IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ARTHUR BOMAR,

 Petitioner

v. 

JOHN E. WETZEL, Secretary, Pennsylvania 

Department of Corrections; ROBERT 

GILMORE, Superintendent of the State 

Correctional Institution at Greene; and 

STEVEN R. GLUNT, Superintendent of the 

State Correctional Institution at Rockview, 

 

 Respondents. 

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CIVIL ACTION

No. 2004-cv-1730 

Honorable Juan R. Sanchez, U.S.D.J. 

THIS IS A CAPITAL CASE

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

LEOR VELEANU

JENNIFER CHICCARINO

KATHERINE E. ENSLER

Federal Community Defender Office 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

601 Walnut St., Suite 545W 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

215-928-0520 

leor_veleanu@fd.org 

jennifer_chiccarino@fd.org 

katherine_ensler@fd.org 

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated: June 19, 2017

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 

Notes of testimony of state court proceedings are cited as “NT” followed by the date and 

page number(s). References to documents in the District Court docket are cited as “Doc. 

[number],” with the numbers corresponding to the District Court’s docket index. 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued two opinions in this case. Commonwealth v. 

Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) (direct appeal), is cited as Bomar I; and Commonwealth v. 

Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2014) (PCRA appeal), is cited as Bomar II. 

All other citations are either self-explanatory or will be explained. 

 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................... i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................................................. 2

Claim I. Petitioner’s Right to Due Process Was Violated When He Was Tried While 

Incompetent and Unable to Rationally Assist Counsel........................................... 2

Claim II. Petitioner’s Convictions and Death Sentence Violated Due Process of Law 

Because Two Witnesses Against Him Received Consideration for Their 

Testimony that Was Not Disclosed to The Jury, and the Prosecutor Failed to 

Correct Their False Testimony. .............................................................................. 4

Claim III. Statements Were Taken From Petitioner on More Than One Occasion in 

Violation of Petitioner’s Right to Due Process Under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; Trial and Appellate Counsel Failed to Properly Raise a Due 

Process Claim.......................................................................................................... 7

Claim IV. Petitioner’s Right to an Impartial Jury Under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments Was Violated Because the Jury Was Tainted by Prejudicial and 

Extraneous Information. ......................................................................................... 9

Claim V. Petitioner Was Denied a Fair Trial and Effective Assistance of Counsel, in 

Violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, Because the Court 

Excused for Cause Jurors Who Expressed Reservation About the Death Penalty; 

Trial Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Object or Attempt to Rehabilitate the 

Jurors; Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Raise this Claim on 

Direct Appeal. ....................................................................................................... 10

Claim VI. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Petitioner His Right to “Life Qualify” Potential 

Jurors During Voir Dire. ....................................................................................... 11

Claim VII. Petitioner’s Convictions and Death Sentence Violate the Sixth, Eighth, And 

Fourteenth Amendments Because Unreliable Forensic Evidence Was Presented to 

the Jury, and Trial Counsel Ineffectively Failed to Counter It. ............................ 12

Claim VIII. Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment Rights Were Violated Because the Sentences 

Imposed for the Rape, Kidnaping, and Abuse of a Corpse Charges Were Based 

Upon Factors Not Submitted to the Jury (Withdrawn). ........................................ 12

Claim IX. Petitioner Was Denied Reliable Sentencing and Effective Assistance of Counsel 

in Violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments Because Trial 

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Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate, Develop, and Present Mitigating 

Evidence, and Appellate Counsel Failed to Investigate or Properly Present this 

Claim. .................................................................................................................... 12

Claim X. Petitioner Is Entitled to Relief Because of the Cumulative Prejudicial Effect of the 

Errors Described Herein. ...................................................................................... 20

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 22

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Abu-Jamal v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., 643 F.3d 370 (3d Cir. 2011) ............................................... 2

Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2007) ............................................................................ 21

Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2011) .............................................................................. 2

Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2008) .......................................................................... 16, 17

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) ........................................................................................ 2

Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2014) .......................................................................... 2

Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2011) ........................................................................... 2

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) .................................................................................... 1

Dennis v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016) ................................................ 2, 21

Fahy v. Horn, 516 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 21

Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 2

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) ........................................................................................... 5

Lambert v. Beard, 537 F. App’x 78 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2013) ........................................................ 2

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) ...................................................................................... 11

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) .......................................................................................... 6

Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401 (3d Cir. 2006) ......................................................................... 14

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) .......................................................................................... 3

Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) ................................................................... 15, 16, 17, 18

Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) ................................................................................ 14, 15 

Saranchak v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 802 F.3d 579 (3d Cir. 2015) ............................................. 14

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) ........................................................................... 13, 14 

Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) ........................................................................................... 15

Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2011) ............................................................................ 1 

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 5 of 29
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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ............................................................................ 2

Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007) ......................................................................... 14, 15

United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998) ....................................................... 9

United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1980) .......................................... 21

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) ........................................................................................ 15

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2001) ........................................................................... 1

State Cases

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2014) ......................................................... passim

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003) ..................................................................... 1

Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33 (Pa. 2002) .................................................................. 15, 16

In re Holtz’ Estate, 222 A.2d 885 (Pa. 1966) .............................................................................. 17

Robinson v. Robinson, 645 A.2d 836 (1994) ............................................................................... 17

Statutes

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d) ................................................................................................................. 5, 7 

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INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, Arthur Bomar, through undersigned counsel, files this Reply to the 

Respondent’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Petition Seeking Federal Habeas Corpus 

Relief (“Response”) (Docs. 45-1/45-2). Petitioner relies upon the procedural history set forth in 

his Petition (Doc. 17) with the addition of the Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 45) and Respondent’s 

Memorandum of Law (Docs. 45-1/45-2) filed on February 8, 2017. The Respondent also filed 

an Appendix on March 2, 2017 (Doc. 47-1). 

To the extent that Respondent argues “how rare and difficult it is for a state prisoner 

habeas petitioner to prevail under AEDPA standard,” Doc. 45-1 at 10, Petitioner submits that

“the [AEDPA] statute directs federal courts to attend to every state-court judgment with utmost 

care, but it does not require them to defer to the opinion of every reasonable state-court judge on 

the content of federal law. If, after carefully weighing all the reasons for accepting a state 

court’s judgement, a federal court is convinced that a prisoner’s custody – or . . . his sentence of 

death – violates the Constitution, that independent judgment should prevail.” Williams (Terry) v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 389 (2001). “‘[E]ven in the context of federal habeas, deference does not 

imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review,’ and ‘does not by definition preclude 

relief.’” Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 340 (2003)). 

“[H]abeas review ‘remains robust [as] evidenced by the many cases in which the 

Supreme Court granted relief because a state court adjudication of a meritorious constitutional 

claim was ‘unreasonable’ or ‘contrary to’ Supreme Court precedent, or was based upon an 

unreasonable factual determination.’” Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625, 629 (3d Cir. 2011) 

(citing habeas petitioner Showers’ briefing). Indeed, acknowledging the robust nature of habeas 

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corpus review, the Third Circuit has granted relief in a number of recent cases. See, e.g., Dennis 

v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., 834 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2016) (suppression of documents in violation of 

Brady1 required federal habeas relief); Branch v. Sweeney, 758 F.3d 226, 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(finding a prima facie case of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, determining that the state court’s 

ruling was an unreasonable application of federal law, and remanding for an evidentiary 

hearing); Grant v. Lockett, 709 F.3d 224, 234-37 (3d Cir. 2013) (granting guilt-phase relief on 

the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim and finding that the state court’s ruling was based on 

unreasonable fact findings and an unreasonable application of Strickland2); Showers, 635 F.3d at 

634 (granting guilt-phase relief and finding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) had been met); Lambert 

v. Beard, 537 F. App’x 78, 87 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 2013) (same); Abu-Jamal v. Sec’y, Dept. of 

Corrs., 643 F.3d 370, 381 (3d Cir. 2011) (same for penalty-phase relief in a capital case); 

Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting penalty-phase relief in a capital case 

under §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2)); Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 142 (3d Cir. 2011) (granting 

guilt-phase relief, inter alia, by finding that the state court’s ruling on an ineffectiveness claim 

was an unreasonable application of Strickland).

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

CLAIM I. PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN HE 

WAS TRIED WHILE INCOMPETENT AND UNABLE TO RATIONALLY 

ASSIST COUNSEL. 

 Respondents do not dispute the fact that Petitioner did not receive an adversarial hearing 

on his competency to stand trial at the time of his trial, but only deny “that the process used to 

determine petitioner’s competency was inadequate or unreliable.” Doc. 45 at 6; see Doc. 45-1 at

 

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 

2 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

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13-14. In relying solely on the state courts’ analysis, Respondents summarily conclude 

that“[t]he factual findings of the PCRA court are supported by the record and the conclusions of 

law are not erroneous . . . [and that t]he same is true of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” Doc. 

45-1 at 20-21.3 Respondents quote the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that, assuming 

Dr. Sadoff’s competency evaluation from eight months prior to trial failed to establish 

Petitioner’s competence at the time of trial, Petitioner had “failed to object to Dr. Sadoff’s 

evaluation and testimony at the pre-trial competency hearing and, thus, he has waived the 

argument.” Doc. 45-1 at 19 (quoting Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1196-97). The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court went on to note that evaluations closer in proximity to Petitioner’s trial and 

conducted by defense expert Dr. Cooke confirmed Petitioner’s competence, see Bomar II, 104 

A.3d 1197, yet Dr. Cooke’s post-conviction conclusions that Petitioner was competent could 

have had no bearing on the soundness of the trial court’s decision not to assess Petitioner’s 

competence at the time of his trial. NT 11/6/08 at 90 (the first time Dr. Cooke testified to 

Petitioner’s competency). 

Under clearly established federal law, where a defendant may be incompetent, he cannot 

“knowingly and intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand 

trial.” Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). Likewise, a defendant’s “demeanor at trial 

might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, [but] it cannot be relied upon to 

dispense with a hearing on the very issue.” Id. at 382-86. In Pate, the Supreme Court 

emphasized that the defendant’s “mental alertness and understanding displayed” during 

 

3

 Respondents note that the PCRA court found Dr. Dudley incredible. Doc. 45 at 5; but 

see infra pp. 17-18. 

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colloquies with the trial judge “offer[ed] no justification for ignoring the uncontradicted 

testimony of [the defendant’s] history of pronounced irrational behavior.” Id. 

Petitioner did not receive an adequate hearing on his competency to stand trial at the time 

of trial despite the trial court’s knowledge of Petitioner’s “history of pronounced irrational 

behavior” and the non-adversarial competency hearing eight months prior to trial. For a full 

accounting of Petitioner’s irrational behavior see Doc. 17 at 7-10. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court’s merits analysis was contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, and thus not entitled to AEDPA deference. The trial court’s failure to invoke state 

procedures designed to protect Petitioner from standing trial while incompetent therefore 

violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law. 

CLAIM II. PETITIONER’S CONVICTIONS AND DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATED 

DUE PROCESS OF LAW BECAUSE TWO WITNESSES AGAINST HIM 

RECEIVED CONSIDERATION FOR THEIR TESTIMONY THAT WAS 

NOT DISCLOSED TO THE JURY, AND THE PROSECUTOR FAILED 

TO CORRECT THEIR FALSE TESTIMONY. 

The prosecutor violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law by failing to disclose 

consideration it offered two key Commonwealth witnesses. Moreover, not only did the 

prosecutor fail to disclose favorable evidence, he failed to correct false testimony. 

In response to Petitioner’s Brady claim, Respondents argue that the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court did address the claim on the merits when it found that even if there was an 

undisclosed deal with Mr. O’Donald that there was no actual prejudice to Petitioner. Doc. 45-1 

at 33. For the reasons set forth in Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law (Doc. 39), Respondents’

argument is without merit. Doc. 39 at 12-14. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not reach 

the question of whether there was an undisclosed agreement between the prosecution and Mr. 

O’Donald thus review is de novo. The court acknowledged that it was not reaching the issue of 

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whether a deal existed and said that the “evidence strongly suggests the existence of such an 

agreement.” Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1192. 

 Respondents’ argument that Petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result of this 

undisclosed deal is wrong. Doc. 45-1 at 33-37. Respondents relied on the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s opinion, but the court’s finding that the evidence was not material was contrary 

to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law, and involved an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2). The materiality inquiry is not just a matter of 

determining whether, after discounting items of evidence tainted by nondisclosure, the remaining 

evidence is sufficient to support a guilty verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1995). 

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Brady’s materiality prong. The Court 

said any violation did not prejudice Petitioner due to the extensive DNA and circumstantial 

evidence against him. Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1192. 

Under the proper test, there is a reasonable probability that the nondisclosure of Mr. 

O’Donald’s agreement and the true motivation for his testimony affected the judgment of the 

jury. The details of Mr. O’Donald’s testimony were the only direct evidence offered by the 

prosecution to show malice and specific intent, both of which are essential elements of firstdegree murder in Pennsylvania. If the jury had known Mr. O’Donald lied at trial, and his 

motivation for testifying was for a reduction in his sentence, it is reasonably probable they jury 

would have rejected his testimony. 

Respondents further argue that Petitioner merely asserts, without demonstrating, that the 

PCRA court’s factual findings are unreasonable, and that “he simply makes up his own facts.” 

Doc. 45-1 at 32. Petitioner did not make up facts. Petitioner presented analysis and argument 

demonstrating why the PCRA court’s factual findings were unreasonable. For example, 

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Petitioner explained why the PCRA court failed to articulate any reasonable analysis as to why 

Mr. Williams would come forward after he completed his sentence and testify that he lied at 

Petitioner’s trial. See Doc. 39 at 17. 

This Court must analyze this claim under Napue4 as well as Brady. Because the 

prosecutor failed to correct the witness’s false testimony, a reviewing court must grant relief if 

there is “any reasonable likelihood” the non-disclosure could have affected the outcome. As to 

materiality under Napue, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied the standard by 

holding that even if an agreement between Mr. O’Donald and the prosecution did exist; its 

nondisclosure did not affect the judgment of the jury in light of the wealth of significant other 

evidence implicating Petitioner in the murder. Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1195. Respondents echo

this analysis. Doc. 45-1 at 34-37. The court’s and Respondents’ analysis is incorrect. Despite 

other inculpatory evidence, it cannot be said that the suppression of his deal and false nature of 

O’Donald’s testimony did not affect the judgment of the jury. The undisclosed agreement with 

Mr. O’Donald was material to both guilt and penalty phases of Petitioner’s trial. 

Respondents also note that the PCRA court found the testimony of Mr. O’Donald and 

Mr. Williams regarding their undisclosed deal with the Commonwealth not credible. Doc. 45-1 

at 32. However, these are unreasonable credibility findings and should not be given deference. 

Both of these witnesses had much to gain at the time of trial by not disclosing that they had a 

deal with the Commonwealth. But, many years later, by the time of the PCRA hearing, neither 

had anything to gain. Their cases were over. Neither were incarcerated and gained nothing from 

 

4 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). 

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coming to court and testifying that they both had deals with the Commonwealth that were never 

disclosed. 

CLAIM III. STATEMENTS WERE TAKEN FROM PETITIONER ON MORE THAN 

ONE OCCASION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO DUE 

PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS; 

TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO PROPERLY RAISE A 

DUE PROCESS CLAIM. 

 The Commonwealth deliberately engaged in trickery, false representations, and 

outrageous conduct to obtain inflammatory and prejudicial evidence in violation of Petitioner’s 

right to due process. Petitioner’s claim involves three deceptive acts by the Commonwealth that 

violate due process. The first involves the Commonwealth’s use of a false transport order that a 

Common Pleas Court judge signed, for a non-existent court hearing. The second and third 

deceptions involve the Commonwealth’s knowing misuse of inmate-informants who testified 

falsely against Petitioner at this trial. Here, Petitioner focuses on the false court order. The false 

testimony from the inmate-informants is covered in Claim 2. Individually and collectively, the 

Commonwealth’s outrageous conduct violated Petitioner’s right to due process. 

Respondents deny using trickery and outrageous conduct in obtaining a statement from 

Petitioner after using a false court order to transport Petitioner away from his place of custody. 

Respondents do not and cannot deny that the court order was indeed false – as a matter of 

undeniable fact, there was no court hearing. Respondents nonetheless assert that the 

transportation of prisoners is merely an administrative matter and there was no intent to deceive. 

Moreover, Respondents cite to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opinion that found Petitioner 

was not misled regarding why he was being transported, and expressly agreed to go with the 

detectives. Doc. 45-1 at 43. The Respondents’ argument and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 

fact-finding are unreasonable and ignore the context in which the false order was issued. The 

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state court’s ruling accordingly rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

§ 2254(d)(2). First, viewed in the context of the Delaware County detectives’ previous attempts

to see Petitioner at the Montgomery County Prison – where Petitioner refused to see them,

became agitated, and indicated that he would rather spend time in 24-hour lockup than meet with 

them – the detectives had a motive to trick Petitioner into an interrogation. Respondents ignore 

this history of Petitioner’s asserting his rights not to speak with the Delaware County detectives. 

It was in this framework that the detectives had the motive and intent to deceive. Bringing Judge 

Kenneth A. Clouse, of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, an order for the release of 

Petitioner for transportation for a “hearing” was the method the detectives could implement to 

remove Petitioner from his surroundings, and overcome his previous refusals to talk. 

The state court finding that Petitioner expressly “agreed” to be transported is likewise an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. From the perspective of an incarcerated inmate, being 

shown a court order for transportation to a court hearing is not something an inmate volunteers 

for or refuses. Had Petitioner refused to “voluntarily” go with the law enforcement agents, he 

would have been extracted from his cell, physically subdued and maced, then transported to the 

hearing one way or another. The state court’s fact finding is unreasonable. Moreover, to the 

extent Petitioner could “volunteer” to go with the detectives, he was tricked. After refusing to 

talk with the detectives on multiple occasions, Petitioner should not have had to assume that a 

court order indicating a court hearing was false. Again, the actions of the Commonwealth are 

indicative of an intent and motive to deceive. 

Respondents also assert that Petitioner “failed to articulate what the due process violation 

actually was.” Doc. 45-1 at 38. Respondents simply put their head in the sand regarding the 

detectives’ deliberate trickery, false representations, and outrageous conduct. That outrageous 

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conduct is itself a due process violation. As held by the Third Circuit: “[i]t is the law of this 

circuit that a criminal defendant may raise a due process challenge to an indictment against her 

based on a claim that the government employed outrageous law enforcement investigative 

techniques.” United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1998). Here, the use of 

a false court order by law enforcement agents to trick Petitioner into an interrogation, after 

previous refusals to cooperate, is outrageous conduct in violation of Petitioner’s rights. This 

trickery in itself, and in combination with the use of inmate informants who falsely testified that 

Petitioner confessed to murder, denied Petitioner of a fair trial. 

CLAIM IV. PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY UNDER THE SIXTH 

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS WAS VIOLATED BECAUSE THE 

JURY WAS TAINTED BY PREJUDICIAL AND EXTRANEOUS 

INFORMATION.

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require that a 

defendant be tried by an impartial jury that is free from any extraneous influences that could 

subvert the fact-finding process. During the course of Petitioner’s trial, at least one juror heard 

extraneous prejudicial information from law enforcement in violation of Petitioner’s 

constitutional rights.

In the Petition and Memorandum of Law, Petitioner argued that while the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court adjudicated this claim on the merits, it applied only state law. Accordingly, this 

Court should review Petitioner’s claim de novo and not defer to state court findings. 

Respondents do not dispute that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied only on state law in 

adjudicating Petitioner’s claim. Rather, they assert “that the state courts properly adhered to the 

constitutional requirements of Mattox and the law as expressed both by Pennsylvania state law 

precedents and by the Third Circuit.” Doc. 45-1 at 47. Moreover, neither the state courts, nor 

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Respondents now, dispute the fact that a juror was exposed to improper extraneous influence. 

The critical issue is whether Petitioner was prejudiced by this exposure. 

In addressing whether Petitioner was prejudiced by the extraneous influence, 

Respondents simply cite to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis of the claim, and assert 

that the state court’s analysis was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly 

established law. This Court should not defer to the state court’s finding because it was based 

solely on state law, and should instead assess prejudice de novo. Moreover, Respondents do not 

engage with Petitioner’s arguments regarding prejudice as detailed in the Petition and 

Memorandum of Law. Rather than repeat the arguments regarding prejudice here, Petitioner 

refers the Court to his Memorandum of Law. See Doc. 39 at 27. 

CLAIM V. PETITIONER WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND EFFECTIVE 

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, 

AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS, BECAUSE THE COURT 

EXCUSED FOR CAUSE JURORS WHO EXPRESSED RESERVATION 

ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY; TRIAL COUNSEL WAS 

INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT OR ATTEMPT TO 

REHABILITATE THE JURORS; APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS 

INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THIS CLAIM ON DIRECT 

APPEAL. 

Claim V avers that Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and 

an impartial jury were violated when the trial judge excluded prospective jurors for cause simply 

because they voiced general, conscientious, or religious objections to the death penalty. The 

crux of Petitioner’s claim is that the trial court’s questions to the jury failed to focus on whether 

the jurors would be able to follow the law as explained by the court. Instead, the voir dire 

questions explored whether the jurors would be able to set aside their reservations and impose a 

death sentence – a question distinct from whether these jurors’ beliefs would impair their ability 

to follow the law. 

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Respondents generally defend the state court conclusions as to the propriety of the trial 

court’s jury questions. The question of whether the state court’s finding that it was proper for the 

court to inquire if a potential juror could set aside his or her reservations and impose a death 

sentence rather than whether the potential juror could set aside his or her reservations and follow 

the law is squarely before this Court. Accordingly, Petitioner relies on the arguments and 

authorities contained in his Memorandum and reincorporates them herein. 

CLAIM VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER HIS RIGHT 

TO “LIFE QUALIFY” POTENTIAL JURORS DURING VOIR DIRE.

In Claim VI, Petitioner averred that he was restricted from questioning potential jurors 

about specific underlying aggravating circumstances and about particular kinds of mitigating 

evidence, limiting his ability to fully and fairly assess the jurors’ positions about the death 

penalty. The right to an impartial jury entitles a capital defendant to a sentencing jury that is 

capable of following the law and imposing a life sentence, just as the state is entitled to a jury 

that is capable of imposing a death sentence. Petitioner’s claim is based upon the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s unreasonable application of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728 (1992), 

where the United States Supreme Court addressed the adequacy of voir dire in determining 

whether potential jurors would fairly consider voting for a life sentence just as they would fairly 

consider voting for a death sentence. 

Respondents simply deny that the voir dire in Petitioner’s case was inadequate and assert

that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasonably applied Morgan. Doc. 45-2 at 67. Other than 

this bare assertion that there was no unreasonable state court application of Morgan, 

Respondents do not engage with Petitioner’s arguments regarding why the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s finding was unreasonable. Petitioner’s argument was adequately addressed in 

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his Memorandum of Law and he now relies on those arguments and authorities and 

reincorporates them herein. 

CLAIM VII. PETITIONER’S CONVICTIONS AND DEATH SENTENCE VIOLATE 

THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS BECAUSE 

UNRELIABLE FORENSIC EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO THE 

JURY, AND TRIAL COUNSEL INEFFECTIVELY FAILED TO 

COUNTER IT.

Petitioner’s claim and legal arguments were adequately described in his Petition and 

Memorandum of Law. Petitioner relies on those arguments and authorities and reincorporates 

them herein. 

CLAIM VIII. PETITIONER’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE 

VIOLATED BECAUSE THE SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR THE 

RAPE, KIDNAPING, AND ABUSE OF A CORPSE CHARGES 

WERE BASED UPON FACTORS NOT SUBMITTED TO THE 

JURY.

Upon further consideration and after conferring with Mr. Bomar, undersigned counsel 

withdrew Claim VIII from this petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

CLAIM IX. PETITIONER WAS DENIED RELIABLE SENTENCING AND 

EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE 

SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS BECAUSE 

TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE, 

DEVELOP, AND PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE, AND 

APPELLATE COUNSEL FAILED TO INVESTIGATE OR PROPERLY 

PRESENT THIS CLAIM. 

Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to investigate and present to the jury an accurate depiction 

of Petitioner’s traumatic childhood, family dysfunction, and serious mental impairment, in 

violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel. Counsel also failed to explain to the jury 

how or why any of the facts she did present were mitigating. As a result, the jury was deprived 

of significant mitigating information and gave little weight to the highly mitigating 

circumstances that were presented.

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 18 of 29
13 

Respondents argue that trial counsel was not ineffective because Petitioner was 

uncooperative. Doc. 45-2 at 74.5 Respondents equate Petitioner’s case to Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465 (2007), in which the defendant instructed his family not to testify and “instructed 

his attorney not to present any evidence at the sentencing hearing.” Id. at 470-71 (internal 

quotations omitted) (noting Landrigan also interrupted his counsel each time he tried to offer 

mitigating information during the sentencing proceedings). Landrigan also told the sentencing 

court to “bring on” the death penalty. Id. at 479-80. Relying in part on Landrigan, Respondents 

argue that Petitioner’s unwillingness to aid trial counsel in her mitigation investigation means 

that she “cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to learn that which the client was unwilling to 

disclose.” Doc. 45-2 at 74. 

Respondents’ reliance on Landrigan is misplaced. Petitioner and the defendant in 

Landrigan had significantly different responses to their respective mitigation investigations and 

presentations. While Petitioner was not generally forthcoming about his childhood and told his 

family not to discuss his childhood, Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1202-03, he did not object to 

counsel’s mitigation presentation at the penalty phase, which included the presentation of Dr. 

Cooke and several lay witnesses, including family members. See NT 3/04/99 at 236. Nor, 

unlike Landrigan, did he actively seek the death penalty. Petitioner’s reluctance to identify 

possible avenues of mitigation “d[id] not absolve [trial counsel] from pursuing those avenues, 

 

5

 Respondents argue both that “Ms. McLaughlin recognized that without the cooperation 

from family members and the petitioner additional investigations and contact with family 

members would not be productive,” (in arguing that counsel did not stop investigating only 

because of a lack of funds), Doc. 45 at 27, yet later Respondents argue that “counsel did not quit 

attempting to investigate and present possible mitigating evidence in spite of petitioner’s 

efforts,” Doc. 45-2 at 97. Respondents cannot argue out of both sides of their mouths to justify 

counsel’s deficiencies. 

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14 

particularly where counsel [wa]s already aware of facts demonstrating that such an investigation 

may be fruitful.” Saranchak v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 802 F.3d 579, 595 (3d Cir. 2015); Outten 

v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 418 (3d Cir. 2006); cf. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005). 

Likewise, in Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2007),which Respondents cite for 

additional support, the defendant “was adamant about not presenting witnesses, and even 

telephoned scheduled witnesses the night before the degree-of-guilt and penalty hearing, telling 

them not to appear.” Id. at 451. He also “unambiguously instructed his attorney not to present 

mitigating evidence at the penalty phase because he wanted to receive the death penalty as 

punishment for his crimes.” Id. at 456. The Third Circuit found the defendant’s “determination 

not to present mitigating evidence was just as strong” as that of the defendant in Landrigan. Id.

at 455. “Thus whatever counsel could have uncovered, Taylor would not have permitted any 

witnesses to testify, and was therefore not prejudiced by any inadequacy in counsel’s 

investigation or decision not to present mitigation evidence.” Id. at 455 (citing Landrigan, 127 

S. Ct. at 1941). 

Landrigan and Taylor stand in stark contrast to Petitioner’s case. He did not seek death 

or forbid a mitigation presentation and, in fact, allowed eight witnesses to testify on his behalf at 

sentencing. Petitioner’s inability to discuss his childhood is rooted in his traumatic upbringing, 

and his reluctance to assist in the mitigation investigation does not excuse counsel’s deficient 

performance, see Doc. 39 at 40, particularly those failures that were not affected by Petitioner’s 

lack of cooperation, see id. at 47-48 (failing to obtain records she was aware existed6

); id. at 48 

 

6

 Respondents summarily deny that trial counsel was responsible for the delay in 

receiving the Aldie counseling records or the Nevada prison records, Doc. 45 at 28-29, but 

provide no basis for such a conclusion and do not dispute that counsel failed to provide an 

adequate release to Aldie Counseling Center, which caused the delay. Doc. 45-1 at 47. In a 

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15 

(failing to provide records in her possession to experts); id. at 49 (failing to follow up on relevant 

reports provided in discovery); id. at 52 (failing to elicit known and highly mitigating 

information from Petitioner’s sister on the stand), or those failures that were even more 

detrimental given Petitioner’s reluctance to open up, see id. at 49 (failing to retain a mitigation 

specialist).

Counsel unreasonably failed either to hire a mitigation specialist or to conduct a 

reasonable background investigation through other means. Counsel’s mitigation investigation 

and presentation fell below the objective standards of reasonableness expressed in Supreme 

Court precedent and the ABA’s professional guidelines. See Doc. 39 at 57-58 (citing Sears, 

Porter, Rompilla, Wiggins7

). The state court’s conclusion that counsel’s investigation and 

presentation were not deficient in light of the totality of mitigation evidence presented during the 

post-conviction proceedings – based almost exclusively on Petitioner’s lack of cooperation – is 

contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See Doc. 39 at 50-51, 

54, 67. 

While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied, and Respondents now primarily rely, on 

Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 33, 45-46 (Pa. 2002), to support counsel’s effectiveness given

defendant’s lack of cooperation, Bomar II, 104 A.3d 1203-03; Doc. 45-2 at 97, neither 

acknowledge that the Third Circuit subsequently found the state court unreasonably applied 

Strickland under § 2254(d), holding that it 

 

similar vein, Respondents summarily deny that “the information provided by petitioner [in the 

Aldie Counseling records] regarding his family history was accurate,” Doc. 45 at 23, but provide 

no basis for such an attack on the veracity of Petitioner’s contemporaneous reporting. 

7 Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 

(2009); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). 

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w[ould] not excuse [counsel’s failure to present significant mitigation at penalty 

phase and failure to call a witness to provide comprehensive social or psychiatric 

history] on the ground that Bond and his family members did not tell counsel that 

his background provided fertile territory for mitigation arguments. Neither Bond 

nor his family had a duty to instruct counsel how to perform such a basic element 

of competent representation as the inquiry into a defendant’s background. They 

did not, as the Commonwealth suggests, have to volunteer “red flags” about 

through a basic inquiry into his background. Trial counsel’s investigation itself 

was unreasonable. 

Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 287 (3d Cir. 2008), as amended (Oct. 17, 2008). The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court’s reliance on its decision in Bond, 819 A.2d at 45-46 – which itself was held to 

be unreasonable – was unreasonable.

Respondents argue that there is “no way of knowing what a mitigation expert would have 

been able to do at the time that petitioner and his family were actively working against prior 

counsel’s efforts to prepare and present mitigation evidence.” Doc. 45 at 30. They argue that 

“[t]he fact that family members cooperated after petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death 

is not evidence that the result would have been different if a mitigation specialist had been 

involved earlier in the process.” Id. But a post-conviction court’s role is to inquire into what 

could have been presented at trial and what the results would have been had such actions been 

taken in order to determine whether a petitioner was prejudiced. Porter, 558 U.S. at 41 (“To 

assess th[e] probability [of a different result], we consider ‘the totality of the available mitigation 

evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding’—and 

‘reweig[h] it against the evidence in aggravation.’”). The importance of hiring a mitigation 

specialist is that he or she is often able to discover mitigation that would not otherwise have been 

discovered. 

More specifically, Respondents argue that “things Ms. Batchelor subsequently told the 

federal defenders about petitioner, she chose not to tell Ms. McLaughlin,” Doc. 45-2 at 77, but 

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 22 of 29
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Respondents neglect to mention the when asked whether Ms. Batchelor discussed these things 

with her, Ms. McLaughlin testified that Ms. Batchelor stopped the phone conversation “maybe 

because of time.” NT 11/6/08 at 103. There is no indication that Ms. McLaughlin ever asked 

Ms. Batchelor about the things that undersigned counsel’s mitigation specialist asked her about. 

Id. For example, Respondents admit that Ms. Batchelor conveyed to Ms. McLaughlin that 

Petitioner was raped by a guard, but then Respondents argued that Ms. Batchelor “did not 

mention it” when she testified at trial. However, Respondents neglect to mention that it was

counsel that failed to ask Ms. Batchelor about the incident on the stand. See Doc. 45 at 28. 

Likewise, Respondents argue that no family member ever told counsel Petitioner had 

been hit in the head or sustained head trauma, Doc. 45-2 at 78, but again there is no indication 

Ms. McLaughlin ever asked a family member whether Petitioner ever sustained injuries to his 

head. See NT 11/6/08 at 103. See Bond, 539 F.3d at 282 (noting neither trial counsel asked 

witnesses about head injuries, among other things).

In regard to the expert testimony offered by Petitioner in post-conviction, Respondents 

note that the PCRA court found the testimony of Drs. Dudley and Cooke not credible. Doc. 45 

at 20, 21; Doc. 45-2 at 84, 89. The PCRA court unreasonably characterized its determinations as 

credibility findings. Finders of fact generally make credibility determinations about the truth or 

accuracy of witnesses’ testimony, which are generally deferred to because the finders of fact 

were able to observe the witnesses’ demeanor while testifying. See Robinson v. Robinson, 645 

A.2d 836, 838 (1994); In re Holtz’ Estate, 222 A.2d 885, 889-90 (Pa. 1966) (“The matter 

of credibility is for the trial court. The discretion possessed by that court * * * is particularly 

broad because his is the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses called before 

him.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 23 of 29
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Here, the court’s focus was on the persuasiveness of the experts, not their credibility in 

the commonly understood sense. For example, Respondents argue that in finding Dr. Dudley 

and Dr. Cooke incredible, the PCRA court deemed Dr. Dudley’s methodologies to be 

“inappropriate, including his testimony about petitioner’s competency,” Doc. 45 at 20, yet the 

court credited Dr. Michaels’s similar methodology, which resulted in a different opinion. 

Moreover, Drs. Dudley and Cooke based their opinions in large part on records made 

contemporaneous to the events, which the records documented, and which are uncontroverted. 

See, e.g., NT 11/6/08 at 186-87, 191; NT 10/21/09 at 47-48, 51-54. Here the PCRA court, rather 

than making credibility determinations, was determining what weight to accord the different 

experts’ testimony in resolving the factual disputes. The court found Dr. Michaels’s findings 

more persuasive in relation to those of Dr. Dudley and Dr. Cooke, but it made no credibility 

findings with respect to any expert. 

The PCRA court’s failure to give any consideration to the testimony of Petitioner’s 

experts was the type of absolute discounting the Supreme Court deemed unreasonable in Porter.

558 U.S. at 42-43(“Yet neither the postconviction trial court nor the Florida Supreme Court gave 

any consideration for the purpose of nonstatutory mitigation to Dr. Dee’s testimony regarding the 

existence of a brain abnormality and cognitive defects. While the State’s experts identified 

perceived problems with the tests that Dr. Dee used and the conclusions that he drew from them, 

it was not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that his testimony might have had on the jury 

or the sentencing judge.”).

Respondents also point out that many of the lay family affidavits on which the experts 

relied were not supported by sworn testimony, see, e.g., Doc. 45 at 20, 24, 26, 28. However, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not cite this as a consideration or reason for not considering the 

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mitigation evidence the family provided, see Bomar II, 104 A.3d at 1198-2000, 1203-04, and 

experts in the fields of forensic psychology and psychiatry typically rely on such documentation 

in reaching their conclusions.8 For example, under the American Psychological Association 

guidelines, forensic psychologists can rely on supporting documents, such as affidavits, to render 

opinions to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty. See, e.g., NT 4/28/09 at 163-64; see 

also NT 11/6/08 at 183 (Dr. Cooke’s request for an affidavit from Ms. Batchelor). Furthermore, 

in explaining his reliance on the Petitioner’s family members’ affidavits, Dr. Dudley explained 

that the fact that each affidavit “independently report[ed] similar sorts of things,” and that 

uncontroverted official records also supported the information in the affidavits supported the 

affidavits’ veracity. NT 10/21/09 at 61-62, 206-07. 

 Respondents’ focus on Petitioner’s citation to Dr. Cooke’s and Dr. Dudley’s affidavits is 

also a red herring. See, e.g., Doc. 45 at 23-25, 26, 30. Drs. Dudley and Cooke testified to the 

same underlying mitigation evidence as was included in their respective affidavits. For example, 

Dr. Dudley testified to the underlying mitigating evidence contained in his affidavit – evidence 

of numerous traumatic childhood events, including psychological, physical and sexual abuse, 

neglect, abandonment; and the longstanding psychiatric symptoms Petitioner had, including 

longstanding memory difficulties to the point of amnesia, dissociation, mood lability, mood 

disorder, psychosis, suicidal ideation, depersonalization, learning problems, attachment issues, 

impulsivity, and extreme paranoia to the point of delusion. See, e.g., NT 10/21/01 at 23-24, 31-

39. While Dr. Dudley did not testify that Petitioner had a specific mental health diagnosis, Doc. 

 

8

 Respondents provide no basis for their contention that the “reliance by experts upon 

those hearsay statements is not well founded.” Doc. 45 at 26. 

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 25 of 29
20 

45 at 30, his conclusions that Petitioner suffers from a longstanding emotional disturbance and 

that at the time of the crime investigation he suffered from “extreme mental or emotional 

disturbance” and his capacity “to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 

conduct to the requirements of law” was “substantially impaired,” were based upon the above 

symptoms and Petitioner’s history of childhood abuse, abandonment, neglect, trauma, family 

dysfunction, sexual abuse, and instability, rather than a specific mental illness diagnosis. See

Doc. 39 at 56. 

Lastly, Respondents argue that appellate counsel was not ineffective in bringing 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims in post-trial motions because at the time he was required 

to do so or they would have been waived. Doc. 45 at 17. However, a requirement to raise a 

claim does not negate counsel’s duty to do so effectively. Respondents acknowledge that 

appellate counsel focused solely on guilt-phase issues with the exception of Petitioner’s 

competency claim. Doc. 45 at 32. In failing to conduct his own mitigation investigation or 

investigate trial counsel’s mitigation presentation, appellate counsel was ineffective. 

CLAIM X. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF BECAUSE OF THE

CUMULATIVE PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF THE ERRORS DESCRIBED 

HEREIN.

Claim X avers that the cumulative effect of the errors described in the preceding claims 

entitles Petitioner to relief. Each claim presented in the Petition individually entitles Petitioner to 

relief. However, if this Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under any particular 

claim, the cumulative effect of these errors requires the grant of a new trial. 

There is no dispute from Respondents that U.S. Supreme Court precedent requires habeas 

courts to assess prejudice cumulatively. Although confusing, Respondents argue that “since 

there is no United States Supreme Court precedent regarding a cumulative error effect claim 

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 26 of 29
21 

post-AEDPA that it cannot be said that the state courts’ decision, that there is no prejudicial 

cumulative error effect in this case, was contrary to or an unreasonable application of established 

federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court.” Doc. 45-2 at 100. However, the 

state court here did not hold that there was no requirement to assess prejudice cumulatively, 

rather, the state court held that that even if there was error, it did not warrant relief. Bomar II, 

104 A.3d at 197. Thus, Respondents’ argument is misplaced. Stated simply, Petitioner does not 

argue that the state court ruling was unreasonable because it refused to assess error cumulatively; 

rather, the state court ruling was unreasonable because based on the prejudice emanating from 

the Brady/Napue violation, as well as error from the Strickland claims, the state court refused to 

grant relief based on cumulative error.

Notwithstanding Respondents’ argument that there is “no United States Supreme Court 

precedent regarding a cumulative error effect claim post-AEDPA,” this Court analyzing this 

habeas petition must assess error cumulatively. Dennis, 834 F.3d at 311-12 (cumulative effect of 

suppression of documents in violation of Brady required federal habeas relief); see also Fahy v. 

Horn, 516 F.3d 169, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (reviewing claim of cumulative error); Albrecht v. Horn, 

485 F.3d 103, 139 (3d Cir. 2007) (same); United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 631 F.2d 14, 

17 (3d Cir. 1980) (remanding the case to the district court to consider the cumulative prejudicial 

effect of various claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness, along with claims of other trial court and 

prosecutorial errors). 

Petitioner has demonstrated throughout his Petition, Memorandum of Law, and in this 

Reply, how constitutional errors undermined his right to a fair trial, and that the merits and 

waiver rulings by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are erroneous. The cumulative prejudicial 

effect of the errors in Petitioner’s case warrants habeas relief.

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 27 of 29
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein and in Petitioner’s prior submissions, this Court should 

grant Petitioner habeas relief. 

 Respectfully Submitted,

/s/Leor Veleanu

LEOR VELEANU

JENNIFER CHICCARINO

KATHERINE E. ENSLER

Federal Community Defender Office 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut St., Suite 545W 

Philadelphia, PA 19106 

215-928-0520 

Dated: June 19, 2017

Case 2:04-cv-01730-JS Document 52 Filed 06/19/17 Page 28 of 29
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Leor Veleanu, hereby certify that on this 19th day of June, 2017, I served a copy of the 

foregoing petition upon the following by ECF: 

William R. Toal, III., Esq.

Assistant District Attorney

Office of the Delaware County District Attorney

Delaware County Courthouse 

201 West Front Street 

Media, Pennsylvania 19063 

 

/s/ Leor Veleanu______________ 

LEOR VELEANU

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