do that’’; 


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Whereas, on March 6, 2014, President Barack Obama issued 

Executive Order 13360 (79 Fed. Reg. 13493; relating to 

blocking property of certain persons contributing to the 

situation in Ukraine), which authorizes the Secretary of 

the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 

to impose sanctions on persons determined to be undermining democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine 

or threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, 

and territorial integrity of Ukraine; 

Whereas President Obama subsequently issued Executive 

Order 13661 (79 Fed. Reg. 15535; relating to blocking 

property of additional persons contributing to the situation in Ukraine), Executive Order 13662 (79 Fed. Reg. 

16169; relating to blocking property of additional persons 

contributing to the situation in Ukraine), and Executive 

Order 13685 (79 Fed. Reg. 77357; relating to blocking 

property of certain persons and prohibiting certain transactions with respect to the Crimea region of Ukraine) to 

expand sanctions on certain persons contributing to the 

situation in Ukraine; 

Whereas, on April 1, 2015, President Barack Obama issued 

Executive Order 13694 (80 Fed. Reg. 18077; relating to 

the blocking of property of certain persons engaging in 

significant malicious cyber-enabled activities), which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation 

with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, to 

impose sanctions on persons determined to be engaged in 

malicious cyber-hacking; 

Whereas, on December 29, 2016, President Obama issued an 

annex to Executive Order 13694, which authorized sanctions on— 


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(1) the Main Intelligence Directorate (also known as 

Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe Upravlenie or the GRU) in 

Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(2) the Federal Security Service (also known as 

Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or the FSB) in Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(3) the Special Technology Center (also known as 

STLC, Ltd. Special Technology Center St. Petersburg) 

in St. Petersburg, Russian Federation; 

(4) Zorsecurity (also known as Esage Lab) in Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(5) the autonomous noncommercial organization 

known as the Professional Association of Designers of 

Data Processing Systems (also known as ANO PO KSI) 

in Moscow, Russian Federation; 

(6) Igor Valentinovich Korobov; 

(7) Sergey Aleksandrovich Gizunov; 

(8) Igor Olegovich Kostyukov; and 

(9) Vladimir Stepanovich Alexseyev; 

Whereas, on December 20, 2017, the Department of the 

Treasury imposed targeted sanctions on 5 nationals of 

the Russian Federation under the Sergei Magnitsky Rule 

of Law Accountability Act of 2012 (title IV of Public 

Law 112–208; 22 U.S.C. 8511 note) and, on December 

21, 2017, the Department imposed targeted sanctions, 

including against one national of the Russian Federation 

for significant corruption, under that Act and a derivative Executive order signed by President Donald Trump; 

Whereas, on January 26, 2018, sanctions maintenance packages were issued by the Department of the Treasury 

under Executive Orders 13660, 13661, 13662, and 

13685, signed by President Barack Obama, and those 


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packages targeted individuals and entities in connection 

with the conflict in Ukraine and the forcible and illegal 

annexation of Crimea by the Government of the Russian 

Federation; 

Whereas no sanctions have been imposed pursuant to mandatory provisions enacted under title II of the Countering 

America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 

9501 et seq.), including— 

(1) section 224 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; relating to sanctions with respect to activities of the Russian 

Federation undermining cybersecurity); 

(2) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 

of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923), as amended by section 225 of 

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act (relating to sanctions relating to special Russian 

crude oil products); 

(3) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act 

of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924), as amended by section 226 of 

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian and 

other foreign financial institutions); 

(4) section 9 of the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine 

Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8908), as amended by section 

227 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to significant corruption in the Russian Federation); 

(5) section 10 of the Support for the Sovereignty, 

Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine 

Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8909), as added by section 228 

of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to certain 


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transactions with foreign sanctions evaders and serious 

human rights abusers in the Russian Federation); 

(6) section 233 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9527; relating 

to sanctions with respect to investment in or facilitation 

of privatization of state-owned assets by the Russian 

Federation); and 

(7) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9528; relating to sanctions with respect to the transfer of arms and 

related materiel to Syria); 

Whereas in testimony on January 30, 2018, to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the 

Senate, Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin said 

‘‘[i]n the near future, you will see additional sanctions’’ 

based on the list of Russian oligarchs or senior political 

figures, presumably against those who had engaged in 

malign activities sanctionable under United States law; 

Whereas a statement on January 29, 2018, from the Department of State asserted that ‘‘several billion dollars’’ in 

defense sector transactions with the Government of the 

Russian Federation or entities affiliated with that Government had been deterred through United States diplomacy and indicated that ‘‘sanctions on specific entities or 

individuals will not need to be imposed because the 

[Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 

Act] legislation is, in fact, serving as a deterrent’’; and 

Whereas the deterrent value of sanctions is derived from the 

perception by potential targets that the threat of imposing such sanctions is genuine: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives— 

2 (1) strongly urges the President— 


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1 (A) to examine intelligence information re2 garding the cyber intrusions and attacks of the 

3 Government of the Russian Federation against 

4 democratic elections and systems around the 

5 world; and 

6 (B) to designate for the imposition of sanc7 tions any persons found to have knowingly en8 gaged in conduct that violates section 224 of 

9 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

10 Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9524; relating to 

11 sanctions with respect to activities of the Rus12 sian Federation undermining cybersecurity); 

13 (2) urges the Secretary of the Treasury and the 

14 Secretary of State to fully implement section 9 of 

15 the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democ16 racy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 

17 (22 U.S.C. 8908), as amended by section 227 of the 

18 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc19 tions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to sig20 nificant corruption in the Russian Federation), tak21 ing into account information provided in the report 

22 mandated under section 241 of the Countering 

23 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub24 lic Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 922) and other credible 


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1 information available as a basis for potential addi2 tional sanction designations; 

3 (3) calls on the President to immediately exer4 cise sanctions authorities provided for under the 

5 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc6 tions Act to impose sanctions on relevant Russian 

7 individuals and entities found to have knowingly en8 gaged in sanctionable conduct, including under— 

9 (A) section 4 of the Ukraine Freedom Sup10 port Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8923), as amended 

11 by section 225 of the Countering America’s Ad12 versaries Through Sanctions Act (relating to 

13 sanctions relating to special Russian crude oil 

14 products); 

15 (B) section 5 of the Ukraine Freedom 

16 Support Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 8924), as 

17 amended by section 226 of the Countering 

18 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 

19 (relating to sanctions with respect to Russian 

20 and other foreign financial institutions); 

21 (C) section 10 of the Support for the Sov22 ereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic 

23 Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (22 U.S.C. 

24 8909), as added by section 228 of the Coun25 tering America’s Adversaries Through SancVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:04 Feb 27, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR749.IH HR749

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1 tions Act (relating to sanctions with respect to 

2 certain transactions with foreign sanctions 

3 evaders and serious human rights abusers in 

4 the Russian Federation); 

5 (D) section 233 of the Countering Amer6 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (22 

7 U.S.C. 9527; relating to sanctions with respect 

8 to investment in or facilitation of privatization 

9 of state-owned assets by the Russian Federa10 tion); and 

11 (E) section 234 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 

12 9528; relating to sanctions with respect to the 

13 transfer of arms and related materiel to Syria); 

14 (4) urges the President— 

15 (A) to publicly acknowledge the ongoing 

16 threat posed by the Government of the Russian 

17 Federation to democratic values and processes 

18 in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere; 

19 (B) to prioritize the development of a co20 ordinated, whole-of-government response to that 

21 urgent threat; and 

22 (C) to work with Congress to provide for 

23 the funding and implementation of that re24 sponse as soon as possible before the 2018 elec25 tions; 


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1 (5) urges the President— 

2 (A) to vigorously implement section 231 of 

3 the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 

4 Sanctions Act (22 U.S.C. 9525; relating to 

5 sanctions with respect to persons engaging in 

6 transactions with the intelligence or defense 

7 sectors of the Government of the Russian Fed8 eration); 

9 (B) to continue to work diplomatically to 

10 encourage substantial reductions in significant 

11 transactions with the intelligence and defense 

12 sectors of the Government of the Russian Fed13 eration; and 

14 (C) to ensure that sanctions are imposed 

15 under such section 231 in the event that a sig16 nificant transaction with a person that is part 

17 of, or operates for or on behalf of, the intel18 ligence or defense sectors of the Government of 

19 the Russian Federation, as defined in guidance 

20 issued by the Department of State, takes place; 

21 (6) supports efforts to expose and publicize 

22 threats posed by the malign influence and disinfor23 mation efforts of the Government of the Russian 

24 Federation, as the United States intelligence com25 munity did in January 2017, including through efVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:04 Feb 27, 2018 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\HR749.IH HR749

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1 forts by social media platforms, independent media, 

2 State and local governments primarily responsible 

3 for elections management and oversight, and other 

4 governmental and civil society actors; and 

5 (7) calls on the President to take specific meas6 ures to ensure the protection of United States demo7 cratic institutions in advance of the 2018 elections, 

8 including the provision of cybersecurity defensive 

9 measures to election administrators at the State and 

10 local level that request assistance and to political 

11 parties and candidates. 

Æ 


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