United States General Accounting Office 

GAO Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Federal Services, Post Office and 

Civil Service, Committee on 

Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

December 1994 CHILD SUPPORT 

ENFORCEMENT 

Families Could Benefit 

From Stronger 

Enforcement Program 

GAO/HEHS-95-24 

United States GAO General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Health, Education, and 

Human Services Division 

B-250916 

December 27, 1994 

The Honorable David Pryor


Chairman, Subcommittee on Federal Services,


Post Office and Civil Service 

Committee on Governmental Affairs 

United States Senate 

Dear Mr. Chairman:


This report, prepared at your request, examines the national child support enforcement (CSE)


program at both the federal and state levels. It discusses federal program management issues


and what some state CSE programs are doing to overcome barriers hampering their child


support enforcement efforts. The report makes recommendations to the Secretary of Health


and Human Services to improve CSE (1) planning, (2) performance measurement, (3) federal


accountability, (4) audits, and (5) program funding structure.


As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier,


we plan no further distribution until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send


copies of the report to the Secretary of Health and Human Services; the chairmen and ranking


minority members of the House Subcommittee on Human Resources, Committee on Ways and


Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; and other interested parties. We also will make


copies available to others upon request.


This report was prepared under the direction of Jane L. Ross, Director, Income Security Issues.


Please contact David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-7201 if you have any questions.


Other GAO contacts and major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI.


Sincerely yours,


Janet L. Shikles


Assistant Comptroller General

Executive Summary


Nonpayment of child support contributes to childhood poverty as well as Purpose	 to increases in the number of families receiving welfare.1

 Today, more 

than one-fifth of America’s children live in poverty, and it has been 

estimated that half will live in single-parent families at some point in their 

lives. 

To help obtain the financial support noncustodial parents owe their 

children and to help single-parent families achieve or maintain economic 

self-sufficiency, the Congress established the intergovernmental child 

support enforcement program in 1975. In 1992, the federal Office of Child 

Support Enforcement (OCSE) reported a nationwide caseload of about 

15.2 million cases, about 60 percent of which received welfare. 

The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Services, Post Office and 

Civil Service, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked GAO to 

review the child support enforcement program to determine how the 

federal government could improve services to the states and to the 

families that depend on the program. GAO’s review focused on (1) whether 

the program has essential management tools in place at the federal level to 

fulfill its mission, (2) how well OCSE has fulfilled its role in fostering the 

development of state child support enforcement programs, and (3) what 

the state programs are doing to overcome barriers hampering their efforts. 

GAO also examined the implications of welfare reform proposals and the 

impact of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA). 

The federal government and the states share child support enforcement Background	 responsibilities. OCSE, within the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS), is responsible for providing leadership, technical 

assistance, and standards to develop effective state programs, which 

actually deliver child support enforcement services to families. Services 

include establishing paternity and support orders; locating noncustodial 

parents; updating support orders to be current with a noncustodial 

parent’s income; obtaining medical support, such as medical insurance, 

from noncustodial parents; and collecting support payments. To help 

ensure state program effectiveness, the federal government uses a “carrot 

and stick” approach involving incentive payments, audits, and penalties. 

The federal government matches about two-thirds of state program 

administrative costs and makes incentive payments to states based on 

collections. 

1

In this report, “welfare” refers to cash assistance provided to families under the Aid to Families With 

Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 

Page 2 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

Federal and state governments first became involved in child support 

enforcement activities with the aim of recovering government welfare 

costs. Child support owed by noncustodial parents of families receiving 

welfare was to be collected by state and local child support programs and 

then returned to the government, with a small portion going to the 

families. As the number of families receiving welfare rose in the 1970s, the 

Congress incorporated existing state and local efforts into the national 

child support enforcement program. 

Over time, the program expanded beyond the original aim of recovering 

welfare because the Congress believed that early enforcement of child 

support obligations could help prevent families’ need for government 

support. For example, families that are not receiving welfare but that 

request program services must be served equally. 

Results in Brief	 Greater federal leadership coupled with equally intensive state efforts 

could better position the national child support enforcement program to 

serve the families that depend on it. Dramatically increasing numbers of 

children needing support—the child support enforcement caseload grew 

180 percent between 1980 and 1992—are focusing attention on federal and 

state efforts to enforce parents’ responsibilities to support their children. 

However, these efforts have been hampered by management weaknesses 

that keep OCSE from (1) effectively leading the program and the states, 

(2) judging how well the program is working, and (3) setting effective 

policies. 

Because of declining resources, OCSE has diminished the level of technical 

assistance provided to state programs. Also, various organization and 

staffing changes have created communication problems between federal 

and state program officials. OCSE audits and data collection efforts, while 

satisfying legal requirements for monitoring and tracking the states’ 

programs, do not provide either OCSE or the states with adequate 

information on program results. Now, under the impetus of GPRA, OCSE is 

getting started on management improvements that could position it to 

better serve states and families. OCSE has also proposed changing the 

incentive payment structure to encourage improved state performance. 

While the federal role is substantial—most program funding is 

federal—child support enforcement is very much a state activity. Today, 

states face common barriers such as increasing workloads that outpace 

resources, inadequate computer systems, and fragmented authority and 

Page 3 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

unstandardized procedures among others. In response, states have 

developed a number of strategies, including augmenting their staffs with 

volunteers and contracting with private collection agencies, improving 

automation to help staff be more productive, and using innovative 

enforcement techniques. Some of the techniques various states have 

adopted are (1) requiring employers to report newly hired employees so 

parents who owe child support can be located, (2) using central lien 

indexes and tax record matching so parents’ assets can be located, and 

(3) revoking driver’s and professional licenses to encourage parents to pay 

what they owe. 

Many welfare reform proposals would further expand child support 

enforcement. Unless OCSE takes steps to strengthen its leadership and 

management of its current program, it may have difficulty implementing 

any new responsibilities. 

Principal Findings


The Child Support 

Enforcement Program Has 

Lacked Essential 

Management Tools 

The child support enforcement program has lacked certain essential 

management tools to assess and improve current program performance. A 

well-articulated mission, programwide planning and goal-setting, and 

accurate data on program performance have not been available to guide 

program management. 

As the program expanded beyond welfare recovery, its mission became 

increasingly less clear. Legislative amendments expanded program efforts 

to include families not receiving welfare and activities, such as medical 

support enforcement, that do not focus directly on collections. In practice, 

this expanded mission has given the program competing 

priorities—without guidance from the federal level on how to manage 

those priorities. 

In the face of the program’s expanded mission, OCSE’s planning efforts 

focused on the agency and its processes, not on outcomes for either the 

national program as a whole or its own operations. Nor did these efforts 

seek input from key stakeholders, such as the Congress and the states. 

Only one national goal exists for the program, and this is a congressionally 

mandated standard for state performance in paternity establishment. Now, 

Page 4 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

in response to GPRA requirements, OCSE is beginning a planning discipline


that identifies priorities and outcomes.


The child support enforcement program has also lacked accurate and


consistent data that could be used to set goals for, assess, and improve


program performance. Despite 20 years of required performance reporting,


OCSE has not developed universally understood data definitions, and states


collect data in ways that make aggregation and comparison impractical.


OCSE and state officials acknowledge that needed data are not available,


and OCSE has taken some actions on this issue. However, as of


December 1994, OCSE was not in a position to know how the national


program was actually performing.


In concept, federal incentive payments reward state programs according


to performance, but this funding mechanism has yet to achieve its


potential. In practice, all states—regardless of performance—have


received some incentive payments. Moreover, the amount of incentive


payments depends on a state’s collections and does not reflect other


important activities, such as paternity establishment and medical support


enforcement. The impact of the incentives is limited because states are not


required to use incentive funds to expand their child support enforcement


activities. Some states have used incentive payments for activities other


than child support enforcement; others have used federal payments to


offset the state part of matching funds for child support enforcement,


according to a 1991 report by HHS’ Office of the Inspector General.


OCSE Has Not Effectively As the Congress originally envisioned it, OCSE’s role included fostering 

Fostered State Program state program development by providing technical assistance and training, 

Development	 developing standards, and exercising federal oversight through audits. As 

HHS experienced workforce reductions in the 1980s, however, OCSE 

resources diminished. Technical assistance and training, which had 

formed a large part of OCSE efforts, virtually disappeared. In several 

instances, regulations were finalized after the effective dates of a law. In 

addition, an HHS-wide reorganization left OCSE with no organizational 

control over those HHS regional staff serving as contact points for the 

states on some program matters. State program staff had to contact 

various offices within HHS for different child support enforcement matters, 

and miscommunications between OCSE, HHS regional staff, and state 

program staff contributed to strained working relationships. 

Page 5 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

By the early 1990s, OCSE’s monitoring role had come into greater 

prominence, with more than half of remaining OCSE staff devoted to 

compliance audits. These audits focused on state compliance with federal 

requirements for administrative procedures and service delivery rather 

than on outcomes of state actions, such as how many paternities or 

support orders were established. State program staff said that while some 

audits had helped them gain state legislative support, the audits 

concentrated too much on administrative details and were too untimely to 

be a useful management tool for them, with audit reports sometimes 

issued 2 years after the period audited. 

OCSE recognizes that while the audits have spurred state actions, the audit 

approach needs to be changed to provide better insight into state program 

performance. OCSE is seeking to shift the emphasis from compliance with 

administrative procedures to ensuring state data integrity. OCSE, however, 

believes that this shift will require a legislative change. 

State Child Support 

Enforcement Programs 

Face Common Barriers, 

Use Multiple Strategies 

Although states have received substantial federal funding for program 

development, at least five common barriers hinder state child support 

enforcement efforts: 

•	 Workload continues to grow and become more time-consuming. Estimates 

of worker caseload ranged from 300 to 2,500 cases per worker, and 

officials believe that many cases now take more time than before. For 

example, the growing number of out-of-wedlock births means that more 

cases need paternity establishment—more than 40 percent of the caseload 

in one state. 

•	 Child support enforcement program functions are only partially 

computerized. Some states do not have statewide computer systems. 

Other states have computerized some functions but others remain manual. 

One state had the computer capacity to seize noncustodial parents’ bank 

assets but did not have caseload intake and parent location functions 

computerized. Another state had extensive case tracking capability but 

lacked the technology to identify assets and levy administrative liens 

through automation. 

•	 State program staff lack control over local units. Some states wanted more 

uniform state implementation and were frustrated by dispersed program 

control. One state’s audits documented that some local districts failed to 

implement state regulations for case processing. In another state, some 

judges did not follow state procedures. 

Page 6 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

•	 State legislatures do not always support state programs’ proposed 

initiatives. Some states have been more successful than others in getting 

legislative support for new enforcement techniques, such as in-hospital 

paternity establishment; revocation of driver’s and professional licenses of 

noncustodial parents who are delinquent in support payments; and using 

administrative, rather than judicial, processes for establishing support 

orders. 

•	 Referrals from welfare offices lacked information that the child support 

enforcement program needed to do its work. GAO found in earlier work 

that poor coordination between welfare and child support agencies 

resulted in inadequate information about noncustodial parents, including 

identity, location, and earnings data.2

 The experiences of the state 

programs that GAO reviewed suggest that very little has changed. 

States that GAO reviewed were at different points in developing or adopting 

strategies to deal with the barriers they faced. The strategies included 

adding staff; refining AFDC intake procedures to facilitate child support 

enforcement; contracting out some functions to private entities; and using 

volunteers. States also used various techniques to garner legislative 

support and were making increased use of automation. 

The actions some states have taken also show that many decisions about 

adding resources, improving automation, and expanding the program’s 

administrative processes lie within the control of state leadership and 

reflect the investments states can make in the program without the 

impetus of a federal mandate. 

Welfare Reform Presents 

Additional Opportunities 

and Challenges 

All the welfare reform proposals that GAO reviewed would add new 

enforcement tools but could also require more of OCSE and the states. In 

addition, some of the proposals would change the funding structure and 

OCSE’s audit approach. Some proposals require greater centralization of 

state operations and give some states tools that they have sought, such as 

employer reporting of new hires or the ability to suspend professional or 

driver’s licenses. However, new and expanded responsibilities may also 

strain OCSE’s ability to effectively implement changes and increase state 

workloads. New demands under welfare reform could include broadening 

OCSE’s role in developing and coordinating expanded automated systems at 

the state or federal level. In addition, state programs may also need greater 

2

Child Support: Need to Improve Efforts to Identify Fathers and Obtain Support Orders 

(GAO/HRD-87-37, Apr. 30, 1987). 

Page 7 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Executive Summary 

technical assistance from OCSE and HHS to ensure effective state 

implementation. 

Recommendations	 GAO is making several recommendations to the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services to strengthen OCSE’s management and leadership. Among 

other things, these recommendations are aimed at establishing 

performance goals for OCSE; promoting greater federal accountability; 

reengineering OCSE audits of state performance to be more 

outcome-oriented rather than process-oriented; and revising the program 

funding structure to better support program priorities. 

HHS stated that the report provides a balanced appraisal of OCSE and the Agency Comments	 national program’s accomplishments, and that GAO’s recommendations are 

well taken. HHS provided additional information about actions that it has 

planned or has in progress that address several of GAO’s recommendations. 

(See app. V.) While most of HHS’ actions are appropriate, GAO has some 

specific concerns about HHS’ response to establishing performance goals 

for OCSE; promoting greater federal accountability; and changing the audits 

and funding structure. (See pp. 95-97.) HHS also provided technical 

comments, as did program officials from selected states and several child 

support enforcement experts; their comments have been incorporated as 

appropriate. 

Page 8 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 9 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Contents


Executive Summary 2


Chapter 1 


The Child Support


Enforcement


Program: Significance,


Organization,


Performance, and


Reforms


14 

The Congress Created the National Child Support Enforcement 15 

Program to Meet Growing Need 

Program Responsibility Is Shared by Federal, State, and Local 20 

Governments 

Funding Designed to Create a Federal-State Partnership 22 

Service Delivery Is Diverse and Complex Across the Nation 23 

Program Responsibility and Tools Have Expanded While Federal 25 

Expenditures Have Grown 

Perception of Program’s Performance Varies Widely 29 

CSE and Federal Reform Initiatives 31 

Scope and Methodology 32 

Chapter 2 34 

CSE’s Mission Has Become Complex 34 CSE Program Lacks Planning and Goal-Setting Efforts Fall Short 39 

Essential Management Better Data Are Needed for Accurate Performance Measurement 43 

Tools Funding Structure Needs Reexamination 46 

Chapter 3 


OCSE Has Not


Effectively Fulfilled


Its Role of Fostering


State CSE Program


Development


52 

OCSE Staff, Financial, and Technical Assistance Resources 52 

Reduced 

HHS Current Organization for CSE Has Not Been the Most 57 

Effective 

Working Relationships Strained 61 

Audits Provide Limited Insight Into Program Outcomes, but Still 63 

Spur State Actions 

Proposed Welfare Reforms Would Place Greater Demands on 67 

OCSE 

Page 10 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Contents 

Chapter 4 


State CSE Programs


Use Multiple


Strategies to Address


Common Barriers to


State CSE Efforts


70 

Experiences of Eight States Illustrate Common Barriers Impeding 72


State CSE Efforts


Some States Have Developed Successful Strategies to Address 

Program Barriers 

Welfare Reform Could Increase States’ Workload but Could Help 

Some Make Changes 

Chapter 5 

Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

88 

GPRA Can Help OCSE Develop Needed Management Tools 89 

Funding Structure Should Be Redesigned 91 

The Federal-State Partnership Needs to Be Reinvented 91 

The Audit Is a Candidate for Reengineering 92 

Welfare Reform Presents Opportunities and Additional 

Challenges for CSE


Recommendations to HHS 94


Agency Comments 95


Appendixes	 Appendix I: Descriptions of Basic CSE Services 98 

Appendix II: Major Requirements of the 1984 and 1988 CSE 100 

Amendments


Appendix III: Selected Characteristics of Eight State CSE 

Programs, 1992-1993 

Appendix IV: Selected CSE Program Requirements in Eight 

Welfare Reform Proposals 

Appendix V: Comments From the Department of Health and 

Human Services 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments 

Related GAO Products 

Tables Table 1.1: Net Budget Savings/Costs for States, Federal 29 

Government, and Taxpayers From the CSE Program, Fiscal Years 

1980-1992 

Table 2.1: Required State Paternity Establishment Percentages 41 

Based on Past Year’s Performance 

Table 3.1: HHS Points of Contact for State CSE Programs 60 

Table 3.2: Statutory Effective Dates and Dates of Final 62 

Regulations for Selected CSE Program Requirements


Page 11 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

78 

86 

93 

102 

106 

108 

114 

116 
Contents 

Table 4.1: Barriers States Face and Some Strategies to Overcome 71 

Them 

Figures Figure 1.1: Child Support Enforcement Caseload, Fiscal Years 

1980-1992 

Figure 1.2: Organization of CSE Responsibilities Within HHS 21 

Figure 1.3: CSE Services and Case Flows 24 

Figure 1.4: Federal Expenditures for Matching Funds to State 

CSE Programs, Fiscal Years 1980-1992


Figure 1.5: Federal Incentive Payments to State CSE Programs 

From the Federal Share of AFDC Collections, Fiscal Years 

1980-1992 

Figure 2.1: Distribution of Child Support Enforcement Incentive 

Payments Based on AFDC Collection-to-Cost Ratio, Fiscal Years 

1986-1992 

Figure 2.2: Distribution of Child Support Enforcement Incentive 

Payments Based on Non-AFDC Collection-to-Cost Ratio, Fiscal 

Years 1986-1992 

Figure 3.1: Staff Directly Accountable to OCSE, Fiscal Years 

1980-1992 

Figure 3.2: OCSE Financial Resources, Fiscal Years 1980-1992 55


Figure 3.3: HHS Points of Contact for State CSE Programs 59


Figure 4.1: Texas CSE Caseload Profile, June 1993 73


Abbreviations 

ACF Administration for Children and Families


AFDC Aid to Families With Dependent Children


CSE child support enforcement


GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of 1993


HHS Department of Health and Human Services


METS Measuring Excellence Through Statistics


OCSE Office of Child Support Enforcement


OBRA’93 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993


Page 12 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

18 

27 

28 

48 

49 

54 
Page 13 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 


The Child Support Enforcement Program: 

Significance, Organization, Performance, 

and Reforms 

Today, child support enforcement is an issue for more American families 

than ever before. The number of out-of-wedlock births and divorces has 

escalated in recent years, and it is estimated about half of American 

children will spend at least some time in single-parent families.3

 Many of 

these single-parent families, particularly those headed by young mothers, 

are at risk of welfare dependency. Child support is critical to these 

families’ self-sufficiency. In the last 5 years, more and more single-parent 

families have sought government assistance from the Aid to Families With 

Dependent Children (AFDC) program, which requires recipients to 

cooperate with the child support enforcement (CSE) program. In addition, 

an increasing number of single-parent families not receiving AFDC have 

voluntarily sought CSE’s help in obtaining child support from noncustodial 

parents. But in 1992, according to data reported by the federal Office of 

Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), only about 19 percent of the cases in 

the CSE program received any child support payments. 

In 1975, in response to the growth in the numbers of families receiving 

AFDC, the Congress created the national CSE program. The federal OCSE was 

created to monitor and help develop existing state and local child support 

enforcement programs. Child support collected for families receiving AFDC 

was to be returned to the government; child support collected for 

non-AFDC families would help these families avoid a need for cash 

assistance from the government. Over the years, the Congress steadily 

expanded CSE program enforcement tools, program requirements, and 

federal funding to states. In 1992, the federal government paid $1.7 billion 

to states in matching and other funds to serve a caseload of about 

15 million families—8.7 million of whom received AFDC.

4 

Because of his concerns, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal 

Services, Post Office and Civil Service of the Senate Committee on 

Governmental Affairs asked us to review the CSE program to determine 

how the federal government could improve services to the states and the 

families who depend on state CSE activities. Our review focused on 

(1)whether the CSE program has the essential management tools in place at 

the federal level that a program needs to fulfill its mission; (2) how well 

the federal office, OCSE, has fulfilled its role in fostering the development 

of state CSE programs; and (3) what state CSE programs are doing to 

3

Family Impact Seminar, “Reducing Family Poverty: Tax-Based and Child Support Strategies,” 

background briefing report (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 4, 1992). 

4

The caseload estimate is from the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Child Support 

Enforcement Seventeenth Annual Report to Congress, which contains data for fiscal year 1992. 

However, refer to pp. 44 and 45 of this report for the limitations of these data. 

Page 14 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 1 


The Child Support Enforcement Program:


Significance, Organization, Performance,


and Reforms


overcome barriers hampering CSE efforts. In addition, we examined 

implications of welfare reform proposals and the Government 

Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) for the CSE program. 

The Congress Created 

the National Child 

Support Enforcement 

Program to Meet 

Growing Need 

Child support is a parental responsibility. However, because of the 

growing number of parents who fail to assume this responsibility, the 

Congress created the national CSE program in 1975 and significantly 

amended it in 1984 and 1988. The program’s purpose is to strengthen 

existing state and local efforts to find noncustodial parents, establish 

paternity, obtain support orders, and collect support payments. Today, the 

program serves two populations: families receiving AFDC and those who do 

not. Although the services provided are essentially the same, collections 

are handled differently for the two groups, with a portion of the AFDC 

collections being returned to the state and federal governments and 

non-AFDC collections going directly to the families. Increases in both 

groups have caused caseloads to climb, and the service needs of both 

groups have become increasingly complex. 

Establishing Child Support: 

Making Parents 

Responsible 

When two people, whether married or not, have a baby, they incur an 

obligation to provide for their child. When parents live apart, the parent 

not living with and providing day-to-day care for the child (the 

noncustodial parent) is expected to help the other parent (the custodial 

parent) provide for the child. 

Although children are entitled to support from parents who live apart, a 

legally binding document—a separation agreement or a support order—is 

needed to establish the appropriate amount of financial support and make 

the payment enforceable on the noncustodial parent. If the parents were 

married at the time of the child’s birth, a support order is usually 

established when the parents separate or divorce. If the parents were not 

married when their child was born, the legal presumption of paternity 

conferred by marriage is lacking, and a permanent support order cannot 

be established or enforced on either parent until there is a legal 

determination of paternity.5

 Paternity is established in either of two ways: 

(1) through voluntary acknowledgment by the father or (2) if contested, 

through determination based on evidence such as scientific (genetic 

testing) and personal testimony. In such cases, paternity establishment 

confers on children the legal rights and privileges that a child born within 

5

In some cases, a temorary support order may be established before paternity is established. 

Page 15 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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The Child Support Enforcement Program:


Significance, Organization, Performance,


and Reforms


a marriage has. Among them are rights to inheritance, medical and life 

insurance benefits, social security, and possibly veteran’s benefits. 

Government Involvement 

Triggered by Growing 

Welfare Caseloads 

Before the national CSE program, federal and state governments became 

involved in child support enforcement primarily through the AFDC 

program, which provided welfare benefits to children who had inadequate 

parental financial support. In 1950, the first relevant federal legislation 

required welfare agencies to notify appropriate law enforcement officials 

when AFDC was furnished to a child who had been abandoned by a parent.6 

Since 1968, federal statutes pertaining to the AFDC program have 

specifically required states to have programs for establishing paternity and 

obtaining support for children who receive AFDC. By 1975, an alarming rise 

in welfare costs resulting from out-of-wedlock birth rates and parental 

desertion as well as a growing demand to relieve taxpayers of the financial 

burden of supporting these families prompted the Congress to create the 

national CSE program as title IV-D of the Social Security Act. The Congress 

believed government welfare expenditures could be reduced, and to some 

extent prevented, by recouping AFDC benefits from noncustodial parents’ 

child support payments. In addition, the Congress believed that earlier 

enforcement of child support obligations for families not receiving AFDC 

could help prevent these families from needing government support. The 

national CSE program incorporated the already existing state programs. 

AFDC and Non-AFDC 

Collections Handled 

Differently 

Families who receive AFDC, and families who do not, enter the CSE program 

in different ways; and the child support payments CSE collects for them are 

distributed differently. A mother who requests AFDC for her child is 

required as a condition of eligibility to assign her rights to child support to 

the government and to cooperate with the CSE program in locating and 

identifying the father of the child.7

 If the child support that CSE collects for 

an AFDC family does not, together with family income, make the family 

ineligible for AFDC, then all but $50 of the monthly support payment goes to 

the state and federal governments in proportion to their AFDC assistance to 

the family. The family continues to receive its full monthly AFDC grant plus 

the first $50 of the support payment. 

6

See the Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, P.L. 81-734, sec. 321(b). 

7

There are procedures to exempt custodial parents from cooperation for good cause. 

Page 16 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Significance, Organization, Performance,


and Reforms


If the family does not receive AFDC, all the child support collected goes 

directly to the family.8

 Parents who do not receive AFDC are under no 

obligation to establish paternity or to use CSE services to collect child 

support. They do so, if at all, voluntarily. 

The CSE Caseload, Between 1980 and 1992, the nationwide CSE caseload9

 grew 180 percent, 

Especially Non-AFDC 

Families, Has Greatly 

Expanded 

from 5.4 million to 15.2 million cases.10 Part of that growth stemmed from 

the increase in the number of single-parent families receiving AFDC. The 

average monthly number rose more than 1 million in the past 5 years, 

increasing from nearly 3.6 million families in 1989 to just over 4.6 million 

in 1993. The larger portion of the CSE caseload increase, however, was in 

non-AFDC cases, which grew from 16 to 43 percent of the caseload during 

this period. In fiscal year 1992, there were 8.7 million AFDC cases and 

6.5 million non-AFDC cases. Figure 1.1 shows the increase in the CSE 

caseload from fiscal year 1980 through 1992. 

8

If a family has stopped receiving AFDC, not all the child support collected may go to the family. In 

almost half the states, support paid above the current obligation amount is used to reimburse any child 

support owed to the state under the AFDC assignment provisions prior to payments owed to the 

family. 

9

Throughout this report, CSE caseload refers to all cases enforced under title IV-D of the Social 

Security Act—both non-AFDC recipients who specifically request services and AFDC recipients who 

are automatically referred to and required to participate in the CSE program. 

10State data about 1992 caseloads and expenditures were the most recent available about state 

programs. 

Page 17 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Significance, Organization, Performance,


and Reforms


Figure 1.1: Child Support Enforcement Caseload, Fiscal Years 1980-1992 

16 Number of Cases in Millions 

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Fiscal Years 

Non-AFDC Cases 

AFDC Cases 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

Increasing Number of 

Young, Unwed Parents 

Makes Caseload 

Increasingly Difficult to 

Serve 

Today, the CSE caseload is more difficult to serve than in the earlier years 

because there are more young, unwed parents. Various studies indicate 

that these cases usually require more services and are more difficult to 

successfully serve than those involving married or formerly married 

parents. For example, cases involving unwed parents require paternity 

establishment, which may be contested rather than acknowledged 

voluntarily. Also, unwed parents are usually less able and less willing than 

married or formerly married parents to pay child support. Such parents 

are generally younger and have less education and earning capacity. They 

are likely to be unemployed or unemployable and have little or no income 

with which to pay support—some are still in high school. In addition, 

some unwed parents are not aware of or do not fully understand the 

parental responsibilities that CSE agencies try to enforce. 

Page 18 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

14 

12 

10 

8 

6 

4 

2 

0 
Chapter 1 


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The growing size and complexity of the CSE caseload reflect major changes 

in demographic characteristics of the American family. High rates of 

divorce and out-of-wedlock birth have resulted in more children living in 

single-parent households. For example, the number of births to unmarried 

mothers increased 82 percent between 1980 and 1991. During the same 

period, the proportion of out-of-wedlock births rose from 18.4 to 29.5 

percent of all births.11 U.S. Bureau of the Census data indicate that there 

were 9.8 million custodial mothers aged 18 years and older in 

1990—39 percent more than in 1979, the first year for which this 

information was available.12 

The increasingly difficult-to-serve nature of the CSE caseload and the links 

between nonpayment of child support, poverty, and increases in families 

receiving AFDC benefits are underscored by socioeconomic statistics. In 

1989, according to U.S. Census data, 62 percent of all custodial mothers 

did not receive child support payments, largely because they lacked 

support orders.13 In that same year, 32 percent of all custodial mothers 

were living below the poverty threshold, and three-quarters of them had 

not received child support.14 Receiving child support appears to be a 

particular problem for never-married custodial mothers and their 

children—they made up 52 percent of the AFDC caseload in 1991, up from 

21 percent in 1976.15 Census data indicate that of all never-married 

custodial mothers, 75 percent did not have child support orders and 

slightly more than half had household incomes below the poverty level in 

1989. 

11Child Support Enforcement Seventeenth Annual Report to Congress, pp. 3-4.


12Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 173, Child Support and Alimony: 1989 (Washington,


D.C.: 1991), tables A-D. 

13Of 6.2 million custodial mothers who did not receive support, 4.2 million did not have support orders. 

Of the others, 1.2 million had orders but did not receive any payments, and 800,000 had orders but 

payments were not due that year. 

14Of those not receiving support, 75 percent did not have an order. 

15Families on Welfare: Sharp Rise in Never-Married Women Reflects Societal Trend (GAO/HEHS-94-92, 

May 31, 1994) and Families on Welfare: Teenage Mothers Least Likely to Become Self-Sufficient 

(GAO/HEHS-94-115, May 31, 1994). 

Page 19 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Program 

Responsibility Is 

Shared by Federal, 

State, and Local 

Governments 

CSE is an intergovernmental program involving the federal, state, and local 

governments. Federal responsibility for the CSE program lies within HHS in 

the Administration for Children and Families (ACF). Within ACF, OCSE 

manages the CSE program at the federal level. A separate office within ACF, 

the Office of Information Systems Management/CSE Information Systems, 

approves, monitors, and certifies state information systems projects for all 

ACF programs, (funded under the Social Security Act), including CSE, and 

reports on CSE matters to the director of OCSE. In addition, ACF staff in HHS 

regional offices are responsible for review and approval of states’ plans for 

all ACF programs, including CSE, AFDC, Job Opportunities and Basic Skills 

Training, and others,16 and for ensuring consistent and uniform adherence 

to federal requirements governing all ACF formula and entitlement 

programs. Figure 1.2 displays the organization of CSE responsibilities 

within HHS. 

16These include foster care and adoption assistance, child welfare, homeless youth, child care, and 

developmental disabilities. 

Page 20 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Figure 1.2: Organization of CSE Responsibilities Within HHS 

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Page 21 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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and Reforms


OCSE is responsible for providing leadership, technical assistance, and 

standards. When the Congress established the CSE program, it envisioned 

an aggressive federal role in ensuring that states actually develop strong 

and effective CSE programs. Title IV-D of the Social Security Act mandates 

that OCSE provide technical assistance to states to help them plan, develop, 

design, and establish effective CSE programs. The act also directs OCSE to 

establish standards for state program effectiveness and monitor the 

operation of state programs through periodic audits. To help ensure 

program effectiveness, OCSE has the authority to assess financial penalties 

if an audit reveals a state has failed to meet certain program standards. In 

addition, OCSE is responsible for maintaining relationships with federal, 

state, and local government officials, private organizations, and for 

individuals interested in the CSE program, and for coordinating and 

planning CSE activities to maximize program effectiveness. 

State CSE agencies are responsible for all activities leading to securing 

financial support and medical insurance coverage from noncustodial 

parents for children involved in CSE cases. To meet federal requirements 

and receive federal funds, state CSE programs must have HHS-approved 

plans indicating compliance with federal law and regulations and must 

operate programs in accordance with those plans. HHS can withhold 

federal funding from states that do not have approved plans. There are 

significant differences in the ways state CSE programs are organized, where 

they are placed in the states’ organizational hierarchies, what relationships 

exist between the CSE program and other state agencies, and the policies 

and procedures that are followed. These characteristics usually vary by 

traditional state-local service delivery structures, levels of court 

involvement required by state family law, population distribution, and 

other state variables. For example, some state child support agencies 

operate their CSE programs with state funds through a network of regional 

offices, while others share the funding with and supervise county and 

other local jurisdictions’ operations. Under both circumstances, certain 

program responsibilities may be contracted out to other entities. In 

addition, the state CSE agencies are not all in human services agencies; in a 

few states, CSE is in the state department of revenue or the attorney 

general’s office. 

The CSE funding structure was designed to share program costs between Funding Designed to the federal and state governments. The federal government matches

Create a Federal-State 66 percent of states’ administrative costs and 90 percent of their costs of 

Partnership developing management information systems17 and certain other services 

17The 90-percent federal match for systems development costs expires at the end of fiscal year 1995. 

Page 22 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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related to paternity establishment. The federal government also pays 

incentives to states for collection efficiency. Incentives are calculated 

separately for AFDC and non-AFDC collections by dividing each by total 

program administrative costs. Incentive payments for AFDC collection 

efficiency range in amounts equal to 6 to 10 percent of the AFDC 

collections. Incentive payments for non-AFDC collections also range in 

amounts equal to 6 to 10 percent of non-AFDC collections but cannot be 

greater than 115 percent of the incentive payments paid for AFDC collection 

efficiency. These incentive payments are funded from the federal portion 

of recovered AFDC collections. Though federal matching funds are 

restricted to CSE program costs, states may use the incentive payments to 

fund programs other than CSE. They must, however, share incentives with 

local governments that bear some of the administrative costs of the CSE 

program. 

CSE is an administratively complex program. While the basic services are Service Delivery Is the same in every location, different families need different services. In

Diverse and Complex addition, how services are delivered varies geographically. The common 

Across the Nation	 services mandated by federal law include client intake (including case 

establishment); locating noncustodial parents; establishing paternity; 

establishing, reviewing, and modifying support orders; enforcing financial 

and medical support obligations; and collecting and distributing support 

payments. Appendix I briefly describes these services and some of the 

activities and organizations involved with each of them. 

Families entering the CSE program require different combinations of these 

services at different times, and thus their cases flow through the program 

on different pathways. In some cases, the child’s paternity has not been 

established and the location of the alleged father is unknown. In these 

cases, the custodial parent needs the CSE program to help with every step: 

locating the alleged father, establishing paternity and a child support 

order, enforcing the order, and distributing collections received. In other 

cases, the custodial parent may have a child support order and CSE 

agencies must periodically review and possibly modify the order to ensure 

continued conformity to state guidelines.18 Order amounts may be 

increased or decreased with changes in noncustodial parents’ ability to 

pay, for example, because of wage increases or job losses. Figure 1.3 

illustrates various combinations and sequences of services that cases 

require as they flow through the program. 

18All AFDC cases must be reviewed every 3 years, and non-AFDC cases must be reviewed at the 

request of either parent. 

Page 23 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Figure 1.3: CSE Services and Case Flows 

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Delivery of CSE services frequently involves the executive, legislative, and 

judicial agencies of state and local governments, such as tax collection 

agencies, the courts and district attorneys, as well as private institutions, 

such as banks, employers, and credit bureaus. At the local level, both 

enforcement and paternity establishment may involve the courts to 

varying degrees. One study of paternity establishment practices in a 

sample of nearly 250 counties found that the local agency responsible for 

child support was the department responsible for human services in 

75 percent of the counties.19 Only 43 percent of the counties, however, had 

paternity establishment handled solely by the department of human 

services. In most other counties, paternity establishment was a joint 

responsibility of the human services agency and a prosecuting or private 

attorney. 

19Pamela Holcomb, Kristin Seerfeldt, and Freya Sonenstein, Paternity Establishment in 1990: 

Organizational Structure, Voluntary Consent, and Administrative Practices (Washington, D.C.: The 

Urban Institute, 1992). 

Page 24 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Paternity and support order establishment and enforcement may be 

handled through a judicial or administrative process, depending on the 

state in which the custodial parent lives. Under a judicial process, 

authority to make paternity judgments, establish support orders, and take 

enforcement actions rests with the courts; proceedings take place in a 

legal setting and typically may involve district attorneys, state’s attorneys, 

county attorneys, judges, legal aid societies, or private attorneys. In 

contrast, under an administrative process, an agency of the executive 

branch of state government has authority to administer certain aspects of 

state child support law or regulation without court approval being 

necessary for legally binding actions. The degree to which administrative 

rather than judicial processes are used varies across all states and within 

states. The functions and enforcement actions to which administrative 

processes are applied differ, as well as the degree to which the processes 

are used; the spectrum of processes is described as ranging from purely 

administrative to quasi-judicial to purely judicial.20 

To help meet the increasing challenge of child support enforcement, the Program Congress has significantly amended CSE legislation over the years. In

Responsibility and addition, federal expenditures have grown considerably. Most states 

Tools Have Expanded continue to report net savings while federal net costs for the CSE program 

While Federal have increased. 

Expenditures Have 

Grown 

Legislative Program Over the years, the Congress has expanded the responsibilities of the CSE 

Expansion program. Under the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984 

(P.L. 98-378), states are to treat AFDC and non-AFDC cases the same. The 

amendments also established the current funding structure. The Family 

Support Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-485) and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 

Act of 1993 (OBRA’93, P.L. 103-66) strengthened requirements for paternity 

establishment, medical support, and support order fairness and currency. 

In addition to expanding program responsibilities, the Congress also 

expanded program tools. The 1984 amendments, for example, required 

universal wage withholding provisions in all support orders, interception 

of federal tax refunds, and reporting delinquent payers to credit bureaus. 

The Family Support Act encouraged states to establish voluntary, civil 

20In most states, however, even those using purely administrative processes, judges still enter support 

orders in divorce proceedings. 

Page 25 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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paternity acknowledgment procedures and provided for establishment of 

paternity standards that states must achieve to avoid being penalized with 

reduced funding, among other things. Appendix II lists the major 

requirements. 

More recently, OBRA’93 strengthened the program by (1) requiring increased 

opportunities for unwed parents to voluntarily acknowledge or otherwise 

establish paternity in a less complicated and more timely manner, 

including in hospitals; (2) removing impediments to the enforcement of 

health insurance provisions in child support orders; and (3) strengthening 

the paternity establishment performance standards initiated by the 

Congress in the Family Support Act. 

Increased Federal Between 1980 and 1992, annual federal expenditures for matching funds to 

Financial Expenditures for state CSE programs increased more than four-fold, from about $350 million 

State CSE Programs to more than $1.3 billion. Figure 1.4 illustrates this trend. Federal incentive 

payments to states, paid out of the federal portion of the recovered AFDC 

funds, also increased, from $72 million in fiscal year 1980 to $339 million 

for fiscal year 1992. (See fig. 1.5.) 

Page 26 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Figure 1.4: Federal Expenditures for Matching Funds to State CSE Programs, Fiscal Years 1980-1992 

1343 Millions 

1300 1212 

1200 

1100 1061 

1000 938 

900 

804 800 750 

700 633 

600 571 

487 507 500 459 

394 400 349 

300 

200 

100 

0 

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Fiscal Year 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

Page 27 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Figure 1.5: Federal Incentive Payments to State CSE Programs From the Federal Share of AFDC Collections, Fiscal Years 

1980-1992 

1100 Millions 

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Fiscal Years 

Retained Federal AFDC Collections 

Incentive Payments to States 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

Federal Net Costs for the 

CSE Program Have 

Increased While Most 

States Reported Net 

Savings 

From 1980 to 1992, federal government spending on state CSE programs 

increasingly outpaced what the federal government saved through AFDC 

recovery. During that period, however, at least 75 percent of the states 

reported a net savings due to their CSE programs. In other words, federal 

payments to states for CSE—matching funds and incentives—were not 

offset by federally retained AFDC collections, but state-reported CSE costs 

were more than offset by the combination of their retained AFDC 

collections and federal matching funds and incentive payments. Through 

fiscal year 1988, there were net savings to the public; since that time, costs 

have exceeded savings.21 (See table 1.1.) 

21Both the federal and state governments may also experience savings in the AFDC programs by 

keeping or moving families off of AFDC through successful child support enforcement efforts. Such 

savings, however, are difficult to measure. 

Page 28 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

1000 

900 

800 

700 

600 

500 

400 

300 

200 

100 

0 
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and Reforms


Table 1.1: Net Budget Savings/Costs 

for States, Federal Government, and Dollars in thousands 

Taxpayers From the CSE Program, Fiscal State net Federal net Net savings/ Fiscal Years 1980-1992 year budget savings budget savings/costs costs to taxpayers 

1980 $230,152 $-102,698 $127,454 

1981 260,969 –128,377 132,592 

1982 307,309 –147,946 159,363 

1983 312,296 –138,078 174,218 

1984 365,522 –105,048 260,474 

1985a 317,334 –230,888 86,446 

1986 275,644 –263,177 12,467 

1987 341,826 –337,278 4,548 

1988 381,001 –355,424 25,577 

1989 403,333 –480,056 –76,723 

1990 338,469 –528,135 –189,666 

1991 385,059 –586,454 –201,395 

1992 434,317 –604,946 –170,629 

Note: Federal net savings/costs refer to the federal share of AFDC collections less incentive 

payments and matching funds paid to the states. 

aAccording to the Congressional Research Service, the sudden decrease in taxpayer savings in 

1985 was caused primarily by the implementation of the $50 “pass through” to AFDC families, 

effective in fiscal year 1985. 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

A widespread public perception exists that the CSE program is failing to Perception of adequately address the nationwide problem of child support nonpayment. Program’s Some state program directors, however, believe CSE performance has 

Performance Varies improved over the years, citing rising collections in recent years in the 

face of an increasingly large and complex caseload often involving teenage Widely	 parents and out-of-wedlock cases. In part, disagreements about program 

performance stem from differing notions of what can realistically be 

expected from the child support enforcement system. 

Advocates for children, policy analysts, human service and CSE 

professionals, and members of the Congress have characterized CSE’s 

effect on the national child support enforcement problem as ranging from 

“unacceptable” to “dismal.” In support of this assessment, they cite Bureau 

of the Census and other national survey data on the size of the problem 

nationwide. These data indicate that 62 percent of all custodial mothers in 

Page 29 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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the United States did not receive child support in 1989. One study has 

estimated the gap between total child support that should be paid 

nationwide and total child support paid as $34 billion in 1990.22 

Advocates and others also have made specific criticisms of CSE’s program 

performance on its current caseload. Using data reported by states to OCSE, 

some have faulted CSE because only 19 percent of all custodial parents 

served by the CSE program in 1992 actually received support payments. 

These observers also point out that of the 15.2 million cases in the CSE 

program in fiscal year 1992, more than 6.7 million cases, or about 

44 percent, were without orders to pay support. In addition, they cite the 

fact that states reported collecting only about one-fourth of the child 

support due for fiscal year 1992 and prior years. 

Others in the child support enforcement community, however, believe that 

CSE program performance has improved greatly in recent years in the face 

of growing caseloads, federal mandates, and increasingly complicated 

out-of-wedlock cases. Between 1980 and 1992, states reported that dollar 

collections steadily increased by over 400 percent, from about $1.5 billion 

to $8 billion. In addition, both AFDC recovery and the proportion of cases 

for which collections were achieved increased between 1980 and 1992 

along with a rise in the caseload. The program’s recovery of AFDC 

payments increased approximately 118 percent, from a national rate of 

5.2 percent to 11.4 percent. Similarly, the proportion of cases for which 

some collections were received increased 36 percent, from a rate of 

13.7 percent to 18.7 percent. 

In part, the disagreement between those who criticize the program and 

those who defend its accomplishments hinges on differing notions of what 

are realistic and achievable expectations for the program. Some expect the 

program to achieve support for more of the families now in the program 

and to reach out and help additional families. Others have more limited 

expectations for various reasons, including the ever-increasing number of 

out-of-wedlock births, the fact that some custodial parents choose not to 

pursue child support, and uncertainties about the ability of some 

noncustodial parents to pay support. 

The ever-increasing number of out-of-wedlock births requires CSE to 

establish paternity on more cases—a sometimes difficult and 

time-consuming task. In-hospital voluntary paternity acknowledgment is 

22Elaine Sorensen, Noncustodial Fathers: Can They Afford to Pay More Child Support? (Washington, 

D.C.: The Urban Institute, Jan. 1994). 

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extending CSE’s reach early and has been shown to be increasing the 

number of paternities established and the efficiency of establishment. 

However, this initiative depends on the cooperation of both parents and 

results to date suggest that much remains to be done. Research reported in 

1991 from the state of Washington, a pioneer of this approach, showed that 

nearly 40 percent of unmarried supposed fathers were signing voluntary 

acknowledgments. Other state programs’ report similar results. These 

results mean that more than half of unwed fathers will have to be pursued 

through other means if child support is to be collected. 

Complicating the question of what realistic expectations are for CSE is the 

fact that not all custodial parents needing child support are served by the 

CSE program, and some choose not to use its services. According to 1987 

Bureau of the Census data, 162,000 teenaged mothers were not awarded or 

were awarded but did not receive regular child support payments. Nearly 

45 percent said they did not receive payments because they did not pursue 

the matter or did not want child support. Similarly, results from state 

demonstration projects of review and modification of orders also illustrate 

the reluctance of some families to have CSE involved in their cases. 

Reasons that non-AFDC custodial parents gave for refusing to have their 

awards reviewed included (1) fear of jeopardizing current payments, 

(2) desire to avoid court proceedings, (3) belief the noncustodial parent is 

paying all he or she can afford, and (4) doubt that the review would result 

in payments. 

Finally, program efforts may not guarantee that cooperative noncustodial 

parents will be able to pay support. Our previous work has shown that 

9 percent of noncustodial fathers aged 23 to 31 have no income to pay 

support.23 Other research has revealed that 27 percent of the noncustodial 

fathers who did not pay child support in 1990 were unemployed for at least 

part of that year. In addition, fathers’ ability to pay has been shown to 

influence their compliance with child support awards.24 

CSE and Federal	 The CSE program is at the forefront of congressional efforts to reform 

government operations in general and, more specifically, to reform

Reform Initiatives welfare. In August 1993, GPRA became law and the nationwide CSE program 

23Child Support Assurance: Effect of Applying State Guidelines to Determine Fathers’ Payments 

(GAO/HRD-93-26, Jan. 21, 1993). 

24Judi Bartfield and Daniel Meyer, Are There Really Deadbeat Dads? The Relationship Between Ability 

to Pay, Enforcement, and Compliance in Nonmarital Child Support Cases, DP#994-93 (Madison, Wis.: 

Institute for Research on Poverty, Mar. 1993). 

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was subsequently selected as a pilot for the implementation of GPRA. In 

addition, in late 1993 and 1994, several welfare reform proposals emerged 

from the Congress and the administration that included changes for the 

CSE program. 

CSE Is Among Pilots for 

Government Management 

Reform 

CSE is among the pilot projects for government management reform under 

GPRA. Unlike most other pilots, however, the CSE pilot encompasses the 

entire federal and state CSE program, not just federal operations. 

The Congress enacted GPRA to strengthen federal program management 

with goal-setting, performance measurement, and results-reporting 

requirements. GPRA is intended to accomplish several government reforms, 

including improved (1) federal program effectiveness and public 

accountability, (2) service delivery, and (3) congressional 

decision-making. To that end, GPRA requires all federal agencies to have 

strategic plans by September 30, 1997, and performance plans by fiscal 

year 1999. 

To initiate program performance reform and identify the best way to 

implement this new system across the federal government, GPRA requires a 

series of pilots. As a pilot, OCSE is required to have a fiscal year 1995 

performance plan by the start of that fiscal year. An OCSE official said the 

plan was submitted to HHS’ Assistant Secretary for Management and 

Budget on September 27, 1994. 

Welfare Reform Proposals 

Call for Changes in CSE 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Major welfare reform proposals introduced in the 103rd Congress 

contained changes for the CSE program. Some proposals call for more 

aggressive and stringent paternity establishment procedures, central 

support award registries in states, and centralized state collection 

procedures, among other measures. In addition, some of the welfare 

reform proposals would add to OCSE’s responsibilities by requiring it to 

establish and operate national databases for support orders and other 

information. 

In doing our work, we reviewed the history of the CSE program, focusing 

on the period from 1980 to 1992, the most recent year for which data were 

available at the time of our review. We interviewed current and former 

program staff in all parts of the CSE program—at OCSE, in HHS regional 

offices, and in state and local CSE programs—including caseworkers, local 

Page 32 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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office managers, county attorneys, state CSE and social service program 

directors, HHS and state auditors, and others. We also talked with CSE 

professionals affiliated with private companies, universities, advocacy 

groups, and policy and social research organizations. We continually 

reviewed published literature on child support and attended meetings of 

professional associations concerned with CSE issues. We analyzed CSE 

program statistics as reported by states and published by OCSE and 

discussed these with officials. 

To identify barriers that hinder state program CSE efforts and how states 

are addressing the barriers, we performed case studies in eight states: 

Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Texas, and 

Virginia. (See app. III.) We selected these states because they represented 

different CSE caseload sizes, both centralized and decentralized program 

structures, administrative and judicial case processing approaches, a 

variety of performance histories as reflected in data submitted for OCSE 

annual reports, and different regions of the country. In addition, we 

reviewed socioeconomic data, including rates of out-of-wedlock births, 

divorce, and unemployment for these states and others. The scope of our 

work did not include the issues surrounding interstate child support 

enforcement. To assess the potential implications of welfare reform on the 

CSE program, we reviewed several welfare reform proposals containing 

changes to CSE. (See app. IV.) 

We conducted our review from November 1992 to December 1994 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. HHS 

provided written comments on a draft of this report. These comments are 

discussed in chapter 5 and included in appendix V. We also obtained 

comments on a draft of this report from selected officials in each of the 

states we studied and several child support enforcement experts. Their 

suggested revisions were incorporated, as appropriate, into this report. 

Page 33 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 2 


CSE Program Lacks Essential Management 

Tools 

The CSE program lacks essential management tools to help fulfill its 

mission. Missing are a well-articulated mission, programwide planning and 

goal-setting, and accurate, consistent data that can be used to measure 

progress toward goals. In addition, the program’s incentive funding 

structure is weakly linked to program performance. 

As the need for CSE services has continued to grow because of rising 

divorce rates and numbers of out-of-wedlock births, an evolving history 

has given CSE a complex mission. Originally intended primarily to recover 

federal and state welfare costs from the child support payments owed to 

AFDC families, CSE today is required to serve AFDC and non-AFDC families 

equally. In addition, some services, such as enforcing medical support, do 

not result in child support collections. As a result, the program faces 

competing priorities. 

In the face of this expanded mission, CSE lacks a program plan and 

measurable program goals that could be used to set priorities. Only one 

national goal exists—paternity establishment—and that was mandated by 

the Congress. In addition, despite nearly 20 years of state reporting, 

program data are inadequate for decision-making because of unclear 

definitions from OCSE and inaccurate reporting by the states. Finally, CSE’s 

funding structure has not been effective in achieving program 

improvements. The structure of incentive payments continues to reflect 

CSE’s original, narrower mission of recovering welfare costs, and the link 

between incentive payments and state program performance is weak. 

CSE’s Mission Has	 The CSE program’s mission has become more complex over time as the 

federal government expanded program requirements but made few

Become Complex	 changes to critical program components, such as the funding structure. As 

a result, different stakeholders—federal, state, and local program officials; 

custodial and noncustodial parents; advocacy groups; and elected 

leaders—have differing expectations of the program. Initially, states and 

the federal government focused the program’s mission on easing taxpayer 

burden through recovering AFDC payments. Over time, the program’s 

mission has been broadened from primary concern with government 

economy to concern with the economic security of children in both AFDC 

and non-AFDC families. In addition, some program activities, such as 

establishing medical support enforcement, focus more on noncollection 

outcomes and may use program resources without generating increased 

child support collections in the short term or at all. Despite these changes 

to the mission, important program components, such as the performance 

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indicators used in federal audits of state programs and the structure of 

federal incentive payments to states, continue to emphasize AFDC cost 

recovery and welfare savings. 

Lack of alignment among program expectations—recover AFDC but also 

serve all in need and provide services that do not result in child support 

collections—has left state programs in awkward positions with their state 

legislatures and executive leadership. As one state program director 

observed to us, 

“[M]ost states are caught in an identity crisis now . . .. [W]e sold our program when it [was] 

supposed to generate revenue to reduce state cost . . .. [T]he taxpayers were the clients 

who were reimbursed the welfare expense . . .. [W]e [are] moving now toward providing 

services to families, but the structure and the funding is [sic] not supportive. It’s not 

clear . . .. I think a national agenda would be very desirable.” 

Moreover, given the competing priorities in program mission and the 

differing pressures generated by program expectations and requirements, 

state program directors must decide how to spread their resources among 

required collection and noncollection activities. 

In addition, welfare reform may further expand CSE’s mission. Some 

proposals broaden the program to include all child support cases in the 

country. 

CSE’s Original Mission of 

Recovering Welfare Costs 

Complicated by Expanding 

Requirements 

CSE’s original emphasis on recovering welfare costs has diminished as 

expanding requirements created a much broader and more complicated 

program mission. In addition to welfare recovery, there is now more 

emphasis on activities that require a long-term view of the program’s 

overall social as well as financial benefits for both AFDC and non-AFDC 

families, such as medical support and paternity establishment. 

When the national CSE program was established in 1975, it focused on 

recovering AFDC payments. The priority placed on recovering AFDC 

payments was supported by state laws and the funding structure. Many 

states had laws allowing courts to set current support orders equal to a 

family’s public assistance grant to recover all of the AFDC payments. In 

addition, the incentive payment structure established in 1975 rewarded 

states only for recoveries of AFDC collections. Thus, the primary 

beneficiaries of the early program were taxpayers, not families and 

children. 

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As noted previously, in 1984 and 1988, the Congress extended CSE’s 

authority and services, thus expanding CSE’s mission. While continuing a 

focus on welfare cost recovery, these amendments raised the priority of 

several other aspects of CSE. The 1984 legislation increased emphasis on 

welfare prevention by providing that states serve AFDC and non-AFDC 

families in the same way. Providing equivalent service to non-AFDC 

families, however, has significantly increased most states’ CSE caseloads as 

described in chapter 1 and illustrated in figure 1.1. In some states, the 

non-AFDC caseload is greater than the AFDC caseload. 

In addition, 1984 amendments and subsequent legislation25 expanded state 

responsibilities by mandating the inclusion of medical support in child 

support orders and the provision of services to families who only receive 

Medicaid. To avoid a potential reliance on Medicaid, these mandates 

require state programs to ensure that parents provide medical insurance 

for their children whenever they have a reasonable opportunity to do so. 

However, medical support enforcement requires an investment of staff and 

automated resources that does not produce child support collections. 

Amendments in 1984 further reduced the emphasis on welfare recovery by 

setting a $50 limit on the amount of child support that AFDC families could 

retain.26 This change allowed AFDC families to keep some of the child 

support collected, while the government retained less. However, some 

state program officials in the states we visited commented that this 

provision is an administrative “nightmare” and it added greater complexity 

to the distribution of collections. 

The 1988 amendments continued to broaden and complicate the program’s 

mission by requiring states to (1) meet performance standards for 

paternity establishment and (2) undertake periodic review of child support 

orders and states’ guidelines governing them to keep orders up-to-date. 

Paternity establishment is an essential first step toward obtaining a child 

support award and collection. However, it can be time-consuming and may 

not result in collections for some time, if at all, depending on case 

complexity and collectibility.27 Another potentially time-consuming and 

25The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203, sec. 9141) amended program 

requirements to provide CSE services to families who receive Medicaid. 

26The 1975 legislation had set a $20 limit, but that provision expired in 1976. No limit was in effect 

thereafter until the 1984 amendments. 

27Case complexity and collectibility depend on such factors as whether the case is contested; whether 

location, blood tests, subpoenas, and other program efforts are required; and the noncustodial parent’s 

ability to pay. 

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labor-intensive activity, periodic review and adjustment of child support 

orders, has also been shown to substantially increase collections, but for a 

small percentage of cases. In addition, states now must respond to 

requests for review and modification from both noncustodial and custodial 

parents. 

Audit Performance 

Indicators and Incentive 

Payments Are Aimed at 

Recovering Welfare Costs 

Despite the movement to broaden CSE’s mission, important program 

components—audit performance indicators and incentive payments— 

remain focused on AFDC cost recovery, not the broader goal of contributing 

to families’ economic security. OCSE is required to audit every state 

program at least once every 3 years, and the audit performance indicators 

for state programs emphasize AFDC collections. In addition to determining 

regulatory compliance, the audits assess the performance of state CSE 

programs by three indicators, two of which focus on AFDC collections: 

(1) AFDC collections divided by AFDC payments (less payments to 

unemployed parents),28 (2) non-AFDC collections divided by administrative 

costs,29 and (3) AFDC collections divided by administrative costs. 

The incentive payment structure continues to give priority to AFDC 

collections despite the changes in 1984. While expanding program 

emphasis beyond recovery of welfare costs, the 1984 amendments 

changed the incentive structure to reward state efforts to make non-AFDC 

collections as well as AFDC collections. However, in this scheme, AFDC 

collection efficiency still has priority because non-AFDC collection 

incentive payments are capped at 115 percent of AFDC collections. That is, 

no matter how well a state program does in collecting non-AFDC support, 

its efforts may not be fully rewarded. In addition, the lack of incentive 

payments for medical support efforts have given these efforts a low 

priority. AFDC collection efforts, therefore, drive state performance. 

Furthermore, HHS’ Office of the Inspector General found that some state 

and local officials are concerned that using collection efficiency for 

determining incentives tends to penalize states for incurring additional 

significant costs that are not expected to yield increased total collections, 

both AFDC and non-AFDC, during the same year, such as costs for in-hospital 

voluntary paternity establishment programs aimed at new unwed parents. 

28States make AFDC payments to children in single-parent families and two parent-families, who are 

needy because of the unemployment of one of their parents. In the calculation for the first indicator, 

AFDC payments to two-parent families are subtracted from the total amount of AFDC benefits paid. 

29The administrative costs used in these calculations may not include laboratory costs incurred in 

determining paternity if a state chooses to exclude them. 

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Some State Leaders Still 

Emphasize CSE’s Recovery 

of Welfare Costs and 

Generation of Additional 

State Revenue 

Despite the program’s shifting emphasis away from recovery of welfare 

costs, some state leadership—legislative and executive 

decisionmakers—still expect CSE to generate revenue, according to state 

CSE officials. In the eight states we visited, many program officials said that 

state leadership tended to focus more on the program’s revenue potential 

than on the social goals of promoting families’ economic security. 

Some state program directors told us that their states’ interest in CSE as a 

revenue generator makes it difficult for them to achieve a balanced 

program. For example, a senior Oregon program official said that it is 

difficult to go to the legislature with a message balancing both social and 

fiscal goals. He explained that the only way to get more money from the 

legislature is to emphasize the program’s money-making potential. If the 

program’s management went to the legislature and talked about economic 

self-sufficiency for custodial families, he believed they would lose the 

budget battle. Overall, he concluded, dollar goals are this program’s 

clearest mission and the easiest to defend. 

New York Office of Child Support Enforcement officials expressed similar 

sentiments about their state legislature’s goals. These officials believed the 

legislature’s primary focus is on collections. As a result, state CSE officials 

made a deliberate decision to link child support enforcement to revenue 

generation, rather than presenting it as a programmatic expenditure along 

with other social programs to obtain more resources for the program. 

To meet the fiscal expectations of their legislatures and executive leaders, 

some state programs set priorities and risk audit findings of deficiencies 

that could result in financial penalties. For example, OCSE’s 1988 audit of 

Iowa’s CSE program revealed medical support enforcement deficiencies, 

and program officials were not surprised. The CSE director acknowledged 

that, in response to legislative expectations that the program generate 

revenue, they had focused their limited staff and automated resources on 

revenue-generating program activities. As a result, they did not give 

medical support enforcement priority attention before the audit because 

of the staff time and automated resources it would have required. 

Welfare Reform May 

Further Expand CSE’s 

Mission 

Among other changes, some welfare reform proposals would expand the 

responsibilities of CSE to create a central registry containing all child 

support orders, even those not now enforced under the program. The 

states, through a central public agency, would be responsible for 

collection and distribution of the payments. All but one of the proposals 

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for including all orders in the program have criteria that allow parents not 

to participate in the order registry and all would allow parents not to 

participate with the central state collection agency. These proposals, 

however, might further move the focus of the program’s mission away 

from welfare recovery because a larger portion of previously unserved 

non-AFDC families would be included. 

In the face of multiple and sometimes competing expectations among Planning and stakeholders, OCSE’s past planning and goal-setting efforts have failed to

Goal-Setting Efforts set program priorities or outcomes; they have focused on OCSE’s activities 

Fall Short	 rather than on the CSE program as a whole. OCSE has not had a planning 

process that focused on outcomes for (1) the program as a whole or (2) its 

role in leading the program. Furthermore, except for paternity 

establishment, national and annual program goals that states are expected 

to achieve have not been defined for the program. The paternity 

establishment goals were defined by the Congress when it legislated 

paternity establishment standards in 1988. While results-oriented planning 

has not been legislatively required of OCSE in the past, it is recognized as an 

important tool for effective program management, and GPRA now requires 

it.30 

In response to the GPRA mandate for all federal agencies to develop 

strategic plans by September 1997, OCSE has taken the initiative to develop 

a strategic plan early. In addition, OCSE is a GPRA implementation pilot 

agency and, as such, is also preparing an annual performance plan before 

one is required. While this new planning effort appears to be avoiding 

some past weaknesses by including stakeholders and establishing 

long-term goals for the national CSE program, several issues remain to be 

addressed as OCSE continues to build its planning discipline. 

Planning Efforts Have Not
 Although expanding responsibilities established multiple priorities for the


Focused on Outcomes
 CSE program over the years, OCSE had not engaged in a planning approach 

that solicited stakeholders’ ideas, identified long-term goals for 

30Our previous work (and that of others) has identified the importance of strategic planning and 

outcome measurement to effective program management. See “Management Vision Needed” in 

Department of Education: Long-Standing Management Problems Hamper Reforms (GAO/HRD-93-47, 

May 28, 1993) and explanation of strategic management in Management of VA: Implementing Strategic 

Management Process Would Improve Service to Veterans (GAO/HRD-90-109, Aug. 31, 1990); Program 

Performance Measures: Federal Agency Collection and Use of Performance Data (GAO/GGD-92-65, 

May 4, 1992); U.S. Department of Agriculture: Revitalizing Structure, Systems, and Strategies 

(GAO/RCED-91-168, Sept. 3, 1991); and Social Security: Sustained Effort Needed to Improve 

Management and Prepare for the Future (GAO/HRD-94-22, Oct. 27, 1993). 

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implementing the program’s mission, or focused on program outcomes. 

Instead, previous planning efforts have principally focused on OCSE, not 

the national program, with an emphasis on process tasks and activities 

instead of on the desired outcomes of these activities. Past OCSE planning 

efforts were abandoned or were focused primarily on implementing 1984 

and 1988 amendments. An early effort in 1980, entitled “Strategic Plan for 

the 1980’s,” was developed by OCSE staff with input only from HHS regional 

staff, not other stakeholders, but this plan was dropped a year after it was 

produced. 

OCSE’s more recent planning efforts, before its GPRA pilot status, focused on 

its own activities rather than on what it planned to accomplish with these 

activities. For example, OCSE’s plan listed activities such as “award and 

monitor new technology transfer contract” and “conduct judicial training 

conference using judicial curriculum guide.” However, the plan did not 

identify what outcomes were expected or desired from these activities. In 

addition, OCSE did not develop or identify the indicators for measuring the 

effectiveness of these activities in the plan, the tracking document, or the 

periodic progress reports. 

Except for Paternity Although OCSE has advised state programs to develop goals, it has not done 

Establishment, National so for the national program. In the face of OCSE failure to set national or 

and Annual Program Goals	 annual goals, the Congress mandated performance standards for state 

paternity efforts31 in 1988 and amended them in 1993.32 These paternity Are Missing
 establishment standards effectively set a national goal for all states to 

eventually attain and differing annual goals for states, depending on their 

past paternity establishment performance. The standards hold all states 

accountable for improving performance until they reach a maximum, 

rather than a minimum, level of performance. As shown in table 2.1, the 

paternity establishment standard requires state programs to continuously 

improve on their individual performance until at least 75 percent of the 

cases that need paternity established have it established. In addition, 

greater proportionate improvement is required from low performers. 

31The Senate Finance Committee stated in its report on the 1984 CSE amendments that OCSE “has not 

fully implemented the requirements for the establishment of standards of effectiveness.” Child Support 

Amendments, Report No. 98-387 (Apr. 9, 1984). 

32Because of technical problems with the modification, regulations have not yet been issued 

implementing the revised standards. 

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Table 2.1: Required State Paternity


Establishment Percentages Based on For CSE cases requiring paternity establishment


Past Year’s Performance Percentage established Required annual increase 

Less than 40 6 percentage points 

40 or greater but less than 45 5 percentage points 

45 or greater but less than 50 4 percentage points 

50 or greater but less than 75 3 percentage points 

75 None 

Source: 42 U.S.C. 652(g). 

In the absence of federally established goals in other areas, some states 

have developed their own goals. The Texas legislature, for example, holds 

the CSE program accountable for meeting a series of annual output and 

outcome goals. Output goals are established for such things as the number 

of (1) paternity actions filed, (2) notices of delinquencies filed, and 

(3) income tax refund offsets submitted to the Internal Revenue Service.33 

In addition, the Texas CSE program has an efficiency goal for its 

collections-to-cost ratio. Outcome goals include the number of 

(1) paternities established, (2) orders established or modified, and 

(3) collections obtained. 

OCSE Is Beginning to 

Build Results-Oriented 

Planning Discipline 

In response to GPRA’s mandate, OCSE is beginning to build a planning 

discipline that includes stakeholders and defines expected results and the 

means of measuring achievement, not just processes and activities or the 

quantity of output. OCSE is developing a strategic plan intended to 

articulate the fundamental mission of the program and establish 

long-range performance goals to implement its mission. Furthermore, 

unlike past planning efforts that did not include program stakeholders, 

OCSE has assembled a core planning team of OCSE and HHS regional office 

officials and state program representatives. In addition, OCSE has engaged 

state CSE program directors in the planning process and held focus groups 

at a national CSE conference to obtain comments and suggestions on its 

draft strategic plan from advocates and CSE professionals. 

OCSE’s August 10, 1994, draft strategic plan goes beyond what GPRA requires 

of a strategic plan. In addition to a program mission and two general goals 

focusing on paternity and order establishment, OCSE has defined numerous 

objectives and many quantitative performance indicators for each goal. In 

33Since our visit to Texas in 1993, the CSE program has changed its output goals. It no longer measures 

paternity actions filed. 

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contrast to past planning efforts, the objectives and performance 

indicators address such key areas as paternity and order establishment 

and medical support enforcement as well as collections. Also, in terms of 

collections, an objective is “to increase the collection rate” and various 

performance indicators are listed that can be used to measure the 

accomplishment of this objective. Such an objective will help the program 

identify what progress can be made in getting support payments for a 

larger proportion of families rather than simply increasing the absolute 

dollars collected. 

As a GPRA pilot project, OCSE has also developed an annual performance 

plan for fiscal year 1995 before such a plan is required from all federal 

agencies. The annual performance plan is intended to provide a direct link 

between the program’s longer-term goals and what state programs and 

OCSE’s managers and staff will need to accomplish each year. According to 

GPRA and the Office of Management and Budget guidance, such plans 

should include several elements such as (1) one or more performance 

goals, (2) performance indicators that will be used in measuring the goals, 

and (3) a description of the means to be used to verify and validate 

measured values. According to an OCSE official, the performance plan was 

submitted to the Office of Management and Budget by September 30, 1994, 

but it was not available for our review. However, another OCSE official said 

that the performance plan is not so detailed as to contain outcome goals 

for OCSE itself. The same OCSE official said these matters may be addressed 

in an in-house OCSE operating plan. 

Some Issues Remain to Be As of September 1994, OCSE’s new planning efforts under GPRA had avoided 

Addressed in OCSE’s 

Planning Efforts 

repeating some past planning weaknesses and omissions, but OCSE had yet 

to address several important issues including outcomes and effectiveness 

measures for its own activities. However, OCSE officials said they recognize 

that the planning process is ongoing and that the strategic plan is a “living 

document” to which they expect to make continuous revisions. 

OCSE’s August 1994 draft strategic plan described some important activities 

OCSE will undertake to achieve some of the plan’s objectives, but the plan 

does not define how OCSE will measure the results of these activities or the 

outcomes expected from services they currently provide to the states. 

Failing to associate outcomes with activities is a past weakness that OCSE 

has the opportunity to correct through its current planning efforts, 

although it is not required of the GPRA strategic plan. For example, the plan 

states OCSE will “conduct an in-depth assessment of OCSE regulations, 

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services, standards, and programs to identify contradictory and confusing 

regulations, unnecessary or ineffective services, and standards that do not 

contribute to customer service.” However, OCSE does not indicate how it 

will measure the accomplishments from this activity. In addition, OCSE has 

not defined outcomes for itself regarding the services it provides to the 

states such as operating the Federal Parent Locator Service and 

processing state requests for federal tax refund interception by the 

Internal Revenue Service.34 OCSE has also not provided outcomes for future 

timeliness of regulations, responsiveness to states about audits and policy 

questions, and regional HHS office commitment and feedback. These are 

the types of issues that OCSE will need to address if it is to build a 

meaningful planning discipline. An OCSE official told us that OCSE’s services 

and results will be addressed in subsequent OCSE operating plans. 

Other issues that have not yet been addressed by the planning process are 

the actions needed by OCSE or the Congress to align the existing funding 

structure and audit approach with the CSE program’s broad mission. 

However, an OCSE official told us that changes to the funding structure and 

audit were contained in the Clinton administration’s welfare reform 

proposal submitted to the 103rd Congress. 

Better Data Are	 Despite nearly 20 years of annual performance reporting, program data 

remain seriously flawed because of inadequate reporting standards and

Needed for Accurate limited state reporting capabilities. As we have reported in the past, the 

Performance	 resulting lack of accurate and consistent data hinders meaningful 

planning, analysis, performance measurement, and management Measurement	 improvement.35 OCSE is attempting to improve program data reporting, but 

its main effort has been on hold because of the transition between 

administrations in 1993 and pending welfare reforms that could alter 

reporting requirements. Given these circumstances, current data 

collection will not adequately support the performance reporting GPRA 

requires. 

States Are Required to OCSE is mandated to prepare an annual report to the Congress no later than 

Report Program Data to 3 months after the end of each fiscal year using data reported by the 

OCSE Annually states. This report is supposed to include, among other information, 

34Federal tax refunds may be intercepted by the Internal Revenue Service and sent to state CSE 

programs to satisfy unpaid child support obligations. 

35See Child Support: Need to Improve Efforts to Identify Fathers and Obtain Support Orders 

(GAO/HRD-87-37, Apr. 30, 1987). 

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program costs and collections, OCSE costs and staffing, caseload size, and 

service data from the states. Since 1977, there have been 17 such annual 

reports with increasing amounts of information about the CSE program. 

OCSE Has Not Developed 

Universally Understood 

Data Reporting Standards 

OCSE has not developed universally understood or applied definitions and 

procedures by which the individual state CSE programs can collect and 

report data. An unduplicated caseload count, essential for accurate 

national program performance measurement, for example, is difficult to 

obtain because of the lack of universally applied definitions and 

procedures. Within OCSE’s definition of a “case,” for example, differences 

occur in reporting because of different state interpretations. OCSE defines a 

CSE case as “every absent [noncustodial] parent who is now or may 

eventually be obligated under law for the support of one or more 

dependent children.” Some jurisdictions establish separate child support 

cases for each child with a custodial mother for whom the father is not 

identified because their fathers may be different; however, not all 

jurisdictions do this. Duplicate case counting can also occur when an AFDC 

case becomes a non-AFDC case as the result of successful collection efforts. 

The family may be counted both as an AFDC case and as an AFDC 

“arrears-only” case because delinquent child support is still owed for the 

time the family was receiving AFDC. 

In addition, OCSE’s description of when a case may be closed is open to 

interpretation. As a result, collection rate statistics as well as total 

caseload figures can be misleading since all states are not equally 

aggressive in closing cases. OCSE has defined the criteria for case closure, 

but it has not set a time frame within which a case must be closed. 

Consequently, states that keep cases open longer than others may report 

higher caseloads and lower collection rates than those that close cases as 

soon as they meet OCSE’s case closure criteria. 

State Data Are Not 

Available, Reliable, or 

Consistent 

Data basic to meaningful assessment of CSE program performance at the 

state and local levels are not available from all states, reliable, or 

consistent. Information that is available in one of the states we visited but 

not reported to OCSE, for example, includes the proportion of cases 

needing different services, such as location of the noncustodial parent, 

enforcement, wage withholding, and collection monitoring. Without this 

information, OCSE and state programs cannot develop an accurate picture 

of caseload needs for resource planning or measure progress in serving 

families. For example, simply knowing the absolute number of paternities 

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established in a given year does not give program managers or policy 

analysts a way to measure the need for such a service. 

Both OCSE and state program officials told us that statistical analyses using 

the state-reported data to determine effective practices among states 

would be highly flawed because of poor data quality and inconsistent 

reporting. The percentage of collections from wage withholding, for 

example, is significantly underreported by one state program we visited 

because of limitations in its payment processing system, according to 

program officials. While this information is reported to the Congress, the 

state program does not find it a key piece of information for managing its 

operations. OCSE’s annual reports contain numerous footnotes submitted 

by states to explain year-to-year variances in their reported data; these 

footnotes reveal the nature and range of problems casting doubt on the 

reliability of program data. Explanations for data variances provided in 

state notes include such problems as the following: 

• contamination of information, 

• lax data entry by the local office, 

• local failure to report data, 

• previous counting methodology resulting in inflated statistics, and 

• adjustments in reporting methods. 

Cost data are also questionable because of varied state practices. States 

use different methods to collect and compute expenditure data, including 

caseload distribution, cost allocation, time studies, and educated guesses. 

Accounts receivable reported by states differ according to their 

procedures for writing off debts, including statutes of limitations, 

judgment-setting practices, and public assistance debts laws. Furthermore, 

states cannot accurately break down administrative costs by service, such 

as establishing paternity, locating noncustodial parents, and distributing 

support collections. 

OCSE Has Tried to Recognizing that data quality is crucial to better program management,


Improve Data and OCSE has made efforts to improve data quality and establish


Establish Performance outcome-based performance indicators; but its main effort was suspended


Indicators in late 1993 until changes to CSE as part of welfare reform are known.


OCSE’s main effort in this area, Measuring Excellence Through Statistics 

(METS), was implemented specifically to improve the quality of state 

statistical and financial data submissions. It involved meetings with state 

CSE directors and ACF regional staff and soliciting comments from all state 

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CSE directors. Active from February 1992 through late 1993, METS 

encompassed efforts to revise the forms and instructions states are 

required to use to report program data, develop ideas for focusing the 

audit process on outcomes, and develop results-oriented performance 

measures. As of April 1993, most reporting definitions and procedures had 

been completed, except for a definition for accounts receivable and a 

procedure for counting interstate cases that would protect against double 

counting. More recently, in September 1994, an OCSE official told us that 

the audit staff is trying to build on the METS effort by looking into how 

states interpret OCSE’s data definitions as well as evaluating state data 

collection systems and the quality of state data. 

Current Data Collection 

Will Not Adequately 

Support GPRA 

Performance Reporting 

Funding Structure 

Needs Reexamination 

OCSE’s current data collection from the states will not be adequate to 

support GPRA’s performance reporting requirements. In addition to 

strategic and annual performance planning, GPRA requires annual 

performance reporting starting in March 2000 on what was actually 

accomplished and what goals were not met. This is a critical element for 

measuring the success of the planning efforts because reporting provides 

essential feedback to managers, policymakers, and the public. Therefore, 

it is important that data collected regarding CSE results be accurate. 

Annual planning will be more difficult if the inaccuracies and 

inconsistencies of past reporting are allowed to continue. 

Although performance-based incentive payments and funding flexibility 

are consistent with GPRA’s focus on encouraging results-oriented 

government,36 several problems with CSE’s funding structure, including the 

incentive system, warrant reexamination. In addition to not having good 

data, a major problem is the weak link between performance and 

incentives. Since states may use incentive payments to fund other 

programs, not all states reinvest incentive payments in the program; 

instead they deposit the payments in the states’ general revenue funds to 

be used to fund other programs. Also, states that do reinvest the funds in 

CSE frequently use the payments to cover a variety of CSE operational costs, 

thus reducing state investment in CSE, rather than supplementing state 

investment. Welfare reform may change this practice because some 

proposals include new funding structures. 

36The National Performance Review led by Vice President Gore also emphasized results-oriented 

government. 

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Incentive Structure Weakly 

Linked to Performance 

Despite congressional expectations, the present incentive structure is 

weakly linked to performance. Since 1984, the incentive payments have 

been expected to “encourage states to develop and improve efficient, 

cost-effective child support programs which balance services for AFDC and 

non-AFDC cases, both interstate and intrastate.”37 But all states, regardless 

of their performance as defined by collection-to-cost ratio, receive some 

incentive payments. In addition, continued minimal performance will still 

earn a state incentive payments. In contrast to the paternity establishment 

standards, goals are not set for improvement in ratios either year to year 

or over the long term. In effect, the potential of this structure as a 

management tool to change state performance is limited. OCSE has 

recognized the shortcomings in the existing structure, but proposed 

changes have not yet been enacted. 

Under the present incentives structure, all states receive incentives of at 

least 6 percent of their AFDC and non-AFDC collections, regardless of their 

collections-to-cost ratio. States achieving ratios of between 1.4 and 2.8 can 

earn up to 10 percent of their collections depending on their achieved 

ratio. As the Congressional Research Service has observed, “under the 

current financing arrangement, states can run inefficient programs and 

still make a profit from the CSE program.”38 

In practice, few states earn the maximum incentive payments. An analysis 

of the collection-to-cost ratios for AFDC collections for fiscal years 1986 

through 1992 showed most states earned 6 to 7 percent incentive 

payments on AFDC collections. In addition, fewer than five states earned 

the maximum of 10 percent each year. See figure 2.1 for this distribution. 

37Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1983, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of 

Representatives, H.R. Rep. No. 98-527, (Nov. 10, 1983), p. 41. 

38The Child Support Enforcement Program: Policy and Practice, U.S. Congress, House Committee on 

Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Human Resources (report prepared by the Congressional Research 

Service), 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989, Committee Print WMCP 101-19. 

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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Child 

Support Enforcement Incentive 

Payments Based on AFDC 

Collection-to-Cost Ratio, Fiscal Years 

1986-1992 

Number of States 

50 

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Years 

9%-10% Incentive Payment 

7.5%-8.5% Incentive Payment 

6%-7% Incentive Payment 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

During the same period, fiscal years 1986 through 1992, several states 

earned non-AFDC incentives from 7.5 to 8.5 percent, and 6 to 18 states 

earned the maximum non-AFDC incentive. However, few of these states 

were able to take advantage of the full incentive earned because the dollar 

amount of the incentive payments is capped at an amount equal to 

115 percent of the AFDC incentive payments. See figure 2.2 for this 

distribution. 

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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Child 

Support Enforcement Incentive 

Payments Based on Non-AFDC 

Collection-To-Cost Ratio, Fiscal Years 

1986-1992 

Number of States 

50 

45 

40 

35 

30 

25 

20 

15 

10 

5 

0 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Years 

9%-10% Incentive Payment 

7.5%-8.5% Incentive Payment 

6%-7% Incentive Payment 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

Note: States may not receive the full dollar amount reflected in the percentages because the 

dollar amounts are capped at 115 percent of the AFDC incentive payments. 

OCSE has recognized the limitations of the incentive payment structure and 

has made two separate legislative proposals to make the structure more 

performance-based. In 1991, OCSE proposed rewards for performance in 

such activities as paternity establishment, order establishment, and AFDC 

terminations resulting from child support collections. It also suggested 

reducing incentives for cost-effectiveness. In addition, the proposal would 

have required states to reinvest the incentives in CSE. Officials at OCSE, 

however, said that the proposal was not pushed because of the change in 

administrations. Currently, OCSE is proposing to eliminate incentive 

payments and replace the entire funding structure with a graduated 

matching formula that would recognize different levels of state program 

performance. Under this proposal, certain levels of performance in at least 

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five key areas would be rewarded with a larger federal match: (1) paternity 

establishment, (2) support order establishment, (3) the portion of child 

support cases in which payments are received, (4) the amount of 

collections compared to support owed, and (5) cost-effectiveness. 

Proposed legislative language for this type of funding structure was 

incorporated in the administration’s 1994 welfare reform bill.39 

Incentive Funds Are 

Sometimes Used to 

Supplant Rather Than 

Supplement Other State 

CSE Funding 

Although many states do use at least some portion of the incentive 

payments to fund their CSE programs, the funds are sometimes used as part 

of the state match for federal funds rather than supplementing the state 

CSE budget and further expanding the program. In 1991, HHS’ Office of 

Inspector General reported that nine states had laws or regulations that 

specifically mandated how incentives must be used.40 In those nine states, 

incentive payments were passed along to local CSE operations or credited 

directly to the CSE program. Of the remaining states, 36 said they directed 

all or some portion of incentive payments to CSE. Those states indicated 

that they used incentive payments for CSE activities, including ongoing CSE 

operations, improving CSE automated systems, piloting CSE demonstration 

projects, and funding additional CSE agency employees. Ten states had 

used incentive payments to fund special CSE projects such as (1) a support 

order review and modification demonstration, (2) contracting with a 

private collection agency to pursue very difficult cases, and (3) automation 

development and preparation of cases for data entry or conversion to new 

systems. 

Further work by the Office of Inspector General and a survey of states 

conducted by Delaware found that incentive monies were used to make up 

the states’ share of the CSE programs’ operating or administrative costs. In 

a follow-up audit of nine selected states in 1991, the Office of Inspector 

General found, “Federal CSE incentives generally were used for the CSE 

program, reducing or eliminating the need for state/local general funds to 

fulfill matching requirements.”41 In Arizona, for example, the audit 

revealed that 70 percent of the incentive payments was used to reduce 

state or local program costs. The Inspector General concluded, “[T]he 

primary impact of incentive payments is that state CSE programs are 

39The administration’s proposal is contained in H.R. 4605 and S. 2224 introduced in the 103rd Congress. 

40See Child Support Incentive Payments, HHS, Office of Inspector General, Report #OEI-05-91-00750 

(June 1991). “States” refers to the 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, and the territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands. 

41See The Use and Equity of Child Support Enforcement Incentive Payments at Selected States, HHS, 

Office of Inspector General, Report #A-09-91-00034 (Apr. 22, 1992). The nine states were Alabama, 

Arizona, California, Kentucky, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 

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funded, sometimes exclusively, by the federal government through the 

federal cost share and incentives.” In fiscal year 1992, approximately 

84 percent of states’ total CSE administrative costs were reimbursed by the 

federal government through matching funds and incentive payments. 

Welfare Reform Proposals 

Include Different Funding 

Structures 

Three of the eight welfare reform proposals we reviewed would eliminate 

the existing incentive payment system and allow increasing federal match 

rates for different levels of performance. Under one, for example, states 

could earn a 5-percent increase in the match rate for improved 

performance establishing paternities and a 10-percent increase for 

improved overall performance. All three proposals would reward paternity 

establishment performance. In addition, one of the three proposals would 

reward state compliance with program and staffing standards. The other 

two propose aligning the funding structure with overall performance in a 

number of key areas, not just cost-effectiveness. Overall performance 

would include performance in (1) the areas of support order 

establishment, (2) child support cases in which payments are collected, 

(3) amount of collections compared with support owed, and 

(4) cost-effectiveness, as defined by the Secretary of HHS. By changing the 

funding structure to one that uses a matching formula exclusively, these 

proposals may eliminate some of the complexity in the current 

arrangement. The only expenditures that would be matched with federal 

funds would be CSE program expenditures. States would no longer receive 

incentive funds that (1) may be reinvested in the CSE program or spent 

elsewhere, (2) must be shared with local jurisdictions, and (3) are 

complicated to forecast because of the effect of the cap on non-AFDC 

incentives. 

Under all three proposals, the maximum federal matching rate a state 

could achieve would be equivalent to 90 percent of the state’s costs—if 

that state achieved the highest level of performance. However, it is 

difficult to predict if any of the three proposals would actually increase 

total federal costs. We do not know how many states, if any, will achieve 

maximum performance under two of the proposals because the 

performance goals are not yet defined. Under the third proposal, a state 

would have to establish paternity in at least 80 percent of the cases 

needing paternity establishment, meet the program standards in at least 

80 percent of the cases, and comply with staffing requirements set by the 

Secretary of HHS. To date, very few states have been able to establish 

paternity in 80 percent of the cases needing it, according to data reported 

by the states. 

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Although the Congress envisioned that OCSE would take an aggressive role 

in ensuring that states develop strong and effective CSE programs, OCSE has 

not done so. Specifically, the Congress tasked OCSE with providing 

leadership, technical assistance, and standards for the CSE program as well 

as monitoring state programs. But as the program evolved, OCSE’s ability to 

direct, assist, and communicate with state CSE programs did not keep pace 

with growing requirements. An HHS-wide reorganization left OCSE with little 

or no control over HHS regional staff who deal with state CSE program staff. 

In addition, its financial resources were reduced, nearly eliminating 

funding for training and technical assistance contracts to the states. 

Subsequently, communications between OCSE, HHS regional staff, and state 

program officials deteriorated, and working relationships became strained. 

On several occasions, OCSE has finalized regulations after the statutory 

effective dates of the legislated provisions, creating uncertainties for state 

programs. Also, while OCSE audits—its principal tool for monitoring state 

programs—have spurred state action in some cases, these audits have 

focused more on compliance with administrative procedures than on 

program outcomes. The audits have provided limited insight into how 

state programs could achieve better program results, and have come too 

late to be useful to some states. OCSE recognizes it needs to revise its audit 

approach and is taking steps to do so. Program personnel in many of the 

states we visited wanted more training and technical assistance from OCSE; 

some of these officials also expressed a desire to be more involved as OCSE 

drafts regulations. 

Since the mid-1980s, OCSE’s ability to fulfill its mission has been affected by OCSE Staff, Financial, an HHS-wide reorganization and workforce reductions. The number of staff

and Technical directly accountable to OCSE and OCSE’s financial resources decreased. 

Assistance Resources	 OCSE’s capacity to provide on-site technical assistance to states, through 

both contracts and OCSE and regional staff, has nearly been eliminated. All Reduced	 areas in OCSE, such as policy development, program operations, and audits, 

experienced staff reductions; but today, more OCSE staff remain devoted to 

audits than technical assistance. 

HHS Reorganization and As the result of a fiscal year 1986 HHS-wide reorganization, regional staff 

Resource Reductions	 devoted to CSE activities are no longer directly accountable to OCSE but 

instead report to HHS regional administrators. In 1986, OCSE was combined 

with five other major HHS programs, including AFDC, into the Family 

Support Administration to emphasize the family. (In 1991, the Family 

Support Administration became the Administration for Children and 

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Families [ACF].) In addition to regional staff, OCSE’s budgetary and 

administrative functions and automated systems unit were transferred to 

other Family Support Administration units. This reorganization changed 

the composition of OCSE staff and the amount of resources OCSE had at its 

disposal. To illustrate, in fiscal year 1986, before the reorganization, OCSE 

controlled 342 full-time positions—95 in regional offices and 247 in OCSE’s 

Washington, D.C., office and area audit offices located around the country. 

In fiscal year 1987, however, after losing control of CSE regional office 

staff, OCSE’s authorized positions dropped to 151. 

In addition to the loss of direct accountability from regional, financial, and 

information systems staff, OCSE’s staff devoted to technical assistance, 

training, policy, planning, evaluation, audit, and research and regulations42 

was also reduced. From fiscal year 1980 to 1992, OCSE staff assigned to 

these activities decreased from 181 to 151. See figure 3.1. From fiscal year 

1987 to 1992, staffing of the OCSE division responsible for training and 

technical assistance declined 37 percent, from 43 to 27. 

42That is, excluding financial and information systems management, and regional office staff 

transferred to other parts of ACF during 1986. 

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Figure 3.1: Staff Directly Accountable to OCSE, Fiscal Years 1980-1992 

Number of Positions 

350 

300 

250 

200 

150 

100 

50 

0 

1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Fiscal Year 

Regional Offices 

Information and Financial Systems 

Audit, Technical Assistance, Policy, Director 

Note: Fiscal year 1982 numbers not available. 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

OCSE financial resources were also reduced beginning in the mid-1980s. 

Along with the staff resources that were removed from OCSE’s control after 

the 1986 reorganization, OCSE’s financial resources were reduced by over 

50 percent. Part of this reduction included about $2 million in contracts for 

technical assistance, publications development, data processing, and other 

services. From fiscal year 1986 to 1987, these contracts declined from 

$5.3 million to $3.2 million. Total financial resources under OCSE’s direct 

control in fiscal year 1992 were $10.4 million compared with $21.3 million 

in fiscal year 1986 when the regions were under OCSE’s control. See 

figure 3.2. 

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Figure 3.2: OCSE Financial Resources, Fiscal Years 1980-1992 

30000 Thousands of Dollars 

1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 

Fiscal Years 

Note: The drop in OCSE’s resources from $21.3 million in FY 1986 to $9.8 million in FY 1987 

reflects an HHS reorganization during FY 1986 in which OCSE lost direct control of regional CSE 

staff and headquarters financial and information systems staff. 

Source: OCSE annual reports. 

Technical Assistance and 

Training to States Greatly 

Reduced 

Despite its mission to provide technical assistance to state CSE programs, 

OCSE’s resources for both direct and contracted work of this kind have 

been reduced. Throughout the 1980s, OCSE funded several contracts for 

training and technical assistance, but today has none. Also during the 

1980s, particularly the early 1980s, both OCSE headquarters and regional 

staff provided extensive, direct, on-site technical assistance to the states 

and conducted formal management studies of local and state programs. 

Joint management studies are no longer done and on-site technical 

assistance is minimal in most regions. In fiscal year 1992, fewer than a 

quarter of OCSE’s staff were devoted to providing training and technical 

assistance. Of OCSE’s fiscal year 1992 staff of 151, 86 people, or 57 percent, 

were devoted to conducting compliance audits. OCSE funds for contracted 

training and technical assistance have been eliminated. OCSE officials said 

that in the early 1980s the office had contracting authority for $3 million in 

training and technical assistance. By fiscal year 1990, however, this had 

Page 55 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

25000 

20000 

15000 

10000 

5000 

0 
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been reduced to $1 million and by fiscal year 1993 to $300,000. OCSE 

officials said they had no funds for contracted training and technical 

assistance in fiscal year 1994. OCSE’s total contracts for publications 

development, printing, data processing, and other services, as well as 

training and technical assistance, were reduced from $7.1 million in fiscal 

year 1985 to $2.1 million in fiscal year 1992. At least six technical 

assistance efforts funded through contracts in the 1980s are no longer 

funded: (1) transferring best practices; (2) training state, local, and federal 

personnel; (3) assisting states in drafting legislation; (4) providing 

orientation and training to state judges and judicial and quasi-judicial staff; 

(5) providing links with the legal community of court clerks, the private 

bar, and prosecutors; and (6) publishing educational articles. 

In addition, in the first half of the 1980s, when HHS regional offices were 

still directly in the chain of command to OCSE, they provided extensive 

on-site technical assistance to state programs; they no longer do. They 

conducted formal management studies of local and state programs, 

sponsored conferences for judges, and met with and testified before state 

legislative committees. Regional staff also made presentations before 

public interest groups; state and local officials, including legislators, court 

personnel, judges, attorneys, and child support administrators; and others; 

and participated in educational panels. They also helped write television 

and radio public service announcements, assisted in drafting state 

legislation, and appeared on television and radio talk shows. At the time of 

our review, most HHS regions were providing minimal on-site technical 

assistance to states. 

OCSE and regional office staff jointly conducted comprehensive 

management reviews of state programs and provided on-site technical 

assistance during the early 1980s. Today, OCSE staff’s technical assistance 

efforts are limited primarily to participating in national conferences, 

distributing pamphlets and self-help guides, writing letters, making 

telephone calls, and posting information on electronic bulletin boards. In 

fiscal year 1981, OCSE’s program operations division performed 14 

management reviews; whereas in fiscal year 1993, OCSE officials said they 

no longer do management reviews. 

The OCSE division director responsible for technical assistance told us the 

small staff and travel budget devoted to technical assistance severely 

limits their ability to compile and disseminate best practices and provide 

direct on-site training and assistance to state programs. In February 1993, 

25 OCSE staff were devoted to training and technical assistance. At the 

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same time, the travel budget for these staff was limited to $10,000. The 

OCSE official said that staff responsible for technical assistance are able to 

meet with regional offices only once a year; they have monthly telephone 

conference calls in lieu of more frequent personal contact. 

HHS Current 

Organization for CSE 

Has Not Been the 

Most Effective 

The current organization of CSE responsibilities within HHS has not been 

the most effective for providing program leadership. OCSE’s ability to 

communicate, direct, and assist state programs is limited. For example, 

OCSE has no direct control over HHS regional resources for CSE, has no 

process for feedback from the regions on CSE work, and receives no 

definite up-front commitment of regional office resources to CSE. 

Furthermore, state CSE programs must deal with several points of contact 

at the federal level. Under this organization, misunderstandings and 

miscommunications of program policy and requirements have occurred 

between states, HHS regional offices, and OCSE. 

Regional Office CSE 

Resources Not 

Accountable to OCSE 

OCSE has no direct control over CSE regional resources and no formal 

process for feedback from the regions. Before the 1986 reorganization that 

created the Family Support Administration (which later became ACF), 

regional CSE staff were directly accountable to OCSE.

43 Under the current 

organization structure, all regional staff report to regional administrators 

for ACF. These administrators must balance resources among all ACF 

programs, including CSE, to meet mandated ACF program requirements. 

However, there is no process for getting firm, up-front regional office 

commitment of resources to the CSE program—OCSE can only set priorities 

for areas of state programs to be examined by regions. 

In addition, there is no formal process for regional office feedback to OCSE 

on the results of their expenditure of resources on CSE. ACF’s director of 

regional operations staff officials told us that it was impossible to 

determine the dollars and staff time spent by the HHS regional offices for 

CSE state technical assistance, training, or program reviews because of the 

intermingling of funds that occurred after the 1986 reorganization. Also, 

OCSE officials did not know if certain regional efforts cited in ACF’s 

strategic plan for performance by regions were accomplished; they said 

the regions had not reported on them. For example, the plan stated that 

regions were going to develop joint plans with states to increase AFDC 

43The April 1991 reorganization combined the Family Support Adminstration, HHS’ Office of Human 

Development Services and the Maternal and Child Health block grant programs administered by the 

Public Health Service into ACF, where OCSE remains today. 

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recovery and the number of paying cases, but OCSE did not know what had 

been done. 

Several Points of Contact HHS’ organization of CSE responsibilities affects communication with state 

for States	 programs. Currently, states must deal with at least five different HHS units 

for their CSE programs as illustrated in figure 3.3. An HHS regional official 

said it is confusing for the states to be dealing sometimes directly with 

OCSE for some things and other times with the regions. The nature of these 

contacts is summarized in table 3.1. 

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Figure 3.3: HHS Points of Contact for State CSE Programs 

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Note: Highlighted boxes show states’ points of contact within HHS. 

Page 59 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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Table 3.1: HHS Points of Contact for


State CSE Programs HHS organizational unit Nature of contact


OCSE, Washington, D.C.	 Federal tax refund intercepts; checks of Internal 

Revenue Service information; federal parent locator 

service; requests for waivers of program requirements; 

and verification of social security numbers with the 

Social Security Administration 

HHS regional offices	 State plan submission and approval; exemption 

requests; required data-reporting reviews; and 

financial systems reviews 

ACF Office of Information Matters concerning certification of child support 

Systems and Management, computer management information systems 

Washington, D.C. 

OCSE area audit offices and Compliance audit scheduling and issues 

Washington, D.C. 

HHS Office of Inspector General Independent investigations of the CSE program 

Poor Communication 

Between OCSE, States, and 

Regions 

The HHS reorganization placing CSE regional office staff in a different chain 

of command rather than having them report to OCSE impaired CSE 

communications between OCSE, the regions, and the states. An HHS regional 

CSE official said the added layers of bureaucracy impeded communication 

with states and their communication with OCSE. Similarly, OCSE officials 

confirmed there have been communication breakdowns with the regions. 

They said that regional staff have misconstrued information and 

communicated inaccurate information to the states. 

States have complained of vague and inconsistent policy interpretations 

from OCSE and HHS regions. One state CSE director described 

communication channels as “convoluted layers,” similar to a “black hole” 

where things just “disappear.” In addition, state representatives testified in 

1991 before the congressionally established Commission on Interstate 

Child Support that CSE policy was often interpreted differently by HHS 

regional offices and OCSE auditors.44 

During our visits to eight states in summer 1993, program officials in one 

state cited OCSE guidance about the requirement to review and adjust 

support orders every 3 years as an example of unclear and untimely 

communication. Though the required implementation deadline was 

October 1993, these state officials were not clear what date should be used 

as the base date for the 3-year review cycle in situations in which families 

44Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform, U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support 

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 249. The Commission was charged by statute 

to make recommendations on improvements to the interstate establishment and enforcement of child 

support awards. 

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go off AFDC and later go back on. They could not discern from the 

regulations which of at least three possible dates could start the review 

cycle: (1) the date the family first went on AFDC, (2) the date the family 

went off AFDC, or (3) the date the family went back on AFDC. 

W Working relationships between state programs and OCSE and HHS regions orking Relationships have been more adversarial than cooperative. State officials cite the need

Strained	 for more technical assistance and timely regulations from OCSE rather than 

policing of processes. According to state officials, the untimeliness of 

regulations has made it more difficult for them to comply with the law. In 

some cases, the late issuance of regulations caused them to go back to 

their legislature to request additional legislative changes. State officials 

also want more input into regulations development. 

States Want More Many state officials we talked with want more technical and training 

Technical Assistance	 assistance from OCSE and HHS regions, like that done in the past. State 

officials want more nationwide training from OCSE and help in developing 

their own training capabilities. They believe the HHS regional offices need 

to be more proactive in sharing information with the states and helping 

states provide additional support to one another. 

Some States and HHS 

Regional Staff Trying New 

Model for Cooperative 

Technical Assistance 

In the face of diminished OCSE resources for technical assistance, states in 

two federal regions are developing model approaches to providing 

technical assistance and training.45 States in one region have established a 

steering committee composed of the chief executive officers of states’ 

human service agencies and the ACF regional administrator. The ultimate 

goal is better coordination of human services. Under the steering 

committee, four work groups address (1) child support enforcement, 

(2) welfare reform, (3) child welfare services, and (4) administration and 

organizational issues. The child support enforcement work group is 

focusing on common training needs and federal-state communication. 

In another region, state child support training coordinators are forming a 

regional training network. The idea originated during a national training 

conference in 1991. The group plans to share materials, attend each others’ 

training sessions, develop training packages for line workers, and serve as 

consultants to each other and to their CSE directors. 

45The regions are Region VII and X. Region VII is Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska. Region X is 

Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Alaska. 

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Untimely Regulations Some officials from the states we visited complained that OCSE’s late 

Make States’ issuance of federal regulations made it difficult for them to pass required 

Implementation More state legislation and comply with the law in time and damaged the 

Difficult program’s credibility with state legislatures. As shown in table 3.2, for 

example, final regulations implementing requirements in the 1988 

amendments for wage withholding on delinquent non-AFDC cases and all 

new or modified CSE cases were issued in July 1992, almost 1-1/2 years 

after the November 1990 statutory effective date. 

Table 3.2: Statutory Effective Dates 

and Dates of Final Regulations for Statutory effective Dates of final 

Selected CSE Program Requirements Program requirement dates regulations 

Wage withholding on delinquent non-AFDC November 1990 July 1992 

cases and all new or modified IV-D casesa 

Presumptive state guidelinesb October 1989 May 1991 

Medical support in all ordersc August 1984 September 1988 

aWage withholding is a procedure by which automatic deductions are made from wages or 

income to pay a debt such as child support. It may be voluntary or involuntary. 

bPresumptive guidelines are a standard method for setting child support orders based on the 

income of the parent(s) and other factors. Child support orders set according to the guidelines 

are presumed to be correct. Judges and others must use the state guidelines or demonstrate that 

the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case. 

cMedical support includes (1) legal provision for payment of medical and dental bills or 

(2) access to the noncustodial parent’s medical insurance or (3) both. 

In the absence of federal regulations, states are left to interpret laws on 

their own. When regulations are issued later, they may have provisions in 

them that make state law incorrect or otherwise require state CSE program 

officials to go back to their legislatures for changes. In 1989, at the time of 

proposed regulations governing use of presumptive state guidelines, OCSE 

proposed additional requirements only 1 month before the statutory 

effective date—long after such requirements should have been known. 

State officials complained that some requirements would cause undue 

burden on those who had taken steps in good faith to achieve compliance 

but now would be out of compliance. 

Even when OCSE has responded to legislation by issuing regulations 

promptly, state officials often find themselves having to address later 

revisions. For example, regulations establishing time frames for 

distribution of support in interstate cases were required by statute to be 

issued by August 1989 and were, but OCSE made significant 

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modifications—in essence finalized the regulations—almost 2 years later 

in May 1991. 

Some States Want a More 

Collaborative Approach to 

Developing Regulations 

Some program officials in the states we visited suggested a new approach 

to developing regulations in which OCSE would solicit more involvement 

from states earlier in the process. Some believed that OCSE does not get 

enough state input before proposing regulations or does not adequately 

respond to state comments on the impact of implementing new policies 

and proposed regulations. These officials believed the approach currently 

used for developing federal regulations provides for state comments too 

late and does not encourage a federal-state dialogue. They would like to 

see states involved before proposed regulations are drafted, when OCSE is 

wrestling with the issues. One program official suggested an alternative 

approach in which OCSE would identify issue areas and use HHS regional 

CSE specialists to discuss the issues with the states and collect ideas from 

the states for OCSE. Program officials in other states believed this approach 

would allow states to participate in the process well before the regulations 

are drafted and public comments are solicited. They also believed this 

approach would save time by reducing state comments later, after the 

draft regulations are published.46 

Audits Provide 

Limited Insight Into 

Program Outcomes, 

but Still Spur State 

Actions 

OCSE compliance audits as presently structured provide only a partial 

picture of state performance. The audits provide little insight into ultimate 

case outcomes and the extent to which the actions taken have been 

productive. The audits focus on compliance with federal requirements for 

written procedures and service delivery and thus highlight what state 

programs have not done, rather than what state programs have 

accomplished and what methods have been particularly successful. In 

addition, audits are untimely with final formal audit reports sometimes 

issued a full 2 years after the period of performance audited. Although 

state officials complained that audits are too late to be a useful 

management tool for them, they acknowledged that the audits and the 

threat of penalties have helped their programs get state legislative 

attention and resources. To ensure compliance with OCSE regulations for 

program standards in anticipation of audits and to improve program 

46What the states suggested is essentially similar to “regulatory negotiation” recommended by the 

Administrative Conference of the U.S. in 1982 and 1985. The conference noted that “bringing interested 

parties together in a cooperative setting at the front end of the rulemaking process . . . has the capacity 

to reduce the likelihood of litigation, to produce faster and less costly rulemaking—and to create 

objectively better rules.” David M. Pritzker and Deborah S. Dalton, Negotiated Rulemaking 

Sourcebook, Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 1990). 

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management, some states are developing internal auditing and monitoring 

capabilities. OCSE is attempting to make the audits more outcome-focused 

and timely. 

Audits Assess Compliance 

With Administrative 

Procedures More Than 

Outcomes 

Despite congressional pressure to measure states’ program effectiveness, 

OCSE has continued to rely on an audit approach that has over 50 

compliance criteria and three performance indicators to judge program 

effectiveness. The performance indicators are limited to measuring three 

outcomes: AFDC and non-AFDC collections-to-cost ratios and AFDC recovery 

rates; they do not address other CSE functions such as paternity and order 

establishment. The compliance criteria include 29 criteria with numerous 

subcriteria for auditing state compliance with federal requirements for 

certain procedures, such as written procedures for publicizing the 

availability of support enforcement services. In addition, there are 23 

criteria with numerous subcriteria for ensuring that states are providing 

child support services in accordance with their approved state plans. 

In the past, OCSE has considered an effective state program one that is in 

substantial compliance with both aspects of the audit: performance 

indicators and compliance criteria. To determine substantial compliance 

with the performance indicators, the level of state performance reached in 

each of the three performance indicators is assigned a numerical score. A 

state’s combined score must equal or exceed 70 for substantial 

compliance. To determine substantial compliance with the criteria, OCSE 

auditors examine state written procedures to determine whether they 

(1) comply with federal laws and regulations and (2) are used in 

75 percent of the cases sampled. In addition, each sampled case may be 

audited for more than one criterion. For example, a case may be reviewed 

for its compliance with both location and paternity establishment criteria. 

Furthermore, a case may fail one criterion but pass another, and thus be 

counted as deficient in one instance and acceptable in 

another—regardless of the case’s ultimate outcome. 

OCSE believes that this audit approach is performance-based. In addition, 

OCSE believes the audits provide clear indicators of state program 

performance because they highlight what services were not provided by 

states during the audited period. However, determining compliance—the 

extent to which procedures are in place and actions are taken on 

cases—does not include an assessment of the effectiveness of the states’ 

procedures in achieving the desired outcomes such as paternity and 

support order establishment. In addition, while many states have failed the 

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compliance criteria, only 3 states have also failed to achieve a score of at 

least 70 on the performance indicators since fiscal year 1986. Therefore, 

audit results present a limited view of state performance. 

Audits Too Late to Be 

Useful 

The usefulness of compliance audits for judging state performance is also 

limited because they are not done in a timely fashion. In some instances, 

final formal audit reports were issued 2 years after the period of 

performance audited. In addition, OCSE has yet to audit state 

implementation of the Family Support Act of 1988 because the audit 

regulations are not yet final. 

State officials, HHS regional staff, and advocates shared the view that the 

audits’ usefulness is limited. State officials expressed confusion over the 

timing and purpose of the audits and believed that penalties were often 

applicable to past conditions that no longer exist. In addition, some HHS 

regional CSE specialists told us the audit reports are too late to be useful to 

the states. 

States Say Audits Provide Although state officials complained about the utility and timing of 

Some Impetus for Change	 compliance audits, some acknowledged positive effects from audits. 

Program officials acknowledged that audits and penalties or the threat of 

penalties47 have helped their programs get state legislative attention and 

resources. With the attention of their legislatures, states were able to make 

a number of legislative, procedural, and system changes to correct 

deficiencies and hire additional staff. In addition, some states said the 

audits were useful in getting offices to use the administrative process. 

Some States Have 

Developed Their Own 

Program Monitoring 

Strategies 

Some states have developed their own internal audit procedures and 

monitoring systems to ensure compliance with federal standards and 

provide more timely performance evaluation for program management. 

Although OCSE is not yet auditing state programs for requirements of the 

1988 amendments, some states are auditing themselves against these 

requirements. OCSE considers a number of state efforts exemplary and 

highlighted seven states’ internal monitoring programs in an information 

memorandum to all states in early 1993. In addition, our review of eight 

states identified some additional efforts. 

47Approximately $21 million in audit penalties have been assessed Ohio, New Mexico, Arizona, 

Mississippi, the District of Columbia, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico as a result of OCSE 

compliance audits since 1975. 

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In California, for example, county performance is reviewed annually, 

feedback from state evaluators is described as immediate, and follow-up 

on corrective action plans for noncompliance is quarterly. California 

formed a separate unit that does the reviews in 21 small counties. That 

unit also validates reviews done in 37 larger counties by local staff who are 

trained by the state in the review methodology and funded by the state. 

Several counties have incorporated software in their case management 

systems for tracking time frames, which has helped the state prepare for 

statewide automation by increasing the uniformity of case management 

throughout the state. An analysis of the review efforts showed marked 

improvement in county compliance with federal program operation 

standards. 

In another state, Delaware, the quality control system that has been 

developed evaluates not only the performance of the CSE agency but also 

that of the Delaware Family Court. An automated sampling process 

ensures that cases selected had activity in the specified program area 

being examined during the specified time period. 

OCSE Is Trying to Change Over the last few years, OCSE has been trying to change the audit process, 

Its Audit Process	 and its officials are on record that the audits need to be more 

outcome-oriented. Working with state CSE program directors and the 

National Governors’ Association, OCSE has been exploring ways to make 

the audits more outcome-oriented and has taken both a regulatory and 

legislative approach to effect a change. 

In September 1993, OCSE published proposed revisions to existing audit 

regulations that officials did not believe required any statutory changes. In 

the proposed approach, achievement of desired case outcomes in sampled 

cases would take priority over compliance with process and time frames 

in determining substantial compliance. If a desired outcome, such as 

paternity establishment, was achieved in a case during the time period 

audited, the case would be considered compliant; deviations from the 

process or time frames leading to that outcome would not be counted as 

noncompliant. If a desired outcome was not achieved, then the case would 

have to meet process and time frame criteria. 

The proposed regulations, however, would not add new performance 

indicators or revise the current indicators that are limited to 

cost-effectiveness and AFDC recovery. OCSE has chosen to delay revisions to 

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the performance indicators until more refined indicators can be devised 

and states have had sufficient time to implement the new standards. 

While the proposed audit regulations would reduce some requirements, 

they would add others, making their net effects on audit timeliness 

difficult to predict. Although the proposed audit regulations combine and 

consolidate current criteria, they would add many significant criteria to 

allow the auditing of compliance with provisions of the 1988 amendments. 

The proposed regulations narrow the focus of audits to 14 of 52 existing 

criteria. These 14 criteria reflect service areas that at least 10 percent of 

the states have failed in the past. However, all of at least 17 additional 

criteria (with numerous subcriteria) would be audited for compliance with 

the 1988 amendments. Moreover, the substantial compliance standards for 

maintenance of records and case closure would be raised from 75 percent 

to 90 percent of cases sampled. 

While the revised audit regulations have not been finalized, OCSE officials 

have decided that further changes need to be made to the audit process to 

focus more on outcomes and less on detailed process requirements. To do 

this, however, OCSE officials believe that the statutory mandate for 

comprehensive audits must be changed. Proposed legislative language 

effecting this change was incorporated in the administration’s welfare 

reform proposal. Pending further legislative action, OCSE has suspended its 

scheduled compliance audits for 1994. Instead, audit staff are evaluating 

state data collection and reporting systems as noted earlier in chapter 2. 

While the federal CSE role varied among the eight welfare reform proposals Proposed Welfare we reviewed, all would give some new responsibilities to OCSE,

48 but few

Reforms Would Place would add resources for technical assistance or change the audit process. 

Greater Demands on	 Under some of the proposals, OCSE would be required to develop and 

coordinate new or expanded national automated information systems. OCSE	 Others would require OCSE to work with the states in such areas as training 

development and establishing staffing standards. New responsibilities 

placed directly on the states may also require greater technical assistance 

efforts and communication by OCSE and within HHS to ensure effective state 

implementation. 

48The proposals generally assigned the responsibilites to the Secretary of HHS, but presumably 

implementation responsibility would be delegated to OCSE. 

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Some Welfare Reforms 

Propose Larger 

Coordinating Role and 

More Responsibilities for 

OCSE 

A number of the proposals we reviewed would require OCSE to develop and 

coordinate new or expanded automated information systems, develop a 

comprehensive training program for federal and state program staff, and 

conduct staffing studies of each state’s program. Four of the proposals, for 

example, would direct OCSE to develop a national database of all child 

support orders issued or enforced by state CSE programs. Six proposals 

would require reporting of newly hired employees to state or federal 

agencies, and one of these would also require OCSE to maintain a database 

of the newly hired employees through a modified W-4 tax withholding 

reporting procedure. 

Also, additional responsibilities for OCSE for training and staffing standards 

for state programs were included in some of the welfare reform proposals. 

Two proposals specifically called for OCSE to provide training as well as 

technical assistance to states. One of these proposals would require OCSE 

to develop (1) a core curriculum and training standards for state programs 

to follow and (2) national training for state CSE program directors. In 

addition, these two proposals would direct OCSE to conduct staffing studies 

in each state, and a third would set a deadline for HHS to set staffing 

requirements as already required under section 452(a)(2) of the Social 

Security Act. 

New State Responsibilities 

Could Require More 

Technical Assistance and 

Effective Communication 

From OCSE 

Under many of the welfare reform proposals we reviewed, states would 

also have new mandates and requirements that may require more technical 

assistance and effective communication from OCSE for implementation. 

For example, seven proposals would impose new requirements affecting 

states’ paternity establishment programs. One called for OCSE to develop 

regulations for voluntary paternity acknowledgment in nonhospital 

settings. Another would give state CSE programs authority to determine if 

an AFDC applicant is cooperating in the paternity establishment effort. 

However, OCSE is responsible for developing the standards state programs 

must use if they believe the custodial parent should be exempt from 

cooperation. In addition, there are proposed mandates for states to 

establish such measures as employee reporting, professional license 

suspension if child support is delinquent, less judicial case processing, 

central collections and distribution, cost-of-living adjustments in new or 

modified child support orders, and inclusion of delinquent child support 

payers in their job search and training programs for welfare recipients. 

While some states are implementing some of these now, others may need 

assistance from OCSE to enact and implement these requirements. 

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In addition, under many of the proposals, states would be required to 

enhance their current systems and establish new databases. These state 

efforts would require technical assistance and monitoring activities by 

OCSE program staff and ACF management information systems personnel to 

ensure efficient development and capacity for linking state systems to a 

national system where necessary. Seven of the proposals we reviewed, for 

example, would require states to establish central or automatically linked 

local registries that would have a record of all child support orders being 

enforced by the CSE program. Some of these proposals would require all 

child support orders issued in the state to be included. 

Specific Funding Scheme One proposal included a provision for a specific funding scheme for 

Proposed for Technical federal activities assisting state programs. Under this proposal, funds from 

Assistance the federal portion of recovered AFDC payments would be used to fund a 

wide range of activities. Among these activities would be information 

dissemination, technical assistance, training of state and federal staff, and 

operation of the federal databases containing child support orders and 

employee information. 

Audits Targeted for Change OCSE would be required under three of the welfare reform proposals to 

Under Some Welfare change the audit process to different degrees. One proposal specified the 

Reform Proposals process be streamlined to (1) be less burdensome on states in substantial 

compliance, (2) produce more timely analysis of states not in substantial 

compliance, and (3) possibly shift resources to providing technical 

assistance. Another proposal required OCSE to create, after a year of study, 

a new process—with new criteria, standards, and reporting—that 

emphasizes outcomes. 

Finally, a third proposal would make the most specific and immediate 

changes. This proposal would require (1) all states to have an annual 

monitoring and reporting capability that meets OCSE standards and (2) OCSE 

to change the focus of its audits to verifying state data, data systems, and 

financial management. Since this proposal would also change the 

incentive structure to reward states for achieving certain levels of 

performance in key areas, such as paternity and order establishment, data 

verification performed by the audits would be critical to the accuracy of 

performance assessment and incentive adjustments. This proposal 

incorporates the statutory change desired by OCSE. 

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Despite substantial federal funding, mandates, and oversight, CSE is still 

very much a state program in which state and local leadership, operating 

in unique political and fiscal environments, is primarily responsible for 

program performance. Our work in eight states49 and our past 

studies—and the research of others— suggest that state programs face 

common barriers hindering their CSE efforts and are at different points in 

developing the specific management and enforcement tools they need to 

overcome or reduce the barriers. State programs must deal with increased 

caseloads; limits in their computer systems’ capacity to serve those 

caseloads; limited control over local program activities; a need to garner 

legislative support for new state CSE initiatives; and poor communication 

between CSE and AFDC staff that impedes CSE’s ability to provide services to 

AFDC clients. 

The states we visited had developed multiple strategies to deal with these 

barriers. Over the years, all had added some staff, increased their use of 

administrative rather than judicial case processing, and developed 

innovative enforcement tools such as requiring employers to report newly 

hired employees to a central state registry and using state tax data to 

locate noncustodial parents. In addition, these states all recognized 

automation as a critical tool for dealing with a variety of barriers and were 

expanding their computer capacity. State programs used a variety of 

techniques, such as having a legislative liaison office, to convince state 

legislatures to enact laws needed to authorize new enforcement tools. 

States also have made changes to improve CSE-AFDC coordination, such as 

locating both programs in the same state agency. 

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the various barriers identified in our 

review and the strategies state CSE programs initiated to overcome them. 

As shown in the table, multiple strategies are often used to address 

different barriers. Appendix III presents selected information about the 

state CSE programs we visited. 

49Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia. 

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Table 4.1: Barriers States Face and


Some Strategies to Overcome Them Barriers Strategies


Increasing workloads and 

resource constraints 

Limited computer system 

capacity 

Dispersed program control 

and lack of procedural 

uniformity 

More staff 

Administrative rather than judicial processes for 

establishment and enforcement of paternity and support 

orders 

Innovative practices such as new-hire reporting to reach 

difficult populations 

Increased use of automation 

Contracts with private collection firms 

Volunteers 

Enhancing existing and acquiring new computer software 

and technology 

Automation used to 

— centralize program data and functions 

— standardize case processing procedures 

— monitor compliance with processing standards 

Lack of legislative support for Legislative activism and consensus-building through 

initiatives and resources 

— assigned staff to promote program mission to 

legislature 

— public awareness campaigns and lobbying efforts 

emphasizing goals and achievements 

— communication with advocacy groups and others 

— improved program management and services 

Inadequate communication Communication initiatives and program liaisons


between AFDC and CSE


programs Mutual education and training programs for staff


Staff co-location 

Revisions to intake and referral process 

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To varying degrees, the eight state CSE programs we reviewed have Experiences of Eight experienced and continue to experience common barriers. These barriers

States Illustrate include (1) increasingly complex and growing workloads coupled with 

Common Barriers resource constraints, (2) limited computer system capacity, (3) dispersed 

program control and lack of uniform procedures, (4) lack of legislative Impeding State CSE support, and (5) inadequate communication between the AFDC and CSE 

Efforts programs. 

State and Local Programs State and local CSE programs must deal with more demanding workloads 

Must Deal With More despite constrained resources. State programs are confronting (1) a 

Demanding Workloads and growing number of cases that more frequently need paternity 

Resource Constraints establishment, (2) increasing time-consuming interaction with custodial 

parents, (3) limited ability to reach some noncustodial parents, and 

(4) federal requirements for medical support enforcement and case review 

and modification. At the same time, state budgets have been seriously cut 

back and some states are seeking ways to “downsize” their governments. 

As a result of rising out-of-wedlock birth rates, paternity establishment is 

becoming an increasingly large aspect of CSE. In Texas, for example, as of 

June 1993, more than 40 percent of Texas’ total caseload needed paternity 

established, according to state figures (see figure 4.1). As described in 

chapter 1, paternity establishment is the first step in obtaining child 

support. It can be time-consuming and involve genetic testing and judicial 

hearings as well as CSE efforts to interview custodial parents and locate the 

alleged fathers. 

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Figure 4.1: Texas CSE Caseload Profile, June 1993 

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In addition, AFDC custodial parents’ reluctance to cooperate with CSE staff 

has been cited by program staff across the country as contributing to the 

workload difficulty. Staff in the eight states we visited also cited contacts 

from increasing numbers of non-AFDC custodial parents as part of their 

growing workload. 

Program officials in all eight states also expressed frustration with the 

difficulty of pursuing noncustodial parents who are self-employed or 

change jobs frequently. CSE officials explained that the inability to reach 

such parents with existing resources and enforcement tools impeded 

collections and overall program performance. 

The expanding CSE program mission also increased CSE case complexity. In 

addition to the traditional establishment and enforcement services, 

program resources are being devoted to medical support enforcement and 

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review and modification of support orders. The additional case complexity 

and the resources required are reflected in the longer time it takes to train 

new caseworkers and bring them up to a full-performance level. In 

Kentucky, officials said it takes 15 months to bring a new caseworker up 

to the full-performance level; whereas, it used to take 9 months. 

At the time of our visits, states were beginning to wrestle with review and 

modification requirements that became effective October 13, 1993. Based 

on the results of state demonstrations of the review and modification 

process, some state program officials anticipated further resource 

shortfalls. The demonstrations revealed that the process is very labor 

intensive, with two states estimating the need for 11 to 13 percent more 

staff to meet the requirements. One researcher noted that review and 

modification “can require considerable persistence to obtain accurate 

income information from parents, perform one or more guideline 

calculations, try to obtain an order agreeable to both parties, and prepare 

the case for court if necessary. In addition, part of the workload burden 

derives from the specifications of the Family Support Act, which imposes 

a complex scheme of notices and timeframes.”50 

Although staffing levels have increased over time for all the states we 

reviewed, program personnel told us that the programs were still 

understaffed relative to caseload size and the amount of work required for 

a typical child support case. Program officials’ estimates of worker 

caseload ranged from 300 to 2,500 cases per worker.51 In commenting on 

workload difficulties, a New York local CSE official estimated that his 

office was 40 percent understaffed. In addition, a 1992 Arizona Auditor 

General report noted that staffing levels were inadequate to address 

rapidly growing caseloads. Telephone inquiries alone can consume staff 

time. State officials in Iowa and Texas, for example, reported that centrally 

located operators handle an average of 7,000 and 31,000 calls a month, 

respectively. These calls are in addition to the calls made to those states’ 

automated inquiry systems and do not include the number of calls handled 

directly by field staff. 

Although CSE programs have received substantial federal funding and state 

funding increases over the years, they have not always escaped budget 

cuts. The Iowa program, for example, experienced a reduced legislative 

50Robert G. Williams, Ph.D., President, Policy Studies, Inc., in testimony before the Subcommittee on 

Human Resources, Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 1994). 

51See Interstate Child Support: Wage Withholding Not Fulfilling Expectations (GAO/HRD-92-65BR, 

Feb. 25, 1992). In a survey of 136 local CSE offices, the median estimate was 1,000 cases per worker. 

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appropriation in 1991 along with all other state agencies. A number of CSE 

officials in the states we visited expressed concern that state funding for 

the program remains insufficient and resources are thinly spread. 

Limited Computer Systems 

Capacity a Barrier to 

States 

Despite nearly 15 years of 90-percent federal funding and a requirement 

that CSE have statewide computer systems by October 1995, some state CSE 

programs lack the systems capacity to serve growing caseloads and 

address additional federal case processing requirements. In extreme cases, 

such as Virginia and Kentucky in 1993, states still do not have single 

statewide computer systems. Instead, they rely on multiple stand-alone 

systems or manual processing to manage and track caseload actions. In 

Kentucky, for example, the largest portion of the state’s caseload was 

being tracked by both a largely manual system in the state area office and 

a local computer system in a corresponding county attorney’s office. 

Kentucky officials noted this arrangement caused duplication of casework 

between state and county offices. In both Virginia and Kentucky, multiple 

systems and the absence of integrated databases make case processing 

and tracking more difficult and require more manual intervention. 

Oregon’s CSE program was among the first to implement automated CSE 

systems but now suffers from aging technology and strained capability to 

carry out federally required CSE functions such as case initiation and 

enforcement.52 Oregon, although it implemented a system between 1975 

and 1978, is now in virtually the same situation as some other states 

developing systems for the first time. Over the years, Oregon made 

incremental enhancements to its system to handle increased caseload 

complexity and federal case processing requirements. Unfortunately, these 

incremental enhancements have strained the system’s functional and data 

storage capacities. A 1991 OCSE review noted major deficiencies and 

recommended Oregon replace its current system. 

Automated systems in Massachusetts and Iowa also continue to have 

limitations. Massachusetts, a leader in using automation to seize 

noncustodial parents’ bank assets, still has a limited system for case 

management. The current system provides little support for case initiation, 

management, and automated tracking of efforts to locate parents, 

paternity establishment, and court proceedings. Caseload intake and 

noncustodial parent location functions are primarily handled manually by 

CSE personnel. In contrast, Iowa’s automated CSE system has extensive 

52Other functional requirements under federal law include case management, financial management, 

security, and reporting. 

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case tracking and reporting capabilities, but its ability to seize bank assets 

is hindered by its current automation capacity. As of June 1993, Iowa 

lacked the technology to identify assets and levy administrative liens 

automatically. One program official said that the ability to do a 

tape-to-tape match of CSE records with self-employment tax and asset 

records would be an “invaluable” enforcement tool. 

Program Control Is Personnel in most of the state programs we visited were frustrated with 

Dispersed and Uniformity 

Is Lacking 

the dispersed and variable nature of their program structure, but not all to 

the same degree. Program personnel in New York, Kentucky, and Oregon 

complained that multiple and autonomous particpants (for example, 

judges, county attorneys, local governments) with competing priorities 

prohibited centralized control and posed a barrier to state CSE program 

performance. These programs lacked uniform statewide procedures and 

as a result had difficulty implementing statewide CSE initiatives. Our 

previous work and the research of others have identified dispersed 

program control as a barrier to improving CSE.

53 According to one study, 

involvement by the courts, prosecutors, advocacy groups, local human 

services agencies, and the CSE agency itself creates a complex interplay of 

competing traditions and values likely to have a limiting effect on the local 

implementation of any reform effort.54 

In a state where county governments exercise significant control of 

program operations, the New York CSE program has experienced 

difficulties providing program direction and implementing statewide 

practices. Clients obtain CSE services through 58 Department of Social 

Services district offices. In the districts, local commissioners control 

program operations and have considerable autonomy in determining local 

management philosophies, organizational structure, and case processing 

procedures and priorities that often conflict with the state CSE program’s 

initiatives. State reviews of district offices from 1982 to 1992 also 

documented that local districts have failed to implement state procedures 

and staffing recommendations and fully utilize the automated information 

system, among other issues. 

Kentucky has experienced similar difficulties managing the program as a 

result of fragmented authority and court and county attorney involvement. 

53GAO/HRD-87-37, Apr. 30, 1987. 

54Charles F. Adams, Jr., David Landsbergen, and Larry Cobler, “Welfare Reform and Paternity 

Establishment: A Social Experiment,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 11, No. 4, 

(1992), p. 667. 

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In certain places, judges use their own individualized procedures rather 

than following uniform state procedures. As a result, the state procedures 

manual is replete with different procedures required in different counties. 

Some judges, for example, will not honor support orders from other 

counties within the state when the custodial parent lives in their 

jurisdiction; they establish new orders and will not collect arrears under 

orders from other counties within the state. 

Even states with greater centralized program control, such as 

Massachusetts, Virginia, Iowa, and Texas, have had some difficulty 

implementing uniform procedures despite having direct control over 

caseworkers and legal staff in local offices. While lines of authority are 

more clearly defined and initiatives are more easily coordinated from the 

program’s headquarters, control and uniformity issues do arise primarily 

in relation to the courts. 

Lack of Legislative Support 

Affects State Programs’ 

Ability to Implement 

Initiatives 

Despite successful efforts in some states, many CSE programs have 

experienced legislative opposition to proposed initiatives over the last 

decade. Some state programs we visited tried but were unable to obtain 

legislative support to implement new processes and tools. In at least two 

cases, however, legislative support was withheld because of historically 

poor program management. 

Examples from the eight state programs we visited illustrate the 

importance of legislative support to adopting practices considered 

innovative by program officials. In 1993, the Massachusetts legislature 

failed to support the CSE program’s proposal for certain administrative 

enforcement techniques opposed by the courts and interest groups. The 

proposal called for implementing in-hospital paternity establishment, 

administrative order establishment, and administrative review and 

modification of orders. While in-hospital paternity establishment passed, 

other elements did not. The CSE director explained that the legislature was 

not convinced that administrative processes would be more efficient than 

judicial processes. In addition, the legislature was concerned that due 

process rights would not be protected if the courts were not involved in all 

child support matters. 

CSE officials in other states we visited told us legislatures had been 

reluctant to approve additional enforcement tools. In New York, past 

proposals for new-hire reporting and driver and professional license 

revocation authority failed because of the legislature’s concern that the 

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measures would hurt business. Iowa’s CSE program has also been unable to 

obtain legislative support for a central lien index that would allow the 

program to quickly identify property held by noncustodial parents and 

place liens on it. Real estate professionals strongly opposed the measure. 

Inadequate 

Communication Between 

AFDC and CSE Results in 

Backlogs and Delays 

Some States Have 

Developed Successful 

Strategies to Address 

Program Barriers 

Inadequate communication has resulted in incomplete AFDC referrals to CSE 

programs and contributed to caseload backlogs and processing delays. 

Communication between AFDC and CSE is important because CSE relies on 

AFDC staff to conduct initial intake interviews and obtain noncustodial 

parent information. Over the years, ineffective communication between 

the two programs has been cited by OCSE and other studies as a barrier to 

performance. In addition, in our 1987 report we found that poor 

coordination between welfare and CSE agencies resulted in inadequate 

information about noncustodial parents, including identity, location, and 

earnings data.55 The experiences of the state programs we reviewed 

suggest that very little has changed. 

CSE personnel in the states we visited cited problems with the interaction 

between AFDC and CSE. Referrals from the AFDC program frequently lacked 

information CSE staff needed to do their work, either because the AFDC staff 

did not collect the information or the parent did not provide it. AFDC 

personnel appeared to be reluctant to penalize AFDC recipients who did not 

cooperate in providing needed information. As a result of incomplete 

referrals, CSE workers spent time and resources tracking down additional 

information, reinterviewing clients, and providing services to clients 

unwilling to identify the absent parent. 

The eight state CSE programs we visited have implemented or are in the 

process of implementing many strategies to reduce or eliminate program 

barriers. The design, implementation, and success of some of the common 

strategies reflect the political and fiscal environment and CSE program 

history in each of the states. 

Multiple strategies are directed at growing workload size and complexity. 

These strategies include hiring more staff and increasing the use of 

(1) administrative rather than judicial processes, (2) innovative 

enforcement techniques, (3) automation, and (4) contracts with the private 

sector. In addition, one state is making extensive use of volunteers to 

extend staff resources. Some of these strategies, such as increased 

55GAO/HRD-87-37, Apr. 30, 1987. 

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automation and private contracting, are also helping to improve program 

control and uniformity within state programs. Because automation is 

recognized as a critical tool for dealing with a variety of problems, all the 

states we visited are enhancing their automated capabilities. In addition, 

some state programs are actively working with their state legislatures and 

others, such as judges and county officials, to build consensus for 

initiatives and legislative support. Some state programs have also found 

ways to improve communication with the AFDC program. 

Although opportunities exist for all states to implement these approaches, 

we found that some state programs demonstrated more initiative than 

others in such areas as legislative activism. However, we also saw 

instances where legislative activism was not completely successful. In 

addition, most of the barriers have not been completely eliminated and 

will continue to require extensive state effort. 

Multiple Strategies Help 

States Address Workloads 

and Supplement Limited 

Resources 

Some State Programs Have 

Hired More Staff 

Administrative Processes Allow 

Greater Efficiency 

No single strategy is used to meet the demands of a growing workload. 

Despite limited resources, all CSE programs we reviewed have added some 

staff over the years. They have also increased their reliance on 

administrative processes, innovative enforcement tools, and automation to 

address growing and more complex caseloads. In addition, some of the 

programs have engaged the private sector to extend staff resources 

through contracts with collection agencies and volunteer recruitment. 

Most state programs we visited have been moderately successful in adding 

staff over the years, although some have experienced staff cuts and hiring 

freezes as well. In Texas, for example, as its CSE caseload tripled between 

1984 and 1992, program personnel more than tripled. Massachusetts’ CSE 

program recently raised its staffing level approximately 25 percent. The 

Kentucky program also experienced two large increases of 30 percent and 

more in 1979 and 1989, but more recently, staffing was cut in 1992 and 

1993 by 6 and 7 percent, respectively. 

In most of the states we visited that have implemented administrative 

alternatives to court processing for such actions as paternity 

establishment, order establishment, and review and modification, CSE 

personnel believe the administrative process has added or will add to their 

programs’ efficiency. However, the type and extent of administrative 

processes used in these states vary. 

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State program personnel in some of the states we visited believed that 

administrative processes have reduced court involvement, created greater 

procedural uniformity, and allowed CSE programs to serve increasing 

workloads more efficiently. Iowa, for example, has had extensive 

administrative procedures for years and continues to add to them. The 

Iowa CSE program expanded its administrative means for paternity 

establishment because program officials believed it would make the 

process faster and cheaper by reducing the amount of attorney and court 

time. In addition, Iowa is implementing an administrative process for the 

review and modification of support awards to more efficiently meet 

federal time frames for review and modification of support orders. 

In contrast, the Texas program has traditionally relied on the judicial 

process for order establishment and enforcement. In the past few years, 

however, as court backlogs have grown, it has added administrative 

alternatives. Texas is now implementing an administrative process for 

order establishment that relies on a mediation conference with the parents 

instead of a court hearing to set the award amount. In promoting this 

approach to the Texas state legislature, program personnel estimated that 

more than 50 percent of the caseload could be resolved using the 

administrative process. 

Innovative Enforcement Tools The eight states we visited are using innovative enforcement tools to 

and Approaches Extend extend their CSE programs’ reach in locating noncustodial parents or their 

Program’s Reach	 assets or to create greater incentives to pay support. These tools include 

requiring employer reporting of newly hired employees, using state tax 

data to locate noncustodial parents, and requiring noncustodial parents 

who do not pay child support to perform community service or revoking 

their professionl, trade, or driver’s licenses. 

Like several other states around the country, Massachusetts, Iowa, 

Oregon, and Virginia have implemented mandatory employer reporting of 

newly hired employees for a number of industries and professions. The 

Texas legislature also recently approved new-hire reporting. Texas 

employers, however, are not required to participate but are encouraged to 

volunteer. 

To reach self-employed noncustodial parents and nonwage income, Iowa’s 

legislature authorized its CSE program and Department of Revenue and 

Finance in 1993 to implement a tax record matching procedure to identify 

self-employed individuals with child support obligations. Self-employed 

noncustodial parents with delinquent child support obligations are sent a 

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notice on Department of Revenue and Finance letterhead requiring the 

payment of child support and the quarterly submission of a state estimated 

tax form. For individuals who do not comply, CSE tries to identify interestbearing assets from the tax return and attempt garnishment. 

Iowa’s CSE program has also obtained legislative authority to order 

noncustodial parents who claim they are unemployed to seek 

employment. Failure to seek employment can serve as evidence to the 

court in determining a willful failure to pay. Iowa has also given the courts 

the power to impose community service as an alternative sentence for 

contempt of court or failure to pay child support. 

Other practices that program officials believe will enhance collections 

include revocation or suspension of professional licenses. Arizona and 

Oregon are among at least 18 states that have obtained authority to revoke 

or block renewal of professional licenses. 

Automation Increases CSE officials in the states we visited commonly noted that a greater 

Efficiency	 reliance on automated enforcement and parent-locating tools has allowed 

their programs to do more work with fewer staff and resources. In general, 

all eight states have expanded their use of automation for case processing 

and asset attachment and are making a considerable number of collections 

through automated wage withholding and interception of other income 

such as unemployment benefits and tax refunds. In New York, for 

example, automated enforcement techniques produce an estimated 

75 percent of total collections. 

Since 1992, Massachusetts has begun to automate a number of innovative 

enforcement tools. Accordingly, the CSE program implemented a “Mass 

Enforcement” initiative that focuses on cases with the greatest potential 

for collections and uses computerized file matches to identify employment 

and asset information. 

Increased automation has helped to free up line staff from administrative 

duties and allow them to do more casework. For example, staff from some 

states said that innovations such as computerized voice-activated response 

systems using “800” numbers have allowed them to spend more time 

working cases and less time responding to simple telephone inquiries 

about payments. Iowa program officials said they were able to reduce their 

central payment inquiry staff from 14 to 8 as the result of a voice-activated 

response system that informs callers when a payment has been received 

by the state. 

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Contracting With the Private 

Sector Extends Limited Staff 

Resources 

Volunteers and Welfare 

Trainees Enhance Staff 

Resources 

Contracting with private sector companies extends limited state program 

staff in a variety of ways, although not all the states we reviewed are using 

contractors. New York, for example, is contracting with a vendor for 

centralized collections and payment processing. Previously, payments 

were made and processed at 58 district offices throughout the state. The 

state estimates that a privately operated centralized collections process 

will save the program between $5 million and $6 million a year. 

Increased workloads and resource considerations have also caused 

Massachusetts, Texas, and Virginia to contract for collection services. 

Massachusetts contracts with two private companies to make collections 

on a small number of difficult cases. Texas started using a private 

contractor in 1993 to supplement staff resources. The contractor is 

expected to pursue collections on cases that are at least 6 months 

delinquent and have arrears of $150 or more. Virginia also relies on a 

contractor to make collections, but only in AFDC cases in arrears, which 

represent about 5 percent of the program’s total caseload. Virginia recently 

created two additional district offices, expanding from 19 to 21, by using a 

private firm to run all operations of the new offices. This contract has 

allowed the Virginia program to expand services geographically while 

staying within its state-mandated staffing levels. 

One state—Texas—supplements staff resources with volunteers, including 

student interns and trainees referred by the AFDC program. These unpaid 

staff answer telephones, file, and perform other office duties. In Texas’ 

fiscal year 1993, volunteer staff put in 130,000 hours in field operations and 

on special projects. The volunteers’ field office hours represented 

approximately one full-time equivalent in each of the 58 field offices. The 

volunteer program director estimated that in addition to the office hours, 

field office volunteers made 225 community presentations about CSE, 

including the responsibilities of parenthood and paternity, that reached 

approximately 175,000 people. HHS’ Regional Office VI is very supportive of 

the volunteer program and has approved federal matching funds for 

computer equipment used by volunteers. 

States Are Improving All state CSE programs are planning and developing statewide systems to 

Automation Capacity	 meet federal certification requirements by October 1995. For some states, 

like Oregon and Texas, this has meant abandoning old, patched-together 

systems in favor of entirely new systems. As a result of a 1991 OCSE review 

that noted deficiencies in Oregon’s current system, state officials decided 

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to identify, transfer, adapt, and implement an automated system that was 

already implemented in another state. 

In addition, some states, like Arizona, are implementing statewide 

computer systems for the first time. In December 1992, Arizona 

implemented a new computer system that has increased capacity. 

According to Arizona officials, more than 300,000 cases are now in a 

centralized database. The new system has allowed the program to 

implement automated tax intercepts, credit bureau reporting, and lottery 

intercepts. The system also has an improved location capacity because of 

additional connections with other computer data systems. Arizona CSE 

personnel said the computer system helped them monitor the stages of 

each case better and had improved automated interfaces. 

Automation Aids 

Centralizing Program 

Control and Uniformity 

Automation has helped some states centralize program control, ensure 

uniformity in procedures, and centralize a number of CSE functions. In 

general, the strategy has been to automate more processes and transfer 

control from local offices to the central CSE administration in the state. 

At the time of our review, New York was beginning to use automation and 

a private contractor to transfer collection processing from the 58 district 

offices to the state office. With centralized collections, payments from 

noncustodial parents are received at one central location, posted by the 

system, and distributed automatically to the custodial parents. Before this 

initiative, the collection process was primarily manual and controlled by 

local Department of Social Services offices throughout the state. New 

York has also used automation to centralize many other functions, 

including lottery intercepts, tax intercepts, administrative penalties for 

nonpayment, and document generation. 

Iowa provides another example of standardization through automation. 

The Iowa CSE director said automation has given the program a single 

process for handling cases and that staff no longer have a choice of how to 

proceed with actions such as order establishment. In addition, the 

program’s case tracking system allows the CSE program to centrally 

monitor and document case actions in terms of federal case processing 

time frames. Reports showing case actions that are not in compliance with 

the time frames are shared with staff at all levels. 

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Legislative Activism Used 

to Garner Support for 

Programs 

The CSE programs we visited have used a variety of techniques to increase 

legislative support. These techniques include legislative liaisons, public 

awareness campaigns, lobbying efforts, consensus building among 

stakeholders, and other initiatives to improve internal management and 

case processes. In many instances, such efforts have resulted in additional 

program resources, authority to implement innovative practices, and 

greater program control. These efforts, however, have not always been 

successful. Some state programs continue to have difficulties obtaining 

necessary legislative support. 

In Texas during the 1993 legislative session, senior program officials, in 

addition to the program’s legislative liaison, lobbied the state legislature 

and made compromises in wording and procedures to institute an 

administrative process. This lobbying effort included an orientation 

session for all legislators and staff at the start of the session. During the 

orientation, CSE staff explained the CSE program and what kind of 

assistance the program can give legislators responding to constituent 

inquiries. CSE convinced the legislature that the judicial process took 

longer than necessary and kept the program from achieving its potential. 

The Texas CSE program also uses other measures to reach legislators, 

judges, and county officials to build program credibility and a consensus 

for action. The program is required by law to report back to the legislature 

on program outputs and outcomes. This requirement has helped keep the 

legislature informed about the effectiveness of CSE initiatives. In addition, 

units of the CSE litigation division work with judges on standardizing court 

procedures and processes to improve CSE and establishing case law with 

carefully selected cases. The CSE director and staff also work with county 

law enforcement and judicial officials to identify program improvements. 

The Massachusetts CSE program has taken several actions to obtain 

legislative support for its initiatives, and program officials believe this 

support has allowed the program to become one of the most aggressive in 

the country. The program has a legislative liaison who meets regularly 

with each member of the legislature and a cadre of key supporters to 

discuss upcoming legislation. In addition, the liaison generates statistical 

packages highlighting program impacts for the legislature. To improve 

program credibility, the Massachusetts CSE program also sponsors public 

service announcements and holds press conferences to publicize 

collections figures. The program also publishes a “10 Most Wanted List” of 

nonpaying noncustodial parents and other pamphlets. 

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As a result of its efforts to gain the legislature’s support, the Massachusetts 

CSE program has had more successes than failures. Successful legislative 

initiatives have included (1) a statute that requires all employers to report 

new hires within 14 days of starting employment; (2) an administrative lien 

provision that creates a child support lien when a child support order is 

due and unpaid; (3) voluntary paternity acknowledgment; (4) authority to 

enforce court-ordered health insurance provisions by directly contacting 

the employer or insurance providers; and (5) access to employment, 

utility, and licensing records to locate noncustodial parents. However, the 

CSE program has been unable to get its entire package of legislative 

initiatives, which include administrative processes for new and modified 

orders, passed in the legislature. 

Actions Taken to Improve 

Communication Between 

CSE and AFDC 

Although problems remain, the state CSE programs we visited have 

implemented initiatives to improve communication with AFDC. Some 

approaches are aimed at improving the referral process, while others have 

focused on improving cooperation through procedural revisions, 

education programs for welfare and child support personnel, and other 

more innovative techniques. 

Oregon appears to have been more successful than the other states in 

confronting and reducing this particular barrier to performance. Oregon 

CSE officials voiced a positive view about the program’s relationship with 

the AFDC program and staff and attributed this view to several factors. The 

CSE director believed that good communication was due, in part, to both 

CSE and AFDC having the same oversight agency and a single computer 

system. In addition, past problems with referral data had been corrected 

through education and refinement of AFDC intake documentation. The CSE 

program developed a training program for AFDC staff on how to enter 

information necessary and useful to CSE efforts directly onto the computer 

system. The CSE and AFDC programs also refined the AFDC intake document 

to obtain child support information. These efforts reduced the amount of 

information AFDC staff were required to get from clients for CSE purposes 

and improved cooperation between the programs. 

Some of the other states we visited are looking at ways to improve the 

quality of data from the AFDC intake process and to better communication 

at senior management levels in each program. For example, Arizona 

recently conducted a study of the intake interview and referral process 

and was planning to establish a pilot office in which CSE personnel would 

be co-located with AFDC staff. CSE personnel will conduct intake interviews 

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to ensure that the necessary information is obtained and will educate their 

AFDC counterparts about appropriate information gathering approaches. 

The Texas CSE program is examining the intake process in coordination 

with AFDC staff and is focusing on mutual education, training programs, 

and discussions with AFDC management. AFDC and CSE management staff 

meet quarterly to discuss common issues and to ensure cooperation. 

Program officials believe cooperation has improved as a result of these 

regular meetings. In addition, liaisons have been established for both 

agencies to assist personnel throughout the state with case processing 

problems. 

Welfare Reform Could All eight welfare reform proposals we reviewed contained new mandates 

for state CSE programs. In some instances, these mandates would add to Increase States’ the workload states are already struggling to address as well as add more 

Workload but Could automation requirements. However, the mandates would give some state 

programs the enforcement tools, such as new-hire reporting and driver’s Help Some Make license suspension, that they have been unable to obtain from state

Changes legislatures. In addition, these mandates would help some state programs 

achieve greater centralization and control of their operations. 

Welfare Reform Could 

Intensify Some Barriers 

States Are Facing 

All the welfare reform proposals we reviewed would expand state 

program responsibilities to different degrees and potentially intensify 

some of the barriers states are now facing. For example, under at least one 

proposal, the CSE caseload would be expanded to include all child support 

orders, even those not now enforced under the Social Security Act. While 

a portion of these new cases may never need enforcement services, they 

would still be subject to the requirement that all cases be automatically 

reviewed and considered for modification every 3 years. In addition, three 

of the proposals require state programs to make greater paternity 

establishment efforts through outreach and voluntary paternity 

acknowledgment. Two proposals would require state parent locator 

services to be used to handle requests from noncustodial parents to locate 

custodial parents for enforcement of visitation issues. 

Welfare reform proposals may further strain state automated information 

systems. As indicated in chapter 3, most of the proposals would require 

state programs to have automated central child support order registries or 

the capability to integrate local registries. In addition, one of the proposals 

would require state programs to match employer reports of new 

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employees with the state order registry. Another would require state 

programs to have automated on-line access to information in any database 

maintained by the state. 

Welfare Reform Proposals 

Provide New Enforcement 

Tools for Some State 

Programs and Require 

Greater Centralization 

The welfare reform proposals we reviewed would provide new 

enforcement tools to some states and require greater centralization of 

operations for some as well. For example, seven proposals would require 

employers to report new hires either to a state or federal unit that then 

makes the information available to all states. In addition, two proposals 

require states to set up central collection and disbursement agencies to 

handle all child support payments throughout the state. Furthermore, one 

proposal offers additional federal funding as an incentive to centralize all 

of CSE under one state-controlled organization. Also, two proposals 

provide for driver’s license suspensions. 

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The history of the CSE program is one of progressively expanded 

responsibilities. Despite annual federal and state funding of nearly 

$2 billion, the CSE program is struggling to keep up with the needs of an 

ever-expanding constituency of welfare, working poor, and middle income 

families. Given nationwide trends toward increasing numbers of 

out-of-wedlock births, federal and state governments are likely to continue 

to face many challenges in managing their programs. In addition, welfare 

reform proposals we reviewed suggest that OCSE and the states may be 

tasked with greater responsibilities in the near future. 

To date, OCSE has been less than effective in the leadership role the 

Congress envisioned when it established the national CSE program. As 

program mission and caseload have expanded over time, OCSE has 

continued to lack some important management tools, including a clearly 

articulated program mission, programwide planning and goal-setting, and 

a means to measure progress toward goals. At present, OCSE does not have 

accurate and consistent data on state program performance. OCSE needs 

such data if it is to assess program performance and take action to 

improve it. OCSE will also need these data if it is to successfully implement 

the management reforms required under GPRA. OCSE’s ability to lead 

effectively would also be helped by a funding structure that is better 

aligned with the current realities of CSE’s mission and that could help 

promote service improvement at the state and local levels. In addition, 

OCSE’s working relationships with state programs in recent years have 

been characterized as more adversarial than cooperative. 

Miscommunications between OCSE, HHS regional staff, and state program 

staff over CSE policy interpretation and other matters have fueled states’ 

dissatisfaction. HHS’ current organizational structure, which divides CSE 

responsibilities between OCSE staff and HHS regional staff not accountable 

to OCSE management, bears some responsibility for these ongoing 

difficulties in the federal-state partnership that is at the core of the CSE 

program. 

OCSE’s audits of state programs are perhaps its most important 

management tool, and some state program staff said that OCSE audits had 

spurred state action. But the audits have focused on monitoring state 

compliance with federally prescribed administrative procedures. As a 

result, the audits give OCSE and state program directors limited insight into 

the ultimate outcomes of program activities, such as whether paternities 

were established, noncustodial parents located, and collections achieved. 

OCSE is aware of the audits’ limitations and has taken some actions to 

change the audits. Our work confirms and reinforces a need to reengineer 

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OCSE audits. Such a reengineering could not only help federal-state 

program relations but also serve as a means for OCSE and state program 

staff to obtain accurate and consistent performance data—key 

management data that could help OCSE and states as they seek to better 

serve the families that depend on CSE efforts. 

In this chapter, we make some specific recommendations. We believe 

implementing GPRA’s management reforms may help OCSE improve its own 

program management as well as serve states better. But whether through 

GPRA implementation or through other means, some rethinking of federal 

management tools, processes, and relations with state CSE programs is 

needed if the issues we have identified are to be addressed. We recognize 

that the CSE program faces many difficult tasks and that even given 

optimum CSE program management, some noncustodial parents may never 

be located and others may never be able to pay support. But continued 

and strengthened efforts by OCSE and states would seem virtually certain to 

help some families. Such efforts are all the more important if OCSE is to be 

given new authorities and responsibilities under welfare reform. 

As a result of the GPRA mandate and OCSE’s pilot project status, OCSE is GPRA Can Help OCSE beginning to build a planning and measurement discipline that focuses on

Develop Needed outcomes. Such a process should enable OCSE to better (1) communicate 

Management Tools	 program expectations, (2) identify the tasks needed to accomplish the 

outcomes, (3) identify the data needed to assess accomplishments, and 

(4) use the information from performance assessment for policy decisions 

and plan revisions. OCSE’s actions to date show promise, but we believe 

some of the issues we have identified remain to be addressed. 

As of September 1994, OCSE had developed a draft strategic plan that 

exceeds what GPRA requires and had avoided repeating some past planning 

weaknesses. To develop the plan, OCSE has sought comments and 

involvement from key stakeholders such as the regional HHS CSE personnel 

and state program representatives. In addition, OCSE had defined a 

program mission, vision, and two general goals with objectives and many 

quantitative performance indicators for each goal. The draft mission 

statement affirms the broad scope and expanded mission the program has 

assumed over the years. The goals focus on paternity and order 

establishment in support of this broad mission, and the objectives and 

performance indicators specifically address outcomes not only for 

collections but for noncollection activities such as medical support 

enforcement as well. 

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Articulating the broadness of the mission and establishing outcomes 

should help to clarify the program’s mission among the stakeholders. In 

addition, through a welfare reform proposal, OCSE is attempting to align the 

existing funding structure and audit approach with the broad mission OCSE 

has defined. Such an alignment is important for stakeholders to clearly 

understand program priorities. In addition to the strategic plan, OCSE has 

also developed an annual performance plan as required by GPRA. According 

to GPRA, the annual plan is intended to provide a direct link between the 

program’s longer-term goals and what state programs and OCSE’s managers 

and staff will need to accomplish each year. 

Setting demanding but realistic long-term and annual measurable 

outcomes for the national program and for state programs will be 

challenging. The variation among states in adopting innovative practices, 

such as voluntary paternity acknowledgment and early employer reporting 

of newly hired employees, suggests a need for OCSE to work with each 

state program individually to set goals that require continuous 

improvement from year to year. One way to do this would be for OCSE and 

states to set goals that reflect and build on past state performance, similar 

to the approach used for the paternity establishment standards. We believe 

that an individualized, cooperative, goal-setting effort would encourage 

greater state responsibility and accountability for achieving the goals and 

the data used to measure performance. A cooperative process would seem 

more likely to promote such accountability than having OCSE or the 

Congress imposing annual goals on state programs. 

OCSE’s planning efforts, however, will need to address some of the issues 

we have raised in this report, including data quality and OCSE’s own 

outcome goals. Improving data quality is essential if OCSE and the states 

are to achieve effective annual performance reporting and OCSE has taken 

some preliminary steps toward this end. However, OCSE needs to define 

data definitions and set standards to promote consistent data reporting. 

Building on initial efforts to clarify definitions and obtain consistent state 

reporting, OCSE officials said OCSE audit staff are currently investigating 

(1) data definitions used by states, (2) state data collection systems, and 

(3) state data quality. However, these officials did not have a plan or 

timetable for the completion of this effort. Furthermore, once measurable 

outcome goals have been established for the program, OCSE and the state 

programs will need to identify the key data needed for annual performance 

reporting and develop the necessary definitions. Data quality, however, 

relies heavily on state program efforts. States will thus need to assume 

greater accountability for the quality of data they submit. 

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Another important issue for OCSE to consider is its own performance as 

both a partner with and manager of state program efforts. While OCSE has 

expressed an intention to assess its processes for serving the states, it has 

yet to set goals for itself regarding the future timeliness of regulations, 

responsiveness to states about audits and policy questions, and regional 

HHS office commitment and feedback. Given the failure of OCSE’s past 

planning efforts to focus on outcomes, measurement, and continuous 

improvement, we believe OCSE will need to address these issues in future 

planning. 

Our work identified several problems with the current program funding Funding Structure structure that, taken together, suggest that the funding structure should be

Should Be Redesigned redesigned. The current incentive payment structure has not been aligned 

with the expanding CSE mission. Furthermore, it does not meaningfully 

encourage continuous improvement, nor does it provide for the cost 

sharing between state and federal governments originally envisioned for 

the program. Instead, the incentive payments make it possible for states to 

shift most, if not all, program costs to the federal government. 

If incentive payments are to promote better state performance, we believe 

they need to be aligned with performance expectations as defined in the 

mission priorities and goals established in the strategic plan. For example, 

if such a plan recognizes a broader CSE mission and includes measurable 

outcome goals for collection and noncollection results, such as paternity 

and order establishment and medical support enforcement, then the 

incentive payment structure should be used to reward state improvements 

and maintenance of the highest level of performance in these areas. We 

endorse the concept of performance-based funding embodied in the 

incentive payments and believe this concept should be retained in the 

redesigned structure. 

OCSE should continue to work with states to find new ways to strengthen 

the federal-state partnership that is at the core of the CSE program. New 

ways to deliver technical assistance and training, as well as new ways to 

develop regulations, would be important steps to this end. In addition, 

long-standing communication problems between state officials, HHS 

regional staff, and OCSE staff, problems due in part to the current 

organizational structure, will need to be addressed. 

The Federal-State 

Partnership Needs to 

Be Reinvented 

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We encourage OCSE to explore more cooperative approaches to developing 

regulations and delivering technical assistance and training. In chapter 3, 

we described some initiatives states would like to see or are trying for 

developing regulations and delivering technical assistance. These may be 

potential models for OCSE to consider or develop further in working with 

the states. 

As part of reinvigorating the state-federal partnership, we believe HHS and 

OCSE officials should consider alternatives to the current federal 

organizational structure for the CSE program, since this structure has 

produced ineffective communication and accountability. To this end, 

OCSE’s strategic planning can help clarify OCSE’s role by establishing 

performance goals for the agency. As with the CSE program, these goals 

should be focused, as much as possible, on results such as more timely 

issuance of regulations and responsiveness to states. The needed 

organizational changes, therefore, should support not only CSE program 

mission priorities, but OCSE’s agency performance goals as well. In 

developing a better functioning organization, we believe HHS should 

consider (1) what the role of regional HHS personnel is, (2) how regional 

resources should be spent on CSE, (3) what mechanisms are necessary to 

ensure accountability to OCSE by regional and ACF staff outside of OCSE who 

are working on CSE priorities, and (4) where federal resources should be 

devoted to foster state goal achievement. 

The Audit Is a


Candidate for


Reengineering


Whatever changes may be made to the CSE program, we believe it is 

essential that the federal government maintain a program monitoring 

function to ensure that children who need financial support are being 

effectively served. However, in view of the problems we and others have 

identified with the program’s audits, we believe, and OCSE agrees, that the 

scope and approach of this monitoring function need to be reconsidered. 

While the audits have spurred state action in some cases, we believe it is 

time for the program audit role to be reexamined and reengineered to 

provide a monitoring capability that is not only more outcome-oriented, 

but supports accurate state performance reporting as well. 

Two existing conditions make this an opportune time to change the audit 

approach. First, GPRA implementation demands accurate, consistent data 

and assessment of progress toward stated goals—elements the current 

program lacks. GPRA annual performance reporting, therefore, should 

provide insights about program outcomes that the current audit approach 

has been unable to provide. To ensure these insights are based on sound 

Page 92 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Conclusions and Recommendations


data, however, the data, not the administrative procedures, should be 

subject to audit. The OCSE audit role, when placed within the GPRA 

framework, can be shifted from ensuring compliance to ensuring data 

integrity and investigating performance problems identified in annual 

performance reporting, thus achieving a more outcome-oriented approach. 

A second condition that enables serious reconsideration of the existing 

audit approach is the growth of state-initiated self-monitoring. As we 

noted in chapter 3, a number of states are conducting their own program 

audits or evaluations using OCSE-promulgated program standards or their 

own evaluation criteria. These state program monitoring efforts can have a 

more timely effect on state operations than OCSE audits and reduce the 

need for OCSE to conduct the type of detailed audits of state administrative 

procedures it has in the past. OCSE is currently considering ways to use 

state monitoring efforts, including replacing the existing federal audit 

approach with required annual state monitoring and OCSE review of the 

results. 

OCSE agrees that the audit needs to be reengineered but believes its ability 

to make significant changes to the audit process is constrained under 

current law. Existing legislation requires OCSE to conduct periodic 

comprehensive audits of state programs to ensure substantial compliance 

with all federal requirements. 

Welfare Reform	 Welfare reform proposals could have various effects on the CSE program. 

Adding federal mandates, as reflected in the welfare reform proposals we

Presents reviewed, may result in a more standard national CSE program. In addition, 

Opportunities and	 welfare reform holds some promise for a redesigned funding structure and 

audit approach. However, under welfare reform, OCSE would likely need to Additional Challenges assume more responsibilities despite its limited capacity and

for CSE	 organizational accountability. Any reform is likely to require greater 

federal leadership than has been exhibited in the past to achieve reform 

goals. 

While increasing requirements would challenge OCSE’s leadership capacity, 

some of the welfare reform proposals provide opportunities for better 

alignment among stated priorities and incentive funding. In addition, some 

target the audit process for change. By focusing financial rewards on 

performance in critical areas in addition to cost-effectiveness, the 

proposed funding structures emphasize the importance of activities such 

as paternity establishment that may not bring immediate collections. 

Page 93 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Conclusions and Recommendations


Furthermore, by focusing the audits more on program outcomes and the 

quality of the data used to measure the outcomes rather than on 

compliance with certain requirements, welfare reform provides the 

opportunity to improve information for future decision-making. 

Many of the current proposals for welfare reform would add to OCSE’s 

responsibilities for providing technical assistance and training and for 

monitoring state programs. As demonstrated by our findings in this report 

and our earlier testimony,56 OCSE is already struggling with existing 

requirements in these critical support areas. Absent the reengineering of 

some OCSE processes, such as the audit, and an organizational structure 

with clear lines of authority and OCSE accountability, welfare reform seems 

likely to present OCSE with serious difficulties in achieving desired results. 

In addition, new requirements in the various welfare reform proposals 

would force legislative action in some states where the CSE programs have 

been unable to obtain the authority to pursue certain measures. However, 

the new requirements would also expand the authority and responsibilities 

of state CSE programs, requiring more stringent paternity establishment 

procedures, central registries, centralized collections, and work 

requirements for noncustodial parents, among others. Some of the new 

requirements could also add to the confusion about CSE’s mission, goals, 

and priorities described in chapter 2. Given all these likely impacts of 

welfare reform on OCSE, it is all the more important that changes be made 

to address the current lack of alignment among stated priorities, 

expectations, performance measurement, and incentive funding. 

Recommendations to	 We recommend that the Secretary of HHS take three actions. First, direct 

OCSE to address the following issues in its future planning efforts, in

HHS	 conjunction with major program stakeholders such as the Congress, state 

program managers, regional CSE specialists, and appropriate advocacy 

groups: 

•	 individualized state performance goals based on such factors as past state 

performance, demographics, and degree of automation; 

• data quality improvement; 

•	 funding-structure changes that will retain the current performance-based 

approach but make it supportive of mission priorities; and 

56Child Support Enforcement: Federal Efforts Have Not Kept Pace With Expanding Program 

(GAO/T-HEHS-94-209, July 20, 1994). 

Page 94 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Conclusions and Recommendations


•	 methods for improving federal-state communication and working 

relationships. 

Second, the Secretary should direct OCSE to establish performance goals 

that are linked to the fulfillment of OCSE’s mission. In this process, we 

believe OCSE should consider setting outcome goals, in addition to output 

goals, in the areas of timely regulatory development, clear policy direction 

and responsiveness to state programs, cooperative planning, and technical 

assistance. 

Third, the Secretary should establish an organizational structure and 

reporting mechanisms for OCSE that support program priorities, set OCSE 

performance goals, and provide greater federal CSE program accountability 

among the regional staff and activities. 

We recognize that during the 103rd Congress the Secretary sought 

statutory changes to reform OCSE’s audit approach and to change the 

program funding structure within the context of welfare reform. Because 

we believe changes to the audit approach and funding structure are 

essential for the program, we recommend that the Secretary continue to 

pursue the statutory initiatives to these ends, as appropriate. 

HHS provided written comments on a draft of this report (see app. V). HHS Agency Comments	 stated that our report was comprehensive and presented a balanced 

appraisal of the CSE program’s accomplishments over the past decade. It 

commented, however, that the funding levels for OCSE training and 

technical assistance activities in the last decade should be depicted in the 

context of increasing stringency in the federal budget for nearly all 

discretionary spending. 

In addition, HHS stated that our recommendations were well taken. For 

most of the recommendations, HHS provided additional information about 

actions it has already taken or is planning that we believe are responsive 

to our recommendations. However, we remain concerned that HHS’ 

comments do not (1) indicate that OCSE is establishing performance goals 

for itself, (2) address the organizational accountability weaknesses we 

have identified, and (3) specify a plan for obtaining statutory changes for 

the funding structure and audit approach. 

With respect to our first recommendation regarding issues important to 

OCSE’s planning efforts, HHS commented that OCSE has taken or is planning 

Page 95 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Conclusions and Recommendations


several actions that we consider responsive. It is planning to develop 

individual annual performance plans with state CSE agencies that will 

contain specific performance goals taking into consideration factors we 

mentioned and others. In terms of improving data quality, OCSE has 

recently started refining standard definitions for data elements and plans 

to meet with regional and state staff to achieve consensus on common 

terminology. In addition, OCSE is seeking to improve federal-state 

communication and working relationships through state visits by OCSE’s 

deputy director and through developing various forums for more 

interaction with the states. 

In response to our second recommendation regarding the establishment of 

OCSE performance outcome goals that are linked to its mission, OCSE 

intends to develop an internal performance plan. While HHS provided 

additional information about the steps OCSE is taking to enhance training 

and establish staffing standards, it did not indicate that the performance 

plan will contain goals, either outcome or output, for OCSE. We believe that 

such outcome goals are essential for OCSE to (1) clarify its role and 

relationship to state programs, (2) focus on results, and (3) better hold 

regional resources accountable. We have clarified our recommendation to 

emphasize that OCSE should establish what outcomes it wants to 

accomplish with its actions. 

With respect to our third recommendation on organizational structure and 

reporting mechanisms, HHS described a recent reorganization, but its 

comments do not indicate how this reorganization will ensure regional 

office accountability for federal CSE activities. HHS states that ACF has 

reorganized so that the 10 regional administrators report directly to a new 

ACF Director of Regional Operations rather than the Assistant Secretary for 

ACF. In addition, an Assistant Director for Child Support Regional 

Operations has been established to assist in the direction and coordination 

of child support activities by the regions. HHS comments do not indicate, 

however, what reporting mechanisms it will use to obtain an up-front 

commitment of regional staff and travel resources to CSE and 

accountability for results of CSE activities. We continue to believe that such 

commitment is necessary to ensure that OCSE knows what regional 

resources are devoted to CSE and how regional actions will support OCSE’s 

performance goals and foster state goal achievement. 

Finally, HHS’ comments do not specify plans for changing the audit to make 

it more outcome-oriented or for reintroducing legislation to change the 

program funding structure. We continue to believe that the Secretary 

Page 96 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Chapter 5 


Conclusions and Recommendations


should pursue statutory initiatives as appropriate to bring about needed 

changes. We have clarified the language of our recommendation to this 

effect. 

Page 97 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Descriptions of Basic CSE Services


Client intake involves opening a case record and compiling data on the 

custodial family and noncustodial parent. The custodial parent is 

interviewed and referral (from AFDC or other states’ agencies) and 

application forms are screened to determine if the information provided is 

complete and accurate. Outside contacts may be necessary to secure all 

needed information. 

Noncustodial parent locator services include efforts at local, state, and 

federal levels to identify a noncustodial parent’s address, social security 

number, place of employment, or the like. This might include efforts to 

directly contact individuals; contacts with public and private institutions, 

such as credit bureaus, state and federal income tax agencies; and 

computer tape matches. 

Paternity establishment is the identification of the legal father of a child, 

usually through the courts or expedited through hearings in a 

quasi-judicial or administrative body. Paternities are established in either 

of two ways: (1) through voluntary acknowledgment by the father or (2) if 

contested, through a determination based on scientific and testimonial 

evidence. Initiation of the paternity process varies depending on whether 

the mother is an AFDC recipient. Mothers who receive AFDC assistance are 

required by law to cooperate in locating and identifying the father of the 

child for whom aid is requested. Mothers who do not receive AFDC, 

however, are under no legal obligation to establish paternity and may 

voluntarily seek CSE services. 

Support order establishment and review and modification involves the 

development of a support order that legally obliges the noncustodial 

parent to pay child support and provide medical insurance coverage when 

available at reasonable cost. It also involves the periodic review and 

adjustment of the order at least every 3 years in AFDC cases and upon 

parental request in non-AFDC cases. The CSE agency must assist custodial 

parents in initiating an action in court or through an administrative or 

expedited legal process that will produce such an order. The CSE agency 

helps in the determination of a child’s financial needs and the extent to 

which the noncustodial parent can provide financial support and medical 

insurance coverage. 

Enforcement refers to a wide array of techniques at the disposal of CSE 

agencies to enforce payment on delinquent cases or to ensure regularity 

and completeness of current accounts. These techniques include bonds 

Page 98 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix I 


Descriptions of Basic CSE Services


and security deposits, federal and state tax intercepts, garnishments, liens, 

and wage withholding, among others. 

Collections processing refers to the processing, recording, and distributing 

of child support collections from noncustodial parents. On AFDC cases, if 

the monthly collection is insufficient to disqualify the family from AFDC, the 

family receives its full monthly AFDC grant plus the first $50 of the support 

payment. The remainder of the support payment is distributed to 

reimburse the state and federal governments in proportion to their 

assistance to the family. On non-AFDC cases, and in AFDC cases where the 

family’s income including the support payment is sufficient to make it 

ineligible for AFDC, support payments are paid directly to the family. 

Page 99 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix II 


Major Requirements of the 1984 and 1988 

CSE Amendments 

In the event of arrearages, automatic wage withholding for IV-D cases and Child Support based on application in non-IV-D cases57 

Enforcement


Amendments of 1984 “Expedited processes” to establish and enforce support orders—defined


as faster, more efficient and under which presiding officers are not judges 

Withholding of state tax refunds if parents are delinquent in support 

payments 

Imposition of liens against real and personal property for amounts of 

overdue support 

Permit establishment of paternity up to a child’s 18th birthday 

Security bonds required of noncustodial parents to secure overdue 

support payments 

Consumer credit bureaus receive upon request data on overdue support of 

any noncustodial parent 

Nonbinding state guidelines for child support available to judges and other 

officials 

Non-AFDC families charged service fees 

Annual notices of support collections to AFDC recipients 

Noncustodial parents may be charged late payment fees 

Federal incentives to local offices 

Continuation of CSE services after AFDC termination 

CSE services for children in foster care cases 

Enforcement of spousal support58 

CSE services publicized 

57IV-D cases are those enforced under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act. Non-IV-D cases are not 

enforced under Title IV-D but may apply for services other than enforcement. 

58Enforcement of legal obligations for support of a spouse or former spouse who is living with a child 

or children to whom an individual owes child support. 

Page 100 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix II 


Major Requirements of the 1984 and 1988


CSE Amendments


Equal provision of CSE services to AFDC and non-AFDC families 

Inclusion of provision for medical support in orders 

Withholding federal tax refunds of non-AFDC families 

Extension of Medicaid eligibility when support collections result in 

termination of AFDC 

Family Support Act of 

1988 

Immediate wage withholding on orders: new and modified IV-D; 

delinquent non-IV-D (November 1990); and all new non-IV-D 

(January 1994) 

Recording of parents’ social security numbers at children’s births 

Paternity establishment performance standards 

State guidelines for child support as a rebuttable presumption 

Periodic review of state child support guidelines 

Time standards for response to requests for services 

States give information to the Federal Parent Locator Service 

Civil and voluntary paternity acknowlegment procedures encouraged 

Extend the paternity statute of limitations up to a child’s 18th birthday 

Genetic testing in contested cases 

Periodic review and modification of support orders 

Monthly notices of collections 

Statewide automated systems 

Time standards for distribution of collections 

Page 101 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix III 


Selected Characteristics of Eight State CSE 

Programs, 1992-1993 

Characteristic Arizona Iowa Kentucky 

Caseload 195,189 126,321 242,768 

AFDC 100,197 60,351 141,372 

Non-AFDC 94,992 65,970 101,396 

Administrative expenditures (in millions) 

Federal share $20.9 $11.1 $21.8 

State share 8.7 5.5 

Total $29.6 $16.6 $31.6 

Incentive payments to states 

(estimated) $ 1.5 $ 6.6 $ 4.4 

Full-time equivalent staffa 900 346 

Administration 

State administered X X 

County administered b 

Operational organization 

Centralized X 

Decentralized X 

Placement of CSE office in 

state government social services social services social services 

Predominant case process 

Judicial X X 

Administrative Xf 

Mixed or quasi-judicial X 

HHS region number 9 7 4 

Selected enforcement tools 

New-hire reporting no yesg no 

License revocation yesk no no 

Page 102 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

9.9 

831 

X 

c 

X 
y

8

2

6

8

9

6

4

X

c

X

s

X

4

o

o

Appendix III 


Selected Characteristics of Eight State CSE


Programs, 1992-1993


Massachusetts New York Oregon Texas Virginia 

210,594 1,007,058 195,347 696,761 294,148 

140,748 510,494 105,087 353,056 150,026 

69,846 496,564 90,260 343,705 144,122 

$29.4 $101.1 $14.1 $66.5 $34.1 

14.9 50.5 7.0 32.6 

$44.3 $151.6 $21.1 $99.1 $50.0 

$10.2 $ 19.0 $ 4.2 $ 8.9 $ 4.7 

831 2,979 410 2,057 

X X X 

X d 

X AFDC X 

X non-AFDC e 

revenue social services social services attorney general social services 

X non-AFDC X 

AFDC 

X 

1 2 10 6 

yes no yesh voluntaryi yesj 

yesl no yesm no no 

Page 103 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

15.9 

935 

X 

X 

X 

3 
Appendix III 


Selected Characteristics of Eight State CSE


Programs, 1992-1993


Notes: Caseload, expenditure, and staffing data reported by the states for fiscal year 1992; other 

information in this table as of June 1993 unless otherwise indicated. 

Some numbers may not add to totals shown because of rounding. 

aTotal number of full-time equivalent staff employed by the state agency and any local agencies 

as well as the number of full-time equivalent staff employed by an agency (public or private) 

working under cooperative agreement or a purchase-of-service agreement with the CSE agency. 

bFive of 15 programs are operated by local county attorneys under contract with the state. 

cIn all counties, many services, such as paternity and order establishment and enforcement on 

cases needing paternity establishment, are provided through county attorneys under contract. 

dUnder contracts with the state CSE office, AFDC cases are handled by branch offices of the 

state department of justice and non-AFDC cases are handled by county district attorneys. 

ePayment processing is not centralized. 

f

Iowa adopted administrative paternity establishment effective July 1, 1993. 

gEffective January 1, 1994. 

hLegislation passed November 1993 for a pilot project limited to eight employment classifications 

through June 1995. 

i

Effective September 1, 1993. 

j

Effective July 1, 1993. 

k

Trade, professional, sport, and business licenses. 

l

Trade, professional, and driver’s licenses as of August 1994. 

mTrade and business licenses. 

Page 104 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Page 105 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
H

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Appendix IV 


Selected CSE Program Requirements in 

Eight Welfare Reform Proposals 

Provision H.R. 4318 H.R. 4414


Program requirement 

Revised audits X


Strengthened paternity establishment provisions X X


National support order registry X X


National directory of newly hired employees 

Nationwide reporting of newly hired employees and X X


employee support obligations


Expanded role of Federal Parent Locator Service X


Training programs 

State program databases X


Expanded service population X


Revised collection distribution priority 

Revised funding structure X


State staffing studies or standards X


New state authority/mandates 

Driver’s license restrictions 

Periodic review and modification of orders 

Professional license suspension


Support order registry X


Centralized collection and distribution


Administrative process


Work by noncustodial parents


Page 106 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix IV 


Selected CSE Program Requirements in


Eight Welfare Reform Proposals


Bill number in 103rd Congress 

H.R. 4126 H.R. 4566 S. 2224 S. 1795 H.R. 3500 H.R. 4476


X X


X X X X X


X X


X X


X X X X


X X X X X


X X


X X X X X


X X


X X


X X


X X


X X


X X


X X


X X X X X


X X


X X


X X X


Page 107 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 

X 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health 

and Human Services 

Page 108 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 109 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 110 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 111 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 112 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix V 


Comments From the Department of Health


and Human Services


Page 113 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix VI 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments


GAO Contacts	 David P. Bixler, Assistant Director, (202) 512-7201 

Sarah A. Morrison, Project Director 

Cathy Pardee, Deputy Project Director, (202) 512-7237 

In addition to those named above, the following individuals made Acknowledgments	 important contributions to this report: Linda Baker co-authored the report; 

Daniel Bertoni and Dylan Jones led the data collection in four states and 

co-authored portions of the draft; Barbara Bordelon provided guidance 

about GPRA implementation; Leslie Albin edited the report; Kevin Kumanga 

provided guidance from past GAO work; Craig Winslow provided legal 

assistance; and Dan Brier, Alice Spargo, Gerard Grant, Harry Johnson, and 

George Scott provided quality assurance through report review and 

referencing. 

Page 114 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Appendix VI 


GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments


Page 115 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
Related GAO Products


Child Support Enforcement: Federal Efforts Have Not Kept Pace With 

Expanding Program (GAO/T-HEHS-94-209, July 20, 1994). 

Child Support Enforcement: Credit Bureau Reporting Shows Promise 

(GAO/HEHS-94-175, June 3, 1994). 

Child Support Enforcement: States Proceed With Immediate Wage 

Withholding; More HHS Action Needed (GAO/HRD-93-99, June 15, 1993). 

Child Support Assurance: Effect of Applying State Guidelines to 

Determine Fathers’ Payments (GAO/HRD-93-26, Jan. 23, 1993). 

Child Support Enforcement: Timely Actions Needed to Correct System 

Development Problems (GAO/IMTEC-92-46, Aug. 13, 1992). 

Child Support Enforcement: Opportunity to Defray Burgeoning Federal 

and State Non-AFDC Costs (GAO/HRD-92-91, June 5, 1992). 

Medicaid: Ensuring That Noncustodial Parents Provide Health Insurance 

Can Save Costs (GAO/HRD-92-80, June 17, 1992). 

Interstate Child Support: Wage Withholding Not Fulfilling Expectations 

(GAO/HRD-92-65BR, Feb. 25, 1992). 

Interstate Child Support: Mothers Report Less Support From Out-of-State 

Fathers (GAO/HRD-92-39-FS, Jan. 9, 1992). 

Interstate Child Support: Better Information Needed on Absent Parents for 

Case Pursuit (GAO/HRD-90-41, May 24, 1990). 

Child Support: State Progress in Developing Automated Enforcement 

Systems (GAO/HRD-89-10FS, Feb. 10, 1989). 

Interstate Child Support: Case Data Limitations, Enforcement Problems, 

Views on Improvements Needed (GAO/HRD-89-25, Jan. 27, 1989). 

Child Support: Need to Improve Efforts to Identify Fathers and Obtain 

Support Orders (GAO/HRD-87-37, Apr. 30, 1987). 

(105495) Page 116 GAO/HEHS-95-24 Child Support Enforcement 
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