J. S63014/16

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.W.P., JR., 

A MINOR

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER : No. 3511 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order, November 4, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. 51-FN-382382-2009, 

CP-51-AP-0000204-2014, CP-51-DP-0002021-2011

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.F., A MINOR :

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER : No. 3520 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order, November 4, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. 51-FN-342382-2009, 

CP-51-AP-0000203-2014, CP-51-DP-0002024-2011

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.R.F., JR., 

A MINOR

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.S., MOTHER : No. 3522 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order, November 4, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court Division at Nos. 51-FN-382382-2009, 

CP-51-AP-0000205-2014, CP-51-DP-0002022-2011

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD,* JJ. 
J. S63014/16

- 2 -

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016

S.S. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees and orders entered 

November 4, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 

Family Court Division, granting the petitions of the Philadelphia Department 

of Human Services (“DHS”) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights 

to her dependent children: T.W.P., Jr., born in December of 2005; J.R.F., 

born in March of 2010; and Z.F., born in April of 2011 (collectively, the 

“Children”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), 

and changing the Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.

1 2

 After review, we affirm.

We summarize the relevant procedural and factual history as follows:

 

1

In a separate decree entered on August 13, 2015, the trial court 

terminated the parental rights of T.W.P., Jr.’s, father, T.W.P., Sr. 

(“Father 1”), pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 

Father 1, who is incarcerated, has not filed an appeal from the termination 

of his parental rights, nor is he a party to the present appeal.

Further, in separate decrees also entered on November 4, 2015, the 

trial court terminated the parental rights of putative father of J.R.F. and Z.F., 

father, J.F. (“Father 2”), also pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b). Father 2 has filed an appeal at Pennsylvania Superior Court Docket 

Nos. 3593 EDA 2015 and 3596 EDA 2015. 

2 Mother does not specifically contest the change of the Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. Therefore, Mother has waived any challenge 

to the change of permanency goal. Krebs v. United Refining Company of 

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that, a failure 

to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the 

brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues).
J. S63014/16

- 3 -

This family became known to DHS on April 16, 2011, when DHS 

received a General Protective Services report that Mother and her newborn 

children tested positive for benzodiazepines and marijuana at the time of 

delivery.3 (Notes of testimony, 7/10/15 at 98-100, 126.) Mental health and 

domestic violence issues were also raised. (Notes of testimony, 8/5/14 at 

39-40; 7/10/15 at 103-104, 135.) On November 9, 2011, the Children were 

adjudicated dependent with DHS supervision and in-home services.4 (Notes 

of testimony, 7/10/15 at 100, 110, 117.)

After Mother was observed under the influence, on January 9, 2013, 

DHS obtained Orders of Protective Custody for the Children. (DHS Exhibit 2; 

notes of testimony, 7/10/15 at 105-106.) On January 11, 2013, the court 

then committed the Children to DHS custody and placed them in foster 

care.5 (DHS Exhibit 2; notes of testimony, 7/10/15 at 107-108.) On 

March 20, 2013, the court again adjudicated the Children dependent. (DHS 

Exhibit 2.)

 

3 Mother gave birth to twins, one of whom did not survive. (Notes of 

testimony, 7/10/15 at 126.)

4

Father 2 and Mother appealed this determination at Pennsylvania Superior 

Court Docket Nos. 321 EDA 2013 and 322 EDA 2013, respectively. These 

appeals were ultimately dismissed on May 23, 2013 for failure to file a brief.

5 The Children are currently in kinship care. J.R.F. and Z.F. are placed 

together, separately from T.W.P., Jr., in a pre-adoptive home. However, 

testimony was presented that J.R.F. and Z.F.’s resource family plans on 

adopting T.W.P., Jr., as well. (Notes of testimony, 7/10/15 at 27-28, 34, 

167.)
J. S63014/16

- 4 -

Mother’s Family Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives included drug and 

alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, domestic violence counseling, 

and appropriate housing. (Notes of testimony, 8/5/14 at 19, 21.) She was 

additionally referred for a parenting capacity evaluation and a dual diagnosis 

assessment. (Id. at 21.)

In March of 2014, the case was transferred to Turning Points for 

Children, a Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”). (Notes of testimony, 

8/5/14 at 16; 7/10/15 at 12.) Prior to transfer, in March 2014, DHS 

changed the Children’s permanency goal with regard to the FSP to adoption. 

(Notes of testimony, 8/5/14 at 25-29, 43-45.)

The trial court held permanency review hearings in this matter on 

June 20, 2013, October 15, 2013, and January 14, 2014. Throughout these 

reviews, the trial court maintained the Children’s commitment, placement, 

and permanency goal.

On April 30, 2014, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b), and to change the Children’s permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351. The court then conducted combined termination and 

goal change hearings on August 5, 2014, July 10, 2015, and August 13, 

2015. Mother and Father 2 each testified on their own behalf. Father 1, 
J. S63014/16

- 5 -

who is incarcerated, did not appear, but was represented by counsel.6 

Additionally, the court heard from the following witnesses: Markey Mosley, 

former DHS social worker; Alimata Doumbia, case manager and supervisor, 

Turning Points for Children; Craig Minus, DHS social worker; Dr. Erica 

Williams, psychologist, Assessment & Treatment Alternatives, Inc., 

stipulated to be a specialist and expert in child and adolescent psychiatry;7

Devon Jacques, case manager, Turning Points for Children; 

Devonnae Grasty, visitation coach, Turning Points for Children; 

Cipriana Arias, permanency specialist, Turning Points for Children; and 

Christina Tavares, child advocate social worker.

On November 4, 2015, following the submission of written closing 

argument, the trial court entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to the Children and orders changing the permanency goal to 

adoption. New counsel was appointed for Mother for purposes of appeal on 

 

6

Father 1’s criminal abstract was admitted as DHS Exhibit 3. (See DHS 

Exhibit 3.) Counsel for Father 1 stipulated to DHS 3 and that Father 1 is 

“unable to care for [T.W.P., Jr.] for the foreseeable future.” (Notes of 

testimony, 8/13/15 at 27.) He further stipulated that the current CUA 

worker would testify to the lack of a current relationship between Father 1 

and T.W.P., Jr., and that it would not cause any irreparable harm if the 

relationship were to be severed. (Id. at 27-28.) As indicated, Father 1 has 

not appealed the termination of his parental rights and he is not a party to 

the present appeal.

7 Dr. Williams conducted a parenting evaluation as to Mother and issued a 

related report dated July 3, 2014, and marked DHS Exhibit 27. (Notes of 

testimony, 7/10/15 at 130. See DHS Exhibit 27.) She therefore offered 

testimony as to Mother only. (Notes of testimony, 7/10/15 at 128-155.)
J. S63014/16

- 6 -

November 12, 2015. Thereafter, on November 18, 2015, Mother, pro se, 

filed timely notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which 

this court consolidated sua sponte on December 18, 2015. Appointed 

counsel subsequently filed a brief on behalf of Mother. On appeal, Mother 

raises the following issues for review:

1. Judge had no authority to rule in said matter 

for he was recused/disqualified from these 

proceedings for his partiality and biasness [sic] 

against [Mother] in open court.

2. Judge [sic] ruling was in contradictory [sic] to 

statutory and constitutional law; violating due 

process rights of [Mother].

3. Judge have [sic] created an arbitrary situation 

by forcing the incompetent attorney of the 

Defenders Association that I asked to be taken 

off my case [and] he said no in open court.

Mother’s brief, at 2.8

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d 817, 

826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if 

the trial court made an error of law or abused its 

 

8

In the summary of argument and argument portions of her brief, Mother, 

through counsel, for the first time raises Sections 2511(a) and (b). (Id. at 

4-11.)
J. S63014/16

- 7 -

discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for 

an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, 

bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, 

however, should not be reversed merely because the 

record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to 

trial courts that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 
J. S63014/16

- 8 -

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

At the outset, we note that DHS argues that Mother has waived all 

arguments on appeal as she failed to include them in her concise statement 

of errors and failed to develop her argument through citation to pertinent 

legal authority.9 (DHS’s brief, at 17.) DHS contends that Mother waived the 

challenge to the trial court’s rulings pursuant to Section 2511(a) and (b) as 

they were not included in her concise statement of errors. (Id. at 17-18.) 

DHS further avers that Mother waived any argument with regard to those 

issues raised in her concise statement and questions presented as she 

“fail[ed] to develop or reference them in her Argument.” (Id. at 19.) As 

summarized:

Here, Appellee DHS is unable to address the issues 

identified in Mother’s statement of questions 

 

9 Counsel for the Children joins in DHS’s brief.
J. S63014/16

- 9 -

presented because the issues are not addressed in 

any form or fashion in her Argument. Accordingly, 

these issues are waived, and Mother’s appeal should 

be denied. Additionally, the two arguments that 

Mother raises for the first time in the Argument 

section of her brief are waived for the reason that 

the issues she raises (challenges to the trial court’s 

findings under Sections 2511(a) and (b) of the 

Adoption Act) are not included in her Rule 1925(b). 

These two issues are also waived as a result of 

Mother’s failure to list them in her Statement of 

Issues Presented. Accordingly, for the foregoing 

reasons, Mother’s appeal should be denied.

Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted).

We could find that Mother waived opposition to the trial court’s 

disposition regarding Sections 2511(a) and (b), as she failed to include them 

in her concise statement of errors. Krebs v. United Refining Company of 

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006) (stating that, a failure 

to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion of the 

brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) 

(stating, “Issues not raised in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance 

with this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).10 Nonetheless, pursuant to 

 

10 We do, however, find that, as Mother failed to develop any challenge 

and/or argument regarding those issues raised in her concise statement of 

errors and statement of questions involved in the argument portion of her 

brief, she waived any such argument. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 

339 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2011) (stating, “[W]here an appellate brief fails to 

provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails 

to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that 

claim is waived.”).
J. S63014/16

- 10 -

Commonwealth v. Laboy, 936 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. 2007) (finding a lack 

of waiver where the nature of a claim can be readily apprehended), we 

conduct a review of the termination of Mother’s parental rights. Significant 

to this determination, the trial court assessed the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511 (a) and (b). (Trial court opinion, 

3/22/16 at 12-16.) We, thus, examine the trial court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights as argued in her brief.

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). 

We have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, 

we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination 

pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in 

regard to a child may be terminated after a 

petition filed on any of the following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused 

the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and 

the conditions and causes of the 
J. S63014/16

- 11 -

incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first examine the court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights 

under Section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(2), the following three 

elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the 

child to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 
J. S63014/16

- 12 -

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 

(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002).

Mother argues that the trial court erred as grounds for termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) were not supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. (Mother’s brief, at 5.) Mother contends that the evidence 

demonstrates her attempt at establishing and maintaining a relationship with 

the Children and engaging in efforts to remedy the causes for the Children’s 

placement. (Id. at 5-6.) “Although her children were not in her care, 

[M]other through her efforts to remain close to her children, exhibited that 

she was eradicating any repeated neglect, that caused them to be placed in 

foster care.” (Id. at 6.) Mother further maintains that she “has 

demonstrated her commitment remedy [sic] the situation that brought her 

children into DHS custody. Furthermore, DHS has not proved that she could 

not remedy such conditions.” (Id.) 

In finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), as 

well as (a)(5) and (a)(8), the trial court stated:

This Court found clear and convincing evidence 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

Sections 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8). The evidence 

supports this Court’s finding that Mother lacked the 

capacity to provide permanency and safety for the 

Children. Mother was active drug user who was in 

and out of treatment for 2-3 years. Mother failed to 

address or even recognize that she was in a 
J. S63014/16

- 13 -

relationship with severe domestic violence which 

threatened the Children’s safety. Additionally, 

Mother was inconsistent with mental health 

treatment. She was unemployed and living in a 

home with no electricity. Finally, the results of a 

Parenting Capacity Evaluation concluded that Mother 

was out of touch with reality and was unable to 

provide safety and permanency required to parent 

the Children. Mother took no accountability for her 

behavior and blamed her mother for the reason that 

her Children were in care. In addition, . . . the Court 

found it was in the Children’s best interests to 

terminate Mother’s rights because the Children, were 

doing well in their pre-adoptive homes, under the 

care of foster parents who were meeting all of their 

needs.

Trial court opinion, 3/22/15, at 14-15. Upon review, we agree.

A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2) and substantiates the conclusion that 

Mother’s repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has 

caused the Children to be without essential parental control or subsistence 

necessary for their physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of 

M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272. Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this 

situation. See id. As the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the 

record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law 

or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decrees with regard to 

Section 2511(a)(2). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

We next determine whether termination was proper under 

Section 2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has 

stated as follows:
J. S63014/16

- 14 -

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed 

below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption 

of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal 

citations omitted). 

As further recognized in T.S.M.:

[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether 

termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a 

child who has a strong but unhealthy bond to his 

biological parent, especially considering the 
J. S63014/16

- 15 -

existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive 

family. As with dependency determinations, we 

emphasize that the law regarding termination of 

parental rights should not be applied mechanically 

but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children 

involved. See, e.g., R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190 (holding 

that statutory criteria of whether child has been in 

care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two months 

should not be viewed as a “litmus test” but rather as 

merely one of many factors in considering goal 

change). Obviously, attention must be paid to the 

pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s 

bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is 

unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against 

the damage that bond may cause if left intact. 

Similarly, while termination of parental rights 

generally should not be granted unless adoptive 

parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and 

loving home, termination may be necessary for the 

child's needs and welfare in cases where the child’s 

parental bond is impeding the search and placement 

with a permanent adoptive home.

71 A.3d at 268-269.

Mother argues that the court failed to consider evidence of the 

continuing bond between her and the Children and her attempts to comply 

with the objectives set forth for her reunification with the Children. 

(Mother’s brief, at 7-11.) Mother avers that “there has not been adequate 

consideration of the emotional needs of the children because mother 

continued to maintain a bond with her children while she was attempting to 

comply with DHS objectives, as her children remained in placement.” (Id.

at 10.)
J. S63014/16

- 16 -

This court finds that Mother’s argument regarding Section 2511(b) 

lacks merit. Again, upon review, as the trial court’s factual findings are 

supported by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result 

of an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s 

decrees with regard to Section 2511(b). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 

(Pa. 2013). We affirm the trial court’s decrees with regard to 

Section 2511(b) on the basis of the discussion in the trial court opinion. 

(Trial court opinion, 3/22/15, at 15-16.)

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decrees and orders of the trial 

court terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing the Children’s 

permanency goal.

Decrees and orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2016