IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 22, 2009 Session

PAUL NEIL LAURENT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2003-B-1165 Mark J. Fishburn, Judge

No. M2008-01836-CCA-R3-PC - Filed August 17, 2009 

Petitioner, Paul Neil Laurent, was convicted by a judge of aggravated kidnapping, attempted

aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority

figure, and one count of attempted child neglect for which he received an effective sentence of

seventeen years. State v. Paul Neil Laurent, No. M2005-00289-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 468700

(Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 27, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006). 

Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he argues that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a

hearing. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court

is affirmed. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court is Affirmed.

JERRY L. SMITH,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, JJ., joined. 

James O. Martin, III, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Paul Neil Laurent.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., AttorneyGeneral and Reporter; Melissa Roberge, Assistant AttorneyGeneral;

Victor S. Johnson, District AttorneyGeneral, and Rob McQuire, Assistant District AttorneyGeneral,

for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Petitioner was convicted in a bench trial of aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated

sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual batterybyan authorityfigure, and one

count of attempted child neglect. Id. at *1. On appeal from his convictions and sentence, this Court

summarized the facts that formed the basis for the convictions as follows:
At trial, A.K., testified that she was the eighteen-year-old step-daughter of 1

the appellant. At the time of trial, the victim was a senior in high school. The victim

stated that she and the appellant had a good relationship when the appellant married

her mother, approximately three years prior to the trial, until an episode that occurred

when she was in tenth grade. While her mother was out of town on business, the

victim caught the appellant hiding in her closet while she was getting dressed.

Several days later, while her mother was still out of town, the appellant took

the victim to a movie. At the movie, the appellant offered alcohol to the victim,

which she pretended to sip so that the appellant would be “satisfied.” When they

arrived home, the victim testified that there was a box of chocolate-covered cherries

lying on her bed with a pair of her underwear wrapped around them, as well as a vase

of flowers on her dresser. The victim claimed that she was “disgusted” and

confronted the appellant about the items. According to the victim, the appellant

confessed that he had seen her undress a couple of times while hiding in her closet. 

The victim reported the incident to her mother.

On November 24, 2002, the victim and her fourteen-month old sister, M.L,

2

were home with the appellant while her mother was at work. She noticed that the

appellant was watching a videotape of one of her dance performances from school. 

The victim described this as “unusual.” That afternoon, the victim woke up from a

nap and went into the kitchen to look for something to eat. She noticed that the

appellant was “messing with his pants.” At that point, the victim stated that the

appellant approached her and stated, “I’ve been thinking about you and I’m crazy

about you.” The victim ran for the back door, but the appellant stepped in front of

it, blocking her path. The victim then tried to run for her bedroom, but the appellant

pushed her down before she could reach the door. After falling to the ground, the

victim stated that she “wound up” in her bedroom with the appellant. The appellant

was “on top” of her and she kept repeating “No, [appellant], please don’t do this.” 

The victim explained that she kept trying to lock her legs, but the appellant would use

his knee to open them up. She remembered that the appellant held both of her arms

and pressed her back against the bed. She believed that the appellant was trying to

rape her.

After struggling for a while, the appellant and the victim ended up on the

floor, talking. Sometime during the struggle, the victim bit the appellant on the

inside of his elbow. The victim thought the appellant stopped because she had asked

It is the policy of this Court not to identify the victims of sexual abuse.

1

M.L is the biological daughter of the appellant and A.K.’s mother, Maria Laurent.

2

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him to repeatedly. Then, the appellant told the victim that he “was going to do this

because he was never going to see her again and that he had to because he and her

mother were going to get a divorce.” The victim testified that the appellant also told

her that he was doing this because she had “teased” him.

The victim tried to calm the appellant down, telling him that she would never

tell anyone what happened. The appellant left the room, and the victim proceeded

to lock her door, change clothes, gather her purse together (including a can of mace)

and try to get out of her bedroom window. She could not open the window and

decided to wait in her room until the appellant left the house to pick her mother up

from work.

During this time, the appellant continued to talk to the victim through the

door. The appellant shook the door handle and was eventually able to open the door. 

As he came in the room, the victim noticed a rope-like object in his hand. The victim

sprayed the appellant in the eyes with mace. The appellant pushed the victim onto

the bed and got back on top of her, holding her forearms and pinning them to the bed. 

The appellant rubbed his eyes against the victim’s eyes, burning them with mace. 

The victim had difficulty seeing with the mace in her eyes. The pain in her eyes

lasted for approximately two hours. The appellant took the mace away, threw it

down and tried to tie the victim’s right hand with a bathrobe sash.

The victim tried to kick her window out in an attempt to escape. The victim

was able to turn over onto her stomach and started to crawl off the bed. The

appellant grabbed her around the knees and pushed her over, hurting her back. The

victim continued to ask the appellant to stop to which he eventually replied, “Okay.

I’m not going to fuck you, I just want to kiss you down there.” The victim testified

that she understood the appellant to mean that he wanted to kiss her vagina. During

this time, the victim pleaded with the appellant to allow her to wash out her eyes.

In response to the appellant’s statements, the victim kicked off her shoes and

unbuttoned her jeans. She testified that she only cooperated with the appellant to get

him to calm down. The appellant removed the victim’s jeans and left her underwear

on. The appellant demanded to see the victim’s breasts. The appellant lifted the

victim’s sweater and placed his hand on her breast. She was not wearing a bra at the

time.

After the appellant took her pants off, he licked the victim on the outside of

her underwear on her vagina. She testified that he licked her on the outside and

inside of the vagina. Specifically, she stated that his tongue, covered by the material

from her underwear, entered the inside of her vagina. The victim testified that the

appellant continued to lick her vagina “like a dog licking water” for approximately

two minutes. Then, the victim got up and told the appellant that she needed to wash

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her eyes. The appellant asked for a kiss, so the victim complied because she thought

if she cooperated with the appellant, she would not get raped.

At that time, the victim went to her bathroom and began to rinse out her eyes. 

The appellant followed her, grabbed her by the buttocks and slid his hand across her

behind. The appellant also washed his eyes. The victim then left her bathroom and

went to the appellant’s bathroom. The appellant followed her and once again placed

his hand on her buttocks. The victim then told the appellant that she was going back

to her bathroom, but instead ran out the back door of the house and down the street

wearing only a sweater, underwear and socks.

The victim ran down the street, trying to flag down passing vehicles. She

finally stopped a van containing DorothyAiley and her husband. The Aileys stopped

when they saw the victim running toward the car, waving her hands and crying “let

me in.” Ms. Ailey described the victim as “hysterical.” Ms. Ailey remembered that

the victim had no pants on at the time. The couple let the victim into their vehicle,

where she gave them her address and stated “he was going to kill her if she didn’t get

away.” Ms. Ailey let the victim use her cellular phone to call her mother. The victim

told her mother that she had been raped. The couple drove the victim to the nearby

Shell station, called the police and waited until the police arrived.

Hannah Tiblier, a nurse practitioner with Metro General Hospital, testified

that she performed a medical exam on the victim on November 24, 2002. The exam

involved a general examination of the body and more specific exam of the genitalia. 

The victim told Ms. Tiblier the following:

He [the appellant] came into my room with a rope in his hand. I

sprayed him in the eyes with mace and he threw me on the bed and

tried to rub it in my eyes. He tied my right arm to the bed, but I got

out of it. I bit him hard on the arm. He pulled my pants off and put

his head down there, my panties were still on though. He touched my

breasts and he kissed me. I kept rinsing my eyes. The burning was

unbelievable. I finally ran out of the house and didn’t have my pants

on. I wanted out of there. 

The victim told Ms. Tiblier that she was not sure if there was sexual

penetration. During the examination, Ms. Tiblier noticed a fresh scratch over the

victim’s right rib cage as well as a fresh scratch on the back of her right wrist. As

part of the examination, labial swabs were collected from the victim. Additionally,

the victim’s panties were collected as evidence in order to preserve any possible

fluids located on them.

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After the call came in regarding the victim, Nicole Swisher, a Sergeant with

the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department responded to the appellant’s residence

on November 24, 2002. As the officers entered the house, the smell of mace was

very strong. Sergeant Swisher located a baby, fourteen-month-old M.K., inside the

house alone, asleep in a stroller. Once they rescued the child, they exited the house

to preserve the scene.

Robert Carrigan, a detective with the Metropolitan Nashville Police

Department met with the victim and her mother, Maria Laurent, at the residence after

the incident. Detective Carrigan noticed that the victim’s room was in disarray and

that there was a bottle of chemical spray or mace and a belt from a bathrobe on the

floor. The appellant was not at the scene, and his car was missing.

The next morning, Detective Carrigan received word that the appellant was

at his residence. When they arrived, the appellant was not present. However, after

a search Detective Carrigan and other officers discovered a suitcase packed with

men’s clothing in a shed behind the house.

Later that day, Detective Carrigan met Ms. Laurent at the house where they

found a letter from the appellant on the kitchen table. The letter stated as follows:

Dear Maria, I’ve never been more sorry in all my life. I should have

listened to you and sought some help. I love you and [our daughter]

dearly. I am such a weak individual. I should have been the adult

and walked away. [Victim], I am truly sorry. I have a huge problem

that started when I was just a kid. I have nowhere to go and nowhere

to turn to except Jesus. If there’s any way that this situation can be

fixed or mended, whatever you say Maria, I’ll do. I still have my

beeper with me, so you can reach me that way, if you want to. Please

say a prayer for me. All my love, [Appellant]. 

Ms. Laurent identified the handwriting as that of the appellant. Upon direction from

Detective Carrigan, Ms. Laurent placed several calls to the pager number that the

appellant left in the letter. During one of those conversations, the appellant agreed to

meet Ms. Laurent in the parking lot of Antioch High School. Ms. Laurent waited for

the appellant at the designated location, but the appellant never appeared. The

appellant eventually turned himself in to the police on December 9, 2002.

Hunter Greene, a DNA analyst with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation,

testified as an expert in serology. Ms. Greene testified that chemical analysis of the

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victim’s underwear revealed the presence of alpha amylase, a component of saliva,

in concentrations consistent with the presence of saliva.

Maria Laurent, the victim’s mother, testified that she has two other daughters

in addition to the victim. Her two young daughters are biologically the appellant’s. 

Ms. Laurent recalled that at some point after her marriage to the appellant, she and

one of her daughters traveled to Dallas, Texas in connection with her work for

American Airlines. Sometime later she learned that while she was gone, the

appellant hid in the victim’s closet and saw her get undressed. The appellant

explained that he was playing hide-and-go-seek and had accidentally seen her

undress. The appellant also told Ms. Laurent that he gave the victim alcohol,

chocolate and roses in an attempt to apologize for hiding in her closet.

Ms. Laurent testified that the appellant had a particular interest in performing

oral sex with her while she was wearing underwear. Ms. Laurent further stated that

she had never discussed the appellant’s desires or interests in regards to oral sex with

the victim.

On November 24, 2002, Ms. Laurent was at work. The appellant was

supposed to pick her up when her shift was over at 7:00 p.m. However, Ms. Laurent

left work early when she received a telephone call from the victim. Over the course

of the next few days, Ms. Laurent was able to reach the appellant on his cell phone

several times. At least one of these conversations was recorded.

Ms. Laurent confirmed that during several of these conversations, the

appellant apologized for his actions and promised to get professional help. The

appellant told Ms. Laurent that the victim was “teasing” him and that he was sexually

aroused by her. Ms. Laurent even discovered that the appellant had placed a new

doorknob on the victim’s bedroom door.

After hearing the evidence, the trial court found the appellant guilty of

aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual

battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and attempted child

neglect. The trial court sentenced the appellant to twelve years for aggravated

kidnapping, six years for attempted aggravated sexual battery, twelve years for

aggravated sexual battery, five years for each count of sexual battery by an authority

figure, and two years for attempted child neglect. The trial court ordered that the

sentences for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted

aggravated sexual battery run concurrently to each other. The trial court also ordered

that the sentences for sexual battery by an authority figure and attempted child

neglect run concurrently to each other, but consecutively to the charges on the first

three counts, for a total effective sentence of seventeen years.

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Id. at *1-5. On appeal, this Court determined that the trial court: (1) properly denied the motion for

judgment of acquittal and motion to dismiss regarding the charge of aggravated kidnapping; (2) the

evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and

aggravated sexual battery; and (3) the trial court properly sentenced Petitioner. Id. at *1. 

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel because, among other things: (1) trial counsel failed to

properly interview witnesses prior to trial; (2) trial counsel improperly waived the preliminary

hearing, denying Petitioner the right to confront the victim prior to trial; (3) trial counsel failed to

put forth a theory of defense at trial; (4) trial counsel failed to seek mitigation at sentencing; (5) trial

counsel allowed Petitioner to make statements against interest in the presentence report; (6) trial

counsel allowed Petitioner to submit a “Statement of Allocution” into evidence at the sentencing

hearing; (7) trial counsel requested a presentencing psycho-sexual evaluation that was later used

against Petitioner.

Hearing on the Post-conviction Petition

At the hearing on the post-conviction petition, trial counsel testified that he had been

practicing law for approximately eighteen years at the time of the hearing. During that time, he spent

eight years as an Assistant United States Attorney and four years as an Assistant Director of the Drug

Investigation Division at the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation prior to entering the private practice

of law in April of 2002. At the time of Petitioner’s trial, trial counsel had tried one jury trial as a

criminal defense attorney. 

Trial counsel explained that he waived the preliminary hearing in Petitioner’s case because

he wanted to prevent potentially more serious charges from being presented to the grand jury. Prior

to trial, trial counsel established a theory of defense for the case. According to trial counsel, the State

would be unable to establish each element of the offense charged. However, trial counsel advised

Petitioner to waive a jury trial due to the facts surrounding the incidents. Trial counsel was afraid

that the facts of the case would horrify a jury. Trial counsel recalled that Petitioner maintained that

the victim “baited him.” Trial counsel felt that waiving a jury trial would take sympathy and

emotion out of the equation.

Trial counsel admitted that he did not interview the State’s witnesses prior to trial. Trial

counsel recalled one episode in which he contacted the victim’s mother. The mother was hostile,

and he determined that pursuing the matter would be fruitless. As a result of his failure to interview

witnesses prior to trial, trial counsel actually asked questions at trial that he did not know what the

answer would be from the witness. Specifically, trial counsel remembered asking Ms. Ailey, the

woman who picked up the victim in the street, if the victim mentioned that she had been raped. Ms.

Ailey answered that the victim did not tell her that she had been raped but told “her mother.” Trial

counsel felt that even if he had known the answer the witnesses would have given he probablywould

have still asked the question at trial. Trial counsel admitted that he asked Nurse Tibler a question

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regarding the victim’s scratches that he should not have asked and would not have asked had he

interviewed the witness prior to trial.

Trial counsel informed the trial court that he attempted to contact a coworker and friend of

the victim who, according to Petitioner, would have corroborated his story that the victim set him

up. Trial counsel was unable to locate this witness. 

Trial counsel recalled that he had Petitioner prepare an allocution statement prior to

sentencing. Trial counsel felt that this was a way for Petitioner to appear apologetic to the trial court

and was a way to avoid rearguing issues that had already been decided. Trial counsel encouraged

Petitioner to be truthful because, in his experience, judges look favorably on defendants who are

cooperative and apologetic.

Trial counsel requested a presentencing psycho-sexual evaluation and submitted Petitioner’s

work history as a mitigating factor to the trial court. Trial counsel chose not to call Petitioner as a

witness at the sentencing hearing based on his previously inflammatory statements regarding the

victim. Further, trial counsel did not feel that Petitioner would perform well during crossexamination. 

The post-conviction court took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the hearing. 

In an order, the post-conviction court found Petitioner’s allegations to be without merit. Specifically,

the post-conviction court determined that trial counsel gave reasonable advice to Petitioner in

waiving the preliminary hearing because the defense was focused on an application of the law rather

than the facts. Further, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel had access to the State’s

file through discovery. The post-conviction court also concluded that trial counsel did not render

ineffective assistance with regard to his cross-examination of witnesses Ms. Ailey and Nurse Tibler

at trial. The post-conviction court determined that rape was not an issue and the comments made

by the nurse were not prejudicial because the victim’s testimony also established the element of

bodily injury.

Next, the post-conviction court determined that even if Petitioner’s work history had been

somehow verified at the sentencing hearing, it would not have made a difference. The work history

indicated that Petitioner had been employed for less than ten years even though he was forty-four

years old at the time of the hearing.

Finally, the post-conviction court found that trial counsel’s actions with regard to the psychosexual examination were required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-705, and thus could

not be considered ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, it was not ineffective assistance

of counsel for trial counsel to encourage Petitioner to be truthful in a presentence report. 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the post-conviction court’s dismissal

of the petition for post-conviction relief.

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Analysis

Post-conviction Standard of Review

 

The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence

preponderates otherwise. See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). During our review

of the issues raised, we will afford those findings of fact the weight of a jury verdict, and this Court

is bound by the post-conviction court’s findings unless the evidence in the record preponderates

against those findings. See Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn. 1997); Alley v. State, 958

S.W.2d 138, 147 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This Court may not reweigh or re-evaluate the evidence,

nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the post-conviction court. See State v. Honeycutt,

54 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tenn. 2001). However, the post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are

reviewed under a purely de novo standard with no presumption of correctness. See Shields v. State,

40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of

counsel, the petitioner bears the burden of showing that (a) the services rendered by trial counsel

were deficient and (b) that the deficient performance was prejudicial. See Powers v. State, 942

S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). In order to demonstrate deficient performance, the

petitioner must show that the services rendered or the advice given was below “the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn.

1975). In order to demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). “Because a petitioner must

establish both prongs of the test to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, failure to

prove either deficient performance or resulting prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief

on the claim.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 580 (Tenn. 1997).

As noted above, this Court will afford the post-conviction court’s factual findings a

presumption of correctness, rendering them conclusive on appeal unless the record preponderates

against the court’s findings. See id. at 578. However, our supreme court has “determined that issues

of deficient performance by counsel and possible prejudice to the defense aremixed questions of law

and fact . . . ; thus, [appellate] review of [these issues] is de novo” with no presumption of

correctness. Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 461.

Furthermore, on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is not entitled to

the benefit of hindsight. See Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d 334, 347 (Tenn. 1994). This Court may

not second-guess a reasonably-based trial strategy, and we cannot grant relief based on a sound, but

unsuccessful, tactical decision made during the course of the proceedings. See id. However, such

deference to the tactical decisions of counsel applies only if counsel makes those decisions after

adequate preparation for the case. See Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App.

1992).

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Investigation Prior to Trial

Petitioner claims that trial counsel failed to conduct independent pretrial investigation of the

State’s witnesses. Petitioner claims that this failure resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel.

The State contends that trial counsel’s pretrial investigation was sufficient.

The proof at the post-conviction hearing established that trial counsel failed to interview the

State’s witnesses prior to trial. Admittedly, it is unwise for any criminal defense attorney not to at

least make an effort to have potential witnesses interviewed even if the witnesses are uncooperative. 

However, trial counsel testified that he had access to the State’s files through discovery, including

all police reports, statements of witnesses, and the medical evidence. In addition, Petitioner failed

to establish at the post-conviction hearing just how the failure to interview witnesses created a

reasonable probability that had counsel conducted the interviews, the results of his trial would have

been different. He has not established actual prejudice and therefore is not entitled to a finding that

counsel was ineffective in failing to interview witnesses. This issue is without merit.

Cross-examination of Witnesses

Petitioner complains that trial counsel examined witnesses without knowing how theywould

respond and that this was prejudicial to his defense. Specifically, Petitioner alleges that his lack of

preparation prior to trial led to additional evidence being introduced about bodily injury suffered by

the victim, an essential element of the offenses of aggravated sexual battery and attempted

aggravated sexual battery. The State alleges that Petitioner failed to show he was prejudiced by trial

counsel’s actions.

At trial, trial counsel questioned Ms. Ailey, the person who rescued the victim from the

street. Trial counsel asked if the victim claimed that she was raped. Ms. Ailey responded that the

victim told “her mother” that she was raped. Next, trial counsel asked Nurse Tibler if the victim’s

scratches appeared to be recent. She responded affirmatively and informed trial counsel that the

victim’s eyes were red and she continuously rubbed them. Petitioner was not charged with rape at

trial. In other words, this was not an issue that could have affected Petitioner’s convictions. Further,

the victim herself testified that Petitioner held her down and attempted to tie her down and rubbed

mace in her eyes. The victim’s testimonyalone would have been sufficient to establish bodilyinjury. 

Petitioner has failed to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s actions.

Sentencing 

Next, Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. 

Specifically, Petitioner claims that trial counsel’s decision to encourage Petitioner to submit an

allocution statement and participate in a psycho-sexual evaluation coupled with the failure of trial

counsel to elicit testimony regarding Petitioner’s work history led to the imposition of consecutive

sentences by the trial court. The State contends that the post-conviction court properly determined

that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.

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With regard to the psycho-sexual evaluation it is difficult to see how counsel can be

ineffective when such an evaluation is required for the pre-sentence report of all sex offenders. See

T.C.A. § 39-13-705(b). Further, the post-conviction court found that encouraging Petitioner to be

truthful and present an allocation at the sentencing hearing in an effort to establish his remorse was

a reasonable strategy. We agree and note again that this court may not second guess a reasonable

strategic decision on the part of the trial counsel even if the strategy was unsuccessful.

Finally, Petitioner seems to complain that the trial court relied on a record of extensive

criminal history in ordering consecutive sentences when in fact Petitioner had no prior convictions. 

There is no evidence in the record to support this allegation. Moreover, this Court has already

upheld the sentencing determination on direct appeal. Paul Neil Laurent, 2006 WL 468700, at *14.

In summary, Petitioner has failed to carry his burden of proof that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel at trail.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. 

___________________________________ 

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE

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