Docket Nos.1 05989, 1 06592 co ns.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IL LINO IS, Ap

pel l ee, v . JA MES MO RRIS, Appel

la nt.–THE PEOP LE OF THE STATE OF IL LI NO IS, A pp el l ee , v . JESS E H OLBO RO W , A pp el l an t.
Opinion filed January 22, 2010.

C HIE F JUS TI CE FIT ZGE RALD d elivered t he judg ment o f the
co ur t , w ith o pinion. Ju sti ces F re eman, Tho mas, Kilbride , G ar man, Ka rmeier , a nd Bur ke c onc ur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

In this consoli

dated ap peal, defen

dants, James Morr is an

d Jesse Holborow, contes

t the f i rst-stag e di sm

i ssa l s of thei r r es pec t ive pos tcon vi cti on petitions . Defen

dant Morris en

tered a negotiated plea of guilt y in t he cir cui

t cou rt of Cook Cou nty to two c oun

ts of aggr avated

cri m i na l sex ual ass aul t in ex change f

or concu rre n t sentence s of 30 years . D efenda nt Holborow entered a negotiated pl ea of guilt y in the cir cuit co ur t of Livi n gs to n C oun ty to hom e i nv as i on wi th gr ea t b odi l y h ar m to the vi ctim, theft, and cri

mi nal tres pa ss to a veh ic le in exch ange f or t he di sm

is sal of f our o ther charges an

d a 16- ye ar ter m of i m pri son men t wi th co ncur re nt t er ms of 3 yea rs a nd 364 days. In thei

r pro se postco nvi

ction petitions, defen

dants each

asserted-2- that they wer e no t informed t hat t hey wo uld be r equ ired t o s er ve terms of man da t o ry su pe rvise d r ele as e ( MS R) in a dd it io n t o t he ir sentence s an d, t he r efo r e, did not re ceive the ben efi t o f thei r negotiated plea agreemen

ts. The ap pe ll ate c ourt aff irm ed i n both m

atter s, fi ndi ng that defendan ts’ po st co nvic t io n c laims were fri volous an d patently without
meri t, as th e rec ord s s

h owe d th at def en da n ts recei ved ad moni sh men ts that su bst an t ially

co mplie d w it h S up r eme Court Rul e 402 (177 Ill . 2d R. 402) and o therwise satisf ie d due proces s. Morris , No. 1–06–2036 (unpubl is hed order un de rSu pr eme Co urt Rule 23) ; Holborow, 38 2 I ll. App. 3d 852. We gr anted l eave to appeal a nd consol

ida ted defendan ts’ cases. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315. For t he reasons that foll ow, we af f i rm the judgmen

t o f the appell

ate co urt with resp ect to b oth defendan ts.

BACK

GROUND Ja mes Mo rr is Foll owing a negotiated guilty

ple a, Morris was conv

icted of two
cou n ts of a ggr avat ed c riminal sexual as sau lt ag ainst t wo different victims , S.B. and C.M. The State’s evi dence dem

onstrated t hat

Mo rr is li ved in t he sa me apa rt ment bu ilding as t he vi ctim s and was acquai nted wi th each of their h usban ds. By vi rtue o f that ac quaint an ce , Mo rr is tricked t he wo men int o o pe ning t he ir fr o nt do o r s, an d t he n fo r ce d h is way i nto thei r a par t ments . While inside, he dr agg ed, st ru ck, and
sex ual l y as sa ul ted th e v i cti m s. Mor ri s opted to ple ad guilt y pur sua nt t o a n eg o t iat ed ple a a gr ee men t r at he rt ha n p r o ce ed t o t r ial. At t he January

18, 2005, plea h

earin g, the trial court was advi

sed that an agree men t had be en reache d be

tween the p art ie s . Defense counsel ou t lined t he agreem

ent, stating, “J

ust so we are c l ear,** *[w]e enter ple as of gui

lty pursuant to t he pl

ea ag re em en t. Pursuant to that agr eement allcounts on each of those i ndictmen ts wil l b e nolle d. Those pl ea s a reen tered wi th t he und er st anding t he se nt ence wo uld be th i rty years in the I lli

nois D epa rt ment of Corrections.” The trial court then admoni shed Morris as follows: “TheseareCla ss X fe lo ny ch ar ge s int he St at e o f Illinois. And Cl ass X felo nie s in t he St at e o f I llino is c ar ry wit h it po ss ible punishment of

si x to th i rty yea rs i n th e Il l i noi s D ep artm

en t of-3- Corr ections, plus

three years of m andatory supervised release. The re is no p ro visions fo r p er iod ic impriso nment. The re is no prov i si on fo rpe r io dic prob ati

on or con di ti ona l di scha rge . You
co uld be f in ed up to $10 ,00 0 on

each of the se matters . Do y

ou unde rst and t he po ssible pu nishment?” Mo rr is responded, “Yes.” A fter further admonish

men ts, the tri al court asked, “K

nowin g the nature of the cha

rges agai nst y ou and t h e pos si bl e p en al ti es , th e l eg al righ ts th at y ou have, d

o youst ill wish to ple ad guil ty to aggravated crim

in al sex ual assa ult in both o f these indict ments ?” Morris answer ed , “Yes.” The tri al court accepted Morr is’ p l ea

an d pr oce eded to sente nc i ng . The tri

al cou rt di d n ot mentio n MSR dur ing sent encing, and t her e wa s no men ti on of MSR in t he se nt en cin g o r de r

. Mo rr is d id n o t file a mo t io n t o wit hd r aw his ple a a nd did no t file a dir ec t ap pe al. In May 2006, Morris f

il ed a pro se po st co nvictio n pet itio n alleging that his co nst itu t ional r ight s we re subs t ant ially violat ed be cau se he contracted wit h t he St at e t o r ece ive a 30 -year sent enc e in exch ange f orhis gu ilt y p l ea , he w as n ot ad v i se d th at h e w oul d b e req ui re d to
serv e t hr ee ye ars of MSR i

n addi tion to his 30-y

ear sentence , and, t her efo re , he was not re ceiving t he bene fit o f his barg ain. The tria l courtdi sm

i ss ed Mor ri s’ pos tcon

vi cti on pet itio n, finding that it w as frivo lou s and pat ent ly witho ut merit . T he t rial co ur t fou nd that Morris’ cl

ai m was bel ie d by the record, which

dem onstrated that Mo rr is wa s s uffic ien t ly ad mo nish ed o f his M SR o blig at io ns. Mo rr is fi le d a m ot ion to reconsi der, whi ch was de nied, and then a

ppeal ed. The ap pe llat e c o ur t affir med in an unp ubl i shed order , finding tha t t he ad moni sh men ts gi v en to Mor ri s p riorto hi

s g ui l ty plea ad vi se d h i m of t he pena lty ra ng e fo r the of f en se, i nc l udi ng M SR, an

d theref ore su bst an t ially

co mplie d w it h R

ule 402 an d th

i s c our t’s pr ec eden

t. Morris , No. 1–06

–2036 (un pub l i shed order

und er Suprem

e Court Rule 23). Morr is n

ow appeals.

Je ss e H ol bor ow Hol bor ow entered a plea of

guil ty to home i

nvasi on with great bo dily ha rm t o t he vic t im, th ef

t, and c riminal tre spa ss t o a vehicle. The St ate ’s evi

dence sh owed that Ho lb oro w and two codef en da n ts unl aw fully e ntere d the

hom e of the v i cti m , 70-y ear-ol d Ber na rd-4- Harris, an d p r o ce ed ed t o be at him and s t ab him befor e t aking hi s beer and his va n wit hou t per mission. As a r es ult o f t his at t ac k, t he vic t im be ca me wheel

chai r bound and cogni

tivel y de fi ci ent and was

no longe r able t o ca re fo r h imself. At the comm

encem ent of the plea heari

ng, the trial

court stated: “M r. Hol borow, I ha ve a w r it t en ple a a gr ee men t be fo r e me indicat ingt hat you d on’ t want a ju ry t r ial. It in dicates you are go ingt o p lead g uilty t o s even c ou nt s ag ainst you. And you are go ingto recei

ve o n C ount 1, h

ome i nv asi on, a 1 6-y

earsentence . *** The re wo uld be a f i ndi ng of great b odi l

y ha rm to the vi ctim, mean

in g t ha t yo u would ha

ve to serve 85 per cent of y

our sentence. *** Six t ee n t imes 85 pe r ce nt is 13.6 years. So t hat

is wh at yo u a r e g o ing t o ha ve t o se rve

. Yo u w ill get cre di t f orwhatev er ti

me y ou ha ve be en i n j ail . Now, the

re wo uld be som e c ourt c osts

to p ay . $200 D

NA f ee. Th ere wo uld be resti

tut ion of $5,643.59. *** An

d you ha ve to make yo ur se lf available and pr ovid e t ru t hful te st imony in the ca se of each co- de f en da n t. *** Is tha

t wha t you wan

t to do, Mr. Ho lbor ow ?” Def endan t respon ded, “ Yes .” The trial court continue d: “Now, it i s i

m por tan t th at y ou u n ders tan d w i th re sp ect to Co unt 1, t he ho me invasion, t hat is a Class X felo ny. Andt he la wsays that if thi s wer e hand le d by ot her than a

ple a ag re em en t, yo u c o uld ge t an ywh er e fr o m six to 3 0 ye ar s in pr ison, pl us th ree y ears mandatory

supervised rel ease. You are not eligi ble for probation, pe riodi c i m prison men t, or
c onditional

di scha rge . If you w ere

f oun d gu i l ty , y ou w ou l d have to get a mi

ni mum of si x y ears, and y

ou c o uld ge

t as
muc h as 30. An d with great bodi

ly harm, you hav

e to serve 85 per cent of y

our t ime. So do you u nder st and w hat t he possibil ities there are, if

this were han dle d by ot her than a

ple a agr eement ?” Hol bor owconf i rmed that he

und erstood, a

nd t he tria

l court continue d: “No w, Co unt 2, agg ra vat ed ba t t er y of a se nior citize n; ** * Co unt 2 is a Cl

ass 2 fe lo ny. ** * T ha t is the on e wh ere y ou are-5- charged wit h kno wingly caus inggr ea t b odi l y h ar m to Bern ard Harris, in that he wa s a se nior citize n, an i ndi vi dual 60 y ears of age or ol der. *** A

nd y ou are e l i gi

bl e the re for an ex

tended t er m. Si n ce th at is a Cl as s 2 , a n ex ten de d term i s s ev en to fourteen yea r s. S o if t his we r e h an dl ed by o ther than a pl ea ag r ee me n t, the l aw prov i de s y ou c oul d ge t an y where f rom three to 14 years

i n pr i son, p l us two y

ears mandatory supervised

release. Other po ssibil

ities in cl ude prob ati on or condi tional dis ch ar ge no t t o ex ce ed fo ur yea r s, pe r io dic impriso nment of

18 to 3 0 m

onth s. A nd y oucould b e fi

ned up to $25,000. So those are the possib il ities there. Do you ha ve any que st ion abo ut t hat , Mr . H olbo ro w?” Defe ndan t had no questions. The

court then stated: “Now, *** C ount 3, 4, C ount 5, a re aggra va

ted b attery count s. Those

are Cl as s 3 f el on i es. You are eli

gible for an extended prison term of u p to ten y ears there . So i f

thi s we re han dle d by ot her than a

ple a a gre em

ent as to t hose three count s, you coul d get anywh er e fr o m t wo t o t en yea r s in pri son, p l us two y ears mandatory

supe rvised releas e.” Addressi ng the n ext count, t he court stat ed, “Co unt 6 i s a

the f t cou nt as a su bs eq uent of fen se. That is a Class 4 felony. And there , you could get prison of an y wh ere f rom one to three ye ars, plus

one y ear ma ndatory supervi

sed releas e.” The cou rt then des cr ibed t he po t ent ial penalt ies at t ache d t o t he
re mai n i n g m i sdem ea n or c oun t. Bef ore accept in

g H olbo ro w’s p lea, t he t rial co ur t re iter at ed t he ple a agr ee m en

t, but made no men

tion of MSR. The t rial

cour t also fai le d t o ment ion MS R in sent enci ng Hol borow, an

d the MSR term
was not incl

uded i n the wri tt en sen tenci ng o rde r. H ol bor ow di d n ot
se ek t o wit hd r aw his p lea an d d id n o t file a dir ec t ap pe al. Hol bor owdid f il e a postco nvic t io n p et it io n a lleg ing t ha t his
co nst it ut iona

l righ ts were substanti ally

violated when

he recei ved a
more onerous sentence than he b argain

ed for i n accepti ng the pl ea ag re em en t. Ho lbor ow co nt ende d t hat he wa s neve r a dvised t hat he
wo uld be r equire d t o s er ve a 3 -year t er m of MS R in add itio n t o t he 16-year se n ten ce h e a gr ee d to a s p ar

t o f his ple a bargai

n. The trial-6- courtsu mmar ily

dismissed H olbo ro w’s p et itio n, finding t ha t his c laim
wa s ref ute d b y th e rec ord . Th

e a pp el l ate court aff irm ed, fi ndi ng that t he t r ial c o ur t men t io ne d M SR t o Ho lb oro w f our dif feren t t im es dur ingt he ple a hea ring

. Holborow, 3 82 I ll. App. 3d a t 861 . T he appe l l ate cou rt a ck n owl ed ge d th at t he ad monishment s co uld have been cl earer, but neverthel

ess conc l uded that the adm oni sh men ts were sufficient to mak

e Hol boro w aw are of

th e M SR

re qui re men t. Holborow, 382 I ll . App. 3d at 865. Ho lb oro w now appeals.

AN AL YSIS The defendan

ts co ll ectivel y ass e rt t hat t he t r ial c o ur t s e rr ed in
su mmar ily

dism i ss i n g th ei r p ost con v i cti on p eti ti ons asf ri vol ousor pa t en t ly wit ho ut mer it at t he firs t st ag e o f po st co nvic t io n review because th e p eti

ti on s dem

on strate d th

at th ei r c on sti tuti on al ri gh ts
were su bst an t ially vio lat ed

. T he Po st

- Co nvic ti onHe ari n g A ct (A ct) ( 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq . (W es t 200 6)) prov

i de s a mec ha ni sm f or crim in al de fen da nt s t o ch alle ng e t he ir convi ctions or sentence s based
ona su bstantial

vi ola tion of thei r rights und er the f edera l or s tat e con sti tu tions. People v. Beaman , 229 Il l . 2d 56, 7 1 (200 8). A pos tcon vi cti on pro ceeding is a

coll ateral attackon a

pri or con vi cti on that is limit ed t o co nst it ut io na l m at ters tha t were n ot an d c oul d n ot have been prev i ousl y adj udicated. People v. Johnson , 206 Ill 2d 348, 356 (2 002). The Act provides

f or athree-stage proceeding i n al l c ases that do not i nv olv e the death pen al ty. People

v. Harr is , 224 Ill . 2d 115, 125 (2007 ). At the f

i rs t st ag e, t he t r ial c o ur t mus t ind ep en de nt ly determi ne, wi thi n 9 0 da y s of it s fi li ng, whether the peti

tion i s f riv olous
orpaten tly wi thout m eri t. People v. Gaultney , 174 Il l . 2 d 41 0, 418 (1996 ); 725 ILCS 5/122–2

. 1( a) (2 ) ( West 200 6) . A p et itio n can be dis mi ssed at the fi rst stage as f

riv olous o rpa t en t ly wit ho ut mer it “o nly if the pe ti ti on has no arguabl

e basi s ei ther in la w or in f act.” People v. Hodges , 234 Ill . 2d 1, 16 (2009). A peti tion lacks an ar gu ab le b as is in la wwh en it is g r o un de d in “a n ind isp ut ab ly meri tless l eg al the ory,” f or exam ple , a lega l theo ry which is co mplet ely cont ra dict ed by t he record. Hodges , 234 Ill . 2d at 16. A p et it io n la ck s a n a r gu ab le b as is in fac t wh en it is ba se d o n a “fa nc iful f ac tu al alle gation,” whi

ch in cl udes alle ga t io ns t ha t ar e “ fan t as t ic o rde lus io na l” or beli ed by the record. Hodges , 2 34 I ll. 2d a t 16- 17. Fur t her , a pet itio n alleging1 The appe al in defen dant Mo rris’ case was brou gh t by the Coo k Co unty State’s Attorne

y’s of fi ce and the appeal i

n d ef en dan t Ho lb oro w’ s cas e was br ought by t he Ill inois Att or ney Gener al . W e ref erto the se pa rt ies as “t he Sta te,” bu t note that t he Stat e raised different ar guments on appeal.
-7- nonf actual an d n o nsp ec ific a ss er t io ns th at m erel y am oun t to
co nclusio ns wil l

not surv i ve sum mary di sm i ssa l und er the Act. People
v. B urt , 205 Ill . 2d 28, 35-36 (2001). We rev ie w the fi rst-stag e d ism is sal of a po st co nvictio n pet itio n de novo

. People v. Williams , 209 Il l . 2d 227 , 234 (2 004). De f en da n ts conten d th at a

su b sta n ti al v i ol ati on of th ei r ri gh ts occurred b ec au se

th e tr i al cou rtsf ai l ed to ad moni sh th em, pr io r to
ac ce pt ing t he ir

ne gotiate d gu

i l ty pl ea s, th at terms of

MSR wo uld be ad ded t o t he ir s en t en ce s. De fen da nt s ma int ain t ha t t he ad dit io n o f MSRs t o t he ir

ba r ga ine d- fo rse nt en ce s d ep r ive s t he m o f t he be ne fit of t he ir ba r ga in a nd vio lat es t he ir

right to due pro cess. Def

endan ts ass ert t ha t t he y ar e e nt it led t o po st co nvic t io n r elie f an d r ely on this cour t’s de cis io nin People

v. Whitfield

, 217 Il l . 2d 177(2005 ), to support t he ir argumen t. The St ate fi

rst argues that b oth def

endan ts were ad eq ua t ely

advi sed of the MSR requi remen t before ple ad ing gu ilt y, and that the trial cou rts ’ a dm oni sh men ts s ub sta n ti al l y com pl i ed wi th Ru le 402 and the

req ui rem en ts of du e p roc es s. A l

ter n ati v el y , the S tate argues that thi

s court an noun ced a new rul e of cri m i na l procedu re in W hitfield, and the n

ew rule s hould n ot be appl

ie d retro act ive ly t o ca se s t ha t we r e f

ina l be fo r e t he pr o no un ce men t o f t he rul e. No t ab ly, there is no dis pute that t he conv

ictions b efore us we ref

i n al pri or to t his co ur t ’s de cision in Whitfield. A s a seco n d al ter n ati v e, th e S tate contends that defenda

nts’ petitions ar e unt im el y f il ed, and that de f en da n ts a reun ab l e to s h ow th at th e del ay i n f i l i n g w as n ot due to their cul pabl e negl ige nce. 1 The i ssue of wh

ether th e adm oni sh men ts gi v en to th e def

en da n ts in thi s ca se w eresuf

f i ci en t to co m pl y wi th Whitfield would not req ui re res ol ution if we were to co ncl

ude th at Whitfield

cr ea t ed a n ew rule that does not warrant r et roa ctive applic ation on colla

teral revi ew. Ac co r di ng ly, we c ons ider t he St at e’s r et ro act ivity arg ument first , a nd det er mine whether Whitfield

cr ea t ed a n ew rule of cri

m i na l procedu re war ra nt ing re t ro act ive app licatio n.-8- In Whitfield

, the defen

dant ple aded guil

ty to charges of fi

rst deg ree murder an

d armed robb ery pursua

nt to a negotiated p le a agr eement whi

ch pr ov ided t hat t he de fendant wo uld r ece ive
co ncur re nt sentence s totali ng 2 5 y ears in exch ange f or his gui lty ple a. Whitfield , 217 Ill. 2d at 179 . Alt hou gh a three-year term of MSR was st at ut o r ily req ui red to be serv ed i n a ddi ti on to t hi s sen

tence, M SR

was never dis cu ss ed by t he St at e d ur ing ple a n eg o t iations and t he defend ant was n ev er ad mo ni shed of hi s MSR obl

iga tion by the trial courtdur ing t he plea h

eari ng. Whitfield

, 2 17 I ll. 2d a t 180 . T he defend ant so ug ht po st co nvict io n r elief, asse rt ingthat his due proc ess right s we r e v io lat ed be ca us e t he MS R t er m ad de d t o his n eg o t iate d sent ence re sult ed in a mo re one ro us s ent ence t han t he one for whi ch he ha d b ar ga ine d b ef

o r e p lea di ng gu ilt y. The defendant ’s petition was dis mi ssed at t he second stage o f post con victio n re view, and t he app ellate co ur t affirmed t he di sm i ssa l order. Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 181-82. In rai si n g h i s c l ai m b ef oreth i s c our

t, t he de fendant ma

de cl ear that he wa s no t co nt es t ing t he va lidit y o f his ple a o n t he gr o un ds t ha t it
was not kno wingly and vo lunt ar ily made. Inst ead , t he de fendant asserted a “b enef

it of the b argai

n” cla im an d a r gu ed t ha t his constitutional

righ t t o due pro cess an

d fun dam ental fai rness was v i ol ate d be caus e the

sen tenc e he rec ei

ve d was di f f eren t, and more onero us, t han t he se nt ence he bar gained for wit h t he S t at e. We expl ai ned that t he def

endan t’s ar gum en

t w as root ed i

n the Un ited Stat es Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cis io n in Santobello v. New York , 404 U.S. 257, 262, 30

L. Ed. 2 d 427, 4 33, 92 S . Ct. 495, 499 (19 71), wh ere t he Su pr em e C our t h el d th at th e def en da n t’ s due process righ

t was violated when t he St at e pr omised t o r efra in from making a sent encing
rec om men da ti on at the defen

dant’s trial

as par t of t he plea agr eement and then f ail ed to hon

or that prom

i se. Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 185. Citing approv

i ngl y to Santobell

o , an d o ur de cis io n in People v. Evans , 174 Ill . 2d 320, 326-27 (19 96) (holdi ng tha t both the St at e and t he defend ant are bound to t he terms of a ple a a greeme

nt under Santobell o ), we declared that a d efendan t has a due pro cess

“ con tra ct” r i gh t to e nfor ce t he t er ms of a p lea ag re ement , a nd t he uni la teralmodi f i ca ti on of th e a gr eemen t to i nc l ude a term of MS R n ot pr ev io us ly

ba rga i ne d f oram oun ted to a b rea ch of t he plea agr eement-9- and vi ola ted pri nc i pl es of f und am en tal f ai rne ss. Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 189-91. We sta ted tha t our op i ni on in Whitfield wa s “

i n con f orm i ty wi th earli er deci sions of thi s court. ” Whitfield , 2 17 I ll. 2d a t 191 . We pointed to Rul e 402 (a)(2), which saf eguards defendants’ due pro cess right to be properly

and f ull y a dmoni shed, and t his c o ur t ’s ho ldin g in People v. Wills , 61 Ill . 2d 105, 109 (1 975 ), t hat a de fendant must be adm o nis hed t hat a pe rio d o f par ole ( now called M SR) is par t of t he sentence impose d t o e nsur e t hat t he plea is kno wing and volu nt a ry. W e a l so p oi

nte d to People v. McCoy , 74 Il l . 2d 398 , 402 (1 979), wh ereth is cou

rt h el d that the f

ai l ure to ad moni sh a def en da nt of pa r o le di d n ot am oun t to adue pro cess vi

olation, as the

defen dant was st ill sentence d

t o a t er m signifi

cant ly l ow er t han t hat which co uld have been impose d had he no t ent ered a gu i l ty p l ea a nd n egoti ated f

or a sentence r ec o mmen da t io n. Ad di t io na lly, we di scussed appe l l ate court
casesthat disti

ngui shed McCoy

and found that t he f

ail ure t o admonish
a defen dant of MSR am

ounted to adue pr oc ess vio latio n wher e t he def enda nt entered an open gui lty ple a, but where the term i mposed , plus MSR, exceede d the ma

xi mum sent ence t he de fendant was t old he
co uld recei

ve. People v. Fish , 316 Ill . App. 3d 795 (20 00) ; People v. B ro wn , 296 Ill. App. 3d 1 041 (19 98) ; People v. Coultas , 75 Ill . App. 3d 137 (19 79 ). W

e a l so n oted appe l l ate cou rt c as es th at h el d th at a due process vi

olation occurred

where the de f en da nt wasnot

advi sed of MSR after enteri

ng a n egotiated guil

ty plea for a speci

fi c sentenc e. People v. Smith , 28 5 I ll. App. 3d 6 66 ( 199 6); People v. Mo ore , 214 I ll

. App. 3d 9 38 ( 199 1); People v. Didley , 213 Ill . App. 3d 910 (1991 ); People

v. O’Toole , 174 Il

l . Ap p. 3 d 800 (19 88) ; People v. Kull , 171 Ill . A

pp. 3d 4 96 ( 198 8). In

rel i an ceon these cas es, and t he prin ci ple s of Rul

e 402, we hel

d: “[A]l thoughsubstantial

co mpli an ce wit h Rule 40 2 is sufficient to establ

is h dueprocess [citations], an d an i mpe rfect admo nishment is

not reversible

error un less real justice h as been de nied o r t he d efe n dant has be en pr ejudice d by t he i n adeq ua te adm onis hm ent [citation], there i s no subs tantial compl ia nce wit h Rule 4 02 a nd

due pro cess is violat ed w hen a defend ant pleadsgui

l ty i n e xc ha ng e f ora specifi

c sentenc e and t he trial cou rt f ai l s to ad vi se the de f en da nt, pri ort o a cce pt ing his ple a, that a manda

to ry s upe rvi sed re lease t er m will be-10- added to that sentence. In these circu msta nces , a ddit ion o f the MS R te rm to the agreed-upon sentence violates due pro cess because the sentence

im posed is m

ore o nerous than the on e defend ant agr eed t o a t t he t ime of t he ple a heari ng.” Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 195. Having det er mined t hat t he de f en da n t’s con sti tuti on al ri gh ts were violated, we f

ash i on ed an appropri ate

rem edy

. Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 202 . We not ed t hat in S antobel lo , the Supreme Court in structed th at, wh erea d efe nd an t do es no t r ec eiv e t he be ne fit of his bar gain, t he remedy is t o en su r e t ha t t he pr o mise be fulfille d o rt ha t de fen da nt is giv en the oppor tunity

to withdraw h

is ple a

. Whi tfield , 217 Ill . 2d at 202, citing Santobell

o , 404 U.S. at 262- 63, 30 L. Ed. 2d at 433, 92 S. Ct. at 499. W

e deter m i ne d tha t the rem edy re quested b y the de fen da nt –fu lfillme nt o f t he pr o mise t hr o ug h mo dific at io n o f his sentence –was a ppro priate, and af

ter consideri

ng cases from ot her jurisd ictio ns aff

ording this type of

reli ef, we det er min ed t hat t he defendant’s se nt en ce sho uld be mo difie d fr o m aterm of 2 5 y ears plus 3 years MSR to a term of 2 2 y ears pl us 3 y ears MSR. The m

atter was reman ded to the tri al cou rt f or m odif i ca ti on of the s en tenc e. Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 205. The Stat e now asks u s to co nsid er wh et he ro ur de cis io n in Whitfield co nst it ut ed a n ew rule an

d, i f so, whet her t he r ule sho uld be applie d retro ac ti ve ly t o ca se s o n c o llat er al r ev iew

. T o mak e t his det er minatio n, w e ap ply the a nalysis set for t h by t he Su pr eme Court in Teaguev. Lane , 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989 ), and a do pt ed by t his co ur t in People v. Fl owers , 13 8 Ill . 2d 218, 237 (1 990 ). In Teague , t he Su pr eme Co ur t held t hat ne w constitutional

rules of cri mi nal procedure are not applic abl e to cases
on coll ateralreview unl

ess the rule fal

ls wi thin one of two except ions: (1) the new rul

e pl aces certai

n ki nds of pr im ar y, pri vate i ndi vi dual conduct be yo n d th

e p owe r of th e cri m i n al -law -m ak i n g a uth ori ty to pro sc rib e; or (2) t he n

ew rule i s a “wa tershed rule ” of cri

mi nal procedure, i.e. , a

ru l e th at is “ ‘ “i

mpl ic it i n the concept of ordered libe r t y” ’ ” and “ wi

th out w h i ch th e l i ke l i h ood of an ac cu ra te
con vi cti on i s se ri ousl y di m i nished.” Teague , 489 U.S. at 311- 13, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356-58, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77, quot in g Mackey v. United States , 401 U.S. 667, 693, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 421, 91 S . Ct. 1160,-11- 1180 (1971), quo ting Palko v. Connecticut , 302 U.S. 319, 325, 82 L. Ed. 288, 2 92, 58 S . Ct. 149, 1 52 (19 37). The Teague Court acknowledged that it i s often di f f i cul t to det er mine wh en a n ew rule is a

nno un ce d, bu t inst ruc t ed t ha t , in ge ne r al, “aca se an no un ce s a ne w r ule wh en it br ea ksne w groun d or im poses a new obl

iga tion on the States or t h e F ederal Gov er n men t. [Ci tations.] To put it diff

erently , a case ann

ounces a ne

w rul e i f th e result wa s n

ot dictated

by p r ec ed en t ex ist ing at t he t ime th e defendant’s conv

i cti on b eca

me f i na l .” (Em phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Teague , 489 U.S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 349 , 10 9 S. Ct . at 107 0; Flowers , 138 Ill . 2d at 239-40. Sin ce Teague , t he Su pr eme Court has further
ex p la in ed t he “new ru le” co ncep t . I n Butler v. McKellar , 494 U.S. 407, 415, 10 8 L . Ed . 2d

34 7, 3 56 , 11 0 S . C t. 121 2, 121 7 ( 199 0) , t he Courti n str uc ted th at “ th e f act th at a cou rt s ay s th at i t s d ec isio n is wit hin the ‘logical

compass ’ of an

earli er de cis io n, o rind ee d t ha t it is ‘controll ed’ by a p r io rde cis io n, is no t co nc lus iv e f or pur pos esof dec idingwh ethe

r the c urren t decisi on i s a ‘ new rul

e’ u nde r Teague .” Furth er, in Saff

le v. Parks , 494 U.S. 484, 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415 , 42 4, 1 10 S. Ct. 1 25 7, 1 26 0 ( 19 90 ), th e S up re me C our

t sta ted th at a dec ision co nst itu t es a new r ule unles s “a st at e co ur t co nsider ing *** [the] cla im at t he t ime *** [t he] co nvictio n beca me final wou ld have felt co mpelled by exist ing pr ece dent t o co nc lud e t ha t t he rule *** was requi red b y the C onsti

tution .” Ap plying the se pri nc i plesto Whitfield

, we concl

ude that a ne w rule was created in

that cas e. Pri or to Whitfield , Il l i n oi s c our ts
r o ut ine ly h el d that a defen

dant’s ri ght to due process was protect ed
even in the face of a f

aulty MS R a dmo nishment, as lo ng as t he defendant’s ple a

wa s e nt er ed kn o win gly

and vol unta ri l y . As thi s court expl ai ned in Wills , “ [t]h

e c ons ti tutiona l req ui rem en t f or a v al i d pl ea of gui l ty is t ha t it be i

ntell ige nt and voluntary .” Wills , 61 I ll. 2d at 110. The Wills cou

rt went on to explai

n that this

requirem ent stemm

ed f rom the Uni ted St at es S upr eme Co ur t ’s de cision in Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U. S. 2 38, 2 3 L. Ed. 2d 274, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1 969 ), and added that one of the objec

tives of t he ne wly a men de d v er sio n o f Ru le 402 wa s to c omp ly with Boykin ’s re qui re men t. Al th oug h cou rts
co nsider ed t he de fendant ’s bar gain wit h t he St at e in det er mini ng t he pr opri ety of certain MSR admoni shm ents, particul

arl y i n c ase s wh

ere there was a f ull y n egotiated plea (Smith , 28 5 Ill. App. 3d 6 66; Moore ,-12- 214 Ill. App. 3d 9 38; Didley , 213 Ill . App. 3d 910 ; O’Toole , 17 4 I ll. App. 3d 8 00 ( 198 8); Kull , 171 Ill . App. 3d 496), the focus o f
re viewing co ur t s’ an alys is remai ned on the requi

remen ts of Rul e 402 and the v oluntary and kn owing n ature of the plea. Whitfield dis t ing uis he d it s r at io na le fr o m Boykin and it s pr og eny by rel y i ng s quare ly o nt he Su pr eme Co ur t ’s de cision in Santobell o , a nd thus m arked the fi

rst t im e this court hel

d that a faul

ty MS R admo nishment de

pri v ed a def en da n t of h i s r i gh t to due p ro ces s by denying h i m th e b en ef i t of h i s b argai n wi th t he St at e. The fact that our opi ni on in Whitfield

was “i n co nfo r mit y” with o t her op inions o f the
cou rt ( Whitfield

, 217 Ill . 2d at 191) does not m ea n th at ou r de ci si on was “di ctated” ( Teague , 489 U.S. at 301, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 349, 109 S. Ct. at 1 07 0) or “ com

pe l l ed” b y th i s c our t’s pr ec eden t ( Saffle , 494 U.S. at 488, 108 L. Ed. 2d at 424, 110 S. Ct. at 126 0; see al so Flowers , 13 8 I ll. 2d at 24 0). Addi tional ly , there can be n

o dispute that t he re medy we fas hioned in Whitfield was nove l and no t base d o n t he pr ece dent of

t h i s c our

t. Acc ordi

n gl y , w e h ol d th at Whitfield
ann ounced a new rul

e. Having reached this co nc lusion, we no w de t er mine whet her t he
new rule s hould b e applie d retro activel y to cases on colla

teral revi ew. Ret ro act iveap plic at io n w o uld o nly be ap pr o pr iat e if t he ne w r ule falls wit hin one of the Teague ex ce pt io ns. I t is c lea rt ha t t he rule
ann ounced in Whitfield

do es no t leg ali ze prim

ary, pri vate i ndi vi dual conduct and does n ot re i

n ter pr et a st at ut e. The re for e, we find t hat t he fi rst Teagueex

ce pti on i s i n appl i ca b l e. W e a l so f i n d th at Whitfield

did not pr ese nt a “ wat er shed ru le” o f criminal pro ced ur e implicit in the conceptof

ord ered l i b er ty and cent ra l to t he ac cur acy o f a co nvictio n. Teague , 489 U.S. at 311- 13, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356- 58, 109 S. Ct. at 1076-77; Flowers , 138 Ill . 2d at 241-42. We ca ut ioned in Flowers that thi s exc ep ti on

mus t be “n arrowly construed” ( Flowers , 138 Ill . 2d at 242), an d w e n ow n ote that, since Teague , t he Un it ed St at es Su pr eme Courtha s r eje ct ed ev er y cl ai m b rought before i

t allegi ng that a new
rule satisfi

es the requirements for water shed statu s ( Whorton v. Bockting , 549 U.S. 406, 418, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1, 12, 127 S. Ct. 1173, 1181-82 (2007)). The only rule i dentif ie d by the Supreme C ourt as an ex amp le of a wathersh

ed rule was pronounced 16 ye ars bef

ore Teague in Gideon v. Wainw

right , 372 U. S. 335, 344 -45, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 805, 83 S. Ct. 792, 796-97 (1963). There, t he Court held that counsel-13- must be ap po inted for any indigent defend an t char ged wit h a felony because the

de ni al of such representation presen

ts an i ntolerabl y h igh risk o f an un r elia ble ver dict . T he r ule in Gideon hasbeen descri bed as
a “pr ofo und a nd ‘ “sw eep ing” ’ cha nge” whi ch al tered our unde rst anding of the “b edrock pro cedural elem ents” esse nt ial to t he fair nes s o f a

cri m i na l procee di ng. Whorton , 549 U.S. at 420- 21, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 14, 127 S. Ct. at 1183-84. Teagueexplains t hat t he sco pe o f the sec ond exce pt ion sho uld be li mi ted: “to those new procedures without which t he li kelih ood o f an accurate conviction i s seriously dim in is hed. Because we

opera te f rom th e pr em

is e that such proc ed ure s w oul d b e s o centr

al to an ac cu rate de term i na ti on of in noce nc e or

guil t, we beli eve i t unli kel y tha t many such
com pon en ts of bas ic due process hav

e y et to em erge. We are a lso of t he view t hat suc h ru les ar e ‘bes t ill ust ra t ed by
re calling the cl assi

c grounds for the i ssua

nce of a w ri t of hab eas co rp us– t hat t he proc ee di ng wa s dom

i na ted by mob violen ce; that the prosecuto r knowin gly ma de use of perj ured t es t imo ny; or t hat the convi ction was b ased

o n a con f es si on extort ed fro m the d efenda nt by

brutal methods .’ [C i

tation .]” Teague , 489 U.S. at 313- 14, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077. Gideon represented thi s type of rule. Ho we ve r , t he rule ann ounced in Gideon , unlike

the rule b efore us, di

rectly aff ectedth e i

n teg ri ty of
a c r iminal c o nvic t io n a nd alt er ed t he man ne rby w hic h c r iminal t r ials
arecond ucted. Teaguema

kes clear that the focus of the in quiry when
co nsider ingwhether th

e s ec ond exce ption a ppl i esi s th e accura cy of t he con vi cti on a nd f i nd i ng of gui l t. The d ueproc ess vi

olation that
occurs when a defe ndan t do es not agree t o a term of MSR b ut t hen recei vesone has n

ot hi ng to do wi

th ac cura cy

of the convi

ction, but invol vesa ma t t er o f se nt en cin g. We emp ha siz ed t his d ist inc t io n in People v. D e La Paz , 204 Ill . 2d 426, 438 (2003), when we considered

wh ethe r t he r ule anno unce d in Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. E d. 2d 4 35, 120 S. Ct . 2 348 (2 000 ), met t he
sec ond exc ep t io n o f Teague . We c on cl uded th at a ru le t ha t o nly af f ects the enh

ancem ent of a def

endan t’s sentence

doe s n ot am oun t to
an error which

seri ously af f ec ts t he fair ne ss , int eg r it y o rpu blic-14- rep uta ti on of judi cial pro ceedings s o as t o fa ll within the sec ond Teagueexce

pti on r eq ui ri ng retr oac ti vi ty i n a l l ca se s. W e s eeno r ea son to devi ate from this rational

e here. Whil e t he r ule anno unce d in Whitfield is based on the b edrock constitutional

righ t t o due pr oc ess, t he Supreme C ourt in structs t hat t his is not eno ugh t o mee t t he second Teagueexception. The Teague
re qui re men t:

“ ca nn ot be met simp ly

b y sh owi n g th at a ne w p r o ce du r al r ule is based on a ‘bedrock’ right . We have fr equ ent ly held that t he Teaguebar

to retro activ

ity applie s to new rules that

are based
on ‘b ed r o ck ’ c o ns t it ut io na l r ig ht s. [ Cit at io n. ] S imila r ly, ‘[t]hat
a new procedural

rule is “f undamen tal” in some abstract sense is no t en o ug h. ’ [ Cit at io n. ] I nst ea d, in o r de rt o mee t t his
re qui re men t, a n ew rule mus t it se lf

co nst it ut e a pr ev io us ly
un re cog n ize d b ed roc k p roc ed

ur al el em en t th at is e ss en

ti al to t he fai rness of a proceedin

g. I n app lying t his requirem ent, we ag ain h av e l ooke d to t he exa mple o f Gideon , an d ‘ weha ve not hesi tated t o ho ld t hat less sw eep ing and fun damental rules’ do not qu alif y. [Ci tation .]” (Em

phasi s i n ori gi na l .) Whorton , 549 U.S. at 420- 21, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 14, 127 S. Ct. at 1183. The ru le anno unce d in Whitfield ca nnot be character ized as a pr of oun d a n d swe ep i n g ch an ge to rules of cri mi nal procedure whic

h is essen tial to the fun

dame ntalfai

rness of crim

in al proceedings. Ac co r di ng ly, we con

cl ude that under Teagueand its p ro geny, t he rule
ann ounced in Whitfield

does not represent a wat e rs he d ru l e of crim in al procedure t hat

r eq ui res retroac ti ve appl i ca ti on to c as eson coll ateral revi ew. T his co nc lusio n d o es no t en d o ur an alys is, ho we ve r , be ca us e in addi ti on to prov

i di ng i ns tructi on on

the appl i ca ti on of ne w ru l eson coll ateralre view, t he Teagueopi ni on a l so p rovi de s i

ns tructi on on t he
anno unc ement of ne w r ules o n co llater al review . I n Teague , t he Supreme C ourt stated:

“W erewe t o r ec o gn ize t he ne w r ule ur ge d b y pe t it io ne rin t his case, we would h

ave to give petitione

r the bene fi

t o f that
new rule ev en t ho ug h it wo uld n ot b e a pp l i ed re troacti v el y to otherssimila r ly sit ua ted. In the wor ds of JUSTICE BRENNAN, such an

in eq ui table resul t would be ‘an-15- un av o ida ble consequenc e of the ne cessi ty that constitutional adj udic ations n

ot stand as m

ere dictum.” [Ci

tation.] *** If there were no other way

to avoid re nd eri

ng a dvi sory o pin ions, we m

igh t well agree that the in

equi table trea tmen t descri bed abo ve is ‘a n insig nifica nt co st fo r a dhe re n ce to
so und pri nc i pl es of deci sion-m aki ng.’ [Ci tation .] But the

re is
a mo r e p r inc iple d w ay of deal in g with the probl

em . We can simp ly refuse to ann

ounce a new ru le in a given ca se u nless t he
rule wo uld be a pplied r et ro act ively to t he defendan t in the case and to all otherssimila r ly sit ua t ed

. ** * W e t he r efo r e h o ld th at, implic it in the r et ro act ivity app ro ach w e ad op t t od ay, is t he pr inc iple t hat habe as c orp usca n n ot b e u se d a s a

v eh i cl e to
crea te new consti

tut iona l rul es of cri mi nal pr o cedure unless those ru les wo uld be appl

i ed retroac ti ve l y to al l de f en da nts on co llater al review t hro ugh o ne o f the t wo exce pt ions w e have arti cul ated.” ( E mph as is omi

tted.) Teague , 489 U.S. at 315-16, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 359- 60, 109 S. Ct. at 1078. In cases f oll owing Teague , the C ourt has stated that “[u

]nder Teague , new rules wil l n ot be appl

ie d or anno unc ed in

cases on col

la teral reviewunl ess they

f al l i nto one of two ex cepti ons.” (Em phasi s ad ded.) Penry v. Lynaugh , 492 U.S. 302, 313, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 274, 109 S. Ct . 29 34, 294 4 (1 989 ); Butler , 494 U.S. at 4 12, 1 08 L. Ed. 2d at 355, 110 S. Ct. at 1216. Th e p ortion

of the Teague op inion discu ssing t he anno unce ment of new rules on coll ateralr ev iew ha s no t be en ap plie d o rdis cu ss ed in t he ca se l aw of th i s state . O ur

cou rtshave no t had t he opp ortu n i ty to address t his po rt ion o f the Teagueop inion, a s o t her t han Whitfield our research has rev eal ed no other case t h at s et f orth a n ew rul e of crim in al procedure in a c ollateral proceedi ng. A rev

ie w of th e Whitfield opini on and the b

rief s f il ed in that cas e de monst ra t es t hat t he
new rule an nounced wa s a nn oun ce d w i thou t the be ne f i t of br i ef i ng or ar gument on the is sue of retroactive ver sus pr os pec t ive app licatio n. T his cou rt wa s n ot as ke d to con sider the is sue of retroactive versus pr osp ecti v e a pp l i ca ti on an d di d n ot co n tem pl ate i t. We ack now ledge t hat , w her e a c ase is “b ef ore us on coll

ateral review, we must deter mi

ne, as a t hr es ho ld matt er ,” whet her gr ant ing the reli ef s ought wil

l c reate a new rul

e. Penry , 492 U.S. at 313, 106 L. Ed. 2d at 274 , 10 9 S. Ct . at 294 4; Wills , 61 Ill . 2d at 111 (no t ing2 The qu e stion of w he ther Whitfield

repr esented a ne

w rule has been r ai sed in the a ppe ll ate cou rt . S ee People v. Molina , 379 Ill. App. 3d 91 ( 2008); People v. Mu niz , 386 Ill . App. 3d 890 (2008) ; People

v. Johnson , 392 Ill. App. 3d 897 (2009).
-16- that t he co ur t mu st co ns ide rwh et he ra n ew rule sho uld ap ply
r et r o ac t ive ly

or pro sp ec ti

ve l y , an d de term i ni ng tha t the ad moni ti on re quir ement ann

oun cedwould appl

y prospecti

vel y to guil ty pleas tak en su b se qu en t to the date

the opi ni on wa s f i l ed). 2 How ever, now that the is sue o f r et r o ac t ivit y is s qu ar ely bef ore us, we recognize that
a bet t er co ur se in Whitf iel d wo uld have been t o fo rg o t he
anno unce ment of a new rule, as the ru le ann ou nced canno t be
ev en ha nd ed ly

appl i ed to de f en da n t W h i tf i el d a n d to all o t he r s s imilar ly si tuated. Teague , 489 U.S. at 316, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 109 S. Ct. at 10 78 . H owev er , the f

act r em ains that a new rul e was an nounced that should n

ot be appl ie d retro activel

y to cases on colla

teral revi ew b ecause it do es no t mee t o ne o f t he t wo ex ce pt io ns a r t ic ula ted i n Teague

. A cc ordi

n gl y , w e h ol d th at t h e n ew rule an no un ce d in Whitfield sho uld o nly be applied p ro spe ct ive ly to ca ses w her e t he
con vi cti on wa s n ot f i na l ize d pr i or to Dece m

b er 20 , 20 05 , the date Whitfield wasan

noun ced. D ef endan ts Morri s an

d Hol borow ar e there f ore not ent it led t o pr o sp ec t ive a pp licat io n o f Whitfield because both of thei

r convictions were f

in al prior to t he Whitfield

dec ision. We are awa

re that ou r d ecisio n in Whitfield ha s c r ea t ed so me con f us i on in the lower courts and thi s conf usi on has n

ot been li mi ted to cl ai ms for postco nvi

ction rel ie f. Indee d, qu est ions r emain in the mi nds of trial court judge s as to what i nf ormation m

ust be convey

ed to ensu re t hat t he ad monishment s given d ur inga pl ea he ar ing co mply wi th th e req ui re m en ts o f Ru l e 4 02 an d d ue proce ss post- Whitf

i eld

. We t ak e t his o pp o r t un it y t o cla r ify. Ult imat ely, adm

onis hm ents are gi ven to ensure that

“the pl ea was entered int ell i gently

and with f

ull knowledge of its consequences” ( Wh it fi el d , 217 Ill . 2d at 184, citing Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243, 23 L. Ed. 2 d 274, 2 79-80 , 89 S. Ct. 1709 , 1712 ( 1969) ), butt hey must also advise t he de fendant of t he ac t ual t er ms of t he ba r ga in he has m ade wi th the Stat e. An adm

onition that uses the term “MSR”wit ho ut pu t t ing it i n s om e rel ev an t con tex t ca n n ot s er v e to advi se the defe

ndan t o f the cons equences

of hi s g ui l ty plea an d c an not-17- aid t he de fendant in making an i nf ormed deci si on about his case . We recogniz e t ha t t he r e is no pr ec ise fo rmula in admonishing a defend ant of hi s MSR obl

iga tion, and we are

m i nd f ul tha t “ [a] n a dm oni ti on of t he cou rt m us t b e read i

n a p ra cti c al and r ealist ic sense . T he ad mo nit io n is s uffic ien t if

an ordi na ry pers on i n th e c i rcu m sta nc esof t he accuse d woul

d un derstand i t to conve

y the re quired warn

i ng.” People v. Williams , 97 Il

l . 2d 252 , 269 (1 983). The t rial court ’s MSR ad moni sh men ts ne ed not be pe r fec t , bu t t he y mus t su bst an t ially
co mply with the requi

remen ts of Rul e 402 and the pre ce de nt o f t his
cou rt. Whitfield

, 217 Il l . 2d at 19 5. Whitfield

requires that de f en da n ts be advise d t hat a t er m of MS R will bead de d to t he actual sentence agreed upon i

n exchan ge for a guilty

ple a to t he off

ense ch arged. I de ally, a t rial co ur t ’s ad monishment wo uld exp licitly l ink MSR to t he sentence

to whi ch def endan t agreed in

exch ange f or his gui lty ple a, would be giv en at t he t ime the

tri al cou rt revi ew ed the prov i si ons of t he pl ea ag re em en t, and would be rei

terat ed bo t h a t se nt en cin g a nd in t he wr itt en j udgme

nt. See People

v. Daniels , 388 Ill . App. 3d 952, 956 (2009) (“the tr ial

cour t should specif

ical ly advi se a defe

ndan t t hat
a t er m o f MSR is par t of t he se nt ence t o w hich the defend ant agree d”); Berrios , 387 Ill . App. 3d at 1064 (“[w]e recogni ze that trial
cou rtsshould in

corpo rate t he man

dato ry supervi sed release admo nitio ns into t he pr ono unce ment o f the spe cific sent ence and t he written judg m ent ”); People v

. Mendez , 387 Ill . App. 3d 311, 321 (2008) (“[I]t wo uld n

ot pla ce a si gnifi cant burden on

trial cou rtsto
co mply wi th Ru l e 402und

er Whitfield

by expl ic itly admo nishing de f en da n ts that t he statuto ril

y requi r ed terms of M SR wi ll

be added to the i r ag ree d-u pon sentence s. Ne i

th er i s i t a s i gn i f i ca n t b urden to in cl ude MS R on

wri tte n j ud gme nt s. T he se simp le, ba sic ally c ler ica l, procedures easi

ly would av oi d t he pr oblem o f insuffi cient adm oni sh men ts”); Peo ple v . Ma rsh all , 381 Ill . App. 3d 724, 736 ( 2008) (“ The b ette

r p ra cti ce wou l d i n cor porate th e m an da to r y supervise d r ele as e a dmo nit io n w he n t he sp ec ific s en t en cin g is
ann ounced. The wri

tt en sent encing jud gment also sho uld includ e t he term of mandat or y super vised releas e”) ; People v. Jarr ett , 37 2 I ll. App. 3d 344, 352 (2007) (“t he t rial co ur t ’s ad monishment co uld have been im proved by expl ic itl y s tating thatMS R w asi

n a ddi ti on t o a ny sentence he rece ived ”) . We stron

gl y en cou rage trial cou rt j udge s to f ol l owthis practice, an d t o dis cu ss MS R w he n r ev iew ing t he t er ms of-18- a def endan t’s pl ea agreem

en t, to incl ude the MSR

term when im posin g sentence , and to add t he MS R term to the wri tten orde r of
con vi cti on and sen

tence. Thi s pract i ce, wh ich is no t un du ly bu rde ns ome, wo uld ens ur e t hat defend ant s und er st and t he consequenc es of thei

r plea a gre em ent and would avoi d prolonged li tigation on the i

ssue.

CONCLUSION For t he r eas ons st at ed he re in, we affirm the jud gment s o f the appe l l ate cou rt.
Judgments affirmed.