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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : CRIMINAL ACTION

: NO. 03-632 

v. :

:

IAN NORRIS :

M E M O R A N D U M

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, J. JUNE 22, 2010

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION...............................................1

II. BACKGROUND.................................................3

III. ANALYSIS...................................................6

A. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in its Entirety........6

1. Sufficiency of the Indictment......................7

a. Applicable Law................................7

b. Count I.......................................8

c. Count II......................................8

d. Count III.....................................9

e. Count IV.....................................15

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.......................18

3. Due Process Rights................................20

B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Principle of Specialty......22

1. Applicable Law....................................22

2. Analysis..........................................23

C. Motion to Dismiss Based on Paragraph 19(f).............26

IV. CONCLUSION.................................................29

I. INTRODUCTION 

This case arises from a grand jury investigation of an

international conspiracy to fix the price of certain electrical

and mechanical carbon products that were sold in the United

States and elsewhere between 1989 and May 2000, as well as an

alleged scheme to obstruct the grand jury’s investigation of that
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price fixing conspiracy by tampering with witnesses and

withholding or destroying documents relevant to the grand jury

investigation. 

On September 28, 2004, a federal grand jury returned

the Second Superseding Indictment (the “Indictment”) against

Defendant Ian Norris (“Norris” or “Defendant”). The Indictment

contains four counts: (1) Count One alleges a violation of the

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1; (2) Count Two alleges a violation of

18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiring to violate two provisions of the

witness tampering statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) and (b)(2)(B)

(Indictment ¶ 13); (3) Count Three alleges a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) for “corruptly persuad[ing]” and attempting

to “corruptly persuade[]” other persons with the intent to

“influence their testimony in an official proceeding” (Id. ¶ 21);

and (4) Count Four alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1512(b)(2)(B) for “corruptly persuad[ing] other persons” with the

“intent to cause or induce those persons to alter, destroy,

mutilate or conceal records and documents, with [the] intent to

impair their availability for use in an official proceeding.”

(Id. ¶ 23). 

Norris is a national of the United Kingdom. On March

23, 2010, Norris was extradited from the United Kingdom (“U.K.”)

to the United States to face prosecution on Counts Two, Three,

and Four. Under the terms of the U.K. Order for Extradition
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Pursuant to Section 93(4) of the Extradition Act 2003, dated

September 22, 2008, Norris may not be prosecuted on Count One. 

On April 8, 2010, Norris appeared before the Court for

arraignment on Counts Two, Three, and Four, at which time he

entered a plea of not guilty to each of those Counts. Norris now

moves to dismiss those Counts in their entirety (docs. no. 25,

38, 42). 

In the first motion to dismiss, Defendant argues the

entire Indictment should be dismissed, both for failure to state

an offense and lack of subject matter jurisdiction (doc. no. 25). 

In the second motion to dismiss, Defendant argues the Indictment

should be dismissed to the extent it violates the principle of

specialty (doc. no. 38). In the third motion to dismiss,

Defendant argues Counts II and IV should be dismissed to the

extent these counts purport to state an offense based on the

allegedly faulty paragraph 19(f) of the Indictment (doc. no. 42.) 

Each motion is analyzed in turn. 

 For the following reasons, the Court will deny the motions

to dismiss. 

II. BACKGROUND

The Indictment alleges, among other things, that

between 1986 and October 2002, Norris was an executive of the UKbased The Morgan Crucible Company plc (“Morgan”). In 1998,

Norris became the Chief Executive Officer of Morgan. During that

same period, Morgan and its subsidiaries were engaged in the sale
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of carbon products in the United States (Indictment ¶ 6). 

In April 1999, the Antitrust Division was conducting a

federal grand jury investigation in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania into possible federal antitrust offenses committed

by the Defendant and others involving carbon products sold by

Morgan. (Id. ¶ 12.) In the course of that investigation, the

Division served Morganite, Industries, Inc. (“Morganite”), a U.S.

subsidiary of Morgan, with a subpoena duces tecum requiring it

and its affiliated companies to produce certain business records

related to the carbon products industry. Following service of

the subpoena, the Indictment alleges that Norris knowingly and

wilfully conspired and agreed with others to corruptly persuade

and attempt to corruptly persuade other persons with intent to

influence their testimony in an official proceeding, and to

corruptly persuade and attempt to corruptly persuade others with

intent to cause or induce them to alter, destroy, mutilate or

conceal records and documents with intent to impair their

availability for use in an official proceeding. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13.) 

The Indictment alleges that, in carrying out this

conspiracy, the Defendant and his co-conspirators: (1) provided

false and fictitious relevant and material information in

response to the grand jury investigation; (2) prepared a written

“script” which contained false information which was to be

followed by anyone questioned by either the Antitrust Division or

the federal grand jury; and (3) distributed the script to others
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who had information relevant to the grand jury investigation with

instructions to follow the script when answering questions posed

by either the grand jury or the Antitrust Division. Moreover,

the Indictment alleges that the conspirators removed, concealed,

or destroyed from business files any documents which contained

evidence of an anticompetitive agreement or reflected contacts

between or among competitors, and persuaded, directed and

instructed others to do the same. (Id. ¶ ¶ 14-18.) 

The Indictment further alleges that to achieve the

goals of the conspiracy, the conspirators committed numerous

overt acts, including the following: (1) the Defendant, in

response to the subpoena duces tecum served on Morganite, asked a

co-conspirator to assemble a task force to search through

Morgan’s business files and remove any documents that contained

evidence of Morgan’s price-fixing agreement or contacts with

competitors; (2) instructed and directed employees of Morgan to

remove and conceal or destroy such documents; (3) called several

co-conspirators to a meeting in England and discussed the grand

jury investigation, explored ways in which to justify or explain

the meeting Morgan had with competitors, and prepared false

summaries of those meetings, which falsely characterized them as

joint venture meetings and which deliberately excluded any

mention of the pricing discussions that occurred (“the script);

and (4) each of the co-conspirators agreed to follow the script

when questioned during the investigation, and they distributed
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the script to the Morgan employees who engaged in price fixing.

(Id. ¶¶ 19(a)-(n).) 

Moreover, allegedly in an effort to end the U.S.

investigation, a co-conspirator provided the false script to an

executive of a corporate price fixing co-conspirator with

instructions to deliver the script to his co-workers who were

potential witnesses because they had attended price fixing

meetings with Morgan and Morgan had already disclosed their names

to the authorities. The co-conspirator is also alleged to have

instructed the executive to have his coworkers follow the script,

treat it confidentially, and destroy it after it was distributed

and read. Later, Defendant and co-conspirators met with the same

executive to further attempt to persuade him to instruct his

employees to adhere to the false script when giving testimony in

the U.S. investigation as a means to put an end to the U.S.

investigation and prevent it from spreading to Europe. (Id. ¶¶

19(u)-(ee)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment in its Entirety

Defendant moves to dismiss the Indictment for three

reasons: (1) the Indictment fails to state an offense; (2) the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and (3) extraterritorial

application of § 1512(b) to Norris’s conduct would violate his

Fifth Amendment’s Due Process rights. Each argument is analyzed

in turn. 
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1. Sufficiency of the Indictment 

a. Applicable Law 

A district court may grant a pretrial motion to dismiss

an indictment, or a portion thereof, if the indictment's

allegations do not suffice to charge an offense. United States

v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002). When deciding a

motion to dismiss the indictment, the court must accept as true

the factual allegations set forth in the pleading. United States

v. Besmajian, 90 F.2d 1153, 1154 (3d Cir. 1990). The Third

Circuit has held that an indictment is sufficient if it “(1)

contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged, (2)

sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared

to meet, and (3) allows the defendant to show with accuracy to

what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction in the

event of a subsequent prosecution.” U.S. v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257,

280 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.

87, 117 (1974) (“It is generally sufficient that an indictment

set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself provided

that ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly,

without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements 

necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’”)

(quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).

Finally, an indictment “may not properly be challenged by a

pretrial motion on the ground that it is not supported by

adequate evidence.” United States v. Gallagher, 602 F.2d 1139,
Count II charges the Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. 1

§ 371. The elements of the offense are: (1) that two or more

persons agreed to commit an offense against the United States, as

charged in the indictment; (2) that the defendant was a party to

or a member of that agreement; (3) that the defendant joined the

agreement or conspiracy knowing of its objectives to commit an

offense against the United States and intending to join together

with at least one other alleged conspirator to achieve those

objectives; that is, that the defendant and at least one other

alleged conspirator shared a unity of purpose and intent to

achieve a common goal or objective to commit an offense against

the United States; and (4) that at some point during the

existence of the agreement or conspiracy at least one of its

members performed an overt act in order to further objectives of

the agreement. See Third Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions

6.18.371A, December 2009; see also United States v. Uzzolino, 651

F.2d 207, 214 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Small, 472 F.2d

818, 819 (3d Cir. 1972). 

Count II of the Indictment alleges Norris “knowingly

and wilfully conspired and agreed with unnamed co-conspirators,

both known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to knowingly and

wilfully commit offenses against the United States, that is: (a)

to corruptly persuade and attempt to corruptly persuade other

persons known to the Grand Jury with intent to influence their

testimony in an official proceeding; and (b) to corruptly

persuade and attempt to corruptly persuade other persons known to

the Grand Jury with intent to cause or induce those other persons

to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal records and documents with

the intent to impair their availability for use in an official

proceeding; that is, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, conducting a price-fixing investigation

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1142 (3d Cir. 1979)).

b. Count I

As stated above, under the terms of the U.K. Order for

Extradition, Norris may not be prosecuted on Count One. Although

Defendant has not yet specifically moved to dismiss Count One,

the parties agree that prosecution on this Count is barred by the

terms of the Extradition Order. 

c. Count II1
of the carbon products industry, contrary to Title 18, United

States Code, Section 1512(b)(1) and Section 1512(b)(2)(B),

respectively.” (Indictment ¶ 13.) 

The Indictment alleges that Norris knowingly agreed

with unnamed co-conspirators to commit numerous overt acts in

furtherance of the charged conspiracy, that the purpose of the

agreement was to tamper with witnesses and corrupt persuasion to

destroy or conceal documents which were the subject of the grand

jury investigation, and that numerous overt acts took place in

furtherance of that agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 12-19.) Count II is

therefore sufficient on its face.

Count III charges Defendant with witness tampering, in 2

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). The elements of the offense

are: (1) the defendant knowingly corruptly persuaded or attempted

to corruptly persuade some person; (2) the defendant acted with

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Defendant argues that Count II is insufficient only

because Counts III and IV are insufficient. See, e.g., United

States v. McNutt, 908 F.2d 561, 565 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Where the

underlying offense agreed upon by the putative conspirators does

not constitute a substantive violation of federal law no

conspiracy can be effectuated under 18 U.S.C. § 371.") 

The Government disagrees and argues that Count II may

survive even if Counts III and IV fail because conspiracy to

commit an offense and the taking of a single step toward its

commission by any of the co-conspirators is sufficient to state

an offense. See United States v. Nelson, 825 F.2d 705, 713 (3d

Cir. 1988) (a single overt act by any member of the conspiracy is

sufficient to satisfy this element). Because the Court finds,

infra, that Counts III and IV are sufficient, Count II is also

sufficient. 

d. Count III2
intent to influence the testimony of that person in an official

proceeding; (3) the defendant knew or should have known that the

official proceeding was pending or likely to be instituted; and

(4) the official proceeding was a federal proceeding. See Third

Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions 6.18.1512B, December 2009; see

also, United States v. Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 248-50 (3d Cir.

1999); United States v. Richardson, 265 Fed. App’x 62, 65 (3d

Cir. Feb. 19, 2008). 

Count III alleges that Defendant “corruptly persuaded

and attempted to corruptly persuade persons, whose identities are

known to the Grand Jury, with intent to influence their testimony

in an official proceeding, that is the federal grand jury sitting

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania investigating, among

other things, possible federal criminal antitrust violations

occurring in the carbon products industry and committed by the

defendant and others.” (Indictment ¶ 21)

Moreover, the Indictment further specifies that in

committing the offense the Defendant: (a) gathered coconspirators in response to the investigation and that they

agreed (i) to falsely character price-discussion meetings they

had with competitors as legitimate joint venture meetings and

(ii) to prepare written summaries of their price discussion

meetings that falsely characterized them as legitimate joint

venture meetings (Id. ¶¶ 19(g-k)); (b) Defendant and coconspirators agreed that when questioned during the investigation

they would falsely characterize the price-discussion meetings as

joint venture meetings as reflected in the written summaries they

prepared (Id. ¶ 19(1)); (c) one of Defendant’s co-conspirators

(i) met with an executive (CW-1) of a company that had

participated in the price-fixing conspiracy to discuss the United

States investigation; (ii) gave that executive meeting summaries

that falsely characterized meetings their two companies had held;

(iii) told that executive the summaries contained the story of

what Morgan executives had told the authorities in connection

with the investigation; (iv) asked the executive to distribute

false summaries to potential witnesses at his company who had

attended price-fixing meetings; and (v) told the executive that

it would benefit the executive’s company if “the recollection” of

those individuals who had attended meetings was the same or

similar to Morgans (Id. ¶¶ 19(u-z)); and (d) the Defendant then

met with CW-1 and discussed the grand jury investigation being

conducted by the Antitrust Division, telling CW-1 that he knew

CW-1's company was aware of the story that Morgan had told

authorities, that CW-1's company’s employees should give the same

testimony in order to have the U.S. grand jury investigation

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closed, and that employees who, in contrast, might tell the truth

should be separated from the company before they were questioned

so that the company could not force them to testify (Id. ¶¶

19(aa-ee)). 

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i. Defendant’s Argument

Defendant argues that the Indictment’s allegations

relating to Count III fail for several reasons: (1) Defendant is

not alleged to have “persuaded” anyone; (2) Defendant is not

alleged to have “corruptly” persuaded anyone; (3) the alleged

plan to remove potentially truth-telling employees from Morgan

fails to state an offense; and (4) the alleged meeting between

Defendant and CW-1 fails to state an offense. 

Defendant emphasizes that the Indictment allegations,

as they relate to the alleged “script” and “rehearsal” fail to

specifically allege that Defendant actually “persuaded” or

“attempted to persuade” anyone as to any testimony. Rather,

Defendant argues that the Indictment’s allegations that he

directed co-conspirators to gather Morgan’s business records and

discussed the grand jury investigation are all perfectly lawful

conduct. 

ii. Analysis 

Defendant essentially argues that the Indictment fails

to allege an offense because the factual allegations contained in

the Indictment may have innocent explanations. His arguments are
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an attack on the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence, not on

the sufficiency of the Indictment itself. At this stage, the

Government need not supply the specific evidence through which to

show Defendant’s intent to obstruct justice.

In this case, the Indictment contains a plain, concise

and definite written statement of the essential facts

constituting the crime charged. The Indictment sets forth

clearly each element of the offense and is sufficient to permit

the Defendant to prepare his defense. The Indictment tracks the

language of the statutes and then alleges facts that, read

together with the charging language, could lead a jury to

conclude that Defendant violated the statutes. See United States

v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States

v. Farrell, 126 F.3d 484, 488 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that

“corrupt persuasion” includes “attempting to persuade someone to

provide false information to federal investigators.”)

 First, Defendant argues the Indictment does not allege

he “persuaded” anyone to tell a false story because the

Indictment alleges he and his co-conspirators “discussed and

agreed” to create and tell a story in connection with the grand

jury investigation. However, as the Government argues, the

following allegations all support the charge that Defendant

corruptly persuaded others and conspired to do so. Norris is

alleged to have: (1) directed the preparation of a list of pricefixing meetings; (2) called a meeting at which he and his co-
Defendant primarily relies on Greenidge and Panarella 3

to argue the Indictment fails to charge an offense. See

Government of Virgin Islands v. Greenidge, 600 F.2d 437 (3d Cir.

1979) (finding that the assault victim and the potential rape

victim were alleged to be different and the statute required that

they be the same); Panarella, 277 F.3d at 684-85 (rejecting

defendant’s argument that the specific facts alleged in the

superseding information did not amount to honest services wire

fraud). Defendant’s reliance on Greenidge and Panarella is

misplaced. 

In Greenidge, the factual allegations could not be

consistent with a statutory element and thus could not support

the charge. However, here, the factual allegations made in the

Indictment when accepted as true, as they must be, are consistent

with and support each of the offenses charged and thus do not

fall beyond their reach. 

In Panarella, the defendant was indicted for being an

accessory after the fact to a wire fraud scheme. Panarella, 277

F.3d at 681. After entering a guilty plea, he challenged the

sufficiency of the charge on the grounds that it failed to allege

that the payments were bribes or that the legislator's actions

were improperly influenced by them. Id. at 682. The Third

Circuit disagreed and found that no such allegation of proof is

required and the mere fact that the legislator received the

payments while failing, in violation of state law, to disclose

them before partaking in a discretionary action that benefitted

the payor sufficiently set forth a charge of honest services

fraud. Id. at 697. Here, the allegations in the Indictment go

beyond tracking the language of the statute, provide much detail

to the alleged crimes and certainly charge an offense for the

purposes of Rule 12(b)(3)(B). 

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conspirators “discussed” the antitrust investigation; (3)

“agreed” with co-conspirators at a meeting to tell a false story

about what had occurred at their meetings; (4) later “cross

examined” each other on the “materially false and fictitious

information contained in the script”; and (5) urged other

persons, if asked, to tell the false story the co-conspirators

had created.3
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Second, Defendant insists that the characterization of

price-fixing discussions as joint venture discussions could be

true in some situations and involve activity that is legal under

the antitrust laws. The Indictment specifically alleged that the

“defendant and the co-conspirators agreed that they would falsely

characterize their meetings with competitors as joint venture

meetings rather than truthfully describe them as price discussion

meetings” (Indictment ¶ 19(j)). Thus, the Indictment alleges

that the meetings discussed in the script were not in fact joint

venture meetings and that the Defendant and co-conspirators who

created the script did not think they were joint venture

meetings. It is for the jury to decide whether the meetings

documented in the script in fact involved discussions of joint

ventures or discussions of price fixing. 

Third, the Indictment’s allegations regarding the

separation of truth telling employees are relevant to, and

further support, the Indictment’s allegations that the

information in the script was false and that the Defendant and

co-conspirators were engaged in an effort to persuade potential

witnesses in the grand jury investigation to provide false

information. 

For these reasons, the Court finds Count III to be

sufficient. 
Count Four charges Defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 4

1512(b)(2)(B). The elements of the offense are: (1) the

defendant knowingly and corruptly persuaded or attempted to

corruptly persuade some person; (2) the defendant acted with

intent to cause or induce that person to alter, destroy, mutilate

or conceal and object with the intent to impair the object’s

integrity or availability for use in an official proceedings; (3)

the defendant knew or should have known that the official

proceeding was pending or likely to be instituted; and (4) the

official proceeding was a federal proceeding. See Third Circuit

Pattern Jury Instructions 6.18.1512B, December 2009; see also

United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 688 (3d Cir. 1999);

United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 2009 WL 1688482, at *52-53

(E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009). 

Count Four alleges Defendant “knowingly corruptly

persuaded other persons . . . with intent to cause or induce

those persons to alter, destroy, mutilate or conceal records and

documents, with intent to impair their availability for use in an

official proceeding, that is the federal grand jury sitting in

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania investigating . . . possible

federal criminal antitrust violations occurring in the carbon

products industry and committed by the defendant and others.

(Indictment ¶ 23.)

Among other things, Count Four states that in

committing the offense: (a) in response to the Morganite federal

grand jury subpoena, Defendant instructed others to conceal or

destroy records contain evidence of price-fixing agreements or

contracts with competitors (Id. ¶¶ 12, 19(a)); (b) Defendant (i)

asked a co-conspirator to assemble a task force to remove

documents that contained evidence of price-fixing or contacts

with competitors; (ii) the co-conspirators assembled a task force

and directed its members to conceal or destroy any evidence of

price-fixing or contacts with competitors that they found; and

(iii) as a result of their efforts, co-conspirators actually

concealed or destroyed such evidence (Id. ¶¶ 19(b-d)); and (c)

Defendant directed another co-conspirator to instruct a person to

conceal or destroy any documents that contained evidence of price

fixing or contacts with competitors (Id. ¶ 19(f)). 

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e. Count IV4

i. Defendant’s Argument 

Defendant argues that Count IV fails to state an

offense because: (1) he is only alleged to have instructed
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removal of Morgan Documents and there is nothing per se unlawful

in this conduct; and (2) the Indictment fails to satisfy the

“nexus” requirement between the destruction and the specific

official proceeding. 

ii. Analysis 

As in Count III, the crux of Defendant’s claim as to

Count IV rests largely on his assertion that the allegations set

forth in the overt acts section are insufficient to prove guilt. 

As explained earlier, dismissal of the Indictment pretrial may

not be predicated upon insufficiency of evidence to prove the

Indictment’s charges. 

First, Defendant argues that the Indictment is

insufficient because it does not allege that he personally asked

anyone to conceal or destroy evidence and he cannot be held

responsible for co-conspirators who did. This argument is

contrary to well settled case law. Under Pinkerton v. United

States, Norris is liable for all reasonably foreseeable acts of

his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. 328 U.S.

640, 647-48 (1946). Accordingly, he may be liable for his coconspirators’ acts to conceal or destroy evidence in furtherance

of their price-fixing conspiracy. 

Second, Defendant asserts that the charge fails because

whatever documents he may have intended to conceal or destroy

were not Morganite documents and thus were not subject to the

grand jury’s subpoena.
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The Court disagrees. The subpoena itself asked for

documents from all “affiliates” and stated it “relate[d] to the

manufacture and sale of specialty graphite worldwide,” which was

defined to include carbon brushes and included specific

references to documents reflecting communications with Morgan and

documents reflecting meetings and communications between any

manufacturers of specialty graphite and specifically called for

such communications between Morganite and Morgan that related to

a third party manufacturer. (See Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss, Ex. 1;

Govt.’s Sur-reply at 7.) Therefore, a reasonable reading of the

subpoena informs that it called for Morgan documents, as well as

Morganite documents. 

Third, Defendant’s contention that he could not have

impaired the availability of foreign-based documents because they

were beyond the grand jury subpoena power is irrelevant. The

statute requires only that the Defendant’s action be taken “with

intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use

in an official proceeding.” 18 U.S.C. §1512(b)(2)(B). The

offense could have occurred even before the grand jury was

empaneled and had authority to issue subpoenas. See 18 U.S.C.

§1512(f)(1) (“an official proceeding need not be pending or about

to be instituted at the time of the offense”). Here, the

relevance of the Morganite subpoena (which also sought Morgan

documents) is that it allegedly informed Defendant of the

existence of the federal grand jury’s price-fixing investigation. 
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As explained earlier, it is for the jury to decide if Defendant

and his co-conspirators’ actions to destroy or conceal documents

were taken with intent to impair their availability in the grand

jury investigation. 

For these reasons, the Court finds Count IV to be

sufficient. 

2. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Norris argues that the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction because the Indictment fails to plead a “substantial

effect” in the United States. However, Norris concedes that §

1512(h), by its language, applies to foreign conduct. 18 U.S.C.

1512(h) (“There is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an

offense under this section.”). Defendant seems to argue that

because the Government does not specifically invoke § 1512(h),

the language is insufficient to overcome the presumption against

extraterritorial application of federal statutes because it

conflicts with principles of international law. 

Here, Norris argues that the exercise of congressional

authority must still comport with international law. He relies

on Wright-Baker for the proposition that extraterritorial

jurisdiction must comport with the requirements of one of the

five theories of criminal jurisdiction under international law.

United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161, 167 n.5 (3d Cir.

1986), superseded on other grounds by statute, United States v.

Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1993). Norris further
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argues that the “substantial effect” test is appropriate in this

case because his alleged conduct is wholly foreign. He argues

that the Indictment must allege that his foreign conduct had a

“substantial effect” on the “official proceeding”, i.e. the grand

jury investigation, or otherwise in the United States. Thus,

Norris argues that because the Indictment fails to allege his

conduct had any substantial effect in the United States, there is

no subject matter jurisdiction. 

Defendant’s reliance on Wright-Barker is misplaced. As

the Third Circuit made clear in Martinze- Hidalgo, an inquiry

into international law is only necessary where congressional

intent is unclear: 

There is, of course, no doubt the Congress may override

international law by clearly expressing its intent to do

so. . . . Inasmuch as Congress in section 955a expressed

no such intent, we felt obligated in Wright-Barker to

apply the nexus test as required by international law.

But 46 U.S.C. app. § 1903(d) expresses the necessary

congressional intent to override international law to the

extent that international law might require a nexus to

the United States for the prosecution of the offenses

defined in the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.

Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056 (internal citation

omitted). 

Here, as in Martinez-Hidalgo, Congress has made clear

its intent to reach conduct outside of the United States. As

such, there is no need to apply principles of international law. 

See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (“As

long as Congress has indicated its intent to reach such conduct,
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a United States court is ‘bound to follow the Congressional

direction unless this would violate the due process clause of the

Fifth Amendment.’”) (citation omitted); see also Pasquantino v.

Untied States, 544 U.S. 349, 379 (2005) (J. Ginsburg, dissenting)

(Congress “has the sole authority to determine the

extraterritorial reach of domestic laws”).

Finally, the Court notes that in Wright-Barker the

Court did find jurisdiction because the defendant’s conduct was

intended to affect the United States, regardless of any actual

effect. 784 F.2d at 168-69. In this case, Defendant’s alleged

attempt to obstruct a United States grand jury investigation

would have had an intended effect in the United States. 

3. Due Process Rights 

Defendant argues that the extraterritorial application

of § 1512(b) would violate his Fifth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause rights because he did not and could not have had notice

that the conduct alleged could result in criminal liability in

the United States. 

Defendant cites the Arthur Anderson case where the

Supreme Court noted, “‘[w]e have traditionally exercised

restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,

both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, and out of

concern that a fair warning should be given to the world in

language that the common world will understand, of what the law

intends to do if a certain line is passed[.]’” Arthur Anderson,
Because Norris is a national of the U.K., the 5

Government sought to extradite him to the United States to stand

trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. On September 29,

2005, the U.K. Home Secretary ordered that he should stand trial.

This decision was upheld by the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court

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544 U.S. at 703 (citation omitted). Norris argues that he lacked

fair warning that actions taken in the U.K. to “prepare a

defense” in conjunction with alleged co-conspirators would

violate U.S. law. (Def.’s Br. at 13.) Thus, he claims that he

did not have fair notice that these defensive steps could form

the basis for substantive violations of United States law. 

The Court disagrees. As noted earlier, the language of

the statute explicitly informs the Defendant of its application

outside the United States. See 18 U.S.C. 1512(h) (“There is

extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this

section.”). Moreover, that the conduct prohibited by the statute

constituted a crime should not have come as a surprise to

Defendant, given that the same conduct constitutes a crime under

U.K. law. Indeed, the House of Lords found, “we are satisfied

that, if Mr. Norris had done in England what he is alleged to

have done in counts 2 to 4 [of the Indictment], with the

intention of obstructing an investigation being carried out into

possible criminal conduct, in regard to fixing prices in the

carbon products industry, by the duly appointed body in the

United Kingdom, he would indeed have been guilty of offences of

conspiring to obstruct justice or of obstructing justice, which

could have attracted a sentence of twelve months’ imprisonment.”5
and the House of Lords. 

-22-

See Norris v. Government of the United States of America and

Others, [2008] UKHL 16 at ¶ 101. 

http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd0803

12/norris.pdf. 

B. Motion to Dismiss Based on Principle of Specialty 

Defendant filed a separate motion to dismiss arguing

the Indictment violates the principle of specialty (doc. no. 38). 

He argues the Indictment contains allegations that exceed the

scope of the Extradition Order upon which he was brought to the

United States. 

1. Applicable Law 

“The principle of specialty requires that an extradited

defendant be tried for the crimes on which extradition has been

granted, and none other.” United States v. Thomas, 322 Fed.

App’x 177, 181 (3d Cir. Apr. 16, 2009) (citing United States v.

Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289, 1297 (3d Cir. 1991)). The U.S.-U.K.

Extradition Treaty expresses this principle as follows:

A person extradited shall not be detained or proceeded against

in the territory of the requesting Party for any offense other

than an extraditable offense established by the facts in

respect of which his extradition has been granted . . . .

U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, art. XII(1) (1972); id., art. XVIII

(2003). “[T]he inquiry into specialty boils down to . . .

whether the surrendering state would deem the conduct for which
-23-

the requesting state actually prosecutes the defendant as

interconnected with (as opposed to independent from) the acts for

which he was extradited.” United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d

754, 767 (1st Cir. 1995).

2. Analysis 

The Extradition Order ordered Defendant’s extradition

for the “offenses listed in the attached schedule.” (Norris

Extradition Order (Sept. 22, 2008).) The Order avers that

Defendant, between April 1, 1999 and May 31, 2000: (1) directed

an employee of Morgan to prepare false and misleading material to

be provided to a judicial investigation; (2) encouraged

executives, officers and employees of Morgan, Morganite and other

companies to provide false and misleading evidence to a judicial

investigation; and (3) concealed, destroyed or removed

information relevant and material to the judicial investigation. 

(Id.) 

Defendant argues that several paragraphs of the

Indictment allege conduct beyond May 31, 2000, and therefore do

not satisfy the principle of speciality. Specifically, the

conspiratorial period for Count II is alleged to have spanned

“[f]rom in or about April 1999, and continuing thereafter until

in or about August 2001.” (Indictment ¶ 13). Moreover, several

of the alleged overt acts included under Paragraph 19 occurred

after May 31, 2000. Accordingly, Defendant argues those

allegations that rely on Paragraphs 19(f) and (t) through (ee)
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should be stricken.

The Court does not agree. Defendant does not provide,

and the Court cannot locate, any legal basis for the Court to

strike particular allegations from the Indictment based on

timeline objections. Rather, Defendant’s motion presents what is

likely an evidentiary issue, rather than a legal issue relating

to the law of specialty. See United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d

146, 153 (8th Cir. 1987) (the doctrine of specialty “has never

been construed to permit foreign intrusion into the evidentiary

or procedural rules of the requisitioning state, as distinguished

from limiting the jurisdiction of domestic courts to try or

punish the fugitive for any crimes committed before the

extradition, except the crimes for which he was extradited.”)

(quotations omitted). Here, the offenses upon which the

Defendant was extradited, and for which he is being tried, are

the obstruction of justice offense charged in Counts II, III and

IV of the Indictment. 

Moreover, upon request for comment by the U.S., the

Secretary of State for the Home Department of the U.K. (“U.K.

Secretary of State”) stated, “Mr. Norris’ trial on obstruction of

justice charges in the Second Superceding Indictment would not be

a breach of specialty, as specialty is interpreted in the United

Kingdom in the context of requests for extradition.” (See Letter
United States courts have consulted with the sending 6

state on whether there has been a breach of the principle of

speciality. See, e.g., United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407,

415 (1886); United States v. Diwan, 864 F.2d 715, 720-21 (11th 

Cir. 1989); Fiocconi v. Attorney General of U.S., 462 F.2d 475,

481 (2d Cir. 1972). 

-25-

of the U.K. Secretary, June 2, 2010). The U.K. Secretary of 6

State further stated, “[i]t is not clear to the [U.K.] Secretary

of State why the two draft English law charges were drafted in a

way that limited the dates therein to May 2000,” and she

“acknowledge[d] that the extradition request made it clear that

whil[e] the price fixing conspiracy was alleged to have ended in

May 2000, the conduct underpinning the obstruction of justice

allegations was clearly alleged in the request to have continued

thereafter.” Id. As the correspondence from the U.K. Secretary

of State unequivocally denotes, the U.K. does not regard the

prosecution of Norris on Counts II, III and IV of the Indictment

as a breach of the extradition treaty or the principle of

specialty. 

Assuming arguendo that the U.K. had limited the scope

of Norris’ extradition to various acts of obstruction of justice

occurring between April 1, 1999 and May 31, 2000, he may

nevertheless be tried for Counts II through IV of the Indictment

because his later acts are interconnected to the acts occurring

prior to May 31, 2000. The Third Circuit in Thomas rejected

defendant’s argument that his prosecution was inconsistent with
-26-

the rule of specialty because his extradition order did not

mention the offense of continuing a criminal enterprise relating

to his indictment’s counts of money laundering and drug offenses.

Thomas, 322 Fed App’x at 179. In Thomas, the Third Circuit found

the defendant was properly tried and convicted for an offense

that was not even mentioned in the extradition order. Here, the

Defendant was charged and is being tried on precisely the

offenses listed in the extradition order. Accordingly, his trial

on obstruction of justice offenses does not violate the principle

of specialty. 

C. Motion to Dismiss Based on Paragraph 19(f)

In a separate motion to dismiss (doc. no. 42),

Defendant argues that Counts II and IV should be dismissed

because paragraph 19(f) of the Indictment does not relate to an

“official proceeding”. Paragraph 19(f) reads: 

In or about May 1999, the defendant directed a

co-conspirator (CC-1) to instruct an employee of one of

Morgan’s United States subsidiaries to go through his

business files and remove and conceal or destroy any

documents that contained evidence of Morgan’s price-fixing

agreement with its competitors or referred to contacts

between or among Morgan and its competitors. In or about

August 2001, the employee destroyed documents relevant to

the grand jury’s investigation due to the instructions from

CC-1. 

(Indictment ¶ 19(f).)

Defendant argues that the alleged instruction to CC-1

had no nexus to the particular “official proceeding” alleged in

the Indictment. Defendant claims that in May 1999, that
-27-

“official proceeding” comprised only the grand jury investigation

of alleged price fixing relating to specialty graphite products

and that, in contrast, the alleged instruction to CC-1 could only

have concerned documents relating to mechanical carbon products,

which were not called for by the April 1999 Subpoena and would

not be called for until 28 months later. Accordingly, he argues

there was no official proceeding relating to mechanical carbon

products in 1999 and, as such, Counts Two and Four of the

Indictment should be dismissed because they both purport to rely

on Paragraph 19(f) as the factual predicate for the alleged

violations. 

However, as the Government notes, the April 1999

Subpoena relates to “all carbon and engineered graphite materials

products[].” (Def.’s Mot., doc. no. 42 at 3 (quoting April 1999

subpoena).) This is a broad definition that could reasonably

include mechanical carbon products. Defendant’s argument seems

to turn on a technical, and unimportant, definition of carbon

products. 

Moreover, even assuming arguendo that mechanical carbon

products were not being investigated in 1999, the offense of

evidence tampering (and the conspiracy charge relating to it)

merely requires action intended to impair the integrity of

availability of evidence for use in an official proceeding. 

There is no requirement that any official proceeding actually
-28-

exist, thus, the offense can occur even before a grand jury is

empaneled. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (“an official proceeding

need not be pending or be instituted at the time of the

offense”); Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 707-708 (“It is, however,

one thing to say that a proceeding ‘need not be pending or about

to be instituted at the time of the offense,’ and quite another

to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.”); United States

v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding no

error with jury instruction that read “It is not necessary for

the Government to prove the Defendant knew he was breaking any

particular criminal law, nor need the government prove that the

Defendant knew that the official proceeding was before a federal

grand jury. An official proceeding includes a proceeding before

a federal grand jury. The grand jury proceeding need not be

pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense."). 

Accordingly, the case law instructs that the requisite

nexus can be established by showing the Defendant foresaw that

the documents would likely be called for by an official

proceeding, even if that proceeding was not pending at the time

of the offense. In this case, the requisite nexus between the

offense and the proceeding may be established regardless of

whether the evidence shows that the allegedly destroyed documents

were explicitly called for by the April 1999 subpoena. See

Arthur Anderson, 544 U.S. at 707. 
-29-

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss the

Indictment will be denied. An appropriate order follows.