NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

CHARLES ANDERSON, Plaintiff/Appellant, 

v.

CITY OF WINSLOW, Defendant/Appellee. 

No. 1 CA-CV 22-0518 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County

No. S0900CV202100305 

The Honorable Melinda K. Hardy, Judge

AFFIRMED

APPEARANCES

Charles Anderson, Winslow

Plaintiff/Appellant

Doyle Hernandez Millan, Phoenix

By William H. Doyle, Brandon D. Millan, Nathan R. Andrews

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which 

Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

FILED 5-9-2023
ANDERSON v. WINSLOW

Decision of the Court

2

G A S S, Vice Chief Judge:

¶1 Anderson appeals the superior court’s grant of the City of 

Winslow’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On July 16, 2020, Anderson felt knee pain after he fell on a city

sidewalk in Winslow, Arizona. A month later, Anderson sought treatment 

at a hospital emergency department for knee pain and returned home the 

same day. At the end of August, he saw his primary care physician who 

suspected a torn ligament and disc in his knee. Following that appointment, 

Anderson underwent an x-ray exam and magnetic resonance imaging 

which showed a diminutive tear in his meniscus. His doctor scheduled 

surgery in February 2021.

¶3 On January 11, 2021 (179 days after his fall) Anderson filed a 

notice of claim (NOC) with Winslow. The NOC said: “Claimant will settle 

for $250,000.00 in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ 

fees.” Anderson also described the location of his fall and said he 

“hyperextended his right knee and sustain[ed] serious injuries to his 

person.” He included medical information about his trip to the emergency 

department, visit with his doctor, imaging, and upcoming surgery. His 

portion of the attached bills totaled about $1,600. Anderson included no

information about his ability to work, pain and suffering, or any other 

information about his costs.

¶4 When Winslow did not respond, Anderson filed a complaint

in propria persona on July 14, 2021. Winslow moved for judgment on the 

pleadings alleging Anderson’s NOC did not comply with A.R.S. § 12-

821.01, thus barring his claim. Anderson responded he specifically asked 

for $250,000 to settle. The superior court found Anderson failed to state a 

“specific amount for which the claim can be settled” because he included 

the language: “in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ fees” 

and did not include facts supporting the requested amount. For these 

reasons, the superior court granted Winslow’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and barred Anderson’s claim.

¶5 This court has jurisdiction over Anderson’s timely appeal 

under article VI, section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 12-

120.21.A.1 and -2101.A.1.
ANDERSON v. WINSLOW

Decision of the Court

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ANALYSIS

¶6 To begin, Winslow argues Anderson waived all his 

arguments on appeal because he appropriated unrelated arguments taken 

from a brief in another case. Winslow is correct—Anderson appears to have 

copied most of his argument from the opening brief in Donovan v. Yavapai 

County Community College District, 244 Ariz. 608 (App. 2018). Anderson, 

thus, made arguments unrelated to his case which he did not raise to the 

superior court.

¶7 Anderson, however, validly appeals the superior court’s 

grant of Winslow’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because 

Anderson’s other arguments are unrelated to this case and he did not 

present them to the superior court, we find Anderson waived them on 

appeal. See Contreras Farms Ltd. LLC v. City of Phoenix, 247 Ariz. 485, 489 

¶ 13 (App. 2019). We address his compliance with A.R.S. § 12-821.01 below.

¶8 “A motion for judgment on the pleadings . . . tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint, and a defendant is entitled to judgment if the 

complaint fails to state a claim for relief.” Mobile Cmty. Council for Progress, 

Inc. v. Brock, 211 Ariz. 196, 198 ¶ 5 (App. 2005) (cleaned up). In reviewing a 

grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the 

complaint’s allegations as true and reviews the superior court’s legal 

conclusions de novo. See Muscat by Berman v. Creative Innervisions LLC, 244 

Ariz. 194, 197 ¶ 7 (App. 2017).

¶9 Anderson argues his NOC stated he would accept $250,000 to 

settle. Winslow contends Anderson did not accurately portray his NOC 

because he did not include the “actual language” of the NOC: “Claimant 

will settle for $250,000.00 in addition to reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ 

fees.” (Emphasis added.) Winslow also contends the italicized language 

above made it “impossible” to determine the specific amount for which 

Anderson would settle his claim.

¶10 To pursue legal action against a public entity in Arizona, an 

individual must file a valid NOC within 180 days of the cause of action. See 

A.R.S. § 12-821.01. A valid claim must “contain a specific amount for which 

the claim can be settled and the facts supporting that amount.” A.R.S. § 12-

821.01.A. “This language unmistakably instructs claimants to include a 

particular and certain amount of money that, if agreed to by the 

government entity, will settle the claim.” Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 

97 v. Houser, 214 Ariz. 293, 296 ¶ 9 (2007). Qualifying language like 
ANDERSON v. WINSLOW

Decision of the Court

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“approximately,” “or more,” and “no less” make it “impossible to ascertain 

a precise amount.” Id. at 296 ¶ 10. 

¶11 A claimant complies with the sum certain requirement if the 

claimant makes an offer. Yollin v. City of Glendale, 219 Ariz. 24, 31 ¶ 19 (App. 

2008). “An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, 

so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that 

bargain is invited and will conclude it.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) 

of Contracts § 24 (1981)).

¶12 Anderson’s NOC included a minimum sum that would 

increase with “reasonable medical cost[s] and attorneys’ fees.” He included 

no documents showing what the future costs would be but did include his 

future scheduled knee surgery. Nothing in the NOC provided a maximum,

or precise, amount for which Anderson would settle. Anderson’s NOC, 

thus, effectively requested $250,000 or more and did not satisfy the sum 

certain requirement. See Deer Valley, 214 Ariz. at 296 ¶ 9; see also Yahweh v. 

City of Phoenix, 243 Ariz. 21, 23 ¶ 11 (App. 2017) (finding a series of 

ambiguous statements of the amount plaintiff intended to demand in 

litigation not a sum certain); Jones v. Cochise Cnty., 218 Ariz. 372, 375 ¶ 8 

(App. 2008) (finding the amount an attorney would recommend for 

settlement not a sum certain). Because Anderson’s NOC was not an offer, 

the superior court did not err in granting Winslow’s motion for judgment 

on the pleadings. 

¶13 Lastly, Winslow asks this court to sanction Anderson for the 

“cumulative effect” of his copying arguments from an unrelated case and 

noncompliance with ARCAP 13 because it “transmuted his appeal from 

meritless to frivolous.” This court may impose sanctions on a party “if it 

determines that an appeal or a motion is frivolous.” ARCAP 25. And this 

court holds self-represented parties to the same standard as attorneys. See 

Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83 ¶ 24 (2017). Though ignorance does not 

excuse a self-represented litigant from complying with procedural rules, it 

may show a litigant made a mistake, rather than a “deliberate strategic 

decision.” See id. at 84 ¶ 25. In the exercise of our discretion, we decline to 

impose a sanction against Anderson, finding his actions were not deliberate 

attempts to evade court procedures.

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

¶14 Because Anderson is not the prevailing party, we deny his 

request for costs. See A.R.S. § 12-341.
ANDERSON v. WINSLOW

Decision of the Court

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¶15 As the prevailing party, Winslow seeks attorney fees and 

costs under ARCAP 21 and 25. As to ARCAP 21, we deny Winslow’s 

request for attorney fees because it provides no substantive basis for it. See

Smyser v. City of Peoria, 215 Ariz. 428, 442 ¶ 50 (App. 2007). Under ARCAP 

25, this court may, as a sanction, award attorney fees and costs, if 

“appropriate in the circumstances of the case, and to discourage similar 

conduct in the future.” As discussed above, we exercise our discretion not 

to sanction Anderson. As the prevailing party, Winslow may recover its 

costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶16 We affirm.