IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Siamion Kremer, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 518 C.D. 2015

: Submitted: November 25, 2015

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge1

HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge

HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE BROBSON FILED: February 3, 2016 

Appellant Siamion Kremer (Licensee) appeals from an order of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (trial court). The trial court denied 

Licensee’s statutory appeal of the one-year suspension of his operating privileges 

by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing 

(DOT). DOT issued a notice suspending Licensee’s operating privileges under 

Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Vehicle Code (Code),

2

based upon his refusal to 

submit to chemical testing. We now affirm.

 

1

This case was assigned to the opinion writer on or before January 31, 2016 when Judge 

Leadbetter assumed the status of senior judge. 

2

75 Pa. C.S. § 1547(b)(1)(i). Section 1547(b)(1)(i) of the Code provides that if any 

person who is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol “is requested to submit to 

chemical testing and refuses to do so . . . [DOT] shall suspend the operating privilege of the 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
2

On November 17, 2013, Lower Southampton Police Officer Joseph 

Zaffino arrested Licensee and charged him with driving under the influence of 

alcohol (DUI). On December 12, 2013, DOT sent a notice of suspension to 

Licensee, informing him that his driving privileges were suspended for a one-year 

period as a result of his refusal to submit to chemical testing following his DUI 

arrest. Licensee filed a statutory appeal of the suspension notice, and the trial court 

conducted a hearing on November 7, 2014.

During the hearing, DOT presented the testimony of Officer Zaffino. 

Officer Zaffino testified that he was on patrol when he observed a vehicle in front 

of him that was “slowing down and speeding up.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 

11.5) Officer Zaffino continued to follow the vehicle, which began to swerve 

within its own lane. (Id.) Ultimately, the vehicle “swerved from the curb lane into 

the passing lane, and then came back from the passing lane all the way across the 

curb lane and drove up onto the curb.” (Id.) The vehicle’s tires were destroyed by 

the accident, and Officer Zaffino activated his lights and pulled over behind the 

vehicle. (Id. at 11.6.) Officer Zaffino approached the vehicle and could smell 

alcohol. (Id.) Licensee, the driver, had glassy eyes. (Id.) Officer Zaffino 

explained that while speaking with Licensee, he noticed that “there was a bit of a 

language barrier, but [Licensee] was able to answer the questions that I had.” (Id.) 

Officer Zaffino asked Licensee to exit the vehicle and explained to Licensee that 

he wanted him to perform field sobriety tests. (Id.) Licensee’s wife informed 

 

(continued...)

person . . . for a period of 12 months.” This provision is commonly known as the “Implied 

Consent Law.”
3

Officer Zaffino that English was not Licensee’s first language and that she would 

be able to translate the field sobriety tests for Licensee. (Id. at 11.7.) Officer 

Zaffino explained Licensee’s wife appeared to “speak English better than 

[Licensee] did.” (Id. 11.14.) After Officer Zaffino began to explain the first field 

sobriety test to Licensee’s wife, Licensee said, “I understand English, you can just 

tell me.” (Id. at 11.7.) Licensee ultimately failed the field sobriety tests, and 

Officer Zaffino administered a portable breath test, which demonstrated the 

presence of alcohol. (Id.)

After Licensee failed the tests, Officer Zaffino placed him under arrest 

for DUI. (Id.) In Officer Zaffino’s vehicle, Officer Zaffino asked Licensee if he 

would “want to go to the hospital to give blood.” (Id. at 11.8.) Licensee agreed to 

submit to the blood test, and Officer Zaffino transported him to St. Mary’s 

Hospital. (Id.) At the hospital, Licensee was placed in a holding cell with a 

“language line.”3 (Id. at 11.8-11.9.) Officer Zaffino read the chemical test 

warning form (DL-26 form) in English, which Licensee was able to hear. (Id.) 

After Officer Zaffino read the DL-26 form, an interpreter translated the warnings 

into Russian via the language line. (Id. at 11.8.) Officer Zaffino explained that 

“[a]fter the translator read the DL-26 form verbatim, [Licensee] refused to give a 

blood sample.” (Id.) Officer Zaffino could not recall exactly what Licensee said 

in refusing the test, but indicated that Licensee responded through the language 

line, and the interpreter responded to Officer Zaffino. (Id.) Officer Zaffino and 

Licensee both signed the DL-26 form. (Id. at 4.5, 11.11.) 

 

3 Officer Zaffino described a language line as “a neutral language interpreter line that is 

used by the hospital.” (R.R. at 11.18.) 
4

Licensee also testified at the hearing before the trial court. Licensee 

explained that during the arrest, Licensee’s wife acted as an interpreter. (Id. at 

11.20.) Licensee understood some of the words that Officer Zaffino was saying, 

and, with the help of his wife, Licensee understood that he was being investigated 

for DUI. (Id.) After his arrest, Officer Zaffino asked Licensee for a blood sample, 

and Licensee agreed to go to the hospital. (Id.) Licensee remembered using the 

language line after arriving at the hospital. (Id. at 11.21.) Licensee described the 

translation of the DL-26 form as “unprofessional” and “kind of not coherent.” (Id.) 

He tried to ask the interpreter questions, because he did not understand what a 

“chemical test” was, but he could not understand the interpreter’s explanation. 

(Id. at 11.22.) Licensee did not inform Officer Zaffino that he could not 

understand. (Id.)

The trial court issued an order on November 7, 2014, denying 

Licensee’s appeal and reinstating the suspension of his operating privileges. 

(Id. at 5.1.) Licensee filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court issued an order 

directing Licensee to file a statement of errors complained of on appeal. Licensee 

filed the statement, and the trial court issued an opinion explaining its decision. In 

so doing, the trial court cited the testimony of Officer Zaffino. The trial court 

explained that Licensee was provided with an interpreter and that Licensee’s 

testimony that he did not understand the interpreter was not credible, because 

Licensee failed to inform Officer Zaffino that he did not understand. The trial 

court also noted that Licensee’s “refusal to submit to chemical testing is 

memorialized in the DL-26 . . . form signed by Officer Zaffino and Licensee.” 

(Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) 
5

On appeal to this Court,

4

Licensee first argues that substantial 

evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that Licensee refused to submit 

to chemical testing. Alternatively, Licensee contends that, even if he did refuse 

chemical testing, his refusal was not knowing and conscious, and, therefore, his 

refusal is insufficient to sustain the suspension of his operating privileges.

We first address Licensee’s argument that substantial evidence does 

not support the trial court’s finding that Licensee refused to submit to chemical 

testing.

5

 In order to suspend a licensee’s driving privileges for refusing to submit 

to chemical testing, DOT must establish the existence of the following elements: 

(1) the police arrested the licensee based upon reasonable grounds to believe that 

the licensee was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; 

(2) the police asked the licensee to submit to a chemical test; (3) the licensee 

refused to submit to testing; and (4) the police warned the licensee that refusing to 

submit to testing would result in license suspension. Bomba v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 28 A.3d 946, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “The question 

of whether a licensee refuses to submit to a chemical test is a legal one, based on 

the facts found by the trial court.” Sitoski v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 11 A.3d 12, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). It is well-established “that 

 

4

This Court’s review of an order of a trial court denying a licensee’s statutory appeal 

from a license suspension by DOT is limited to considering whether the trial court’s factual 

findings are supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court erred as a matter of 

law or demonstrated a manifest abuse of discretion. McCloskey v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of 

Driver Licensing, 722 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 740 A.2d 235 (Pa. 1999).

5

“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.” Miller v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 

745 A.2d 111, 116 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).
6

anything less than an unqualified, unequivocal assent constitutes a refusal.” Dep’t 

of Transp. v. Renwick, 669 A.2d 934, 939 (Pa. 1996).

Licensee takes issue with the trial court’s reliance on Officer Zaffino’s 

testimony and argues that the officer’s testimony was insufficient to prove that 

Licensee refused chemical testing. During the hearing before the trial court, 

Officer Zaffino testified:

A. . . . After the translator read the DL-26 form 

verbatim, he refused to give a blood sample.

Q. You said he refused. How did he refuse to give a 

sample?

A. I don’t remember exactly. He either said -- I would 

imagine him saying no or, you know, I asked, can you 

repeat it, and he would have said yes.

Q. But he responded to you? . . . 

A. He responded through the language line and the 

language line responds to me.

(R.R. at 11.8.) Licensee contends that Officer Zaffino’s testimony is equivocal

and, therefore, does not constitute substantial evidence to support the finding that 

Licensee refused chemical testing. 

Equivocal testimony is that which is vague and leaves doubt as to its 

meaning. Chadwick v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (Benjamin Franklin Hotel), 

573 A.2d 652, 655-56 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 694 (Pa. 1990). 

While Officer Zaffino’s testimony as to what Licensee said exactly in refusing 

chemical testing may be equivocal, this does not affect the substance of 

Officer Zaffino’s testimony—namely, that Licensee, through the interpreter, 

verbally refused to submit to chemical testing. Such testimony constitutes 

substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Licensee refused 

chemical testing, as it demonstrates that the Licensee did not offer unqualified, 
7

unequivocal consent. Although Officer Zaffino’s failure to recall the exact 

conversation that took place could have affected the weight to be given to his 

testimony, this Court does not reweigh evidence. Hasson v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 866 A.2d 1181, 1186 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) 

(“Determinations as to . . . the weight assigned to the evidence are solely within the 

province of the factfinder.”). Because Officer Zaffino’s testimony was sufficient 

to support the finding that Licensee refused to submit to chemical testing, we reject 

Licensee’s argument.

We next address Licensee’s argument that his refusal to submit to 

chemical testing was not knowing and conscious. Specifically, Licensee contends 

that “[t]he interpreter was not available for cross examination [which] should have 

put a doubt in [the trial court]’s mind as to whether [Licensee]’s refusal was 

conscious and knowing.” (Licensee Br. at 16.) Licensee maintains that because an 

interpreter’s services were used, the interpreter should have been required to testify 

at the hearing before the trial court. In support of this contention, Licensee cites an 

unreported decision of this Court, Godoy-Romero v. Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1173 C.D. 2012, 

filed Jan. 22, 2013).6 In Godoy-Romero, a licensee was arrested and taken to a 

hospital for chemical testing. At the hospital, the licensee informed the arresting 

officer that he did not understand English, and the officer utilized the services of an 

interpreter to communicate the implied consent warnings to the licensee. After the 

warnings were translated to the licensee, the interpreter stated, “No blood work. 

 

6

Pursuant to Section 414 of the Commonwealth Court's Internal Operating Procedures, 

“[p]arties may . . . cite an unreported panel decision of this court issued after January 15, 2008, 

for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” 
8

Just ticket.” Godoy-Romero, slip op. at 1. DOT suspended the licensee’s 

operating privileges based on the licensee’s refusal to submit to chemical testing, 

and the licensee appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court

sustained the licensee’s appeal and found that the officer’s testimony regarding the 

licensee’s refusal was not credible, because the officer “based his determination of 

the refusal on statements made by the interpreter who was not available for 

cross-examination.” Id., slip op. at 2. DOT appealed to this Court, which affirmed 

the common pleas court’s order. In so doing, we explained that the only evidence 

supporting the licensee’s refusal—the officer’s testimony—was determined by the 

common pleas court to be not credible. Because DOT failed to sustain its initial 

burden to show that the licensee refused chemical testing, the burden never shifted 

to the licensee to prove that his refusal was conscious and knowing. 

The instant matter is distinguishable from Godoy-Romero. Here, the 

trial court found that Officer Zaffino’s testimony was credible, despite the fact that 

the interpreter did not appear at the hearing before the trial court. Godoy-Romero

does not stand for the proposition that when a police officer engages the services of 

an interpreter, the interpreter must appear at the hearing before the trial court.7 

 

7 We note that it is “not the officer’s duty to enlist the assistance of an interpreter to make 

sure a motorist understands implied consent warnings.” Martinovic v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau 

of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 

834 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“Requiring certified interpreters for every driver who 

may have difficulty understanding a police officer . . . due to a . . . language barrier . . . is not 

only not required by the [I]mplied [C]onsent [L]aw, it is simply not feasible, particularly in the 

case of DUI investigations where temporal concerns are paramount.”), appeal denied, 849 A.2d 

241 (Pa. 2004). Rather, “[a]n officer’s sole duty is to inform motorists of the implied consent 

warnings; once they have done so, they have satisfied their obligation.” Martinovic, 881 A.2d at 

35 (emphasis in original).
9

Rather, the common pleas court in Godoy-Romero found the officer’s testimony to 

be not credible due to the interpreter’s absence, and that testimony was the only 

evidence supporting the licensee’s refusal. As noted above, there was no such 

determination in the instant matter. Licensee essentially asks us to make our own 

determinations as to the credibility of the witnesses, which, under our standard of 

review, we are unable to do. “Determinations as to the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight assigned to the evidence are solely within the province of the trial court 

as fact-finder.” Reinhart v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 954 

A.2d 761, 765 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). We, therefore, reject Licensee’s argument that 

his refusal to submit to chemical testing was not knowing and conscious, because 

the interpreter did not testify at the hearing before the trial court.

To the extent that Licensee argues that he was unable to make a 

knowing and conscious refusal, because he did not understand the implied consent 

warnings or the meaning of “chemical test” due to the “unprofessional” 

interpretation, we reject Licensee’s argument. The licensee bears the burden “to 

establish that []he was not capable of making a conscious and knowing refusal to 

submit to chemical testing.” Lanthier v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 22 A.3d 346, 348-49 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). “Whether a licensee satisfies 

the burden of showing an inability to make a knowing and conscious refusal of 

testing is a factual determination for the trial court to decide.” Gombar v. Dep’t of 

Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 678 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). 

“Such a determination must be affirmed on appeal if supported by competent 

evidence in the record.” Lanthier, 22 A.3d at 352.

Here, the trial court specifically determined that Licensee’s testimony 

concerning his understanding of the warnings and translation was not credible, 
10

because “Licensee also admitted that he made no attempt to communicate his 

alleged lack of understanding to the officer.” (Trial Ct. Op. at 3.) As noted above, 

we will not reevaluate the trial court’s credibility determinations on appeal. At the 

hearing before the trial court, Officer Zaffino testified that although Licensee 

seemingly did not speak English as well as his wife, Licensee was able to complete 

the field sobriety tests when Officer Zaffino explained them in English. (R.R. at 

11.7, 11.14.) On the way to the hospital, Officer Zaffino asked Licensee in English 

if he would consent to a blood test, and Licensee consented to the test without the 

need for an interpreter. (Id. at 11.7-11.8, 11.15-11.16.) Licensee heard the implied 

consent warnings in English, and the interpreter also translated the warnings for 

Licensee. (Id. at 11.8.) Licensee did not attempt to inform Officer Zaffino that he 

did not understand the warnings or the chemical test. (Id. at 11.22.) This 

testimony constitutes substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination 

that Licensee was capable of making a knowing and conscious refusal. We, 

therefore, reject Licensee’s argument that he was unable to make a knowing and 

conscious refusal, because he did not understand the implied consent warnings and 

chemical test.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Siamion Kremer, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 518 C.D. 2015

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, :

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 3rd day of February, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County is hereby AFFIRMED.

 

 P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge