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### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 21 1- CV UNITED WATER SE RVICES, L.L.C. ,

Appellant
v . Carlos M. ZA F F IRINI , Sr., Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 1, Webb County , Texas Tr ia l Co ur

t N o. 20 06 -C VF -0 01 71 2- C1 Honora ble Fr ed Shannon, 1 J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 21, 2009 REV ERS ED AN D REN DE RED I N PA RT; REV ERS ED AN D REM AN DE D I N PA RT United Water Service s, L .L .C. ( “United” ) reta ined attorney Carlos Z aff

irini to assist Unit ed in p ro c ur inga

wate r a nd wa ste wate r se rv ic e a g re e me nt wit h the City of

L are do , T e xas. A f

e e dis pute de ve lop e d b e tw e e n th e pa rt ie s, and Z a ff ir ini su e d Uni te d for mon e y he c la ime d wa s owe d und e r t he ir contra ct. United denied Z aff irini’s claim and counter sued Z aff irini f or over pay ments. Both par

ties filed compe ting motions for summary judgme nt. The trial court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor04
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- 2- of Z aff irini, awar ding him all the damag es he sought. United now appe al s . For the re asons dis c us se d b e low , w e re ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt , a

nd re nd e r i n part , an d r e mand in p art
. F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND The re levant fa cts in this lawsuit are essentially undisputed. Duringthe y ear 2000, United lear ned that the City

of L are do (“City ”) intende d to pr i v ati ze the operation of its water a nd wastew ater

fac iliti es. In order to inc rea se its c hance s of being awa rded the contra ct, United re tained attorney Z aff irini for an initial one-year term to assist United in neg otiations with t he City . United and Z aff irini memorialized their ag ree ment on J anuar y 1, 2002 in a document e ntit led “Reta iner Ag ree ment.” T h e entire Retainer A g ree ment consists of four pa g es, two exhibit s and one
atta c hme nt. Ex hi bi t A d e sc ri be s th e le g a l se rv ic e s Z a ff ir ini wa s h ir e d to pr ov ide and Exhi bit B details Z aff

irini’s compensation. Z aff irini was to ear

n a one-time $50,000 pay

ment upon execution of the Re ta ine r A g re e me nt and a n a dd iti on a l $5 0, 00 0 p ay me nt i f a nd wh e n U nit e d a

nd the City
e ntered into a

c on tr a c t. E xhibi t B fu

rt he r p ro vid e s th at in

the e ve nt Unit e d is awa

rd e d th e City contra ct, Z aff

irini w ould r ece ive a conting ency fee . This fee was more fully descr ibed in Attachment 1 a nd state s, in p art , th at if

Un ite d is awa

rd ed th e Ci ty c on tr a c t, Z a ff ir ini wo uld

re c e ive monthl y pa y me nts of $3 ,0 00 fo r t

he lif e of the City c on tr a c t. Sub se qu e ntl y , the City awa rd e d the c on tr a c t to Un ite d, and Un ite d and the City e nte re d into
a wr itten contrac t on May 8, 2002 (“Ser vice Agr eeme nt”). The ini tial contra ct t erm between United and the City

was for five y ear s—October 1, 2002 throug h September 30, 2007. Adispute betwee n the par ties eventua lly

cause d United and the Cit y to execute a written document entitled “Mutual Dissolution Agre ement.” I n that document, United a nd the City

ag ree d to dissolve their contrac t04
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- 3- and to provide mutual re lease s of claims, ef fec tive May

5, 2005. As part of

the dissolution ag ree ment, United paid the City $3 milli on dollars without admission of breac h or def ault. Some months after United’ s contrac t with the City was dissolved, a f ee dispute a

rose ove r whether Z aff irini was due monthly

fee s under his Reta iner Ag ree ment with United. Z aff irini sued United for brea ch of contra ct and fra ud claiming United had failed to pa y him 21 months of fe es for a total of $63,000. United answe red the lawsuit, denying the alleg ations in Za ffirini’s pe tition and
asser ting se vera l affir

mative def

enses. United f

urther f iled a counte rcla im ag ainst Z aff irini seeking the re tur n o f $ 18 ,0 00 in o ve rp ay

me nts “ du e to a

n a ccou nt in g ove rs ig ht” that c a us e d U nit e d to continue pay

ing Z aff irini monthl y

fee s from May t h ro u gh Dec ember 2005, even though United’s contra ct with the City

ended in Ma

y 2005. Af te r ini tia l disc ov e ry , both pa rt ie s file d moti on s f

or summa ry jud g me nt. Th e tr ia l c ourt

he ld
a he ari ng and , at the c on c lus ion , g ra nte d Z a ff ir ini ’s tr a dit ion a l mot ion fo r summa ry ju dg me nt,
awa rdingZ aff

irini $63,000 in damag es, $21,000 i n attorney ’s fees t hroug h summary judgme nt, and conditional attorney ’s fe es in the eve nt of an a ppeal. T h e t ri al cour

t denied United’ s no-evidenc e and tra ditional moti ons for summary judgme nt and its counterc laim. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW We r e vie w a

tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r gra

nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt de novo
. ValenceOperating Co.
v . D or se tt , 164 S.W .3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). When both parties move f or summary

judgme nt, and the trial cour

t gr ants one motion and denie s the other, the a ppellate c ourt consider s the summary judgme nt evidence prese nted by both side s, deter mines all questions pr esente d, and, if it deter mines the trial cour

t erre d, rende rs the judg ment the t ri al cour t should have re ndere d. Id. ; FM Pr op s. Op e ra ting Co . v . Ci ty

of A us tin , 22 S.W .3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000).04
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- 4- B R EA C H O F C ON TRA C T C L A IM We beg in our ana ly sis by first ex am i n i n g the competingtraditional motions for summary judgme nt. Z aff

irini filed his moti on for summ ary judgme nt on the basis that United had breac hed its contract with him when it fa ile d to pay him monthl y

fee s for the time pe riod of January 2006 thr ou g h Se pte mbe r 3 0, 20 07 . In s up po rt of his mot ion , Z a ff

ir ini fi rs t ar g ue d that his c on tr a c t w ith United entitled him to rece ive monthly fee s for the “life” of United’s c ontrac t with the Cit y , or fr om May 8, 2002 throug h September 30, 2007. Z aff irini further ar gu ed t h at in the event United terminated its contra ct wi t h t h e City for c onvenienc e, he w as still entitl ed to the total amount of monthly fee s, reduc ed to pre sent-day value. United filed both a written response to Z aff irini’s motion and its own affirmative motion for summary judgme nt, arguing that Z aff ir i n i had fa iled to establish his breac h of contra ct ac tion beca use at the time of the alleg ed bre ach, when United stopped pa ying the monthly

fee s in J anuar

y 2006, there was no e nforc eable contra ct betwe en Z aff irini and United. Specific al l y , United
ma int a ine d that Z a ff

ir ini ’s monthl y

fe e wa s c on tin g e nt u

po n th e e xiste nc e of

Un ite d’ s c on tr a c t w ith the City
. Be cause that contra ct had ende d on May 5, 2005, so did United’s contra ctual oblig ation to pay a monthly

fee to Z aff

irini. United furth erargued that Z aff irini’s motion for summary judgme nt also failed beca use United did not, a

nd could not, terminate its contra ct with the City for convenie nce. To succe ed on a br eac h of contra ct claim, t h e plaintiff must prove: (1) the exis tence of a valid contra ct; (2) perf

ormanc e or tender ed perf

ormanc e by the plaintiff; (3) brea ch of the contra ct by the def endant; and ( 4) dama g es sus tained as a result of the bre ach. McLaughlin, Inc. v . Northst ar Drilling T

echs., I nc ., 138 S.W .3d 24, 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.). Her e, the pa rties04
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- 5- do no t di sp ute tha

t U nit e d a nd Z a ff ir ini e nte re d int o a

wr itt e n c on tr a c t, i.e. , th e Re ta ine r A g re e me nt. They also do not dispute that Z aff irini was timely

paid the initial pay

ment s du e h im under the Retainer A g ree ment. Instead, their f ee dispute c enter s around the monthly fee due Z affi ri n i , as descr ibed in Attachment 1 to t h e R et ai n er A g ree ment (“A ttachment 1”) . The e ntire provision
c on sis ts o f t

wo se nte nc e s and

re a ds a s f

oll ow s: Upon commenc emen t of a se rvice ag ree ment for the ope ration of the w astewater sy ste m of the cit y of L are do (“ Se rv ic e Agre e me nt” ), UWS a g re e s to e xten d th is Retainer A g ree ment for the life of the Servic e Agree ment upon the same te rms and c on dit ion s b ut w ithZ a ff

ir ini to b e pa id t

hr e e tho us and do lla

rs ($ 3, 00 0. 00 ) p e r m on th for se rvice s rende red a s su ch service s are descr ibed her ein. I f the Company te rm inate s f

or c onve nie nc e , th is f

e e sh a ll b e pa

ya ble fo r th e lif

e of the Agre e me nt, but reduc ed to pre sent day value. In lawsuits involving written a g ree ments, our prim ary conce rn i s to determine the tr ue intent of the pa rties to the contra ct. See P er r y Homes v . Cull, 258 S.W .3d 580, 606 (Tex. 2008). To
asce rtain that intent, w e look first to the languag e used in the instrument. Id . Contract languag e that can be g iven a de finite or ce rtain mea ning is c onsidered una

mbiguous a

nd should be construe d by the cour t as a matter

of law. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v . RenaissanceW omen’ s Group, P.A. , 121 S.W. 3d 74 2, 74 6 ( Te x. 20 03 ). An un ambi g uo us c on tr a c t will be e nf or c e d a s w ri tte n, and

g e ne ra lly the writi ng alone will be deemed to express the pa rties’ intentions. Luc k

e l v . W hite , 819 S.W .2d 459, 46 1- 62 (T e x. 19 91 ) ( int e nt is de te rm ine d fr om the e xpre ss langua g e fo un d wi thi n th e “ fo ur c or ne rs ” of the do c ume nt)

. Paro l e vid e nc e is n ot a dmi ssi ble to r e nd e r a c on tr a c t amb iguo us wh ic h, on its f a c e , is c a p a b le o f b e in g g iv e n a d e f

in it e le g al meaning
. N

a t ’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI I ndus., Inc., 907 S.W .2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995). Fur thermore , when the fac ts surroundingperf ormanc e of an unambiguous cont ra ct are undisputed, the dete rmination of whethe r a pa rty has bre ache d the contra ct is also a question of law for the court and not a question of fac t f or the jury
. Mee k v. B ishop04
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- 6- Pe te rso n &Sh ar

p, P. C. , 919 S.W .2d 805, 808 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (the e x istence of

the contra ct wher ein the appe llee agree d to pay the appe l l ant fe es for

leg al
re pr e se ntatio n w a s und isp ute d, a s w a s th e a pp e lle e ’s fa ilure to p ay

the fe e s) ; Bank One, Tex., N.A.
v . S te war t , 967 S.W .2d 419, 432 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (noting that dispute reg ardingterms of a n ag ree ment and whe ther undisput ed actions constituted a bre ach w ere questions of law). I f, howe ver, the languag e used in the c ontrac t is capable o f m o re t han one
rea sonable interpre tation, an ambiguity exis ts and the par

ties’ intent should be submitted to the jury
as a fac t question. Columbia Gas Transmissi on Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W .2d 587, 589 (Tex. 1996). An ambiguity does not e x ist simply beca use the pa rties diffe r in their interpr etations of the c ontrac t lang uag e. In re D. W ilson Cons tr. Co., 196 S.W .3d 774, 781 (Tex. 2006). As noted ea

rlier, the c ontrolling c ontrac tual provision at issue in this lawsuit consists of two sentenc es. B oth pa

rties maintain that the languag e used in the pr ovision is unambiguous but proffe r conflictinginterpre tations. W e will examine eac h sentenc e in turn. Se nte nc eOne

– L if eof the Se rv ic eAgre e ment Z a ff ir ini mov e d f

or summa ry jud g me nt o n th e ba sis that Unit e d bre a c he d its co ntr a c t w ithhim when United stoppe d paying him monthly fee s. In support of hi s motion, Za ffirini first ar g ued he w as entitled to rec eive the monthly fee s for the “life ” of the Service Ag ree ment. The c ontrac tual provision
at is su e re a ds in r e le va

nt p art a s f oll ow s: Un ite d “ a g re e s to extend this Retainer A g ree ment for th e life of t he S ervice Agr eem ent
. . . w it hZ a f f ir in i t o b e p a id

thr e e th o u s and dollars ($3,000.00) pe r month for ser vices re ndere d . . . .” (e mph a sis a dd e d) . In b ri e fi ngbe fo re the tr ia l c ou rt and thi s c ourt , each party

a sse rt s an a lte rn ate meaningfor the w ord “life ” as use d within the above- quoted sentenc e.04
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- 7- Z aff irini contends the “life” of the S ervic e Agr eeme nt beg an when United and the C ity signe d the agree ment on May

8, 2002, and continued until the conc lusion of the i n i t i al five-year contra ct term on September 30, 2007. In support of his inter pretation, Z aff

irini points to the S er v i ce Agr ee m en twh i ch s t at es th atth e “ t erm ” o f t h e a gre em en ti s f i v e y e a r s
— O c t o b er

1 , 2 0 0 2 th ro u gh September 30, 2007
. Ho we v er, be cause the agree ment was sig ned five months earlier , Z aff irini maintains the Service Ag ree ment had a “ life” of five year s and five months. United counter s that “life” ref ers to the a ctual existence of a contra ctual re lationship between Un ite d a nd the City , an d is disti nc t fr om the “ te rm ” of the Se rv ic e Agre e me nt as argue d b y Z a ff ir ini
. Acc ording ly , when United a nd the City

mutually dissolved t h ei r co ntrac t, the “life” of the Servic e Ag ree ment ended a

nd so did United’s obligation to pay a monthly

fee to Z aff

irini. Te rm s u se d in

c on tr a c ts a

re g ive n th e ir pla in, or din ary , an d g e ne ra lly a c c e pte d me anin gun le ss the agree ment shows the words a re use d in a

technica l or diffe rent sense
. W este rn Re se rv e LifeIn s. Co. v . M e ad ows , 152 Tex. 559, 261 S.W .2d 554, 557 (Tex. 1953)
. Her e, it is apparent that United and Z aff irini intended to use the word “life” in its ordinar y sense. The word “ life” g ener ally means “t h e period from birth to death” or “the period of e x istence.” See W EB S TER ’ S N I NTH N EW C OL L EGI AT E D I C T I O N A RY 689 (1990). B y specific ally

ref ere ncingthe “life ” of the Service Ag ree ment instead of the “term” of the S ervic e Agr eeme nt, the parties intended that the contrac tual obligation to pay

Z aff irini a monthly fee would continue as longas the Servic e Agree ment was a live or “in e x istence.” Sentence Two – Discount t o Present-Day

V alue Provision As an a lternative a

rgument in support of his m o t i o n fo r summary judgme nt, Z aff

irini maintained that bec ause United terminated its contra ct wit h the C ity for convenienc e, Z aff irini was04
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- 8- entitled to the total amount of monthly fee s, reduc ed to prese nt-day value under t he second sentenc e of the c on tr a c tua l pr ov isi on fo un d in Atta c hme nt 1 to t

he Re ta ine r A g re e me nt. I t r e a ds : I f t he C o m pa nyt e r m in a t e s fo r c o nv e ni e nce , this fee sha ll be payable for the life of the Ag ree ment, but reduc ed to pre sent day value. (empha sis added). We beg in by

noting that both par

ties offe r conf

licting inter

pretations of what trigg ers this particula r contra ctual provision. Under Z aff irini ’s i n t erp retation, he argues it would apply to the fac ts of the
case as follows: I f Unit ed terminates its contract with the City (Service Ag ree ment) for

convenie nce, Z aff irini would be entitled to his fees reduce d to prese nt-day value. United counters the above quoted contra ctual provision was intended to a pply only in the event United terminate d its contract ( Retainer Ag ree ment) wit h Z aff

irini for convenienc e, but simply did not apply , as Zaf firini argued, if United terminated its contra ct (Servic e Agree ment) with the City . In supp o rt o f i ts interpretation, United direc ts us to other provisions contained within the body of t he Retaine r Ag ree ment betwee n United and Z aff irini. Specifically , those provisions allow United to ter m i n at e Za ffirini’s prof essional service s for c ause or

without cause a

nd further

provide that, in the eve nt Z aff irini is terminated without cause, he would rec eive compensation as set for th in ex hibit B and attachment 1—the ve ry pr ov isi on at is su e he re . A c c or din g ly , U nit e d a rgue s th e pr op e r i nte rp re tatio n o f t his pr ov isi on

wo uld be that it is trig g ere d only if United t erminate s Z aff irini without cause during the l ife or exis tence of United contra ct with the City . Her e, it is undisputed that United never soug ht to terminate Z aff irini’s reta iner a g ree ment for a

ny rea son—with cause or

without cause. United fu r th e r a r g u e s , ir r e g a r d le s s o f what trig g ers the a

bove contr actua l provision, Za ffirini’s alternative argument in support of summary judgme nt also fails bec ause United did not have the contra ctual rig ht to terminate its contrac t with the City for convenie nce as alleg ed by Z aff irini. Base d04
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2 ... Secti o n 15
. 5 of t he Se rvi ce A greem ent , ent i t l ed “ C i t y C o nveni ence T erm i nat i o n D uri ng t he M anagem ent P erio d ,” st ates as fo l l o w s:

T erm i nat i o n R i ght and Fee
. T he C i t y s hal l have t he rig h t at any t i m e af t er f o l l o wi ng t he C om m en ce m en t D at e, ex er ci s abl e i n i t s s ol e di s cr et i on , f o r its c o n v e n ie n c e a n d w itho u t ca u se , t o te rm ina te this S e rv ic e C o n tra c t up o n 6 0 d a ys’ w ritten n o tice to the c o m p a n y. If the C ity e x e rc ise s its rig h t t o ter m ina te the S e rv ic e C o n tra c t p u rs u a n t t o this S e c tio n , t h e C ity sh a ll p a y the C o m p a n y a conve ni enc e t er mi nat i on f ee equal t o t he s um of

$15 8, 33 3. 33 f

or e ach of

t he f i r s t 12 mont hs t hat ha s el ap sed f rom t he C o m m encem ent D at e. . . . (emp hasi s ad d ed ). I t i s un di s put ed t hat t he C i t y di d not i nv oke t he above cont r act ual p r ovi s i on, nor d i d t he C i t y pay U ni t ed a c onven i enc e te rm ina tio n fee
.

- 9- on the languag e in the contr act be tween United and the City , only the City could terminate the Service Ag ree ment for c onvenienc e, not United. We agree . The summary judgme nt evidence estab li s h ed that United did not have the contra ctual authority to terminate its contra ct with the City for c onvenienc e. T h atc o n tr a c tu a l r i g h tb e l o n g e d s o l e l y t o th e C i ty. 2 Fur

thermore , based on the summary j u dg ment
e vid e nc e , th e Se rv ic e Agre e me nt w a s mutua lly dis so lve d a s a

wa y of avoidi nglit ig atio n a nd a s a compromise and r elea se betwe en the City and United. Sum m ary Judgm ent Evidence Ha vin g re vie we d th e langua g e us e d in the Re ta ine r A g re e me nt b e tw e e n U nit e d a nd Z a ff ir ini , we hold as a

matter of law, that despite the par ties’ disag ree ment over its interpre tation, the contra ct is un am b i gu ous. In re D. W ilson Cons tr. Co., 19 6 S. W.3 d at 78 1; Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. , 907 S.W .2d at 520. By specific ally ref ere ncing “life” in A ttachment 1, the par ties expressed their intent to p ay Z a f

f i r i n i a m o n th l y f

e e o f $ 3 , 0 0 0 f

o r a s l o n g a s th e S e r

v i c e A g r e e m e n t w a s a liv e or in exis tence . In other wor ds, United would “e x tend” Z aff irini’s Retainer A g ree ment beyond its ini tial one-year term and pa

y a mont hly $3,000 fee for as long as the S ervic e Agr eeme nt betwee n United and the City exis ted—beg inning Ma

y 8, 2002 when the Ser

vice Agree ment was sig ned and possibly even04
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3 ... T h e initial ter m o f t h e S e rv ic e A g re e m e n t b e tw e e n U n ited a n d th e C ity w a s fo r five ye a rs ; ho w e v e r, the C ity d id ha v e the o p tio n o f re n e w ing the S e rv ic e A g re e m e n t f o r o n e a d d iti o n a l t e rm o f f ive full co n tra c t yea rs .

- 10- e xten din gbe y on d th e ini tia l fi ve -ye ar te rm of the City c on tr a c t. 3 Howeve r, the c ontrac tual obligation to Z aff irini would cea se whe n the S ervic e Agr eeme nt betwee n United and the Cit y no longe r existed. This interpretation harmonizes and g ives eff ect to all the provisions of the contrac t, and is consistent wi th t he pa rt ie s’ e xpre sse d inte nt t o e xten d Z a ff ir ini ’s Re ta ine r Agre e me nt wi thi n c e rt a in l imi tatio ns . Her e, the summary judgme nt evidenc e establishes that the contractual re lationship between United and the City was dissolved by mutual a g ree ment of the parties e ffe ctive May 5, 2005. Once the lif e of the Se rv ic e Agre e me nt e nd e d, so did Un ite d’ s c on tr a c tua l ob lig atio n to pa y Z a ff ir ini a monthly fee
. See M

arshall v. Marshall, 735 S.W .2d 587, 592 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, wr it ref’ d n.r.e.) (whe n a contract is limit ed to duration by the happening of an event or conting ency , the eve nt
or c on tin g e nc y

de te rm ine s th e duratio n)
. Th e re fo re , at th e tim e of the a lle g e d b re a c h b y

Un ite d, in J anuar y 2006, no enfor cea

ble contra ct exis ted betwee n United and Z aff irini and summary

judgme nt in f avor of Z aff irini on his breac h of contra ct ac tion was improper. W right v. Christ ian & Smith, 950 S.W .2d 411, 413 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 1997, no writ) (“ [t ]he threshold inquiry in a bre ach of contra ct ac tion is whether an enfor cea ble ag ree ment exis ts be tween the parties” ). Acc ording ly , we
re ve rs e that por

tio n o f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt a wa rd ingZ a ff ir ini dama g e s, atto rn e y ’s fe e s and c os ts on his breac h of contra ct claim, and r ender a take -nothing judgme nt as to that claim. Fur thermore , in the interest of justice, w e re m an d United’s cla im for attorne y ’s fe es ar ising fr om the brea ch of contra ct claim for

further consideration by

the trial cour

t. U N I TED ’ S N O -E V I D ENC E M OT I ON F OR S UM M ARY J UDGMENT ON Z AF F I RI NI ’ S F RAUD C L A IM In addition to his cause of a ction for breac h of contra ct, Z aff irini pled a sec ond cause of ac tion, for f raud, a lleg ing that United knowing ly made promises and materia l misreprese ntations that04
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- 11- Z aff irini would rece ive a monthly fee for the life of the Ser vice Agree ment with the City . To defe at thi s c la im, Un ite d f

ile d a no -e vid e nc e mot ion fo r summa ry jud g me nt o n th e ba sis tha t Z a ff ir ini c ou ld produce no evidenc e that his fra ud cause of action arises out of a duty independe nt of the contra ctual relationship. See Southwestern Be ll Tel. Co. v. De Lanney, 809 S.W .2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991) (whe re plaintiff see ks damag es for brea ch of duty cre ated under contra ct, rather than a duty imposed by

law, the claim sounds only

in contrac t). The tria l court denied United’s no-evide nce motion for summar y judgme nt, but failed to otherwise dispose of Z aff irini’s fra u d cl ai m . A s ummary

judgme nt which do e s n ot d isp os e of

a ll c la ims is g e ne ra lly

int e rl oc uto ry , a

nd the re fo re no t a

fi na l a pp e a la ble jud g me nt. See M cNally v. Gue vara, 52 S.W .3d 195, 196 (Tex. 2001). Howe ver, in this instance, the trial court clea rly intended for

its order t o b e final and appe alable. T he cour t gr anted Z aff

irini’s motion for summary judgme nt on his contract c laim , aw ar d ed Z aff irini all the damag es he sought including attorney ’s fe es and c ourt costs, and fur ther include d a stateme nt that “this ju d g ment is final and disposes of all claims and all parties a nd is appea lable.” See Lehm ann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W .3d 191, 200, 204 (Tex. 2001)

. B e c a us e the tr ia l c ourt ’s or de r p ur po rt s, a lth ou g h e rr on e ou sly , to dis po se of all issues and e very

party , the orde r is final and appea lable. Id. Since the orde r er roneously states that it is final, we r ever se the portion of the trial court’ s order purportingto rende r final judg ment as to Z aff irini’s fra ud claim and r emand the c ause to the tria l court for further pro ce ed ings a s to the
unre so lve d f

ra ud c la im. U N I TED ’ S T R A D ITIO N A L S UM M ARY JUDGMENT M OT I ON –R E S T I T UT I ON F OR U N JUST E NRI CHMENT Un ite d a lso so ug ht s umm ary jud g me nt b a se d o n it s c ounte rc la im f or re st it ut ion f

or un jus t
e nr ic hme nt. In sup po rt of its un jus t enr ic hme nt c la im, Un ite d s ou g ht r e tur n o f e xce ss f

e e s mi sta ke nly04
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4 ... T he part y s eek i ng r es t i t ut i on bas ed on un j us t enr i chmen t mus t es t abl i s h bo t h t hat t her e was un just enri chm ent and t hat t he p ers o n s o ught t o be charged e i t her “wrongf ul l y s ecured a be nef

i t or had pa ss i vel y recei ved one whi ch i t woul d be unc ons ci onabl e f or h i m t o re t ai n. ” Vill a rre a l v. G ra n t G e o p h y sic a l, In c . 1 3 6 S.W
. 3 d 26 5 , 27 0 (T ex. A p p .— S a n A n to n io 2 0 0 4 , p e t. d e n ie d ); B a rre tt v . F e rre ll, 5 5 0 S .W .2 d 1 3 8 , 1 4 3 (T e x . C iv. A p p .— T yle r 1 9 7 7 , w rit re f’ d n . r . e. ) ( ci t i n g 66 A M . J UR . 2 D R e stitu tio n a n d Im p lied C o n tra c ts § 4 , p . 9 4 7 (1 9 7 3 ))
.

- 12- paid by United to Z aff

irini after May 2005 totaling $18,000. 4 The trial c ourt denied United’s motion for summary

judgme nt, and furthe r orde red that United take nothingon its countercla im. At the time of the summary judgme nt he aring , only

United had a

pendingmotion for summary judgme nt on United’s claim of unjust enric hment. Clearly , the t rial court had the a uthority to either g rant or deny United’s summary judgme nt motion on that g round. T EX . R. C I V P. 166a. The trial
c ourt , h ow e ve r, no t on ly

de nie d U nit e d’ s mo tio n b ut a lso re nd e re d a take -n oth ingjud g me nt a g a ins t United. The de nial of a summar y judgme nt motion does not finally decide any

question befor e the court. Anderson v. Borm ann, 489 S.W .2d 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App.—S an Antonio 1973, writ re f’d n.r.e.) . Additionally , without a pending moti on seeking such relief from Z aff irini, the trial cour

t lacks a leg al basis for rende ringa take -nothing judgme nt ag ainst United. Y oung v. Hodde

, 682 S.W .2d 236, 23 7 ( Te x. 19 84 ) ( ho ldi ngtr ia l c ourt e rr s in re nd e ri ngtake -n oth ingjud g me nt a g a ins t c ounte r- c la im in a bs e nc e of mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt b y

pla int if f s e e kin gthat r e lie f) ; Ci t

y o f Ho u s t on v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 605 S.W .2d 717, 718 (Tex. C i v . App.—Houston [1stDist.] 1980, no writ). Acc ording ly , we r ever se the portion of trial court’s judgme nt r ender ing a take- nothing judgme nt as to United’s unjust enrichment claim and rema nd the cause to the trial court f or fur ther c onsideration of that cla im. C ONCL US I ON B a se d o n th e fo re g oin gre a so ns , w e re so lve the a pp e a l a s f oll ow s: 1. We reve rse the tr ial court’s summar y judgme nt in fa v o r o f Z aff irini and instead re nder judgme nt in favor of

United that Z aff

irini take nothing on his breac h of contra ct cl aim ; we04
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- 13- further reve rse the a

war d of attorne y ’s fees to Z aff irini and rema

nd United’s cla im for attorney ’s fe es to the trial cour t for conside ration; 2. Be cause the trial cour t errone ously

rende red a fina l appea lable judg ment without addressing Z aff irini’s fra ud claim, we remand Za ffirini’s fraud claim to the t rial court for conside ration; and 3. We reve rse the tr ial co u rt ’s judg ment that purports to rende r a take-nothingjudgme nt on United’s counte rcla im for re stitut ion for unjust enrichme nt, an d re m and United’ s
c ounte rc la im t o th e tr ia l c ourt fo r f ur the r p ro c e e din g s.

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice