### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NASHVILLE Februar y 7, 2002 Se ssion
RALPH D. RICHARDS v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Appeal by Pe rmission f

rom the Supreme C ourt Spec ial Worker

s' Compensat

ion Appeals P

anel Chancery Court for Coffee County No. 98-442 John W. Rollins, Chancellor

No. M2000-01255-SC-WCM-CV - Filed March 26, 2002

We granted review in this workers’ compensation case to deter min e whether the Special Worker s’ Compensation Appeals Panel erred in concluding that the e vidence prepond erated against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of a nd in the course o f his employme

nt. After re viewing th e record and applicable authority, we c onclude that the evidence didnot preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. We therefore re ject the Panel’s findings and conclusions and affirm t he judgme

nt of the tr

ial cour t. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel Rejected; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirm ed

E. R ILEY A NDERSON , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which F RANK F. D ROWOTA , III, C.J., and J ANI CE M. H OLDER and W ILL IAM M. B ARKER , JJ., joined. A DOLPHO A. B IRCH , J R ., J., not participating. Frank C. Lynch, Winchester, Tennessee, for the appellant, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. Gregor y M. O'Ne al, Winc hester, Tenness ee, for the appe llee, Ral ph D. Richa

rds.

OPINION Summary of Proof1 Both Ric hards and Bow ers test ifi ed that t

he door was approximately 16 feet wide and 12 to 14 feet high, w ith a hand le near the floo r and d oub le-wo und springs.

2 Dr. Col e was Ri chards ’ physi cian and al so an employe r-appr oved physi cian.
-2- The employee, Ralph D. Richards, age 43, was employed by B.F. Goodrich for over twe nty years and at the time of the alleged injury worked in the maintenance de partment. Richards testified that sometime in the spring of 1998, he was working the second sh ift, i.e. , 3:30 p.m. t

o midnight, when he tried

to lift a large wooden door near the tow motor shop. He said that when he bent over at the waist to grab the door handle, h e injure d his back

and fell to the floo

r. Acco rding toRichards , the shift supervisor, John Davidson, saw him mom ents afte r the injur y occurr ed. He sa id he worked the remainder of his shift following the injury, although he tried to take it easy. Richards testified that he had ne

ver had a si milar in

jury, other than muscle pulls, and that he thought that the injury would get better after a few days.

Richards testified that a couple of weeks after the door lifting incident, he injured his hip and leg when he fell into a coolant tank at work. He also sa

id that he did not dec ide to see

a doctor until several weeks later when he injured his ba ck while trying to put on a swimsuit.

Richards further testified that he could not identify the exact date that the injury occ urred and agreed that although his complaint alleged that the injury occurred on Ma y 15, 19 98, while lifting a metal ob

ject, he could not r

ecall hu rting his back

while lifting a metal object. Moreover, Richards admitted that he had made a prior statement that the coolant tank incident occurred in late March or early April of 1998, and that it occurred afte r the injury from lifting the door. Finally, Richards acknowledged that he did not tell Dr. Rich ard Cole, his physician, or Dr. Lana Cook, a chiropractor, that he h ad suffered a work-related accident and that he never filed a written injury report with his employer.

James Bowers testified that he saw Richards hurt his back while trying to lift the large door
near the tow mot

or room. 1 He could not

recall the precise date the incident occurred, but he believed it took place while he and Richards were working se cond shift after the employee supper break. He testified that the shift supervisor, John Davidson, saw that Richa rds had be en injure d and that

he told Davidson that the door ne eded to be replac ed. Bowe

rs said tha

t he had ma

de similar complain

ts about the door to other supervisors on prior oc casi ons. He agreed that he and Richards had bee n both work

and socia

l friendsfor twen

ty years

. On May 26, 1998, Richards went to the office of Dr. Col e 2 and told Cole’s assistant that he “hadbeen hurting for a few weeks” a nd that he ha

d hurt his b ack while

stepping i nto a swims uit. Cole advised Richards to take several days off from wo rk and referred

him to Dr. Cook, a chiropractor, whom Richards saw on several occasions. When Richards ’ pain

persiste d, Dr. Cole sent him for an MRI and referred him to Dr. Gre gory Lansford, a neurosurgeon.3 In response t o Richards’ t esti mony that he had fall en into a c oola nt tan k ab out o ne m onth after they had been i nsta ll ed and t hat t his occurr ed aft er t he door l ift ing incident , Davidson int roduced recor ds i ndicat ing t hat t he coolant tanks had been install ed in M arch of 1997

. -3- DeborahRichards, the employee’s wife, testified that her husband told her that he injured h is back while lifting adoor at work. She could not reca ll the exa ct date it occurr ed, nor h ow much tim

e elapsedafter the injury b ef ore Richa rds went t

o the doct or. She te stified th at her hu sband ra rely complained and was reluctant to go to the doctor for any illness or injury.

The first witness for th

e defen se was John Da vidson, the maintenance supervisor, who testified that on April 28, 1998, he saw Richards wearing a back bra ce on a work projec t and i nquired about whether he had hurt his back on the job. Richards responde d “No, I don’t kno w where I did

it.” Davidson testified that he had not previously seen Richards wearing a bac k brace, that he never saw Richards injure his back, and that he ne ver rece ived any information about Richards being injured while lifting a door or falling into a coolant tank. 3 Davidson also testified that it was his r

esponsibi lity to fill out accident reports and thatRichards had never reported a workrelated back injury to him. Continuing with the defense proof, Donna Fielding, human resources supervisor and registered nurse, testified that Richards never filed a complaint for a work-related injury of any kind in 1998, much less one stemming fromthe lifting of a door or falling into a coolant tank. In May, June, and July of

1998, she

receiv ed numer

ous work e

xcuse forms on behalf of Richards from Dr. Cole’s office for an injury which was not identified as work- related. Although Richards told Fielding that he hurt his back, he also told her that he did not know how or where the injury happened and that he may have

hurt his ba

ck while putting on a

swimsuit. Fielding said that she had no information that Richards claimed he suffered a work-re lated injury until she received a letter from Rich ards’ attorney on July 17, 1998. She then completed a report stating that Richards had “lower back pain” and that the cause was “unknown.” She testified that al l employees received info rmation on filing claims for work-related injuries and that the information was also posted in the workplace. Fielding also introduced time sheet s for Apr il a nd May of 1998, which demonstrated that Richards and Bowers did not work the same shift during those months. She concluded that the large door near the tow motor room had been replaced in November of 1998 following a safety committee walk-through. Finally, Dr. Gre gory Lan sf or d testified by deposition that on July 9, 1998, he examined Ralph Richards, who “presented with a history of back and ra dicular right

leg pain w

hich [Ric hards] stated began after pulling a heavy spring -loaded

door at w ork.” Dr . Lansfo rd said th at an MRI4 Although the medi cal recor ds i ndicated tha t Ri chards ’ pai n had been ongoi ng f o r “eig ht m onth s,”

Lan sford said th at the re cord s sho uld h ave note d “eig ht w eek s.”
-4- revealed a ruptured disc consistent with complaints of back and leg pain 4 and, as a result, he performed

surgery on July 31, 1998. Dr. Lansford said that Richards did “extr emely we ll” following surgery and physical therapy, and he allowed him to return to work o n Octobe r 14, 1998 , with “common-sense” restrictions on lifting, bending, and stooping. Dr. Lansford testified that, based
on the history he was given, the injury was work-related, and he assigned a ten percent impairment rating to the body as a whole.

The trial court dismissed the complaint after finding that Richards’ back injury did

not arise outof and in the course of his employ men t. The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel disagreed, holding that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and remanding for calculation of benefits. We gran ted revi ew to add

ress the se issues

. Standard of Review

Our standard of review of factual issues in a work ers’ co mpensatio n case is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of corre ctness of the trial court’s findings, unless the preponderance of the evidenc e is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (1999 & Supp. 2001); see Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., Inc. , 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn. 1999). Our standard

of revie w of lega l issues is de novo

. Tucker v. Foamex, LP , 31 S.W.3d 241, 242 (Tenn. 2000).

When the trial court has seen the witnesses and heard the testimony, especially where issues of credibility and the weight of testimony are involved, the appe llate cou rt must ext

end cons iderabl e deference to the trial court’s factual findings. Seals , 984 S.W.2d at 915; see also Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc. , 36 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Tenn. 2001)

. In contrast, when medical proof is presented by deposition, the reviewing court may draw its own conclusions about the weight and credibility of the expert testimony since it

is in the same position as the trial judge for evaluating such evidence. 984 S.W.2d 915; 36 S.W.3d at 71. Compensability

To be eligib le for wo

rkers’ compensa

tion benefits, an employ ee must e stablish that he or she suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of his or her employment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50- 6-102 (12 ) (1999) ; see Houser , 36 S.W.3d at 70-71.

An injury occurs “in the course of” employment if it takes place while the emplo yee was performing a duty he or

she was employed to perform. 36 S.W.3d at 71. An injury “arises out of”-5-

employment

when “there is a

pparent to the ra

tional min d, upon a consideration of all the circumst ances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed

and the resulting injury.” Fink v. Caud le , 856 S.W.2d 952, 958 (Tenn. 1993). Stated another way, the “course of” requireme nt focuses on t he “time, place and circumstances” of the injury, and the “arises out of” requirement refe rs to the “cause or origin” of the injury. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc. , 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn. 1997).5 Although the appell ant has al so argued that Richards fa iled t o provide ti mely notice of hi s i njury, we need not addres s t hat i ssue in l ight of our de cis ion.
-6-

Analysis

The principal issue in this case is whether Richards established that he suffer ed an injury arising out of and

in the cou rse of hi s employme

nt. 5 The appe

llant, Lib erty Mutual Insurance, argues that the tr ial cour t proper ly dismisse d the cla

im after making the

following

findings:

Th e bottom line

. . . in this r

ecord, t hese witn esses te stifyin g a s they’ve testified from

both sides, I think the plaintiff has failed in his burden of proof

to establish that this injury occurred during the

course and scope of

his employ ment. I think it’s just unfortun ate, but I

just don’t think the plaintiff has carried his burden.

Richards , on the other hand, argues that the Panel made an independe ntexamination of the evidence and properly determined that the evidence pre ponderated against the trial court’s finding.

We note that

the Panel ’s c onclusion was largely based on the trial court’s failure to make explicit findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses and upon the Panel’s own determination that no other caus es for the injury h ad been identifie d. As state d by the Pa nel:

Th e o nly witnesses to the door lifting episode were [Richards] and James Bowers. The trial judge did not find that they were less than credibl e and, from our independent examination of the reco rd, we cannot say that the trial judge should have discredited their testimony

. Moreover, the record contains no evidence the episode did not occ ur, only t hat th ere is a discrepancy as to when it occur red. In addition, the undisputed expert medical evidence is the testimony of Dr. Lansford that the injury was causally connected to that occurrence. (Emphasi s added). In our vie w, howev er, the Pa

nel did not

give suff icient de ferenc e to th e trial court’s conclusi ons with re spect to th e sharpl y conflic ted oral

proof and substitute d its judgment for the trial court’s in the cr

itical ar ea of the credibi lity of the

witnesse s.
As this Court has repeatedly emphasized, a re viewing c ourt must gi ve “con siderab le deference” to the tria

l judge wit

h regar d to o ral, in-court testimony as it is the trial judge who has viewedthe witnesses and heard the testimony. See Houser , 36 S.W.3d at 71. Thisis particularly true w hen the c

redibilit y of the w itnesses a

nd the we ight assign

ed to thei r testimon

y are cr itic a l issues. See Seals , 984 S.W.2d at 915. Moreover, because there is no requir ement that a trial court make express findings of fact regarding a witness’s credibility, the absenc e of such findings does not alter the applicable standard of review. Indee d, the trial court’s findings with resp ect to cr edibility-7-

and the weight of the evi de nce, as in the present case, genera lly may be inferred from the manner in which the trial court resolves conflicts in t he t estimony and decides the case. See Tobitt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. , 59 S.W.3d 57, 62 (Tenn. 2001).

Our close review of the evidence indicates tha t Richards and Bowers testified that Richards injured his back while lifting a heavy door at work . Neither

Richards , nor his w ife, nor Bowers, however, could recall the date of the injury, although Richards’ complaint alleged it was May 15, 1998, while lifting a metal object. This evidence conflicts with the testimony of John Davidson and Donna Fie

lding, both

of whom testified that Richards told them he did not know how or where he had injured his back. As early as April 28th, Richards was wearing a back brace at work and told Davidson he did not know how he hurt his back. Davidson testified that Richards never informed him of a work-related back injur y fr om lifting a door or by falling into a coolant tank and that he never completed an accident form for a back injury on behalf of Richards. Fielding likewise testified that Richards never info rmed her of a work-related back injury and that he instead told her he may have injured his back w hile stepping i nto a swims uit. She al so testified that employment records showed Bowers and Richards worked dif ferent shifts during April and May of 199 8, that al l of the e mployees were e ducated

as to the procedures for filing a workrelated injury claim, and that Richards did not file such a claim for a ba ck injury.

Althou gh Dr. Lansf

ord opined that the injury was work-related, he adde d that his opinion was based on the history given by Richards, which he presumed was truthful. The proof also indicated, however, that Richards did not tell the first doctors who saw him – Dr. Cole and Dr. Cook – that he had injur ed his bac k in a wor

k-rela ted incid ent.

In short, although there was no dispute that Richards suffered an injury to his back, we disagree with the Pa

nel’s a ssessmen

t that the i n-court

testimony o f the witnesses co nflicted only with respect to when the injury occurred. On the contrary, our re view indicates that the testimony s harply conflictedwith respect to how and where the i njury occurr ed. In such a case, the role of the trial judge, who has seen the witnesses and has heard their testimony first-hand, is to resolve the conf licts. In this case, the trial judge resolved the conflicts by finding that Richards had failed to carry the burden of proof

of estab lishing tha

t the injur y arose o ut o f and in the course of employment. We thereforeconclude that the ev idence in the record does not preponderate aga inst the trial court’s finding.
Conclusion

After reviewing the record and applicable authority, we conclude that the evidence did not prepond erate against the trial court’s finding t hat the employee failed to establish that the injury
arose out of and in the course of his employment. We therefore reject the Panel’s findings and conclusion s and affi rm the judgment of the trial court. Costs are taxed to the appellee, Ralph D. Richards, for which execution shall issue if necessary.-8- ___________________________________ E. RILEY A

NDERSON, JUSTICE