Speed and the Fog of War: 

Sense and Respond Logistics in 

Operation Iraqi Freedom-I 

Case Studies in National Security Transformation 

Number 15 

Paul Needham and Christopher Snyder 

January 2009 

Sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Forces Transformation and Resources 

Prepared by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy 
ii

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official 

policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the 

U.S. Government. All information and sources for this paper were drawn from 

unclassified materials. 

Dr. Paul Needham is professor of logistics and Director of the Supply Chain 

Management Concentration Program at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He is 

retired from the United States Air Force after serving 23 years in various logistics 

positions.

LtCol Christopher Snyder is a logistics officer in the Marine Corps. He was assigned to 

the 1st Marine Division, G-4, as an Individual Augmentee (IA) during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF)-I. He has served in various staff positions and has commanded the 3rd 

Transportation Support Battalion, III Marine Logistics Group, and later the Logistics 

Operations School, Training Command. LtCol Snyder is a 2008 graduate of ICAF. 
1

Introduction

The term “fog of war” is often associated with the commander’s lack of clear information 

on the battlefield. “War is inherently volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous. For 

this condition, contemporary U.S. military usage offers the acronym VUCA.”1

Compounding the “fog of war” on the modern battlefield is the high tempo of operations 

or speed sought by commanders to overwhelm and defeat the enemy. This case study 

proposes that the use of sense and respond (S&R) logistics during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF-I) would have provided logisticians critical decisionmaking information 

(situational awareness) thereby reducing the fog of war and facilitating more efficient and 

responsive support to the warfighter. In drawing this conclusion, the following study 

analyzes the events of OIF-I, citing logistical lessons learned and difficulties experienced, 

and offers suggestions to reduce those challenges. 

The implementation of S&R logistics will shape future joint logistics requirements while 

driving changes in joint doctrine and how we support the operational environment. 

Current efforts under the Forces Transformation and Resources Office (formerly the 

Office of Force Transformation) and the Program Manager, Light Armored Vehicle (PMLAV) pave a path for S & R logistics implementation within the military. Lastly, the 

study highlights the current Marine Corps logistics operations in Iraq and offers some 

insight into the future. An initial overview examines the events that led to the overthrow 

of Saddam Hussein. 

OIF-I: An Overview 

By most accounts the invasion of Iraq, now known as Operation Iraqi Freedom-I, was a 

huge success. During March 2003, 167 ships operated by the Military Sealift Command 

created a “Steel Bridge of Democracy” that ferried required equipment forward into 

theater. To appreciate the range of this endeavor, there was on average a ship every 72 

miles from the United States to Kuwait.2

 Additionally, pilots flew thousands of C-130, C5, and C-17, and commercial sorties both inter- and intratheater to deploy and position 

almost 424,000 U.S. personnel and their equipment.3 This herculean feat facilitated the 

reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) of forces in the Area of 

Operations (AOR) and supported the concept of operations developed by the combatant 

commander. 

Subsequently, “during OIF, we witnessed the most dominating, rapidly moving, and 

ultimately successful combined air, sea, and ground fighting force ever to go into battle. 

The battle plan called for a 30-day campaign to combat victory. The coalition did it in 3 

weeks.”4

 Common conventional military doctrine would have dispatched a few hundred 

thousand troops on the move to Iraq supported by a large logistics tail known as the “iron 

 

1

 Eugenia C. Kiesling, “On War: Without the Fog,” Military Review, Sept.–Oct. 2001, 1. 2

 Globalsecurity.org, “Sealift in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Globalsecurity.org, available at 

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/sealift-oif.htm>. 3

 T. Michael Moseley, Operation Iraqi Freedom: By the Numbers (Tampa, FL: Assessment and Analysis 

Division, USCENTAF, 2003), available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ 

report/2003/uscentaf_oif_report_30apr2003.pdf>.

4

 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 1. 
2

mountain.” Instead, then Central Command Combatant Commander, General Tommy R. 

Franks, “envisioned a swarming, rapid, responsive force capable of removing threats 

immediately: relying on speed more than mass.”5

 The concept of speed became the 

underlying theme throughout the war for all commanders, and in particular for the 1st

Marine Division, “speed was a culture.”6

 

Based on the timely accomplishment of military objectives, one would envision that OIFI was a model for success. However, there were fundamental challenges in providing 

logistics support across the battlefield to support both a high tempo and aggressive 

operational pace. The 350-mile move in figure 1 from Kuwait to Baghdad utilized a 

supply system more suited to the Cold War environment based upon the requisition 

methods, delivery means, and time delays. The VUCA environment also highlights the 

need for an agile combat force supported by logisticians who can quickly adapt and 

sustain the warfighter with all required resources. 

Figure 1: Map of the Battlespace7

Although all services made significant logistical achievements, this case study will 

largely focus on the Marine Corps. OIF-I involved unprecedented movements for the 

Marine Corps. 

During the successful execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 1st Marine 

Division (1stMARDIV) conducted the longest sequence of coordinated overland 

 

5

 Diane K. Morales and Steve Geary, “Speed Kills: Supply Chain Lessons from the War in Iraq,” Harvard 

Business Review 81, no. 11, November 2003, 16. 6

 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 62. 

7

 Globalsecurity.org, March 28, 2003 DoD Briefing (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2003), 1, 

available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom-ops-maps_03-2003.htm>.
3

attacks in Marine Corps history. From crossing the line of departure (LOD) on 

the border between Kuwait and Iraq, to the culmination of hostilities well north 

of Baghdad, the division covered 808 kilometers in 17 days of sustained combat.8

 

Understanding the complex coordination and sequencing to move the force is highlighted 

by this statistic from March 23, 2003: 

The division began crossing the Euphrates River in the vicinity of An Nasiriyah using 

bridges to the east and west of the city. Within 12 hours, the division passed 8,000 

vehicles through this vital choke point and was then poised for operational maneuver on 

Baghdad.9

 

“Supporting a rapid speed of advance became the metric that guided all the division G4’s (logistics officers’) preparation for combat.”10 Planning was instrumental, especially 

with fuel considerations. Initially, a methodical analysis was conducted to determine 

culminating points for the main maneuver units, Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) 1, 5, 

and 7. The analysis was based on standard planning figures found in doctrinal 

publications, and the experience of senior logisticians. Retrospectively, the figures were 

optimistic and too conservative. Combat loads, desert terrain, and 24-hour operation of 

vehicles consumed more fuel than even the most robust estimates. 

The combat service support battalion responsible for the division’s success was CSSB10, supplied from the 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG). CSSB-10 provided direct 

support to all 1stMARDIV units in the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) zone. 

During the combat phase of the operation, the battalion conducted over 400 such 

convoys, covering nearly 120,000 miles, in order to sustain the forward 

movement of the 1st Marine Division in its attack towards Baghdad. The battalion 

distributed nearly 3,000 pallets of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE’s), nearly 1,000,000 

gallons of water, over 2,000,000 gallons of fuel, and over 2,000 tons of 

ammunition.11 

Even during this prodigious accomplishment, the response to demands from the division 

often met with time lags. Frequently, these were the result of a rapidly changing 

battlefield and the fog of war. For example, refueling thousands of vehicles often took far 

longer than expected. As the war progressed, pumps, refueling trucks, and other essential 

equipment began to fail, which further compounded resupply efforts. One particular 

challenge was the clarity of actual fuel levels. The levels were sometimes exaggerated or 

lacking in accuracy due to faulty fuel gauges. An added barrier concerned knowing the 

exact location of supported units as requests for resupply were passed and consolidated 

up the chain of command. Another impediment to speed and logistics responses: often 

units had to move before a resupply convoy could meet them. This resulted in confusion 

for the CSSB Marines, who did not have the same communication assets as the Division 

Marines and hampered a coordinated linkup. This was not a problem unique to the 

Marine Corps. Brigadier General Stultz (USA), Deputy Commander of the 377th

Transportation Command, echoed similar challenges of keeping up with the warfighter. 

 

8

 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 1 

9

 Ibid., 2. 

10 Ibid., 65. 

11 Ibid., 7.
4

“It was not so much being able to supply them, but to locate where they were moving to. 

That tended to be a challenge for us as we moved out convoys across the desert.”12

Further compounding the Marine Corps efforts were changes in the division’s priority of 

effort and scheme of maneuver for the regimental combat teams (RCT’s) during the 

movement to Baghdad. 

Once again, the Marine Corps task organization proved to be a force multiplier. 

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM provided an opportunity for I Marine 

Expeditionary Force and the 1st Marine Division to again demonstrate the 

strength and flexibility of the Marine air-ground team in many areas, including 

logistics. The unprecedented distances over which the 1stMARDIV fought, and 

the speed with which it traveled, placed a considerable burden on logistics and 

fostered several innovative changes to doctrinal concepts of support. From early 

planning efforts, the division scheme of maneuver was based on the concept that 

speed equals success.13 

Supporting the division’s plan required a change in mindset for the logisticians and 

creative thinking. Moving large quantities of all supplies was not feasible, and 

logisticians were challenged to provide focused, precise support at the right time and 

location. 

Aside from organizational changes, the division logistician’s also enabled speed 

with several planning and equipment innovations. For instance, G-4 plans 

developed metrics to measure a unit’s tactical objectives against potential 

logistics culminating points and determine the optimal locations for resupply 

points. This enhanced the generic “days of supply” planning factors from 

doctrinal publications. The culminating point analysis graphically depicted where 

the division would require an operational pause to refuel and helped determine 

material and functional solutions to push off the pause.14 

However, to say that logistics went off without a hitch would be a distortion of the 

truth.15 The supply support system was one area in particular that failed to respond to the 

demands of supported units. As the Marine Corps came together on the battlefield, the 

lack of a unified Marine Corps supply system caused chaos in the supply chain. I MEF 

was utilizing the Asset Tracking Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS I), II MEF was 

using ATLASS II, and Blount Island Command was employing a commercial supply 

system for maritime prepositioning forces equipment.16 Additionally, the Marine 

Logistics Command’s (MLC) field warehouse system was scrapped at the beginning of 

the operation because of its inability to perform. As a result, the supply system 

architecture used during OIF was a combination of workarounds between systems and 

methods. Supply personnel from the battalion to the division level never had visibility of 

 

12 Army Logistician, “Logistics System Strained but Succeeds in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army 

Logistician 35, no. 5, Sep/Oct 2003, 1. 13 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 65. 

14 Ibid., 66. 

15 Robert E. Love, “Operation Iraqi Freedom - Marine Corps Logistics at its Best?” Marine Corps Gazette

88, no. 1, January 2004, 48. 

16 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 66–67. 
5

a requisition from the time it entered the system until receipt. The system compatibility 

issues combined with the lack of a local area network left division’s supply officers 

without an automated means to pass requisitions, get feedback, or reconcile management 

reports. Lastly, none of these systems provide any in-transit visibility in the supply chain. 

Although many convoys were launched throughout the operation, their contents and 

locations remained a mystery to those requiring the supplies. The result was a loss of 

faith in the system and frantic efforts to obtain parts by any means possible.17

Understandably, simple tasks are difficult during combat operations, but problems 

persisted even after hostilities came to an end. Following the push to Baghdad, the 

1stMARDIV consolidated near Ad Diwaniyah. Due to seasonal rising temperatures, 

water needed to be cooled in M-149 Water Bulls. A request was forwarded to the 

Division Rear at Camp Commando, Kuwait, and all available water chillers were pushed 

forward. While not a combat essential item, the chillers were important to quality of life 

and ensuring that Marines stayed hydrated. Days passed and units began to question the 

status of the request. Division Rear stated the chillers had been placed on a resupply 

convoy and should have arrived. Division G-4 watch officers spent days trying to locate 

the whereabouts of the chillers by contacting all regimental logistics sections and combat 

service support units. Tension increased, as the simple request remained unfilled. The 

chillers were finally located in an obscure location. A reliable tracking method on the 

equipment could have avoided days of confusion and a waste of manpower. 

Unfortunately, this kind of experience was common. Often a Marine escort was sent with 

needed supplies ensuring they did not get lost along the way from Kuwait to the unit in 

Iraq. 

In another situation following the consolidation, 1stMARDIV’s Task Force Tripoli was 

tasked to conduct a significant movement down to the border between Saudi Arabia and 

Iraq. The task organization was centered on elements of three battalions of Light 

Armored Vehicles (LAVs). Due to the rough terrain and wear on LAV tires, the logistics 

plan called for a Class IX block of at least 20 spares. Initial reports indicated few if any 

tires in the supply system. Again, the division logistics planners and combat service 

support personnel began a quest to locate all available spares. Inventory counts and 

locations were inaccurate as the mission approached. Eventually, logisticians adequately 

supported the movement by locating tires in often surprising locations. Again, mission 

success was achieved not through any automated means, but rather through putting “eyes 

on” the logistics support areas to find the required items. 

One final example of sustaining the warfighter centered on artillery rounds. During the 

initial fighting in southern Iraq, artillery units operated and were heavily supplied with 

Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) 155 mm rounds. Although 

extremely effective in open areas against ground troops, the DPICM has a significant 

submunition dud rate. As the 1stMARDIV approached the populated areas around 

Baghdad, the 11th Marine Regiment switched to firing High Explosive (HE) 155 rounds 

that are more effective in urban warfare. The logisticians did not anticipate the impact of 

the changeover and the number of fire missions that were being executed. The resulting 

requests for immediate resupply of HE rounds created significant challenges to move a 

 

17 Ibid., 66–67. 
6

few thousand artillery rounds from logistics support areas in Kuwait to front line units. 

Although the requests were eventually filled utilizing intra-theater C-130 aircraft 

combined with ground transport, the lack of situational awareness and information flow 

threatened to delay the tempo on the battlefield and the fire support to units securing 

Baghdad. 

Push VS. Pull Logistics 

After devoting a great amount of time to planning, the division’s logisticians would have 

preferred a push-based demand chain to better meet combat unit requirements. 

Nevertheless, the reality of a dynamic environment, where the enemy has a say in the 

action, often forces logisticians into a pull-based supply chain scenario. While the pullbased supply chain is more appropriate to higher demand uncertainty,18 the ability to 

respond in a timely manner is extremely difficult in a wartime environment and 

compounded even more by the distances and lack of information flow across the 

battlefield. Anticipating requirements and pushing out unneeded supplies or the wrong 

equipment simply slows down the tempo and conflicts with the commander’s intent. 

Thus, because the push-pull boundary is floating, the logistician is caught in a quandary 

where neither supply chain option is optimal. 

Ultimately, success for the Marines reflected what Major General Mattis (USMC) called 

a “logistics light diet.”19 While the above examples focus mainly on the Marine Corps, 

there are parallels within the Army 3rd Infantry Division (3rdID). One brief from the 

3rdID stated, “logistics is the most challenging operation conducted on the battlefield,” 

and “just-in-time logistics is not sufficient to support the tip of the spear.”20 Efforts for 

the 3rdID logisticians were exasperated by the late arrival and integration of logistics 

headquarters units, such as the 3rd Corps Support Command (COSCOM) just prior to the 

launch of the combat phase of operations. In fact, because logistics activities were not 

fully planned and integrated, the 3rdID made its last Class IX supply draw prior to March 

19, 2003, and did not receive any replacement parts replenishment until March 30, 

2003—and that draw was and inadequate to support the division’s high-tempo 

operations.21 The experiences of 3rdID further highlight problems associated with pullbased supply chain theory because there were few or no requisitions submitted by units 

for almost three weeks (see figure 2). Whether this was a case of the warfighter not 

requesting parts or a failure of the logistics system is a point of contention. 

 

18 David Simchi-Levi, P. Kaminsky and E. Simchi-Levi, Designing & Managing the Supply Chain, 2nd ed. 

(New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2003), 123. 

19 Science Applications International Corporation, Objective Assessment of Logistics Operation in Iraqi 

Freedom (Washington, D.C.: SAIC, 2004). 20 Ibid. 

21 Ibid.
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Figure 2: 3rdID Supply Requisitions22

Based on the well-publicized march into Bagdad, one would correctly surmise that the 

Army and Marine Corps ultimately achieved success during OIF. However, the advance 

was logistically cumbersome, and the system did not necessarily perform as advertised. 

Nevertheless, success is often judged by where you sit on the battlefield. Accordingly, 

there were various opinions from the strategic to tactical level on how well the joint 

logistics system supported the warfighter. 

Expert Critiques and Assessments 

Joint Doctrine 

In analyzing OIF-I, how do we define effective logistics support on the battlefield? “The 

supported Joint Force Commander (JFC) expects logistics to give him freedom of 

action—to enable the effective execution of his mission according to the timetable.”23

There are three imperatives for success in the joint logistics environment. The first is 

unity of effort by defining the process, establishing roles and responsibilities of the 

players, and identifying common output metrics while keeping the process transparent 

through shared awareness. “Unity of Effort is the coordinated application of all logistics 

capabilities focused on the JFC’s intent, and is perhaps the most critical of all joint 

logistics outcomes.”24 The second imperative is rapid and precise response to effectively 

meet constantly changing requirements of the joint force in a complex, unfolding battle. 

The key characteristics of rapid response are velocity, reliability, and visibility. These 

features should ultimately provide an end state of improved efficiency. Essential to rapid 

 

22 C. V. Christianson, Our Joint Logistics Challenge, Jan 16, 2008. 

23 C. V. Christianson, “Joint Logistics: Shaping our Future,” Mobility Forum 15, no. 3, May/Jun 2006, 24. 24 Ibid.
8

and precise response is performance tracking to identify areas of success and progress 

while improving the overall process. Speed, is the most critical aspect of improving 

response and delivering critical supplies to the warfighter. On the battlefield, warfighter 

success is intricately tied to the speed of resupply. Lastly, joint logistics enterprise 

visibility must be established with an enterprise data architecture, authoritative source 

data, and 24/7 access to the network.25 The use of S&R logistics can be a key enabler to 

accomplishing these three goals and optimizing warfighter support. 

In light of the experiences of OIF, it is prudent to review Joint Publication (JP) 4.0, 

Doctrine for Support of Joint Operations. Joint Logistics is “the deliberate sharing of 

Service logistics resources ... to support the joint force operational requirements, enhance 

synergy, and reduce redundancies and costs.” JP 4.0 provides several principles of 

logistics that are a “guide for analytical thinking and prudent planning” by the combatant 

commander: 

• Responsiveness is the “keystone” principle. Its basic premise is to provide the 

“right support in the right place at the right time.” 

• Simplicity is the “avoidance of complexity. Mission-type orders and 

standardized procedures . . . establishment of priorities and pre-allocation of 

supplies and services by the supported unit can simplify logistic support 

operations.” 

• Flexibility is the “ability to adapt logistic structures and procedures to 

changing situation, missions, and concepts of operation ... [and] includes the 

concepts of alternative planning, anticipation, reserve assets, redundancy, 

forward support of phased logistics, and centralized control with decentralized 

operations.” 

• Economy is the “provision of support at the least cost. When prioritizing and 

allocating resources, the commander must continuously consider economy.” 

• Attainability “is the ability to provide the minimum essential supplies and 

services required to begin combat operations .... An operation should not 

begin until minimum essential levels of support are on hand.” 

• Sustainability is “a measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all 

users throughout the theater for the duration of the operation .... Long-term 

support is the greatest challenge for the logistician ....” 

• Survivability is the capacity of the organization to prevail in the face of 

potential destruction. High-value targets that have a distinct effect on logistics 

must be protected.26 

The use of S&R logistics is paramount to fulfilling the principles of joint logistics in the 

VUCA environment that characterizes current and future warfare. The battlespace will 

continue to evolve, and success will come through reducing the fog of war. 

 

25 Christianson, Our Joint Logistics Challenge, 9; Christianson, Joint Logistics: Shaping our Future, 23. 26 The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 4.0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (Washington, 

DC: The Joint Staff, 2000), II:1-3. 
9

Defining Success 

Without S&R logistics, how do we currently support the warfighter? According to LTG 

Christenson, “We do sense and respond logistics now. We just don’t have the decision 

support tools.”27 Thus, to apply the above principles, it is incumbent upon 

decisionmakers to use the information available, combined with their best professional 

estimate of the situation. The result is an allocation of limited resources to support 

ongoing operations based on the plan and commander’s intent. Having access to more 

complete and clearer information would certainly make the logistician’s job easier and 

would help avoid costly delays. 

Fundamentally, success in OIF-I was not achieved through trial and error or luck. The 

rapid offensive movements during OIF-I for the Army and Marine Corps were due to the 

lessons learned in the first Gulf War and the actions of logisticians on the ground. But at 

times the ability to actually track and control the moving units was nonexistent, and only 

accomplished based on the leadership of unit commanders. “As Brigadier General Jack 

C. Stultz, noted, with the combat troops of Iraqi Freedom moving at a faster pace than 

ever before, the ability of logisticians to keep them supplied was taxed but never in 

danger of breaking down.”28 To avoid failure, the logistician had to overcome significant 

hurdles to maintain the pace of the combat units. Ultimately, the stressed lines of 

communications unavoidably degraded warfighter support. 

Other opinions of OIF-I logistics support are even more optimistic, as “support was 

delivered where it was required, when it was required, and the waste associated with 

Desert Storm’s “iron mountain” of unused supplies was avoided.”29 The Deputy 

Undersecretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness goes on to say that “each 

combat unit was equipped with transponders, allowing both combat leaders and 

logisticians at Central Command to track the troops’ movement in real time. Similarly, 

radio frequency identification (RFID) tags were attached to all inbound material 

containers at their point of shipment. These data, plus information from other systems, 

were integrated into a common operating picture, which allowed the coalition to achieve 

real-time information dominance.”30 Thus, at the strategic level, the accomplishments of 

OIF are viewed favorably. However, close examination reveals that serious challenges 

degraded the effectiveness of logistics support. 

Another Perspective 

The commanders of the 1st FSSG and MLC offer some additional insight for 

consideration. 

“During OIF, MEF sustainment was critical, and the volume of support provided was 

staggering. MLC supply fielded nearly 65 percent of over 108,000 demands, issuing over 

143,000,000 pounds of ground and aviation ammunition and over 9.7 million, meals, 

ready-to-eat.”31

 

27 C. V. Christianson, Interview with LTG Christianson, January 16, 2008. 

28 Army Logistician, Logistics System Strained but Succeeds in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 1. 

29 Morales and Geary, Speed Kills: Supply Chain Lessons from the War in Iraq, 17. 30 Ibid., 17. 

31 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 162. 
10

Although the numbers are impressive, they do not tell the whole story. According to 

leadership, there are significant shortfalls that must be addressed. Of particular concern is 

the logistics command and control capability. “We need one logistics information 

technology system for the entire Marine Corps and an end to Balkanization of different 

systems on different coasts and legacy systems that can’t talk to one another.”32 

Effective sustainment involves the ability to support the requesting unit in a timely 

manner. Although requisitions were processed through existing supply systems, the status 

and location of parts was obscure. 

In-transit visibility of repair parts, both inter- and intra-theater, was not acceptable during 

OIF. Visibility of material was only feasible when stopped at a distribution node. The 

MLC could not track in-transit repair parts. It was particularly tough to indentify lost or 

frustrated items. We desperately need a decent logistics command and control 

architecture and bandwidth to support it.33 

Furthermore, garrison logistics information technology (IT) was of little value. “In many 

cases the IT simply was not used, while in other cases commercial systems were used ’on 

the fly’ in order to obtain in-transit visibility, all resulting in limited supply and 

maintenance discipline.”34 Given the IT issues associated with OIF, a significant 

investment in new and improved IT capability will be required to support future VUCA 

environments and capitalize on new weapons technology. 

While the Marine Corps faced many challenges with in-transit visibility, perceptions at 

higher headquarters were at variance with reality in theater. General Walter Kross, USAF 

(retired), who was the Director of Operations and Logistics of the U.S. Transportation 

Command (USTRANSCOM), implies that Iraqi Freedom had “asset visibility—in 

transit, from factory to foxhole.”35 He goes on to say that the previous experience of Gulf 

War logistics with materiel not making it forward to meet a clear requirement had been 

fixed during OIF. In fact, at the height of the ground war, orders for Class IX repair parts 

virtually stopped because of the pace of the battle and difficulties with relaying requests 

back to supporting units. This interruption demonstrates the lack of coordination among 

communications systems, integration, and location. The overall fill rate was less than 55 

percent, and the average order ship time was approximately 23 days.36

Horror stories abound of available critical repair parts being somewhere between 

Kuwait aerial/seaport of debarkation and the frustrated unit in Iraq—as the 

supplies remained locked in the logistics chain. At the conclusion of hostilities 

over seventy 20-foot containers containing requisitioned repair parts were 

returned from Iraq to Kuwait unused and undelivered.37

The demand for speed and the unprecedented distances covered presented significant 

challenges for logistics units. 

 

32 Ibid., 162. 

33 Ibid., 162. 

34 Love, Operation Iraqi Freedom—Marine Corps Logistics at its Best?, 48. 35 Walter Kross, “Iraqi Freedom: Triumph of Precision-Guided Logistics,” Army Logistician 35, no. 5 

(September-October 2003, 2003), 22. 

36 Love, Operation Iraqi Freedom—Marine Corps Logistics at its Best?, 49. 37 Ibid., 49. 
11

Good situational awareness of the logistic status of forward deployed units is 

critical. For the MLC, because of the length of supply lines, the problem was not 

in-the-moment requirements, but what would be needed 4 to 6 days in the future. 

Combining experience and a clear understanding of the scheme of maneuver is 

critical. The current and future requirement is for predictive operational logistics 

to anticipate the war fighter’s needs.38 

Across the services, all units must have an ability to communicate and pass information 

on the battlefield. In OIF-I, Marine Corps combat support units did not possess the same 

command and control systems as other major subordinate commands, the division and 

wing. “We need the same command and control capability as any other element of the 

Marine air ground task force, to include position tracking and long-haul 

communications.”39 Without the same capability, logisticians operate in a vacuum and 

react to the situation rather than anticipate. The result is a force reverting to a pull-based 

supply chain instead of a push-based supply chain. Additionally, limited resources may 

be mismanaged because the dynamic environment often overcomes immediate 

requirements. Command and control is essential to reduce the fog of war and maintain 

speed. Even the best logisticians cannot support needs they do not know. 

The Marine Corps’s ability to extend its logistics culminating point up to eight times the 

doctrinal distances is a success story for all Marines in OIF. The operational reach of the 

Corps is better than ever. Moreover, we can sustain the force over those distances, 

provided we are able to anticipate operational requirements.40 

However, anticipation is only possible with situational awareness and the ability to 

alleviate confusion. “The key to future successes will be investing in the intellectual 

development of Marines, and the company organizations and equipment to create 

logistics organizations that can maintain velocity on the modern battlefield.”41

Information flow must improve for this vision to become a reality. The analysis provided 

by Marine Corps logisticians is important because S&R logistics provides a solution to 

overcome the shortfalls identified during OIF. 

A Solution for the Future 

Where Are We Going Wrong? 

Throughout history, smart warfighters and commanders have tried to deceive and 

confuse their opponents using any technological means at their disposal ....The 

Technologies developed to aid the warfighter in these emerging environments 

(fourth generation warfare) must be designed to support dynamic, adaptive 

operations. Sense and Respond Logistics aims to deliver precise, agile support 

through adaptive and responsive demand and support networks.42 

 

38 Christopher M. Kennedy et al, U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography

(Washington, DC: History Division, United States Marine Corps, 2006), 162. 

39 Ibid., 162. 

40 Ibid., 163.

41 Ibid., 163. 

42 Kshanti Greene et al, Cognitive Agents for Sense and Respond Logistics (Amherst, MA: Department of 

Science, University of Massachusetts Amherst, 2005), available at <http://www.cs.umass.edu/ 
12

In the future, military forces will operate in more complex and uncertain environments 

that require the application of new military concepts and technologies. Stovepiped 

logistics will not adequately support the warfighter in a dynamic, global environment. 

In 2004, then Office of Force Transformation (now known as the Forces Transformation 

and Resources Office, through its charter to transform the military, embraced the concept 

of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) as a core focus to enhance the operational capability 

of the U.S. Forces. Utilizing NCW will allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to 

leverage information technology and change operational reality on the battlefield. As a 

result, the effects-based capability of sense and respond logistics (S&RL) is being 

developed to apply two vital NCW ideas: avoid stovepiping, and integrate operations, 

intelligence, and logistics into a seamless capability. 

For the Marine Corps, S&R logistics is viewed primarily as a logistics modernization 

effort, but the data collected is valuable not only to logisticians throughout the enterprise, 

but also to operators. The use of sense and respond technology will enhance logistics 

support. Moreover, the ability to integrate the information into operational planning and 

execution in real time and connect all the stakeholders throughout the enterprise will 

improve the survivability of the weapon systems/platforms. Thus, S&R logistics provides 

a solution to optimizing the supply chain, delivering enterprise-wide visibility, and 

establishing a life-cycle approach to systems readiness. Critical to employing S&R 

logistics as part of NCW is ensuring that the right people see the right information at the 

right time. Thus, the use of S&R logistics will not only be a force multiplier, to the 

logistics community, but will also increase combat readiness for the Marine warfighters. 

 ~dcooper/papers/2005_Greene_DAMAS.pdf>. 
13

Chris Wagner

Chris Wagner

Sense and 

Respond 

Brokered

Demand and 

Supply

4. Sea Base negotiates for 

supplying rockets and 

transportation

4. USMC Artillery Unit 

participates in 

negotiations for 

rendezvous and 

delivery of HIMARS 

rockets

Take-away:

• Commodity Brokers for scarce resources

• Situation awareness factors into support

2. The HIMARS Rocket 

Commodity Control Agent 

requests HIMARS rockets from 

battlespace elements 

(operational units, logistics 

support)

Information: Demand Signal

Information: Supply Response

Information: Negotiation

Physical Movement

1. USMC Artillery Unit calculates 

it will deplete HIMARS rockets 

before resupply and it requests 

rockets from the HIMARS Rocket 

Commodity Controller

5. Sea Base transports 

rockets to USMC Artillery 

Unit

4. The HIMARS Rocket 

Commodity Control Agent 

selects Sea Base response 

to request for rockets and 

negotiates for rendezvous

3. Allied Nation 

does not 

respond to 

request as it 

cannot deliver 

in time 

3. Forward Airbase 

and Depot responds 

that it has rockets 

and transportation

3. Army Unit 

responds that it 

has rockets and 

no available 

transportation 

3. Sea Base responds that 

it has rockets and 

transportation

1. The HIMARS Rocket 

Commodity Control Agent 

(running on a computer at the 

Forward Supply Depot) 

determines if the USMC 

request for HIMARS rockets 

falls within current guidelines 

for commander’s intent, 

prioritization of tasks, and 

availability of resources

S&R

Rapid Prototyping Rapid Prototyping

Concept Concept

Experimentation Experimentation

S&R

Rapid Prototyping Rapid Prototyping

Concept Concept

Experimentation Experimentation

Figure 3: Notional S&R Logistics43

The notional illustration of S&R logistics in figure 3 presents an alternative for future 

logistics support. Although this scenario reflects the resupply of HIMARS rockets to a 

Marine Corps artillery unit, it could as well apply to resupply of 155mm HE artillery 

rounds during OIF-I. Is there a reason that resources cannot be reallocated or 

redistributed on the battlefield based on need or execution of the commander’s intent? 

The implementation of S&R logistics will bring improvements in technology, but also 

requires changes in joint logistics doctrine and strategic agreements to facilitate the 

reallocation of resources between Services and allies. 

Building on the above example, imagine the difference in the logisticians’ ability to 

support OIF-I. With S&R logistics, fuel levels could be monitored constantly and 

resupply requirements could be calculated without forwarding requests over unreliable 

radio nets. Although CSSB-10 was able to refuel the division, the amounts delivered did 

not meet total requested requirement. Thus, logisticians had to allocate fuel based on their 

situational awareness that may have missed key information. S&R logistics provides the 

visibility to anticipate culminating points based on the scheme of maneuver and deliver 

appropriate fuel amounts to the right location and the right vehicles. Furthermore, S&R 

logistics enables logisticians to make decisions based on who needs limited resources 

based on commander’s guidance/intent, and priority of effort for the battle. Finally, 

having a comprehensive awareness of assets on the battlefield allows the reallocation of 

 

43 Office of Force Transformation, Sense and Respond Logistics: OFT S&R Overview Briefing

(Washington, DC: Office of Force Transformation, Department of Defense, 2004). 
14

supplies, such as fuel, from one major subordinate command to another. An example is 

available from OIF-I. Normally responsible for refueling aircraft at Forward Arming and 

Refueling Points, Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS), provided fuel to division 

units because they were closer and had fuel available. In this scenario, S&R logistics 

provides the total sight picture to analyze the data and make the best decisions to support 

the warfighter. 

Current Efforts in S&R 

In the Marine Corps, the concept of S&R logistics has gained significant momentum in 

recent years. After the U.S. Army published its Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD) for the Army Diagnostic Improvement Program (ADIP) dated 6 June 2000, the 

Marine Corps came on line with the Marine Corps Operational and Organizational 

(O&O) Concept for Autonomic Logistics (AL). Through the Fleet Operational Needs 

Statement (FONS), dated 13 March 2000, and Mission Need Statement (MNS), dated 5 

April 2002, the Marine Corps identified its requirement for AL to utilize a system of 

communications networks to gather and transmit ground tactical equipment mission 

critical data to a centralized location so that it can be processed and delivered in real-time 

to near real-time in support of the warfighter.44 AL would provide the capability for 

reporting mission critical data such as equipment health, identification, location, fuel and 

ammunition levels, and mobile loads in systems throughout the spectrum of Marine Air 

Ground Task Force operations. 

At the service level, the use of S&R logistics supports the three-pronged Marine Corps 

Logistics Modernization (LOGMOD) improvement and integration initiative that focuses 

on Marine Corps people, processes, and technology. The Solution Initiating Directive 

(SID) states, “future Marine Corps warfighting equipment will report its operational 

status through Embedded Diagnostics/Embedded Prognostics (ED/EP) technologies.”45

The key “respond” portion of S&R logistics will be the fielding of the Global Combat 

Service Support-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC). S&R logistics is part of modernizing and 

integrating information technology while streamlining the supply, maintenance, and 

distribution processes, all resulting in a more effective and efficient Logistics Chain 

Management (LCM) process. 

Additionally, PM-LAV, through its efforts to manage total life cycle management has 

established an integrated data environment (IDE) to focus on the product life cycle. Once 

data is collected from sensors, the IDE becomes the central depository for platform 

information that provides historical data and access to various stakeholders. The broad 

objectives of the IDE include asset management throughout the life cycle, information 

sharing for all stakeholders, providing access to enterprise-wide information, and 

leveraging existing initiatives. With the implementation of S&R, the desired end state is 

improved readiness and combat availability. 

 

44 Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Operational and Organizational (O&O) 

Concept for Autonomic Logistics (AL) (NO. LOG 62) (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command, 2002). 

45 Logistics Modernization Transition Task Force, Logistics Modernization Solution Initiating Directive

(Arlington, VA: Installation and Logistics (I&L), Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, 2005), 

available at <https://logmod.hqmc.usmc.mil/LOGMOD_SID_July_2005.pdf>.
15

Under the reliability centered maintenance (RCM) concept, the Marine Corps is moving 

forward with the “sense” portion of S&R logistics. “Smart” platforms under the 

Embedded Platform Logistics System (EPLS) are “being designed to monitor, collect, 

process, record, report, store, and archive the operational status and system health of the 

platform on which installed.”46 In September 2007, Lockheed Martin was awarded a 

$145 million contract for the EPLS. The EPLS is the hardware infrastructure for AL and 

will be installed on LAVs, Medium Tactical Vehicle Replacements (MTVRs), and 

Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs). Utilizing data captured from individual sensors, 

the EPLS will provide predictive data and failure analysis consistent with RCM.47 The 

result is a large amount of both operational and logistics data that can be used by the 

warfighter and logistician to provide predictive data prior to a mission and failure 

analysis for the maintainers. 

The transmission of data still remains a long pole for S&R logistics. Current plans with 

the LAV are for the data to be passed locally via a hard connection from the LAV to a 

data collection system. A possible alternative is wireless transmission to a collection unit 

near the equipped systems, but this option raises network security concerns. In either 

method, the data collection process would have time delays, and logisticians needing the 

information would not have the visibility to be proactive and timely until the data is 

received. 

The combination of proactive diagnostics, logistics, and prognostics seeks to change the 

traditional maintenance concept in the Marine Corps. Instead of conducting maintenance 

and inspections at fixed intervals, maintenance can take place when necessary, keeping a 

higher percentage of vehicles in service, saving money, and creating faster turnaround 

time for real problems.48 Under the S&R logistics concept, maintenance will be 

scheduled and performed when failure is sensed, and parts will be ordered automatically, 

without human intervention. With continuous inspections through the sensors, and 

rebuilds taking place as required, the likelihood of catastrophic failure should be reduced. 

Additionally, EPLS takes the responsibility away from the crew to stop operations in 

hostile territory to check the readiness of a vital subsystem, e.g., LAV gearboxes. In the 

end, the commander should have more clarity on the readiness of equipment in the 

planning and execution of combat operations. 

What Does the Future Hold? 

While S&R technology can provide benefits in any situation/environment, the scenario 

presented by the rapid deployment and employment of large forces in OIF makes 

technology essential to obtaining clarity across the battlespace. The road ahead is 

challenging based upon current technology needed and funding requirements to 

implement S&R. Fully fielding this operational capability will not happen overnight. 

Although we possess the technology and tools to move forward with S&R logistics, 

success will only come through a directed, coordinated, and sustained joint effort. An 

 

46 Program Manager, Embedded Platform Logistics System, RCM-21 Analysis of Embedded Platform 

Logistics System (EPLS) (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Systems Command, 2007). 47 Defense Industry Daily, “USMC Putting Prognostics in its Vehicles,”Defenseindustrydaily.com, 

available at <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/usmc-putting-prognostics-in-its-vehicles03852/?camp=newsletter&src=did&type=textlink>. 

48 Ibid.
16

essential question is, who will pilot this effort for DOD—a joint S&R office, or will PMLAV continue to lead? 

The potential of S&R logistics is unlimited; however, there are challenges to fully 

utilizing the technology. Developing an NCW environment and sharing the data 

throughout the enterprise will be challenging. All the players in the LCM and operational 

chain of commands stand to benefit from savings in scarce dollars and human lives with 

increased survivability. Future military operations will benefit as fewer resources are 

deployed, allowing a more rapid deployment and buildup of combat power. Tailored 

responses will be applied to both planned and unplanned events. Additionally, S&R 

logistics will help eliminate the iron mountain and provide more agile and flexible 

support. Although there is no substitute for planning, the use of S&R technology provides 

the logistician reliable data from sensors fed automatically. This eliminates possible 

transmission errors as information is forwarded via radio nets and emails, avoids inflation 

of the actual requirement, eliminates delays due to Marines performing other tasks, and 

mitigates the fatigue associated with combat. Evolution of the NCW and command and 

control capabilities to provide the links between transmitting and receiving signals is not 

instantaneous. However, the ability to transmit data across the enterprise provides 

logisticians with a more responsive demand and support network while allowing the 

operators to recognize the operational context and coordination issues to continue the 

mission; the end result should be savings across the spectrum and a more lethal, agile 

capability on the battlefield. 

Current Operations In OIF – What Has Changed? 

“Significant (supply) progress has been made in Iraq since OIF-I,” according to BGen 

Kessler, Commanding General, 2d MLG, II MEF, Camp Lejeune, NC, who returned 

from Iraq in February 2008.49 First, there is more confidence in the system due to intratheater visibility. Class IX repair parts are shipped with an accompanying RFID tag that 

can identify all the parts in a particular box or pallet by accessing the warehouse to 

warfighter (W2W) system. The RFID tag identifying the parts is associated with a 

particular vehicle for movement from the logistics support area to the supported unit. The 

vehicle’s movements can be tracked using Blue Force Tracker (BFT), if the resupply 

truck identification is known. Alternatively, visibility on shipments can also be accessed 

from the ITV Server that will update with the RFID tag’s location each time it passes 

within 300 feet of an interrogator. However, there is no bridge between W2W and BFT. 

Currently, to gather information from both W2W and BFT, a logistician needs access to 

both systems to identify truck location on the battlefield and which parts are on the truck. 

These systems provide an improved enterprise visibility, but do not solve the problem of 

integrating the data architecture to enable a common logistical picture under one system. 

Additionally, there is more confidence in the system due to the relatively short response 

time for most repair part requisitions. OIF-I experienced significant challenges because of 

an immature logistics theater and the high tempo of operations. Now, the environment 

and operating conditions are more static, and the Marine Corps’ Supported Activities 

Supply System (SASSY) Support Unit (SMU) at Al Taqaddum, Iraq, is equal to all the 

SMUs in the Marine Corps, totaling approximately $124 million worth of supplies. The 

 

49 J. Kessler, Interview with BGen Kessler, February 22, 2008. 
17

warehouse employs many automated features, but still relies on large containers to store 

inventory. Due to the large account, readiness across the MEF Forward is averaging 94-

95 percent, an outstanding level even when compared to garrison operations. 

Although improvements have been made on the Marine Corps side, there is still a lack of 

automated means to see inventory in the Army Supply Support Areas. Informal 

relationships exist to mutually support Army and Marine Corps units, but enterprise total 

asset visibility across the services is nonexistent. Until Global Combat Service SupportMarine Corps is fielded and integrated with like systems from other services, the situation 

will not improve. Furthermore, there are still unanswered questions with respect to the 

Services’ Title 10 requirements to train, organize, and equip their forces, and how the 

issue of reimbursement will be addressed when one Service provides repair parts and 

supplies to another. 

Conclusion 

“War logistics, when truly working, should be transparent to the warfighter.”50 Based on 

the OFT Vision, S&R logistics is a means to this end by providing the commanders and 

logisticians a tool to know “what is where as well as what is on the way and when they 

will see it.”51 Although varying degrees of success were identified for logistics support 

during OIF-I, the use of S&R logistics would address many of the challenges that created 

so much confusion and fog during the war. 

However, critical areas must still be addressed. While the EPLS is an important first step 

to establishing a sense capability on critical systems, the communications links and pipes 

to pass the sense data to the relevant decisionmakers appear to be at a standstill. The 

implementation of S&R logistics seems to be a sequential rather than concurrent process. 

Passing of the sense data across the enterprise must be given the same priority of effort 

and funding, otherwise data will be sensed and collected, but not acted upon. Having the 

capability to monitor and predict failure, knowing actual fuel and ammo levels of weapon 

systems, and being able to track materiel on the battlefield are all immediate needs of 

logisticians. Policymakers, the Armed Services, and industry, must work together to fund, 

develop, and field this capability. Initial efforts on the EPLS by PM-LAV will begin 

establishing a capability that not only benefits the logistician, but also improves the 

lethality of the warfighter through increased speed and confidence. 

“Logistics must be ready to move and extend the logistics chain, synchronized with the 

advance of the combat force, to maintain continuous flow and support.”52 The challenges 

associated with OIF-I are not going away, and the future consists of a more VUCA 

environment. S&R logistics provides the capability to take the logistics community into 

the 21st century and revolutionize the conduct of war. The use of S&R logistics will not 

only enable a transformation in military logistics, but also fundamentally change the endto-end support to the warfighter, while effectively integrating the enterprise and changing 

the approach to weapons systems support and joint doctrine. 

 

50 Kross, Iraqi Freedom: Triumph of Precision-Guided Logistics, 22. 51 Ibid., 22. 

52 Science Applications International Corporation, Objective Assessment of Logistics Operation in Iraqi 

Freedom, 1. 
18

Instructor’s Guide to Case Study Sense and Respond Logistics 

This case study proposes that the use of sense and respond logistics during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom I would have provided logisticians critical decisionmaking information 

(situational awareness), thereby reducing the fog of war and facilitating more efficient 

and responsive support to the warfighter. In drawing this conclusion, the paper analyzes 

the events of OIF-I, citing logistical lessons learned and difficulties experienced. The 

paper also offers suggestions to reduce those challenges. The case provides a good 

background to examine S&R logistics in the context of a major military operation. 

This case study can be taught with the following objectives in mind: 

Objective 1: Understand the changing support requirements to the 1st MarDiv during 

their movement in OIF. 

Objective 2: Understand the set of challenges logisticians faced in supporting the 1st 

MarDiv’s movement and operations. 

Comment on both objectives—this case study provides numerous examples of using 

planning factors, and yet reality not matching the plan. Also, various low-tech sensors 

(fuel gauges) were not always accurate as a sensing device. The case describes numerous 

complications, logistics officers dealing with unknowns, and rapid changes 

demonstrating logistics flexibility. The case mentions fuel, water, rations, tires, and 

artillery rounds and provides commentary on the various problems encounters along with 

workarounds. 

Objective 3: Understand the intent of sense and respond Logistics and how, when the 

concepts are applied to OIF, changes in support would have resulted. 

Comment. Sense and respond logistics is based on information flows to allow for more 

rapid and precise logistics response. The demand signal, that is, an event that will initiate 

action, e.g., fuel gauge at 1⁄4 full initiates an operation prior to push fuel forward before a 

vehicle runs out of fuel. S&R logistics envisions similar sensing of demand signals from 

all classes of supply, including Class IX repair parts—replace parts just before failure. 

Objective 4: Explore how supporting future combat forces with the “sense and respond” 

concepts will benefit the warfighter. 

Comment. S&R logistics in the future will result in greater effectiveness and increased 

efficiency. The set of sensors and information sharing is intended to improve situational 

awareness and provide the warfighter various planning options. The key to S&R is 

sensing the demand signal, responding rapidly to the demand signal, and sharing 

information creating a common operating picture. Some of the issues that will impact 

S&R logistics and need to be discussed are information requirements—in an austere 

environment without a telecommunications infrastructure, logistics information will have 

to be transmitted—competition for bandwidth! The demand signal must be recognized 

and acted on—when will the logisticians sense the demand, and how will they be able to 

respond?