UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

LOS REYES FIREWOOD; PAUL KEITH REYES, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO’S BERNALILLO COUNTY METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER; JAIL DIRECTOR CHIEF RAMON RUSTIN, Defendants - Appellees. No. 14-2108 (D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00303-KG-SCY) (D. New Mexico)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before HARTZ , MCKAY , and MATHESON , Circuit Judges.

Plaintiffs Los Reyes Firewood and Paul Keith Reyes, appearing pro se, appeal a

decision of the United States District Court for the Distri ct of New Mexico dismissing

* After examining the briefs and the appella te record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not mate rially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1( G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order a nd judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its pe rsuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### November 26, 2014

Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 their incoherent complaint for failure to comply with Rule s 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants Bernalillo Count y Metropolitan Detention Center and Ramon Rustin contend that (1) we are without jurisdiction because the district court’s dismissal of the complaint was not a final judgment, and (2) the district court’s judgment on the merits is correct. 1 We hold that we have jurisdiction and affirm the district court’s judgment. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 we may only ente rtain appeals of “final decisions.” The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice. “A case dismissed without prejudice may or may not be a fi nal appealable order, depending upon the

circumstances.” Moya v. Schollenbarger , 465 F.3d 444, 448 (10t h Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The circumstances here imply that the dism issal was a final order. To begin with, the opinion and order states that “a final order of dismissal will be entered.” Mem. Op. & Order at 2, Los Reyes Firewood v. State of N.M.’s Bernalillo Cnty. Metro. Det. Ctr. , No. 1:14-cv-00303 (D.N.M. June 17, 2014) (emphasis added). Second, the district court denied as moot plaintiffs’ motions relati ng to subpoenas and a continuance. Such

1 Defendants also argue that Los Reyes Firewo od is not represented by counsel, so it may not proceed in this appeal. While artificia l entities may not appear without an attorney, see Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony , 506 U.S. 194, 201

‒ 02 (1993), the law is less clear on whether sole proprietorships can appear pro se, see Lattanzio v. COMTA , 481 F.3d 137, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). The record does not show whether Los Reyes Firewood is a sole proprietorship; but we n eed not resolve whether it is because it raises only the same failing arguments as Mr. Reyes.3 motions would ordinarily not be mooted if th e case survived. In ad dition, on the same day as the opinion the district court i ssued an Order Imposing Additional Filing

Restrictions. The order states that “[t]he Court is concerned that pro se Plaintiff Paul Keith Reyes will continue to engage in frivo lous litigation, as he has in numerous other cases, and continue to cause needless expense to opposing parties and waste scarce judicial resources.” Order Imposing Additional Filing Restrictions at 1, Los Reyes

Firewood , No. 1:14-cv-00303 (D .N.M. June 3, 2014). 2 It provides that Mr. Reyes must refrain from filing documents in cases removed to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (an or der in a previous case restrict ed Mr. Reyes’s ability to file pro se suits directly in the district) unless re presented by counsel or with court permission to proceed pro se. See id. at 2–3. The “overall tenor” of the order displays the court’s intent to dispose of the entire action. Moya , 465 F.3d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our jurisdiction established, we now turn to the merits. “The legal sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law, and a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is re viewed de novo.”

Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). Mr. Reyes’s arguments on appeal to defend the sufficiency of his complaint are, howeve r, utterly incomprehensible. He complains of “an association-in-fact RICO enterprise” preventing Los Reyes

2 The district court noted that Mr. Reyes had filed eight cases in federal court since 2006, all “dismissed as either frivolou s, for failure to state a claim, or by stipulation.” Order Imposing Additional Filing Re strictions at 1 n.1, Los Reyes Firewood , No. 1:14-cv00303.4 Firewood from paying taxes, Ap lt. Br. at 4; claims that taxation of Los Reyes Firewood and seizure of its property were violations of the Hobbs Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and requests negotiation of outstanding filing-fee issu es in other cases. Ev en though we must construe the pro se brief liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), we can scarcely iden tify, much less evaluate, the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them.” Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). This failure waives Mr. Reyes’s issues on appeal. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the district court ruled corr ectly. Mr. Reyes’s amended complaint is, like his appellate brief, incoherent. Count one appears to con cern a dispute with a bonding company and asserts the need for “a grand jury trial.” Am . Compl. for Damages at 2, Los Reyes Firewood , No. 1:14-cv-00303 (Mar. 28, 2 014). Count two alleges that Mr. Reyes was imprisoned without a fair hear ing (but fails to a llege any supporting facts), was denied access to a prison law libra ry, and must live in “unsafe places to maintain oral hygiene,” which place is unspeci fied but apparently is “his little brothers [sic] house.” Id. Count three alleges unspecified cr uel and unusual punishment by the

defendants. Count four alleges that Mr. Reyes no longer pays taxes because of actions by

the defendants and others. And count fi ve requests a “trial by grand jury.” Id. at 3. None of these allegations presents “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Ci v. P. 8(a)(2), or stat es “a claim upon which relief can be granted,” id. 12(b)(6).5 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Mr. Reyes also moves to proceed in forma pauperis . To succeed, he “must show . . . the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan , 937 F.2d 502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991). He has failed to make that showing. The motion is DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge