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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS 

DIVISION II 

No. CV-17-319

JENNIFER DENEN

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 

SERVICES AND MINOR CHILDREN

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: September 20, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT 

[NO. 26JV-16-346] 

HONORABLE TOM COOPER, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED; MOTION TO 

WITHDRAW GRANTED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

Appellant Jennifer Denen appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her 

two children, M.F. and R.R. Pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human 

Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), 

Denen’s counsel has filed a no-merit brief and motion to withdraw asserting that there are 

no issues of arguable merit to support an appeal and that she should be relieved as counsel. 

A copy of counsel’s brief and motion was mailed to Denen, and after being informed of her 

right to file pro se points, Denen declined to file any points. We affirm the trial court’s order 

and grant counsel’s motion to be relieved.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). At least one statutory ground must 

exist, in addition to a finding that it is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights; 

these must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) 
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(Repl. 2015); Mitchell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 715, 430 S.W.3d 851. 

Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a 

firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Brown v. Ark. Dep’t of Human 

Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 303, 521 S.W.3d 183. The appellate inquiry is whether the trial 

court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly 

erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, 

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. Id. 

On August 17, 2016, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) filed a 

petition for emergency custody and dependency-neglect concerning M.F. (d.o.b. 6-26-12) 

and R.R. (d.o.b. 9-22-15). The accompanying affidavit provided that DHS had received a 

hotline report that M.F. had been observed displaying inappropriate sexual and aggressive 

behaviors indicative of possible sexual and physical abuse. DHS scheduled interviews for the 

children at the Child Advocacy Center. One of M.F.’s half-siblings (whose custody is not 

at issue in this appeal) was interviewed, and he disclosed that M.F. was called an “idiot all 

the time” and “whooped regularly with a stick on the buttocks and back.” R.R.’s physical 

examination showed a “horrible rash on her vagina and buttocks,” an “extremely filthy” 

genital area, and a diaper area with “dried feces, trash, and excessive discharge.” 

M.F. disclosed that she had been spanked by Denen and R.R.’s putative father, 

Clarence Reed. She said that at times she would not be fed at home, even though her 

siblings were eating. At the time of the interview, she had a black eye, scars on her wrist, 

and “severe bruising covering her buttocks and down her leg.” When a police officer asked 
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M.F. her name, she responded “Idiot.” The affidavit also detailed that Reed admitted ziptying M.F.’s hands, which caused the bruising, and calling her an idiot. Denen

acknowledged to the police that she knew Reed had been abusing M.F. but had not stopped

him. DHS exercised an emergency hold on the children, and the trial court entered two 

separate ex parte orders, one granting custody to DHS for M.F. and R.R., and the other 

placing Denen’s four other children (half-siblings to M.F. and R.R.) in their father’s sole 

custody and suspending Denen’s visits with those children. 

A probable-cause hearing was held on August 24, 2016, and continued M.F. and 

R.R. in DHS’s custody. An adjudication hearing was held one month later, and the court 

found by clear and convincing evidence that M.F. and R.R. had suffered from physical 

abuse and neglect and had also been subjected to aggravated circumstances based on chronic 

abuse and extreme cruelty. The goal of the case was set for adoption. The adjudication order 

was not appealed. DHS then filed a petition to terminate Denen’s parental rights. 

At the termination hearing, DHS first called Judy Jenson, the investigator assigned to 

the case. She testified to the details and allegations in the affidavit. Jenson said that she 

concluded her investigation with a finding that Denen and Reed had subjected a child to 

“Threat of Harm, Failure to Protect, Striking a Child on the Face or the Head, Cuts, Bruises 

or Welts, Failure to Thrive, Inadequate Food, [and] Tying and Restraining a Child.” 

A DHS caseworker testified that Denen was facing criminal charges based on the 

reasons the children entered foster care. The caseworker further opined that termination 

was in the children’s best interest because the children would be at risk of suffering the same 

abuse and neglect if returned to the mother. 
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DHS also put on a counselor from the Child Advocacy Center who provided therapy 

to M.F. The counselor, Karen Wright, testified that M.F. suffered from PTSD and would 

require therapy for quite some time to recover. During therapy, M.F. had disclosed to 

Wright that her mom would tie her up and hit her with a plastic bat, and Wright found the 

disclosure to be very credible. Finally, DHS put on an adoption specialist who believed both 

children are adoptable based on their characteristics. 

Denen testified that she was willing to comply with the case plan. She said she had 

not attempted to contact her children because there was a no-contact order in place, and 

she did not have a way to contact her caseworker from prison. She testified she was 

incarcerated because she had been charged with first-degree domestic battery, permitting 

child abuse, and first-degree endangering the welfare of a minor child. She also informed 

the court of some of the services she had completed while in prison. 

On January 18, 2017, the trial court entered an order terminating Denen’s parental 

rights as to M.F. and R.R. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interest, and the court specifically 

considered the likelihood of adoption, as well as the potential harm of returning the children 

to Denen’s custody as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(A). 

The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence of three statutory grounds under 

subsection (b)(3)(B). 

In the no-merit brief, Denen’s counsel correctly asserts that there can be no 

meritorious challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of Denen’s 

parental rights. Although the trial court found three grounds for termination, only one 
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ground is necessary to support the termination. See Draper v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 

2012 Ark. App. 112, 389 S.W.3d 58. In both the adjudication order and the termination 

order, the trial court found under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9–27–

341(b)(3)(B)(vi)(a) that both children were dependent-neglected as a result of physical abuse 

and neglect perpetuated by Denen. 

In both the adjudication order and the termination order, the trial court also found 

under Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(B)(i) that there were 

aggravated circumstances because M.F. had been subjected to chronic physical abuse and 

repeated, extreme cruelty. 

An adjudication order is an appealable order in a dependency-neglect proceeding. 

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(a)(1)(A). When a party fails to appeal from an adjudication order and 

challenge the findings therein, she is precluded from asserting error on appeal with respect 

to those findings from an order terminating parental rights. See Holloway v. Ark. Dep’t of 

Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 458, 468 S.W.3d 805. Because Denen did not appeal from 

the adjudication order, which contained the trial court’s findings by clear and convincing 

evidence that the children were dependent-neglected as a result of abuse and neglect and 

that M.F. had been subjected to extreme cruelty, the grounds supporting termination cannot 

be challenged in this appeal. Moreover, on this record we conclude that the trial court did 

not clearly err in finding these statutory grounds. 

We also agree with counsel’s assertion that there can be no meritorious challenge to 

the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. The findings 

of abuse and neglect from the adjudication hearing were not appealed, and at the termination 
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hearing the psychological examiner and the caseworker both testified that the children 

would be at risk of harm if returned to Denen’s custody. There was also evidence that the 

children are adoptable. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court’s finding that 

termination of Denen’s parental rights was in the best interest of the children was not clearly 

erroneous.

Denen’s counsel also included in her brief seven additional rulings adverse to Denen

and explained why they would not support a meritorious appeal. The first concerned trial 

counsel’s objection to the introduction of the certified copy of the record from this 

proceeding, and the remaining were objections made by DHS and sustained by the court. 

Those objections were: three for appellant’s trial counsel being argumentative with the 

witness, one for a question that had been asked and answered, and two more for relevance. 

We agree with counsel that none of these rulings constituted reversible error.

After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we agree with counsel that an appeal 

from the trial court’s decision to terminate Denen’s rights would be wholly without merit. 

We are satisfied counsel has complied with the requirements of Linker-Flores, supra, and this 

court’s rules, and none of the adverse rulings provide a meritorious basis for reversal.

 Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted. 

 VIRDEN and GLOVER, JJ., agree.

Tabitha McNulty, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant. 

 

One brief only.