### In th e



# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2958

M ARC S H E L L, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

K E VI N S MI T H

, in hi s offi ci al capac i ty as Mayor of the City of Anderson, et al., Defen dants-Appellees.

Appe al f ro m the Uni ted S tates Distri ct Co urt fo r the So uthern Distri ct o f Indi ana , Indi ana pol i s Divisi on. No. 1: 13 -CV- 58 3 — Jane E. Ma gnus- Sti nson , Judg e.

A RGU E D M ARC H 31, 2015

— D E C I D E D J UN E 15, 2015

B e f o r e K A N N E a nd R OV N ER, C i r c u i t J u dg e s , a n d S PRI N G MANN

, District Judge. *

The Hono rab l e Theresa L. S p r i ng ma nn o f the Nor thern Distri ct of * Indi ana, si tting by desi gna tio n.2 No. 14-2958
S PRI N G MANN

, District Judge. Plainti ff- Appellant Mar c Shell

w or k e d fo r the Ci ty of Anderson T ransi t Sy stem (CA

TS) as a Mechani c’s Helper on the day shi ft. According to the jo b descri ption for the posi tion, a Me ch ani c ’s H e l p e r m a y oc c a si ona l l y driv e bus es to fi eld locations

. A Commerci al Dri v er’ s Li cens e (CDL) i s r equi red to driv e the CA TS bus es. Shell’s hearin g and vis i on i mpai rments prev ent hi m from obtaining a CDL. Nev ert heless, he w or ked for tw elv e y ears in the posi tion wi thout a CDL a nd without driving a bus

. When gener al manager St ephon Blackwell w as appointed at CA TS as part of personnel changes made by the new may or , he informed Shell that hi s employment w ould be ter minated u nless he obtained

a CDL, as the jo b descri ption required i t. When Shel l di d not gethi s CDL, B lackw ell ter minated hi s employment. After he w as fi red, Shell sued the Ci ty under the Americ ans wi th Di sabi li tie s Act (ADA) for fai lure to accomm odate hi s di sabi li ty , leading to the ter minati on of hi s e mployment. He also alleged that hi s ter minati on w as poli tic ally motiv ated. The di stric t c ourt gr anted sum mary judgment in fav or of the Ci ty

. On appeal, Shell challen ges only the di stric t court’s entry of judgment as a matter of law on hi s ADA clai m. W e agr ee that a jury should dec i de whether the City v i olated t he ADA. The ADA prov i des that a cov ered employ er shall not “di scr iminate again st a quali fi ed indi vidu al on the basi s of di sabi li ty

.” 42 U.S

. C. § 12112(a). “Di scri minati on,” for the purposes of § 12112(a), inclu des “not making rea so nable
accomm odations to the known physi cal or mental li mi tations of an other wi se quali fi ed indi vidu a l wi th a di sabi li ty” unles s the e mp loy er “can demonstrate that the accomm odationNo. 14-2958 3

w ould imp o se an undu e hardshi p on the oper ation of the bus iness .” 42 U

. S.C. § 12112(b) (5)( A). T o establi sh a clai m for fai lure to accomm odate, a plainti ff mus t show that he i s a “quali fi ed indi vidu al wi th a d i sabi li ty .” EEOC v

. Sears, Rob uck & Co. , 417 F .3d 789, 797 (7th Ci r . 2005). A quali fi ed indi vidu al i s defin ed as “an indi vidu a l who, wi th or wi thout reasonable
accomm odation, can perfor m the essenti a l func tions of the employment positi on.” 42 U.S .C. § 12111(8). The i ssu e on appeal i s whether the recor d contains su ffi

ci ent evidenc e from whi ch a reasonable jury could conclu de that driving a bus w as not an essenti al func tion of Shell’s jo b as
a Mechani c’s Helper

. In deci ding thi s questi on, we rev i ew the di stric t court’s gr ant o f su mmar y judgment de nov o. Bay v
. Cassens T ransp. Co. , 212 F .3d 969, 972 (7th Ci r
. 2000). Summary judgment i s appropr i ate where the admi ssi ble evidenc e shows that there i s no genuine di spute as to any material fact and that the moving party i s entitled to judgment as a matter o f law

. Fed. R. Ci v

. P

. 56(a); Lawson v
. CSX T ransp., Inc

. , 2 45 F .3d 916, 922 (7th Ci r
. 2001). In deter mining whether a genuine i ssu e of material fact exis ts, w e view the rec o r d in the li ght most fav or able to the nonmoving party

. Anderson v
. Liberty L ob by, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Ci ty maintai ns that Shell w as not a quali fi ed indi vidu al becau se he di d not sati sfy “the requis i te ski ll, exper i ence, educati on and other j o b-related requirements of the employment posi tion,” 29 C.F .R. § 1630.2(m)

. According to the Ci ty , possess ing a CDL i s a lawfu l qua l ifi cati on standard—“jo b relat ed and consi stent wi th bus iness necess i ty”—t hat Shell cannot meet. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (recognizing as a defense4 No. 14-2958

an e mploy er’s “quali fi cati on standards” that deny a jo b t o an indi vidu al wit h a di sabi li ty as long as those standards are “jo b-related and c on s i s te nt w ith bus iness necess i ty”); see also 29 C.F .R. 1630.15(b)( 1). How ev er

, di sposing of Shell’s clai m i s not that straightfor

w ard. The Ci t y could only require Shell to hav e a CDL i f one
w as necess ary to perfor m an ess e nti al func tion of the Mechani c’s Helper posi tion. See, e.g., Baert v
. Eucli d Beverage, Ltd. , 1 49 F .3d 626, 631–32 (7th Ci r
. 1998) (confl i cting evidenc e o n i ssu e o f wh e t he r driving a tr uck w as an essenti al func tion of Dri v er Helper posi tion precluded sum mary judgment in fav or of an employ er despi te i ts clai med poli cy that Driv er Helper s hold the same CDL the Dri v ers held). Dri ving a bus i s the only func tion of the Mechani c’s Helper pos i ti on th a t re qui res a CDL. So i f dri ving a bu s is not one of the fundam ental jo b duti es of the posi tion, the Ci ty could not use Shell’s inabi li ty to obtain a CDL as the bas i s for hi s termin ation. An essenti al func tion i s a fund amental jo b duty required of

a person in the jo b; a marginal duty i s not an essenti al func tion. See 29 C.F .R. § 1630.2(n)( 1). EEOC reg ulati ons prov i de: A jo b func tion may be consi dered essential for any of sev eral reasons, inclu ding but not li mi ted to the following: (i ) The func tion may be essenti al becau se the reason the posi tion exi sts i s to per form thatfunc tion; (i i ) The func tion may be essenti al bec a us e of the li mi ted numb er of employ ees av ai lable amongNo. 14-2958 5
whom the perfor manc e of that jo b func tion can be di strib uted; and/or (iii) The func tion may be hi ghly speci ali zed so tha t the in cumbent in the posi tion i s hi red for hi s o r her exper tis e or abi li ty to perfor m the particu lar func

tion. 29 C.F .R. § 1630.2(n)( 2). Factor s that may be take n into accoun t when deter mining whether a jo b duty consti tutes an essenti al func tion inclu de: (i ) The employ er’s jud gm e nt a s to whi ch f unc tions are essenti al; (i i ) W r itten jo b descri ptions prepar e d be fo r e a d

v ert i sing or interv i ewing appli cants for the jo b; (i i i ) The amount of tim e spent o n the jo b performing the functi on; (i v) The con sequences o f no t requiring the in cum bent to per form the functi on; (v) The ter ms of a collecti ve b a rg a ining agr eement; (vi ) The w or k exper i ence of past incu mbents in the jo b; and/or (vi i ) The current w or k exper i ence of incu mbents in si mi lar j obs. 29 C.F .R. § 1630.2(n)( 3). In adv a ncin g the i mport ance of the driving requirement and the corr esponding CDL requirement, the Ci ty has relied chi efly on a wri tte n jo b descri ption for t he Mechani c’s Helper6 No. 14-2958 posi tion. Accordi ng to a jo b d escri ption created in 1992, the Mechani c’s Helper i s “responsible for assi sting wi th mechan i c duti es, and w ashing, cleaning, lubri cating, and refueling
v ehi cles.” Thi s descri ption of the jo b suggests that t he M e chani c’s Helper assi sts only wi th v ehi cles. Sev eral of the li sted duti es deal speci fi cally wi th v ehi cles. For example, a Mechani c’s Helper i s to clean the buse s, r e p lace batter i es and li ghts, maintai n flui d lev els, perfor m v arious li ght mechan i cal maintenance w or k on v ehi cles, repo rt low quanti ties of automot i v e supp li es and pi ck up parts, and maintain equi pment, too ls, and w or k areas in clean and or derly condi tion. The jo b descri ption states that a Mechani c’s Helper “may occasi onally drive and deliv er bus es t o v arious fi eld locations .” Other duti es li sted in the jo b descri ption hav e nothin g to do wi th the bus es or mecha nic a l duti es. The jo b descri ption states that a Mechani c’s Helper cleans “gar age and offi ce areas, inclu ding
sweeping, mopping, w ashing windows and w alls, and emptying tr ash; mows gr ass and tr i ms aro und bui lding; paints a s needed.” Shell urges that the jo b descri ption i s just one factor to consi der. Indeed, as ci ted abov e, the reg ulati ons l ist it as just
one of sev eral. The ADA i tself requires that “consi derat i on” be giv en t o the employ er’s judgment as to what func tions are essenti al, and that a jo b descri ption be “consi dered evidenc e of the essenti al func tions .” 4 2 U .S.C. § 12111(8). The employ er’s deter minati o n about what func tions are essenti al i s certainly giv en w ei ght, but i t i s one of sev en factors the court should consi der , inclu ding “[t]he amount of tim e spent on the jo b perfor ming the funct ion” and “[t]he consequen ces of not requiring the [employ ee] to perfor m the func tion.” 29 C.F .R. §No. 14-2958 7 1630.2(n)( 3)(i i i ), (i v); see also Miller v
. Ill. Dep’t of T rans p
. , 643 F .3d 190, 198 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (recognizing that under the federal reg ulati ons, “the em ploy er’s judgment i s an i mport ant f actor , but it i s not contro lling” and “ w e also look to evidenc e of the

e mplo y er’s actual practic es in the w or kplace”); DePaoli v
. Abbo tt Labs. , 140 F .3d 668, 674 (7th Ci r
. 1998) (notin g that whi le

w e do not other wi se second- guess the employ er’s judgment in describing the essenti al requirements for the jo b, w e do look to
see i f the employ er actually requ ir e s a ll employ ees in a particu lar posi tion to p e rfor m the allegedly essenti al func

tions ). The di stric t court, in g iv ing deference to the Ci ty’ s posi tion, di d not consi der any o f the other § 1630.2(n) f actor s,
or draw reasonable inferences in Shell’s fav or as required at the

sum mary judgment stage. The recor d contains facts that mi ght

caus e a r e a so nable jury to di scoun t the Ci ty’ s relianc e on the jo b desc ripti on, part i cularly as i t relates to the need to dr i v e a bus

. First, the language of the driving duty i tself i s quali fi ed by “may” and “occasi onally .” Second, and more i mport antly , the 1 Ci ty’ s a ct ual practic es suggest that the need for a day shi ft Mechani c’s Helper to driv e a bus i s not fund amental to the jo b. Th is sa me j ob descri ption w as in place when Shell w as hired.

The job de scr ipti on is le ss e qui voca l wh e r e it state s th at a duty of 1 th e positi on is to “[o] pe r ate [] City ve hi cle s in se r vic e , maint e na nc e
an d r e pair wor k

. ” H o w e ve r , it is unc le ar wh at ope r ate me an s in
con ne cti on wi th main te na nc e , or how th is is dif fe r e nt fr om th e
se par ate “may occa sion all y dr ive ” r e qui r e me nt

. It may be th at th e for me r doe s n ot r e qui r e a CDL . Sh e ll’ s de sign ate d e vide nc e is t ha t he pe r for me d th e ope r atin g fun cti on.8 No. 14-2958
It di d not ch a ng e for all tw elv e y ears that Shell fi lled the posi tion. Y

et, driving bus es on publi c ro ads w as not part of hi s reg ula r duti es for any port i on of the tw elv e y ears he held t he posi tion. Whenev er Shell w as required to be present at a fi eld location, he drove hi s own v ehi cle. Shell w ould run err ands, pi ck up parts and suppli es, tr ansport materials betw een the CA TS gar age and ter minal, and ride wi th the Dir e ctor of Oper ations or wi th the mechani cs who w ere movin g b uses to
v arious locations for repairs. Although an employ er’s abi li ty to assi gn dut ie s t o another employ ee does not make them nonessenti al, see Basith v
. Cook Cnty. , 241 F .3d 919, 929 (7th Ci r
. 2001), i t i s di ffi cult to see how the duty could be deemed essent i al at the sum mary judgment stage when there i s no evidenc e that i ts reassi gnment i mpacted the Ci ty’ s abi li ty to prov i de dependable tr ansi t services to i ts c i tizens in an effi ci ent
or e ffe cti v e manner

, or other wi se created a hardshi p or burden. The C ity arg ues, wi thout evidenti ary proo f, that not requi rin g She ll to oper ate CA TS v ehi cles, and instead requiring other employ ees—who are not Mechani c’s Helpers—to do so,
w ould decrease the effi ci ency of CA TS’s op e ra ti on s. The recor d does not indi cate how many CA TS’s employ ees had CDLs and

w ere av ai lable to mov e a bus for repair purpo se s. W e w ere advis ed at or al arg ument that many of the employ ees hold

such a li cens e, havin g st a r t e d their careers as bus driv ers. Cert ainly , all the mechan i cs and the driv ers have CDLs. A reasonable inference i s that driving a bus i s not a func tion that only a li mi ted numb er of CA TS’s employ ees can perfor m. Nor i s the recor d dev eloped reg ardin g how many tim es a mechan i c
or driv er mi ght actually d e si re another employ ee to driv e a bus, or for what reasons, or how mu ch tim e the task mi ghtNo. 14-2958 9
take

. Whi le the am ount of tim e spent perfor ming a task i s but one f actor to consi der

, a duty i s “not essenti al i f i t [i s] so small

a part that i t could be reassi gned to other employ ees at neglig ibl e cost to the employ er .” Kauffm an v
. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, 769 F .3d 958, 962 (7th Ci r
. 2014). Bey ond i ts conclu sory statement, the Ci ty offers no evidenc e of any actual burden on the oper ation of the tr ansi t system. Thi s v oid exis ts d e spite the fact that CA TS oper ated for more than a deca d e wi thout requiring the Mechani c’s Helper on day shi ft to driv e
a bus

. Cert ainly

, that i s a sufficie nt length of tim e to realize a negativ e i mpact and be able to present some evidenti ary proo f of the same. The Ci ty insi sts that i t does hav e proo f reg ardin g the negativ e co nsequen ces, and poin ts to the Declarati on of Ri ck Ga rr ett, who becam e the Di recto r of Oper ations at the same tim e that Blackw ell becam e the General Manager after the new may or too k offi ce. Garret t explain s that the employ ee hi red to replace Shell, Darr ell Rensel, has a CDL and “can per form all of the tasks i denti fi ed in the Mechani c’s Helper jo b descri ption.” (See Supp. App. 105, Decl. of Ri ck Garret t ¶ 10.) Thi s statement i s no more pert inent to the questi on at hand than the equally obvious statement that S he l l cannot perfor m all the duti es i dentifie d

. Addi tionally , statin g that he “ can perfor m ” tasks p ro vides no insi ght into whether he actually perfor ms them, how often he perfor ms them, or whet he r they are
necess ary

. The Declarati on does not ev e n single out driving bus es from all the other tasks li sted in the jo b descri ption, and certainly does not addr ess whether CA TS’s oper ations w ould be burdened by making other arr angements for the particu lar duty of driving a bus

. Garret t adds that “[h]aving a CDL, so10 No. 14-2958
M r
. Rensel can perfor m maintenance func tions on CA TS

v ehi cles, i s an essenti al func tion of the Mechani c’s Helper posi ti on
. ” Thi s c on c lusory statement does not hav e evidenti ary
v alue. Garret t does not ev en i denti fy the “maintenance func tions ” that Rensel “can perfor m.” Accordingly , the Ci ty i s left wi th no evidenc e on su m m ary judgment to suggest that the

c on s equences of not requiring that the Mechani c ’s H e l p e r d riv e
a bus i s a factor that w ei ghs in i ts fav or and should preclude a jury tr i al. The Ci ty ar gues that j ust bec ause i t r estructured t he jo b in the past and al l o w ed Shell to perfor m janitorial, but not all mechan i cal, duti es does not require i t to continue to go bey ond the ADA’s requirements. The Ci ty relies o n W infrey v
. City of Chicago , 259 F .3d 610 (7th Ci r
. 2001), and Basith v
. Cook County

. , 241 F .3d 919 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 0 1 ). Thi s arg ument assu mes that the duty at i ssu e i s an essenti al func tion of the jo b, and t ha t t he Ci ty prev i ously accomm odated Shell bey ond wh a t t he ADA demands when i t di d not req uir e hi m to perfor m the duty

. If these assu mpti ons are tr ue, the Ci ty i s corr ect. And whi le a jury could ulti mately agr ee wi th the Ci ty , genuine i ssu es of material fact preclude making these prer equi si te assu mpti o ns at the

sum mary j udgment stage o f thi s cas e. In W infrey, the ci ty dev eloped a rev i sed jo b descri ption for

a w ard cle rk posi tion to be held by an employ ee who had become blind. How ev er , the supervis or for the posi tion w a s not consu lted and only found out the plainti ff w as blind when he showed up for w or k. The sup erv i sor did n ot k now how to
accomm odate the plainti ff, so he only allow ed hi m t o answer phones and take mess ages. A few months later , consu ltants who w or ked on behalf of the blind ca me to the w or ksi te toNo. 14-2958 11
dev elop adjusted w ard clerk duti es. The su perv i sor pr epared

a li st of four “ p art i al essenti al” w ard clerk duti es he thought the plainti ff could perfor m. 259 F .3d at 613. The co nsu ltants prepar ed a recommendati on for the plain t iff that conclu ded that he w as capabl e of perfor ming these w ard clerk func tions

. How ev er

, there w ere o t he r w ard clerk func tions that the plainti ff did not perfor m. Id. at 614. The ci ty di d not tr ain the plainti ff to perfor m all the duti es required of a w ar d cl erk

. Thus, he w as not consi dered a full w ard clerk, nor w as he

r emunerated as one in the scal ed-down jo b. The plaint iff desi red a hi gher payin g jo b, such as a full w ard clerk, and sued the ci ty under t he ADA for fai ling to accomm odate hi s blindness
. The plainti ff arg ued that the cit y’s wi llingness to create the adjusted, li mi ted w ard cle r k p osi tion demonstrate d that those four dutie s mu st hav e been the only essenti al duti es of the full w ard clerk posi tion. Responding to thi s arg ument, w e noted that i t w as “clear from the onset of thi s case that the Ci ty created a modi fi ed w ard clerk posit i on for [the plainti ff ], consi sting of duti es that [hi s supervis or ] beli ev ed he could perfor m.” Id. at 616. The creation of the m odifi ed posi tion di d

no t demonstrate that the four duti es he perfor med w ere th e only essenti al duti es for the unmodi fi ed posi tion. Id. The plainti ff in Basith w as a p ha rmacy techni ci an in a county hospi tal. The evidenc e in the case established that deli v ery of medi cati ons to the hospi tal’s patien ts w as essenti al to the func tioning o f the pharmacy , and that the pharmacy techni ci an w as the best posi tion to ful fi ll thi s need. Basith , 241 F .3d at 929. The p l a inti ff could not deli v er medi cati ons to patien ts, but desi red to hold the pharmacy techni ci an posi tion anyw ay
. One of the plainti ff’s arg uments again st a finding that12 No. 14-2958
deli v ery w as an essenti al func tion w as that hi s employ er had p r e v i ously created a posi tion for hi m that di d not require deli v ery
. W e held that “[a]b sent independent evidenc e that the func tion w as non-ess ential, w e d o not beli ev e i t wi se to consi der the speci al assi gnment as proo f that deli v ery w as not
an essenti al func tion becau se i t w ould puni sh [the defendant] for going bey ond the ADA’s requirements.” Id. at 930 (stating that the evidenc e showed that the jo b could be rest r uc t ur ed, not that d e li v ery w as non-ess ential ). As we noted, Basi th’s suggested accomm odation w ould hav e resulted in the restr ucturing of hi s jo b and the jo bs of o t he r e mplo y ees, whi ch the ADA does not r equi re. Id.
In both W

infre y a nd Basith the employ ers atte mpted to
accomm odate employ ees who had be come di sabled during their ter ms of employme nt by creating speci al posi tions that required less than the full duti es no r ma l ly perfor med. These

w ere alter nati v e posi tions to the jo bs the plainti ffs desi red. In contrast, the Ci ty hi red S hell into the Mechani c’s Helper posi tion knowi ng he ha d physi cal li mi tations that prohibi ted hi m from o bt a inin g a CDL and driving a bus

. Whether Shell

w as asked to perfor m less than a ll o f t he wri tte n duties is not indi cati v e of whether the Ci ty consi dered the duti es he w as not expected to perfor m to be essential. Mar k Baugher, who w as
one of the Di recto rs of Oper ation s d ur ing Shell’s tenure, indi cated that S hell could do ev ery thing he needed hi m to do

as a Mechani c’s Helper (Supp. App. 195, Decl. of Mar k Baugher ¶ 11.) Havin g been emplo yed in v arious CA TS jo bs since 1979, Baugher w as also able to testify t ha t the v ehi cle maintenance duti es, such as oil changes and prev entativ e maintenance at the garage, were performed by the m echani csNo. 14-2958 13
themselv es, not the Mechani c’s Helpers, ev en when Shell w as not the Mechani c’s Helper

. ( Id. ¶ 12.) In contrast, the Ci ty furni shed no evidenc e reg ardin g how the jo b w as perfor med befor e S he ll fi lled i t. Fr om Baugher’s statements and Shell’s
co nti nuous perfor manc e of the jo b for tw elv e y ears, a jur y could find that restr ucturing t he t a sk of driving a bus w as a reasonable response to a non-ess ent ia l func tion of the Mechani c’s Helper posi tion rat her than a reassi gnment of an essentia l duty

. Cf. Miller, 643 F .3d at 197 (no sum mary judgment becau se a reasonable jury could find that a plainti ff who

w as unabl e to w or k at hei ghts in exposed posi tions w as “asking only that he be allow ed to w or k a s he had w or ked

success fully for sev eral y ears” when hi s supervis or s and cow or ker s p e rmi tte d hi m to sw ap tasks among hi s fellow crew members s o thathe could av oid that occas i onal task). Addi tionally

, i t should be noted that there w as no informed “deci si on” that keeping S hell employ ed in t he same posi tion, and doin g the same duti es he had done for tw elv e y ears prior , w as untenable becau se i t required other s to perfor m an essenti al func tion of the posi tion. Blackwell, who had been on the jo b for one day before giving Shell the news that he w ould be fi red unles s he obtained a CDL, look ed only t o t he jo b descri ption to make thi s deter minati on. Blackwell had no prior exper i ence managing a tr ans p or ta ti on d e p a rtm ent, and di d not
rev ie w Shell’s perfor manc e or duti es or the past practic es of CA TS. Cf. Gratz el v
. Offic e of Chief Judges , 601 F .3d 674, 680 (7th Ci r
. 2010) (holding that when an employ er deci ded to e l i m inate
a speci al posi tion the plainti ff held by incorpor ating i t as one among many court repo rt er dut ie s, whi ch the plainti ff could not perfor m, no ADA violati on occurred becau se an employ er14 No. 14-2958
i s not required “to maintain an exis tin g posi tio n or structure that, for legiti mate reasons, i t no longer beli ev es appropr i ate”). Blackw ell made no atte mpt to p ro vide legiti mate reasons for di scontinuing the exis tin g st r uctur e of the CA TS gar age oper ations

. Be ca use there i s evidenc e and reasonable inferences fav or able to both parties, and the factual recor d does not establi sh as a matter of law that driving a bus w as an essenti al func tion of the Mechani c’s Helper posi tion, thi s case mus t be allow ed to proceed to a jury

. The judgment of the di stric t court i s v acated, and the ca se is remanded for further proceedings consi stent wi th thisopin i on.