IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-60550

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

THOMAS WAYNE CLIFTON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:08-CR-67-1

Before SMITH, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Thomas Wayne Clifton appeals the 48-month sentence he received 

following the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that his plea, 

pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to a Mississippi 

rape charge was insufficient evidence that he violated the mandatory condition 

of his supervised release that he not commit another federal, state, or local 

offense.

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 20, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release if it finds by 

a preponderance of the evidence that he has violated a condition of his release. 

United States v. Minnitt, 617 F.3d 327, 332 (5th Cir. 2010); 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). We review for abuse of discretion. See Minnitt, 617 F.3d at 332. 

Revocation of supervised release does not require proof sufficient to sustain a 

criminal conviction. United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 481 (5th Cir. 

2005). Instead, “[a]ll that is required is enough evidence, within a sound 

judicial discretion,” to satisfy the district court that the defendant has violated 

the terms of his supervised release. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Mississippi procedure permits a defendant to enter an Alford plea, which 

allows him to maintain his innocence but concede the State had sufficient 

evidence to convict him. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 119 So. 3d 404, 408 (Miss. 

Ct. App. 2013). Here, Clifton confirmed that he was entering an Alford plea 

because, based on three days of trial testimony, he would likely be convicted. 

Given Mississippi’s treatment of Alford pleas, Clifton’s Alford plea was 

sufficient evidence to satisfy the district court that Clifton’s conduct had not 

met the conditions of his supervised release. See Spraglin, 418 F.3d at 481; see

United States v. Fleming, 3 F.3d 437, 1993 WL 347098, *1 (5th Cir. 1993).

Clifton argues that his 48-month sentence, which was above the 

guidelines policy statement range of 30 to 37 months, was greater than 

necessary to achieve the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. He contends that a 

sentence within the recommended policy statement range was warranted 

because prior to incarceration, he was a productive member of society, working 

at Wal-Mart, and supporting his family, and he had spent four years in state 

custody and was transferred into the Marshals’ custody on the day he was 

supposed to be released.

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This court generally reviews “a sentence imposed on revocation of 

supervised release under a ‘plainly unreasonable’ standard, in a two-step 

process.” United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2013). In 

conducting this review, this court follows the procedural and substantive 

considerations that are employed in the review of original sentences, but 

provides more deference to revocation sentences than to original sentences. 

See United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). As Clifton argues 

no procedural error, the issue is whether his sentence was substantively 

reasonable under abuse of discretion review. See Warren, 720 F.3d at 326.

The district court may impose any sentence that falls within the 

appropriate statutory maximum term of imprisonment allowed for the 

revocation sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In so doing, the district court is 

directed to consider the factors enumerated in § 3553(a), including the 

nonbinding policy statements found in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing 

Guidelines. United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 90-93 (5th Cir. 1994).

By statute, the maximum term of imprisonment to which the district 

court could sentence Clifton upon revocation of his supervised release was five 

years. See § 3583(e)(3). Thus, Clifton’s sentence was within the statutory 

maximum. Additionally, the court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors

when it discussed Clifton’s policy statement range of imprisonment and 

Clifton’s “history and characteristics.” See § 3553(a)(1), (a)(4)(B). Thus, 

Clifton’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable.

AFFIRMED.

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