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66–532PDF 2011

FUTURE OF AL-QAEDA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 24, 2011

Serial No. 112–21

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

TED POE, Texas 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D., professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University ................................................................................................................... 5

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., senior political scientist, RAND Corporation ................... 11

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, deputy director and senior fellow, Transnational 

Threats Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies ..................... 25

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .......................................................... 7

Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................................ 13

Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement .................................................. 28

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 53

(1)

FUTURE OF AL-QAEDA 

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing of the subcommittee will come to order. 

Today we consider the impact of the death of Osama bin Laden on 

the al-Qaeda terrorist network and U.S. counterterrorism policy. 

Bin Laden was the symbolic, ideological and strategic core of the 

al-Qaeda movement, and the primary source of inspiration for that 

organization and many associated groups. His killing is a very significant development in our struggle against al-Qaeda. 

With depleted ranks and resources, with polling showing that its 

star is waning in the Middle East, some go so far as to declare that 

al-Qaeda is ‘‘in its death throes.’’ As we will hear today, that is 

wishful thinking. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda has proven all too adaptive, and that is one of the subjects that we are going to be looking 

at today. 

One analyst notes that al-Qaeda operatives were not driven by 

loyalty to bin Laden’s personality. They were driven by his twisted 

ideals. They embraced those twisted ideals. And, ‘‘We need to acknowledge at the outset,’’ says a USAID report on violent extremists, ‘‘the power of ideas.’’ It is the power of ideas that drove this 

movement, and, ‘‘We need to recognize that many violent extremists are moved, primarily,’’ as USAID tells us, ‘‘by an unshakable 

belief in the superiority of certain values; by a perceived obligation 

to carry out God’s command, or by an abiding commitment to destroy a system that they view as evil.’’ God says that system is evil, 

so they must destroy it. 

The lesson here is that bad ideas matter. Bad ideas have bad 

consequences. 

Unfortunately, a growing number of affiliates, a growing number 

of individuals, are looking to fulfill this vision that bin Laden had. 

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has already been linked 

to Fort Hood, and to the failed underwear bomber, and the cargo 

plane plot. That is the most energetic part right now of al-Qaeda. 

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is threatening with deep roots in 

North Africa, deep roots in Europe. We have seen from bombings 

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an increasing number of European and U.S. citizens have traveled 

to Somalia to link up with al-Shabaab. 

Bin Laden’s location, his hideout, has raised yet more doubts 

about the intelligence services in Pakistan. Was its intelligence 

service complicit, or was it just incompetent? 

ISI has supported militant networks inside Pakistan and Afghanistan that are targeting U.S. soldiers. Nuclear proliferator A.Q. 

Khan received state support. A terrorism trial in Chicago heard 

testimony this week that ISI provided, ‘‘financial and military assistance’’ to the LeT, the group that killed more than 160 in the 

Mumbai massacre. By the way, six Americans were killed there as 

well. 

In the past 10 years, Pakistan has received $20 billion in U.S. 

aid. Simply put, our Pakistan policy is not working. 

Assuming connections between bin Laden and the Pakistani military and intelligence services, a former top IAEA official has asked, 

‘‘What is to say that they would not help al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups gain access to sensitive nuclear materials, such as 

highly enriched uranium or plutonium?’’ This is not such a farfetched question. 

Intelligence work, including interrogations were key to tracking 

down bin Laden. It is notable that outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 

there have been no reported U.S. detentions of high-value terrorists 

under this administration. For instance, an Indonesian behind the 

Bali bombings was taken into custody by Pakistani authorities just 

months before our operation that took out bin Laden. Found near 

Abbottabad, he has been described as an intelligence ‘‘gold mine.’’ 

Yet, the Obama administration has, according to the L.A. Times, 

‘‘Made no move to interrogate or to seek custody of’’ this individual. 

Bin Laden’s death comes with the unfolding of the Arab Spring. 

The demise of autocracies in that part of the world is welcome for 

sure, but there are legitimate concerns that democracy in these 

countries may empower parties hostile to the U.S., confounding 

counterterrorism cooperation. 

One witness today will compare al-Qaeda to, in his words, ‘‘a 

shark in the water that must keep moving forward no matter how 

slowly or incrementally or die.’’ We look to today’s witnesses for answers on how to kill this deadly predator. I will now turn to our 

ranking member, Mr. Sherman, of Los Angeles, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

these hearings. We have an excellent panel, and we hope that they 

will shed some light on what we can expect from the most significant terrorist organization in the world, now that its leader and 

founder is dead. 

We found out that bin Laden was more than just an ephemeral 

figurehead, just an inspirational presence, but rather he risked his 

own security in order to communicate with the organization and 

tried to play a role in day-to-day and long-term planning. 

Whatever his role, it is obvious that Osama bin Laden’s death 

does not yet mean the end to al-Qaeda. What may be less obvious 

is that the death of al-Qaeda would not mean an end to our struggle against extremist Islamist terrorism. Other groups of folks affiliated or unaffiliated with al-Qaeda will continue even if that orVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:25 Jun 28, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\052411\66532 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ganization ceases, and al-Qaeda is a Sunni-inspired organization, 

and its demise might have little effect on the Iran-inspired Shia 

radical organizations, including, especially, Hezbollah. 

Bin Laden’s death, I believe, should be viewed as a milestone 

rather than a turning point. It is an important accomplishment, 

but it does not mean the end of al-Qaeda, let alone the end of terrorism. 

I think among the important questions we can pursue today is 

this. First, what impact does the Arab Spring, coinciding as it does 

with the death of bin Laden, have on al-Qaeda and other terrorist 

organizations? Is it part of a one/two punch against al-Qaeda, as 

noted expert Peter Bergen contends, or does al-Qaeda see an opportunity in these revolutions? 

It is our hope that the democratic revolutions in the Arab States 

will want the rejection of al-Qaeda, and violent groups, and the extremist philosophy behind them. But, we can look at history where 

again and again, whether it is the Russian revolution, the French 

revolution, or an Iranian revolution, we see circumstances where 

moderate pro-democratic forces take the lead in deposing a tyrannical regime only to see anti-democratic forces prevail in the end. 

As long as we are focused on terrorism and its future, we need 

to focus on Eastern Libya. According to a West Point study, Eastern Libya provided more militants for the insurgency in Iraq, more 

foreign fighters with American blood on their hands, than, virtually, any other area on a per capita basis. At least some of these 

militants are now part of the Eastern Libyan insurgency against 

Ghadafi. What impact do they have on the Libyan revolt and its 

power structure? Why have we not pressed the transitional National Council to turn in these terrorists with American blood on 

their hands over to the United States? Or at a minimum adopt a 

formal policy to exclude from their government and from their military forces those who have sought to kill Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Having met with the person who was identified as the prime 

minister of the transitional authority, he seems very intent upon 

benefitting from the American military, and benefitting from the 

military efforts of those who have tried to kill the American military. 

Now, Pakistan is, of course, important. Obviously, bin Laden had 

support from inside Pakistan. Obviously, the ISI supports various 

terrorist organizations, and does business with others. We should 

not forget that Pakistan has also suffered more from terrorism 

than I believe just about any country, with the possible exception 

of Afghanistan. Even today, we read of the recent attack on their 

naval base and the destruction of assets and the death of Pakistani 

military personnel there. 

Finally, if I can take a minute, I think it is important that Congress and this committee do its job. First, the Constitution makes 

it clear that Congress needs to be involved before we engage in 

military activities in Libya, and the War Powers Act gives the 

President only 60 days, which has expired, before obtaining congressional authorization. Congress should demand that it play its 

constitutional role, its role under U.S. law. We should not, in an 

4

effort to bring democracy and the rule of law to Libya, ignore the 

rule of law and democracy here in the United States. 

I am pleased that in this room for the next 2 days we will have 

hearings on Libya. 

Second, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal 2012 

will come to the floor. It contains an authorization for the use of 

force, known as the war on terror, that appears to expand the authorization passed in the wake of September 11th. I want to study 

this language carefully, but the study I would like to engage in is 

to have a hearing on it before this committee, have a markup on 

it before this committee, and have this committee play its role 

under House rules, which is to discuss, debate, markup, improve 

any act that authorizes force. So, I may have to vote to stroke that 

language, even if I would have supported it if it had been the product of a markup in this room. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. 

We will go to Mr. Higgins of New York for any opening statement he might have. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, just briefly, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to hear the panel speak to the issue, obviously, that 

is before us. But, just a thought. While, you know, the killing of 

bin Laden symbolically and substantially is very, very important, 

relative to the war on terrorism, I think it is important, what I 

would like to get is a sense from the panel, al-Qaeda morphed into 

al-Qaeda-ism a long time ago, and it seems to me that al-Qaeda is 

younger, Egyptian-based, more aggressive, and more sophisticated 

with respect to the use of modern technology. And, you know, the 

world is smaller, because we can all communicate. Everybody can 

plug in and play. But, the only thing you cannot commoditize, in 

terms of the new technology and the ability to communicate, is the 

imagination that you bring to these tools of collaboration. 

So, I am very interested in hearing from the panel as to their 

sense of, you know, what the new al-Qaeda has emerged to or has 

evolved to, in terms of its sophistication, its aggression, and its 

youth. 

So, with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

We will hear now from Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Dr. Seth Jones, and 

Mr. Tom Sanderson, who are going to testify. 

Bruce Hoffman is a professor in Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He held the corporate 

chair in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at the RAND Corporation. He holds a doctorate from Oxford University, and he is 

the author of the book, ‘‘Inside Terrorism.’’

Dr. Seth Jones is a senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, and he most recently served as the representative for the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Jones specializes in 

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and he has a particular 

focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan and al-Qaeda. 

Mr. Tom Sanderson is deputy director and senior fellow in the 

Transnational Threats Project, at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies. Sanderson currently co-leads an al-Qaeda 

5

Futures Project. He just returned, I had a chance to have lunch 

with him the other day, from a month-long trip to North Africa, to 

six African nations, gauging the current state and future prospects 

for al-Qaeda on the continent. 

All of the witnesses’ complete written testimony, I will remind 

you again, will be entered in the record, so we would like to keep 

it to 5 minutes so that we can get to questions. We’ll start with Dr. 

Hoffman. 

STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, 

SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Sherman, and members of the committee, subcommittee, 

for this opportunity to testify. 

Confronted with the sudden death of a leader, terrorist groups 

become cornered animals. When wounded, they lash out, not only 

in hopes of surviving, but also to demonstrate their remaining 

power and continued relevance. 

Al-Qaeda is no different, and will keen for its leader by killing, 

but it will not necessarily attack soon. Instead, we should brace 

ourselves once the 40-day mourning period that some Muslims observe ends. 

Given al-Qaeda’s stated determination, to punish the U.S., what 

should we prepare for in the near and further off future, in terms 

of possible scenarios and potential terrorist attacks? 

First, we should be concerned about planned al-Qaeda attacks already in the pipeline. Just days before bin Laden’s killing, German 

authorities disrupted a planned al-Qaeda attack in Berlin. We 

must assume that additional plots are already in motion or will 

soon be. 

Second, we need to worry about al-Qaeda harnessing the same 

social networking tools that facilitated the Arab Spring to spark a 

transnational spate of spontaneous terrorist attacks. These lowerlevel incidents would, thus, pre-occupy and distract intelligence 

agencies, in hopes that a spectacular al-Qaeda attack might avoid 

detection. 

Third, as the May 6, 2011, al-Qaeda statement indicates, the 

group will seek to further strain Pakistan’s relations with America, 

by summoning both its jihadi allies and ordinary citizens there 

against the Pakistani Government. Al-Qaeda will, thus, hope to undermine Pakistan’s fragile democracy by creating a popular backlash against the U.S. 

Fourth, we cannot discount the possibility of another major Pakistani jihadi attack in India. Al-Qaeda will see in a such scenario 

an opportunity to regroup and reorganize precisely when the world 

is distracted by a major escalation of tensions in the subcontinent. 

Finally, al-Qaeda affiliates, like its Yemen franchise, al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula, will remain largely unaffected by bin 

Laden’s death. They will, however, likely embrace vengeance in 

order to further burnish their terrorist credentials as rising stars 

within the movement’s firmament. 

Al-Qaeda has been compared to the archetypal shark in the 

water that must keep moving forward no matter how slowly and 

incrementally or die. And, al-Qaeda has always regarded this as a 

6

generational struggle that goes beyond the purview or interests of 

any one individual. The loss of bin Laden will not affect that calculus. 

Accordingly, the United States should continue to kill and capture al-Qaeda leaders and operatives, as it has so effectively done, 

especially, during the past 3 years of stepped-up aerial drone attacks. At the same time, the U.S. must continue to deprive alQaeda and its leaders of the sanctuaries and safe havens that it 

depends on. 

History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a physical 

sanctuary or safe haven, which is why it has invested so much of 

its energy in recent years in strengthening the capabilities of its affiliates and associates in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa. 

Thus, the highest priority for the U.S. must be to concentrate our 

attention on al-Qaeda as a network global phenomenon. This will 

require both continued U.S. military operations in South Asia, 

along side a continual scanning of the horizon to counter al-Qaeda’s 

presence and prevent its expansion into failed and failing states. 

But, equally critical are enhanced and better targeted U.S. efforts to counter al-Qaeda’s propaganda efforts in the aftermath of 

bin Laden’s killing. These should include redoubling our efforts to 

water down the al-Qaeda brand, targeted and enhanced communications directed toward the core demographic from which alQaeda continues to draw its strength, young people, enhanced use 

of the Internet along side traditional media as part of a coordinated 

cohesive information campaign, and making far better use of victims of terrorism, their stories and their formidable ability to challenge the jihadi narrative. 

In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this time to 

declare a total victory. Al-Qaeda’s hopes of renewal and regeneration in the aftermath of bin Laden’s killing rests on its continued 

access of the geographical sanctuaries and safe havens that the 

movement has always depended on, and historically abused as 

bases from which to plot, and plan, and launch international terrorism attacks. 

Only by depriving al-Qaeda of those sanctionaries, by destroying 

the organization’s leadership, and disrupting the continued resonance of al-Qaeda’s message, will this movement finally be defeated. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Dr. Seth Jones. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL 

SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Congressman 

Sherman, other members of the committee. 

While Osama bin Laden’s death is, and certainly represents, a 

serious blow to al-Qaeda, I would like to focus my comments here 

on two questions. What is the structure of al-Qaeda today, and how 

will it evolve? And second, how will that impact the threat to the 

United States’ homeland, which, obviously, we care a great deal 

about. 

To take the first question first, I think al-Qaeda, and it is certainly plausible that it has already moved in this direction anyway, 

will likely become more decentralized and diffused. It is unclear at 

this moment, for example, whether Ayman al-Zawahiri, who does 

not have the same pedigree as a front-line soldier the way Osama 

bin Laden had, will be able to provide the same kind of oversight 

over the affiliated groups. That is an open question. 

In addition, there are questions about his focus on a day-to-day 

basis on the United States. Osama bin Laden was focused, predominantly, on targeting the U.S. homeland. Al-Zawahiri has clearly focused on a range of issues, including Egypt, as well as the U.S. 

homeland. So, there are questions about how much some elements 

of central or core al-Qaeda will continue to focus on the U.S. homeland. 

What is important to recognize building off of some of the work 

that Dr. Hoffman has put together, is to understand what al-Qaeda 

looks like today. And, I will argue that it includes at least five 

rings of concentric circle. The first is Central al-Qaeda, which continues to be based in Pakistan today, and which still is a dangerous 

organization led, among others, by Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, led as the primary general manager, somebody who probably 

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ure, Atiyah abd al-Rahman, Libyan, in taking a lot of the information coming from affiliates and pushing it up for regular dedicated 

answers from the al-Qaeda leadership, Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani, 

involved in operations, Abu Yahya, Libyan, involved in propaganda, and a range of others. But, that Central al-Qaeda is still 

dangerous. I will come back to that in a second. 

But, outside of that then, there is a subsequent ring, which is the 

affiliated groups, and others on this panel, including Mr. 

Sanderson, will talk about the African connection and others. But, 

those are, obviously, the key groups who have changed their 

names, al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in East Africa, al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, but are affiliated organizations. 

And, outside of that is the allied groups, and this is where I 

think we are potentially most vulnerable, and where if al-Qaeda 

does become a more decentralized organization some of the more 

fundamental threats may come from these allied groups. These are 

groups who will coordinate, they conduct joint training, may conduct some joint operations, groups like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrike-Taliban, Pakistan, the Haqqani Network, which pose a notable 

threat to the U.S. homeland, as we have seen with Faisal Shahzad, 

the Mumbai style plots last year and others. Then we have allied 

networks and inspired networks. 

But, let me finish with a couple of key points. One is that alQaeda Central is still a very dangerous organization. We see multiple plots emanating from the Pakistan theater. I would remind 

everyone here that several key individuals that are Americans, or 

have lived in America, still remain in Central al-Qaeda, Adnan el 

Shukrijumah from Broward County, Florida, continues to be involved at senior levels in al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan, Adam 

Gadahn from California, the Riverside, California area, still involved at fairly senior levels of the propaganda realm. 

Mr. ROYCE. Actually, Garden Grove. 

Mr. JONES. That is right. I have, actually, interviewed some of 

his family members, so they are still down there. 

In addition, let me just conclude, just based on timing, that I 

think one of the weakest areas of America’s counterterrorism strategy, certainly against al-Qaeda, is that most of these individuals 

that, as Mr. Higgins mentioned earlier, that people are listening to, 

including Anwar al-Aulaqi. Look at his track record. He was arrested twice in the San Diego area for soliciting prostitutes. He has 

no formal education as an Islamic scholar. 

Our ability to get those messages out, to make unclassified his 

arrest records, is something I think that would be helpful. Adnan 

el Shukrijumah, from Broward County, beat his sister’s girls, was 

arrested for felony for beating girls back in the 1990s, that stuff 

should be publicly available. 

And then finally, just to build on one of Bruce’s comments, Winston Churchill observed over a century ago, during the British 

struggles in the Northwest Frontier, that time in this area is measured in decades, not months or years. It is a concept that does not 

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cause I think we are seeing a much more diffused organization 

across the globe. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]


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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Jones. 

Mr. Sanderson. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS 

PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL 

STUDIES 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished 

members of the committee, it is an honor to testify before this subcommittee on the Future of al-Qaeda. 

Mr. Chairman, we all agree that Osama bin Laden’s death is a 

victory. I see it as an opportunity to advance the still necessary 

struggle against al-Qaeda and its ideology. 

Most likely it was bin Laden’s hope that by the time he was 

killed or captured he would have helped establish and solidify a durable, largely self-sufficient movement. He was successful in this 

regard. Those who fought or trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s 

and 1990s are the spine of today’s al-Qaeda movement. 

Veterans of the more recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, 

have served as a new generation of credible fighters, and many of 

them now occupy senior leadership positions within al-Qaeda, or its 

affiliated groups. 

What are al-Qaeda’s prospects going forward? I believe the 

broader al-Qaeda movement will survive the death of bin Laden for 

several reasons. First, al-Qaeda’s many associates are financially 

and somewhat operationally autonomous. Second, al-Qaeda’s narrative that Islam is under attack is embedded, and continues to 

resonate with Muslims around the world, even if its violent strategy does not. Third, existing conditions, such as the safe haven in 

Pakistan, and the chaos in Libya, offer lifelines for al-Qaeda. 

I would like to offer you some very brief insights from recent research in Africa, which took me to six nations in West Africa, East 

Africa and North Africa, to investigate the current state and future 

prospects for al-Qaeda and its associated movements. 

Field work took place in Morocco, Mali, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, 

and Tanzania, and included more than 40 interviews with journalists, academics, intelligence officials, a member of the Muslim 

Brotherhood, regional security officials, Muslim community leaders, 

and others. 

Libya emerged as our greatest concern. Those we interviewed 

worried that the conflict there could soon become an arena for 

jihad. On April 14th, Ayman al-Zawahiri called on, ‘‘Egyptians and 

western desert tribes to support their brothers in Libya.’’ alZawahiri added that Muslims from the region, ‘‘must rise to fight 

both Ghadafi’s mercenaries and NATO crusaders,’’ if American and 

NATO forces enter Libya. 

One may question how influential al-Zwahiri is today, but these 

statements reflect al-Qaeda’s thinking at the senior-most level. 

The fears that such a scenario would greatly improve the fortunes of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, as well as 

former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, some of 

whom were allied with Osama bin Laden. The steady flow of people 

26

and weapons into and out of Libya, Algeria and Chad suggest that 

AQIM has already taken advantage of this opportunity. 

My sources verified press reports that AQIM has acquired shoulder-fired SA–7 anti-aircraft missiles in Libya, and brought them to 

Mali. Given al-Qaeda’s longstanding obsession with targeting commercial aircraft, the possibilities are obvious. 

There are other militants based in Libya, which stand to gain 

from the current crisis. As I mentioned, in the eastern part of 

Libya one time LIFG fighters, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group fighters, are active in the rebellion against Ghadafi. 

The Arab Spring was a major blow to al-Qaeda. In what appears 

to be his last statement, bin Laden voiced support for the popular 

revolutions across the Middle East in North Africa, but he may 

have been accepting reality while hoping to take advantage of the 

situation in due time. The uprisings implicitly vetoed several pillars of bin Laden’s ideology. 

In Egypt and Tunisia protests succeeded, where al-Qaeda had 

failed, removing longstanding autocrats. The protestors’ goals were 

largely secular, their use of violence minimal, and their calls for democracy and a strong world for women anathema to al-Qaeda. 

Only days ago I interviewed a young female member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who enthusiastically supported democracy and human rights. I do not believe she represents the future 

that bin Laden hoped for. 

The trend toward political participation by Islamists is also problematic for al-Qaeda. As Peter Bergen points out, al-Qaeda has not 

provided for people’s materials needs, while Islamist organizations 

that actually participate in political processes do, and do so under 

the banner of Islam. 

Over the years, militants in and out of al-Qaeda have debated 

how best to achieve their utopian vision of an Islamic caliphate. Arguments over the wisdom of the 9/11 attacks and the doctrine of 

takfir in particular, have roiled al-Qaeda and focused criticism on 

bin Laden and his followers. 

Alternative strategic approaches may now come to the surface 

with the killing of al-Qaeda’s founder and leader, and we could 

very well see some examples in the months ahead. 

As we do look ahead, al-Qaeda certainly will experience setbacks 

in the wake of bin Laden’s death. Some remaining al-Qaeda leaders 

will lay low in fear of what is revealed in the information gathered 

at bin Laden’s compound, just as drone attacks have injected risk 

into the calculations of terrorists, so does the dramatic killing of 

Osama bin Laden and the data that was gathered on site. 

Maintaining pressure at a moment of transition for al-Qaeda 

leaders could yield gains. Any adjustments by parts of the movement could leave signatures useful to counterterrorism officials. 

The death of bin Laden rightly prompts talk about his ongoing 

influence on the broader al-Qaeda movement, but it will require 

much more time to sufficiently understand the nature of his influence, and to then tailor our counterterrorism policies. 

Having said that, I think continuing what we have been doing 

in large part is right, drone strikes, denying safe haven, preventing 

the flow of funding, countering online radicalization, supporting regional allies, and directly and thoroughly addressing the conditions 

27

that make violence so appealing for the young people that join the 

movement, will be needed in greater degrees. But, I am mindful 

that this will have to be done in a severely resource constrained 

environment. 

Osama bin Laden succeeded in cultivating a far-flung, mature 

and capable movement and an ideology that continues to resonate. 

The Israel and Palestine situation, Western influence, and lethal 

partners in the safe haven in nuclear-armed Pakistan, and a long 

list of underlying conditions, will facilitate recruitment and operations. 

Pursuing policies based on the notion that Osama bin Laden’s 

death signals the end for al-Qaeda and its affiliated groups would 

be a premature, unwise, and dangerous position to take at this 

time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]

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Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Tom. 

Let me ask you about the comments the director or head of MI5 

in Britain made about the possibility of terror attacks by alShabaab. He recently said that they are worried about terrorism on 

the streets, inspired by those who learned that craft alongside alShabaab fighters, because so many, a ‘‘significant number,’’ I think, 

was the quote, a significant number of people were traveling to Somalia. 

You were in Kenya and Tanzania, and you saw a little of that. 

What do you think the prospects are for attacks on the British 

homeland? We have also received reports that al-Shabaab, along 

with the Somali Americans, are making the trek to the region 

through Kenya. 

Mr. SANDERSON. They, in fact, have, Mr. Chairman. We are 

aware that the first suicide bombing involving America was Somali 

American who traveled from the States to the Horn of Africa in an 

attempt to push back the Ethiopian invasion and fight those individuals. 

The Somalis have quite a significant diaspora. They have individuals around the world, the UK, Australia, United States, and the 

fact that they are members of an organization that is extreme, and 

driven to push back neighbors such as Ethiopia that have been 

supported by the United States, merits caution and concern. 

I think the director of MI5’s comments are reasonable. I think 

that we do need to look at this potential threat. At this point, the 

individuals have gone and focused on Ethiopia and focused on Somalia, or into claims in the area, not on the United States. So, I 

don’t want to put too much stress there, but it is a valid thing to 

look at. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Jones, any thoughts on that question? 

Mr. JONES. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

One thing I would like to add is, one of the growing concerns 

with al-Shabaab in the United States is not just for communities 

in places like Minneapolis, but also what we are seeing is an increase in special interest daily in networks that are bringing Somalis into and out of the United States, including those connected to, 

directly or indirectly, to al-Shabaab. 

So, we have a pipeline that can move individuals from the 

United States to Somalia, through Latin America, particularly, 

Mexico, as well as move them back. In some cases, it may be to 

visit family, but I think there is a growing concern of the use by 

al-Shabaab of a range of trafficking and other networks in Latin 

America, especially, Mexico, that were they to decide to fundamentally target the U.S. homeland there is a well-defined ability to get 

into the U.S. 

Mr. ROYCE. I would also like to ask you about the former Pakistani commando by the name of Kashmiri. There have been multiple terrorism plots that he’s been linked to in Europe, in particular, and sort of these large-scale Mumbai-style plots that he’s 

tried to pull off in cities there last summer. 

You see some speculation he might try to take over the organization. Do you have any thoughts on whether or not that is plausible? 

36

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, in my view, partly because he is a 

Pakistani, he is not an Arab, I think it would be unlikely he has 

the strategic level support across the affiliates to, actually, take 

control of the organization. But, he has a well-developed network 

of operatives in Europe, in South Asia, and in a range of other 

places, to put him in a very influential operational level position. 

So, I would not assess he would take over Central al-Qaeda, but, 

certainly, plays a very important operational level role, including 

links with David Headley, for example. 

Mr. ROYCE. Right. Right. 

Well, let me go to Mr. Hoffman here for a minute, because on 

these Mumbai-style attacks there was the comment that the LeT 

holds the match that could start the war between India and Pakistan. A Mumbai attack itself could have led to that kind of escalation. 

What can we be doing to stop another one of these attacks that 

would originate in Pakistan by organizations linked to al-Qaeda, or 

linked to these terrorist networks, that attempt to create this kind 

of mayhem in India, with a hope for tit for tat. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, this was precisely one of the scenarios I painted in my testimony, the fear that one of these groups 

either operating on their own or operating at al-Qaeda’s behest, or, 

perhaps, someone else’s behest, might attempt to trigger some confrontation with India to deflect attention from the war and terrorism and from Afghanistan. 

I think groups like LeT are enormously valuable to al-Qaeda, because they provide what al-Qaeda does not, the social welfare services. They have gone beyond being a mere terrorist group. 

And, in LeT’s case, I think they are extremely dangerous, because the bottom line is that they are the Hezbollah of South Asia. 

They are so embedded in Pakistani society, in terms of running 

schools, clinics, training camps, a relationship with the government, one could say even also a state-sponsored relationship with 

the government, that their power is dangerous. They have 

operatives and a presence throughout the world I think that alQaeda could only dream of, and in this sense they are so embedded 

in Pakistani society that they represent a threat to, I think, its stability. 

Mr. ROYCE. They have an open campus where they can routinely 

recruit new graduates. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, precisely, and estimates of upwards of 2,000 

facilities in total in Pakistan. 

And, even when you spoke about Ilyas Kashmiri, I think you put 

your finger on one of the dangerous trends we are seeing, is that 

individual groups do not matter any longer. You see people gravitating from one group to another, that joining a group like LeT or 

Harakat-ul-Jihad, which was Ilyas Kashmiri’s group, is just a gateway to other groups. And, you see someone like Kashmiri going 

from having served in the Pakistani army, having trained the 

mujahideen in the 1980s, going to a radical Pakistani jihadi group, 

and then being tasked by al-Qaeda to engage in international terrorism. And, this loops back to what you were asking about alShabaab. 

37

This is an entity that 10 or even 5 years ago none of us would 

have heard of or would have cared about. 

Mr. ROYCE. Sure. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. But, they are a group that now seeks to operate 

on the international scene. 

Mr. ROYCE. But, we did have a steady flow of information coming 

in about these terrorist personalities, partly by the information 

that we were getting from those that we were interrogating, those 

who we were interviewing. 

And, I mentioned earlier the highest ranking terrorist, I guess 

you would call him, captured in the last several years is this Indonesian, Umar Patek. Despite the fact that he is described as a 

‘‘gold mine,’’ we have not interrogated him. 

What do you make of this? Do you have an explanation of why 

the administration has been so reluctant to do so, and how big a 

target is he? How valuable is the information he could provide? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I do not, sir, have an explanation. I think that 

like all terrorist leaders, he has a potential wealth of information, 

even if it is not actionable intelligence, but helping us to understand the wiring diagram of terrorist organizations, helping us to 

understand the decision-making processes, helping us to understand the relationships between them, that has, as I just described, 

drifted people from one terrorist group to another. 

So, all that, of course, is enormously important, not just in a tactical sense of killing and capturing other terrorists, but also building up the strategic picture of how these groups operate, so we can 

prevent their regeneration. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman. 

Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In this room for 15 years, I have criticized the State Department 

for failure to enforce the Iran Sanctions Act and its progeny, so I 

should bring up that they have done a good day’s work today, they 

just released a statement that seven companies have been sanctioned, including the State Oil Company of Venezuela. 

Now, as to the issues of this hearing, Mr. Hoffman, one thing 

that I am interested in is how much money did bin Laden die with, 

and who controls it now? Do you have any insight or knowledge of 

the answers to those questions? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. No, sir, I do not, but one thing I would point out 

is that in recent years al-Qaeda has turned more and more to selffunded operations, on a modest amount of spending. 

Mr. SHERMAN. He seems to have been rather stingy with his own 

personal money, or his personal money was wildly exaggerated. He 

notoriously only bought one-way airplane tickets, saving money 

and tipping us off to some extent. 

Mr. Jones, you preferred an interesting idea, and I think it is a 

good idea that we try to discredit these terrorists, whether it be at 

large or otherwise. We may not be believed, but the public is interested in little salacious details. 

I, for one, think that it would be a good idea not to satisfy my 

own prurient interest, but rather as an effort to discredit, to relieve 

some of the personal and embarrassing things found in bin Laden’s 

compound. 

38

Do we have legislation to carry out the program you have outlined? I mean, we have laws to protect life, liberty and property of 

Americans, and yet, when you are a terrorist we do take, you know, 

the SEALs do knock down your door, presumably, they are willing 

to take their life, we are going to invade their privacy. Is legislation 

necessary in order to say that if you are indicted on terrorism and 

refuse to present yourself to American authorities, that we can violate your privacy and talk about your arrest record? 

And, by the way, the individuals you were talking about, are 

they easily indictable or have they been indicted on terrorism? 

Mr. JONES. Some of them, including Adam Gadahn, have been 

indicted. He was indicted in the early 2000s. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. 

Mr. JONES. I think, frankly, with most of the individuals we are 

talking about, it probably is not necessary to establish legislation 

to release information about them, especially, because the vast majority are not even Americans. 

And, even those like Adnan el Shukrijumah, who have lived in 

the United States, he is not an American citizen. So, I would suspect——

Mr. SHERMAN. I am not sure that the average guy in my district 

who is an immigrant to the United States, but does not have his 

citizenship, should just have his arrest record released for the purpose of embarrassing him, unless, you know, and then I draw a distinction between that individual and these terrorists. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. JONES [continuing]. But, certainly, releasing Anwar alAwlaki’s solicitation of prostitutes in San Diego, I think would be 

helpful in denigrating his character. Whether it would contribute 

to individuals not seeking his guidance, as we saw with Major 

Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, is unclear. 

But, I think making that information publicly available, again, I 

am not sure if legislation is required, or if better strategic thinking 

is required. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I look forward to getting your analysis on 

a case-by-case basis, and would be willing to carry legislation if it 

was carefully drafted. 

Last question, is Peter Bergen right, is Saif al-Adel the interim 

leader of al-Qaeda, and if so, or even if not, he spent many years 

in Iran, supposedly, under house arrest. Was it house arrest or was 

he a house guest? 

Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. Sure. Sir, in my personal view, I have seen no strong 

evidence that Saif al-Adel has taken on the role as the senior leader of Central al-Qaeda in Pakistan. 

He, certainly, has played a very historically important role, sat 

on the inner shura, traveled to Iran after the overthrow of the 

Taliban regime in December. 

My understanding is it was ‘‘house arrest,’’ that many of alQaeda’s leaders in Iran were monitored quite closely, in a few cases 

were encouraged to leave. Some have left, actually, somewhat recently, but, certainly, not arrested. 

39

Mr. SHERMAN. And, the fact that some have left Iran, it is not 

like they had to evade Iranian law enforcement in order to leave 

the country, is that correct? 

Mr. JONES. I cannot give you details on every case, but that is 

my understanding in at least some of them. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, usually, if you are under house arrest you 

cannot leave, and if you are a house guest you can, you may even 

be asked to. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Poe of Texas. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have questions about Pakistan and then Libya. 

How ingrained, if they are, are al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups 

in the Pakistan Government? 

Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. The Pakistan Government and its intelligence service 

has had a history of providing direct assistance to a range of proxy 

organizations to pursue its interests in India, including Kashmir, 

as well as in Afghanistan. 

So, a range of these groups includes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network. 

The concern I would have is that several of these groups, including the Haqqani Network, as well a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, have a 

very close relationship with senior al-Qaeda leaders. So, at the very 

least one could draw a conclusion that there is a, to use the Kevin 

Bacon analogy, very close, perhaps, one or two degrees of separation between elements of Pakistan’s Government and al-Qaeda. 

Mr. POE. Since the taking out of Osama bin Laden, there has 

been a lot of discussion about how trustworthy an ally Pakistan is. 

I think they are playing both sides, at least two sides, maybe more 

sides than that. 

If what you say is true, how should we be moving forward to 

make sure that the intelligence service in Pakistan does not go further and help these groups obtain uranium capability that they can 

use? Is that a concern that we should have, the United States 

should have, that the intelligence service in Pakistan is working 

with these groups so that maybe they could obtain uranium and 

move in a nuclear capability? 

Mr. Sanderson, anybody want to answer that? 

Mr. SANDERSON. It is clearly a concern. I do think they are playing both sides, because they have a lot of interests that go beyond 

what we are interested in. But, I would yield to Dr. Jones, given 

that is his area of expertise. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Mr. Jones? 

Mr. JONES. I think it would be helpful, as a general principle, as 

we consider future amounts of assistance and types of assistance 

to provide to Pakistan, that they increasingly rethink their policy 

of providing assistance to proxy organizations. 

There are clearly terrorist organizations that they have fought, 

have died fighting. The Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan is one good 

example. So, they have serious threats to their homeland, some of 

which overlap with ours, but some of which do not. 

40

I would suggest strongly encouraging them, including through 

the types and amounts of funding we are providing to them, that 

they must stop providing direct assistance in some cases to militant groups, because it creates a sanctuary in that country that is 

extremely unhelpful and dangerous for America’s national security. 

Mr. POE. Military support that we have sent to Pakistan, our 

own Government is now saying that 40 percent of the bills they 

give back to us are rejected by our Government as invalid bills for 

what they are billing us for in Pakistan regarding their military. 

How do we know, or give me a take on what you think our military support turns out to be going through Pakistan, the intelligence service, and going to one of these groups ended up being 

used against us. Is that a possibility, a probability, or not? 

Mr. JONES. I have seen no evidence, that does not mean it does 

not exist, of abusing our equipment or any other monies and pushing it toward militant groups. 

But, as a general policy, organizations that we have a relationship with in Pakistan have provided assistance. 

So, in a sense, I am not sure it matters that much. At the very 

least, they are taking knowledge in some cases, and pushing it to 

some militant groups. 

Mr. POE. Last question is Libya. 

Who is in charge of the Libyan rebels? 

Mr. Sanderson? They are looking at you, so I will let you answer. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Absolutely, Mr. Congressman. 

I cannot answer that specific question for you. What I can answer is your initial question as to the threat and role of al-Qaeda 

there. 

I do not know who is running the rebellion, but I can tell you 

that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is on the western flank, has 

networks into the country, and can certainly trade on the chaos 

there. On the eastern side, which we know from previous statements, and from the West Point study, that is where you had a tremendous number of extremists who traveled to Iraq to fight, the 

second highest number per capita for any country. 

Then you have Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members, former 

members, one of the senior former members of the LIFG recently 

reported that in the last 18 months 40 former LIFG—or 40 Libyans, not, necessarily, LIFG, 40 Libyans have joined AQIM. So, you 

have a crossover between the groups. You have the rebels in the 

east being infiltrated by former LIFG members into AQIM poised 

to make gains in this chaos. 

And, that has, I think, great implications for what is going on 

next door in Egypt, as they start to right themselves you do not 

want that degree of instability next door in Libya. 

Mr. POE. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Poe. 

We will go to Mr. Higgins of New York. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to just talk about al-Qaeda in Pakistan. And, if you 

are talking about the future of al-Qaeda, I also think it is fundamentally important to talk about, you know, how they sustain 

themselves, you know, how do they exist. 

41

And, in Afghanistan, which I have heard some estimates that the 

heroin trade is about 60 percent of Afghan’s entire economy. And, 

Taliban does not own the poppy fields, but it presides over it. It 

charges protection, it makes money in the movement of drugs. 

And, I also understand that drug movement becomes more profitable the further away from its point of origin. 

To what extent is al-Qaeda involved in the movement of heroin 

from Afghanistan through Central Asia and South Asia? 

Mr. JONES. My understanding, Congressman Higgins, is, and I 

am not an expert on the drug trade, is they make some money off 

of the transportation of opium-based products, but it is by no 

means their primary source of assistance, which may come from a 

range of other activities, Gulf financing, kidnapping. 

So, they have, like many groups, significant redundancy in where 

they get financing from. I would say they do not need a large 

amount of funding, but other groups, including the Afghan Taliban, 

are the primary beneficiaries, as well as government officials on 

both sides of the border, of most of the drug money. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Mr. Congressman, I cannot give you a figure, of 

course, but I will say that you correctly characterized the increasing amount of money as it goes out of Afghanistan. You know, this 

is between 6,000 and 8,000 tons per year, with about half of it 

going west through Iran, 20 percent going through Central Asia, 

the rest through Pakistan. 

Incidentally, we learned while on the Swahili Coast, and in other 

parts of Africa, that heroin was coming down there and causing 

problems among the Somali community. 

So, this is tremendously dangerous and does increase in benefit 

to them as it goes further and makes money for those along the 

route. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Well just, it seems to me that there is what a book 

by Gretchen Peters called Seeds of Terror, she puts the number at 

about half-a-billion dollars a year the Taliban makes in taxing, 

charging protection, and presiding over those opium-based products. 

But, the point is, if an economy, you know, that is 60 percent, 

you know, heroin based, the movement around that country cannot 

be all that profitable, but the heroin has to get to more places 

where a lot of money can be made. 

And, if you assume that the Taliban’s involvement is confined to 

Pakistan, then other elements are involved in moving those opiumbased products, as you said, throughout the world and making an 

lawful lot of money. 

Mr. JONES. Sir, if I can just add one issue. 

Based on the fact that much of that opium, or a chunk of it, does 

go to areas like Eastern Europe and Western Europe, you see in 

Dubai, for example, where a lot of the drug money is funded by 

large numbers of Russian mafia, so I think the end areas where 

that drug money is coming, is going to, and Gretchen has outlined 

this as well in her work, does mean that a lot of the conduits are 

in areas like Dubai and in Eastern Europe. 

So, I would say those appear to be the primary recipients of the 

assistance and the funding as it comes through on its way to areas 

like Eastern Europe. 

42

Mr. HIGGINS. Just a final question. 

Again, you talked about al-Qaeda is now decentralized, diffused, 

and other influences is gaining, but their popularity seems to be 

declining, particularly, in the Islamic world, as evidenced by the 

Arab Spring and other indicators. 

So, you know, where would you put the relative strength of alQaeda today, versus, let’s say, 5 years ago? 

Any of you. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. I would say it is stronger, beyond any doubt. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Stronger. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. 20 years ago al-Qaeda, perhaps, had seven international networks worldwide. Today it has 11. 

You show me any entity in the past 2 or 3 years when most governments throughout the world had been, you know, immersed in 

cutbacks and laying off personnel and so on, al-Qaeda has been 

able to expand by more than 50 percent its worldwide presence. 

So, I think that is a reflection of a conscious strategy, both to decentralize, and as Dr. Jones said, but also to deflect attention away 

from South Asia to strengthen the core group, because the core 

group then still remains a player. 

Mr. ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Folks, thank you for being here today. 

You know, some say the attention given to the al-Qaeda leadership struggle risks placing personalities and individuals above 

ideas and ideology. And, I tend to agree with that. 

And, I don’t believe has been said about the threats to world 

peace, and, definitely, peace in the Middle East, posed by the Muslim Brotherhood. I don’t believe we talk about the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence in the region enough, and you are really just starting to hear about that in recent events. 

And, furthermore, I cannot say enough about the despairing language of terror within the administration. If you look at the 9/11 

Commission report, and the terms, it had words like terrorism and 

jihad, and Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda and others, mentioning that, and then look at the lexicons that are out there in the 

services, intelligence services, even within the administration. 

I am concerned about that, because I believe you have got to define your enemy. 

Dr. Jones, I am going to take a different line of questioning here, 

because I am concerned about closer to home. What is your opinion 

on the threat level from the terrorist organizations, Hezbollah and 

al-Shabaab in, say, Latin America, and even closer to home in Mexico, along our border? 

Mr. JONES. That is a very good question. 

My personal view on the two you noted, Hezbollah and alShabaab, is both do present a threat, but it is not clear that it is 

an imminent threat to the U.S. homeland. 

I am not an expert on Hezbollah, like some others, including Dr. 

Hoffman here, and that general region, but I would say that their 

primary focus still appears to be the general Lebanon, Israeli area. 

However, I would also note that an incident like Israeli or U.S. 

attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities could obviously change 

that very quickly. 

43

The same thing is probably also true of Shabaab, whose primary 

focus remains in and around Somalia. There are growing concerns 

of a linkage between al-Qaeda East Africa, but I would say the 

threat streams through Latin America to the U.S. homeland, active 

plotting, based on al-Shabaab, I have not seen evidence of a very 

serious threat. 

I would say the most serious threats continue to come from Central al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and some of the 

Pakistani groups, including Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan, and 

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, all of which have some number of networks operating through Central America. 

Mr. DUNCAN. That is interesting. 

Mr. Sanderson, and then I will ask Mr. Hoffman questions. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Congressman. 

I would just like to remind everyone that there is significant penetration by Hezbollah supporters on the level of a criminal nexus 

that clearly could also serve as the beachhead of a future attack. 

If you look at the trading, illegal trading of cigarettes that came 

out of the Carolinas with the Hamoud brothers, the profits from 

that were used to buy laser range finders, night vision goggles, 

blasting caps that were sent back to the Bekaa Valley. 

A second group up in Canada bought pseudoephedrine tablets, 

brought them in to the northern United States, traded them with 

Mexican methamphetamine gangs, who then created methamphetamines, and the profits from that were also sent back to Lebanon. 

So, that is a significant threat in my mind. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Mr. Hoffman, last July we had the first IED explode in this hemisphere, and in Mexico. Can you elaborate, or can 

you talk about the influence that Hezbollah may have with the 

Mexican drug cartel, any involvement there? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, sir, Hezbollah has long been involved in the 

Western Hemisphere, going back at least several decades. Its 

strength has always been in the triple border area between Brazil, 

Paraguay and Argentina. 

I think in recent years it has been able to establish a more auxiliary beachhead in the northern part of Latin America and Venezuela, in particular. 

So, I think its influence in these areas, its involvement in illegal 

smuggling narcotics trafficking, as Mr. Sanderson described cigarette smuggling and so on, its presence in the United States, I 

think, and its infrastructure throughout the region is quite strong. 

I have no evidence at all, but I would be skeptical that it was 

necessarily engaged in an act of alliance with, for instance, the 

Mexican drug cartels, because Hezbollah modus operandi, as Dr. 

Jones has described, is, essentially, to lay low and to be ready in 

the event some adversarial action is taken by the United States or 

some other country against Iran, or, perhaps, against Lebanon, and 

then to mobilize its operatives in other hemispheres to strike. 

It is not inconceivable that that technology would be transferred 

by Hezbollah, but I think, unfortunately, what we have seen since 

Iraq is that the IED technology has really spread to many different 

theaters, and is not confined to any one group any longer. But, that 

sort of technology not least because of the Internet, not least as I 

described earlier because of the flow of individuals now between 

44

multiple terrorist groups, unfortunately, has spread, and may, indeed, be a harbinger of the future when you see IEDs elsewhere. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

We are going to go now to Mr. Connolly of Virginia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having this hearing, and welcome. 

Mr. Jones made reference to the Haqqani Network. It seems fairly convincing evidence that the elements of the ISI have provided 

protection to them, to the Haqqani Network, which has operated 

openly and with impunity in Pakistan, or at least parts of Pakistan, Peshawar, to wit. 

My question goes to, I mean, the title of this hearing is the future of al-Qaeda, but I think we are particularly increasingly focused on the Pakistani relationship. 

How should the United States look at Pakistan? And, you know, 

it seems to me that there are competing theories. You could look 

at Pakistan and say, duplicitous, manipulative, and we have to do 

something about that. 

You could look at Pakistan and say it is a conveniently compartmentalized government. So, there are legitimate elements here of 

the Pakistani Government who are cooperating openly and honestly with the United States in the fight against terror. After all, 

they have lost Pakistani military personnel in that fight. 

And then, there are other elements in other compartments that 

are not, or you could, I suppose, say given the money on the table 

they know how to play us beautifully. We do not have a lot of 

choices, given the fact that we have a nuclear capacity, and so they 

are cynically opportunistic in our relationship. 

Now, I think there is a quandary up here on the Hill as to, well, 

we need to figure out how, in fact, we see the relationship, because 

there are so many conflicting variables in this very complex relationship. 

So, I want to give you all an opportunity to tell us what you 

think, how you are advising the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 

how should Congress look at this relationship, given recent events? 

Dr. Hoffman. 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, sir, I think you have given a very accurate 

description of the problem, it is all of the above. It is all of those 

things. It is duplicitous and manipulative, it is convenient and compartmentalized. I would argue it is also very selective in its cooperation. 

It cooperates with the United States against those groups that it 

believes most directly threaten the Pakistani Government, that is 

the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban. It gives other groups, if not a pass, 

then turns a blind eye, or in some respects is actually involved in 

supporting them. 

The trial, I think, currently underway in Chicago, that involves 

Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani National based in the United States, 

and David Headley another, actually, a dual Pakistani American 

citizen, sheds a lot of light on this, because, of course, according to 

David Headley’s testimony the senior major in the ISI, Major Iqbal, 

was one of his handlers, and not only knew about the Mumbai attacks, but had an active role, and he certainly did not try to stop 

the attackers when he learned that Americans were being delibVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:25 Jun 28, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\TNT\052411\66532 HFA PsN: SHIRL
45

erately targeted, and for that matter American Jews were also 

being, specifically, targeted in a Chabad House. And, I think that, 

and the trial, and that information, controvertibly, I think, provides 

us a wedge to push back. 

We cannot completely forsake Pakistan. We need their assistance 

clearly, and as you, yourself, pointed out, not all elements of the 

Pakistani Government are uncooperative or inimical to U.S. interests, but I think we have to make it clear that their selective backing of some groups and going after other groups has to end, and 

that should be one of the main pre-conditions for aid in the future. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. I think it is useful, in answering your question, to 

understand what motivates, what likely motivates Pakistan as very 

similar to what motivates all countries in that region, maximizing 

its own national security interests. 

It acts to protect its own borders. It has serious concerns about 

its relationship with India. It has serious concerns about India’s 

very close relationship with Afghanistan. 

It has, since its creation in 1947, used proxy organizations, because it is a relatively weaker state, to deal with the Indians. It 

did it from the moment it was established in the Kashmir area. 

So, I would say in general the more I think that we can argue 

that policy of providing assistance to proxy groups ends up undercutting Pakistan’s own security interests in the long run, because 

any of these groups will and have turned on Pakistan itself. It cannot control these groups in all aspects, certainly undermines its 

own security. 

But, I would just say very bluntly that I find it very difficult to 

believe we can continue to provide the amounts and degrees of assistance that we provide them, to the government, who is structured, if you look at the structure of the ISI, to provide assistance 

to proxy groups. That just—I do not think that is the best way to 

provide American taxpayer dollars to a country that continues as 

a matter of foreign policy to provide assistance to militant groups. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me, not for me 

to ask anymore questions, but to allow Mr. Sanderson to respond 

as well? 

Mr. ROYCE. Certainly, Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

I would echo Dr. Jones’ comments about the interest, and no 

doubt about it, we are left with a terrible choice, and we are held 

over a barrel to a degree here. 

But, the recent attack on the Pakistani naval base, I think, is a 

good reminder to the Pakistanis about how unwieldy some of these 

internal groups can be. 

And, speaking of interests, we also have to look beyond our specific interests on extremism in al-Qaeda, to interests in Asia, and 

we do not want to move away too much from Pakistan, given their 

relationship with China, and our interests with India and China, 

at large. 

46

So, I think that leaves us in a position where we have clear to 

continue, but certainly not at these numbers. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson of Ohio. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Hoffman, you noted that decapitation strikes have rarely provided a decisive end to a terrorist movement, instead they often 

paralyze a group, only to see the rise of an even more dangerous 

successor. Hamas, which has had several of its top leaders eliminated is a case in point, some argue. Yet, the death of al-Zarqawi, 

al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq, is believed to have seriously degraded 

that group. 

Why was the case of Zarqawi different, and where does the death 

of bin Laden fall on that scale? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, sir, that is an excellent parallel to draw, and 

you are absolutely right, the death of al-Zarqawi in May 2006 degraded al-Qaeda in Iraq, but, of course, it did not eliminate the 

threat. Al-Qaeda in Iraq continues today, weaker, but, nonetheless, 

still with an ability to inflict pain and suffering on the Iraqi people 

and to target—tend to undermine the fragile democracy in Iraq. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Many point to the Internet as an increasing 

source of radicalization for home-grown terrorists. In a message 

after bin Laden’s death, al-Qaeda’s online propaganda arm sought 

to rally supporters by low-tech means, and they said something like 

this: ‘‘We say to every mujahid Muslim, if there is an opportunity 

do not waste it. Do not consult anyone about killing Americans or 

destroying their economy. We also insight you carry out acts of individual terrorism with significant results, which only require basic 

preparation.’’

How do you assess U.S. efforts to combat what one analyst has 

called a virtual caliphate? 

Mr. HOFFMAN. Anemic, I think under resourced, under 

prioritized. I think that in the past 10 years that is the one arm 

on the war on terrorism that we have not devoted sufficient attention or resources to. 

I think it is something that people tend to shy away from, because the metrics are not clear. And, because the metrics are not 

clear, there is a devaluation of it, but I think it is absolutely essential. In and of itself, it is not going to win the war on terrorism, 

but in a sense it is an essential adjunct to kinetics to killing and 

capturing terrorists. 

For example, the Voice of America’s budget, over 90 percent of 

it is dedicated to traditional media sources, television, radio and 

newspapers, and it has been that way for years. Yet, we are in the 

21st century in the Internet age, and yet, only roughly 6 or 7 percent of its budget is designed to communicate across the Internet. 

There are only a handful of individuals in the State Department, 

I think, in the single digits, that, actually, engage in counter messaging. 

So, I think we have this nascent capability, but it is one that is 

being completely under resourced and, really, I think, completely 

unexploited. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And, am I interpreting your answer correctly, do 

you see this as a significant security threat? 

47

Mr. HOFFMAN. Absolutely, sir, and, of course, the example of Inspire magazine, which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has produced, is clear evidence of that. 

There is now a raft of individuals that have been inspired by Inspire, Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, Faisal Shahzad, 

for example, in terms of the Times Square bombing, Umar Farouk 

Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, and the list goes on. 

This is a very effective tool. It is a way to animate, to mobilize, 

and, ultimately, I think, to activate or, actually, to engage individuals, just as you described, in low-level violence, that I say reflects 

an al-Qaeda strategy that is designed to throw at us this multiplicity of low-level threats, in hopes of creating so much noise, and 

so many distractions, that it is al-Qaeda’s hope that bigger, more 

spectacular attacks or attempts will then prove more successful. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Sanderson, bin Laden has been credited with 

unifying Islamist terrorist groups to target the far enemy, the U.S. 

and the West, and wage a defensive jihad to protect all Muslims 

against the West’s reported war on Islam. 

Without bin Laden, some argue that the al-Qaeda affiliates will 

further fracture and focus on local issues, as they were postured 

prior to al-Qaeda’s rise in the ’90s. 

Is that where you see the organization going, and if not, where? 

Mr. SANDERSON. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. 

Bin Laden was successful in overlaying his global jihad with the 

local goals of a number of associated groups around the world, and 

that was effective, and I think there are elements within some of 

those groups that still believe in that. 

But, I do think that with his death some will reconsider that. 

There are also competing theories out there and strategies, Abu 

Musab al-Suri pointed out the consequences of targeting the far 

enemy, a technically advanced United States, that resulted in the 

destruction of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan. 

So, there were already people who were challenging that focus, 

and I do think that as his influence recedes, with his death, to the 

degree that it will, I think others will start to voice their opinions, 

and you will see people push in different directions. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ROYCE. Well, let me just thank our witnesses, not only for 

their testimony and traveling here today, but for their expertise. 

Bin Laden is dead, but we have a lot to grapple with in the aftermath. 

Thank you all for appearing at this hearing. We stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommitted was adjourned.] 

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