*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law

of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation

of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the

terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 3/12/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

RICHARD NAGOL,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 95-2109

v. D. New Mexico

LUNA COUNTY; SCOTT VINSON, County

Manager; BURT IRWIN, County Commissioner;

TOM LINDSAY, County Commissioner; FRED

HERRERA, County Commissioner; HONORABLE

FRED GIFFORD, County Magistrate;

HONORABLE MANUAL D.V. SAUCEDO,

District Court Judge, 

(D.C. No. CIV-95-377-M)

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This cause is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.
- 2 -

Richard Nagol brought this in forma pauperis pro se action alleging various

constitutional and pendent state law claims against the County of Luna, its manager and

commissioners, the county magistrate, and a state court judge. The district court

dismissed the complaint sua sponte, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Nagol appeals the dismissal, contending that the

district court erred on the facts and the law. We affirm. 

The relevant facts are fully set forth in the district court’s Memorandum Opinion

and Order, R. Vol. I, Tab 4. Briefly, Nagol’s action arises from incidents at two public

meetings. At the first, he criticized certain ordinances which the commission proposed,

called Commissioner Vinson stupid, and shook his finger at him, and he claims that

Vinson responded by approaching him in a threatening manner. He alleges that

subsequently, as part of a conspiracy to cover up alleged crimes, the commissioners and

county manager improperly refused his demand to be placed on the agenda for a second

meeting. In so doing, he argues that they denied his First Amendment rights of free 

speech and association, and violated the Fourth Amendment by forcibly removing and

falsely arresting him when he attempted to speak at that second meeting. He also alleges 

that the magistrate judge and state district court judge denied him due process and equal 

protection by placing unconstitutional restrictions on his access to state courts. In

addition to his constitutional claims, his action includes pendent state claims for assault,
- 3 -

defamation, and malfeasance in office. In his brief to us, Nagol cites no authority, but

generally refers to his U.S. Constitutional rights.

We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6) de novo. Although we liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings, Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we will not supply additional facts, nor will we

construct a legal theory. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); Dunn v.

White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1059 (1990). 

Broadly construed, Nagol’s complaint seems to seek a remedy in federal court

under 42. U.S.C. § 1983. However, it is well settled that not every injury inflicted by a

state official acting under color of law is actionable under § 1983, and “[v]iolation of

local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been invaded.” Paul v.

Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 700 (1976) (quoting Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108

(1945)). 

Thus, the district court correctly ruled that “the barring and physical removal of

plaintiff from the meeting as well as his subsequent arrest when plaintiff attempted to

reenter, smack of tort law,” and do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. R.

Vol. I, Tab 4 at 4 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled in part on

other grounds by, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). Rather, as the court noted,

the situation clearly involved “individual conduct for which there exists adequate state

remedy,” and not the “unlawfulness of an established state procedure.” Id.
- 4 -

Regarding Nagol’s equal protection and due process claims, the district court

correctly held that the magistrate and state court judge are absolutely immune from suit

for damages. See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 107 (1994). Additionally, to the extent that Nagol seeks injunctive relief and reversal

of the state court’s restrictions resulting from earlier litigation, he has failed to provide

any evidence which would indicate a denial or lack of state procedures to remedy his

alleged injury, or which would otherwise show that he did not have a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue. In any event, we agree with the district court’s

conclusion that the state court’s narrowly written requirement that Nagol be represented

by counsel or have prior judicial approval to file suits is constitutional. See Tripati v.

Beaman, 878 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir. 1989).

Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed the complaint for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Stephen H. Anderson

Circuit Judge