COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

C.V.,

 Appellant,

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY

AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES,

 Appellee. 

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-12-00088-CV

Appeal from

65th District Court

of El Paso County, Texas

(TC # 2009CM8178)

O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from a judgment terminating a mother’s parental rights to her six 

children. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (TDFPS) sought termination 

of both the mother’s and the father’s parental rights. After a bench trial, the court found TDFPS 

presented clear and convincing evidence establishing that Appellant: 

knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the [children] to remain in conditions or 

surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the 

[children];

engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the [children] with persons who engaged 

in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the 

[children];

used a controlled substance, as defined by Chapter 481, Health and Safety Code, 

in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and:
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(i) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment 

program; or

(ii) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment 

program, continued to abuse a controlled substance;

See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. §§§ 161.001(D), (E), (P)(West Supp. 2012). The trial court also found 

that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental relationship. The trial 

court did not terminate the rights of the father and he is not a party to this appeal.

On appeal, C.V. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the best interest 

finding. She concedes that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the three statutory predicates. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Foundational Premise

We begin with the fundamental premise that children need stability, security, consistency, 

and continuity. These common threads of a child’s well-being relate not only to physical 

caretaking but also to psychological parenting. When the threads are woven into daily life, the 

fabric called family swaddles the child and promotes physical and emotional growth. Threads 

left dangling often unravel into chaos. And that word -- chaos -- is repeatedly found throughout 

the record here.

The Parents

C.V. and E.G. are the biological parents of all six children and have been together for 

approximately fifteen years. The record reflects, however, that C.V. was married to another 

man, J.H., on July 27, 2004 and never divorced him. C.V. claimed at trial that the marriage was 

immigration-related and that she considered E.G. her common law husband. In any event, E.G. 

was adjudicated the father of all of the children.
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The Children

For clarity and ease of reference, we will refer to the children by number rather than 

extended sequential initials. As we will discuss more thoroughly below, the children were 

removed in December 2009. The final hearing on the merits began June 1, 2011 and was tried in 

piecemeal fashion until closing arguments on January 6, 2012. During the trial, the children 

celebrated birthdays and different witnesses testified to different ages of the children depending 

upon the dates of their testimony.

Child 1 was nine years old when trial began and was living in her fifth foster home. She 

was eleven years old by the time the trial concluded. Her current clinical therapist, Irene 

Cadena, testified that the child suffers from anxiety, depression, nightmares, and outbursts of 

anger. She has a history of self-harm by cutting and has been hospitalized due to outrageous 

anger, which involved hitting and kicking walls. The child’s initial therapist, Mara Hernandez, 

described the girl’s severe aggression, assaultive behavior, severe emotional problems, 

sexualized behavior, and lack of boundaries. She is unable to follow instructions, respect limits, 

or abide by social order, and she shows no empathy for the feelings of others. Consequently, she 

has been medicated and hospitalized at University Behavioral Hospital in El Paso at least five 

times. Her most recent hospital stay lasted four weeks. Child 1’s sexual behavior involves pole 

dancing, inappropriately rubbing against other children, and acting out sexually against a sofa. 

She told Hernandez that she had observed her cousins’ sexual actions and had witnessed her 

mother engage in sexual relations at a cantina in Juarez. She made an outcry of molestation by 

her cousin and her uncle to her mother, but C.V. apparently did not believe her. On the other 

hand, she also alleged sexual abuse by one of her foster fathers which was disbelieved by the 

foster mother. Child 1 described a crowd of people at the family home who repeatedly “fought”
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and “hit each other.” She related incidents of domestic violence in the family home to her foster 

mother and expressed fear that visitors in the home were affiliated with gangs. Cadena also 

addressed the issue of family violence, reciting that the child observed physical violence and she 

and her siblings would hide under the bed. When asked whether these incidents would 

negatively affect the children, Cadena emphatically answered yes. When asked, “How?” she 

replied:

Well, usually children that come from homes where there’s been violence, 

physical violence, or any type of abuse, particularly physical violence, they will 

enter another relationship just like that, because they feel that violence is part of 

love. 

Cadena specifically mentioned that the girl needs stability. She lacks trust “because she has 

never had that trust or nurturing from her mother.” Child 2 was seven years old when trial

began. He has been diagnosed with ADHD and aggression, and has significant psychological 

and behavioral issues. He was prescribed multiple psychotropic medications and on four 

occasions, his foster mother took him to University Behavioral Hospital due to his suicidal 

thoughts, threats to others, and self-harm. The latest hospitalization lasted for six days and 

Dr. Moreira diagnosed him as bipolar. The foster mother explained that most of Child 2’s 

behavioral problems occurred before and after visits with his mother, but she acknowledged this 

behavior could be related to his wanting to stay with her. Child 2 was placed in a residential 

treatment center about 70 miles from Lubbock in July 2011 because he was having idealizations 

of killing the foster parents and foster siblings. His clinical psychologist, Dr. Felix Carreon,

noted that the boy described in graphic detail how he would kill or mutilate his foster parents if 

they crossed him. Dr. Carreon conducted two psychological evaluations, one in March 2010 and 

the second in July 2011. These tests revealed anxiety, depression, anger, and disruptive 

behavior. He was diagnosed with temper deregulation disorder with depression and an Axis I 
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diagnosis of neglect of a child. While Dr. Carreon opined that the boy improved in his 

functioning while in foster care, he admitted that the child’s psychological testing results showed 

a deterioration between the two test settings with regard to social adaptive behaviors and 

adjustments. He explained this in his written report, noting that the most salient features 

regarding this child’s difficulties have to do with his attachment to a family system and parents 

that apparently have not been able or willing to comply with the conditions necessary for 

reunification. He characterized this as a pathological bond to his biological parents. Dr. Carreon 

also noted that the boy has displayed odd and dangerous behaviors. He ate two tubes of 

toothpaste. After the foster father noticed a drop in electrical lighting in the home, he discovered 

the boy had put a nail clipper in his bedroom electric socket causing an electrical short. The boy

worries about what will happen the next day and has even gone to sleep wearing his school 

clothes. Child 2 lies frequently and does not accept responsibility for his actions. He provokes 

difficulties, likes to fight and hit other children, and has poor frustration tolerance. Yet this child 

has qualified for gifted classification and is actually doing well in school.

Child 3 was six years when trial began. He has mild mental retardation, ADHD, hearing 

loss and asthma. He has suffered from encopresis and his mother admitted she never had him 

evaluated by a doctor. She also admitted that his behavior included aggression, tearing his pants, 

and biting his shirts. The boy’s therapist, Mara Hernandez, testified that he made substantial 

progress in foster care, specifically in his moral development and behavior. His foster mother 

said the child arrived at her home very dirty and soiled. He had no knowledge of hygiene or 

table manners. She explained that the child would soil his underwear, gnaw on things with his 

teeth, and break things in his mouth. Katherine Valencia, a clinical treatment coordinator with 

the El Paso Center for Children, testified that the child would spread feces in the bathroom and 
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had a tendency to chew things like tennis shoes, pencils, pens, markers, clothing, and furniture. 

He exhibited developmental delays and was diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. 

Child 4, a five-year-old, exhibited severe hyperactivity, impulsiveness, competitiveness, 

aggression, and outbursts of anger His tantrums can last up to 45 minutes. He suffers from 

anxiety disorder. Although highly intelligent, he needs very close supervision because of poor 

judgment. He told his foster mother that his father beat them a lot. She described behavior 

problems, including aggression, destructive tendencies, and sexual awareness. 

Child 5 was four years old. Her therapist, Mara Hernandez, explained that the child 

exhibits the same behavioral disorders as the other children, including severe hyperactivity, 

physical violence, anger, poor judgment, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, fighting with siblings, 

and an inability to follow instruction. Katherine Valencia added that the little girl has a mood 

disorder and reported that the child received speech therapy and psychiatric services. Child 4 

and 5 played a game called “mom and dad,” which their foster mother described as inappropriate 

sexualized behavior. At the time the behavior was first noted, the children were two and four

years of age. 

Child 6 was only two years old at the time of trial. This little girl exhibited non-stop 

crying, pulling her hair, and hitting herself. Katherine Valencia testified that she suffers from an 

unspecified disturbance of her autonomic nervous system for which she is medicated. Even 

while medicated, she continued to show instability and emotional deregulation. The child is 

developmentally delayed, and in need of speech and psychiatric therapy. Mara Hernandez 

opined that the child needed structure and a highly stimulating environment to achieve her 

developmental milestones. Child 6 could not stand to have anyone touch her and was in need of 

occupational therapy for sensory integration. 
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Removal of the Children

The Department received an intake in May 2009 that Child 1 had been hit with a belt by 

her father. CPS conducted an investigation and the mother tested positive for drugs. When she 

failed to attend a drug assessment, the children were voluntarily placed with their maternal 

grandmother. Following a police report that two of the children were found running in the street, 

CPS made a determination of neglect. The children were removed on December 4, 2009. Child 

6, the baby, tested positive for cocaine at the time of removal. C.V. claimed she had drugs on 

her hands when she picked up the child. In any event, with no suitable placement options, the 

Department sought temporary managing conservatorship of all six children. They were placed in 

three separate foster homes, with the four youngest placed together. 

The Service Plan

In safety plans, the mother was specifically ordered by the court to (1) attend all of the 

children’s medical appointments; (2) attend a psychological evaluation; (3) attend a drug and 

alcohol assessment; (4) attend parenting classes; (5) submit to random drug testing; (6) refrain 

from using illegal substances; (7) refrain from associating with individuals having a history of 

using illegal substances; (8) attend therapy sessions; (9) obtain stable employment and provide 

proof; (10) obtain stable housing; (11) attend and complete domestic violence classes; and (12) 

attend and complete anger management classes. Of these requirements, C.V. completed the 

psychological evaluation, the drug and alcohol assessment, three parenting classes, random drug 

testing, and therapy sessions. She failed to attend more than ten of the children’s medical 

appointments. 

C.V. began a drug court program in January 2010. She tested positive for marijuana in 

April. She tested positive for ecstasy in September and was ordered to serve seven days in jail. 
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She completed an out-patient drug treatment program, but relapsed again, testing positive for 

cocaine in May 2011. At that point, the drug court recommended that she obtain in-patient 

treatment and offered assistance in making arrangements. Although C.V. expressed an interest, 

she never followed through. She was unsuccessfully discharged from the drug court program in 

July and the Department’s plan changed from reunification to termination. 

Visitation Between Mother and Children

Beginning in January 2010, C.V. had supervised visitation with her children. They were 

originally scheduled once a week for two hours and then increased first to four hours and then to

six hours. Witnesses described the supervised visitations as chaotic. It was characterized by 

constant fighting, punching, scratching and biting. Rather than engaging in horseplay, the 

children were very aggressive toward each other. C.V. would sit back and watch without 

intervening or redirecting the children’s attention. The visitation room was child-friendly, with 

tables, stools, and toys. Jessica Rodriguez, one of the caseworkers, described how C.V. watched 

the children rather than interacting with them. Grace Gonzalez, a Department caseworker 

assistant, described the relationship between C.V. and the children as loving, but that the mother 

needed help redirecting them. The worst situation occurred when the children were playing in a 

park. Child 2 became “very, very violent” with Child 4. C.V. was unable to control the child on 

her own and, according to Gonzalez, the children “didn’t take any direction from her at all.” 

C.V. admitted to missing seven visits. According to the children’s foster mother, therapist, and 

caseworker, C.V. showed up late at least once or twice a month and that visits were cancelled as 

a result. The children threw tantrums when their mother did not show up and would kick, 

scream, hit, and punch windows. 
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In September 2010, C.V. was permitted to have unsupervised visitation. The 

unsupervised visits stopped when C.V. tested positive for ecstasy and then resumed in late 

January 2011. The visits started at four hours per week and then increased to six. C.V. agreed 

that she would not have other individuals in her home during the visits. But she then allowed 

relatives to come over, including the relative that allegedly sexually assaulted Child 1. In March 

2011, the unsupervised visits were stopped when one of the children was hurt when he was 

slammed against a wall by his cousin. No overnight visits were ever allowed. In May 2011, 

C.V. again tested positive for drugs. Until this point, the Department’s plan was still family 

reunification. Thereafter, termination of the mother was the goal. The Department was looking 

at the paternal grandmother for placement, but she was unwilling due to other obligations. 

Needs of the Children

The caseworker, psychologist, therapist and treatment coordinator all testified about the 

children’s needs. Department caseworker Teresa Garcia explained that the children needed 

stability and constant attention. Dr. Carreon testified that the children needed a stable, 

consistent, and nonthreatening environment. Therapist Mara Hernandez described the children 

as demanding and “high maintenance,” needing close supervision and one-on-one attention The 

baby needs environmental stimulation as well as firm and consistent limits. According to 

Hernandez, the children’s behavior related to their home environment and was not a result of 

placement in foster care. 

When you have that, there’s a term for that adjustment disorder that can affect 

your mood and your behavior. But it is that, an adjustment. You usually adjust 

and your true self comes out once you adjust. But this seems to be the way they 

were always -- that was their reality. And all three children made -- or refer to 

that when the lived . . . when they lived with mom . . . how they used to hit each 

other and fight with their cousins. And that was according to them. That was 

reality for them. 
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Katherine Valencia explained that the children need consistency to be successful in their 

respective treatments. C.V. admitted that the children were sometimes too much for her, that she 

was overwhelmed, and that during times of stress she turned to drugs. 

Relationship Between Father and Children

One interesting and significant twist permeates this trial. Throughout most of these 

proceedings, E.G. was in prison and was not part of the children’s lives. He was original 

convicted of robbery in 1999 when he was 18 years old. He was placed on probation, but was 

revoked in June 2009 for failure to report to his probation officer. He was released on March 1, 

2011, but revoked again on March 29, 2011 for a curfew violation. He remained in jail until 

September 4, 2011. Thus, the trial had been in progress for nearly three months before his 

release. He contacted the case worker the day after he returned to El Paso and has consistently 

maintained that he wants all six of the children to live with him. By the end of trial, he was 

working as a landscaper, and living with his mother and C.V. He was visiting with the four 

younger children beginning once a week, then every other week, and finally, at the therapist’s 

recommendation, every one or two weeks. Child 1’s therapist would not let him visit her at all 

and gave him no information other than that she had “had a break down.” He did talk with Child 

2 by telephone almost every other day. He hoped that the family could be reunited, but if he had 

to choose between his wife and children, he would choose his kids. In that event, he proposed 

that the children would live with him and his mother.

Plans for the Children

The Department’s plan for the children was adoption because there were no suitable 

relative options for placement. It was hoped that the children could be reunified in one home. 

This of course was complicated by the fact that the father’s rights were not terminated. The 
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father had suggested his mother and sister as placement options, but his mother was unwilling 

and his sister was uncooperative. E.G. testified and he and C.V. reunited upon his release from 

prison. C.V. believed that his presence in her life has improved her situation because he is a 

support system for her. Her plan was for the children to live with her and her mother. 

Alternatively, she believed the children should live with her, E.G. and E.G.’s mother. As of 

January 2012, all but the oldest child expressed a desire to return home. 

GENERAL LEGAL STANDARDS AND BURDENS OF PROOF IN

PARENTAL TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS

The natural right of a parent to the care, custody, and control of their children, is one of 

constitutional magnitude. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985); see also Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)(acknowledging 

that a parent’s rights to “the companionship, care, custody, ad management” of their children are 

constitutional interests, “far more precious than any property right.”) However, although 

parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, such rights are not absolute. See In the Interest of 

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). 

A parent’s rights may be involuntarily terminated through proceedings brought under 

Section 161.001 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West 2008). 

Under this provision, the petitioner must establish: (1) one or more of the acts or omissions 

enumerated under subsection (1) as grounds for termination; and (2) that of the parent-child 

relationship is in the child’s best interest. Id.; see also Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 

S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)(noting that both elements must be established; termination may not 

be based solely on the best interest of the child as determined by the trier of fact.). 

Although parental rights may be terminated, the elevated status of such rights combined 

with the severity and permanency of termination, requires a petitioner to meet a heightened 
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burden of proof. 1 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747, 102 S.Ct. at 1391; accord Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 

20-21. Accordingly, the quantum of proof in a termination proceeding is elevated from the 

preponderance of the evidence to “clear and convincing evidence.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747, 

102 S.Ct. at 1391; accord Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20-21; see In the Interest of M.S., E.S., D.S., 

S.S., and N.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003) and In the Interest of D.S.P. and H.R.P., 210 

S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.)(cases recognizing that involuntary 

termination of parental rights is a drastic remedy which divests the parent and child of all legal 

rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child’s right 

to inherit from the parent.); see also In the Interest of B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353-54 (Tex. 

2003)(noting that because of the severity and permanency of termination, due process requires 

the party seeking to terminate parental rights prove the necessary elements by the heightened 

burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence.). 

“Clear and convincing evidence” means the measure or degree of proof that “will 

produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations 

sought to be established.” TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2008); see In the Interest of

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see also In the Interest of J.A.J., 243 S.W.3d 611, 616 

(Tex. 2007)(contrasting the standards applied in termination proceedings and the standards 

applied in modification proceedings); In the Interest of C.D., No. 02-10-00070-CV, 2011 WL 

1743688, at *4 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth May 5, 2011, no pet.). This intermediate standard falls 

between the preponderance of evidence standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable 

doubt standard of criminal proceedings. State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); 

 

1 This heightened standard is likewise statutorily required. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 161.001 (stating that, 

“The court may order termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence . . . .). [Emphasis added].
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In the Interest of D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied)(op. on 

reh’g). Although the proof must be more than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence, 

there is no requirement that the evidence be unequivocal or undisputed. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 

at 570. 

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILDREN

On appeal, C.V. challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the children. In other words, 

she challenges only the second prong of Section 161.001. Her sufficiency arguments are 

premised on three grounds: (1) there was insufficient evidence of a plan for permanency given 

the court’s failure to terminate the rights of E.G.; (2) her compliance with service plans was 

substantial and material; and (3) the children had formed bonded relationships with her as the 

result of a high degree of maternal nurturing conduct prior to removal. 

Standards of Review

The applicable legal and factual sufficiency standards of review are explained in In re 

J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002) and In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002). “We hold that the 

appellate standard for reviewing termination findings is whether the evidence is such that a 

factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s 

allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. 

In reviewing a legal sufficiency claim we consider all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s finding, “to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have 

formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 

(Tex. 2005), quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We give deference to the factfinder’s 

conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that finding, and 
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presume the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long as a 

reasonable factfinder could do so. Id.; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. We disregard any

evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved, or found to have been incredible, 

but we do not disregard undisputed facts. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573; In re J.F.C., 96 

S.W.3d at 266. A legal sufficiency or no evidence point will only be sustained when the record 

discloses one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is 

barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a 

vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla of evidence; or 

(4) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact. See Swinney v. Mosher, 830 

S.W.2d 187, 194 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).

When addressing a factual sufficiency complaint, we must assess the entire record to 

determine whether the evidence permits “a factfinder [to] reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d at 25. Unlike in a legal sufficiency review, our focus in reviewing a factual 

sufficiency complaint is not based simply upon the undisputed evidence that supports the verdict 

but the disputed evidence as well. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “Implicit in the standard is 

our obligation to accord the factfinder the deference needed for it to fulfill its role.” In re 

J.H.M., No. 07-07-0109-CV, 2009 WL 5174364, *9 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Dec. 29, 2009, no 

pet.), citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25-26. 

Factors to Consider

When determining the child’s best interest, the focus is on the child and not the parent. 

See In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 804, 812 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2003, no pet.). A strong presumption 

exists that it is in the child’s best interest to preserve the parent-child relationship. Swate v. 
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Swate, 72 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.App.--Waco 2002, pet. denied). However, the presumption in 

favor of the parent-child relationship may be overcome. The Supreme Court has clearly 

articulated the factors which a trial court should consider in determining the best interest of the 

child. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976). The Holley factors are: 

1. the desires of the child;

2. the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child;

3. the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child;

4. the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of 

the child;

5. the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child;

6. the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody;

7. the stability of the home or proposed placement;

8. acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate the existing parent-child 

relationship is not appropriate; and 

9. any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Analysis

Teresa Garcia is the ongoing CPS case worker for all of the children, although she is the 

fourth to be assigned. She testified that the Department’s permanency recommendation was 

termination of parental rights. Child 1 has made outcries of sexual abuse, has engaged in 

sexualized behavior that she claims she learned from her mother, and is afraid of her parents. 

She believes that her mother will not protect her and she is afraid that her father will hit her. The 

girl related circumstances of family violence against her mother and her siblings. 

Garcia explained that C.V. has repeatedly missed medical appointments and visitation 

with the children. The mother admitted that she is unable to handle the children, it is too much 
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for her, and she feels overwhelmed. As a result of the stress, she relapses and returns to drug 

usage. Her support system is composed of the relatives that have caused harm to the children, 

including alleged sexual abuse. The fundamental issue was the mother’s inability to care for her 

six children alone. She tended to blame events or others for all of her missteps. She denied 

taking ecstasy -- someone else put it in her drink. She denied taking cocaine -- she simply had it 

on her hands when picking up the baby. Even after completion of the court-ordered substance 

abuse treatment program, she continued to use drugs. The coordinator of the drug court believed 

she would have benefited from inpatient treatment, but she did not seek help from the 

Department nor did she self-admit. She blamed missed visitations or therapy appointments on 

others who gave her wrong directions, or she had a flat tire. The fact that C.V. did not grasp or 

understand the severity of the children’s physical, neurological, psychological, and physical 

problems concerned Dr. Carreon.

Clearly, children need a great deal in terms of a family environment that is stable, 

that is consistent, that is nonthreatening, for whatever reason that might be, so that 

the child then can involve themselves in the process of development. Otherwise, if 

you don’t have those ingredients, then you have impediments to the child’s 

development. 

*****

And any family, even under the best of conditions, would need a lot of services, 

would need to know when to seek those services, would need to be able to follow 

through with those services, be persistent, consistent, all those kinds of things, that 

under the best of conditions -- as I’ve seen many families, who -- parents, again, 

who I would say would function at a high level and they struggle quite a bit to try 

to meet the needs of their children. So that I can say, that if he was to return to his 

biological family, there’s -- a lot of conditions would need to be met, even when 

the courts are not involved. 

Katherine Valencia echoed his concerns:

I think in looking at the case as a whole for these four children, and the time that 

I’ve been involved with these four children for the last year, in implementing the 

services that they need, in understanding mom has had a relapse, information was 
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given to us that she had the relapse earlier this year, I think for these kids, they 

have to have stability and consistency. And when a mom is still trying to deal 

with her issues and still going through recovery, it would be difficult -- may be 

difficult for her -- if she’s not healthy enough, she may not be able to support all 

these kids’ needs. And to miss a psychiatric appointment, when you’re looking at 

kids that are taking psychotropic drugs, and to not understand their needs or their 

behaviors, could be detrimental to the children. The children, themselves, are at a 

very critical age of development. And so for a mom that’s not understanding, 

receptive and consistent, that is a challenge. 

C.V.’s attorney argued that she doesn’t have much initiative. She depends on a solid 

support system. While E.G. was in jail, C.V. turned back to drugs. She also violated the 

Department’s insistence that other relatives not visit. While she perceived them as a safety net, 

the record reveals that they were a danger to the children. C.V.’s own mother was validated by 

the Department as neglecting the children while they were placed with her. We thus reject her 

argument that her compliance with the safety plan was substantial and material. We also reject 

her argument that the children had bonded because of a high degree of nurturing conduct. 

Numerous witnesses described C.V.’s failure to interact with the children or to intervene when 

dangerous and violent behavior erupted. Dr. Carreon also explained how at least one child had a 

pathological fantasy of returning to an intact and functional family structure.

Finally, the failure of the trial court to terminate the father’s rights is not before us and we 

do not express an opinion thereon. Nevertheless, C.V. argues that since the trial court did not 

terminate the father’s rights, the couple’s ability to reunite the family weighs against a finding of 

best interest. In other words, the court could not find that it was in the children’s best interest to 

terminate her when she was living with E.G. and “stability” had returned. She directs us to no 

authority in support of this argument. She also contends that there is no plan for permanency as 

long as E.G’s rights are not terminated. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, C.V. 

herself suggested placement with her, E. G. and his mother. Second, the court need not consider 
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“the couple” when addressing the parenting ability of each individual seeking custody. The 

needs of these children are highly significant and of long standing duration. E.G. returned to jail 

in June 2009. The initial intake on the children was received the month before based on 

allegations that E.G. had hit Child 1 with a belt. C.V. failed a drug assessment and the children 

were placed with her mother. By December 2009, all six had been removed. Certainly the 

factfinder could determine by clear and convincing evidence that the violent and aggressive 

behavior of the children -- toward themselves and others -- stemmed from more than a weak 

support system in the household. There was also evidence of turbulence and domestic violence 

in the home. That the trial judge may have been willing to give the father a second chance does 

not require a finding that termination of the mother was not in the children’s best interest. We 

look only to the conduct, behavior, circumstances, and reasons offered by the mother. And as 

the Department’s attorney suggested, sometimes love is not enough. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 

at 26 (noting that, “[j]ust as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional 

underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical 

interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.”). 

We conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction 

that termination was in the children’s best interest. We give deference to the factfinder’s 

conclusions, indulge every reasonable inference from the evidence in favor of that finding, and 

presume the factfinder resolved any disputed facts in favor of its findings, so long as a 

reasonable factfinder could do so. We disregard any evidence that a reasonable factfinder could 

have disbelieved, or found to have been incredible, but we do not disregard undisputed facts. 

From this voluminous record, we can discern that all but one of the children wanted to return to 

their mother. But we can visualize the significant physical and emotional needs of all of these
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children. There continues to be a threat of future emotional and physical danger to the children. 

C.V. is lacking the parental abilities necessary to interact appropriately with the children, divert 

or redirect their attention when they engage in inappropriate activity, participate fully and 

regularly in their therapy sessions, and protect them from family aggression. C.V. has had 

programs available to assist her. The personnel of the drug court offered to help her obtain inpatient drug treatment, but C.V. never followed through. During visitations, it was Department 

personnel who redirected the children while C.V. sat by and watched. Her first plan for 

permanency was that she and the children would live with her mother, who had already been 

validated as negligent when the children were living with her. She cannot provide stability 

inasmuch as the children and their problems frequently cause her to become overwhelmed. The 

record demonstrates that she disbelieved her daughter’s claims of sexual assault, she failed to 

seek medical advice when her six-year-old suffered from recurrent encopresis, she failed to 

protect her children from recurring domestic violence, and she exposed her children to 

inappropriate sexual behavior. Her excuses are aimed at blaming others or insisting that stability 

could be restored once E.G. was released from prison and living with her. The evidence is 

therefore legally sufficient to support termination. We also find it to be factually sufficient. We 

have reviewed the entire record and considered not only the undisputed evidence but the disputed 

evidence as well. We overrule Issues One and Two and affirm the judgment of the trial court 

below.

April 30, 2013

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice

Before McClure, C.J., Rivera, and Antcliff, JJ.

Antcliff, J., not participating