J-S48034-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MATTHEW WHITE

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 595 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001856-2017, 

CP-51-CR-0001857-2017

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2020

Matthew White (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury 

convictions, at trial docket CP-51-CR-0001856-2017 (Case 1856), of

aggravated assault, robbery,1 and related offenses. He avers the trial court 

erred in: (1) consolidating two dockets for trial; (2) admitting Facebook photos 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a), 3701(a)(1)(iv). As we discuss infra, Appellant was 

also convicted of second-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(b), and related 

offenses at trial docket CP-51-CR-0001857-2017 (Case 1857). He took an 

appeal in that case, which was docketed in this Court at 594 EDA 2019. 

However, that appeal was dismissed on June 19, 2019, for failure to file a 

brief.
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and telephone records, on the grounds they were not authenticated; and (3) 

failing to dismiss the charges due to a Brady2 violation. We affirm.

Appellant was charged at Case 1856 and Case 1857 for separate 

offenses committed on consecutive nights. Over Appellant’s objection, the 

trial court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the two cases 

for trial.

3

 The trial court has noted this case has a “complex procedural 

history[, including] one change of trial counsel, three changes in prosecutors, 

and five trial date continuances, borne primarily by the Commonwealth’s 

inability to provide discovery in a timely manner.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. 

During or shortly after jury selection, on August 1, 2018, the Commonwealth 

provided additional discovery — a photo array (discussed infra). On August 

3rd, the trial court conducted a hearing, found the evidence was Brady 

material, and continued trial so that Appellant “could review the material in 

question and be afforded a fair trial.” Id. at 15-16. The presentation of 

evidence commenced almost six months later, around January 28, 2019.

The trial court aptly summarized the evidence for Case 1856:

On January 7, 2017, [Appellant] contacted transgender sex 

worker Ramiro Alejandro “Aly” Damian-Lopez via an 

____________________________________________

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3 The trial court’s opinion states it granted consolidation on March 9, 2018, 

the day after the Commonwealth filed a motion for same and Appellant filed 

a response. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/12/19, at 1; Trial Docket, at 15

(unpaginated). However, we note, there is no corresponding entry on the trial 

docket.
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advertisement placed on backpage.com. After exchanging a 

series of text messages, [Appellant] arranged to meet at DamianLopez’s home at 1309 North 52nd Street in West Philadelphia, as 

he had done more than five times in the past. Upon arriving . . . , 

[Appellant] sought to speak with Damian-Lopez instead of 

purchasing her services, and upon discovering that [Appellant] did 

not have money, Damian-Lopez asked him to leave. [N.T.,

1/29/19, at 216-22.]

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on January 8, 2017, DamianLopez and transgender housemates Miayanna Brooks and Saleem 

Singleton, who also performed sex work, were watching a movie 

in Damian-Lopez’s bedroom. . . . Singleton went to the kitchen

and [saw Appellant outside the window,] trying to get Singleton’s 

attention . . . . [N.T., 1/29/19, at 11-12, 83-90, 222-23.]

After [Appellant] mentioned Damian-Lopez’s name, Singleton 

opened the front door and asked him whether Damian-Lopez knew 

he was there. Without answering, [Appellant] pushed Singleton 

into the kitchen, pressed a 9mm pistol against Singleton’s ribs, 

and warned, “Don’t fucking scream.” [Appellant] forced Singleton 

into Singleton’s bedroom and demanded money. There, he stole 

$70 from the dresser and a cell phone from Singleton’s purse. 

Then, [Appellant] pointed his gun to the back of Singleton’s head 

and forced Singleton to escort him to Damian-Lopez’s bedroom. 

[N.T., 1/29/19, at 91-101.]

At [Appellant’s] behest, Singleton knocked on DamianLopez’s door and asked her to slide approximately $40 under the 

door. As Damian-Lopez attempted to retrieve the money, 

[Appellant] forced open the door and pushed Singleton into the 

room. Holding Brooks, Singleton, and Damian-Lopez at gunpoint, 

[Appellant] demanded money, cell phones, and marijuana. As 

Damian-Lopez, who recognized [Appellant] as a previous 

customer, searched for money, [Appellant] forced Brooks and 

Singleton to sit on the ground and stole two cell phones from the 

bed and approximately $300-$400 from Damian-Lopez. Using his 

gun to direct them, [Appellant] forced Brooks, Singleton, and 

Damian-Lopez to crawl back into the kitchen, where he told them 

that they were “too pretty to kill” and exited through the front 

door. [N.T. 1/29/19, at 16-20, 100-13, 222-32.]

Brooks chased after [Appellant] to the parking lot outside the 

JSSK Laundromat across the road at 1300 North 52nd Street, 
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where Brooks yelled, “You fucking pussy.” Upon hearing this, 

[Appellant] turned around and fired at Brooks, but missed. This 

encounter was captured by the laundromat’s security cameras. 

[N.T., 1/29/19, at 19 -20; Commonwealth Exh. C-9.]

[Brooks contacted police, who responded to the scene. The 

complainants described Appellant] as a black male, approximately 

twenty-six years old, wearing all black clothing, brandishing a 

silver and black semiautomatic pistol, and having a teardrop 

tattoo on his face. . . . The next day Detective Michael Kimmel 

recovered video surveillance footage from the JSSK Laundromat 

and one fired cartridge casing . . . from the crime scene. The 

surveillance footage showed [Appellant] shoot at Brooks before 

running in the direction of the camera, passing close enough to 

permit witnesses to provide a positive identification from the 

video. [N.T., 1/29/19, at 307-21; N.T., 1/30/19, at 197-221,

258-73.]

Trial Ct. Op., at 3-5. 

The trial court also summarized the trial evidence for Case 1857:

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on January 9, 2017, [Appellant] 

arranged to purchase the services of transgender sex worker 

Vivian Royster via an advertisement on [b]ackpage.com[. He 

arranged to meet her] at 5406 West Girard Avenue, which Royster 

shared with [her paramour, Barry Jones (the decedent), and her 

aunt, Betty Jones (unrelated).] When [Appellant] arrived, Royster

. . . recognized [him] as a previous client[. N.T., 1/30/19, at 5-

7, 13, 36-37].

In the bedroom, Royster asked for payment[. Appellant]

drew a silver and black semi-automatic pistol, pointed it at 

Royster, and said “You know what this is.” Upon Royster 

screaming and informing him that there was no money[,

Appellant] ransack[ed] the room, taking $30 and a cell phone 

from a dresser. [N.T., 1/30/19, at 15-22.]

During the commotion, the decedent burst into the room and 

began struggling on the bed with [Appellant] for the gun. During 

the fight, [Appellant] pushed the decedent off the bed, aimed his 

weapon and shot the decedent in the face twice. [Appellant] also 

aimed his weapon at Royster and fired one shot and missed. 

[Appellant] immediately ran down the steps, followed by Royster, 
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where he turned around, fired once, and grazed Royster in the 

shoulder before absconding. Betty Jones called 911[. N.T. 

1/31/19, at 23-34.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6. The decedent was pronounced dead that night. Id. at 6. 

Royster was friends with Damian-Lopez and Singleton, the victims in the prior 

night’s robbery. N.T. Trial, 1/29/19, at 250; N.T. Trial, 1/30/19, at 45.

The trial court summarized the police investigation of the two incidents:

After midnight on January 10, 2017, Royster [reviewed the 

laundromat surveillance video and] identified the [person] on 

[the] video as the same individual who killed the decedent. 

Royster was unaware of [the prior night’s] incident at the time she 

made the identification. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Royster 

travelled to Singleton[ ] and Damian-Lopez’s apartment and 

informed them about the shooting. [N.T., 1/29/19, at 132-37, 

241-53; N.T., 1/30/19, at 40-47; Commonwealth Exh. C-39.]

* * *

[Around January 13 or 14, 2017,] Singleton received a 

“Suggested Friends” Facebook notification[,] which directed [her]

to [Appellant’s] profile page[,

4 which] contained multiple “selfie”

images of him. Having recognized [Appellant’s] “selfie” images as 

depicting the perpetrator of the January 8, 2017 robbery, 

Singleton took multiple “screenshot” photos of [Appellant’s] 

Facebook profile through the smartphone’s camera and provided 

them to Detective [William] Kelhower. On January 14, 2017, 

detectives provided Brooks, Singleton, . . . Damian-Lopez[, and

Royster] with photo arrays containing [Appellant’s] image, and 

each witness identified [Appellant] as their assailant. [N.T.,

1/29/19, at 20-34, 132-46; Commonwealth Exhs. C-10, C-16, C18, C-89, C-90, C-91.]

____________________________________________

4 Here, the trial court opinion states the Facebook profile “was listed under 

[Appellant’s] name.” Trial Ct. Op. at 7. However, as we discuss infra, the 

Commonwealth’s exhibits show a profile name of “Hamzah Allah’s Lion.” 

Commonwealth Exh. 11.
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Philadelphia Police officers arrested [Appellant] the next day. 

[I]nvestigators searched [Appellant’s] cell phone, numbered 

(215) 416-5660, and discovered [he] employed an application 

called “Sideline,” which allowed him to spoof a different number[, 

(610)589-0673,] for caller identification purposes[. Investigators 

also] discovered that [Appellant’s] phone, via Sideline, employed 

the (610)589-0673 number to call Damian-Lopez’s and Royster’s 

phones before both the robbery and the murder. Investigation of 

[Appellant’s] internet search history revealed approximately 44 

individual searches for pornographic videos depicting transgender 

participants between December 24 and December 25, 2016. 

[Appellant] further accessed advertisements for transgender sex 

workers via backpage.com . . . on December 29, 2016 and at 1:15 

a.m. on January 14, 2017. Approximately one hour after the 

January 14, 2017 search, [Appellant] accessed two news articles 

covering the January 9, 2017 homicide. [Appellant] also searched 

for 9mm magazines use[d] to hold the same type of ammunition 

used in each incident. [N.T., 1/31/19, at 297-331.]

Detective James Dunlap, an expert in cell tower analysis, 

reviewed the phone records for [Appellant’s] (215) 416-5660 

phone number and discovered that at 9:46 and 9:56 p.m. on 

January 9, 2017, that phone was used to make two outgoing calls 

from the cell tower nearest to 5406 West Girard Avenue. [N.T. 

2/4/19 at 126-30.]

. . . Ballistics testing revealed that the recovered [fired cartridge 

casings] from both 1309 North 52nd Street and 5406 West Girard 

Avenue were all fired from the same weapon . . . . Police officers 

recovered the murder weapon on September 11, 2017. . . . [N.T., 

1/31/19, at 67-70, 89-90, 101-20.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 6-8.

The jury returned a verdict on February 7, 2019. At Case 1856, the jury 

found Appellant guilty of three counts of robbery5 and one count each of 

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5 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(iv).
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possessing instruments of crime (PIC), aggravated assault, burglary, and 

firearms not to be carried without a license6 (VUFA 6106). At Case 1857, the 

jury found Appellant guilty of second-degree murder, attempted murder, PIC, 

aggravated assault, VUFA 6106, and two counts of robbery. Immediately 

following the verdict, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole.

Appellant’s counsel filed a timely post-sentence motion, along with a 

motion to withdraw as counsel. On February 13, 2019, the trial court denied 

the post-sentence motion but permitted counsel to withdraw, and directed 

that appeal counsel be appointed. The following day, before counsel was 

appointed, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal at Case 1856. That appeal 

is docketed in this Court at the present case, 595 EDA 2019. New counsel 

was appointed on February 19th, and yet another substitute attorney was 

subsequently appointed.

At this juncture we note Appellant also filed a notice of appeal at Case 

1857.7 Trial Ct. Op. at 2 n.4. That appeal was docketed in this Court at 594 

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6 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 907(a), 2702(a), 3502(a)(1), 6106(a)(1). “At trial, the 

Commonwealth presented a Certificate of Non-Licensure showing that 

[Appellant] was not licensed to carry a firearm.” Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Appellant 

was also charged with the attempted murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 901, of Brooks, 

and was found not guilty.

7 While the record for Case 1857 is not presently before us, the trial court 

states: “This Court’s Office of Judicial [R]ecords confirmed that [Appellant’s] 
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EDA 2019, but was dismissed on June 19, 2019, for failure to file a brief. 

Commonwealth v. White, 594 EDA 2019, Order, June 19, 2019. Appellant 

did not seek relief from that dismissal. Thus, only the appeal from Case 1856 

is presently before us. Although, as we discuss infra, the evidentiary rulings 

and Appellant’s appellate issues pertain to both trial dockets, this panel only 

has jurisdiction to grant relief, if any, at Case 1856.

Appellant raises the following four issues for our review:

I. Did the lower court err in granting the Commonwealth’s Motion 

for Consolidation where evidence of the murder in question would 

not have been admissible in a separate trial for the robbery of 

Miayanna Brooks, Saleem Singleton, and Aly Damien and was not 

capable of separation by the jury? 

II. Did the lower court err in admitting alleged Facebook photos 

of [Appellant] that had not been properly authenticated?

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pro se Notice of Appeal was filed separately for each docket.” Trial Ct. Op. at 

2 n.4.

We further note that at the instant docket, for Case 1856, this Court 

issued a per curiam order on January 29, 2020, directing Appellant to show 

cause why this appeal should not be quashed pursuant to Commonwealth 

v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). See id. 185 A.3d at 977 (appellant 

must file separate notices of appeal “when a single order resolves issues 

arising on more than one lower court docket,” and failure to do so will result 

in quashal of appeal). Appellant filed a response, and this Court vacated the 

show cause order, but advised the issue would be referred to the merits panel. 

Order, 4/2/20.

Upon review, we observe Appellant’s February 14, 2019, pro se notice 

of appeal lists the docket numbers for both Case 1856 and 1857. We conclude 

this filing satisfies Walker, for purposes of the Case 1856/595 EDA 2019 

appeal. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 

2020) (en banc) (a notice of appeal, for one trial docket, does not violate 

Walker if it also lists other trial dockets numbers).
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III. Did the lower court err in admitting phone records where the 

Commonwealth failed to authenticate the records via a qualified 

records custodian?

IV. Did the lower court err in failing to dismiss the charges against 

[Appellant] in light of the Commonwealth’s failure to timely 

disclose Brady material?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

In his first issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting the 

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the two cases for trial. He first 

recounts that the investigation in Case 1856 (the robbery of Damian-Lopez, 

Brooks, and Singleton) “revealed video and Facebook photos that were . . . 

used . . . to make identifications” in investigating Case 1857 (the homicide of 

Jones and robbery of Royster). Appellant’s Brief at 17. Appellant concedes 

that evidence of the first night’s “robbery would have been admissible at a 

separate trial for the homicide case.” Id. Appellant avers, however, the 

converse is not true: “The events and investigation of the homicide case . . . 

in no way lead to the identifications regarding the robbery. As a result, the 

events of the homicide case would not have been admissible in a separate trial 

for the robbery.” Id. We conclude no relief is due.

We note the relevant standard of review:

“Whether or not separate indictments should be consolidated for 

trial is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such 

discretion will be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion 

or prejudice and clear injustice to the defendant.” Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 provides that joinder of offenses 

charged in separate indictments or informations is permitted when 

“the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a 
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separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury 

so that there is no danger of confusion.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 

582(A)(1)(a). While evidence of other criminal behavior is not 

admissible to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes, 

such evidence “may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity or absence of mistake or accident” so long as the 

“probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.”

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2),(3)[.]

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1105, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(some citations omitted).

Here, the trial court discussed its reasons for granting consolidation:

[T]he evidence presented in each case would be admissible to 

demonstrate the history and natural development of the facts of 

the other matter. Each incident occurred in the same geographic 

area on consecutive days, and targeted tightly knit members of 

the city’s small transgender community. [Appellant] used the 

same weapon to perpetrate each offense. [Appellant’s] modus 

operandi bears a striking similarity for each offense: [he] used a 

mobile phone application to mimic the same (610) 589-0673 

number that he used to contact both Damian-Lopez and Royster, 

each of whom he had previously hired, in order to gain access to 

their homes. The video surveillance evidence recovered pursuant 

to the January 8, 2017 Robbery investigation was shown to 

Royster, who identified the perpetrator of the Robbery as the 

decedent’s murderer. Singleton’s discovery of [a] Facebook 

profile containing [Appellant’s] name and photographs permitted 

the police to assemble a photo array containing [Appellant’s] 

photo, which Brooks, Singleton, Damian-Lopez, and Royster

[used] to identify [Appellant] as the perpetrator of each crime. 

Upon recovering [Appellant’s] phone incident to arrest, 

investigators obtained data showing [Appellant’s] interest in sex 

acts involving transgender performers and his history of searching 

for transgender sex workers via backpage.com.[8]

____________________________________________

8 The trial court also found consolidation of the cases would not risk confusing 

the jury. Trial Ct. Op. at 11. Appellant does not challenge this finding on 

appeal.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11.

Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that the police investigation of 

the second night’s homicide “in no way lead[s] to the identifications regarding 

the [first night’s] robbery.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. This limited discussion, 

however, does not address, let alone dispute, the trial court’s analysis that 

evidence relating to each incident would tend to show “motive, opportunity, 

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity” relevant to the other 

incident. See Johnson, 179 A.3d at 1116. Appellant has not established the 

trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion, and we do not disturb its 

consolidation order.

Appellant’s second claim is that the trial court erred in admitting the 

Facebook photos of him, on the ground they were not properly authenticated. 

Appellant’s Brief at 18. As stated above, Singleton received a “Suggested 

Friends” notification on Facebook, which directed her to a Facebook profile 

under Appellant’s name and containing multiple photos of Appellant. Trial Ct. 

Op. at 7. Singleton used her phone to take multiple “screenshots” of this 

Facebook profile page. Id. Appellant filed a motion in limine to preclude the 

screenshots, and the trial court conducted a hearing on July 31, 2018.9 See 

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9 “Appellant preserved the issue by litigating the pre-trial motion in limine, 

and was not required to object to the trial court’s ruling on the motion or place 

an objection on the record at trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal.”

Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 652 (Pa. Super. 2013), citing, inter 
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N.T. Motion in Limine, 7/31/18, at 10-11. Appellant claimed the exhibits 

should be excluded because they could not be linked to any account made by 

him: “We don’t know if it’s a fake account someone [made] and used 

[Appellant’s] picture[.]” N.T. Motion, 7/31/18, at 12. Appellant further 

alleged it was not established that he was the person depicted in the Facebook 

photos. The Commonwealth responded that it was irrelevant who made the 

Facebook account, but instead, “what matters is that” Singleton recognized 

Appellant in the photos. Id. at 13. The Commonwealth further averred that 

the question — of whether Appellant was the person in the photos — was for 

the jury to decide. Id. at 14. The trial court admitted the photos. Id. at 15.

On appeal, the sum of Appellant’s argument is that there was no 

evidence he created the Facebook profile, nor that he “was in fact the person 

depicted in the photos.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant relies on 

Commonwealth v. Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154 (Pa. Super. 2018), which he 

summarizes as reversing “the admission of social media posts via a computer 

forensic expert [where] there was no evidence [the] defendant had created 

the account or sent the communications and photos in question.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 18. No relief is due.

We note:

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alia, Pa.R.E. 103(b) (“Once the court rules [on evidence] definitively on the 

record — either before or at trial — a party need not renew an objection or 

offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.”).
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When ruling on a trial court’s decision to grant or 

deny a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse 

of discretion standard of review. The admission of 

evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 

court, and a trial court’s ruling regarding the admission 

of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that 

ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, 

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be 

clearly erroneous.

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 901, 

authentication is required prior to admission of evidence. The 

proponent of the evidence must introduce sufficient evidence that 

the matter is what it purports to be. See Pa.R.E. 901(a). 

Testimony of a witness with personal knowledge that a matter is 

what it is claimed to be can be sufficient. See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(1). 

Evidence that cannot be authenticated by a knowledgeable 

person, pursuant to subsection (b)(1), may be authenticated by 

other parts of subsection (b), including circumstantial evidence 

pursuant to subsection (b)(4). See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(4).

Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1158-59 (some citations and footnote omitted).

In the case sub judice, the trial court acknowledged the general

“difficulties in properly authenticating evidence obtained through social media 

accounts.” Trial Ct. Op. at 11, citing Mangel, 181 A.3d 1154. The court 

reasoned, however, “the author of the Facebook profile in question was 

irrelevant:”

Singleton took the [screenshots] and thus had the requisite 

knowledge to show that the photograph is a fair and accurate 

representation of the images that appeared on [her] phone’s 

screen at the time. This evidence was not used to prove 

[Appellant] authored the Facebook profile or curated the photos 

that appeared within it, rather the evidence was admitted to show 

the jury the course of investigation which culminated in Brooks, 

Singleton, Damian-Lopez, and Royster identifying [Appellant] as 

the perpetrator of each crime via photo array. [Appellant] fails to 

show that the Commonwealth failed to properly authenticate the 

photos in question.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

The Facebook profile-screenshots do not bear Appellant’s name, but 

rather show a profile name of “Hamzah Allah’s Lion.” Commonwealth Exh. 

11. Appellant does not argue that someone deceitfully created a social media 

profile using his name. We agree with the trial court the identity of the person 

who created the Facebook profile is not relevant; as the trial court simply 

states, the Commonwealth did not seek “to prove [Appellant] authored the 

Facebook profile or curated the photos that appeared within it.” See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 12. Instead, the evidence was presented to show Singleton saw the 

photos on her Facebook account, recognized the person in the photos as their 

assailant, and took and provided screenshots to the police. Id.

For these same reasons, we conclude Mangel, the case relied upon by 

Appellant, is distinguishable. In that case, the Commonwealth sought to 

introduce Facebook posts and messages allegedly made by the defendant. 

Mangel, 181 A.3d at 1155-57. This Court held the evidence was properly 

excluded, reasoning “the Commonwealth presented no evidence, direct or 

circumstantial, tending to substantiate that [the defendant] created the 

Facebook account in question, authored the chat messages, or posted the 

photograph of bloody hands.” Id. at 1164. In this case, as stated above, the 

Commonwealth did not argue Appellant created the Facebook profile or posted 

the photos to that account. Accordingly, the Commonwealth was not required 

to authenticate who created the Facebook account.
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Appellant’s third claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting 

evidence of his phone records on the ground that they were not authenticated 

by a qualified records custodian. Appellant’s Brief at 19. He summarizes: (1) 

Detective Kelhower testified about “the subscriber’s information pertaining to 

the phone purportedly connected to” Appellant; (2) Agent Joseph Purfield 

testified about “the contents of Sideline/Pinger records[,] as well as the call 

detail records for [Damian-Lopez] and . . . Royster;” (3) and Detective Dunlap 

testified about “the content of call detail records.” Id. at 20. Appellant 

asserts, “The Commonwealth failed to qualify any of these witnesses as a 

records custodian or to lay any of the requisite foundation . . . for the records’

admission under Pa.R.E. 803(6).” Id. We conclude these claims are waived.

“We have long held that ‘[f]ailure to raise a contemporaneous objection 

to the evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal.’” Commonwealth v. 

Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted).

This [C]ourt cannot review a case upon a theory different from 

that relied upon in the trial court, or raised for the first time on 

appeal. A theory of error different from that presented to the trial 

jurist is waived on appeal, even if both theories support the same

basic allegation of error which gives rise to the claim for relief. It 

is a firm rule in this jurisdiction that if the ground upon which an 

objection to the admission of evidence is specifically stated, all 

other reasons for the exclusion of the evidence are waived and 

may not be raised thereafter.

Commonwealth v. Mehalic, 555 A.2d 173, 183 (Pa. Super. 1989) (citations 

omitted). “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Furthermore, where “an issue 
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is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below,” the statement 

of the case and argument sections of an appellant’s brief must specify the 

place in the record where their issue was raised before the trial court. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(1), 2119(e).

Appellant fails to identify the place in the record where he objected to 

the admission of the phone records on the ground they were not authenticated 

by a records custodian. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(1), 2119(e). With respect to 

Detective Kelhower’s testimony, Appellant cites page 199 of the January 31, 

2019, trial transcript. That portion of the transcript reveals Appellant raised 

only a hearsay objection. See N.T., 1/31/19, at 199. With respect to Agent 

Purfield’s testimony, Appellant raised no objection of any nature during their 

direct examination. See id. at 298-332. During Detective Dunlap’s direct 

examination, Appellant raised several objections, but none related to 

authenticating the phone records. See N.T., 2/4/19, at 80-130. For the 

foregoing reasons, we conclude the issue is waived for our review.

Furthermore, we agree with the Commonwealth that this issue is waived 

for Appellant’s failure to include it in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement. Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement framed a challenge to the 

phone records-evidence as follows:

The trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce 

various documentation relating to phone records and evidence 

obtained through these phone records, from a phone seized from 

[Appellant]. Further, that certain information pertaining to that 

which was derived from the cell phone was not provided in a

timely fashion to [Appellant] in violation of the appropriate 
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discovery rule[. N.T., 1/31/19, at 213-16.] As a result thereof 

[Appellant] should be awarded a new trial.

Appellant’s Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b), 4/8/19, at 1 (unpaginated). This statement makes no 

reference to authenticating phone records or a records custodian. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement . . . are 

waived.”).

Appellant’s final claim is that the trial court erred in not dismissing the 

charges, pursuant to Brady, due to the Commonwealth’s failure to timely 

disclose evidence of a photo array. Appellant’ Brief at 20. We set forth the 

context:

On January 12, 2017, [during the investigation of the 

robberies and homicide,] Damian-Lopez [told] Detective William 

Kelhower . . . that she observed the perpetrator of the robbery at 

a grocery store near the intersection of 52nd Street and Girard 

Avenue. At that location, Detective Kelhower detained Michael 

Attaway, an individual who fit the perpetrator’s description. 

Detectives prepared a photo array containing Attaway’s photo, 

which was shown to Brooks, Singleton, and Damian-Lopez. 

Neither [sic] witness identified Attaway or any other individual in 

the photo array. [N.T., 1/31/19, at 243-56.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 7.

Detective Joseph Murray testified at trial that he presented the January 

12, 2017, photo array to Brooks, Singleton, and Damian-Lopez. Trial Ct. Op. 

at 9. He informed homicide detectives of the result, but failed to provide them

with copies of the array. Id. Detective Murray “rediscovered the array in 

April or May of 2018 and provided it to Detective” Jeffrey Gilson, who 
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investigated this case. Id. “The assigned Assistant District Attorney for the 

July 30, 2018[, hearing] discovered the array’s existence on August 1, 2018,

and immediately passed the discovery to trial counsel for review.” Id. At that 

time, jury selection had already been conducted. Id. at 15.

The trial court summarized:

On August 3, 2018, this Court presided over a hearing and 

concluded that this evidence constituted relevant Brady material. 

This Court further expressed that the Commonwealth’s piecemeal 

passing of discovery deeply concerned this Court. Despite this 

Court’s exasperation over the Commonwealth’s handling of 

discovery in this matter, it ultimately concluded that the proper 

remedy was to continue the matter so that [Appellant] could 

review the material in question and be afforded a fair trial. [N.T. 

8/3/18 at 152-63.]

Trial Ct. Op. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).

On appeal, the sum of Appellant’s argument is:

[A]fter numerous prior continuances due to the late disclosure of 

discovery, on August 3, 2018, this matter had to be continued in 

the midst of jury selection due to the Commonwealth’s eleventhhour disclosure of evidence pertaining to the Michael Attaway 

photo array. This resulted in [Appellant], who had already 

been in custody for nearly two and a half years, having to wait 

an additional five months for trial. The Courts of this 

Commonwealth have previously found that such an outrageous 

discovery violation concerning Brady necessitates dismissal of the 

case. Commonwealth v. Smith, 615 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1992) 

(charges dismissed and retrial barred due to substantial Brady

violation). . . .

Appellant’s Brief at 21 (emphases added).

“Under Brady and [its progeny,] a prosecutor has an obligation to 

disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or punishment of an 

accused[.]” Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1129 (Pa. 2011). 
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“[S]uch evidence is material ‘if there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.’” . . . In sum, there 

are three necessary components to demonstrate a Brady

violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the 

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is 

impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the 

State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have 

ensued.”

Commonwealth v. Causey, 833 A.2d 165, 170 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations 

omitted).

Here, the trial court discussed:

By granting a continuance, this Court elected to pursue the 

most fundamentally sound solution to the present issue, and did 

everything in its power to preserve [Appellant’s] right to a full, 

fair, and speedy trial. Prior to trial, [Appellant] received all of the 

Brady material in question, and with the benefit of that material, 

was granted sufficient time for him and trial counsel to prepare an 

effective defense. At trial, defense counsel thoroughly crossexamined Detective Kelhower concerning his investigation of 

Attaway as a potential suspect. [N.T., 1/31/19, at 219-82.] Trial 

counsel further examined Brooks, Singleton, and Damian-Lopez 

concerning their prior identification of the assailant as having a 

tattoo under his left eye. [N.T., 1/29/19, at 62-70, 185-98, 261-

301.] Trial counsel further called Detective Joseph Murray as a 

defense witness, who, under examination, admitted that he both 

misplaced and failed to provide this discovery material to the 

Commonwealth’s attorneys. [N.T., 2/4/19, at 182-96.]

The above facts clearly indicate [Appellant] had the 

opportunity to fully present any evidence pursuant to the 

discovery materials the Commonwealth failed to disclose in 

anticipation of the August 1, 2018 trial date. As a result of this 

evidence, the jury was able to fully consider the methods used to 

identify [Appellant] as the perpetrator, and consider any 

discrepancies that appeared in the witnesses’ description of the 

perpetrator, including the presence or non-presence of facial 

tattoos. Having considered all of this evidence, and knowing that 

[Appellant] did not have the tattoos described over the course of 

the investigation, the jury still elected to convict him in each 
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matter. Accordingly, [Appellant] fails to demonstrate prejudice 

and is not entitled to relief.

Trial Ct. Op. at 16-17.

Appellant’s sole issue is that the Commonwealth’s Brady violation 

resulted in his having to wait, “after numerous prior continuances,” “an 

additional five months for trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. The premise of this

argument is mistaken. Although the trial court continued trial on August 3, 

2018, due to the disclosure of the Brady material, the court also pointed out 

that an “October 22, 2018, trial date was rescheduled to January 28, 2019,

because of defense counsel’s unavailability.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1. This 

continuance spanned approximately three months.

Furthermore, the trial court criticized the Commonwealth’s “lack of 

preparedness” and “piecemeal passing of discovery,” and acknowledged there 

were “five trial date continuances, borne primarily by the Commonwealth’s 

inability to [timely] provide discovery.” Trial Ct. Op. at 1 n.1, 15-16. 

However, the court also noted: (1) it appointed new defense counsel “after 

[Appellant] attempted to assault previously appointed counsel;” (2) the 

parties made an earlier joint continuance request, from March 18 to July 30, 

2018, “for defense review of additional discovery concerning [Appellant’s] use 

of a phone number spoofing application;” and, as stated above, (3) defense

counsel was unavailable, after the Brady continuance, resulting in a threemonth continuance. Id. at 1 n.1. 
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Whereas Appellant requests dismissal of the charges, we note, as did 

the trial court, that “dismissal . . . is an extreme sanction that should be 

imposed sparingly and only in cases of blatant prosecutorial misconduct.” See

Trial Ct. Op. at 15, citing Commonwealth v. Wilson, 147 A.3d 7, 13 (Pa. 

Super. 2016). Incorporating our foregoing discussion, the approximately twomonth continuance attributable to the Commonwealth’s late disclosure of the 

Attaway photo array, in itself, did not constitute prejudice requiring dismissal 

of the charges. Thus, we conclude no relief is due.

Finding no merit to any of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/29/20