Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1505-PL-312 | November 18, 2015 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

APPELLANT PRO SE

John D. May 

Greencastle, Indiana 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

Wayne E. Uhl 

Stephenson Morow & Semler 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John D. May, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

Greene County Sheriff’s 

Department, Greene County 

Jail, Sheriff Michael Hasler and 

Jail Commander Darrin 

MacDonald, 

Appellees-Plaintiffs 

November 18, 2015 

Court of Appeals Case No. 

28A01-1505-PL-312 

Appeal from the Greene Circuit 

Court 

The Honorable E. Michael Hoff 

Trial Court Cause No. 

28C01-1412-PL-43 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1505-PL-312 | November 18, 2015 Page 2 of 7

 Case Summary 

[1] John May represented himself in a civil suit while he was incarcerated in the 

Greene County Jail. After he was sentenced for his criminal convictions and 

transferred to the Department of Correction, May filed a complaint for 

injunctive relief and damages against several Greene County entities wherein he 

alleged that he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts 

because the jail did not have a law library. The trial court granted the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because May’s civil action was not a challenge 

to his convictions or a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, May did not 

have a constitutional right of access to the law library, and we affirm the grant 

of the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] While incarcerated at the Greene County Jail in 2014, May represented himself 

in a civil case which was “filed against May by Debra Stephens as a small claim 

that was transferred to the plenary docket.” Appellees’ Br. p. 4. Stephens was 

the victim in May’s convictions for intimidation, criminal mischief, and battery 

with a deadly weapon. The jail did not have a law library, and when May 

requested law books, he was told that there were no funds or space for them.1

 

In March 2015, after he was transferred to an Indiana Department of 

 

1

 According to May, the jail’s library consists of an incomplete set of the 1998 edition of the Indiana Code. 
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Correction facility, May, acting pro se, filed an Amended Verified Complaint 

for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Action for Mandate against the 

Greene County Sheriff’s Department, the Greene County Jail, Greene Superior 

Court, Greene County Sheriff Michael Hasler, Greene County Jail Commander 

Darrin MacDonald, and Greene Superior Court Judge Dena Martin, the last 

three in their individual and official capacities. In the complaint, May asked 

the trial court to issue an order 1) declaring that May’s rights and those of 

similarly situated offenders at the jail were violated because the jail does not 

have a law library; 2) enjoining the defendants from further violating May’s 

rights and those of any inmate; 3) ordering the defendants to establish such a 

library; and 4) ordering the defendants to pay May both compensatory and 

punitive damages for the violation of his rights. Defendants the Sheriff’s 

Department, the jail, Sheriff Hasler, and Commander MacDonald filed a joint 

motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.2

 May appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[3] At the outset we note that May proceeds pro se. A litigant who proceeds pro se is 

held to the rules of procedure that trained counsel is bound to follow. Smith v. 

Donahue, 907 N.E.2d 553, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, cert. dismissed. 

One risk a litigant takes when he proceeds pro se is that he will not know how to 

 

2

 In April 2015, the trial court granted May’s motion to dismiss Judge Martin and the Greene Superior Court 

as defendants. 
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accomplish all the things an attorney would know how to accomplish. Id. 

When a party elects to represent himself, there is no reason for us to indulge in 

any benevolent presumption on his behalf or to waive any rule for the orderly 

and proper conduct of the appeal. Foley v. Mannor, 844 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2006). 

[4] As an additional preliminary matter, we note that the defendants are correct 

that May lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. The standing requirement acts 

as an important check on the exercise of judicial power by Indiana courts. 

Schulz v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1041, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. Its 

primary purpose is to insure that the party before the court has a substantive 

right to enforce the claim that is being made in litigation. Id. To possess 

standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the 

lawsuit and must show that he has sustained or was in immediate danger of 

sustaining some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue. Id. It is not 

sufficient that a plaintiff merely has a general interest common to all members 

of the public. Foundations of East Chicago, Inc. v. City of East Chicago, 927 N.E.2d 

900, 903 (Ind. 2010), clarified on reh’g, 933 N.E.2d 874 (Ind. 2010). Here, at the 

time he filed this action, May had been transferred to the Department of 

Correction and was no longer an inmate at the jail. Therefore, he did not have 

a personal stake in injunctive relief at the time he filed the suit, and lacks 

standing to seek such relief. We now turn to May’s remaining claims for 

compensatory and punitive damages for past injuries. 
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[5] We review a trial court’s ruling on a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion using a de novo 

standard. Lei Shi v. Cecilia Yi, 921 N.E.2d 31, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). This 

means that we give no deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. A motion to 

dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 

Veolia Water Indpls., LLC v. Nat’l Trust Ins. Co., 3 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 2014). In 

conducting our review, we accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint, and 

only consider the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw 

every reasonable inference in favor of the non-moving party. Snyder v. Town of 

Yorktown, 20 N.E.3d 545, 550 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. We will affirm 

a dismissal under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) only if it is apparent that the facts alleged 

in the complaint are incapable of supporting relief under any set of 

circumstances. Id.

[6] May argues that the trial court erred in granting the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss where he was denied his constitutional right of access to the courts 

because the jail did not have a law library. The United States Supreme Court 

has held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts 

requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of 

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or 

adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 

817, 828 (1977). However, the Supreme Court later noted that the right of 

access to courts was limited to direct criminal appeals and actions under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 354 (1996). Specifically, the Court in Lewis explained as follows: 
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Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform 

themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything 

from shareholder derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The 

tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates need in 

order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in 

order to challenge the conditions of their confinement. 

Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the 

incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of 

conviction and incarceration. 

Id. at 355. 

[7] Here, May’s civil action was filed by Debra Stephens as a small claim that was 

transferred to the plenary docket. Stephens was the victim of the actions 

resulting in May’s criminal convictions. It was not a challenge to his 

convictions or a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In this instance, 

May did not have a federal constitutional right of access to the law library. See 

Maggert v. Call, 817 N.E.2d 649, 651 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that where 

Maggert’s civil action was for the theft of his property and not a challenge to his 

conviction or a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Maggert had no 

federal constitutional right of access to the law library).3

 

3

 May also directs us to 210 Ind. Admin. Code 3-1-15(a), which provides that the “right of inmates to have 

access to the courts shall be insured. Inmates shall have confidential access to their attorneys and the 

authorized representatives of their attorneys. . . . Jail inmates not represented by counsel shall have 

reasonable access to an adequate law library.” To the extent May cites this provision to support his claim of 

a violation of his federal constitutional right of access to the courts, we have already explained that May had 

no such right of access to a law library to defend his civil action. See Maggert, 817 N.E.2d at 651. We further 

note that May makes no argument that this code provision establishes a cause of action distinct from his 

constitutional claim. Last, any argument alleging a violation of the Indiana Constitution fails because there 
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[8] Affirmed. 

Robb, J., and Pyle, J., concur. 

 

can be no claim for monetary damages arising out of the Indiana Constitution. McIntire v. Franklin Twp. 

Cmty. Sch. Corp., 15 N.E.3d 131, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.