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66–173PDF 2011

SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS IN THE

MIDDLE EAST, PART 2

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 5, 2011

Serial No. 112–28

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

VACANT 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michael H. Posner, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State ...................................... 5

Ms. Tamara Wittes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State ...................................................................... 7

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Michael H. Posner and Ms. Tamara Wittes: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 9

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 32

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 33

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 35

(1)

SHIFTING SANDS: POLITICAL TRANSITIONS 

IN THE MIDDLE EAST, PART 2

THURSDAY, MAY 5, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:14 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. The subcommittee will come to order. 

I apologize for the delay here. We had our last vote prior to this 

hearing, and Members of Congress traditionally head out like 

scalded dogs, quite frankly, after last votes. The votes were supposed to be after this hearing when it was originally set up, so I 

apologize for the few members on both sides. But we appreciate the 

gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Chandler, for being here so that we 

can get started. We have to have two members present before you 

can start a meeting, so that is what I was waiting for. I would have 

started right away. 

The subcommittee, as I say, has now come to order. I want to 

wish everyone a good afternoon. I also want to welcome Mr. Chandler especially for being here this afternoon for this hearing. 

This is the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

South Asia. This hearing was called to assess the current trajectory 

of the political transitions in the Middle East and to examine U.S. 

policy toward the region as it stands today. 

For the past 4 months, the world has witnessed unprecedented 

changes throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The peaceful protests that began at the end of last year continue to shake 

the region to its core. The power structures that have defined the 

region for decades continue to crumble as protesters take to the 

streets by the thousands. Unlike in the past, however, they were 

not protesting against the United States nor were they protesting 

against Israel. Instead, they were protesting for their own Godgiven human and universal rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit 

of happiness. 

This unrest, however, has not been without its challenges. Across 

the region, from Libya to Yemen, entrenched regimes have sought 

to maintain their stranglehold on power by any means necessary. 

In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh supported and then rejected an 

agreement to step down from power. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s 

ongoing and ruthless murder of peaceful protesters has already 

2

claimed the lives of hundreds of Syrian citizens. In Bahrain, the 

government’s targeted crackdown has resulted in the indiscriminate imprisonment of swaths of the country’s Shiite population. 

Most recently, a Bahraini military court in a closed-door trial sentenced four protesters to be executed. 

Syria is particularly a cause for concern. To date, the Obama administration’s response to the brutal crackdown in Syria has been, 

in many people’s view, tepid and disappointing. The few messages 

that have been sent have been mixed at best, and it does not appear that the administration has any Syria policy beyond engagement. The administration has implemented symbolic but largely ineffective sanctions, including against several members of the regime, not including Bashar al-Assad himself. Indeed, the best description the administration has proposed to date was actually 

made by one of President Obama’s advisors who said of Libya that 

the President is ‘‘leading from behind.’’

It is unclear why the administration has not taken a stronger 

stance against a regime that, if it were to fall, could significantly 

alter the strategic landscape of the region. Although many questions remain about what government would follow the Assad regime were it to fall, there are many steps that the U.S. could be 

taking at this time to influence that outcome. The half-committed 

approach that the administration has taken to date, however, does 

not make sense in any circumstance and risks squandering a huge 

strategic opportunity for the U.S., not to mention helping to end 

the bloodshed that intensifies every day. 

Another recent development should give all of us reason for concern. I returned earlier this week from a visit to Israel, Jordan, and 

Egypt and, while in Israel, the news broke that Hamas had signed 

a reconciliation deal with Fatah. I was, in fact, discussing with Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad his tremendously important statebuilding efforts when the deal was likely signed. Shortly thereafter, 

I had the opportunity to meet with Israel Prime Minister 

Netanyahu who expressed grave concern both for Israel’s security 

as well as for the prospects for peace. How, he asked us, could the 

Palestinians be serious partners for peace if they welcomed into 

their ranks vicious terrorists who continue to deny the very right 

of the State of Israel to exist? His concern is more than justified. 

I was deeply disturbed to learn just this morning that at a meeting in Rome on the situation in Libya, Secretary Clinton did not 

rule out the prospect of negotiations with an entity which may include Hamas. I find this shocking, especially in light of what she 

said on the same subject as a Senator, and I quote:

‘‘We are withholding money from the Hamas government, 

which I think is absolutely appropriate, and we are trying to 

ensure that no country gives any funding to Hamas government unless and until they renounce violence and accept 

Israel’s right to exist.’’

I sincerely hope that the Obama administration is not even considering negotiating with Hamas or with any government in which 

it is a partner until or unless it meets the principles laid out by 

the Quartet in 2006. We must insist that it meet these principles 

before their role, however small, is legitimized. I look forward to 

3

hearing the witnesses clarify U.S. policy toward Palestinian reconciliation. 

While the details of the Hamas Fatah agreement have yet to 

emerge, I hope that, in contrast to what I fear, the Palestinian 

leadership will proceed on a path to responsible state building and 

forgo the tired path of rejectionism. 

And that concludes my statement. 

Since the ranking member is in New York today with the President and therefore unavailable to be here, I don’t know if the 

gentlelady might like to make a statement or not. I don’t want to 

put you on the spot. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. That is fine. 

I just want to say that, having run into the hotel and we were 

both in Israel—we were in Jerusalem. Obviously, both of us have 

keen interests in the future security and safety of the State of 

Israel and were there at a particularly interesting moment when 

the Palestinian Authority, Fatah did reach this agreement, again 

without much detail, with Hamas; and we then were able to meet 

with both the Israeli leadership and some of the Palestinian leadership. 

But, of course, we are very interested to see how this plays out 

and are interested in your comments and background as you see 

it today, which we know could change tomorrow. But our understanding is that we heard when we were there is that we might 

get Hamas—the Palestinian Authority thought they would get 

Hamas to agree on some level of nonviolence but not on recognition 

of Israel, not on any of the other principles of the Quartet. So that 

seems to us inadequate, in spite of the fact that so many Israelis 

live every day with the fear of violence, of rockets, and suicide 

bombers. So I look forward to the comments. 

My expectation is that there will be other hearings as we follow 

this through. But know that our relationships with Israel are 

strong, and we are determined for a two-state solution that actually does create real safety and security in what, if anything, has 

gotten to be a more volatile part of the world. 

So I look forward to your comments and will stay as long as I 

am able to. Sorry, the afternoon probably got away from the chairman here in how many members are attending. But I look forward 

to your comments. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would the gentlelady yield for just a moment? 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Sure. 

Mr. CHABOT. On what you had said about some level of nonviolence, just to clarify, you said I think you thought it would be 

inadequate, correct? 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I don’t have any information about the specifics. 

What we did hear is that there would be some understanding about 

whether—about incitement or whether actually commitment to 

nonviolence. Now what that means, I said I am suggesting that, 

without any details, we don’t know what that really means and 

whether there is a commitment. 

Mr. CHABOT. I didn’t know if you said adequate or inadequate, 

and I was trying to clarify that. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I said probably not adequate. I am suggesting 

that it is not adequate. 

4

And, honestly, my own feeling is that, unless there is an agreement to at least at some point recognize the State of Israel, the 

whole deal is inadequate. But that is not for us to decide, except 

for the point of view of aid, but it is certainly—those are decisions 

to make. But the point of view, it is going to have to be Israel’s 

decision to whether they consider that worthy of any kind of further discussion. 

I think my feeling when I was there was that this did not help 

enhance the opportunity for negotiations and settlement talks. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

The gentleman from Virginia is recognized to make a short opening statement, if he would like to. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a prepared opening statement, and I would ask without 

objection to be entered into the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I simply want to note—and thank you for 

holding this hearing—we are looking at a transformative moment, 

obviously, in the region; and it remains to be seen where this all 

leads. I have to admit I am troubled by the recent reconciliation 

agreement between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority because 

of its implications both for our concern about terrorism in the region, for the recognition of the State of Israel, and for the peace 

process itself; and it remains to be seen whether this is really a 

workable agreement in terms of logistics on the ground. 

So I am very interested, obviously, in that set of questions but 

also on the post-bin Laden world with the events—dramatic events 

of this last week. What does that mean as we move forward? And 

what is the long-term staying power of any kind of indigenous 

democratic movement in North Africa and in the Middle East that 

certainly has started with a lot of hope? And we have to stay vigilant in terms of where it all leads, Mr. Chairman. So I think this 

is a timely hearing, and I am certainly interested in the views of 

our two witnesses, and I want to thank you for holding it. 

And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back. 

I would like to introduce our two distinguished witnesses here 

this afternoon. I will begin with Mr. Michael H. Posner. 

Mr. Posner was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for the 

Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor on September 23, 

2009. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Posner was the 

Executive Director and then President of Human Rights First. He 

played a key role in proposing and campaigning for the first U.S. 

law providing for political asylum which became part of the Refugee Act of 1980 and was a member of the White House Apparel 

Industry Partnership Task Force. 

Before joining Human Rights First, Mr. Posner was a lawyer in 

Chicago. He received his J.D. From the University of California 

Berkley Law School and a B.A. With distinction and honors in history from the University of Michigan. 

And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Posner. I will go 

ahead and make the other introduction first, and we will hear from 

you. 

5

Ms. Tamara Wittes was sworn in as a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs on November 9, 2009. She coordinates democracy and human rights policy for the Bureau and supervises the Middle East Partnership Initiative and the broader 

Middle East and North Africa Initiative. 

Before joining the State Department, Wittes was a Senior Fellow 

at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Before that, she served as Middle East Specialist at the 

U.S. Institute of Peace and previously as the Director of Programs 

at the Middle East Institute in Washington. She also taught at 

Georgetown University and was one of the first recipients of the 

Rabin-Peres Peace Award established by President Bill Clinton in 

1997. 

She holds a B.A. in Judaic and Near Eastern studies from 

Oberlin College and an M.A. and Ph.D. in government from 

Georgetown University, and we welcome you here this afternoon as 

well. 

As I am sure the witnesses know, we operate under the 5-minute 

rule, and we ask that you please try to keep your testimony to that 

5 minutes, and your entire statements can be entered in for the 

record. So, even if you have more than 5 minutes we will definitely 

get that. 

So, without further ado, Mr. Posner, you are recognized for 5 

minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL H. POSNER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 

RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. POSNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. We have a longer written statement which we will 

submit for the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Without objection. 

Mr. POSNER. I want to, first of all, thank you for inviting us to 

testify on this important subject at this important moment. You 

rightly recognize that this is a pivotal moment in the Middle East 

and North Africa. 

President Obama has said often that the future of the Middle 

East will be written by its own people, not a foreign power. But we 

have a huge stake in the outcome. So this administration is playing 

a critical role in supporting the forces of democratic reform, and we 

are standing with those in the region who are calling for a peaceful 

democratic transition for tolerance, for pluralism. As you said, Mr. 

Chairman, people in the region are demanding life, liberty, and the 

pursuit of happiness. 

Our policy is pragmatic, and it is in keeping with American principles, values, and interests. We believe that when people talk 

about a conflict between our democratic values and our desire for 

stability, that is a false dichotomy. The United States has a profound interest in regional stability, including the well-being of 

Israel, which several of you have mentioned and which remains our 

close critical ally; and we believe that respect for human rights and 

principles of accountability are actually key components in longterm stability. 

6

My colleague, Tamara, is going to talk more about some of the 

U.S. interests, but our strategy is one of empowerment. We support 

and empower those in the region who are committed, as we are, to 

peaceful and democratic transitions. 

Secretary Clinton has spoken a number of times about the need 

to build sustainable democracies; and some of the elements are rule 

of law, transparency, accountability, the existence of civil society, 

representative political parties, women’s empowerment, and a 

healthy relationship between government and the private sector. 

These are essential building blocks. In places like Egypt and Tunisia, we are hard at work in trying to help people in those countries 

build those essential ingredients. 

We also believe that Internet freedom is an essential ingredient; 

and we are actively involved at the State Department in both diplomatically advancing notions of an open Internet platform—it 

played such an important role both in Tunisia and Egypt. We are 

also spending money that Congress has appropriated to develop 

both new technologies to circumvent firewalls but also to protect 

activists. We have trained 5,000 democracy activists in the Middle 

East and all regions of the world, and we are about to allocate new 

funds for that. 

We also believe that there is a relationship between building institutions of democracy that are accountable and supporting economic policies that deliver growth. 

And, finally, when violations occur, as they have in Syria and 

other places, we are committed to and are speaking out about the 

human rights abuses as we see them. 

You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the situation in Syria; and I want 

to just take a few sentences and say something about that. 

President Obama, Secretary Clinton, and many of us have spoken out about the killing, torture, detention, and abuse of peaceful 

protesters in Syria. The situation in that country has gone from 

bad to worse, and we are committed to challenging that in every 

way that we can. 

We led an effort 10 days ago at the United Nations to have a special session called and have a resolution condemning the violations 

of human rights in Syria—first time that has ever happened—and 

there is now a U.N. investigation and report of what is happening. 

We have unilaterally issued an executive order with specific targeting of individuals and entities responsible for human rights violations, and we continue to monitor the situation, which is increasingly unstable. Our Ambassador there, Robert Ford, has conveyed 

our grave concerns to the Syrian Government at the highest levels 

virtually on a daily basis. 

So we share your concern. We are very mindful of the severity 

of the situation. Peaceful protesters, people who are challenging the 

government there, are being gunned down; and that is totally unacceptable. We have said that. We will continue to say it, and we will 

continue to find allies in Europe and elsewhere to help reinforce 

that message. 

Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, and we will now hear from 

Ms. Wittes for 5 minutes. 

7

STATEMENT OF MS. TAMARA WITTES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I also want to express my appreciation for the invitation to testify on this crucial subject. 

Secretary Clinton has noted that when there is a gap between a 

government and the needs and the aspirations of its people that 

state will become more brittle rather than more stable. And in the 

Middle East that gap has been widening in many places for some 

time. The Arab Spring, therefore, carries the potential for citizens 

in the region to build societies on a more stable foundation, more 

democratic, more economically dynamic, and more capable of tackling their own challenges. 

The task of achieving that brighter future rests in the hands of 

the people and leaders of the region, but the United States has a 

strategic interest in their success, and we can play a key role. 

Now, the United States remains steadfast in our commitment to 

advancing our core interests in the region and defending the security of our allies. Those interests, including countering violent extremism and achieving a negotiated Middle East peace, are widely 

shared by citizens across the region seeking peace, prosperity, and 

freedom. 

Regional stability, of course, has always been a key factor in our 

ability to pursue those goals, and today it is crystal clear that stability in this region demands democratic reform. The changes 

under way in the region were driven by a rising generation unwilling to accept a status quo that denied them the opportunities they 

deserved and a status quo that they knew was unsustainable. That 

is a situation characterized by corruption, inequality, unemployment, resource depletion, and political marginalization. 

The success of these new movements for greater democracy, opportunity, dignity, and accountability will be a sine qua non for the 

region’s ability to overcome its longstanding political, economic, 

and social challenges; and in this way the outcome of the Arab 

Spring will have a powerful and lasting impact on regional stability 

for years to come. 

But events in the region today also present a tremendous strategic opportunity for the United States and all those who advance 

a positive agenda for the future of this region. The peaceful, homegrown movements that put Egypt and Tunisia on the path to democratic transition offer a powerful repudiation of the extremists’ 

false narrative that violence and conflict are the only ways to effect 

change. And since we wholeheartedly embrace the positive potential of this region, we likewise embrace those who seek to realize 

that potential through peaceful democratic reform. 

Our response to the upheaval in the region is rooted in a consistent set of principles, as my colleague said. We oppose the use 

of violence against peaceful protesters and support the universal 

rights of free expression, assembly, and association. We strongly 

condemn killing, torture, and abuse of peaceful protesters; and we 

make clear our view that people’s legitimate demands and aspirations must be met by positive engagement from governments in the 

form of meaningful political and economic reform. 

8

Certainly there will be great challenges ahead in countries undergoing democratic transition. We are encouraged to see governments elsewhere in the region taking affirmative steps to address 

their citizens’ concerns, but there are more challenging scenarios 

where calls for democratic reform are held back or met with violence and there is the risk of backsliding or the derailment of 

progress. 

And, Mr. Chairman, you mentioned Palestinian reconciliation. 

Let me be very clear. We certainly understand the concerns you 

have raised. There has been a deal signed, but there are many 

steps left to implement that agreement, and we are monitoring it 

closely. But, from our perspective, it is absolutely clear that, in 

order to play any constructive role in achieving peace, any Palestinian Government must accept the Quartet principles. They must 

reject violence, accept Israel’s right to exist, and agree to abide by 

previous agreements. 

We will continue to stand up firmly for our principles and our interests in this region. As citizens and leaders in the Middle East 

move toward democratic change, we will support their efforts. We 

believe in their potential, and we look forward to a day when all 

the citizens of the region are able to have their voices heard, their 

rights respected, and their aspirations met. We believe that that 

will be a brighter future and a more stable future, one that works 

for them and for us. We look forward to continuing to work with 

this committee and with the Congress to make that future a reality. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Posner and Ms. Wittes follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

It is my understanding that the gentlelady from New York has 

a codel to catch, and so I am going to defer my questions so she 

can get them in before she has to leave. 

So the gentlelady is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman; and thank 

you for holding this very relevant hearing today and thank you to 

our guests. 

My question—and I will get right to the point—is with regard to 

the Muslim Brotherhood. I would like you to please explain to me 

what you see their role is in the Middle East. We are hearing concerns from Egypt, from Israel, and from Jordan as to they are gaining power. And I would like to hear what the administration, what 

your thoughts are about the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Ms. WITTES. Well, thank you, for the question. I think it is a very 

important issue to raise, and it is one that we are follow closely. 

The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt abandoned violence in the 

1970s. Since then, they have played a role in politics, but their 

views have not always been clear. And what we are looking to see 

emerge in Egypt is a diverse political marketplace where people 

will face a real choice and where organizations like the Brotherhood and other political parties are challenged to make their views 

clear, including on core democratic principles: Rejection of violence, 

the embrace of democratic values and rules, both before and after 

the election, and a commitment to equality for all under the law, 

including women and minorities. Those are the requisites to play 

a constructive role in the democratic process. 

Ms. BUERKLE. As a follow-up to that, does the administration—

are they opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, their power, and 

them expanding their power in Jordan? 

Ms. WITTES. Well, in Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is not 

itself politically competitive. There is a political party, the Islamic 

Action Front, which has some links to the Brotherhood which is a 

recognized political party and competes in Jordanian elections. 

They have been a part of the political scene there for some time. 

Ms. BUERKLE. And I think, as a follow-up, we have heard from 

many of their concerns regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, and I 

would like to know if the administration sees them as a moderate 

group or as a group that is really a threat as what we have heard 

from—testimony we have heard from folks from Israel and the like. 

Ms. WITTES. I think from our perspective what is important is 

that we see a diversity of views and voices and that we see all of 

those who want to participate in the democratic process embracing 

democratic principles. It is a concern for the process and a concern 

for the integrity of the democratic process. It is not for us to choose 

the winners of those political competitions. That, obviously, is for 

the people in the region to make that choice, but we want to see 

them make that choice within a free and fair and competitive context. 

Ms. BUERKLE. So as a follow-up to that, do you see the Muslim 

Brotherhood as an organization that would allow that process to 

play out or what be a threat to the freedom, to the very thing that 

these people are fighting for? 

Well, I will let you comment on that, and I will follow up. 

18

Ms. WITTES. Thank you. I think as the situation in Egypt continues to evolve and as the Egyptian people start to prepare for 

their elections, there are already a number of new political parties 

forming and organizing, there are a lot of debates swirling around 

the role of religion and politics, and I think that we are already 

seeing the Egyptian people engage robustly in this discussion. So 

that process is going to continue to play itself out; and, of course, 

we will be watching it closely. But, ultimately, it is up to the Egyptian people to determine their future. 

Ms. BUERKLE. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentlelady, Ms. Schwartz, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. Thank you for the opportunity for 

questions. 

I wonder if you could speak a little bit more following up on the 

previous questions about the situation in Egypt, and I would say 

a couple questions, if I may. One is on how prepared they are for 

elections in September. There is some sense that some of the points 

you are making in terms of new and emerging parties, how quickly 

can they be organized, how substantial they can be, how competitive they can be? 

Of course, I agree with you this is up to the people of Egypt to 

make these decisions for their future, but, as we encourage democratic reforms, we don’t want them to be unprepared for those reforms. We know that that is not going to bode well for good decision making for them, and so I don’t want us to push too hard to 

lead in that direction. 

And, secondly, the word is to—we originally had heard that 

Egypt was going on abide by previous treaties. Have you heard otherwise? There is obviously deep concern in Israel about the border 

with Gaza, whether, in fact, that will be open, whether that would 

then lead to weapons, munitions, other supplies coming into Gaza 

that would potentially enhance the opportunity for violence and destruction? 

So let me start there, and then if there is an opportunity for a 

follow-up I would be pleased to be able to. 

Mr. POSNER. Thank you. Let me answer the first set of questions 

first. 

I think what we have seen over at least 30 years in Egypt is an 

ossification of all institutions, including political institutions. And 

so as transition now is under way, one of the challenges Egyptians 

face, particularly young people and others who took to the streets, 

is that they don’t have experience with political parties. They 

don’t—they haven’t had the ability to do political polling or to organize to do electioneering. And so we are very much involved. Congress has and we have made available as part of our bilateral 

funds to Egypt to go to groups like NDI and IRI to begin that 

building process, building the foundation for sustainable democracy 

in Egypt. It is not going to happen overnight, but it is critically important. 

There is an important segment of Egyptian society, secular, reform-minded, democratic, concerned about the future of their own 

19

country; and they want and are eager to build the skills to play a 

vital role in a political process that will lead to a democratic Egypt. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Will that happen in 6 months? 

Mr. POSNER. I think it is going to be a real challenge. I think we 

are in a transitional phase. I think realistically to have elections 

in 6 months, both for Parliament and the President, strains a system that is in a very embryonic state. And so I think we need to 

be quick and resolute in trying to help right now, but we also need 

to be mindful that, over time, we have got to stay the course and 

this is going to happen over a period of years. 

I am optimistic in the long term we can get there, but I think 

we shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking that it is going to look 

like the United States or Western Europe in a matter of months. 

And so I think we are committed to helping those Egyptians that 

share our democratic aspirations, and we know that it is going to 

be a process for them to learn, to build their capacity, to build their 

constituencies, and over time to have the role they deserve in 

Egypt. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Just related to those points, do you have some 

sense of how much Iran is trying to play into influencing parties 

that could evolve, that would be more sympathetic to their position 

and anti-West and anti-democratic, ultimately? 

Mr. POSNER. We are always mindful and wary of the intentions 

of Iranian Government. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. As we should be. 

Mr. POSNER. And that is certainly an aspect, it is a feature in 

many of these countries. 

I think our primary focus, though, right now, is the need to be 

in building that capacity, that democratic capacity that Egyptians 

themselves want. They want the same kinds of opportunities people have in this country, economic and political opportunities. We 

can help reinforce their own aspirations and desires. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. I have 1 minute left, but maybe we could answer 

the question about the treaties, the treaty with Israel and the border on Gaza. 

Ms. WITTES. Absolutely. Thank you. This, obviously, is an issue 

of core concern for us as well as for our Israeli allies. 

The interim government announced almost immediately that 

they would continue to respect their international commitments. 

That was an announcement that we welcome, and we expect them 

to hold to, and I think that is going to be an important element 

for us to see in any future Egyptian Government as well. 

During this interim period, we have seen the Government of 

Egypt continue to uphold those commitments, engage with Israel 

on important issues, including security, and also continue to work 

to stop arms smuggling through Egyptian territory. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you. I believe my time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentlelady yields back. 

The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Manzullo, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

The President and the rest of the people in the State Department 

in various positions wasted no time in condemning Mubarak, asking him to step down. The same with Qadhafi, made statements 

20

hinting at the peaceful removal of the leader of Yemen, and yet the 

Arab country that suffered perhaps the most casualties, at least recorded, is Syria. And aside from condemning the violence, which is 

easy, because no one likes violence, the President has made no 

overtures to ask Bashar to step down. 

Only a couple days ago, the Obama administration issued an executive order freezing the assets of three top Syrian officials, most 

notably Maher al-Assad, who is President Assad’s brother. I realize 

in this crazy world you have to pick and choose your friends. But 

I am a little bit miffed as to why the United States is apparently 

not taking harsher action or asking Bashar to leave office. 

Do either of you two have any comments on that? 

Mr. POSNER. Congressman, one of the things that the President 

said—I want to quote his words. He said, ‘‘This outrageous use of 

violence to quell protest must come to an end now. We strongly oppose the Syrian Government’s treatment of its citizens. We continue to oppose its continuing destabilizing behavior more generally, including support for terrorism and terrorist groups.’’

Those are statements that aren’t made lightly or easily. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand that. But he didn’t ask him to step 

down. 

Mr. POSNER. Well, what we have done, as you indicated, is to impose now unilateral sanctions. We also led an effort at the United 

Nations to have Syria condemned by the international community 

for the first time, and that happened in the last 2 weeks. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand that. But why doesn’t the administration ask him to step down? 

Mr. POSNER. I think we are at a point now where we are constantly reevaluating the policy. As the violence escalates, we are 

going to explore options; and we are going to also take our lead 

from what is happening in the country and what people there are 

saying and doing. We have made it very clear that we are utterly 

condemnatory of the violence. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand that. I read the words and quoted 

them myself. I just think it is inconsistent. 

Mubarak left and who is left but the Muslim Brotherhood? You 

have to sometimes wonder what you ask for. And the Middle East 

is ablaze right now. But I don’t see that much pressure on Syria. 

I don’t see the President asking for his removal, asking for him to 

step down, when he was not reticent to do that with regard to the 

other leaders I mentioned. 

Mr. POSNER. Well, I would take exception to two things you just 

said. One is, I don’t think the only thing that is an alternative in 

Egypt is the Muslim Brothers. There is a significant democratic 

movement in Egypt that we are supporting and need to support 

which seeks to have a peaceful, democratic, rights-respecting——

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand. I want to return to Syria. 

Mr. POSNER. Yeah. But with respect to Syria, we are very mindful of the severity of the situation. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand that. I am trying to get an answer 

as to why the President is not as forceful with Syria as he has been 

with other Arab countries. 

Ms. Wittes, do you have a response to that? 

Ms. WITTES. Congressman, thank you. 

21

I think it is important to note that, in addition to the steps that 

we have taken on our own, we have been working to mobilize the 

international community on this issue as well. And, as you know, 

Syria has relationships that are in some ways more multifaceted 

with other international partners. So it is very important for us to 

work together with them. 

With our own action, with the executive order on Friday, our 

hope is to galvanize the European Union as well. 

Mr. MANZULLO. I understand that. Here is a guy that has got 

snipers shooting innocent people. A bullet went through the eye of 

a little 4-year-old. I think the message is, there is any message at 

all, it is very inconsistent, that America is giving Bashar a pass. 

And you can have all the diplomatic language you want, you can 

have all the—so he is a bigger shot than the other people. Apparently, he is acceptable. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Does the gentleman seek additional time? 

Mr. MANZULLO. I do. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman gets another minute. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you. 

Can somebody give me a better response—not a better, a more 

complete response? Does the United States want him out, Bashar 

out? 

Ms. WITTES. Congressman, I think it is important that as this 

situation across the region has evolved, and it has evolved very 

quickly, that we look at each country and each environment on its 

own terms. The environment in Syria has been deteriorating significantly over the last couple of weeks; and I think as you look at 

the range of actions that we have taken—I see us escalating our 

activity——

Mr. MANZULLO. But how many more people have to die before 

the President acts? I think more people have died now in Syria 

than died in Libya before the President acted. 

Ms. WITTES. I think what we saw in Libya was a situation in 

which there was the real threat of mass violence. 

Mr. MANZULLO. So there is no threat of mass violence with over 

close to 600 people being killed in Syria? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has once again expired. 

Would the lady like to answer the question? Or you have already 

answered it? Thank you. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me pick up where my friend from Illinois just left off, 

though, Ms. Wittes. How do we square the apparent inconsistency 

in our policy, U.S. policy, with respect to Egypt on the one hand 

and Libya and Syria on the other? 

I think we have got some explaining to do to the American public. I mean, if the differences are self-evident to you and the administration, they are not to us or the public. 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Congressman. I think it is an important 

and valuable question. 

I think that in our response across the region, we have been rooted in a consistent set of principles: Number one, that peaceful proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 16:46 Jul 05, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\050511\66173 HFA PsN: SHIRL
22

testers have to be dealt with peacefully and cannot be met with violence; that people have to enjoy their fundamental human rights 

to free expression, free assembly, free association, and to have a 

right to have a say in how they are governed; and, number three, 

that these aspirations, these demands that are being expressed by 

citizens across the region have to be met by governments in the region with meaningful political and economic reform that is done 

through a peaceful political process, a process of dialogue, a process 

of inclusion. That has been our consistent approach across the region. Now——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let me ask you a question, because my time—

I know the chairman is going to give me 1 extra minute, but still 

we are going to run out of time, unfortunately, and I really would 

love to continue this. But has the administration called for regime 

change in Damascus? 

Ms. WITTES. No, we have not. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And I think that is really Mr. 

Manzullo’s point, that there seems to be a discrepancy between our 

approach—we even called for Hosni Mubarak to step down, and it 

is passingly strange that we have not done the same in Damascus. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Or Bahrain. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Let’s make a footnote we have got to revisit that 

issue at some point. 

Mr. Posner, you made some talks about the atrophying of institutions that intrigued me. Because one of the things that struck me 

about Egypt when it was sort of hot and heavy was the eerie resemblances to Iran in this respect; that U.S. policy seemed to have 

been complicit or acquiesced in the lack of any political space being 

created in the opposition—let alone it being viable sufficient to actually govern. 

And the problem is, in an autocratic regime, inevitably it will 

crumble, and if there has been no political space created for some 

kind of viable opposition into that vacuum, others can exploit opportunities. It happened in Russia in 1917. It certainly happened 

in the Iranian Revolution after the fall of the Shah. 

I just wonder if you, given your unique portfolio, what your observation is about that moving forward? What have we learned 

about that as a country in terms of our diplomacy? 

Mr. POSNER. Thank you, Congressman. 

I think one of the things—I went to Egypt 1 year ago January 

to look at some of the programs that our office is supporting and 

some programs that the MEFI office that Tamara oversees, is supporting. We have over the years been, in fact, quite eager to support exactly those independent voices that you are describing. 

And one of the reasons why, in the long term, I am optimistic 

about Egypt is that there is a very vital society there, a very vital 

civil society. There are a range of groups working on women’s 

issues, working on human rights issues, working for children, 

working on environment, a range of other things; and the United 

States Government has been in contact with those people and supportive of their continuity. 

It hasn’t been an easy process, and now we are in a different 

place where those groups have more opportunity to grow and to 

23

thrive. And, in addition, there is really the ability now to build political parties in a proper democratic space. 

So I think that is—I think we—could we have done more? We 

could have. But I think we have done a lot. We are now very focused on what needs to be done going forward, and I think there 

are a number of Egyptians who I met 6 weeks ago there who are 

eager to work with us and to benefit from our assistance and our 

experience. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I guess I would add one more thing to your list; 

and that is the military. Big difference between the—even though 

we had close relationships with the Iranian military as well. In 

Egypt, in a sense, it was a force for stability but also played a cushion between uprisings or demonstrators and the police. It actually 

protected the civilian population. 

Mr. Chairman, I would request the extra minute. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman without objection is granted an additional minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Back to you, Ms. Wittes. Just real quickly, does the United 

States support the agreement between Hamas and the PA that was 

hammered out in Cairo? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

I think our clear position is that any Palestinian Government, if 

it wants to play a constructive role in the peace process, needs to 

accept the Quartet principles. We have yet to see what government 

may emerge out of this agreement, whether this agreement sticks, 

but it is clear what we are looking for, which is for the members 

of that government to agree to reject violence, accept Israel’s right 

to exist, and embrace peace agreements. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes. And the Israeli Government in the form of 

its prime minister made it very clear that they see this as disastrous for the peace process and for Israel moving forward. Do we 

share that view? 

Ms. WITTES. We share the concerns, and we are going to be monitoring this very closely. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yields back, and I now recognize 

myself for 5 minutes for questions. I might note—or 6. 

And I would note, following up on the gentleman from Virginia’s 

question, that clearly I agree with the Israeli Prime Minister. I 

think it is disastrous for the peace process, personally. But I will 

get into that later, potentially, if we have a second round. 

But, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I returned earlier 

this week from a visit to the Middle East. While in Israel, I had 

an opportunity to travel to Jericho and the West Bank and toured 

the Joint Operations Center under the command of the U.S. Security Coordinator, General Michael Moeller. The USSC is charged 

with working with the Palestinian Authority to train locals to provide security in their own West Bank community. 

I must say that I was very much impressed with both the leadership of General Moeller and his team and the professionalism 

shown by Palestinian officials at the Center. It is very encouraging 

to observe the building of fundamental institutions of a state that 

we hope will one day soon be able to live side by side with Israel 

24

in peace. Although, as I just stated, I am very skeptical about this 

reconciliation with Hamas involved. 

It was only a day earlier, however, that I was meeting with Daniel Ayalon, Israel Deputy Foreign Minister, when we received news 

of this Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism 

Act of 2006 explicitly forbids U.S. funding of a Palestinian Authority Government which includes Hamas members unless or until it 

fulfills numerous obligations, including the three Quartet principles, as has been mentioned here already: Recognizing Israel’s 

right to exist, renunciation of violence, and acceptance of past 

agreements. 

In short, until Hamas ceases to be Hamas, the United States is 

legally barred from assisting any entity which contains it. It would 

be extremely unfortunate if this reconciliation rendered the Palestinian Authority’s state-building effort moribund, and yet it appears it would do just that. 

Throughout all of this, however, the administration has been notably quiet. I know we have talked some today, but, other than 

that, quite quiet, with the exception of Secretary Clinton’s unfortunate remark, with I mentioned in my opening statement. 

What is the administration’s policy toward this reconciliation? 

And we have been talking about that. Is it, as I hope, working to 

ensure that Hamas has no role in both the Palestinian Government 

as well as in the PLO? It is not, I hope, considering negotiation or 

asking that Israel negotiate with any bodies which include Hamas 

members. How can we ask Israel to make peace with an organization that continues to target its civilians with indiscriminate rocket 

fire? 

The situation in Syria continues to spiral out of control, and we 

have been talking about that as well. Bashar al-Assad, far from the 

reformer some of us once considered him, has shown himself to be 

a ruthless despot willing to murder his own people in order to continue to repress them. Despite this, the administration I believe 

continues to take only piecemeal steps that hardly tell Assad or the 

broader region that they cannot mow down their own citizens who 

are merely peacefully protesting for their universal rights. 

Just the opposite. Our, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

I believe tepid response—and I think we are hearing that from 

both sides here today, that there are concerns about this—that response sends a signal to the world’s despots that we will only respond to brutal crackdowns with symbolic but ineffective measures. 

Beyond the moral dimension, Syria has for decades shown itself 

to be one of the most malign actors in the region. It continues to 

closely align with Iran, who is assisting it in its crackdown. It facilitates a free flow of weapons across its borders to Hezbollah in 

southern Lebanon, and for years it ushered across the Iraqi border 

jihadis who killed countless Iraqis and our own servicemen and 

women. 

Damascus also hosts the headquarters of a number of international terrorist organizations, including Hamas. 

Although many questions remain about what government would 

follow Assad should the regime fall, there are many steps that the 

U.S. could be taking at this time to influence that outcome. 

25

It is also noteworthy that the administration has not yet spoken 

of withdrawing its recently appointed Ambassador in Damascus, 

Robert Ford, or of kicking out the Damascus Ambassador in Washington. 

So, again, just following some of the questions of some of my colleagues, I hope the administration will take back there is considerable concern here, at least in this committee, about much tougher 

action with respect to Syria. 

And I welcome any comment from either. 

Mr. POSNER. If I can, just one comment on your last point. I don’t 

think there is any difference between us in terms of the severity 

of the situation. We are mindful, we are watching it, we are monitoring it, we are reporting on it every hour of every day. 

Ambassador Ford has been for us a vehicle, an individual who 

can reach out both to the Syrian Government at the highest levels 

but also to reach out to people who are on the receiving end of this 

violence. 

I worked for many years, as you indicated in the outset, in the 

nongovernmental world. And one of the worst things that can happen in a situation where thousands of people are being arrested, 

where they are being shot, where they are disappearing, where 

there are all these violations going on, people want to know that 

governments like the United States are there, meeting with them, 

aware of what they are facing, and trying to help them in a dayto-day way. Ambassador Ford, that is what he is doing every day. 

He is spending long hours helping families, meeting with victims, 

meeting with human rights advocates, meeting with journalists, 

trying to mitigate what is a terrible situation. 

So we can have a broader debate about the overall policy, but 

this aspect of it, I think it is right for us to have a presence there, 

it is right for us to have a senior diplomat whose role it is really 

to be our advocate-in-chief in Damascus and in Syria fighting for 

the very principles of human rights that you and I are talking 

about. 

Mr. CHABOT. My time has expired; and I recognize the gentleman 

from Florida, Mr. Deutch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Posner, I would like to follow up on the chairman’s question 

and your response. Can you lay out in a little greater detail how 

this process works? Ambassador Ford, you said, can reach out to 

those who are on the receiving end of the violence and that he has 

the opportunity to try to mitigate this violence. Can you just describe how that works? When having these meetings and learning 

of—and meeting directly with the families and hearing directly of 

the ramifications of these actions taken by the Syrian Government 

and this regime, how does that then—how does he then communicate with the regime? What does he communicate with the regime? And, ultimately, what message are we sending? 

Mr. POSNER. We received a report from one of the human rights 

organizations yesterday or today that perhaps as many as 1,000 

people have been arrested since Monday in half a dozens cities in 

Syria. We gather that information. The Ambassador takes that information. He meets with these organizations but also family members of the people who have been detained. He and others in the 

26

Embassy then approach the government. It is a constant process of 

both trying to figure out where people are, how families can get access, how they can get a lawyer, and how they can get released. 

Now, do we succeed in every case in resolving the differences? 

No, we don’t. But it is enormously helpful to the people who are 

feeling under horrible strain because they don’t know where their 

loved ones are that an Ambassador from the United States is there, 

mindful of their story, ready to meet with them, ready to go in and 

talk to senior officials and say we are concerned about this. 

We do this all over the world. It is not unique to Syria. I was 

in China last week. We have an Embassy. They are very dedicated, 

doing exactly the same thing. We do it in lots of countries around 

the world. 

It is very important to people that are feeling they have no authority, no power, no ability to challenge or ask questions of their 

own government that there are influential diplomats, especially 

from the United States, ready to play their role. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And just changing direction for a second, in your 

testimony, you talked about the human rights abuses occurring at 

the hands of the Iranian regime. And I would suggest that the 

wave of democracy sweeping the Middle East really began after the 

2009 disputed elections in Iran. Yet, in more recent times, the opposition movement within Iran has not galvanized the same momentum as in other countries throughout the region. Can you discuss the state of the democracy movement in Iran and what this 

country is doing and what we ought to be doing to empower the 

opposition? 

Mr. POSNER. I think your analysis is correct. Since May 2009, the 

Government of Iran brutally has cracked down against the opposition. And it has been—I think the hypocrisy of the Iranian Government has become all the more clear in the last few months as they 

are cheering on people in other societies who are challenging authority while basically brutally cracking down on their own dissenting voices. 

We do things both directly and indirectly to try to lend support 

and solidarity to people in the opposition and people in the human 

rights movement, democracy movement in Iran. We led an effort at 

the U.N. in March to have, for the first time, a special rapporteur, 

a special expert on Iran. The government fought us like crazy on 

that. We were really in the lead, and we got the U.N. to do that. 

We worked with Iranian dissidents both inside and outside the 

country, hugely dangerous for some of them. We don’t broadcast all 

of those associations. But we are trying to figure out, for example, 

how they can get better access to information through the Internet. 

Congress passed the VOICE Act, which gives us some resources to 

begin to open up access to information and allow Iranian dissidents 

to speak among themselves. 

There is still a vital movement in Iran, many of them young people who are desperate and frustrated beyond belief at what they 

see is a totally autocratic, despotic government. They will continue 

to push, and we will continue to help them. 

Mr. DEUTCH. To that end, Mr. Posner, we yesterday introduced 

bipartisan legislation to impose sanctions on those who aid in the 

abuses of the opposition movement and further human rights 

27

abuses within Iran. I would invite you take a look. I think it is consistent with the efforts that you have just described; and, ultimately, we would be looking to you for some additional guidance 

as well. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yields back. We are going to go into 

a second round, so the gentleman will get another bite at the apple, 

if he would like. 

So I recognize myself for another 5 minutes, and I am going to 

give a couple of quick questions first. 

First of all, after the Assad regime has killed hundreds of Syrians, does the administration believe that the Assad regime holds 

any legitimacy? Yes or no. Or a sentence, if you need a sentence, 

after the yes or no. 

Ms. WITTES. Mr. Chairman, I think the Syrian people are looking 

at the actions of this regime and drawing their own conclusions, 

and I think you see the effect of that in the street. 

Mr. CHABOT. I didn’t hear a yes or no. And I am talking about 

the administration, not what they think. Does the administration 

believe that the Assad regime holds any legitimacy. 

Ms. WITTES. Mr. Chairman, I think it is the Syrian’s people judgment here that is important, and I think they will draw their conclusions based on his behavior. 

Mr. CHABOT. So the administration isn’t taking a position at this 

point, at least from what you are saying? 

Ms. WITTES. We are being guided—as Assistant Secretary Posner 

said earlier, we are being guided by the events we see on the 

ground, and we are reevaluating on a daily basis. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. Next question. Does the administration still 

believe that Abu Mazen is committed to peace, given the fact that 

he just publicly embraced the leader of Hamas and said Hamas did 

not have to recognize Israel’s right to exist? 

Ms. WITTES. Mr. Chairman, I think Abu Mazen—President 

Abbas has over the course of his career exercised a lot of leadership 

on this issue as somebody who is committed to a negotiated solution with Israel. This reconciliation agreement is something that 

has yet to play out. We are going to be looking at it very closely; 

and, as I said, we are going to be looking for some very specific 

things before we can make any assessment as to what the impact 

will be on our policy. But I think President Abbas’ personal commitments that he has made in office have been supportive of the 

process. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me go down a different road here. 

I had a former Arab head of state in my office just yesterday, and 

we talked for a good hour about a whole range of issues. He was 

in the Middle East, although it was in my office. And he kept coming—he must have six different times come back to the, well, if we 

can just solve the Israeli-Palestinian problem, everything else falls 

into line. And he said it over and over again. And I disputed that, 

and I think that has been used as an excuse for the corrupt governments that many of the Arab governments have had in the Middle 

East for years, but I would like to see what the administration believes about that. 

28

Mr. POSNER. I agree with what you say. There have been a number of actions at the U.N. and elsewhere where the Israeli-Palestinian dispute has become the centerpiece and in some ways to the 

exclusion of so many other problems in the region. And what is interesting about events of the last several months is that people who 

took to Tahrir Square in Egypt or to the streets in Tunisia and all 

these other countries are so focused on their own future. It is striking how much the focus is on how to democratize, how to open up, 

how to create greater opportunities in Syria, in Egypt, in all of 

these other countries. 

So I think we are seeing a change in the region. It is a welcome 

change. There is now on the merits a discussion about what governance and what democracy and what the future holds throughout 

the Middle East, and I think we ought to be supportive of that. 

Mr. CHABOT. Let me conclude—I have only got a short period of 

time left here—on a couple of points, just to wrap this up. On both 

sides I think it is pretty clear that there is considerable concern 

with the administration’s lack of greater emphasis on Syria, more 

action there, more affirmative things done, when you have the regime that essentially has killed hundreds of their own people and 

probably much worse than that over the years. So that is something I would strongly urge the administration to look at very 

closely. I know that they have spent time on Libya, considerable 

time and effort there, but I think Syria warrants it. 

Secondly, relative to this reconciliation, I have great skepticism. 

The way it was explained to me by the foreign minister of Egypt, 

who is very excited about this, much more so than Prime Minister 

Netanyahu, obviously, was that you have Hamas and you have the 

Palestinian Authority, and they come together and have elections 

and form some independent entity of some sort, and then that is 

the independent entity that Israel is going to negotiate. 

Well, as far as I am concerned, it is a nonstarter. Because everybody knows that Hamas is right behind this independent entity, 

and they still haven’t met the Quartet’s requirements, principles, 

as we know. So, whereas I always hope that peace will break out 

there, I don’t really believe it is real. 

And then, finally, relative to Egypt, we met with a lot of the 

young leaders, the people that were on Tahrir Square, we met with 

the generals, we met with a whole range of people, and one of the 

things of considerable concern to me is, first of all, Israel’s role—

or, excuse me, Egypt’s role in this reconciliation and that they 

bought into it, but even more so their change in engagement with 

Iran. They seem to be much more willing to engage Iran. 

And we all know that Ahmadinejad has essentially said that his 

intention is to wipe Israel off the map. And we also know that he 

seems to be bound and determined to move forward on this nuclear 

program, despite the fact that our allies and the United States 

have been attempting to do this non-militarily through sanctions 

through years now. 

But Iran and Egypt’s sidling up to them is of considerable concern, I believe. Could you comment on that element, Egypt getting 

closer to Iran and what the administration’s attitude would be toward that and what we ought to do about it? 

29

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think that is a crucial 

question, and it is one that we are spending a lot of time focusing 

on ourselves. 

We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s role in the region, its 

sponsorship of terrorism, its illicit nuclear program, and its failure 

to comply with its own international obligations in that regard. 

And what we see is that, as these events have taken place across 

the region, the Iranians have been seeking to exploit them in order 

to distract from that regional agenda. But they have been doing 

that in a way that I would say has exposed their tremendous hypocrisy in claiming to support popular movements elsewhere in the 

region that they think will work to their advantage while engaging 

in brutal repression at home and now, as we see, are complicit in 

Syrian repression as well. 

So, from our perspective, the developments in the region and the 

work that we can do to support democratic transition in this region 

will work to Iran’s disadvantage. This is part of the strategic opportunity that we are presented with here, and it is one that we want 

to pursue. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Just let me conclude with one other thing I just want to mention 

on Iran. One of the mistakes I think that the United States made 

was when there was at least a chance it looked like the people 

were rising up that we didn’t give them additional support. And I 

know that there was the thinking that if the United States gets in 

they will use the United States and say, well, these people are all 

just—it is the U.S., it is the great Satan, it is Israel and all that 

kind—they are going to say that stuff anyway, and they said it 

then. 

But I think we should have been much more engaged probably 

behind the scenes. But I think we should have given more encouragement to those people. 

But the information that we gather is that there is a significant, 

essentially, wiping out of all of the leaders. They had cameras, and 

they are killing people on a regular basis over there, and that is 

something I think we need to do, and I know it is somewhat limited what we can do. 

But these people are out there trying to speak out and trying to 

enjoy the same freedoms, maybe not the United States to this level, 

but at least free from this type of regime that they have been 

under for decades now, and the people are one after another being 

wiped out. And that is one of the reasons that I think we haven’t 

seen, you know, sweep and fear. If there is any country in that region you would like to see this happen, it would be Iran. I think 

they were ahead of everybody else, unfortunately; and maybe if it 

had happened now, maybe it would have been different. 

But anyway, you don’t have to respond, but to the extent that 

the administration can think about that, I would, as chair of this 

committee, appreciate it. 

And without anything else coming before the committee, members will have 5 days to supplement their statements or questions. 

If there is nothing further to come before the committee, we are 

adjourned. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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