J-S49010-17

2017 PA Super 349

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WALTER ANDREWS, 

Appellant.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1524 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000627-2015

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FITZGERALD J.*

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2017

Appellant, Walter Andrews, appeals from the September 9, 2016 

Judgment of Sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Venango 

County imposed after the trial court, sitting without a jury, found Appellant 

guilty of Failure to Comply with Registration Requirements.

1

 After careful 

review, we conclude that Appellant had until 12:00 midnight on the third 

business day to register his new address at an approved registration site. 

Appellant was arrested and booked into jail at 11:21 P.M. on the third 

business day, which tolled his registration requirements. Therefore, we 

reverse Appellant’s conviction and vacate Appellant’s Judgment of Sentence. 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1).
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The factual and procedural history is not in dispute. Appellant is a Tier 

III sex offender subject to the registration requirements under 

Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10–9799.41. On Friday, November 6, 2015, at 

7:19 P.M., while under parole supervision, Appellant left Guadenzia 

Residential Treatment Facility located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On 

Sunday, November 8, 2015, he arrived at 38 Prospect Avenue, Franklin, 

Pennsylvania, the home of Appellant’s husband, Thomas Andrews, who was 

also under parole supervision.

The Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) declared 

Appellant delinquent from supervision, deemed him to be an absconder, and 

issued a warrant for his arrest. PBPP relayed this information to PBPP Agent 

Pascoe, who was supervising Appellant in Philadelphia, and PBPP Agent 

Clarke, who was supervising Appellant’s husband in Franklin, Pennsylvania. 

On November 12, 2015, Agent Clarke and his colleague PBPP Agent 

Harriger went to Mr. Andrews’ home to check on Mr. Andrews and inquire 

about Appellant’s whereabouts. Before knocking on the front door, Agent 

Clarke did a perimeter security sweep of the home and heard voices inside. 

Looking through the window, Agent Clarke observed two males standing 

inside the kitchen. 

After calling for backup from local police, Agent Harriger knocked on 

the front door with Lieutenant Baker while Agent Clarke positioned himself 
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outside the rear of the home. Several minutes later, Mr. Andrews answered 

the door and allowed Agent Harriger, Lieutenant Baker, and Agent Clarke 

into the home. When asked if anyone else was present in the home, Mr. 

Andrews responded that no one else was there. After conducting a search of 

the home for approximately ninety minutes, the agents found Appellant 

hiding in an upstairs bedroom inside a cubbyhole located behind a dresser. 

Lieutenant Baker took Appellant to Venango County Jail, where Appellant 

was booked at 11:21 P.M. 

On July 12, 2016, after a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant 

guilty of Failure to Comply with Registration Requirements, and on 

September 9, 2016, sentenced him to a term of 46 to 120 months’ 

incarceration.

Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied 

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the trial court erred in finding the Commonwealth had 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [] Appellant had failed to 

register a change in residence or termination of residence within 

three business days as required by 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)? 

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

The offense of Failure to Comply with Registration Requirements

requires that the Commonwealth prove, inter alia, that an individual 

knowingly failed to register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required 

under SORNA. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1). Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 
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9799.15(g), a SORNA registrant must appear at an approved registration 

site within three “business days” after leaving or changing residence or 

lodging. The registration period is tolled if a registrant is incarcerated. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(c)(1)(i). 

Appellant acknowledges that, pursuant to the statute, he had three 

business days to register his address with the state police after leaving 

Guadenzia on Friday, November 6, 2015. Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant 

notes that November 7 and November 8, 2015, were weekend days, and 

Wednesday, November 11, 2015, was Veterans Day, a Pennsylvania state 

holiday. Id. Accordingly, he maintains that his arrest on Thursday, 

November 12, 2015, occurred on the third “business day.” Id. Appellant 

contends that once he was arrested and booked into jail at 11:21 P.M., his 

reporting requirements were tolled by statute. Id. Appellant further argues 

that “the trial court erred when it found that the business day ended at 5:00 

P.M. because the penal statute, which must be strictly construed, does not 

place a time limit on when a person may register during the business day 

and there are registration sites open at all times.” Id. 

Appellant’s sole issue on appeal requires this Court to interpret a 

statute, which implicates a question of law. Commonwealth v. Warren, 

84 A.3d 1092, 1095 (Pa. Super. 2014). Therefore, our scope of review is 

plenary, and our standard of review is de novo. Id.
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When interpreting a statute, this Court must apply the Statutory 

Construction Act of 1972. See 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. The object of all 

interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the legislature and give effect to all of the provisions of the 

statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). “When the words of a statute are clear and 

free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the 

pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Generally, a statute's 

plain language provides the best indication of legislative intent. 

Commonwealth v. Shiffler, 879 A.2d 185, 189 (Pa. 2005). See, e.g.,

Pennsylvania Fin. Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, 664 

A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1995) (“Where the words of a statute are clear and free 

from ambiguity the legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very 

words.”). In reading a statute’s plain language, “words and phrases shall be 

construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and 

approved usage, while any words or phrases that have acquired a peculiar 

and appropriate meaning must be construed according to that meaning.” 

Shiffler, supra at 189 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 However, when the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention 

of the legislature may be ascertained by considering, inter alia, the occasion 

and necessity for the statute; the mischief to be remedied; the object to be 

attained; the consequences of a particular interpretation; the legislative 
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history, and the legislative and administrative interpretations of such 

statute. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c). Importantly, “while statutes generally should 

be construed liberally, penal statutes are always to be construed strictly, 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1), and any ambiguity in a penal statute should be 

interpreted in favor of the defendant.” Shiffler, supra at 189. Finally, 

when ascertaining the intention of the legislature, we presume that the 

legislature “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution 

or unreasonable” and “intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.” 

1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1), (2). 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g), the statute at issue here, provides in 

relevant part:

[A]n individual specified in section 9799.13 shall appear in 

person at an approved registration site within three business 

days to provide current information relating to:

* * *

(2) A commencement of residence, change in residence, 

termination of residence or failure to maintain a residence, thus 

making the individual a transient.

* * *

(7) A commencement of temporary lodging, a change in 

temporary lodging or a termination of temporary lodging. In 

order to fulfill the requirements of this paragraph, the individual 

must provide the specific length of time and the dates during 

which the individual will be temporarily lodged.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g) (emphasis added). Appellant is challenging the 

trial court’s interpretation and application of the term “business days.” 
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The term “business days” is not defined in SORNA and there is a 

dearth of case law specifically defining the term. Instantly, both parties 

concede that the term “business days” excludes weekend days and 

Pennsylvania state holidays. Our examination of the Legislature’s intent 

supports this conclusion. The Legislature used the term “business days,” 

rather than just “days,” indicating an intent to distinguish certain “business 

days” from other days of the week. Likewise, we recognize that the 

“common and approved usage” of the term “business days” excludes 

weekend days and Pennsylvania state holidays. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903. See, 

e.g. Commonwealth v. Britton, 134 A.3d 83 (Pa. Super. 2016) (affirming 

the appellant’s conviction of Failure to Comply with Registration 

Requirements where the trial court had taken judicial notice that Appellant 

absconded from a halfway house on a Sunday and was arrested on a Friday, 

distinguishing weekend days from weekdays for purposes of determining 

three business days). Accordingly, we agree with the parties’ interpretation 

of the term “business days” to exclude weekend days and Pennsylvania state 

holidays.

The question then becomes: for purposes of SORNA registration, what 

time does a “business day” end? To answer this question, we must consider 

information relevant to the registration sites themselves. Pursuant to 

SORNA, the Pennsylvania State Police must “publish a list of approved 

registration sites in the Pennsylvania Bulletin and provide a list of approved 

registration sites in any notice sent to individuals required to register under 
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this subchapter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.32(2). See 45 Pa.B. 2690 (published 

May 30, 2015) (listing most recent approved registration sites). The list 

contains over 140 approved registration sites, including the name, address, 

and telephone number of each site. See 45 Pa.B. 2690 Only a few 

registration sites list their operating hours, and the closing times vary. See 

id. The Pennsylvania Bulletin provides that, “[p]rior to going to a site, it is 

recommended that individuals call the site to ensure that it is currently open 

to the public or that a registering official is there to process the individuals, 

or both.” Id. Significantly, Agent Clarke testified at Appellant’s trial that 

the Pennsylvania State Police Station, located twenty minutes from the 

home where Appellant was arrested, is an approved registration site that is 

open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. N.T. Trial, 7/12/16, at 

42-43. 

In light of the fact that: (1) the statute requires an individual to 

appear in person to register; (2) there are over 140 approved registration 

sites; (3) the registration sites are all open different hours; and (4) some 

registration sites are open twenty-four hours a day, we conclude that it was 

the intent of the legislature to allow an individual to register at any time 

before 12:00 midnight on the third business day after changing residences. 

To conclude differently would be unfair to a registrant who refers to the 

published list, contacts his local police barracks as instructed, learns that the 

police barracks is open twenty-four hours a day, and relies on that 

information to determine when he can register. 
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We, thus, hold that the term “business days” in 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9799.15(g) should be construed as excluding Saturday, Sunday, and 

Pennsylvania state holidays and as providing that the window on the third 

day of registration closes at 12:00 midnight. Accordingly, we agree with 

Appellant that the trial court erred when it convicted him of Failure to 

Comply with Registration Requirements because Appellant was booked into 

jail at 11:21 P.M., prior to 12:00 midnight on the third business day. See

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(c)(1)(i). 

Conviction reversed. Judgment of Sentence vacated.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/7/2017