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CRISIS IN KYRGYZSTAN: FUEL, CONTRACTS, AND

REVOLUTION ALONG THE AFGHAN SUPPLY CHAIN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 22, 2010

Serial No. 111–150

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York, Chairman

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

HENRY CUELLAR, Texas

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

JACKIE SPEIER, California

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

JUDY CHU, California

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah

AARON SCHOCK, Illinois

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANH ‘‘JOSEPH’’ CAO, Louisiana

RON STROMAN, Staff Director

MICHAEL MCCARTHY, Deputy Staff Director

CARLA HULTBERG, Chief Clerk

LARRY BRADY, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts, Chairman

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

PAUL W. HODES, New Hampshire

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut

PETER WELCH, Vermont

BILL FOSTER, Illinois

STEVE DRIEHAUS, Ohio

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois

JUDY CHU, California

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona

DAN BURTON, Indiana

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri

ANDREW WRIGHT, Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on April 22, 2010 .............................................................................. 1

Statement of:

Huskey, Eugene, professor, Stetson University; Ambassador Baktybek

Abdrisaev, lecturer, Utah Valley University, and former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United States 1996–2005; Alexander Cooley, professor,

Barnard College at Columbia University; Scott Horton, professor, Columbia Law School, and Contributing Editor, Harper’s Weekly; and

Sam Patten, senior program manager, Eurasia, Freedom House ............ 7

Abdrisaev, Ambassador Baktybek ........................................................... 19

Cooley, Alexander ...................................................................................... 32

Horton, Scott .............................................................................................. 43

Huskey, Eugene ......................................................................................... 7

Patten, Sam ............................................................................................... 56

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Abdrisaev, Ambassador Baktybek, lecturer, Utah Valley University, and

former Kyrgyz Ambassador to the United States 1996–2005, prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 21

Cooley, Alexander, professor, Barnard College at Columbia University,

prepared statement of ................................................................................... 34

Horton, Scott, professor, Columbia Law School, and Contributing Editor,

Harper’s Weekly, prepared statement of .................................................... 45

Huskey, Eugene, professor, Stetson University, prepared statement of ...... 9

Patten, Sam, senior program manager, Eurasia, Freedom House, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 58

(1)

CRISIS IN KYRGYZSTAN: FUEL, CONTRACTS,

AND REVOLUTION ALONG THE AFGHAN

SUPPLY CHAIN

THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN

AFFAIRS,

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John F. Tierney (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tierney, Welch, Driehaus, Quigley,

Flake, Duncan, Turner, and Fortenberry.

Staff present: Andy Wright, staff director; Boris Maguire, clerk;

Scott Lindsay, counsel; LaToya King, fellow; Aaron Blacksberg and

Bronwen De Sena, interns; Adam Hodge, deputy CD; Laura Kieler,

legislative correspondent for Representative Tierney; Adam

Fromm, minority chief clerk and Member liaison, Stephanie Genco,

minority press secretary and communication liaison; Tom Alexander, minority senior counsel; and Christopher Bright, minority senior professional staff member.

Mr. TIERNEY. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, the hearing entitled, ‘‘Crisis in

Kyrgyzstan: Fuel, Contracts, and Revolution Along the Afghan

Supply Chain,’’ will come to order.

I ask unanimous consent that only the chairman and ranking

member of the subcommittee be allowed to make opening statements. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask unanimous consent that the hearing record be kept open

for 5 business days so that all members of the subcommittee be allowed to submit a written statement for the record. Without objection, that too is so ordered.

So good morning, everybody, and particularly our witnesses. I

want to thank you again for being here today and helping to enlighten us on a region of the world that many Americans have not

had an opportunity to study in depth.

Today’s hearing will explore the recent revolution in Kyrgyzstan,

the causes of the political turmoil there, and Kyrgyzstan’s critical

role in the supply chain for the United States and NATO’s war effort in Afghanistan, although, Ambassador, you make the good

point that cannot be the only and the sole focus of our relationship.

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In addition, we will examine the political and geopolitical significance of allegations of corruption in connection with U.S. fuel contracts at the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan. That is, of course, a

critical transit and re-supply hub for Operation Enduring Freedom.

Last Monday, the subcommittee announced a wide-ranging investigation into allegations that the contractors who supply fuel to the

Manas Air Base had significant financial dealings with the family

of deposed President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. I understand from press

reports that the interim government in Kyrgyzstan has announced

its own investigation into allegations of corruption in the Bakiyev

regime, including the Manas fuel contracts.

Of course, allegations of corrupt practices among Kyrgyz public

officials are an internal Kyrgyz matter. However, some of the

present allegations raise serious questions about the Department of

Defense’s management and oversight of contractors along the Afghan supply chain. Today’s hearing will not answer the who, what,

and where of the contractual dealings at Manas. It will also not

test the veracity of allegations that are swirling in Central Asia.

These questions will be answered in due course by the subcommittee’s ongoing investigation.

Rather, the purpose of today’s hearing is to look more broadly at

the recent revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Kyrgyz-American relations, the history of the U.S. presence at Manas, and the significance of the allegations of corruption at the base as a driver of the

revolution.

Since 2001, Kyrgyzstan has been a critical ally of the United

States in support of our ongoing military efforts in Afghanistan.

The Manas Air Base is a crucial hub for U.S. troops going in and

out of Afghanistan, as well as a refueling station for the United

States and NATO aircraft operating in the region. Not unexpectedly, Kyrgyzstan’s willingness to host a U.S. air base on former Soviet soil has generated some domestic controversy in Bishkek, and

even more controversy in Russia, which looks suspiciously at the

United States’ influence in Central Asia.

As the United States has increased its presence in Afghanistan,

our dependence on the Manas Air Base and the Northern Distribution Network—that, of course, is the supply chain to Afghanistan

through Central Asia—has also increased. U.S. dependence is particularly acute at Manas; in March 2010 alone, 50,000 U.S. troops

transited in and out of Afghanistan through this base.

So let’s be honest. At many times throughout our history, the

United States has closely dealt with unsavory regimes in order to

achieve more pressing policy or strategic objectives. That is realism

in a nutshell. But the United States also prides itself on a more

enlightened view of our role in the world and our long-term interests in universal respect for democracy, the rule of law, and human

rights.

Some suggest that the United States has allowed strategic and

logistical expedience in Kyrgyzstan to become a lasting embrace of

two corrupt and authoritarian regimes. Regardless of U.S. intent,

we are left with the fact that both President Akayev and President

Bakiyev were forcefully ousted from office amid widespread public

perceptions that the United States had supported the regimes’ reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jun 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\65551.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
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pression and fueled—I say that without any pun intended—their

corrosive corruption.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Kyrgyzstan’s political opposition, the

men and women who bravely confronted President Bakiyev for his

corruption and oppression, were left in the lurch. Today, many of

those opposition leaders are in power and, I expect, the United

States will have to work hard to restore our credibility in their

eyes, beginning with transparency regarding U.S. fuel contracts at

Manas. I wish them the good judgment to transform the art of

Kyrgyz governance in a manner deserving of the Kyrgyz people.

Ultimately, it is my belief that only transparency will help

Kyrgyz-American relations move forward on a new page. And toward that end, I look forward to our witnesses’ thoughts on the future of this important alliance.

With that, I would like to yield to Mr. Flake for his opening remarks.

Mr. FLAKE. I thank the chairman and thank the witnesses for

coming.

Kyrgyzstan is at a turning point, it seems. I think we are all

hopeful that political stability will come. We have a vested interest,

as the chairman mentioned, certainly with the air base as a supply

hub for our operations in Afghanistan. The existence of a U.S. base

in a former Soviet territory has been troublesome for Russia and,

to make matters worse, there are longstanding allegations that

former leadership benefited illegally from Department of Defense

fuel contracts, as has been mentioned.

So there is no easy solution here, particularly given the air base

and the situation we have there, but I look forward to any light

that can be shed on the situation and what we can do as Members

of Congress to make sure that we have a secure situation for our

war efforts in Afghanistan and also to help lend stability to the situation there.

I yield back.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Flake.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Turner for a unanimous consent request.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to request

unanimous consent to make an opening statement.

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank

you and the ranking member for holding this hearing on what is

a very important issue, and I would like to pause for a moment to

recognize in the back of the room we have Dr. Conroy and her AP

Government class from Georgetown Visitation. They are all seniors

who are here today participating in the hearing, and they include

my daughter, Jessica Turner. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to recognize them.

Mr. TIERNEY. The committee welcomes all members of that class,

as well as their faculty. We hope you enjoy your stay in Washington and appreciate, Jessica, your dad’s good work on this committee. He does really in-depth work and has been a leader here, and

we appreciate that.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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For the last 9 years, Kyrgyzstan has continued to assist the

United States with our efforts in Afghanistan. Successive governments in Bishkek have resisted tremendous pressure from some

other governments who would prefer the U.S. military bases be

evicted from Central Asia. As a member of the House Armed Services Committee, I am frequently reminded of the critical contribution the Manas Transit Center makes to supplying the United

States and NATO troops in Afghanistan.

I was further reminded of Kyrgyzstan’s strategic location during

my visit there several years ago. Manas also plays a vital role in

providing security and military assistance to the Afghan people. By

doing so, this facility and U.S. presence there helps the Kyrgyz security. We are grateful for Madam Otunbayeva’s recent statements

that the lease for use of the transit center will continue for another

year. This assurance comes at a critical time in the buildup of

United States and allied counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, Manas creates other opportunities for the Kyrgyz

public, including economic benefits such as jobs, salaries, and good

services procured, as well as humanitarian assistance provided by

the military personnel base there. For example, the U.S. service

members have assisted a local orphanage by donating their time

and money.

However, our relationship with Kyrgyzstan and with Central

Asia as a whole should not be seen exclusively through the prism

of U.S. bases there or as an adjunct of our Afghan policy. Currently, the Defense and State Departments groups Central Asia in

the same bureaus and divisions as Afghanistan and Pakistan. This

organizational structure may act as an enabling factor for administration officials to pigeonhole Central Asian countries as simply a

corridor to get to Afghanistan.

We should have in place policies and strategies that look at Central Asian states as countries that have their own unique cultures,

challenges, and possibilities. One of these possibilities is helping

and encouraging the Kyrgyz people to create economic opportunity.

Kyrgyzstan has little economic means today. The Kyrgyz people

need economic opportunities and jobs to achieve long-term stability.

Stability is in America’s and NATO’s military interest. Economic

development would help perpetuate stability. Prosperity and stability in Kyrgyzstan is also in America’s and Europe’s economic interest.

Most of the highways already exist for transportation. There is

required investment that should assist the better border management and supporting infrastructure, and border control would also

help stem narcotics flow out of Afghanistan, an issue that I am

concerned about.

To help the Kyrgyz invite more investment, its democratic

friends around the world, including the United States, must help

its government to increase transparency. I hope that the administration and nongovernmental organizations, some of which are represented at this hearing, will assist the Kyrgyz Republic in creating

ways that provide transparency for commercial transactions. This

includes working with the new interim authorities to determine a

way forward that eliminates any suspicion of wrongdoing by any

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party to remove lingering doubts that the U.S. directly or indirectly

condones corruption.

In the near future, I hope we will also be able to hear from administration officials to outline and describe U.S. strategies in the

region. We need to ensure that we have a strategy not only to help

Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors, but a strategy which continues to

buildupon and cultivate U.S. relationships in the region.

Again, I want to thank the chairman for holding this hearing.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Turner.

Is there any other Member who would like to ask for unanimous

consent for an opening statement? Otherwise, we have the opportunity to place them on the record, of course, as usual.

The subcommittee will now receive testimony from the panel that

is before us today. A brief introduction of each of them to begin,

starting with Dr. Eugene Huskey. He is the William R. Keenan, Jr.

Chair of Political Science at Stetson University in Florida. He also

serves as an associate editor for the Russian Review and is a member of the Editorial Board for the Journal of Communist Studies

and Transition Politics.

Dr. Huskey’s work focuses primarily on transition politics and

legal affairs in the former Soviet Union and its successive states

of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. He is the author of several books and

has published dozens of articles about the political affairs of

Kyrgyzstan and other former Soviet states. He has been asked to

speak before the CIA, the Department of State, and numerous universities in Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Europe, and the United States. Dr.

Huskey received a B.A. from Vanderbilt University, an M.A. from

the University of Essex, and a Ph.D. in politics from the London

School of Economics and Politics.

Ambassador Baktybek Abdrisaev is a distinguished visiting professor of history and political science at Utah Valley State College.

From 1996 until 2005, he served as the Kyrgyz Ambassador to the

United States and Canada, and from 1995 to 2000 he was a member of the Kyrgyz Parliament. Prior to that, Ambassador Abdrisaev

was appointed director of Kyrgyzstan’s International Affairs Department under former President Askar Akayev.

Ambassador Abdrisaev specializes in international relations, diplomacy, and Central Asian comparative politics. He has published

dozens of scholarly articles and op-eds on Kyrgyz politics, is the author of Kyrgyzstan’s Voice in Washington, Reflections of the Kyrgyz

Ambassador on Bilateral Relations During the Transition Year.

Ambassador Abdrisaev holds a B.S. from the Bishkek Polytechnical

Institute, a Ph.D. from the Institute of Electronics Academy of

Sciences at Belarus, and a honorary professorship of the International University of Kyrgyzstan.

Ambassador, I want to express the committee’s sympathies. I

know you had personal losses during this latest uprising over

there, lost three close members of your family and friends, amongst

others, so we extend our sympathy to you. We know this is difficult

testimony for you today and a difficult period of your life, and we

thank you for taking time out to share with us your experience and

your knowledge of this area, because it was in fact you that first

negotiated the agreement with respect to Manas, so you have particular insight for us on that. Thank you.

6

Dr. Alexander Cooley is an associate professor of international

relations at Barnard College at Columbia University and is currently a global fellow with the Open Society Institute. His areas of

expertise are the political transformation of post-Soviet Eurasia,

the politics of the United States overseas basing, and theories of

contracting and organization. Dr. Cooley has written two books, including Base Politics: Democratic Change in the U.S. Military

Abroad, which examines the political impact of the U.S. military

bases in overseas host countries, including Uzbekistan and

Kyrgyzstan. He obtained his B.A. from Swarthmore College, a Masters in philosophy from Columbia University, and a Ph.D. from Columbia University.

Scott Horton is an attorney, a lecturer at Columbia Law School,

and a contributing editor for Harper’s Weekly. Mr. Horton is

known for his work in emerging markets in international law, especially human rights law and the law of armed conflict. He is a lifelong human rights advocate and co-founder of the American University in Central Asia, where he currently serves as a trustee.

Mr. Horton is also a member of the Board of the National Institute of Military Justice and a member of the Council on Foreign

Relations. Mr. Horton holds a B.A. from the University of Maryland and obtained a J.D. from the University of Texas following

studies at the University of Munich and Mainz in Germany as a

Fulbright scholar.

Sam Patten is the senior program manager for Eurasia at Freedom House. From 2008 to 2009, Mr. Patten served as a senior advisor for the Democracy Promotion at the Department of State. Prior

to that, he headed the International Republican Institute’s Moscow

Office and directed its political programming in Baghdad from 2004

to 2005. Mr. Patten has also helped manage democratically focused

campaigns in Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, Albania, and Northern

Iraq. Prior to his international career, Mr. Patten served as an advisor to Senator Susan Collins and a speech writer to Senator

Olympia Snow. Mr. Patten obtained his B.A. from Georgetown University.

So we have a lot of fire power here today. We expect to really

learn a lot and, again, we want to thank you for being here, sharing your expansive expertise.

It is, of course, the policy of the committee to swear in witnesses

before they testify, so I ask you to please stand and raise your right

hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. The record will please reflect that all

of the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

Again, I remind you that your full written statement will be put

into the written record, and I appreciate, as do the members of the

committee, how extensive those written remarks were and how

helpful they are in getting our background together. We allot about

5 minutes for opening remarks. The light will turn green, with a

minute to go it will turn to amber, and when the 5-minutes are up

it will turn to red and the floor drops and out you go. [Laughter.]

But basically we won’t do that. We are appreciative of your being

here. We will have some latitude, but we do want to get to a point

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where we can have some questions and answered exchange back

from the committee members to the panel.

So, Dr. Huskey, would you please start?

STATEMENTS OF EUGENE HUSKEY, PROFESSOR, STETSON

UNIVERSITY; AMBASSADOR BAKTYBEK ABDRISAEV, LECTURER, UTAH VALLEY UNIVERSITY, AND FORMER KYRGYZ

AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES 1996–2005; ALEXANDER COOLEY, PROFESSOR, BARNARD COLLEGE AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY; SCOTT HORTON, PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA

LAW SCHOOL, AND CONTRIBUTING EDITOR, HARPER’S

WEEKLY; AND SAM PATTEN, SENIOR PROGRAM MANAGER,

EURASIA, FREEDOM HOUSE

STATEMENT OF EUGENE HUSKEY

Mr. HUSKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Flake,

and subcommittee members, for giving me the opportunity to speak

about U.S.-Kyrgyz ties and about the country of Kyrgyzstan, which

I have been studying for the last two decades. Much of my testimony today is based on interviews that I conducted with three

dozen members of the Kyrgyz opposition during the last 2 years.

Many of those interviewees have now assumed prominent posts in

the new government and five of them make up the new collective

leadership of the country.

We are here today because the United States tried to please a

dictator. We all understand that difficult decisions have to be made

in wartime, but our embrace of the Bakiyev regime in Kyrgyzstan

was far tighter than it needed to be in order to retain our basing

rights in that country.

This became clear to me when I began interviewing opposition

leaders in July 2008. They complained that for the first time in the

post-communist era they were shunned by the U.S. Embassy in

Bishkek. In late April 2009, the opposition candidate for president,

Almaz Atambaev, told me that neither he nor other opposition politicians had been able to meet with the new U.S. Ambassador, even

though she had been in her post for more than 6 months.

Atambaev was by no means a radical politician; he was a former

prime minister and a successful businessman. He is now in fact the

first deputy leader of the interim government, the No. 2 man in the

country.

I heard the same refrain of isolation from the heads of NGO’s in

Bishkek. They had become untouchables in the eyes of the U.S.

Government. These NGO leaders were smart, energetic, and anxious to take their country in a liberalizing direction.

With the U.S. Embassy out of the picture, the Russian Embassy

in Bishkek stepped into the breach and, for the first time, Russian

diplomats started to cultivate contacts in the western-oriented

NGO community. This was the opening gambit in what would become a more balanced Russian policy toward government and society in Kyrgyzstan.

In spite of our numerous concessions to the Bakiyev regime, including the granting of lucrative contracts that is the subject of today’s hearing, I would argue that the recently vented anger of

Kyrgyz leaders and ordinary citizens over the air base does not reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:17 Jun 23, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\KATIES\DOCS\65551.TXT KATIE PsN: KATIE
8

flect an inherently anti-American sentiment in the country. It derives instead from a sense that the United States betrayed its own

principles and the forces of change in Kyrgyzstan in order to curry

favor with a despotic ruler who held the key to the air base.

It also, I should add, reflects popular frustration with a decadelong history of Kyrgyz presidents selling or leasing pieces of the

country’s territory to the highest foreign bidder. These bidders have

included Russia, Kazakhstan, China, Uzbekistan, and the United

States.

Let me turn finally to a few of the issues that will shape the future of the air base and U.S.-Kyrgyz relations more broadly. First,

it is vital that the interim government in Bishkek consolidate its

authority throughout the country. The air base cannot function

properly against the backdrop of sporadic civil unrest, never mind

a civil war. The country is deeply divided along north-south lines

and pockets of resistance to the revolution remain in the south.

Because the revolution was made in the north by northerners,

and because the deposed president was from the south, there is

great concern in the south that the interest of this historically disadvantaged region will not be fully represented in Bishkek. The interim government has made a good start by including two leaders

from the south in its senior ranks, but there is still much work to

do.

Second, who rules Kyrgyzstan and how will be determined in the

next 6 months by the introduction of a new constitution and the

holding of new elections. The new constitution is likely to strip the

presidency of much of its power and strengthen the parliament.

This should make politics more competitive, but it may also complicate future negotiations over the air base. The U.S. administration may need to gain the support of a coalition of parties instead

of a single individual, as in the past.

As elections grow closer, the tensions within the collective leadership will increase because the focus of the rulers will shift from

governing to campaigning for their party or for the presidency. It

is at this point that the system is likely to be at its most fragile

and there will be the greatest temptation for Kyrgyz politicians to

use the air base at Manas as a whipping boy in order to advance

their own electoral prospects.

It is in the interest of the United States, then, to have a thorough and early airing of our misdeeds with regard to the base and

the Bakiyev regime. We do not want the next elections in

Kyrgyzstan to be swayed by an October surprise that could reveal

embarrassing details of our earlier policy toward the country. I welcome, therefore, your efforts to investigate our policies toward the

Bakiyev regime. I also welcome the early signs from the administration that we will be pursuing a new strategy of engagement

with governments and societies in Central Asia.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Huskey follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Doctor. We appreciate your remarks.

Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR BAKTYBEK ABDRISAEV

Mr. ABDRISAEV. Dear Mr. Chairman, dear Ranking Member

Flake, dear members of the subcommittee, ladies and gentlemen.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for inviting

me to testify before your committee on the recent change of government in Kyrgyzstan and its impact for U.S.-Kyrgyz relations.

When the upheaval of April 6th and 7th happened in

Kyrgyzstan, I was teaching my students in Utah at Utah Valley

University. This time, in comparison with the events 5 years before, a regime of the deposed President Bakiyev, as he promised,

used live ammunition against protesters, and soon, like many others in Kyrgyzstan, I felt a great pain from this.

Among those who fell, struck by the two bullets in the head was

my nephew, 35 years old, Rustan Shambetov, and one of my wife’s

cousins, Mirlanbek Turdaliev, 29 years old, who was raised as an

orphan in Jalalabad, the same city from which the deposed President Bakiyev also came. Then one more person, Joldoshbek

Kudaybergenov, 36 years old, journalist, who was just witnessing

the process and tried to await some news about that. He was

struck by a bullet.

So this is also the proof that there were so many people there

involved, not just the crowd and mob, but just many people who

are sincerely, genuinely trying to witness the changes that was

going on.

So the upheaval caused 85 people so far and hundreds and hundreds still are there in hospitals. And now the Kyrgyz people there

want, first of all, accountability for the government which was undermined by corruption and nepotism, and also a government

which authorized the use of lethal force against protester citizens.

But they also want a new government, and they have high expectations from the people who are now in the interim government who

would restore democratic freedoms, ensure free access to the market, and the system of corruption and patronage.

They also are asking questions. Most important, is America truly

our friend? And if so, then, first, America should demonstrate its

commitment to democracy and the values of an open society with

more than just words. Second, America should also remember that

Kyrgyz society, despite the questions quite sharp and not pleasant

about the procurement contracts, etc., still continues to view America as a model worth emulating.

Third, America should remember that its support, for example,

for education in Kyrgyzstan has had a far more positive impact on

our country than the Transit Center. U.S.-founded American University in Central Asia is now among the most prestigious universities in Central Asia and the region, and America can show it

cares about our country by continuing such generous support for

education that is shaping our country’s future.

And as far as the air base, Manas, is concerned, I would like to

remind you, first, that its major aim was, and still continues to be,

to support U.S. military operations in the war in Afghanistan and,

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as a result of that, to maintain security for the Kyrgyz public

against external threats that originate in that country.

Therefore, from the beginning, the air base operation, the issue

of payment was never our primary concern. The Kyrgyz government was focused on the threat of its own population originating

from Afghanistan starting from 1999 when, for the first time, we

experienced incursions of al Qaeda on our soil and, as a result, 3

years before 9/11 we experienced such attacks and we lost 55 lives

of our people in uniform and citizens.

So, therefore, when the United States came with such a proposal,

we welcomed it and said, as President Akayev mentioned in 2002

during his visit to Washington, DC, at CSIS, that Kyrgyzstan will

make its own contribution to fight with this great evil terrorism.

We are not asking for the money because this is our own fight for

the triumph of democracy and the right to enjoy its fruits, to live

in peace and prosperity.

I am really grateful to you for, again, having this hearing. So

many of you talk why and how the issues from such kind of strategic importance now shifted to the issue about the so-called corrupted practices from both sides, and I know that my colleagues

have a lot to offer.

But my main message is that we have to restore our cooperation

on a wide-range of issues, and the issue of the base is extremely

important to us, to continue to keep its presence as a strategic

asset for us against a strike from Afghanistan and, at the same

time, to pay attention to other areas—education, political, and economic reforms—which could help the country continue to advance

itself in Central Asia, which deserves its own right and place in the

international community.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Abdrisaev follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Ambassador.

Dr. Cooley.

STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER COOLEY

Mr. COOLEY. Thank you very much, Chairman Tierney, Ranking

Member Flake, distinguished members of the subcommittee, for

this privilege of addressing you today. I am a political scientist who

has studied the Manas Air Base since its establishment in 2001

and studied in a comparative context, viewing developments related to the base in comparison to other bases that we have in places

like East Asia, Southern Europe, and other post-communist states.

Regrettably, it is not surprising that the U.S. military presence

has become intertwined with allegations that the U.S. supported of

the repressive and corrupt regime of President Kurmanbeck

Bakiyev. At the same time, I do believe we have the opportunity

now, if we act I think with some foresight and we act aggressively,

to salvage the base.

I think it is important at the outset to understand that the base

has come to mean different things for Kyrgyzstan and the United

States. For us it is, naturally, this important, vital hub to support

the mission in Afghanistan. And for the Kyrgyz, when it was first

established, this was also the security purpose.

However, the base’s role within Kyrgyzstan has evolved since its

establishment, and during the Bakiyev regime and, I would argue,

the latter stages of the Akayev regime, the base became viewed primarily as a domestic source of rents, income, and patronage. So

this is why the United States has to pay quid pro quo to establish

its presence in Kyrgyzstan. It otherwise lacks the authority, just

from of this vital international mission, to keep the base.

Now, this quid pro quo has been official, in the form of rental payments that have gone from $2 million to $17 million to the current $60 million, but some of the quid pro quo is also tacit; and this

is when we get into the business of base-related service contracts

and fuel contracts. Unfortunately, both these official and these tacit

payments have tended to accrue to Kyrgyz elites and have not benefited Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz’s development as a whole. So the

base means very different things to each side.

As you mentioned in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, the

base also became a symbol of the U.S.’s indifference to regressions

in Kyrgyzstan’s human rights and democracy. Also, the base itself

was viewed not only as a symbol, but as an actual site of Bakiyev’s

greed and cronyism. It functioned as a daily reminder of what this

regime had become.

The point I want to make in my remarks to you is that we

learned actually the wrong lessons about the relationship between

political authoritarianism, stability, and basing rights. Many DOD

and State Department officials I talked to pointed to the example

of Uzbekistan as a cautionary tale of what can go wrong; where,

in 2005, after the crackdown of Uzbek security services against

demonstrators in the eastern city of Andijon, there was a wave of

international criticism, including from the U.S. State Department.

The Uzbek government became very concerned about our political commitment to them. This was also in the middle of the colored

revolutions. And this led to a series of events that resulted in the

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eviction of the U.S. military from the Karshi Khanabad K2 facility

in the summer of 2005.

So the lesson seems to have been learned: don’t push Central

Asian governments on human rights and democracy; otherwise, you

will jeopardize the base. But the fact of the matter is that

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have very different political cultures.

Kyrgyzstan is considerably more open; has a better civil society;

and its security services are not as repressive and never have commanded the loyalty of the regime as they have in Uzbekistan.

And you saw that; in both 2005 and 2010, the security services

did not go to the mat for the Kyrgyz regime. So that is one thing,

that we sort of thought there was this one Central Asian political

culture that fits all.

A second point I would make is that we started viewing

Bakiyev’s authoritarianism as, in and of itself, evidence of political

stability, when in fact it was popular protest against electricity rate

hikes and against the greed and corruption of the regime that led

to its destabilization.

So I would just make those two points.

Recommendations going forward. We do have to mend fences

with the Kyrgyz government, and quickly. I think we can offer financial support for very specific goals that we can agree with, for

example, helping them finance this upcoming Presidential election

that will be so open.

Second, I think U.S. officials should publicly declare their willingness to cooperate with any Kyrgyz investigation to Bakiyev-era

base-related business practices and open these transactions to public scrutiny. I realize these are going to inconvenience certain parties, but the symbolism is important. This has to be treated as a

political crisis, not as a legal matter. And one suggestion I would

have is look at ways in which base-related contracts can accrue

into the Kyrgyz national budget, as opposed to private entities with

offshore registrations.

Finally, I think both the President and the Congress should recommit to supporting Kyrgyzstan’s democratization and support

the appropriate programs.

My final point, yes, the base was extended for a year, and we are

all grateful for that, but we are entering a campaign cycle now

where this will become a political pinata for populous politicians to

really link the base to U.S. support of an unpopular dictator. So as

Professor Huskey mentioned, it is imperative that we take these

actions now, and not in October when the campaign is in full

swing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooley follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much, Dr. Cooley.

Mr. Horton.

STATEMENT OF SCOTT HORTON

Mr. HORTON. Chairman Tierney, Ranking Member Flake, and

distinguished Members, it is a great honor for me to appear before

you today and talk about the situation in Kyrgyzstan.

I want to start by noting my colleague, Alex Cooley’s comment.

He says we need to look at this as a political matter, rather than

a legal matter, and I will submit we have to look at it both ways.

I submit that principally because I am a lawyer and it is my duty

here to look at the legal issues; and that is what I have done. But

I also feel that is a fundamental aspect of the political controversy

in Kyrgyzstan today.

This revolution, reduced to one word, was about corruption. Now,

all the political leaders that I have talked with agree, and in the

wake of the revolution there is a great deal of talk about the rule

of law and transparency. And the question I hear thrown at me as

an American, when I talk with them, over and over again is what

is your commitment to the rule of law and transparency? You talk

about this all the time and we don’t see it in your conduct in our

country.

And I am ashamed to say I think they have a valid point. So I

looked with some care at the publicly available information concerning the fuel contracts that were written relating to Manas, and

I note in my remarks that we don’t have the quality of information

that a prosecutor could use to bring a case, but I think we can

draw some conclusions from this information.

And the first is that there are numerous red flags of the sort traditionally used by our Department of Justice when looking at bribery cases relating to public contracts, which suggests strongly that

we may be looking at a violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices

Act and other anti-bribery statutes. And certainly there are sufficient red flags to merit the opening of a formal and detailed inquiry

into what transpired.

The second thing is looking at the structure of these contracts

and looking particularly at Red Star and Mina Corp., the two entities which received in excess of $1 billion in fuel supply contracts.

They are very disturbing questions concerning these companies.

They appear to have come out of nowhere with no prior track

record of involvement in this sector; the individuals involved with

them have copious connections to the U.S. Government, but not

really very much to the fuel supply industry; and the contracting

relationships themselves are, in a word, extraordinary, not consistent with traditional contracting rule and approaches.

In fact, yesterday, in an article by Aaron Roston, he secured and

released and published a Memorandum of Agreement between the

Department of Defense and Red Stas, which I examined, and I

have to say I was just shocked by it. It is nothing like a traditional

contracting document.

All this together shows the absence of an arm’s length relationship between Red Star and the Department of Defense, and I think

that is quite troubling because, of course, it is Red Star and Mina

Corp. that historically did do contracts with President Akayev’s

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family—I think that information is really quite well established—

and are accused of having concluded similar contractual arrangements with entities controlled by President Bakiyev. In any event,

that accusation is out there, presented very sharply by the Kyrgyz

government, and it is incumbent upon us to operate transparently,

get to the bottom of the facts, and admit we made a mistake if in

fact we did.

I also am concerned about the role the U.S. Department of Justice has played in this, because after the 2005 revolution, the Justice Department did come in, did conduct an investigation, and appears to have given a wink and a nod to these arrangements involving Red Star and Mina Corp., and I think that raises serious

questions in my mind about their understanding of this contract

corruption issue, particularly because this occurs at a time when

our Justice Department is telling us that procurement contract

fraud is a priority for the Department of Justice. Indeed, they say

it is a national security issue. And I don’t see how we can reconcile

the way they have behaved in this case with those sorts of statements.

In the end, how our Defense Department contracts for services

at Manas makes a statement about how we view Kyrgyzstan. Is

this a fellow democracy that shares our values and the rule of law

and transparency, or do we view this country as congenitally corrupt and governed by competing bands of kleptocrats, where we

have to use walking-around money to accomplish goals and we define the relationship only in short-term ways, because we are really

not looking for a long-term relationship?

The simple truth is that Kyrgyzstan is not a well established,

stable democracy, but it is also is not some sort of Hobbesian nightmare. The people in Kyrgyzstan have very, very high aspirations.

And the question is what is the path forward? How are we going

to proceed? Are we going to work with the Kyrgyz and support

their aspirations for a modern democracy that lives up to the values that we both articulate, or are we going to continue dealing

with them in a way that shores up corruption in the country and

autocratic rule? And I think the approach of the last few years is

not worthy of the United States and is not worthy of Kyrgyzstan.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Horton follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Horton.

Mr. Patten.

STATEMENT OF SAM PATTEN

Mr. PATTEN. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Tierney, Congressman Flake, and other Members, for the opportunity to speak

on behalf of Freedom House to this subcommittee.

In his novel The Last Tycoon, Scott Fitzgerald wrote that there

are no second acts in American lives.

In view of recent events, a fitting question for this hearing, and

for those who are concerned about Kyrgyzstan’s future, is whether

there is indeed a second act in store for Kyrgyzstan, the far-distant

mountainous Soviet state that is little known to the American people.

I would argue that there is if we learn the correct lessons from

the recent experience. Those lessons would be the first application

of such lessons in the former Soviet Union. In no instance since the

color revolutions between 2003 and 2005 have any of the former

dictators been brought to account for their crimes against their

people.

Unfortunately, Mr. Bakiyev’s exit from Kyrgyzstan denies the

Kyrgyz people the opportunity to hold him and his regime to account for the crimes that he committed. However, hopefully the full

investigation that other witnesses have talked about and alluded to

will be conducted and there will be an opportunity to bring the

Bakiyev family to account for the crimes that no other former Soviet leader has to date been called to account for.

Freedom House is probably best known for the rankings that we

produce each year of Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit,

taking a look at all of the countries of the former Soviet Union and

indeed the world. This year, for the first time, we downgraded

Kyrgyzstan to not free in January for a variety of reasons having

to do with the Bakiyev government’s relationship with the media,

its increasing censorship, the violence with which it dealt with

journalists, and its increasing political repression.

In the spirit of fairness, I took our report to the then Kyrgyz Ambassador in Washington, Zamira Sydykova, who is a relatively

thoughtful woman and a former journalist, much in the same spirit

as the interim leader, Rosa Otunbayeva, to have a conversation

and to explain to her why Freedom House downgraded Kyrgyzstan

to not free.

She listened to the reasons that I laid forth and that were in our

reports, and at the end of our discussion she asked, ‘‘why is it that

the State Department no longer talks to us about democracy? It

used to be that every sentence the State Department would say to

us would include the word democracy; now they only talk to us

about trade. If your State Department does not care about democracy, why should we?’’

I was stunned by her reaction to the report and, indeed, there

is an important responsibility. Much blame has been put on the

Department of Defense for the recent events that have happened

in Kyrgyzstan. I think it is important to look at the role in a whole

government approach that the State Department also needs to

play.

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We have seen in the New York Times the fairly apocryphal account of an opposition leader, which has been mentioned here

today, visiting the U.S. Embassy and saying that the revolution begins on Wednesday, and the diplomat with whom he spoke said,

‘‘oh, yeah?’’ Other opposition figures, as we have heard, were not

received at the U.S. Embassy and, in fact, Congress passed the Advanced Democratic Values Act in 2006. There is a law on the books

requiring senior U.S. diplomats to actively outreach and engage opposition figures, human rights activists, and others in all countries

where the United States conducts diplomatic relations. Kyrgyzstan

should be no exception; the other countries of the former Soviet

space should be no exception.

The recent incident in Kyrgyzstan and the ongoing tumult that

comes from the events of the last 2 weeks puts the regional situation, particularly with Kazakhstan, as the chairman of the OSCE,

in a unique perspective. Kazakhstan’s becoming the first chairman

of the OSCE east of Vienna is a historic precedent.

The events of the last 2 weeks presented the first opportunity in

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE to actively engage in a

constructive way to diffuse violence, to put monitors on the ground,

and work in the process of healing the country of Kyrgyzstan. They

failed. They failed to deploy ODIHR, which had the monitors and

the resources necessary to engage, and, instead, reverted to oldstyle former Soviet diplomacy, in effect whisking Bakiyev off

through Kazakhstan to Belarus, where he safely sits today.

I think that is an important lesson looking forward about just

the role of multilateral institutions in the OSCE in particular and

how it was intended to be used in situations like this and how, perhaps in the balance of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, it can do a better job.

Looking also in the regional perspective, there are lessons to be

learned here with respect to Uzbekistan in particular. And the case

was raised that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are not similar in

many circumstances; however, the lessons are the same. The lesson

that we have learned in Kyrgyzstan is that backing up a single dictator does not put us in a very good position when a revolution

happens.

The question with Uzbekistan is not if the revolution will happen, but when it will happen, and do we want to be in the same

position sitting here at this table, wondering what happened, when

things do change in Uzbekistan, as we are today. A careful look

and review of the situation and how Kyrgyzstan got to where it is

hopefully will put us in a better position when that comes.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Patten follows:]

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Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Patten.

Thank all of our witnesses for your testimony, both written and

oral; it has been informative on that. We are going into a question

and answer period here, about 5 minutes per Member, and we will

go around more than one cycle if that is amenable to all the witnesses and the Members desire it.

Mr. Patten, it is not unusual for the United States, if we go back

in our history, unfortunately, and find out how often diplomatically

we have chosen to support somebody who was authoritarian in nature or convenient to moving our priorities forward, as opposed to

keeping those open contacts with opposition leaders as well, and

playing a different role. Pakistan comes to mind, General

Musharraf, as a more recent thing, but it goes on and on.

Let me ask first, though, to all the witnesses here. I am hearing

that it is a good idea to do this investigation, it is a good idea to

do it early on, it is a good idea to be as inclusive and thorough as

we can be. Yet, on the other hand, I am hearing that doing that

may give fodder to sort of a pinata sort of situation in the elections

coming up in that country. So can you weigh or balance for me the

pros and cons of that? In any order people want to speak up.

Dr. Cooley, you have been nodding away. Do you want to speak

first?

Mr. COOLEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think the base is going to be

a pinata whether we have the investigation or not. I think candidates are positioning themselves. They have all the fodder that

they need to make these connections. And, again, this operates in

Kyrgyz political space. This is regardless of what the intentions

may or may not have been on the part of the State or DOD. The

base will be an issue. That is why having an investigation, being

contrite about some of the arrangements, all of this is important

to give domestic political support to those factions, to those candidates that want to maintain the base and have good relations

with the United States.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure, Mr. Horton, go ahead.

Mr. HORTON. I would just add that I think investigations are occurring because the Kyrgyz side is conducting an investigation.

And while we talk about transparency, actually, I think all of us

who have tried to look into the issues surrounding these contracts

have discovered very quickly we can get much more detailed information much more quickly in Bishkek than we can get it in Washington.

There are prosecutors out there right now doing detailed investigations. Information is circulating about the pricing of the fuel

contracts right now. Copies of the documents are circulating. It is

out there. And, frankly, it would behoove us to conduct our own investigation and be out there with conclusions ahead of them. We

have to view it in that context.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Horton, as long as you are on that, I take note

of your comment that there are U.S. individuals connected with

some of these companies, like Red Star and Mina. So tell me a little bit about that, why we should be cautious of that and what you

know so far.

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Mr. HORTON. Well, again, I viewed this from a perspective of traditional analysis of the FCPA as it will be applied in a commercial

setting and I said, if we viewed this as a commercial contract——

Mr. TIERNEY. The FCPA being the Federal Corrupt——

Mr. HORTON. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. And one thing the

prosecutors do applying this is they look to these sorts of contract

and subcontracting relationships and test is there really an arm’s

length relationship between the original company and the first tier

contractor.

In applying those tests, we come to a conclusion very quickly

there is no such arm’s length relationship, and that using the traditional factors—who are the officers, who are the people who are

working in the company, what is its tradition, what is its business

history, has it operated in this sort of business in the past, what

volume of business did it have before, how are the contracts concluded, was there open bidding for it—you apply all these tests and

it flunks every single test, which means, using the traditional Department of Justice analysis, not arm’s length.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ambassador, what do you say about the Akayev regime when it was in power? Do you believe it was corrupt as well

as the Bakiyev? Do you take no position on that or what information do you want to share?

Mr. ABDRISAEV. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, first of all,

about the previous question, I think that such an investigation will

be quite important for a fellow democracy, an emerging democracy,

to learn lessons from the leading democracy in the world. It will

demonstrate how some of the problems must be resolved in a legal

framework. It would be really great.

Second, about the corrupt practices, I think this is an issue

where we have to now admit that during Akayev’s regime, when

I was an ambassador, in 2003 I was at—University and I was

grilled on the same issue 7 years ago, and I admitted that probably, yes, because the president’s family is involved in that business.

But how do we have to regulate it? What kind of legislation and

framework do we need, because it is an issue that our country has

to admit and then resolve. And probably this investigation will help

for us to not to allow for the rulers to do something, which people

view as against their benefits and for their wealth.

But second, also, it would help for us to understand how the base

changed its status from being of strategic importantance for protection from external threats to now becoming such a source of controversy. Because we have another example in Kyrgyzstan of the

famous company Kumptor Gold Mining. It experienced the same

kind of problems during 2 or 3 years, and we have just couple of

such projects. Why are we in such a bottleneck when people now

view the U.S. base as just a source of money? And it is quite an

important question which I think this investigation also would help

to resolve.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. HUSKEY. Mr. Chairman, could I speak to the comparison of

President Akayev and Bakiyev on this point?

Mr. TIERNEY. There being no objection, sure, go right ahead.

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Mr. HUSKEY. It is true that both were corrupt, both regimes were

corrupt, but the degree of corruption in the most recent regime of

Bakiyev was far greater, bringing his son right into the central

core of the executive branch. The other difference, however, didn’t

have to do with corruption, but it had to do with the level of repression. In Akayev it was still possible to have a relatively vibrant

civil society. That was being destroyed since 2007.

We had a criminalization of the state in Kyrgyzstan, where law

enforcement authorities were intermingled with criminal groups,

where the former chief of staff of the president was incinerated in

his car because he dared to flirt with the opposition, we had journalists and opposition politicians being killed, members of the parliament being killed. This kind of thing didn’t happen under

Akayev. So I think there was a qualitative difference between the

Akayev and the Bakiyev eras.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. Thank you for that.

Mr. Flake, you are recognized.

Mr. FLAKE. We have spoken about the air base, Dr. Cooley, the

air base being used politically.

Dr. Huskey, if you could elaborate how will this be used in a political campaign? Is there popular support in the population for the

air base? Does the population simply want the revenue to trickle

down a little more freely? Or what kind of politics are going to be

used with the air base? If you could elaborate.

Mr. HUSKEY. Again, as I was suggesting, the air base has to be

seen as a part of a decade-long history of Kyrgyzstan either selling

or auctioning its territory. It began at the end of the 1990’s with

the Chinese border delimitation, where Kyrgyzstan lost 250,000

acres to China. There are lots of rumors about the president at the

time taking money and other members of the cabinet. Kazakhstan

was given territory; Uzbekistan was on the verge of getting a very

sweet deal.

Unfortunately, Manas is a part of that tradition, and I don’t

think we can say that in the Kyrgyz population the base is terribly

popular. They, I think, have forgotten what happened in 2001; it

is almost a decade beyond that point. And, as Ambassador

Abdrisaev was saying, the incursion of people from Afghanistan

through southwestern Kyrgyzstan at the end of the 1990’s, alarmed

the population and the government. But now I think the base is

not a terribly popular idea.

The only thing I would say is that it is possible that some of the

parties that are now separate will come together before the election. If they do, one could imagine a moderate stance on this, an

accommodational stance. The danger would be that kind of fused

party would be outflanked by a party willing to, again, hit the pinata, as Professor Cooley says, with the air base issue.

Mr. FLAKE. Dr. Cooley.

Mr. COOLEY. The base will certainly be an issue in the campaign,

but it is not going to be the only issue, and I would argue it

wouldn’t be the prime issue. What drove the events of the last 2

weeks were anger about, as was stated, the increase in electricity

and gas tariffs, which is a result of corruption and the accelerating

pace of corruption, which has been pointed out that in the Bakiyev

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government, the level of corruption, the depth of corruption intensified tremendously.

Really, by focusing on corruption and coming up with concrete

ways of being more transparent in the way in which funds are provided for rent and other aspects of the base, the United States can

best represent itself and put the base issue to rest and address the

focus on the real issue in Kyrgyzstan, which is corruption and its

affect on government, which is entirely corrosive.

Mr. FLAKE. Did you have something to add there?

Mr. COOLEY. Just very quickly. The base faces a very negative

media environment, and always has, in Kyrgyzstan from the Russian language press, and a lot of the stories that they run are untrue; they are rumors, they are meant to delegitimize it, accuse the

base of doing all sorts of things that they are not doing. So the

media terrain is very difficult and issues like this just keep stacking up on top.

Now, the transit center does have a Web site; it is much more

proactive than it was a year ago, and I would commend the base

for taking some good PR steps. But a lot of the images in the

Kyrgyzs’ mind about the base have been set.

I think our best case scenario, a pro-base politician, if we want

to use that word, I think will only be able to run on the promise

that they will keep the base, but renegotiate some of its legal provisions. I think that is the political space. I think the sort of time

for business as usual, no one is going to get behind that.

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Ambassador, first, I am glad to see you at UVU.

My kids are at BYU next door. I am wondering, there was as much

as $8 million a month, it was thought that might have been

skimmed off these fuel contracts. Is there any effort or was this

money seized somewhere in these campaigns that will come out?

Are politicians claiming that they can recoup some of this money

and is that a way that they can, through transparency and whatnot, legitimize the existence of the base, at least? Is there an effort

to seize the money that has been skimmed? Or is that money just

gone now?

Mr. ABDRISAEV. I think it requires a serious investigation from

the Kyrgyz side and U.S. side as well. But, first of all, hearings and

transparency in this process I think would help us maybe to recover part of that money. But the difference with the previous regime, now people would at least know how that money would be

spent with the current ones for a couple more years. I think there

is no feeling with the new people there will be such problems like

before because now we have a plurality.

So many people with different opinions, they will liberate some

decisions which benefit society in a more positive way than the previous regime. The previous regime, everything was so clouded and

secret and, therefore, as a result, of course, such problems. But now

I think it is worth to do it.

And, by the way, my guess is if you would do that, we would ask

also the economic conditions and question the presence of another

base which exists and also a Russian one. And, by the way, when

we signed the agreement with both the United States and Russia

in 2001, the reasons were the same, and it is quite important for

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us to see how, in this case, society would benefit politically, strategically, economically from both cases. So don’t be afraid.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. HORTON. [Remarks made off mic.]

Mr. FLAKE. If that is OK with the chairman; I am out of time.

Mr. TIERNEY. Sure. Go ahead.

Mr. HORTON. [Remarks made off mic.]

Mr. FLAKE. Can you put the mic on?

Mr. HORTON. I am sorry. So $200 million they say has been

transferred out. They are trying to trace that money and freeze it

right now. So there is an ongoing effort to specifically identify the

counter-parties and freeze and secure the funds, just hold it while

they then deal with the question of liability and whether it can be

recovered.

Mr. FLAKE. OK. Thank you.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Driehaus, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for holding this hearing.

Dr. Huskey, you had talked about the actions of the U.S. Embassy and our treatment of opposition leaders leading up to the

change in government, and I am curious as to your opinion as to

whether or not, structurally, at the embassy, folks have recognized

the failure of their actions and what we have done to address that.

Or are the same people in place? We talk a lot about this investigation and looking at the air base, but I am wondering if we are

also looking internally at the decisionmaking process at the embassy and whether or not we have learned anything from that and

are outwardly expressing signs that, yes, we recognize what we

failed to do and we are adjusting for that.

Mr. HUSKEY. Last week I spoke to people in the State Department and the administration. I think there is a recognition that

changes have to be made in the embassy. The previous Ambassador

who left—it would have been right about when I arrived in July

2008, had had a fairly active agenda with opposition members, and

the new Ambassador, Ambassador Gefeller, adopted a very different policy.

I understand, again, simply from secondhand accounts, that

there was some disagreement with that policy in the embassy

itself, and I am afraid you will have to go elsewhere to find more

detail about this, but obviously an ambassador would not, it seems

to me, on her own be able to make such an important decision as

to stand aside from the opposition of the democratic change-oriented forces in a country. That would have had to have been something known and approved in Washington.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. So it is your understanding that the policies that

were being pursued were being instructed or driven by the State

Department in Washington, not necessarily driven by the Ambassador?

Mr. HUSKEY. I would so assume.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Have there been outward signs at the embassy to

the government? There has been mention of the way in which we

could help fund education, how we could pay for the elections. We

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tigation is important, but are there other things that the embassy

could be doing to show that we have learned our lessons, to show

that, in fact, we are working cooperatively with the government, we

are rooting out some of the corruption that has been identified and

we are on a new path? Have there been outward signs to that effect from the embassy?

Mr. HUSKEY. The embassy has certainly been talking to the interim government, and very actively. It is probably early days to

re-engage with NGO’s, but I would assume they would do that and

they would do that, again, very actively. There are a number of

projects that the United States probably ought to get involved in

in that region, some of them infrastructural projects that would assist them in hydroelectric production.

Russia has gotten involved in a very big way with a kind of demonstration project, a huge scale project that is now somewhat uncertain as to when it is going to be finished. But there are a lot

of small scale hydroelectric things that we could do in the United

States that I think would bring terrific economic and political benefits to both sides.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. ABDRISAEV. I would like just to add maybe the view of the

outsider, because for 5 years I was out of the decisionmaking in

Bishkek, also dealing with the U.S. Embassy. I think it will be difficult to blame just the Ambassador for such changes in policy. My

guess is that the opinion of [indiscernible] is quite important. The

United States probably already decided not to treat our country as

a fellow democracy, but just a regular case of a corrupted and

failed state.

And we could see so many opinions not only among the State Department people, but also among the [indiscernible] experts. In

2005, I was surprised by the fact that President Nazarbayev used

the case of Kyrgyzstan as mocking in order to be reelected for the

next time, and it was surprising that neither the United States or

experts in the west, they just looked at that case as something

which is indifferent for them.

Our country was used as a case of, again, a violent one and failed

one, and here we already started to lose its connections based with

respect to the values and shared values as well. And Bakiyev we

have to also take into account, he did all of the efforts in order to

cut ties with the United States. He never ever expressed his desire

to come to Washington, DC. During his time, four diplomats were

expelled from Kyrgyzstan. It is unimaginable. It is unimaginable to

expel for almost nothing.

And I can understand the Ambassador, when she came to her

new position, there was already a whole trend. Now it is necessary

to change, again, to restore our attention based on the multidimensional cooperation—educational, people’s diplomacy exchanges and

other things that could restore the credibility and will be a different attitude.

Mr. DRIEHAUS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Turner, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Patten, you had mentioned that perhaps they weren’t hearing the word democracy enough from us, so my question is about

70

democracy. I would like each of you, if you would, to give us your

thoughts on what does the transition look like. Is it possible for

them to transition to democracy? And what can we do to help?

Mr. PATTEN. Of all the——

Mr. TURNER. I am sorry, Mr. Patten, before you begin, because

I have a feeling that may take up most of my time for you to each

give your thoughts on democracy.

I want to ask unanimous consent from the chairman. I have an

article that is ‘‘Regardless of Who Is in Power, We Have an Ally

in Need,’’ by Eric Stewart, former U.S. Department of Commerce

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, which just

sounds many of the themes that I know you are going to be telling

us.

Mr. TIERNEY. Without objection, that will be put in the record.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Mr. Patten.

Mr. PATTEN. Thank you, Congressman. Kyrgyzstan has, for some

time, been seen among all the Central Asian states as the most

pluralistic, with the most opportunities for citizen participation.

And certainly during the Akayev period that was seen to a far

greater extent than in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan or obviously

Turkmenistan.

The repressions increased over the Bakiyev term, but there is an

experience in Kyrgyzstan of civic entitlement that does not exist

elsewhere in Central Asia, and for that reason there is an opportunity, particularly in this next 6 months and the 3-months leading

up to the constitutional referendum, and then in the fall elections.

The key issue is really going to be the legitimacy of the interim

government. This is an unelected government, whereas Bakiyev

was elected, albeit by a rigged election. So the best way that they

can approach that from a standpoint of democracy is to engage civil

society, which is reasonably strong in Kyrgyzstan relative to other

Central Asian countries.

There is an independent public council of strong civil society

groups that has played a very constructive role in the last 2 weeks.

They have engaged in an effort to try and ease tensions between

Bakiyev, before he left the country, and the interim government,

and they have offered draft legislation already to be considered,

issues such as freedom of the media and reform of police and law

enforcement.

So encouraging and supporting civil society is probably the best

thing we can do in the next 3 to 6 months.

Mr. HORTON. Well, I agree with Sam Patten on every single point

he made; they are exactly right up and down the list. And I think

acting decisively, vocally, and with funds to support these elections,

to support the constitution process is extremely important. Enabling civil society, ensuring that it plays a vibrant role, as I am

sure it can, in this process is critical.

And I think Kyrgyzstan is a standout in this entire region; it is

a country where there are, in fact, millions of people who deeply

care about democracy and civil liberties. They are willing to take

to the streets for it, to stand up and die for it. They have overturned two governments over this. It is a unique opportunity and

it is something that forms the basis for a bond with the United

71

States that can be lasting and it can serve our mutual security interests.

Mr. COOLEY. Yes, I would just underscore that I think the focus

should be on encouraging political pluralism, be it in media or civil

society. Yes, the technical stuff is important in terms of democracy,

but it is really creating spaces for the rich political pluralism and

diversity of viewpoints and external affiliations that the Kyrgyz

have. I think that should be the focus.

Mr. ABDRISAEV. I would like also to mention here, as an addition,

that now it is time to work with the political parties, and during

my couple of years last time with the opposition, I could see a couple of really great hopes with several parties. So that is why if we

would embolden them, help them, especially not only with creating

the party structures, but also some of the bodies which help them

to develop programs, analytical research, etc., and they will quite

quickly adjust to that, it will develop quite a sound, long-lasting

programs and would have an impact.

One such party I would say [indiscernible]. I was impressed. He

is the person during the 2-years was trying to push the process of

engaging the people, using his grassroots level support and with

quite impressive developments.

Mr. HUSKEY. Just quickly. I think we have heard about two preconditions that are in place for democracy, one is culture and one

is leadership with Tekebaev, the Ambassador just mentioned

Atambayev Suriev.

But I think the other issue is institutions and what kinds of

rules are going to be established in the constitution drafting. It is

my feeling that a parliamentary republic for Kyrgyzstan will be

preferable. It will prevent the concentration of power; it will be less

likely that we will have a winner take all type election with the

presidency. And we see already in the draft that Mr. Tekebaeu has

put forward, he has the idea of the legitimacy of the opposition,

which we take for granted in this country, but which we only developed in the early 19th century in the United States.

And Kyrgyzstan and many other countries in the world are trying to do that. He is trying to institutionalize this by actually giving the opposition the chairmanships of the two key committees in

the next parliament; that would be the budget committees and the

defense committees. Frankly, I am not sure that will work, but at

least there is the idea of creating institutions that are going to prevent a concentration of power.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you. You can pretty much bet that wouldn’t

work around here. [Laughter.]

Mr. Welch, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

I really appreciate your testimony, but I want to ask the question

about what appears to me to be an unresolvable conflict, and get

your thoughts on that. On the one hand, the necessity for the

American military is to have a secure supply line, and that obviously is to protect our troops. And that need suggests, to accomplish it, a partner that they can deal with, corrupt or not, and that

urgency of supplying our troops is going to take precedence, I

would think, over any other goals.

72

What you have been describing are, in effect, pro-democracy

goals that I certainly support, but in the real world, particularly

with the pressure that is on our troops, is going to be considered

a luxury. So how do you do both, or do we have to face the fact

that we can’t do both?

I will start with you, Dr. Huskey.

Mr. HUSKEY. It is going to be very difficult to do both, but the

reality is that if they elect a government that isn’t willing to extend

the air base lease, there is not much we can do about it except offer

a lot more money. And I think money will speak in a country that

has a very small GDP, struggling budget, economic crisis. I think

there are ways, therefore, that even if we have a very negative outcome in the fall, that we may be able to counterbalance that, but

I think it is going to be a very heavy price we would have to pay.

Mr. WELCH. Ambassador.

Mr. ABDRISAEV. Thank you for asking such a question. I think

now we have more hopes with this second upheaval that society

and political structures which we are creating would be more receptive to the variety of opinions, and I think that no one need here

to be afraid that if the ruling party will make such a decision. Now

we have more voices in order to oppose.

You can see, for example, I have an opinion. This is a base which

has a strategically important meaningful [indiscernible]. I know

several opposition leaders, hardliners who are saying the base is

necessary to keep there. Why? Because we already sacrificed 55

lives and the situation now in Afghanistan is worse than it was in

1999. Therefore, it is something where will be no decision like

Bakiyev; money in pocket and that is it.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you. Let me keep going. Thank you very

much, Ambassador.

Dr. Cooley.

Mr. COOLEY. No, I mean, I think this is the dilemma. I would

make two points. One is because of the different things that the

base meant to us and to the Kyrgyz, I think threats that the

Kyrgyz should somehow evict the United States were not credible.

In other words, I think we had considerable more leeway for maneuver on the political issues than we thought at the time, No. 1.

No. 2, planning for political change, especially in an important

overseas base host, that has to be part of the strategic planning effort.

Hedging our bets, reaching out to potential future political leaders, it is not an all or nothing proposition, because we have a lot

of historical cases here. The Philippines, we didn’t manage the opposition well there; Thailand; Spain; Greece; Turkey; Okinawa;

even the backlash in Korea that you see. All of these have to do

with sort of democratizing forces coming in and reexamining basing

relationships because somehow they were linked to sort of the past.

So I would make that strategic planning part of the way we think

about the base in an everyday sense.

Mr. WELCH. Thank you.

Mr. Horton.

Mr. HORTON. I would say I think we have to start by recognizing

there will be situations where imperative concerns of national security will justify a departure from normal procurement rules. I will

73

put that mildly. But I am not sure, in fact, I believe that

Kyrgyzstan was not such a case, and where the appropriate effort

to do it the right way needed to be made and wasn’t made.

And I think there is also another really fundamental point that

I think Alex just made, but I will put it in slightly different terms.

It is a question of whether we are focused on the short-term or a

long-term relationship. If it is a short-term, well, corners will be

cut and we don’t care.

If we want to have a long-term relationship with this country, we

want to have a facility there for the long term—and that is a politically very hot issue, of course—then we have to modulate our behavior accordingly, and we have to respect them and show respect

for their institutions, their aspirations for rule of law and democracy. We haven’t done that. That, I think, was a serious error in

Kyrgyzstan. And now it is up to us to draw conclusions about it

and try and straighten the situation up.

Mr. PATTEN. Congressman, your question is really central in

terms of whether or not we can do both, and I believe we can do

both on the basis of accumulated experience and looking at where

we have been successful and where we haven’t been successful. As

Ambassador Abdrisaev mentioned in his opening remarks, having

served the Kyrgyz government at the time the base was initially

opened, it is in the Kyrgyz national security interest to have an

American presence there. The tide seems to have shifted in Central

Asia where, in the 1990’s, when the Americans first showed up in

Central Asia, all of the states understood that there was a strategic

value in having the United States present.

Now that we are in the position of appearing to be blackmailed

by a dictator, other dictators are looking at that and seeing possible

opportunities. We have to shift back to the strategic questions

while applying the lessons learned.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Welch.

So, Mr. Horton, at this juncture is there any information that

you are aware of that suggests that the Department of Defense

purposely designed the fuel service contracts to enrich the first

families?

Mr. HORTON. It seems to me that the Department of Defense absolutely accepted that might be the most expedient way to proceed.

Mr. TIERNEY. You should have been a diplomat.

Mr. HORTON. That is the perception, the very broad perception

inside Kyrgyzstan. We see that charge being made dramatically by

the chief of staff, Edil Baisalov, a number of other people. I, frankly, looking at the details of how these contracts were structured,

who was involved with them, I find it very difficult to refute that.

I think it is likely that we are going to see the Defense Department say, well, at the end of the day, we got the fuel, we got it

on time, and we got it for a reasonable price, so who cares. And

the answer to that has to be, two governments fell in part because

of this, so it really does make a big difference and it really has disturbed our relationship with this country, which at one point was

clearly the most pro-American country in Central Asia and today

may no longer be that.

Mr. TIERNEY. So it begs the question or the answer, I guess, that

certainly they could have taken steps to steer those contracts away

74

from the private interested companies and to another government

type of entity or something a little more national in nature on that,

how would that have looked?

Mr. HORTON. I think they could have gone through a transparent

public bidding process for the contracts, and they should have—

what you would have seen, probably, was an effort by Kyrgyz authorities to rig the process so that only one company would be

available as a possible provider or bidder.

But I think the United States would have come out of this much

better if it went through a public process and procurement, set it

up for bids, and awarded it. At the end of the day, if it wound up

going to a company that was controlled by the president, if that

happened as a result of an open public process because that was

the only company that was capable of fulfilling the contracts, we

would be a lot better off.

Mr. TIERNEY. Well, I think we already have evidence that was

not the case.

Ambassador, let me ask you. For a country the size of Kyrgyzstan, and now the $64 million lease number people bandy

around, what would that money have meant to Kyrgyzstan if it had

not been dissipated into other corrupt bodies? What would it do for

a country like Kyrgyzstan to have the use of that money?

Mr. ABDRISAEV. I think it is this question of the government, and

probably they would be in the process of open bidding, they will see

how, through the taxes, it will be redistributed to different needs

for the people, and they could explain it. But with the government

of the Bakiyev, probably this was not the case; they were interested

in different things.

You mean not about additional to the oil? I think, again, through

the budget they could show the true use for the paying of the salaries and sustain some of the other projects. But my guess here is

base issue is not—the problem that now we have a bottleneck in

Kyrgyzstan and the base is becoming just one of the few projects,

and we need here more diversity. Still, the problem will continue

further in the future, and we have to work on that issue as well.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Dr. Huskey, how does that number relate to the overall GDP of

Kyrgyzstan?

Mr. HUSKEY. I think it is something like 3 percent. I mean, this

is not high. It is a significant amount of money and it clearly could

have been put to very good use for the Kyrgyz people if this money

had not been syphoned off. It is a trick, because even if you have

open tender, you need to have a competitive bidding process.

It is possible in a Bakiyev-like environment for people surrounding the family, after the fact, to come in and horn their way into

these legitimate businesses. This has happened one time after another in Kyrgyzstan and other parts of the post-communist world.

But at least the original bidding should be competitive and aboveboard.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. Driehaus, would you care to ask any more questions?

Mr. DRIEHAUS. I would just like to ask one final question, if we

could run through the panel. Clearly, the United States has suffered a blow in terms of its legitimacy in Kyrgyzstan with respect

75

to the long-term interests of the United States in the region and

the country, and I think we have discussed some of this, but what

are your one or two things that you believe we should be focusing

on that would support the long-term interests not just of

Kyrgyzstan, but also of the United States—which I believe would

also benefit us in the short-term—with regard to the base?

Dr. Huskey.

Mr. HUSKEY. Well, I think something that hasn’t been talked

about is the role of Russia in this. Russia has been a very important player in bringing about the revolution, in trying to expel the

United States in the first place, so this is not just a U.S.-Kyrgyz

issue.

There is a triangular aspect to this, so I think we have to frame

it in that way. Russia is trying to expand its sphere of influence,

understandably, after the difficult decades for them of the 1990’s,

and why it wanted to expel the United States. Was that simply a

sphere of influence issue? Was it trying to have a bargaining chip

with the United States on other perhaps larger issues of bilateral

matters between the two countries? Let me just stop there and I

will let my colleagues add.

Mr. ABDRISAEV. I think it is an issue about investments, which

were already mentioned, quite an important one, and I planned at

the beginning not to raise that issue, but probably it is time.

Kyrgyzstan, from 1998, is the only country from the WTO in the

region, and from that time during all of the 12 years, it is the only

WTO member in the whole region, and China just during 2000.

So you could imagine that 12 years ago 200 percent of [indiscernible] against all our goods, and this is a factor that has contributed

to the poverty, unemployment, and desperation. So we need more

investments. And the people would be happy. And Kazakhstan,

who is teaching us about many things, they are also contributing

to our poverty as well.

Why? Two hundred percent. I would like to say, like President

Reagan said in a famous speech, Mr. Gorbachev, please, tear that

wall down. And then it will be a miracle. Our people know how to

handle it.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you.

Mr. COOLEY. I think one lesson here is that we need to get out

of the sort of competitive mind-set that our competition with Russia, some type of great game, that zero sum for influence in Central

Asia. I think this is potentially quite destructive because it also

leads the Russians to behave in that kind of way, where they think

any kind of blow that they can strike against our presence there

is a gain for them.

So I think part of it has to be recalibrating the mind-set, being

very clear as to what our goals are in Central Asia. Are they access

to the base? That is not the same thing as undermining Russia,

and working, I think, in a more consultative way with Moscow

would behoove us.

I see three-way competition in Central Asia between Russia, the

United States and China. China did more trade with Central Asia

in 2009 than Russia. So in this relationship Central Asia is not our

backyard; Afghanistan’s backyard. We need to have a distinct

76

brand. What do we stand for that China doesn’t stand for and that

Russia doesn’t stand for.

So this is why we get back to the importance of things like transparency and investment, engaging on a range of sort of social democracy issues. Things that the two other regional powers don’t do,

I think that will be part of our brand in Central Asia moving forward.

Mr. HORTON. I think the path to our retention of our position

with this base starts with our demonstration that this relationship

is not just about the base; that there is a broader foundation for

it, that we care about democracy, we care about human rights, but

especially that we care about education.

When you press Kyrgyz when they say you really don’t care

about anything in the base and you press them, is that really true,

frequently they will sort of grudgingly say, oh, well, of course we

recognize you did do all these things in the education sector; there

is the American University that was set up, there was support for

secondary education, there was English language training, there

were scholarships.

Frankly, the best invested money we put into Kyrgyzstan easily

has been in the education sector, and it has been the basis for popular support in Kyrgyzstan for the broader security relationship. It

is students from Kyrgyzstan who go to high schools in the United

States, who go to colleges, who get masters degrees. Those are the

people who say this isn’t a bad idea; we need to sustain that relationship. We need to learn that lesson and we need to continue

that investment.

Mr. PATTEN. I would put forth that Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region where there has been regime change since independence. You could argue that in Turkmenistan, Turkmenbashi

died and he was succeeded by his doctor, but it is essentially the

same thing. There have now been two rounds of regime change in

Kyrgyzstan, and the second round has been more violent than the

first.

So I think our strategic interest is in institutionalizing a way for

regime change according to a democratic procedure in Central Asia

that will serve as a model for the other countries, because this is

the looming question for Uzbekistan, for Kazakhstan, for the other

countries: how does succession happen, and I think Kyrgyzstan

presents an excellent opportunity to look at better models for succession, and that could really be America’s legacy in the region. As

Dr. Cooley said, it is really a question of having the American

brand be one of values, and that is what the people of Central Asia

are looking toward.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Fortenberry, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all

for coming today. I am sorry I have missed the balance of your testimony, and I apologize if some of this is a bit repetitive.

I think, Mr. Ambassador, you may be best suited to answer this

first question. Culturally speaking, what is the disposition of the

people of Kyrgyzstan toward the United States as we look toward

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ful transfers of power and long-term stability in the country for the

well-being of the people, but also clearly to secure interests that we

have, such as our own base?

Mr. ABDRISAEV. According to the poll which was made public last

year by the IRA, in Kyrgyzstan we have quite a negative trend toward the United States. Feelings are not good, and probably because of some of the promises which were not fulfilled. But partly

also this process was inflamed by the transfer of the Russian Federation into the policies from the regime, which was now changed.

In general, if we would implement suggestions which my colleague just made—education, grassroots level education and support more to those forces, which we have already there, civil society, NGO’s, media—they could start flourish, then we will change

the tide dramatically and, parallel also, the base would continue to

exist. It is my opinion that people could understand how to balance

that together. It is time for us just to very, very [indiscernible] and

people of Kyrgyzstan would understand that clearly.

I agree also with the opinion of my colleague from Freedom

House that it is the second change of regime in Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, we lost the time during 5 years in order to do that in an

orderly way, and now it is time to show how it is possible to do

in Central Asia something which, by the way, happened quite successfully in Mongolia. Same thing; country, small size, but five, six

times changes of the regime, and now it is a full-fledged democracy.

Something we have to look at the lessons and to try to work quite

actively.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Mongolia, by the way, is a partner country

with the House Democracy Partnership Commission on which I

serve, one of the early recipients of this opportunity to be in dialog

with us on an ongoing basis as to how we build their technical capacity in their parliament, their legislature. So you are right, that

is a good example in the region there.

Does Russia actively connive at fomenting this anti-American

spirit, or is it just part of the broader organic movement in the

area at this point in time?

Mr. ABDRISAEV. Russia now is trying to regain its influence in

the region and in Kyrgyzstan as well, and we have to admit that

Russia has a legitimate right to be there in that territory, and proRussian sentiments are quite great.

I think it is time also for us to see how to work together with

Russia, and even if Russia was involved in the change of the regime, probably it is also a sign that Russia has quite high stakes

in promoting the regimes which are not so looking toward feudalism like previous government or Bakiyev tried to create. I have

plenty of examples which before Russia and United States tried to

implement in Central Asia to the benefits of the Kyrgyz Republic,

so it is time also to find the common goals.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Well, somebody made the point that to convict the people that it is not necessary to pick a side here, but to

actively engage in their own well-being by active engagement, constructive engagement with the United States, constructive engagement with Russia is a potential outcome that is beneficial to them

particularly, but would also help stabilize our relationship, I assume.

78

Dr. Cooley, did you want to——

Mr. COOLEY. No, I would just also make the point that ever since

the apparent double-cross of Bakiyev against Putin last year, when

Russia offered a $2 billion package of investments and assistance

to close down the base, the base closure was announced and then

was walked back, relations between Moscow and Bishkek really deteriorated to an all-time low and Russia really launched an all-out

soft power blitz in the media that really undermined the Bakiyev

regime, calling him corrupt and nepotistic, drawing attention to

these aspects of his rule.

It was an onslaught and it put us in an embarrassing position

where it was the Kremlin, for its very own cynical political purposes, that was drawing attention to these governance issues that

we were relatively silent on. So Russia, through its soft power,

through these cultural influences, also through the fact that

Kyrgyz workers live and work in Russia and send home remittances which comprise anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of Kyrgyz

GDP, for all these reasons Kyrgyzstan’s connections with Russia

are quite close, and we need to take that into account.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. There is a certain irony in what you just said,

though.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you, Mr. Fortenberry.

Let me thank all of the witnesses for giving up your time today

and sharing your expertise. You can’t get rid of us very easily, so

I am hoping that you all are available for us to call on at some

point in the future if we want to take advantage of your knowledge

and your understanding and your expertise.

So I will take those little nods of your head as assent to that,

and I appreciate it. You have been a tremendous help to us in setting the table for what I think are going to be some pretty extensive hearings, and I think you have let us have some context to

where we ought to go.

So I want to thank all of you. Ambassador, thank you especially

through your difficult times that you are experiencing. It is our

hope that this investigation does serve the purpose of lending some

transparency and accountability to the situation for the United

States and for people in Kyrgyzstan, and that we just find out what

happened, who the players were, what they did, and we can then

determine whether it was good, bad, or indifferent and act accordingly from there to make sure that we build a stronger relationship

and take a good path forward.

I do want to just say that I note one thing that is a common

thread on this, that we can’t always have just a military priority

solely and lead with the military, put that as our foremost priority,

treat it as if it is the only one or whatever. We have to have a more

whole-of-government approach, as somebody mentioned earlier, and

reach out diplomatically, as well. Rule of law issues, democracy, all

those things are important, and in that context I think that we

may get more cooperation out of friends and allies if we show a

deeper interest and a longer-range interest in their well-being, and

then that should encompass some of our mutual priorities as well.

79

So thank you all for being here and for all that you have done

for this committee. We appreciate it. I thank the members of the

panel as well.

Meeting adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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