IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

ABBOTT LABORATORIES et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE ex rel. TONY RACKAUCKAS, as District 

Attorney, etc.,

Real Party in Interest.

S249895

Fourth Appellate District, Division One

D072577

Orange County Superior Court

30-201600879117-CU-BT-CXC

June 25, 2020

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, 

Kruger and Fujisaki*concurred.

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Justice Kruger filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief 

Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Corrigan concurred.
1

ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

S249895

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

The Orange County District Attorney (District Attorney) 

brought this action against several pharmaceutical companies, 

alleging that the companies had intentionally delayed the sale 

of a generic version of a popular pharmaceutical drug to 

maximize their profits at the expense of consumers throughout 

California. The companies moved to strike references to 

“California” in the complaint, arguing that the District Attorney 

has no jurisdiction to enforce California’s consumer protection 

laws outside the geographic boundaries of Orange County. After 

the trial court denied the motion to strike, the companies

obtained an order from the Court of Appeal directing the trial 

court to grant the motion.

The People, as real party in interest and represented by 

the District Attorney, have asked this court to determine 

whether the District Attorney’s authority to enforce California’s 

consumer protection laws under the auspices of the unfair 

competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) is 

limited to the county’s borders. We hold it is not: The UCL does 

not preclude a district attorney, in a properly pleaded case, from 

including allegations of violations occurring outside as well as 

within the borders of his or her county. 

I.

The District Attorney initiated this action by filing a 

complaint in the name of the People of the State of California 

against Abbott Laboratories, AbbVie Inc., Teva 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

2

Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.; Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc; 

Duramed Pharmaceuticals Inc.; and Duramed Pharmaceutical 

Sales Corp. (collectively, Abbott). The complaint alleged that 

Abbott violated the UCL by entering into agreements to delay 

the market debut of generic versions of Niaspan, a prescription 

drug used to treat high cholesterol. As a result, the District 

Attorney alleges, users of Niaspan, their insurers, public health

care providers, and other government entities paid substantially 

higher prices for Niaspan than they would have if the generic 

version had been available without improper delay. The District 

Attorney sought an injunction prohibiting Abbott from further 

violating the UCL and an order for restitution and civil 

penalties, including treble penalties for violations that injured

senior citizens or disabled persons. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 

§§ 17203, 17206, 17206.1; Civ. Code, § 3345; all undesignated 

statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code.)

Abbott, in turn, filed a motion to strike “claims for 

restitution and civil penalties to the extent that those are not 

limited to Orange County.” Noting that the District Attorney’s 

complaint makes no specific claim to penalties or restitution 

extending beyond the bounds of the county, Abbott asked the 

trial court to strike 16 references to “California” from the 

complaint on the ground that a district attorney’s enforcement 

authority under the UCL is limited to the geographic boundaries 

of his or her county. According to Abbott, the motion was 

intended to “focus” the case, discovery, and scope of any 

potential settlement.

The trial court denied the motion to strike, finding 

“premature” Abbott’s concerns about the scope of discovery and 

financial exposure as well as any enforcement concerns that 

might arise if the Attorney General were excluded from a 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

3

negotiated statewide settlement. The court explained: “If 

there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General 

. . . is going to know about [it]. So, we will deal with that if and 

when. . . . There are going to be more players in any kind of 

settlement unless there’s a carve-out.” The court did not refer 

specifically to the geographic scope of the District Attorney’s 

authority during the hearing or in its minute order. 

Abbott sought review by means of a writ petition. A 

divided Court of Appeal overruled the District Attorney’s 

demurrer and granted relief to Abbott, directing the trial court 

to vacate its order denying the motion to strike and to enter a 

new order striking the allegations under which the District 

Attorney sought statewide monetary relief. (Abbott 

Laboratories v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 31

(Abbott).)

The Court of Appeal observed that “though district 

attorneys have plenary authority to pursue actions in the 

criminal arena in the State’s name [citation], their ‘authority is 

territorially limited’ to the confines of their county.” (Abbott, 

supra, 24 Cal.App.5th 1, 19, quoting Pitts v. County of Kern

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 361 (Pitts).) By contrast, “with respect to 

civil actions, a district attorney has no plenary power.” (Abbott, 

at p. 19.) “Rather, it is settled that a ‘district attorney has no 

authority to prosecute civil actions absent specific legislative 

authorization.’ ” (Id. at p. 20, quoting People v. Superior Court 

(Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 753 (Humberto S.).) As to 

whether the UCL grants such authority, the court looked to 

People v. Hy-Lond Enterprises, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 734 

(Hy-Lond), which held that a district attorney has no authority 

to limit the powers of the Attorney General or other public 

agencies under the guise of UCL enforcement. (Hy-Lond, at 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

4

pp. 752–753.) The Court of Appeal here explained it had “no 

difficulty applying Hy-Lond’s principles to bar a district 

attorney’s unilateral effort to seek restitution and civil penalties 

for UCL violations occurring outside his or her own county 

jurisdiction.” (Abbott, at p. 25.)

Writing in dissent, Justice Dato explained that Abbott had 

failed to “offer anything approaching an ‘extraordinary reason’ 

to justify this court’s decision to intervene at the pleading stage” 

in order to address “a motion to strike that does not challenge 

the plaintiff’s ability to plead a valid claim, but merely seeks to 

edit the language of the complaint in a manner that better suits 

the defendants’ tactical purposes.” (Abbott, supra, 24 

Cal.App.5th at p. 34 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) Even if Abbott had 

met this threshold showing, Justice Dato continued, “the 

majority opinion reaches the wrong result.” (Id. at p. 37 (dis. 

opn. of Dato, J.).) According to Justice Dato, it is the court, not 

the plaintiff, that awards restitution, and “there is nothing 

inherently problematic about the court awarding restitution to 

statewide victims of defendants’ unlawful business practice.” 

(Ibid.) “[E]ven absent a request by the District Attorney the 

court is empowered by section 17203 to award restitution ‘to any 

person’ adversely affected by the defendants’ unlawful conduct. 

. . . This includes, potentially, residents of counties other than 

Orange.” (Ibid., quoting § 17203, italics added by Dato, J.) 

Similarly, Justice Dato explained, the court could impose civil 

penalties based on any violation proven in the case, within or 

outside of Orange County: “The penalties are the punishment 

imposed for each violation proved in a law enforcement action 

brought on behalf of the People of the State of California. If the 

violation is proved, the penalties are appropriately imposed.” 

(Abbott, at p. 38 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) Finally, Justice Dato
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

5

rejected Abbott’s argument that a district attorney may not bind 

the Attorney General in settlement, explaining “it is well 

established that the District Attorney’s action will have no res 

judicata effect on a private party’s restitution claim, except to 

the extent that the party signs a release.” (Id. at p. 37 (dis. opn. 

of Dato, J.).)

We granted the District Attorney’s petition for review, 

which was limited to the Court of Appeal’s decision to grant writ 

relief. The District Attorney did not seek review of the portion 

of the Court of Appeal’s opinion overruling the demurrer. 

Accordingly, we express no view on the service requirements of 

section 17209, as all papers filed in this court have been properly 

served upon the Attorney General. (See § 17209 [requiring 

service of appellate briefs or petitions in UCL matters on the 

Attorney General within three days of filing with the court].)

II.

We review the trial court’s denial of the motion to strike 

for abuse of discretion. (Cal-Western Business Services, Inc. v. 

Corning Capital Group (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 304, 309.) To the 

extent the decision rested upon a legal determination as to the 

scope of the District Attorney’s authority, it is a question of law 

subject to de novo review. (Ibid.; see Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at 

p. 345.)

A.

The UCL prohibits unfair competition, defined as “any 

unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” 

(§ 17200.) The statute’s “purpose is to protect both consumers 

and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial 

markets for goods and services.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 

Cal.4th 939, 949.) “In service of that purpose, the Legislature 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

6

framed the UCL’s substantive provisions in ‘ “broad, sweeping 

language” ’ ” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 

310, 320) to reach “anything that can properly be called a 

business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law” 

(Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 94, 113). 

“By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 

“borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful 

practices’ that the unfair competition law makes independently 

actionable.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles 

Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, quoting State 

Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 

Cal.App.4th 1093, 1103.) “ ‘[T]he Legislature . . . intended by 

this sweeping language to permit tribunals to enjoin on-going 

wrongful business conduct in whatever context such activity 

might occur.’ ” (Cel-Tech, at p. 181, quoting American Philatelic 

Soc. v. Claibourne (1935) 3 Cal.2d 689, 698.)

To that end, the Legislature has created a scheme of 

overlapping enforcement authority. Section 17204 provides that 

actions for relief under the UCL may be prosecuted “by the 

Attorney General or a district attorney or by a county counsel 

authorized by agreement with the district attorney in actions 

involving violation of a county ordinance, or by a city attorney of 

a city having a population in excess of 750,000, or by a city 

attorney in a city and county or, with the consent of the district 

attorney, by a city prosecutor in a city having a full-time city 

prosecutor in the name of the people of the State of California 

upon their own complaint or upon the complaint of a board, 

officer, person, corporation, or association, or by a person who 

has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a 

result of the unfair competition.”
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

7

The UCL grants broad equitable authority to courts to 

remedy violations. Section 17203 provides in relevant part: 

“Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in 

unfair competition may be enjoined in any court of competent 

jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or judgments, 

including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to 

prevent the use or employment by any person of any practice 

which constitutes unfair competition, as defined in this chapter, 

or as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any 

money or property, real or personal, which may have been 

acquired by means of such unfair competition.” Such remedies 

are “cumulative . . . to the remedies or penalties available under 

all other laws of this state.” (§ 17205.)

While the UCL provides for both public and private 

enforcement, authorized public prosecutors have an additional 

tool to enforce the state’s consumer protection laws: civil 

penalties. “Any person who engages, has engaged, or proposes 

to engage in unfair competition shall be liable for a civil penalty 

not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) for 

each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil 

action brought in the name of the people of the State of 

California by the Attorney General, by any district attorney, by 

any county counsel authorized by agreement with the district 

attorney in actions involving violation of a county ordinance, by 

any city attorney of a city having a population in excess of 

750,000, by any city attorney of any city and county, or, with the 

consent of the district attorney, by a city prosecutor in any city 

having a full-time city prosecutor, in any court of competent 

jurisdiction.” (§ 17206, subd. (a).) “The court shall impose a civil 

penalty for each violation of [the UCL]. In assessing the amount 

of the civil penalty, the court shall consider any one or more of 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

8

the relevant circumstances presented by any of the parties to 

the case, including, but not limited to, the following: the nature 

and seriousness of the misconduct, the number of violations, the 

persistence of the misconduct, the length of time over which the 

misconduct occurred, the willfulness of the defendant’s 

misconduct, and the defendant’s assets, liabilities, and net 

worth.” (§ 17206, subd. (b).) “If the action is brought by a 

district attorney or county counsel, the penalty collected shall be 

paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was 

entered.” (§ 17206, subd. (c); see also § 17207 [similar 

provisions for civil penalties against any person who 

intentionally violates any injunction prohibiting unfair 

competition].)

B.

Abbott argues that this case is controlled by our statement 

in Safer v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 230, 236 (Safer) that 

“the Legislature has manifested its concern that the district 

attorney exercise the power of his office only in such civil 

litigation as that lawmaking body has, after careful 

consideration, found essential.” According to Abbott, the UCL 

contains no legislative finding that statewide enforcement by 

district attorneys is “essential” to the purpose of the UCL. 

The proceedings at issue in Safer arose when a 

farmworkers’ union set up picket lines around the fields of 

several Ventura County strawberry growers. (Safer, supra, 15 

Cal.3d at p. 233.) The growers filed suit to obtain injunctive 

relief against the union and its members, and the trial court 

issued a temporary restraining order limiting the spacing and 

number of pickets. The next day, the Ventura County Sheriff 

arrested a number of participants in ongoing picketing 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

9

activities, charging three with willful disobedience of a lawful

court order, a misdemeanor offense. Then, when the defendants 

appeared for jury trial, the district attorney dismissed the 

misdemeanor charges and instead served them with orders to 

show cause in contempt proceedings initiated under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 1209. (Safer, at p. 234.) The net result 

of these maneuvers was “to convert a misdemeanor proceeding, 

in which defendants had the protection of a jury trial and other 

statutory safeguards, into a contempt proceeding, in which 

defendants would be stripped of these protections.” (Ibid.) The 

defendants demurred and, alternatively, sought jury trial on the 

civil charges. The trial court denied relief.

We held that the trial court acted in excess of its 

jurisdiction when it permitted the district attorney to prosecute 

a contempt proceeding arising from private civil litigation “in 

which the district attorney could rest his participation neither 

upon standing as a party nor upon statutory authorization.” 

(Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 233.) Our analysis began with a 

survey of instances in which the Legislature empowered a 

district attorney to bring a civil action. (Id. at pp. 236–237.) 

Observing that none of these authorization statutes “empower a 

district attorney to intervene at will in a civil case involving 

private parties in an economic dispute” (id. at p. 236), we 

discerned a “general mandate” on the part of the Legislature 

“that public officers not use their funds and powers to intervene 

in private litigation” (id. at p. 237). We held that because the 

district attorney was not authorized to intervene in the

underlying labor dispute, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction 

by permitting the district attorney to institute the civil contempt 

proceedings. (Id. at pp. 242–243.)
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

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Although Safer specifically concerned “a disturbing 

instance” of intervention by a public prosecutor in private civil 

litigation (Safer, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 242), Abbott notes that 

we have cited Safer for the general proposition that “a district 

attorney has no authority to prosecute civil actions absent 

specific legislative authorization.” (Humberto S., supra, 43 

Cal.4th at p. 753 & fn. 12 [citing cases]; see Pacific Gas & 

Electric Co. v. County of Stanislaus (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1143, 

1155–1156 [citing Safer to explain that if a specific provision of 

the Cartwright Act authorizing the district attorney to bring 

antitrust actions on behalf of the county or its subdivisions did 

not exist, the district attorney would be unable to do so].)

Even assuming Safer established a general requirement 

that a district attorney may not pursue civil litigation without 

specific legislative authorization, that requirement is satisfied 

with regard to a district attorney’s authority to bring a UCL

action. As we explained in People v. McKale (1979) 25 Cal.3d 

626, a case concerning a district attorney’s authority to 

prosecute violations of the Mobilehome Parks Act (Health & Saf. 

Code, § 18200 et seq.) under the UCL: “While [Safer] held a 

district attorney may prosecute civil actions only when the 

Legislature has specifically authorized, specific power exists in 

the instant case. The district attorney is expressly authorized 

to maintain a civil action for either injunctive relief or civil 

penalties for acts of unfair competition. (Bus. & Prof. Code, 

§§ 17204, 17206.)” (McKale, at p. 633.) The question in this case 

is not whether the District Attorney can bring “unlawful” UCL 

claims predicated on violations of the antitrust laws, but 

whether the District Attorney can seek remedies under the UCL 

for conduct occurring outside of his county. Safer says nothing 

about the scope of remedies that may be sought.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

11

As to this question, Abbott concedes that the District 

Attorney may seek and obtain statewide injunctive relief upon 

a sufficient showing before the trial court. This concession 

follows directly from the text of the UCL’s provision on 

enforcement of injunctive relief. Section 17207, subdivision (a)

provides: “Any person who intentionally violates any injunction 

prohibiting unfair competition issued pursuant to Section 17203 

shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed six thousand 

dollars ($6,000) for each violation.” Section 17207, subdivision 

(b) then provides that such penalties “shall be assessed and 

recovered in a civil action brought in any county in which the 

violation occurs or where the injunction was issued.” (Italics 

added.) In other words, section 17207 explicitly contemplates 

that an injunction issued in one county may operate to prohibit 

future violations in another county. “The purpose of such relief, 

in the context of a UCL action, is to protect California’s 

consumers against unfair business practices by stopping such 

practices in their tracks. An injunction would not serve the 

purpose of prevention of future harm if only those who had 

already been injured by the practice were entitled to that relief.” 

(In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 320.)

There is thus no dispute as to the District Attorney’s 

general authority to bring UCL claims or his specific authority 

to pursue statewide injunctive relief. The issue here, more 

precisely, is whether a civil enforcement action initiated by a 

district attorney under the UCL may seek civil penalties for 

violations occurring outside of the district attorney’s county as 

well as restitution on behalf of Californians who do not reside in 

the county. To answer that question, we return to the text and 

purpose of the UCL.
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

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C.

“ ‘ “[O]ur fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the 

lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ 

[Citation.] As always, we start with the language of the statute, 

‘giv[ing] the words their usual and ordinary meaning [citation], 

while construing them in light of the statute as a whole and the 

statute’s purpose.’ ” (Apple Inc. v. Superior Court (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 128, 135.) As the parties and amici curiae observe, the 

text of the UCL does not explicitly address the geographic scope 

of a district attorney’s authority to seek civil penalties and 

restitution. But the statute does contain several clues that bear 

on the question presented.

First, in addition to contemplating statewide injunctions 

(§ 17207), the UCL authorizes courts to “make such orders or 

judgments . . . as may be necessary to restore to any person in 

interest any money or property . . . which may have been 

acquired by means of . . . unfair competition” (§ 17203, italics 

added). Further, with regard to civil penalties, the statute says: 

“The court shall impose a civil penalty for each violation of [the 

UCL].” (§ 17206, subd. (b), italics added.) The broad language 

of these provisions is not qualified by any reference to geography 

or the identity of the plaintiff. The statute contains no 

geographic limitation on the scope of relief that courts may order 

in an enforcement action brought by a district attorney.

The purpose of the quoted language of section 17206 was 

to codify the standard set forth in People v. Superior Court 

(Olson) (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 181, 198, for determining the 

number of violations and corresponding civil penalties resulting 

from the publication or broadcast of a media advertisement. 

(See Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, pp. 1707–1708; Sen. Com. on 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

13

Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1586 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) 

as amended May 4, 1992, pp. 1–2.) Although the legislative 

history does not include any specific consideration of the 

question before us, it is notable that the Olson case was brought 

by the Orange County District Attorney seeking injunctive relief 

and civil penalties for false advertisements that ran in multiple 

counties and that targeted homeowners in Orange County and 

Riverside County. (Olson, at p. 185 & fn. 2.). Neither Olson nor 

the legislative history of the 1992 amendment to the UCL raised

any concern about the geographic scope of relief sought in an 

enforcement action by a district attorney.

Second, section 17206, subdivision (c) provides in part: “If 

the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the 

penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in 

which the judgment was entered, and one-half to the General 

Fund.” (See also § 17207, subd. (c) [similarly allocated civil 

penalties recovered for violation of injunction prohibiting unfair 

competition, with one-half to the treasurer of the county in 

which the judgment was entered and one-half to the State 

Treasurer].) The Legislature’s allocation of one-half of civil 

penalties in a statewide action to the county in which the 

judgment was entered indicates that the Legislature did not 

design the civil penalty scheme to ensure an allocation of civil 

penalties to counties in accordance with the number of 

violations in each county. Rather, penalties are awarded in 

large part based on the location in which judgment is entered, 

regardless of the number of violations proven or their 

corresponding locations.

Third, in making injunctions prohibiting unfair 

competition widely enforceable throughout the state, section 

17207, subdivision (b) distinguishes between “any county in 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

14

which the violation occurs” and “any county . . . where the 

injunction was issued.” In other words, the county “where the 

injunction was issued” is not necessarily the county “in which 

the violation [of the injunction] occurs,” and civil penalties to 

punish violation of an injunction may be obtained through a civil 

action filed in either type of county. (Ibid.) Thus, for example, 

if an injunction entered in Orange County is violated in 

Riverside County, civil penalties for that violation may be 

recovered in a civil action brought in Orange County. By its 

terms, section 17207 not only confirms that courts may grant

statewide injunctive relief, but also contemplates that an action 

brought in the county where an injunction was issued may 

result in an imposition of civil penalties for violations occurring 

in other counties. Moreover, section 17207 shows that the 

Legislature knows how to write language limiting the award of 

civil penalties to the county “in which the violation occurs.” But 

it did not enact any such limitation in section 17207 (civil 

penalties for violation of an injunction) or in section 17206 (civil 

penalties for engaging in unfair competition) based on the 

identity of the plaintiff. As noted, the latter provision states 

without qualification: “The court shall impose a civil penalty for 

each violation of this chapter.” (§ 17206, subd. (b).)

A straightforward reading of the UCL’s broad language is 

consistent with the statute’s purpose and history. As the parties 

note, there is no specific indication in the voluminous legislative 

record of the UCL that the Legislature intended to grant 

statewide enforcement authority to district attorneys or to 

withhold such authority from them. But what the record does 

reveal is a clear trajectory toward greater and overlapping 

public enforcement at all levels of government.
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

15

The scope of public UCL enforcement has expanded in the 

decades since the statute’s enactment in 1933. (See Kraus v. 

Trinity Management Services, Inc. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 116, 129–

130.) Although the statute originally provided only for 

injunctive relief, the Legislature granted to the Attorney 

General and district attorneys the authority to obtain civil 

penalties for violations of the UCL in 1972. (Compare Stats. 

1963, ch. 1606, § 1, p. 3184 with Stats. 1972, ch. 1084, § 2, 

p. 2021.) In 1974, the same authority to seek injunctive relief 

and civil penalties was extended to city attorneys of jurisdictions 

with a population in excess of 750,000, despite objections that 

“prosecution of unfair competition cases should be a county-wide 

function, rather than broken up into cities,” because “harmful 

competition will arise between the two entities.” (Sen. 

Republican Caucus, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1725 (1973–1974 

Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 24, 1974, p. 2; see Stats. 1974, ch. 

746, § 1, pp. 1654–1655.) The law was amended in 1988 to grant 

standing to the San Jose City Attorney (Stats. 1988, ch. 790, § 1, 

pp. 2557–2558), in 1991 to grant standing to all county counsel

(Stats. 1991, ch. 1195, § 1, p. 5799), and in 1992 to grant 

standing to all city attorneys with the consent of their respective

district attorneys (Stats. 1992, ch. 430, § 4, p. 1707; see 

generally Fellmeth, California’s Unfair Competition Act: 

Conundrums and Confusions (Jan. 1995) published as part of 

Recommendation on Unfair Competition Litigation (Nov. 1996)

26 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 227, 234 & fn. 24). These 

amendments were generally opposed by the California District 

Attorneys Association (CDAA), which argued that the Attorney 

General and district attorneys had the “training and experience” 

to best serve the public interest in the area of consumer 

protection and that “their effectiveness may well be jeopardized 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

16

or compromised through the expansion of this section.” (Exec. 

Dir., Cal. District Attorneys Assn., letter to Sen. Ayala re. Sen. 

Bill No. 709 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) May 10, 1991; see also 

Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 2440 (1987–

1988 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 9, 1988, pp. 1–2 [similar]; but 

see Dept. Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 

1586 (1991–1992 Reg. Sess.) July 23, 1992, p. 3 [noting the 

CDAA’s neutral position to compromise legislation sponsored by 

retailers].)

The sole exception to this trajectory of expanding UCL 

enforcement was the 2004 enactment of Proposition 64, which 

revised the UCL’s standing provisions for private individuals by 

providing that “a private person has standing to sue only if he 

or she ‘has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property 

as a result of such unfair competition.’ ” (Californians for 

Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, 

quoting § 17204, as amended by Prop. 64, § 2.) Proposition 64 

had no effect on suits brought by the Attorney General, the 

district attorneys, or other public prosecutors.

In sum, the text of the UCL grants broad civil enforcement 

authority to district attorneys, and this broad grant of authority 

is consistent with the statute’s purpose and history. We see no 

indication that in an enforcement action brought by a district 

attorney, the Legislature intended to limit civil penalties or 

restitution to the geographic boundaries of the district 

attorney’s county.

III.

Abbott contends that we must read a geographic 

limitation into the District Attorney’s UCL enforcement 

authority in order to give effect to the “hierarchical structure of 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

17

the prosecutorial function within California’s executive branch” 

as set forth in the California Constitution.

Article V, section 13 of the state Constitution provides: 

“Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney 

General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the 

duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State 

are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General 

shall have direct supervision over every district attorney and 

sheriff and over such other law enforcement officers as may be 

designated by law, in all matters pertaining to the duties of their 

respective offices, and may require any of said officers to make 

reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and 

punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the 

Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion 

of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being 

adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the 

Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the 

superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the 

Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. 

When required by the public interest or directed by the 

Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district 

attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office.”

This provision mentions “the powers of a district attorney” 

but does not define those powers except by reference to “the 

investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime 

in their respective jurisdictions.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) 

Elsewhere, the state Constitution requires the Legislature to 

provide for each county “an elected district attorney” (Cal. 

Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b)) but does not elucidate the district 

attorney’s powers. Rather, the Legislature has conferred upon 

district attorneys both criminal and civil enforcement authority
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

18

as a matter of statute, declaring that “the district attorney is the 

public prosecutor, except as otherwise provided by law” (Gov. 

Code, § 26500, 1st par.), and providing for certain secondary

duties when he or she is “not engaged in criminal proceedings in 

the superior court or in civil cases on behalf of the people” (id., 

§ 26501). When a district attorney prosecutes criminal 

violations of state law, he or she acts in a state rather than a 

local capacity, and that authority is “territorially limited.” 

(Pitts, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 361; see People v. Eubanks (1996) 

14 Cal.4th 580, 589 [district attorney of each county is vested 

with power to conduct prosecutions of criminal offenses “within

the county”].)

In reading the language of the constitutional provisions 

concerning the role of the Attorney General and district 

attorneys, we find nothing in those provisions that constrains

the Legislature’s prerogative to structure UCL enforcement so 

that a district attorney has authority to seek civil penalties and 

restitution for violations outside of his or her county. The UCL 

does not undermine the Attorney General’s constitutional role 

as California’s chief law enforcement officer. In particular, the 

public enforcement authority that the UCL grants to district 

attorneys does not constrain the Attorney General’s prerogative 

to intervene or take control of a civil enforcement action that, in 

the Attorney General’s view, does not adequately serve the 

public interest. (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 [“Whenever in the 

opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being 

adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the 

Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the 

superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the 

Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district 

attorney.”]; Gov. Code, § 12550 [Attorney General “has direct 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

19

supervision over the district attorneys,” and “[w]hen he deems 

it advisable or necessary in the public interest . . . , he shall 

assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and 

may, where he deems it necessary, take full charge of any 

investigation or prosecution of violations of law of which the 

superior court has jurisdiction”].) In the UCL context, the 

Attorney General’s supervisory role is facilitated by the 

requirement that all appellate briefs or petitions in a UCL 

matter be served upon the Attorney General. (§ 17209.) Thus, 

the ultimate locus of control and accountability for UCL actions 

is the office of the Attorney General.

The Attorney General, as amicus curiae, does not join 

Abbott’s constitutional arguments but offers three practical 

concerns in support of Abbott’s position. First, the Attorney 

General suggests that the District Attorney’s position would 

present “conflicts of interest” between local prosecutors’ 

responsibility to statewide victims, to whom they are not 

politically accountable, and their own incentives to secure a 

greater share of available remedies for local constituencies. 

“The result,” according to the Attorney General, “could be a 

degradation of UCL enforcement, as local prosecutors compete 

to be the first to settle a case and secure penalties for local use.” 

Second, “granting statewide enforcement authority to local 

prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead 

the way in matters of national or international prominence” by 

compromising the Attorney General’s primary role in consumer 

enforcement. Third, the Attorney General contends, the “widely 

recognized geographic limitations on district and city attorneys’ 

UCL authority have formed the basis for decades of interoffice 

cooperation” between state and local prosecutors, and this

cooperation, which is crucial to the intensive investigations and 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

20

litigation necessary to pursue UCL claims, would be jeopardized 

by a rule allowing any district attorney to pursue statewide 

remedies. The CDAA, as amicus curiae, echoes these concerns, 

adding that an “assertion of statewide jurisdiction and 

preemptive authority . . . should come . . . only after a careful 

analysis by the State Legislature to resolve competing policy 

objectives.” (See Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores 

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 578.)

These concerns are not without force, and we do not take 

them lightly. But two caveats are in order. First, the Attorney 

General’s “conflict of interest” concern appears directed solely at

civil penalties rather than restitution, as restitution is paid to 

victims, not the county, and thus does not create the same “race 

to file” incentive. Second, all of these concerns are presented in 

the abstract. In support of his argument, the Attorney General 

offers a single example of a district attorney unilaterally 

pursuing statewide relief in parallel with a coalition of state and 

local prosecutors. As the Attorney General recounts, the 

District Attorney of Trinity County, represented by contingency 

fee counsel, sued Volkswagen shortly after the discovery of the 

worldwide diesel emissions cheating scandal, even as the 

Attorney General was investigating the same conduct in what 

eventually resulted in litigation involving all 50 states as well 

as federal and foreign agencies. Although the Attorney General 

suggests that “granting statewide enforcement authority to local 

prosecutors would endanger California’s ability to credibly lead 

the way in matters of national or international prominence,” he 

reports that the district attorney in that matter dropped his case 

with no apparent negative effects.

In any event, we note that concerns similar to those raised 

by amici curiae have been conveyed to the Legislature at various 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

21

junctures when it considered proposals to expand local 

enforcement (ante, at pp. 15–16), and the Legislature

nevertheless chose to create a decentralized enforcement model 

in which a district attorney has authority to obtain statewide 

relief. Although arguments in favor of a more centralized model

are not without merit, the Legislature reasonably could have 

believed that an overlapping scheme of decentralized 

enforcement has several potential advantages.

First, “for a defendant in a state the size of California, a 

law enforcement action alleging a statewide unlawful business 

practice and seeking monetary relief creates, at least 

potentially, a substantial economic exposure. To the extent law 

enforcement can be Balkanized and monetary relief limited to 

local jurisdictions—especially early in the litigation—a 

defendant’s ‘management’ of the exposure is greatly facilitated.” 

(Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 32 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)

Second, although it is possible that a district attorney will 

pursue a settlement that undervalues the true scope of 

statewide claims, it is also possible that the alternative would 

be no enforcement or penalty at all for violations outside of the 

district attorney’s county. Indeed, the limited enforcement 

resources of the Attorney General have been a significant factor 

in the Legislature’s repeated expansion of public enforcement 

authority under the UCL. Although concerns about conflicts of 

interest or duplicative enforcement have been expressed each 

time the Legislature expanded the scope of UCL enforcement, 

neither the legislative record nor the briefing before us points to 

any concrete or widespread problems. “Pursuing litigation 

against corporate defendants is expensive, and the Legislature 

was doubtless aware that both financial and political 

considerations may sometimes discourage a public prosecutor 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

22

from undertaking such a case. Consistent with the UCL’s broad 

remedial purposes and the perceived need for vigorous 

enforcement, there is nothing unconstitutional about the 

Legislature’s decision to permit and encourage multiple public 

prosecutors with overlapping lines of authority on the theory 

that more enforcement in this context is better than less.” 

(Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).)

Without denying that the UCL scheme may “incentivize 

public prosecutors [to] act[] in their respective county’s financial 

self-interest” at the expense of full redress for violations in other 

counties (Abbott, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 31), we are unable 

to conclude that the Legislature necessarily believed this 

concern outweighs the incentive that the scheme provides for 

district attorneys to bring enforcement actions that might 

otherwise not be brought at all. In the litigation before us, there 

is no indication at this stage that the balance of incentives is 

tipped toward a settlement that is motivated by a conflict of 

interest or is otherwise improper. In this case, “the concern 

about a local district attorney binding other prosecutors to an 

improper or inadequate settlement is as fanciful as it is 

premature.” (Id. at p. 35 (dis. opn. of Dato, J.).) In any event, 

concerns about local “windfalls” are tempered by the UCL’s 

mandate that all penalties recovered by local prosecutors be 

used exclusively “for the enforcement of consumer protection 

laws.” (§ 17206, subd. (c).) 

Third, as to the Attorney General’s leadership role and the 

value of interjurisdictional cooperation, the Attorney General 

retains authority to intervene or take over the case (Cal. Const., 

art. V, § 13; Gov. Code, § 12550), and in any event, the Attorney 

General has not identified any specific way in which the District 

Attorney’s conduct of this litigation has compromised such
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

23

values. Notably, the trial court here appears quite alert to the 

importance of the Attorney General’s role, explaining that “[i]f 

there’s a settlement, I can guarantee you the Attorney General 

. . . is going to know about [it]. So, we will deal with that if and 

when. . . . There are going to be more players in any kind of 

settlement unless there’s a carve-out.”

The Court of Appeal relied on Hy-Lond, supra, 93 

Cal.App.3d 734, in which the Attorney General moved to set 

aside a stipulated judgment between the Napa County District 

Attorney and a nursing home operator with facilities in 12 

counties. (Id. at pp. 739–742.) The stipulation provided for 

general injunctive relief and payment of civil penalties (id. at 

pp. 741–742, 748–749) and designated the Napa County District 

Attorney as “ ‘the exclusive governmental agency that may 

enforce the provision of this injunction’ ” (id. at p. 741, fn. 1). It 

purported to absolve the company of past wrongdoings and 

immunize it from future unfair competition lawsuits brought by 

anyone acting on behalf of the state for alleged violations of any 

acts covered by the injunction. It also purported to bar the state 

or any of its administrative agencies from taking action to 

suspend or revoke the company’s license based on the alleged 

acts referred to in the complaint. (Id. at pp. 741, fn. 2, 749.)

Hy-Lond held that the Attorney General had standing to 

intervene and move to vacate the judgment. Unlike Abbott, the 

defendants in Hy-Lond argued that the district attorney must 

be able to act on behalf of the state in a civil enforcement action

because “parties dealing with the state must be able to negotiate 

with confidence with the agent authorized to bring the suit, and 

without the fear that another agency or other state entity might 

overturn any agreement reached.” (Hy-Lond, supra, 93 

Cal.App.3d at p. 752.) While acknowledging this concern in the 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

24

abstract, the court in Hy-Lond reasoned that the parties were 

on notice that the district attorney had no right “to surrender 

the powers of the Attorney General and his fellow district 

attorneys to commence, when appropriate, actions in other 

counties under the provisions of law.” (Id. at p. 753.) Moreover, 

the settlement in Hy-Lond ran afoul of the general rule that “an 

injunction cannot be granted to prevent the execution of a public 

statute by officers of the law for a public benefit.” (Ibid.) 

Finding these principles dispositive, the court noted but did not 

examine the further argument that a contrary rule would result 

in an intolerable conflict of interest by “put[ting] the initiating 

district attorney in the position of bargaining for the recovery of 

civil penalties that would flow into his county’s coffers, at the 

expense of surrendering the rights and duties of the state to 

control the respondent’s activities generally through the powers 

of the Attorney General” and other local and state enforcement 

agencies. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 754 [“the powers of the district 

attorney are limited by the recognition of a possible conflict of 

interest” and corresponding rules of professional conduct].)

Hy-Lond is inapposite because it concerned a negotiated 

settlement that specifically sought to limit future enforcement 

authority of the Attorney General and other officials. The 

parties in this case have not reached any settlement; there is no 

judgment that purports to bind other public prosecutors or limit 

their enforcement authority; and the role of the Attorney 

General has not been compromised or usurped. Further, the 

trial court said that “if [defendants] reach a settlement with the 

district attorney, unlike the trial court in Hy-Lond — and if the 

[Attorney General] comes in and says I want to be heard about 

this, you bet I’m going to let them be heard on this.” This is not 

a case where a trial court appears poised to approve a settlement 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

25

without affording the Attorney General an opportunity to 

participate.

Ultimately, the pros and cons of centralization or 

decentralization in the enforcement of California’s consumer 

protection laws is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. 

We acknowledge amici curiae’s concern about democratic 

accountability, but it is undisputed that the Legislature has 

authorized local prosecutors to seek a statewide injunction 

under the UCL. And it is the Legislature, elected by voters 

across the state, that has decided to allow local prosecutors to 

seek civil penalties. The state Constitution does not preclude 

the Legislature’s choice of an overlapping scheme of public 

enforcement, with no geographic limitations on courts’ authority 

to impose civil penalties and award restitution in actions 

brought by district attorneys. Of course, nothing prevents the 

voters from petitioning their legislators or placing an initiative 

on the ballot to restrict this authority for local prosecutors if 

they believe it is not sound policy. But we have no authority to 

impose geographic limits on the broad enforcement authority 

that the text of the UCL grants to district attorneys.

The Court of Appeal, having reached the contrary result, 

suggested that a district attorney could seek civil penalties 

beyond the boundaries of his or her county if the Attorney 

General were to provide written consent to the litigation. But 

just as the UCL imposes no geographical limits on a district 

attorney’s enforcement authority, it contains no provision 

requiring the district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s 

consent to enforce the statute. The Court of Appeal cited 

statutes dealing with intercounty cooperation between district 

attorneys’ and city attorneys’ offices, but those statutes do not 

mention the Attorney General. Simply put, the UCL does not 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

26

require a district attorney to obtain the Attorney General’s 

consent, written or otherwise, before pursuing an enforcement 

action under the statute.

Finally, we note that the complaint in this case specifically 

alleges that at least some of the violations occurred in Orange 

County and that venue is therefore proper in the Orange County 

Superior Court. We have no occasion to address whether a 

district attorney could bring a UCL claim for conduct occurring 

entirely outside the bounds of his or her county. (Cf. § 17207, 

subd. (b) [public actions to enforce violations of a UCL injunction 

may be brought by specified local and state officers “in any court 

of competent jurisdiction within his or her jurisdiction without 

regard to the county from which the original injunction was 

issued”].) At the same time, the practical and legal concerns 

raised by the parties and amici curiae, including questions 

regarding the preclusive effect of statewide relief obtained by an 

individual district attorney, may induce the Legislature to 

consider amending the UCL to add procedures to minimize the 

risks of conflicting enforcement efforts. A basic starting point 

would be the provision of notice to the Attorney General and 

other relevant officials in cases where a district attorney seeks 

a UCL remedy for violations outside the county’s borders.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J.

27

CONCLUSION

We reverse the judgement of the Court of Appeal and remand 

the matter to that court for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

LIU, J.

We Concur: 

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

KRUGER, J.

FUJISAKI, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 

District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

S249895

Concurring Opinion by Justice Kruger

I agree with the majority opinion that district attorneys 

exercising their authority to enforce the unfair competition law 

(UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) may seek civil 

penalties and restitution for violations occurring outside their 

counties’ borders. I write separately, however, to call attention 

to a gap in the statutory enforcement scheme that the 

Legislature may wish to fill.

As the majority opinion explains, the text and history of 

the UCL indicate that when the Legislature empowered district 

attorneys to sue “in the name of the people of the State of 

California” (Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 17204, 17206, subd. (a)), it 

intended to authorize district attorneys to pursue the full suite 

of remedies that are available to the state, including civil 

penalties and restitution for violations occurring outside county 

borders. But absent an effective mechanism for coordinating 

efforts, empowering scores of local officials to sue in the name of 

the State of California will inevitably create some practical 

challenges. These potential challenges are particularly acute in 

the context of the UCL, which provides that any civil penalties 

recovered by a district attorney “shall be paid to the treasurer of 

the county in which the judgment was entered.” (Bus. & Prof. 

Code, § 17206, subd. (c).) As amici curiae the Attorney General 

and the California District Attorneys Association observe, this 

provision creates an incentive for district attorneys to race each 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Kruger, J., concurring

2

other to the courthouse and to enter settlements that maximize 

their own counties’ recoveries, potentially at the expense of 

consumers elsewhere in the state. The amici curiae worry that 

the net effect may be to hamper effective statewide enforcement 

of the UCL rather than enhance it.

The majority correctly notes that the UCL’s system of 

overlapping public enforcement authority generally has not—to 

this point—given rise to such difficulties. (Maj. opn., ante, at 

p. 20.) But as a consequence of our decision today—which has 

dispelled the cloud of uncertainty that had previously hung over 

statewide enforcement actions brought by district attorneys—

we may well see an increase in attempts to bring such actions, 

and an increased risk that the Attorney General’s and California 

District Attorneys Association’s worries will be realized.

In other statutes with similar enforcement regimes, the 

Legislature has provided a roadmap for how public officials 

should sort out areas of overlapping responsibility from the 

moment a complaint is filed. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 12652

[spelling out specific procedures for the Attorney General and 

local prosecuting authorities to follow to ensure coordination in 

pursuing False Claims Act violations].) Such provisions 

implicitly recognize that the Attorney General is “the chief law 

officer of the State,” obligated “to see that the laws of the State 

are uniformly and adequately enforced,” and accorded the 

authority to exercise “direct supervision over every district 

attorney.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13.) They also recognize that 

the Attorney General’s ability to carry out these obligations 

depends, in the first instance, on receiving adequate notice of 

relevant claims.
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Kruger, J., concurring

3

The UCL lacks a comparable notification provision for 

trial proceedings. It does contain one for appellate matters: On 

appeal, the parties must serve the Attorney General with copies 

of their briefs and petitions. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17209.) The 

required notice ensures that the Attorney General is aware of 

appellate proceedings that may generate published, binding 

precedent and affect future interpretations of the law. But for 

the surely far greater number of UCL cases that are resolved in 

the trial courts, the current statutory scheme contains no 

mechanism to ensure notice. As the majority opinion notes, the 

Attorney General has the authority “to intervene or take control 

of a civil enforcement action that, in the Attorney General’s 

view, does not adequately serve the public interest.” (Maj. opn., 

ante, at p. 18, citing Cal. Const., art. V, § 13 and Gov. Code, 

§ 12550.) But to exercise those constitutional powers—or even, 

at a lesser level, to provide input, direction, or oversight—the 

Attorney General must first be aware of the existence of the 

underlying action.

The Legislature may wish to fill this gap by requiring that 

district attorneys and other public prosecutors serve the 

Attorney General with a copy of any UCL complaint whose 

prayer for relief seeks monetary relief for violations occurring 

beyond the borders of their respective jurisdictions. Such a 

requirement—which would parallel the existing statutory 

requirement to serve the Attorney General with copies of each 

appellate brief or petition—would go a significant way toward 

addressing the legitimate concerns the Attorney General and 

other district attorneys have expressed about the powers we 

recognize today, and toward facilitating coordination and 
ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. SUPERIOR COURT

Kruger, J., concurring

4

collaboration between different enforcing authorities in the 

future.

 KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Abbott Laboratories v. Superior Court

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding 

Review Granted XX 24 Cal.App.5th 1

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S249895

Date Filed: June 25, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Orange

Judge: Kim G. Dunning

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel: 

Kirkland & Ellis, Michael John Shipley, Jay P. Lefkowitz, Adam T. Humann and Yosef Mahmood for 

Petitioners Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., Duramed Pharmaceuticals Sales Corp., Inc., and Barr 

Pharmaceuticals, Inc.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, Jeffrey I. Weinberger, Stuart N. Senator and Blanca F. Young for Petitioners 

AbbVie Inc. and Abbott Laboratories.

Horvitz & Levy, Jeremy Brooks Rosen, Stanley H. Chen; Janet Y. Galeria; and Heather Lynn Wallace for 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America and California Chamber of Commerce as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Tony Rackauckas and Todd Spitzer, District Attorneys, Joseph D'Agostino, Assistant District Attorney, 

Kelly A. Ernby, Deputy District Attorney; Robinson Calcagnie, Mark P. Robinson, Jr., and Kevin F.

Calcagnie for Real Party in Interest.

Dennis J. Herrera, City Attorney (San Francisco), Yvonne R. Meré and Owen J. Clements, Deputy City 

Attorneys; Michael Feuer, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Michael M. Walsh and Monica D. Castillo, 

Deputy City Attorneys; Mara W. Elliot, City Attorney (San Diego), Mark D. Ankcorn, and Kathryn Turner, 

Chief Deputy City Attorney, Kristine Lorenz, Deputy City Attorney; Richard Doyle, City Attorney (San 

Jose), Nora Frimann, Assistant City Attorney; James R. Williams, County Counsel (Santa Clara), Greta S. 

Hansen and Danny Chou, Chief Assistant County Counsel, Laura S. Trice, Deputy County Counsel; 

Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney (Oakland), Maria S. Bee, Chief Assistant City Attorney, Erin B. Bernstein, 

Deputy City Attorney; Alison E. Leary and Jennifer B. Henning for City Attorneys, League of California 

Cities and California State Association of Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest. 

Law Office of Valerie T. McGinty and Valerie T. McGinty for Consumer Attorneys of California as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Nicklas A. Akers, Assistant Attorney General, Michele R. Van

Gelderen, Daniel A. Olivas, Hunter Landerholm, and David A. Jones, Deputy Attorneys General, for 
Attorney General as Amicus Curiae.

Mark Louis Zahner; and Thomas A. Papageorge for the California District Attorneys Association as 

Amicus Curiae. 

Jeffrey S. Rosell, District Attorney (Santa Cruz), Douglas B. Allen, Assistant District Attorney, for Santa 

Cruz County District Attorney as Amicus Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Kelly A. Ernby

Deputy District Attorney

401 Civic Center Drive

Santa Ana, CA 92701-4575

(714) 834-3600

Yvonne R. Meré 

Deputy City Attorney

Fox Plaza

1390 Market St., 6th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94102-5408

(415) 554-3874

Jay Lefkowitz

Kirkland & Ellis LLP

601 Lexington Ave.

New York, NY 10022

(212) 446-4800